2
25
74
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1518/28905/LMellefontGJ240907v1.2.pdf
c3c68519d05f9fbf29d812d6cddee532
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Mellefont, Gilbert John
G J Mellefont
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-06-17
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Mellefont, GJ
Description
An account of the resource
Seven items. The collection concerns Gilbert John Mellefont (b. 1924), and contains his log book and photographs. He flew operations as an air gunner with 50 Squadron.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Trevor Spark the donor] and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
G J Mellefont’s flying log book for navigator’s air bomber air gunner’s flight engineers
Description
An account of the resource
Flying log book for navigator’s air bomber air gunner’s flight engineers for G J Mellefont, air gunner, covering the period from 25 February 1944 to 10 September 1946. Detailing his flying training and operations flown. He was stationed at RAF Andreas, RAF Husbands Bosworth, RAF Market Harborough, RAF Scampton, RAF Wigsley, RAF Syerston and RAF Skellingthorpe. Aircraft flown in were Anson, Wellington, Stirling, Lancaster and Dakota. He flew a total of 29 operations with 50 Squadron, 5 daylight and 24 night. Targets were Flushing, Dusseldorf, Gravenhorst, Harburg, Dortmund-Ems Canal, Munich, Heilbronn, Gdynia, Politz, Houffalize, Royan, Merseburg, Karlsruhe, Dresden, Bohlen, Mitteland Canal, Ladbergen, Harburg and Bremen. His pilot on operations was Flight Lieutenant Jones.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944
1945
1946
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LMellefontGJ240907v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Belgium--Houffalize
England--Leicestershire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
France--Royan
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Harburg (Landkreis)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Leipzig Region
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Munich
Great Britain Miscellaneous Island Dependencies--Isle of Man
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1945
1946
1944-10-07
1944-10-11
1944-11-02
1944-11-03
1944-11-06
1944-11-07
1944-11-11
1944-11-12
1944-11-16
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-04
1944-12-05
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1944-12-19
1944-12-21
1944-12-22
1944-12-30
1944-12-31
1945-01-01
1945-01-02
1945-01-04
1945-01-05
1945-01-07
1945-01-08
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-19
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-02-22
1945-02-24
1945-03-05
1945-03-06
1945-03-07
1945-03-08
1945-03-20
1945-03-21
1945-03-22
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
14 OTU
1654 HCU
50 Squadron
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
C-47
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Lancaster Mk 1
Lancaster Mk 3
Operational Training Unit
RAF Andreas
RAF Husbands Bosworth
RAF Market Harborough
RAF Scampton
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF Syerston
RAF Wigsley
Stirling
strafing
training
Wellington
Window
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1505/28878/LDaviesLA1581024v1.1.pdf
5dc683c3518902902e9b933aa91a9a29
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Davies, Leslie and Jack
Leslie Alfred Davies
L A Davies
John Richard Davies
J R Davies
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-04-28
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Davies, LA-JR
Description
An account of the resource
49 items. Collection concerns Leslie Alfred Davies (1922-1996, 1581024 Royal Air Force) and his brother John Richard Davies ( - 1944, 1580941). Leslie served as a Lancaster navigator on of 50 Squadron completing his tour of 30 operations in March 1945. John served a Lancaster bomb aimer on 166 Squadron He was killed in action 3 August 1944. Collection consists of Leslie's crew's individual logbooks and biographies, operational histories, photographs of people, aircraft and a grave, documents and correspondence. <br /><br />The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Murray Davies and catalogued by Nigel Huckins. <br /><br />Additional information on John Richard Davies is available via the <a href="https://losses.internationalbcc.co.uk/loss/105795/">IBCC Losses Database.</a>
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Leslie Davies observer’s and air gunner’s flying log book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LDaviesLA1581024v1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
Observer’s and air gunner’s flying log book for L A Davies, navigator, covering the period from 4 August 1943 to 16 April 1945 and from 26 September 1948 to 13 June 1953 with no. 5 reserve flying school. He was stationed at RAF Port Alfred, RAF Llandwrog, RAF Husbands Bosworth, RAF Market Harborough, RAF Wigsley, RAF Syerston, RAF Skellingthorpe and RAF Castle Bromwich. Aircraft flown in were Anson, Wellington, Stirling, and Lancaster. His pilot on operations was Flying Officer Jones. He flew a total of 30 operations with 50 Squadron, 5 daylight and 25 night. Targets were Flushing, Nuremburg, Dusseldorf, Gravenhorst, Harburg, Duren, Dortmund-Ems Canal, Munich, Heilbronn, Gdynia, Politz, Houffalize, Mittelland Canal, Royan, Merseburg, Karlsruhe, Dresden, Bohlen, Ladbergen and Bremen.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Cara Walmsley
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Poland
South Africa
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Belgium--Houffalize
England--Leicestershire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--West Midlands
France--Royan
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Harburg (Landkreis)
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Leipzig Region
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nuremberg
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
South Africa--Port Alfred
Wales--Gwynedd
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1944-10-07
1944-10-11
1944-10-19
1944-10-20
1944-11-02
1944-11-03
1944-11-06
1944-11-07
1944-11-11
1944-11-12
1944-11-16
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-04
1944-12-05
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1944-12-19
1944-12-21
1944-12-22
1944-12-30
1944-12-31
1945-01-01
1945-01-02
1945-01-04
1945-01-05
1945-01-07
1945-01-08
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-19
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-02-22
1945-02-24
1945-03-05
1945-03-06
1945-03-07
1945-03-08
1945-03-20
1945-03-21
1945-03-22
14 OTU
1654 HCU
50 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
Air Observers School
aircrew
Anson
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Lancaster Mk 1
Lancaster Mk 3
navigator
Operational Training Unit
RAF Castle Bromwich
RAF Husbands Bosworth
RAF Llandwrog
RAF Market Harborough
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF Syerston
RAF Wigsley
Stirling
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1505/28863/BDaviesMJDaviesLAv1.1.pdf
763f7838c00c66324015cd1da0a86c44
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Davies, Leslie and Jack
Leslie Alfred Davies
L A Davies
John Richard Davies
J R Davies
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-04-28
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Davies, LA-JR
Description
An account of the resource
49 items. Collection concerns Leslie Alfred Davies (1922-1996, 1581024 Royal Air Force) and his brother John Richard Davies ( - 1944, 1580941). Leslie served as a Lancaster navigator on of 50 Squadron completing his tour of 30 operations in March 1945. John served a Lancaster bomb aimer on 166 Squadron He was killed in action 3 August 1944. Collection consists of Leslie's crew's individual logbooks and biographies, operational histories, photographs of people, aircraft and a grave, documents and correspondence. <br /><br />The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Murray Davies and catalogued by Nigel Huckins. <br /><br />Additional information on John Richard Davies is available via the <a href="https://losses.internationalbcc.co.uk/loss/105795/">IBCC Losses Database.</a>
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Leslie Alfred Davies and crew
Description
An account of the resource
Biographies of navigator Leslie Davies and all his crew. Includes photographs of Lancaster, 50 Squadron, his crew, Leslie Davies himself, training course photographs. Covers his tour from 7 October 1944 to 22 March 1945. List his crew and aircraft used on operations. Followed by biography of Leslie Alfred Davies early life, training and post tour marriage. Continues with biography of pilot Frederick David Jones including early life, training in Canada, operations and later life. Followed by biographies of Norman Parrinder, tail gunner; George Jarmy, bomb aimer; Gilbert John Mellefont, mid-upper gunner; Ernest Marrs, wireless operator and Robert M Smith, flight engineer. Continues with description of the tour including map with targets and descriptions of many of their 30 operations before concluding comments on groundcrew and bomber command in general. Contains many photographs including targets, aircraft, one of battleship SMS Schleswig-Holstein, several of remains of Lancaster bombers, groundcrew at work, bombs, anti-aircraft guns and the bomber command memorial in Green Park London.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
M J Davies
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Eighty-two page document
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
BDaviesMJDaviesLAv1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Civilian
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-10-07
1945-03-22
1943-08-02
1945-02-16
1945-01-14
1944-11-21
1944-09-27
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1944-10-07
1944-10-11
1944-10-19
1944-11-02
1944-11-06
1944-11-11
1944-11-16
1944-11-21
1944-11-26
1944-12-04
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1944-12-21
1945-01-01
1945-01-04
1945-01-05
1945-01-07
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-02-02
1945-02-08
1945-02-13
1945-02-19
1945-02-21
1945-02-24
1945-03-05
1945-03-20
1945-03-22
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
South Africa
South Africa--Port Alfred
Wales--Gwynedd
England--Leicestershire
Canada
New Brunswick--Moncton
United States
Oklahoma
Oklahoma--Ponca City
Great Britain Miscellaneous Island Dependencies--Isle of Man
France
Ontario--St. Thomas
England--Lancashire
England--Barrow-in-Furness
England--Herefordshire
Wales--Vale of Glamorgan
Netherlands
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Germany
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Munich
Germany--Heilbronn
Poland
Poland--Gdynia
Scotland--Aberdeenshire
Belgium
Belgium--Houffalize
France--Royan
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Bremen
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Ontario
New Brunswick
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
10 Squadron
14 OTU
1654 HCU
50 Squadron
6 BFTS
Advanced Flying Unit
aerial photograph
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
anti-aircraft fire
Bolingbroke
bomb aimer
bomb trolley
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
Bombing of Trossy St Maximin (3 August 1944)
British Flying Training School Program
C-47
crash
Distinguished Flying Cross
FIDO
flight engineer
Flying Training School
George VI, King of Great Britain (1895-1952)
ground crew
Halifax
Heavy Conversion Unit
incendiary device
Ju 88
killed in action
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Lancaster Mk 1
Me 262
memorial
military service conditions
missing in action
Mosquito
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
petrol bowser
pilot
RAF Banff
RAF Barrow in Furness
RAF Husbands Bosworth
RAF Llandwrog
RAF Madley
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF St Athan
RAF Syerston
RAF Wigsley
reconnaissance photograph
service vehicle
Stirling
target indicator
training
V-1
V-weapon
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1505/28860/SDaviesLA1581024v10009.2.pdf
a2e0bbb31054fe7d0db6a7ef6c0fd7d9
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Davies, Leslie and Jack
Leslie Alfred Davies
L A Davies
John Richard Davies
J R Davies
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-04-28
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Davies, LA-JR
Description
An account of the resource
49 items. Collection concerns Leslie Alfred Davies (1922-1996, 1581024 Royal Air Force) and his brother John Richard Davies ( - 1944, 1580941). Leslie served as a Lancaster navigator on of 50 Squadron completing his tour of 30 operations in March 1945. John served a Lancaster bomb aimer on 166 Squadron He was killed in action 3 August 1944. Collection consists of Leslie's crew's individual logbooks and biographies, operational histories, photographs of people, aircraft and a grave, documents and correspondence. <br /><br />The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Murray Davies and catalogued by Nigel Huckins. <br /><br />Additional information on John Richard Davies is available via the <a href="https://losses.internationalbcc.co.uk/loss/105795/">IBCC Losses Database.</a>
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
SDaviesLA1581024v10009
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
Description
An account of the resource
Flying log book for navigator’s air bomber air gunner’s flight engineers for G J Mellafont, air gunner, covering the period from 25 February 1944 to 10 September 1946. Detailing his flying training and operations flown. He was stationed at RAF Andreas, RAF Husbands Bosworth, RAF Market Harborough, RAF Scampton, RAF Wigsley, RAF Syerston and RAF Skellingthorpe. Aircraft flown in were Anson, Wellington, Stirling, Lancaster and Dakota. He flew a total of 29 operations with 50 Squadron, 5 daylight and 24 night. Targets were Flushing, Dusseldorf, Gravenhorst, Harburg, Dortmund-Ems Canal, Munich, Heilbronn, Gdynia, Politz, Houffalize, Royan, Merseburg, Karlsruhe, Dresden, Bohlen, Mitteland Canal, Ladbergen, Harburg and Bremen. His pilot on operations was Flight Lieutenant Jones.<br /><br /> This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Belgium--Houffalize
England--Leicestershire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
France--Royan
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Harburg (Landkreis)
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Leipzig Region
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Munich
Great Britain Miscellaneous Island Dependencies--Isle of Man
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1945
1946
1944-10-07
1944-10-11
1944-11-02
1944-11-03
1944-11-06
1944-11-07
1944-11-11
1944-11-12
1944-11-16
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-04
1944-12-05
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1944-12-19
1944-12-21
1944-12-22
1944-12-30
1944-12-31
1945-01-01
1945-01-02
1945-01-04
1945-01-05
1945-01-07
1945-01-08
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-19
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-02-22
1945-02-24
1945-03-05
1945-03-06
1945-03-07
1945-03-08
1945-03-20
1945-03-21
1945-03-22
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Title
A name given to the resource
G J Mellefont air gunner log book
14 OTU
50 Squadron
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
C-47
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Operational Training Unit
RAF Andreas
RAF Husbands Bosworth
RAF Market Harborough
RAF Scampton
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF Syerston
RAF Wigsley
Stirling
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1505/28859/SDaviesLA1581024v10008.2.pdf
ed8bf40534d07483bcb8ccc0be856f7f
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Davies, Leslie and Jack
Leslie Alfred Davies
L A Davies
John Richard Davies
J R Davies
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-04-28
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Davies, LA-JR
Description
An account of the resource
49 items. Collection concerns Leslie Alfred Davies (1922-1996, 1581024 Royal Air Force) and his brother John Richard Davies ( - 1944, 1580941). Leslie served as a Lancaster navigator on of 50 Squadron completing his tour of 30 operations in March 1945. John served a Lancaster bomb aimer on 166 Squadron He was killed in action 3 August 1944. Collection consists of Leslie's crew's individual logbooks and biographies, operational histories, photographs of people, aircraft and a grave, documents and correspondence. <br /><br />The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Murray Davies and catalogued by Nigel Huckins. <br /><br />Additional information on John Richard Davies is available via the <a href="https://losses.internationalbcc.co.uk/loss/105795/">IBCC Losses Database.</a>
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Sergeant E Marrs air gunner/wireless operator's flying log book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
SDaviesLA1581024v10008
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
Flying log book for E Marrs, wireless operator, covering the period from 12 September 1943 to 10 September 1946. Detailing his flying training, operations flown and post war flying with 10 Squadron. He was stationed at RAF Barrow, RAF Madley, RAF Mona, RAF Market Harborough, RAF Wigsley, RAF Syerston, RAF Skellingthorpe and RAF Broadwell and India. Aircraft flown in were Dominie, Proctor, Anson, Wellington, Stirling, Lancaster, Halifax, and Dakota. He flew a total of 30 operation with 50 Squadron, 5 daylight and 25 night. Targets were Bremen, Flushing, Nuremberg, Dusseldorf, Mitteland Canal, Harburg, Duren, Dortmund-Ems Canal, Munich, Heilbronn, Gdynia, Politz, Houffalize, Royan, Merseburg, Karlsruhe, Dresden, and Bohlen. His pilot on operations was Flight Lieutenant Jones. <br /><br />This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1945
1946
1944-10-07
1944-10-11
1944-10-19
1944-10-20
1944-11-02
1944-11-03
1944-11-06
1944-11-07
1944-11-11
1944-11-12
1944-11-16
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-04
1944-12-05
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1944-12-19
1944-12-21
1944-12-22
1944-12-30
1944-12-31
1945-01-01
1945-01-02
1945-01-04
1945-01-05
1945-01-07
1945-01-08
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-19
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-02-22
1945-02-24
1945-03-05
1945-03-06
1945-03-07
1945-03-08
1945-03-20
1945-03-21
1945-03-22
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Belgium--Houffalize
England--Cumbria
England--Herefordshire
England--Leicestershire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Oxfordshire
France--Royan
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Harburg (Landkreis)
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Leipzig Region
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nuremberg
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Wales--Anglesey
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
10 Squadron
14 OTU
1654 HCU
4 Group
5 Group
50 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
C-47
Dominie
Halifax
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Lancaster Mk 1
Lancaster Mk 3
Operational Training Unit
Proctor
RAF Barrow in Furness
RAF Madley
RAF Market Harborough
RAF Mona
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF Syerston
RAF Wigsley
Stirling
training
Wellington
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1505/28858/SDaviesLA1581024v10007.2.pdf
efdd956e8f0ca559504f18f9ad4afe07
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Davies, Leslie and Jack
Leslie Alfred Davies
L A Davies
John Richard Davies
J R Davies
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-04-28
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Davies, LA-JR
Description
An account of the resource
49 items. Collection concerns Leslie Alfred Davies (1922-1996, 1581024 Royal Air Force) and his brother John Richard Davies ( - 1944, 1580941). Leslie served as a Lancaster navigator on of 50 Squadron completing his tour of 30 operations in March 1945. John served a Lancaster bomb aimer on 166 Squadron He was killed in action 3 August 1944. Collection consists of Leslie's crew's individual logbooks and biographies, operational histories, photographs of people, aircraft and a grave, documents and correspondence. <br /><br />The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Murray Davies and catalogued by Nigel Huckins. <br /><br />Additional information on John Richard Davies is available via the <a href="https://losses.internationalbcc.co.uk/loss/105795/">IBCC Losses Database.</a>
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Flight Sergeant G Jarmy's bomb aimer log book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
SDaviesLA1581024v10007
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
Flying log book for G Jarmey, bomb aimer, covering the period from 29 August 1943 to 8 July 1945. Detailing his flying training, operations flown and instructor duties. He was stationed at RCAF Fingal, RCAF London, RAF Moreton Valance, RAF Husbands Bosworth, RAF Wigsley, RAF Syerston, RAF Skellingthorpe and RAF Upper Heyford. Aircraft flown in were Anson, Bolingbroke, Wellington, Stirling, Lancaster and Oxford. He flew a total of 32 operations with 50 Squadron, 6 daylight and 26 night. Targets were Wilhelmshaven, Bremen, Flushing, Nuremberg, Dusseldorf, Mitteland Canal, Harburg, Duren, Dortmund-Ems Canal, Munich, Heilbronn, Gdynia, Politz, Houffalize, Royan, Merseburg, Karlsruhe, Dresden, and Bohlen. His pilot on operations was Flight Lieutenant Jones. This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1945
1944-10-05
1944-10-06
1944-10-07
1944-10-11
1944-10-19
1944-10-20
1944-11-02
1944-11-03
1944-11-06
1944-11-07
1944-11-11
1944-11-12
1944-11-16
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-04
1944-12-05
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1944-12-19
1944-12-21
1944-12-22
1944-12-30
1944-12-31
1945-01-01
1945-01-02
1945-01-04
1945-01-05
1945-01-07
1945-01-08
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-19
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-02-22
1945-02-24
1945-03-05
1945-03-06
1945-03-07
1945-03-08
1945-03-20
1945-03-21
1945-03-22
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
Canada
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Belgium--Houffalize
England--Gloucestershire
England--Leicestershire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Oxfordshire
France--Royan
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Harburg (Landkreis)
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Leipzig Region
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Ontario--London
Ontario--Toronto Region
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Ontario
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Fighter Command
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
14 OTU
16 OTU
1654 HCU
50 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
Air Observers School
aircrew
Anson
Bolingbroke
bomb aimer
bombing
Bombing and Gunnery School
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
RAF Husbands Bosworth
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF Syerston
RAF Upper Heyford
RAF Wigsley
RCAF Fingal
Stirling
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1505/28856/SDaviesLA1581024v10004.2.pdf
b3df53ab0cf582d58504080a267c232d
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Davies, Leslie and Jack
Leslie Alfred Davies
L A Davies
John Richard Davies
J R Davies
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-04-28
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Davies, LA-JR
Description
An account of the resource
49 items. Collection concerns Leslie Alfred Davies (1922-1996, 1581024 Royal Air Force) and his brother John Richard Davies ( - 1944, 1580941). Leslie served as a Lancaster navigator on of 50 Squadron completing his tour of 30 operations in March 1945. John served a Lancaster bomb aimer on 166 Squadron He was killed in action 3 August 1944. Collection consists of Leslie's crew's individual logbooks and biographies, operational histories, photographs of people, aircraft and a grave, documents and correspondence. <br /><br />The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Murray Davies and catalogued by Nigel Huckins. <br /><br />Additional information on John Richard Davies is available via the <a href="https://losses.internationalbcc.co.uk/loss/105795/">IBCC Losses Database.</a>
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Robert Smith flying log book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
SDaviesLA1581024v10004
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
Flying log book for R M Smith, flight engineer, covering the period from August 1944 to 16 November 1945. Detailing his flying training and operations flown. He was stationed at RAF St Athan, RAF Wigsley, RAF Syerston and RAF Skellingthorpe. Aircraft flown in were Stirling, Lancaster, and Oxford. He flew a total of 30 operations with 50 Squadron. 5 daylight and 25 night. Targets were Flushing, Nuremberg, Dusseldorf, Harburg, Dortmund-Ems Canal, Duren, Munich, Heilbronn, Gdynia, Politz, Houffalize. Royan, Merseburg, Karlsruhe, Dresden, Bohlen, Mitteland Canal and Bremen. His pilot on operations was Flight Lieutenant Jones. This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1945
1944-10-07
1944-10-11
1944-10-17
1944-10-18
1944-11-02
1944-11-03
1944-11-06
1944-11-07
1944-11-11
1944-11-12
1944-11-16
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-04
1944-12-05
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1944-12-19
1944-12-21
1944-12-22
1944-12-30
1944-12-31
1945-01-01
1945-01-02
1945-01-04
1945-01-05
1945-01-07
1945-01-08
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-19
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-02-22
1945-02-24
1945-03-05
1945-03-06
1945-03-07
1945-03-08
1945-03-10
1945-03-11
1945-03-22
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Belgium--Houffalize
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
France--Royan
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Harburg (Landkreis)
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Leipzig Region
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nuremberg
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Wales--Vale of Glamorgan
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
1654 HCU
50 Squadron
aircrew
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
flight engineer
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Oxford
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF St Athan
RAF Syerston
RAF Wigsley
Stirling
training
Window
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/332/28218/LSpenceMA437564v1.2.pdf
7eb1e7e133d289e24205761a1e4a9a8d
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Spence, Max
Maxwell Alexander Spence
Maxwell A Spence
Maxwell Spence
M A Spence
M Spence
Description
An account of the resource
Three items. An oral history interview with Maxwell Alexander "Max" Spence (437564 Royal Australian Air Force), his log book and a photograph. He flew operations as a navigator with 460 Squadron.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Max Spence and catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-10-05
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Spence, MA
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Max Spence's flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
Navigator’s flying log book for L Spence covering the period from 25 February 1944 to 12 April 1945. Detailing his flying training and operations flown. He was stationed at RCAF Edmonton (2 AOS), RAF West Freugh (4 OAFU), RAF Hixon (30 OTU), RAF Lindholme (1656 HCU), 460 Squadron (RAF Binbrook). Aircraft flown in were Anson, Wellington and Lancaster. He flew a total of 18 night-time operations with 460 Squadron, targets were Mannheim, Wiesbaden, Politz, Dresden, Chemnitz, Dortmund, Duisburg, Pforzheim, Cologne, Nuremburg, Hanau, Bralichstrasse, mining, Total 19 operations. His pilot on operations was Pilot Officer Harrison. The book has been scribbled in with coloured crayons. This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Terry Hancock
Cara Walmsley
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LSpenceMA437564v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Canada
Great Britain
Poland
Alberta--Edmonton
England--Staffordshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Yorkshire
Germany--Chemnitz
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Hanau
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Pforzheim
Germany--Wiesbaden
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Scotland--Prestwick
Germany--Nuremberg
Alberta
Germany
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1945
1945-02-01
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-12
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-15
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-02-22
1945-02-23
1945-02-24
1945-03-01
1945-03-02
1945-03-05
1945-03-06
1945-03-15
1945-03-16
1945-03-17
1945-03-18
1945-03-22
1945-03-23
1945-03-26
1945-04-04
1945-04-05
1945-04-09
1945-04-10
1656 HCU
30 OTU
460 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
Air Observers School
aircrew
Anson
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
Operational Training Unit
RAF Binbrook
RAF Hixon
RAF Lindholme
RAF West Freugh
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/194/27209/MAdamsHG424504-170215-01.2.pdf
1081940cd3d5fc25972f96a05b4902d4
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Adams, Herbert
Herbert Adams
H Adams
Herbert G Adams
Description
An account of the resource
88 items. Collection concerns Herbert George Adams DFC, Legion d'Honour (b. 1924, 424509 Royal Australian Air Force). He flew operations as a navigator with 467 Squadron. Collection contains an oral history interview, photographs of people and places, several memoirs about his training and bombing operations, letters to his family, his flying logbook and notes on navigation.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Herbert Adams and catalogued by Nigel Huckins and Trevor Hardcastle.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-02-15
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Adams, HG
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[inserted] (There is some duplication of notes for Ops [symbol] 1 to [symbol] 14 as I wrote something at different times (years apart.)) [/inserted]
[inserted] [symbol] Soon after we feathered that engine over “A” Flight commander flew up on our wing top & feathered 3 engines & kept up with us! He was giving us some assurance that a lightly loaded Lancaster could fly level (for a while) on 1 engine … reassurance for a new crew [/inserted]
My navigation Logs & Charts of our operations with 467 (RAAF) Squadron at Waddington, near Lincoln, from 10.9.44 to 16.1.45, with extracts from a publication giving some details of every operation by 467 & 463 Squadrons from 10.9.44 to 25.4.45.
[circled 1] [underlined] LE HAVRE, 10.9.44 [/underlined] 21 from 467, 20 from 463 as part of 992 bombers on 8 different German strong points outside of Le Havre. The targets were accurately marked and bombed, with no losses from Waddington. We took off at 1522, flew to Syerston (nearby), then did a radius of action on a track of 260oT so as to be back at Syerston at 1604 at 8000’. The winds were about what was forecast, 025/15; we bombed at 1723 at 12100’, bomb load was 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500 lb H.E. Two minutes after we dropped our bombs our Port Outer motor stopped (stray AA – fire?), we feathered the prop & flew home OK on 3 engines, airborne for 3h 55 min.
[symbol] On 11.9.44, 218 bombers from 5 Group attacked the German positions still holding out at Le Havre, with no losses. 2 British divisions were attacking Le Havre & the German garrison surrendered a few hours after the raid. The British wished to capture the port intact, but the German garrison had laid mines, and blown up most of the docks, and so it was several weeks before the port could be used.
DAMSTADT, 11.9.44. 226 Lancasters from 5 Group bombed at night, losing 1 crew (all K.I.A.) from 463 Sqdn. Our pilot, Peter Gray-Buchanan, did his “Second Dickie” on this raid.
[circled 2] [underlined] STUTTGART, 12.9.44. [/underlined] 20 from 467, 14 from 463, of 204 from [underlined] 5 Group [/underlined]. (On the same night 378 Lancasters bombed Frankfurt with success.) Post-war, a German expert – Heinz Bardau – wrote that the northern & western parts of Stuttgart city were erased in this concentrated attack… a [underlined] fire-storm resulted [/underlined], with 1171 people killed, the city’s highest fatality figure for the war.
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STUTTGART (Con’t)
467 Sqdn lost 2 crews (F/L D. Brown, 5 KIA, 2 POW, F/O Bright. 5 KIA, 2 POW.)
We took off at 1916 & set course at 1919, staying at 2500’ until 2137 when we began climbing, to 16000’ by 2233. Our last GEE fix was at 2232 and the next (after bombing OK at 2316) at 0022… so nearly 2 hours of Dead Reckoning with some map reading. (The Germans jammed our GEE receiver so that the screen was filled with “Grass”). The actual winds were about as forecast 160/15 at the target. Our bomb load was 1 x 4000 lb “cookie” & 13 J clusters (of incendiaries). Two minutes after bombing our gunners saw a fighter (they think a Do217) at about 400 yards, so we began to “corkscrew”. We continued corkscrewing until 2329, seeing one plane (unidentified) at about 50 yards! and another with a light on (!). We were airborne for 6h 51 min.
[circled 3] [underlined] BOULOGNE. 17.9.44. [/underlined] We took off at 0806 & flew to Syerston, then did a Radius of Action (on track of 260oT) to return to Syerston at 0837 at 6000’, where we did a circuit to port to lose height & get into formation at 3000! We had an uneventual [sic] trip to the target where we bombed at 8100’, dropping 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500 lb. We were airborne for 3h 26 min. 19 Lancs from each of 467 & 463 joined 762 bombers dropping more than 3000 tons of H.E. bombs on German positions around Bologne in preparation for an attack by Allied troops. The German garrison surrendered soon after the raid.
[circled 4] [underlined] BREMERHAVEN 18.9.44. [/underlined] 19 Lancs from each of 467 & 463 were part of a total of [underlined] 206 from 5 Group [/underlined], with no losses from Waddington. The post-war assessors found that this 5-Group attack, with less than 900 tons of bombs, started a [underlined] fire-storm [/underlined] which destroyed 2750 buildings in the main port area, & that [underlined] 30000 [/underlined] people were made homeless & had to live in the open until evacuated several days later.
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Extracts from a publication giving some details of every wartime operation by 467 & 463 Squadrons (loaned by Sam Nelson) RED = Daylight. BLACK = Night BLUE = We weren’t on it.
[circled 1] 10-9-44 LE HAVRE 21 from 467, 20 from 463 as part of 992 bomber raid on 8 different German strongpoints outside Le Havre. The targets were accurately marked and bombed. No losses.
D. 3h 55m. 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500. 12000’ (We lost P.O. engine during bomb-run).
Day 11-9-44. LE HAVRE. 218 bombers from 5 Group attacked German positions still holding out at Le Havre. Two British divisions were now attacking Le Havre and the German garrison surrendered a few hours later. The British wished to capture the port intact as a supply port for the armies, but the German garrison had proved spiteful – they had mined and blown up most of the docks, and it was a number of weeks before the port could be used.
[inserted] Night [/inserted] 11-9-44 DAMSTADT. 226 Lancasters of 5 Group.
Our pilot (Peter Gray-Buchanan) did his “second dickie”. 1 A/C from 463 lost (7 KIA).
[circled 2] 12-9-44 STUTTGART. 20 of 467, 14 of 463, of 204 from 5 Group. (Same night 378 Lancasters on Frankfurt … with success.) Post war, a German expert, Heinz Bardau, wrote that the Northern + Western parts of the city were erased in this concentrated attack, & that a fire-storm resulted … 1171 people killed. Stuttgart’s highest fatality figure for the war. 467 lost 2 crews: F/L D. Brown .. 5 KIA, 2 POW; F/O Bright … 5 KIA, 2 POW.
F 6h 50m 1 x 4000 + 13 J clusters. 15750’
[circled 3] 17-9-44. BOULOGNE. 19 from 467, 19 from 463, of 762 bombers dropping more than 3000 tons of H.E. bombs on German positions around Boulogne in preparation for an attack by Allied troops. The German garrison
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surrendered soon afterwards.
D. 3h 25 m. 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500. 8100’
[circled 4] 18-9-44 BREMERHAVEN. 19 of 467, 19 of 463, of 206 from 5-Group. No losses from Waddington. The post-war assessors found that this 5-Group attack, with less than 900 tons of bombs, started a fire-storm which destroyed 2750 buildings in the main port area, & that 30000 people were made homeless & lived in the open until evacuated several days later.
D 4h 45m. 18 cans (incendiaries – 150 per can). 15250’
[circled 5] [inserted] 19-9-44 [/inserted] RHEYDT/MUNCHEN-GLADBACH. 19 of 467, 16 of 463, of 227 Lancasters of 5-Group bombing the twin towns. German reports state that only between 267 and 271 people were killed. 467 lost one Lanc, crashing on returning (4 KIA, 1 POW, 2 evaded, including pilot, F/O Findlay) Master Bomber was W/C Guy Gibson, VC, DSO, DFC (of Dambusters fame) flying a Mosquito … which crashed in flames near the Dutch coast. He and his navigator (S/L J.N. Warwick, DFC) were killed and buried at Steenbergen-en-Kriesland. (Orbited target for 17mm – marking delay). 11000’
D 5h 5m 1 x 2000 + 12 J clusters.
[circled 6] 23-9-44 DORTMUND-EMS CANAL (Aqueduct). 19 of 467, 17 of 463, of 136 Lancs. from 5-Group mounting a special attack on the aqueduct at Ladbergen on the Dortmund-Ems Canal. The canal was breached, but losses were heavy 10% of the force were lost. 467 lost F/O G.A. Brown and crew. (5 KIA. 2 POW). (Orbited target losing height for 15 min extra there. Meant to bomb 14000’ but 6400’ due to cloud)
C 5h 25m 14 x 1000
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[inserted] On the unused back of one of the logsheets are some sketches (rough) of GEE BOX & the kind of blips, scales etc, displayed [/inserted]
(BREMERHAVEN, Con’t).
We took off at 1832, orbited base until 1844, when we set course at 2000’. At 1915 we needed to alter course southwards to regain our track as the winds were from about 085oT rather than 060oT (forecast). Our last GEE fix (before jamming) was on track near turning point A, and we’d climbed to 15000’, from which height we bombed at 2103. Our bomb load was 18 cans of incendiaries. The Lancaster bomb-bay, (quite long & wide, under the floor) had 14 ‘hooks’, so to use 18 cans, 3 of the hooks had a framework added to hold 3 cans side by side. The bomb-aimer could select all 14 hooks to release independently, usually at fairly short time intervals to produce a “stick” of bombs usefully spread. Each can of incendiaries released 150 small bombs about 5 cm diameter & about 40 cm long, each capable of starting a fire.
It was an easy trip for navigation, with GEE only jammed for about 1/2 hr before & after the target. We were airborne for 4h 46 min.
[circled 5] [underlined] RHEYDT/MUNCHEN-GLADBACH. 19.9.44 [/underlined] 19 Lancs from 467, & 16 from 463 were part of a total of 227 from 5 Group bombing the twin-towns. German reports state that only between 267 & 271 people were killed. 467 Sqdn lost one Lanc. crashing on returning (4 KIA but pilot, F/O Findlay, & one other evaded, & the 7th was imprisoned). The Master-Bomber was W/C Guy Gibson VC, DSO, DFC, of Dambuster fame, flying a Mosquito which crashed in flames near the Dutch coast. He and his navigator (S/L J.N. Warwick, DFC) were killed and buried at Steenbergen-en-Kriesland. We took off at 1856 and did a Radius-of-Action (track 260oT) to arrive back at Base at 1913, at 2000’. The winds were about as predicted, we kept close to track & time, and arrived at target at 2139 at 11000’, but were told to [underlined] orbit [/underlined] (to port) due to marking problems. At 2148 we were told to [underlined] orbit again, [/underlined] until, at 2151 we we [sic] told to “attack Green spot fires direct”, which we did at 2155, at 11000’.
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[photograph] D-Dog at Waddington, 1944
[photograph] [symbol] Peter at pilots window
[photograph] Our gunners
Left: Ken Nicholls, Rear Gunner
Right: Ray Giles, Mid-Upper Gunner
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RHEYDT/MUNCHEN-GLADBACH (Con’t).
At 2159 1/2 I logged “a/c hit ground – explosion – flame & smoke”
At 2201 1/2 I logged “a/c on ground, bears 000o, 2 min (51o23’, 05o51’E).
At 2211 we saw an unidentified fighter so went into the corkscrew routine, at about 51o30’N 05o00’E.
At 2213 1/2 , while in starbord [sic] turn saw unidentified fighter above us, at about 51o31’N 04o53’E, so continued to corkscrew.
At 2221, I logged “possible a/c hit ground 3 mi on port beam, about 51o32 1/2’N 04o19’E. Our bomb-load was 1 x 2000 lb & 12 “J” clusters. We were airborne for 5h 5 min.
[circled 6] [underlined] DORTMUND-EMS CANAL [/underlined]. 23.9.44. 19 from 467 & 17 from 463 of total 136 Lancs from 5 Group mounted a special attack on the aquaduct at Ladbergen. The canal was breached, but losses were heavy … 10% of the force. 467 Sqdn lost F/O G.A. Brown & crew (5 KIA, 2 POW).
We took off at 1906, did the usual Radius-of-Action to be back at Base at 1931 at 2000’. We crossed the Channel at 4000’ then climbed to 6000’, keeping nicely to track until 2047. GEE was being jammed, and the next 2 fixes showed us 10 & 20 mi North of track … they may have been wrong. We continued by dead-reckoning through cloud climbing to 14000’ and arriving at the target on time at 2148. (We were told by Master-Bomber at 2146 “to bomb 150 ft N.W. of Red Target Indicator (flare)” J. But we were in thick cloud, so [underlined] orbited to port [/underlined] losing height … very dangerous in cloud. At 2155 the Master-Bomber said “cloud base is 8000’, come in and bomb”, but we were still in cloud & had to do [underlined] another orbit [/underlined], losing height to 6300’, so that finally we could see the target at bombed at 2203 from 6400’.
At 2205 I logged “a/c hit ground & exploded 8 mi S.E. of [symbol], (at about 51o59’N 07o53’E.”
At 2228 1/2 I logged “crossed river; a/c hit ground, port beam, 3 mi.”
At 2229 “a/c directly under us hit ground, 52o15’N 06o11’E.”
At 2231 1/2 I logged “a/c hit ground ahead about 10 mi” [brackets]
At 2236 1/2 I logged “a/c (same one?) on port beam, 5 mi [brackets] 52o10’N 06o00’E
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DORTMUND-EMS CANAL (Con’t).
After leaving the target area, the winds must have been stronger than predicted from the South.
At 2253 I logged “Strong searchlights ahead … Bomb-Aimer thinks its Rotterdam” (about 10 mi North of desired track). So we immediately turned 40o to port, but copped some flak.
At 2303 we saw searchlights over the OVER FLAKKEE area, and at 2304 got our first GEE fix since our last good one at 2047 putting us about 11 mi north of track.
Our bomb-load was 14 x 1000 lb. We were airborne for 5h 25 min.
[underlined] CALAIS. 24.9.44. [/underlined] 8 from 467, & 7 from 463 of a total 188 from 5 Group. 8 were shot down, including 1 from 467 Sqdn, F/O R.A. Jones (3 KIA & 4 POW).
[circled 7] [underlined] KARLSRUHE 26.9.44 [/underlined]. 17 from 467, 14 from 463 of a total 227 from 5 Group. A short German report states “that there was damage throughout the city & lists several important buildings destroyed”. 467 Sqdn lost F/O K. Miller (1 KIA, 6 POW).
We took off at 0055 & did the usual radius-of-action to be back at base at 0113 at 3000’. The winds were much as predicted and we kept close to track & timing, our last reliable GEE fix was at 0337; we arrived at target at 0408 and Master-Bomber told us to “bomb direct on mixed Red & Green T.1’s” But we had 10/10 cloud below us, so we “went round again” & managed to bomb at 0414 from 11500’. Our first reliable GEE fix on the way home was at 0444, only just over 1 hour of jamming.
Our bomb-load was 18 cans of incendiaries, and we were airborne for 6h 50 mins.
[circled 8] [underlined] KAISERLAUTERN 27.9.44 [/underlined] 16 from 467, 15 from 463 of a total of 217 from 5 Group, did the only major raid of the war by Bomber Command. 909 tons of bombs were dropped causing widespread damage to this medium-sized city. A local German report complained that the town was not a military objective, but went on to list a catalogue of small factories destroyed. We took off at 2205,
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24-9-44. CALAIS. 8 of 467, 7 of 463, of 188 from 5-Group. 8 were shot down. 467 lost F/O R. A. Jones & crew (3 KIA, 4 POW)
[circled 7] 26-9-44 KARLSRUHE. 17 of 467, 14 of 463, of 227 from 5-Group. A short German report states that there was damage throughout the city & lists several important buildings destroyed. 467 lost F/O K. Miller & crew (1 KIA, 6 POW).
J 6h 50m 18 cans incendiaries 11500’
[circled 8] 27-9-44 KAISERLAUTERN. 16 of 467, 15 of 463, of 217 from 5-Group on Kaiserlautern, a medium-sized city, in the only major raid on it by Bomber Command during the war. 909 tons of bombs were dropped a widespread damage was caused. A local German report complains that the town was not a military object, but goes on to list a catalogue of small factories destroyed.
H 6h 20m 18 cans incendiaries 4000’
(Sept. Summary: 467 flew 199 sorties; lost 6 crews (23 KIA, 17 POW, 2 Ev.) 4 tours completed.)
[circled 9] 5-10-44 WILHELMSHAVEN 17 of 467, 16 of 463, of 227 from 5-Group. 10/10 cloud, marking by H2S. The Wilhelmshaven Diary states that only 12 people died and one bomber was shot down. 467 lost 1 crew (they ditched … hadn’t got to the target … at about 11 am. They were finally rescued about 5pm next day. After short leave, they returned to ‘ops, and were all Killed-in-Action on the Harburg raid.
(This was the only ‘trip’ on which we were allowed to use H2S (they thought enemy fighters could use its transmission to find us). We couldn’t see the markers, so bombed by H2S.)
C. 5h 5m. 18 cans incendiaries. 15000’ (We flew to target in formation escorted by long-range Mustangs
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did a Radius of Action to be back at base at 2228 at 3000’. We stayed at 3000’ until 0010, then climbed to 4500’ and stayed at 4500’ until close to target, when told to bomb from 4000’, which we did (1 1/2 min early), dropping 18 cans of incendiaries. We kept close to track all the way and only lost GEE for an hour. We were airborne for 6h 20 min.
[circled 9] [underlined] WILHELMHAVEN. [/underlined] 17 of 467, 16 of 463, of 227 from 5-Group, a daylight raid flying in formation to the target, escorted by long-range Mustang fighters. The met. forcast [sic] was for considerable cloud at the target, and we were given the most unusual priorities for bombing:-
(i) drop them visually if target is clear;
(ii) use H2S if target is obscured; or (!)
(iii) drop when you see another bomber drop its load.
We took off at 0755, did a Radius of Action to be back at base at 0811 to join formation at 1500’. My GEE set was not working, but being in formation I didn’t have to navigate anyway. Ted Pickard, the new assistant Nav. Officer, criticised my lack of effort to have some practice. At 1010 we began to climb to 15000’ at the target where at 1106 there was 10/10 cloud below. Our Bomb Aimer & I operated the H2S and aimed at the NW corner of the town and dropped our bombs at 1110 and noticed two other Lancasters dropped theirs immediately after. We flew home independently, but other Lancs were visible so we followed the stream. At 1212 I took over flying a plane for the first & only time, keeping straight & level without much trouble for half an hour. We did a bit of map-reading for the last 1/2 hour, and landed at 1306, being airborne for 5h 5 min. Our bomb-load was 18 cans of incendiaries. The Wilhelmshaven Diary states that only 12 people died and that 1 bomber was shot down. 467 lost 1 crew … they ditched before the target at about 11 am & were (finally) rescued about 1700 the next day. After short leave they resumed ops., but were all K.I.A. on the HARBURG raid on 11.11.44. Our bomb-load was 15 cans of incendiaries
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[circled 10] [underlined] BREMEN [/underlined] 17 of 467 Sq., 18 of 463 Sq., of 246 from 5 Group, a night raid on 6.10.44, with bomb-load 18 cans of incendiaries dropped from 17250’. Air borne at 1736 & did Return of Action arriving back at base at 1753 at 5000’. A good navigation trip keeping close to desired track, but winds were lighter than expected, so, despite reducing air-speed twice (10 mph each time) we did a 60o – 120o triangle to lose 7 min. This was the last of 32 major Bomber Command raids on Bremen of the war. This raid, based on the 5 Group marking method, was an outstanding success. 1021 tons of bombs were dropped, of which 868 tons were incendiaries. A detailed report (local) is available which was compiled by an official who stated that: “the night was clear, with 3/4 full moon. A huge fire area was started. Classed as destroyed were 4859 houses, 42 factories, 2 shipyards, the Focke-Wulf works & the Siemens-Schubert electrical works. The transport network was seriously disrupted.” This raid, by no more than 1/4 of Bomber Command (& hardly mentioned in the British War History) had finished Bremen … it was not attacked again in the war.
We landed at 2233 after a trip of 4hr 55 min.
[circled 11] [underlined] FLUSHING [/underlined] (WEST DYKE on WALCHEREN ISLAND in the Scheldt Estuary.) 12 of 467, & 11 of 463 of a total of 121 of 5 Group, a daylight raid on 7.10.44. We each did 2 runs dropping a stick of 7 each run (all 1000 lb HE bombs). The sea-wall was breached and virtually all the island was flooded except the rest of the sea-wall, the central tour (Middleburgh) & the town of Flushing. English newspapers had a photo of the flooded island the next day. We had no losses despite plenty of A.A. [inserted] [two indecipherable words] [/inserted]. On the same day 846 of Bomber Command attacked Kleve-Emerich & Kembs Dams. 617 Sqn. used Tallboys (12000 lb bomb) on Kembs to destroy the floodgates to [underlined] prevent [/underlined] the Germans flooding the valley in the face of the American & French advance.
We were airborn for 3h 10 min.
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[circled 10] 6-10-44 BREMEN. 17 of 467, 18 of 463, of 246 from 5-Group. This was the last of 32 major Bomber Command raids on Bremen during the war. The raid, based on the 5-Group marking method, was an outstanding success. 1021 tons of bombs were dropped of which 868 tons were incendiaries. A detailed local report is available which was compiled by an official who stated that the night was clear with 3/4 full moon … A huge fire area was started. Classed as destroyed were 4859 houses, 42 factories, 2 shipyards, the Focke-Wulfe works and the Siemens Schubert electrical works. The transport network was seriously disrupted. This raid, by no more than 1/4 of Bomber Command (and hardly mentioned in British (War) History, had finished Bremen and the city was not attacked again by Bomber Command.
D 4h 55m 18 cans incendiaries 17250’
[circled 11] 17-10-44 FLUSHING (WALCHEREN ISLAND – WEST DYKE)
12 of 467, 11 of 463, of 121 from 5-Group to successfully breach the sea-wall near Flushing. No losses. (The same day 846 of Bomber Command attacked Kleve Emerich & Kembs Dams … 617 Squadron used ‘Tallboy’ bombs on Kembs. (The idea was to destroy the floodgates to [underlined] prevent [/underlined] the Germans flooding the Rhine valley in the face of French & American advances … this was done OK.)
D 3h 10m 2 sticks of 7 x 1000 6100’ Extra 6 min. orbit for 2nd stick.
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DAY 11-10-44 FLUSHING. 14 of 467, 20 of 463, of 115 from 5-Group attacked gun positions on N. bank of Scheldt Estuary near Flushing. No losses from Waddington.
[deleted] NIGHT [/deleted] [inserted] DAY [/inserted] 14-10-44 DUISBURG Bomber command sent 1013 heavy bombers, and 473 fighters, Americans sent 1251 heavy bombers and 749 fighters … the raid was carried out on a directive from Allied H.Q. to show the Germans the power of Bomber Commands.
NIGHT 14-10-44 BRUNSWICK 19 of 467, 20 of 463 to join 233 of 5 Group. The most effective of numerous raids on Brunswick. Using the 5-Group low-level marking method, Brunswick was finally destroyed. A German report simply lists the number of hectares burnt out. 23000 people were rescued from air-raid shelters and only 200 perished. A special train was sent from Bavaria to help feed the 80000 homeless.
DAY 17-10-44 WESTKAPELLE 2 of 467, 9 of 463 of 47 from 5-Group attacking sea-wall at Westkapelle. Bombing appeared to be accurate but no report is available. No losses.
[circled 12] 19-10-44 NUREMBERG (& DUISBURG) 20 of 467, 20 of 463, of 263 from 5-Group with 7 Mosquitoes in a special low-level-marked attack on Nuremberg. The target was completely cloud-covered and low-level marking could not be used. The raid was effective but not the ‘knockout’ as hoped. (There were 103 bombers from another Group on Stuttgart and other targets, losing only 0.9%). 467 lost F/O E. Rodwell & crew (7 KIA)
D 8h 10m 1 x 2000 + 12 J clusters. 17400’
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On 11-10-44, 16 of 467, 20 of 463 of total 115 (all 5 Group) attacked big gun positions on the bank of [underlined] Scheldt Estuary [/underlined], near Flushing. The big guns prevented a sea attack to open the Estuary for Allied supply shipping (a minefield had to be cleared too), and they menaced the Canadian Army who were attacking south of the Estuary, but couldn’t match these big guns for range. I think the weather was bad, poor visibility maybe no great harm done to the guns.
On 14-10-44 there was a big daylight raid on [underlined] Duisberg [/underlined], carried out as a directive from Allied H.Q. to show the Germans the power of Allied Air Power. Bomber Command sent 1013 heavies & 413 fighters, the Americans sent 1251 heavies & 749 fighters.
That night, (14-10-44) 5 Group sent 19 of 467 Sq & 20 of 463 Sq of a total of 233, to [underlined] Brunswick [/underlined], using the 5 Group low-level marking method, Brunswick was finally destroyed. A German report simply lists the number of hectares burnt out. 23000 people were rescued from air-raid shelters & only 200 perished. Special train sent from Bavaria to help feed the 80000 homeless.
On 17-10-44, 2 of 467, & 9 of 463 Sq. of total of 47 of 5 Group attacked the sea-wall again near Westkapelle on Walcheren Island. Bombing appeared to be accurate but no report was available.
[circled 12] [underlined] NUREMBERG [/underlined]. 5 Group sent 20 of 467 Sq. & 20 of 463 Sq of a total of 263 with 7 Mosquitos to do low-level marking. There was total cloud cover which prevented the low-level marking. The raid was effective but not the knock-out hoped for. The rest of Bomber Command raided Stuttgart & other nearby targets, only losing 0.9%. 467 Sq. lost F/O Rodwell & crew (7 KIA). We took off at 1713, did a Radius of Action coming back to base at 1718 at 2000’. We reduced speed to 150 mph but still had to lose 6 min doing 60oL, 120oR, then got to [symbol] OK but had to orbit as directed.
Bombed 15 min late at 17400’ on Red & Green Target [deleted] [indecipherable word] flares [/deleted]
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Our bomb-load was 1 x 2000 lb HE, and 12 ‘J’ clusters (incendiary). After leaving the target we descended to 6000’, & flew on dead-reckoning, south of Stuttgart & Strasbourg for 2 hours until I got the first GEE fix, nearly 20 miles north of our track, but safely over France. Sid discovered that we had one of the ‘J’ bombs “hung-up”. We went to the jettison area in the Channel & tried to release it manually … did 2 orbits as we kept trying, but without success. So we flew on home to base at 4000’, landing after 8hr 9 min airborne, by far our longest flight so far.
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[inserted] [symbol] Don Coults (Engineer went to Ireland to visit his parents there. [/inserted]
After our 11th Op at Flushing we went on the usual 6-day leave, after only about 4 weeks after we started our tour. The crews were put on a roster for leave, usually each 6 weeks, but you could go earlier if a few crews before you on the list went missing.
A few items from a diary I kept then … 7th Oct: On our return from the Flushing op, we “shot-up” the ‘drome (low level) for W/C. Brill who was going home to Australia. Wrote up log book. Went to a dance with Jackie from our Mess.
8th:- Applied for leave passes. Got paid. Packed.
9th:- Collected subsistence money, & petrol coupons for bike, [symbol] got leave passes. Caught train to London, missed by Ken. Booked in at A.C.F. Club for the night. Ken arrived at 10 pm. We booked in for the rest of the leave. Nice room.
10th. Had breakfast at the Boomerang Club. I looked around & spotted Kirk Beddie from Mendooran. I’ll just go back in time to our first couple of operations to relate a coincidence. When our 8 new crews arrived together, our Nav. Leader, F/Lt Arnold Eastman, was still doing Ops himself, yet was responsible for in-service training of the navigators (especially us new ones). So he delegated the checking of log & charts, and giving advice to some of his senior navigators (Who’d lasted, say 10 ops or more). The first one who helped me twice was called Scotty – I didn’t find out his surname, it was strictly teacher & pupil, especially as he looked elderly … moustache & bald patch … (actually he was about 26). I didn’t see him again at Waddington – we had about 300 air-crew Flight sergeants there.
Anyway, at the Boomerang club, I said good-day to Kirk, we told each other what we’d been doing … he was well into a tour as captain of Sunderland crew – doing Atlantic patrols.
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I remarked that it was a coincidence that the only two fliers [sic] from Mendooran should be on leave at the same place & time. He said ‘-“Oh no, there’s another Mendooranite over here, Vernon Gall, who was the teller at the Bank of NSW there.” I replied that I didn’t know him. Kirk said:- “Well you might not have met him as you were at High School at Mudgee when your parents came to Mendooran, then you worked in Sydney, went into the Army, then the Air Force – you rarely were in Mendooran. Well, what do you know – there he is, I’ll bring him over & introduce you.” Kirk came back with Scotty. We laughed about that coincidence! After the war, when I bought the sports depot in Mudgee & transferred my bank a/c to the Bank of NSW there, Scotty was the teller.
[symbol] At the Club I also met Joe Barber & Eric Gentle who’d been with me at Cootamundra. Ken saw 4 chaps he knew at Lichfield, and I met Rupe Brown the Australian ground-crew corporal who looked after the 3 Lancs & ground crews at our dispersal corner. We went to a play, but didn’t enjoy it - - too serious. Back at A.C.F. played table-tennis with Ken & darts with Sid.
11th: Got some free theatre tickets with Sid & the play was quite enjoyable. Cinema after lunch .. Red Skelton in “Bathing Beauty”, very funny. Game of darts at the Club. Met Jack Freer, who played the saxophone on the ship across the Pacific.
12th. Ken & I got tickets for a play … a good comedy. Darts at the club after supper.
13th Got tickets for a show on Monday. Bought a wireless for £12/3/4.
[symbol] After the war, I found that Ray Meers (Rear Gunner) & Lindsay Francis (Wireless-Operator-Gunner, of Mendooran had both done tours with B.C. about the same time as I.
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14th. Bought more Xmas cards. Had lunch with Peter Dunn from Mudgee at the Club. Saw a newsreel, went to the Windmill theatre, a few beers with Ken, Supper, then table-tennis.
15th. Rupe left to return to Waddington (he’d shared our room
Visited Mme Tussauds waxworks Museum .. very good.
Walked through the Zoo. Saw a newsreel.
16th. At Boomerang Club met Ken Vidler’s crew (I think they were killed a bit later.) Walked the Embankment, saw Cleopatra’s Needle, down Whitehall, got a glimpse of 10 Downing St (cordoned off by Police). Saw the show we’d booked “Happy & Glorious”, easily the best show we’d been to. Had a few drinks with 2 girls who sleep in the railway station at Gloucester Road to be safe from air raids – they’d been doing that for years!
17th: Rain all day. Went cinema that featured 3 films … 4 1/4 hours. Had a steak (!) for 5/- then another film; couldn’t find the ‘steak’ cafe again.
18th. Packed, Sid came back from Exeter & Bristol. Played crib on the train with Sid, all the way to Lincoln. Lunch at 3, collected bike & rode back to camp.
19th. Flew at once for high-level-bombing practice … too much low cloud, so we got a fighter & did some affiliation practice. Then lunch & briefing at 1.30 for a “trip” to Nuremberg, the scene of one of B.C.’s worst losses sometime earlier, when about 500 heavies were caught below high cloud, searchlights lit them up & (from memory) nightfighters, mainly, & flak brought down 49 for a loss rate of 9%. This time it was cloud below us and 467 only lost 1 crew, F/O Rodwell’s … all KIA.
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[circled 13] 23-10-44 FLUSHING. 21 of 467, 20 of 463 of 121 from 5-Group attacked gun positions near Flushing. Visibility was bad and the bombing scattered.
D 3h 20m. 14 x 1000. Briefed to bomb at 6500’ but forced to descend (bad visibility). Bombed at 4000’
[circled 14] BERGEN 28-10-44. 20 of 467, 15 of 463, of 237 from 5-Group, to attack U-boat pens at Bergen. Target was cloud-covered and master-bomber called off the attack after only 47 planes had bombed … from below 5000’ (Mountains within 10 miles of track nearly 4500’!)
D 7h 30m. 12 x 1000 Briefed to bomb at 9000’. Orbited once [inserted] extra 6 min there [/inserted] and lost height using GEE to avoid mountains … bombed at 3800’ Diverted to Marston Moor on return (fog over Waddington). Returned next day.
[inserted] (On our final run there was AA fire from [underlined] above [/underlined] us (mountains) as well as below!) [/inserted]
[circled 15] 30-10-44 WALCHEREN ISLAND. 13 of 467, 13 of 463, of 102 from 5-Group attacked gun positions near Walcheren. The attack was successful and the Allied ground forces commenced their attack on 31st. No losses
Briefed to bomb at 6000’. Cloud over target. Two orbits made – 20 min over target area – bombed at 3500’.
D 3h 20m. 14 x 1000.
OCT ’44 SUMMARY: 467 flew 157 sorties, lost 2 crews (7 KIA, 7 Ev): 5 tours completed, incl. (C.O.) W/C. Brill completing his 2nd tour. 1 crew ditched, rescued & returned.
DAY 1-11-44 HOMBERG. 19 of 467, 17 of 463, of 226 from 5-Group attacked the Meerbeck oil plant at Homberg. Marking was scattered + only 159 planes attempted to bomb. No losses from Waddington.
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After nearly 2 hours on the way home we tried to jettison a J-Cluster (incendiary) which had “hung-up”. We turned back to try to realease [sic] it manually, but failed. So we brought it home & it was safely removed. We landed 1/2 hour late, time airborn was 8hr 9 min. Our bomb-load was 1 x 2000 lb HE & 12 ‘J’ clusters dropped from 17400’.
[circled 13] [underlined] FLUSHING [/underlined] 5 Group sent 121 incl. 21 of 467 Sq & 20 of 463, to attack big gun positions near Flushing on Walcheren Island on 23.10.44. Visibility was bad & the bombing was “scattered”. We took off at 1429, did a Radius of Action & got back to base at 1434 at 2000’. Had a good navigation trip but had to descent from 6500’ to 4000’ to see the target. 1 1/2 min before we bombed our gunners reported a Lanc. hit the sea behind us (I plotted it at 56o33’N, 03o27’E). Quite a few planes were lost and a lot of A.A. damage – we had many holes. Our bomb load was 14 of 1000 lb HE, and 1 of them “hung-up”. We tried to jettison it but couldn’t. We were airborn [sic] for 3h. 19 min.
[circled 14] [underlined] BERGEN (NORWAY) [/underlined] 5-Group sent 237 of which 20 from 467 Sq + 15 from 463, on 28-10-44 to attack U-boat pens at night. We took off at 2221 & did a Radius of Action & got back to base at 2250 at 1500’ which we maintained until 0120 (up till then we were over the N. Sea) when we climbed to 9000’ & increased speed to 180 mph as we were 3 min behind time. When we got to the target we were in cloud. The master bomber told us to come down to 5000’ … we had to orbit carefully as there were mountains East of Bergen over 4000’. I used GEE position lines to descend safely away from mountains to 3800’ when we bombed … about 10 min after the planned time. It was nice to have GEE all the way (no jamming like over Germany) & we kept nicely to track all the way. Our bomb load was 12 x 1000 lb HE. There was plenty of flak around Bergen … some from mountain tops nearly level with us! There was a lot of cloud (& maybe smoke-screen) at the target … master bomber cancelled the raid after only 47 of us bombed
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30.10.44. [symbol] 15 WALCHEREN ISLAND (FLUSHING). 13 from 467 Sqdn & 13 from 463 of 102 total (all 5 Group), daylight raid on big gun emplacements on the Southern edge of Walcheren Island. The Germans also held the Southern banks of the Scheldt Estuary. The Allies had always wanted to capture Antwerp (50 miles inland, the biggest port for unloading tanks & other heavy equipment). While ever these big guns covered both sides of the Estuary, the Allies couldn’t go in to clear the minefields. In fact the Canadian army trying to take the South bank was held up by bad weather (flooded terrain), lack of petrol & ammunition (Patton was partly to blame along with Eisenhower) for so long that eventually, [inserted] our [/inserted] [deleted] Armies [/deleted] [inserted] Marines [/inserted] took Antwerp from the East & finally [inserted] 8 NOV [/inserted] captured Walcheren Island by “sailing” through gaps in the sea-wall from the East! It then took [inserted] nearly [/inserted] another month to clear the mines & winter had set in … too late to use Antwerp for the big offensive they may have been able to mount had they cleared Antwerp 3 months earlier.
We took off at 1340, did a R. of A. & got back to base at 1356 at 1500’. The navigation was easy & we stayed on-track & on-time to the target. We’d been told to bomb at 6000’, but found cloud below, so had to orbit [inserted] twice [/inserted] lose height to 3500’, finally bombing 22 min later than planned. Our bomb load was 14 x 1000 lb HE. We had no losses. The attack was successful, and the Canadian army began their attack along the S. bank the next day.
We dropped 14 x 1000 lb HE; the flight took 3h 20 min. For October, 467 Sq. flew 157 sorties, lost 2 crews (7 KIA, 7 Evaded); 5 tours were completed; 1 crew ditched, were rescued & returned.
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Nov 1st. 226 Lancs of 5 Group (19 from 467 & 17 from 463), in daylight, raided the Meerbeck oil plant near Homberg. Weather was bad, the marking was scattered and only 159 attempted to bomb. No losses from Waddington.
2.11.44 [symbol] 16. DUSSELDORF. 5 Group was part of a big raid (992) by Bomber Command, 15 from 467, 15 from 463. Detailed German reports listed 5000 buildings destroyed, many of them industrial & production works. There were other raids that night too … a total of 1131 sorties. We took off at 1651, 15 min. late. We climbed to 17000’ & increased speed to 170 mph to catch up. At 1920 (at 18000’) we were “coned” by searchlights … very dangerous as ‘flak’ then could be fired visually. We shook them off & bombed at 1925, & I noted that an aircraft was hit about 10 mi ahead, our heading 220o.T. On the way home in the next 26 min, I made 12 more log entries of aircraft crashing to the ground with estimates of their bearing & distance from us.
The RAF had set up 2 more GEE “chains” based in Europe. I tried the RUHR chain, but found the readings “wouldn’t plot”.
Our bomb-load was 11 x 1000 lb & 4 x 500 lb HE.
The trip took 5h 20 min.
467 Sqdn lost F/O Langridge & crew (3 KIA, 5 evaded).
Dusseldorf taken (on Cook’s tour 19.6.45
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[circled 16] 2-11-44. DUSSELDORF. 15 of 467, 15 of 463 as part of 992 of Bomber Command. Detailed German reports list 5000 buildings destroyed, many of them industrial & production works. (There were other raids that night too … a total of 1131 sorties.) 467 lost F/O L. Langridge & crew (3 KIA, 5 evaded).
C. 5h 20m. 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500. 18000’
NIGHT 4-11-44 DORTMUND-EMS CANAL. 12 of 467, 12 of 463, of 174 from 5-Group attacked the canal near Munster. The banks of the canal were breached again. A report from Albert Speer to Hitler dated 11.11.44 was captured at the end of the war. Speer stated that the raids on the Dortmund-Ems canal, with attacks on the rail system, produced more serious setbacks to the German war industry at this time than any other type of bombing.
[circled 17] 6-11-44. EMS-WESER CANAL. 19 of 467, 16 of 463, of 235 from 5-Group attacked near the junction of the Ems-Weser and Mittland canals, near Gravenhorst. Markers had considerable difficulty in finding the junction due to ground haze, until a low-flying Mosquito (pilot: F/L L.C. de Vigne, and Aust. navigator, S/L. F. Boyle of 627 Sqdn) found and marked the target with such accuracy that the marker fell into the water and was soon extinguished. Only 31 planes bombed before the Master-Bomber ordered the raid be abandoned. 10 planes lost in the raid, 3 crews from 463 (all KIA). Waddington was fog bound on return & most planes were diverted to Seething. We were perhaps the last to land (in v. poor visibility).
D 5h 25m. 14 x 1000 (but did not bomb). Orbited target once, for extra 10 min. over it.
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4.11.44. 174 Lancs of 5 Group, 12 each from 467 & 463 Sqdns, attacked the Dortmund-Ems Canal, near Munster. The banks of the canal were breached again. A report from Albert Speer to Hitler dated 11.11.44 was captured at the end of the war. Speer stated then:- “that the raids on the Dortmund-Ems Canal, with attacks on the rail system, produced more serious setbacks to the German war industry, at this time, than any other type of bombing.” (In early 1945, the raids on oil targets may have been even more damaging to their war effort.)
6.11.44 [symbol] 17. EMS-WESER CANAL. 235 of 5 Group, 19 from 467, 16 from 463 attacked the Ems-Weser junction with the Mittland Canal, near Gravenhorst. The markers had considerable difficulty finding the junction due to ground haze, until a low-flying Mosquito (pilot: F/Lt L.C. de Vigne, & Australian navigator, S/Ldr F. Boyle of 627 Sqdn) found & marked the target with such accuracy that the marker landed in the canal & was soon extinguished. Only 31 planes bombed before the Master-Bomber abandoned the raid. 10 planes were lost, 3 of them from 463 Sqdn (all KIA).
We were supposed to take off at 1633 but actually took off 28 min late, so once we climbed to 11000’ we boosted our I.A.S. to 180 mph & were on-time by 1915. I logged a Lanc. crashing at 1923 1/2; we had to orbit twice [inserted] (12 min) [/inserted], at the target (due to the marking problem) … very dangerous. Logged 4 more planes crashing [deleted] at [/deleted] in the target area, & another at 1943, after we’d left the target without bombing. I couldn’t get any “joy” on either of the 2 new GEE chains. The trip took 5h. 25 min. We brought back our 14 x 1000 lb H.E. bombs.
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The weather deteriorated on the way back … the bumps were so bad that I had to hold all my navigation gear down to stop them hitting the roof, & brace my knees under the nav. table to avoid joining them there. The visibility at Waddington was bad due to fog, and most of our planes were diverted to Strubby; however, Peter did an abbreviated circuit (so he could actually keep the runway in sight) & then came in as if in a Tiger Moth, almost clipping the caravan stationed near the “funnel” (where they might use a Verey to send-you-round-again), but he landed safely … and then they closed the airfield.
Besides getting the 2 new GEE chains (RHEIMS & RHUR) to help with navigation over Germany, we now had LORAN fitted. It was similar in some ways to GEE, but depened [sic] on the radio signals being reflected from the ionosphere (only at night). The stations were widely separated … I think England, Norway, Italy … and each single reading had to be made & timed, then another [deleted] one [/deleted] tuned-in, read & timed … probably 2 min or more later, & the running -fix method used. On 9.11.44 we did at [sic] Cross-Country, using Loran, over England, ending with some high-level bombing practice … 3 1/4 hrs trip. The trailing aerial had to be used to receive Loran signals.
11.11.44 [symbol] 18. HARBURG. A 5-Group raid of 237 planes, + 8 marker Mosquitos, 19 from 467, 14 from 463 … a night raid on the Rhenania-Ossag oil refinery, near Hamburg. This refinery had been raided several times by American daylight bombers. We took off at 1627, did a R. of A. to be back a [sic] base at 1634 at 3000’.
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(HARBURG)
We climbed to 15000’ & later to 16000’ to get out of cloud, & kept nicely to track all the way to the target, getting a bit behind time all the way (no worries we were over the sea nearly all the way). We bombed 8 min late from 16000’. Our WOP (Eric) told us the Master Bomber said to bomb the centre of the Red Target Indicators (there were 4), but to ignore outside Indicators which were dummies (set up by the Germans). Half an hour before the target I wanted to use LORAN, but Eric (our WOP) said he’d been ordered not to use the trailing aerial. I relied on Dead-Reckoning from the target and got my first GEE fix 50 min later about 15 mi. N. of track.
Our bomb-load was 1 x 4000 lb “cookie”, 6 x 1000 lb, & 6 x 500 lb H.E. We could still see the plant burning from 100 mi away on our way back. Our squadron lost F/O Fedderson’s crew (7 KIA) & F/O Eyre’s crew (6 KIA, 1 POW) … one of these killed was Geoff (“Bushie”) Goodfellow, their navigator, one of my best friends … we played a lot of cards together & we bunked opposite each other in our room. He came from Tooraweenah (father ran the “Mountain View” hotel there), & he said I was the only person he’d met that had even heard of the place, let alone been there, which I had.
F/L Kynoch’s plane was hit & badly damaged, but he crash-landed it at Manston (an emergency ‘drome on the coast) & he & the crew survived.
The flight lasted 5h. 35 min.
On 13.11.44 we did our “20 SORTIE CHECK”, on a flight of 55 min. We’d only done 18 ops plus the 2 BULLSEYES at Lichfield & Swinderby.
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[circled 18] 11-11-44 HARBURG. 19 of 467, 14 of 463, of 237 from 5-Group, plus 8 Marker Mosquitos attacked the Rhenania-Ossag oil refinery at Harburg (near Hamburg). This had been attacked several times by American (day) bombers. Brunwig’s ‘History of Hamburg & Harburg’ (air-raids), gives the raid a brief mention. (We could still see the plant burning 100 miles away on our way home.)
467 lost F/O. M. Fedderson & crew (7 POW), and F/O. T. Eyre & crew [inserted] (G Goodfellow was the Nav) [/inserted] (6 KIA, 1 POW). F/L Kynoch’s plane was hit and badly damaged – he crash-landed at Manston (an emergency ‘drome on the coast).
D 5h 35m. 1 x 4000 + 6 x 1000 + 6 x 500 16000’
[circled 19] 16-11-44 DUREN. 15 of 467, 15 of 463, as part of 1188 from Bomber Command, attacked Duren, Julich & Heinsburg in support of the American 1st & 9th armies which were about to advance on this area. Raids were made by 1239 American heavy bombers on targets in the same area. (this was the biggest raid we took part in … there were planes to the horizon all the way, heaps of fighter escorts.) 9400 tons of bombs dropped. The result was disappointing. Heavy rain and wet ground prevented much of the tank assault and slowed the supplies of artillery ammunition and the armies’ advance was slow and costly. (For our part, the centre of Duren was reduced to rubble.) G/C. Bonham-Carter, O/C of Waddington led our Group, as ‘second dickie’ to the crew who had bombed the wrong target on a daylight raid on Flushing (23-10-44?), killing some Canadians.
D 5h 25m. 12 x 1000. 10500’
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16.11.44 [symbol] 19. DUREN (daylight). 15 planes from 467, & 15 from 463, were part of a big effort by Bomber Command (1188 planes) attacking Duren, Julich & Heinsburg in support of the 1st & 9th American Armies which were about to advance in this area. Raids were made on other targets in this area by 1239 American heavy bombers. This was by far the biggest raid we took part in … there were planes to the horizon all the way with heaps of fighter escort … [deleted] B [/deleted] 9400 tons of bombs were dropped, but the result was disappointing. Heavy rain & boggy ground prevented most of the tank attack and slowed supplies of artillery ammunition with the result that the advance was slow & costly. For our part, the centre of Duren was reduced to rubble – it may have needed bulldozers to clear a path through it! The base commander at Waddington, Gp/Capt Bonham-Carter, led 5 Group as ‘second dickie’ to one of our crews who had bombed the wrong “target” (a smoke-generator) on an earlier daylight raid near Flushing on 23.10.44, killing some Canadian army men.
The navigation was easy. Our bomb-load was 12 x 1000 lb H.E. dropped from 10500’. Flight time: 5h 25 min.
[two photographs]
Snaps of Duren taken on the “Cook’s Tour” I did on 19.6.45.
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Extracts from Diary –
18.11.44 navigators briefing at 1.30 for a v. long trip. Not enough time for preparation. Our crew just got out to the “kite” when the trip was “scrubbed” …joy! After tea we went down to the local Horse & Jockey (Hotel). Saw a bloke about his car, & bought it for £3 … a little Morris 8 HP Sedan
19.11.44 To navigation section before lunch for another briefing, to the same place as yesterday, more time for preparation & less to do. No lunch … sandwiches at briefing … then it was scrubbed again. Collected car.
20.11.44. Went to briefing for another daylight raid on the Dortmund-Ems canal, but it was scrubbed. Went to town with Ken Nichols & Ken (of ground crew) … wanted to go to the theatre, but all seats were sold, so we went to the cinema & saw “White Cliffs of Dover.”
21.11.44. Briefed again for the same canal raid as yesterday, chart was already done. [symbol] It was scrubbed at the 11th hour & we missed lunch … again had sandwiches in the briefing room.
21.11.44 [symbol] 20 DORMUND-EMS CANAL
We took off at 1726, did a R. of A. & got back to base at 1754 at 2000’. The winds were light & fairly consistently Westerly at first, then N.W. It was easy to keep on track & close on-time. At 2020 I logged “Lanc, crashed & blew-up 15 mi. astern”. We’d been at 10250’ until 2058 when WOP told us to descent to 3-4000’ … we did so, fast, and bombed at 2103. At 2108 I logged: “Aircraft crashed below us 3 mi. past other target.” At 2232 we jettisoned a hang-up bomb in the sea. Landed at base at 2337, time airborne 6h 11 min. Our bomb-load was 13 x 1000 lb H.E.
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21.11.44. [symbol] 20. DORTMUND-EMS CANAL, near LADBERGEN.
15 from 467, 15 from 463 bombed Dortmund-Ems & Mittland Canals; as part of Bomber Command maximum effort of 1345 heavy bombers attacking 6 targets in this general area.
No losses for 5-Group.
We took off at 1726, did a R. of A. getting back to base at 1754 at 2000’. I had a good navigation trip, GEE from England lasted until 2020, then the RUHR chain worked to the target area. I logged a Lanc. blowing-up 15 mi astern at 2020. We were briefed to bomb at 10500’ but, 5 min before out T.O.T our W.O.P. (Eric) got word that we descend to 3 – 4000’ to get below cloud. We descended quickly & bombed 5 min later at 4500’; then began climbing again into the clouds. Tried Loran for fixing without success. We had a bomb hang-up, but jettisonned [sic] it in the sea at 2222.
Our bomb load was 13 x 1000 lb H.E.
The trip took 6h 10 min.
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This is an enlargement of the smaller print of the area bombed repeatedly … DORTMUND EMS CANAL.
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[photograph] Open bomb-bay of a Lanc. loaded with 1000 lb H.E. bombs. Bomb-aimer could select each one to drop separately at predetermined intervals (usually close together as a “stick”.)
[photograph] Our Mid-upper gunner Ray Giles, near his turret – 2 Browning .303 machine guns
[photograph] Lanc’s in formation on a daylight raid. Nearest is PO-J
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On a low-level “Cooks Tour” from Wigsley on 19th June, 1945 (after war’s end in Europe), I took some photos with the old box Kodak.
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The Dortmund Ems canal where it was built above a stream, shown clearly in the left photo. The embankments here were bombed repeatedly, 8 times I think. We did 3 of Ops there and one at the nearby Ems-Weser canal.
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Broken bridges over the Rhine at Duisberg – we didn’t bomb there, but 5 Group did.
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The Krupps works at Essen, which was regularly bombed by the RAF during most of the war. Including some 1000 – bomber raids.
[photograph] Wrecked bridges at Cologne, another regular RAF target; somehow the Cathedral survived.
[photograph] The railway marshalling yards at Hamm received plenty of “attention”
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Dusseldorf was regularly bombed … we did our 16th Op. there
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[circled 20] 21-11-44. DORTMUND-EMS CANAL, (near LADBERGEN). 15 of 467, 15 of 463 as part of 1345 Bomber Command heavies attacked 6 targets in this general area. 5-Group targets were the Mitteland and Dortmund-Ems canals … without loss.
D 6h 10m. 13 x 1000. Briefed to bomb at 10250’, got 5 min warning by radio to descend to cloud base … bombed at 4500’.
[circled 21] 23-11-44. TRONDHEIM. 16 of 467, 4 of 463 of 171 from 5-Group, incl. 7 Mosquito Markers, to attack U-boat pens at Trondheim. The target was covered b y a smokescreen and could not be marked. The Master Bomber ordered the raid abandoned. No losses. (The weather was bad; big wind changes. Many jettisoned bombs in North Sea or diverted to North Scotland due to fuel shortage … we were the only one to return to Waddington with bombs still aboard.)
D 10h 55m. 9 x 1000 (brought home).
26-11-44 MUNICH (Our rear gunner, K. Nickols, went on this trip as ‘spare bod’.) 270 Lancs from 5-Group, 467 lost F/O Findlay & crew (crashed – out of fuel … their Nav. vomited and blocked his oxygen supply, went unconscious and they got lost in cloud. But all survived the crash and were flown home by the Americans on 1.12.44.
NOVEMBER SUMMARY 467 did 148 sorties, lost 4 crews (9 KIA, 8 POW, 11 Ev) 8 tours expired. 2 were badly wounded.
NIGHT 4-12-44 HIELBRONN. 282 from 5-Group (Main force attacked Karlsruhe). 467 lost F/O J. Plumridge & crew (6 KIA. 1 POW). F/L Bill Kynock & crew attacked by fighter, rear gunner killed (F/S R. Steele), and plane badly damaged (we think it was ‘D’.), crash landed at Manston (emergency airfield).
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23.11.44 [symbol] 21. TRONDHEIM (Norway). 5-Group sent 171 planes (including 7 Mosquito markers) to attack the U-boat facilities there. This was a very long trip mostly over the North Sea at low-level (1000’) in bad weather, rain & severe wind-changes. Tankers topped us up with petrol at the end of the runway before we took off at 1609, 12 min late. GEE ran out at 1848 … over 2 hours before we’d reach the target. We were unable to identify where we crossed the coast, so we continued on northwards and at 2050 saw the target lit up by flares to our left. A wind velocity to use for bombing was received by radio, and at 2055 we saw yellow Target Indicators about 10 mi to Port. We turned to a Westerly course. At 2102 we were told to abandon the raid as a smoke-screen obscured the target. We continued by Dead Reckoning & B.A. (Sid) identified a pin-point at 2112. We descended from 9000’ to 1000’, and at about 2130 discovered that the earlier pin-point was wrong, giving a new one near Smolen Island. At 2248 I got my first GEE fix (after 1 1/2 hr since the target) … about 50 mi NW of where we thought we’d be … big wind change. Pilot (Peter) & I decided to aim to land at LEUCHARS (Nth Scotland) as we had a head-wind. Then, at 0024 I got a good fix & found the wind had eased & changed to NE, and by 2130 was from the NW & getting faster. Pilot & Engineer consulted with me & we decided to try for Waddington, cutting our speed back from 190 to 170 mph. The wind held about NW & increased to about 45 mph, so we reached base OK & landed at 0302, with only about 80 gallons left. Most of our planes jettisonned [sic] bombs in the North Sea, or landed at Leuchars. We were the sole plane to bring our bombs home to Waddington. Trip-time 10h 53 min.
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26.11.44. 5-Group sent 270 heavies to MUNICH. Our rear-gunner, Ken Nicholls went as a “spare-bod” in place of a sick crewman. One of the 467 crews crashed, out of fuel. Their navigator had vomited and blocked his oxygen supply, he went unconscious, and they were lost in cloud. They all survived the crash-landing and were flown back by the Americans on 1.12.44.
November summary for 467 Sqdn: 148 sorties, 4 crews lost (9 KIA, 8 POW, 11 Evaded); 8 tours expired. 2 men were badly wounded.
4.12.44 (night). HEILBRONN was attacked by 282 from 5 Group, while the main force of Bomber Command attacked Karlsruhe. 467 Sqdn lost F/O Plumridge & crew (6 KIA, 1 POW). F/Lt Bill Kynoch’s plane was attacked by a fighter, his rear-gunner killed (F/Sgt R. Steele) & the plane badly damaged … we think it was our favourite “D”. They crash landed at the emergency ‘drome, Manston, & we heard that “D” was a write-off.
6.12.44. GIESSEN (night) attacked by 255 of 5-Group (19 from each of 467 & 463 sqdns) while the rest of Bomber Command bombed Osnabruck & Leuna (oil plant).
8.12.44 URFT DAM [symbol] 1. 205 of 5-Group (10 of 467, 15 of 463). 9/10 cloud over target, no result observed. No loss.
10.12.44 URFT DAM [symbol] 2. 5-Group (15 [inserted] each [/inserted] of 467 & 463). All were recalled before the target due to bad weather & visibility.
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More extracts from Diary.
23.11.44. No operations on. Went to Lincoln with Peter & Don in my car to see about getting Peter’s car fixed. Went to the pictures.
Feeling very crook … terrible cough.
24.11.44. Went on sick parade. The Dr. reckoned I was OK for flying … I didn’t. had heard there was to be a long trip that night & saw the Dr. again .. he put me into Sick Quarters & I slept!!! about 20 hours a day. Our crew wasn’t listed for the operation that night, but our rear-gunner, Ken Nichols, opted to go with Bill Kynock’s crew … but the trip was scrubbed anyway. Ken visited me.
25.11.44. Still in sick-quarters. No ops. Ken, Don & Rupe came to see me, then they went to an ENSA concert on the base.
26.11.44. Out of sick-quarters. Ken went with Kynoch’s crew to MUNICH in crook weather. It was OK at the target, quiet & a good ‘prang’. Went over to [deleted] 3 Sqdn [/deleted] SICK QUARTERS to see Ted Pickerd who’d been our Navigation analysis ‘joker’ for some months. Played pontoon, won 10/- Kynoch’s crew were diverted to Langham.
27.11.44. Went to Swinderby & got 3 gal of petrol in the car. Ken & Kynocks crew came back from Langham.
28.11.44. No ops. Made up a list of comments on ops that had to be done … big job. Flew to Thornaby [deleted] to bring [/deleted] & back in ‘D’ [deleted] back [/deleted] with a ferry crew for their plane.
Navigators party on tonight … too bad Ted Pickerd is still in sickquarters. Des Sands (o i/c A flight … Sqn Ldr, DFM on 2nd or 3rd tour) Lionel Hart & I took others in cars, the rest used bikes. Wionderful show. Bags of beer & fun.
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NIGHT 6-12-44 GIESSEN 19 of 467, 19 of 463, of 255 from 5-Group. (Main force attacked Osnabruck & Leuna).
DAY 8-12-44. URFT DAM [symbol] 1. 10 of 467, 15 of 463 of 205 from 5-Group. 9/10 cloud over target and no result observed. No loss.
DAY 10-12-44 URFT DAM [symbol] 2. 15 of 467, 15 of 463 … 5-Group. All recalled before reaching target due to bad weather and visibility.
[circled 22] 11-12-44 URFT DAM [symbol] 3. 15 of 467, 15 of 463, of 233 from 5-Group, with Mosquito Markers. Hits observed but no breach seen. (We brought our bombs home, despite doing an orbit … (hoping for gap in clouds) … against orders … extra 7 min. in target area. Very accurate radar-directed flak; we lost P.O. motor.).
F 6h 5m. 14 x 1000 (brought home) (9750’)
[circled 23] 17-12-44 MUNICH. 22 of 467, 19 of 463 of 280 from 5-Group, with 8 Mosquito Markers. (Main force attacked Duisburg, Ulm and Munster … a total of 1310 heavies, 1.1% loss.) Reconnaissance showed severe damage. 467 lost F/O T. Evans & crew (all 7 Ev) … they collided after bombing with an engine on fire.
M 9h 45m 1 x 4000 + 9 cans + 1 MONROE 11750’
[circled 24] 18-12-44 GDYNIA. 19 of 467, 15 of 463 of 236 from 5-Group. 2 crews from each flight attacked 2 pocket Battleships anchored near the port (which was the main target) … we hit “Lutzow” with 3 of our bombs (& 1 v. close in water) nicely near funnel area. Considerable damage to port area.
M 9h 45m. 10 x 1000 S.A.P.
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29.11.44. No ops. Went into Lincoln to try to register car … no joy; had to go to Sleaford, but no time. Tore around garages [inserted] for [/inserted] a battery & brake adjusters, but no joy. Finished off the navigation comments from yesterday. Decided to sell my autocycle & got a buyer. Played pontoon, won 3/-.
30.11.44. No ops. Went to Sleaford, got car registered & oil changed. Got coupons for petrol to go on leave, packed up, got leave pass, laundry & shoes. Went into Lincoln with Ken & got petrol & a new battery. Saw about trains for Ray & Eric for tomorrow.
1.12.44. Went out to our dispersal where mechanics helped get new battery in & working after a lot of trouble … bludged a couple of gallons of petrol from Ken (ground crew). Left at 10.10, had lunch at Nottingham & then went on to Birmingham, getting to where Don was staying at 3.30. had tea there, played solo until 1.30 am, went down to “Old Farm” at [inserted] ? Wesley [/inserted] Westly Castle for the night.
2.12.44. Duck eggs for breakfast! Lunch at Police Station (don had been a policeman in Birmingham before he enlisted for air crew.) Then tea at Mrs Benlays (friend of Don). Met Ken & Mrs Smith & Margaret from next door. Played solo. Went to Police Club for drinks. More solo ‘till 2 am. Slept next door at Smiths.
3.12.44. Breakfasts on both at Smiths & Benlays. Called at jewellers for Ken’s watch, but no luck. Set off for Swindon. Lunch at Swan’s Nest in Stratford. Looked over Shakespeare’s birthplace, got postcards & saw Home Guard parade. Went on to “Stow-in-the-Wold” & stayed the night in a nice little pub. Played darts, crib & drank beer.
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[photograph] Engineer Don Coutts & Mid Upper Gunner Ray Giles, Birmingham
[photograph] Rear Gunner, Ken Nichols, & Ray Giles at Benlay’s place at Birmingham where we stayed on leave 1/2 Dec ’44.
[photograph] Ray Giles, at Benlays’ place, Birmingham
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More from the Diary.
4.12.44. Rachel Swindon for dinner. Found our way out to Clyffe-Pyhard & saw Bunty Duff & got back just before dark. Had tea at fish & chip shop & went to pictures – saw Jon Hall & Maria Montez in ‘Cobra Woman’.
5.12.44 After breakfast towed an Engineers car to get it started. Bought side-lamp for car. Reached Slough via Reading for lunch & called [deleted] on [/deleted] at Margaret Vyner’s place … she was in London meeting Hugh Marlowe, home from France on 72-hours leave. Saw Mrs Vyner & Hugo, had afternoon tea & went to Slough, booked in at Salthill Hotel & had tea. At pub, picked up 2 girls & took them home but got lost on the way back. Turned in at 12.30.
6.12.44. Looked around a lot of shops in Slough & finally got some bulbs for dash-lights. Met an old Aussie-Scot, Macintosh for yarn & drinks; he showed us his home at 26 Windsor Rd. Slough. Drove to Windsor & looked over Eton College on Founders Day, … going for 504 years. Saw Windsor Castle & had tea there. Played cards with Ken, before & after tea.
7.12.44. After breakfast caught train to London & booked in at A.C.F. Club. Met Scottie Gall & Kirk Beddie again; had steak (!) & mushrooms at Athens Cafe; went to pictures & saw “Casanova Brown”. More steak with onions then a variety show at the Empire in Finsbury Park. Went back tp pub at Gloucester Rd & saw girls we knew from last leave in London. Also ran into Syd & Peter.
8.12.44. Arranged to meet Peter on the way to Cambridge. Got car at Slough & was 1 hr late in meeting Peter. Had lunch at Cambridge Arms. Saw a good picture “Love Story”. Met a navigator I knew at Brighton … Cameron, who’d done 35 ops in Mosquitos. More steak & onions for supper.
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9.12.44. Looked at some of Cambridge University … not much to see. Had lunch at roadside pub and got to Lincoln about 4.30. collected photos, had drinks at the Saracens head & went to a show at the Royal Theatre. Peter’s car had a flat tyre. Got battle-dress from cleaners & put overcoat in. A good leave
10.12.44. Welcomed back to nav. section. No ‘war’ today. had an interview for commission with Group-Captain Bonham-Carter. W/Cdr Bill Brill had told us not to apply for a commission until we’d done about 20 “trips”. But after he left, in October, the new C.O. W/Cdr J.K. Douglas invited anyone interested in a commission to apply, regardless of the number of ops. I did, but didn’t impress him with my answers (especially when I said “probably not” to his question “would I be more use to the air force with a commission?”. He didn’t recommend me. But Bonham-Carter said something like this: “I have 2 W’ Cdrs here, at 467 & 463; one C.O. recommends virtually all applicants after they’ve done 20 trips; the other (Douglas) likes to interview them at depth & knocks a few back. I have to make the final decision. You seem to be doing well. I’ll look at you again next month.” (He saw me in Mid-January with only one Op (Brux) to go, and recommended me without any further questioning.)
11.12.44. Took laundry & boots down but didn’t have time to check them in … there’s “war” on. Went to briefing room & sorted out Gee charts. The briefing was hurried; the plane we got, (F), was slow, climbed poorly, and we were late getting to the target.
(con’t on next page)
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11.12.44 [symbol] 22. URFT DAM No 3. Daylight raid by 233 from 5-Group (15 each from 467 & 463 Sqdns), with Mosquitos doing the marking. Hits were observed but no breach seen. We brought our bombs back despite doing an orbit (against orders) hoping for a gap in the clouds … we spent 7 minutes extra over the target, and experienced very accurate radar-directed flak just after leaving. We lost our Port-Outer motor.
We took off at 1205, did a R. of A. returning to base at 1219, at 6000’. We climbed to 12000’ & “cruised” at 170 mph, but gradually got behind time (5 min late at 1350) but only 3 min. late at the target. This plane, F, would not go any faster with our bomb-load of 14 x 1000 lb. H.E. Pilot feathered our Port Outer motor at 1554 (maybe some flak damage). Jettisonned [sic] 2 bombs at 1645 which took extra time … ending up 47 min. late home. Flight time 6h 5 min.
17.12.44 [symbol] 23. Night-raid on MUNICH by 280 from 5-Group, (22 from 467, 19 from 463), with 8 Mosquito markers. The rest of Bomber Command attacked Duisberg, Ulm & Munster, a total of 1310 ‘heavies’, for a 1.1% loss rate. Reconnaissance showed severe damage. 467 lost F/O T. Evans & crew (all 7 Evaded) … they collided after bombing with an engine on fire; they baled out before the plane crashed.
We took off at 1636, 3 min late, and immediately began climbing on course, south for Reading, then into France near Le Havre, mostly at 4000’, very bumpy, tried 5000’ to get out of cloud, then down to 3000’ & back to 4000’. As we neared the SW corner of Switzerland we climbed to 15000’ & skirted its southern border, seeing lights on in some villages.
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We had a good navigation trip to the target, keeping close to track & timing OK. We used GEE until 2026, then some LORAN fixes (some inaccurate) but sighted target at 2152, descended to 12000’ to bomb at 2211.
At 2214 I logged “air-to-air firing up – qr. to beam”
At 2215 1/2 “ “ “aircraft went in 40 mi ahead”.
We began descending in steps to 5500’ & continued to use LORAN until 2350 when GEE came good.
I got very airsick about 2250 (first time since Cootamundra!), and at about 2310 saw flak coming up from Mulhouse, so we turned to Port to avoid it. At 0110, the GEE box went unserviceable (U/S), and we read PUNDITS back to base where we landed at 0220. Flight time was 9h 45 min, bomb load was 1 x 4000 lb “cookie” & 9 cans of incendiaries & 1 Monroe.
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18.11.44. [symbol] 24. GYDNIA (“A” Target: Pocket Battleship LUTZOW).
A 5-Group raid, 236 planes, 19 of 467 & 15 of 463 Sqdn, on the Naval base. Considerable damage to the port area was reported. Two crews from each flight of both squadrons were to arrive at their targets … two pocket battleships, 9 min before the rest of the Group were to start bombing; the markers & the accompanying flare-force (they dropped lots of long-burning flares to light up the area for the Markers) arrived then too. We were supposed to see the battleships in the light of the flares & do our bombing between 2151 & 2156. Our bomb-load was 10 x 1000 S.A.P (Semi-Armour Piercing) bombs … unlikely to be really damaging, although the decks of the pocket-battleships were much thinner than on “real” battleships (although they had 16” guns, the same.)
We took off at 1712, already 10 min later than planned, & flew at about 3 – 4000’ at 180 mph until 2000, when we climbed to 11500’. GEE had given out at 1850, but LORAN was OK & I got good signals at 1920, but we hadn’t been given Loran charts that covered beyond 56oN. So it was dead-reckoning & the hope of a pin-point later. Then, at 2055 1/2, I got a Loran fix, on track, just below the 56oN latitude, which could be plotted. I got another dubious fix at 2105 1/2, about 5 mi Sth of track, then another good one at 2122 1/2, on track again. I got another good Loran fix at 2133 which allowed me to estimate the wind velocity at 190/23. We turned on dead-reckoning 3 min late at point E, & arrived at point F, on dead-reckoning 2 min late, and steered visually for our target. At 2150, Syd, our Bomb-Aimer, reported a smoke screen starting over the battleships area. The flares went down at 2150 1/2, but didn’t penetrate the smokescreen. At 2153 our Pilot, Peter, decided to “go-round” again. As we turned Syd saw the Lutzow, [indecipherable word] behind us now. We flew North East
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for a while, did a timed run, using his stop-watch, to be back over our target at 2158. But again, the smoke-screen obscured our target. We turned Northwards & repeated the timed run. All this time we experienced a lot of radar-predicted flak, close enough to keep rocking our plane. While we were doing this 3rd orbit, Peter said: “If we can’t bomb this time, we’ll go round again and lose height to bomb at low-level.” Syd said: “Geez, that would be bloody dangerous.” At 2206, the target was clear & we bombed accurately. On the photograph which we saw back at base the next day, 3 of our bombs hit the deck amidships, one very close to the funnel, and a 4th bomb right alongside in the water. We’d actually bombed from 11750’ at 150 mph (I.A.S.), heading 260oT. At 2208 I logged: “Lanc. crashed Stb. Bow, 20 mi.” We crossed the coast at 2216 and got a Loran fix at 2222 1/2, only 3 mi. S. of track. The rest of the trip home was uneventful, we kept close to track and landed at 0303, flight-time 9h 51 min.
[drawing of area map]
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I did some research about the Lutzow & Admiral von Sheer. They were both damaged and the Lutzow was towed to Swinemunde, the Admiral von Sheer to Keil, where, on the night of 9/10 April ’45, a raid using 591 planes, sank the von Sheer, and so severely damaged the light cruised Emden & the heavy cruiser Hippo, that their crews then scuttled them … they were unable to put to sea. Then on the night of 16/17 April, 617 Squadron attacked Swinemunde, & effectively disposed of Germany’s last pocket battleship, Lutzow, although I read that its crew also finally scuttled it, as it was beyond repair
[symbol] [underlined] 25 [/underlined]. 27-12-44. 5-Group sent 200 planes (15 of 467 & 12 of 463) to bomb [underlined] RHEYT [/underlined] (our [symbol] 25 trip), the railway yards there, part of Munchen-Gladbach, where we’d done our 5th trip. We took off at 1204, did a R. of A. to be back at base at 1220 at 6000’. We were supposed to fly in formation but there was a lot of confusion … we finally flew individually until 1309 when we joined the formation. Near the target, the other planes began turning towards the target long before reaching the GEE lattice line we were told to follow. We did as we’d been told, and bombed at 1505 1/2 from 17200’. The trip home was uneventful, the navigation easy, as we had GEE all the way, using the RHUR chain over Germany. We had some flak going close just after the target at 1512 1/2. We landed at 1705, flight-time was 5h., bomb-load was 14 x 1000 lb. H.E.
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[deleted] [circled [indecipherable number]] [/deleted] NIGHT 21-12-44. POLITZ. 17 of 467, 17 of 463, of 207 from 5-Group attacked synthetic oil plant. 3 Lancs lost over Europe, but 5 crashed in England on return … 90% of airfields were fogbound … most were diverted to Scotland, but some were so short on fuel they had to try to land in fog. (F.L. Kynoch crashed ‘M’ at Waddington, but no injuries.)
[circled 25] 27-12-44 RHEYDT. 15 of 467, 12 of 463, of 200 from 5-Group, attacked railway yards at Rheydt. No loss
C 5h 0m. 14 x 1000. 17200’
DAY 28-12-44 MOSS SHIPPING (OSLO FIORD). 4 of 467, 6 of 463 of 67 from 5-Group attacked a large naval unit off Oslo Fiord. No direct hits claimed.
30-12-44 HOUFFALIZE. 12 of 467, 12 of 463 of 166 from 5-Group attacked the German supply bottleneck at Houffalize. Cloud obscured target. (Main force of 500 heavies attacked Kalh-Nord railway yards near Cologne … results obscured by cloud.)
DEC ’44 SUMMARY. December ended in a long spell of cold, fog & snow which restricted operations and serviceability. 467 flew 172 sorties, losing 2 crews + 1 gunner. (7 KIA, 1 POW, 7 Ev) 8 crews finished tours. 1 crew crashlanded [sic] and were rescued.
(The 2 Lanc. Squadrons (467 & 463) had learnt that the 5-Group method of marking was the most cost-effective way of striking heavy flows to the enemy. From 17.8.44 (when Bomber Command returned to attacks on Germany proper, after the many short trips for 2nd Front, a total of 72881 sorties from which 696 aircraft were lost (… about 1%). In this period of 137 days [deleted] 467 & 463 [/deleted] [inserted] Bomber Command [/inserted] made 530 sorties per day (av.) & lost 5.1 planes per day (av.) … 265708 tons of bombs were dropped.
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[circled 26] 1-1-45. DORTMUND-EMS CANAL 18 of 467, 5 of 463 of 102 from 5-Group, breached the canal near Ladbergen, (the Germans had repaired the canal again.) They were using an enormous number of slave labourers (‘Todt’ workers … 40000 we heard) to repair these vital links in their transport system. (And so when the barges began to run again they ‘knew’ the Lancs would soon come, and they were ready with AA & fighters … it was a hot spot.)
(On this trip F/O Merv Bache got an immediate DSO … their B/A. was Sam Nelson (WaggaWagga) … onfire, [sic] crashed just inside Allied lines … they’d all baled out in time. F/S Thompson of 9 Sqdn. got a posthumous VC also.)
B 6h 40m. 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500. 10900’
Landed at STRUBBY on return, due to fog.
NIGHT 1.1.45 MITTELLAND CANAL (GRAVENHORST). 4 of 467, 6 of 463, of 152 from 5-Group with 5 Mosquitos. No loss. During all this period, Waddington, and most of England, was deep in snow. Aircraft were buried in snow, and runways could not be kept open for them. Landing on icy runways was difficult. (On 1.1.45, Bomber Command flew 598 sorties day & night, and 5 planes crashed trying to land.)
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More about the DORTMUND-EMS on 1/1/45.
Many years after the war I got to know Sam Nelson, (also a golfer), who was the Bomb Aimer in Merv Bache’s crew. He told me that his navigator was in the process of writing a small book covering their ‘troubles’ that day. I mentioned that I still had my logs & charts, including for that day, so I posted them to him, with the result that parts of my log & chart were photocopied (reduced size) and included in his book … and I received a copy; later a few more pages were sent about what happened to their crew members thereafter. Several of their crew had a reunion in Canberra just at the time when they refurbished the Lancaster display in the War Museum. They told the staff of their “trouble” on 1/1/45, and were given the privilege of going inside the Lanc, even though it was not then open to the public.
I’ve made a “pocket” at the back of this folder for that book.
On pages 33/4 of that book is some details about a major German air attack on Allied aircraft & airfields on the same morning as our daylight raid on the Dortmund-Ems Canal. It may have been fortunate for us that most of their fighters were otherwise-occupied that morning.
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[circled 27] 4.1.45. ROYAN (S. France).
8 of 467, 16 of 463, of 344 Lancs & 7 Mosquitoes. F/O R. Eggins (467) had a mid-air collision with another Lanc., they baled out & were rescued.
Stubborn German garrison holding out at Royan prevented Allies from using Bordeaux as a port. (the Americans had kept a big force in that area, hoping to capture Bordeaux much earlier.) Bomber Command was ordered to bomb the town. It appears that the order was cancelled, but that order not received by the Squadrons concerned. But the French people there were told of the cancellation. As a result 700 French people were killed & soured relations with Britain.
We took off at [deleted] 0122 [/deleted] 0104, did the usual Radius of Action to be back at base at 0140 at 2000’. We flew southwards crossing the coast near Portsmouth. We had GEE all the way 7 so kept nicely on-track; the winds mainly from NNE varied between 35 & 60 mph.
When just short of the target we got a message at 0359 1/2 “do not bomb for 2 min.” We were due there in about 1 min. I wrote “Have to orbit I think.” Then at 0400 1/2 we were told “Come in & bomb”, which we did at 0401 without having to orbit, at 6250’.
We had an easy trip home, airborne for 6h. 30m. Our bomb load was 1 x 4000 (“Cookie”), & 16 x 500 lb HE.
On the back of my chart are several diagrams showing what the displays looked like on the GEE-BOX, and an indication of the curves on our GEE Charts.
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NIGHT. 5-1-45 HOUFFALIZE. 10 of 467, 8 of 463, of 131 from 5 Group, with 9 Mosquitos attacked supply bottleneck at Houffalize in the Ardennes. Target was hit with great accuracy. No loss. (Main force of 664 attacked Hannover, losing [underlined] 4.7%. [/underlined])
[circled 28] 7-1-45 MUNICH. 11 of 467, 16 of 463, of 645 Lancs. and 9 Mosquitos. This was the last major raid on Munich by Bomber Command; the industrial area was severely damaged. 467 lost F/O W. McNamee & crew (all KIA) … Severe icing caused high fuel consumption … they ran out of fuel and baled out over the sea 5 mi. from Eye, but were not found.
V 8h 45m. 1 x 4000 + 6 J clusters.
(The winds on this trip were forecast at about 80 mph from NW, so the route to the target was direct across Germany, then home south of Switzerland. (Usually, on Munich trips, we’d go out south of Switzerland, hiding from radar behind the mountains – maybe – then come home, faster across Germany.) The winds, in places, exceeded 100 mph. We were forced to ‘waste time’ on the way to the target (dangerous over Germany!). We took 3 hours to reach Munich loaded, then 6 hours to come home empty!)
[inserted] I haven’t got my log & chart for this trip – mislaid when I was teaching ATC cadets at Forest Hills [/inserted]
NIGHT 13-1-45 POLITZ. 17 of 467, 14 of 463, of 218 Lancs & 7 Mosquitos from 5-Group, attacked the oil plant near Stettin. Intended to be [inserted] a [/inserted] blind H2S attack, but the target was clear and the 5-Group low-level-marking was used in an accurate attack. Photo-reconnaissance stated that the oil plant was reduced to rubble. No loss from Waddington.
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NIGHT 14-1-45 MERSBERG-LEUNA. 14 of 467, 14 of 463 of 573 Lancs & 14 Mosquitos attacked the synthetic oil plant at Leuna. Albert Speer wrote … “this was the most damaging raid on the synthetic oil industry”. (The remainder of Bomber Command raided Grevenbroich & Dulmen … a total of 1214 sorties.)
[circled 29] 16-1-45 BRUX. 16 of 467, 12 of 463 of 231 Lancs & 6 Mosquitos of 5-Group, attacked the synthetic oil plant in western Czecho-slovakia [sic] (the plant had P.O.W. camps quite close by). The raid was a complete success. Speer also mentions this raid “as a particularly severe setback to oil production”. (Bomber Command attacked 4 other targets this night with a total of 1238 bombers. All were successful … the loss rate was 2.4% (about 30). No loss from Waddington.
D 10h. 0m. 1 x 4000 + 12 x 500 (Not dropped – bomb circuit U.S.) 14250’
(The bombing circuit was faulty – we made 3 orbits of the target, taking 20 mins, but could not remedy the trouble. We set out for home with bombs aboard and flew home at fairly low altitude – varying between 4500’ & 8500’, our airspeed 15 – 20 mph slower than the rest of the force. Then we had to make a diversion into the North Sea jettison area to manually release one bomb fitted with anti-handling fuse. The result was that we were last home, nearly an hour late. As this was our last trip we were ‘expected’ to come home faster than usual & be ‘first home’ … many thought we were unlucky enough to ‘get the chop’ on our last trip. The aircraft had severe problems (besides the bomb circuit and resulted in a tragic crash on 2.2.45, killing all but one of the crew … included were T. Paine & W. Robinson from Mudgee.)
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I met Chris Jarret at a University conference in the 60’s and heard from him what happened to them in ‘D’ on the night of 2-2-45.
He was lucky to survive, although it was easy for the Bomb-Aimer to be first out when told to “Bale-Out”. The next man out would have been Tom Paine, the Rear Gunner, & he told me that he was the only other one to get out & open his ‘chute in time to avoid death, but that Tom landed over the crest of a hill & was killed by the plane crashing & bombs exploding near him, while Chris had landed on the other side of the hill.
Tom Paine was in my classes at Mudgee High right from 1st year in 1936.
Bill Robinson must have started in 1935 as he was a year ahead of us; but I can remember him as the school was rather small (about 400) compared to the 1000+ when I taught there in the ‘60s.
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NIGHT 22-1-45. GELSENKIRCHEN. 0 from 467, 1 from 463. (photographic)
JANUARY SUMMARY. The month ended with heavy snow and bad visibility. 467 did 90 sorties losing 3 crews (7 KIA, 14 Ev.) 4 crews ‘tour-expired’.
NIGHT 1-2-45 SIEGEN (Railway Yards) 21 of 467, 19 of 463 of 271 from 5-Group. 467 lost one crew – the navigator was our A-flight commander, Des Sands DFM, an Australian in the RAF on his second tour … he survived, parachuted, captured.
NIGHT 2-2-45 KARLSRUHE. 19 of 467, 16 of 463, of 250 from 5-Group. 467 lost 2 crews (14 KIA (incl. a ‘second dickie’ pilot) 1 POW. ‘D’ was one of the two. F/O A. Robinson [inserted] (pilot) [/inserted] and Rear Gunner – Tom Paine – went to school with me at Mudgee High – Tom was in the same class. (See extract from ‘The Bulletin’ for story by Bomb-Aimer survivor, whom I met accindentally [sic] at an external studies school at UNE (Armidale) in the ‘60’s.)
NIGHT 7-2-45 DORTMUND-EMS CANAL (near LADBERGEN)
13 from 467. 467 lost c.o. W/C J. K. Douglas & crew (+ second dickie Bomb-aimer) … 3 KIA, 4 POW, 1 Ev.
NIGHT. 8-2-45 POLITZ. 15 of 467, 16 of 463 of 163 total (5-Group was 1st ‘Wave’, other groups followed and put this important oil plant out of action for the remainder of the war. 1020 bombers attacked other targets including Krefeld.
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13-2-45 DRESDEN. 17 of 467, 19 of 463 of 144 Lancs and 9 Mosquitos from 5-Group attacked Dresden as the 1st wave of a 2-part attack, dropping 800 tons. The second wave, 3 hours later, dropped 1800 tons, mostly incendiaries, causing a devastating fire-storm. German report says that more than 50000 people died.
14-2-45 ROSITZ. 16 of 467, 16 of 463 of 224 Lancs + 8 Mosquitos from 5-Group, attacked the oil refinery near Leipzig. The rest of Bomber Command attacked 4 other targets – a total of 1316 ‘heavies’, loss rate 1.7%.
19-2-45 BOHLEN. 19 of 467, 16 of 463 of 254 Lancs and 6 Mosquitos from 5-Group. Raid was unsuccessful. The Master Bomber, W/C E.A. Benjamin DFF + Bar, was shot down by flak & killed. Only superficial damage was caused.
20-2-45 MITTLELAND CANAL near GRAVENHORST. 10 of 467, 10 of 463, of 154 Lancs & 11 Mosquitos of 5-Group … raids on the canal by now were called “the milk run”. A comment (in the Waddington report) … “5-Group had bombed the canal so often that the Germans could leave their guns aimed ready for the next raid”. The Master Bomber abandoned this raid when it could not be marked properly due to heavy low cloud. (The Main Force – of B.C. – did 4 raids using H2S. Total of 1283 sorties, loss rate 1.7%)
21-2-45 MITTLELAND CANAL (again). 10 of 467, 10 of 463 of 165 Lancs & 12 Mosquitos from 5-Group. Weather was clear, and the canal was breached.
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The Main Force raided 4 other targets, 1110 sorties; losses 3.1%. 463 Sq. lost their C.O. W/C Forbes on his last trip of 2nd Tour … shot down by German nightfighter ace, Major H.W. Schnaufer.
NIGHT 23-2-45. PFORZHEIM. 1 of 463 (Photo) 367 Lancs of 1, 6 & 8 groups. 1825 tons of bombs dropped … “The 3rd most effective raid of the war … killed 17000, and 83% of the town destroyed by a fire-storm.
DAY 24-2-45 DORTMUND-EMS CANAL. 18 of 467, 11 of 463, of 166 Lancs & 4 Mosquitos from 5-Group … The target was obscured by cloud and the raid abandoned. No Loss.
FEBRUARY SUMMARY. The weather was often bad. 467 did 158 sorties, lost 5 crews + 3 who baled out + 3 “2nd dickies”. (25 KIA, 15 POW, 1 Ev.) 3 tours expired. 1 Crew crashed in training.
NIGHT 3-3-45. DORTMUND-EMS CANAL. 15 of 467, 15 of 463, of 212 Lancs + 10 Mosquitos of 5-Group breached the aqueduct near Ladbergen in 2 places, putting it out of action until after the war’s end. 467 lost F/O R.T. Ward and crew (7 KIA); F/O R.B. Eggins & crew (6 KIA, 1 POW), and the C.O. W/C E. Langlois & crew (5 KIA, 2 POW) … he had only become C.O. on 9th Feb. 8 Lancs lost over Ger. 20 over U.K.[inserted] loss [/inserted] 3.6%
(This night the Luftwaffe mounted “Operation Gisela” sending 200 night fighters to follow various bomber forces into England (& so not being detected). They took the British defences by surprise and they shot down 20 bombers over England (some were Lancaster training planes … a couple at Wigsley, where I was Duty Navigator in the control tower!) The bomb dump at Waddington was attacked but wasn’t blown up. 3 German fighters crashed flying too low.
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NIGHT 5-3-45 BOHLEN 15 of 467, 15 of 463 of 248 from 5-Group, attacked synthetic oil refinery. Target was cloudy but some damage. Bomber Command made 1223 sorties for 31 lost over Germany and 10 crashed in England … “visibility had detiorated [sic] for returning aircraft”. (Percy Jobson, of Wagga Wagga, a friend of hockey years, was shot down, parachuted, on this trip … a big write up given.)
NIGHT 6-3-45. SASSNITZ - - a port on the Baltic Sea.
NIGHT 7-3-45 HARBURG. oil refinery (5-Group). Bomber Command total (on various targets): 1276, loss 41 (3.2%)
DAY 11-3-45 ESSEN by 1079 bombers … the largest day raid by B.C. … “paralysed Essen until the Americans entered. 467 lost 1 crew (all KIA) on collision with a Hurricane near base in F.A. training.
DAY 12-3-45 Dortmund. 1108 planes, record tonnage 4851 tons … with fighter escorts, over 2000 planes … “put the city out of the war”.
NIGHT 14-3-45 LUTZKENDORF. 5-Group attack on oil refinery, losing 18 (7.4%). Main Force of 568 attacked Zweibrucken & Homburg & other minor targets … 2.8% loss
NIGHT 16-3-45 WURZBURG. 5-Group, 225 Lancs & 11 Mosquitos, dropped 1207 tons with great accuracy in 17 minutes … 89% of industrial part of city destroyed. 467 lost F/O Thomas & crew (6 KIA, 1 POW). Main force attacked NUREMBERG with 480 planes, losing 28 (4.2%), due to night-fighters joining the bomber stream before the target
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DAY 19-3-45 ARNSBERG RAILWAY VIADUCT. 37 Lancs of 617 and 9 Sqdns (and 1 photo Lanc. from 463) dropped 6 ‘Grand Slam’ 10-ton bombs … the ‘earthquake-effect’ collapsed the viaduct … the film was spectacular.
NIGHT. 20-3-45 BOHLEN. 5-Group. The main force was on Hemingstedt with 675 planes, loss rate 1.9%.
DAY 22-3-45 BREMEN. 5-Group. Rail bridge.
NIGHT. 23-3-45 WESEL. 5-Group. 1000 tons in 9 minutes from 9000’ … as close army support … “British Army crossed the river before the bombers had left the area”, and Wesel was in British hands before midnight (the bombing ended at 2239). Wesel claims it was the most heavily bombed town in Germany … 97% of buildings destroyed in main town area; population reduced from 250000 at outbreak of war, to 1900 in May ’45.
DAY 27-3-45 FARGE Oil Storage, 5-Group plus 2 of 617 attacking U-Boat shelters with 23’-thick concrete roof. 2 of the Grand-Slam bombs penetrated the roof and brought down thousands of tons of concrete and rubble, rendering the shelter ineffective.
MARCH SUMMARY 467 flew 185 sorties, lost 4 crews (24 KIA, 4 POW), 4 crews completed tours.
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DAY 4-4-45 NORDHAUSEN. 5-Group … Military barracks Many ‘forced labourers killed’.
DAY 6-4-45 IJMUIDEN … on ships … raid abandoned due to bad weather.
NIGHT 7-4-45 MOLBIS. Benzol plant … “all production ceased”.
NIGHT 8-4-45 LUTZKENDORF. 5-Group. Oil refinery. ‘Put out of action until end of war’. Main force was on Hamburg 440 planes, & other targets, total of 918 planes … 1.3% loss.
DAY 9-4-45 HAMBURG .. oil storage (5-Group) and 617 Sq attacked U-Boat shelters with Grand Slam bombs, and Tallboy bombs. Both raids successful. On this raid German ME 152 & 153 jet fighters attacked the Lancs for the first time.
NIGHT 16-4-45 PILSEN 5-Group. Rail Yards.
NIGHT 18-4-45 KOMOTAU 5-Group.
DAY 23-4-45 FLENSBURG Railway yards. (Abandoned – cloud)
NIGHT 25-4-45 TONSBERG Oil Refinery & U Boat pens (Norway)
463 Sq. lost the last Lancaster of the war (crew survived)
3300 Lancasters lost in the whole war.
467 Sq from Nov ’42 to 26 Apr ’45 – flew 4188 sorties, used 214 Lancs. lost 110 by enemy action, 4 damaged – crashlandings but recovered. 590 KIA. 117 POW. 8E Ev. 5 DSO, 146 DFC. 2 CGM. 36 DFM
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[underlined] 467 SQUADRON – R.A.A.F. [/underlined]
467 Squadron was formed at SCAMPTON, LINCOLNSHIRE 7-11-42.
Moved to BOTTESFORD by 30-11-1942. Moved to WADDINGTON 11-11-1943.
Bottesford Station Commanding Officers: G/C. SWAIN, F.R.O: OBE: DFC.
From 3.3.43. – G/C. McKECKNIE, W.N: DFC.
[underlined] 467 SQAUDRON moved to WADDINGTON 12.11.43 [/underlined]
Waddington Station Commanding Officers:
16.4.43. G/C. S.C. ELWORTHY, CCB, CBE, DSO, MVO, DFC, AFC, MA.
31.3.44. G/C. D.W. BONHAM-CARTER, CB, DFC.
14.4.45. G/C. E.D. McK. NELSON, CB.
1.8.45 G/C. D.D. CHRISTIE, AFC.
24.8.45. G/C. A.E. TAYLOR.
467 SQUADRON COMMANDERS:
7.11.42. W/C. C.L. COMM, DSO, DFC. _ _ _ KIA 16.8.43.
19.8.43. W/C. J.R. BALMER, DFC, OBE. _ _ _ KIA 11.5.44.
12.5.44. W/C. W.L. BRILL, DSO, DFC & Bar _ _ _ Died 1964.
12.10.44. W/C. J.K. DOUGLAS, DFC, AFC. _ _ KIA 8.2.45.
9.2.45. W/C. E. le P. LANGLOIS _ _ KIA 3.4.45.
4.3.45. W/C. I.H. HAY, DFC. _ _ To disbandment.
467 STATION ADJUTANTS: F/L. BURFIELD_CARPENTER.
F/L. A.D. McDONALD (A18121): F/L. J.M.W. LOVE.
467 SQUADRON moved to RAF METHERINGHAM 16.6.45 and were disbanded there October, 1945.
[underlined] 467 STATISTICS COMPILED FROM OPERATIONAL RECORD BOOKS [/underlined].
First Operational Sortie – 2/3.1.1943 – To FURZE _ Minelaying.
Last Operational Sortie – 26/26.4.45 – to TONSBURG.
[underlined] OPERATIONAL SORTIES ATTEMPTED [/underlined]:
No. of a/c actually took off on operations: 3977
No. of Operational sorties completed: 3795
No. of Operational sorties failed: 182
[underlined] REASON FOR FAILURE OF SORTIE [/underlined]:
a/c failed to return – listed missing 105
a/c early return due to Engine Failure: 28
a/c early return due to Electrical Failure: 10
a/c “ “ “ to Armament Failure: 9
a/c “ “ “ to Oxygen Failure: 9
a/c “ “ “ to Instruments, radio, intercom failure: 12
a/c “ “ “ to Ice in flight & ice damage: 6
a/c “ “ “ to Navigational Error: [underlined] 3 [/underlined]
[underlined] 182 [/underlined]
No. of Sorties completed in a/c damaged by Enemy Action: 230
No. of Aircrew listed in Operational Record Books as flown on ops from 467 Sqdn, RAAF: (inc. RAF, RNZAF, RCAF): 1814
No. of Aircrew listed in ORB’s as War Casualty from 467 Sq: (includes) RAAF, RAF, RNZAF, RCAF): 760
No. of whole crews posted to 467 Sq. for Ops: 258
No. of whole crews finished tour of ops – 30 or more: 74
No. of whole crews lost on Ops: 115
No. of whole crews still operating when hostilities ceased 8.5.45. and not tour expired: 31
No. of whole crews posted to other Squadrons during tour: 34
No. of whole crews with no Ops. before hostilities ceased: 4
No. of crews from 53 Base who flew on ops from 467 Sqdn and not listed as posted to 467 Sqdn. 6
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[inserted] Extract of “WAR” List for an Operation … late 1944. [/inserted]
F/S J.W. Singer (Can) – Sgt A. Carson – [missing name]
PB. 193 ‘W’ – F/O R.J. Harris – P/O J.T. Adair – Sgt T. Andrews – Sgt R. Walker
P/O H.F.C. Parsons – F/L R.W. Cook – Sgt S. Saunders
EE.136 – F/O A.L. Keely – F/S W. Chorny (Can) – Sgt A.E. Wotherspoon – Sgt C.H. Connwell
F/S L.W. Tanner – Sgt S.D. Chambers – Sgt J.E. Johnson
LM.713 – F/O C. Newton (Can) – Sgt P. Grant – Sgt W. Gregory – Sgt E.H. Cooper (Can)
Sgt R. Flynn (Can) – Sgt L.G. Kelly – Sgt R.S. Stevens (Can)
LM.715 ‘O’ – F/O R.W. Ayrton (Aus) – Sgt M.J. Herkes – Sgt H.K. Huddlestone – Sgt D.K. Chalcraft
F/S N. Bardsley – Sgt W. Scott – Sgt J.A.W. Davies
ME.809 – F/O R.C. Lake – P.O J.A. Peterson (Can) – Sgt R.W. Baird – Sgt R.A. Morton
W/O G.B. Watts (Can) – F/S G.E. Parkinson – P/O R.D. Kerr (Can)
No. 467 Squadron, Second Wave
NF.908 ‘C’ – F/L J.K. Livingstone – F/L D.O. Sands – F/O E.G. Parsons – F/O R.N. Browne
P/O W.D. McMahon (Aus) – F/O J. Pendergast – F/O T.C. Taylor
PB306 – F/O R.J. Mayes (Aus) – F/O L.J. Hart (Aus) – Sgt D.H. Hamilton – F/S J. Manning
F/S A.R. Edgar (Aus) – F/S J.G. Muir (Aus) – F/S K.W. Cary (Aus)
LM.100 ‘D’ – F/O P.R. Gray-Buchanan (Aus) – F.S. H.G. Adams (Aus) – Sgt D.M. Coutts – F/S J.R. Giles (Aus)
F/S B.J. Payne (Aus) – F/S E.J. Taylor (Aus) – F/S K. Nichols (Aus)
PD.215 ‘F’ – F/O L. Landridge (Aus) – F/S D.G. Beverley (Aus) – Sgt J. Halstead – Sgt D.J. Allen
F/S K.C. Woollam (Aus) – F/S W.C. Denny (Aus) – Sgt B.A. Davies
LM.542 ‘K’ – F/O T.A. Gummersall (Aus) – F/S L.C.C. Chalcraft (Aus) – Sgt J. Clemons – F/S E.R. Baldwin (Aus)
F/O F.A. York (Aus) – F/S S.J. Anders (Aus) – F/S W.H. Bradbury (Aus)
LM.233 ‘M’ – F/O J.J. Sheridan (Aus) – F.S G.W. Gould (Aus) – Sgt B.J. Ambrose – Sgt J. Hodgson
F/S A. Raymond (Aus) – F/S W. Branagh (Aus) – Sgt R. Ward
LM.677 – F/O J.J.J. Cross (Aus) – F/S D.F. Edwards (Aus) – Sgt K.M. Pope – F.S W.K. Perry (Aus)
F/O V.L. Drouyn (Aus) – F/S W.V. Maurer (Aus) – F/S M.D. Wilkie (Aus)
NF.910 – F/O G.H. Stewart (Aus) – F/O R. Faulks (Aus) – Sgt G. Hopwood – F/S D.J. Morland (Aus)
F/S R. Galov (Aus) – F/S M.J.H. West (Aus) – F/S F.H. Skuthorpe (Aus)
NF.917 ‘Q’ – F/O R.S. Forge (Aus) – F/O H.M. Bissell (Aus) – Sgt W.C. Bradley – Sgt H. R. Harvey
F/O R.H. Darwin (Aus) – F/S E.J. O’Kearney (Aus) – Sgt R. Haire
ND.473 – F/O R.H. Mellville (Aus) – F/S J.L. Klye (Aus) – Sgt R.J. Brady – F/S D.D. Suter (Aus)
F/S J.F. Tongue (Aus) – F/S B.T. Hoskin (Aus) – F/S R.C.M. Newling (Aus)
NF.908 – F/O L.R. Pedersen (Aus) – F/S J.S. Hodgson (Aus) – Sgt D.R. Ba.dry [sic] – Sgt E.W. Durrant
F/S P.K. Garvey (AUS) – F/S V.J.M. McCarthy (AUS) – Sgt A.E. Dearns
NN.714 – F/O E.B. Rowell (Aus – F/S R.L. Morris (Aus) – Sgt A.J. Halls – Sgt. A Thomson
F/S D.J. Taylor (Aus) – F/S A.S. Smith (Aus) – Sgt A. Thomson
F/S D.J. Taylor (Aus) – F/S A.S. Smith (Aus) – Sgt J. Hodge
No. 463 Squadron, Third Wave
ND.133 ‘X’ – W/C W.A. Forbes (Aus) – F/O J.A. Costello – P/O W.A. Martin – F/S A.J. Norman
F/O W.J. Grime – P/O W. McLeod – P/O K.L. Worden
PD.311 ‘O’ – F/O P.J. Bowell (Aus) – F/S E.A. Petersen (Aus) – Sgt W. Forster – F/S W.H.J. Butcher (Aus)
F/S W. Plumb (Aus) – W/O J.R. Williams (Aus) – F/S I.D. Dutfiield [sic] (Aus)
LM.130 ‘N’ – F/O A.G. Stutter (Aus) – F/S P.L. Wilkinson (Aus) – Sgt H. Walsh – F/S M.F. Woodgate (Aus)
F/S P. O’Loughlin (Aus) – F/S D.J. Browning (Aus) – F/S H.R. Holmes (Aus)
PD.337 ‘L’ – F/O F.H. Smith (Aus) – Sgt E. Moss – ?
F/S B.A. Donaghue (Aus) – F/S R.T. Simonson (Aus) – F/S E.R. Cameron (Aus)
ND.977 – F/O G.T. White (Aus) – F/S G.D. Smith (Aus) – Sgt C. Jackson – Sgt V.G. Dunn
F/S H. Robinson (Aus) – F/S J.J.B. Middleton (Aus) – Sgt W. S. Bayne
PD.330 ‘F’ – F/O K.P. Brady (Aus) – F/S E.D. Rees – Sgt C.R. Levy – F/S G. Berglund (Aus)
F/S G.W. Boyes – F/S J.D. Stevens (Aus) – F/S J.E. Cox (Aus)
MD.332 – F/O B. Ward-Smith (Aus) – F/O R.W. Markham (Aus) – Sgt E. Taylor – F/S A.J. Tyson (Aus)
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[underlined] 5 Group, [/underlined] the biggest of 6 in Bomber Command.
Our 467 squadron was one of 18 Lancaster squadrons the Group. They were:-
9 at Bardney
227 at Balderton
[missing number] 4 (Rhod.) “ Spilsby
[underlined] 463 & 467 “ Waddington [/underlined]
49 “ Fulbeck
619 at Strubby
50 & 61 “ Skellingthorpe
630 “ East Kirkby
57 “ East Kirkby
617, 627 “ Woodhall Spa [symbol] Mosquitos
83 & 97 (Pathfinders) Coningsby
106 Metheringham
189 Fulbeck
207 Spilsby
[underlined] Some notable raids [/underlined]:
1944 Sept. 12/13. First operational use of [underlined] Loran [/underlined].
“ 23/4. Dortmund-Ems canal breached by [underlined] Tallboy [/underlined] (12000 lb bomb, designed by Barnes Wallis).
Oct. 3 Sea wall at Westkapelle (Walcheren Is) breached.
“ 14/5 Biggest night ops by Bomber Command of the war.
“ 23/4. Part of 1055 plane raid on Essen.
“ 25 “ “ 771 “ “ “ “, finishes it.
Nov. 2/3 “ “ 992 “ “ “ Dusseldorf.
“ 4/5. 174 Lancs breach Dortmund-Ems canal again.
“ 12 Tirpitz sank at Tromso by 9 & 617 Sqdns.
1945 Jan 1/2. 157 Lancs breach Mittleand canal.
“ 4/5. raid on Royan kills many French civilians.
“ 7/8. Part of 654 a/c; last raid on Munich.
Mar 14. Bielefeld aquaduct [sic] broken using Barnes Wallis’s new 22000 lb Grand Slam bomb. by 617 Sqdn.
“ 27. U-boat shelter at Farge blown up using the Grand Slam bomb, by 617 Sqdn.
Feb. 20/21 First of 36 consecutive night raids on Berlin by Mosquitos of 627 Sqdn.
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[circled 8]
[underlined] 5 Group [/underlined] Sqdns. As at 22.3.45.
Lanc I, III
9 Bardney
44 (Rhod.) Spilsby
49 Fulbeck.
50 Skellingthorpe
57 East Kirkby
61 Skellingthorpe
106 Metheringham
189 Fulbeck.
207 Spilsby
227 Balderton
463 [brackets] RAAF Waddington
407 RAAF Waddington [/brackets]
619 Strubby
630 East Kirkby
[symbol] 617 Woodhall Spa.
[brackets] 83 PFF Coningsby
97 PFF Coningsby [/brackets]
627 Woodhall Spa. Mosquito IV, XX, 25.
(83, 97 & 627 on loan from 8 Group.)
[inserted] [underlined] 1944. [/underlined] [/inserted]
Sept 12/13 First operational use of LORAN.
“ 23/4. Dortmund Ems canal breached by Tallboy (12000 lb).
Oct 3. Sea wall at Westkapelle (Walcheren Is) breached.
14/15 BC. biggest night ops of war.
23/24. 1055 raid on Essen. 25th 771 on Essen finishes it.
Nov 2/3. 992 on Dusseldorf.
4/5. 174 breach Dortmund Ems canal again.
12. Tirpitz sank at Tromas by 9 & 617 Sq.
Jan 1/2. 157 breach Mittleand Canal.
[inserted] 1945
Jan 4/5 Royan – many French casualties.
7/8 Last raid on Munich 654 a/c
Mar 14. Bielefeld aqueduct broken … Grand Slam 22000 lb.
27 U boat shelter at Farge successful using “ “ “
Feb. 20/21 first of 36 consecutive night raids on Berlin by mosquitos. [/inserted]
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Extracts from “The Hardest Victory – RAF Bomber Command in WW II by Dennis Richards. (Hodder & Stoughton, 1944.)
1944. March to June. The Transportation Plan, preparatory to OVERLORD … the invasion in Normandy. As part of the plan to convince the Germans that the landing would be in the Pas de Calais, far more bridges and railway workshops and marshalling yards were attacked North of the Seine than South of it. In this phase Bomber Command dealt with 37 of the railway centres, 8th American Air Force heavies 26, & AEAF (fighters, fighter-bombers, light & medium bombers, & recon. aircraft, a mixture of RAF & USAAF squadrons) 20. Bomber command dropped nearly 45000 tons on these centres, twice the tonnage of the other 2 put together. Harris in “Bomber Command” wrote:- “Bomber Command’s night bombing proved to be rather more accurate, much heavier in weight & more concentrated than the American daylight attacks, a fact which was afterwards clearly recognised by SHAEF when the time came (later) for the bombing of German troop concentrations within a mile or so of our own troops.”
In this phase, Bomber Command made 69 attacks, 9000 sorties & lost 198 planes (1.8%). They did enormous damage. In the end about 2/3 of the 37 centres were classed as completely out of action for a month or more, and the remainder as needing only some further “attention” from fighter-bombers.
Unhappily, the toll of friendly civilian lives was sometimes more than the “prescribed” limit of 100 – 150 per raid … (Coutrai 252, Lille 456, Ghent 482), but overall the total was much less than the 10000 “limit”.
The attacks on rail centres by all 3 air forces proved catastrophic for the Germans. Only about 12% of rolling stock was fit for use. A division from Poland took 3 days to get to West Germany, then 4 weeks to the Normandy battlefront!
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[duplicate page]
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[circled 2]
A particularly important raid, both in technique & results, was that on 5/6 Apr. (’43) on the Gnome et Rhône aero-works at Toulouse. 144 Lancs from 5 Group, with Leonard Cheshire of 617 SQN doing the initial marking at low level from a Mosquito. 2 Lancs of 617 reinforced the marking with great accuracy & this led to a raid which completely destroyed the factory. Thenceforth, Harris normally entrusted 5 Group (the largest in the Command) with its own marking, independent of the Pathfinder Force.
Bomber Command’s biggest task just before the invasion was to help silence the enemy’s coastal batteries … most nights since 24/25 May, & for deception purposes many of them outside the intended invasion area. But as D-Day neared, so the assault stepped up. On 2/3 June, 271 bombers attacked 4 batteries in the Pas de Calais (where the Germans most expected the invasion). On 3/4 June, 135 bombers attacked batteries at Calais & Winereux. On 4/5 June, 257 a/c attacked … this time in the invasion area. On 5/6 June (when invasion fleet was under way) Bomber Command put on max. effort … 1136 a/c (1047 attacked) [inserted] 5000 + tons of bombs. [/inserted] against [deleted] the [/deleted] 10 of the main batteries on the invasion coast. Other air formations & naval bombardment also attacked there & between them 9 of the 10 batteries were made incapable of sustained fire against the invasion forces.
In the week after D-Day, B.C. flew 3500 sorties to prevent reinforcements getting to the front. In the most skilful attack, 8/9 June. Lancs of 83 Sqn lit up railway tunnel at Saumur, then marked by Mosquitos, then 25 Lancs of 617 Sqn. dropped new 12000 lb “Tallboys” [inserted] [symbol] designed by Barnes Wallis. [/inserted] blocked the tunnel & delayed the Panzers.
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[circled 3]
During the struggle in Normandy, B.C. operated in strength close to battlefield. 14/15 Jun, 337 vs troops & vehicles at Aunay & Evrecy (near Caen). 30 Jun first B.C. daylight there … 266 Lancs & Halis & a few Mosquitos & Spitfire escort bombed a road junction at Villers-Bocage from 4000’ & frustrated a panzer attack. Of B.C.’s 5 other attacks in close support the biggest was 18 Jul .. GOODWOOD (max effort) … 1056 from B.C., 863 of AEAF & 8th A.F. to help the push SE of Caen towards Falaise …. but had bad weather & unsubdued anti-tank guns stopped the offensive (only 6 miles max.). But it impressed the Germans … Von Kluge who’d just replaced Rommel, wrote to Hitler on 21 Jul:- “There is no way by which, in the face of the enemy air forces’ complete command of the air, we can discover a form of strategy which will counterbalance the annihilating effects [underlined] unless we withdraw [/underlined] from the battlefield. Whole armoured formations allotted to counter-attack were caught beneath bomb carpets of the greatest intensity so that they could be got out of the torn-up ground only by prolonged effort … The psychological effect of such a mass of bombs coming down with all the power of elemental nature on the fighting forces, especially the infantry, is a factor which has to be taken into very serious consideration. It is immaterial whether such a carpet catches good troops or bad. They are more or less annihilated, and above all their equipment is shattered ...”
(He suicided a month later when Hitler wouldn’t allow a withdrawal)
On 7/8 Aug. 1019 a/c of B.C. raided 5 points in advance of Allied troops … helping Canadian 1st Army to open the way to Falaise.
Allies had 14000 a/c against German 1000 in those weeks.
25 Aug. Paris was free. 3 Sept. Brit 2nd Army in Brussels.
Resumption of oil targets delayed by V-1 threat.
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[circled 4] Jan (1944)
Hitler had hoped to begin V-1s vs London as ‘New Year present’ but damage to ‘ski” sites, & Fiesler works at Kassel & their own trouble with getting the bomb to operate reasonably – caused set-backs. Allied bombing of railways held up delivery of launchers & bomb components.
12/13 Jun first V-1 attacks. 7 of 55 sites managed to fire total of 10 … of which 3 reached England. But they improved. Bet. 15/16 & 16/17 Jun. 144 crossed Kentish coast & 73 reached London.
Operation CROSSBOW … B.C. + AEAF + 8th A.F. attacked V-1 sites from mid June to mid-August … using 40% of B.C. strength Targets were the modified launch sites, supply depots, & ‘large sites’ (V-2 rockets [deleted] maybe [indecipherable word] [/deleted]. B.C. attacked these day & night. B.C. flew 16000 sorties, 59000 tons vs the V-1 targets only losing 131 a/c ([symbol] 1%).
By mid-Aug, less need [symbol] defences (AA & fighters redeployed & more effect … + proximity fuses [symbol] [symbol] 20% reaching target; + balloons + finally our armies overrunning the launching sites.
Every day but one from 5 to 11 Sept Harris sent out 300 or more a/c to bomb [deleted] h [/deleted] [underlined] Le Havre [/underlined] area. (We did our [underlined] first trip [/underlined] on 10 [deleted] 8 [/deleted] Sept. 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500 lb.) that day 992 sorties. Total for the week 2500 sorties, 9750 tons … the ground attack after the last air raid on 11 Sept. succeeded & only c. 50 fatalaties [sic]. [inserted] (our 3rd) [/inserted] [underlined] Boulogne [/underlined] [inserted] we dropped 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500 lb. [/inserted] had become the next objective. We were in big raid on 17 Sept. by 762 a/c, opening the way for attack by Canadian army, … garrison gave in on 22 Sept, in diary of captured German officer: “Sometimes one could despair of everything if one is at the mery [sic] of the RAF without any protection. It seems as if all fighting is useless & all sacrifices in vain.”
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[circled 5]
Germans still held Dunkirk & Ostend … it became clear that key to faster supply to our armies was Antwerp, 40 miles up R. Scheldt. Allies captured Antwerp on 4 Sept. but Germans still held river banks, South Beveland & [underlined] Walcheren Is. [/underlined] dominating its approach from the sea. Allies tried, MARKET GARDEN, airborne troops to capture bridges over Maas, Wasl & lower Rhine … a disaster, losing 1st Airborne Div’n. [symbol] Try to open the Sheldt Estuary. B.C. began attacks on Walcheren Is. in 3rd week of Sept. Hitting batteries proved difficult. Canadian army told to capture Is. … their C.O. suggested bombing might breach its sea-walls & flood some low-lying batteries. Oct 2nd .. leaflets & broadcast to locals. Oct 3. .. Pathfinder Mosquitos in waves of 30 created a big gap in wall 60’ thick at top & 204’ at base. (617 Sqn with Tallboys not needed … took ‘em home!)
Many parts of Is. now flooded, but no surrender. Further attacks on walls on Oct 7, 11 & 17. We did our [underlined] 11th op [/underlined] [inserted] on 7 OCT. [/inserted] on [underlined] Flushing dyke [/underlined] walls, 2 sticks of 7 x 1000 lb, 2 runs at fairly low alt. & achieved a good breach.
We also bombed gun batteries on [underlined] Walcheren [/underlined] Is again on Oct. 23 (14 x 1000 lb) and Oct 30 (14 x 1000 lb) … [underlined] our 13th op [/underlined].
The plan was to take Wal. Is by amphibious assault & to ‘soften it up’, B.C. raided c 277 on Oct 28; then on Oct 29 with 358 a/c, then on [underlined] Oct 30 with 110 a/c [/underlined]. [inserted] [underlined] our 15th [/underlined] [/inserted] (us). On 1 Nov. Canadian & Scottish troops began a week of hard fighting … Royal marines sailed landing craft through the gaps in the sea-walls. B.C. flew 2000+ sorties in 14 raids there, 9000 tons of bombs … only lost 11 a/c ([symbol] 0.4%).
Antwerp not used for another 19 days … time taken to clear the estuary of mines.
[page break]
[circled 6]
B.C. continued to attack towns in Germany & coastal targets in the autumn & winter of 1944.
On [inserted] 12th [/inserted] Sept. we did our [underlined] 2nd trip [/underlined] on [underlined] Stuttgart [/underlined] (1 x 4000 lb + 13 J clusters). (Our skipper had been [deleted] there [/deleted] [inserted] to [underlined] Danstadt [/underlined] [/inserted] the previous night as “2nd-dickie”). Then our [underlined] 4th [/underlined] on Bremerhaven on 18 Sept. (18 cans). & 5th on Munchen-Gladbach the next night 19 Sept (1 x 2000 lb + 12 J clusters) on which Guy Gibson as master bomber went missing (KIA). Our [underlined] 6th on [/underlined] 23 Sept. was our first of 4 raids on [underlined] Dortmund [/underlined] Ems canal “the vital link between the Ruhr & North Sea”. (14 x 1000 lb). B.C. did about 10 raids on the canal, “each time draining the canal for several miles & leaving scores of barges stranded. And this was not simply a one-off piece of temporary damage. As soon as, by the effort of 4000 (Todt) labourers, the canal was once more fully working, B.C. breached it again - & went on doing so as required until the end of the war.” (It was a fairly “dicey” target – they [underlined] knew [/underlined] we’d be coming & [underlined] where [/underlined] (where the aqueduct was above ground level.)
Sept 26. Op [symbol] 7 on Karlsruhe (18 cans)
“ 27 [symbol] 8 “ Kauserlauten (18 cans).
Oct 6 [symbol] 10. Bremen (18 cans)
Oct 5. Daylight formation (!) on Wilhelmshaven (18 cans). - - cloud obscured target & we (& others) bombed by H2S … the only time we used it on ops … mostly we were denied its use because they reckoned German fighter &/or flak could pick us up from its transmission.
Oct. 19. Op [symbol] 12. Nuremburg (1 x 2000 lb + 12 J clusters).
Oct 28 op 14 Bergen (Norway) U-boat pens … but brought bombs back due to smokescreen over target. Had to descend to near mountain tops to clear cloud – did so safely using GEE.
[page break]
[circled 7]
“In the last quarter of 1944, nearly half the tonnage dropped by B.C. was aimed at Urban areas in general rather than on more specific targets. … eg. Stuttgart, Nuremburg; [underlined] Dusseldorf (our 16th [/underlined] on Nov 2nd, 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500) Munich our [underlined] 23rd [/underlined] on Dec. 17 (1 x 4000 + 9 cans + 1 monroe). & [underlined] Munich [/underlined] again our 28th on Jan 7th (1 x 4000 + 6 J clusters).
Our [underlined] 18th [/underlined] on 11 Nov. on Harburg oil refinery (near Hamburg) caused huge fire visible 100 miles on way home (1 x 4000+ 6 x 1000 + 6 x 500 lb).
16 Nov, Our 19th a daylight on [underlined] Duren [/underlined], part of a huge effort to react to battle of bulge destroyed the town to rubble. (12 x 1000 lb).
Our 24th Gdynic .. Dec 18, on Pocket Battleship ‘Lutzow’ (also there the P.B. Admiral Von Sheer) … may have caused enough damage to have Latzow towed (?) to Swinemunde where 617 Sqn finished it off on 16/17 April ’45 (10 x 1000 SA.P.).
5 Group. HQ Grantham, then Moreton Hall, near Swinderby.
[underlined] AOC’s [/underlined] Harris 11.9.39. Bottomley 22.11.40.
Slessor 12-5-41. Coryton 25.5.42. Cochrane 28.2.43
Constantine 16.1.45.
A/C. Hampdens, Manchesters, Lancasters, Mosquitos.
[underlined] B.C. casualties, Aircrew [/underlined] Operational K. 47120
Died as POW 138
Missing now safe. 2868
POW “ “ 9784
Wounded. 4200
[underlined] Non-operational [/underlined]
K. 8090
Wounded 4200
[page break]
A brief summary of the Bache crew’s experiences after the Operation to the Dortmund-Ems Canal on 1st January 1945.
A number of entries in the 160 pages that I wrote during 1945 in the second of my three war diaries refer to events connected with, or as a result of, the Bache crew’s experiences on 1st January of that year. (The three diaries contain a total of some 420 pages which cover only some sections of my overseas service in the RAAF, mainly while travelling to and while in Canada doing my navigator training, the Operation on 1st January 1945, that period which is summarised below and my trip back home from England. Unfortunately they do not cover any of the crew’s other Operational Sorties in detail but an amount of information on these is available from other sources in my possession)
The following very short summary makes use of extracts from some of the entries in my second diary, (other than from the 17 pages which contributed to my chronicle of events directly associated with our 16th Operation on 1st January 1945). It then goes on to refer to information that I have received since from various members of our crew covering their individual moves after the crew broke up in May 1945, plus each one’s post war status.
However, for the sake of brevity, this summary does not include any detailed references to those of our Operational Sorties which we flew between 19th February and 18th April 1945 – and some other of the events in which the crew were involved between January and May of that year – but which were not as a direct consequence of the Operation on 1-1-45 These matters may (possibly?) be covered at some future date.
So, picking up this account from a point part way through January 1945 –
My additional navigational duties during 1945.
During the period early in 1945 when our crew was non-operational, while we waited for Ernie and Cec to recover from their injuries received on 1st January, I was employed in the squadron’s navigation section in various ways. Some of these duties continued after we returned to Ops – particularly on the occasions where our crew was not flying on that Op.
Amongst other things, I had been requested by the squadron navigation leader to assist him by looking after the navigation Order Book, which covered matters such as changes in navigational procedures as these came through from No 5 Group Headquarters, as well as setting up an improved system for bringing this information to the notice of the navigators on the squadron. I was also asked to devise ways of drawing attention to cases or areas in which we should take steps to improve navigational performance.
I “dreamed up” a cartoon type character of a navigator who I named “Ayling-Rouse” (who was something like a mixture of the infamous idiotic pilot character, P/O Prune and the well known ancient Chinese philosopher, Confucius) to assist with this and it seemed to be quite successful in getting the guys’ attention! – the style being recommended for use elsewhere in the Group.
I was also shown by the section’s navigation assessment officer how to assess the squadron navigator’s Operational flying log sheets and plotting charts – and learned how to get the navigators away on “cross-country” training flights etc.
I was then introduced by the squadron navigation leader to Operational navigation briefing procedures and other of his duties – and taken to some of the pre-Operation navigational planning conferences, which were held via a Group telephone hook up between
[page break]
the various squadrons just prior to our squadron Navigators Briefing for the Op. concerned.
As an upshot of all this, I was made deputy navigation leader and eventually stood in for the squadron navigation leader on occasions – including the conducting of the Navigators Briefing and the navigation specialist officer’s briefing contribution at the Main Briefing which followed, for those of No. 467 Squadron’s crews who were to participate in the daylight Bomber Command attack on “Hitler’s Hideout” at Berchtesgaden, in April 1945.
As it turned out – like so many other planned attacks – this Operation had to be “scrubbed” (ie cancelled) at the last minute because of bad weather in the target area – but was carried out a day or so later by 359 Lancasters – of which some were from other squadrons in No 5 Group and some from Nos. 1 and 8 Groups. However it so happened that Nos. 463 and 467 Squadrons were not available to go there with them on that day due to our station’s involvement in an attack on Tonsberg in Norway which required take-off later in the same afternoon.
(As a result of the additional navigation section work which I had carried out while our crew was “off Ops” waiting for the return of Cec and Ernie and also after we returned to Ops, the squadron navigation leader, when he was informed by the squadron commander early in May that the Bache crew had been selected as one of several crews for a voluntary posting from No. 467 Squadron to Transport Command, tried to convince me not to go with them. He indicated that I was being recommended for a navigation leader’s training course – and would then probably go with the squadron on its intended transfer to the Far East theatre of War.
However, because of the close crew bonds developed during our earlier Operations – and particularly as a result of the events on 1st January 1945, I decided to stick with Merv, Sam and Cec in their transfer to Transport Command.)
Ernie returns to the crew and we return to Operations.
As events turned out, Ernie was declared fit for flying after several weeks and we resumed Ops with him back with us on 19th February, as by this time we were starting to “champ upon the bit” again. However we had to make use of the substitute wireless operators – Cec still being out of action.
Merv’s promotion and his new role on the squadron.
By then Merv had been promoted to the rank of Flight Lieutenant and on occasions had acted as O/C of our “A” Flight, then as O/C “B” Flight, to which our crew was transferred some time in March.
Cec returns to the crew for our trip in “S Sugar”
According to my diary, Cec – who had been recovering from his ankle injury in the RAF hospital at Wroughton, near Crewe, (as was Ernie after they were both transferred from the hospital in Holland) – was flown back to the squadron by Merv and I when he has discharged from there on 22nd February.
However he did not stay, but went to a convalescence place near Liverpool and remained unfit for flying for the remainder of our Operational Sorties – rejoining the crew just in time for our flight to Jouvincourt in France in PO-S on 6th May to bring a planeload of ex-prisoners of war back to England.
Page 2
[page break]
End of the war in Europe and its effects on No. 467 Squadron.
Hostilities in Europe ceased on 7th May 1945 and No. 467 Squadron was one of the Bomber Command squadrons selected for transfer to the Far East theatre of War.
Part of the Bache crew transfer to Transport Command.
Cec then joined Merv, Sam (who had been commissioned in February) and I, in our transfer on 11th May from No 467 Squadron of Bomber Command to Transport Command – to which we were posted as one of five “part-crews” from Waddington.
(These crews were taken from those who were apparently classified as “nominally tour expired” – ie those who had carried out 28, but in our case 25, Operations).
We went to the recently transferred RAAF No. 466, ex No. 4 Group Bomber Command Halifax squadron at Driffield for Transport Command flying training.
Sam’s Departure from Driffield.
We thought that the bomb-aimers who were transferred with us to No. 466 Squadron would have been trained as load masters for Transport Command flying crew “cargo supervision etc”, but were informed shortly after arrival on No. 466 Squadron that it had been decided they were now not required.
So Sam was to leave us! However the blow was softened considerably when he received notification that, because of his long period of service in the RAAF (including time served as a medical orderly in ground staff in the New Guinea theatre of war), he was to be repatriated back to Australia where he would be eligible for discharge from the Service.
He was first of all transferred to the Australian Aircrew Holding Centre at Brighton, on the south coast of England – to await a draft back home aboard a troopship.
Merv, Cec and I continue Transport Command training on No. 466 Squadron.
Merv, Cec and I continued on with No. 466 Squadron at Driffield – where we picked up an Australian Second Pilot (Merv becoming Senior Pilot) – and then converted to and flew in their Halifax bombers.
We then went with the squadron when it relocated to RAF Bassingbourn in September.
From Halifaxes to Liberators.
At Bassingbourne the squadron converted from Halifaxes to 4 engine Liberator bomber type aircraft – American designed and built – and a somewhat different aircraft from the 4 engine British designed and built heavy bombers in which we had previously flown. (It was not long before I christened the Liberator “the Flying Brick” after comparing its flying characteristics with those of our beloved Lancasters).
After we had completed a number of familiarisation exercises in the UK we were scheduled to undertake training flights and later, service transport operations, between UK and India.
The end of World War II in the Far East and the disbanding of 466 Squadron.
We were about to carry out our first training flight to India when the war in the Pacific area suddenly ended – resulting in the squadron being disbanded on 26th October 1945.
Page 3
[page break]
So the four of us, including the Australian Second Pilot, were transferred to Brighton for repatriation back home and discharge from the RAAF.
Our return to Australia.
As things turned out, all the Australian members of our crew, except for Sam, who had left England much earlier – finished up finally going back to Australia together on the same ship – the Athlone Castle.
Our return by sea to Australia is another story – including us becoming involved in a Mutiny aboard the first ship, the Orion, on which we were embarked – and from which we were later disembarked again, back in England, after it broke down in the Bay of Biscay!
Return Home and Post War
Sam
Sam, who received his promotion to Flying Officer in August, returned to Sydney in NSW for discharge from the RAAF. He and his wife, Valda, now live in Wagga, N.S.W.
Merv
Merv returned to Adelaide in South Australia for discharge as a Flight Lieutenant. He and his wife, Ethel, continued to live there until he died in 1974.
Cec
Cec returned to Brisbane in Queensland, for discharge, by which time he had been promoted to the rank of Flying Officer. He married Dawn there and they continued to live in Brisbane, but later moved northwards to Caloundra, on the Sunshine Coast in Queensland – where he died from a war related complaint in 1997.
Les
Les, Jim and Ernie remained at Waddington – Les transferring to No 463 Squadron to join Jack Blair’s crew (also ex 467 Squadron, on which they had done 24 Ops prior to the end of the war in Europe). They subsequently moved with the squadron to RAF Skellingthorpe in July. Here he remained until the war in the Pacific concluded, after which No. 463 Squadron was disbanded on 25th September 1945 and all of its RAAF personnel were repatriated back to Australia. He had the rank of Pilot Officer when he was discharged.
Les married and he and his wife, Norma, now live at Seymour, Victoria.
Jim
Jim remained on No. 467 Squadron at Waddington after Merv, Sam, Cec and I left for Transport Command – and while there joined F/O C F Stewart’s crew (which had done 6 Ops on 467 Squadron prior to the end of hostilities in Europe) – as mid upper gunner.
They were posted to No. 463 Squadron, which was also located at Waddington, on 4th June – and went with this squadron when it was relocated to RAF Skellingthorpe on 3rd July.
They remained with No. 463 Squadron until it was disbanded on 25th September 1945 – after which Jim was transferred to Brighton along with all its other Australian members and then returned to Australia for discharge from the RAAF. He was promoted to the rank of Warrant Officer sometime during this period.
Jim married and he and his wife, June, live in Sydney, N.S.W.
Page 4
[page break]
Australian War Memorial
Page 1 of [missing number]
No. 467 Squadron
No. 467 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force was formed at Scampton in the United Kingdom on 7 November 1942. Although intended as an Australian squadron under Article XV of the Empire Air Training Scheme, the majority of its personnel were originally British. The replacement of these men with Australians was a gradual process and it was only towards the end of the war that the squadron gained a dominant Australian character.
The squadron relocated to Bottesford on 23 November 1942 and commenced operations on 2 January 1943. A year later it moved to Waddington, which remained the squadron’s home until the end of the war. Equipped with Avro Lancaster heavy bombers, and forming part of 5 Group, RAF Bomber Command, the squadron’s operational focus for much of the war was the strategic bombing offensive against Germany. Bombing almost entirely by night, it participated in all of the major campaigns of the offensive including the battles of the Ruhr, Berlin and Hamburg. In addition to Germany, the squadron also attacked targets in France, Italy, Norway and Czechoslovakia. On 20 June 1943, 467 was the first Bomber Command squadron to participate in the “shuttle service” where aircraft would leave the United Kingdom, bomb a European target, and then fly on to an airfield in North Africa. There they would refuel and rearm and then bomb another target on their return flight to Britain. The German port of Friederichshafen was the outbound target, and the Italian port of Spezia the inbound one.
In addition to the strategic bombing offensive, 467 Squadron was also employed in support of ground operations prior to, and during the D-Day landing, during the drive out of the Normandy beachhead in mid-1944, and during the crossing of the Rhine in March 1945. The squadron also participated in the offensive to remove the threat posed by Germany’s terror weapons and participated in raids on the weapons research facility at Peenemende, and on V1 flying bomb and V2 rocket assembly and launch sites in France.
467 Squadron’s last bombing raid of the war was an attack on the oil refinery and tankerage at Vallo in Norway. Even before the cessation of hostilities, the squadron was employed to ferry liberated Allied prisoners of war from Europe to Britain and it continued in this role after VE Day. The squadron was one of several identified to form “Tiger Force”, Bomber Command’s contribution to the strategic bombing campaign against Japan. It relocated to Metheringham to prepare for this role, but the war against Japan ended before “Tiger Force” was deployed. 467 Squadron disbanded on 30 September 1945.
Between January 1942 and April 1945, 467 Squadron flew 3,833 sorties and dropped 17,578 tons of bombs. It suffered heavily in the course of its operations – 760 personnel were killed, of whom 284 were Australian, and 11 [missing number] aircraft were lost.
References AWM 64, RAAF formation and unit rolls [2 symbols] ORMF 0118, Roll 95 [2 symbols] 1/426 December 1942 – December 1943 [2 symbols] 1/427 January – December 1944 [2 symbols] 1/428 January – October 1945 [2 symbols] 1/435A December 1942 – March 1945; Units of the Royal Australian Air Force; a concise history. Volume 3, bomber units, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1995).; H.M. Blundell, They flew from Waddington! 463 – 467 Lancaster Squadrons, Royal Australian Air Force, (Sydney: W. Homer, 1975).
Category Unit
http://www.awm.gov.au/unit/U59451/
4/10
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
463 & 467 Squadron Notes on Ops
Description
An account of the resource
Extracts from publications giving details of all operations by 467 and 463 Squadrons from 10 September 1944 to 25 April 1945. Details include number of aircraft, target, bombloads and losses. Interspersed are details of operations carried out by Herbert Adam's crew on 467 Squadron between 10 September 1944 and 16 January 1945 which include many extracts from his diary describing operations and daily activities. Included are photographs of aircraft, crew members, air to ground views, targets, cook's tour and a map diagram. Details of 5 Group Squadrons, Extracts from books and a summary of Bache crew's experiences after operation to Dortmund Ems canal.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
H G Adams
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Seventy eight page handwritten book
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Memoir
Text. Personal research
Identifier
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MAdamsHG424504-170215-01
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
France
France--Le Havre
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Pas-de-Calais
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Germany
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Braunschweig
Netherlands
Netherlands--Walcheren
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Germany--Nuremberg
Norway
Norway--Bergen
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Germany--Hamburg
Norway--Trondheim
Germany--Munich
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Harburg (Landkreis)
Germany--Giessen (Hesse)
Germany--Euskirchen (Kreis)
Poland
Poland--Gdynia
Belgium
Belgium--Houffalize
France--Royan
Germany--Merseburg
Czech Republic
Czech Republic--Most
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Siegen
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Pforzheim
Germany--Sassnitz
Germany--Essen
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Halle an der Saale
Germany--Würzburg
Germany--Wesel (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Germany--Nordhausen (Thuringia)
Netherlands--IJmuiden
Germany--Flensburg
Norway--Tønsberg
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Czech Republic--Plzeň
Germany--Herne (Arnsberg)
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-09
1944-10
1944-11
1944-12
1945-01
1945-02
1945-03
1945-04
1944-04-05
1944-04-06
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
1944-06-30
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Tricia Marshall
463 Squadron
467 Squadron
5 Group
air gunner
aircrew
bombing
bombing of Toulouse (5/6 April 1944)
Cook’s tour
Gibson, Guy Penrose (1918-1944)
Grand Slam
H2S
killed in action
Lancaster
Mosquito
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
nose art
RAF Waddington
searchlight
tactical support for Normandy troops
Tallboy
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/868/27101/LHendersonIG19220504v1.1.pdf
9cd39ce6bc2aedc73f96559d333eb1a4
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Henderson, Ian
Ian Grant Henderson
I G Henderson
Description
An account of the resource
Five items. An oral history interview with Ian Henderson DFM (b. 1922), his log book, a diary of operation, a memoir and a photograph. He flew operations as a navigator with 153 Squadron.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Ian Henderson and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Collection is NtA.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2017-09-18
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Henderson, IG
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Description
An account of the resource
Ian Grant Henderson’s navigator’s log book covering the period from 28 June 1943 to 9 Aug 1945. Detailing his flying training and operations flown as navigator. He was stationed at RCAF Edmonton (2 AOS), RAF Bishops Court (7 OAFU), RAF Peplow (83 OTU), RAF Blyton (1662 HCU), RAF Kirmington (166 Squadron and 153 Squadron), RAF Crosby-on-Eden (109 OTU). Aircraft flown in were Anson, Wellington, Halifax, Lancaster and Dakota. He flew a total of 11 operations with 166 Squadron and 21 with 153 Squadron, total 32 plus one leaflet drop (Blois) and one recall (Neuss). His pilot on operations was Flight Lieutenant Legg. Targets were Calais, Saarbrucken, Emmerich, Duisburg, Stuttgart, Essen, Cologne, Wanne Eichel, Duren, Dortmund, Urft Dam, Royan, Bonn, Bottrip, Heligoland Bight (mining), Politz, Dresden, Chemnitz, Mannheim, Misburg, Bremen, Harpererheg, Paderborn and Lutzkendorf. This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Terry Hancock
Cara Walmsley
Title
A name given to the resource
Ian Grant Henderson’s navigator’s flying log book
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1945
1944-07-04
1944-07-05
1944-09-25
1944-09-26
1944-09-28
1944-10-05
1944-10-06
1944-10-07
1944-10-14
1944-10-19
1944-10-20
1944-10-23
1944-10-24
1944-10-25
1944-10-28
1944-10-30
1944-10-31
1944-11-02
1944-11-16
1944-11-19
1944-11-20
1944-11-29
1944-12-03
1944-12-28
1944-12-29
1945-01-05
1945-01-06
1945-01-28
1945-01-29
1945-02-03
1945-02-04
1945-02-05
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-12
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-15
1945-02-21
1945-02-22
1945-02-28
1945-03-01
1945-03-05
1945-03-06
1945-03-15
1945-03-16
1945-03-21
1945-03-24
1945-03-27
1945-04-04
1945-04-05
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LHendersonIG19220504v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Canada
France
Germany
Great Britain
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Alberta--Edmonton
England--Cumbria
England--Lincolnshire
England--Shropshire
France--Calais
France--Royan
Germany--Bonn
Germany--Bottrop
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Chemnitz
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Emmerich
Germany--Essen
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Helgoland
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Paderborn
Germany--Saarbrücken
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Wanne-Eickel
Northern Ireland--Down (County)
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Germany--Urft Dam
Alberta
Great Britain
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
153 Squadron
166 Squadron
1662 HCU
83 OTU
Advanced Flying Unit
Air Observers School
aircrew
Anson
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
C-47
Halifax
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
Operational Training Unit
RAF Bishops Court
RAF Blyton
RAF Kirmington
RAF Peplow
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1391/24703/MDunmoreG635201-160526-03.1.pdf
66e9cdc7b6b0f6706fc2113aa115abfb
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Dunmore, George
G Dunmore
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-05-26
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Dunmore, G
Description
An account of the resource
17 Items concerning Flight Lieutenant George Dunmore DFM (5601) who flew 45 operations as a flight engineer on Lancaster with 83 Squadron at RAF Scampton and then as part of the Pathfinder Force at RAF Wyton. Commissioned in 1944 he continued to serve in the general duties branch as flight engineer and then equipment branch until 1967. The collection contains his logbook, an account of a maximum effort operation, official documents and letters, a history of an individual aircraft, pathfinder certificate, recommendation for DFM, career notes as well as photographs and memorabilia. A sub-collection of 58 photographs of aircraft under repair or being manufactured in factories.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Louise Dunmore and catalogued by Nigel Huckins
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
OPERATIONAL HISTORY OF [underlined] AVRO LANCASTER IB R5868 MERLIN XX [/underlined]
29 Jun 42 Joined No 83 Squadron RAF Scampton – a/c letter “Q”
[underlined] OPERATIONAL FLYING WITH 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
[list headings] [underlined] Date [/underlined] [underlined] Pilot [/underlined] [underlined] Target [/underlined] [underlined] Hrs Mins [/underlined]
[list] 8/9 Jul 42 S/L R.L.Hilton DFC Wilhelmshaven 1,260 x 4 IB 4 13 [space] 11 Jul 42 S/L R.L.Hilton DFC Danzig 5 x 1,000 10 5 Daylight. 14/15 Jul 42 P/O J.E.Partridge Bordeaux Mining 1 x 22 1 x 14 1 x 13 set 6 1 x 22 7 40 [space] 18 Jul 42 S/L R.L.Hilton DFC Essen – Krupps Works 6 x 1,000 4 0 Daylight. 19/20 Jul 42 F/Sgt Calvert D. Vegesack 6 x 1,000 6 0 [space] 21/22 Jul 42 S/L R.L.Hilton DFC* Duisburg 112 x 30 IB 3 41 [space] 25/26 Jul 42 S/L R.L.Hilton DFC* Duisburg 1 x 4,000 6 x 500 2 x 250 3 32 [space] 26/27 Jul 42 P/O J.E Partridge DFC* Hamburg 1,260 x 4 IB 5 8 Holed in port wing on way out by flak ships. 5/6 Aug 42 W/C D.Crighton-Biggie Mining in Gironde River 22 – 13 set 2 13 set 6 44 – 13 set 1 7 14 Slight flak damage. 6/7 Aug 42 P/O J.Marchant Duisburg 1 x 4,000 900 x 4 IB 4 3 [space]
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[list headings] [underlined] Date [/underlined] [underlined] Pilot [/underlined] [underlined] Target [/underlined] [underlined] Hrs Mins [/underlined]
[list] 9/10 Aug 42 S/L R.L.Hilton DFC* Osnabruck 1 x 4,000 900 x 4 IB 3 57 Alternative target. 10/11 Aug 42 P/O J.Hodgson Mainz 1 x 4,000 8 x 30 IB 5 38 [space] 18/19 Aug 42 S/L R.L.Hilton DFC* Flenxburg 14 x 4 Flares 5 5 PFF. No attack. 24/25 Aug 42 S/L R.L.Hilton DFC* Frankfurt 112 x 30 IB 5 45 [space] 8/9 Sep 42 F/Sgt Jackson L.T. Frankfurt 6 x 4 Flares 8 x 250 IB 5 24 No attack. Flares dropped but cloud and haze plus intercom failure prevented bombing. 13/14 Sep 42 S/L R.L.Hilton DFC* Bremen 1 x 4,000 6 x 4 Flares 4 24 [space] 14/15 Sep 42 S/L R.L.Hilton DFC* Wilhelmshaven 6 x 4 Flares 8 x 250 IB 4 6 W/Op wounded by frire from another 4-engined twin fin a/c overtaken on return flight over the sea! 2/3 Oct 42 S/L R.L.Hilton DFC* Krefeld 4 x 7 Flares 10 x 250 inc 3 40 [space] 5/6 Oct 42 F/Lt J.E.Partridge DFC* Aachen 8 x 4 Flares 2 x 7 Flares 1 x 4,000 HC 5 45 No attack. Weather u/s. 2 x 4 flares dropped, remainder brought back. 6/7 Oct 42 S/L R.L.Hilton DFC* Osnabruck 1 x 4,000 HC 9 x 4 Flares 1 x 4 Flares 4 25 [space] 13/14 Oct 42 S/L R.L.Hilton DFC* Genoa 10 x 4 Flares 6 Flares internally 1 x 4,000 HC 9 20 Landed at Mildenhall (weather).
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[list headings] [underlined] Date [/underlined] [underlined] Pilot [/underlined] [underlined] Target [/underlined] [underlined] Hrs Mins [/underlined]
[list] 7/8 Nov 42 S/L J.K.M.Cooke DFC Genoa 10 x 4 Flares 6 Flares loose 1 x 4,000 HC 7 10 [space] 9/10 Nov 42 S/L R.L.Hilton DFC* Hamburg 9 x 4 Flares 1 x 3 whole and ! green with stars 1 x 4,000 HC 5 0 [space] 13/14 Nov 42 S/L R.L.Hilton DFC* Genoa 9 x 4 White 3 x 1,000 RDX 7 55 [space] 15/16 Nov 42 P/O R.N.H.Williams DFM Genoa 9 x 4 Flares 3 x 1,000 GP 7 20 [space] 29/30 Nov 42 Sgt Partridge H.A. Turin 1 x 4,000 gel 4 x 500 GP 7 25 [space] 2/3 Dec 42 P/O J.Marchant Frankfurt 10 x 250 inc 1 x 4,000 gel 5 55 [space] 21/22 Dec 42 F/Lt J.Hodgson DFC Munich 1 x 4,000 gel 7 07 [space] 15/16 Jan 43 S/L R.L.Hilton DFC* Berlin 1 x 4 Green 1 x 4 White 6 T.I. Red 6 T.I. inc 1 Red Flare int 7 20 No attack claimed. Flares brought back except 1 x 4 White. 11/12 Feb 43 F/Sgt Partridge H.A. Wilhelmshaven 6 x 4 White Flares 3 T.I. Green 1 x 4,000 HC 3 x 500 GP 5 23 Flares and T.I.s brought back as instructed. 13/14 Feb 43 F/Sgt Partridge H.A. Lorient 6 x 4 White Flares 4 T.I. Green 1 x 4,000 gel 4 40 [space] 14/15 Feb 43 S/L J.K.M.Cooke DFC Milan 9 x 4 White Flares 1 x 4 Red Flares 2 T.I. Red 1 Green Flare 1 x 4,000 HC 7 35 9 x 4 Flares brought back.
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[list headings] [underlined] Date [/underlined] [underlined] Pilot [/underlined] [underlined] Target [/underlined] [underlined] Hrs Mins [/underlined]
[list] 16/17 Feb 43 S/L S.Robinson DFM Lorient 8 x 4 White 4 T.I. Red 1 x 4,000 HC 4 22 Bomb sight u/s. 18/19 Feb 43 F/O F.J.Garvey Wilhelmshaven 1 x 4,000 gel 12 x 8 x 30 inc 4 22 Rear turret u/s for 3/4 of trip. 19/20 Feb 43 W/C R.L.Hilton DFC* Wilhelmshaven 4 T.I. Red 6 x 500 GP 4 07 [space] 25/26 Feb 43 F/O F.J.Garvey Nurnberg 1 x 4,000 gel 10 x 8 x 30 inc 6 24 [space] 26/27 Feb 43 F/O F.J.Garvey Cologne 1 x 4,000 HC 12 x 8 x 30 inc 3 24 Dropped but bombing circuit u/s – bomb doors damaged by bombs falling on them. 28/1 Mar 43 P/O U.S.Moore DFM St Nazaire 8 x 4 White 4 T.I. Green 1 x 4,000 HC 4 34 [space] ½ Mar 43 P/O U.S.Moore DFM Berlin 4 T.I. Green 1 T.I. Yellow 1 x 4,000 HC 6 15 Minor flak damage. 8/9 Mar 43 F/O F.J.Garvey Nuremburg 2 x T.I. Yellow 2 x T.I. Green 1 x 4,000 HC 8 x 8 x 30 inc 6 47 [space] 11/12 Mar 43 F/O F.J.Garvey Stuttgart 4 x T.I. Green 6 x 4 Flares 2 x 90 x 4 inc 1 x 4,000 HC 5 37 Mid-upper and Gee both u/s 12/13 Mar 43 F/O F.J.Garvey Essen 4 x T.I. Green 1 x T.I. White 1 x 4,000 HC 2 x 250 GP LD 1 x 250 GP LD 4 08 [space] 27/28 Mar 43 F/O F.J.Garvey Berlin 6 x T.I. Green 6 x T.I. Yellow 1 x 4,000 HC 2 x 250 GP (LD) 6 56 [space]
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[list headings] [underlined] Date [/underlined] [underlined] Pilot [/underlined] [underlined] Target [/underlined] [underlined] Hrs Mins [/underlined]
[list] 29/30 Mar 43 F/O F.J.Garvey Berlin 2 x T.I. Yellow 1 x Green with Red 3 x 4 White 4 x T.I. Red 1 x 4,000 HC 7 08 Flak damage. 2/3 Apr 43 F/Sgt McNichol G.A. St Nazaire 4 x T.I. Red 6 x 1,000 GP 4 x 500 GP 4 36 [space] 23/24 May 43 F/O F.J.Garvey Dortmund 4 x T.I. Green 1 x T.I. Green (LB) 4 x 1,000 GP (NF) 1 x 4,000 HE 2 x 1,000 GP (LD) 4 33 [space] 25/26 May 43 F/O F.J.Garvey Dusseldorf 1 x T.I. Yellow (LB) 1 x T.I. Green (LB) 3 x T.I. Green 1 x 4,000 HC 3 x 1,000 GP 1 x 1,000 GP (LD) 4 08 [space] 27/28 May 43 F/Sgt King R. Essen 1 x 4,000 HC 4 x 1,000 GP 6 x 500 MC 4 34 [space] 29/30 May 43 F/O M.R. Chick Wuppertal 1 x 4,000 HC 1,008 x 4 inc 72 x 4 ‘x’ inc 4 48 [space] 11/12 Jun 43 F/O M.R.Chick Munster 1 x 4,000 12 SPC x 8 x 30 4 52 [space] 12/13 Jun 43 F/O M.R.Chick Bochum 1 x 4,000 HC 1 x 1,000 GP 1 x 1000 GP (LD) 12 x 90 x 4 inc 4 36 [space] 16/17 Jun 43 F/Sgt Cummings M.K. Cologne 1 x 4,000 HC 12 x 90 x 4 inc 4 07 [space]
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[list headings] [underlined] Date [/underlined] [underlined] Pilot [/underlined] [underlined] Target [/underlined] [underlined] Hrs Mins [/underlined]
[list] 19/20 Jun 43 P/O H.Mappin Moutchanin 5 x 1,000 MC 8 x 500 MC 3 45 [space] 21/22 Jun 43 F/O M.R.Chick Krefeld 1 x 4,000 HC 12 x 90 x 4 inc 4 18 [space] 22/23 Jun 43 F/Lt F.J.Garvey Mulheim 8 x T.I. Green 1 x 4,000 HC 6 x 1,000 GP 4 07 Flak damage. 24/25 Jun 43 F/Lt F.J.Garvey Elberfeld 1 x T.I. Green LB 4 x T.I. Green 1 x 4,000 HC 6 x 1,000 GP (2LD) 4 24 [space] 28/29 Jun 43 F/Lt F.J.Garvey Cologne 3 x T.I. Green 1 x T.I. Green LB 1 x 4,000 HC 6 x 1,000 MC 4 19 [space] 3 Jul 43 F/Lt F.J.Garvey Cologne 1 x T.I. Green LB 3 x T.I. Green 1 x 4,000 HC 6 x 1,000 MC Backer Up 4 48 Windscreen holed. 12/13 Jul 43 F/O W.R.Thompson Turin 8 x 500 GP LD 6 x 8 x 30 inc 9 30 [space] 24/25 Jul 43 S/L R.J.Manton Hamburg 1 x 4,000 HC 4 x 1,000 MC 1 x 12 x 20(F) 6 11 [space] 25/26 Jul 43 F/Lt F.J.Garvey Essen 1 x 4,000 HC 3 x 1,000 MC 2 x T.I. Green (LB) 3 x T.I. Green 4 39 Passenger: General Anderson USAF
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[list headings] [underlined] Date [/underlined] [underlined] Pilot [/underlined] [underlined] Target [/underlined] [underlined] Hrs Mins [/underlined]
[list] 27/29 Jul 43 F/Lt F.J.Garvey Hamburg 2 x T.I. Green LB 3 x T.I. Green 1 x 4,000 HC 3 x 1,000 GP LD 5 34 [space] 29/30 Jul 43 S/L R.J.Manton Hamburg 1 x 4,000 HC 10 x 500 MC 5 42 [space] 12/13 Aug 43 F/Lt F.J.Garvey Milan 2 x T.I. Green LB 2 x T.I. Green 1 x 4,000 7 47 [space] 14/15 Aug 43 F/Lt F.J.Garvey Milan 4 x T.I. Yellow 1 x 4,000 3 x 500 8 07 [space]
[underlined] OPERATION FLYING WITH 467 SQUADRON (BOTTESFORD) – a/c letter “S”
*27/28 Sep 43 P/O A.M.Finch Hanover 1 x 4,000 HC 104 x 30 1,260 x 4 inc 5 23 Recommended a/c after [underlined] 78 [/underlined] trips unreliable for ops. *29 Sep 43 P/O N.M.McClelland Bochum 1 x 4,000 HC 104 x 30 1,260 x 4 inc 4 50 [space] *2/3 Oct 43 F/Lt H.B.Locke Munich 1 x 4,000 HC 84 x 30 600 x 4 inc 8 17 [space] *3/4 Oct 43 F/O J.A.Colpus Kassel 1 x 4,000 HC 24 x 30 1,440 x 4 inc 6 11 [space] *4/5 Oct 43 P/O B.R.Jones Frankfurt 1 x 4,000 HC 1,440 x 4 inc 6 51 [space] *7/8 Oct 43 F/O J.A.Colpus Stuttgart 1 x 4,000 HC 72 x 30 990 x 4 inc 6 50 Landed at Tangmere
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*18/19 Oct 43 P/O N.M.McClelland Hanover 1 x 4,000 HC 104 x 30 1,260 x 4 inc 5 15 This aircraft ‘S’ is only fit for a conversion unit *3/4 Nov 43 P/O N.M.McClelland Dusseldorf 1 x 4,000 HC 108 x 30 1,560 x 4 inc 4 21 [space] *10/11 Nov 43 P/O A.Fisher Modane 1 x 4,000 HC 44 x 30 840 x 4 inc 7 35 [space]
11 Nov 43 Moved with Squadron to Waddington.
*18/19 Nov 43 P/O N.M.McClelland Berlin 1 x 4,000 HC 52 x 30 1,170 x 4 inc 8 21 Shot-up over Bonn. *23/24 Nov 43 P/O N.M.McClelland Berlin 1 x 4,000 HC 48 x 30 900 x 4 inc 6 31 [space] *23/24 Nov 43 P/O N.M.McClelland Berlin 1 x 4,000 HC 64 x 30 1,230 x 4 inc 6 31 [space] 26/27 Nov 43 F/O J.A.Colpus Berlin 1 x 4,000 HC 56 x 30 1,050 x 4 inc 7 46 Had collision with another Lancaster just after bombing the target. Went into severe dive to port, but by use of rudder aileron and engines, aircraft maintained height and landed at Tholthorpe. 15/16 Feb 44 P/O J.W.M.McManus Berlin 1 x 4,000 HC 6 x 30 900 x 4 ‘X’ 6 48 [space]
* Sorties credited to other aircraft in the official records for which there is sufficient evidence to indicate that they were flown in R5868.
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[page break]
[list headings] [underlined] Date [/underlined] [underlined] Pilot [/underlined] [underlined] Target [/underlined] [underlined] Hrs Mins [/underlined]
[list] 19/20 Feb 44 P/O J.W.M.McManus Leipzig 1 x 4,000 HC 36 x 30 1,050 x 4 150 x 4 ‘x’ 7.24 [space] 20/21 Feb 44 P/O J.W.M.McManus Stuttgart 1 47 DNCO (Did Not Complete Operation) Port Outer shaky on take-off, cut at 13,000 ft. Bomb load jettisoned. 24/25 Feb 44 P/O J.W.M.McManus Schweinfurt 1 x 4,000 HC 104 x 30 900 x 4 inc 7 32 [space] 25/26 Feb 44 P/O J.W.M.McManus Augsburg 1 x 4,000 HC 92 x 30 650 x 4 100 x 4 ‘x’ IB 7 45 [space] ½ Mar 44 P/O J.W.M.McManus Stuttgart 1 x 4,000 HC 72 x 30 800 x 4 100 x 4 ‘x’ IB 8 08 [space] 18/19 Mar 44 P/O J.W.M.McManus Frankfurt 1 x 4,000 88 x 30 1,200 x 4 inc 150 x 4 ‘x’ 5 58 [space] 22/23 Mar 44 P/O J.W.M.McManus Frankfurt 1 x 4,000 60 x 30 1,500 x 4 inc 5 12 Tail wheel tyre collapsed on landing (possibly flak damage). 24/25 Mar 44 P/O J.W.M.McManus Berlin 3 19 No attack. Port outer failure. Port inner oil leaks. Bombs jettisoned. 25/26 Mar 44 P/O R.E.Llewelyn Aulnoye 13 x 1,000 MC 5 15 Bombed with port outer engine failure – returned at 5,000 ft resulting in just making Tangmere. 11/12 Apr 44 P/O A.B.L.Tottenham Aachen 16 x 5000 MC 30 x 4 inc 4 11 [space]
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[list headings] [underlined] Date [/underlined] [underlined] Pilot [/underlined] [underlined] Target [/underlined] [underlined] Hrs Mins [/underlined]
[list] 18/19 Apr 44 P/O A.B.L.Tottenham Juvisy 14 x 1,000 M fused 6 hr delay 4 15 [space] 20/21 Apr 44 P/O A.B.L.Tottenham La Chappelle 18 x 500 MC 4 17 [space] 22/23 Apr 44 P/O A.B.L.Tottenham Brunswick 1 x 2,000 HC 12 x 500 ‘J’ clusters 5 27 [space] 24/25 Apr 44 P/O A.B.L.Tottenham Munich 6 x 500 ‘J’ inc 144 x 30 inc 9 39 Landed at Market Harborough. 26/27 Apr 44 P/O A.B.L.Tottenham Schweinfurt 1,800 x 4 inc 150 x 4 ‘x’ IB 8 58 [space]28/29 Apr 44 P/O A.B.L.Tottenham St Medard-en-Jalles 6 x 1,000 (USA) GP 5 x 500 MC 7 29 [space] 3/4 May 44 P/O T.N.Scholefield Mailly 1 x 4,000 HC 16 x 500 MC 5 33 [space] 6/7 May 44 P/O T.N.Scholefield Sables-sur-Sarthe/Louailles 13 x 1,000 GP (USA) 4 46 [space] 10/11 May 44 P/O T.N.Scholefield Lille 1 x 4,000 HC 16 x 500 MC 3 28 [space] 11/12 May 44 P/O T.N.Scholefield Bourg Leopold 3 36 Ordered NOT to bomb. Fighter attack for 9 1/2 mins by 2 Ju 88s. Successfully forestalled 9 or 10 attacks carrying full bomb load. 5/6 Jun 44 F/O I.Fotheringham St Pierre du Mont 11 x 1,000 GP (USA0 4 x 500 GP 4 12 [space]
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[list headings] [underlined] Date [/underlined] [underlined] Pilot [/underlined] [underlined] Target [/underlined] [underlined] Hrs Mins [/underlined]
[list] 6/7 Jun 44 F/O I.Fotheringham Argentan 2 x 1,000 MC 2 x 1,000 SAP (USA) 10 x 500 GP 3 59 8/9 Jun 44 F/O I.Fotheringham Rennes 12 x 500 GP 2 x 500 LD 2 x 1,000 SAP (USA) 6 11 Landed Metheringham. 12/13 Jun 44 F/Sgt Millar K.V. Poitiers 11 x 500 MC 2 x 1,000 GP (USA) 12/13 Jun 44 F/Sgt Millar K.V. Poitiers 11 x 500 MC 2 x 1,000 GP (USA) 1 x 1,000 MC 6 35 [space] 14/15 Jun 44 F/O I.Fotheringham Aunay sur Odon 11 x 1,000 MC 4 x 500 MC 4 35 Army Support. 24/25 Jun 44 F/O G.C.Skelton Prouville 14 x 500 MC 2 x 1,000 MC 3 22 ‘P’ Plane Installations. 27/28 Jun 44 F/O I.Fotheringham Vitry 9 x 1,000 GP (USA) 2 x 500 GP (USA) 2 x 500 GP LD 72 hrs 7 31 [space] 29 Jun 44 F/Sgt Johnson M.G. Beauvoir 11 x 1,000 4 x 500 3 25 Buzz-Bomb site. Daylight attack.4/5 Jul 44 F/O W.R.Williams St Leu d’Esserent 11 x 1,000 4 x 500 4 23 Buzz-Bomb site. 7/8 Jul 44 P/O M.G.Johnson St Leu d’Esserent 11 x 1,000 4 x 500 4 49 Buzz-Bomb site. 14/14 Jul 44 P/O M.G.Johnson Villeneuve St Georges 16 x 500 GP 2 x 500 GP 6 hr LD 6 44 [space] 18 Jul 44 F/Sgt Cowan I.R. Caen 11 x 1,000 SAP (USA) 4 x 500 MC 3 30 Daylight.
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[list headings] [underlined] Date [/underlined] [underlined] Pilot [/underlined] [underlined] Target [/underlined] [underlined] Hrs Mins [/underlined]
[list] 18/19 Jul 44 F/O M.G.Johnson Revigny 10 x 1,000 MC 12 hrs LD 3 x 500 12 hrs 5 07 [space] 8 Dec 44 W/C J.K.Douglas Urft Dam 14 x 1,000 4 25 Daylight attack. Landed at Ford. 17/18 Dec 44 S/L E.L.Langlais Munich 1 x 4,000 9 09 [space] 18/19 Dec 44 F/O P.K.Shanahan Gydnia 9 x 1,000 9 19 [space] 21/22 Dec 44 F/O G.A.Stewart Politz 1 x 4,000 HC 5 x 1,000 MC 10 51 Landed at Leuchars. 27 Dec 44 F/Lt M.G.Johnson Rheydt 13 x 1,000 MC 4 53 Daylight. ½ Jan 45 F/O W.K.Boxsell Gravenhorst-Mittelland Canal 13 x 1,000 MC 6 38 Landed at Lossiemouth. 13/14 Jan 45 S/L E.L.Langlais Politz 1 x 4,000 HC 9 x 500 MC 2 x 500 MC LD 10 10 [space] 14/15 Jan 45 F/O J.J.J.Cross Merseberg 1 x 4,000 HC 9 x 500 GP 9 11 Landed at East Moor. 16/17 jan 45 F/Lt F.Lawrence Brux 1 x 4,000 HC 10 x 500 MC 2 x 500 MC LD 9 43 Hit by light flak. Bomb Aimer slightly injured. 1/2 Feb 45 F/Lt F.Lawrence Siegen 1 x 4,000 HC 16 x 500 MC 6 11 [space] 2/3 Feb 45 S/L E.L.Langlais Karslruhr 1 x 4,000 HC 12 SBCs (150 x 4 inc) 7 04 [space] 16/17 Mar 45 F/Lt P.K.Shanahan Wurzburg 1 x 4,000 HC 11 SBC (150 x 4 inc) 6 40 [space]
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[list headings] [underlined] Date [/underlined] [underlined] Pilot [/underlined] [underlined] Target [/underlined] [underlined] Hrs Mins [/underlined]
[list] 20/21 Mar 45 F/O L.W.Baker Bohlen 1 x 4,000 HC 14 x 500 MC 8 19 [space] 22 Mar 45 W/C I.H.A.Hay Bremen 14 x 1,000 MC 5 19 Daylight attack. 23/24 mar 45 F/O L.W.Baker wesel 13 x 1,000 MC 5 32 [space] 27 Mar 45 F/O L.W.Baker Farge 11 x 1,000 4 35 Daylight attack. 7 small flak holes in wings. 4 Apr 45 W/C I.H.A.Hay Nordhausen 1 x 4,000 HC 16 x 500 MC 7 09 Daylight attack. 6 Apr 45 S/L W.M.Kynock Ijmuiden 14 x 1,000 MC 3 18 Daylight. No attack made. Army already there. Turned back by the Master Bomber. 9 Apr 45 W/C I.H.A.Hay Hamburg 13 x 1,000 MC 4 18 Daylight. 16/17 Apr 45 F/O R.A.Swift Pilsen 1 x 4,000 HC 13 x 500 MC 8 23 Landed at Boscombe Down. 18/19 Apr 45 F/O L.W.Baker Komotau (Czechoslovakia) 18 x 500 MC 8 08 Landed at Lyneham. 23 Apr 45 F/O L.W.Baker Flensberg 8 x 1,000 MC 6 x 500 MC 5 24 No attack made Weather u/s.
Grand Total of Operational Flying = [underlined] 795 25 [/underlined]
Bombs Dropped Operationally = [underlined] 466 tons approx. [/underlined]
[underlined] POST-WAR HISTORY [/underlined]
[list] 23 Aug 45 to 15 MU – exhibition aircraft. 16 Mar 56 Struck off charge as an exhibition aircraft and transferred to 13 MU Wroughton to the Historical Aircraft Collection (Museum). 1959 To Scampton – for display. 24 Nov 70 to 71 MU for refurbishing. 12 Mar 72 To RAF Museum, Hendon.
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Operational history of Lancaster 1B R5868
Description
An account of the resource
List of 135 operations flown by Lancaster R5868 from 8/9 June 1942 until 23 April 1945. List includes pilot, target, bomb load. hours flown and comments. Was with 83 Squadron at RAF Scampton and Wyton then 467 Squadron at RAF Bottesford and then RAF Waddington until the end of the war.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1942-06-29
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Thirteen page typewritten document
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MDunmoreG635201-160526-03
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
England--Lincolnshire
England--Cambridgeshire
England
Germany
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Poland
Poland--Gdańsk
France
Germany--Essen
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Vegesack
Germany--Mainz (Rhineland-Palatinate)
Germany--Flensburg
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Krefeld
Germany--Kiel
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Germany--Aachen
Italy
Italy--Genoa
Italy--Turin
Germany--Munich
Germany--Berlin
France--Lorient
Italy--Milan
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Cologne
France--Saint-Nazaire
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Wuppertal
Germany--Bochum
France--Montchanin
Germany--Kassel
France--Modane
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Schweinfurt
Germany--Augsburg
France--Maubeuge Region
Germany--Braunschweig
France--Bourg-en-Bresse
France--Saint-Médard-en-Jalles
France--Mailly-le-Camp
France--Sablé-sur-Sarthe
France--Lille
Belgium
Belgium--Leopoldsburg
France--Saint-Pierre-du-Mont (Landes)
France--Argentan
France--Rennes
France--Poitiers
France--Villers-Bocage (Calvados)
France--Abbeville Region
France--Vitry-en-Artois
France--Beauvoir-sur-Mer
France--Creil
France--Caen
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Siegen
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Würzburg
Germany--Wesel (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Germany--Nordhausen (Thuringia)
Netherlands
Netherlands--IJmuiden
Czech Republic
Czech Republic--Pilsen Basin
Czech Republic--Chomutov
Germany--Düsseldorf
Great Britain
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Osnabrück
Germany--Stuttgart
France--Bordeaux (Nouvelle-Aquitaine)
Great Britain
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1945
1943-07-24
1943-07-25
1943-07-27
1943-07-28
1943-07-29
1943-07-30
1944-04-18
1944-04-19
1944-05-03
1944-05-04
1944-07-04
1944-07-05
1944-06
1944-07
1944-08
1942-07
1942-08
1942-09
1942-10
1942-11
1942-12
1944-02
1944-03
1944-04
1944-05
1944-12
1945-01
1945-02
1945-03
1945-04
1944-06-05
1944-06-06
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
1944-06-24
1944-06-25
1944-07-18
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Robin Christian
467 Squadron
83 Squadron
bombing of Hamburg (24-31 July 1943)
Bombing of Mailly-le-Camp (3/4 May 1944)
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
bombing of the Juvisy, Noisy-le-Sec and Le Bourget railways (18/19 April 1944)
bombing of the Normandy coastal batteries (5/6 June 1944)
bombing of the Pas de Calais V-1 sites (24/25 June 1944)
Lancaster
mine laying
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Pathfinders
RAF Bottesford
RAF Scampton
RAF Waddington
RAF Wyton
tactical support for Normandy troops
target indicator
V-1
V-weapon
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/308/24681/LMottersheadF422232v1.1.pdf
f76801c86e1314e5d06be70cf352a3ad
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Mottershead, Frank
F Mottershead
Description
An account of the resource
Eleven items. An oral history interview with Frank Mottershead (422232 Royal Australian Air Force), photographs and his log book. He flew operations as a wireless operator with 463 Squadron.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Frank Mottershead and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-04-30
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Mottershead, F
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Frank Mottershead’s observer’s and air gunner’s flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
Observer’s and air gunner’s flying log book for F Mottershead, wireless operator, covering the period from 29 April 1943 to 9 April 1945. Detailing his flying training and operations flown. He was stationed at RCAF Calgary, RCAF Mossbank, RCAF Pat Bay, RAF Lichfield, RAF West Freugh, RAF Syerston and RAF Waddington. Aircraft flown in were Norseman, Fort II, Bolingbroke, Anson, Hampden, Wellington, Stirling and Lancaster. He flew a total of 30 operations with 463 squadron, 6 daylight and 24 night. Targets were Rheydt, Dortmund, Calais, Karlsruhe, Kaiserslauten, Wilhelmshaven, Bremen, Flushing, Brunswick, Bergen, Harburg, Duren, Ladbergen, Munich, Heilbronn, Geissen, Gdynia, Houffalize, Mitteland Canal, Politz, Brux, Dresden, Rositz, Bohlen, Wesel, Ijmuiden and Hamburg. His pilots on operations were Flying Officer Smith and Flight Lieutenant Huxtable.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LMottersheadF422232v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
Canada
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Alberta--Calgary
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Belgium--Houffalize
British Columbia--Vancouver Island
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Staffordshire
France--Calais
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Giessen (Hesse)
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Leipzig Region
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Munich
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Wesel (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Netherlands--IJmuiden
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Norway--Bergen
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Scotland--Wigtownshire
Germany--Hamburg
Saskatchewan
Alberta
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Czech Republic--Most
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1945
1944-09-19
1944-09-20
1944-09-23
1944-09-24
1944-09-26
1944-09-27
1944-09-28
1944-10-05
1944-10-06
1944-10-11
1944-10-14
1944-10-15
1944-10-23
1944-10-28
1944-10-29
1944-11-11
1944-11-16
1944-11-21
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-04
1944-12-06
1944-12-18
1944-12-19
1944-12-30
1945-01-01
1945-01-02
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-01-16
1945-01-17
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-15
1945-02-19
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-03-20
1945-03-21
1945-03-23
1945-03-24
1945-04-06
1945-04-09
1654 HCU
27 OTU
463 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
aircrew
Anson
Bolingbroke
bombing
Bombing and Gunnery School
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
Hampden
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Operational Training Unit
RAF Lichfield
RAF Syerston
RAF Waddington
RAF West Freugh
Stirling
training
Wellington
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/573/23289/LGardR1852841v1.1.pdf
a6303bea6d23e7cd05c2ec0d98c509fb
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Gard, Ronald
Ronald Leslie Gard
R L Gard
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Gard, R
Description
An account of the resource
Six items. An oral history interview with Flight Sergeant Ronald Gard (-2022, 1852481 Royal Air Force), his log book, correspondence reporting him missing and membership of the caterpillar club. He flew operations as a rear gunner with 463 Squadron and was shot down on an operation to Leipzig.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Ronald Gard and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Ronald Gard’s flying log book for navigators, air bombers, air gunners, flight engineers
Description
An account of the resource
Flying log book for navigators, air bombers, air gunners, flight engineers for R Gard, air gunner, covering the period from 7 March 1944 to 14 February 1945 when he went missing on operations. He was stationed at RAF Stormy Down, RAF Turweston, RAF Silverstone, RAF Winthorpe, RAF Syerston and RAF Waddington. Aircraft flown in were Anson, Wellington, Stirling and Lancaster. He flew a total of 17 operations with 463 squadron, 4 Daylight and 13 night operations. Targets were Brunswick, Nuremburg, Flushing, Bergen, Homberg, Dusseldorf, Ems-Weser Canal, Dortmund-Ems Canal, Trondheim, Giessen, Heimbach, Gdynia, Merseburg-Luana, Siegen, Politz and Rositz. His pilot on operations was Flight Lieutenant Padgham.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LGardR1852841v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
England--Buckinghamshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Northamptonshire
England--Nottinghamshire
Germany--Altenburg (Thuringia)
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Giessen (Hesse)
Germany--Homberg (Kassel)
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Siegen
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Norway--Bergen
Norway--Trondheim
Poland--Gdynia
Wales--Bridgend
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1945
1944-10-14
1944-10-15
1944-10-19
1944-10-20
1944-10-23
1944-10-28
1944-10-29
1944-11-01
1944-11-02
1944-11-03
1944-11-06
1944-11-07
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-11-23
1944-12-06
1944-12-07
1944-12-08
1944-12-11
1944-12-18
1944-12-19
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1945-02-01
1945-02-02
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-14
1945-02-15
1661 HCU
17 OTU
463 Squadron
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
missing in action
Operational Training Unit
RAF Silverstone
RAF Stormy Down
RAF Syerston
RAF Turweston
RAF Waddington
RAF Winthorpe
Stirling
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1280/19140/LStewartJ1522846v1.2.pdf
0fcc9b8b200096bd6304c98b9ed16e52
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Stewart, James
J Stewart
Description
An account of the resource
Four items. The collection concerns Sergeant James Stewart (1522846 Royal Air Force) and contains his log book and photographs. He flew operations as a navigator with 207 and 630 Squadrons.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Jean Quartley and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-10-02
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Stewart, J
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
James Stewart’s flying log book for aircrew other than pilot
Description
An account of the resource
Flying log book for aircrew other than pilot for James Stewart, navigator, covering the period from 17 July 1943 to 21 December 1945. Detailing his flying training, operations flown and post war flying duties. He was stationed at RCAF Portage la Prairie, RAF West Freugh, RAF Turweston, RAF Silverstone, RAF Swinderby, RAF Syerston, RAF Spilsby and RAF East Kirkby. Aircraft flown in were, Anson, Wellington, Stirling and Lancaster. He flew 10 operations with 207 squadron 1 daylight and 9 night and 10 operations with 630 squadron 1 daylight and 9 night. His pilots on operations were Flying Officer Dougal, Flying Officer Lawson, Flying Officer French, Flight Lieutenant Downing, Flying Officer Cranston, Flying Officer Price, Flight Sergeant Grange and Flying Officer Lowman. Targets were, Homburg, Geissen, Heinbach- Urft dam, Munich, Gdynia, Politz, Royan, Merseburg, Siegen, Gravenhorst, Ladbergen, Dortmund-Ems Canal, Bohlen, Hamburg, Wesel and Kiel Bay. He also flew 2 Operation Exodus to Brussels and Lille with 630 squadron and 1 Operation Dodge to Pomigliano with 207 squadron.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Cara Walmsley
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LStewartJ1522846v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
Canada
France
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--Kiel Bay
Belgium--Brussels
England--Buckinghamshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Northamptonshire
England--Nottinghamshire
France--Lille
France--Royan
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Euskirchen
Germany--Giessen (Hesse)
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Homberg (Kassel)
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Munich
Germany--Siegen
Germany--Wesel (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Italy--Pomigliano d'Arco
Manitoba--Portage la Prairie
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Scotland--Wigtownshire
Germany--Urft Dam
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Manitoba
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1945
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text. Log book and record book
Text
207 Squadron
44 Squadron
630 Squadron
aircrew
Anson
bombing
Cook’s tour
crash
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
mine laying
navigator
Operation Dodge (1945)
Operation Exodus (1945)
Operational Training Unit
RAF East Kirkby
RAF Silverstone
RAF Spilsby
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
RAF Turweston
RAF West Freugh
Stirling
take-off crash
training
Wellington
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[Drawing]
1
9
4
5 GROUP NEWS
No 30 JANUARY
[Boxed] NO EXTRACTS OR QUOTATIONS MAY BE MADE FROM THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE AUTHORITY OF THE GROUP INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, 5 GROUP. COMMUNICATION TO UNAUTHORISED PERSONS IS A BREACH OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT. COPIES NOT REQUIRED FOR RECORD PURPOSES AFTER CIRCULATION ARE TO BE DESTROYED AS SECRET WASTE IN ACCORDANCE WITH A.M.O. A.411/41. [/boxed]
[Page Break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
[Boxed] In our last issue Air Marshal Sir R.A. Cochrane, K.B.E., C.B., A.F.C., bade farewell to the Group after two years of command. As many know, Air Marshal Cochrane left us to take up the appointment of Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Transport Command. We wish him every success in his new sphere.
It is unfortunate that his successor, Air Vice Marshal Constantine, C.B.E., D.S.O., is unable to write a Foreword this month. At the time of going to press he is suffering from a bad bout of influenza, and we wish him a speedy recovery. Air Vice Marshal Constantine has come to us from Headquarters, Bomber Command, so we are by no means strangers. In welcoming his to the Group we assure him of our close co-operation and support for the future. [/boxed]
[Page break]
Famous Last Words
[Drawing] Navigator: “Pilot, you are below the safety height for this area”
Pilot: “To hell with that, I’m not going to fly in cloud” [Drawing]
These actually were the last words that this pilot ever spoke. Immediately afterwards, the aircraft struck a hillside, six of the crew being killed. The seventh member, although badly injured, survived to tell the tale. Here is his account.
“It was on the attack on Heilbronn on the night 4/5th December, 1944. The attack was successful and after bombing we set course for position ‘D’ descending in steps as briefed. Just South of Strasbourg the Navigator told the Captain that we were below safety height and the Captain replied that he wanted to get out of cloud. This was the last speech over the intercom., and I have no idea of the height of the aircraft. Immediately after this remark the aircraft hit a hillside. I was thrown out of my turret and landed under the mid-upper turret. I eventually regained consciousness, not knowing how long I had been there or where I was. After calling out the names of the other members of the crew for 15 minutes I decided to sit in the aircraft until daylight owing to inclement weather. Daylight arrived with a heavy fall of snow, but it did allow me to find my boot which I had lost, and with great difficulty, owing to my right arm and left hand being broken, put my boot on and jump out of the aircraft. The aircraft was broken in half, the break being behind the wings. The mid-upper gunner was dead in his turret and the others were 15 – 20 yards from the aircraft. After convincing myself that all were dead I set course SW by the aid of my compass.”
Here is a perfect example of the gross disobedience and stupidity of the Captain being responsible for the death of himself and five other members of the crew. It has happened hundreds of times before and will happen as many times in future, unless YOU guard against it.
The flight plan is issued for your safety. It is the best efforts of the planning staffs to safeguard you from your twon [sic] main hazards – the enemy and the weather.
KNOW. YOUR. FLIGHT. PLAN, AND. STICK. TO. IT.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] operations
[Underlined] DORTMUND EMS CANAL – 1st JANUARY. [/underlined]
The stretch of canal at LADBERGEN, newly repaired, was once again attacked, this time in daylight. Force employed – 102 Lancasters and 2 Mosquitos.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Two Mosquitos of No.54 Base were to mark the aiming point with Red T.I. cascading at 5,000 feet, burning for 12 minutes at H – 4. The leading Lancasters of No.54 Base were also to drop Red T.I. on the aiming point.
[Underlined] AIMING [/underlined] (a) Using the T.I’s as a guide to identification, crews were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the Western branch of the canal. Care was to be exercised not to overshoot, as the Western branch was the primary objective.
(b) Normal gaggle formation was to be maintained until the Bomb Aimer could see the target. During the bombing run, aircraft on the flanks would automatically converge towards the centre. Immediately after bomb release, flank aircraft were to resume normal gaggle formation. Bombing heights 9,000 – 12,000 feet. Bomb load 14 x 1000lb MC/G.P.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] The weather at the target was clear, with good visibility, and crews identified the target visually. Once again the bombing was very concentrated, but results could not be assessed on the spot, as a large proportion of delay-action bombs was used. Owing to the frequency with which this target has been attacked, and the vast number of bomb craters, it is impossible accurately to estimate the degree of concentration, but it is apparent that as good a concentration was achieved on this daylight attack as on any of the night attacks.
The Western arm of the canal was breached once more, over a considerable distance, and there is much flooding both to the East and West of the canal.
[Underlined] MITTELAND CANAL – 1/2nd JANUARY [/underlined]
Master Bomber – Wing Commander Smith
Aerial reconnaissance showed that the Germans were making frantic efforts to put this canal back into commission. When repairs were about complete, it was decided to make a further attack on the stretch of the canal at GRAVENHORST, to deny the enemy this important artery of communications. The attack was carried out at night. Force employed – 152 Lancasters and 5 Mosquitos.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Target to be marked blind by Lancasters with T.I. Green. Flares to be dropped in target area, in the light of which the aiming point was to be marked by Mosquitos with Red T.I. Crews to aim centre bomb of stick at the M.P.I. of the Red T.I. or as directed by the Master Bomber. Bombing heights 9,000 – 12,000 feet.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather clear, with good visibility. The blind marking and illumination went according to plan, and a very good concentration of Red T.I. was dropped 150 yards from the aiming point. Once again a very large proportion of delay-action 1,000lb MC/G.P. bombs was used. The attack was an outstanding success, and a tremendous concentration was achieved on and around the aiming point. The canal and its embankments have almost been obliterated, in fact to such an extent that their course in places can hardly be distinguished. Many barges have been destroyed or left stranded. Both this canal and the stretch of the Dortmund Ems canal at LADBERGEN, attacked during the afternoon, are still 100% unserviceable four weeks after the attack.
[Underlined] ROYAN – 4/5th JANUARY [/underlined]
Master Bomber – Wing Commander Smith
A surprise attack was made against the German garrison at Royan, on the French West coast at the mouth of the Gironde. The 5 Group raid was later followed by an attack by No.1 Group.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] A suitable marking point was selected, and the target was divided into seven sectors. One or two Squadrons were allotted to each sector. Bases were to spread their aircraft evenly over the allotted sectors and height bands. Bombing was to be carried out by means of a timed overshoot of the markers. Bombing heights 6,000 – 10,000 feet. Marking and illumination sequence as normal. Bomb load 1 x 4,000lb + max. 500lb MC/G.P.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather: no cloud, but some ground haze. After some preliminary delay and difficulty with the marking, the Mosquitos succeeded in dropping 2 Red T.I’s 100 yards 220 degrees, and a third Red T.I. 180 yards 190 degrees from the marking point. The main force was then called in to bomb with overshoots as planned, and a good sector attack developed, in spite of some aircraft having to make more than one bombing run.
It is not possible to distinguish on the P.R.U. cover, the 5 Group from the 1 Group attack which followed soon after, but damage is well spread throughout the town, and is severe.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] The planned T.O.T. was 10 minutes, but investigation reveals that about 80% of all aircraft bombed over a T.O.T. of 5 minutes. This caused a high concentration of aircraft and was chiefly due to the unforeseen and unavoidable hitch in the preliminary marking. The result was that many of the earlier aircraft had to go round again, and some were seen flying on reciprocal courses to the planned bombing headings. The consequent risk of collision may largely have accounted for our loss of six aircraft, as the defences were practically negligible.
[Underlined] HOUFFALIZE – 5/6th JANUARY [/underlined]
Houffalize was an enemy strong point in the Ardennes salient. The aim of this attack was to destroy enemy troops, armour and supplies concentrated in and around the village. Force employed – 131 Lancasters.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Oboe Mosquitos of No.8 Group were to mark the target with Red T.I. These T.I’s were to be backed up by four Lancasters of No.54 Base dropping Green T.I’s. The main force were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the Red T.I’s. or failing this, at the M.P.I. of all the Green T.I’s. Bombing heights 9,000 – 12,000 feet. Bomb load 1 x 4,000lb H.C. + max. 500 lb MC/G.P. Crews were warned of the proximity of allied forces, and strict instructions were given that bombs were not to be dropped unless the T.I. Red and/or Green were positively identified.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather 8/10ths thin cloud inlayers 4,000/10,000 feet, with good visibility. A good concentration of Red and Green T.I’s was put down on the target, and the Master Bomber ordered the main force to bomb direct as planned. The majority were able to do so, but some 30 aircraft were unable to obtain satisfactory bombing runs on account of the cloud conditions and quite rightly brought their bombs back. Reconnaissance, and later the capture of the village, proved that it was virtually destroyed.
[Underlined] MUNICH – 7/8th JANUARY [/underlined]
Master Bomber – Squadron Leader Stubbs.
Two attacks were made on Munich this night, the first one by 216 aircraft of No.5 Group, and the second by some 370 aircraft of Nos. 1, 6 and 8 Groups.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Blind markers were to drop T.I. Red on the marking point; these were to be followed by a small number of flares. The accuracy of the Greens was to be assessed by Mosquitos of No.54 Base. This assessment was then to be passed to the Master Bomber, who was to order the backers up to drop Red T.I. in relation to this assessment. The Master Bomber was then to select the most accurate markers, on which to issue his bombing orders. Blind marking with high bursting T.I’s was to be used as an emergency.
Main force crews were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the most accurate T.I. with delay as ordered. Bombing heights 17,250 – 20,000 feet. Bomb load 1 x 4,000lb + max. 4lb incendiary clusters.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather: broken medium cloud in early stages of attack. Later clear, with moderate visibility. The Lancasters dropped several Red T.I’s accurately in the target area; Mosquitos then went in dropping Green T.I’s. The most accurate one, some 200 yards North of the marking point, was then backed up on the Master Bomber’s instructions, and the main force ordered to bomb the centre of the Green T.I’s with overshoot as ordered. Crew reports indicate a heavy and successful sector attack, but no photographic cover has yet been obtained to confirm this.
[Underlined] POLITZ – 13/14th JANUARY [/underlined]
Master Bomber: Squadron Leader Benjamin
This was No.5 Group’s second attack on this first priority oil target, and it was confidently expected that, given favourable conditions, amends would be made for the attack which went astray on December 21/22nd, 1944.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Blind marking, flare illumination and Mosquito visual marking in normal sequence. Skymarking was provided for, should cloud conditions preclude visual marking. A suitable marking point was selected, and crews were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the markers as directed by the Master Bomber, using a false wind vector to bring the bombs on to the aiming point. Bombing heights 15,500 feet to 17,750 feet. Bomb load 1 x 4,000lb H.C. + max. 500lb G.P.
The Master Bomber was to transmit a false wind vector to the main force at H – 5. The vector was to be calculated on a forecast bombing wind, which would be either confirmed or corrected at H-15 on W/T from 5 Group Headquarters. A vector wind, to be set on the bombsight, was issued to crews before take-off. This was based on forecast winds, and was to be used if the vector bombing wind transmitted by the Master Bomber was not received.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather: there was no cloud in the target area, but a smoke screen was in operation. In addition, the snow covered ground made visual identification of the marking point difficult. Proximity T.I. Green were dropped punctually near the target, and flares followed. Several Red T.I. were dropped wide by the Mosquitos, but subsequent ones were more accurate, one 50 yards and 155 degrees and a second 300 yards 290 degrees from the marking points (plotted from night photographs). The accurate markers were backed up, and the main force was ordered to bomb as planned.
Crews reported a good concentration, but an investigation of the winds used for bombing indicated that the attack once again miscarried. A serious mistake was made in the calculation of the false vector, and the wind thus used resulted in the displacement of the M.P.I. of the bombs some 1,000 yards S.E. of the aiming point. This is borne out by plots of strike photographs. The vector wind issued by the Master Bomber was transmitted several minutes late. A fair proportion of crew, those who bombed in the first waves, used the vector wind set on the bombsight before take-off. There is therefore a prospect that a proportion of the weight of the attack fell on the target, but while no P.R.U. cover has yet been obtained, there is sufficient evidence from night photographs and analysis of the winds used, to indicate that this attack may prove to be a disappointing failure.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] Success against this type of target, now amongst the most heavily defended in Germany, depends to a large extent on initial surprise. The losses incurred on this attack were 2 Lancasters, or 0.9% of the total force, but this low loss rate cannot be expected to continue, if the target has to be revisited several times before success is achieved.
[Underlined] LEUNA – 14/15th JANUARY [/underlined]
Master Bomber: Squadron Leader Stubbs
A force of 219 aircraft was despatched to attack the priority one synthetic oil plant at LEUNA, near Merseburg.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] It was anticipated that the target would be covered by a thin layer of cloud, and therefore, in addition to the normal illumination and blind marking procedure, arrangements were made for high-bursting Red T.I’s to be dropped blind over the selected marking point, during the T.O.T. If cloud conditions permitted, Mosquitos were to mark the marking point with T.I. Green. The Master Bomber was to instruct the main force at which markers they were to aim.
The main force were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the markers selected by the Master Bomber, delaying release for 12 seconds, attacking on a common heading of 120°.
Bombing Heights 15,500 – 17,750 feet. Bomb load 1 x 4000lb H.C. + maximum 500lb MC/G.P. (10% long delay).
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather at target: 10/10ths thin stratus at about 1,000 feet. Hazy; poor visibility. Blind markers and flares went down on time, and in the light of the latter the Mosquito markers were able to identify the target area through the thin cloud. The first Green T.I., assessed as 250 yards N.W. of the marking points (and plotted 300 yards 282°) was backed up, and the Master Bomber instructed the main force to aim at the resulting concentration, delaying release for 14 seconds.
Crew reports of the attack were enthusiastic. P.R.U. photographs so far obtained only cover the Northern portion of the plant, but they reveal that this section has been heavily hit, and almost all important installations damaged. On the date of photography (21.1.45) there were no signs of productive activity, and economic experts estimate
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
that production will be restricted to about 25% for one to two months.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] It must be borne in mind that this target was attacked later in the night by other Groups in the Command. They, however, encountered worse weather in the target area, and obtained no night photographs with ground detail.
[Underlined] BRUX – 16/17th JANUARY [/underlined]
Master Bomber: Squadron Leader Benjamin
The synthetic oil plant at BRUX was the third oil target to be attacked by the Group within a week. Force employed – 230 aircraft.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] The target was to be marked by blind markers with T.I. Green, followed by flare illumination. If cloud conditions permitted, a selected marking point was then to be marked visually by Mosquitos with Red T.I. The Master Bomber was then, if possible, to assess the markers, and instruct the main force at which group of T.I’s they should aim. T.I. Green bursting above the cloud, were to be dropped over the target as a last resort by the Blind Markers. The main force were to aim their bombs as ordered by the Master Bomber, on a heading of 118°, delaying release by 13 seconds. Bombing heights 14,000 – 16,750 feet. Bomb load 1 x 4,000lb H.C. + maximum MC/G.P. (10% long delay).
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather 10/10ths strato cu; tops 3,000 feet. Two Mosquito visual markers flew below cloud and were able to identify the oil plant; they dropped their Red T.I’s but these were almost invisible from above the cloud. The Master Bomber therefore decided on sky marking, and told the Flare Forces to retain their flares. A good concentration of green skymarkers was dropped, and the Master Bomber ordered the main force to bomb direct either the Red T.I’s if visible or the glow of fires.
No bombing results were seen, and no indication of the accuracy of the attack could be obtained from night photographs owing to cloud. Photographic cover since obtained is partly cloud obscured, but shows very heavy fresh damage, especially to the Power Station, Cooling Tower, organic sulphur remover plant and pump houses. It is also possible that the most important Winkler Generator (Priority I) has been considerably damaged.
Despite the difficult marking conditions the results of this attack may be considered highly satisfactory.
[Underlined] ATTACKS BY NOS. 617 AND 9 SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] BERGEN – 12th JANUARY [/underlined]
Sixteen Lancasters from each of 617 and 9 Squadrons took off to attack the U-boat pens, a floating dock and shipping at Bergen.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Three aircraft of No.617 Squadron were each to select a ship (in known positions) with Tallboy fused .5 seconds. Three more No.617 Squadron aircraft were to attack a floating dock, in which was a submarine. The remaining 617 aircraft and all No.9 Squadron aircraft were to attack the pens with Tallboy fused 11 seconds delay. No.617 Squadron (using the S.A.B.S.) were to aim direct, and No.9 Squadron (using the Mark XIV) were to select a suitable aiming point off the target and calculate a false wind vector to shift the bombs onto the target. The Squadrons were to be escorted by Mustangs.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather clear: good visibility.
[Underlined] No.617 Squadron. [/underlined] Two of the three aircraft detailed to
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
bomb shipping attacked. The aircraft detailed to attack the floating dock found it visible only from directly overhead; it could not be seen from sufficient distance away for a satisfactory bombing run to be made, so these aircraft also attacked shipping. Of the ten aircraft whose target was the Pens, only three attacked: four did not bomb because smoke from previous bombs obscured the target, the remainder experienced other troubles.
[Underlined] No.9 Squadron. [/underlined] Fourteen aircraft attacked the primary target. One aircraft was unable to identify the selected aiming point owing to smoke, and one aircraft is missing.
No.617 Squadron claim one ship sunk; three ships received near misses. A good concentration of Tallboys was put down on the Pens, and the attack is reported as the best yet made on them. Pens No.2 and 3 were both hit, and photos show two (possibly three) direct hits.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] Several snags arose during this operation. No.617 Squadron, using the S.A.B.S. must be able to see the aiming point clearly. On this occasion, several aircraft could not bomb, in spite of making several orbits, as the target was obscured by smoke from earlier bombs. No.9 Squadron were more lucky, and their offset aiming point remained visible during nearly the whole of the attack.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Drawing] navigation
[Underlined] STANDARD OF NAVIGATION FOR JANUARY. [/underlined]
Navigation during January (when the majority of targets were long range) was the highest standard for any month. This shows that Navigation, which has stood still for so long, is now moving again, and in the right direction. This is good – let us keep it moving, and in the same direction.
An analysis has been made of the width and length of the Bomber stream during January. To deal first with track-keeping. The average width of the streams going to the target was 25 miles; on the return journey, it was 25 1/2 miles. (The former figure does not include supporters, who normally take a different route). The maximum permissible width of the stream is 10 miles, therefore we still have a long way to go. However, considering that the majority of operations were against long range targets and that on a number of occasions the true wind velocity differed vastly from that forecast, these results are satisfactory.
Now to deal with timing. The average length of the stream going to the target was 50 miles, permissible length being 36 miles. On the return journey it was 64 miles, permissible length being 37 miles. It will be noted that the standard of timing going to the target is very good, particularly considering the deep penetrations and the varying winds encountered. On the return journey, however, the standard of timing is NOT good. Crews are STILL racing back to liberated territory. It is easier to maintain accurate timing on the return journey because Navigators know the true wind velocities and can therefore make allowances. But in a number of instances they do not make the necessary allowance, and consequently concentration suffers. It is a well known fact that aircraft who lag behind the main stream are easy prey for enemy fighters, also those who stick their necks out ahead of the mainstream give the enemy that little bit of extra warning which is so vital to him. Captains and Navigators have been told this time and again, but a few tend to completely ignore all warnings.
In the last three years Navigation has progressed beyond expectation; immense strides have been made in windfinding, track keeping, the air plot, navigational aids and navigation technique. All these improvements should have resulted in perfect timing, but they haven’t – yet! Navigators, you must do everything in your power to remove this deficiency, because only when our timing is as good as all other items of Navigation can we say that we are doing a 100% job.
At this stage it is well to recall the aim we set ourselves 3 months ago. That is, a concentration of no greater dimensions than 50 miles X 20 miles. Well, we have almost achieved that. When we do in fact achieve it, then we shall set ourselves a new goal, until finally we reach perfection. DON’T say this cannot be done, we set ourselves what was thought to be an impossible goal in practice bombing wind finding – and we achieved it. On this same reasoning there is no reason why we should not obtain perfect track keeping and timing – but remember, this depends entirely on YOU.
Read this entire paragraph through again, then set yourselves a goal – and, finally make sure you achieve it.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
Station and Squadron Navigation officers must ensure that all new crews are made aware of the great importance of accurate track keeping and timing. These officers must see that all new crews know the goal we have set ourselves and that they must help us to achieve it.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING VECTOR ERRORS. [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by Squadrons this month is 4 m.p.h. exactly, the same as last month. We are STILL not getting any nearer our goal of 3 m.p.h. This goal can and must be obtained if we are to play our full part in the bombing team. Let us then get on with the job and achieve our goal immediately.
[Table of Ranked Average Vector Error by Squadron]
It is good to see that No.56 Base have made a big improvement in their Vector Errors and are now in the top half of the list. No. 55 Base, with the exception of one Squadron, have slipped very badly, and are now in the bottom half of the table. This is not their usual place of residence; it is to be hoped that they do not intend staying there.
An excellent example of consistently accurate windfinding was given by F/O Chorney, Navigator, No.9 Squadron. He recently arrived on the Squadron from Conversion Unit and completed, with his crew, three high level bombing exercises in the first few days on the Squadron. The Vector Errors, converted to 20,000 feet were as follows:-
First Exercise – 14 yards or 2/3 m.p.h.
Second Exercise – 16 yards or 4/5 m.p.h.
Third Exercise – 6 yards or 3/10 m.p.h.
This is really first class windfinding, and it enabled the Bomb Aimer to obtain some perfect bombing results. No. 9 Squadron are always leading the Group in bombing vector errors. What about some other Squadron making a really determined effort to oust them from their position of honour?
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined]
[Drawing] THIS MONTH’S Bouquets [Drawing]
The names of the eight Navigators, two from each Base, who submitted the best work this month are set out below. They have been chosen for their consistently accurate and methodical work, which includes good track keeping and timing, constant wind velocity and E.T.A. checks and log and chart work of a very high order.
1. W/O Murray – No.50 Squadron
2. F/O Harris – No.463 Squadron
3. F/O Pilkington – No.227 Squadron
4. F/O Hassall – No. 49 Squadron
5. F/L Williamson – No.619 Squadron
6. F/S Baker – No.630 Squadron
7. F/L Hatch – No. 97 Squadron
8. F/L Westphal – No. 83 Squadron
[Underlined] MET. INFORMATION. [/underlined]
It has been the practice in this Group for nearly 3 years to get the Station Met. Officer on each Station to give a brief review of the Met. situation to Navigators every morning. Everyone has agreed that this has been most useful to Navigators, particularly the wind distribution information. Two Squadrons in the Group have improved on this system, and it is now the responsibility of each Navigator in turn to obtain from the Met. Officer the “story” for the night, and then give the information, more fully, to the Navigators. This system has a double benefit. It necessitates each individual Navigator taking a keen interest in Met., thereby considerably improving his knowledge; also it provides Navigators with valuable practice in lecturing, practice which almost everyone needs. In each Squadron the Navigation Officer is present, and he is the judge on the effectiveness of the lecture and the ability of the lecturer.
This new system has provoked great competition throughout the two Squadrons and its adoption by other Squadrons is strongly recommended. All Navigation Officers are urged to give this system a trial.
All Navigators are provided with a Form 2330 before take-off, and are asked to make observations of the weather and fill in the back of the form. This is a big task for anyone because it necessitates spending a considerable amount of time away from Navigation – time which can be ill afforded. However, it is vital that the Met. Staff obtain an accurate picture of the weather encountered on route and at the target. If they do not receive this information, then it is obvious that their future forecasting will suffer.
Here is a difficult problem which has to be solved. No. 55 Base appear to have the answer. Each Navigator is given a specific
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
area in which to make accurate observations of the weather and it is necessary for him to give information only for this area. Consequently each Navigator need only concentrate on this item for a few moments of the operation, and naturally he is therefore more determined to do that amount of work thoroughly. The result is that Navigators need only spend two minutes at the most observing the weather, while on the other hand the Met. Officer is assured much valuable and accurate information. The Met. Officers of No.55 Base are very pleased with the reports they have received under this new scheme; they consider they are more complete and accurate than those received under the old scheme.
All Bases are urged to give this method a trial.
[Underlined] SELF ANALYSIS CHART. [/underlined]
Here is the third and final Self Analysis Chart for you to complete. If you missed the first two for any reason look them up immediately and answer those questions too.
(i) Do you know how Gee coding is indicated on the main time base and how to apply the corrections?
(ii) On entering the aircraft do you always note the ‘A’ error of the D.R. compass?
(iii) Do you check through your Navigation Order Book regularly to ensure that you are conversant with all orders?
(iv) Do you know how to adjust the presets on the Loran receiver, and do you know what faults are attributable to wrongly adjusted presets.
(v) Do you always remember to switch on your ‘Z’ equipment before take off?
(vi) Do you always carry out your preflight test in accordance with Appendix ‘B’ of Aircraft Drill No.9.
(vii) Do you know the three standard methods for windfinding and issue of bombing winds, which were issued recently?
(viii) Do you always remember to alter your V.S.C. when you pass the central position of two isogonals; and do you check regularly that the variation has been set in the right direction? (Don’t laugh at the second half of this question, to date some 20 instances have occurred of Navigators straying badly from concentration, and one actually returning early, as a result of setting the variation the wrong way).
(ix) Do you always make sure that you fully understand the procedure for bombing windfinding and issue of bombing winds, for each operation? (This question is most important, lack of knowledge of the procedure by a large number of crews on a recent operation, had a disastrous effect on the bombing accuracy).
If you have answered all the questions truthfully you will now be able to categorise yourself. The system of marking is in the November Summary.
Did you make note of all the points on which you lost marks, and did you rectify those mistakes immediately?
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] Question (v) of last month’s Summary was incorrectly worded, it should read as follows:- “Do you know the position on the return journey of an operation from which you are allowed to relax the Group timing. Do you know why you are allowed to relax Group timing from this position and why this position was chosen”.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION ORDER BOOKS. [/underlined]
All navigation order books have been standardised during the month, and by the time this Summary reaches Squadrons all new order books should be completed.
This is the first time we have had standardisation in order books. Now that we have brought them up to date we must keep them so. Squadron Navigation Officers must see that all documents marked for inclusion in the Order Book are inserted immediately.
You will find a great deal of valuable information in this book. The rigid adherence to all these orders is a necessity and is vital to the safety of the aircraft. Don’t rush through the enclosures, read them carefully and make a note of all items of major importance. Let you [sic] motto be to “read, mark, learn and digest”.
Make a habit of going through the order book once a week, thus keeping yourself up to date.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS. [/underlined]
F/Lt. Beattie, D.F.C. Nav. Leader No.5 L.F.S. posted to Transport Command.
F/Lt. Bowes, D.F.C. No.5 L.F.S. to be Nav. Leader.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Drawing] radar nav:
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
In view of the nature of the targets attacked by this Group during the month, and to prevent early warning of the approach of a bomber stream, H2S Mark II was not used on any of the bombing operations.
It has also been necessary to cut down the use of H2S Mark III to the absolute minimum that will allow accurate approach and target marking.
Many operators have expressed strong opinions regarding these restrictions, and the view is held that H2S is redundant, or that the efficiency of crews is decreasing. Don’t be misled by these opinions but judge by results. One can bring up many arguments for and against the current policy, but few set operators will fail to agree that the whole success of many of Five Group’s attacks has been solely sue to the element of surprise. Radar silence has helped considerably to bring this about. Another factor partly due to Radar silence has been the very low loss rate suffered by the Group.
[Underlined] H2S Mark II [/underlined]
A number of Gardening operations have been carried out by Squadrons equipped with H2S Mark II during the month, and the standard attained by the crews indicated that individual operators are still maintaining their efficiency on the set, despite the difficulties in obtaining sufficient training.
P.P.I. photographs indicate that good approaches have been made and excellent lays obtained. In this connection Station Radar Navigation Officers are to be congratulated on the conscientious manner in which they are plotting the photographs of the release points. All the plots are checked at this Headquarters, and so far, only one has been found to be incorrect.
H2S mining is, and will continue, to play a great part in the strangling of the enemy’s shipping lanes and to ensure that not one single mine is laid outside these channels it is intended to develop mining teams in each of the five Squadrons of No.55 Base in the very near future. Crews will, therefore, be tested on their ability with H2S on arrival on these Squadrons, and the best will be selected to receive highly concentrated training in all aspects of mining with H2S.
These teams will be given the best possible equipment available to the main force, and every effort will be made to keep it in a high state of serviceability.
Preceeding [sic] crews have set a high standard in H2S mining in the Group, but it is hoped with the development of these mining teams an even higher standard will be reached. It is therefore up to each and everyone concerned wo make this scheme a practical success.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] H 2 S Mark III [/underlined]
Despite the restrictions on the use of H2S Mark III which have been necessary, and the low serviceability, there has been some excellent blind marking during the month. The majority of the targets were small, but fortunately gave compact responses useful for blind bombing. One target in particular – BRUX - was a completely new H2S target for No.54 Base, with little or no landmarks in the vicinity to check. This in no way deterred the marker and flare force, and they were able to find and mark it with their usual precision.
The new Mark IIIE equipment has been tried successfully on operations during the month. The mark, which gives a far better definition than previous marks, and has the added advantage of sector scan, is expected to be used increasingly during the next few months, and we are confidently expecting even more accurate target marking with it in the near future.
[Underlined] H2S Photography [/underlined]
A new Air Staff Instruction relating to H2S photography has been issued recently, and all set operators should be now aware of its contents. If you are not, ask your Station Radar/Nav. for a copy and study it carefully.
It can hardly be said that the P.P.I. photographs taken during the month were of a high standard, and it is evident that set operators are not carrying out the correct photographic procedure. It is appreciated that the Bantam Camera is only makeshift equipment until the Automatic Camera arrives, but excellent results have been obtained by those operators sufficiently keen to find out where they released their T.I’s, flares, bombs or mines. P.P.I. photographs are the only means of ascertaining where the attack developed if 10/10 cloud prevailed and therefore they are as much an operational photograph as the ordinary F24 bomb release photograph. Unfortunately many crews fail to realise this, and the photographs now being received look as if they have just been taken haphazardly in the target area.
One photograph taken anywhere in the target area is insufficient for plotting purposes, and operators must see that they carry out the provisions of A.S.I. Nav.17 to the letter – i.e. one photograph on the run-up 10-15 miles away from the target, and another within 30 seconds of the T.I., flare, bomb or mine release. Unless you take these two photographs and they are plottable, the whole film will be classed as a MANIPULATION failure and questions will be asked.
The majority of P.P.I. photographic failures during the month have been due to:-
(i) Insufficient gain.
(ii) Insufficient exposure.
(iii) Failure to wind the film over (two exposures on one negative).
(iv) Failure to set shutter.
(v) Too large 10 mile zero.
In taking P.P.I. photographs remember maximum contrast is necessary so that towns may be distinguished among the ground returns, and the illumination must be sufficient to register on the film. A complete revolution of the scan must also be given for the exposure as the afterglow is too faint to produce an image, and the
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION [/underlined]
photograph is formed gradually as the scan revolves.
H2S Training
To enable crews to obtain more training in the use of H2S Mark II it has been decided to allow the equipment to be used on the return route from all operations from a position of longitude determined by this Headquarters. Station Radar/Navigation Officers are to ensure that every advantage is taken of this facility.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
The Continental Gee Chains continued to give good service during January, with the majority of operators obtaining coverage on both chains to 1000E.
There were, nevertheless, many conflicting reports on jamming experienced on these chains, but many navigators expressed the opinion that the enemy was transmitting a complete set of locked spurious pulses. To ascertain if this was so it has been decided that on the Squadrons holding H2S cameras one navigator is to take photographs of the Gee tube on future operations. R.A.F. Station, Fulbeck, have carried out ground tests to decide the best exposure, and it has been found that with the green filter removed, gain normal and brilliance high, 1/25 second is sufficient. Until this evidence is forthcoming no move can be made to counteract the menace.
There is one point, however, that navigators should remember. By reference to your D.R. position, you have a sound idea of the lattice values to give a fix, and is these values are set up on the Gee Indicator there should be no difficulty in defeating locked spurious pulses jamming.
With the successful elimination of the salient in the West the “C” slave of the Cologne Chain has been returned to its original position, and the Ruhr Chain is once again transmitting. Cologne Chain Fixing Charts are therefore being withdrawn, and the Ruhr Chain Charts re-issued. In addition the maintenance periods have been re-adjusted, and the Ruhr and Rheims Chain now give 24 hours service.
The Northern Chain was again used most successfully and gave excellent coverage to 1300E, but unfortunately there is evidence of errors in the fixes given by this Chain. The Radar Navigational Aids Control were approached with information on the approximate inaccuracies and their conclusions indicate that the errors experienced are more likely to be due to natural causes than in the Transmitting Stations.
For instance at 5600N 0600E an error of ± .02 in reading on the North Eastern Chains gives a maximum error in fix of approximately 6 nautical miles. The same reading tolerance on the Northern Chain in the same area gives a maximum error in fix of approximately 17 nautical miles.
It might be argued on mathematical grounds that such errors should be evenly distributed about the true track, but the evidence of test flights etc., seems to indicate that under any given conditions most navigators will have a definite bias on one side or the other, and that this bias is influenced far more by local conditions than by the individual.
On this case the average error of all fixes was approximately 126°/10 nautical miles and it would appear the local conditions influencing the bias were:-
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION [/underlined]
(i) Weak “A” pulse on the Northern Chain and navigators would thus set a low reading when lining up the leading edges of the pulses. The amount of this error depends on the difference in amplitude of the signals.
(ii) A wind change to Westerly giving a starboard drift.
In view of the above it is therefore considered unlikely that errors exist in the Northern Chain.
Navigators may do well to ponder over the above facts, which indicate the necessity for reading off co-ordinates accurately to ensure that no discrepancies arise when changing over from one Gee chain to another.
Work is still progressing on the damaged Eastern Chain Tower, and corrections to be made to the B, C and D readings on this chain will continue to be issued when the route taken by aircraft is in an area where considerable fixing errors are likely to be encountered.
[Underlined] LORAN [/underlined]
Loran has proved by far the most useful Radar navigational aid during the month, excellent coverage having been obtained on all operations.
It is gratifying to note that since the introduction of this aid, increasing use if being made of the navigational facilities it affords, and navigators are quite confident as to its accuracy. With more and more reliance being placed on Loran it is anticipated that in future routeing will be more carefully considered so as to simplify fixing and if possible to run along lattice lines.
It is noted from operational reports that it is not always possible to check Loran fixes against Gee or H2S. Should any Navigation Analysis Officer note any discrepancies in Loran fixes which it is thought may be due to errors in ground stations, information will be welcome at this Headquarters. It may be possible to correct the ground stations for such an error, provided information is forthcoming.
The following are comments on the major operations carried out during the month:-
[Underlined] MUNICH – 7/8th January, 1945. [/underlined]
Both R4 and R5 signal strength was good and maximum coverage obtained was approximately from 03.00E to the target. It is however, noted that operators are still not making maximum use of the equipment as the spread between first fixes is in the region of 8 degrees. This may be due to some navigators placing more reliance on Gee fixes. It is emphasised that operators must use Loran to its maximum coverage, particularly as training flights are not possible over this country, and Gee must only be used as a check. Sky waves can be tricky, and the more experience one has in fixing with them, the simpler the identification becomes. Jamming in this area was practically negligible and splitting of signals did not present any serious difficulties to the operators. The only jamming reported appeared to be due to static or W/T transmissions and only resulted in an increase of grass or waving of the traces.
[Underlined] PILITZ – 13/14th January, 1945. [/underlined]
The Rate 5 signal strength again restricted coverage on
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION [/underlined]
this operation, although most operators managed to obtain fixes outside the theoretical limits of the S.S. Chain. A plot of first fixes on this operation is much more concentrated than before. This indicates that where Gee coverage is likely to be erratic, operators are resorting to Loran and trying to obtain full use of the facilities it affords. Rate 5 signals presented difficulties throughout the route due to fluctuations in strength, but spitting and jamming was practically non-existent. Routeing along R4 lattice lines where possible in this area would no doubt be helpful.
[Underlined] LEUNA – 14/15th January, 1945, and
BRUX 16/17th January, 1945. [/underlined]
Both R4 and R5 signal strength was good, and coverage was obtained to the target. Once again navigators expressed their preference for Gee, the first fixes plotted in the majority of cases being at the limits of Gee coverage. Set operators can do a lot to remove this prejudice by obtaining accurate Loran position lines and urging the navigator to use them in preference to Gee. It is appreciated that Gee position lines are obtained simultaneously and are simpler to plot, but with the increased attention the enemy is paying to the Continental Gee Chains, more interest shown in Loran may result in dividends.
Intermittent splitting was reported by the majority of crews, but in no way did this interfere with the fixing. A number of operators reported jamming at approximately 10E. This appeared to consist of spurious pulses or sine waves, but did not last long enough to cause any serious difficulties.
The policy adopted by this Group of instructing Loran operators to correct dividers in the air is having excellent results, and practically 75% of all alignment troubles are being cleared up during flight. Much of the success of this is due to the Loran Instructors and Radar Officers on the Squadrons and it is hoped that before long operators will be 100% efficient. To assist in this a simple fault finding table is being issued to all operators shortly.
All Loran operators will be interested to hear that steps are being taken to extend S.S. Loran coverage North for 250 miles. This will considerably simplify training over this country, and will mean that S.S. Loran can be used on night operations from Bases. It will only then be necessary to use Gee for homing and other duties requiring accurate and easy fixing.
The [sic] provide this S.S. coverage one of the Homing Chain stations has had to be closed down, and position lines only can now be obtained from this chain.
The question of serviceability checks on Loran has been discussed recently, and it has been decided that the navigator shall carry out the pre-flight tests. This in no way relieves the Air Bomber of his responsibilities in regard to Loran, and a good Air Bomber will always be present when the navigator carries out the tests. Squadron Loran Instructors must therefore ensure that both navigators and Ait Bombers are capable of carrying out the pre-flight tests.
Tests have been carried out with a fixed aerial and loading unit on the last five operations. These tests have proved quite successful and the signal strength has been equally as good as with a trailing aerial. Air Ministry have been approached for permission to manufacture the Loading Units and it is anticipated the whole of the Group will be equipped shortly. The provision of such a fixed aerial will considerably simplify the use of Loran and enable operators to fix
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION [/underlined]
in the target area.
One further word in regard to Loran Training – Air Bombers, in view of the fact that they are the set operators, must be given equal if not more instruction than the navigators, and the Squadron Navigation and Bombing Leaders must co-operate fully in this connection.
[Underlined] Loran in Mosquitos [/underlined]
Better results are now being obtained by the Mosquito navigators. Difficulties due to an inefficient aerial system have been overcome, and Loran has been used successfully for tracking into the target.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] tactics
The main interest this month from the tactical point of view was the attack on Bergen by Nos.9 and 617 Squadrons, when several aircraft were intercepted by enemy fighters when withdrawing from the target area. An escort of Mustangs accompanied the force, but was unable to come to their assistance; this was due mainly to the aircraft being dispersed over a considerable area after orbitting [sic] the target. The enemy fighters, however, did not have everything their own way. One Lancaster was attacked continuously for 16 minutes by no less than five fighters, but got away with only moderate damage, while another survived three attacks without sustaining any damage whatsoever. All crews would do well to note the points brought out by this attack.
(i) A fighter escort cannot protect stragglers or widely dispersed aircraft.
(ii) A resolute crew, well trained in gunnery and combat manoeuvres, can give a very good account of itself, even when singled out for concerted attack.
(iii) The corkscrew is a very effective combat manoeuvre in daylight as well as night.
The golden rule, however, is still DO NOT STRAGGLE. Combat manoeuvres are unnecessary and dangerous if aircraft are in gaggle.
Our night tactics of evasion and rapid loss of height from the target are still keeping our losses to fighters very low, but the last attack on Karlsruhe showed once again that if the fighters do contact the bomber stream either en route or over the target they are just as deadly as ever. Crews should, if possible, increase their vigilance near the target as the enemy, particularly since the successful jamming of his A.I. by Window and other means, is making every effort at target interception, where a concentration of aircraft is assured.
A small number of combats is still being reported with jet-propelled aircraft. Reports generally are inconclusive, but although it seems unlikely that the enemy is using jet-propelled fighters at night in any numbers, it is possible that some form of rocket or liquid jet projectile is being used. Crews should pay close attention to such phenomena and report in particular if a suspected jet fighter makes any attempt to follow the aircraft, or carry out a definite attack.
[Underlined] WISHFUL THINKING [/underlined]
A captain of aircraft was heard to remark that he had heard upward firing cannon in German night fighters were no longer being used as they interfered with the master unit for the compass. He has since been reported missing.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] air bombing
The past month has not provided many opportunities for crews to display their bombing skill either on the Ranges or on Germany, but it is hoped that the slack periods have been used to full advantage and that new and inexperienced crews now have a full understanding of what is expected of them in the target area.
There are still too many examples of bomb loads being scattered over considerable distances from the target for no apparent reason, and the manipulation failures that still happen from time to time are difficult to understand in view of the fact that the Air Bomber has plenty of time to check and double check every switch on his panel on the way to the target. Be prepared for any swift change in the tactics to be employed over the target, and if the change involves any alterations to bombsight settings, make sure that they are done accurately.
The importance of accurate “flying for bombing” has often been stressed, and if any doubts still exist among Pilots the following example should help to dispel them.
F/O McDonnell and crew, No.9 Squadron, have completed three bombing exercises since their arrival from No.5 L.F.S. and obtained the following results:-
[Table of Errors on Exercises]
Errors in yards converted to 20,000 ft.
These results show a fine understanding between the members of the bombing team, F/O McDonnell (P), F/O Fricker (A/B), and F/O Chorney (Nav.) which is all the more remarkable as F/O Fricker did not join the crew until the end of L.F.S. training. The errors speak for themselves and require no comment, but the fact that F/O McDonnell was a Staff Pilot at a Bombing and Gunnery School before coming to No.5 Group should provide food for thought.
Good results, operational or training, are obtainable only if every member of the bombing team realises the importance of his own contribution to the combined effort, and it is the Captain’s duty to ensure that his crew make every effort to obtain results similar to those mentioned above.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS. [/underlined]
F/O Jones has been appointed Bombing Leader of No.44 Squadron in place of F/Lt. Lowry, now tour-expired.
F/Lt. Foulkes has moved to No.617 Squadron and F/Lt. Arkieson has taken over the Bombing Leader’s duties at No.630 Squadron.
F/Lt. Wake, ex No.106 Squadron and No.1660 H.C.U. has been appointed Bombing Leader of No.61 Squadron in place of F/Lt. Nugent.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] BOMBING ANALYSIS. [/underlined]
No.9 Squadron, Bardney, have carried their Bombing Analysis a step further than the majority of Squadrons in the Group, and there is no doubt that their methods are producing results.
Each crew has its own file which contains all the practice bombing results, including the Forms 3073 and signals giving the quadrant readings. In addition, a sheet of tracing paper with the graticule cross in the centre, is kept in the file and all bombs dropped by the crew are re-aligned on a common heading and transferred to the tracing paper. Therefore, when a crew has completed five exercises, there are approximately 30 bombs shown on their sheet and as they are all re-aligned on to a common heading it is easy to detect any tendency of the Air Bomber to sight slightly off the target.
These sheets do indicate that some Air Bombers consistently sight to one side of the target and steps can then be taken to eradicate this tendency.
Bombs dropped with a proven instrument error are marked in a different colour and can then be ignored when assessing the Air Bomber’s accuracy of sighting.
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION. [/underlined]
The following results have been received, all from No.56 Base.
S/Ldr. Walmsley, DFC – 119 yards
120 yards
150 yards (A.S.I. error)
F/Lt. Lewis (189 Sqdn.) – 123 yards
F/Lt. Gibson, DFC (49 Sqdn.) – 125 yards
No.56 Base would welcome a little competition from Bombing Leaders in other Bases.
[Underlined] BIG CHIEF COMETITION. [/underlined]
W/Cdr. Milward (No.619 Sqdn.) 61 yards.
An excellent exercise, which has seldom been beaten by any entrant in this competition.
[Underlined] QUIZ. [/underlined]
1. Which is the sighting angle flexible drive, the top or the bottom one?
2. In what respects does the normal 30 lb. I.B. differ from that used in the ‘J’ type cluster?
3. How is the heating device in No.13 bomb station controlled?
4. What are the Air Bomber’s duties in an aircraft joining the circuit after an operational flight?
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] THE MONTH’S BEST EXERCISES. [/underlined]
SQDN. PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR CREW ERROR
9 F/O McDonnell F/O Fricker F/O Chorney 75, 63, 34
44 F/O Coventry F/S Gibson Sgt Ayre 39
57 F/O Pauline Sgt Cartwright Sgt Hole 47
61 F/O Cain F/S Lewis F/O Williams 75
F/O Crocombe F/S Devine F/O Reeves 78
227 F/O Osborne F/S Rochman F/S Kydd 74
617 F/O Flatman F/O Kelly F/O Mackie 72
F/L Lancey F/S Perry W/O Robin 80
619 F/O De Marco F/S Johnston F/S Sharman 65
F/O Davis F/S Page F/S Cook 66
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
[Table of Squadron Bombing Competition Results]
No.83 Squadron head the January competition with a clear lead over the remainder of the Squadrons, six of whom failed to qualify.
No.61 Squadron have shown a great improvement over last month, when they failed to qualify. It would not be unexpected if they finish at the head of the table next month.
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF CREWS [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
For the month of January No.55 Base were credited with 52 ‘C’ categories, the correct number was 23.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE. [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice by Squadron]
No.627 Squadron:- 134 bombs with an average error of 77 yards, and 70 T.I’s with an average error of 139 yards.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] signals
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
The W/T control of operations during January maintained the high standard which is now characteristic of our W/T Controllers’ Operators. A pleasing feature of this operating is the accuracy of tuning and timing now being obtained by all Link aircraft. These are very important points, and this accuracy is now even more important than ever, as the time of opening W/T watch has been curtailed, thus allowing a much shorter time for the Main Force aircraft to be properly tuned to the Link aircraft. This should present no great problem to Wireless Operators, but it will require constant practice and training to maintain the standard now expected.
[Underlined] W/T CONTROLLERS’ TESTS. [/underlined]
During January, 48 Wireless Operators (Air) took part in the W/T Controllers’ Test, as laid down in 5G. S.S.I. No.13, and out of this number 32 passed as fit for control duties. The percentage of failures (33 1/3) is a measure of the severity of the test. The failures can be classified under two headings, viz. inaccuracy in tuning, and incorrect procedure. The first of these faults can be eliminated by practice tuning in the Squadron W/T Training Room, and the second by more thorough scrutiny of Air Staff Instructions, Part VI, Sigs/1, Page 7, para.10. Signals Leaders please note!
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION. [/underlined]
Categorisation of all Wireless Operators (Air) in the Group is being carried out enthusiastically by all Squadrons. The results at the end of January are as follows:-
[Table of Wireless Operator (Air) Categorisations by Squadron]
To ensure that this categorisation is being carried out in accordance with the instructions laid down in 5 Group letter 5G/S.14466/Sigs. dated
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
5th December, 1944, the Group Signals Leader, when visiting Squadrons, will check some of the Wireless Operators as to their eligibility for their category.
[Underlined] GROUP W/T EXERCISE. [/underlined]
The Group W/T Exercise during January was, like the curate’s egg, good and bad in parts. The frequency (5220 kc/s) is not very suitable, being rather overcrowded, and efforts are being made to obtain another one for this exercise. The geographical position of some squadron installations, in relation to this Headquarters, makes reception of each other’s signals very difficult, but this is, perhaps, within limits, quite useful in training operators to work under difficult conditions. After each exercise a signal is now being despatched to each Base and Squadron concerned, giving a summary of the exercise.
[Underlined] APOLOGY. [/underlined]
In last month’s summary, in our appreciation of the work done by Radio Schools, O.T.U’s and Conversion Units in producing the type of Wireless Operator we require, we inadvertently left out the (O) A.F.U’s and 5 L.F.S. As continuity is essential throughout all training, the work done by these units is obviously on a par with the others. We regret this omission and assure these units that their work is just as much appreciated.
[Underlined] SIGNALS FAILURES. [/underlined]
The signals failures percentage, against the 1,572 sorties flown during January, was 3.684. This shows an increase of 0.501 against the figure for December. Approximately 75% of the defects are attributed to faulty equipment and are, presumably, unavoidable. There was one servicing failure and one due to manipulation. Despite this increase in failures, not one sortie was cancelled as the result of a signals defect. There were three early returns, all of which were caused by faulty equipment. One revelation worthy of note is that there was only one T.R.1196 failure throughout the month – never has T.R.1196 serviceability been so high.
[Underlined] V.H.F. R/T. [/underlined]
The V.H.F. R/T serviceability shows a decrease against the figures for December. Of the 33 T.R.5043 defects, eight were due to broken whip aerials. Six of these aerials had been repositioned in accordance with B.C.S.P. No.10 (R.T.I.M. No.833), but owing to our inability to obtain the correct rubber grummets and paxolin plates, unsatisfactory substitutes had to be used. A very careful watch must be kept on existing non-standard V.H.F. aerial fittings. Meanwhile, further efforts are being made to obtain the correct items.
[Underlined] RADAR. [/underlined]
[Underlined] AMALGAMATION. [/underlined]
A considerable amount of attention was focussed this month on the problem of amalgamation of the Communications and Radar Maintenance Branches. Following a conference with No.56 Base representatives, a visit was paid to Linton-on-Ouse in No.6 Group, where a scheme is working with great success, and much useful information was gained. With this as a basis, an experiment was commenced in No.56 Base, from which some measure of success is expected.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] EMPLOYMENT OF WIRELESS OPERATORS
(W.A.A.F.) IN RADAR. [/underlined]
Following up a suggestion by Mr. Wardley-Smith, of T.R.E., a scheme was put into effect in No.49 Squadron, Fulbeck, whereby ten Wireless Operators (W.A.A.F.) were attached to A.G.L.T. Daily Servicing Parties, and the R. & I. Section, No.49 Squadron, were warned that after one month’s training, six Radar Mechanics would be withdrawn from the squadron. A T.R.E. P.D.S. member has been attached to Fulbeck to observe the experiment, which is progressing favourably.
In view of the increasing employment of Wireless Operators in Radar duties, a series of courses was commenced at Bardney for their benefit. The duration of the course is a fortnight, and will cover Radar principles, Loran and Gee. Relevant films will be shown and practical work given. Although no startling results are expected, it is hoped to stimulate interest, and provide for any further knowledge.
[Underlined] LORAN [/underlined]
A most welcome chapter in the Loran story occurred last month, when Air Ministry decontrolled the supply of the equipment. This permitted immediate action to renew the rapidly dwindling stocks of spares and to silence the cynics who were saying that no sooner is an installation proved than the equipment goes off the market.
[Underlined] H.2.S. MARK III. [/underlined]
As a result of the shortage of Radar personnel, the decision was made last October to curtail the fitting of H.2S. in No.53 Base, and concentrate personnel thrown up, into No.54 Base, with the object of obtaining the best from the H.2.S. available. Since that date, efforts have been made to legalise the position of these Radar mechanics. On January 19th official approval was given with the birth of the No.5 Group Special Radar Development Party, vacancies for which were given up by No.53 Base. Much good work has been done already by the party in their unofficial capacity, and continued and increasing success will be expected in the future, now that it is legalised.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] gardening
The Group Gardeners operated on two nights this month, visiting the Eastern Gardens, and planted the small but effective total of 143 vegetables.
Bad weather limited the Command output to 668 vegetables, which is well below the present monthly lift, and clearly demonstrated the importance of taking every available opportunity to plant in good weather, so that the enemy’s minesweeping force may be employed to its maximum capacity and never allowed to relax for one moment.
[Underlined] COMMAND SUMMARY OF VEGETABLES PLANTED. [/underlined]
No. 1 Group – 235
No. 5 Group – 143
No. 4 Group – 137
No. 6 Group – 119
No. 3 Group – 34
[Underlined] GREAT STRENGTH RETURNS THE PENNY. [/underlined]
After months of hard work, and heavy Gardening operations, combined with the menacing effects of our Group’s bombing visits to the Oslo Fjord areas, interesting news is now coming to hand of some of the disturbing results achieved.
The main trooping ports in Oslo Fjord were closed on various occasions and the enemy has had to bring less suitable ports into use, and employ extra shipping in the effort to carry out his programme of transporting troops from Norway to Denmark. The Harbour Master of this district has been working overtime to compete with his difficulties in keeping an ‘Open Port’, and has bitterly complained that 12 mines exploded without warning between the 8th and 25th October, 1944.
A new transport the “DARES”, estimated at 7,000 tons, has joined the Oslo – Aarhus run, but she is reported to have returned to Aarhus on 2nd January with damage to her engines caused by mine. The “DONAU”, 9035 tons, also employed on this run, was sunk by sabotage in Oslo Fjord on 16th January, and the 6,360 tons “ULANGA” was last reported in floating dock as a result of bomb damage received during the bombing attack on shipping on New Year’s Eve.
Two more large transports, the “WINRICH VON KNIPRODE” (10,123 tons) and the “MAR DEL PLATA” (7,340 tons) have also been damaged by collision and marine risk, and so the enemy’s valuable fleet of twelve large transports has, for the time being, been reduced to seven.
The attack with bombs on 28/29th December also reduced the available shipping by sinking the “NORDVARD”, when 70 Germans were lost, damaging the “ANGAMOS”, an ex-Danish fruitship, and breaking the back of
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GARDENING. [/underlined]
an oil lighter, the “SAONE”, now reported aground off the port of HORTEN. Three more ships were also sunk off MOSS.
THE FOLLOWING CASUALTIES HAVE ALSO BEEN REPORTED:-
“ROALNDSECK”, 1,845 tons, was damaged by an explosion on 17th January, after loading horses and material for Oslo; her cargo was unloaded subsequently and she was expected to dock for repairs.
The German vessel “GOTENHAFEN” was damaged by a mine prior to 27th November, 1944, and returned to Hamburg to discharge.
A minesweeper was sunk by a magnetic mine near Arundal, Norway, on 3rd January, 1945.
A German Auxiliary, believed minelayer, was mined and sunk 4 miles North of Rosnaes Light, at the Northern entrance to the Great Belt, on 5th January, 1945.
The Danish “FREDERICKSHAVN” 1,480 tons, damaged by a mine off Halls on 19th November, 1945.
The Norwegian S.S. “KONG TRYGVE”, 1,141 tons, mined at Moen and towed to Copenhagen.
The German “MARTHA HALM”, 984 tons, mined near Aarhus (probably November, 1944).
Norwegian “MARVEL”, 1,566 tons, slightly damaged by a mine off Kullen on 17th October, 1944.
“DORIANA” Danish Schooner, mined and sunk in Femersund late November, 1944.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] training
[Underlined] TRAINING ACTIVITIES DURING JANUARY [/underlined]
It was a month of snow, hail, fog and ice, but despite this the amount of training by Squadrons showed an increase on the December figures.
Squadrons did 3245 hours training – 2868 hours by day and 377 hours by night – giving an average od 180 hours per Squadron compared with 122 hours in December.
Some of the Squadrons occupying the lowest place in the training lists in December improved their position very much – in particular No.44 Squadron which recorded a total above the Squadron average.
The lowest Lancaster Squadrons were No.227 Squadron (99 hours), No.9 Squadron (124 hours), No.189 Squadron (140 hours) and No.57 Squadron (141 hours). Thus for the second consecutive month Nos. 227 and 189 Squadrons were behind in their training. No.9 Squadron is also showing low figures and for the last two months has done scarcely any air gunnery training. Fighter affiliation can always be included on bombing exercises.
No.627 Mosquito Squadron is lowest of all with 56 hours, but when its aircraft situation improves the training hours are expected to jump.
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF PILOTS [/underlined]
There are now 273 pilots in the Group holding categories, leaving 142 yet to be categorised. The remaining pilots on Group strength are those not liable for categorisation because they have done more than 20 sorties in the main force and over 30 in No.54 Base Squadrons.
During the month 171 categories were given to pilots on New Crew and 10/20 Sortie Checks. No.54 Base showed good progress and are making up leeway rapidly now the Base has facilities for categorisation. This Base has also introduced Categorisation into No.627 Mosquito Squadron. The following table shows the state of Categorisation in the Group:-
[Underlined] RECORD OF CATEGORISATION [/underlined]
[Table of Pilot Categorisation by Base]
Total Categorised in January = [underlined] 171 [/underlined]
Total Categorised in Group = [underlined] 273 [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING [/underlined]
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] The “percentage categorised” is based on recorded pilot strength on 31st January. This includes pilots not liable for categorisation.
[Underlined] ERRATA: [/underlined] Apologies to No.55 Base for an error which incorrectly put the Base “well behind in categorisation” in last month’s summary.
[Underlined] NO.5 L. F. S. REPORT [/underlined]
No.5 L.F.S. produced 49 crews for Squadrons at an average of 15 hours per crew, and its aircraft flew 840 hours. The crew total was the lowest in the Unit’s history because of the weather, and accommodation at Syerston is now at its maximum.
There are still approximately 160 crews to be trained by the L.F.S. before it disappears, and its last days are going to be strenuous. It is estimated by 1st April, 1945, the Staff will be able to say “D.C.O.” and pack their bags.
[Underlined] NO. 1690 B.D.T. FLIGHT [/underlined]
There were 13 days during the month unfit for fighter affiliation – about the same as December – but fighter affiliation results were mush better. The Flight did 398 details, of which 332 were by day and 66 by night. The night details included 21 for No.75 Base.
The total hours for the Flight were 354 and the average hours per aircraft was 25. Pilots averaged 24 hours for the month.
The fine affiliation record which has been established by No.1690 B.D.T. Flight is still being marred by accidents. There were three again last month in the Flight, two the month before, and three the month before that.
[Underlined] INSTRUMENT FLYING AND LINK [/underlined]
There was a further improvement in Link times. The average Squadron time has gone up from 78 hours in December to 101 hours in January but Nos. 9, 463, 97 and 617 Squadrons are still lagging behind.
[Table of Link Times by Base and Unit]
GRAND TOTAL (Including 5 LFS and 1690) = 2173:
ACTUAL AVERAGE/SQUADRON = 101 hours. REQUIRED AVERAGE/SQUADRON = 132 hours.
+ Marks the Squadrons where times are TOO LOW.
˨ 1690 B.D.T.F. and No.5 L.F.S. excluded from Base average.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
second thoughts for pilots
[Underlined] “GEORGE” MARK VIII [/underlined]
The Auto Pilot Mark VIII is the latest and best type of “George”. One of our S.D. Squadrons has used it for 90% of all its operational flying time in recent months. Points to note:-
(i) Trim your aircraft BEFORE putting “George” in.
(ii) If “George flies one wing low, trim out with rudder bias.
(iii) Keep the trim indicator on the air pressure gauge central by adjusting the elevator trim.
(iv) When reporting unserviceability, give full information including behaviour of aircraft, air pressure and outside air temperature. Whenever possible take the mechanic up on an air test.
(v) Exercise “George” at every opportunity. The more it is used the better it is.
(vi) Read Pilots Noted General A.P.2095, Part IIIG – Auto Pilot, Mark VIII.
[Underlined] FIRST AID [/underlined]
Investigations into emergency landings at Woodbridge show that first aid in the air can do a lot to help the recovery of injured aircrew. Remember:-
(i) Keep the patient comfortable, warm and on oxygen.
(ii) Always use the First Aid dressing. Know when and how to apply a tourniquet.
(iii) One Ampoule of morphia is sufficient for a person in pain.
(iv) Do not remove flying clothing unless it is absolutely necessary to allow the wound to be dressed. Flying clothing provides warmth and a certain amount of splinting.
(v) The M.O. has a lot of useful tips. Talk to him.
FLY YOUR CORKSCREW – DON’T SKID ALL OVER THE SKY!
UP PORT
[Drawings]
IS LIKE THIS – [underlined] NOT [/underlined] LIKE THIS!
N.C.M.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] accidents
The first month of the year produced a “score” of 28 aircraft damaged in the Group. 11 were totally destroyed, 1 was Cat. ‘B’, 8 were Cat. ‘AC’ and 7 were Cat. ‘A’. Of the total, 14 were the result of technical failures, collisions on operations, or high winds, while one was unavoidably damaged when it hit birds in flight. 5 accidents are still “obscure”, leaving 8 accidents classed as definitely avoidable.
This shows a welcome drop in the “avoidable” rate, and even allowing for some of the “obscure” accidents eventually being classified accurately, the total is still well below the previous monthly average. This is a big step in the right direction at the beginning of the year. Here are the details:-
[Underlined] Squadrons. [/underlined]
[List of Avoidable Accident Type Numbers]
[Underlined] TAXYING ETC. [/underlined]
These accidents maintain their notorious position. Never a month but brings its depressing tale of careless taxying and M.T. collisions, and although, as a rule, severe damage is not sustained, these incidents are never excusable. Log Books are endorsed in “red” for careless taxying every month, and we can only repeat once again that it is folly and gross disobedience of orders to taxy at night without searching thoroughly ahead with taxying light or Aldis lamp.
[Underlined] HIGH GROUND ACCIDENTS. [/underlined]
A Lancaster proceeded on a short navigation cross country recently. The pilot was briefed to set course over base at 4,000 feet. The aircraft left a base in this Group to fly due West for some 60 miles and back again. It must have been apparent to the pilot and navigator that the safety height near the end of the outward leg was much higher than at base, yet this crew descended through cloud and hit a hill in level flight, with all the engines under power. The hill was some 1,700 feet high. There were no survivors.
In spite of all that has been done to stamp out this “suicidal” descent through cloud, these incidents still occur, and by no means as seldom as is generally realised. All pilots and navigators take heed.
Another accident this month points almost the same moral. The results of the investigation are not yet forward, but it would appear that a Lancaster returning from an operation flew low in bad visibility, and hit a wireless mast. The pilot may have simply been trying to break cloud without checking his safety height, or he may have misread his altimeter, but in any case there is every indication that this was another completely avoidable fatal accident. Although the truth will
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ACCIDENTS. [/underlined]
never be completely known, the circumstances of this crash provide a warning to all. [Underlined] Do not [/underlined] come down to low heights in bad visibility to see the ground. Height spells safety every time, and good instrument flying clinches it.
[Underlined] STAR AWARDS. [/underlined]
The table below shows the avoidable accident position this month. This is, as usual, subject to revision when all accidents have been thoroughly investigated.
[Table of Avoidable Accidents by Unit with Star Award]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] gunnery
Enemy fighter activity was comparatively slight during the month of January, 1945, and a total of only 38 combats took place over this period. Of these, 3 enemy aircraft are claimed destroyed, one of these being reported as a jet aircraft, and 5 are claimed as damaged.
Of the 38 combats, 9 were reported following the daylight operation on Bergen when Lancasters of Nos.617 and 9 Squadrons were repeatedly attacked by F.W.190’s. Crews from these Squadrons claimed 4 F.W.190’s damaged, and these have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command. During these encounters the Hun made full use of the sun, and it is wondered how many Gunners went prepared, armed with spectacles, anti-glare. Each gunner is entitled to draw one pair of these spectacles on his clothing card, and it is hoped that Squadron Gunnery Leaders will check that Gunners are fully equipped.
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
14/15.1.45 “W” 189 Sqdn – ME.109
14/15.1.45 “M” 467 Sqdn – 1 Jet aircraft.
16/17.1.45 “D” 630 Sqdn – JU. 88
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
12.1.45 “U” 617 Sqdn – FW.190
12.1.45 “W” 617 Sqdn – FW.190
12.1.45 “S” 9 Sqdn – FW.190
12.1.45 “J” 9 Sqdn - FW.190
13/14.1.45 “M” 61 Sqdn – JU. 88
[Underlined] GUNNERY AIR TRAINING [/underlined]
The Order of Merit is based on the following system of marking:-
Night Affiliation (Camera and Infra-Red Film) 10 points.
Night Affiliation (Without Camera) 8 points.
Day Affiliation (Camera and Gyro) 5 points
Day Affiliation (Camera only) 3 points
Day Affiliation (Without Camera) 1 point.
[Table of Air Training Scores Ranked by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GUNNERY [/underlined]
No.467 Squadron are to be congratulated on going to the top of the ladder, and also for completing 32 Night Affiliation exercises. Certain squadrons are still making scant use of their Gyro Assemblies, and it is hoped that next month’s returns will show an improvement in this respect.
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF AIR TRAINING EXERCISES [/underlined]
[Table of Affiliation Exercises by Squadron]
[Underlined] Total number of Affiliation exercises for January = 878 [/underlined]
In spite of 14 days of inclement weather which prohibited all flying, the total of Affiliation exercises shows a very creditable increase on the December total. Night Affiliation exercises are increasing steadily, and Infra-Red films are being taken more frequently. Self-towed drogue exercises have been completed by certain Squadrons, and it is hoped that next month Squadrons will use every endeavour to get the maximum number of crews carrying out this exercise. This is the one exercise where the gunner has the opportunity of firing his guns at a target whilst carrying out combat manoeuvres.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] armament
[Underlined] INCENDIARY STOREHOUSES. [/underlined]
Covered storage for cluster projectiles containing 4 lb incendiary bombs has now been provided at all stations and the layouts should be in full working order.
Present stocks of clusters are low, but stations must be prepared to receive larger quantities which will test the efficiency of the organisation and layout of these stores. Full information is contained in the following letters and signal:-
5G/402/17/Org. dated 3.11.44.
5G/621/14/Armt. dated 3.1.45.
5G/621/14/Armt. dated 21.1.45.
Signal R.911 dated 27.1.45.
5G/621/14/Armt. dated 4. 2.45.
Particular attention is drawn to the need for careful handling of uncased cluster projectiles in order to avoid damage to either the cluster tail or the tails of the 4 lb. bombs.
[Underlined] DEFECT REPORTS. [/underlined]
We are well aware that preparing six copies of a defect report in accordance with A.P. 2608A and B.C.A.S.I’s causes a certain amount of inconvenience but unless these reports are submitted on every occasion, complete information on any one subject is not available. Instances have occurred where the ingenuity of Armament personnel has produced excellent modifications, but when forwarded to higher authority the reason for the modification is not understood because no defect reports have been rendered. Although “pen pushing” is not popular amongst Armament Technical personnel, it is, as you will see, necessary.
[Underlined] S.B.C’s. [/underlined]
Our old friend the S.B.C. is still called upon to perform its duty in delivering showers of 4 lb incendiary bombs upon our enemies. If reliable functioning of this equipment is to be ensured, the various tests and inspections laid down must be carried out conscientiously, more particularly so if S.B.C’s have not been used recently.
[Underlined] MAN-POWER. [/underlined]
The foregoing remarks will undoubtedly raise the question of lack of man-power. This deficiency is well known and aircrew cadets have been posted to units to assist armament personnel. These cadets are strong, healthy and intelligent and after elementary training, if armament personnel issue clear and concise instructions, they are quite capable of dealing with many of the jobs requiring unskilled and semi-skilled labour, thus relieving trained armament personnel to perform the more intricate technical duties.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES TABLE [/underlined]
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A – MANIPULATION B – MAINTENANCE C – ICING D – TECHNICAL E – ELECTRICAL F – OBSCURE
[Page break]
[Drawing] flying control
[Underlined] LANDING TIMES FOR JANUARY, 1945. [/underlined]
[Table of Landing Times by Base and Station]
During the recent heavy snowstorms and frost, the fall on occasions reached five inches. Snow plans have been revised and were put into operation early, with a consequent higher degree of serviceability. Methods employed varied considerably because of local conditions and the amount of manpower available. The three methods generally used were “sand and salt”, ploughing and rolling. Sand and salt proved excellent under conditions of small falls, rolling where the fall was medium but a heavy fall required ploughing. Salting brought with it difficulties of drainage clearance and ordinary mechanical brushing was not always equal to the task. Similarly, the “Snowgo” was not of great assistance in conditions where the fall of snow was fine and a strong wind prevailed, but was of use following ploughing.
Except in the morning following the heaviest fall, stations maintained a high degree of serviceability. All stations were able to keep their runways serviceable and in only a few cases was there not a subsidiary runway available by the afternoon following overnight fall. In one or two cases lighting difficulties followed on the thaw, but were tackled promptly and except in one case were remedied at an early stage. The position was complicated by the high wind causing damage to outer circuit and funnel lighting.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] FLYING CONTROL. [/underlined]
The P.W.D. has developed a new form of lighting, evolved from the F.I.D.O. installation. The apparatus is portable and is intended to assist aircraft in lining-up on the approach under conditions of poor visibility. Petrol from a 40-gallon drum is pumped manually through a 50-yards feed pipe into a pre-heater at the end of a 20-feet burner line which is pegged into the ground. The intense flame far exceeds the sodium burners in brilliancy and penetration. Following successful trials by 2nd T.A.F., various lay-outs are being tested at Balderton. When the most successful form has been found, a demonstration will be arranged.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] aircrew safety
[Underlined] DITCHINGS. [/underlined]
One known ditching occurred this month and another possible one was reported at the same time and in the same area. An aircraft, believed of 617 Squadron was seen to ditch on the 12th approximately 15 miles off the Norwegian coast. The ditching was seen by a number of crews and was well covered by prompt sighting reports. A Warwick standing by for just such an eventuality was quickly in position, and in making a dummy run saw the crew on the wing of the aircraft with no dinghy visible. As the airborne lifeboat was dropped, the aircraft sank. One man was seen to board the lifeboat and all but two of the others were seen to be making their way towards it. A Lindholme dinghy was then dropped to the two stationary members after which the Warwick, owing to the presence of enemy fighters had to withdraw.
In a position just North of the above ditching, an aircraft which was seen to be on fire over the target was believed to have ditched. A further lifeboat was dropped in darkness over the believed position.
In spite of intensive searches for these lifeboats and survivors from other incidents, nothing was found and it is believed that the survivors were found and picked up by the enemy.
[Underlined] HEAD INJURIES. [/underlined]
A medical report from the Emergency Landing Runways states:- “The majority of eye and face injuries are caused by perspex fragments, the eyes and upper head being involved more than the head below the eyes”. Most injuries have been caused by enemy action and the carrying of goggles (to be used whenever possible) by all crew members cannot be too strongly emphasised.
[Underlined] FIRST AID. [/underlined]
The above report also states “First Aid has, on the whole improved, but is still not up to the standard of the Americans. It was felt that poor First Aid was chiefly due to night condition, but that this is not the case has been proved by recent R.A.F. daylight raids. There is still the occasional casualty who has bled to death from a limb arterial wound and which could have been prevented by a properly placed tourniquet”.
Aircrew Safety Officers should institute a drive to improve the standard of First Aid.
[Underlined] THREE GOLDEN RULES. [/underlined]
When in doubt of your ability to:-
(i) Reach an airfield – initiate Emergency and Distress messages.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIRCREW SAFETY. [/underlined]
(ii) Fly the aircraft – order your crew to “Put on parachutes”.
(iii) Land safely – order your crew to “Crash Landing Stations”.
A little time spent in studying for your own safety will afford you more time to study for your enjoyment.
[Underlined] THE DIVIDENDS. [/underlined]
Air Ministry report that 2161 aircrew (923 R.A.F. and 1238 Americans) were rescued in Home Waters during 1944 making a total, since the War began, of 5,467.
During last December 41 aircrew were rescued – this represents 19.3% of the aircrew involved in known ditchings.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] engineering
[Underlined] SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
January produced only 1572 sorties; weather conditions were the retarding factor. The peack [sic] serviceability reached during January was 95.8% of Lancasters on charge: the balance of unserviceable aircraft was made up of aircraft undergoing Major Inspection and aircraft undergoing modification for special commitments. It was singularly fortunate that during this bad weather spell quite a number of aircraft became due, or almost due, for Major Inspection.
[Underlined] ENGINE FAILURES [/underlined]
[Underlined] FLAME TRAPS. [/underlined]
Much progress has been made with the methods of cleaning flame traps, and it is hoped that now local instructions have been given to C.T.O’s to remove flame traps at 150 or 225 hours according to the time available, and also to change the flame traps at any time they are suspected of being choked, that another source of engine failure has been eliminated. Under a scheme evolved by Messrs. Rolls Royce, these flame traps can be cleaned quite successfully in under half an hour. 53 Base are experimenting with their own washing bath and if successful this scheme will be introduced into each Base Major Servicing Section to cater for flame traps throughout the Base.
[Underlined] COOLING DUCTS. [/underlined]
Unfortunately, much unserviceability is being caused by the failure of the one-piece cooling duct and many hours are consumed in changing them after few flying hours. Command are controlling the supply of replacements but the situation is becoming serious owing to the extremely short life of this type of duct.
[Underlined] FAILURE OF NO.2 FUEL TANK. [/underlined]
The work entailed in changing No.2 tank is fully realised. The frequency with which these tanks spring a leak does not decrease, and many high speed tank changes have taken place to get the aircraft off on Ops to time. Although Mod.1179 was introduced with a view to reducing the number of No.2 tank failures, insufficient of these modified tanks have been received in the Service to make themselves felt.; as a result of enquiries, it seems pretty certain that many modified tanks are now coming through. No instance is known of a tank failing subsequent to the incorporation of Mod.1179.
[Underlined] CONTROL OF M.T. [/underlined]
In view of A.M.O. A.30/45, the complete responsibility of the maintenance organisation of Mechanical Transport now rests with the Engineer Branch. Due to a number of reasons which are well known to many, immediate improvements cannot be expected, nor will the position be eased without hard work and perfect co-operation. The broad policy has already been defined by Bomber Command Engineer Staff, and early in February it is anticipated that this Group will be in a position to request the attendance of the Command Engineer Officer to discuss the proposals for placing the M.T. maintenance on a sound footing. Man power is the obvious problem, and even with an increase in maintenance establishment the actual bodies will not be available for some time, if at all.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ENGINEERING. [/underlined]
This control of transport maintenance is an added responsibility to the already hard pressed C.T.O., but it was the natural course of events that this transfer of responsibility should take place as the first major consideration of the C.T.O. is the serviceability of aircraft, and with an inefficient mechanical transport section, the serviceability suffers considerably. C.T.O’s, in their own interests, must endeavour to give as much thought as possible to this transport problem without detracting from their personal interest in the operational efficiency of the aircraft.
[Underlined] FLIGHT ENGINEERS [/underlined]
[Underlined] FUEL GAUGES [/underlined]
A demonstration to prove the accuracy of petrol gauges was laid on at Coningsby on the 25th January, but unfortunately the weather intervened and it was agreed that it would be unsafe to carry out these trials; it was most disappointing as it was hoped that the accuracy or otherwise of these gauges would be proved once and for all. The demonstration will be laid on again at some future date, but in the meantime Flight Engineers can do much to help to prove the statement that these petrol gauges are sufficiently accurate to be relied upon. In the new Flight Engineer’s log (B.C. Form 10) on page 3 under the heading “Flowmeter Reading” four columns will be found; all Flight Engineers, in future, must record in these columns petrol gauge readings throughout the trip, paying particular attention to the reading just before landing and then checking the reading again when the aircraft is parked in dispersal. Care must be taken to read the gauge in the tail down position for this check. With the information gained from Flight Engineer’s Logs, and the results of the demonstration, it will be decided if gauge reading should replace dips to ascertain the fuel remaining in an aircraft after a trip.
[Underlined] PETROL CONSUMPTION. [/underlined]
Petrol consumption throughout the Group has shown a marked improvement over the past twelve months, but occasions still arise in squadrons where two or three aircraft use 210 gallons per hour when all other aircraft use an average of 180 gallons per hour. The Flight Engineer Leader must investigate these cases thoroughly. Points to note are air speeds, revs and boost used and A.S.I. in climb and descent. He must check the last six trips of these aircraft; if he finds high consumption in all cases he must report it to the C.T.O. If, however, he comes to the conclusion that it is the pilot and flight engineer to blame, he must report this to the Commanding Officer of the squadron who will undoubtedly see that the erring pilot and flight engineer receive instructions on engine handling.
[Underlined] FRESH RECRUITS. [/underlined]
When a new Flight Engineer reports to a squadron be must be thoroughly examined by the Flight Engineer Leader to ascertain if he is quite capable of carrying out his duties. Questions should be selected from the 5 Group Lancaster Quiz. If it is found that he is weak in any subject, instruction must be given him without delay. If convenient, the Flight Engineer Leader or his deputy should fly with him on his first N.F.T. or cross-country, to check him on aircraft drills and the way in which he handles throttles, rev levers and his fuel tank manipulation in the air. Any faults must be remedied before he becomes operational.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
[Table of 5 L.F.S. Aircraft Serviceability]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] photography
During the month of January, 54.6% of the night attempts produced successful ground detail photographs, a good figure for this time of the year, and an increase of 8% upon the previous month.
Examination of the table shown on the following page will reveal an improvement in the failures recorded, 5.62% as compared with December, 1944, 9.2% and November, 1944, 12.4%. It should, however, be clearly remembered that discarding the “bomb-door operation” of the F.24 camera is probably one of the causes for this reduction.
The descriptive list still contains many failures which should never occur, and it is hoped that the efforts of all concerned will result in a steady monthly decrease of all technical failures.
Photographers are again reminded that inability to trace the real cause generally results in a failure being classed as “obscure – photographic”. Therefore every effort must be made to root out the causes and to effect cures for future operations.
Now that all units except Nos. 83, 97 and 627 Squadrons are using 100% composite film, it will demand all the skill of the photographers and full supervision of the N.C.O’s to ensure that the attention to detail in making up the composite films, and their final processing is carried out in accordance with B.C. Composite Film Instructions. There is no room for slap dash work when working with colour film. Extreme care in making up the film, correct preparation of solutions, and exact time and temperature during processing are essential. Photographers are reminded that this branch of R.A.F. Photography was introduced by photographers of this Group, and the standards set must be maintained by all Bases.
H. 2. S. photography and the equipment, is not yet receiving the attention that is necessary. This branch of photography is as important as the normal F.24 photography, and Senior N.C.O’s are to see to it that all their staff are skilled in producing the best results in the shortest possible time. The local manufacture of perspex trays and fixed vertical enlargers should do much to solve dark-room problems.
It is not enough to produce good photographs, unless they are available for the Air Staff in the shortest possible time, and in this respect the S.I.O’s and Photographic N.C.O’s should remember that A.C.I.U. waits for all films to arrive before commencing their analysis. This is being delayed unnecessarily because some films are not reaching this Headquarters until five and six days after the raid, and in some cases failure films are as much as 14 days overdue. All films, whether ground detail, target conditions, or technical failures, must reach this Headquarters within the time limits prescribed in B.C.Ph.I’s.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHY [/underlined]
[Underlined] ANALYSIS – NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHY – JANUARY, 1945. [/underlined]
[Table of Night Photography Results Ranked by Squadron]
This photographic inter-squadron ladder is produced on the number of failures (excluding those due to Target Conditions –“T.C.”) incurred during the past month, as a percentage of the number of attempts.
NOTE + (Armt. I = Armt. [underlined] Technical [/underlined] Failures.
(Armt.II = No flash illumination – presumed flash failures.
Owing to the limited number of Day operational sorties during the month of January, 1945, a ladder will not be compiled.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] decorations
Supplement No.36866 to London Gazette dated 29th December, 1944.
The KING has been graciously pleased to give orders for the following promotion in, and appointments to, the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire:-
To be Additional Knight Commander of the Military Division of the said Most Excellent Order:-
Air Vice Marshal The Honourable Ralph Alexander Cochrane, C.B., C.B.E., A.F.C., Royal Air Force.
To be Additional Officer of the Military Division of the Military Division [sic] of the said Most Excellent Order:-
Wing Commander Walter Edward Dunn (35210), Royal Air Force.
To be Additional Members of the Military Division of the said Most Excellent Order:-
Acting Squadron Leader Edwin Maurice Undery (79198) R.A.F.V.R.
Acting Flight Lieutenant Henry Rutter Locke (101687) R.A.F.V.R.
The KING has been graciously please to approve the award of the British Empire Medal (Military Division) to the undermentioned:-
560272 Flight Sergeant Frank Haines, Royal Air Force.
The following IMMEDIATE award were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 54 BASE [/underlined]
W/C J. WOODROFFE, DFC & BAR DSO
W/C M.A. SMITH DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O I.H. BYERS DFC
F/SGT G.F. CARTWRIGHT DFM
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/C J.A. INGHAM, DFC, AFC DSO
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O S.V. GEORGE DFC
SGT W.T. STOKES DFM
F/L W.M. KYNOCH DFC
SGT D.J. ALLEN CGM
[Underlined] 227 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT R.H. PAYNE DFM
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] DECORATIONS [/underlined]
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.F. LEWIS DFC
F/O R.G.W. GROSS DFC
F/O B. GRIFFITHS DFC
P/O E.C. REDFERN DFC
P/O G.F. MAULE DFC
P/O W.J. SHEPPARD DFC
F/O J.D. MELROSE DFC
P/O B. TAYLOR DFC
P/O W.R. HORNE, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O J.A. PETERSON DFC
F/O C.H. SHEPHERD DFC
F/O J.W. MOORE DFC
W/O C.B. WATTS DFC
F/O A.R. DEARDEN, DFM DFC
F/SGT R.D. KERR DFM
SGT S.G.D.L. MAJOR DFM
F/O S.A. MORRIS DFC
P/O A.M. HOLMES DFC
SGT A.L. CUNNINGHAM DFM
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT F.A. WELLS DFM
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L A.E.W. WYNARD, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O P.M. ABBOTT DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L H.G. McLEOD DFC
F/L H.W.T. ENOCH DFC
F/O E.R. OLIVER DFC
F/O E.H.E. HEARN, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O A. GEORGE DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O C. SHILLAW DFC
P/O C.V. ALLEN DFC
F/O E. GLOVER DFC
F/O N.J. MacDONALD DFC
F/O J.S. BEARD DFC
F/O M.T. CLARKE DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.J. LING DFC
F/O S. PARKER DFC
F/O H.L. INNISS DFC
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O A.J. BOOKER DFC
P/O C. SUMMERSCALES DFC
W/O M.F. INGMIRE DFC
F/L W.E. SIDDLE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/L A.C. MacDONALD DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O G.J. WOOLNOUGH DFC
P/O W. HARVEY DFC
W/O G.O. EDMUNDS DFC
F/L W.G. COOPER, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O R.B. CANEVER DFC
P/O A. McCRACKEN DFC
F/SGT R. SMITH DFM
F/L C.C. SHERRING DFC
F/O H.W. HAGGERSTON DFC
F/L W.G. ROGERS DFC
F/O W.E. CLAYFIELD DFC
W/O G.A. CARVELL DFC
F/L W.M. REID, DFC BAR TO DFC
S/L W.G. WISHART, DFC & BAR DSO
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O E.W. MacDONALD DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.K. BRADY DFC
F/O J.A. GIDDENS DFC
F/O F. PARKER DFC
P/O N.A. FERGUSON DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.E. HATTAM DFC
F/O B.K. PURDY DFC
F/L G. GARDEN DFC
F/L A.R.H. MORRIS DFC
F/O G.M. DENHOLM DFC
F/O K. SCHULTZ, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O R.W. BOARD DFC
F/L D.J. JOHNSTONE DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L W.L. BRILL, DSO, DFC BAR TO DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O N.J. ERB DFC
F/O A.W. ALLISON DFC
SGT J. PALIN DFM
P/O V.A. BAGGOTT DFC
F/L D.F. McLAUGHLAN DFC
P/O S.J. HAYTON DFC
P/O H.R. PURSER DFC
P/O L.W. WEAVER DFC
P/O C. DEAN DFC
P/O B.F. KENT DFC
F/O S.A. SEMPLE DFC
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O D.H. CHENEY DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O W.G. STEVENS DFC
P/O A.B. NEILSON DFC
P/O J.R. HILL DFC
P/O K.H. YOUDALE DFC
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT W.W.M. DEBOOS, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/L J.B. MITCHELL DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O A.R. KERR DFC
P/O W.K. GOODHEW DFC
F/O H. LONG DFC
P/O D.R. MALLISON DFC
P/O M.A. SWAIN DFC
P/O R.P. MITCHELL DFC
F/O R.L. McCANN DFC
F/SGT E.J. BROWNE DFM
W/C BLOME-JONES DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
war effort
[Table of Aircraft, Sorties and Results Ranked by Squadron]
[Underlined] NOTES: [/underlined] Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “Successful Sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties, Nos. 9, 49, 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another Squadron, the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons. Squadrons above establishment are calculated on an establishment of 20.
[Page break]
[Drawing] equipment
[Underlined] COLD WEATHER. [/underlined]
The whole country has recently had one of the coldest spells in human memory; in fact in Lincolnshire we thought it much colder. At any rate Equipment Officers managed to keep their stations fairly warm. In view of the strictness of the regulations on rationing of coal and coke they are to be congratulated.
Equipment Officers should look to their fuel stocks; there may be another cold spell.
[Underlined] THEFT. [/underlined]
Equipment Officers should check every now and again the registered mail book. A case has come to light where an N.C.O. Equipment Assistant made it his job to collect the registered mail and also by some means managed to get the blue I.V’s given to him. Thus by destroying certain of the blues he was able to get away with quite a number of watches.
So carry out surprise checks on the registered mail.
[Underlined] CONFERENCE. [/underlined]
The Group Equipment Officers’ Conference was held this month at Bomber Command. Many points of interest were discussed and the minutes which have been received at this Headquarters will be passed to Base Equipment Officers in due course.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] A LETTER FROM “A DEAD CITY”
We publish below a letter written from Brunswick to a German Soldier on 17th November, 1944. The names and address shown are entirely fictitious, but the letter itself is authentic.
Beckenwerker Strasse 157
Braunschweig
Nov 17
My Dear Karl,
I would have replied to your last letter earlier but in consequence of the great raid on Braunschweig we were without light or water for a long time and we are still without gas. Braunschweig was completely reduced to dust and ashes by a heavy night raid on the 15th. October. We were very lucky – the Forchaus is still standing quite undamaged. The Kraft Durch Freude Hall and factory bay and a hostel were destroyed. It is said that Braunschweig is the most severely damaged town, apart from Darmstadt. Gauleiter Lauterbacher called Braunschweig “the dead city”. Its innumerable citizens were charred or burned in their cellars, there are even yet any number of missing. The numbers of dead runs to about a thousand. All the same the victims are few when considering the destruction. We are at present completely cut off from the world; as our station is destroyed, as well as the signal box and the installations, no trains are arriving here.
We are weary of the war and hope it will end soon. God keep you.
Emma.
Reference is made to the attack by aircraft of this Group on the night of 14/15th October, 1944, which was dealt with in detail and photographs published in the November issue of the NEWS.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] war savings
[Table of War Savings by Station]
GRAND TOTAL NATIONAL SAVINGS FOR JANUARY, 1945 - £8,711 13. 6d.
A – Approximate number of pence per head.
B – Approximate percentage of personnel saving.
C – Total savings.
[Page break]
[Underlined] DISTRIBUTION LIST. [/underlined]
[Underlined] EXTERNAL. [/underlined]
No. 53 Base … 28
No. 54 Base … 28
No. 55 Base … 24
No. 56 Base … 20
No. 75 Base (“For Attention Base Intelligence Officer”) … 4
Headquarters, Bomber Command … 6
Headquarters, Bombe Command – Eng. Staff … 1
Dr. B.G. Dickens, O.R.S., H.Q. B.C. … 1
Headquarters, Flying Training Command … 1
H.Q., P.F.F., Wyton … 1
P.N.Z.A.F. Headquarters, Strand, W.C. (vis H.Q. B.C.) … 1
R.A.A.F. Overseas Headquarters, Kodak House, 63 Kingsway, W.C.2 …2
Air Ministry, T.O.I. … 1
Air Ministry (D.D.T. Nav.) … 2
W/Cdr. Nairn M.A.P., Map Room, 6123, Thames House, Millbank, S.W. 1
A/Cdr. H.L. Patch, C.B.E., Air Ministry (D.Arm.R.), King Charles Street, Whitehall … 1
G/Capt. C. Dann, O.B.E., M.A.P., Millbank … 1
Air Chief Marshal Sir E.R. Ludlow-Hewitt, K.C.B., C.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C., 136, Richmond Hill, Richmond, Surrey. … 1
Air Marshal The Hon. Sir R.A. Cochrane, K.B.E., C.B., A.F.C., A.O.C.-in-C., Transport Command … 1
Air Vice Marshal Coryton, C.B., M.V.O., D.F.C., A.O.C. 3rd Tactical Air Force, South East Asia … 1
Air Commodore H.V. Satterly, C.B.E., D.F.C., Headquarters, No.54 Base 1
S/Ldr. D.A. Green, D.S.O., D.F.C., Bomber Command Tactical School, Finningley … 1
Headquarters, No.92 Group … 6
Headquarters, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 21, 23, 25, 54, 91, Groups 1
Headquarters, No.29 Group … 12
Nos. 11, 14, 16, 18 O.T.U’s … 1
No. 16 O.T.U. (Intelligence Section) … 2
S.I.O., No.27 O.T.U., Lichfield … 1
S.I.O., No.29 O.T.U., Bruntingthorpe … 1
T.A.D.U., Cardington … 1
Director of Studies, Advanced Armament Course, Fort Halstead, Nr. Sevenoaks, Kent … 1
R.A.F. Station, Jurby … 1
R.A.F. Station, Manby … 1
R.A.F. Station, Silverstone … 2
N.C.O. i/c Bombing Range, Wainfleet … 1
No. 93 M.U. … 1
R.A.F. Staff College … 1
Polish Air Force Staff College, Beach Hotel, Weston-Super-Mare 1
Empire Air Navigation School, Shawbury … 2
No.25 Group, School of Air Sea Rescue … 1
92 Group Navigation & Signals Instructors’ School, Little Horwood, Nr. Bletchley, Bucks … 1
Aircrew School, Balderton … 2
Bomber Command Instructors’ School, Finningley … 2
[Underlined] INTERNAL. [/underlined]
A.O.C. … 1
S.O.A. …1
OPS. 1 … 1
S.MET.O. … 1
C.S.O. … 2
O.R.S. … 1
G.T.I. … 1
G.F.C.O. … 1
P.R.O. … 1
OPS. RECORD BOOK … 2
CIRCULATION … 4
FILE … 1
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
[Stamp]
9 Wadd.
10 Skell.
6 Bdy.
2 Minuted.
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V Group News, January 1945
5 Group News, January 1945
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Five Group Newsletter, number 30, January 1945. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and articles on famous last words, operations, navigation, this month's bouquets, radar navigation, tactics, air bombing, signals, gardening, training, second thoughts for pilots, accidents, gunnery, armament, flying control, aircrew safety, engineering, photography, decorations, war effort, equipment, a letter from a dead city, war savings,
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IBCC Digital Archive
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1945-01
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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59 printed sheets
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eng
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MStephensonS1833673-160205
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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Belgium
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Great Britain
Norway
Poland
Germany--Braunschweig
England--Lincolnshire
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Ladbergen
Germany--Mittelland Canal
France--Royan
Belgium--Houffalize
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Germany--Leuna
Czech Republic--Most
Norway--Bergen
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1945-01
5 Group
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Lancaster
Master Bomber
mine laying
Mosquito
navigator
pilot
radar
rivalry
Tallboy
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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V GROUP NEWS
[Stamp]
No 29. December, 1944
[Page break]
V GROUP NEWS
No 29. December, 1944.
[Page break]
Foreword by the A.O.C.
In this foreword I say Goodbye to 5 Group after two years of command, covering a period when the Group, in common with the other Groups in Bomber Command, has seen much hard fighting and very great damage inflicted on Germany. In particular, the Winter campaigns of 1942/43 and 1943/44 will be looked back upon in future years as outstanding examples of sustained courage and endurance on the part of the crews, some of whom made 12 or more attacks on Berlin alone. In those days neither the training organisation nor the factories could maintain a sufficient flow of crews and aircraft to keep pace with losses, and Squadrons were often 25% below establishment; but it was those campaigns, with the parallel campaigns by the U.S. forces, which were then arriving in strength, which finally put Germany on the defensive in the air. They forced her to turn over her production from bombers to fighters and to draw off for the protection of her industries many hundreds of aircraft which she badly needed to support her battle fronts. They marked the beginning of her decline as an Air Power.
During 1943 the new equipment which was beginning to come along was still far from perfect. There were no A.P.I’s to watch over course keeping; Gee and the D.R. Compass were still being introduced, and H.2.S. was yet to come; while systems of target marking were in their infancy. The past two years have, therefore, been periods of development and training which have had to be continued while a major campaign was in progress. In spite of the hard knocks which the Group has had to take, progress has been steady until, nowadays, targets are seldom missed when conditions are reasonably satisfactory.
The special technique against small targets which has been built up in this Group, based upon low level marking and off-set bombing, has achieved results which, in terms of bombs per acre over the target area, are unsurpassed by any other bombing force in the World. For this state of affairs, all in the Group share the credit – the aircrew for having down to a heavy training task at a time when they might hope that their period of arduous training lay behind them – the ground crews who have never failed to get an aircraft into the air if it was humanly possible to do so – the specialists in every branch for their ingenuity in servicing highly complicated mechanisms – and finally the whole body of personnel whose determination that the Group should never pull less than its full weight has been a great incentive to me personally and I believe to all the other senior officers throughout the Group.
It is, as a team, that the work has been done, and in saying Goodbye to its members, I include every officer, airman and airwoman in the Group. I thank you all for your extraordinary exertions over two difficult years and ask you to accept that the honour, which H.M. The King recently bestowed upon me as Air Officer Commanding, is a tribute to the growing list of targets destroyed and thus to the work of everyone in the Group.
I wish you all Good Luck.
V” group news. No. 29. December, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] tactics
December has been marked by the first serious attempts by the G.A.F. to intercept Bomber Command aircraft in daylight. On two separate occasions formations of 30 to 40 ME.109’s and FW.190’s attacked bomber gaggles and succeeded in destroying several bombers before the fighter escort came to the rescue. The enemy fighters showed a marked disinclination to attack the main gaggles which tightened formation when attacked, but concentrated on picking off stragglers and aircraft in the thinly spaced parts of the bomber stream. Although corkscrewing by stragglers proved effective in some cases, the main gaggles carried out no combat manoeuvres. Several fighters were claimed destroyed or damaged, including a claim by one mid-upper gunner of two destroyed – a good effort.
Although during these attacks some bombers fired a few Green Verey cartridges the fighter escorts never saw them. Crews should therefore in future continue firing Greens until it is obvious that the fighter escort has seen and engaged the enemy.
German night fighters are still expending considerable energy and fuel without achieving much success, and have again failed this month to offer effective opposition even to deep penetrations. There are signs, however, that the lack of success over Germany may tempt the enemy to resume intruder activity over this country. With the large number of aircraft now operating and with no IFF in use it will be very difficult to detect intruders returning with the main stream, particularly if the return route to the Group area is from the North Sea. Suitable action is being taken to deal with this danger, but crews must remain on the alert over this country, particularly when circling the airfield lights preparatory to landing, and should view with extreme suspicion any twin-engined aircraft seen, even if it is burning navigation lights.
V” group news. No. 29. December, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] operations
[Underlined] HEILBRONN – 4/5TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bombers:- Town - W/Cdr. Smith
Marshalling Yards – W/Cdr. Shorthouse.
A force of 292 aircraft took off to attack the town and marshalling yards. Nos. 53 and 55 Bases and 106 Squadron were detailed to attack the town. Aircraft were spread over an 85° sector, and crews were to aim at the red markers, delaying release as ordered.
No.56 Base was to attack the marshalling yards, which were to be marked with Yellow T.I., aircraft to aim at the T.I. and delay release dor4 seconds.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined]
[Underlined] TOWN [/underlined] Weather over the target varied between no cloud and 5/10ths alt. cu. at 12/14,000 feet. Illumination and marking went according to plan, and the marking was assessed as accurate. The markers cannot be plotted on the night photographs. An initial tendency for the bombing to undershoot was corrected by the Master Bomber, and a good sector attack developed. An area of 2000 X 1500 yards has been wiped out, and on the West side damage is severe and widespread. Only the outermost suburbs to the South and West have escaped lightly.
[Underlined] MARSHALLING YARDS [/underlined] One Yellow T.I. was assessed as 100 yards South of the Marking Point, but the Master Bomber was unable to distinguish it from flares burning on the ground, so did not issue any instructions. Crews also had difficulty in identifying the marker, and approximately 50% attacked the town instead. Subsequent reconnaissance has revealed only limited damage to the yards.
[Underlined] GIESSEN – 6/7TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Benjamin.
Target – Marshalling yards and town some 35 miles North of Frankfurt. Force 265 aircraft, the majority on the marshalling yards.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Normal marking and illumination were used. The marshalling yards were 1 1/2 miles South of the town, thus presenting a difficult marking problem. The solution was to select a common marking point to the South of the yards, and issue the marshalling yard force with two false wind vectors calculated to spread the bombs up the centre of the yard. The force on the town was to carry out normal overshoot procedure on a common heading.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Blind marking and illumination were good. One Red T.I. dropped visually is known to have been placed accurately on the marking point, while another has been plotted about 1 1/2 miles East of the town. It is apparent that the majority of crews attacked
“V” GROUP NEWS. No. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
the accurate T.I. while a small minority (which proved to be inexperienced crews) were attracted by the inaccurate marker. Photographs have shown that two sticks of incendiaries fell across the accurate T.I., one in the early stages of the attack, and another later. Only careless and slipshod bombing drill and failure to adhere strictly to briefing instructions could have been responsible for this.
Fortunately these loose sticks did not obliterate the accurate marker and a good concentration developed.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined]
[Underlined] MARSHALLING YARDS [/underlined] A heavy concentration fell on these yards, which almost entirely destroyed the round houses, and cause very considerable damage to rolling stock. At the Southern end of the yard, three tail bridges over the roadway were destroyed or very badly damaged, as were also the important fly-over bridges. The standard of concentration was equal to that on French marshalling yards.
[Underlined] TOWN [/underlined] The town has suffered heavily throughout, the main city area to the North being almost completely devastated by fire. Included in this devastation were a rubber works, the arsenal, the gas and water works, engineering works, and the power station.
[Underlined] URFT DAM – 8TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
The Urft Dam lies a few miles south of Duren. In the event of an enemy withdrawal, he might well blow up the dam and flood the surrounding country, thus seriously impeding Allied ground forces.
206 aircraft were despatched in an attempt to breech the crest of the dam overflow, and so forestall any action by the enemy at a critical period. The dam itself was too strong to be destroyed even by ‘Tallboy’ bombs.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] The main force were to attack in pairs of squadrons at five minutes [sic] intervals. Crews were to bomb visually.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Unfortunately 6 – 9/10ths cloud at 6 – 8,000 feet was encountered over the target, and only 128 aircraft identified and bombed. Due to weather conditions bombing was scattered and although hits were claimed, the dam was not breached.
[Underlined] URFT DAM – 11TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
This target was again attacked in daylight by 233 aircraft.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Similar to previous attack, though the overall T.O.T. was shorter. Aircraft carrying 12,000 lb bombs were to attack last.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Once again the weather for bombing was bad, cloud being 5 – 9/10ths at 6 – 8000 feet. 176 aircraft bombed through gaps in the cloud, and claimed hits. Army ground reports claim six hits on the spillway, bit the hoped for erosion had not taken place, although some reduction in the water level was apparent.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] OSLO FIORD – 13/14TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Benjamin.
Sixty-one aircraft of No.54 Base were detailed to attack enemy shipping in Oslo Fiord. The chief target was the cruiser Koln. It was known that this ship had been very active recently, but the chief difficulty lay in locating it, as it returned to different berths after each operation.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] No.54 Base provided their own illumination and marking. In the light of flares, Mosquitoes were to mark a selected position near the supposed anchorage of the ship, and the Lancasters were to aim visually.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] The target was reported to have moved North from the briefed position. This made visual identification extremely difficult, and bombing results were not observed. The force started to bomb in the vicinity of the proximity markers. On instructions from the Master Bomber, bombing was shifted to a large merchant vessel in the centre of the harbour. A little later, a cruiser believed to be the Koln was identified lying some two miles West of the marking point, and those crews who had not already bombed were ordered to attack the new target. Bomb splashes were observed round the cruiser, but no damage has been established.
[Underlined] MUNICH – 17/18TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Stubbs.
289 aircraft took off to attack this very important target, determined to atone for the last attack which was only partially successful. The illuminating and marking plan was normal, except that the visual Red T.I. were to be backed up with a White T.I. flashing ‘V’. The attack was to be in two man sectors, and bombing on the Red markers with overshoot as ordered.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather over the target was clear with good visibility. Marking and illumination went according to plan, and a good concentration of Red T.I. was achieved. Except for an initial stick of incendiaries which fell across the markers, crews reported good bombing and a successful sector attack. Although the town is of more substantial construction than other targets attacked successfully by this Group, day cover shows very considerable areas of severe damage spreading out from the main station, and covering the old centre of the town.
[Underlined] GDYNIA – 18/19TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/Cdr. Woodroffe.
This large Polish port is the main base for what remains of the elusive German Fleet, and at the time of the attack all except two of the larger operational units were present, as well as a large concentration of U-boats, and merchant shipping. 227 aircraft attacked the target.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] The target was out of range of Mosquitoes, so all marking was carried out by Lancasters. The target was to be illuminated blindly, and by the light of these flares a picked force of
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
the best bombing crews were to attack the pocket battleship LUTZOW visually. Marking for the main attack was to be a stick of Red and Green T.I. dropped visually at the South Western side of the docks. The Master Bomber was to select the most accurate of these T.I’s and instruct the main force to bomb it with a false wind vector.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather over the target was clear, but with moderate visibility and a smoke screen late in the attack. A few crews identified the LUTZOW and bombed her, and the remainder joined in the main attack. Illumination and marking was good, and the most Southerly T.I. was accurately backed up. Due, however, to an error of calculation before take-off (a reciprocal wind was used), the Master Bomber’s navigator issued a strong wind vector, and the main weight of the attack fell to the North and West of the berth where the main naval units were lying. Although day photographs show no damage to the main fleet, and old SCHLESIEN class battleship is down by the stern, and damage is visible to warehouses, floating docks and merchant shipping.
Instead of an outstanding success the Group achieved some slight damage incommensurate with the weight of the attack. This attack affords a good example, which all should note, of the far reaching effect of small mistakes.
[Underlined] POLITZ – 21/22ND DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/Cdr. Woodroffe.
207 aircraft took off to attack the synthetic oil plant, one of the most important and most heavily defended targets in Germany. It had already been attacked by American heavy bombers, but was back in full production at the time of the attack.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] The target was to be marked blindly with Yellow T.I. and White flashing ‘V’. In the light of flares, the marking point was to be marked with a stick of Red and Green T.I. The Master Bomber was to pick out the most suitable T.I. and order main force to bomb it with a false wind vector set on the bombsight.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather at the target was clear, but an extensive smoke screen was in action which made visual identification of the target very difficult. In addition to this, a number of flares did not light until they struck the ground, and others ignited just above the ground. These were confused with the Yellow proximity T.I. and added still further to the difficulties of the Master Bomber and visual markers. Nevertheless, Marker I, identifying what he considered to be the marking point, dropped his stick of Red and Green T.I’s. The Master Bomber called for an assessment, and three separate and independent assessments were made, two of 200 yards North, and one of 200 yards N.E. On the basis of this, the Master Bomber instructed Link I to work out a wind vector assuming the T.I’s to be 300 yards North of the marking point. This was then issued, and the main force called in to attack.
Night photographs show that the markers were centred some 2,000 yards North of the target and the main weight of the bombing was displaced accordingly.
The bomb aimer of the marker aircraft which dropped the stick of Red and Green T.I’s claims to have identified visually the marking point in relation to three well defined pin points, and there is no evidence to show why the markers fell so far North.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] ST. VITH – 26TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by 8 (P.F.F.) Group.
The target was a concentration of armour, troops and supplies inside the salient made by the new German thrust on the Western Front. Conditions for take-off were bad with very poor visibility, and only 26 aircraft took off for the attack.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Target was to be marked by Oboe aircraft with Red T.I, backed up with salvoes of Red and Green T.I. Bombing was to be direct on the markers, or as ordered by the Master Bomber.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Crews reported marking accurate and on time, and bombing was well concentrated.
[Underlined] RHEYDT – 27TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by 8 (P.F.F.) Group.
44 aircraft took off in conditions of poor visibility to attack the marshalling yards South of Munchen Gladbach, which were handling a large volume of military traffic for the German thrust on the Western Front.
[Underlined] PLAN] [/underlined] The method was controlled Oboe ground marking. The aiming point was to be marked initially with Red T.I., backed up with salvoes of Red and Green T.I. A Master Bomber was to direct the bombing.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather over the target was clear, and the first wave had no difficulty in identifying visually. The target was soon covered in a dense pall of smoke which tended to obscure the markers, but all crews reported a good concentration of bombing. P.R.U. cover shows severe damage in the yards, with a slight spread of bombing into the town area.
[Underlined] OSLO FIORD – 28/29TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bombers: S/Ldr. Benjamin and W/Cdr. Petty.
Two forces totalling 67 aircraft took off to attack shipping in Oslo Fiord. The larger force had for its target the cruiser Koln, lying off Horten on the West side of the Fiord, and the secondary force was to bomb any shipping seen off Moss on the Eastern shore.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Due to the very bright moon it was decided to dispense with flare illumination. The marking force was to drop Wanganui flares and Flame Floats near any large vessel seen, and the main force was to attack visually, running up-moon.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather over the target area was clear, but a thin layer of cloud at 15/20,000 feet diffused the moonlight, and made deceptive shadows on the water. Neither force could identify shipping clearly, but several large ships were bombed with unobserved results. One large merchantman off Moss may have been damaged by several near misses, and a small ship seen on the early night photographs had disappeared by the close of the attack.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] HOUFFALIZE – 30/31ST DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
The target was a concentration of enemy armour, troops and supplies concentrated In and around a village a few miles North of Bastogne. 156 aircraft took off for an attack in the early hours of the morning.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] The aiming point was to be marked with Red T.I. by Oboe aircraft, and crews were ordered to bomb direct. Due to the proximity of friendly troops, crews were ordered not to bomb unless the Red T.I. were positively identified.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] 5 – 8/10ths cloud was encountered at the target, and only 90 aircraft bombed, reporting a good concentration of bombing around the markers. The remaining aircraft were unable to identify the Red T.I. so brought their bombs back to Base, as ordered.
[Underlined] OSLO FIORD – 31ST DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
A force of 28 aircraft took off in search of shipping, especially the cruiser Koln, in the Fiord, including 12 aircraft of No.617 Squadron carrying 12,000 lb Tallboy bombs.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Marker aircraft were to illuminate the area and mark the ships and cruiser with Wanganui Flares and Flame Floats. Bombing was to be visual in the light of further flares. The Tallboy bombs were fused .5 seconds delay so that they would explode 100 feet under water. The remaining aircraft carried 1000 lb MC/GP bombs fused TD .025.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather over the target area was clear, and the cruiser, together with several merchantmen were claimed as identified. The cruiser was under way during the attack, which made marking and bombing very difficult. Results of the attack on the cruiser were unobserved, but a near miss on a large ship by a Tallboy swung her 90° to starboard and brought her to a standstill.
[Underlined] SPECIAL OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] IJMUIDEN – 15TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
The target was the concrete E/R boat pens, and was attacked by No.617 Squadron carrying 12,000 lb Tallboy bombs. Hits were obtained and the pens suffered further severe damage.
[Underlined] ROTTERDAM – 29TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
No.617 Squadron carried out another precision attack with 12,000 lb Tallboy bombs, the target being the concrete E. boat pens. Crews reported concentrated bombing, and P.R.U. cover confirms a heavy concentration of craters on and around the target, and two out of the three sections of the pens have been severely damaged by direct hits.
[Underlined] OSLO – 31ST DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
No.627 Squadron celebrated New Year’s Eve by a pinpoint attack by 12 aircraft on the Gestapo Headquarters in Oslo. The attack
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
was carried out in two waves of six aircraft, and all the first wave reported successful bombing. The second wave was hampered by smoke and dust from the bomb bursts, but two aircraft identified the target and bombed. Flak was intense and all the aircraft were hit, but returned to base safely. Rumours current in Stockholm suggest that the attack was highly successful.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Diagram] gardening
Unfavourable weather caused many operations to be cancelled at the beginning of the month, but when conditions improved on the 14th December the Group Gardeners ‘set to’ at such a pace that our previous record of 520 vegetables was in danger of being beaten before the end of the year.
Reviewing the month’s activity, all Gardeners have been most decidedly successful in planting 415 vegetables by 84 sorties in little over a fortnight. This total, 35.6% of the Command effort (1162), places 5 Group well in the can of Gardening operations, and is a commendable achievement befitting the end of a hard but memorable year of war.
[Underlined] 55 BASE [/underlined]
55 Base evenly distributed their effort by most Squadrons operating nine sorties each, visiting a selection of Kattegat and Eastern Baltic areas. On one occasion this was combined with a Group bombing force on an important Naval Base, which, in conjunction with 106 Squadron’s lay, a few days before, produced some highly satisfactory results, denying the use of the Port to the enemy and closing his Exercise Areas for U-boats and surface craft outside. Southern Norway also received attention in co-operation with other Groups, directed primarily against the movement of troops and material for the Wehrmacht from Norway to Denmark. There is conclusive evidence to show that shipping in the Fjords was seriously held up. The closing of the main ports and the consequent dislocation of traffic, had an even greater importance than the actual number of casualties caused.
[Underlined] 54 BASE. [/underlined]
54 Base have surpassed previous records by the excellent performance of 106 Squadron and the Mosquitos of 627 Squadron.
[Underlined] Fine Work by Metheringham. [/underlined]
R.A.F. Station, Metheringham, have repeatedly succeeded in lifting eleven maximum loads under difficult conditions, and on one occasion raised their record to fifteen Gardeners loaded at short notice and ready by ‘take-off’ time. These results cannot be obtained without the co-operation and hard work of the Ground and Armament staffs, who are to be congratulated on a fine month’s work.
[Underlined] 174 Vegetables Planted by a Single Squadron. [/underlined]
106 Squadron have had the busiest month of any Gardening Squadron on record, and have successfully planted a total of 174 vegetables for 36 sorties.
[Underlined] An Outstanding Operation. [/underlined]
Quite the most outstanding operation performed by 106 Squadron was their lone visit to the Eastern Baltic in the Privet and Spinach areas, when 15 Gardeners delivered their loads off an enemy port on a round trip of 1810 miles. Taking into consideration that no other Gardeners were in operation on this night, it stands as one of the greatest Squadron penetrations, and all who took part are to be congratulated on their effort.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GARDENING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] Mosquitos. [/underlined]
627 Squadron were able to perform their first operation with Mosquitos on the 29th December, when Gardeners were briefed for an important river target, high on the priority list. Four Gardeners were very successful in planting their vegetables in the correct area without opposition, while three others unfortunately had difficulty in the area and returned with their loads. This unusual method of Gardening promises well for the future, as specially selected areas can be planted where it is bound to cause the greatest inconvenience and damage to enemy traffic. The results of this small scale planting were most effectively obtained for the cost of eight Vegetables. Time, opportunity and weather permitting, will tell its own story with regard to the menacing effects of Mosquito Gardening in the forthcoming year.
[Underlined] SQUADRON SORTIES. [/underlined]
[Table of Gardening Sorties by Squadron]
[Underlined] 5 GROUP CALENDAR – 1944. VEGETABLES SUCCESSFULLY PLANTED [/underlined]
January 25
February Nil
March Nil
April 388
May 520
June 30
July 64
August 260
Sept. 77
October 316
November 126
December 415
[Underlined] Total Planted – 2221 [/underlined]
[Underlined] GROUP MONTHLY SUMMARIES – DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
No.5 Group 415
No.6 Group 232
No.1 Group 212
No.3 Group 168
No.4 Group 135
[Underlined] GARDENING POINTS. [/underlined]
(i) Only one Vegetable had to be jettisoned “Safe”. This was done in the correct manner.
(ii) All Gardeners unable to pin-point their target by H2S or ‘Visual’ returned with their load in the correct manner, or laid in Secondary Gardens.
(iii) 97.4% of the Vegetables dropped were planted successfully.
(iv) 12 Gardening areas were visited this month, covering a mileage flown of 98,230 miles in 7 nights.
[Underlined] CONCLUSION. [/underlined]
Although it is difficult to appreciate the results of our efforts without conclusive proof of sinkings or damage, it is firmly believed that many plantings have brought great success. It is estimated that at present the rate of sinking and/or damage, to enemy ships stands at 46 Vegetables per ship. It can therefore be satisfactorily assessed that, by planting 2221 Vegetables in the past twelve months, 5 Group alone have accounted for no less than [underlined] 48 ships SUNK [/underlined] or [underlined] DAMAGED. [/underlined] This figure gives at least one ship per week, and does not take into account the dislocation of shipping caused through closed ports, ships waiting to be discharged, extensive minesweeping operations and heavy
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] GARDENING. [/underlined]
repair work, combined with the feeling that it will be for ever unsafe to travel at sea until the bitter struggle ceases.
In conclusion it may be safely be said that it has been a splendid Gardening Year, and that all Gardeners have indeed maintained their high standard of efficiency; let us continue to do so, and face the year of 1045 with ever increasing zeal to destroy and annoy our enemy’s shipping.
[Underlined] THE FOLLOWING CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN REPORTED. [/underlined]
A German steamer was mined and sunk five miles SW of South Langeland about 15th November, 1944.
German BRYNGE was mined and sunk in Kalundborg Fyord in Summer of 1942. This ship was reported as mined in July 1941.
German MAGDELINE VINNEN (4594 G.T.) was in dock in November, 1944, for extensive repairs after mining.
German TELDE was under repair after being mined. This ship was reported as mined on 13th October, 1943.
Danisg VIBORG (2028 G.T.) was mined (i) on 1st September, 1944, (ii) on 17th September, 1944. The vessel reached port under her own power and as far as can be seen she is undamaged.
A Danish broadcast of 13th December, 1944, reported that wreckage of the motor vessel GRETE (51 G.T) was found North of Laeso in the Kattegat.
The Danish PHONIX (895 G.T.) struck a mine and grounded off Hals on 4th November, 1944.
An unidentified German vessel was also damaged by a mine off Hals on 4th November, 1944.
The German steamer CONSTANZA was heavily damaged by a mine off Kullen on 1st December, 1944.
Several overlapping reports give the following casualties in Oslo Fjord during November, 1944:-
(a) A tug mined and sunk in Horten Inner harbour on 29th November.
(b) The SVEIN (119 G.T.) damaged by a mine off Gulholmen on 16th November.
(c) Two M.T.B’s sunk by mines in the harbour at Horten on 29th November.
(d) A small merchant ship mined and sunk near Veslos, Horten.
An unidentified Finnish vessel of about 1000 G.T. was damaged by a mine in Oslo Fjord on 14th December, 1944.
A Swedish broadcast on 18th December reported that the Norwegian EGORVUS arrived at Bergen on 4th December. The ship was badly damaged aft, probably by a mine.
A German ship HERMINA was sunk by a mine in Stettiner Haff on 19th August, 1944.
The German S.S. ARION (2297 G.T.) was damaged by a mine near Nordenham in the Weser estuary during October, 1944.
The German hospital ship MONTE ROSE (13,882 G.T.) arrived Moss in Oslo Fjord on 12th November following repairs at Akers to make good damage caused by mining.
The Norwegian NINA (1,487 G.T.) was damaged by a mine off Schultzegrund on 27th October, 1944.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] signals
1944 was a memorable year in the Signals life of the Group, and we can look back with satisfaction on such accomplishments as the general installation of V.H.F. R/T equipment and Loran into all aircraft in the Group; the improvements obtained by the Coningsby Radar Development Party in the performance of H2S Mark III; and the evolution of the ideal technique of W/T control in the target area. Let us take each of these four items in turn, and see if there are any lessons to be learnt.
[Underlined] V.H.F. R/T. [/underlined]
When No.617 Squadron were carrying out training for their famous attack on the German Dams, it became obvious that the existing bomber R/T (T.R.1196) was incapable of providing the efficient inter-aircraft R/T communication required, owing to severe interference experienced at night on the frequency band used. The V.H.F. R/T set T.R.1143 was therefore fitted, and gave excellent results. V.H.F. R/T was used by 617 Squadron for several other special operations. In April, 1944, 5 Group began operating as a separate force on special targets – carrying out their own marking and controlling. It was decided that aircraft of the Illuminating and Controlling team should be equipped with V.H.F. R/T and the remainder of the force be controlled by W/T.
[underlined] H2S Interference. [/underlined]
All Lancaster aircraft of Nos.83 and 97 Squadrons were, therefore, equipped with T.R.1143 V.H.F. R/T sets. This was the first occasion on which V.H.F. R/T sets had been fitted to aircraft carrying the H2S equipment, and on the first operation it was found that very severe interference was caused to the V.H.F. R/T by the H2S. Test proved that the interference was being picked up by the base of the V.H.F. aerial which protruded through the aircraft skin near the H2S set. All V.H.F. aerials were immediately mounted outside the aircraft skin and this cured the trouble.
[Underlined] Main Force Fitting Programme. [/underlined]
In June 1944 it was decided to fit all the remaining aircraft of 5 Group with V.H.F. R/T, and by the end of July this fitting programme was completed – thanks to the good work of a small 26 Group fitting party, and to the enthusiastic support of individual Squadron Signal Sections.
[Underlined] Removal of S.B.A. [/underlined]
To ease the burden on these sections and to put an end to much useless waste of energy and material, S.B.A. equipment was removed from all 5 Group aircraft.
[Underlined] Inadvertent Radiation of Intercomm. [/underlined]
Airborne R/T equipment is normally operated by the pilot, and he must be able to change from receive to transmit with the
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
minimum of trouble. A small “press to speak” switch is therefore mounted on the control wheel, the mere pressing of which actuates a relay which causes the V.H.F. R/T to radiate. Occasionally relays come out of adjustment and occasionally pilots squeeze the “press to speak” switch unknowingly. It is not surprising, therefore, that we soon had cases of crew intercomm. being radiated continuously in the target area – almost completely ruining the control R/T. The ease with which the unwitting culprits were tracked down by their nicknames indicated a somewhat lax crew discipline.
The first countermeasure was an order to the effect that all transmitter crystals were to be removed from main force aircraft. This action proved to be an effective cure, but placed an added burden on the Wireless Mechanics. Bardney produced the answer – the fitting of a simple switch in the transmitter H.T. circuit – accessible from inside the aircraft. In all main force aircraft this switch is sealed in the off position after each D.I. check. In aircraft which may have to transmit the switch is placed in the on position. This scheme still left 20 or 30 aircraft liable to radiate intercom., and in spite of careful briefing and especial care of relays, the inevitable occurred and another operation was nearly ruined by one of the Illuminating Force radiating intercom. throughout the attack. Woodhall Spa produced the cure this time in the shape of a neon indicator which illuminated the words “Check VHF” everytime [sic] the V.H.F. R/T set was in the transmit condition.
[Underlined] Enemy Freya Interference. [/underlined]
During an attack in September, unusually severe interference was experienced from enemy Freya transmissions occurring on our V.H.F. R/T frequencies. With the prospect of an increasing number of operations over Freya Territory, this interference constituted a serious threat, and Headquarters, Bomber Command, made immediate arrangements for R.A.E. Farnborough to find a cure. Tests soon proved that the inclusion of a simple device known as a “series limitor” would completely eliminate Freya interference.
[Underlined] All aircraft change over to American SCR.522 sets. [/underlined]
Fortunately for 5 Group this modification coincided with the decision of higher authority to refit all our aircraft with the American V.H.F. R/T set SCR.552. This new set was already fitted with the series limitor. During the night of the 16th October the colossal task of setting up and changing 350 aircraft V.H.F. R/T sets was accomplished without a hitch. All pilots expressed themselves as highly satisfied with the excellent performance of the American sets, but there was a general complaint regarding the fact that the incoming V.H.F. R/T signals tended to swamp crew intercom. We were told to adjust the pre-set volume control in the set!
[Underlined] Effect of Icing on V.H.F. R/T Aerials. [/underlined]
The advent of winter and resulting increase in icing risks was brought home on the night 19/20th October when a large number of V.H.F. R/T aerials broke off. Our friends at R.A.E. once more came into the breach and quickly produced a modified form of mounting for the whip aerials so that they really could whip and thus prevent ice accretion. All aircraft are now being so modified as fast as the necessary parts arrive.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] Pilots’ Manual Volume Control. [/underlined]
No matter how carefully the pre-set volume control was adjusted it was found that it was impossible to cater for all requirements, and pilots continued to complain of the loud V.H.F. R/T signals jamming vital crew intercom. As a result of a unanimous demand from Bases made at the November Group Signals Conference, a number of volume controls were received for trial. These trials resulted in an immediate plea for general fitting throughout all Group aircraft, and this was acceded to.
[Underlined] R/T Speech Training. [/underlined]
The best R/T equipment – like the ordinary trunk telephone must be met half way with properly articulated speech. The average airman does not possess a natural telephone voice but the excellent R/T speech training unit at Woodlands, Stanmore, soon remedies this. During 1944 [underlined] 140 [/underlined] pilots of 5 Group have benefited from the instruction given by this School.
[Underlined] FINALE. [/underlined]
The closing days of 1944 thus found the final chapter of our V.H.F. R/T story completed – a pilots’ volume control – no more inadvertent radiation of intercom. – no more Freya or H2S interference – no more broken aerials – just perfectly clear R/T at a strength to suit all pilots.
It has been an interesting story and it is hoped that those about to sample the joys of V.H.F. R/T in bomber aircraft will benefit from our experiences.
[Underlined] THE DEVELOPMENT OF W/T CONTROL TECHNIQUE. [/underlined]
At first sight it would appear to be a simple matter to arrange for one aircraft to control 250 other aircraft in the target area by W/T. The T.1154/R.1155 W/T equipment carried by our Lancasters is very efficient and easy to manipulate, and the W/T frequencies available to the Group are as clear of interference as one can expect these days. It was found by grim experience, however, that the accuracy of tuning by the average operator was below the standard required for control purposes. On more than one occasion, we regret to say, the control operator was as much as 30 kc/s off frequency – with the result that few aircraft received the control signals.
[Underlined] Crystal Monitor. [/underlined]
It was found that the only certain way of ensuring that the control operator was precisely on frequency was to resurrect the crystal monitor type 2, and make him tune the transmitter by plugging his phones into the crystal monitor and tuning his transmitter to the dead space.
[Underlined] Crystal Controlled Transmitters. [/underlined]
This scheme proved a complete cure, but was rather cumbersome and profiting by Binbrook’s experiments, a number of Controllers’ W/T transmitters were modified for crystal control. All that was necessary was to plug the appropriate crystal into the master oscillator grid circuit. This certainly simplified the tuning problem, but deprived the operator of listening-through facilities, and also his ability to hear his own morse. This latter failing resulted in the transmission of poor morse, so the scheme was abandoned and we reverted to the crystal monitor.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] Transmission of Perfect Morse. [/underlined]
The job of finding W/T operators capable of transmitting perfect morse under rather nerve wracking conditions was slightly more difficult that the problem of accurate tuning. Operators who produced copy-book morse in the Squadron Training Room were sometimes found to possess nerves when they remembered that 250 other operators and several ground stations including Group Headquarters were hanging on every dot they made. A special test for Controller Operators was therefore introduced, covering morse, tuning ability, and correct procedure. During 1944, a total of 170 W/T Operators in the Group successfully passed the rigorous test, and many of these operators have since proved themselves on actual controlled operations.
[Underlined] Control Procedure. [/underlined]
To ensure that all aircraft W/T receivers are accurately tuned, the control operator transmits six callsigns a few minutes before target time. This transmission also enables the deputy control operator to check the tuning, and also to take over control if the transmissions are not heard. Thereafter throughout the attack, the control operator transmits two callsigns every minute unless control code signals are being handled. This scheme was evolved to enable W/T operators to concentrate on their tail warning device without missing any W/T signals.
[Underlined] Control Code. [/underlined]
To ensure speed and security, a special three-letter code covering all eventualities likely to arise during the illuminating, locating, marking and destroying of targets was evolved. A new code is used for each operation.
[Underlined] Deliberate Enemy Jamming. [/underlined]
To counter possible attempts by the enemy to jam the control frequency, an elaborate system of alternative frequencies and W/T guards is laid on for each operation, but happily, so far (touching wood) we have only been ‘jostled’ into doing this on two occasions and each time the scheme worked satisfactorily. We now realise just how effective 100 Group’s Countermeasure ‘Jostle’ really is!
[Underlined] Enemy Spoofing. [/underlined]
The Hun is quite capable of attempting to spoil a controlled attack by putting out spoof transmissions on our frequencies. To counter such attempts operators are reminded of the challenge procedure used with SD.0182 verification tables. No such attempt has, however, ever been made.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined]
With the experience of 170 successful controlled attacks behind us in 1944, it can be said that we now have a system which is guaranteed to produce excellent morse, precisely on frequency and at the exact time required. It has resulted in the birth of a brand of wireless operator of an efficiency far exceeding that attained in the old days of perpetual W/T silence. The never failing manner in which diversion signals, wind messages and ‘target attacked’ signals are handled reflects the effect which the 5 Group Signals procedure has had on its wireless operators. Their morale was never higher and their keenness never greater. They are a credit to the Radio Schools, O.T.U’s and Conversion Units who produced them. May they keep it up in 1945.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] H.2.S. MARK III. [/underlined]
In August, 1944, it was decided to exploit the blind bombing potentialities of H2S Mark III to the full, and resultant action took two parallel courses, viz:-
(a) An intensive training programme for set operators, with the object of thoroughly familiarising them with the equipment.
(b) Considerable cleaning up of the equipment to obtain increased accuracy, improved presentation and high sensitivity. This latter programme consisted of the selection of the most efficient units from the available H2S equipment and their embodiment into one aircraft installation, coupled with a detailed bench setting procedure.
This work naturally clashed with the prevailing shortage of Radar Mechanics. This was overcome by attachments from the Headquarters, Bomber Command, Radar Development Party, and from No.53 Base, as a result of a decision to curtail the fitting of H2S within that Base. Bench and workshop accommodation was extended in sympathy with the manpower increase.
Flight tests and H2S photography soon demonstrated that the scanner was a definite weakness in the equipment. Severe gaps appeared in the P.P.I. presentation, which made an accurate bombing run exceedingly difficult. Two mechanics under T.R.E. direction constructed a scanner tester with which the scanners could be tested on the ground. The gaps in the polar diagram were filled in by means of a sheet of perspex mounted on the face of the mirror, the ideal position of which was fond by trial and error. This treatment was successful with approximately 50% of the scanners.
[Underlined] The Perfect Scanner. [/underlined]
At this time a perfect scanner was loaned to Coningsby by T.R.E., and flight trials soon demonstrated that the adjective “perfect” was not an exaggeration. As a result, action was taken with our local manufacturer to cast a mirror to the perfect mirror. Trials with the cast mirror were carried out with the resultant paradox that the polar diagram was an improvement over the original. The production of cast mirrors was extended, and operational results proved that the presentation obtained was the best ever.
This labour reaped its dividends in no uncertain fashion; the ability of the operators to obtain best results from the equipment under operational conditions, coupled with the increased efficiency and accuracy of the equipment, were producing remarkably low bombing errors. Figures of a 300 yards error on the live bombing range were by no means uncommon. A still more satisfying substantiation, of course, came from the raid results.
[Underlined] H2S MARK IIIE. [/underlined]
In parallel with this improvement programme, two mechanics have been attached to T.R.E. to construct two sets of H2S Mark IIIE under T.R.E direction. Their work was completed in November, and the equipment transferred to Coningsby, where flight trials proved that it was vastly superior to H2S Mark III, and possessed the added advantage of requiring a less detailed setting up procedure. It is hoped to continue this story at a later date.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
As the operational policy of ‘evasion’ developed, Radar transmissions became more and more restricted, and as a reult [sic] it was decided to install Loran in all aircraft of No.5 Group. This was a bold decision, because the equipment had not been adequately proved operationally, and the prospects of jamming were menacing.
The fitting was carried out in two phases, as equipment became available. Firstly in Nos. 53 and 54 Bases, and finally in Nos. 55 and 56. Each programme was completed rapidly as a result of excellent co-operation between the Engineering and Signals Branches.
[Underlined] Teething Troubles. [/underlined]
Initial results were not so good; Loran required longer manipulation than Gee, and while targets were within Gee coverage, the new equipment did not offer much temptation. Furthermore, the divider circuits were temperamental and suitable areas for training were too far away to allow training flights to be carried out. However, a successful raid on Munich proved the worth of the equipment, and instated it as a very necessary aid outside the limits of Gee coverage. Each navigator was issued with a screwdriver and was instructed in the art of setting dividers in the air.
The trailing aerial was a nuisance. One very vicious specimen, which brought matters to a head “collected large lumps of Window, which jammed the aerial when the wireless operator attempted to wind it in when approaching the target. He succeeded in cutting it away whereupon it jammed the bomb doors; it was cut loose again and it wrapped itself around the rear turret”. Experiments were carried out, as a result of which it was found practicable to use the 27 ft. forward suspension of the T.R.1196 aerial and a suitable loading unit. This modification has been passed to Bomber Command.
A similar aerial was developed for Mosquito aircraft, for which the internal aerial for Loran had proved unsatisfactory.
H2S interference has been experienced. A modification to suppress the receiver during the H2S transmissions has been found successful on the bench, and is undergoing air tests.
[Underlined] Prospects. [/underlined]
It is a simple device to maintain, and in these days of acute shortage of Radar Mechanics, that is an important factor. It does not radiate any energy and is therefore quite safe to use on our deepest penetrations. We look forward to doing great things with Loran in 1945.
[Underlined] TELECOMMUNICATIONS. [/underlined]
1944 saw the final completion of the Base organisation, and the resolution of all queries concerning the positioning of Ops. switchboards and the occupation of Secon huts – both of which caused a considerable amount of heartburn and one time or another. The year saw only one new change, and this was the introduction of a new scheme to speed up the passing of operational information to Bases and Stations. New? We were told that we were going back to 1939 by introducing this scheme but whether new or old it has served one purpose very well.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
Prior to January, 1944, all operational “gen” had been passed by “scrambler” to Base or parent stations, and passed on by the latter to stations or satellites, and a very cumbersome and doubtful method it was. On at least one occasion the omission of the word “if” nearly wrecked an operation. Delays were excessive and the whole system needed a thorough overhaul.
It was decided, therefore, to enlist the aid of the teleprinter network, and the first move at Group was to put an ops. teleprinter in a specially built cubicle adjacent to the Ops. planning room. Bases and Stations were then asked to take similar action, which by hook or by crook they speedily carried out. The final step was to arrange for a simultaneous broadcast to all Bases and Stations and this presented some difficulties, because half the Group was still in the parent/satellite stage. Nevertheless, the difficulties were soon overcome, and the scheme became a working proposition.
The advantages have been manifest from the outset. Messages are handed to the teleprinter operator as soon as they are written out, and are teleprinted at once. The broadcast remains set up as long as planning continues, and handles no other traffic; it is strictly unidirectional. The moment messages are received at Bases and Stations they are handed into the Ops. Room. Thus the overall delay has been cut to the absolute minimum. At the same time speech circuits and “scrambler” phones have been relieved of a tremendous load, and are free for conferences and for the passing of sudden changes of planning detail. In addition to these points, the broadcast network has proved so efficient that operations can now be laid on at extremely short notice, e.g. thirty minutes between time of laying on and time of Flight Planning, a state of affairs quite unthinkable more than 12 months ago.
[Underlined] SIGNALS SECURITY. [/underlined]
Now that the Hun has lost his radiolocation network in France and the Low Countries, it is more than ever necessary that the maintenance of R/T, W/T and Radar silence should be strictly applied in accordance with briefing instructions. He must also never be allowed to note the difference between an operational and a non-operational day. In this connection, the following inadvertent radiation of intercom. on H/F R/T was actually heard by Waddington during a recent daylight operational take off:-
First Dim Wit: “What is going on down there?”
Second Dim Wit: “It is an Ops take off.”
First Dim Wit: “Where are we?”
Second Dim Wit: “Waddington.”
First Dim Wit: “I suppose their satellite is u/s.”
Needless to say, callsigns were not employed in this tea-time chatter otherwise there would have been most serious repercussions for someone.
[Underlined] CODES AND CYPHERS. [/underlined]
1944 saw a radical change in the cypher policy in Bomber Command. In January all cypher facilities were withdrawn from Stations, and Group assumed the responsibility for this traffic, transmitting it to Bases in plain language either by “scrambler”, teleprinter or postagram.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
This released two Section Officers from each Base, who were replaced by one Flight Officer, who became a librarian of all secret and confidential publications.
Early in the year R.A.F. Cypher Sergeants were posted into the Group to gain experience before overseas service, and they are now doing vital work in our forward communications in the battle zone.
Life went on uneventfully at Group until shortly before ‘D’ Day, when only the chosen few and the cypher officers knew the actual time and date of the invasion.
And then again, from early in September until the sinking of the Tirpitz, the Group Cypher Office enjoyed a spell of heavy traffic. After some difficulty in obtaining speedy transmission of messages, direct communication was obtained with Archangel, thus making it possible to deliver in Russia deciphered messages within one hour of origination.
It is occasions like these that relieve the dull monotony of a Cypher Officer’s life – the perpetual routine messages and amending and checking of documents – and make them feel that they are perhaps of some slight use.
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
Throughout December a large decrease in the number of W/T Controllers’ tests, due to adverse weather conditions, has shown that every available opportunity must be taken by the wireless operator (air) to carry out these tests. This requires good co-operation between the Signals Leader and the Squadron and Flight Commanders, and Signals Leaders must ensure that they carry out their part in placing all their requirements before these people, who will do their best to meet these requirements.
During December, 20 tests were carried out, and of these, 16 passed as fit for W/T Controller’s duties. The Squadrons who carried out these successful tests were:-
83 Squadron – 4
97 Squadron – 1
44 Squadron – 2
57 Squadron – 4
630 Squadron – 2
227 Squadron – 1
50 Squadron – 2
Controlled Operations.
Reception of W/T messages transmitted by the W/T Links was again very satisfactory. The standard of operating by the Link operators was quite good, though there is still room for improvement in procedure. Study of 5 Group Air Staff Instructions Sigs/1, and constant practice will eliminate these small mistakes. The transmission of the “Target Attacked” signals presents no problems to our operators, and we are
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
happy to state that up to date there have been no failures in this respect – keep it up.
[Underlined] Group W/T Exercise. [/underlined]
Despite the re-arranging of sections and times of this exercise, the results are far from satisfactory. Signals Leaders must have a drive on getting every Wireless Operator (Air) in their squadrons to take part in at least one exercise per month. The number of crews per squadron are such that, even if they have been operating the previous night there should still be available a quota of operators to carry out these exercises the following morning. If they are being detailed for other duties, point out the requirements of this exercise to your Squadron Commander. He will co-operate.
[Underlined] Points for Signals Leaders. [/underlined]
During the past year, Wireless Operators (Air) of this Group have shown that they can carry out most duties assigned to them, but a summary of the year’s work reveals that there are still a few loopholes in their work which require filling up. For instance, the number of manipulation failures for the year was 20. Now this is a very small percentage of the sorties flown, but it can and must be reduced until in 5 Group such a thing as a manipulation failure ceases to exist. Never let it be said that the equipment is better than the man. Also, the reception of, and action on, diversion messages still leaves much to be desired. These, and other weak points can only be overcome by proper instruction and practice.
[Underlined] Categorisation. [/underlined]
Now that the majority of Squadrons have an Analysis Officer attached for categorisation duties, the results of their labour should soon be forthcoming and all Wireless Operators categorised when they arrive on the Squadron, and at their 10, 20 and 30 sortie checks. The standard categorisation paper has met with universal approval and it now rests with the Signals Leader and his assistant to ensure that these tests are carried out as instructed.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] navigation
[Underlined] REVIEW OF NAVIGATION FOR THE YEAR, 1944. [/underlined]
During the past 12 months many innovations and improvements in Navigation have been initiated by No. 5 Group. The most notable of these are:-
(i) Introduction of the A.P.I. attachment, which ensures more accurate windfinding for bombing.
(ii) Introduction of the A.P.I. and A.P.I. attachment windfinding drills.
(iii) A reduction in the practice bombing vector error from 9 m.p.h. in January to 3.4 m.p.h. in December as a result of (i) and (ii) above. Also a corresponding decrease in the operational bombing wind finding errors, although this fact is difficult to determine for obvious reasons.
(iv) New log and chart work procedure, in which all duplication of work is eliminated.
(v) Introduction of the Categorisation scheme.
(vi) Appointment of Navigation Analysis Officers.
(vii) Reduction of the “Spread” of aircraft on operations from a concentration box 100 miles x 50 miles in January to a concentration box 50 miles x 25 miles in December. (Room for still more improvement here).
(viii) Elimination of Astro and a consequent increased amount of time available for teaching more essential subjects.
The most notable of these new activities were the Categorisation Scheme, coupled with the appointment of Analysis Officers and the monumental decrease in bombing wind finding errors. They have greatly increased the standard of navigation and bombing accuracy.
This improvement in navigation must continue and be accelerated. Suggestions as to how the present standard and technique can be further improved will be welcomed. So, go to it, and don’t be afraid to voice your opinions and suggestions – and make sure that 1945 is a year of Victory.
[Underlined] IMPORTANCE OF ACCURATE TRACK KEEPING AND TIMING. [/underlined]
The general standard of track keeping and timing which was achieved on the shorter range operations is still being maintained on the longer range sorties we are now undertaking. There are [underlined] STILL, [/underlined] however, a few STRAGGLERS. No matter what is said or done either by Group Headquarters or the Station and Squadron Navigation Officers the percentage of stragglers still remains the same. A few of them are unavoidable, e.g. genuine compass failure, late take off, failure of all Navigation instruments combined with sudden wind change; but the majority are due either to poor and indifferent navigation or else a lack of understanding of modern tactics.
Aircraft in the concentration enjoy first the protection afforded by other aircraft, second the protection of “Window” and
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
third the protection of the countermeasures provided by No.100 Group aircraft. It is therefore impossible for a fighter, once he has got into the stream, to home on to an individual aircraft in that concentration. On the other hand, it will be very simple for the fighter to home on to any straggler, because that aircraft will be isolated from the concentration and will therefore stand out. This applies to aircraft who are out in timing, as well as off track.
Concentration in both track keeping and timing is also a safeguard against flak. It is obvious that a compact mass of aircraft will completely black out a Cathode Ray tube, and make it impossible for any one aircraft to be singled out for attack. Also it is equally obvious that the chance of being hit is considerably diminished as all aircraft are passing through the defended area in a very short space of time.
So now you know!! Keep on track and on time throughout the whole operation and minimise tour chance of being shot down.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING VECTOR ERRORS. [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by squadrons this month is 4 m.p.h. exactly. This figure is an increase of .2 m.p.h. on last month’s figure. It is only fair to state, however, that much of the practice bombing this month has been done by the new crews, and this fact may account for the slight increase in the vector error. Remember the goal we set ourselves last month – an average vector error of below 3 m.p.h. Can we achieve it? The answer is YES – but only if EVERY navigator does his very best on every exercise. Let us start the New Year well and achieve our goal in the first month.
[Table of Average Practice Vector Errors by Squadron]
97 Squadron have been rising rapidly in this table and have now reached second place. Well done, and it is hoped that your ambition does not end there, but that you will go on and beat 9 Squadron, who have held the lead for seven consecutive months.
No.56 Base are still in the bottom half of the list. Next month we hope to see all their squadrons at least six places higher. What about it, No.56 Base?
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] THIS MONTH’S Bouquets [Drawing]
The names of the eight navigators, two from each Base, who submitted the best work this month are set out below. They have been chosen for their consistently accurate and methodical work, which includes good track keeping and timing, constant wind velocity and ETA checks and log and chart work of a very high order.
F/Sgt. Leigh – 106 Squadron
S/Ldr. Burnside – 97 Squadron
F/O. Reeves – 61 Squadron
F/Sgt. Edwards – 467 Squadron
F/Sgt. Treadwell – 189 Squadron
Sgt. Smith – 49 Squadron
W/O. Rose – 619 Squadron
F/Lt. De Friend DFM – 57 Squadron
P/O Searle, 227 Squadron, who has appeared in the last two summaries and W/O Murray, 50 Squadron, who appeared in the last summary, have both again submitted work of an exceptionally high standard. This is an excellent performance on the part of these two navigators and we congratulate them.
They have been omitted from this month’s list however, so as to give the remainder of the Group a chance!
[Underlined] UNION NEWS. [/underlined]
F/Lt. De Friend, D.F.M. – No.57 Squadron Navigation Officer, to be Station Navigation Officer, Fulbeck. Now S/Ldr.
[Underlined] ANALYSIS AND CATEGORISATION. [/underlined]
The Navigation Analysis is going very well. Analysis Officers on all Squadrons are doing an important job in a very efficient manner. Theirs is a tiresome and tedious job, but, if it is done conscientiously and well, it will pay handsome dividends in the form of better and more accurate navigation. It is to be hoped that all navigators are taking advantage of this extra service and are liaisoning [sic] with the analysis officers. Listen to what they have to say, note where you lost marks on your last sortie, and then follow their recommendations, and those if the Station Navigation Officer.
Lack of system is causing an appreciable loss of marks to some navigators, this applies particularly to the new crews. Working to a system will halve your navigational difficulties. The time to complete each cycle of operations is left for you to decide, but it is always best to work on an easy fraction of an hour, e.g. 10, 12 or 15 minutes. No system should have a time interval of more than 15 minutes.
The categorisation scheme has been in operation for 4 months
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
now and is well established. It is interesting to note that over this period, the number of “A+” and “A” category navigators has risen from 116 (12 Squadrons) to 203 (14 Squadrons), and the number of “C” and “D” category navigators has been reduced from 63 (12 Squadrons) to 28 (14 Squadrons). These figures are very encouraging. We should, however, have NO “C” or “D” navigators in the Group. Station Navigation Officers and Analysis Officers must concentrate on these crews until they reach at least the “B” category.
[Underlined] BRIEFING. [/underlined]
It has often been said that a really first class briefing is half the operation. Whether that statement is strictly accurate or not is difficult to say, but it is a fact that a well briefed crew has a far better chance of completing a successful sortie, no matter how adverse the conditions, than a badly briefed crew.
One or two navigation briefings which have been attended during the last month have been below the standard required. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers must pay particular attention to this aspect of their work. The most noticeable faults of briefing officers are:-
(i) Speaking too quickly;
(ii) Not raising their voice;
(iii) Speaking with a cigarette or pipe in the mouth;
(iv) Rushing through important details and not repeating them at least once;
(v) Failing to give a little advice on navigational details, particularly to the inexperienced navigators.
Navigation officers, do any of these faults apply to you? If so, then remedy them immediately, and give your navigators a chance. Squadron Navigation Officers should detail two deputies and train them to give a good briefing, so that a high standard will always be maintained.
Navigators do you always get the most out of each briefing? Do you listen to all the valuable information and advice given you and do you use it, or are you one of those people who knows all the answers and just don’t listen to the briefing officer. If so, then revise your ideas immediately. No matter how rushed you are, always listen to the Briefing Officer and make notes of all the important points. That extra 10 minutes attention in the briefing room will save you many a headache on the operation. Once you are airborne it is too late to remember something which you forgot to ask in the briefing room.
[Underlined] SAFETY HEIGHTS. [/underlined]
With the present tactics of flying low over parts of the Continent, it is essential to know the safety heights along the route. Do YOU always note the safety heights along the track and also for a distance 20 or 30 miles either side of track, just in case? Mark the spot heights in feet, on your plotting chart. This will act as a double check.
Several reports have been received from crews in recent weeks of aircraft crashing into high ground when flying low. None of these reports have yet been corroborated, but they may be true. So take warning and don’t end your days on the side of a mountain. It’s too cold this weather anyway.
Remember that spot heights on a topographical map of the Continent are always given in metres, with the exception of the Straits
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
of Dover sheet. All spot heights for Great Britain are given in feet.
[Underlined] SELF-ANALYSIS CHART. [/underlined]
Here is the second analysis chart fir you to complete. If you missed the fist one for any reason look it up now and answer those questions too.
(i) Have you read and do you know all the Air Staff Instructions and 5 Group Drills which apply to YOU?
(ii) Do you know all your compass drills?
(iii) Do you know the maximum coverage of each Gee chain and which is the best chain to use over (a) North Western Germany, (b) Southern France, (c) Frisian Islands, (d) Paris area, (e) North West Denmark?
(iv) Do you know the maximum height at which H2S should be switched on?
(v) Do you know the position on the return journey of an operation, from which you are allowed to relax your timing? Do you know why you are allowed to relax timing from this position, and why this position was chosen?
(vi) Do you know [underlined] all [/underlined] the Group flight plan speeds for climbing, diving, straight and level flight, with and without a bomb load?
(vii) Do you always fill in your Form 2330 correctly and hand it to the Me. Officer on return?
(viii) Do you always pass the drift to the pilot after each alteration of course, especially on the run up to the target?
(ix) Do you always check your altimeter with the pilot’s when descending, and do you regularly check your A.S.I. with the pilot’s? When there is a discrepancy between the two A.S.I’s which do you take as being accurate?
(x) Do you always make allowance for time of turn when altering course, e.g. 1/4 minute before E.T.A. for turns up to 30°, 1/2 minute between 31° and 60°, and 3/4 minute between 61° and 100°
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] radar nav:
[Underlined] REVIEW FOR THE YEAR 1944. [/underlined]
During the past 12 months considerable strides have been made by No.5 Group both with the introduction of new Radar navigational aids, and in the use of those that existed prior to the beginning of the year. The most notable have been:-
(i) The introduction of H2S MK.II into Nos. 44, 207 and 619 Squadrons.
(ii) The introduction of H2S MK.III into No.54 Base.
(iii) The introduction of an H2S categorisation scheme at Coningsby in order to ascertain the most efficient blind marker crews.
(iv) Experiments at Coningsby to determine the efficiency of H2S MK.III and the production of specially selected MK.III equipment to give far more efficient blind marking than before.
(v) Incorporation of the 184 indicator in H2S MK.III, which has enabled a blind bombing technique of releasing direct on the response to the developed to a high standard of proficiency. [sic]
(vi) The introduction of H2S photography both on MK.II and MK.III squadrons from which it has been possible to ascertain the positions of release of mines and T.I’s and also give us considerable H2S cover of the Continent.
(vii) The introduction of the R.F. Unit 27 for use with the Gee receiver.
(viii) Consequent upon the invasion of Europe, the introduction of Continental Gee chains which give more accurate coverage over Western Germany.
(ix) The introduction of Loran, which has resulted in long distance fixing, and a consequent improvement in D.R. navigation.
(x) The appointment of Station Radar Navigation Officers who are responsible for the application of, and training in, Radar Navigational aids throughout the Group.
Most notable of the above activities were the experiments at Coningsby, which have resulted in a considerable decrease in blind marking errors, and have produced equipment which has given far better responses on the H2S MK.III P.P.I. than ever before. Coupled with this is the introduction of Loran into the whole of the aircraft in No.5 Group, which has further raised the standard of navigation, and resulted in fixes being obtained over various areas of enemy territory with considerable success and without enemy interference of any kind. This was an ambitious scheme as it involved the fitting of all aircraft and the training of all navigators within a period of six to eight weeks, and great credit is due to the Radar sections and Loran Instructors for carrying it out without a hitch.
This improvement in navigation must continue and be accelerated in the forth coming year, not only by the introduction of new Radar
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
navigational aids, but by the raising of the standard of efficiency of the present equipment. Suggestions as to how this can be done will be welcome. Do not be afraid to let us have your ideas and opinions. No matter how trivial they may seem to you, they may have far reaching effects if applied throughout the whole Group. If you do this far better Radar navigation facilities may come into being, and possibly help to win the victory this year.
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
The majority of operators have made good use of this aid during the month and much information has been obtained on the operational value of the chain.
A summary of results obtained on the three long range operations is as follows:-
[Underlined] MUNICH [/underlined] Rate 4 signals, particularly the Master signal, were weaker than usual with considerable splitting, thus decreasing the value of the S.S. Chain as a whole on this particular sortie. Rate 5 signals were much stronger than previously reported, perhaps due to the southerly route taken. Investigations have been made into the possible causes of the difficulties experienced and have rather indicated that weather conditions were the primary cause of the Rate 4 signals’ weakness, as the worst meteorological conditions lay between the Rate 4 Master Station and the route taken. A plot of the first and last fixes taken on this operation indicates, however, that despite the difficulties outlined, Loran could have been used from 0400E on the outward route on 0700E on the return route. It is apparent from this plot that many operators did not make full use of this aid, and it can only be assumed that they did not persevere with the equipment to ensure fixing at frequent intervals.
The procedure of watching the signals and taking readings between splitting cannot be too highly stressed. A visit to the Radar Section at night now and again and watching the S.S. Loran Chain on the bench set will prove of great value if you wish to become really efficient on this excellent navigational aid.
[Underlined] GDYNIA & POLITZ [/underlined] Much to the surprise of the majority of Loran operators exceptional coverage was obtained on these attacks. Although the routes lay mainly outside the service area, signals were strong and fairly easily recognisable, and a considerable number of operators were able to obtain fixes from the Danish Coast to the target and return. Once again, however, the first and last fixes plotted indicate that operators are not persevering. It is appreciated that many little difficulties crop up in flight but when Loran is the only aid available there can be little excuse for not endeavouring to use it.
It should be possible to obtain a first and last fix plot which shows a concentration of fixes at the point of entry into the service area and another concentration at the target. Whether or not this can be achieved is entirely up to the skill and initiative of every individual operator.
The main snags encountered on operations this month were:-
(i) Incorrect alignment of dividers.
(ii) Dampness.
(iii) H2S interference.
(iv) Difficulties with the trailing aerial.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
Divider trouble appears to be an inherent fault of this equipment and has occurred more frequently in the past few weeks due to dampness. Switching the set on and leaving it for a little while to dry out may cure the trouble due to dampness. If the set does not react, then it is up to the operator to carry out the correct alignment procedure. Screwdrivers are trickling through slowly, and when all operators are equipped failures due to divider trouble should be things of the past.
In addition to divider trouble, there are still some operators who report equipment unserviceable although on check nothing can be found wrong. In the majority of these cases the remedy is simple such as turning up the brilliance, switching on the master switch, or checking and replacing blown fuses – small points but essential ones, and if you know your Loran Aircraft Drill you should have little trouble from this source.
As regards snags (ii) to (iv) the Radar Sections are working out means of counteracting efficiently the snags which have cropped up from these sources, and we expect to hear of their solution any day. 55 Base are busy with a fixed aerial which has already been used on operations with success.
Further trials are to be carried out and if successful it is intended to adopt this aerial throughout Group.
[Underlined] GEE. [/underlined]
Gee has again proved the most valuable navigation aid during the month, although from maximum fix plots it is evident that operators are still failing to obtain maximum coverage from the Continental chains.
With little or no jamming reported on the Continental chains there should be little difficulty in obtaining fixes to maximum range, and the spread between maximum fixes obtained by squadrons should be less than 1/2 a degree and not 3 degrees as is the case at the present time. The fact that all squadrons are also using Loran should not prevent operators from obtaining an occasional Gee fix as a check.
Due to circumstances beyond control, one of the Ruhr Gee Chain Stations has had to be moved away from the vicinity of the front line. This Stations [sic] has been re-sited and the Ruhr Chain has been renamed the Cologne Chain. Topographical Charts have been issued but once the front line is again stabilised it is anticipated the Ruhr Chain will once again come into being.
News has also been received of new lattice charts to a scale of one million. These charts covering the London-Berlin and London-Munich areas will give the lattice lines for the Continental Gee chains and they should be in general use by the end of January.
Navigators are reminded that the Eastern Chain is now phased for a point in the North Sea, and that inaccuracies occur in the chain South of a line Calais to Frankfurt. If you are flying below this line remember the fixes you obtain should be from either the Ruhr or Reims Chain and [underlined] not [/underlined] the Eastern Chain.
[Underlined] H2S [/underlined]
H2S Mark II have been used on two occasions during the month, and operators, despite their various activities with Gee and Loran,
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
managed to obtain good results on the equipment. This is evident from the excellent P.P.I. photographs which have been produced both of the targets and landmarks on track. It is, however, evident from H2S reports that many operators are still failing to use H2S (when they can) for a check on the target. Although you are bombing visually, there is no reason why you should not set up your H2S for blind bombing – the Air Bomber’s remark “Bombs gone” will serve as an admirable check on your estimation of the release point on H2S.
The highlight of this month’s activities with H2S Mark III has been the introduction of H2S Mark IIIE which gives much more clearly defined response and incorporates sector scan. So far blind bombing errors on this equipment have averaged .4 of a mile. In addition a new scanner has been manufactured which is practically perfect, and it is anticipated will give far better reception on the P.P.I. than before. Further tests are being carried out before any general statement as to its efficiency is made.
Intense interest has been shown in this Group’s challenge to 8 (P.F.F.) Group for an inter-Group Blind Bombing Competition which 8 (P.F.F.) Group have accepted.
The final details of the competition are almost complete and the contest will take place during January on the neutral Bombing Range. Good luck 54 Base and may the best side win.
H2S Photography has improved considerably during the month with both Mark II and Mark III squadrons producing excellent results. Revised H2S Photographic Instructions have been issued, and every operator should visit the Photographic Section and acquaint himself with the provisions laid down in these instructions.
Once again the reputation of the Group has been maintained on Gardening sorties. Both photographs and plots indicate that plantings have been in the correct furrows. These results indicate that despite restrictions, operators can still use H2S efficiently when required.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] air bombing
1944 has been a year of exceptional progress from the bombing aspect of the activities of the Group. The average crew error for December 1943 was 295 yards at 20,000 feet, and our present results have not been achieved without a sustained effort on the part of everybody concerned to reduce that figure to the present error of 171 yards at 20,000 feet.
Changes have taken place in equipment and methods of training during the past year, and all possible means of improving the bombing accuracy of the Group have been investigated and, where possible, put into operation. The more important changes were as follows:-
The introduction of a completely new method of Bombing Analysis and the provision of a tour-expired Air Bomber to conduct the analysis on each squadron.
The categorisation of all crews on their ability to bomb accurately.
The installation of the Mark XIVA Bombsight.
A drive on the crew aspect of bombing training and the installation of Automatic Observers and sensitive skid recorders in selected squadrons to determine the errors due to inaccurate flying.
Permission to build two new targets at Wainfleet was obtained, and clearance for local dropping of T.I’s was granted.
A quarterly inter-squadron bombing competition was started, the winning squadron to hold a splendid trophy presented by Lord Camrose.
Crews were instructed to bomb on briefed tracks to provide training in operational methods.
An extension of flashlight targets took place early in the year but other commitments have caused the reduction of flashlight facilities at the present time.
Improved methods of transmitting bombing results from ranges has provided means of early analysis and assessment.
The two most notable events were the introduction of the new form of bombing analysis and the system of categorisation of crews on their ability to bomb accurately. Bombing analysis provides a method of determining the source of errors and has produced an excellent standard of wind finding, and bombsight maintenance, but it will not provide the maximum benefit until every captain studies the analysis of the exercises completed by his crew, and ensures that everything possible is being done to eliminate errors.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
The categorisation of crews, although based on practice bombing only, does give an indication of a crew’s ability on operations. When a crew obtains an A+ or A category it proves three things:-
(i) The Captain can make an accurate bombing run with no skidding turns or sudden changes in the flying attitude of the aircraft.
(ii) The Navigator can find a good wind.
(iii) The Air Bomber knows how to use his bombsight correctly and can guide the bombsight graticule [underlined] on [/underlined] to the target and not merely in the vicinity of the target.
It is reasonable to suppose that a bombing team displaying these qualities on a practice target can reproduce similar efficiency on a real precision target, but it would be unreasonable to suppose that a crew obtaining ‘C’ or ‘D’ category results during practice will obtain better results on a real target. Therefore it is essential that Squadron Commanders and Flight Commanders make every effort to provide these low category crews with as many opportunities as possible to improve their position.
The weather experienced recently, plus unavoidable commitments has reduced the time available for training, but a study of the summary of practice bombing illustrates the disparity in the number of bombs dropped by various squadrons.
During the coming year it will be more necessary than ever to maintain steady progress in bombing accuracy, targets will grow smaller and more valuable to the enemy. It is certain that the Hun will make strenuous efforts to defend them; his defences can be outwitted, but it is all of no avail if the percentage of bombs required to demolish a target fails to hit that target. A continuance of progress already made, and a repetition of the excellent co-operation existing between our crews, armourers and bombsight maintenance staffs will make an early end to the War something more than wishful thinking.
[Underlined] BOMBING RANGES. [/underlined]
The lifting of black-out restrictions on certain areas is causing some confusion in the identification of bombing ranges at night, and it is only by good fortune that serious accidents have been avoided. Bombing Leaders must make sure that crews taking off on a night bombing detail are conversant with the lighting arrangements at the Practice target. The installation of illuminated signal arrows on all Bomber Command ranges should eliminate any doubts concerning identification, and it is expected that all crews know the provisions of 5 Group Air Staff Instruction BL.24.
Another point which is not receiving the necessary attention is the firing of smoke-puffs during a practice bombing exercise. At least one smoke-puff [underlined] must [/underlined] be fired during every exercise, and to enable the range staff to find an accurate wind the smoke-puff must be fired directly over the range signals area. Some smoke-puffs intended for Epperstone have been fired over Nottingham, and the Hill’s Mirror (Observation) is not sufficiently mobile to cope with these approximations.
[Underlined] THE “LORD CAMROSE” TROPHY. [/underlined]
The trophy, awarded to the squadron producing the best average crew error over a period of three months, is leaving Skellingthorpe
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBER. [/underlined]
for Bardney. No.9 Squadron has achieved an outstanding result with an average crew error of 127 yards for 570 bombs, during the months of October, November and December. No.50 Squadron made a gallant attempt to retain the trophy for the third successive occasion, but their average crew error of 139 yards for 420 bombs during the same period only took them to second place.
No.9 Squadron’s success was made possible by the hard work and co-operation of all concerned with the bombing effort, and it will be necessary for other squadrons to obtain extraordinarily good results if the trophy is to change hands at the end of March.
Well done No.9 Squadron!!!
[Underlined] BOMBING ANALYSIS. [/underlined]
56 Base (S/Ldr. Walmsley) is making efforts to find ways and means of obtaining a true wind for purposes of bombing analysis. The method now adopted seems promising and after an extended trial it might be worthy of adoption by all Bases. A smoke-puff is fired at the commencement of the exercise and the wind found is recorded at the range. At the end of the exercise, when times and headings are passed to the Range, the A.P.I. wind used for the exercise and the A.P.I. wind found from the positions recorded during the exercise are both transmitted to the Range. All three winds are then sent on the same signal as the bombing results e.g.
SP 300/40
API 290/39
MAPI 305/42
If a squadron carries out four exercises it can be seen that twelve winds are easily available for analysis purposes.
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] SQUADRON AVERAGE BOMBING ERROR FOR 8 EXERCISES. [/underlined]
1st 97 80
2nd 463 87
3rd 9 89
4th 630 95
5th 50 97
6th 467 106
7th 207 107
8th 619 108
9th 49 116
The remaining squadrons did not complete sufficient exercises to submit an entry.
No.97 Squadron have headed the Group competition after being placed second last month. Their effort during this month was undoubtedly the best in the Group, both in numbers and quality, and the Squadron is to be congratulated on the results. The efficiency of a squadron is reflected in the condition of its various Sections, and the Bombing Section at 97 Squadron H.Q. is an example of what it should be.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] DECEMBER’S OOUSTANDING CREW ERRORS. [/underlined]
SQDN. PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR ERROR AT 20,000 FT. IN YARDS
44 F/O Daggett F/O Sharpe F/O Hindlay 55
50 F/O Lillies F/O Skinner Sgt Tye 71
189 F/O Herbert F/O Cottier F/O Skinner 43
207 F/O Cook F/S Boddy F/S D’Arcy 75
227 F/O Skipworth Sgt Steadman Sgt Ward 72
617 F/O Leavitt F/S Oldman F/O Withams 49
F/O Flatman F/O Kelly F/O McKie 53
F/L Dobson F/O Johnstone P/O Knight 55
619 F/L Brown F/S Meakin F/O Thanes 68
5 LFS F/O Blair F/S Bethune F/S McShane 74
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORISATION [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categorisations by Base]
Crews are categorised on the average crew error of their last three bombing exercises and the following limitations apply to the various categories:-
A+ 85 yards or less
A 140 yards or less
B 210 yards or less
C 280 yards or less
D Over 280 yards
All A+ crews can be congratulated on the exceptional standard of accuracy and efficiency attained by the bombing teams. It is not just luck which produces results, methodical work and attention to detail is the basis of accurate bombing.
[Underlined] AIR BOMBER QUIZ [/underlined]
1. What are the safety heights for the release of a 4000 lb. bomb over land and water?
2. What suction recordings must be obtained to ensure full bombsight serviceability?
3. What prevents condensation on the lens of the collimator?
4. Is it possible to do a “lights” check with bomb doors closed?
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE. [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Results by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] engineering
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES FOR THE YEAR 1944. [/underlined]
On the completion of the first full year of Base Organisation, progress can now be reviewed. For inclusion in this Summary such a review must necessarily be very brief, but it is the intention to produce one in detail under separate cover so that lessons learnt during the year can be made clear, and faults can be analysed and suggestions made for improvements.
53 and 54 Bases have completed a full year unhindered by unheavals [sic]. 51 Base after a long period of excellent work in the Group transferred their affection wholly to 7 Group on formation of the separate training group. 56 Base, which was the original 52 Base at Scampton had unfortunately to break down their organisation at Scampton and rebuild it on new ground at Syerston. This did not retard progress to a great extent, but the smooth running efficiency of the Base Organisation was some weeks getting into its stride again. 55 Base is our only Base which is formed on a war-time station, and has been functioning as such for the latter half of the year; the problems of the economical and efficient running of this type of Base vary from those which are housed on stations built to peace-time design.
The basic principle behind the original scheme of Base organisation is the economy in man power, material and equipment, and this economy has been implemented in the Bases in 5 Group since their formation.
Conservation of equipment is the key note of serviceability. The least line of resistance is to remove an unserviceable item of equipment from an aircraft and fit a new item from the main stores caring little of what happens to the unserviceable item removed, which is returned to the main stores for ultimate transfer to a Repairable Equipment Depot. There is no doubt that up to a point, serviceability can be maintained with this short-sighted outlook; but by this means much equipment is en route between stations and R.E.D’s and between R.E.D’s and repair contractors, and much more is heaped up outside these various places waiting repair. So there must come a day when many particular items are in very short supply. By taking full advantage of the Base organisation and the repair facilities of the Base Major Servicing Sub-sections, the unserviceable item removed can be repaired and kept in circuit. It can be used time and time again, maintained in a serviceable condition, and a good Base can pay a dividend rather than rely on a subsidy. Such conservation of equipment has been made possible by the formation of the Base specialist repair bays, i.e. hydraulics, pneumatics, tyres, brakes, sparking plugs, propellers, metal repairs, modifications, power plants, instrument and electrical sections.
Much thought has been given to the building and improvement of these specialist bays and, for instance, the spark plug cleaning is now in its correct perspective. Due to a large amount of pressure and powers of local purchase being brought to bear, ideal cleaning and test equipment is available in Bases in this Group, and Bases are
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ENGINEERING. [/underlined]
capable of catering for cleaning and testing up to a thousand plugs a day. As Base organisation was a scheme devised subsequent to the building and planning of stations, no designed housing for the various sections was available; therefore improvisation of certain other rooms, buildings and sections has been necessary by local initiative. The equipment required for the repair and testing od the hundreds of components has not been available through Service sources, as the requirement at the time of Base sub-section organisation was not known to higher authority. Therefore local initiative was brought to bear again, and Base major servicing sections are now in possession of excellent test equipment which will cater for the efficient testing of the various services.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
[Table of 5 LFS Serviceability]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] training
[Underlined] PROGRESS DURING THE YEAR. [/underlined]
There were numerous changes and developments in training throughout 1944 to meet operational requirements and to deal with new equipment, particularly Radar devices. As a background to all that was new there was a constant pressure on basic flying and operational procedure in an endeavour to improve standards and enable crews to raid successfully in more rigorous conditions.
On other pages of this Summary, developments in training are dealt with in detail. The main task has been to produce sufficient crews of a good standard to do the job, and at the same time to form new squadrons.
The year opened with the Training Units in the throes of conversion to Stirling aircraft and the L.F.S. in its infancy. This 2-type training on 4 engined aircraft created many problems which made the life of aircrew under training extremely strenuous. New, at the end of the year a change-over is again in progress, but squadrons fortunately have a surplus of crews to help them through the Winter months until “all through” Lancaster training is in full swing.
Among the many new features introduced into training, the Categorisation of aircrew members was perhaps the most interesting and represents an attempt to increase the individual efficiency by frequent detailed tests of his ability and analysis of his results. As an essential part of this policy, various instructors and Analysis Officers were appointed to squadrons and the value of their work was soon evident.
Crew members thus have the opportunity of finding out quickly where they are wrong, why they are wrong and what they can do to improve their efficiency. Squadron Commanders and Specialist Officers can also place their fingers quickly on the weak spots in crews.
The year also saw the introduction of No.5 Group Aircraft Drills, Check Lists in aircraft, and the addition of several new and important Air Staff Instructions; one of the latest and most important being “Precautions against Hazards in Conditions of Cumulo Nimbus Cloud”.
Other new features were the production of the new Lancaster Aircrew Quiz and the standard No.5 Group Link Trainer Syllabus which was produced to meet the particular requirements of four engined pilots. All these things provide sufficient material for crews to “find the answers” if they are in doubt and give instructors the facts necessary for the production of high standard crews.
Figures are not the final measure of effort, and “figure chasing” invariably defeats its purpose. They do, however, provide a basis for comparison and do indicate if an effort is being made. The final measure comes in the assessment of raid damage, the casualty lists and the squadron record of early returns and abortive sorties.
It is interesting to note, therefore, that parallel to the
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING. [/underlined]
increase in sorties flown and bombs dropped, training hours and figures have also improved. The total of practice bombs dropped has increased and the error has gone down. Assessable fighter affiliation exercises have more than doubled themselves, and in particular, night affiliation grew from nothing to a satisfactory total of nearly 350 exercises in the first month of the Winter. Navigation errors came down. Link Trainer hours rose steadily and instrument flying standards improved – a little slowly perhaps but the ground was ploughed.
There must be no relaxation in training during 1945. It has no saturation point.
[Underlined] EVENTS DURING DECEMBER. [/underlined]
The exceptionally bad weather during December made regular training difficult, but despite this, Squadron Instructors completed 102 Category Checks, leaving 159 Category Checks to be done to give every pilot in the Group a Category. There are now 185 pilots in the Group holding Categories. Nos. 54 and 55 Bases are well behind the other Bases in their category tests. The following table shows the state of categorisation of pilots in the Group:-
[Underlined] CATEGORY OF PILOTS. [/underlined]
[Table of Pilot Categories by Base]
Total squadron training amounted to 2200 hours – a very big increase on the previous month owing to the weather. Of this total 1650 hours were by day and 550 by night. The average per squadron was 122 hours. Six squadrons were very low on the list – No.61 Squadron did 50 hours; 189 Squadron 58 hours; 227 Squadron 64 hours; 630 Squadron 65 hours; 44 Squadron 85 hours. It is hoped all these squadrons will double their efforts during January.
[Underlined] NO. 5 L.F.S. REPORT. [/underlined]
No. 5 L.F.S. produced 73 crews for squadrons at an average of 13 hours per crew. The Unit flew 1100 hours. Loran training was given during December, and bombing results showed improvement on November.
[Underlined] 1690 B.D.T. FLIGHT. [/underlined]
The Flight was “grounded” by weather for 14 days, but they flew whenever squadrons asked for details. A total of 252 day details and 91 night details were flown. This included 97 da details and 41 night details for No.75 Base.
Total hours for the Flight were 323, and the average hours per aircraft on charge was 24. Pilots averaged 18 hours per month.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] INSTRUMENT FLYING AND LINK [/underlined]
During the Winter of 1943 there was definite evidence that the standard of instrument flying was not sufficient to meet all the requirements of operational flying in conditions of adverse weather, and special attention was paid to this phase of flying throughout 1944. A summary of the action taken to improve instrument flying throughout the Group is tabulated below:-
(i) More flying on primary instruments, by the inclusion of specific exercises in the Heavy Conversion Units, and the inclusion of a test on this point in the Pilot’s Category Check.
(ii) A revival of the use of the “hood” to provide more genuine I.F. practice in the air in day light.
(iii) The issue of a standard 5 Group Link Trainer Syllabus to meet the particular requirements of pilots of four engined aircraft (corkscrew on instruments, and flying on primary instruments only, etc.).
(iv) A modification to the Link Trainer to enable the Artificial Horizon and Directional Gyro to be “toppled” during an exercise.
(v) The introduction of a new type Artificial Horizon with a reduced turn error.
(vi) The acquisition of additional Link Trainers and Instructors towards the end of the year, which now gives each squadron one machine and one instructor.
The effort made is revealed by the fact the Squadron Link Trainer hours rose from 495 hours in December, 1943, to 1804 hours in December, 1944 – just short of a four-fold increase. The new squadrons and new Link Trainers now make more practice easier, and the acid test is the squadron average spread equally over all pilots and flight engineers on strength, and most of all, the quality of the instrument flying.
December was the best month to date and congratulations go to Nos. 49, 467 and 50 Squadrons for having reached the target for pilots on the Link Trainer. This was the third consecutive month in which No.49 Squadron has reached their target. No.44 Squadron went very close to the squadron target of 132 hours, but the bulk of the time was done by the flight engineers, the pilots being below the average with a total of 44 hours.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] LINK TRAINER TIMES. [/underlined]
[Table of Link Trainer Hours by Base and Squadron]
GRAND TOTAL – 1804 hrs.
ACTUAL AVERAGE PER SQUADRON – 78.8 hrs.
REQUIRED AVERAGE PER SQUADRON – 132 hrs.
+ SQUADRONS WHERE LINK TIMES ARE FAR TOO LOW.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
second thoughts for pilots
[Underlined] SWINGING ON TAKE-OFF. [/underlined]
There have been two swinging accidents on take off recently and on each occasion the Pilot flagrantly ignored the Lancaster Swinging Drill (No.5 Group Aircraft Drill No.5). Read the Drill through carefully again and make sure that both you and your Flight Engineer know it thoroughly.
[Underlined] FIDO LANDINGS. [/underlined]
The average hold-off tends to be too long and the landing too far up the runway. This is largely because Pilots, having an exaggerated idea of the bumpiness in the box, come in at too high an airspeed – 115 m.p.h. I.A.S. is quite sufficient. Check this tendency particularly when returning with full bomb load.
On the circuit “glare” makes it difficult to see other aircraft on the same level, or slightly above. Ensure a careful “circuit look-out” normally is maintained and that navigation, upper and lower identification lights are on.
Turn your cockpit lighting on full before entering the funnel. This will enable you to read your instruments in the glare on the approach.
[Underlined] OVERSHOOTING. [/underlined]
The following are the commonest causes of overshooting:-
(i) Airspeed too high on the approach into wind. It should be 120m.p.h. with a moderately laden aircraft on the initial approach, and [underlined] 105 – 110 m.p.h. over the boundary. [/underlined] With an all up weight of 55,000 lbs to 58,000 lbs. it should be 120 m.p.h. on the initial approach and [underlined] 115 m.p.h. over the boundary. [/underlined]
(ii) Too high over boundary. You should not be above 25 – 50 feet over the boundary by day or in the Green of the G.P.I. by night.
(iii) Throttles left open too long after the initial check thus prolonging the float.
[Underlined] LOSS OF CONTROL. [/underlined]
Straight and level instrument flying is fairly sound with the amount of practice that the average pilot has during training and operations, but instrument flying with Artificial Horizon or A.S.I. u/s, steep turns, combat manoeuvres, etc. are known to be weak through lack of practice. There is no reason why this weakness should exist as there are ample opportunities for instrument practice on N.F.T’s and training flights generally.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] CUMULO NIMBUS CLOUD. [/underlined]
Take special note of the new Air Staff Instruction Trg/6 – “Precautions against Hazards in conditions of Cumulo Nimbus Cloud”. This instruction contains three main points:-
(i) A Safety Area for climbing and descending.
(ii) A maximum height above which the aircraft is not to fly until it enters the Safety Area.
(iii) A minimum ”cross country” height above the cloud after climbing in the Safety Area.
Make sure you can see clear skies above by day or stars by night before climbing in the Safety Area. Do not fly in Cumulo Nimbus cloud. Turn round and fly clear.
[Drawing] Do [underlined] you [/underlined] always catch the “LATTICE LINE SPECIAL”
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] gunnery
[Underlined] “DECLINE AND FALL OF THE G.A.F.” [underlined]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
4/5.12.44 “P” – 106 Squadron – JU. 88
4/5.12.44 “Q” – 61 Squadron – ME.410
4/5.12.44 “M” – 189 Squadron – JU. 88
6/7.12.44 “V” – 630 Squadron -JU. 88
6/7.12.44 “B” – 57 Squadron – ME.110
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
6/7.12.44 “L” – 97 Squadron – JU. 88
6/7.12.44 “F” – 463 Squadron – ME.110
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
4/5.12.44 “A” – 619 Squadron – FW.190
4/5.12.44 “W” – 207 Squadron – JU. 88
4/5.12.44 “B” – 463 Squadron – JU. 88
6/7.12.44 “S” – 227 Squadron – JU. 88
6/7.12.44 “D” – 463 Squadron – JU. 88
6/7.12.44 “S” - 44 Squadron – ME.410
6/7.12.44 “O” – 619 Squadron – ME.110
6/7.12.44 “D” – 49 Squadron – FW.190
All the above claims have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
There was a marked increase in the number of combats this month, though the majority took place on the first two operations of of [sic] the month; the targets being Heilbronn and Giessen respectively. These two nights contributed 82 combats to the total of 101 for the whole of the month, and it will be noted that all the successes claimed were registered on these two nights.
Five enemy aircraft are claimed as Destroyed, two Probably Destroyed and eight Damaged. Five cases were noted of gunners firing on enemy aircraft attacking another Lancaster, and in one case the fighter was destroyed. In all the other cases the enemy aircraft broke off his attack. These gunners are to be congratulated on their vigilance and offensive spirit. See the fighter first and shoot first are the two best axioms for gunners; it has been proved that they pay.
[Underlined] RESULTS OF C.G.S. COURSES [/underlined]
F/O MacIntosh – 207 Sqdn – Cat. “B”
F/O Van Beck – 619 Sqdn – Cat “B”
F/O Ray – 97 Sqdn – Cat. “B”
P/O Hansom – 83 Sqdn – Cat. “B”
F/O Burnham – 467 Sqdn – Cat. “B”
P/O Annandale – 50 Sqdn. – Cat. “B”
It is good to note that the standard of candidates selected
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GUNNERY [/underlined]
for C.G.S. courses has been such as to show a return of 9 Cat. “B”s out of the last 9 nominations. Keep this up Gunnery Leaders, and submit to your Base Gunnery Leader any gunner who possesses the necessary qualifications for C.G.S. Gunners who have been categorised as “A+” on Squadrons should be automatic selections as candidates for C.G.S.
[Underlined] REVIEW OF ADVANCEMENT IN EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING DURING 1944 [/underlined]
1944 marked the advent of new training equipment and new ideas on training, which have resulted in a marked improvement in training on Squadrons.
The most important items are as under:-
1. Standard Free Gunnery Trainer.
2. Flash Trainer.
3. Turret Manipulation Assessor.
4. Skeet Ranges.
5. Self-towed Drogue.
6. Categorisation of Air Gunners.
7. Gunnery Analysis Officers.
8. Infra-Rad Photography on Night Fighter Affiliation Exercises.
9. A.G.L.T.
Of the above items, Categorisation of Gunners has gone ahead in Conversion Units and on Squadrons and every Squadron gunner now has a category. 92 Group have now followed suit and are now categorising gunners on similar lines.
Gunnery Analysis Officers were instituted on the basis of one Officer per Squadron, whose duties are to supervise and co-ordinate all training, both practical and theoretical, on Squadrons. These duties include Skeet Range shooting and assessment of all cine gyro assessor films. Each Officer has attended the Skeet Range Shooting Course and an Aessment [sic] Course at 1690 B.D.T. Flight.
[Underlined] GUNNERY AIR TRAINING [/underlined]
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION – ORDER OF MERIT [/underlined]
The Order of Merit is based on the following system of marking:-
Night Affiliation (Camera and Infra-Red Film) – 10 points.
Night Affiliation (without Camera) – 8 points.
Day Affiliation (Gyro and Camera) – 5 points.
Day Affiliation (Camera only) – 3 points.
Day Affiliation (without Camera) – 1 point.
[Table of Fighter Affiliation Order of Merit by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GUNNERY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF AIR TRAINING EXERCISES. [/underlined]
[Table of Air Training Exercises by Squadron]
[Underlined] TOTAL OF AFFILIATION EXERCISES FOR DECEMBER – 502 [/underlined]
Bad weather and operational commitments have brought the total of Fighter Affiliation details for the month down with a rush; this month’s total being less than half of the total for November. Even with this low total, it is very satisfactory to note that [underlined] Night Affiliation exercises totalled 111, [/underlined] eleven of which were with Infra Red film. It is to be hoped that squadrons will fit the camera to the maximum number of aircraft carrying out Night Affiliation.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] armament
This year 1944 has seen the introduction into the Group of many new items of equipment and stores; a review of the changes and the part taken by Armament personnel in producing the right answers, or getting the inevitable gremlins out of new equipment will not come amiss in this issue.
[Underlined] BOMBS. [/underlined]
This subject is overshadowed by Tallboy; the introduction of this large egg has been most successful but has entailed a lot of hard work and hard thinking for armament personnel. Other bombs which arrived are the American series A.N.-M.44, 58, 59, 64, 65 and 76.
[Underlined] CLUSTER PROJECTILES. [/underlined]
The long awaited incendiary clusters have arrived in the form of Nos. 4, 14, 15 and A.N.M.17. So far these clusters have proved a mixed blessing, and have not yet replaced our old friend (or enemy) the S.B.C.
Handling clusters in the open resulted in many attempts to devise a satisfactory lay-out, but no really satisfactory method, providing adequate protection against weather and damage during handling, was evolved.
The A.O.C. came to the rescue with the Large Incendiary Store House Scheme. Successful trials have been carried out which indicate that this scheme will solve all our troubles, and damaged clusters will become a thing of the past, or a case of excessive handling.
[Underlined] BOMB GEAR. [/underlined]
The introduction of hydraulic winches has saved much sweat and many man-hours.
Modification No.74 has been incorporated to enable 18 bombs (20 when No.13 Station adaptors is available) to be dropped in one stick.
The Type N. Release slip arrived fortunately in small numbers, as snags were soon found to exist. No.53 Base have done a lot of work and finally produced a modification which it is expected will eliminate the danger of accidental release during bombing-up and de-bombing.
[Underlined] MARKER STORES. [/underlined]
Since No.5 Group has carried out its own target marking, many stores have been introduced, considerably complicating armament work in No.54 Base, and calling for local modifications to meet ever changing operational requirements.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ARMAMENT. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FUZES AND PISTOLS. [/underlined]
The introduction of new stores has brought with it a corresponding increase in the variety of Fuzes and Pistols. The quantity necessitated the approval of an additional storehouse.
[Underlined] BOMB HANDLING AND STORAGE. [/underlined]
Stacking trucks have made their appearance, and have proved useful tools. The cry is for more and we hope to see more during 1945.
Equipment for handling S.B.C’s including the heavy transporter (once again modified) is arriving, and all stations should be fully equipped early in 1945. Some of this equipment can be used in handling cluster projectiles and mines.
[Underlined] MINES. [/underlined]
The variety has increased and is still increasing, calling for carefully planned storage so that any type can be made available at very short notice.
[Underlined] TURRETS. [/underlined]
The F.N. 121 has arrived in small numbers. No.56 Base found some snags in the Servo Feed and initiated remedial action.
[Underlined] GUNS. [/underlined]
Great strides were made at the beginning of the year in solving the gun freezing problem. Experiments were carried out with various types of anti-freeze oil, both for the turret hydraulic system and for the guns themselves. Gun ejection seals were introduced and extensive firing trials carried out on operations to ascertain whether, in fact, it was the accumulation of ice on the breech block which caused failures, or the freezing of static oil in the Palmer Firing Gear. Attempts were made to raise the internal temperature of the turret by the use of first, the Galley heater, which proved unsuccessful, and secondly, with ducted heating both to the rear and mid-upper turrets. This type of heating has proved more successful, and is being incorporated in production aircraft, many of which are already in service.
[Underlined] MODIFICATIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS. [/underlined]
Apart from those already mentioned, Armament personnel were responsible for many bright ideas, some of which are reported below.
A de-belting and cleaning machine for .303 ammunition was designed an manufactured by R.A.F. Station, Swinderby. It is understood that Bomber Command is interested in this machine which has been working satisfactorily for some months.
The enlarging of trigger guards to enable gunners to have easy access to the triggers when wearing thick gloves. Now a Bomber Command modification.
Modification to F.N. 120 turrets to enable gunners to wear the pilot type parachute submitted by R.A.F. Waddington, now as a Command Modification.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ARMAMENT. [/underlined]
Heating for the Palmer Firing Valve Box, submitted by East Kirkby and issued as a Command modification.
Re-positioning of the MK.IIC C.G.S. Junction Box to enable the ‘C’ type parachute to be used in F.N.121 turrets. Submitted by R.A.F. Station, Waddington, and issued as a Bomber Command modification.
Improvements of Bomber Command Mod. No.3 to increase the Gunner’s vision, submitted by R.A.F. Waddington, and at present being investigated by Bomber Command.
All electrical firing gear in turrets. This modification submitted by Metheringham was at first turned down due to the inability to obtain the necessary solenoids. M.A.P. have recently shown interest in this modification and have requested full particulars.
The re-positioning of F.N. 50 Solenoids and the shortening of the Bowden Cable. This modification was submitted by R.A.F. Station, Bardney, as a means of preventing the Bowden Firing Cable from catching on the armour plating and causing run-away guns. Although not accepted, an alternative modification was incorporated in production.
East Kirkby were responsible for a modification to the No.44 Bomb pistol which facilitates the fitting of safety wires. Now a Command modification.
R.A.F. Station, Bardney, were responsible for the design and manufacture of a triple adaptor to enable 3 X 500 lb. bombs to be carried on the four centre stations of the Lancaster bomb bay. This modification aroused great interest both at Headquarters, Bomber Command, and at the Air Ministry, but was eventually turned down as the Ministry of Aircraft Production had, at this time, a similar development under way to achieve the same purpose. This adaptor took the form of a quintuple carrier slung across the bomb bay. It is understood that progress with this development is satisfactory.
Due to the delay in the manufacture of the new Heavy S.B.C. Transporter a protective plate to prevent damage to 4 lb. incendiary bomb tails when carried in S.B.C’s was introduced by R.A.F. Station, East Kirkby, and has since been issued as a Bomber Command modification.
[Underlined] BOMBING RANGES. [/underlined]
To meet the increased number of bombing targets required for practice bombing, personnel at Wainfleet Range erected two additional targets at Ingoldmells and Wrangle, the former was initially used as a dive bombing target. The range personnel worked hard to keep this target in repair and put up a tough fight against the sea assisted by well aimed bombs.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES TABLE. [/underlined]
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A – MANIPULATION B – MAINTENANCE C – ICING D – TECHNICAL E – ELECTRICAL F – OBSCURE
[Page break]
[Drawing] flying control
A year ago, the “5 Group Quick Landing Scheme” was introduced, following trials at Skellingthorpe. During the year developments in the scheme have speeded up the landing times. In September, 1943, the Group average was 3.67 minutes. On the introduction of the scheme this average fell to 2.66 minutes in January, 1944. Since May, 1944, when it fell to 1.99 minutes, the figure has remained below 2 minutes and in December, 1944, reached its lowest level, 1.61 minutes.
The main alteration to the original scheme took place at the end of September, on the introduction of the Command Standard Landing Procedure, when the Group scheme was amended to bring it into line with the Command Scheme by advancing the initial call-up point to the funnel, increasing the height at the initial call and renaming the calling positions.
Developments in airfield lighting have assisted in this reduction of landing times, mainly in conditions of poor visibility. Sodium lights in the funnel and on the flarepath have been of great value. Speedier clearance of the runway and perimeter track have been assisted by the introduction of directional arrows and illuminated dispersal numbers.
Tarmac and asphalt used in the surfacing of runways and perimeter tracks have improved serviceability, though considerable difficulties have arisen in the case of satellite airfields carrying two squadron traffic.
Radar developments during the year foreshadow and entire change in flying control methods, when much of the present use of lighting will be subordinated to control through Radar. The increased heavy traffic in all areas of Bomber Command makes such development vitally necessary.
[Underlined] LANDING TIMES FOR DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
[Table of Landing Times by Base and Station]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] photography
[Underlined] ANALYSIS DAY PHOTOGRAPHY – DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
[Table of Day Photographic Analysis Ranked by Squadron]
[Underlined] ANALYSIS NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHY – DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
[Table of Night Photography Analysis Ranked by Squadron]
This photographic inter-squadron ladder is produced on the number of failures (excluding “Target Conditions” “T.C.”) incurred during the past month, as a percentage of the number of events.
+ 617 and 627 Squadrons are omitted from the ladder in view of the relatively low number of attempts of each.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] aircrew safety
[Underlined] THE PAST YEAR. [/underlined]
The drive to save lives of ditching bomber crews and crews forced to bale out or crash land was continued. It is hard to establish how many lives were lost due to ignorance of procedure, Safety Drills or equipment, but a review of successful incidents shows a trend towards better knowledge and understanding of the drills and a decline in the number of stupid mistakes.
The year saw the ‘K’ type personal dinghy come and go. It also saw the completion of successful trials in 5 Group of the prototype Back-type parachute, which it is hoped will soon be available to all heavy bomber crews. As an interim measure the Seat-type parachute was made compulsory for Pilots and Rear Gunners.
An ingenious “Warning horn” for emergency in the air was devised within the Group and tested successfully. It has been forwarded to Bomber Command for approval and general adoption. The horn gives audible warning to all crew members to bale out or prepare for ditching when the intercomm. has failed.
[Underlined] INTO THE SEA. [/underlined]
One known ditching occurred in the Group during December – an aircraft (believed to be of 189 Squadron), returning to a diversion airfield after attacking Politz, came down in the sea about 5 miles N.W. of Banff. No signals were received from this aircraft, the incident being reported from land, and in spite of an extensive search no survivors were picked up though an aircraft wheel was seen.
[Underlined] CRASH STATIONS. [/underlined]
There have been several crashes recently in the vicinity of airfields during return from operations in bad weather. Captains of aircraft are reminded of the “Crash Landing Drill” (Appendix ‘C’ to Drill No.8 of 5 Group Aircraft Drills refers). This Drill says “The Pilot is to order ‘Crash Stations’ as soon as a crash is imminent or probable, i.e. landing in bad visibility or when the aircraft has suffered damage which is likely to make a normal landing difficult”.
[Underlined] PARACHUTES. [/underlined]
It has been noticed that a lot of pilots and rear gunners are still not using the Seat-type parachutes on all flights. This is now compulsory. See Air Staff Instruction Trg./7.
[Underlined] DRILLS. [/underlined]
A reminder that Saturday morning is still the Safety Drill morning. Get a practice done once a week and you won’t get your feet wet if you have to ditch. It’s cold in the North Sea these days.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] accidents
In reviewing flying accidents for the past 12 months, it is only fair to record what the Group has achieved in effecting a reduction in the actual rate of accidents during the period. This is best shown pictorally by means of the following graph:-
[Graph of Aircraft Damaged per 10,000 hours through 1944.]
The graph is self-evident and the consistent decrease in the rate throughout practically the whole year is something of which we can be proud. At the same time, without wishing to belittle the efforts of the those who have been responsible for achieving this reduction, we must not be misled by these figures into thinking that the accident rate is by any means satisfactory.
The hard fact still remains that in 12 months 360 aircraft were seriously damaged in flying accidents. Of these4 125 were totally destroyed including 60 cases in which one or more members of the crew received fatal injuries. In squadrons you can probably recall a fatal crash and perhaps a taxying collision and you may even have been involved in an accident yourself. We at Group as onlookers see most of the game; the accidents we can call to mind are not just isolated instances and it is for this reason that the above figures are quoted: to emphasise the serious consequences of accidents and to make quite clear that great effort is still required if we are to fulfil our aim of entirely eliminating unnecessary loss of lie and unnecessary damage to aircraft.
[Underlined] CAUSE AND PREVENTION. [/underlined]
If you have read past issues of ‘V’ Group News you will have seen repeated references to taxying accidents. It is not surprising therefore, that when examining all the avoidable accidents which have occurred during the year, we find that no less than 32% occurred whilst taxying. Barely is there the slightest excuse for this type of accident, particularly as Air Staff Instructions give adequate advice as to the means of safe taxying. Read Flying Control 24.
Overshoots and heavy landings together accounted for 22% of the avoidable accidents. These two causes have been linked together because
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ACCIDENTS. [/underlined]
the root cause of each often lies in the approach and a good approach is dependent to a very great extent upon speed. Remember that when landing heavily laden there is no need for an excessively high final approach speed: 115 m.p.h. but never faster.
The next most serious cause from the point of view of numbers was swinging during take off and landing, accounting for 16% of the total. Once again we repeat the warning to open throttles slowly, easily and smoothly, and do not open up to full throttle before travelling 500 yards down the runway irrespective of your load.
A reminder to Squadron Commanders. Do not forget Air Staff Instruction Ops.2/47. This will help materially in the general drive to keep accidents down to a minimum.
[Underlined] THE NEW YEAR. [/underlined]
Thank you for the results achieved in 1944. You have proved what can be done and it only remains for this success to be continued and bettered in 1945.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] equipment
[Underlined] USE OF EQUIPMENT. [/underlined]
The Powers that Be are becoming very anxious about the large quantity of Service Equipment which is being mis-used. Instances quoted are Navigation Bags used for weekend holdalls, blankets as table coverings, etc. Equipment Officers can help the Station Commanders to stop this mis-use by pointing out any irregularities that come to their notice.
[Underlined] DISCREPANCIES IN BARRACK INVENTORIES. [/underlined]
Attention is drawn to Headquarters, Bomber Command, letter BC/50816/E.1 dated 19th December, 1944. If the station has not already broken down the Barrack Inventory into site inventories, under A.M.O. A.559/43, this should be done at once.
[Underlined] IN RETROSPECT. [/underlined]
The Equipment Officers and their staffs very rarely see the result of their work. Nevertheless the work they have put in during the last year has certainly helped the Group’s achievements. Without their good work this Group would not have done as much as it has. The New Year motto for the Equipment Section is “We get ‘em, you smash ‘em – we getcha some more!”
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
education [Drawing]
During December, Bomber Command opened its own E.V.T. school at Bourne. The aim is to train instructors for E.V.T. work after the cessation of hostilities with Germany. Groups are being asked to supply 10 instructors for each course, so that it is essential that a steady influx of volunteers is forthcoming from stations. Lists are submitted from Stations monthly, and the last two or three returns have not brought in nearly enough names to ensure the success of the scheme. There should always be publicity on stations asking for volunteers, and the importance of the work must be impressed on suitable candidates. It is realised that some men are put off by the fact that conditions of service have not yet been published, and by the idea the E.V.T. work might postpone demobilisation. It is thought that conditions of service will not be unfavourable, and great emphasis must be laid on the fact that no one will be kept in the service after they are due to be demobilised. It is clear that to postpone demobilisation after a person’s group is named to leave the service would destroy the whole foundation on which the scheme has been built.
The end of December makes a logical break in the winter programme, when the work of the last three months can be reviewed. Many stations have produced fairly good results, no station has done all that can be done even under present conditions. Classes at Lincoln have been well attended, there have been successful classes on stations. Some very good work has been done with aircrew cadets and handicraft and music clubs have flourished. There are still many deficiencies however. There are some stations where no classes are organised for Matriculation. It cannot be that on a station of strength 1000, there are not six people who want to take this important examination. The only explanation is bad publicity and lack of drive on the part of the Education Officer. Some stations have, as yet, no facilities for woodwork, while suggestions for the formation of cookery classes and instruction in Home Nursing for W.A.A.F. have brought little result. In some cases there is an inclination to wait for this Headquarters to arrange lectures and not enough initiative of the part of stations to obtain good lecturers themselves.
To an outside observer, the difference in the standard of News Rooms is very surprising. It is realised that some stations have better facilities for display and more comfortable furniture than others, although this is not always the fault of circumstances, but rather a lack of interest and initiative. Sometimes this deficiency is not on the side of the Education Officer, but often that officer is to blame for not making the best of his opportunities. There should be a frequent alteration of display material, with news and topical articles up to date. There is not enough variety of topics and far too many maps reproducing the same localities. One large map of Europe and one of the Far East are sufficient for keeping the War Fronts up to date. The large number of airmen using the News Rooms is a proof that far more time and attentions should be given by the officers concerned in making the rooms really first class.
The service as a whole has shown a greater realisation of the importance of education in the last six months. It is up to Education Officers to take advantage of this increased interest and to make their work attractive and appealing to the personnel of their station.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] decorations
The following IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.L. BLUNSDON DFC
P/O A.F. JONES DFC
F/O R.C. LAKE DFC
F/L E.F.A. JONES DFC
S/L A.G. WILLIAMS DFC
F/SGT A.H. HORRY DFM
P/O J.E. STOWELL DFC
P/O E. SHIELDS DFC
P/O D. MacINTOSH DFC
P/O W.D. TWEDDLE DFC
F/O R.C. HARVEY DFC
F/O F. SOWERBY DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/O J.H.C. BRAHAM DFC
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O A.J. WALKER DFC
F/O T.H.J. PLAYFORD DFC
W/O L.J. HAZELL DFC
P/O N. EVANS DFC
A/F/L R.E. KNIGHTS, DFC DSO
F/O A.E. KELL, DFC BAR TO DFC
W/C J.B. TAIT, DSO & 2 BARS, DFC & BAR 3RD BAR TO DSO
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O S.J. BRISTOW
F/O N. STOCKWELL DFC
SGT H. McKNOX DFM
F/SGT A.J. FROST DFM
F/SGT E.R. BOLAND DFM
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O H.F. ARNOLD DFC
F/O L.M. PEDERSON DFC
P/O J.C. FLEMING DFC
P/O J.A. CASTLES DFC
F/SGT E.R.G. HAINES DFM
F/SGT J. CHRISTIAN DFM
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON (CONTD) [/underlined]
SGT J. SKIDMORE DFM
SGT J.A. RICHARDS DFM
W/O L.W.J. THOMAS DFM
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L R.N. QUINN, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O F.N. DAVIS DFC
F/O W.J. DAVIS DFC
A/F/O N. BALLANCE DFC
F/SGT F.A. KIRBY DFM
F/SGT E.T. MANNING DFM
F/SGT H. LEWIS DFM
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O O.C. THOMAS DFC
F/O W.F. MARTIN DFC
F/SGT M.J. THORNE DFM
F/O K.E. BLY DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O D.W. SIMMONS DFC
W/O V.G. BURGESS DFC
F/SGT J.H. KEENAN DFM
W/O A.F.C. HARROW DFC
SGT J.A. LYON DFM
P/O E.J.H. ROBERTS DFC
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O P.W. ALLWOOD DFC
A/F/O P.C. CORNISH DFC
F/O T.P. JUPP, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/SGT I.O. HARRIS DFM
F/O L. HATCHER, AFM DFC
F/SGT G.S. HAZELTINE DFM
F/O R. HOBBS DFC
F/O R.E.H. FOOTE, DFC BAR TO DFC
A/W/O W.G. TROTTER DFC
F/SGT M. BRENNAN DFM
W/O J.E. HUDSON DFC
P/O V.J. ROBLEY DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J.A. PEARCE DFC
A/W/O G.D. MOIR DFC
A/F/L N.N. PARKER DFC
A/F/L G.H. LAING, DFC BAR TO DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON (CONTD) [/underlined]
F/SGT G. BROWN DFM
W/O A.J. CROLL, DFM DFC
W/O F.H. GREEN DFC
A/F/L G.H.R. POLSON, DFC, DFM BAR TO DFC
F/O P.J. HUMPHREYS DFC
F/SGT D.S. NICHOLLS DFM
F/SGT J.D. McINGLIS DFM
A/S/L T.H. MAKEPEACE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/SGT W. MANDERSON DFM
F/SGT R. MOORE DFM
P/O A.A. AVELINE DFC
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/O J. NETHERWOOD DFC
F/O L. COEN DFC
A/S/L J.W. ALLINSON
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O W. McINTOSH, DFM, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O E. OAKES DFC
P/O C.B. SUTHERLAND, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O G.D. CHESWORTH DFC
P/O J.S. COOK DFC
W/O G.W.J. AINSWORTH DFC
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O W.G. EVANS DFC
W/O T.J. McLEAN, DFM DFC
A/F/O J. GINGLES, DFM DFC
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L R.L. BARTLEY, DFC BAR TO DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L R.E. MILLICHAP DFC
F/L J.W. MARTIN DFC
F/O J.W. LENNON DFC
F/O M.A.J. BEAUDOIN DFC
A/F/L D.E. HAWKER DFC
F/O G.J. BATE DFC
F/O L.A.V. WOOD DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] war savings
[Table of War Savings by Station]
[Underlined] GRAND TOTAL NATIONAL SAVINGS FOR DECEMBER, 1944 - £6,476. 7. 11d.
A- Approximate number of pence per head.
B – Approximate percentage of personnel saving.
C – Total savings.
[Page break]
It Happens Every Day!!
When A.C.W. Mary Jones arrived at Station Z,
She saw the Station Signals Off., and unto him she said,
“I’ve nine days leave to come, good sir, and it would be a boon
“If I could have it right away. My boy friend’s sailing soon”.
Without delay the woeful Waaf was whisked upon her way,
And when her time was up she sent a message reading “Pray
“Extend my leave a further week; the ship is still in port”.
The Signals Off. agreed to this – he was a decent sort.
But when the girl requested yet a further forty-eight,
He quite forgot his decency and telegraphed, irate,
“Return at once to unit”, but the errant maiden tarried,
And wired “I want another fortnight more, for I am getting married,
“The church is fixed; the guests are warned. This afternoon at two
“By special licence we’ll be wed. Our hours of bliss are few
“So please agree”. Defeated he confirmed this new request,
And fourteen days ensued of peace, with no word from the pest.
On day fifteen a gentle knock upon his office door
Announced that Mary Smith (nee Jones), was back in camp once more,
And wished to have an interview, which he with some elation
Agreed to give, because he wished a fuller explanation.
The genial soul was quite prepared to overlook the past;
A little talk was his intent, and so he gently gassed,
And maundered on, and moralised for quite a lengthy spell.
‘Mongst other things – “My dear”, he said, “I’m pleased to see you well;
“And now that you are back you’ll do your very best I know.
“The section’s very under-staffed. We need you ever so!”.
He stopped at last. The girl then spoke. (You’ll guess her purpose maybe).
“Oh sir” I’d like my ticket please” I’m going to have a baby!”
ANON. (Circa 1945.).
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
war effort
[Table of Aircraft and Sorties Carried out by Squadron]
[Underlined] NOTES: [/underlined] Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “Successful Sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties, Nos. 9, 49, 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another Squadron, the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons. Squadrons above establishment are calculated on an establishment of 20.
[Page break]
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Dublin Core
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Title
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V Group News, December 1944
5 Group News, December 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 29, December 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and articles on tactics, operations, gardening, signals, navigation, this month's bouquets, radar navigation, air bombing, engineering, training, second thoughts for pilots, gunnery, armament, flying control, photography, aircrew safety, accidents, equipment, education, decorations, war savings, it happens every day, and war effort.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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1944-12
Contributor
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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68 printed sheets
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eng
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Text
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-18
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
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Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Kattegat (Baltic Sea)
Belgium--Houffalize
Belgium--Saint-Vith
Denmark--Kalundborg
Denmark--Langeland
England--Lincolnshire
Germany--Euskirchen (Kreis)
Germany--Giessen (Hesse)
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Munich
Germany--Rheydt
Netherlands--Ijmuiden
Netherlands--Rotterdam
Norway--Oslo
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Germany--Urft Dam
Temporal Coverage
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1944-12
5 Group
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
demobilisation
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
flight engineer
Gee
gremlin
H2S
Lancaster
Master Bomber
mine laying
Mosquito
navigator
Pathfinders
pilot
radar
rivalry
Tallboy
training
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1186/18578/SWatsonC188489v1-1.2.pdf
41dce93a36a706458878ffce711dc143
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1186/18578/SWatsonC188489v1-2.1.pdf
78bceef44f30c4e1a4f2d533cd690cd9
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Watson, Clifford
C Watson
Description
An account of the resource
Five items. Two oral history interviews with Flying Officer Clifford Watson DFC (1922 - 2018, 1384956, 188489 Royal Air Force), a memoir, his service and release book, and a scrapbook containing photographs and documents. He flew operations as an air gunner with 150 and 227 Squadrons.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Clifford Watson and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2017-06-28
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
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Watson, C
Transcribed document
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Transcription
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Photograph
JUST ANOTHER TAILEND CHARLIE
CLIFF WATSON DFC
HUNTINGDON
JUNE 1989
[page break]
[underlined] SEQUENCE [/underlined]
[underlined] File [/underlined] [underlined] Page [/underlined] [underlined] Location [/underlined]
[underlined] GROUP O [/underlined]
D 3 Joining up [underlined] AC2 [/underlined]
4 Babbacombe - 11 ITW Newquay [underlined] LAC [/underlined]
8 Troopship HMT Mooltan - Freetown - Capetown
G 7 Southern Rhodesia - Bulawayo [underlined] LAC [/underlined]
8 EFTS Belvedere Scrubbed TIGER MOTHS [underlined] AC2 [/underlined]
10 A/G Course, Moffat ANSONS [underlined] LAC-Sgt [/underlined]
11 Polsmoor Transit Camp [underlined] Sgt [/underlined]
J25 14 HMT Monarch of Bermuda
15 West Kirby - Bournmouth
17 25 OTU Finningley - Bircotes - WELLINGTONS
18 30 OTU Hixon - Sieghford
19 Leaflets to Paris
Wedding
J26 21 West Kirby - HMT Johan Van Vanderbilt
K1 23 Algiers - Blida - 150 Sqdn WELLINGTONS
K2 27 Fontaine Chaude (Batna) [underlined] FIt/Sgt [/underlined]
LT 32 Kairoaun
LU 35 On leave in Tunis, Chad in Jail
MT 46 End of First Tour - 47 raids
47 2 BPD Tunis - 500 mls. by lorry to Algiers
HXM Capetown Castle - Greenoch - West Kirby
NS 49 Screened 84 OTU Desborough
50 Norton, Sheffield Discip. course
53 W.O - 6th June D Day [underlined] W/O [/underlined]
OS 55 Aircrew Pool, Scampton - HCU Winthorpe STIRLING
56 Syerston Lanc. conversion LANCASTERS
P 57 227 Sqdn. Bardney – Balderton [underlined] P/O [/underlined]
60 DFC [underlined] F/O [/underlined]
63 End of Tour - VE Day
Q 67 Redundant - Photographic Officer, Farnborough
68 u/t Equipment Officer 61MU Handforth
[underlined] GROUP 4 [/underlined]
69 Lager Commandant, Poynton prison camp
2W 75 Civvy Street, Whitehaven Relay Service [underlined] MR [/underlined] .
79 Development Manager, Metropolitan Relays London
44 83 To Kenya, Kirksbridge Farm, Kiminini Kitale
48 85 HM Prison Service Asst. Supt. gr2
555 95 Civil Aviation Radio Officer
556 Mbeya Radio Supt.
557 103 UK leave PMG1 – Flt/RO lic. C. & G.
670 104 Eastleigh - Mwanza
107 Royal visit
680 113 UK leave
114 Entebbe Telecomm. Supt
115 Kisumu
700 123 Nairobi Comm. Centre Ast. Signals Officer
720 129 UK leave
750 134 Nairobi HQ & retirement
800 135 Laikipia Security Network
96 151 Pye Telecommunications, Cambridge Project Engineer
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[underlined] ILLUSTRATIONS [/underlined]
12A Air Gubber Coiurse 24 CAOS Moffat
15A Finningley Reg. Whellams
20A Bride & Groom 1/3/43
CW in flying kit
CW & HF at Richmond
26A Stan Rutherford with Hilda & Cliff at Richmond
Bill Willoughby (NAV) at Whimpey port gun position
Bill Willoughby & Stan Chatterton in their pits at Blinda
44A Pantelleria target photographs
48A CW with Mum, Barnoldswick
Skipper & B.A. with Hilda at Richmond
Skipper & Hilda at Richmond
48B Skipper& [sic] B.A. with Cliff at Richmond
Stan Rutherford in the snow, at Bircoates
Outside Chalet at Blida
Wimpey at Kaircan
48C At Richmond CW & Hilda
52A Warrant Officer parchment
54A three of Aircrew peeling spuds at Scampton incl. Frank Eaglestone
56A F/O Forster DFM 2nd tour Nav.
C.W.
W/O Foolkes at rear of NJ-P
64A Crashed Remains of 9J – O
64B F/O Cheale, F/O. Bates
S/Ldr Chester DFA with F/O Cheale, W/O Foolkes & F/O Forster DFM
64C More of 9J – O
64D F/O Ted (Ace) Forster DFM, CW & W/O Pete Foolkes
64E CW with rear turret of 9J – O
CW with motor-byke
Sgt. Geoff (Doogan) Hampson, Flight Engineer
64F Newspaper cutting
Start of Second Tour – Frank Eaglestone, Ted Forster & Pete Foolkes
More of 9J – O
64G Ted Forster Ready for Gerry?
Lunchtime over Homberg [sic]
64H P/O Bates (My last tour Skipper)
Part of F/O Bates’ usual crew
64J F/LT. Maxted (Gunnery Ldr) Pete Foolkes and F/O Sandford (spare gunner or Sqdn Adj?)
More of 9J – O
64K Doogan again
More of 9J – O
64L DFC Citation
64M Apology from H.M.
64N F/O Croker’s Lanc. on Torpedo dump at Wyke
Christmas Dinner at Wyke
Reverse of Pete’s Xmas Card 1989
Part of F/L Croker’s letter with Xmas Card
66A-H Examples of Battle Orders
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[underlined] DEDICATION [/underlined]
The section dealing with my R.A.F. career is dedicated to Lady Luck who shows no compassion, is completely immoral and yet cannot be bought.
After a remarkable interview on television recently, Raymond Baxter asked of Tom Sopwith "To what do you attribute your tremendous and unparalelled [sic] success over such a long period?” In his 94th. year he replied “Luck, pure luck”. His reply was the same when asked again at his 100th. birthday party.
This must apply to every aspiring aviator, and I was no exception.
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[underlined] THE EARLIEST YEARS [/underlined]
My first ten year or so were spent in Yorkshire, having been born on the [deleted] 22nd [/deleted] [inserted] 11th [/inserted] of February 1922, at 45 Federation Street [inserted] the home of my paternal Gt Grandparents [/inserted], Barnoldswick almost opposite nr. 26 where my Grandparents lived, and about two years after my father was demobbed from the Kings Own Yorkshire Light lnfantry after the Great War. My sister Winifred Sofia was born almost two years later on the 2nd. of January 1924. About that time the family moved to a shop at 33 Rainhall Road where my father established a wireless business. I attended the infants school only 50 yards away, often joined by Winifred.
At the shop, my father built radio receivers of the "Tuned Radio Frequency" type, (TRF), a good 10 years ahead of the superhet. At the same time he held one of the first radio amateur licences in Yorkshire, with the callsign 2ZA. His aerial was a wire to the top of a 50 ft. pole in the back yard and starting with a spark transmitter his first radio contact was with another amateur in Colne, whose transmitter output was connected between the gas and water pipes, He had no means of measuring his frequency but thought it was somewhere around 300 KHz. (1000 metres) He soon progressed to using valves and gradually higher frequencies, though almost everything was really trial and error. When communication progressed to "working" other countries the prefix G was added to UK call-signs. He once told me that his first telephony transmission was achieved using a GPO carbon microphone in the aerial circuit. The only receivable broadcast wireless station at that time was the BBC's 2LO and when people heard it for the first tine there was indeed great wonderment and excitement
In 1926 came the general strike. Money was very scarce and people were hungry. There was no money coming in and the shop closed down. The family moved to a house in Rook Street, close to the railway bridge and opposite the cobler's [sic] wooden workshop. Most of us wore clogs in those days, with leather tops and laces, and iron-shod wooden soles.
Before going to war my father had served an engineering apprentiship [sic] , and worked with steam engines. With outstanding debts at the shop and a wife and two small children to support, he volunteered to work with L.M.S. railway company, and drove a train between Barnoldswick and I think Skipton. The engine was pelted with stones at some of the bridges and he was very unpopular with the strikers, althought [sic] many of them were quite happy to use the train. Thus the family was sustained and he received a letter of thanks and a medalion [sic] from the chairman of L.M.S.
When things returned to normal the family moved again, to nr. 14 School Terrace in Dam Head Road and Winifred and I attended the infants and Junior Schools across the back street. My mother was able to resume working at the mill as a cotton weaver with her sisters Molly and Annie. Their brother Jim -my uncle- was a 'twister', that is he connected the cotton threads on the warp to tails ready for applying to the loom for weaving. The noise. in the weaving sheds was deafening and weavers were quite adept at lip reading. This had a great influence on their broad northern accent. Most weavers operated six looms, loading manually the weft into the shuttles before changing them. My uncle Charlie -the brother of my paternal grandfather=- was a manufacturer employing about a hundred people running 500 or so looms. I remember the big warehouse doors and the lift which was operated by water pressure. To go up, just turn on this tap!. Going down transfered [sic] the water back into a holding
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tank. There were two offices, large wooden boxes, one on each side of the big doors and just under the ceiling. Accessed by ladders. One office was for uncle Charlie and his clerk, and the other for the more junior staff. When I called to see them in 1941 I noted the intercom. system between the offices. It comprised, at each terminal, two empty Lyle Golden Syrup tins one for speaking into and the other for receiving. they were connected by two lengths of taught string which vibrated the diaphragms being the bottoms of the tins. I was surprised at their effectiveness. There was also a loop of string pulled manually between the two places with a small box attched [sic] for transferring documents. I was impressed. Uncle Charlie said he would consider changing the strings after the war.
At School Terrace my father carried on building wireless sets in the attic and also helped his friend Tom Shorrock who owned the local radio relay service. This comprised a wireless receiver and amplifiers connecting some hundreds of houses with a pair of bare wires to loudspeakers at a cost of ninepence per week for each loudspeaker. The idea appealed to my father and he was able to instigate some technical improvements. By then the wireless manufacturing industry had become well established and radios became readily available. My father had paid off his debts and was discharged from bancrupsy [sic].
At this stage we moved into a new house at 25 Melville Avenue. which was nearer to Fernbank Mill for my mother but also had an inside toilet and bathroom. It also had electricity mains in place of the more customery [sic] gas lighting. An electric soldering iron must have seemed luxurious after heating a copper bit on a gas ring.
Our school was only a few minutes walk from home. Gisburn Road Council School. I remember it and the teachers very well, Mr Alfred Green Petty.the Headmaster, Miss Housen who tought [sic] music english and poetry, and above all Mr Heaton who tought [sic] arithmetic, citizanship [sic] and physics. Miss Housen did not think much of my efforts, I couldn’t sing and disliked poetry, but I got on fine with Mr. Heaton, who also tought [sic] my father over 20 years earlier. Over a fairly long period he gave me extra homework in arithmetic most nights, generally a problem or two and he checked the results next day. It was almost private tuition and thanks largely to him, I excelled in the subject. I think children’s attitudes' in the main were very different to those of the present day. Discipline was strict by consent, not fear. Reward was achieved by effort alone and there was friendly competition between us. Most of us got the cane for some minor offence like climbing over the school wall, in my case refusing to stand in the front of the class and recite ‘the wreck of the Hesperus’. We did respect our teachers.
About this time we moved to a house in Headingley for just a few weeks and then on to. Fence, which we knew as wheatley Lane. During that period my father was working in London at Stag Lane fitting the electrics in Rolls Royces. My mother worked at the cotton mill nearby and Winifred & I were looked after partly by Mrs. Ingham who had a sweet shop. Our stay in Fence was also [deleted] m [/deleted] of short duration.
Tom Shorrock was a friend of Mr. Ramsbottom who was struggling with a one programme radio relay system in Keighley. He already had thriving electrical business and Tom introduced my father to him. So we moved yet again, to Keighley, and my father became Engineer and Manager of Ramsbottoms Radio Relay Service in the centre of Keighley. From 33 Lister Street, the Receiving and Amplifying Station the wires branched
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out on the roof tops in all directions. By then there were two BBC programmes, Home Service on 342 mtrs, and the Light Programme on 1500 mtrs, so they converted to two pairs for two programmes. We were living at 25 Lawnswood Road but soon moved to a new house at 21 Whittley Road. I recall helping Leslie Wright – Dad’s foreman to erect a garage which cost £7.10.0 to house the new Austin 7 which cost £75 taxed and insured. The other personality I remember well was Walter Spurgeon, chief wireman.
Winifred and I attended Holycroft Council School. Some of the lessons were by listening to the radio, an innovation in those days, and it was my job to check the radio was working, each morning.
It was in Keighley that Mrs. Alice Kilham, my father’s secretary came on the scene. She lived in Oakworth with her daughter Mary, her husband being in a sanitorium being treated for TB. During very cold winter around 1933 the snow was six feet deep and they came to live with us at Wittley Road.
Winifred and I were in the Girl Guides and Boy Scouts respectively and we decided to take the Signaller badge which meant sending and receiving the morse code. We were told the speed required was 12. Having established a battery and buzzer, and a morse key and headphones by the beds in each bedroom, we soon memorised the code and communicated with each other, quickly reaching 12 words per minute. Eventually we progressed to 18 words per minute and then went to take the test. Only then did we find that the speed required was 12 LETTERS per minute, not words. 12 letters is only 2 words per minute. However this faux pas proved very useful about eight years hence.
After just a few years in Keighley, the system was working well and no longer presented a challenge. My father was approached by a group of businessmen from Norwich who were interested in the “wired wireless” system. They were owners of radio busineses [sic] who felt they shouId have a stake in the competition and bank managers hoping to earn a quick buck. All the bank managers were Yorkshiremen. So Norwich Relays Ltd. came into being with premises in St. John Maddermarket, and my father became Engineer and manager, taking with him his secretary and foreman Lesley Wright from Keighley. Allan Moulton joined the firm and was responsible for obtaining wayleaves, that is obtaining permission from owners to put wires on their property. He was a popular figure in Norwich, his main qualification for the job was that he played cricket for Norfolk and knew most people who mattered. Leslie died whilst in his thirties in Norwich.
Once again we moved house, to 119 Unthank Road, and Mrs. Kilham and Mary moved into a cottage in Blickling Court near Norwich Cathedral. Winifred I went to the Avenues Council School initially but not for long. I remember getting a prize for my ‘lecture' on how a TRF wireless worked, showing them the working radio I had made. Probably not very accurate but there was no-one present who could contradict me, fortunately.
At 13 I changed to the Norwich Junior Technical School in St. Andrews. Soon after we moved house yet again to a new house, “Wayside", in Plumstead Road, on the boundary of Norwich Aerodrome. Winifred then joined Mary at St. Monicas private school. On Saturday mornings I attended Art School on the top floor. I achieved very little there, the art master quite rightly concentrating on pupils who showed some potential. For an enjoyable two years we concentrated on technical
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subjects, woodwork, maths, physics, Chemistry, mechanics, technical drawing, metal and woodwork etc. The masters I remember well, ‘Chemi’ Reed the principle, Mr. Abigail, Mr. McCracken and Mr. Lishman. At the end of two-year course I transfered [sic] to Unthank College in Newmarket Road, joining the 5th. form. This was big change for me, the emphasis was on classical subjects, in English literature we spent a whole year studying Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night's Dream and Spencer's Fairy Queen. I couldn't: get interested in either but I later achieved a credit in the School Certificate by answering questions on A.G. Street’s Farmers Glory which I read in bed the night before the exam. Mr. Bertwhistle the English Lit. master was furious. For Physics and Mechanics I had tuition from Mr. Horace, the Principal's son and on Wednesday afternoons I visited “Chemi” Reed's house at 33 Britannia Rd. for tuition.
In early 1939 my father, Mr. Moulton and Mrs. Kilham acquired six run-down relay firms and the Nuvolion loudspeaker factory in South London from a Mr. Olivisi, a Frenchman. My father moved to Stretham to a flat in Pullman Court and Mrs. Kilham and Mary and to duCane Court in Balham where the Moultons also had a flat. My mother and Winifred moved to a house in West Norwood and I became a boarder at Unthank College. Soon after taking the School Certificate I joined my mother in London and we moved to a flat in New Southgate. I became articled to George Eric Titley, a Chartered Accountant in St Paul’s Churchyard, commuting to the city 6 days a week by underground. Rail fare was tenpence return per day and I was paid ten shillings per week. Fifty pence in 2004 currency The firm was Gladstone Titley and Co. at 61-63 St. Pauls Churchyard and I was the junior with qualified accountants Joe Oliver, Clarke and Jenkins, and Miss Miller the Secretary. It was amusing 6 years hence when I barged into a Board Meeting at 69 Lavender Hill, Sqdn/Ldr Jenkins still in uniform was sitting there when F/O Cliff Watson appearedstill [sic] in Battledress. Jenkins was called up in 1940 as an Account Squadron Leader.
On the 3rd. of September 1939 War was declared and any plans we all had for the future were kiboshed. During the blitz in 1940 to be nearer my father and to help out at Relays we moved home to Ascot Court in Acre Lane, Clapham.
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[underlined] JOINING UP [/underlined] .
The outbreak of war found me as a clerk articled to a Chartered Accountant in St. Paul's Yard. London. At the age of 17 1/2 it went without saying that within a year or two my occupation would be changed way or another. In the family Radio Relay business men were already leaving to join to Forces. My father was on an army reserve and expected to be called up at any time. I felt my best course was to abandon accountancy for the time being and try and help out; so I joined the firm as a General Factotum. During the Blitz on London my job was fault-finding and replacing the overhead lines, knocked down by Jerry bombers where buildings and whole streets were destroyed. The Radio Relay Service, a two programme four wire system in those days, linked the BBC with some tens of thousands of homes in South London, homes where the radio was never switched off. The system carried air raid warnings also. All too frequently the radio was interrupted by an announcer at Scotland Yard with “Attention please, here is an important announcement, an air raid warning has just been officially circulated". There were occasions when bombs were dropped before the sirens sounded, but never before the announcement was made on our Radio Relay System.
September, aged 18 1/2, I found my employers were trying hard to register me as being in a reserved occupation. The Manager, Allan Moulton, had already been successful in his own case, which was reasonable. Someone had to run the firm and my father had sailed off to Abbysinia [sic] in March. At the time I was working literally 18 hours per day and my fifty bob per week hardly paid for digs.
On a very rare afternoon-off I was walking down Kingsway and tried my luck at the R.A.F. Recruiting office. One look at an applicant for aircrew wearing glasses brought an instant decision from the man at the door. I walked along the Strand and down Whitehall, and having removed my spectacles tried the Royal Navy. I completed the application form and was told that I would be called for interview eventually, but there was a very long waiting list.
I tried the R.A.F. again about a week later having left-off my spectacles for several days, and an application form for training as a pilot was completed. Had I previous flying experience? Yes. Fortunately I was not asked for details, as a passenger with Alan Cobham's Flying Circus might not have carried much weight. - In 1936 we had lived at a house called "Wayside” in Plumsted Road, Norwich, on the Mousehold aerodrome boundary, with a panoramic view of the aerodrome, and I was fascinated by it all like most boys of my age. It was to be three months before I heard from the R.A.F. - the Navy had missed the boat – I was to report to the Aircrew Selection Board near Euston station, on the appointed day about a week hence, for 'medical and academic examinations'. The letter added that in the maths exam `log tables but not slide rules are permissable [sic] ’.
The great day arrived, and at 8.30 am. with about 80 other applicants we were told there would be three one hour written exams, Maths, English and General Knowledge, followed by a medical and a brief interview. Maths was a typical 5th. form end of term test, and English an essay with a wide choice of subjects. General knowledge was mainly common-sense. One of the questions I recall; "Is the distance from London to Warsaw nearer 100, 600 or 2000 miles?”. The Medical Exam was carried out by about 6 examiners, probably Doctors, on a production Iine basis.
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Then the interview after a delay of some hours. Three uniformed R.A.F. officers who had obviously been places in previous wars. "Why do you want to fly"? I have forgotten the particular piece of flannel I used, but it brought no comment and another member of the Board fired his shot, "Which is colder, minus 40 Centigrade or minus forty farenheit [sic] ? Instant answer to that, I'd hear. it before somewhere. The third member asked "that does your Father do" I replied "He is an officer in the R.A.S.C. fighting the Italians in Abbysinia [sic] ". This brought a chuckle from two of them for some reason and the interview was over. I would be advised by post of their decision after the exam. results had been studied.
A week later I was told to report to Euston for attestation, actual reporting for duty would follow after some weeks. There was a brief ceremony and I was given a document which stated that " AC2 Clifford Watson 1384956 has been accepted for training as a pilot in the R. A. F. and is to be prepared to report for duty of a few days notice". It went on to state further that his teeth should receive the earliest attention, one extraction and two fillings.
About three months later my call-up papers arrived, and meanwhile I had met two other local lads whose paths had converged with my own and were to stay parallel for the next six months or so. Raymond Colin Chislett, the son of a Battersea butcher, .and Tom King., of Wandsworth. The three of us reported to the R.T.O. at Paddington and joined a party bound for Babbacombe near Torquay.
During the week at Babbacombe we were issued with uniforms, introduced to drill and Service discipline, lectured on the history of the R.A.F. and told something of what the future held for us. We were made to feel that we really belonged and were indeed priveleged [sic] to be chosen to follow in the footsteps of 'The Few'. We were perhaps more than a little naive to think that we were all destined to become fighter pilots, but we were made to feel that the fate of England and the empire rested entirely with us. The Bombers were taken for granted and were not in the forefront of than news at that time. In any case we Londoners had seen our Fighters in action and - we admit it - imagined ourselves in their shoes. There was a tremendous urge to get on with it and to make a success of it. A great sense of urgency prevailed. I remember well that first day in the Royal Air Force. We were advised to write down our Service numbers so we wouldn't forget them, and above all, we had strawberries and cream for tea. The last I saw of strawberries and cream for about eight years, and as for forgetting one's Service number...! Perhaps it was intended as a joke, but we were taking everything very seriously. At the end of the week there was another Pep talk, very well delivered by a Squadron Leader - and equally well received. He remarked that about Babbacombe, people will say "Never in the History of human conflict, have so many been burgered [sic] about by so few". A misquotation of those immortal words. He went on to say that the two most important weeks in your R.A.F. careers are the first and last, and "you have already survived 50% of them, Good Luck chaps, and have a good trip". There was probably a lot more feeling and sincerity behind those words than we realised at the time. He had seen it all and been there 'in the last lot'. "Have a good trip” was to have real meaning in due course.
A short journey by train took us to no. 10 Initial Training Wing at Newquay for 8 weeks of ground training. We were accommodated in
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Trenance Hotel, one of many taken over by the R.A.F. Another hotel was used for lectures in Navigation, Airmanship, Aerodynamics, Engines, Aircraft Recognition, Signalling, R.A.F. Law and Administration, etc. etc. some drill and P.T., and swimming in the local baths. The sea and beach were out of bounds due to mines and other surprises awaiting the enemy. I had to concentrate hard in the classroom on everything, except signalling. The required speed for sending and receiving morse was 12 words per minute and I had been happy at 18 w.p.m. in the Boy Scouts.
The 18 w.p.m. came about through a misunderstanding. My sister Winifred (a Girl Guide) and I were learning morse for our Signaller badges and were told that a speed of 15 was required, so we practiced until we were competent at 18. It was only when we took the test that we learned the required speed was 15 letters and not words per minute. However this mistake was now serving me well.
The only part I did not enjoy was the cross-country runs, but someone had to be in the last three. After two weeks we were told now that we had smartened-up a bit we would wear white flashes in our caps so we would not be mistaken for real airmen.
There was great speculation as to where we would go for flying training. Maybe stay in Britain, or was it to be Canada, U.S.A., South Africa or Rhodesia, and was there not a possibility of it being Australia?. Meanwhile we must concentrate on passing the current hurdle, it could not by any means be taken for granted that we would all pass the course. In fact after only four weeks, four out of the original 50 were "scrubbed" - a new word to add to our rapidly 'increasing vocabulary.
After about 5 weeks we were issued with some flying kit, boots and Sidcot suits, goggles, helmet and a full issue of gloves - silk, wool, chamois and gauntlets. 4 pairs worn together, and a fifth, electricalIy heated, yet to came. We were not to know that it would be 15 months before we wore any of this. I doubt whether our destination was known to anyone at I.T.W. except that it was overseas somewhere. Seven days embarkation leave and the entire course was posted to West Kirby, no. 1 P.D.C., near Birkenhead on the Wirral. We were joined by about 300 other u/t Pilots from other I.T.W.s and it was just a matter of waiting for the draft. There were parades each morning and we were allowed out of camp at mid-day. It was here that Tom, Ray and I teamed up with John Heggarty, a u/t Pilot who had been at 11 I.T.W. in Scarborough. He was from Birkenhead, of Anglo/French parentage. The four of us visited Liverpool every evening, a place crowded with Navy, Army and Air Force types mostly in transit to somewhere or other. Scores of ships were loading in the Mersey, but after a couple of weeks it was a special train for us to Greenock on the Clyde for immediate embarkation on the "Mooltan", a merchant ship of same 30,000 tons. Our 350 were accomodated [sic] on "D" Deck, just above the water-line, where we spent most of our time, not by choice but by order. Some slept on the mess tables, others under them, with the top layer of bodies in hammocks, a crippling device. To realise that hammocks were the traditional sleeping arrangements for British sailors left me unimpressed and I felt that something far more superior could have been devised. However, navies of many countries seem to favour them. Once aboard, there was no going back. On the second day aboard we were tugged down the Clyde and next morning counted over 40 big ships steaming very slowly in a north-
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westerly direction out at sea. Obviously we were bound for Canada, hence the heavy flying kit .and four pairs of gloves. A week ought to see us in the St. Lawrence. How wrong we were. the convoy was shepherded by some very impressive naval ships, Cruisers, destroyers etc. and Sunderland flying boats were in constant attendance for the first few days. After three weeks of steaming in all directions, first into the freezing cold, then warmer and finally very hot indeed, at 0500 one day the engines slowed and finally stopped; a rattling of chains and then silence. All very dramatic but a buzz on the P. A. system told us we had arrived in Freetown. Portholes were to remain closed. We may go up on deck but on no account were we to remove our shirts nor buy anything from the natives. By mid-day the temperature below decks was almost unbearable and there was no respite from that for a further two weeks. Salt water showers were available at all times, it was just a matter of stripping and walking through the shower. No need for a towel, but in any case that was reserved for absorbing perspiration and we became accustomed to the salt water. Food on board was very good under the circumstances. Two orderlies from each "table" would collect it from the galley (vocabulary still improving) and dish up, and after the meal two more orderlies would clean the tables and wash up. The chores were shared on a roster basis at each table, and each had some duty to perform every few days. We were very fortunate in that we were cadets and not yet real airmen we spent some of our time attending lectures in the second class lounge. We estimated there were about 3000 troops aboard. There was lots of talent for the almost daily concerts. A daily newssheet called "DER TAG”, together with the P.A. system kept us up-to-date with the news. The 9 o-clock news was a must.
Five weeks out of Liverpool it who getting cold again, even below decks, and greatcoats were essential deckwear for the endless lifeboat drills. There were lifeboats but for most of us it was a matter of parading on deck near a stack of Carley floats. The subject was better not discussed, there was no satisfactory answer to abandoning ship.
The Mooltan carried one gun mound at the stern above the propellers, manned by a RoyaI Artillery crew in transit. It seemed to be of about 4" calibre but was not fired during our voyage. It was said the deck would cave in, but this might have been an exaggeration. There were also two ramps off the stern for depth charges of which there was a supply near the ramps. The sixth week was really cold and wet and we estimated our position as somewhere in Antarctica. We then turned more or less north and after a total of seven weeks dropped anchor late one afternoon a few miles out at sea, with much speculation about our location. At about 7 pm. the shore was like Blackpool illuminations. Wherever we are, don`t they know there's a war on? A buzz on the P.A. system told us we would be disembarking next day and our British currency would be of no use to us in this foreign country. We should hand-in all currency, and get a receipt which would be exchanged for local currency when we got ashore. Next morning we entered the docks and disembarked. It was only then we found we were in Durban and were taken straight to the Transit Camp at Clairwood. The army contingent remained on-board and were understood to be bound for action in the Middle
East. So we had arrived in South Africa, and a very congenial and pleasant place it turned out to be.
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[underlined] SOUTHERN RHODESIA [/underlined] .
Clairwood Camp was just a few miles from Durban and there we spent 7 days, very enjoyable, but for the first two days, stoney broke. We had handed in all our money aboard ship but it was to be 10 days before it was exchanged for local currency. However, we seemed to get into Durban every day and we were made very welcome in the Service canteens and clubs.
Before I left England, I was given a card which stated that LAC Cliff. Watson was the son of a respected member of the Battersea Rotary Club and any co-operation afforded to him would be greatly appreciated. I noticed the Rotary insignia at the doorway of a Barclays bank in Durban and asked to see the manager. Could I please borrow £5 and I would refund it as soon as I was paid. 45 years later I would certainly not undertake such a venture. It happened to be the first Friday in the month which was the day of the monthly Rotary luncheon. The three lads from Battersea were invited to lunch and each given £10 on condition that we did not refund it. This was hospitality indeed. Several times in Durban we were entertained by the local people, and of course the environment was completely strange to us, so were the bunches of bananas, pawpaws and other fruits.
After about a week to regain our land legs, we embarked on a train and steamed north. The train was a coal burner and we were aboard for 3 days bound for Bulawayo. Food on the train was really first-class. At one stage we were told to disembark for a spot of exercise [sic] and whilst this was in progress the train moved off. We were marched in a direction at right-angles to that of the train and met up with it about an hour later. This was my first experience of African trains, and the 4-berth cabins, rather superior to even today's "sleepers" in Britain. Looking back on it 35 years later when I was concerned with radio communications between trains and stations in the U.K., - my firm was trying to Introduce a communications system-, I recalled chatting with the Radio Officer in his Radio Cabin on the train whist he was on the morse key in contact with the station at Mafeking. It was many years later that communication with trains in Britain was established.
After a very pleasant three-day journey, we arrived in Bulawayo and buses took us to Hillside Camp, formerly the Agricultural Show Ground. We were accommodated literally in what had been the Pig Sties. These were merely wattle poles supporting corrugated iron roofs with hessian round the poles to represent walls. The whole structure was whitewashed and with plenty of fresh air the accommodation was ideal. There must have been about 600 trainee pilots at Hillside Camp, and we embarked on a second I.T.W. course of ground training. There was however a single Tiger Moth on which we learned to swing the prop. and start the engine. So at last we had sat in an aeroplane although it wasn't going anywhere. At least it was supposed to be anchored down, but an Australian did taxi it a hundred yards or so after an evening of celebration.
Our stay in Bulawayo was certainly very pleasant, we visited Cecil Rhodes grave at Matopas, the ancient ruins of Zimbabwe, spent weekends on farms, enjoyed the swimming and so on, but our minds were on the war of which we were not feeling a part. Pearl Harbour had brought the
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Americans into the fray, several Capital Ships had been lost and things were going badly 'up north'.
In January came a very welcome posting, to 25 E.F.T.S. (Elementary Flying Training School) at Belvedere, on the outskirts of Salisbury. Here the day started at 0400 and we enjoyed tea and toast of our own making before assembling at 0425 for two-mile march to the airfield. By 0500 half the course would be standing-by for flying and the other half lectures and more ground training. Breakfast was between 0900 and 1030 hrs. which included the 2 mile march each way, and after breakfast the two halves of the course changed over. Flying started on the sixth of Jan. with what was to be a typical day, with 30 minutes of flying instruction at 0515, and lectures after breakfast. Addresses by two ex-fighter pilots F/O Newton and a Flight Sergeant whose left leg was in plaster. The following day I managed to get in an hour’s flying with P/O Bentley, concentrating on turns, glides and climbing. From the outset the instructor frequently cut the throttle without warning sometimes deliberately putting the aircraft into a spin. then telling the pupil to get on with it. My next flying session was with Ft/Sgt Oates as P/O Bentley was on leave and in six weeks of flying instruction managed 12 hours with 7 different instructors. A final three hours was spent with F/O Newton in one hour sessions and I was full of confidence and looking forward to the C.F.I.'s test the following day.
Maybe in retrospect I was over confident, even though most of my friends had been "scrubbed", including Hancocks, Robinson, Morgan, King, Barlow, Vivian, Bolton, Friend, Britton, Jones and Fry. Having made what I thought were two acceptable circuits and landings, the C.F.I.'s final remarks were "Sorry old lad, but as a Service Pilot you make a bloody good rear gunner". I did not regard these as being the words of the Prophet, but so ended my career as a u/t Pilot after 9 months in the R.A.F.
All was not lost however, like all the others whose Personal file was stamped "wastage", I found myself at Disposals Depot, which also happened to be at Belvedere, and in good company. All of us were sadly disillusioned and disappointed at failing the Pilot's Course, and the reasons given for the apparent failure were seldom accepted. Where do we go from here in the long term was the main question, and the opportunity to influence this came at an interview at Group H.Q. in Salisbury. The only guidance came from others who had already had their interviews and were awaiting a posting. The alternatives appeared to be many, we could opt out completely and remuster to ACH GD, reduced to the lowest rank of Airman 2nd. Class and thence take pot luck with no trade and no personal ambition. But we had joined the R.A.F. with too much purpose for this to be acceptable. We could apply for training as Observer which at that time embraced both Navigator and Bomb Aimer duties, but we were meeting chaps just starting that course who had waited six months for it after failing the pilot's course, and this indicated that it could be a year more before we qualified. The most logical answer appeared to be the Air Gunner Course which lasted only six weeks, and apparently with hardly any waiting list, so in less than two months it seemed we could become a sergeant with half a wing, not quite what we set out to achieve, but a far cry from where we stood at the time.
At the interview at Group H.Q. I asked why I had failed and was shown the comments made by my instructors. With the exception of the
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C.F.I.’s comment they were all favourable and I became a little argumentative. For the first time I learned that on the C.F.I. test I had climbed at less than full throttle but at the correct air speed with the normal rate of climb. What I should have done apparently was give it full throttle, keeping the correct air speed and letting the rate of climb take care of itself. On the training aircraft the emphasis had been on speed and rate of climb whereas it should have been on speed only and full throttle.
I remarked that the C.F.I.'s aircraft was more like a Gladiator than a Tiger Moth. The alternative careers were as we had deduced amongst ourselves and I applied to remuster to u/t Wireless Operator/Air Gunner and to do the A/G course as soon as possible. This was approved on the spot, and my file was endorsed “Watson requests an A/G course merely for the quickness in getting onto ops." I was supposed to start the course the following week.
It was to be three months before I was actively posted to Moffat to do the Air Gunner Course, and the greater part of this was spent on leave, returning to camp periodically to check progress. We had only to walk along the road away from town to be offered a lift which generally meant spending the rest of the day with new friends, and quite often arranging to spend a week or so with them. It was on the 15th. of Feb. Tom King and I were spending 10 days leave with our hosts Mr. & Mrs. Bedford at Poltimore Farm, Marandellas that we listened to Churchill's speech, with the dreadful news of the fall of Singapore. This led to a general discussion on the likely future plans of the war and it was generally felt there would be an allied landing at Dakar with the assistance of the French, and the forces would move north and then east to catch Rommel in a pincer movement. Not too far out in our argument, only 2000 miles, but we had the general scheme and timing right. Later we were shown around the tobacco "barns" where 12,000 leaves were drying in each of 10 barns. My diary records that "one of the most interesting things we were shown was the castrating of 300 pigs" A rather messy business", perhaps I was less squeamish in those days. Later about 2000 head of cattle were dipped including 3 wicked looking bulls. The two children tried to keep us amused, and with great success. We repaired their bicycles, small car, swing and dolls' house furniture, the dolls house being about 20 feet square. We carved out the names Wendy (8) and Cliff (20) on a tree and really began to enjoy the Rhodesian way of life. We cycled over to Chakadenga Farm and had tea with Mrs. Nash and also met the local jailer. We tried to repay all this kindness by making ourselves generally useful, and I recall changing the oil in Mrs. Nash's Chevrolet and repairing the lights. We also refitted the long-wire aerial on the house radio and refurbished the engine house which accommodated the lighting plant and batteries.
We tried to spend.as much time away from camp as possible, our idea being 'out of sight, out of mind'. Occasionally the S.W.O caught up with us and we were detailed for guard duty on the aerodrome, a 12 hour guard working 2 hours on and four off. The complete guard comprised 6 airmen, 4 on standby in the guard room, one cycling around the aerodrome and one standing in a sentry box at the side of the double gates which were normally closed. There were neither fences-nor ditches linking the gate posts and it was easier to drive a car onto the airfield on the wrong side of the gate posts than to bother with the gate. Generally the Orderly Officer carried out his inspection about 7.pm. but on one
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occasion suddenly appeared about 3 am. from the direction of the airfield and drove up to the main gate on his way out, parking so near the gate it could not be opened. I turned out the guard, which took about 5minutes and we were treated to a tirade and lecture covering several subjects including how utterly futile the guard was. One of the chaps said “you are absolutely right Sir" which made matters worse and he stormed back into his car. The headlights had been left on and the car wouldn't start, so we leaned our rifles against the sentry box and pushed the car backwards so we could open the gates. Finally the entire guard pushed the car forward and it started without trouble, but headed back towards camp. We decided to remain at the open gate, and a few minutes later the car returned at great speed, and disappeared through the gate in a tremendous cloud of dust without further formality. We had good laugh but it did little for the morale of chaps whose ambitions had been thwarted and who felt they were wasting their time in the R.A.F. and, even more so in guarding a gate which had no real purpose with blank ammunition and rifles which it would be too dangerous to fire. By the end of March the aerodrome guard was taken more seriously and comprised 24 Europeans and about 60 Africans, which meant the remustering aircrew trainees were on guard every few nights. I was given the job running the Post Office and Stores which exempted me from guard duties but also curtailed my leave periods.
On the 3rd. April Tom King and 20 others were posted to 24 C.A.O.S. at Moffat, near Gwelo, about half-way between Salisbury and Bulawayo, for their Air Gunner Course. The intake was 50 per month and we wondered where the other 40 had come from. Meanwhile Ray Chislett the other member of the Battersea trio- was doing extremely well at Cranbourne flying Oxfords. Root and Robertson were killed the previous day in a Harvard whilst officially on practice instrument flying but actually beating up a tree and misjudging matters
On the 1st. of May, I was posted to Moffat and started the A-G course. Things seemed to be happening in our favour at long last; and had been delayed because of a large influx of remustered ground crews who had got out of Singapore just in time, and also another large influx of Aussies for Air Gunner training. It was good to see Tommy King pass out as a Sgt. A-G and for Cpl. Luck to receive his commission.
On Sun. the 10th. of May there was a church parade in best blues and khaki topee, held in Gwelo. Two days later L.A.C. Chick Henbest, u/t A-G ex u/t Pilot shot a large hole in his own aircraft's tail. When he as charged with the offence he brought an expert witness, the Station Armament Officer ! - to state that such a thing was technically impossible. The Air-Gunner training was partly intergrated [sic] with that of the Navigator's, and on the 13th. May on such an occasion 'Ace' Buchanan and another A-G, piloted by Sgt. Reed, force-landed near QueQue and were missing for 5 hours
In the four weeks at Moffat we carried out 9 hours of Air firing in Anson aircraft using a Vickers Gas Operated gun of .303 calibre. This was mounted on a Scarfe ring with the gunner standing and firing at a drogue towed by a Miles Master aircraft. 200 rounds were fired during each exercise [sic] , the 3 "pans" of ammo. having been filled by the gunner and then 'doctored' by an armourer with faulty rounds, and other simulated faults. The only turrets available were on the ground, and comprised an ancient Frazer Nash, Daimler and electrical Boulton & Paul. A total of 4 hours was spent in them. We were supposed to swing the
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turret aiming at moving light images on the wall but in practice the bulbs in the ring-sights were all faulty.
On the 29th. May we graduated and were presented with brevets and tapes. The course was posted to Capetown but I had to report to Salisbury to give evidence at Gooding's Court Martial. Gooding had stolen my Agfa Carat camera and scores of other items in Bulawayo. Meanwhile on the news, 1000 Bombers over the Rhur [sic] again and 37 missing. A few days previously the very first raid on this scale was made on Cologne with 44 aircraft missing. The Middle-East war was becoming more intensive and in Russia Jerry was in real trouble, but we seemed a very long way from it all.
One of my friends on the Pilots course was Ian Smith who lived in Salisbury and with whom I used to go looking for buck in the early mornings. Ian had failed the course like most of us but being a Rhodesian had obtained his discharge locally and joined the Southern Rhodesia Light Battery currently at the K.G. VI barracks. I went to the barracks in the afternoon and saw Norman, and was introduced to Solomon, Slim and other Rhodesians in the S.R. Army Medical Corps. After tea in the mess we went to the local bioscope to see 'East of the River'. On the 13th. of June I managed to get another 19 days leave which was spent with Mr. & Mrs. James at their farm at Gilston, about 16 miles south of Salisbury. With three Aussies we had a wonderful holiday, riding, cycling, tennis, swimming, all at the farm. We rode up to the bushman's caves in a copje 4 miles into the bundu and photographed them. To the Aussies it was like being home and I concluded there was no alternative to this sort of life.
On my return to Disposals Depot my stolen camera was returned to me and I found that Gooding was on yet another charge,- stealing a W/T Set - . A few more days leave to say cheerio to all my friends in Salisbury, and I returned to Gwelo to find that I was posted to Bulawayo to give evidence at the Court Martial. I stayed with Mr. & Mrs. Rose for a week or so and spent some time at the Cement works where Mr. Rose was Manager. I was offered a job there if I would return after the war and for a long time this formed the basis of my post-war plan, but a great deal was to happen before that time came. The Court Martial was a very formal affair, and Gooding was charged with theft on about 45 counts. He had not disposed of anything he had stolen for personal gain, and pleaded Kleptomania. He was sentenced to dismissal from the R.A.F. after immediate return to U.K., and recommended for psychiatric observation. He survived the war, certified unfit for Military service and resumed his career with a firm of solicitors in Surrey. The case was finished just in time for me to join the rest of the course on the 1st. of July at Bulawayo station. In Gwelo I had bought a tin trunk which was now nearly full of presents, pyjamas for Hilda, stockings for Mum, embroidering material, tobacco, cigarettes, jam and so on.
After a 55 hour train journey we arrived in Kapstaad and enjoyed Iunch with John Heggarty before joining another train to Retreat and the drive to Polsmoor Transit Camp by bus. It rained heavily for a couple of days and the activity was just one big reunion. I met friends I had not seen since Newquay. Dicky Aires and Jack Frost were there as Sgt. pilots, Howard Iliffe (1090111) and Bob Hildred also, having trained as pilots at George, in the Union. Arthur Brittain a Sgt. Observer and Stewart Evans who was in the Officers Mess at Kumalo. In the next four
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weeks we spent most of our time in Capetown, making a beeline for the Soldiers Club. The welcome we received from the South Africans was positively overwhelming, and people were literally queueing up to entertain us. On the 4th. of July a group of four of us including Ray Chislett and two Maltese soldiers met Mrs. Williams and had tea at her flat. After tea we motored out to a vineyard and got quite merry on four glasses of their own wine. On the way out one of the tyres was punctured and it took us less than three minutes to change the wheel. In the evening we went to the Odeon Bioscope at Seapoint with complimentary tickets which appeared from out of the blue. Howard. Iliffe, John Heggarty and I spent a great deal of time together in Capetown where Howard & I met two young ladies. One of them, introduced as Cheri de la Chene said she was French and had spent five years in Paris, but she could not understand my efforts at speaking French. John Heggarty had quite a brainwave and I introduced him as a member of the Free French Forces,-L'Aviation Francais Libre-. John was absolutely fluent in native French and soon discovered that Cheri was neither French nor a University student, but a schoolgirl of 14 at the Convent. Whilst in Capetown I met Binedall with whom I used to correspond before the war, and he gave me a large matchbox which I left with Mrs. Williams' mother to be collected after the war. I have left it rather too late. The climb up Table Mountain with Ray was very interesting and from the top we had a wonderful view of Muizeuburg. This reminds me of one night during a trial blackout at Muizenburg, Heggarty and I met Mrs. Macbeth who invited us to dinner on the following day. We gladly accepted and on arrival at the house next day referred to her as Mrs. Shakespeare. This was laughed off and we spent a very enjoyable evening. After dinner we went to a show in Muizenburg and met a lady who had lived near Battersea Park. In 1952 in Mbeya in Tanganyika I was talking to another 'Radio Ham' in Muizenburg arid mentioned my faux pas with Mrs. Macbeth's name. He said he was living in Mrs. Macbeth's guest house and she had related the story at dinner only a few days previously. Stuttafords of Adderley Street provided a very interesting experience for Heggarty and me. We wandered into a tea-room the likes of which we had never seen before, it seemed the ultimate in luxury. We asked mildly for just two cups of tea but up came the whole works of silver teaset with lots of pastries and cakes. We said no thankyou, really, just two cups of tea, but the lady was adamant. We said it was jolly nice but funds were limited and the cakes were beyond our means. She said she would be very cross if we didn't have at least half a dozen cakes and then gave us a bill -for 1/3d. Fixed charge for two, she said. Wonderful people, it was embarrassing at times. We called in a Milk Bar for a milkshake and they insisted it was on the house. We would buy a bunch of grapes for a 'ticky', -3d- and they refused payment. One Saturday Ray and I spent the day with the Brandt family who lived at Rosebank . We went for a run with them in the car in the afternoon, round Table Mountain and took some very good photographs. They also drove us to the Lion Match Company's factory in Capetown, where we were given a tour - and quite a lot of labels- a wonderful finale to my first trip to Africa.
After meeting up with our old friends whose paths had taken many different ways and finally converged, but not without the loss of several due to accidents, the resentment at failing the pilot's course had just about worn off. The original crowd of rookies at Newquay were still basically together and covering all aircrew 'trades'. Someone had
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[photograph]
[underlined] AIR GUNNER COURSE [/underlined]
[underlined] APRIL 1942 [/underlined] [underlined] 24 C.A.O.S. MOFFAT, GWELO. [/underlined] [underlined] S. RHODESIA [/underlined]
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[underlined] POSTSCRIPT [/underlined]
The A/G course was rather an anti-climax after the concentration and determined outlook on the pilots course. Most of us felt we had wasted our time and had been let down.
During a "lecture" on the Browning gun by Cpl. Paddy Gilligan he noticed correctly that my eyes were closed and pointing to me, yelled "You, what was I saying?", I replied "You were saying 'as the breach block moves to the rear the cam on the rear sear rides along that on the barrel extention [sic] . . . ' There followed a discussion on my detailed phraselogy [sic] and he wound up by shouting "Your problem Watson is you don't speak effing english". I replied that I try to speak the King's english Cpl! and that did it, he swore to fix me. Study of the Browning gun comprised learning parrot-fashion the sequence of events and other odd statistics such as effective range and rate of fire. There was a drawing on the wall which gave us some idea of what it looked like, but the Browning was something for the future, the R.A.F. currently uses the V.G.O. or so we were told. The following day Gilligan told me to go to the billet and make sure the African had cleaned all the lampshades, including the one in his little room. This I did and two hours later reported they were all clean. The next day with no preamble I was told to report to the Orderly Room immediately. I was marched in to the C.O. and charged with failing to carry out an order, and also making a false report. Gilligan gave evidence and said the lampshade in his billet was filthy, I could not have checked it. The C. O. accepted this and I was given a severe rep. and 7 days jankers. I went straight away to the billet and I asked the S.W.O. to accompany me. He delegated a Sgt. Clerk and together we checked the offending lampshade. Sure enough it was filthy. I found the african cleaner and he swore that he had cleaned the shade but the Cpl. had then made him change it for one in the next but where they were all dirty. We all trooped next door and saw that all were indeed filthy except one.
The Sgt. could see what Gilligan was up to and endorsed my written report addressed to the C.O. which also applied for redress of grievance. The result was that my Severe Rep. was cancelled and so was the balance of the jankers.
At the end of the course the exam. papers were marked by Gilligan and he gave me 61% in all subjects which was the absolute minimum for a pass. Again I wrote to the C.O. and he agreed that Gilligan was up to his tricks again. He changed the exam. results to an average of 93% If I had not been so argumentative I could very well have "failed the course"
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to fly the thing, but there was a lot of other work to be done also. A cutting from the Rhodesia Herald whilst at Moffat spelt it out:-
I wished to be a pilot,
And you, along with me;
But if we all were pilots,
Where would the Air Force be?
It takes guts to be a gunner,
To sit out in the tail,
When the Messerschmitts are coming,
And the slugs begin to wail.
The plot's just a chauffeur;
It's his job to fly the plane;
But it's we who do the fighting,
Though we may not get the fame.
If we must all be gunners,
Then let us make this bet;
We'll be the best damn gunners
That have left this station yet
Nearly half a century later it does seem somewhat corny.
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[underlined] OPERATIONAL TRAINING. [/underlined]
And so to the 2nd. August 1942; we boarded HMT J/6, The Monarch of Bermuda and were shown to our cabins, stowed our kit and were issued with passes to go ashore until 1500 hrs. A last look at Table Mountain and Kapstaad and at 1630 on the 3rd. we left South Africa, hoping and firmly intending one day to return. The 10 day voyage to Freetown was a very pleasant cruise, escorted by two Battle Cruisers and three Corvettes and accompanied by The Empress of Russia, we ploughed along at a steady 12 knots. Our favourite pastime was reading the inter-ship messages on the Aldis lamps. Among other things we learned that one of the Empress's boilers was u/s and shut down. Which limited the speed of the whole convoy. There were several U Boat warnings during daylight and these coincided with lifeboat drills, which were taken very seriously.
The accommodation was very good, all the R.A.F. NCOs being accommodated six in each cabin. The cabins were equipped as they had been for luxury cruising pre-war, each with a toilet room with saltwater shower. The portholes remained open the whole time, but this time we were on 'A' and not 'D' Deck. In the Sgts Mess Italian P.O.W.'s waited upon us, and make a very good job of it. All fatigues are carried out by them and they caused no trouble at all. The vigilance of the Polish guards probably influenced that, their bayonets being fixed ALL the time, and there were few words passing between the guards and prisoners, just a few gestures with the bayonet. The Poles had been in action since August 1939 and were a long way from home, first defending their country, evacuating to Yugoslavia, and then making their way to Abadan to join the British. There were 1800 Italian prisoners aboard, mostly captured in Bardia and Tobruk about two years previously. They were a meek and miserable-looking lot. One of our 'stewards' who we called 'Grandpa' was a Cpl Major, and had medals for the Bolshevist and Abbysinian [sic] wars. He spoke very little English, but excellent French, and in return for a few cigarettes made me a bracelet in which he put photos of my fiancee [sic] , Hilda, and me. The material was similar to duralumin and he claimed it was a piece from a shot-down British Bomber in Abbysinia [sic] , a most unlikely story. His only tools were a pen-knife, a razor blade and a 4” nail for engraving. The Italians were confident the Axis would win the war and were expecting Stukas, Fokker Wolfe Condors and 'U' Boats to appear at any time.
There were several hundred European civilians aboard, mostly evacuees from Alexandria and Cairo, who seemed to think they owned the ship. Many of them were ducked during the Crossing the Line ceremony, we claimed exemption, being old timers at that sort of thing!!
There was some form of entertainment almost every evening; mainly variety concerts organised by the troops. During one of these I recall a wounded ex 8th-Army Soldier impersonating Stanley Holloway in his Northern accent with a poem,
"The Reason Why"
The unity of Empire .is seen in ships galore,
As they plough in convoy fashion, to Britain's island shore,
Across the world's big oceans, around continents as well,
The Bulldog breed keeps up the creed that history will tell.
We've roughed it on this convoy, we've lived like herded sheep,
Yet all can see, it's got to be, if freedom's cause we'll keep
We're mixed like breeded cattle, the R. A. F. as well,
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That R.A:F. who two .years ago Just drove the 'uns to 'ell.
They say the good ship Monarch, J6 her tag, goes back to Afric [sic] shortly,
but always behind that Flag.
The Flag we're fighting Jerry for,
the Flag of which we're proud,
the Flag which may be a tattered rag,
but with honoured blood endowed.
In that environment and atmosphere this was pretty stirring stuff.
On the 14th. of August we dropped anchor in Freetown. Just as a year ago, it was very hot and humid, with an overcast sky. This time we were not restricted to below decks, but enjoyed the freedom of the ship and were able to trade with the natives. Sunderland seaplanes were seen patrolling out to sea, with Walrus amphibeans [sic] doing about 60. m.p.h., around the harbour. There was lots of signalling between ships and we could cope with the morse, but the semaphore was too advanced and clever for us.
Sunday the 16th at 0600 the Monarch and the Empress slipped out of Freetown and rejoined the Royal Navy out at sea. We were a little concerned for an hour or two, as the sun was rising on the port beam, but we eventually turned right and the sun returned to it's proper place, astern. We expected to reach England by thursday, but rumours of the invasion of France were rife and my diary actually records that this might delay us a little!. The general topic of conversation was what would it be like going through Customs. We were advised on the P.A. system to hand in any unauthorised arms and ammunition, including loot taken from the enemy. I had 3 kitbags, a tin trunk, suitcase and issue R.A.F. webbing and packs, and somewhere in that lot was 25 lbs. of sugar, 10 lbs of tea, 8 pairs of silk stockings, 2 dress lengths, 15lbs. of jam, lady's pyjamas, 2000 cigarettes and other dutiable material. I also had a very small .22 revolver in my pocket and decided to risk it. It was really a toy, hardly a weapon of war. In the very early hours of the 26th. of August we docked at Greenoch. An hour later our party of 240 or so assembled on deck with a mountain of kit, all newly trained sprog aircrew sergeants. The train pulled in to within 100 yards of the ship and in less than 30 minutes we were on our way by train to Glasgow, then on to London. Whilst changing stations in London, I telephoned the office, BATtersea 8485, at 0730 and was disappointed that Hilda was not yet at work!
We arrived at no. 3 P.D.C. Bournemouth and moved into luxury hotels, expecting to be sent on leave immediately, hardly worth unpacking, but this was not to be. We were interviewed several times, medically examined, kit reorganised and generally messed about for a week. According to my pay book, I was a Sgt. Air Gunner, u/t Wireless Operator, and at one interview I was told that this could not be so. Either I could stay as a Sgt. A-G or lose my tapes and become an AC2 u/t Wireless op., eventually doing a wireless op. course. It was emphasised that the whole business of training was highly organised into streams, and once in the main stream it was better to drift with it rather than to try and change course. Streams could not cross, but only merge. All very academic and enlightening so it was agreed that u/t wireless op. would be deleted from my paybook, and of course, having done a couple of tours as a rear gunner I could always apply for a wireless course.
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That's what the man said and I was in no position to argue, 'Just a couple of tours'.
A week later we were on leave, and Hilda met me at Waterloo after just over a year apart. We had a few hours in London before going up to Barnoldswick to take my mother by surprise. After five rather hectic days of visiting relatives and friends we returned to London and met Hilda's parents and relatives, for just one day before returning to Bournemouth.
We were billeted in an attic at Ocean Lodge and took our meals at the Vale Royal. The food was the most unappetising and uninteresting we had seen in the R.A.F. so far. Life in Bournemouth consisted entirely of parades, square bashing, P.T. drill, lectures and swimming, each activity taking place some miles away from the previous one.
Bournemouth was full of sprog air crews, 90% Sergeants, few realised what the future might hold, and; in retrospect, I don't recall even thinking about it.
We were clear of Bournemouth on the 2nd. of October, and posted to 25 O.T.U., Finningley. near Doncaster.
The first 14 days were spent in lectures, practical work on guns in the armoury, and in firing on various ranges. We were introduced to the FN20 rear turret and relieved to have the opportunity of stripping the .303 Browning guns. We who had trained in Rhodesia did not advertise the fact that we had never actually seen a real Browning gun, only a wooden model, all our air-firing having been carried out on V.G.O.'s [Vickers Gas Operated) guns. We had spent several hours in a turret on the ground in Rhodesia. A Boulton & Paul electrically operated mid-upper type as fitted to a Defiant but bearing no resemblance to the rear turrets of Wellingtons and Whitleys.
11th. November was relatively peaceful at Finningley. In the world outside the Allies had landed in North Africa and occupied the coastal strip from Casablanca, through Oran to 50 miles east of Algiers where the big build-up was taking place. Jerry was being pushed towards Tunisia and Rommel's Afrika Corps was in full retreat in Libya, having been pushed out of Egypt, The Huns marched into hitherto unoccupied France and hard fighting was still going on in Stalingrad. Madagascar was in British hands. My diary records that Jerry lost over 600 aircraft in two days, according to the B.B.C. Nearer home I also recorded that "I flew today for the first time with my pilot, Sgt. Rutherford, and with Sgt. Bishop, W/optr., on circuits and bumps. Our Navigator Allan Willoughby is at Bircotes doing cross-countries". For some of us the pace was slow, and some of the time was spent in 'Brains Trust' sessions. Here a team of experts would sit on the platform and questions on any subject would be asked by the rest of us. In reply to the question "How do you think we should deal with the Huns after the war?", the M.O. replied "Castrate the bloody lot, the R.A.M.C. could do that in only a couple of weeks". Most of the discussions however were in a more serious vain. Over this period the weather was not very good. No 14 Course crews have been helping the Landgirls digging up potatoes and 12 Course chaps were heaving coal, We then had coal and coke allocated and delivered to our billets, which eliminated the need to pinch it from the Officers' Mess. we were accomodated [sic] in the peace-time married quarters close to their Mess.
One of our Wimpies from Bircotes crashed into a Beaufighter near Caernarvon where my sister was stationed in the W.A.A.F. There were no
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[photograph] [underlined] REG WHELLAMS [/underlined]] 1333520
[underlined] AT 25 OTU FINNINGLEY [/underlined]
(10 FORSTER RD. WALTHEMSTOW E.17 )
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survivors. A Defiant crashed near my home in Barnoldswick and we pressed on with the routine of local flying, stripping nothing more interesting than guns, and lectures and so on.
My diary records that on the 9th. December, after a little over two months we were taken by lorry to Bircotes to fly as a crew. Losses were high, on a Bullseye on London we lost three aircraft. One of them apparently ditched without trace near the French Coast, the only clue to this being their dinghy which would have been released automatically striking the water. A second crew headed by Ft/Lt. Anneckstein crashed into the watch office, killing the Bomb Aimer who was stretched out in the bombing position. A third crew crashed on landing at Bircotes, without fatality, but with the crew rather shaken-up. We were living Nissen huts about 2 miles from the 'hangars' and 3/4 mile from the in the other direction. The place was a sea of mud in parts and we generally washed AFTER breakfast for some reason which eludes me after 45 years
One point in favour of Bircotes, it was on the Great North Road and just before Christmas I enjoyed a 48 hr. leave with Hilda in London! I met Tommy King in Battersea who was a Rear Gunner on Halifaxes with three ops. to his credit, all to Italy. A brief respite and back to Bircotes. The flying aspect was proving more interesting now, I could see a little beyond my own situation and get involved to some extent in the general carry-on of working as a crew. We had a first-class Skipper, Sgt. Stan. Rutherford, a down-to-earth tough New Zealand sheep farmer. Our Navigator Allan Willoughby from the West country whom we regarded as the Academic member of the crew, but who suffered greatly from air sickness. On those occasions our Bomb Aimer Stan Chadderton from Liverpool took over the navigation without any problems. Stan trained as an Observer - which included both Bomb aiming and Navigating in the U.S.A. and we were thus very fortunate in having a standby navigator. Our Wireless Operator Harry Dyson was from Huddersfield possibly the socialite of the crew, and fancied his chances in the rear turret, giving me a welcome change on occasions.
I started the New Year well by having four runaway guns, over Missen, the bombing range, splattering a main road. The safety catches were 'off' and the guns ready for instant action almost all the time the air, and the reason the guns fired has not been fully explained. I vaguely put it down to a build-up of hydraulic pressure in the triggering system. This did not fool the Armourers who put it down finger trouble on my part - literally.
By the 7th. of Jan. we had completed all our day-flying details of cross-countries, bombing, air firing etc. and were suddenly posted to 30 O.T.U. Hixon, in Staffordshire to complete the night flying excercises [sic] . It took three days visiting various sections to obtain signatures on a Clearance Certificate before we were free of Finningly [sic] , and the after we arrived at Hixon, we were despatched to the satellite airfield at Seighford. A week later we were still without aircraft at Seighford and when the Skipper, Navigator and W/op went to Finningley to collect one, Stan Chadderton & I took French leave and shot off to see respective Hildas. It was on that leave that Hilda and I decided to get married and arranged for bans to be called in Seighford and Battersea.
On the 24th. Jan, our night-flying excercises [sic] almost completed we enjoyed a new experience. We were put on the battle order and briefed for an attack on Lorient. Everything was rushed and finally when
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boarding the aircraft -which was u/s-, the raid -or our part in it- was cancelled. We were to have dropped six 500 lb. bombs in 10/10ths cloud and were warned about the fighters and lots of flak. We found later that the Americans had bombed Lorient in the afternoon followed by 121 aircraft of Bomber Command that night. One Stirling was lost. In early Feb. we were doing a 6 hour cross-country operational excercise [sic] simulating a real trip and towards the end of it were joyfully bombing what was thought to be our target on the bombing range. After dropping two sticks of 11 1/2 lb. practice bombs the "target" lights were extinguished and although we remained over them for a further 20 minutes they did not come on again. Thirty minutes later "W" William landed at base amid great consternation. Apparently the O. C. Night Flying had thought we were lost and had been sending up rockets. These were seen by the Stafford Fire Brigade who came dashing out to Seighford expecting a major disaster. On reporting to the Watch Office the Skipper was congratulated upon a successful bombing attack on Hixon aerodrome.
A few nights previously Jock King and crew had crash-landed on the Yorkshire moors. They were over the North sea, badly iced up and losing height gradually until they ran out of it on the moor. The aircraft was a complete write-off and the Rear Gunner very badly injured by the Brownings crashing into his chest. On the 7th. Feb. the whole crew went to the local church and heard the Banns called. Two aircraft were lost from our unit the previous night, one piled straight in at Hixon, all killed, and Sgt. Browning bounced off the runway and finished upside down in the adjacent field. The 11th. Feb. was my 21st. Birthday and the Crew got absolutely sloshed in Eccleshall. It was a memorable party and the Skipper and Bomb Aimer got themselves lost on the way home and spent part of the night in a ditch. On the 14th. we completed the last of our cross-country details. The pages of my diary covering this trip are indistinct having been submerged in water in 1949, but there were problems. The first 4 hours were spent on accurately flown courses, but there was difficulty in keeping to specific heights. The aircraft seemed to climb and alternately lose height for no explicable reason and this distracted the Skipper from the required accuracy. Eventually with only 60 gallons of fuel indicated, the Skipper called "Darky Darky this is Nemo xx .....". Up came a 'gate' of two searchlights and signalled the direction of a friendly runway. 10 minutes later we all developed an instant inferiority complex, we had landed at Wyton, the home of 109 Squadron Pathfinders. One Wellington Mk.111 bombed up with four small practice bombs, was parked amid Lancasters, Mosquitoes and B17 Fortresses. However we were made very welcome and at 0400 hrs. thoroughly enjoyed the bacon, egg, fried sausages, toast and marmalade etc. Had I known then, that 40 years hence I would be retired and settled within 4 miles of Wyton I would have been a happier man. Aircraft on the first raid of the war had taken off from Wyton. The next two weeks were very active with little actually achieved. We were briefed almost every day for something which was cancelled every time but with one exception. We were told to do an air test on an aircraft which was parked near the perimeter fence. The rear turret was almost touching the fence at the other side of which was a haystack and chicken coop. The ground was muddy and rather more revs than usual were needed to free the wheels and move the aircraft forward. The hurricane strength wind created completely demolished the hen coop and the haystack, and many of the hens became airborne as never before. There
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was no time for recriminations however, on landing we went straight to the briefing room and learned we, were on a Nickel that night. The Oxford Dictionary gives a different meaning, but to Air Crews 'Nickel' is a generic term for a bum fodder or leaflet raid. It did imply that someone had some confidence in us, maybe. The target was Paris.
At last we were over enemy-occupied territory, still on our side of the Rhine, and still a long way from it, but we were getting nearer and there was no lack of confidence, at least initially. Problems developed, first my ring-sight ferrel broke off, so there was no hope of accurate aiming if attacked, then my intercom microphone ceased to function. The fault was later found in the Rotating Service Joint below the turret. We had a standby signalling system of push button and lamp, but that too was out of order for the same reason. I could hear the skipper calling me on a routine check but had no means of replying. Receiving no reply, Barry Dyson crawled back to the rear turret to check up, not knowing what to expect. He had overlooked the fact that we were at 15.000 feet - the highest we had been at that time- and almost passed out due to lack of oxygen. He reconnected his adapter to the system just in time. He was also inadequately clothed for a temperature of -18C but putting 1800 lbs of leaflets down the flare chute restored his circulation. Di banged on the turret door and we exchanged greetings. He returned to his office and reporting my situation to the Skipper. Meanwhile I was incommunicado for the rest of the trip, but I could hear the others conversing. Shortly after that I felt the rotation of the turret was becoming sluggish and I tried to fire a short burst. Three of the guns fired one round each and then stopped, but number one was working. I cocked and recocked the guns several times, tried firing them manually and eventually three were working. I fired a short burst and regained a little confidence. An hour after leaving Paris the turret rotation would not respond to the hydraulics so I ensured that manual operation was still possible. I knew that to bale out I would have to open the turret doors, then the aircraft bulkhead door, grab my parachute pack, drag it through both doors and into the turret, rotate the turret onto the beam, fit the 'chute, open the doors, disconnect the intercom and oxygen and go out backwards. I decided to give it a try except for actually bailing out - and decided it was probably not feasible in the time available, but I did get the parachute into the turret and tucked it down the side. I learned a lot that night, more had gone wrong in my department on that one trip than during all my training. Di learned the odd lesson too, to wear more clothing in case he had to move away from the hot air system under his table.
The following day we were advised that our O.T.U. course was completed and the Skipper was asked to state the crew's preference either to join a squadron bombing Germany or to go overseas. Our preference for Germany was unanimous; after all, I was getting married and most of us had already been overseas!. And so we went our separate ways on 7 days leave
March 1st, 1943 perhaps the most important day of my life, Hilda and I were married. Staying at Hilda's home I took my cousin Frank to Trafalgar Square and showed him the Lancaster bomber, then on to St. Pauls Churchyard where I used to work and showed him a Stirling Bomber. He was thrilled with London and with the aircraft in particular. At 1pm we met Mum and Topsy at duCane Court and lunched in Balham, and whilst Mum and the others went to meet Hilda's folks, I went on to the Church,
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St. Mary's in Battersea. Some years later when I saw the photographs I realised I was wearing a white shirt with my airman's uniform. Hilda joined me at the Alter [sic] and looked absolutely lovely in her white wedding dress. The service was grand and the organist played two hymns. The church bells remained silent, they were reserved for signalling a possible enemy invasion. We enjoyed a wonderful reception at Hilda's home and on Monday we went to Lancing on honeymoon, the guests of Mr. & Mrs. Pittock at 10 Orchard Avenue. After a few days at Lancing I returned to camp and somehow organised more leave. At 0300 on the 10th. however the police delivered a telegram-which stated "Report to Hixon immediately, posted overseas". I tried to convince them that it was a joke on the part of the crew, and I was not stationed at Hixon in any case. However, at 0700 Hilda accompanied me to Euston where we said goodbye on the platform for the last time for several months at least. One night spent at Hixon, and the following day we travelled by train with two other crews to no. 1 P.D.C. West Kirby.
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[photograph] [photograph]
1st. MARCH 1943 (WHITE SHIRT) 25 O.T.U. FINNINGLEY
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SECOND HONEYMOON SEPT ‘43
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[underlined] SECOND TIME TO AFRICA [/underlined]
At West Kirby we handed in our blue uniforms and were issued with army Khaki battle dress and tropical flying bowlers and helmets. Within a few days we embarked on a Dutch Vessel, the Johan van Vanderbilt in the Mersey, and were allocated first and second class cabins still equipped to. peace-time standards. Service in the Dining Hall was fabulous, staffed by natives from the Nederlands [sic] East Indies. The cuisine was superb, there was white bread and butter and sugar on the tables. A full breakfast at 0800, a peacetime lunch at 1300, tea at 1630 and dinner at 1900. Coffee was available in the Snr. N.C.O's lounge at any time during the morning. The Army Privates' quarters were similar to those we had experienced on the Moultan, sleeping in the same place as they eat, scrubbing everything by 0830 and with lots of bull. They had to wear greatcoats at all times whilst on deck and carry their life-jackets and water bottles. They not only manned the guns but were also detailed for lots of guard duties. Everything seemed to be guarded, but the reason was generally obscure. The cabins were shared with the Army Snr. N.C.O.s and they felt it quite a change to enjoy such comfort. The main topic of conversation was speculation about our destination, North Africa, Middle East or Far East? At a lecture on the 20th. March a senior Army Officer gave us a talk in the big second-class lounge, a very interesting run-down on the state of the war in all theatres. He dealt at some length with the North African campaign and said that very shortly the 1st. and 8th. Armies would meet and a few days after that Jerry would be slung right out of Africa. He wanted to dispel all rumours that we were part of a force invading the south of France. I cannot recall whether we were actually told in so many words, but we expected our destination was either Algiers or Bone.
The armourment [sic] on the Johann was comparatively small. We had about 10 Lewis guns, .303 calibre, and a naval gun at the stern, all manned by the army. There were about 16 ships in the convoy, with troops and cargo, protected by 5 Cruisers and Destroyers, and 2 Corvettes. Not as impressive perhaps as in August 1941, but a more wartime environment.
It was a feeling not entirely new to us, we knew by calculation that it was the 21st. of March and we were sitting comfortably in the First Class Lounge enjoying a coffee, but whereabouts on the Atlantic ocean was the ship? We know we had been heading east all morning so the chances. were we are heading for Gibralter [sic] , it was not warm enough for Freetown to be our destination. Where we were bound was open to speculation like most other vital factors affecting us. What were we going to do when we get to wherever it was? We were a Wellington crew which did not rule out finding ourselves on a Boston or Mitchell doing close army support work. And what after we had completed a tour of ops.? Chad the Bomb Aimer and Di the Wireless op. were both keen to remuster and train as Pilots. Allan Willoughby said he was 'marlish' and quite happy to carry on navigating. I felt the war would be over before we had finished our first tour. The Skipper said little but probably thought we were a bunch of dreamers, comparing us with his sheep back in N.Z.. We were not in fact approaching Gibralter [sic] , we had passed through the Straits during the night.
At 0300 on the 22nd. we were approaching the minefield off Algiers and were attacked by a Ju88 torpedo bomber. We heard the Johan's guns open up
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and the Windsor Castle received a direct hit from a torpedo on her stern, three members of her crew being killed. She also lost her steering and means of propulsion. Efforts were made to tow her into Oran without success but she sank at 1700 the same day. The Service personnel and remainder of the crew were taken aboard destroyers. Hurricanes arrived within minutes of the attack, but just too late and not ideal aircraft for the job at 0300 hrs. My diary - written up a few days after the event,- refered [sic] originally to The Duchess of Windsor and this was changed a few years later to the Windsor Castle.
There was no longer any secrecy about our destination. Di said the R.A.F. had opened an O.T.U. in Algiers, and we were destined to do another course. There were lots of rumours, but one fact was established, we had been in the R.A.F. over two years and we felt it was high time we did something towards the war effort.
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At 0300hrs. on the 23rd. March we were paraded on deck thankful for our greatcoats, which we were still wearing with great discomfort when we disembarked at 1100. A brief stop at an Aircrew Reception Centre, a large hotel on the sea-front, before going to the Aircrew Pool at Surcouf, about 30 miles from Algiers. There was no great feeling of urgency here, the Allies had landed at Algiers on the 6th. of November and the Germans had already been driven some hundreds of miles, to the East.
It was just a matter of waiting, something that most servicemen became very good at. We could not take the initiative and start our own war, but could only make the best of it. Quoting from my diary, "Life at Surcouf is perfect, we share the officers' mess and enjoy typical French peacetime meals. Lots of Bully Beef but the Chef - a French Civilian - certainly knows how to camouflage it. Our chalet is literally on the beach and the sea never more than 20 yards away. We could swim all day long without the formality of swimming trunks, or walk around the village. Sometimes we hitch-hike Into Algiers". There was very little to do in the village, and I recorded that I found the French very unhelpful and generally impolite. We all carried side-arms of course. There was practically nothing to buy except strange local booze, the Americans had seen to all that when they passed through, and the bars seemed to be open all the time. Algeria was, politically, a part of Metropolitan France in the eyes of the French, it was home to many Frenchmen, and they probably realised it might never be quite the same again. After a three-week rest at Surcouf we reported to 150 Squadron at Blida, about 30 miles south of Algiers. This place was most certainly at war, there were Wellingtons, Hudsons, Hurricanes, Commandoes and Albacores for squadrons of Bomber, Coastal, Fighter and Transport Commands, and the Fleet Air Arm. With the exception of Transports and 142 and 150 Wellington Squadrons, all aircraft were controlled by Coastal Command. We were part of the North Africa Striking Force - so we were told. Life was good at Blida, most of the food was tinned and we enjoyed eggs and bully beef every day in the mess. Generally in the evenings we would have a fry-up of eggs and bread with more bully on the primus stove in the billet. The Mess Hall was used as both dining hall and lounge. The arabs wandered round the camp selling eggs and oranges but prefered [sic] to exchange them for food -- more bully beef.
The currency in use was the French Franc with an exchange rate of 200 to the £1 sterling in which we were paid. BMA (British Military Authority) notes were also in use but the most popular currency outside the town was the tin of bully. We were billeted in chalets formerly the peacetime living quarters of the French Air Force. Each chalet had four large rooms-and accommodated two Wellington crews. It was very pleasant to sit out on the verandah [sic] . My rather battered diary records that on the 28th. March 1943 we were discussing what we proposed to do on completion of our first tour. Rather naive, we would have little or no say in the matter. We had been allocated an aircraft, "F" for Freddie, but it was a case of one crew to one aircraft and its present owners had not quite finished their tour and were reluctant to part with it. For two days they had been bombing and straffing [sic] a large German convoy bound for Bizerta which was not left alone even when part of it had docked. We finally took over the aircraft and for five days were airborne for several hours each day. On the afternoon of the 5th. April we took off
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in "F" for Freddie for an hour's fighter affiliation excercise [sic] with two Hurricanes. Employing violent evasive action to make things difficult for the fighters, we crossed the coast about 10 miles east of Algiers at 3000 feet and passed directly over a British destroyer. The Navy was wide awake and saw a heavy bomber being chased by two Hurricanes, immediately opened fire on us with considerable light flak. The pilot of a third Hurricane which was on an operational patrol saw the mini-battle and joined in. When he saw that one of his chums was only 100 yards from my rear turret and happy to stay there, he realised that we were in a different ball game, peeled off and, carried on with his patrol, finally returning to Maison Blanche.
On the night of the 6th. April we bombed the Marshelling [sic] yards at TUNIS, with 3500 lb. and 54 30 lb. incendiaries. We bombed in one stick from 8000 ft. and surprisingly were held in searchlights which we lost at 3000 feet. Not a very good effort on our part, the bombs overshot the target but hit the aerodrome 3 miles north according to the timing point photograph. All 28 aircraft returned safely, two of them damaged There was little light flak but some heavy stuff said to be radar controlled. For an hour on the return journey I changed places with Harry Dyson, our Wireless op. On the 7th. we attacked troop concentrations at night making several bombing passes at low level and finally coming in very low firing 7 Brownings. Chad the bomb aimer used the two guns in the front turret, I had four in the rear and we carried beam guns on these occasions. Only the front gunner could see what he was firing at. One aircraft of 142 Squadron, G George was shot down by light flak. On the 10th. we raided MONSERRATO aerodrome in Sardinia, an aircraft was seen over the target with navigation lights on, visibility was good and we moved away hoping the runway lights would be switched in. The aerodrome remained in darkness and we dropped our bombs singly. There was no light flack from the aerodrome to worry us, and the aircraft with lights on was not seen again. After a further 30 minutes of stooging about we returned to Blida. There was a reasonable amount of heavy flak which we learned on return had downed one aircraft of 142 Squadron. - 2 in 2 nights-. On the way back a searchlight opened up a few miles ahead and the skipper put the nose down so we were at 2000 ft. when we passed directly over the searchlight. Stan Chadderton in the front turret opened fire and the Skipper told me when to open up, aiming straight down. The light stayed on after we had passed, pointing vertically, maybe we did a little damage, probably not. Inside the aircraft however, the dive had caused the Elsan lavatory to come loose and scatter it's contents over the floor.
The following morning, fearing the wrath of the ground crew when they saw the Elsan, we stayed in bed until noon and breakfasted in the billet. Eggs and fried potatoes, fried bread and tinned pears and fresh oranges, served by the wireless op. and rear gunner to the Skipper and the rest of the crew still in bed. In the afternoon we were stood down and Joe Shields (Sgt. Rimmer's Rear Gunner) and I went into Blida to try and find presents to take back to England. The bigger French shops were all closed - no stocks- and we scrounged around the Arab quarters, without success. I mentioned earlier that we always carried side-arms and several times we were crowded by the Arabs. Production of the revolver dispersed them but it could have been very tricky.
On the 14th. April we raided MONSERRATO for the second time, the first run-in at 8000 feet and then 6000 feet. Direct hits were seen on
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the aerodrome this time with 1000 and 250 pounders. No incendiaries were dropped but 10 minutes was spent 8 miles north of the town dropping leaflets. The leaflets were the "laissez-passer" type printed in German instead of the more usual Italian. An aircraft over the target area sporting an orange light seemed to be signalling to a searchlight. We assumed it was acting as a decoy for a night-fighter and the only one of us keeping an eye on it was the navigator standing at the astrodome.
The rest of us searched the allocated parts of the sky according to the book!. All our aircraft returned safely and reported good aiming. Photographs confirmed the success, but we had borrowed "M" Mother which was without a camera. The return journey was uneventful and crossing Mare Nostrum Di tuned in to the 9 o-clock news from London. The announcer Alvar Lidell read "Algiers reports that the R.A.F. Strategical Airforce in North Africa has continued to batter aerodromes in Tunisia and Sardinia, damaging runways and destroying aircraft on the ground, without loss to themselves". Someone remarked "That's one way of looking at it"!. Actually a few nights ago 142 Sqdn. had lost 2 in 2 nights. 150 Squadron had lost one but the crew bailed out. Four of the crew managed to get through the enemy lines but the Rear Gunner was wounded and there was no news of him for several weeks.
The docks at TUNIS received our attention on the night of the 17th. April, with very careful placing of 500 and 250 pounders. Direct hits were observed in the docks area and there was concentrated heavy flack. It didn't worry us, we were well below it at 6000 feet. There was lots of light flack mostly concentrated on an aircraft displaying red and green navigation lights. At one stage this aircraft came to within 600 yards on the starboard beam and we converged to about 300 yards. We clearly identified it as a Wellington and gave it a long inaccurate burst from the rear turret. On this occasion every fourth round was a tracer. The nav. lights were extinguished and the aircraft was not seen again. There was no satisfactory explanation as to the identity of this aircraft. A captured Wellington perhaps acting as a decoy but attracting most of the flak. Possibly one of ours with the lights switched on accidentally, one shall never know. Two aircraft are missing, piloted by Sgt. Chandler of 150 and Sgt. Lee of 142. One sent out an SOS and ditched but there was no signal from the other. On our return to Blida there was a blanket of cloud over the whole area and our 23 aircraft were diverted to Maison Blanche. One aircraft was known to have a damaged undercarriage, which collapsed on touch-down and was a write-off but there were no injuries. Road Transport was waiting to take us the 30 miles or so back to Blida and we finally got to bed at 6 am. We shared the lorry with Sgt. Leckie's crew who had bailed out over Tunisia on the 14th. The Squadron Leader had flown to Sousse and brought them back to Algeria. Leckie had himself crash-landed the aircraft with no hydraulics and only one engine, somewhere in Allied-occupied Tunisia.
On the 23rd. April my diary records a tedious week of activity which achieved very little. Every day we were briefed for a night op. and every day we did our Daily Inspections and air tests, but in the late afternoon the Sirocco came up suddenly and the trips were cancelled. During the week, two Albemarles crashed on the runway, both from Gibralter [sic] carrying supplies which included mail from U.K.
Our uniform since leaving West Kirby has been British Army Khaki but with shoes and no putees. Our R.A.F. blue shirts with collar and tie and also blue forage caps were not exchanged. We have no tropical
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kit and it is getting very warm here. Our aircraft "F" for Freddie, has been grounded all week with "G" George, both with a trimming box problem. The policy is still one crew to an aircraft, and we enjoyed a very easy week. On the 28th. we managed to borrow "D" Donald and bombed DECIMONANU again, this time with a 4000 lb. 'blockbuster’ and a few incendiaries for good measure. After bombing we stooged around for 30 minutes having a close look at fires on the ground. Searchlights waved about apparently aimlessly and the light flack with tracer seemed equally haphazard. At 3000 feet we were caught by one searchlight and within seconds were held in a cone of five. The lights were dazzling and the three of us manning guns all fired point blank, it being impossible to aim. In theory a combined rate of fire of over 8000 rounds per minute should have hit something worth while, but after a very short burst my four guns jammed, a problem seldom experienced. At only 3000 feet we were quickly out of range of the searchlights. We were over Blida at 0700 hours which was covered in fog and diverted again to Mason Blanche. We were not very popular at Maison B, everyone had-their own problems which were not always appreciated by others on different types of aircraft performing widely differing types of work. We were in bed at Maison B. by 1000 hrs. probably without the knowledge of the 'owners' of the beds who had spent the night in then; and there we stayed until 1700. The tinned steak pie for tea made a very welcome change. Our aircraft "F" for Freddie still had a faulty-trimming box.
It was only in the air we were able to listen to the Radio News from London, although we had a reasonable supply of current newspapers brought out by the steady stream of aircraft from U.K. On the 29th. we logged another trip to BIZERTA, this time in "T" Tommy with a 4000 pounder. Take-off was at 0005 hours and the weather the worst for flying we had yet experienced in Africa. The target was the docks and all was unusually quiet. The coast-line was visible through about 4/10ths cloud and on our first run over the docks we dropped incendiaries. Positive identification of the target, so round again to release the 4000 pounder which the press were refering [sic] to as 'cookies'. It seemed that over Germany the lads were dropping 8000 pounders. The flak and searchlights opened up simultaneously and was relatively intense. We found later that we were the first to bomb. Some had difficulty in finding the target due to cloud and the enemy was trying not to attract our attention. Again there was low cloud at Blida and we were diverted to Maison Blanche. Two aircraft were lost on the Bizerta raid, one landed at Bone (now renamed Annaba) with one engine u/s, and a 142 Sqdn. aircraft did a belly-landing on the grass at Maison B. On our return we found that Sgt. Leckie, operational again after being shot down in Tunisia, had crashed into the mountain immediately after take-off. Another 150 Sqdn aircraft crashed on take-off, barely getting airborne, and it was assumed that he had engine failure. Two of the crew actually survived the explosion. It had been a fateful night, we were briefed for take-off from west to east, with a left turn onto course. Just before take-off a strong wind developed from the west causing the duty runway to be changed from 09 to 27 and we took off from east to west. Sgt. Leckie turned left instead of right, straight into. the Atlas mountains, all killed instantly. Our own Bomb Aimer Stan had flown on a raid with Sgt. Leckie only two nights previously. When I revisited Blida on business in 1978 I was astonished to appreciate just how near those mountains were to Blida aerodrome..
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[photograph] WITH HILDA & THE SKIPPER SEPT ’43 RICHMOND ON THAMES
[photograph] BILL WILLOUGHBY NAVIGATOR AT THE PORT BEAM GUN POSITION
[photograph] NAVIGATOR & BOMB AIMER IN THEIR PITS
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The following morning an aircraft of 142 was seen to be making a peculiar approach, and just before touchdown. one engine cut and the other was going flat out, resulting in a spectacular disintegration at the side of the runway, in which no-one was seriously hurt. By the end of April we had four aircraft all Wellington Mk.10s equipped for carrying 4000 pound bombs. Bomb doors had been removed and they were said to have a special main spar.
On the 5th. May it was farewell to Blida, the war was moving east. Each crew was issued with a First World War Bell tent and this together with official stores and personal effects was piled into the aircraft. I remember the Wireless Op. Di and I putting our (stolen) palliases [sic] aboard for our Ground-crew passengers to rest on during the flight. A very thoughtful act on our part said the Skipper. It was just that Di and I intended to sleep in the manner to which we were accustomed. Our destination was Fontaine Chaude, about 250 Kms. ESE of Blida. About half way in deference to our guests we opened a tin of spam and served slices of spam followed by stewed plums from a large tin we had been hoarding. Our destination was a stretch of desert near a tiny village. After landing we pitched our tent and organised our palliases [sic] into beds with the help of a dozen or so empty boxes. Meanwhile vehicles were arriving with our squadron personnel, more stores, aircraft and by late evening we had a small township. A small marquee served as a Sgts. Mess and on the first evening we enjoyed stew and green peas followed by pears and real cream. These had been provided by the Americans on an emergency basis. The following day was spent partly on an aerodrome inspection. The war had passed through Fontaine Chaude and it was possible the Arab scavengers had overlooked bits of war material which could do damage to aircraft, particularly the tyres. There were no runways, only sand with some coarse grass.
Back to war next day and Group Captain (Speedy) Powell briefed us for a raid on TRIPANI, a naval base in Sicily. We were 30 minutes late on take-off due to delays in bombing-up. We carried only six 500 pounders instead of eight, and some incendiaries. We were 20 minutes behind the bomber stream of 26 Wellingtons. 'The bomber stream'!. This was an expression used by a newly joined crew who were very displeased with having to finish their tour in North Africa after starting it over Europe. They treated our desert war with some contempt after their recent experiences over Germany, but were reported missing about three weeks after joining us. We were in cloud shortly after take-off and nearing the target came out of it at 12,000 feet. We moved over towards a concentration of heavy flak bursts and the bomb aimer thought he had found a pinpoint through breaks in the cloud. The bombs were dropped into the area of flashes and fires on the ground but it was not a satisfactory raid. We lost two aircraft. One was seen to go down in flames over the target having been coned by searchlights. Sgt. Pax Smith, a New Zealander and crew ran out of fuel in pitch darkness and had strayed too far to the west, over Algeria. My diary records "They bailed out in an airmanlike manner but the Bomb Aimer was concussed and the Rear Gunner broke both legs on hitting the ground and rolling down the side of a hill. Three of the crew are in the rest camp at Constantine and the two inured in hospital in Algiers".
The reader might be surprised at apparent navigation errors such as this, but the only nav. aid available was a QDM (course to steer) to reach in this case Algiers, which would not have helped. We had no M/F
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Beacons on which to take bearings. The Navigator worked on his dead reckoning plot backed up by a visual pinpoint from the bomb aimer map-reading if visibility was suitable. Quite often the only aid was the Rear Gunner taking a drift reading from his turret. Over the sea the Wireless op. would drop a flame-float down the flare chute, which would burst into flames on striking the sea. The Rear. gunner would rotate his turret and depress the guns, holding the flame in his ringsight for ten seconds, then read off the drift on the indicator by his side. There was sometimes a drift indicator in the 'Nav. Office' also. The same procedure was used over the desert during the day using a smoke bomb in place of a flamefloat.
We learned that Sgt. Leckie who was killed hitting the mountain was Commissioned two weeks before his death and had also been awarded a D.F.C. for his crash-landing in Tunisia. So Sgt. Leckie was really P/O Leckie D.F.C. and didn't know it, but the end result was the same. He and our own Skipper, Sgt. Rutherford 416170 R.N.Z.A.F. had been great buddies for a long time. (or what was regarded as a long time in those days)
May 10 my diary states, a Boomerang lastnight. We took-off with a 4500 pound payload for delivery to PALERMO, the Capital of Sicily. About 30 min. after take-off the petrol cover on the port fuel tank came open and the Skipper had great difficulty in keeping the left wing up. There was no option but to jettison half the bomb load in the sea and return to base. There was an enemy air-raid in progress at Bone and we kept a few miles to the east of it with the I.F.F. on. Our own night-fighters operating from Maison Blanche were known to be very active and we had great faith in our I.F.F. We were first back of course - not really having been anywhere!- and we waited for the others in the debriefing tent. To no avail, they had been diverted and returned the following afternoon. We enjoyed an afternoon and evening off, and went by lorry to Batna, a small town about 30 miles from our base. There was little to be seen and nothing to buy and no sign of any social activity. Conversation with the natives was difficult and they were not interested in the war.
On the night of the 12th. it was the turn of NAPLES again, 21 aircraft with 90,000 lbs. payload bombed within five minutes of each other. It was a lovely night, visibility 30 miles and not a cloud in the sky. As we approached Naples we could clearly see Mt. Vesuvius and convinced ourselves we could see the thin column of smoke drifting from it. Our last pinpoint on the way out was the Isle of Capri and we gave it a short burst of .303 for good measure. A futile act but the guns had to be fired occasionally. At NAPLES we went straight in, the target was clearly visible and the one stick straddled the railway yards and industrial area. My diary records that flak was intense and said to be some of the hottest in Europe, and reading that after a lapse of 45 years causes me to question the authority for such a statement. It was a small target compared to some of those in Central Europe, and the 40 searchlights at Napoli were quite effective, but would have been more so if it had been dark. All our aircraft returned safely after a 7 1/2 hour flight, not a bad effort for Wimpies with no overload tanks. As the W/op describes it, we climbed into our pits just as dawn was breaking. By 0900 we had the option of discarding our mosquito nets and being pestered by the insects, or enjoying a turkish bath due to the heat. Our 1916 vintage bell-tent was reasonable for our crew of five although in earlier times it accomodated [sic] , goodness knows how, 22 soldiers.
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At about 1400 we were happy to get airborne again on an air test where we could cool down, but at 1700 it was briefing again. A "maximum effort" - another phrase. imported from our colleagues bashing away in Central and Northern Europe, on CAGLIARI, a port and industrial town in Sardinia. All 26 aircraft were over the target area within minutes of each other, again visibility was near perfect. Bombing heights were staggered and we bombed from 6000 feet. Our 4000 pounder landed just north of the railway yards among some tall buildings and started a fire. Our W/op Harry Dyson claimed at debriefing that he could feel the heat from our own fire when we turned in again to see the damage. Di was prone to exaggeration by this time, perhaps due to frustration of monitoring broadcasts from Base and seldom touching the morse key. We came back over the target at 2000 feet and the flames were leaping high. We could still see the flames from 70 miles away at 8000 feet on our way home. Listening to the B.B.C. we learned that American bombers had raided Cagliari earlier that day, "wiping the place out". They also claimed they could still see fires burning when they reached the African coast. In daylight too; our W/op was not alone in the exaggeration stakes. However, it was a very satisfactory raid. We were in a shallow dive when the bomb was released and is thought to have scraped the fuselage under the aircraft where there was damage to the geodetics and six feet of fabric had been torn off.
On the 15th. our crew was stood down for 24 hours and I received four letters from Hilda, the first for many weeks. At this rate of completing ops I should be home in less than three months. It was very tiring night after night, particularly as is [sic] was not possible to sleep comfortably in the heat of the day. The target was PALERMO, and three of our 25 aircraft failed to return, including Sgt. Rimmer, and Sgt. Alazrachi, the latter a Free French pilot. It is not known what happened to any of them except that one aircraft was seen to go down in flames over the target. Rimer's Rear Gunner was Joe Shields, one of the best, and the crew had been with us since O.T.U. at Finningley. Polfrey the Navigator, Cave the Bombadier [sic] and Jack Waters the Wireless-op, all very keen types.
On the 16th. it was our turn to make a fragment of history. For the very first time, the R.A.F. bombed ROME. Rome, we were told was an open undefended city, and we were briefed to fly from the mouth of the River Tiber, over the city dropping leaflets, and return at 5000 feet dropping more leaflets, then bomb the LIDO DI ROMA near the mouth of the Tiber. Our first bomb went in the river and the last one in the sea, but the rest of the stick neatly straddled the buildings at the Seaplane Base. Over the city itself, there was considerable light flack with tracer, aiming point- blank without result. Not bad at all far an open undefended city, but we were forbidden to display any hostility except dropping leaflets. Even the lids of the Small Bomb Containers loaded with leaflets were secured with wire so as not to fall on the Romans. Later the B.B.C. claimed there was no flak over Rome.
An easier trip the following night which after the event gave me a slight suggestion of a guilty conscience for the the [sic] very first (and last) time.
"Your target" said the Group Captain, "is the German 'U' Boat refuelling Base at ALGHERO, in Sardinia, put paid to it". Our bomb load was 7 x 500 pounders, 4 S.B.C.'s of 30 lb. incendiaries and 2 x 250 pound bombs. We overflew the target at 4000 feet and first dropped several sacks of
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leaflets. These were in Italian and told the people of Alghera that when we very shortly occupied their country and liberated them from the beastly Germans, they would be treated better than ever before, provided with medical aid and food, and every other possible benefit. All we need is a little co-operation and understanding from them. Having spread the gospel, we made three bombing runs over Alghero, at 3000, 1500 and 700 feet, all perfect O.T.U. practice type runs. On the last bombing run, Allan Willoughby manned the port beam gun, Dyson the front turret and the [deleted] the [/deleted] three of us fired our 7 Brownings at point-blank range into the chaos below. The sole opposition comprised two small-calibre machine guns which were soon out of action. Maybe it was a U Boat refuelling base, but only in the sense that it was a small fishing village and happened to have a jetty where drums of oil could be trundled down to a U Boat at the end of it. Our vision of a Sardinian type Lorient or Brest was soon dispelled. The BBC reported 'our bombers based in North Africa attacked targets is Sardinia lastnight'.
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For a couple of days our conversation had centred around an incident over the Lido di Roma. A seaplane base consists mostly of water; on our first run over it we had difficulty in locating the buildings and were hoping to see a tidy straight line of parked seaplanes. The Skipper decided to drop a flare and asked the Wireless Op. to arm no. 1 of 4 already in position in the flarechute. As he removed the safety pin the flare ignited and the top part of it shot through the roof of the aircraft with flames pouring out of the lower end, streaking past the rear turret.
The blinding light startled Stan Chadderton at the Bombing panel and he instantly jettisoned all the flares, undoubtedly preventing a major disaster. How easy it was to be shot down by one's own flare.
According to Intellegence [sic] reports, there were 1,100 casualties in our raid on Cagliari on the 13th., most of them having been caught by a single bomb. This figure is highly suspect but it originated from an Italian report.
On the 21st. it was a stooge over Sicily with 18 250 lb. bombs.
A convoy was within range of the Ju88 Torpedo bombers based in Sicily and our task was to try and keep them on the ground, or if they did manage to take off, prevent them from making an airmanlike landing on return. Aircraft took off singly starting at 1700 hrs.; we were the 24th. at 2045 hrs., with two others to follow. A direct flight to Castelvetrano, identify the aerodrome and one bomb away, then set course for Ciacco, same procedure, and on to Borezzo. If a flare path is seen anywhere give it priority and stooge around in that area for a while. All the bombs were dropped on the three targets and no flarepaths were seen. We concluded there were no enemy landings or take-offs, but one aircraft was seen to go down in flames into the sea; probably Sgt. Williams of our squadron who was on his first mission from Africa, although he had done several over Germany. At Castelvetrano there was lots of light flak using tracer, and we felt the heavy flak in some areas was predicted. We were not experiencing the 'thick carpets' of flak ever-present over Germany, perhaps ours was more personal, just a few batteries carefully aiming at one or two Wimpies.
It was all go, and on the 23rd. we did an easy 3 1/2 hour trip. 2 hours of which was over Africa. We crossed the Tunisian coast and reached Pantelleria 20 minutes later, an island only 7 miles in length with an aerodrome on the western side. Visibility was poor, but we went straight in and dropped 4,500 lbs. in one stick. These were plotted later as just to the south of the aerodrome. We cruised around out at sea for 20 minutes at 7,000 feet, studying four barrage balloons clearly visible at 5000 feet. On our return however there was no support for this theory from anyone else and we were told it was only heavy flak. This was of course quite possible, in poor conditions and with tired eyes imagination can take over. Within a week however, it was generally accepted that the enemy were deploying barrage ballons [sic] although not in great numbers. Most of our aircraft were not fitted with cable cutters on the leading edge of the wings. Pantelleria was an easy trip and we were advised that it would count only as half a trip towards our 35. We had generally assumed the first tour was 30 trips but it did not seem to worry anyone. The day. after the Pantelleria trip, the Squadron mascot, Wompo, or Wimpy. a pedigree Heinz 69 was killed in action. Whilst he was
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merrily chasing some small creature he was accidentally hit by a jeep driven by F/O Langlois, a pilot of 150. He was so badly damaged that one of the lads put him down with his Smith & Wesson .38.
On the 24th. we staggered off the desert in "F" for Freddie heading for Sardinia carrying eight 500 pound bombs and some incendiaries and it seemed ages before we reached even 100 feet. I was not aware of the drama in the front office, both the Skipper and Bomb Air were struggling even to keep us airborne. At about 500 feet it was not possible to maintain height and the Skipper had no option but to lighten the load quickly. Two 500 pounders were released and seconds later there was a tremendous bang from down below, but the aircraft began to maintain height. We were just within sight of the Sardinian coast with the engines overheating when the Skipper jettisoned the remaining bombs and nursed the aircraft back to Fontain Chaude. That was our second boomerang. Had we been carrying a 4000 lb. cookie the episode would have had a very different ending. By the 2nd. of June we had completed 6 more trips and moved camp further east, to Kairouan. Our patch of desert was about 6 miles west of the walled City, said to be the fifth most holy in the Moslem world. The place was very dry, and the well 100 yards from our tent was out of bounds. The R.A.M.C. and the Afrika Korps had both marked it as poisoned by their repective [sic] enemies. It was said to contain human remains, but tests carried out just before we moved on showed the water had not been polluted and was 100% fit for drinking. Meanwhile our water was delivered by two water bowsers each of which travelled 30 miles east to Sousse several times each day. Many years later the record shows that neither the Germans nor the Allies polluted any water supplies. After all, both hoped to recapture them and put them back to their own use. On the first night from Kairouan we were credited with one more trip, having completed two halves! That is, two trips to PANTELLARIA.
We took off in waves of 3 or 4 throughout the night, arriving over the target 45 minutes later. Our aircraft was "C" Charlie which carried one 4000 pounder. On the first run in we overshot, but came round again and in a typical OTU practice run, Stan Chadderton placed the bomb neatly in the centre of the small town. A 45 minute flight back to base and an hour's respite whilst the aircraft was checked, refuelled and bombed up, then the mixture as before.
On the 27th. we were piling into a lorry to go out to the widely dispersed aircraft; the nightly German raid on Sousse was in full swing when a single Ju88 came over to look at our flare path. He was clearly visible and stooged around at will for about 10 minutes before making a run at about 1000 feet dropping 3 bombs in a salvo 300 yards from the Sgts. mess. Nothing was hurt except our feelings and there was no material damage. We had no A-A guns, so the Luftwaffe did not receive the same energetic welcome handed out to us. We relied on Beaufighter squadrons for defence. The R.A.F. policy was reasonable, as the aircraft were dispersed over a wide area and a single stick of bombs would be ineffective against a single aircraft as a target on the ground. We took-off half an hour later for a tour of Sardinia, again with a payload of eighteen 250 lb. bombs. Our only brief was to stooge around between aerodromes and generally make a nuisance of ourselves. There were no allied troops in Sardinia yet so no special care was called for. Our bombs were expected to be released on aerodromes, searchlights and guns. The
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main object was to keep the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica on the ground. These trips were not very popular and provided good practice for Ju88 night fighters. We were stood down on the 3rd. June after doing two ops the previous night. We slept all morning and in the afternoon crowded into a lorry and went to the seaside. Monastir, near Sousse and we had our first baths since leaving Blida. We were in good company and had Mare Nostrum to ourselves with tens of thousands of other Allied troops. I have been there several times since and always think of the mass of naked troops in the sea. A good target for the the [sic] German aircraft? Not really, the scores of light A-A guns made it a very dicey target. The Allies must have had well over a thousand aircraft of different types in the area. The Arab town of Monastir was out of bounds to the Army but not, for some probably invalid reason to the R.A.F. We had a 'shufti' and two of us invested in a sort of haircut. Most of the inhabitants seemed to be French, Monastir having been the fashionable part of the Sousse area,
The night of the 4th. June was an unlucky one for 150 Squadron. We lost three of our 16 aircraft on the ground without intervention from the enemy. The aircraft were bunched fairly close together, having been bombed-up and ready for take-off. During a final check, a Bombadier accidentally released a flare which lay on the ground. He dashed off to find an Armourer to make it safe but within minutes the flare ignited. Within 15 minutes the whole area was ablaze and three aircraft, M Mike, A Able and P Peter, each complete with over two tons of bombs and full petrol tanks blew up. Our aircraft which was to have taken us twice to Pantelleria that night 'N' Nuts, together with seven others, was severely damaged. About half the squadron went to Panteleria [sic] , 2 half-trips and in full moonlight reported a couple of Ju88's circling the island. One aircraft returned with about 40
square feet of fabric torn off.
The following night a new target was added to our growing list, SYRACUSE in eastern Sicily, only a little light flak was encountered, and it was just a matter of bombing the water front. Our main task was in fact to drop leaflets on several of the coastal towns, working our way anticlockwise round Sicily. We passed slightly to the west of Pantelleria on the return leg and saw the Wimpies from the Western Desert squadrons bombing the island.
The exact words written in my diary are "bashing hell out of the island".
Our own Group Captain - "Speedy" Powell also went to Pantelleria but complained that his bomb did not explode. We riled him that it went into the sea. We were now seeing a great deal more of the British army and the Americans and we were realising just what small cogs we were in all the activity. We had an American guest with us when he ran us over to the Ops. Room in his personal jeep to collect lastnight's aiming point photograph. He noticed in the caption at the bottom of the photograph "280 deg.T" and remarked "Geez, mighty hot up there aint [sic] it?". It refered [sic] to our course, not the temperature, but we did not add any further complication to trying to explain.
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in the next 12 days we carried out only two raids, the first an easy one to PANTALARIA [sic], which surrendered the following day, and the second to a new target, MESINA [sic], the straits between the toe of Italia and Sicile [sic] . on the way out we passed very close to our favourite island and across Sicily to the target. The target was already marked with 14 flares by the Western Desert squadrons, and for the first time in North Africa that part of the job was done for us. I noted at the time that "the A-A defences were baffled by the number of aircraft over the target at the same time. There were 34 aircraft and only F/Lt. Langlois ran into trouble. He was caught in the searchlights from both sides of the straits and dropped from 11,000 to 2,000 feet to escape them. In doing so he flew through the balloon barrage, but without further incident.
My diary has recently been opened for the first time in over 42 years, so I have not pondered over its accuracy. 34 aircraft simultaneously over the target probably did seem like a thousand bomber raid to us!. Our Bomb Aimer that night was Ft/Lt. Casky, our own being in jail in Tunis. After our last trip to 'the' island we went to Tunis on a 48 hr. verbal pass. The Skipper had the trots, which we all suffered from time to time, and he tried to rest in the tent nearest the toilet trench. Willoughby the Navigator, Stan Chadderton Bombadier [sic] , Harry Dyson the Wireless Op and myself, Rear Gunner. We were each issued with two boxes of American "K" rations, and hitch-hiked first to Sousse and then to Tunis. The first leg was in the back of an Army lorry and the main leg up the coast road by R.A.F. "Queen Mary" which carried about a hundred of us. The whole trip took only 6 hours. The town of Tunis had been in Allied hands for 4 days and there were still a few Germans in hiding. We had given no thought to accommodation which did not seem to be important. Leaving Stan and Di in a canteen abandoned by the Germans, Wally and I eventually found an hotel near the docks area where we were able to book two rooms. I cannot recall the name of the hotel, but the address was 49 Rue de Serbie. The hotel was in very poor condition, no water, all the windows had been blown out, doors smashed, walls cracked and so on. No catering but we had our 'K' rations. Opposite the hotel was a bombed church and all around the buildings were either destroyed or severely damaged. The docks had been our main target in Tunis, and they were destroyed, with all the warehouses practically levelled out. One cargo vessel was beached and two others rested on the bottom. The Arabs were mostly friendly and told us the bomb damage in town was done mainly by 4 engined bombers is daylight, which let us off the hook. The European French were not so friendly, possibly many of them having lost comfortable homes. Some were quite abusive verbally but to others we managed to explain that we flew Chasseurs, pas des bombardiers. In our minds we had liberated the people of Tunis - and the rest of North Africa - from the Germans. We did not fully appreciate that the Arabs saw it differently. The Inglisi and Americans were no different to the Germans and Italians, and they in turn did no less for them than the French. They lived for the day when they would be left to manage their own affairs. In our wanderings around town we met a Tommy who was a Prisoner of War on a ship which had. been bombed at night a few miles out of Tunis. The ship was Italian, homeward bound and had been straffed [sic] by Spitfires during the day. The ship was spotted by two Wellington crews during a night raid on the docks, and the ship was
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bombed, then straffed [sic] from a few hundred feet. The vessel came to a halt and the 20 or so Germans and Italians abandoned ship. Three of the several hundred British prisoners had been regrettably killed in the action and all the others managed to get ashore in lifeboats and floats in the final days of the Axis evacuation of North Africa. The ship was without lights which should have been carried. Another 8th. Army private told us he was a P.O.W. being transferred from a lorry onto a boat about a week ago when about 30 Spitfires and Kittyhawks arrived and caused chaos with their 20 and 40 mm. cannon. The guards were overpowered and most of the 500 or so P.O.W.’s managed to get away. He spoke highly of the fighter pilots, convinced the attack was a very well-planned sortie to release the P.O.W.'s., not just to blaze away at anything German that dared to move. He could very well have been correct,
On our last evening in Tunis the four of us shared a battle of wine with a meal at a roadside cafe. When we were paying the bill we found there was money left over and asked for another bottle of their excellent wine. As the wine was brought over, a Sgt. M.P. standing behind us shouted "no more wine for them", after which Stan told him to mind his own business. The M.P. then grabbed Stan's arm and held it to his back, but seeing threatening movements from the rest of us, released it. Stan then turned quickly and thumped the M.P. who promptly disappeared. Shortly afterwards two R.A.F. Sgt. S.P.'s came is and asked if we had had some trouble and if so would Stan like to put in a complaint to the Provost Marshal? This seemed like a good countermeasure to a possible charge made by the Sgt. M.P. and Stan accompanied the two R.A.F. S.P.’s to the Provost Marshal's office. In reality this was the jail and as they entered the door the Sgt. M.P. set about Stan who gave as good as he got. But this was inside the jail, Stan was at a big disadvantage and about to spend the first of three nights in it. The jail was is fact next door to our hotel is Rue de Serbie. Willy and I did not suspect that Stan was in trouble, we assumed our S.P.’s were just being helpful, so we sat down again with the bottle. Perhaps Di's conscience was not quite so clear, and when he saw the S.P.'s coming he made himself scarce. We caught up with him later asking an M.P. where he could pinch a Jeep. The M.P. humoured him and directed him to an American car park with lots of Jeeps, but Di had seen a tramcar and decided to pinch that instead. Fortunately the tramcar was off the rails, and he changed his attention to the French tricolour on top of a derelict building. He climbed the building and removed the flag, then Willy and I managed to get him back to the hotel. Di's condition was not due to a session of heavy drinking, we had seen very little of anything alcoholic for a long time and two glasses of local wine would have been more than enough to really get him going.
The three of us hitch-hiked back to Kairoaun and reported the loss of one Bomb Aimer to the Skipper. The following day Squadron Leader Miller D.F.C. flew to Tunis and demanded Stan's release from jail. He had a major row with the same Sgt. M.P. who started it all and who was asking what authority the Squadron Leader had. The Squadron Leader pointed to his 2 1/2 rings of rank and the D.F.C. and asked the M.P. whether he thought they were scotch mist. Stan was released and back at Kairoaun was charged with causing an affray, resulting in a Reprimand. The Sgt. M.P. was charged and given a Severe Reprimand and reduced to Corporal.
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By the 16th. of June we were operational again as a crew. the target was again NAPLES, a 6 hour 15 min. stooge and rather tiring. There was a full moon and visibility was 25 miles. We could clearly see Pantelaria [sic] to port, and later, north of Sicily, the small island of Maritimo, just the tip of a mountain sticking out of the sea. The Isle of Capri provided a good pin-point. Over the target area there was 9/10ths. cloud so we bombed from above the flares. Flak was moderate and widely spread. There was slight consternation when one of my turret doors fell off for no apparent reason. I wondered what else would fall off but everything else seemed to be intact so it was just a matter of strapping myself in - which according to the book should be so in any case. Just after "bombs gone" I reported a twin-engined aircraft starboard quarter up at 1000 yards. The Skipper started to weave gently. and Di went to the astrodome position to search above the horizontal whilst I -theoritically [sic] at least-- concentrated on below the horizontal. This is not an easy task when the rear gunner is expected to ignore one fighter leaving it to his colleague whilst searching for others. Di became somewhat emotional to say the least, said it was not a fighter but merely flak, and then went on to give a commentry [sic] on searchlight activity and flak at least - by then- five miles away, and of only historical interest. Whilst in a turn to port the other aircraft was directly astern and I identified it as twin engined and without the high tail fin of the Wellington. The Skipper did a diving turn to starboard and we lost the other aircraft. Di claimed it was another aircraft not to be confused with the one he identified as flak! Normally Di stayed at his radio position, it was better that way. On the return journey, either there was a raid on Trapani or someone had strayed off-course. On the 18th. it was again to SYRACUSE, an exceptionally clear night, almost no cloud and a full moon. We could have dispensed with the flarepath on take-off and we felt as if we were doing a day trip. Over the target there was tracered flak up to 7,000 feet and we were geared up to bomb from 5,000 feet. We expected night fighters, and even day fighters, so went straight in at 5000 feet, bombed and straight out again, down to 3,000 feet for a quick tour of several nearby small towns and villages where we dropped leaflets. We were glad to get home that night, such met. and lunar conditions were hazardous. SALERNO again on the 21st, a routine trip, but on the 24th. of June I got a message to call at the 'Orderly Room', which in reality was the bell tent next to the C.O.'s tent. There was great discussion on which particular crime had caught up with me, but it was all very innocent. I came out of the bell tent as a Flight Sargeant [sic] much to the annoyance of the Sgt. Skipper and the three other Sgts. in the crew. It didn't help very much when I told them they need not call me Flight Sgt. ALL the time, just once in the morning and again in the evening.
In the early hours of the 26th. June we bombed the naval base of BARI in S. E. Italy, and it was an almost complete fiasco. It was not possible to see the ground due to haze, and the Western Desert aircraft had dropped the marker flares in the wrong place. Fires were started over an area of about 60 square miles, maybe one or two on the target by sheer chance. The target was a small oil refinery built especially to deal with the crude oil from Albania. Important to the Axis because that particular oil needed special treatment which, we were advised, only Bari could provide. We were now spending more and more time over the Italian mainland, for the first time we were seeing concentrations of
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lights in the form of a triangle which were assumed to be Prison and Internment Camps. On the way out we saw Trapani being bombed by our colleagues from the Western desert. The following afternoon it was too hot to sleep and I flew with Sgt. Whitehouse, a new pilot from Britain, in a brand new aircraft, 'D' Donald. We traced the path of the 8th. Army to beyond the Mareth line, at about 2500 feet. There were few battle scars; It was hard to appreciate that this was a place of such dreadful carnage so recently.
Kairouan was placed out of bounds due to Typhus, and there was nothing in the walled city to tempt us to ignore the order. The Arabs were less friendly and our revolvers were not looked upon merely as a taken of authoriity [sic] . According to a report in a Daily Mirror which took a few weeks to arrive, the lads were reported to have been given a hearty welcome by the French people in the Holy City of Kairouan. Actually there were only a handful of French remaining. Another Daily Mirror headline we found amusing was "BLOCKBUSTERS ON BIZERTA". It went an to say that "Lastnight our Bombers based in North Africa again pounded Bizerta; During the entire raid, blockbusters were dropped at the rate of one every two minutes. Absolutely correct, it was a raid from Blida, but it did not say that the raid was of 2 minutes duration and that we had only two aircraft able to carry the blockbusters. However, we looked forward to reading even an old Daily Mirror and to listen to the B.B.C. when airborne. Some of the stock phrases brought a chuckle at times 'Fires were left burning..', "Rear Gunners straffed [sic] the target..." "All opposition was overcome.." "Many two ton blockbusters ...." etc. etc, It appeared far more impressive in print than in reality doing it. Generally all we saw were explosions and dull red glows, tracer coming up and curving away passed us, and being blinded sometimes by searchlights. We did not picture at the time the loss of life down below and the damage caused to factories and buildings of all descriptions, in any cases, mostly houses. Straffing [sic] was invigorating and served to let off steam, but the supporting arithmetic was disappointing. An aircraft travelling at 180 m.p.h. (264 feet per second) over a target 360 yards in length would take 4 seconds to traverse the target. A .303 Browning has a rate of fire of 1200 rounds per min., the four in the rear turret having a combined rate of 4800 per min., or 80 rounds per second. There is time only for a 4 second burst of 320 rounds - not a lot - The Reargunner sees nothing of the target until it is passed and needs to be told when to open fire by someone in the front office. On straffing [sic] details it is likely the front turret with two guns, and one beam gun would be in use, increasing fire power by 75%, Possibly even a four-second burst once experienced at the receiving end might cause the enemy to duck next time we come by. This was an acceptable technique along a straight road. The aircraft was often fitted with two beam guns, one on each side, but only one was manned. Vision was poor from the beam positions and normally we would pass to one side of the target with one wing low. The gun on the other beam would have been aiming upwards. On the 28th 150 Sqdn. was stood down for 24 hours, but the previous night we paid a visit to SANGIOVANI on the southern toe of the Italian mainland: This was a daylight trip with four squadrons of Wellingtons to the train ferry terminal, a dock or lock which the ferry would enter and the water level be adjusted such that the level of the rails on land and ferry coincided. The train would then be shunted an or off the ferry as required. Flack was intense for
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Italian targets and there were trains both on-the ferry in dock and onshore. The whole lot was successfully reduced to a shambles but 6 of our aircraft failed to return. Our heaviest loss yet in a single night.
The 30th. of June was Willie's birthday and we celebrated it over MESINA. According to the B.B.C. we are blitzing both sides of the straits, Mesina to the west in Sicily and Sangiovani on the Italian mainland. The straits are only 3 1/2 miles wide, and carry the greater part of all enemy traffic to Sicily, entirely in German control with concentrated light flack [sic] from both sides and from ships in the middle. A trip lasting 5 1/2 hours.
The whole crew is beginning to feel the strain of long periods of intense activity. Although most of the memories are of the actual bombing ops., that was only a part of it. Aircraft had to be inspected daily on the ground and also air tested ready for the next trip, before bombing up. The Navigator had to prepare his flight plan prior to take off and this was done also on the many occasions when trips were later cancelled. All of us spent at least some time in the Intellegence [sic] Section to keep up-to-date with the position of the front line and the general trend. It was perhaps in some ways easier for us than for our counterparts in Europe. We had fewer distractions. There was no looking forward to a pint in the local pub. nor getting home to the family for a day or two. Not even the local cinema. There was very little booze to be had, I seem to remember a ration of one bottle of beer per fortnight which I used to take up on an air test to cool it down, and then give to the Armourers after landing. The batman was not going to ask "which suit and shoes are you wearing tonight Sir? " as he did later at Spitalgate. Evening wear was the same as for the rest of the day, shorts, perhaps a shirt, certainly no socks, and sandals on the feet. On the few occasions when we went out of camp we generally wore khaki battledress which we wore also of course on ops. I was finding it increasingly difficult to keep my eyes open at night for long periods, and finding it very tempting to rest my head on the guns and have a doze, but to do so would be absolutely unforgiveable. The Skipper was under an even greater strain and a six hour trip was 6 hours of concentrated effort. On one or two occasions he dozed off for maybe just a few seconds, but fortunately by his side most of the time was Stan Chadderton the Bombardier who very quickly realised the position and watched points up front. The amount of nattering in the air was on the increase, also. It was standard procedure to use oxygen at night regardless of altitude, and the microphones with their electrical heaters were built-in to the mask. Everyone was connected to the intercom system all the time except for the Wireless op. who was able to switch out his own connection when using his radio. Microphones were switched as required by individual wearers. The Skipper's microphone was switched on all the time and so too was the Rear Gunner's in danger areas. Procedures were relaxed somewhat in our particular theatre of war; we could get along quite nicely without oxygen below 10,000 feet and I don't recollect flying much above that height. Whenever I reported anything Di dashed to the astradome [sic] and objected. If the rotation of my rear turret was not rythmical [sic] both the Skipper and Navigator objected. The turret and guns presented an assymetrical [sic] shape to the slipstream with a consequent rudder effect. If I kept the turret facing starboard for too long the aircraft would do a gentle flat turn to starboard. Meanwhile the Skipper was trying to maintain a course determined by the
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Navigator who was keeping a watchful eye on his compass, perhaps not appreciating that it was the rear gunner making things difficult. Although the sides of the turret were clad with perspex, it was difficult to see through it with the degree of clarity required. In fact the perspex in front of the turret had been removed to provide a clear vision panel. Even on the ground the whole crew was getting very irritable with each other. For almost a year we had lived worked, ate and near enough slept together almost without a break, the same endless routine, and anything to which we could look forward seemed an awful long way off. Whose turn to carry the water, became a very important issue at times and would lead to an argument [sic] . After some very harsh wards we would agree that it was stupid to argue about such a trivial issue, which in turn led to a bigger argument on who started the argument in the first place. I remember Chad the Bombardier putting paid to the row one day by getting off his bed - known as a pit - and announcing "Well, I've get to go for a **, anyone care to join me'? The loo comprised a trench, 20 feet long, several feet deep and about one foot wide over which one crouched. There was a choice of direction in which to face, and one or two of the bigger chaps preferred to straddle the trench. There was no need to interrupt a conversation in going to the toilet.
By the end of June the length of tour was clarified. First it was to have been 30 trips as in Britain, then it had been increased to 40 as some trips were not very hazardous, then some of the trips counted only as halves, and the tour was again changed to be 250 hours of operational flying. The Western Desert tour was said to be 40 trips or 250 hours, whichever was the less. However, there were other things to think about. Sgt. Lee and two other pilots were paraded before the whole squadron Air Crews and called "Saboteurs" by the Group Captain, having between them written off five aircraft in taxiing accidents. Group Captain 'Speedy' Powell was a very keen type and conducted all the briefings himself, was generally the first one off the ground and first back in time for debriefing. Whilst we were resting he would sometimes return to the target in an American twin boomed lightning to try and assess the damage - or find what we had actually bombed!
On the night of the 30th. June we were stood dawn and watched 142 Sqdn. take off for southern Italy. The starboard engine of one aircraft cut a few seconds before the aircraft should have get airborne. The aircraft swung and crashed into a jeep which was waiting to cross the 'runway', killing both American occupants and breaking it's back, a complete write-off. My diary makes no mention of the fate of the crew. We had just been issued with a new aircraft, 'B Beer' and I spent most of the day cleaning the guns and turret which were still all greased up as when they left England. Normally this work was carried out by the Armourers, but I was expected to take an active interest in the guns and turrets. The guns were removed, stripped, soaked in petrol, thoroughly cleaned and reassembled, replaced in the newly-cleaned turret and then harmonised. In Britain the harmonising of guns was carried out by placing a board at a predetermined distance in front of the turret and adjusting the ring-sight and guns to line up with specific paints or circles on the board. In North Africa we placed a can or any handy object on the ground 300 yards away and pointed the guns and ring-sight at it.
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Another day-off on the 2nd. July and Jumbo Cox, a Navigator on 150 Sqdn. and I hitch-hiked into Sousse and spent a few hours in the sea. After our dip we queued for 20 minutes at a huge marquee and enjoyed the most wonderful mug of tea of all time. I have thought many times in the last 40 years of that mug of tea.
The 4th. of July turned out to be the-hottest in temperature we had experienced for a long time. We had bombed TRAPANI in the very early morning. Intensive flack and searchlights with tracer up to 5000 feet. At 2000 feet the temperature was 95 Farenheit [sic] and not much lower at 9,000 feet, our bombing height. I was wearing only trousers and a shirt and was soaked in perspiration. Even the slipstream felt hot when I put one hand outside. Apart from the oppressive heat, it was a routine trip, and we managed to sleep most of the following afternoon, in 130 deg. in the shade. The wind was from the south-west, straight off the Sahara, and several airmen passed out with heatstroke. Metal parts of the aircraft were too hot to touch and a Wellington on the ground of 37 Squadron went up in flames. On the night of the 6th, we were briefed to attack aerodromes in Sardinia, and Sgt. Chandler piloted the first aircraft off. Both engines cut immediately after take-off whilst his undercarriage was still lowered. With full fuel and bomb load he somehow managed to avoid the inevitable and landed in a cultivated area at the end of the runway. Some of the crew suffered minor injuries, but it was 40 minutes before the rest of us were given a green to take-off. The wrecked aircraft was directly under the take-off path. Seven aircraft failed to get off the ground, including ours, all due to engines overheating after running for over 40 minutes on the ground. We had also lost air pressure for the brakes. Of the aircraft which did take off none was successful in finding the target, flouted by bad weather over Sardinia. Sgt. Valentine was above 10/10ths cloud with engines overheating and deemed it necessary to jettison his bombs "over the sea". We were not generally briefed with the positions of Allied shipping convoys, but were routed away from them without being given the reason. Sgt. Valentine decided to return by the shortest route and when has bombs whistled down on the convoy the Navies took a very poor view and let fly with everything they had. This was a well-established practice on the Navy's part, so there was no cause for complaint. In all, that night was a waste of 30 tons of bombs, 4000 gallons of petrol and over 150 flying hours.
On the 7th. we visited an aerodrome at COMISO in Southern Italy, delivering 4500 lbs, of bombs. It was a new target to the R.A.F., and apparently undefended, Only three of us managed to locate it and we were lucky in the timing of our 3 flares in obtaining a pinpoint. We obtained good aiming point photograph which showed our stick of bombs had straddled the dispersal area, with the last two landing in the olive groves.
Nearly half a century later I wonder why we did not use the radio for communicating with other aircraft in providing mutual assistance. We had no V.H.F. but the TR9 H.F. R/T would have been adequate. Observing Radio silence I feel was taken to extremes, our signals might indicate our presence to the enemy, but they were aware of that in any case. They might home onto us, but our transmissions would have been brief and on a frequency initially unknown to the enemy. They were not equipped to respond fast enough to information gleaned by monitoring, neither was the area covered with direction-finding
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stations. I feel this was one of the matters where a principle had been established and which was not reviewed often enough under changing circumstances.
On the evening of the tenth of July, just before briefing we heard aircraft engines and it was like being at a cinema show. Wave after wave of Dakota transports thundered overhead on their way to Sicily. It reminded me of the film "An Engishman`s Home" and the massive formations of German bombers, but these aircraft were American and British and were definitely not making a film. At briefing Groupie put us in the picture. "Accurate timing and accurate bombing, more so than ever before" was his opening phrase. We were briefed to bomb a specific part of SYRACUSE whilst paratroops were being dropped close by and other paras were already in position ready to capture our target immediately after the bombing. Flares were dropped accurately and the target successfully bombed, although some bombs went in the sea because of its close proximity. We noted a very large fire at Catania and "a number of queer lights which suggested fifth column activity" according to my diary. 45 years later I wonder how I reached that conclusion. Looking down from about 9,000 feet on the southern coast of Sicily on the return journey, we saw the Navy shelling the coast and several searchlights on shore began to sweep out to sea. One of the searchlights located a ship and held on to it, whilst the others went on sweeping. From another ship there were just three flashes of light, and seconds afterwards, three flashes on shore, one in front of the offending searchlight, one slap on it, and the third behind it. That was one searchlight out of action, and the others switched off in sympathy. The Navy carried on firing without further interruption. My panoramic view of the action from nearly two miles above gave no indication of the destruction and agony caused by those three shots.
The following, night it was the turn of MONTECORVlNO in western Italy, a new German aerodrome. Over the target we narrowly missed colliding with Jack Alazrachi in `Q' Queenie. His starboard wingtip scored our port wing and my diary records "a very shaky do". Our stick straddled the aircraft parking area and we took an excellent aiming point photograph of 15 aircraft an the ground. It was later confirmed officially that our two squadrons destroyed 40 aircraft and damaged many more.
On the 13th. at briefing, Group Captain Powell grinned and glanced down at his flying boots and said "Yes chaps, we are in for an interesting trip, Jerry is landing a massive convoy at MESINA and we are instructed to smash it." We went out at 6000 ft. above sea level which, over Sicily averaged about 2000 feet above ground. I found it difficult to concentrate on a formal rear-gunner type search, there was so much activity. Ground detail could be seen very easily and the Tactical Air Force was observed bombing all over the island. There were flares everywhere, bombs creating havoc, flak barrages and intensive shelling by the Navies. Over our target, the flak was intense but scattered. Sgt. "Pax" Smith's aircraft was holed, something went through his bombing panel and made two big holes in the front turret. This crew, like most did not include a full-time front gunner, the Bombardier occupied the turret as and when expedient and on this occasion had just returned to the second dickie seat when the aircraft was holed. One aircraft was seen to crash and another, in flames, exploded on hitting the ground. At debriefing we learned that one Wellington of 142 Squadron was missing,
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and this was manned by six officers, five of whom had completed one tour over Germany. The sixth, flying as 'second dickie' was on his very first trip.
Another new target to us, on the 15th, CROTONIA, an aerodrome on the east coast of the toe of Italy. A routine trip out, good visibility and straight in to the taget [sic] . There were four flak batteries, but Sgt, Mickie Mortimer was just ahead of us and his first stick silenced all four. Our single stick straddled the aerodrome and enlarged the existing fires among aircraft on the ground. We stooged around for a little while watching aircraft blowing up and more bombs adding to the havoc on the ground. When all was quiet we dropped to 250 feet and went in with guns blazing and between us fired about 4000 rounds into the fires, We must have hit something. There were dummy fires to the north and south-east of the aerodrome, very unreal and no-one was fooled by them. On the way out of the target area we were followed. by an aircraft sporting an orange light, and at one stage took light evasive action, but he did not attack. Several other rear gunners reported the same experience, non [sic] was actually engaged. We were routed back round northern Sicily, as usual Trapani was being attacked and other targets nearby were being bombed. We were hoping to see the 142 Sqdn. aircraft with the blue light which we nearly shot down returning from Salerno. The Bombardier in the second pilot's seat reported two aircraft ahead, one with a white light which we assumed to be a decoy. We expected the aircraft to allow us to overtake, and whilst the one with the light drew our attention his chum would sneak is from another dirction [sic] . We lost both the other aircraft for a minute or two, then the aircraft with the light - this time a blue one - reappeared on the starboard bow at about 500 yards. Meanwhile Chad had taken over the front turret, but held his fire. He identified it as a Wimpey. The Skipper altered course and we passed about 100 feet below the Wimpy. I got a plan view of him and confirmed the identification. As he fell behind I flashed dah dah dit, dit dit dit on my inspection lamp. There was no reply from the other aircraft but it landed 15 minutes after us and taxied towards 142 dispersal, On that same trip two of us saw an aircraft at 800 yards on our port quarter up which closed in to 500 yards. He was at too great a range for our .303s, but we were ready for an instant dive to port. He surprised us by turning away to port at about 400 yards, and again two of us identified it as a Wimpey.
Enemy aerodromes continued to take up most of our effort, and on the night of the 17th. it was three hours each way to POMIGLIANO near Naples, passing round Vesuvius with it's dull red glow. The target was initially very quiet and consequently not easy to locate. On our first run in at 6000 feet, we were a few minutes early, but dead on time at 4000 feet on our second run. We were caught and held in searchlights, and the light flak was point-blank. Allan Willoughby claimed he could smell it when the Skipper asked him for a course for home after the second run-in. When Stan the Bombardier announced that we still had nine 250 pound bombs aboard, someone suggested we should jettisson [sic] them on the town. Allan suggested we strike at a village a few miles ahead but Stan refused to drop them anywhere except the aerodrome at Pomigliano. The third run-in was at 5000 feet and the searchlights got us again as soon as the bomb doors were open. We were in a cone of eight and it seemed we had the aerodrome to ourselves. The bombing was accurate and we lost height to 2000 feet, all quiet again. My part in all this had
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really been that of a passenger listening to and witnessing the drama, and I was not popular when I suggested to the Skipper that we go back at low level and put a few lights out. Chad was in favour and had the front turret in mind, Allan was not keen and didn't like the smell of flak, and Dyson thought the idea was 'plain stupid'. Dyson was probably right for the wrong reason, but the Skipper was thinking we had got away with it for well over 30 trips so far, and there was no point in tempting providence. A three hour stooge back to Blida with nothing but silence on the intercom. Other aircraft were seen in the circuit and our TR9 radio was out of order. This was a very low power transmitter/receiver operating between 4 and 8 MHz. and used by the Skipper to contact Air Traffic Control at Base. If we still had an acceptable reserve of fuel we would have gone away and returned in 30 miniutes [sic] , but fuel was low and the Skipper decided to land without any formalities or delay. This aroused the wrath of the Flight Commander who tore a terrific strip off him next day. Our report at debriefing was very different to that of Sgt. Whitehouse and crew, who said it was a wizard O.T.U. run, bombs slap on the runway, no flak, no searchlights and the whole thing was 'a piece of cake'. He had in fact been to the wrong aerodrome, Crotone, which we had pranged on the 15th. where the defences stayed silent in order not to attract attention. - an old Italian custom -. The reason for the accuracy of the searchlights was a layer of cloud at 10,000 feet, a full moon and clear visibility. We were silhouetted against the cloud even without the searchlights.
Two nights later Sgt. Whitehouse, this time officially and with the rest of us, went again to CROTONE. We were all very tired and I found it difficult to keep awake. Visibility was 15 miles with a nearly full moon and on the way out for long periods we actually enjoyed the visible company of other Wimpies. On arrival at CROTONE we were surprised to see fires already started and spent a good five minutes in ensuring that it was indeed the target, Two bombing runs were made, at 3000 feet and 1500 feet, dropping nine 250 pounders each time. The bombs were seen bursting among aircraft on the ground, some of which were already ablaze. 400 yards from the burning aircraft was a small wood which had obviously been hit and was burning merrily. My diary records "from the ground it would have seemed like Nov. 5th.
Rockets were going up and verries by the score.
Someone had pranged a pyrotechnic store."
We made a third run at 200 feet and spent some 1500 rounds at the aircraft on the ground. Other gunners did the same. We were amazed to find everything so easy, and no opposition as far as we know, our raid on the 15th. should have given them a good idea of what to expect. There were no dummy fires and still they make no effort to disperse aircraft. The absence of fighters was strange; even day-fighters would have been very effective under those conditions. One crew reserved an odd bomb for the village south of the arodrome [sic] . It had a 36 hour delay and landed in the centre of the village. Not a very nice thing to do, and an act certainly not in accordance with our leaflets. Sgt. Pax Smith the intrepid Kiwi was on the last trip of his tour and elected to hit a railway bridge near the coast. It also had a' 36 hour delay fuse and missed the bridge by 50 yards. The British army was not at all happy with Smithy's effort, they planned to use the bridge within a week or two and were going to some considerable trouble to make sure the enemy
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didn't blow it up. They hadn’t counted on Smithy, but fortunately he wasn't quite up to scratch an that last trip.
One night off and then back try the 'Big City" , the capital of Italia, not to be confused with the really big one, the Capital city of Deutchland, with which there was absolutely no comparison. It was over two months since we had been to Rome, and it was still supposed to be an 'Open, undefended City'. Our specific target was PRACTICA DI MERE, an aerodrome just to the southwest of Rome. The Groupy had made it very clear at briefing, that nothing must be dropped on Rome itself. The target would be marked by flares positioned by W/O Coulson of 142 Squadron. We had no target map but the the [sic] aerodrome was plotted on the map of Central Italy - probably half million scale -. As we were passing the island of Maratimo, Chad was in the second dickie seat, map in hand and decided to get a clearer view of Maratimo by opening the sliding window at his side. The map disappeared out of the window, but with Allan's D. R. navigation we reached the target as Coulson's flares went down. Target marking at that stage of the war in Italy was in its infancy and was carried out with flares designed for lighting up the ground. These were very different from the coloured Target Indicators used to such great effect over Germany. Bombing was not particularly accurate, but well clear of Rome itself, where there was plenty of light flak and searchlight activity which exploded the myth about an undefended city. This activity extended down the Tiber to the Lido di Roma, where the Radio Station was still operating. The Vatican was blacked out very effectively
On the 25th. we started 8 days leave, taking an aircraft back to Blida for an engine change and major inspection. We took advantage of the stores at Blida and were issued with new uniforms, shoes and anything we wanted, just a matter of signing for it, it was two years before the system caught up with me and I was debited with the cost.
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[bearer document in English and arabic]
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[photograph]
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TWO OF OUR AIMING POINT PHOTOS
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The first three days were spent in Algiers with Harry Dyson at the Hotel Radio Grand but the inactivity - or something - was too much for Harry so we returned to Blida, only to find the rest of our party had adjourned to the rest camp at Surcouf. I spent most of my time in the next few days in Blida, partly with a French-Arab family Iloupcuse Moka Mourice Bijoutier, at 11 Rue Goly, Blida. 30 years later I was able to find the area but no-one recognised either the name or the address. Like most places, Blida had changed a lot in the intervening years. I remembered it as an almost typical French village, beautifully clean, tables and chairs outside the cafes, and a very pleasant atmosphere. After 20 years or so of independence it was a very different story, and I thought a rather sad one. I made several excursions into Algiers where the Yanks had become very well organised. They had-taken over and re-organised six cinemas, all with continuous shows for about 12 hours per day, and open house to Service personnel. I visited all six. The N.C.O.'s Club in Rue d'Isley was our base camp in Algiers, where we enjoyed endless cups of tea and cakes. The Malcolm Club, exclusive to R.A.F. personnel provided a good hot meat each evening. It was on this leave that I visited the local Match Factory at Caussemille, being an ardent Philumenist - collector of matchbox labels-. The factory was at that time owned and operated by the French and I was given a conducted tour of the factory. Most of the labels presented to me at the factory are in my collection to this day. My next visit to the factory was 37 years later, when I met with a very cool reception. The French had gone long ago, only their name remained. In that area of Algiers, all the street names were written on the street signs in Arabic except one, Caussemille. This was the name of an old French or Belgian family of match manufacturers possibly difficult to translate into Arabic. I met several of the chaps from the Rhodesia training days, one had joined Coastal Command and was detached from 'U.K. to Maison Blanche on White Wimpies. It had taken him six months to complete 100 hours and he was rather gloomy about the next four hundred to complete his tour. He was in fact rather nervous, his job being mine-sweeping; I asked him "what height do you fly at?" He replied that `it was a two-dimensional job, no such thing as height'. Causing magnetic mines to blow up by flying over them at very low level could not have been very pleasant. Maison Blanche is now known as El Beda, the International airport of Algeria, not so well organised as it was in 1943, and not half so busy! Blida aerodrome is the Headquarters of the Algerian Air Force and is a prohibited area to foreigners.
At the end of our 8 days in comparitive [sic] civilisation, we were glad to collect our newly serviced Wimpey and return to Kairouan. I was immediately recruited to fly with Sgt. Stone to MARINA DI PAOLA. We stooged over northern Sicily is daylight and very close to Trapani our old favourite which had been severely bashed about. During the invasion it was subjected also to heavy Naval shelling. Being with a different crew perhaps made things more interesting, seeing how they reacted to various aspects, and I thought they had a rather strange and formal appoach [sic] . We did not see our bombs burst and our photoflash failed to go off. There was none of the usual binding we experienced with our own crew, everyone was pleasant, courteous and cheerful. At debriefing Group Captain Powell said "Good Show chaps, I expect you are glad to get onto ops at last, and that's the first one done". I was speechless but thinking about their next 44, maybe they were also. I can see "Speedy Powell" very clearly making
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that statement, a memory revived recently in the film "Target for Tonight" in which he was the Flight Lieutenant taking the briefing; the same very distinctive and distinguished voice.
On the night of the 4th., the crew not feeling particularly refreshed after its leave, our target was BATTAPAGLIA. It was daylight almost to the Italian Coast and we arrived with 20 minutes to spare, circling the target area. 'Bang on time we dropped the flares, but there were no bright lights'. The twenty minutes of sight-seeing had upset the routine and the flares were dropped on 'safe', and therefore failed to go off. We still had two flares so went down to 3000 feet and dropped the bombs through 9/10ths cloud using individual flares. 90 seconds after bombing, Stan identified the target 4 miles ahead. We had neither bombs nor flares left, and were depressed at putting up such a rotten show on what turned out to be the last trip of our tour. We could have done a spot of straffing below cloud, but instead called it a day.
The following night we waved the boys off to MASINA, and we felt rather sad that we were no longer operational. Sqdn. Ldr Garrad and crew were also no longer operational, having failed to return from MASINA. Someone suggested staying and doing another tour, but Dyson thought the idea was "stupid" - like most other ideas - and with deep regrets we said cheerio to our friends on 150 and 142 Squadrons, and climbed in the back of a lorry bound for Tunis. Pax Smith and Mickey Mortimer and crews were with us and we sat back and enjoyed the scenery, some taking pot-shots at nothing in particular with their revolvers. We had in fact lots of unofficial ammunition of 9mm. calibre, captured from the enemy. This fitted nicely into our .38 Smith & Wessons and differed from the .38 ammo. only in that it had no ejection flange at the end of the cartridge. This had the effect that we could use captured enemy ammo. but they could not use ours because of the flange.
We arrived at no. 2BPD in Tunis just in time for dinner and a cold shower, the first shower for about nine months. During our week or so in the Transit Camp, we had a sort of parade each morning and then were free for the day. It was on one of these parades that our Skipper's name was called to approach the C.O. "Sir, 416170". With no prior warning, the citation was read out and he was presented with the D.F.M. Next it was the turn of Mickey Mortimer to march up and also receive a D.F.M. I seem to recall that he did a somersault before saluting in front of the C.O., or was it a back somersault after receiving the award? either of which today seems quite incredible. Pax Smith had already received a D.F.M for his earlier exploits. My one other recollection of the Transit Camp was an old Italian Water Tanker which was used as a static water tank. It held 10,000 gallons of water and must have weighed over 53 tons when full. All 24 wheels were firmly embedded in the sand up to their axles. It was when we departed from Tunis by lorry for Algiers that one of the Canadian officers decided to hitch-hike back to U.K. and to rejoin the party at the Reception Centre. I learned later that he flew first to Algiers with the R.A.F. and then flew to U.K. with the Yanks. He was an old hand at that sort of thing, having hitch-hiked from Blida to New York and back with a colleague in less than a week.
Meanwhile the rest of us travelled the 500 miles to Algiers by lorry along the coast road, and after a few days in the transit camp boarded a troopship, the Capetown Castle, a passenger liner of the Castle line. We were accommodated in 4-berth cabins with full peace-time fascilities [sic] .
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each cabin was allocated one Italian P.O.W. who slept outside the door, and attended to the cleaning, dhobi etc. We were not impressed by the Italians as fighting men, but had no complaints of their ability and willingness in the job they were then doing. It was a very comfortable voyage and we lived it up in a manner to which we were certainly not accustomed.
After a very pleasant and restful 10 days or so we disembarked at Greenoch and I recollect forming up on the key [sic] prior to joining a train for Liverpool and West Kirby. A rather pompous redcapped Military Policeman called us to attention, right turn, at the double, march! It was more astonishment than lack of discipline which caused everyone to stay put. He was told to get his knees brown and get a few other things too, and we walked to the train, deliberately out of step. Our first steps back in England were certainly not going to be at the double ordered by Red Caps.
This was my fourth visit to West Kirby, where we were rekitted, saying cheerio to our Khaki battledress and tropical kit, documents checked, medical exam. and then disembarkation leave. It was at West Kirby that our Crew was really disbanded, very sad after working as a team for so long, but another phase of our careers was completed.
Of the Crew? Stan Chadderton was commissioned on his second tour and we have met several times in the past 40 years, but I have no news of the Skipper and the rest of the crew. Stan met the Skipper, then a Flight Lieutenant at Brise [sic] Norton at the end of the war on his return from a German P.O.W. camp. We can only hope he returned safely to New Zealand and was able to return in the farm. Allan Willoughby is thought to have ended the war as a Squadron Leader.
My association with the Wimpy was not yet over, however, it was still in use in large numbers in the U.K. for operational training, and was to remain so until the end of the war. More "Wimpys" were built than any other operational. bomber.
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[document from C-in-C]
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[photograph] C.W WITH MUM BARNOLDSWICK
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[photograph] HILDA WITH THE SKIPPER AND BOMB AIMER
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[photograph] [underlined] WITH THE SKIPPER & BOMB AIMER – SECOND HONEYMOON SEPT. 1943 [/underlined]
[photograph] [photograph]
[underlined] AT OUR CHALET AT BLIDA [/underlined]
WATSON – RUTHERFORD- DYSON – CHADDERTON & PADDY (MORTIMER’S FRONT GUNNER)
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[underlined] OUR 150 SQDN. SKIPPER SGT. STAN RUTHERFORD 416170 RNZAF [/underlined] [underlined] A WIMPEY AT BLIDA [/underlined]
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[photograph] AT RICHMOND SECOND HONEYMOON
[photograph]
48B
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[warrant officer parchment]
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[underlined] Screened [/underlined] .
September 1943 saw me at 84 O.T.U. Desborough, a Flight Sgt. with 43 ops under my belt, and that wonderful feeling of being ex-operational. For the next six months or so I was to be a "Course Shepherd", responsible for 12 Air Gunners. Desborough was a typical Operational Training Unit where, in the main, newly-trained aircrew were introduced to operational aircraft and the techniques of dealing with the opposition which was by no means limited to the Germans. There were three courses running simultaneously which gave ample scope to the Captains in making one of their most important decisions, that of selecting their crews.
For the first two weeks or so the training comprised mainly lectures and familiarisation with equipment. Air Gunners were generally able to make an early start with the flying where even on circuits and bumps an extra pair of eyes was to advantage.
The Course Shepherd ensured the smooth-running of the Air-Gunners training. There were specialist instructors for lectures on subjects such as guns, turrets and tactics, but the C.S. supervised their flying aspects and work on the range, in detail.
I particularly enjoyed the Fighter Affiliation sessions, where trainee gunners would take over the rear turret whilst being attacked by one or two Miles Masters or any other "Playmate" who could be cajoled officially to co-operate.
I would stand at the astrodome guiding the gunner with the timing of his advice and instructions to the Pilot. The standard evasive action (referred to later in 5 Group as "Combat Manouvre [sic] ") was the corkscrew, well known to, and anticipated by, the enemy, I might add that until I arrived at 84 OTU I had never even heard of the corkscrew. During the OTU excercises [sic] the fighter pilots were generally sporting enough not to press home their attacks with too much determination, but to allow the bomber sometimes to 'escape', thus giving the rear gunners - or some of them-- the false impression that they actually stood some chance of survival.
I felt quite at home in the "Wimpy" and encouraged the pilot to throw the aircraft around, and make the corkscrews rather more violent to simulate a real attack, where a quick getaway was the only solution to survival. For fighter affiliation excercises [sic] , the turret was equipped with an 8mm. Camera Gun, fitted in place of one of the four .303 Browning machine guns, the remaining three Brownings being de-armed. Each gunner plugged-in his own personal film cassette, and results were assessed the following day in the cinema.
Air firing excercises [sic] were supervised, where the speed of the Wellington was reduced, and a Miles Master would overtake about 3 or 400 yards abeam, towing a drogue. The gunner would be authorised to fire when the towing aircraft was outside his field of fire. He would then fire off about 200 rounds from each gun (five 2-second bursts), at the drogue. It was more than likely that air firing during his initial training had been carried out using a single gun not mounted in a turret. Air to ground firing was limited to a single exercise on a range near the coast, there being little scope for this type of work for heavy bombers over Deutchland.
Not very popular with the coming of Winter weather were the exercises at the firing butts or range. Six trainees would each be given a rear turret, together with four belts each of 200 rounds. He would
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mount the guns and fit the ammunition belts. Take-off procedure with safety catches 'on', then firing a few short bursts, landing procedure, clear the guns, etc. . Generally a few faulty rounds were deliberately built-in to create gun stoppages which the trainee had to clear. Finally he removed the guns from the turret and stripped and cleaned them ready for the next trainee.
All this took about three hours and it was on one of these sessions that unpleasantness developed with one of the trainees. Of the 12 Air Gunners in my little flock, eleven were Sergeants and one was an Acting Pilot Officer on probation. Like the others, his previous flying experience was limited to about 8 hours, and he had not yet been within 10 miles of an operational aircraft. He had been top of his course at Gunnery School and granted a Commission. I found that one of the Sergeants had fitted the guns in the turret and armed them with the belts of ammunition for him whilst I was busy with the others. He had managed to fire-off the rounds, and eventually, with some assistance the guns were removed. He flatly refused to clean the guns, claiming that it was an inappropriate task for an officer. I put it to him that although on a squadron the guns would be lovingly cared for by the armourers, he must still be fully au-fait with every aspect of guns and gunnery. He firmly refused to touch the guns and soil his hands and I told him that unless he gets on with it, we should be late for lunch. Four of the sgts. each took a gun and cleaned them. Some very cryptic comments were made by the Sergeants and I told the Ag. P. O. he was foolish. Later that day, to my absolute astonishment, I was marched in front of the C.O. and charged on a form 252 with insubordination. I was advised that an N.C.O. does not give orders to officers and I replied with something to the effect that I was the instructor and the officer the pupil, giving orders was an essential part of the job. Nevertheless, I was severely reprimanded. I had on several occasions applied for a posting back to operations, and the following day the Station W.O. told me my request had been granted and I was going to a squadron at Norton, near Sheffield in Yorkshire. Which squadron and with what type of aircraft was unimportant. I had never heard of Norton, bit hush-hush they had said. I should have realised that something was amiss, I was not being posted, but only detached. On arrival at Norton I found I was on an Aircrew Refresher Course which I was slow to realise was a correction or discipline course, a form of punishment. There were about 150 aircrew at Norton, from Flt/Lts to Sgts, almost all operational or ex-operational. At least I was among friends.
The day started with a call at 0600, on parade at 0630 , march to breakfast and an inspection at 0730 with greatcoats, followed almost immediately by a further inspection without greatcoats. This was followed until 1800 by sessions of drill, P.T. and lectures, with a break for lunch. Drill was just ordinary uninspiring square -bashing, wearing aircrew-issue shoes, and not boots. The instructor, said to be an L.A.C. Ag-Sgt. shouted commands and abuse, and was indeed very smart and probably efficient at his job, but utterly ignorant and useless off the barrack square. There was no rifle drill, and requests to introduce it were rejected. It was too easy for us to obtain .303 ammunition. P. T. was equally uninspiring and great emphasis was placed on recording improvement in performance as the training progressed. Lectures were farcical and covered most aircrew subjects, including navigation, gunnery, bombing techniques, target marking, etc. etc. There was not a
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flying badge among the instructors and obviously none had any flying experience in any capacity. No-one could possibly take the lectures seriously and there must have been some hair-raising answers in the written tests. The main problem was that at the slightest provocation one could be put on C.O.'s report. This was not a formal charge - which would have been on record - but an interview with the C.O. which would generally wind-up with an award of an extra 3 weeks at Sheffield. My policy was to keep my head down, or in modern parlance, to maintain a low profile. I generally managed to be near the back of the classroom and in the rear ranks on the drill square trying to be invisible. We were allowed out of camp after 1900, with an inspection at the gate, but lights out was at 2200, not allowing much scope. Most evenings were spent in the mess comparing notes and discussing our "crimes"; the instructors were conspicuous by their absence. I recall no-one admitting to flying or taxiing accidents, or misdemeanours whilst flying. Most of the reasons seem to have been absence without leave probably through boredom-, saying the wrong thing in an off-guarded moment or making someone more senior look silly. There was no connection between Norton and aircrew who were alledgedly [sic] L.M.F. or those who were reluctant to fly. Rather than charge a man formally with an offence, the easy way out was to send him on a "refresher course" with no reference to alleged crime or punishment. Operational aircrew discipline is often quoted as having been unique. All jobs were carried out with the same degree of dexterity, and responsibilities in the air within a trade were the same irrespective of rank. The Pilot was the Head Man, whether Squadron Leader or Sergeant. In the air, there were no formalities. The Pilot was 'Skipper' and no-one called anyone 'Sir'. This was generally so on the ground within the confines of the crew, but if it was a non-crew matter or there were V.I.P.'s about, a low-level type of formality might be introduced. Neither was there time for formality in the air where an attack may start and finish - one way or another - in seconds or less. On sighting a fighter at 300 yards a Rear Gunner in a film picked up a microphone and was beard to say "I say Skipper, I think we are being followed". A Guardsman might come up with "Permission to speak Sir", but life's not like that in the air.
Nearing the end of the 3-week course at Sheffield came the farcical final exams. I sailed through everything except P.T. where we were required to run 100 yards in 14 seconds. I was feeling fitter than I had for many years, but that 100 yards took me 17 seconds. Not good enough, try again. The second attempt took 19 seconds and the third attempt 24. I was told that "we would keep doing it all bloody night until I achieved it in 14 seconds". I merely said there was no point in attempting the impossible and I refused to carry out an unlawful order. So for me it was C.O.'s report next day. The C.O. said it was within his power to grant me an indefinite extension to the length of my course. I realised that to argue was probably futile and I recall being contradictory by saying something to the effect that "I have nothing to say except to remind everyone there is a real war going an out there and the sooner some of us get on with it the better". I don't know why I said it or thought what it might achieve, but I was easily provoked. I was awarded an extra 3 weeks at Sheffield, and was very surprised next morning when I was issued with a railway warrant to leave that morning with the others on my "course". I was convinced this was a mistake and succeeded in remaining invisible until I was well clear of Sheffield.
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Most of us felt the invasion of Europe was imminent and we had discussed our plans in the mess within earshot of the 'instructors'. When the balloon goes up, we return to base regardless of the opposition on the grounds that it was our duty to escape from captivity. In retrospect this was not entirely logical thinking but it might have influenced the C.O., I don't know. As far as I know there was no mass exodus and I have no idea how or when R.A.F. Norton was finally closed down. Suffice to say that it was a disgrace and an insult to aircrew, it would have been far more British to charge a man if he had allegedly done something wrong rather than take this easy way out. In general, training and lectures were taken very seriously by air crew and it could be claimed that the type and standard of lectures at Norton were in fact dangerous. Most of us realised it was just a load of absolute rubbish and did not take it seriously, and we had learned long ago to assess the value of the spoken word relative to the background and qualifications of the speaker.
The question of L.M.F. is an even more deplorable but entirely separate subject. Books have been written about it and it became a highly controversial issue. There were indeed some chaps who took such a bashing they felt they had had enough and to continue would increase the risk to the aircraft and crew or even crews. Most other operational aircrew have no less respect for them for admitting it and asking to be excused. L.M.F. and R.A.F. Norton were totally unconnected.
However, feeling very fit physically, and mentally ready to deal with the Ag. P. O. who knew all about the form 252 but couldn't strip even a Browning gun, I returned to 84 O.T.U. Desborough. A written request for an interview with the C.O. was given to the S.W.O. within minutes of arrival. I saw the Gunnery Leader and learned that I was to resume charge of the same course but less the sprog officer who was last seen on his way to Eastchurch as L.M.F and unsuitable for operations. I found later that he had been reduced to the ranks. It seems the other instructors had given him a very hard time all round, and particularly with combat manouvres where he was sick every time he flew. It was just not done to issue 252's but his chances of survival were improved. The C.O. agreed later that a mistake had been made and on paper my case had been reconsidered and the severe rep. withdrawn. Sheffield could not be undone and would have to be written off to experience, but he would see if he could hasten my promotion to W.O. and a posting to a real squadron.
At this time, the O.T.U. instructors were all crewed up and ready to back up the operational squadrons if necessary. Many of us were getting restless seeing a great increase in ground activity to the south and southeast. Lots of real aircraft, Lancasters, Halifaxes, Mosquitoes, Gliders etc. etc. and our status with the Wimpies as ex operational did little for our ego, making us feel like the 'has beens' we really were.
At about 0200 on the 6th. June, now a Warrant Officer, I was Orderly Officer and asleep in the duty room. The Duty Officer, a Ft/Lt. was flat out in the other bunk. A message was delivered marked "Top Secret" and I awakened the Duty Officer. He told me to open it. The message caused his to open a sealed envelope from his pocket and his exact words were "Christ, it’s started". 'It' was "Operation Overlord". Within a minute the Tannoy was blaring "All Duty Flight personnel to their flights immediately" 'All sreened aircrews to the Briefing Room
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at 0500," and so on. There followed a day of intense activity; air tests, bombing up, briefing, changing the bomb load, rebriefing, and the job of Orderly Officer went completely by the board.
In July, the great moment arrived, and our complete second tour crew of five was posted to Aircrew Pool at Scampton en route ultimately to a 5 Group Squadron.
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[photograph]
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[photograph] AT AIRCREW POOL SCAMPTON AUG ‘44
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[underlined] SCAMPTON [/underlined]
For Wellingtons we were indeed a complete crew, but we were not destined for Wellingtons, but Lancasters, and we needed either a Navigator or Bomb-aimer and another Gunner. Our Pilot and Observer had already completed tours on Blenheims and were good material for Mosquitos. They said cheerio on our third day at Scampton and were posted to a Mosquito Conversion Unit. The remaining three of us had ceased to exist as a crew and had become “odd bods”. We began to feel like members of staff but eventually we went our individual ways. Indeed I was put in charge of the Night Vision Centre for two months, until I met a pilot who was a Flight Lieutenant with a tunic that had obviously seen some service, and he had over 3,000 flying hours to his credit. With him was a Flying Officer Observer plus DFM, obviously clued up and who looked the academic type, a cheerful Flying Officer Bomb aimer and a Pilot Officer Rear Gunner. Four clued-up characters forming the nucleus of a gen crew. Somehow or other I became their other gunner and we were joined by a second tour F/Sgt Wireless operator and a Sgt. Flight Engineer ex fitter. A few days later we were posted to Winthorpe to 1661 Heavy Conversion Unit and settled into a course on Stirlings, flying together for the first time as a crew.
Familiarisation with a four-engined aircraft was the main purpose of the course; important to the skipper F/Lt. Chester who had been a Flying Instructor on Tiger Moths in Canada for a long time. He was about 8 years older than the rest of us and we were happy with his rather more mature approach to the job. The Flight Engineer, Sgt. Hampson, whom we called Doogan for no apparent reason, had flown on Liberators over Burma and nothing seemed to worry him unduly. F/O Pete Cheale was successful on two or three practice bombing sessions, and to F/O Ted Foster DFM it was all just routine stuff. F/Sgt. Frank Eaglestone’s radio was the same as on his previous tour, the good old R1155 and T1154 (still in service in 1960). The Rear Gunner was P/O Harvey who nattered endlessly about a chunk of flack [sic] still embedded somewhere about his person, and his first tour in general. He knew it all, or thought he did, but it soon became apparent that his experience was very limited and he had yet to do his first trip against the enemy. Because of this I insisted that he should have the mid-upper turret, and as Senior gunner, pulling a negative seniority in rank, I would take over the rear turret. He didn’t like that at all, and he left the crew. What became of him I don’t know, but Flt/Sgt Foolkes appeared from somewhere and took his place. Pete was one to take everything in his stride and was welcome to either turret. He preferred the mid-upper, possibly finding it more comfortable, being much taller than the average rear gunner. As for me, one rear turret was very much like another, the same Frazer Nash FN120 we had used on the later Marks of Wellington. A few mod cons perhaps, such as Hot air central heating in the turret. I recall that when we touched down on the runway at Winthorpe, the rear turret was still over the graveyard on the other side of the main road.
Whilst at Winthorpe, I found that 150, my old squadron, was about 20 miles away at Hemswell. I paid them a visit, but their only real link with the 150 of North Africa was the squadron number. 150 Squadron had been disbanded in Algiers though it’s final station was Foggia in Italy. I left
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it at Kairouan just before the move to Italy. Later it was re-formed with Lancasters and in theory had been in action since the beginning of the war, having been at the forefront with Fairey Battles in 1939-40 in France.
After about three weeks of routine and not very demanding training we graduated to the “Lanc” Finishing School” at Syerston. There we converted to Lancasters with about 14 hours flying, circuits and bumps, the odd practice bombing exercises, fighter affiliation and a Bullseye over London, co-operating with searchlights. Just what the Londoners down below thought of this aerial activity without an air raid warning was probably misconstrued. We were still in one piece, feeling fit, very confident and ready to join a squadron.
Our next move was to Bardney, near Lincoln, about 160 bods, and judging by their ranks and gongs, a rather experienced bunch, mostly second tour types. Bardney was the home of 617 and 9 Squadrons, rumours were rife of course. Were we obvious replacements for 617, where prestige was high and directly proportionate to the losses, - the highest in the Command? Our luck held, we were to become a new squadron, 227, just an ordinary Lancaster Squadron to enhance the might of 5 Group. It transpired that we were to become “A” Flight, and the Skipper was promoted to Squadron Leader. Meanwhile “B” Flight was forming at Strubby.
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[underlined] 227 SQUADRON [/underlined]
The first op. by aircraft of the newly-formed 227 Squadron was on the 11th. of October 1944 and most of us at Bardney were not even aware of it. Only three aircraft of "B" Flight, forming up at Strubby, were involved, a short early afternoon trip to FLUSHING. Three nights later "A" Flight provided three aircraft and "B" Flight four aircraft on a more typical raid by 240 aircraft of 5 Group on BRUNSWICK. The Squadron was beginning to take shape and on the 17th., two aircraft of "B" Flight joined 47 others on a short excursion to breach the dyke at WESTKAPELL. Two nights later was a 5 Group effort to NUREMBURG, with "A" and "B" Flights providing seven and five aircraft respectively. This fourth raid by 227 aircraft was only "A' Flight's second involvement, the aircraft and crews really becoming attached for this purpose to 9 Squadron.
On the 21st. October we were transferred to Balderton, at the side of the A1 near Newark and joined the crews of "B" flight.
Our Skipper had been promoted to Sqdn/Ldr. in command of "A" Flight, and was very such absorbed in getting his half of the squadron organised and operational, with little time left for actual flying. Our crew was kept busy in their respective sections, particularly Navigation, Bombing and Wireless, but there was not a great deal to be done in the Gunnery office: The Gunnery Leader was Flt/Lt. Maxted who occupied a small office in a sectioned-off Nissen hut. It was barely furnished with a desk and a few chairs; posters on the wall amplifying the vital issues and a notice board. The state of readiness of each aircraft and gunner was displayed with a record of daily inspections completed. The D.I. 's were an important part of the routine, and the gunners generally took part in the air tests prior to bombing up.
Our first mission as a crew was to Bergen in Norway. It was also a personal first trip for the Skipper, Bomb aimer and Flight Engineer. It was my 46th. op. but also my first in the mighty Lancaster. The Navigator, Wireless op. and Mid-upper gunner were all veterans having carried out their first tours on Lancs.
Our flight out over the North Sea which used to be called the German Ocean by some was uneventful, and Bergen was approached from the east at 10,000 feet. With the target ahead and in sight to those in the front office, all was quiet except for engine noise through someones [sic] microphone which had been left switched on. Peace was shattered by an almighty bang and shudder, confirming we had been hit, and the nose of the aircaft [sic] went down. I was forced against the left side of the turret unable to move, and found later the speed had built-up to over 370 mph. The Skipper was shouting for assistance. Ace the Navigator somehow managed to crawl forward a few feet and found Doogan with his head in the observation blister admiring the view of Bergen above. The Skipper had both feet on the dash trying to pull the aircraft out of the dive. The only control Ace could reach was the trimming wheel on the right of the Skipper's seat and he turned this to make the aircraft tail heavy. The nose came up and so did the target. The Flight Engineer added his contribution by exclaiming "Coo, i'n' [sic] it wizard". That was his opinion, but we were heading straight up the fiord and Ace brought this to the attention of the Skipper very smartly. Our height was down to 1500 feet and Ace and the Skipper somehow managed to turn the aircraft through 180
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degrees without hitting either the sea or the hills. Still tail heavy, we gradually climbed away to the west, and for the first time I saw the target, dead astern, always a welcome sight, and I set about sorting myself out from the intercom. leads, electrical heating cable, oxygen pipe and also checking that the turret doors would still open. Silence was broken about 100 miles from Bergen by our brash young Canadian Bomb Aimer, Pete Chiele, "Skipper, we still have the bombs-aboard". I think It-was Ace, who pulled the jettison toggle. At least my turret seemed intact and I took the opportunity of the lull in the drama of opening the turret door with my elbows, leaning backwards into the fuselage and making sure I could reach my parachute pack. Then a quick reversal and I was again "on the job” after a break of less than ten seconds. On the Wimpey and Lanc. the Rear Gunner had a choice of exits, either through the rear escape hatch inside the fuselage, or direct from the rear turret. I was well rehearsed in the latter method, first to rotate the turret dead astern, using the manually operated handle if there was no hydaulic [sic] pressure, then to open the sliding doors. These never failed to open on practice sessions, but an axe was provided inside the turret just in case. Then to remove the parachute pack from its housing and drag it carefully into the turret, placing it above the control column. Off with the helmet complete with oxygen mask, intercom, 24 volt supply and associated pipes and cables and also the electrical heating cable connector. The parachute pack was then clipped on, the turret rotated onto either beam, lean backwards and push with the feet. The alternative exit gave one more room to manouvre [sic] , but the escape hatch itself was rather narrow for a Rear Gunner wearing his full flying kit, particularly the 1944 version of "Canary suit", so-called because of its colour. There was also the phsychological [sic] aspect of deliberately entering an aircraft which was probably on fire. On the Wellington Mk1C with an FN20 turret and only two guns, there was provision to stow the 'chute pack inside the turret. Also the doors were hinged, opening outwards and they could be jettisoned. Although I mentioned being well rehearsed, drill was carried out with the aircraft stationary and upright, not quite the same as in an anticipated emergency bale-out. My only excuse for claiming the checking of my 'chute as practice was that I felt I should be doing something more useful than just sitting there, whilst there seemed to be so much happening up front. There was even more drama unfolding, the Wireless op. had passed a coded message to the Navigator instructing us to divert to Holme on Spalding Moor in Yorkshire, but only the W/op was issued with the code-sheet of the day. The Skipper did not receive the message in plain language until we were in R/T contact with Balderton, which was closed due to thick fog or very low cloud. However, the Navigator knew our exact location and there was fuel in the tanks. Eventually we re-joined the tail-end of the gaggle and landed at Holme. I recall spending the rest of the night on the floor in the lounge of the Sgts. Mess. The following morning we took a walk around the hangars and Doogan chatted with some ground crews who were changing an engine on a Halifax. He actually told then they were not going about it properly and their reaction was quite startling and informative.
Our second trip as a crew was two days later, to WALCHEREN in daylight. This was more reminiscent of our raids from North Africa except that 110 aircraft, including 8 Mosquitoes, took part. From North Africa our "Maximum Effort" had been two squadrons, a total of 26 aircraft, which
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seemed a lot at the time!. 12 aircraft from 227 took part, each having its own specific target, ours being a gun battery which was already completely submerged in water when we arrived. Just ahead several aircaft [sic] were bombing the sea wall and the Skipper decided to back them up, bombing from 3500 feet. The wall was breached and the sea poured through, but our bombs were all fused for delayed action which would not have amused the natives. In fact too much damage was done which, according to a story in Readers Digest, took over six months to repair. However, the main object was to silence the German artillary [sic] and this was achieved. This particular trip had been our introduction to the "formation" known as the "5 Group Gaggle". Pilots were not very practiced at Straight and level flying, it had been seldom recommended, and it seemed to me as a Rear gunner that everyone weaved along in the same direction, taking great pains to stay as far away as possible from other aircraft, but remaining in the stream.
Two days later Ches. and Co. joined 16 other crews from 227 on an afternoon excusion [sic] to an oil plant at HOMBURG. The ground was mostly obscured by cloud and visibility at 17,000 feet was poor, about three miles. Approaching the target a Lancaster in front of us was hit by flak and one engine was on fire. The aircraft passed below us and the fire was extinguished, but its no. 2 engine was stopped. It remained just behind us until we were over the target. The target was marked by 8 Mosquitoes of 8 Group, but marking was scattered over a wide area and out of the 228 Lancasters only 159 bombed. Results were poor, a recce. next day showed that most of the bombs had hit the industrial and residential areas. One Lancaster was lost, due to flak.
The following night 15 aircraft of 227 joined a total force of 992 aircraft on DUSSELDORF. Our Skipper flew as Second Dickie to F/L Kilgour, and the rest of us kicked our heels. This was the last heavy raid on Dusseldorf by Bomber Command, and 18 aircraft were lost. F/O Croskell and crew failed to return, our first 227 Sqdn casualties, but news was received shortly afterward they were safe in Allied hands. They were operational with the squadron again in Feb.
On the 11th. of November, we surprisingly found ourselves on the Battle Order for an evening raid on the Rhenania-Ossag oil refinery at HARBURG, close to the battered Hamburg. This was a 5 Group effort with 237 Lancasters and 8 Mosquitoes. 7 Lancasters were lost, including 9J"S" with F/O Hooper and crew. F/O Bates' crew reported that "oil tanks were seen to explode at 1924 hrs". but German records make no reference to the oil tanks, only that 119 people were killed and 5205 others were bombed out. Flak was not intense and the bombing appeared to be mainly on target. There were fighters about but the return journey was uneventful for us. Once again we were beaten by the fog at Balderton, and as our new F.I.D.O. was not yet operational, we were diverted to Catfoss. The night was spent in the chairs in the Sgts. Mess, but the officers among us were luckier to find beds.
For most of the following four weeks we were without either a Skipper or a Navigator. The Skipper was detached "on a course" and then spent a couple of weeks on a Summary of Evidence. Ace the Navigator was detached to Newmarket racecourse to clue up on some new equipment or technique. For three days I was detatched [sic] to Waddington as a Witnessing Officer at a Court Martial, which I found depressing. It seemed that at Waddington there had been an old car which was used by anyone who could find some petrol to run it. It was the property of an unlucky aircrew
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member who failed to return one night. The car was very useful, but whilst having neither licence nor insurance it was eventually involved in a serious accident, and the R.A.F. took over where the civilian court left off.
0n the 6th. December I had a letter of complaint from my mother, enclosing a newspaper cutting from the Barnoldswick & Earby Pioneer, showing a photo of me and referring to my award of a D.F.C. Why had I not told her? I don't think she ever believed me when I claimed that her letter was the first I knew of it. On Dec. 11th., with Ace still at Newmarket, we became 'Dambusters' - of a sort - for the day. Bomber Command Diary states " "233 Lancasters of 5 Group and 5 Mosquitoes of 8 Group took part. Hits were scored on the dam but no breach was made. 1 Lancaster lost". The squadron diary reflects a successful sortie, in that direct hits on the dam wall were observed, but the 1000 lb. bombs were too small for the purpose. My own recollection of the raid was quite different. We were stooging along just above cloud in company with scores of other Lancasters when the others were seen to be doing a 180 degree turn. Within seconds the sky within my range of vision was empty and in all directions no-one could see another aircraft. The mid-upper and I advised the Skipper that we were now unaccompanied and for 20 minutes we tried to impress upon him that we were extremely vulneruble [sic] (or words to that effect). We were just a few hundred feet above and silhouetted against a layer of stratus and I asked him to fly just inside the cloud, or at least just to skim the tops, but he replied that it was too dangerous, too much risk of collision. The mid-upper gunner agreed, collision from Gerry fighters. Vocabulary worsened and finally the Skipper realised we were 40 minutes and over 200 miles from the rest of the gaggle, we turned round. It has been suggested that as Flight Commander he must display a press-on attitude, and we were all in favour of this, but there was no-one around to impress and it was pretty obvious to the gunners that either Frank had missed a diversion message or we were in the wrong gaggle. Bomber Command Diary disproves the latter, but there is still uncertainty in my mind about that particular operation. Both Pete in the mid-upper turret and I realised that if we were attacked by fighters the Skipper would not take the slightest notice of our requests or advice. We were not disputing that the Skipper was in charge and the one who makes the decissions [sic] , but in our situation he had no choice other than to take advantage of the cloud. We regarded this as an expression of no confidence in the gunners, and we made it very clear to him both then and later that it was no way to finish a tour.
It was 10 days before we flew again, our 6th. trip with 227 embarking on their 22nd. trip as a squadron. The target was the synthetic oil plant at POLITZ, in the Baltic. 207 Lancasters and 1 Mosquito were detailed, including 13 Lancasters of 227. Two from 227 experienced mechanical failure and aborted soon after take-off. This was a long stooge, and 3 Lancasters were lost, plus a further 5 which crash-landed in England. The raid was successful, the main chimneys having collapsed and other parts of the refinery being severely damaged. On return to eastern England we were again unable to land at Base due to weather, and were diverted to Milltown, in Scotland. Fuel gauges were reading zero or less when a weary Ches. and crew finally landed after a trip lasting 10 hrs. and 15 minutes. F/O Croker in 9J"K" wound up at Wick, in Morayshire, his aircraft being so badly shot-up it was declared
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a write-off. The following morning we flew to Wick to join F/O Croker and crew and give then a lift back to Balderton. Among others, there was a Met. Flight at Wick, equipped with B17s, Flying Fortresses. It was their job to climb to a great height, making Met. observations, and some of their trips exceeded 12 hours duration. I recall the armourers at Wick cleaned and polished our three turrets and 8 Browning guns without being asked, and making a very good job of it too. Everyone was provided with beds, and it seems the officers were so comfortable the Skipper decided to stay at Wick over Christmas. The town of Wick was "dry', no pubs, but among the N.C.O's, this made no difference, we had no money with us. Normally on a diversion we didn't need any money, but for a several day stop-over it was embarassing [sic] to be absolutely without. We would like to have taken our turn in paying for the drinks is the Mess. I seem to recall trying to obtain an advance from Pay accounts without success, accompanied by the other two W/Os in our crew. I was reminded of one incident at Wick by Ace, our Navigator; We were not like most other crews, sticking together as a crew. The Commissioned officers kept to themselves, the three Warrant Officers maintained their own little triangle, and Doogan prefered [sic] his own company despite the W/O's efforts to get him to join us. It seems that one night at Wick we carried him and his bed outside and he awoke next morning in the middle of the parade ground which was covered is snow. I have no personal recollection of this, but there it is in black and white in Ace's book, 'Just Another Flying Arsehole'. We returned to Balderton on the 27th., with 14 of us aboard, and did not see the ground until we actually touched down. For the first time we landed with the assistance of FIDO, which was probably very scary for the pilot. In the rear turret I just got an impression of landing in the middle of a fire.
The following night we missed a trip to OSLO, our squadron providing only 5 of the force of 67 Lancasters. On the afternoon of the 30th. we were briefed for an evening take-off to HOUFFALIZE, a total force of 154 Lancasters and 12 Mosquitoes. German Panzers had broken through the American lines in a desperate attempt to thwart the Allied advance, in what became known as the Battle of the Bulge. The weather gave the Germans the advantage, low cloud and thick fog prevented the 2nd. Tactical Air Force from playing its part to the full. With almost 100% Allied air superiority in the area, Typhoons and other fighters operating on a cab-rank principle responding in seconds to detailed requests from the chaps below, Gerry was learning what it was like to be at the receiving end of the slaughter he started is 1939. But not for that few days at the end of 1944 in the Fallaise gap. The close proximity of Allied troops called for great accuracy in bombing and straffing [sic] , and this was not possible in the prevailing conditions. Because of the bad weather in the target area, take-off was postponed every few hours but we were eventually relieved to get airborne about 0230. Conditions over the target were quite impossible and the flares dropped into the murk below probably caused hearts on both sides to miss a few beats. Some crews did bomb, but Chas. quite rightly felt it was too risky. We had not been briefed for any secondary target so our bombs wound up in the Wash. Finally, we landed at about 0830 after 24 hours of effort of one sort or another. Nothing really achieved, but at least we had tried.
It was about this time that my father visited the Squadron for a few days. He was a Captain in the R.A.S.C. recently returned from East
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Africa and awaiting release on medical grounds. He was very impressed with what he saw but we could not obtain authority for him to actually fly with us. On the Sunday morning he watched our parade and later mentioned that as the W/O called out names, one Ft/Sgt responded to at least five of them. Also that some were in best blues, some in battledress, one or two with greatcoats and one even with a raincape. Two were actually standing on parade with bicycles ready to shoot off somewhere immediately after the parade. His thoughts at the time were how can such an undisciplined lot perform any serious task. Later that morning sitting in the Gunnery Office, gunners came in with more of a wave than a salute, a brief word from them and I would put a tick on the board against their aircraft. I explained to my father that this was their way of reporting that their turrets and guns had received and passed the daily inspection. After lunch in the mess he noticed a great deal of activity and movement, and a clear but quiet sense of urgency. He asked what was happening and I showed him the Battle Order.
The following day he said how wrong was his first impression. Everyone had a job to do, they know what was required of them and they got as with it without any shouting of orders or people stamping around. I was Duty Gunnery Leader that night, as was my lot quite often over that period, and was able to show my father what made a squadron tick. He thoroughly enjoyed his stay, but I don't think he met the Skipper. In fact I don't think we saw anything of our Skipper during the whole month of January, by the end of which 227 had completed 33 ops. "A” Flight Commander's crew had totted up only 7 as a crew and some of us were not at all happy with this performance. On the 2nd. Feb. F/O Bates was short of a Rear Gunner and I could have kissed him when he asked me to deputise for WO Bowman. This was an experienced and popular crew who had already completed 14 trips of their second tour. Bowman was in fact the only one outside our crew I had known a year ago. We had carried out our first tours together on 150 Sqdn. Wellingtons, and he was the only other 227 bod with an Africa Star. I cannot recollect why he was not available that night. Our target was KARLSRUHE, a 5 Group effort of 250 Lancasters and 11 Mosquitoes, of which 19 were from 227. Cloud up to 15000 feet and the consequent difficulty in marking caused the raid to be a failure. 14 Lancasters were lost, including 9J"D" with F/O Geddes and crew. The total effort of Bomber Command that night was 1252 sorties. Targets included Wiesbaden's only large raid of the war, and Wanne-Eickel, neither attack was regarded as a success. Very little was achieved that night for a loss of 21 aircraft.
On the night of the 7th. Feb., F/O Bates was airborne again with 11 others from Balderton in a total force of 188 aircraft, to the Dortmund-Ems Canal. All 227 Sqdn. a/c returned safely, but 3 were lost in all. I was not with him this time although W/O Bowman was not available. After about 5 hours sleep the Battle Order for the coming night showed 18 crews from 227 sqdn., including F/O Bates, with F/O Watson as Rear Gunner. It felt great to be doing something useful. The weather en route was clear and there were still fighters about, largely responsible for the loss of 12 Lancasters, but the bombing was extremely accurate. According to Speer, the German armaments minister, the oil refinery was kaput for the reminder of the war and a big setback to the German war effort. All 227 sqdn aircraft returned safely, one, F/O Edge's 9J"B" having aborted with problems on 2 engines and landed safely at a farm in Norfolk. It was in fact F/O Bates’ 18th. and final trip on
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227 sqdn., a very satisfactory finish. It was a satisfying night too for 'our own' Navigator, Ted Foster who flew as a 'spare Bod' Navigator with F//Lt [sic] Pond. On the 14th. Feb., 6 weeks into what surely must be the final year in the war against Germany, we were no doubt startled to see our Skipper and crew on the Battle Order. A 5 Group effort, the target was ROSITZ oil refinery near Leipsig [sic] , a force of 232 Lancasters and Mosquitoes, including 12 from Balderton. Our aircraft was 9J"H" and a couple of hours or so after take-off the Skipper found he could not come to terms with his magnetic compass, the performance of which was erratic. An hour or so later the Giro compass also started to play up and fortunately the Skipper did accept the advice of the Navigator and turned back, navigating solely on "Gee" back to base. It was not possible to carry-on navigating to the target on "Gee", we would have [inserted] 14/2/45 Rositz [/inserted] been out of range long before the target was reached. 9J"G" skippered by F/O Tate had engine trouble just after take-off and returned on three engines. We were the second aircraft to abort on that trip. There were some ribald comments next day when the Instrument Section reported there was nothing wrong with either compass. The comments were not facetious however, no-one would seriously accuse either the Skipper or an experienced Navigator like Ace of pulling a fast one. Both I am quite sure would have preferred to take part in the destruction of Rositz This was in fact the Skipper's final trip, although we did not realise it at the time and still regarded his as our Skipper for the next two months.
The record shows that in the following four weeks Ace did three spare bod trips whilst the rest of the crew passed the time somehow. The spell was broken for me when F/Lt Hodson asked me to take over his rear turret on the 14th. of March. Ace had already done his last bombing raid although he too might not have realised it at the time. His grand finale, quite fitting was a daylight 1000 plus Bomber raid on DORTMUND on the 12th. of March, as Wing Commander Millington's Navigator. It was also to be the Wingco's final trip before swapping his duralumin pilot's seat with a little steel armour plating at his back, for I think a wooden one in the House of Commons where his back was probably just as vulnerable.
Our target was another oil refinery, at LUTZKENDORF, a typical 5 Group effort of 244 Lancasters and 11 Mosquitoes, 15 of the former being from Balderton. We enjoyed the company of F/O Howard as 2nd. Pilot. In fact five aircraft from 227 Sqdn. carried 'Second Dickies' that night. Out of a total of 18 aircraft lost, two were from 227 Sqdn., both with Second pilots. It was feared by many that carrying a Second Pilot increased the risk, but I did not share this concern. The Second Pilot it is true would take the place of the Flight Engineer who would either stand between the two pilots or sit on the dickie-seat. Some drills had to be slightly modified for the occasion, but I would have thought the presence of an extra bod would tend to put the others more on their toes. The crew I was with were on their 18th. trip and had been with the Squadron from the outset. Nothing untoward happened to us, there was the usual flack and searchlights, maybe fighters but one saw none. Bombing seemed reasonable well concentrated and photo-reconnaissance next day showed that 'moderate damage' was caused.
On the 7th. of April the squadron completed its transfer to Strubby, and was detailed for action the same night. I was favoured to fly once more with F/Lt Hodson and crew, LEIPZIG again, this time to the
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Benzol plant at MOLBIS. 13 Lancasters of 227 joined 162 others and 11 Mosquitoes, all from 5 Group. The weather was good, bombing accurate, and the oil plant put completely out of action. No aircraft were lost and the raid was considered a 100% success.
After a few hours sleep we were briefed for an attack on LUTZKENDORF, the same target as on the 14th. March. It had been attacked the previous night by 272 aircraft from 1 and 8 Groups who caused only moderate damage. I was detailed to fly with W/O Clements and crew who were on the 5th. trip of their first tour, in 9J"Q". On take-off the starboard outer engine failed and Ace who waved us off said he saw the aircraft sink to within a few feet of the ground; but that few feet made all the difference and the Skipper was able to gain height gradually until it was safe to jettisson [sic] the bombs in the sea. The trip was aborted and a safe landing made at Strubby. Subsequent inspection showed a fuel leak from no.2 port tank and oil leaks from the two outer engines. 242 aircraft were on this raid, and 6 were lost, but another oil refinery was put out of action for the rest of the war. The 19 aircraft put up by 227 all returned safely and were diverted to the west because of weather.
Two nights later, on the 10th. I was again with W/O Clements, to the Wahren Railway yards at LEIPSIG. The force of 230 aircraft comprised 134 Lancasters, 90 Halifaxes, and 6 Mosquitoes, of which 1 Lancaster and 1 Halifax failed to return. Immediately prior to take off I had trouble with the turret sliding doors, they wouldn't close, but I rotated the turret onto the port beam as was general practice for take-off with the doors open. This was spotted from the ground and the Skipper was told on R/T soon after we were airborne. I had to get out of the turret and through the bulkhead door to fix them, but finally managed to get then to slide. If I had failed to fix then nothing would have made me admit it, it would just have been a little draughty. The trip went very well, the marking was accurate and the bombing concentrated. Some flak and plenty of fighter flares about but we saw no fighters. It was a quiet return trip and all 227 aircraft returned safely.
That was my last trip and also the last for W/O Clements and crew. It was the 57th. involvement by 227 Squadron which was to carry out 4 more bombing raids, terminating with BERCHTESGADEN itself, on the 25th. of April. The war in Europe was virtually over, but our impression was that 5 Group was to form the nucleus of Tiger Force to help finish the job in the Far East and we would be a part of it. It was with these thoughts that I went on leave on the 26th. April, a spare bod without a pilot, but still expecting to fly again with the squadron..
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[photograph]
[photograph]
[photograph]
64A
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[photograph] [photograph]
F/O. CHEERFUL CHEALE R.C.A.F.
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F/O BATES F/O PETE CHEALE (BA) W/O PETE FOOLKES
S/LDR CHESTER (PILOT) F/O FOSTER
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[photograph]
[photograph]
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64C
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[photograph] F/O. TED FOSTER D.F.M.
C.W. PETE FOOLKES MID-UPPER
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64D
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[photograph] CLIFF’S OFFICE
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[photograph] OUTSIDE OUR DES. RES.
C.W. & GEOFF HAMPSON (FLIGHT ENG
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[newspaper cutting of D.F.C. award] [photograph]
227 SQDN W/OP – NAV – MID- UPPER
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64F
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[photograph] [underlined] TED (ACE NAV) FOSTER D.F.M. BALDERTON NOV 44 [/underlined]
[photograph] [underlined] RUNNING UP ON HOMBERG 1/11/44 AT LUNCHTIME [indecipherable word] [/underlined]
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[photograph] [underlined] F/O. BATES [/underlined]
[photograph] [underlined] F/O BATES W/O JENNERY (NAV) SGT. WESTON (FLT. ENG) [/underlined]
FEB 45
64H
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[DFC citation]
64L
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[letter from HM George VI]
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[Sgt Mess Wick Christmas Menus 1944]
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F/O CROKER’S LANCASTER AT REST IN TORPEDO DUMP XMAS ‘44
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[inside of christmas card]
CHRISTMAS CARD FROM PETE IN CANADA
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[photograph]
STIRLING AT H.C.U. WINTHORPE
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AT BLIDA
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LANCASTER AT SYERSTON
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[letter of introduction to airfield manager in Iran]
154A
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F/LT. MAXTED (GUNNERY LEADER) PETE FOOLKES & F/O SANDFORD (SPARE GUNNER OR SQDN ADJ)
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TED FOSTER WITH BITS OF 9JO
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64J
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[photograph]
GEOF. HAMPSON FLT. ENG.
[photograph of 9J-O]
[photograph of 9J-O]
64K
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[christmas card]
CHRISTMAS CARD FROM PETE IN CANADA
64P
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[typewritten letter]
[underlined] PART OF F/L CROKER’S LETTER WITH XMAS 1990 CARD [/underlined]
64Q
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[location map for 1994 reunion]
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[underlined] FINAL LEG [/underlined]
Recollections of events in my final 15 months in the R.A.F. are reasonably clear but somewhat hazy of detail and of the order in which they took place.
I was still with the Squadron on VE Day, the 5th. April, on leave in London with Hilda. I recall going up to Leicester Square by tube train with my father, Alice and Hilda to join the celebrations and actually walking back the five miles to Lavender Hill in the early hours. This would explain why I had no knowledge of the Victory Parade at Strubby until I was shown a photograph of it many years later. I was on leave again in London in early August when the Americans dropped the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and suddenly the war was over. I was still in uniform and had to await my turn for demob.
I have no recollection of attending a Reselection Board when I was made redundant from flying, nor of actually leaving the Squadron. I think my first posting after the Squadron was to Gravely, as a Squadron adjutant. I had always thought that the Squadron was 106, but according to the Bomber Command War Diaries 106 was never at Gravely [sic] !. There is no mistaking the actual station, however, it is only 4 miles from my present home and parts of it are still recogniseable [sic] . I was astonished to find many years later that 227 Sqdn had transferred to Graveley about the 8th. of June and was disbanded there on the 5th. of September. I was there for about 6 weeks during which time we closed the Sargeants’ [sic] Mess and did a very little paper-work. We had neither aircrews nor aircraft, it was just a matter of holding office and very little else!. I probably spent most of it on leave.
I then became a Photographic Officer u/t and did a very interesting course at Farnborough which lasted 8 weeks. One of the instructors was a Sgt. Peter Clark, a leading Saville Row fashion photographer before the war and Hilda’s first employer. I went on leave yet again and was eventually told to report to 61 M.U. at Handforth in Cheshire as a u/t Equipment Officer. I duly reported to the Station Adjutant at Handforth feeling very much out of place. Of the hundreds of service types around only the ex-Air-Crew were in battle dress, the others were either in best blues or dungarees. I had always thought that battledress was the working uniform of the R.A.F., but it was not so at Handforth. I felt more as if I was in the Luftwaffe. The Station Adj. took me to see the Chief Equipment Officer, who was a Wing Commander and this feeling became even stronger. I reported formally and the C.E.O. said “And what the hell are you supposed to be?”. Those were his exact words and I did really wonder whether we were in the same air force. I replied that “I am here as a u/t equipment officer Sir”. “MM what’s your trade?” “Rear Gunner” – without waiting for the ‘Sir’, he exploded and almost shouted “That’s not a trade, it’s General Duties”. He was technically right but raising his voice unduly went on to add “You are supposed to be able to sit here and do my job, you’d feel a bloody fool doing my job, wouldn’t you!”. Fascinated by the smirk on his face and hypnotised by the Defence medal on his breast I just stood there in disbelief at this outburst and quietly laughed. “Well?” He wanted an answer and I said in a rather light vane “Yes Sir I would, but less of a bloody fool than some would have felt doing my job for the last three years”. That was it, he stood up and said “Right, come”. We went along the corridor and straight in to see the Station Commander, a Group Captain. The WingCo[sic] was very agitated and without preamble
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told the Groupie of my ‘gross insubordination’. He recited the dialogue in accurate detail and the Group Captain asked for my account. I agreed with the C.E.O.’s account but said that I was provoked, there was no reason for his outburst and I grinned only because I didn’t think he was being serious. Invited to comment the WingCo said he had been affronted by my being improperly dressed. I made no further comment and the Groupy told the WingCo that he would deal with the matter. The WingCo saluted and left, and I thought I was for the chop. The Group Captain sported R.F.C. wings and had obviously seen his share of action. He stood up and extended his right hand in friendship. “Sorry old chap, I didn’t get your name, do sit down”. I was back in the R.A.F. He asked “Where were you in Africa?” Not an idle question, followed by “Did you know Group Captain Powell?” Yes Sir, he was our Base Commander of 142 and 150 Squadrons, Speedy Powell of “F” for Freddie”. Speedy had been the Briefing officer in the film ‘Target for Tonight’. I mentioned some of his exploits and finally his loss, and the Group Captain was distressed. He told me that like the other 12 ex-Air Crew on the station, I was a square peg in a round hole, but to make the best of it and to go back to see him if I had a problem. In the mess that evening I met the others and soon found we were all on duty every day and every night. u/t Orderly Officer, then Orderly Officer, and through the whole range of Asst. Duty Officer, Duty Officer, Fire Picket, in-line Fire picket, Cyphers, Security, etc. etc. Only the ex Air-Crew Officers performed these tasks and after two weeks of this we agreed something must be done. One period of 24 hours I was Duty Cyphers Officer. This was just a title, there was neither Cyphers Section nor Intellegence[sic] Section and I found that for almost all the duties we were allocated there were no instructions. Several of us individually addressed the Station Adjutant in writing and one even enquired whether he should draw-up his own set of procedures for inclusion in Station Standing Orders. For reasons that could only have been sour grapes, there was a measure of ill-feeling between the ‘permanent’ equipment and Admin officers, and the air-crew types. Many of the former had spent the entire war at places like Handforth, and there is no doubt they did a vital job, and maybe were still doing it. In our case, the war for us was over, and after our experiences of the last few years there was a limit to the amount of being messed around that we were willing to accept. We discussed having fire drills with real fires and creating a few incidents for practice, but finally we drew lots and two of us applied through the C.E.O. to see the Group Captain. The C.E.O. refused permission so we made our request through the Station Adjutant. This was approved and we told the C.O. what was happening, we were being “imposed” upon from a great height. He called in the Station Adj. and told him that all Air Crew Officers would go on indefinite leave the following day. He told the two of us to ensure that all application forms were with the Station Adj. by 3 pm. And for me, it was straight to Whitehaven, in battledress.
I had applied for release from the Service under “Class B”, having an immediate job to take up which would in itself create work for 5 other ex-Servicemen. Hilda was in fact holding the fort in Whitehaven, and nothing came of the application.
It was about four months before I was recalled to Handforth, and immediately detached to no. 7 Site at Poynton to take over as Equipment Officer i/c and also as Officer i/c. the Prison Camp. There was an Equipment W/O running the Stores with about 200 Airmen and I agreed with him that it could
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stay that way. The Stores comprised 8 massive hangars full of equipment. I regarded my main job as O.C. the Stalag with its 1000 P.O.W.’s (750 Italian and 250 German) and my staff of 15 Air Crew N.C.O.s who had all been kriegsgefangener themselves. The Senior German prisoner was a Warrant Officer who spoke excellent English having studied it for 5 years in prison camps. Most of the prisoners, including the Italians, had been taken in the Western Desert. The Germans were very smart indeed, in contrast to the Italians, and the two axis partners had as little to do with each other as they could arrange. Gangs of prisoners were guarded by some of the 200 Airmen, supervised by ex-AirCrew NCO.s. The prisoners were not interested in escape, there would have been no point, but I put an immediate stop to their sneaking out of camp at night to try their luck. The German and Italian messes were separate from each other and staffed by R.A.F. cooks. The Germans asked if they could do their own cooking and I agreed but with nominal supervision of two airmen in case we had visitors. I made the same arrangement for the Italians but initially they refused. I appointed one of the Corporal Majors as Senior Iti [sic] and made him responsible. I threatened to fully-integrate them with the Germans if there was any nonsense, and with that some of them nearly burst into tears. They were a lazy shower. I had the Officers’ Mess all to myself, but that’s another story. It was a very cosy three months, with most long week-ends spent in Whitehaven where Hilda had taken-over the Relay system. It was also a tremendous anti-climax to the previous five years.
Eventually when the magic number 26 came up, I reported to R.A.F. Uxbridge for demob. and collected my pin-striped suit and a cardboard box to put it in. I realised then that my career in the R.A.F. was initially over. Straight to Whitehaven by train, still in battledress.
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[underlined] FIRST TOUR TARGETS [/underlined]
[table of targets and bomb loads]
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[table of targets and bomb loads continued]
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[underlined] 2nd TOUR [/underlined] [underlined] 227 SQUADRON [/underlined]
[table of targets and bomb loads with additions]
[underlined] 227 SQUADRON [/underlined]
After flying Beaufighters from Malta the Squadron folded in August 1944. The new Squadron was formed in 5 Group on 7/10/1944. Flying Lancasters from Bardney, Balderton and Strubby. Flew 815 sorties and lost 15 aircraft (1.8%) in 61 raids. 2 were also destroyed in crashes.
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[underlined] Back to Civvy Street [/underlined]
By early 1946 the great transition from War to Peace was taking place and many of us were gradually realising that we could now plan some years ahead with a very good possibility of surviving to carry them out. Of my colleagues at Metropolitan Relays, only Reg. Weller had paid with his life, having been killed in action in Italy, with the army. Allan Cutbush had been taken prisoner at Tobruk and spent some time in a prison camp in Italy. Eventually he escaped and spent a couple of years as an Italian farm worker. Soon after the invasion at Anzio he rejoined the Allies and had the greatest difficulty in convincing them that he really was a Private in the Royal Signals. Alan was first to be demobbed and rejoined the firm as manager of a newly aquired [sic] group of branches in the Mansfield and Retford areas. George Holah had left in 1939 to join the army, and spent the next six years in India, returning as a Major in the Indian army complete with an Anglo-Indian wife and family. George did not return to Relays, but joined the Metropolitan Police, and in 1975 was a Clerk in the Central Registry at New Scotland Yard. How he managed to transfer from being a private in the British army to a Commissioned Officer in the Indian army I don’t know, assuming it actually happened. I have not met George since 1939.
In June 1945, my father, Mrs. Kilham and Mr. Moulton bought privately another run-down radio relay system, West Cumberland Relay Services, Ltd., in Whitehaven, and I was invited to develop it. Although Germany had capitulated, the war was not yet over. Japan might have seemed a long way off but was still our Enemy and the job had to be finished. Meanwhile Hilda moved to Whitehaven and set-up home in the flat above the shop at 49 Lowther Street. Colin was then 9 months old and it was a further year before I was demobbed, but during that period I seemed to have spent most of my time in Whitehaven. Hilda kept the Relay ticking over, with very limited assistance from the staff, until March 1946 when I was given indefinite leave on compassionate grounds.
The relay was well and truly run down, with about 400 subscribers each paying 1/3d per week for two radio programmes. It was losing money fast, the entire network needed rewiring and the amplifiers and other equipment were just about a write-off. I had with me the name-plate from my office door at Poynton. One of the German prisoners had made it for me, a notice which proclaimed in Gothic characters
Obr. Lnt. Cliff. Watson D.F.C.,
LAGER COMMANDANT EINTRITT VERBOTTEN
I put this on my new office door, but drew a line through the bottom line.
Sorting out a fault on a 100 watt amplifier, I asked the engineer, Joe, for a soldering iron, and he said he never used one but preferred the special solder in a tube, which he handed to me. In that single sentence he had proved to me that his technical knowledge was just about zero. I demonstrated the solder’s futility by proving that it was not even an electrical conductor. Consequently all the equipment was full of dry joints and I spent a whole night in soldering connections. The stuff Joe was using out of a tube was for repairing small holes in pans and kettles. I was very disappointed in Joe, his technical
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knowledge was effectively less than zero. The next weekend he claimed to have worked all day Sunday clearing a line fault. He had deliberately caused this fault on the previous morning and I traced and corrected it myself within an hour of his doing so. He had shorted out two wires on our own roof and on Monday morning went straight onto the roof to remove the short. I was there waiting for him and sacked him on the spot for sabotage and dishonesty.
I thus took over the technical side but also looked closely at the system of collecting and keeping records of accounts and customers. The only record of payments was in the collector’s field book and there was no record of where the customers or relay installations actually were. I spent a week with the collector who was very reluctant to assist, and Hilda and I drew up a set of records and established a working system. In the next two weeks I found so many fiddles and had proof of so much skulduggery that I sacked the collector without notice. I found installations where the user claimed to have made one outright payment to the collector who had pocketed the money, a hundred or so loudspeakers recorded as being “on loan” which had in fact been paid for and all manner of other private arrangements. The collector was easily replaced, and Mr. Fee joined us. I was fortunate too in meeting Bert Wise, ex Royal Navy P.O. Telegraphist who had been on Submarines, and who took over the technical aspect including the outside lines. Bill Campbell, ex Royal Army Service Corps driver/mechanic was very quickly trained on installations and line work, assisted by John Milburn, a school leaver. John had a very broad Cumbrian accent and initially I found communication difficult, “As gan yam nar marra” meant “I am going home now chum”. I felt I ought to be replying in French or something other than English.
Bill Campbell’s first job was to take the train to London and bring back a vehicle. It was a new Hudson NAAFI wagon completely fitted out by Met. Relays and full of cable, bracket insulators etc. My first act was to buy a set of maps covering the area to a scale of 1:10,000, and display it on the wall. The idea was that if we could establish exactly where we were we stood a better chance of knowing where we were going. A basic plan for the overhead lines was derived and we worked as a team, stripping out old wiring, checking and replacing where necessary, and keeping a record of installations connected. When an installation was serviced and documentation complete we fitted a capacitor in the loudspeaker for technical reasons and a new programme selector switch. The capacitors were to prove very useful later. The service we had to offer at that time was poor, and although it was gradually improving, we were spending far too much time on fault-finding, diverting us from the main program. Within a month it was very clear that our top priority was to rewire and re-equip. I managed to convince the London Office of this and they sent me a team of 3 wiremen from London, led by Dennis Horton who was inherited as a foreman at Mansfield, complete with two Dodge trucks and tons of installation materials. For four months this team concentrated on rewiring for four programmes, gradually reducing and finally almost eliminating the line faults.
The receivers and amplifiers were at Harras Moor in a cottage, but this was at the end of a two mile line, too far from our main load. We ran a 6-pair cable the whole distance and used these as 600 ohm lines, to feed five 1 KW amplifiers at Lowther Street. A bank of 6 AR88 receivers was installed at Harras Moor and two “straight sets” on loop antennas for the BBC Home and Light programmes. In town we had 210v. DC mains and had to fit rotary
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invertors. We also installed a 9KVA petrol/paraffin engine-driven alternator for use during power cuts, which were all too frequent. I could never understand how the grid system could sustain power through seven winters of wartime industrial production and as soon as the war was over we had to live with power cuts. Harras Moor was providing us with four good radio channels, Home, Light and Third BBC, Radio Eirein, Luxembourg, Paris, New York and others from around the world. We were getting organised and I was able to concentrate on sales, keeping our own gang of three busy on new installations. Within two years we had 2,200 installations, including the two Music Halls, cinemas, and all the factories. In addition we were doing more than 90% of all the Public Address work in Cumberland, some of which were quite memorable. At Grasmere Sports the events included a Fell Race and the first year we gave a running commentary over our P.A. system. The runners were out of sight near the top of the fell, so for the following year we applied to the Post Office for permission to use an H/F radio link to cover the gap. This was refused, “you will have to apply for a telephone”! The following year Bert Wise and John Milburn climbed the fell with an Aldis Lamp and battery, and established themselves where they could see the runners at the top and the ‘ops room’ on the showground. I too had an Aldis lamp and Bert flashed me the numbers of the runners as they reached the top of the fell. This delighted the spectators but completely upset the bookies who alone had the complete information in previous years.
The Post Office were also upset, claiming they had a monopoly on signalling, but declining to put it to test in court. I suggested that to try and licence boy scouts to signal in morse code with torches was ludicrous. I enjoyed the atmosphere of these events and went to quite some lengths to obtain the appropriate marshal music. At a Conservative Party fete one particular rather rousing piece was played several times and I was asked by a retired General why the Hell I kept playing the Red Army March Past.!!
A month after taking over, Hilda and I went for a walk - with the pram - to Hensingham, about three miles inland, and I was surprised to see Relay wires between chimneys and lots of downleads. I had not expected to find another system so close and I checked at some of the houses, asking who provided the system! I was told it was owned by a builder called Leslie but it hadn’t worked for several years. Leslie was the fellow from whom the company had bought West Cumberland Relays, and on checking with him I found it was part of the ‘system’ we had taken over. Further search showed a line of poles stretching for about two miles across the fields which had originally linked the village to the lines in Whitehaven. It also showed that a whole area of Hensingham had no electricity, ideal for relay. There was already a big housing estate and this was being extended, and I decided there was adequate potential in the village, but to replace the trunk route to it would be too expensive. We compromised by obtaining four modified 50 watt Vortexion Amplifiers and four receivers from London. Fred Wright brought them by road in his small van, the logo on the side of which was “Radio Trouble-shooting Service”. I did my very best to put up a case for keeping the van, to no avail. The next day we installed the equipment in an air-raid shelter at Hensingham, as a temporary measure, and immediately started connecting subscribers. Within a few weeks the wiring reached the side of the village where the lines from Whitehaven went across the fields, and we began to replace one pair all the way to link with Whitehaven. With this in operation on the third channel we were able to switch
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off one of the Hensingham amplifiers. Later all four programmes were fed from Whitehaven and the station in the air-raid shelter dismantled. The amplifiers were put to use at Whitehaven Hospital and the Workhouse. Both places were wired for 4 programme relay, but at the flick of a switch microphones could be switched in for announcements, and in the case of the latter, to broadcast concerts from the stage.
It was at Hensingham that I found a row of about 30 terraced houses, all without electricity and all wired with three twin cables of different sizes. This rather intrigued me and I enquired further. Most of the houses had battery driven wireless sets which used a 75 volt dry battery for H.T., a 2 volt accumulator for L.T. and a 9 volt grid bias battery, and in one case I found one of these sets without batteries but connected to the 3 pair cable. The old lady owner said it had not worked for several years. I quickly found the man who recharged the accumulators and he confirmed that the cables I had seen were once used for providing power supplies to radios. I think the system must have been quite unique. Shortly afterwards, the houses were connected to the relay system. My only regret is that I didn’t buy up those radios and store them for 50 years. As more and more installations were connected on the Woodhouse estate, the load on the five mile line gradually became too heavy with a corresponding reduction in line voltage and therefore volume. To overcome this we rented an air-raid shelter from the British Legion on the estate and fitted 4 amplifiers to take the load. These were fed from the incoming line itself, but for emergency use we also fitted receivers. Later the receivers came in useful for about three months during reconstruction of an area over which our main line had been fitted. One of the radio dealers found that we were using local receivers and that they were subject to radio interference from vacuum cleaners, so he had a sales drive in the immediate area of our receiving station with rental vacuum cleaners at 1/- per week. Reception gradually deteriorated but after three months of emergency operation our main line was again complete and the receivers switched off. Reception then was near perfect on our system and dreadful for the rest when the vacuum cleaners were being used. He had put a lot of time and money into trying to wreck our system, and had a double-fronted shop in Lowther Street, but I was sorry to see his shop with a bicycle in one window and a Bible in the other when I left Whitehaven..
On a new housing estate where 5 new houses were commissioned each week, we took a gamble and wired them all. When the first tenants moved in the loudspeaker was playing and the tenant’s radio problems were resolved. After 3 or 4 weeks I would go along and generally sign them up. Some of them of course compared it to their own ‘wireless’ if any, which could not possibly reach our standard of reproduction and reception. There are very few places in and around Whitehaven where we had not fitted microphones and radio, and after reaching near saturation in two years there was little scope for further development.
Whitehaven had been a very satisfying experience, but was marred by the Williams Pit disaster where 160 miners were trapped underground and lost their lives. John Milburn’s father was among them. It was traditional for the eldest son to take over where the Dad left off, and we were very sorry indeed to lose John. Hilda had run the office and “showroom” assisted later by Connie Sim from St. Bees. Bill Campbell was still our mainstay on the lines.
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I handed over to Bert Wise, still wearing his Navy P.O.’s hat, and moved to Wandsworth as Development Manager for Metropolitan Relays. A flat was available for us above the shop at 111 Garratt Lane, but on arrival we found it occupied by squatters. For several weeks we lived with Hilda’s parents until the squatters moved to the second floor and we took over the first floor. They were a decent couple in their forties, and had been desperate for accommodation. Our shop had been empty so they moved in, knowing that when an eviction order was issued by the court, they would be allocated a council house or flat. It was a short-cut to the top of the housing list, and the firm had to go through the motions of demanding court action. The ground floor was established as a showroom, even with T.V. in the window, an impressive amplifier room and an office with the same old sign on the door, Lager Commandant!
The original plan was to develop the area working outwards from Garrett Lane and to use the linesman from H.Q. at Lavender Hill, but there was line work to be done from the very outset and it was this part of the job which would be the limiting factor in our rate of progress. I insisted that we employed our own gang of wiremen. Bill Cutler was my wayleave expert, and having planned the main basic routes of our main lines, it was Bill’s job to find out who the landlords were and to obtain their formal permission to fit our wires on or over their property, generally between chimneys. The easiest way was first to sell the relay service to the tenants and their order was used as the reason for our request to fit the wires. We started to run four main lines, no.1 along Garrett Lane to link up with the Lavender Hill system at West Hill. No 2 made a beeline west along Garrett Lane to a Council-owned housing estate which at the time had no electricity. No 3 went due south to Southfields and along Merton Road, over the Redifon buildings and on to Putney, and No. 4 went north towards Wandsworth Common. Everyone on the staff except me, but including Bill Cutler and the linesmen was given five shillings commission for each new customer they signed up. The average wage at that time was £7 per week (in London) and there were few days when the gang did not hand in the paper-work and deposits for customers they had signed up and probably already installed in addition to the day’s work allocated to them. Quite often we would have thousands of leaflets distributed to houses in a particular area which was proving difficult but which they needed to cross.
At about this time, my father retired and went to East Africa, settling at Kirksbridge Farm, Kiminini, 10 miles west of Kitale on the Kakemega Road, and about 260 miles from Nairobi.. He sold his controlling interest in Metropolitan Relays to Seletar Industrial Holdings, Ltd. and their representative, Colonel Slaughter, took over as Chairman. Mr. Moulton became Director & General Manager and I was Development Manager with sufficient shares to qualify for a seat on the board. At the time T.V. was still in its infancy, though beginning to catch on, but the main background entertainment would be the wireless for some time to come. Transistors were still in the experimental stage and Radio Relay provided an alternative to cumbersome and relatively expensive valve radios, with near perfect and trouble-free reception. As Development Manager I made sure I was not bogged down with routine day to day running, and at the outset established a reliable Manager at Garrett Lane, Jack Thompson, whose knowledge of the business was gleaned entirely from Bill Cutler and myself with on-the-job training. Bill had been with Radio Relay since about
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1930, except for during the war when he was a technician in the R.A.F. on Link Trainers.
I was asked to have a look at Yeovil in Somerset and see whether it appeared suitable to establish a relay system, and if I felt it so justified, to spend some time there making a detailed study. I spent a week studying the layout of the town, types of housing, probabilities of future development, the people and their attitudes and in discussion with the Borough Surveyor and Town Clerk’s office staff. I realised that Colonel Slaughter had been a senior army officer and also a senior civil servant for a long time, and that my future relationship with him depended to a large extent on the impression he gained from my first formal report. I recommended that it was a border-line proposition and included a financial budget for 5 years. It would be three years before the system was breaking even and this was too long. The Capital required was too high unless the system was subsidised by another well-established branch. I felt we could find better places to apply our efforts. The Colonel decided to have a look for himself and I went with him to Somerset a week later. Alone, he met the Council officials concerned and one of them agreed to support our application if a relative of his was given a seat on the board of the new company!. I had known of that before the meeting but thought it better not to be involved, nor to include thoughts of that nature in my report. The Yeovil proposal was dropped and I turned my attention to Maryport.
Whilst Bert Wise was on holiday Bill Cutler and I went to Whitehaven for two weeks to relieve him and also to investigate Maryport.
I had known Maryport for some years and I already knew that it would be a goer from the outset. With lots of Council houses (no wayleave problems on them), a working type population, even with an element of communism. It had known major unemployment and soup kitchens and was still a little Bolshie.
We had many friends in the area and a good popular working system in Whitehaven as an example. In that two weeks I produced the same type of report as for Yeovil, but recommended we should go ahead immediately. We saw the Council Officials and agreed a draft agreement with them, found suitable accommodation for a shop in town and a receiving station just out of town to which we could run our own lines. Two weeks later I returned with the Colonel and together we met the Council Committee and completed formalities. From then on it was all systems go. Bill Cutler asked if he could get it organised and he did a very thorough job, using the labour and resources from Whitehaven. He stayed on as Manager and a few years later took-over Whitehaven also when Bert Wise ran-off with his secretary, Connie Sim.
Meanwhile Garratt Lane was running smoothly, and number 1 line had reached East Hill. In a junction box on the wall of a block of flats we had two four-pair cables, one from Lavender Hill, and the other from Garratt Lane, and on an experimental basis we linked the two together, isolating the line at Garratt Lane. We were thus able to monitor the Lavender Hill system in our Control Room, providing their service to our installations on the way. The Garratt Lane amplifiers were fed by Post Office line from Lavender Hill, and each amplifier could provide 1 kilowatt of audio power, sufficient for 3000 loudspeakers. Most of the loudspeakers were switched to no. 2 channel, the Light Programme, still referred to as the Forces programme by the majority. Channels 3 and 4 were very lightly loaded and we were able to switch off the Garratt Lane amplifiers on these channels for most of the time. At that time my family
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home was the flat above the showroom at Garratt Lane, and was guarded by Rex, a huge Great Dane/Alsation [sic] hybrid. Only Hilda and the children could handle it, presumably because they fed it regularly, but everyone else - including me - had to be very cautious.
Eventually it took a bite out of the Manager’s wife and was returned to Battersea Dogs’ Home.
I was spending more time at Garratt Lane where progress was losing momentum, and extending our no. 3 line over West Hill to East Putney was proving difficult. Near Putney Bridge, still a mile from our lines was a highly suitable area of small houses and it was going to take a year to reach them at our current speed. Without much fuss we established a station in the basement of a shop in the middle of this area, using 4 receivers built by Fred Wright’s dept. and 4 small 50 watt Vortexion amplifiers. This station was identical to the one fitted at Hensingham. We then had a sales drive in that part of Putney with the emphasis towards West Hill, and in 4 months were able to link the two systems.
I was interested to recall that for monitoring our four programmes we used a modified aircraft type automatic bomb release mechanism. This was a uniselector type of relay unit which clunked round and changed programme every 30 seconds instead of releasing bombs.
All my staff were ex-Servicemen and there was a dynamic no-nonsence [sic] approach. In contrast to this, our General Manager Allan Moulton based at Lavender Hill, had a stock answer to any serious proposal for action put to him, of “Wait a little while and see what happens”. My attitude was that we know what we want to happen and it wont unless we make it. He didn’t like my Lager Commandant notice on the door either but there it stayed. In 1948 the war was not forgotten by most of us and many satisfactory business deals were made in that spirit of comradeship and trust.
In Feb. 1949 I found that someone called Fry had studied Belfast on our firm’s behalf and had strongly recommended starting a relay service there. The report came to me quite by accident and at the same time I found he was surveying Bath, introducing himself as Development Manager in Relay Association circles. I tackled Colonel Slaughter about it and he said it was news to him, but he took it up with Moulton to whom Fry was reporting. I found that Moulton resented the fact that I was responsible direct to the Chairman, and also that my contract detailed my renumeration including commission which was the £1500 per year, 4 times the average wage. To clear the air we had a formal meeting and I put forward my prediction for future development. I forecast that within 2 or 3 years a general rundown of the system would be inevitable with the increase of television; further that it would be prudent to reduce expenditure on “wired wireless” and to develop the rental side of both radio and T.V., but to reconsider with Fred Wright - who was not at the meeting - the policy of manufacturing T.V. sets. My prediction became factual and was influenced also by transistor radios of which we had no knowledge at that time. There was 33% Purchase Tax on most things including T.V. sets. This was payable at the point of sale and not on rentals. As our sets were never sold but remained the property of Met. Radio & T.V. Rentals Ltd. no Purchase Tax was payable. This loophole was soon to be closed, as forecast, and tax was payable on the rental itself. It became cheaper to buy sets from the big manufactures than to actually make them.
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The Colonel remarked that as Development Manager I was really saying we should stop developing, and I agreed. This set the scene for further discussion well outside the intended scope of the meeting. The Chairman asked Moulton for his views on likely technological advances, but Moulton had none and said we can only try and stay afloat, seeking support from Fry. The Colonel shot down Moulton completely and asked Fry to detail his relevant qualifications. After a silence Moulton was told to study the content of my prediction and not to go off at a tangent on development nor without reference to him. Fry was sent packing and the meeting was closed. I learned quite a lot from Colonel Slaughter, he had spent a long time in the Royal Engineers and one of his attributes was building a flat-bottomed boat on the Nile, one of the biggest in service. His personality was such that when he looked up and down disapprovingly at an obvious ex-Serviceman leaning over a bar, the man immediately took his hand out of his pocket and squared himself up. I actually saw this happen in Maryport, he had that effect on people. (That was in 1948, it might not be the same over 40 years later).
No more was heard of Fry, and I never did join the Board, I was too busy getting on with the job, but it was time for reflection. I realised that when my father was Chairman he had the engineering and technical aspects at his fingertips and he took care of them. He was succeeded by the Colonel who was a business-man but who had no backing on the engineering side. My brief was the Development of the Radio Relay Systems, I regarded technological changes as a matter for the General Manager, Moulton, but I was not responsible to him.
I met the Colonel again privately and I said it seemed that I was Development Manager in a firm which was not going to develop any further. Although there was plenty of routine work to be done I felt the Electrical Trades Union would soon start making things very difficult as it was doing in the Post Office. In view of the probable technological changes, I felt that Colonel Slaughter would rather sell-out than try to steer a ship without a rudder. I was being rather outspoken but straightforward and the Colonel approved of this. I told him I would like to call it a day and try my luck in Africa, Kenya was said to be a land of opportunity. If that failed there was always a job in Bulawayo 2500 miles further south of the Cement Works with Mr. Rose.
The Colonel agreed I could leave when convenient but if I wanted to return within 6 months, to drop him a line. It was four years since the war in Europe had ended. Britain was changing and so was the attitude of many people some of who were very disillusioned. Hilda and I agreed it was time to make a move.
And so in July 1949 I went to Africa for the third time, but with Hilda and the two children, not knowing what sort of a career I was seeking, but nevertheless full of confidence, and still with my Lager Commandant board.
The following year, Colonel Slaughter retired and Seletar’s controlling interest in Metropolitan Relays was sold to British Relay Wireless which later became Vision-Hire. Within a further 12 years the wired-wireless or Relay industry in the U.K. closed, being overtaken by technology.
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[underlined] KENYA [/underlined]
The flight to Nairobi was a very pleasant trip by Argonaut, calling at Rome, Benina, - which we had known as Bengazi [sic] -, Cairo, Khartoum and Entebbe. On the last leg of the flight we flew very low at times, quite unofficially to give us our first views of big game from the air. The flight was very enjoyable, in very easy stages, and in retrospect the Argonaut was about the most comfortable aircraft we were to fly in, in our many subsequent flights to Africa. It was I think the first and only time we travelled in first class.
We were met in Nairobi by Duncan Fletcher, a friend of my fathers, and spent the night at Torr’s Hotel, in Delamere Avenue, the leading hotel at that time. The Stanley Hotel across the road was being refurbished to become the New Stanley, and within a few years Torr’s was closed and became the Ottaman [sic] Bank. I recall the strawberry and cream cake for tea at Torr’s for which it had been famous for many years. The following day we journeyed the 260 miles by bus to Kitale. This was a road we would take many times in the years to come. The first half was tarmac, 100 miles of which from the top of the Nairobi escarpment, through Naivasha to Nakuru, having been built by Italian prisoners of war. From the top of the escarpment there was a wonderful view of the Rift Valley and Mount Longenot [sic], an extinct volcano, and to the west over the plains towards Mau Forest and Kisumu. The bus took us down the escarpment, dropping about 2000 feet to the floor of the Rift Valley, passed the little Italian church built by P.O.W.’s, and northwards past Lake Elementita and Nakuru, then the rough murram road to Kitale. The journey took about 10 hours, but was far from tedius [sic], there was so much to be seen.
Kitale seemed like a typical american western type of small town, the roads were not made up and the sidewalks were made of wood. Many of the buildings were made of timber clad with mabati - corrugated iron - and most europeans wore khaki drill. We were met at the bus station by my father and completed the remaining 9 miles of our journey to our new home, Kirksbridge Farm, Kiminini where a guest house had been built for us, about 100 yards from the main house. Colin and Wendy, aged 6 and 4 were introduced to the Ayah, the african nurse, called Nadudu, who spoke only Swahili and her tribal language, Kitoshi, but within a matter of days was communicating without difficulty with the children. Nadudu had her own rondavel, a thatched roundhouse on the lawn at the side of the guest house, and took care of all the children’s needs.
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[underlined] Hoteli King George [/underlined]
Life on the farm had provided a welcome anticlimax to just about everything that had gone before, but it could hardly be a long-term solution for a young couple with a growing family. We did not appreciate at the time the serious effects of the political unrest and changes which were beginning to take place. We thought that common sense would prevail and most of us felt we had a good working relationship with the Africans; only a misguided few claimed to really understand them! Neither Hilda nor I felt we were achieving a great deal on the farm and we agreed it was time to look further afield.
In April 1950, after almost a year in Kitale, I responded to an advert in our national newspaper, the East African Standard, for Prison Officers. Salary £550 per year, uniform and furnished accomodation [sic] provided, generous leave etc. Military experience advantageous, with the rank of Asst. Supt. of Prisons. One pip! At least the job would get us to Nairobi where most of the action was, and we would have an opportunity to look around, but it was also to give me an insight into a very different and often sordid aspect of life. My application was successful. Our family, Hilda and myself, Colin and Wendy, with Paddy and Jeep our two Alsations all crowded into the Austin A70 and once again made the now familiar safari to Nairobi. 150 miles of murram road, through the Transnzoia, and the plains around Eldoret settled almost entirely by South Africans from the Union, winding around ravines to Mau Summit, up and over the 11,500 ft. mountains at Timbarua to Nakuru then 100 miles of luxurious tarmac through Naivasha with its flamingoes [sic] , passed Elementita an extinct volcano, up the escarpment to Nairobi. The tarmac road was built by Italian prisoners of war in W.W.2, the best stretch of road in East Africa. We also took with us Edward Ekeke, an African driver who had been with my father in Abbysinia [sic] during the war. Although a Kikuyu he was a trusted servant, and if left alone by the politicians and other agitators would have stayed loyal, but tribal and other pressures on chaps like Ekeke were great, and in retrospect it was foolish of us to trust them. Ekeke returned to Kitale with the Austin for more personal effects and re-joined us after a few days. I think he must have finally returned to the farm by 'taxi', as the african buses were called.
As it claimed in the advert., accomodation [sic] was provided. It could have been described as a three-bedroomed chalet, the walls and roof being of mabati (corrugated iron), and was built on stilts about a foot off the ground. We learned that is [sic] was originally built at the other side of the prison and had been carried to its current location by 200 prisoners. As far as I remember, we moved straight into the 'house', and roughed it until Hilda made it comfortable. There was a bathroom, but the loo was a 'thunderbox' at the end of the back garden with a bucket which a gang of prisoners dealt with about 5 am. every day. The kitchen was a Colonial type near the back door, with a wood stove, and an adequate supply of kuni (firewood) provided by more prisoners.
The prison was totally enclosed within a high stone wall, designed to hold 700 prisoners, but with a prison population of about 1900 Africans, 180 Asians, 20 Somalis and 12 Europeans. Quite separate was a small compound for the Wamawaki, (women), with about 20 African and 1 Asian inmate (in for murder but only men were eligible for hanging, so she was serving life). The whole 2000 or so were in the care of about 9 European officers and 200 African Askari. The
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Officer i/c was 'Major' Martin M.C., W.W.1 Veteran,as [sic] Snr. Supt., his number 2 was Henry Thacker with 3 pips as a Supt. Henry spoke fluent Kikuyu in addition to Swahili, and in fact had a Kikuyu 'wife'. He had been in the Prisons service for 36 years at that time and sported one medal ribbon, on his right breast. Legend had it that it was awarded by the Royal Humane Society after he saved a cat from drowning, but Henry was on a totally different wavelength to other Europeans. Sid Swan with 2 pips was i/c the stores and accounts, having spent the war in the Kings African Rifles, and having been demobbed as a Major. Other junior officers like myself included Bunty Lewis, rather effiminate [sic] but nevertheless an ex Royal Artillery officer who had a Kenya-born wife; Paddy McKinney, a large hairy ex Irish Guards Sergeant; Jimmie Vant, ex Kings African Rifles, the son of a Keswick lawyer turned Kenya farmer. Jimmie and his wife Dulcie regarded themselves as Kenya settlers and claimed to spend most of their time at the ranch on the Kinankop, hence their landrover vehicle. Another officer, Whitehouse who joined about the same time as me seemed to spend most of his time off sick and did not stay with us very long. There were three other officers whose names elude me but they were all ex-service, and all lived just outside the wall of the main prison.
The Duty Officers i/c worked a shift system, 0600 to 1800, assisted by a "day-duties" officer during more or less office hours. The Duty Officer was responsible for the day to day activity in the main prison. We were each armed with an enormous ancient revolver of 0.45 calibre and six rounds of ammo., issued by Mr. Thacker. I objected to the rounds of ammo., pointing out they were dum-dums, the bullets having been filed down to within 1/8" of the cartridge cases., and they contravened the Geneva convention. I remember Henry saying "there is nothing in the Prisons Ordinance about the Geneva Convention, and that's all that matters"! We were ordered in writing to wear the revolver in its holster at all times when on duty, and I thought of my four Brownings of long ago to deal with one enemy, compared to a ridiculous revolver in a compound with nearly 2000 potential enemies. It was in fact general practice, strictly unofficial, to carry the revolver but to leave the ammunition in the safe, and the prisoners knew this. I did carry a loaded Czech. .25 automatic in my pocket of which the prisoners were not aware. Some months after I joined, the Snr. Supt. inspected Paddy's revolver and put him on a charge for not carrying ammunition, "contrary to station standing order number something or other". Paddy was eventually charged before the Commissioner of Prisons and pleaded not guilty, asking to see the written order. This was produced and the charge dismissed. The order refered [sic] to the revolver only, and not ammunition. All very childish, but Paddy of the Irish Guards was not one to be messed about. He produced his dum-dum bullets to the Commissioner who was astonished, and all the dumdums were withdrawn. Paddy also pointed out how ludicrous it was for a lone officer to carry firearms in a crowd of hundreds of prisoners, but the order remained. He was a likeable fellow and when the C.O. quoted the book of rules, Paddy made a detailed study of it. In addition to the Prisons Ordnance, we also had Station Standing Orders which gave Paddy ample scope for playing the barrack-room lawyer. He was seen one night at a party in the Military Police Snr. N.C.O.'s mess, and was put on [deleted] a [/deleted] two charges by Martin. Before the Commissioner he was charged with sleeping off the station and drinking whilst on duty. Again Paddy asked for the rule-book and pleaded not guilty. The book stated that an officer would not sleep off the station whilst
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on duty. Paddy agreed he had been at the dance all night and did not in fact sleep anywhere! case [sic] dismissed. Station standing orders also stated that an officer would not partake of alcoholic drink whilst on duty, but a further order stated that an "officer was deemed to be on duty at all times". It therefore followed that all Prisons Officers were required to be completely teetotal, and that was an unlawful order. Martin had met his match and was told to edit Station Standing Orders.
The day started at 0630 by unlocking the European cells and counting the inmates, whilst the Askari dealt with all the other prisoners. There was no point in an escape attempt by Europeans, they would not have got very far before being picked up, but for other races it was a different matter. They were guarded very closely. The four main racial groups were quartered separately for sleeping and eating, their customs and diet and indeed their whole culture differing considerably. Only the Europeans slept on beds, the others were not interested and prefered [sic] the floor, some with very thin mattresses. The Europeans wore shoes, the Somalis heavy boots, Asians wore flipflops and the Africans stuck to their bare feet which were generally tougher than any footwear. European food was probably similar to that in U.K. prisons, and with each race having its own traditional food, this was not a case of discrimination, each prefered [sic] its own. Each group also provided its own cooks. Some of the Asians in fact opted out of Prison food and had it sent in, but it was very thoroughly checked. Uniforms differed too, some compromise between standard prison garb and ordinary native dress. Europeans wore K.D. slacks and shirts with arrows printed on them. Africans wore white shirt and white shorts held up by string.
Two or three hours were spent in the early morning preparing prisoners for court, generally about 50 of them. Some were on remand, and others were convicted prisoners who were required to give evidence in cases where they were involved as witnesses. In the late afternoon all were returned to the prison possibly with changed status. The paper-work had to be watched very carefully, confusion could arise where one prisoner might have a conviction warrant on one case, a remand warrant on another and possibly a production order to appear as a witness in an entirely different case. It was not unknown for a prisoner to be involved in two cases under different names. Language sometimes presented a problem. The courts conducted the business in English and Kiswahili, but there were many tribal languages and quite often interpreters had to be employed. One such case was when 60 prisoners of the Suk tribe were charged with murder having massacred the District Commissioner and his staff of 12. The only interpreter who could cope with the Suk language translated into Kitoshi, and a second one translated from Kitoshi into Swahili. All 60 were hanged at the prison in due course. They seemed very young to me and I doubt if they really knew what it was all about. They were the ones rounded up by the Police after spears had been thrown at the D.C.'s party from a crowd of 2000 whilst he was reading the Riot Act -literally-.
Relationships between officers at the prison were generally very good, with the exception of Martin who thought he was playing soldiers and Thacker for whom we felt rather sorry. 36 years as a prisons officer must have warped his mind somewhat. After about two months I decided to be like the other officers and wear my medal ribbons, and that was when I first fell foul of Major Martin. He asked me what the first medal was and I told him. He said he
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had not authorised me to wear it and I laughed and said I didn't need his authority, the King's was good enough. Shortly after this I was on duty when 45 new African prisoners were admitted, but there were 50 warrants. Some were convicted on Capital Charges, (murder, manslaughter, rape etc). My Chief Warder had signed for 50 bodies and 50 warrants, but there were only 45 bodies. It was 5 pm and my obvious priority was to determine which 5 prisoners were missing. It took until 6.30 to sort it out, no-one was missing, the Court was at fault in issuing two warrants each to five prisoners, instead of one warrant and one production order each. Only then did I get around to locking up the European prisoners for the night, 30 minutes late, and I entered this in the log. The next day an Asian prisoner complained to an Asian Official Prison Visitor that the Europeans were not locked up until 6.30 whereas the Asian prisoners were locked up on time. This was racial discrimination and the official visitor reported the matter direct to the Commissioner. I was charged by Martin for failing to carry out a particular standing order in that I failed to lock up the Europeans at 6 pm. 'How do you plead?' saith [sic] the Commiss. 'I don't', I replied, 'I request the case be taken by the Member for Law & Order'. He was the member of Legislative Council equivalent to the U.K. Attorney General, and this was a genuine option available to an officer charged before the Commissioner, same sort of procedure as an Airman on a 252 asking for a Court Martial rather than take his C.O.'s verdict. The Commissioner suspended the charge for the time being and asked Martin why the charge was brought. I was then asked why I had failed and I said that I was the Officer responsible and in unusual circumstances I concentrated my action in what I considered the most important aspect, which was resolving the problem of the 5 apparently missing prisoners. I consider I acted correctly, regardless of Station Standing Orders. Martin said he had not known that and I suggested that he should read the duty log before signing it as seen, next time. I also suggested that an amendment be made to the standing orders to the effect that nothing contained therein would prohibit an officer from using his initiative when he felt it necessary. Anyhow, I went on, it is an unlawful order in any case, and that will be my alternative defence with the Member for Law & Order. The commissioner was intrigued and read out the order "You will lock-up the European prisoners at 6 pm.", looking to me for comment. I said it was an impossible order, locking-up people involves work which takes time, 6pm is a moment of time in which by definition no work can be done. I said the whole set-up is childish and the Commissioner asked Martin to withdraw the charge. It seemed I had joined Paddy in his war of attrition against Martin.
Our two alsations, Paddy and Jeep had settled-in very nicely, with only their hereditary training. Their self-appointed task of guarding Hilda and the children was unending. When the family was inside the house, one guard would remain with them whilst the other maintained watch on the verandah [sic] and patrolled outside in the garden. When the children were in the garden whilst prisoners were working in the area, either Paddy or Jeep would deploy themselves between the two groups. Only by instinct our dogs knew the prisoners were not to be trusted and were watched very carefully, but the African askari were regarded as allies. The prison was very close to the boundary of Nairobi National Park, and grew cabbages two feet in diameter in what must have been some of the most fertile land in Kenya, receiving all the effluent from the 2000 odd inmates. Late one afternoon an african prisoner in a work gang fancied his
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chances and made a run for it, sprinting along the road passed [sic] the house hotly pursued by about six askari. The askari were at a disadvantage wearing heavy boots and jerseys, but they were joined by Paddy and Jeep who caught up with the prisoner and arrested him in the Game Park. When the askari caught up with them they found the prisoner literally with his pants down, leaning exhausted against a post supporting a notice "Stay in Your Car, Beware of Lion".
It was essential but sometimes difficult not to become involved emotionally with the prisoners, almost all of whom had in their eyes suffered a grave injustice by winding-up in jail. One afternoon whilst I was on duty the Chief Immigration Officer, a Mr. Pierce, came to the prison and required me to serve a Deportation Order on a European Prisoner, Major Melbourn. I read the document first and found that Melbourn had been declared an 'undesireable [sic] immigrant' and was therefore to be deported within 5 days. Melbourn had in fact served about 12 months of a three year sentance [sic] for bigamy and would be required to complete the term in the U.K. He was 'undesireable [sic] ' because he had changed his job without permission. I remarked that this was a very lame excuse for such drastic action. After an exchange of views I said I had not sought his permission when I joined the Prisons Service and he advised me to do so without delay! A few days later I was detailed to escort the prisoner to Mombasa, and hand him over to the officer i/c of the prison at Fort Jesus. Meanwhile I had studied all the Melbourn files and they showed a good example of how a fellow could slip up over small technicalities which produced major consequences. Melbourn was a British Army officer serving overseas for almost the entire war. During the Blitz, his wife was in a Convalascent [sic] home in Liverpool which received a direct hit and she disappeared without trace like many others. He had been drawing a marriage allowance in the normal way and eventually reported to his C.O. that it should be discontinued because he believed his wife had been killed in an air-raid. He was advised that until he had proof of this the allowance would continue. He should have applied to the courts for it to be deemed that his wife had been killed but the environment of the Burmese jungle and other wartime pressures were not conducive to that sort of logic and he let the matter rest. After the war he made enquiries in Liverpool without result, and was eventually released from the Army having served for 30 years. Several years later he became engaged to the daughter of the French Consol [sic] in Nairobi, and when they were married he declared that he was a bachelor. They were Catholics and had he referred to himself as a widower, there could have been difficulties and the authorities would have required proof in any case, which he could not provide. Soon after the wedding someone who had been a clerk in the Pay Corps spotted the reference to 'Bachelor' and thought it rather odd that Melbourn had claimed a marriage allowance during the war. He reported this and the subsequent enquiry led to Melbourn being charged with bigamy and convicted. Whilst it was essential that justice must be seen to apply equally to all races, Europeans were the Bwana Mkubwas and were supposed to set an example. White men in jail were an embarassment [sic] to Government and wherever possible they were returned to the U.K. Melbourn had slipped-up on a second trechnicality. [sic] In the U.K. After [sic] demob. he and two ex-Army colleagues, all of whom had served in East Africa in 1945, decided to establish a business in Kenya, and the three applied for Entry permits, Employment passes, Dependants [sic] passes in two cases, and Residence permits. Complete with ambitious plans for the future and proper documentation
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the trio arrived in Nairobi and set about organising their new enterprise, one of the first acts being an application to register the name of their company. Whilst this was 'going through channels' problems came to light which could not have been foreseen and their plans had to be abandoned. Melbourn remained in Nairobi and obtained employment, and his two colleagues returned to U.K., disillusioned by the red tape. Whilst looking for a reason to declare Melbourn an undesireable [sic] immigrant the application for permission to work with a firm which did not exist came to light and provided the necessary ammunition.
On the night train to Mombasa Melbourn was very chatty, we were both in civvies, he was allowed to use his own money and I felt the best policy would be to let him have a few drinks and to sleep it off. He undertook to behave and understood that at the first sign of being unco-operative he would be handcuffed to his bunk. He told me his story which was the same as gleaned from the files, and added that he had made arrangements to escape at Suez and join the sister of one of the Somali inmates. I handed him over at Fort Jesus, wished him luck and had a look around Mombasa before returning to Nairobi on the night train. About two months later we learned that he had indeed jumped ship at Suez and was working as a Newsreader at Oomdemaan on Egyptian International Radio Broadcasts. I bought some brass plates from him in Nairobi which today are displayed at Wendy's home in Cherryhinton [sic] , and which remind me of the injustice metered out to one who served for 30 years in the British Army.
Another European prisoner, on remand, had been arrested for vagrancy. He was a British merchant seaman who felt like a change, had legally entered Kenya with proper documentation and had taken a job driving a native bus. The authorities deemed this was not a suitable job for a white man, declared him undesireable [sic] and deported him, by ship. He would have been quite happy to have joined a ship at Mombasa as crew-member or paid his own passage. He most certainly did not meet the definition of vagrancy, he had more than adequate means of support. I recall his bitterness when he said it was fair enough to drive a bloody army lorry for five years but not an african bus.
For nearly six months I relieved Ron Woods as officer i/c the Tailoring section of Prison workshops, whilst he was on home leave. In the workshop 200 prisoners beavered away sewing and stitching, 100 with sewing machines and the other half working by hand. We produced uniforms for all Government departments and also for prisoners and were allowed to undertake private work for anyone willing to provide their own material. One of the European prisoners had been a tailor in civvy street and he was very helpful. There was also a 'mechanical workshop' employing about 100, mostly producing articles in metal for Gov't departments, but also repairing and generally working on motor-cars. I took the opportunity of turning them loose on my father's Packard and they did a very good job. The Tailoring section even produced some seat covers for it without being asked. Shortly after the car was finished, a Salvation Army Major came to me and said that Johnson, a European prisoner who had worked on the car, had seen the light after several months of Bible study and was now determined to go straight. He was serving five years for armed robbery, having held up a taxi in Mombasa. The Major asked for my support for his application to the Parole Board and was in fact going to great lengths to secure the Prisoner's release. I declined my support, and told the Major he had been spoofed, Johnson would never go straight. However, the appeal
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was successful and Johnson suggested to me the night before his release that for a small fee he could arrange to 'steal' the car and drop it over Nairobi escarpment for me. Such were the people we were dealing it, [sic] [inserted] with [/inserted] but what finally became of him I don't know.
After several months we moved to a much nicer house in the prison officers' compound. Hilda was doing photographic retouching and finishing work in the city for Arthur Firmin, and life was without undue pressures. On saturday [sic] evenings we occasionally went to see our friends George and Iris Dent at the Oasis pub. George was an engineer with the Army Kinema Corporation and a very keen 'ham', VQ4DO, ex ZS6DO. At their parents' Pub George showed films which provided entertainment. This was before the days of television in Kenya. It was on the evening of one of our visits we were sitting in the Dent's home, Wendy was stretched out asleep on the couch and Iris's little boy was playing with his toy cap-gun. This reminded me that the pain in my rear was caused by my .25 automatic in my trouser pocket, so I moved the gun to my jacket pocket. Iris saw this move and said it looked a far nicer gun than her .38 and asked to see it. I handed it over, having checked there was no round up the spout and it was on safe. To our absolute astonishment, Iris cocked it, off with the safety catch and fired. The bullet demolished the leg of the couch less than a foot from Wendy's head. The song "Pistol-packing mamma" didn't seem at all funny any more. Colin was with us and had attended Nairobi Primary School for about two months. Wendy was looked after during the day by Nadudu, the Kitoshi ayah we had taken with us from Kitale. The children called her Bundudu.
With the withdrawal of the British Army from Kenya, George and Iris returned to South Africa, George taking up employment with the S.A. Broadcasting Corporation. Today the Oasis pub is thriving, still on the main Mombassa [sic] Road and close to Nairobi airport at Embakasi.
I was concerned only with Nairobi prison, but there were prisons in 8 or so towns, backed up by several camps. Later when Mau Mau really got under way, there were many more much bigger 'internment' camps. Some of them in my day were known as rather tough places. Hard Labour was still the prerogative of the courts; It meant exactly that, and was invariably stone breaking. A gang would be given a task of smashing up a number of very large boulders and feeding the fragments through a screen before putting them onto a lorry. Only when the task was complete would they be marched back to the living area. One of our camps was at Lokitong, about 450 miles north of Nairobi, and it frequently happened that prisoners had to be returned from there to Nairobi to attend court. There was no telephone, the only communication with the camp was was [sic] by a telegram to Kitale prison and thence a letter by bus and camel to the camp. It was generally a three-week process, so six weeks was needed to produce a prisoner from Lokitong to a court in Nairobi. I put up a written suggestion that in the absence of telephones we should establish a number of radio stations. I could undertake to establish the stations myself using ex-army 21 sets, maintain them and also to train the operators. The suggestion was submitted through Mr. Martin but addressed to the Commissioner, and according to the Chief Clerk went straight into Martin's waste paper basket. A few days later I delivered a copy direct to the Commissioner's office with a covering letter with my estimate of costs, about £100 per station plus my time and travelling.
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I promised instant communication with the camps but it was too revolutionary and there was no provision in the budget for it. About four years later the job was done for them by the Police at a cost of £700,000 with recurring annual expenditure of over £100,000. A lot of money in those days. Jimmie Vant became the Prisons Dept. Telecommunications Officer with no knowledge whatsoever of the subject. He didn't really need any, all the work was carried out by the Police which was staffed entirely by technicians on secondment from the U.K. Home Office. Such is the price of progress and sophisticated over-engineering. No doubt in the 1990s they will be able to spend even more millions and do the job via satelite [sic] .
Returning home one afternoon having collected Hilda and two other ladies from the city, and Colin from school, we found the prison surrounded by armoured cars and light tanks with hundreds of Police and Army personnel. Apparently there was a rumour of a pending mass breakout, but it was only a rumour. I regarded it as a show of strength for the benifit [sic] of the unruly.
The job in the Prisons Service was like no other I have held either before or since. It was work which started and finished according to the duty roster and activity was determined and limited by the various orders laid down. For every minor detail there had to be a written authority. The Prisons Service had become established about the turn of the century and the antiquated system did nothing to inspire enthusiasm. On one occasion Paddy Mc.Kinney and I were taking a five minute breather in the office and enjoying a coca-cola, when Martin came in and without preamble ordered us to put leg-irons on Mchegi, then stormed out again. Mchegi was a "casi kubwa", a 6'3" Kikuyu in a condemned cell. The leg-irons were a reprisal for Mchegi's offensive the previous day. Martin, on his round of inspection had moved aside the 6" square observation panel in the door of Mchegi's cell to look inside, and received the full force of the contents of the choo (night soil!) bucket in his face. Mchegi was awaiting hanging and had nothing to lose. He was a very dangerous individual who had already killed and because of his violance [sic] often remained in his cell during excercise [sic] periods. Putting leg-irons on this tough character was a formidable task and Martin knew that. Paddy startled me by suggesting that I should open the door of Mchegi's cell, and he would wait at the open end of the corridor where it entered the prison yard. I replied that I would rather he opened Mchegi's door and I would wait in the yard. However, Mchegi had no personal animosity towards me and Paddy's complete plan appeared rational. I opened the cell door with the greeting "Mjambo Mchegi", and he stepped out of the cell, seeing a clear passage to the prison yard and beyond to the open gate in the outside perimeter wall of the prison, with neither officer nor askari in sight. Mchegi recognised his chance to escape and made a dash for it. It was at the end of the corridor that Paddy stepped out hit him and simultaneously an askari tripped him up. Before Mchegi recovered four askari had rivetted on the leg-irons and dragged him back to his cell. A few minutes later Paddy and I were finishing our cokes in the office when Martin came in and remonstrated, "why haven't you carried out my order?" Paddy said we had done so and Martin exclaimed "impossible". When Martin was told just how it had been done we were both on a charge once more. The Commissioner reminded us that striking a prisoner was a very serious matter but when Paddy said it was the preferred alternative to shooting him, there was no answer, and the matter was dropped. Mchegi gave no more trouble and apologised to Martin for his indiscretion, and
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Paddy saw to it that Mchegi received his full ration of excercise [sic] time in the prison yard. It was about three weeks after the choo bucket incident that Paddy was in the yard and attacked from the rear by a prisoner with a pair of 12" scissors. Fortunately Mchegi was watching and although still in leg-irons tackled the assailant, overcoming him just in time. Paddy was still cut, but there was no doubt that Mchegi had saved his life. He took a great interest in Mchegi and asked why he had been a condemned prisoner for so long, just waiting for the death sentance [sic] to be carried out. Paddy saw to it that the stabbing incident received a great deal of publicity, and eventually Mchegi was released from jail. Some years later I found he was a Snr. Warder at the prison.
About the same time, a new recruit joined us, with the same rank, Asst. Supt. Gr.2, but we found his salary was in fact 2 increments (£120 per annum) higher than ours and we wanted to know the reason why. We were told that he had been in the armed services and was awarded two increments for war service. We, apparently, had been under the average age of entry for the Prisons service at the time of our war service. Our next move was to try and compare our respective efforts during the war, but the new recruit was very reticent about his service career, and somehow didn't seem to speak the language of the soldier. It was several weeks later we found he had been in the German Army and the rest of us felt this really was too much. Regulations on war service increments however did refer to the "armed services" and made no mention of which side a fellow was on. We were not still fighting the [deleted] a [/deleted] war, but we were a uniformed service after all. The Gerry could see he was not wanted and resigned.
After 12 months as a Prison Officer I was very disgruntled with the way of life and went to see the Commissioner and gave him one month's notice. This he accepted and on my return to the prison I was handed a letter terminating my appointment with immediate effect, signed by Martin.
I then set about thinking of another job, there was lots of scope and on the air next morning my father suggested I should go and see Joe Furness who was Director of Civil Aviation. Later that day, in prison uniform, I called to see the Personnel Officer of D.C.A., one Bert Leaman, and found there might be a possibility of joining the Telecommunications section, and arranged an interview for the following day.
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[underlined] CIVIL AVIATION [/underlined]
In April 1951 I joined the E.A. Directorate of Civil Aviation as a Radio Officer on a salary of £610 per year. I had no relevant qualifications for this job but I could cope with the morse code at 25 words per minute and had aquired[sic] a general background of aviation during the war years! The first two weeks were spent at R.A.F. Eastleigh studying the workings of the Telecommunications and Air Traffic Control systems, after which I was posted to Mbeya near the Tanganyika/Northern Rhodesia border at 6500 feet above sea level. The journey down to Mbeya was by road, 900 miles, and in the middle of the rainy season. Much advice was received, “all the hotels are closed”, “the roads are waterlogged and blocked”, “there is no petrol beyond Arusha” and so on. We decided to do the trip in four short stages of between 200 and 300 miles per day, with night stops at Arusha, Dodoma and Iringa.
Our 1949 Ford Prefect, KCC13, with 60,000 miles on the clock was reshod at a cost of £10. Recapped tyres were the vogue at that time, a practice which has since stopped, being said to be dangerous. However, those recaps. did 22,000 miles on some of the worst roads in the world, without problems, before being replaced, a better performance than the original new tyres. With the car loaded with household equipment, and with Colin and Wendy lying on blankets near the roof of the car we headed south down “the Great North Road”. The first 100 miles was tarmac and no problem in the pouring tropical rain. Always to the south of us -dead on track- were towering thunderheads of cumulo [sic] -nimbus, but nearing the end of the tarmac the rain stopped. Indeed for the next three days the rain stopped falling about twelve hours ahead of us, but also remained on our tail. On the second day, deep ruts in the road caused a broken rear spring near Dodoma, but this was repaired overnight at George’s Garage; very well equipped with spare springs was George. Crossing the hundreds of fords, or drifts was exciting and at times quite hilarious, many being over 100 years wide and comprising merely a strip of concrete 10 feet wide on the bed of the river. Most of them were covered by water, hiding the concrete and the only clue to its location was provided by the poles at each side of the drift. More often than not the river bed at the side of the concrete was worn away creating a drop of a foot or so. A piece of thick wire fixed to the front of the car together with a vertical line on the windscreen, could be lined up with the centre of the two distant poles. By ignoring everything else and having implicit faith in the navigational instrument, we always reached the other side without going over the edge. Without this blind faith there would have been a tendency to keep a little to the up-stream side of the drift. To go over the edge on the other side could have been disastrous. In two places on the second day we were really bogged down in mud but we quickly mastered the technique of driving in reverse over the worst parts, thus becoming front-wheel drive. The most interesting village we passed was Kondor Arangi, between Dodoma and Iringa, on the third day. A beautifully painted and spotlessly clean Arab village, probably unchanged for centuries and almost completely independent of the world outside. After over 35 years I can still recall the aroma of freshly-baked bread, and the welcoming atmosphere of the village. On through Iringa and the final leg of 250 miles of the beautiful scenery of Southern Highlands, completely unspoilt by development. After a night at the Iringa Hotel, we had made our usual early-morning start and reached Mbeya by mid-day. Straight to the Railway station in
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Mbeya, a typical East African Railways and Harbours station complete with platforms, but the nearest railway lines and trains were over 400 miles away. A search for Paddy and Jeep, our two alsations, which had been put on the train five days previously in Nairobi, was to no avail. It was to be a further three days before they reached Mbeya, very hungry and very thirsty. After a night in ‘Links’ Salter’s Mbeya Hotel we inspected our new home at the airport. Known as Wilson Airways Rest House, built in 1932 for use by British Airways – before the change of name to Imperial Airways, and B.O.A.C. – It was ‘U’ shaped with 2 kitchens and 10 bedrooms. No electricity of course but a dozen or so paraffin lamps took care of the lighting problem. An african [sic] was provided to carry water from a tap about four hundred yards away to keep our small tank topped-up. The house was very convenient at the side of the runway, actually the grass landing area. It was very pleasant to sit on the verandah[sic] where there was a wonderful view of Mbeya Peak. We had only two neighbours, the Claytons from Burnley who were ‘refugees’ from the groundnut scheme at Kongwa and now in charge of a tipper unit with the Public Works Dept., and Bwana Grigg, an old-timer who had been a prospector and was then a Weights and Measures Inspector.
Mbeya was our home for 2 1/2 years, the aerodrome had been up-graded from a one-man to two-man station open from 0600 to 1800 hrs. every day. My colleague was George Hanson, who originally hailed from Selby in Yorkshire, an ex-wireless operator in Royal Signals during the war who had joined E.A. Posts and Telegraphs as a Radio Officer in 1947. George had spent 3 years in Burma during the war and returned to Selby in 1946. To find his fiance [sic] in the arms of two Italian prisoners. According to George he gave the Italians a thrashing – which would have been very true to character – and left them with their heads jammed in the railings, to be released later by the fire-brigade. The Law caught up with him and George was given a dressing -down by the magistrate who said “We don’t want ruffians like you in this country”. George claims he told the magistrate to get some service in and his knees brown and the case was adjourned. At that time the Crown Agents were recruiting for East African Posts & Telegraphs Dept. and George felt it was time to emigrate. All aeronautical communications were handled by E.A.P. & T. until the end of 1950 when they were taken over by the Directorate of Civil Aviation. George and I had to cover 84 hours each week between us, thoeoretically[sic] a 42 hour week, but there was no provision for sickness, local leave, and the many chores which required both of us, like being in three places simultaneously. We were assisted by an african [sic] wireless operator, a Kikuyu 1200 miles from his home, a cleaner, a watchman, and a diesel mechanic, Kundan Singh Babra, all of whom lived on the station. George and I agreed our individual responsibilities, we would each carry out our 42 hours per week on watches, which included R/T to aircraft on HF and VHF, an aerodrome control function, W/T to Nairobi as required, originating meteorological reports each hour and coding them into Aero format, and customs duties. In addition, he would deal with all the admin., and I would see to the technical aspect of keeping the station on the air.
The station had been established in 1932 and the original Marconi M/F Beacon, a type TA4A was still in use and in immaculate condition. We had a stock of MT16 valves enough to last for another 30 years. We also had an ex-South African Air Force T1190 of 1933 vintage, fitted in 1940, and four ET4336 transmitters for working aircraft on R/T and Nairobi on W/T. Everything was in very good condition and gave me no problems. Our “office” was at the D/F
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(direction finding) station, and was fitted with one of the original DFG10 Marconi recieivers [sic] .
We could not see the runway from the office, which rather limited our scope in controlling it.
Each week, Mbeya had only 4 East African Airways scheduled Dakotas and Loadstars, on the Nairobi-Dar es Salaam route, plus a Beaver of Central African Airways from Blantyre in Nyasaland and one R.A.F. transport from Johannesburg to Nairobi. There were also up to a dozen or so charters which sometimes arrived with little or no notice. Our M/F Beacon was the only navigation aid for some hundreds of miles in all directions. The D/F Receiver was not in use and had a faulty power unit. This I serviced and used the receiver for monitoring Tabora’s M/F Beacon. We were operating also on 6440 KHz, the Salisbury F.I.C. channel, unofficially, to keep in touch with the Beaver aircraft which were not fitted with Nairobi F.I.C. channels. This proved very useful and also gave us a rapid link with Salisbury Ndola and Blantyre. One day and R.A.F. Anson called on [underlined] 6440 [/underlined] and reported his MF/DF receiver, - in his only [inserted in margin] NOT 6440 BUT 5190[?] [/inserted in margin] navigational aid – out of order. He was over mountains, - he hoped – in cloud, could we give him QDM’s, (courses to steer) on M/F ?. I told him to transmit on 333 KHz, the standard frequency for this purpose, and it took only a few seconds to retune the DFG10 to this frequency. For the next 2 1/2 hrs. I gave him a QDM every three minutes. The weather was bad and the aircraft eventually landed at Mbeya, staying overnight. The Navigator was visibly shaken, he did not know his position, only that if he acted on the QDM,’s he would eventually reach Mbeya. Only after landing could he calculate his ground speed, about 70 knots. On arrival over Mbeya the crew were able to see Mbeya Peak above cloud, This was five miles to the North of us and with a cloud base of 3000 feet above the aerodrome they were able to descent and land. All this would of course have been totally unacceptable to a civilian aircraft which would have possibly returned to it’s starting point. The R.A.F. aircraft without any Nav. Aids had really no option. Some weeks later we received a letter from the R.A.F. thanking us for the assistance we had given the Anson crew in providing M/F bearings thus preventing a possible disaster, etc. etc. Unfortunately this letter was also copied to D.C.A. H.Q. with another asking if the facility could be retained. The next mail brought a letter from our own boss, the Director of Civil Aviation.. “Whilst complimenting and thanking you for taking the initiative on this occasion…”. The letter went on to point out the legal significance of giving information to pilots and of undertaking to provide a direction-finding facility with 20-year old equipment and no spares. I made sure I could provide an alternative power supply of 2 and 130 volts which did not take much imagination and adapted some modern valves – type 6C4 – with bases to replace the original 1930 vintage triodes. There were not used in my 2 1/2 years in Mbeya and we continued to give bearings to the R.A.F. unofficially. About 2 years later a Pye VHF set was fitted together with a D/F antenna and also a modern Redifon M/F Beacon, both with an effective range no better than 25% of the 1932 equipment. This was not the fault of the manufacturers. In the case of the D/F the reason was the difference in propagation characteristics and with the M/F Beacon it would have been better to retain the original 1932 Marconi type antenna.
I have no notes of this period, but memories are many. I recall seeing a Cheetah on the grass landing area we called a runway, whilst carrying
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out a runway inspection. As I approached, the cheetah ran off. My foot was hard down doing 58 m.p.h. just behind it, but the cheetah gradually drew away. Daily inspection of the ‘runway’ was necessary. Ant-Bear holes appeared quite often, and just one of these was sufficient to wreck an aircraft. Africans had free access to the runway except when aircraft were actually using it. One evening a grass fire started and swept first along the windward side of the runway where the grass was long, and then crossed it in a line of flame and black smoke the whole length of the runway. Hilda and I were on foot at the other side of the runway and witnessed literally hundreds of snakes fleeing from the fire. There were lots of snakes and other creatures in that area which after all was open African bush. This was again highlighted at 6 am one morning when I drove to the D/F station and opened up the radio. It was still dark and there was a very pungent smell of pigs. I assumed there was a dead animal outside but within a few minutes it was daylight and having established contact with Nairobi on w/t and confirmed there were no overnight disasters requiring my attention, I went outside to investigate. There were elephants all over the place, standing there, and looking just as surprised as I was. I made a strategic withdrawal smartly into the D/F station and bolted the door. On my way to the office I had met the African nightwatchman who was waving his arms about and saying something about ‘tembo mningi sani”. The word Tembo was generally associated with Elephant Brand Beer, which was more a part of everyday life in our immediate area than the animal after which it was named. I assumed he had been drinking and thought no more of it. The africans too were soon awake and trying to chase the elephants out of the maize, throwing tin cans, stones and even pangas at them. Three africans were killed in the process. Meanwhile I telephoned the police who said it was not their shouri (affair), “tell the Game Warden”. It was then 6.15am. and the Game Warden would not take the matter seriously, claiming I was drinking too much, “see the M.O.”! There was a scheduled Dakota due at 7 am. and I asked the pilot to overfly the runway and make sure there were no elephants on it, and this he agreed to do. I gave him the surface wind and QNH and landing clearance, and he came straight in and landed, without checking. He too thought I was not being serious about the elephants. It was mid-day before the elephants left of their own accord and moved back towards the mountains to the south. The Africans said the elephant movement was a sure sign that Rungwe, our local dormant volcano was about to erupt, and the elephants had already received warning. They took me to the fire trench round the Shell petrol dump which was 10 feet deep, and showed me the alternate layers of volcanic ash and sandy soil, starting at the bottom with four inch layers. At the 5’ level about 8” layers, gradually thickening as compression decreased to a 12” layer of ash and finally, 18” of soil at the top. There was no record of the date of the last erruption,[sic] probably some hundreds of years ago. We did experience several earth tremmors [sic] in Mbeya, but it was a nice life and we decided to stick it out!
Colin and Wendy were attending Mrs. Maugham-Brown’s infants school in the town and were making very good progress. Hilda was doing retouching of photographs for Arthur Firmin which were sent to and from his Nairobi office by air mail. It was in Mbeya that I built my first amateur transmitter with bits and pieces from the junk box, and was soon in daily contact with the outside world on the morse key.
On the sixth of Feb. 1952 I called my chum in Liverpool as usual and he told me that all U.K. stations were closed for the day in deference to King
[inserted] G6YQ George [/inserted]
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George VI who had died during the night. Later that day Hilda and I went to Mbeya School to see Colin, expecting the football match to have been cancelled. I expressed my surprise to the Provincial Commissioner (the King’s direct representative) that the Union Jacks were not at half mast and the game still on. He told me not to spread rumours and he would deal with me after the game. Just after half-time a Police askari despatch rider drove onto the field and gave the P.C., who was referee, a message. The P.C. stopped the game and announced that the King was dead. He was very annoyed indeed that I had received the message direct from U.K., many hours ahead of the official channels. Mbeya had a local telephone service which did not connect with any other. It was also at one end of a single-wire line of about 1000 miles which was used for passing telegraph messages. This linked about 30 places ‘up-country’ with Dar es Salaam, the Capital. There was no other way officially of telecommunicating with Mbeya. It so happened that I had a pair of ex-military amplified telephones, which were battery powered, press-to-talk operation and which gave an amplification each of 20 dB (100 times). I sent one of these to Jimmie Waldron in Dar es Salaam and by arrangement he called me one morning at 0545 on this line. We had a first-class conversation which was truly remarkable. This was possible only because the operators at the 30 or so other stations were still asleep, and not interfering. I have no doubt this particular exploit would compare very favourably with the record longest telephone conversation over a single wire and earth, if indeed a record has been established.
George Hanson and I got on very well with each other, both being from Yorkshire and both being ex-Service, but eventually his tour of 2 1/2 years was completed and he was succeeded by Doug. Clifton, who was ex-PTT and R.A.F. ground wireless operator. We moved into the cottage vacated by George and family, near to the transmitting station, and I ran a mains cable underground between the two. This gave us 230 ac. Power for 12 hours a day and at night whenever the radio beacon was required for overflying aircraft.
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One quiet morning the Provincial Commisioner [sic] asked me to his home to discuss a problem, and on arrival I was told that the Governor, Sir Edward Twining was convalescing in Mbeya, having just arrived, but could stay only if he could speak regularly with the Chief Secretary in Dar es Salaam. The Police and Posts & Telegraphs Departments had already been approached and could not assist. I was authorised to cut clean across any rules and regulations in order to set up a communications channel. Back at the D/F Station I sent an official message on the Aeronautical W/T channel to CHF ZHTD (Officer i/c Airport Dar-es-Salaam) asking him to pass a message to Jimmie Waldron, P.T.T. Chief Engineer’s office. I told Jimmie of the Governors request and the powers bestowed upon us, and that I would call him on 7151 KHz which was just above the upper limit of the amateur 40 meter band. I would install a receiver at the P.C.’s house. Would he advise me of his transmitting frequency. Meanwhile I got the local P.T.T. to connect my second aerodrome telephone line to the second line to the P.C.’s house. This automatically provided a microphone for the P.C. and enabled me to make a simple connection to my amateur transmitter at the airport. Half an hour later I received a message on the aeronautical channel “Loud and clear on 7175, Dar es salaam calling you on 8775. A check on my local receiver and indeed there was Jimmie. I then drove to the P.C.’s house and retuned the receiver to 8775, and we had first class duplex communication. A lady’s voice came on “Is that you George?” “No Love, this is Cliff”. “Oh dear, this is Lady Twining, is my husband George there please?” I handed him the telephone and restrained myself from saying “It’s for you George, I thought your name was Edward”. For the next two weeks the link was in constant use and another letter of thanks was sent from D.C.A. in Nairobi.
Why the fuss one might say, but in 1952 it was the very first time [inserted] H E [/inserted] H.H. the Governor had spoken by private radio telephone to his Chief Secretary from outside Dar es Salaam. This was another ‘first’, also on an amateur basis.
At Mbeya Post Office I was introduced to the Manager of New Saza Gold Mine, which was about 100 miles north of Mbeya. He said his radio link with Mbeya had not worked for four years although experts from all over East Africa had tried to fix it. It was a simple w/t link to Mbeya Post Office where there was an operating position and transmitter set up on 3900 KHz which seemed to be a reasonable frequency for the job. “Fix it and you can name your price”, and I agreed to have a go on a ‘no pass, no fee basis’. I first set up a spare DCA transmitter keyed from the D/F station, rather than rely upon co-operation from the Post office. My own DCA operator would monitor. I called the local Post office from the aerodrome but there was no reply. This was the rainy season and it would be a three hour drive through the bush to New Saza, so I lost no time over the Post Office and set off in my Ford Prefect complete with two amateur transmitters and two receivers, any combination of which could do the job if all else failed. On arrival, their station appeared to be working and with adequate output, but I soon found the output stage was doubling to 7.8 MHz. and not amplifying straight through 3.9. A higher tapping on the coil fixed that and I called Mbeya Post office. No reply. Then I called ZEQ3, my own office at the D/F Station and my operator came up trumps. We were in contact with
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Mbeya. I asked my operator to ring the Postmaster asking him to kick his wireless operator. He found the transmitter had the wrong crystal in it and the receiver was also detuned. Having corrected this, all three stations were in contact. The station receiver at New Saza was a pre-war ‘straight set’, that is, not a superhet, and was not ideal, so I added one of my own receivers. In addition, I fitted a second operating position, with my own equipment and separate aerial, as a standby. The manager was delighted and I was rewarded handsomely. Only once in the next 18 months did I need to visit New Saza for a minor fault. Electrical and mechanical power for the mine was derived from a very old wood-burning steam engine of pre-1914 vintage and German manufacture.
On the road about half way to the mine, was Chunya, a typical American-type western one-horse town, the main street being unpaved and 200 feet wide. The place was almost derelict, a few prospectors still panned for gold in the stream, but in years gone by it had supported a population of over 2000. There was a Police post which sported a telephone connected to Mbeya Post office. The overhead line ran at the side of the ‘road’ and I had this in mind for emergency use. A field telephone was part of my standard safari equipment in the car. Later on I carried a transmitter on the aeronautical H/F channels in addition. Communications was often the key to survival.
One very hot day, about noon, George Blodgett, an American tourist, took off from Mbeya in his Cessna 180 with his wife and another passenger, continuing their round-the-world holiday. The aircraft carried the same load as when it took off from Dar es salaam without problem a week or so previously. But Dar was at sea level, and Mbeya at 6500 feet. Dar had a proper concrete runway with a clear flight path. Mbeya had a grass ‘runway’, much shorter and with a small hill at one end and a mountain within 4 miles at the other end. It was the slight banking to avoid the small hill which caused the aircraft to stall and plough along the ground, writing itself off. It took me several minutes to reach the wreck, to find a bewildered trio shaken-up, but physically unhurt. There was a strong smell of petrol which came from a 5 gallon can INSIDE the aircraft. The can had a hand pump and hose which fitted on the drain cock of a fuel tank inside the port wing. Transferring the petrol was achieved by opening a window and leaning out to fix the pipe. This rather surprised me as George was a very experienced pilot and was in fact the first to cross the Andes in Peru, solo, where some years later he went missing without trace. His life-story was written up in Time & Life and referring to his accident in Mbeya, it said he had crashed in the bush and the Despatcher from Mbeya trecked [sic] all night to reach the aircraft, to find George and his passengers surrounded by lions and tigers. Lions were a possibility but the only tigers in Africa are [deleted] a few imported ones in captivity. [/deleted] [inserted] in West Africa and are not tigers as we know them. [/inserted]
Mbeya was a peaceful place, and to a large extent we were able to plan our lives. Occasionally we became involved with the local tribesmen, particularly after one of their frequent skirmishes. Generally a small group would appear at the house bearing the injured on bicycles with blood all over the place, and asking me to take the casualties to hospital. The first time this happened I took them by car to the African Hospital and not really knowing the system, gave them my name. Some weeks later I received the bill. Subsequent deliveries were made in the name of Ramsey Macdonald!
Soon after joining DCA I noticed on one of many flight plans received the name of Iliffe as Captain of an incoming Dakota. When the First Officer
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called me on VHF I requested him to ask the Captain if the number 1090111 meant anything to him. Back came the reply, affirmative. I gave him my first service number 1384956 and after he had landed, went over to the Terminal Building to see him. There wasn’t much time for reminiscing but he marvelled that I had remembered his first service number. It was on a pay parade in Bulawayo that Howard’s name was not called with the others in alphabetical order. It was called at the very end when he gave his ‘last three’, somewhat disgruntled, as “Sir, One one bloody one”.
We had seen a great deal of each other on the troopship going to Durban and until our ways parted at Belvedere where Howard got his wings and my records were stamped ‘Wastage’. After his training at Belvedere, he completed S.F.T.S. on Oxfords and in U.K. converted to Dakotas. His war was on Transport Command, flying Dakotas. We met several times in the next 15 years, the last time being in 1965 when Howard was the Captain of a Comet of East African Airways returning to the U.K.
After 2 1/2 years in Tanganyika our tour was finished and we were due for 6 months leave in U.K.. We opted to travel by air rather than sea but did not realise when making the decision that this referred to trunk travel to U.K. from the International Airport of the territory in which we finished our tour. It was unlikely that we would return to Mbeya after leave, my successor expecting to stay for the full 2 1/2 years. All our effects were crated up whilst we spent the last week in Mbeya Hotel. The car was left with the Postmaster and Paddy our Alsation [sic] boarded with Mrs. Maugham-Brown. And so with four children, Christopher a baby of 4 months, we said farewell to Mbeya at the railway station, not by train but by diesel-powered bus - referred to as a ‘taxi’ by the Africans. The first leg took us the 250 miles through Southern Highlands to Iringa, where accommodation was reserved at Iringa Hotel. The next day was very similar, by another ‘taxi’ to Dodoma. The drivers were Africans, probably ex-Kings African Rifles, and their driving was of a very high standard considering the state of the road. There was some tarmac in the towns, but otherwise the road surface was graded murram, a well-packed reddish sand. This was apt to become corrugated after rain and scarred with deep wheel ruts. Ruts made by lorries could be quite deep and dangerous to cars with little clearance below. The ‘taxi’ took us direct to the railway station at Dodoma where we had been advised to request compartments as near to the engine as possible, where the sway is minimum. The first job was to wash all the nappies and as we had two compartments it was easy to sling a couple of lines and hang up the nappies to dry. It was very hot in Dodoma, and the carriage windows were all open because of the heat. In the evening the engine got up steam and the train moved off amid clouds of thick black smoke, most of which seemed to come in at the windows. For 18 hours we chugged across the plains with its tens of thousands of many different types of wild animals, gradually descending to the coast and becoming progressively hotter. Arriving in Dar es Salaam at about 4 pm., the temperature in the shade was 120 deg.f. and it was a great relief to flop onto the beds in the air-conditioned hotel. The evening was spent in trying to clean up our clothing and indeed ourselves, with Christopher’s nappies hanging on lines in the hotel room. The nappies dried within an hour but were still filthy. After a browse around the big stores in Dar, we handed in our 480 lbs. of baggage and placed ourselves in the capable hands of B.O.A.C.
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Our flight home was by Arganaut, [sic] 16 hours flying, stopping at Nairobi, Entebbe, Khartoum, Benghazi and Rome. Plenty of seat room, excellent food and a very comfortable flight. One engine developed trouble approaching Italy and we were delayed for 24 hours in Rome. The Romans were hostile to the British at that time, I cannot remember why this was so, but we enjoyed a conducted tour of Rome and first-class hotel accommodation. At breakfast next morning I thought I recognised a fellow at the next table. He was under the same impression and when he spoke to us there was instant recognition. He was the B.O.A.C. Rep. in Rome and we had seen a great deal of each other on the squadron in North Africa. He was then W/O Woolston, a pilot on 150 Sqdn. We arrived in London 24 hours late, but there were no complaints. B.O.A.C. had made the trip very enjoyable.
The greater part of our leave was spent in London with Hilda’s parents, and I took the opportunity of spending 12 weeks at the School of Telegraphy in Brixton, for an Intermediate C. & G. in Telecomms and a P.M.G 1st. Class licence. I was also on a course of Dexedrine to reduce my weight, eating very little and actually losing it at the rate of 1lb. per day, for 44 days. Peter Gunns, another D.C.A., Radio Officer had been at the school for 6 months and was doing the complete 12 month course for a P.M.G. second class licence. I decided to give it three months and take the first class ticket. The Principal at the school advised against it, almost everyone first obtained a second-class ticket before trying for a first. For three months I swatted hard, long into the night and then went to Post Office H.Q. in St. Martin-le-Grand and applied to take the P.M.G.1 licence. The Chief examiner asked to see my second-class licence and when I said I didn’t have one, he said “look son, try for a second class and if you pass, come back in a few years time and try for a first”. I replied that I was not interested in anything second-class and he shrugged his shoulders and booked me to take the exam. three days hence. The exam. took from 9 am to 5 pm., written and practical and was quite intensive. The final part was the morse test at 25 w.p.m. and the examiner was wearing an R.S.G.B. tie. I took a chance at the end of the test and sent, on the key ‘QRA? De VQ4BM’ and after an exchange of greetings he asked me if I was returning to Kenya. I replied “yes, but only if I pass this exam”. He sent QRX3 and left the room, returning with a smile and said “strictly off the record, you could book your ticket”. The next three days were taken up with City & Guilds exams, and I was delighted when my P.M.G. licence arrived by post. The following day, feeling on top line, Hilda and I went to M.C.A. Headquarters at Berkeley Square and I applied to take the Flight Radio Officer’s exam. I found this was held only twice yearly and by sheer coincidence the next one was the following day. I was told to just fill in the form, pay £3 and come back at 0830 the next day. I saw the Chief examiner and told him I wasn’t quite prepared for the exam. at such short notice, it was many years since I had studied the S.B.A. and Navigational aids. He told me not to worry about them and to check through the last 5 exam. papers, copies of which he lent me. They could be bought openly from the “shop” downstairs, but this was already closed. He also said “bear in mind that everything has its own natural frequency”. I spent until 5 am next morning making sure I could answer all the questions on those papers, and doubly sure of the compulsory questions. I noticed that
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year 4 had the same compulsory questions as year 1, and year 5 the same as year 2. Year 6 was to be my lot and if this was to be the same as year 3, on cathode ray tubes, all would be well, and I had a couple of hours sleep. It had taken me a long time to realise what the Chief Examiner had meant by “it’s own natural frequency”.
The exams were spread over a period of two days and I failed two of them. The first was a three-minute test writing down the phonetic alphabet and I wrote “Alpha bravo coca delta foxtrot golf hotel etc.” The examiner looked over my shoulder and remarked “what on earth have we here, have you never heard of able baker Charlie?”. I thought this was a catch and I said “yes but that went out three years ago when I.C.A.O. introduced this one”. It seemed that Britain was three years behind the rest of the world on this simple issue. I had however quite rightly failed on R/T procedure. All went well on a simulated flight from Manchester to Jersey when I received a chitty that both engines had stopped and we were on fire. There was already a M’iadez in force from another aircraft and I broke radio silence and put out my own “M’aidez” without the Captain’s authority and that was the end of the exam. FAILED! on two counts. I had passed two three hour written papers, a two hour practical exam., an hour’s morse at 25 w.p.m. and failed on two ridiculous details. I said I was sufficiently experienced to anticipate the Captain’s instruction to send out an SOS but the book does say that only the Captain has the authority. However, I paid another £3 which I could by then ill-afford and resat the two parts the following morning. The licence came by post a few days later. The R/T Procedure test was the same as before, and when we reached the point where I had put out my M’aidez I just sat tight. I heard the other aircraft transmit his SOS again and it was acknowledged by Jersey Approach. Without authority to transmit an SOS I could not break radio silence according to the regulations and I continued to sit tight. One minute of real time was equivalent to 10 minutes of ‘flying’ and after 30 minutes of theoretical flying time I removed my headphones and placed them on the table. The examiner did likewise and asked me what I thought I was doing.
I just said “swimming to the surface”. He laughed and said O.K. at least you didn’t originate a M’aidez. In the practical M.C.A. exam the equipment in use was the T1154 and R1155 and the main object of the examiner seemed to me to be one of getting me confused, argumentative and thoroughly rattled. Thanks maybe to the dexedrine I realised what his game was and remained very calm indeed. He admitted afterwards that he was trying to get me rattled, remaining calm and composed was all important in the air!. I cast my mind back 10 years but said nothing.
Meanwhile Peter Gunns was still plodding on and becoming very discouraged. I urged him to take the PMG2 the following week, there was little point in further delay. I spent a week with him going through every paper set for 5 years, and he was successful in the exam. A few weeks later we returned to Nairobi together. About 10 years later Peter died of a heart attack whilst on night duty in the Nairobi Communications Centre. He was taking a short break and read in the newspaper that Pinnocks had folded up. He had £15,000 invested with them, and the loss was too much to bear. After a few weeks at Eastleigh I was posted to Mwanza on the southern shores of Lake Victoria, again in Tanganyika.
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Our car, a Ford Prefect KCC13 (new price £400) and Paddy our alsatian, were nearly 1000 miles away in Mbeya and I was able to scrounge a flight as supernumery [sic] crew with East African Airways. The return journey by road with Paddy took 30 hours non-stop except for refuelling and for half an hour at dawn when driving was dangerous. The work in Nairobi was operating air/ground channels on R/T and W/T and also at the D/F station giving H/F bearings to aircraft on the Khartoum and Johannesburg sectors where navigation aids were few and far between. It transpired later that the D/F station was adjacent to the Mau Mau graveyard. I recall one day looking out of the door and seeing the police askari guard fast asleep with his loaded rifle on the ground beside him. More for security reasons than mischief I took the rifle inside the building and it was still there when I closed the station at 1830. But there was no sign of the askari, so I put the rifle in the loft of the small building, intending to do something about it next day. Somehow I forgot all about it for two weeks and then handed in the rifle at the R.A.F. guardroom and questioned why the police had taken no action. The askari had just disappeared without trace.
Once again our household effects were packed into crates, and despatched by ‘rail’ to Mwanza. We had exchanged our Ford Prefect for an Austin A70 and motored via Kitale (my father’s farm) to Kisumu where we boarded the M.V. Rusinga. The Rusinga ploughed clockwise round the lake shore calling at Musoma, Mwanza, Bukoba, Entebbe, Jinja and complete circle to Kisumu. Her sister ship the M.V. Usoga called at the same ports, but went anti-clockwise round the lake. A third ship, the M.V. Sybil was smaller and more or less a reserve vessel. Lake Victoria was the second largest inland sea in the world, and became the largest when its level rose 8 feet with the building of the dam at Jinja a few years later. The voyage of about 200 miles took a very pleasant 30 hours with one halt at Musoma. We were met at Mwanza Port by Johnny King who I was relieving. He said he expected to return to Mwanza in 6 months as it was his station and his wife’s father was Government entomologist permanently stationed there. His wife’s family were German, very domineering and forceful. I didn’t mind the mother’s clay pipe but took an instant dislike to her Bavarian-type husband. I insisted upon a proper formal take-over at the airport which was just as well, and the proper storage of King’s personal effects at P.W.D and not in the transmitter room. For a couple of weeks we stayed at Mwanza Hotel and then moved to a delightful house at Bwiru, facing north with a wonderful view over Lake Victoria. Palm trees in the foreground, paw paw trees in the garden and - we discovered much later - leopard in the hills at the back of the house. The water supply came from a storage tank half a mile up the hill via a metal pipe on the surface of the ground, and was always hot enough for a bath without further heating. The water had to remain in our roof storage tank for some time before we could regard it as being a cold water supply. Water and electricity could not be taken for granted in East Africa, but the house was connected to the town electricity supply.
The airport was a fairly new one about 10 miles east of town, by the lake shore, the single runway 18/36 being of grass. It was a neat little place, the transmitters being in the room below the Control Tower with two diesel engines and fire station being in a custom-built building 50 yards away. The
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transmitters were two RCA ET4336s, a G54 Redifon M/F Beacon and an ex-R.A.F. T1154. In the Control Tower was a Pye PTC704 VHF set with a direction-finding antenna. There were only 6 scheduled aircraft per week and an average of about 10 charters. This was a ‘one man’ station and my working hours were long. Perhaps the highlight of the tour was the four-day visit of H.R.H. Princess Margaret. The ten mile road to town was ‘tarmaced’ [sic] a few days before her arrival. The original murrum (red sand) surface was first graded and then covered by a quarter inch layer of chippings and sprayed with tar. The cost was £11,000 which was charged to my aerodrome maintenance vote. For the few days of the visit the road looked really superb, and then just a few days later it rained and the remains of the “tarmac surface” were cleared away by grader, the surface reverting to murram once more.
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Every effort was being made by the Administration to make the Royal Visit a success and the costs were covered somehow. The M.V. Sybil was in dock for 6 months at Kisumu being completely refitted so the Princess could spend just a few hours on the lake. An R.A.F. Shackleton flew down from Aden to provide an escort for the Sybil. Four radio stations were established on the boat, each with an operator, to contact the Police on H/F W/T, Aircraft on VHF, Mwanza Airport on H/F R/T, and E. A. Railways & Harbours. Just about every vessel afloat on Lake Victoria seemed to be milling around outside the harbour waiting for the Sybil and the Princess. A Widgeon aircraft, the only amphibean [sic] in E. Africa, was detailed to position itself at the end of the runway at instant readiness for take-off. The Shackleton took-off to patrol an hour before the Sybil was due to leave harbour, Captain Chris Treen positioned his Widgeon and stayed put with engines idling. All the Sybil's radios were tested and people were getting excited. We were then advised that it was a case of not tonight Josephine, H.R.H. had a headache, the trip was cancelled. The Shackleton, looking remarkably like a real Lancaster landed on my murrum runway, and the Widgeon had to be towed in backwards, the engines having over-heated.
In company with all the other Colonial officials I had been given six pages of foolscap telling me how to address the Princess and how to conduct myself in the Royal presence. There was also an application form for a Permit to be at the airport for her arrival and another application form regarding my being presented to the Princess. It was the two application forms which bugged me. I refused to apply for a permit to enter the airport where every aspect was my responsibility, if anyone denied me access, be it on their own head. "Before applying to be presented", the write-up stated, "You must qualify under at least one of the following headings:-
1. Be a Government Servant on a salary exceeding '£x'
2. Be a serving officer of H. M. forces,
3. Be a retired officer having held a rank above 'Y'
4. Hold a Civil Decoration equivalent or senior to an M.B.E.
5. Hold a military decoration.
6. Have already been presented to another member of the Royal Family.
There was virtually an order to apply if one qualified and this decided me to ignore the whole issue. I was not in favour of the pomp and circumstance and the relatively vast expenditure involved, and I was never any good at playing charades and other party games.
Just before the Royal Visit a gang of workmen turned up at the airport and were starting to fit a toilet suite in the 'Crew Room'. This was a small room where aircrews could relax and enjoy a little privacy between flights. Toilet facilities were quite adequate without specially converting the crew room for the Princess. I vetoed the plan, and finally the toilet wing, already with four Asian type and four European type loos was enhanced with one new and rather superior loo. The superloo did come in useful however; whilst the Princess was inspecting the guard of honour, the bare-chested Engineer of the Widgeon aircraft appeared inside the Terminal building,
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looking quite incongruous in his filthy shorts and sandals. I told him to keep out of sight until Princes Margaret had left. He did, and hid in the superloo. After the visit, someone fixed a royal coat of arms an the door to which I had the only key. I was tempted to replace the heraldry with a replica of the board made for me by one of the German prisoners at Poynton. written in Gothic characters "Lager Kommandant, Eintritt Verbotten".
The Royal Visit was the highlight of the decade for Mwanza, the road to the aerodrome was closed for three hours and all the Police were concerned only with the visit. It was during that three hours the villains broke into many European houses. We lost all our shoes which were not actually being worn at the time, some clothing, and all our clocks including a time-switch I had just repaired for someone.
There was one charter aircraft based at Mwanza, the Widgeon piloted by Chris Treen. It was a very busy aircraft, being an amphibean [sic] , going relatively short flights mostly around the lake shore. Chris had a full-time engineer who was not very co-operative, and the operation proved to be uneconomical although Chris tried very hard. He was on Transport Command during the war and later flew in the Berlin Air Lift, then flew the Widgeon from U.K., 6000 miles to Mwanza. The airline had its moments, on one occasion the Provincial Commissioner was climbing out of the aircraft at Ukerewe Island into a dingy which collapsed and he was nearly drowned. Submerged rack. and crocodiles added to the excitement
One of the busiest aircraft at Mwanza was a Miles Magister which, was owned privately and which has also been flown out from England by its owner, an official of the Lint & Seed Marketing Board, who also had an Aircraft Maintenance Engineers' licence. It became the main asset of the Mwanza Aeroclub and was very active at weekends.
The tribe an Ukerewe Island had it's own language, and the story goes that the District Officer studied the language and wrote a dictionary and grammar for it. Having done so he applied for the £60 per year "language competency allowance", and to qualify had first to pass the Official Colonial Office exam. in the subject. The Colonial Office department which organised such matters was duly asked to prepare an exam. and find an invigilator for it, but was not given the identity of the candidate. There was no record of anyone being able to speak the language, and they approached the obvious source, the District Officer Ukerewe. As a part of his normal chores he was pleased to prepare the two papers as 2 hours of translation each way between English and the native language of Ukerewe. On arrival in U. K. on leave, he received a letter from another Colonial Office department, addressing him by name and asking him to invigilate at as examination, giving the venue and date. Shortly after, yet another office wrote to him advising him that an examination had been arranged and wishing him luck in the exam. He hardly needed it, reporting as directed in his official capacities as both invigilator and examinee. Not only that, but he had also prepared the examination papers. He was the only European who knew the language and he got his £60. per annum. The common language with the natives was of course an up-country impure Swahili, as in all parts of East Africa.
I had studied Kiswahili in the Prisons Service and from books, but the grammatical version was spoken only at the coast and on the radio. The
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Africans in the Prison Service and those I worked with spoke the up-country version, almost completely ungrammaticaI. The further one went from the coast the more it became a matter of joining words together. Nevertheless, it was an interesting and descriptive Ianguage. Beautiful words like 'maradadi' which in fact is an adjective meaning 'beautiful', and 'tafadahali', said to mean 'please' , but I never actually heard an African use it. ' Asanti' meaning thankyou was frequently used. Calling someone a "shenzi" hardly needs translation.
The Caspair Lake Service operated daily. Based at Entebbe, a DeHavilland Rapide flew to Kisumu, Musoma, Mzanza, Bukoba and back to Entebbe. It called at Mwanza three times weekly and remained on the ground for 4 hours. Paddy O'Reilly was the most colourful of the pilots and on one occasion was missing when the aircraft was due to take-off. He had borrowed a native canoe and paddled out into the lake for some peace and quiet. He was very soon asleep and when he awoke he found he was two miles off-shore without a paddle. He was soon rescued and took off two hours late.
I had a very good African Assistant at Mwanza, Zepherino Shija, and he was a tremendous help in making things run smoothly. In fact my African staff were all good types, far from home, politicians and the trouble-makers to be influenced by them.
It was at Mwanza that I really became involved with radio repairs, and once I had repaired a few, word quickly spread and I was inundated with them. Many of the 'dukes' -shops- in town sold radios but hadn't the vaguest idea how they worked or how to repair them. Most of the radio owned by the Africans were powered by dry batteries, using a 4-pin plug on the power lead which was very often forced the wrong way into the socket on the battery. This instantly blew all four valves for which the shops charged 25 shillings each. I bought valves for 3 shillings each in quantity and sold them in sets of 4 for forty shillings, throwing in a new and better type plug. I must have repaired over a thousand radios in two years, plus many bigger sets for Europeans. Before very long I met Mr. Manning, the American Head of the African Inland Mission in the Province, and he showed me a room full of equipment, domestic radios, car radios, record players, tape recorders, transmitters, P.A. ampIifiers etc. etc. Every item was faulty. I was invited to repair what I could, keep what I wanted and throw out anything that was past it. Three trans-receivers were very attractive and they needed only setting up. Independent transmitter and receiver units powered from 115v a.c. but with rather limited frequency coverage of 5 to 8 MHz. I used them on the air for a couple of weeks and they were then taken by road to African Inland Mission stations in the Belgium Congo where they had a network on 7150 KHz. These sets were to prove very useful within a few years during the Congo rebellion which came with "Independence". It took me 6 months to empty the room, and all except three or four units were returned to use within the Mission organisation. Those three or four units caused a misunderstanding with Mr. Manning. I said "These units are U/S, best place for them is in the lake", and I could see that I had upset him. He associated my expression 'U.S' . with Uncle Sam, or the United States, but when I explained it meant ‘unservicable’ in English Service jargon a crisis was avoided.
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I met a fellow called Nawotsey, supposed to be a Belgian, who was making a fortune killing crocodiles for their skins. He had just about wiped them out on Lake Rukwa. His technique was to use an infra-red lamp and sniperscope at very close range, typically six feet. His equipment gave a lot of trouble and I charged him well over the odds for repairs. In reality he was German, and ex-German army. There were many of them in ex-German Tanganyika but few had the guts to admit it, and there was not a nazi among them, in theory.
Eventually one of the dukas offered me £50 per month cash if would stop doing radio repairs. This was not far short of my salary and quite a compliment, but not accepted.
We became very friendly with one German, Dr. Schupler, who had been a wartime Medical Officer in the Luftwaffe. He was serving in Dresden the night of the 13th. of February 1945 when it was attacked by over 800 R.A.F. bombers, followed by over 300 American Fortresses the next day, causing between them 137,000 casualties including an estimated 50,000 killed. A doctor somehow seemed to be in a different and acceptable category, but our talks had reminded one of a period I had almost forgotten, and about which I had stopped thinking. One good point in East Africa's favour, there was very little to remind us of the war. A row of ribbons perhaps on a police uniform, or a retired senior type using his old rank, but there were few occasions when we compared, notes on our respective war efforts. The Germans were supposed to be super-efficient, a myth already exploded, but in the main they were still mostly distrusted.
Mwanza was a peaceful place, there was only one murder during our 2 years residence, and that was committed by a mad african from Dodoma, 400 miles away. I could not have visualised at the time that within twentyseven years this nice little airport would be bombed by the Uganda Air Force. I can picture now the little bakery where the murder was committed. It was in same road just before we left that a hyena was running down the road to meet us. We were in the Austin A70 which already had a damaged right. wing and I put on full speed. We met the hyena head-on, relative speed about 70 and he was thrown completely over the car. He lay on the road for about two minutes, then picked himself up and loped off into the bush. We had ringside seats watching an interesting battle between hyena and baboon one evening. Our bungalow was on the hillside and the bedroom windows on one side were 15 feet above ground, and level with the tops of the pawpaw trees, heavily laden with fruit. The baboon were taking the fruit and being attacked by about a dozen hyena which were being thrown around by the baboon. The fight finished suddenly for reasons best known to the combatants. They might have sensed the presence of a leopard, which was very likely, but we were not aware of the leopards ourselves until a few weeks later. In the middle of one night we were awakened by a scuffling outside the window and there was the most obnoxious stench. There was the so-called laugh of the hyena and a deep sawing sound which we were told was a leopard. It seemed that a hyena had been dragging an old carcass along when it was disturbed by a leopard. The carcass was dropped outside our bedroom window and later one of them returned to collect it. Apparently baboon are the favourite diet of the leopard and everything including baboon and leopard dislikes the hyena. One of them cornered a neighbour’s dog in our garage and
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chewed off it’s vital parts before help arrived too late. Snakes too were in abundance around Mwanza, and a European girl had been crushed, but not fatally by a python near the lake shore. One of the houseboys hacked a monitor lizard to death, thinking it was a snake. Hilda recalls the occasion when I encountered a leopard on the driveway to the house and I got out of the car to tell her!. There was the occasion too when Paddy, our Alsatian was aware of a leopard outside the front door and Paddy's hair literally bristled. The leopard was probably aware of Paddy's presence also. I was away in Nairobi at the time
Some months before the end of our tour, we received a telegram from Les with the sad news that Hilda's father had died. At about the same time the Kenya Education authorities informed us that as we were no longer resident in Kenya, Colin and Wendy would have to leave Kitale School. The alternative was Kongwa, a school established at the time of the groundnut scheme, a British Government fiasco then almost fully wound up after wasting eighteen million pounds. Kongwa was about 400 miles away and difficult to reach from Mwanza, and as it would be only a temporary measure in any case, we felt it better that Colin and Wendy should return to U.K. We saw them off on the Dakota on an hour's flight to Entebbe where they were met by Flossy and Pi Reed. The following day they flew to London and stayed with Mum at Korella Rd., in Wandsworth.
In early June `57 it was time for home leave again and once more we packed all our household effects into huge crates ready for shipping to our next station which had not yet been decided. I had been promoted to Radio Superintendant [sic] in Mbeya and later to Telecommunications Supt. having passed departmental exams for the two lots of promotion. I was finally relieved by Sailor Seaman who immediately objected to the long working hours. The way of life on the outstations had a great deal to commend it. There was no television but we always had a good radio set. There was not the pressure we were to experience in later life and we made our own entertainment. It would be nice to go round again.
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Before leaving Mwanza I had ordered a VW Beetle on the home leave scheme stipulating the date and time that I would collect it in London. This resulted in a considerable saving. The cost was £330 delivered London whilst the price in East Africa was £1250. Colin and Wendy were already in Britain, only John and Chris were with us on this trip. From Mwanza we should have returned via the capital, Dar es Salaam, as we did from Mbeya, but for some weeks I had been pointing out the futility of the extra 1600 miles via Dar, when the the [sic] aircraft would go via Entebbe in any case. Sanity prevailed and we flew by DC3 to Entebbe, a nice lunch at the Lake Vic. and a 10 hour flight to the U.K. with one stop at Benghazi. I think that was our first trip by Jet aircraft, a Comet. I have flown in many jets since then, but none as comfortable and roomy as the Comet. The following day we went to Lower Regent Street and collected our new VW Beetle, which came into the showroom one minute ahead of schedule. I was very impressed by the German organisation. I was taken into a workshop and given some useful tips about the car which was to serve us well for over 200,00 miles most of which was on murrum, our reddish East African sandy soil.
In the following six months we made good use of the car, visiting my mother in Barnoldswick, the Yorkshire Dales, and whilst up north had a rendezvous avec Ace (Ted) and Mary Foster, Ace having been our second tour Navigator. Ted recalled this many years later and remembered an incident in a Southport restaurant. We were sharing two tables with Ted and Mary and their three children, making a party of 4 adults and 7 children. Ted alleges the waitress exclaimed “By gum are these all yours?” and claims I replied “No, they are from the local orphanage, we are just taking them out for the day”. She said that was right champion and gave us a discount! I went to Liverpool also and en-route noticed that a Police car had been right behind me for several miles. I slowed down to 30 for the next five miles and eventually the blue light came on and I was stopped. “What speed were you doing Sir?” An instant reply, “29.5 m.p.h. “The officer agreed with that and said “Why, it’s a lovely road and there’s no speed limit. When you slowed down from 80 to 30 we thought you had a problem, enjoy your visit Sir”. I had a “Visitor to Britain” sticker on the back which was supposed to help a little. In Liverpool I met Stan Chadderton, our First tour Bomb Aimer. I called at Stan’s house and his wife Hilda directed me to the Gladstone Dock where Stan was working, I seem to remember being introduced to his boss and Stan was given the rest of the day off. We adjourned to the Lord Nelson Pub and reminisced well into the night about our efforts in North Africa.
We had made another acquisition whilst in Mwanza. Clearly a base was needed in Britain even if my work was to be in East Africa. Les told us of a house in Glyn Neath called Glaslyn going for £1850 on the balance of a 999 year lease. I offered to buy it if the freehold was available. It was very quickly ours at a total cost £1910 and £25 solicitor’s fees. Hilda’s Mum moved into Glaslyn and Colin and Wendy had already joined her. Glaslyn was a comfortable and handy sort of place, only a few hundred yards from Aunt Doll’s cottage.
In early December I was told to report direct to Entebbe Airport to relieve Henry Day in charge of Telecommunications. I wrote to P.W.D. in Mwanza and asked them to send on our boxes and car by Lake Steamer to
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Entebbe, and completed other arrangements. Just before Christmas I handed over the new car to the A.A. near Tower Bridge and paid £75 for shipping it to Mombassa [sic]. Then with our four children and a mass of baggage we once again booked-in at Victoria Air Terminal and shortly afterwards we realised we had just been home for six months and were then in Entebbe. The Comet aircraft was flown by Howard Iliffe, 109011! but I discovered this too late to meet him.
At Entebbe we were met by Henry Day who had been in charge for six months in an acting capacity and he made it clear that as he was now demoted – with loss of acting pay – I could not expect any co-operation from him. For 10 days we stayed in the Lake Victoria Hotel, luxurious but not at all homely and with it’s population of some hundreds of cats living on the roof. We then moved into a house with a red mbati (corrugated iron) roof. Between the ceiling and the roof was a foot of sand and if the builders had been designing an oven it would have taken some beating. The red iron absorbed the heat from a tropical sun and it was retained by the sand. Entebbe was a pretentious place, not the capital of Uganda, which was Kampala 20 miles north, but where most of the senior Gov’t officials lived. The airport was a minor one to U.K. standards but trying very had [sic] to appear important. I found the whole place docile and yet offensive, “toffee-nosed” is the phrase which comes to mind. The job itself was not at all demanding, I had a team of about 8 Engineers including Frank Unstead and Gibby. Also three Radio Officers including Henry Day and several Africans to operate the teleprinters and radio links to Nairobi. There was little for me to do personally. Airport Management was taken care of by Uganda Government officers. The East Africa High Commission, of which the Directorate of Civil Aviation was a part, was responsible for Air Traffic Control and telecommunications. About six airlines had their own Station Managers and there was a great deal of empire building which led to over-manning and inefficiency. An individual’s importance was determined by the number of his subordinates and the extent of his warrant to incur expenditure. There was a great deal of ill-feeling too, between the officers of Government and those of the High Commission, later more appropriately renamed the East Africa Common Services Organisation. The latter was responsible for all communications in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, except for the actual maintenance of roads. It included E.A. Posts & Telegraphs, Railways & Harbours, Fisheries, Meteorlogical [sic] Depts., Civil Aviation and several Medical Research establishments. Politically, the scene was complex, Kenya was a “Colony & Protectorate” – some of each – Tanganyika was a Protectorate with a United Nations mandate and Uganda a combination of twelve Kingdoms formed into a ‘State’ with 12 Kings, a Prime Minister and also a President. It had its political problems but they were not mine. Dickie Dixon was Senior Air Traffic Controller and therefore Officer i/c Navigational Services in which capacity I was his deputy. As I was not at that time a qualified Air Traffic Controller, this led to friction, and as I have already implied, Entebbe was not a happy place. The crunch came when I was told by Dickie to compile all the Annual Confidential reports, including those for Air Traffic Controllers. I told him that I did not think it proper that I should report on officers whose qualifications I did not hold myself. He should do them himself and I would write them for all the Telecommom [sic].
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staff. The previous year he had reported on the Telecomms staff and I disagreed strongly with his findings in one case, that of Gibby who, he wrote, “was slow in carrying out a job”. He was indeed slower than most, but was also the most thorough engineer in the Department. When repairing an equipment he not only repaired the current fault but also brought it right up to the manufacturer’s specification. My personal relationship with Dickie deteriorated rapidly, and rather than speak to me he would write me memos. In one of his many memos he “required” a technical explanation of a particular problem, and I replied to the effect that “as the conductivity between the two points was less than half a mho, this was inadequate for proper operation”. He wrote to my Chief in Nairobi complaining that I was taking the Mickey, and this brought him a rude reply. I could have referred to “a resistance greater than 2 ohms” instead of “a conductivity less than half a mho”, which would have been more helpful, but I made my point.
One major problem at Entebbe was the absence of schools for European children, and Colin and Wendy had to go to Nairobi and Kericho respectively, as boarders. This would have cost little had I been stationed in Kenya and paid the statutary [sic] Education Tax, but as I was stationed outside Kenya and had not paid the Kenya tax I had to pay the full boarding fees. I was not alone in this of course, it was a problem for all families of the E.A. High Commission living in Uganda.
However, I learned that in June 1958 Dinger Bell was finishing his four year tour at Kisumu in Kenya, and I managed a transfer for myself, handing-over Entebbe to an officer returning from a U.K. leave. At that time we had two cars, and I remember taking the Austin A70 to Kampala and selling it in a bar to a consortium of five Africans for £25, each chipping in with a hundred shillings. We travelled to Kisumu by road, our effects going by lake steamer. It was an easy day’s drive round the north-east shores of Lake Victoria, through Jinja, with its crocodiles at the source of the Nile. This was in the days before the level of the Owen Falls dam was raised by eight feet. It was refreshing to arrive at Kisumu, and we were pleased with everything we saw. We spent the first week in the hotel, then moved in to Dinger Bell’s house at 55 Mohammed Kassim Road, near the African Broadcasting Service transmitting Station.
Kisumu Airport had been established about 1932, and had, like Mbeya been a scheduled stop on the Empire Air Route of (the original) British Airways. The lake was ideal for the Empire Flying Boats and our staff pilot, Capt. Casperuthus had many stories of flying Hannibal biplanes into Kisumu. During the Second World War it was taken over by the R.A.F. and used extensively by Catalina amphibeans [sic] and Sunderland seaplanes. R.A.F. aircraft of most long and medium range types were regular visitors, together with the 3-motor Junkers 52 transports of the South African Air Force. With two excellent murrum runways and four hangars, it had seen some service one way and another.
The Control Tower was a small two storey building of 1932 vintage, the ground floor being taken up completely by the transmitting room. The first floor comprised the Control “tower”, a small office, and store. Originally there had been a second floor with a glass top for good all-round vision but this had been removed at the end of the war and replaced with a tiled roof. The second floor became the loft and housed the VDF antenna. I
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found the transmitters had been sadly neglected for many years. Two RCA 4336 types were used on R/T., a third on W/T., and a new Redifon GR49 NDB. There was also a dual transmitter which was not on the inventory and which had in fact been ‘liberated’ from a Catalina, before it joined the other two scuttled in the lake at the end of the war. This set was the best of the lot, and certainly my favourite. It was complete with a 110v ac supply of 600 Hz, not 60 and within a month I had modified an old T1190 power unit to drive it. The M/F section was put into use in place of the Redifon beacon, and the H/F section performed wonderfully on the amateur bands.
Being a ‘one-man station’ my working hours were long, 7 days a week and seldom a whole day off, but I had a workshop and bench and put my waiting-for-aircraft hours to very good use, mostly repairing domestic radios. The transmitters were giving a lot of trouble. As an example, whilst tuning a rotary inductance on a 4336, a two inch nail providing an electrical contact dropped out and had to be bodged up again. The GR49, although nearly new, was using modulator valves at the rate of a pair every two weeks due to a missing relay and associated wiring which had actually been left out at the factory during production. Fortunately there was a good old T1154 which acted as a standby for all transmitters except VHF, so I was able to take each transmitter in turn out of use for as long as was necessary whilst I overhauled them. As this progressed I was enjoying the practical work and decided to make use of a three-foot cabinet which was not on charge. (I inherited quite a lot of useful ‘junk’ at Kisumu!). At the Fisheries office on the lake shore, also on the airport, I found that a vehicle had demolished a rondaval (a 12 ft. diameter building constructed of aluminium). I volunteered the services of my crash-tender crew to clear up the mess and to take away the wreckage. A few days was spent by the crash crew in cutting the best of the aluminium into 19” panels of standard sizes, and suitable chassis. One of the ET4336 transmitters was going to be off the air for several weeks waiting for spares, and in order not to delay my overhaul programme I built a two-stage transmitter on one of the 3 1/2” panels. This was a 6V6 crystal oscillator driving an 807 to a dipole antenna. The operator at Nairobi reported our signals as very good and better than they had been for a long time. 20 Watts in place of 400, but it was the dipole antenna in place of a random length of wire which made all the difference. Within three weeks the 3’ cabinet contained 4 transmitters and was providing all services except VHF and M/F Beacon. The overhauling programme was completed, the official transmitters finally tested and then switched off. For the next 18 months we operated almost trouble-free. My monthly engineering reports to H.Q. in Nairobi were mainly negative and referred to “routine preventative maintenance only”. However, Sid Worthy, Chief Telecomms. Engineer was not fooled, and in due course he wrote and asked why my monthly electricity bill was only a quarter of what it had been for many years. Before I had plucked up enough courage to reply, Sid arrived unannounced and went direct to the Transmitter room, finding the four big transmitters switched off. In the Control Tower he saw my all-purpose cabinet, and to put it lightly, he was not amused. I suggested to Sid that we should make our own single-purpose transmitters and dispense with the old uneconomical general-purpose types. He agreed there was no good technical or financial argument against this but what would he do with his army of 50
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or so engineers? He compromised and allowed me to leave my own equipment in use provided I removed it a month before I left Kisumu.
One of our friends at Kisumu, Jimmie Sanson was a very keen constructor of model aircraft and several he had made were lost in the lake. His final model was a rather superior type with six-foot wingspan and single engine using alcohol as fuel. The rudder was radio-controlled on 27MHz. and the aircraft made some very impressive flights at the airport. On one occasion it went up to about 2000 feet before it ran out of fuel and for almost an hour Jimmie kept it turning over the airport. The aircraft was trimmed slightly nose-heavy but apart from turns, he had no other control. Eventually it was so far down-wind that it was lost to sight and last seen heading for the mountains. After a period of calm, the wind changed in the early evening and Jimmie and I were standing outside the Control Tower lamenting his sad loss when one of the crash Crew shouted “Bwana, Ndegi ndogo narudi”. His eyesight was far superior to ours, we saw nothing until the aircraft appeared over the end of the runway and actually landed, after a record flight of over three hours. Up-dating the radio control was the next stage and two months and about £200 later an eight function system was completed, giving control of the engine, elevators, ailerons and rudder. The machine could then be made to taxi out, take off and carry out aerobatics. The engine was used in short bursts and as there appeared to be a permanent thermal over the runways during the warm days, thirty minute flights were quite routine. Eventually the aircraft was lost over Lake Victoria and probably joined the three Catalinas on the bottom. Perhaps one day a Catalina will be recovered from their fresh-water grave, but the Sanson special was lost for ever..
My official work ran quite smoothly, with a little excitement occasionally. At 3 am one night, Nairobi Flight Information Centre phoned and asked me to open up the VHF and call Alitalia 541 which was three hours overdue in Nairobi, from Khartoum, and with no radio contact for four hours. I sped through town doing over 70 m.p.h. to my Control Tower, switched on and called the aircraft. There was a weak signal in reply and I managed to get a class C bearing of 270 degrees. A second transmission confirmed this and I told the operator he was probably over the Congo, but certainly well to the west of Kisumu. I told him QDM Kisumu 090, but the pilot would not agree and said he was east of Kisumu, not west, and approaching Mombassa [sic]! His signals faded right out and I telephoned F.I.C. asking them to log the QDM of 090C that I had passed to the aircraft. After half an hour, whilst F.I.C was sending frantic messages to all points west, I heard the aircraft calling Kisumu and was soon in good contact giving QDM’s, his signals gradually improving. It was just 0530, 20 minutes before first light when I heard the aircraft and sent out the boys to light-up the gooseneck flares. Then he was overhead and decided to carry on to Nairobi. This was rather disappointing, and in fact the wrong decision, his endurance being insufficient for any further diversion. I was told much later that the Captain and Navigator had a row before take-off and were not on speaking terms. The aircraft was a DC8 and the Italian crew and passengers had been very lucky indeed. The police followed me through town and I was charged with speeding, but the fine of 60 shillings was refunded later by the court when the urgency became known.
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Some weeks later Nairobi F.I.C. phoned again, about 4 am., an Air Liban DC6 from Cairo was lost and was not within the scope of Nairobi VDF. The aircraft had made a brief contact on the area cover VHF through Lodwa, and another aircraft north-east of Kisumu had heard the DC6, but of course had no idea of range or direction. This time I went through town at a more reasonable speed, opened up the radio, and called Air Liban. The crash crew was called out and the boys started dispensing paraffin and setting out the flares right away. I called Nairobi on 5680 H/F R/T to establish my station was on the ball, and every two minutes called the Lebanese Airlines aircraft. About 20 minutes later the aircraft replied to my call and I gave him a QDM of 225, and was satisfied there was no risk of it being the reciprocal. Three minutes later I measured 230 and then 235. He said his Giro compass was u/s and his magnetic compass erratic, and that he would use a standby giro, set to my figure. He turned 10 degrees to port and the QDM increased, 10 degrees to starboard and the figure decreased, so he was heading for Kisumu, and not going away from it. The bearings were given every two minutes and were reasonably steady, and after about 25 minutes the pilot said he thought he could see the coast, meaning the shores of Lake Victoria. It was still very dark but a clear night (not a contradiction of terms) and the boys hurtled out to light up the goosenecks. I told the pilot the wind was north-easterly at 15 knots, he was down wind, duty runway 06. I reminded him of the very high ground 2 miles to the north of the airport and he replied “O.K. Bud, Thanks a lot, I’ll come straight in on 24, hope youv’e [sic] got some gas, we shure [sic] ain’t [sic]”. A few minutes later he made a good landing and parked outside the 1932 wooden terminal building. The Captain of the Air Liban DC6 was an American pre-war Veteran. I had completely forgotten to tell the East African Airways agent but did so at 0545. There was no catering at the airport so he found some buses and the passengers were taken to the hotel. I was also late in phoning the police who dealt with immigration, but they hadn’t a clue how to deal with 60 international transit passengers. Similarly, it was a new experience for Customs, so both departments decided to pretend it hadn’t happened.
The Captain asked me to tell the non-English-speaking African Shell Assistant to put 3000 gallons of 100 octane into the tanks. I translated to the startled assistant “Bwana Mkubwa anataka gallon elfu tatu, pipa sabini na tano”. That was 75 drums of petrol to be pumped by hand. Finally he compromised with 400 gallons, but it was still quite a task, even with only 10 drums.
The Captain was concerned about the limited fuel and lack of a reliable compass and we double-checked that the met. conditions to Nairobi were near perfect. A scheduled DC3 of East African Airways came in at 10am. And was taking off for Nairobi at 11 am. The two pilots talked together at length and studied the map. The DC6 took-off three minutes after the Dakota and the two remained in visual contact until Nairobi was in sight. Surprisingly, the DC6 did not carry a radio compass for M/F but relied entirely on VHF, which, in East and Central Africa was quite inadequate.
I was criticised by DCA for not informing them in detail of progress, and was conscious of this at the time, but had I done so, they would have confused the issue with lots of advice. A civilian airliner without a reliable compass would be a major issue. I operated an “aerodrome
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advisory service”, not being an Air Traffic Controller. F.I.C. would have tried to control my detailed activity, but with a bit of common sense, things worked out well.
The visit of Her Majesty the Queen Mother to Kisumu went off smoothly except that two European Police Inspectors on the airport main gate refused permission for me to enter without a permit. One of my passengers, an R.A.F. Wing Commander leaned out and said he was the Queen’s Pilot, better open the gate old chap. Police had been drafted in for this event from hundreds of miles. I remember little else about the Royal Visit, or it’s main purpose. On these occasions most of the senior officials climbed in on the act, establishing their own importance.
I do remember in detail the visit of Billy Graham. My brief from the organising committee was to provide the Public Address systems. The main system had to cope with an audience of 30,000 people, with three microphones for which I borrowed a 300 watt amplifier from Twenche Overseas Trading Co. in Nairobi and used my four 100 watt loudspeakers. In addition there were six other systems for separate areas where the audience spoke only their tribal languages. Each of the six would hear Billie Graham plus one interpreter translating into the appropriate tribal language for that particular group. There were nine microphones on the platform for the evagelist [sic] and 8 interpretors [sic]. In addition the Post Office ran a special line about a mile at the end of which they connected a candlestick type of telephone with a carbon microphone and place it with my nine microphones. This relayed the proceedings to another mass meeting in Nairobi. The microphone was ineffective until I connected the P.O. line direct to the main amplifier output via a suitable transformer. Billie Graham had a very efficient team. Harley and Bonnie Richardson are two I remember, both very hard working and leaving nothing to chance. They were backed-up by representatives from most church denominations.
The following Christmas, the missionaries approached me again, could I use my loudspeakers at the Church to simulate bells on Christmas morning. An interesting proposition, and someone had written to Bradford Cathedral to scrounge a tape of the Cathedral bells. I had to edit the tape considerably, as every two a rich Yorkshire-accented voice was superimposed with “You are listening to the bells of Bradford Cathedral”. I set-up the amplifier and loudspeakers at the Church at about 7 pm. On Christmas-eve and tested the system with a record of carols. Within minutes, people began to gather and joined in. The Vicar asked if I could connect a microphone and in no time at all he was conducting an impromptu carol service with a bigger congregation than he had enjoyed for a long time, well over 1500. At 7 am next morning I relayed the bells of Bradford Cathedral, but could not resist pre-empting them with a verse of ‘Christians awake’. The loudspeakers were in constant demand and were in use every day for two weeks during H.H. the Aga Khan’s visit. Events included H.E. the Governor’s barazas, opening a ginnery and so on, all official requests from the Provincial Commissioner. I was spending so much time away from the airport that I fitted a TCS12 Transmitter and a good H/F receiver in the car to work aircraft and keep in touch with the airport. At the African hospital I fitted a receiver and 50 Watt Vortexion amplifier imported by my father, and installed 30 loudspeakers round the wards. This was followed by a similar
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job at an American mission hospital about 30 miles from Kisumu, but more ambitious with microphones, tape recorder and record player. At the Roman Catholic Cathedral in Kisumu I fitted an amplifier and loudspeakers with microphones on the Altar and pulpit. Another system was fitted at the African Community Centre in Kisumu and one way and another I was kept very busy indeed.
The transmitter in the car was used also on the 40 metre amateur band to keep in touch with my father and amateur chums in Nairobi and other parts of East Africa. On one occasion Tom Mboya took an interest in it and was quite impressed. Tom was a Luo by tribe and a party leader of the Kenya African Democratic Union, a very nice chap with an attractive wife Pamella [sic], daughter of Mr. Odede, a Kisumu lawyer. Tom wanted to buy the transmitter but for me to sell it to him would not have been wise. Later Tom was shot and killed in Nairobi.
Kisumu was fairly well populated and within 10 miles or so of town we saw very few wild animals. The two exceptions were the protected herd of impala in Kisumu township and the hippo which abounded on the lake shore. They came ashore at night to graze and I encountered them on the aerodrome several times. One rather amusing occurrence, the airport was wide in area and Africans frequently trekked across the runway and even drove their cattle over it at most inappropriate times. On several occasions I impounded the cattle after due warnings and charged the owners with trespass under section 69 of the Colonial Air Navigation Act. When I found the offenders were getting six month’s imprisonment and losing their cattle, I stopped charging them and the Police insisted upon taking over this task. Finally they agreed to drop the practice, when I told them that I doubted whether the Colonial Air Navigation Act really applied in Kenya and in any case I had invented the content of section 69. However, the runways had to be watched carefully and checked every time there was an aircraft movement.
One morning at Kisumu a uniformed Prisons Askari I had known at Nairobi Prison in 1950 came to my Control Tower and after a smart salute handed me a note saying it was from Bwana Mkubwa ya Ndegi. It was from Commander Stacey-Colles R.N. Ret’d., my former boss and previous Director of Civil Aviation. He had arrived at Kisumu Prison only two hours earlier, and was serving a three year sentence. He had been found guilty of receiving money, a refund of an airline ticket issued by the High Commission and which he did not use. At the time he was in Britain having travelled home on a complimentary ticket from Air France. The official ticket was handed in to East African Airways and a refund obtained which was paid into his bank instead of the High Commission’s account. He claimed no knowledge of this and most of us believed him. He would not prejudice his career and Navy pension in this way, someone had fixed him. The note was a list of things he wanted, which I soon assembled and took to him at Kisumu prison, where I found I knew the Prisons Officer from 1950. A very embarrassing situation. I met Stacey and gave him the radio, writing materials, money, cigarettes and cakes from Hilda, on the first of many visits. Three days later the Askari was back with a long message in code for Muriel Pardoe, his former secretary in Nairobi. I sent this off straight away on the aeronautical W/T channel, addressed to HKNCHQPA, the ICAO address which would reach Miss Pardoe from any airport in the western world. HK was Kenya, NC Nairobi City, HQ DCA
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Headquarters and PA Personal Ast. To the Director. The code was in five letter groups with a double substitution of letters, a similar system to that used during the war.
The message was decoded by Muriel who obtained whatever it was Stacey was asking for and gave it to Capt. Casperuthus who was DCA pilot of the Avro Anson. Casper gave it to the Controller at Wilson airport who passed it to a pilot about to depart for Kisumu. The pilot handed it to me at Kisumu and I delivered it – whatever it was – to Stacey in prison the same day. Three days later the radio set came back to me with the askari, not working. Two of the valves had been swapped over, and I noticed a piece of paxeline had been fitted neatly inside the bottom of the set, forming a false bottom. Under it was a note asking me if I could fit a B.F.O. into it. This was a beat frequency oscillator and Stacey could want it for only one reason, to monitor morse, probably on the Prisons channel, to see what was happening. There were two spare holes for valve holders on the chassis and plenty of space for fitting a mains power supply, vacant in this case because it was a dry-battery receiver. I fitted the B.F.O. as requested, and also another valve as a flea-power transmitter, using just a channel freq. crystal about 6.5 MHz and a tuned circuit on the anode. Maybe 50 mW output, I had no means of measuring it, but I tested the set at a range of 2 miles using 3 feet of wire for an aerial it was received at the control tower. The morse key was just a matter of touching a wire to the chassis. I returned the set to Stacey personally and explained the switching of the B.F.O. and transmitter keying. He was delighted and agreed to be very careful, taking absolutely no-one into his confidence. About six weeks later I met my former colleague the Prisons Officer in town and he told me there was some concern over the prisoners getting confidential information before he received it himself. He quoted that a week ago a prisoner asked if he could change cells and share with a particular prisoner who would be transferred to Kisumu with three others on a date a week hence. He said the four arrived that day, how could the prisoner have known a week ago? It should have been obvious, there were many ex-service personnel who were good W/T operators and the Prisons Radio on 7 MHz could be monitored by anyone, the signals being in plain language morse. I said nothing. Stacey’s frequency was monitored at my office where I had a similar tiny transmitter. It was used at a specific time of day on only two occasions for test purposes, but he found it satisfying and consoling to have a personal and totally clandestine link to the outside world. It gave him a great deal of satisfaction and from my point of view did no real harm. Stacey was a great organiser and motivator.
The African Inland Mission in Mwanza had colleagues in the Sudan [author indicates with X and page footnote that it is Kisumu not Mwanza] who visited Kisumu frequently in their Cessna aircraft. They desperately needed two transmitters in the Sudan but were not able to obtain import permits. They could however get a permit to re-import a transmitter if it had been sent out of the country for repair. I suggested to them that they should send me a piece of otherwise useless equipment which might look like a transmitter to the uninitiated and send it to me as a transmitter for repair, together with the appropriate paper work. This was done and in an antenna tuning unit they brought me, I built a 10 Watt transmitter without changing it’s outward appearance in any way. A few weeks later a second one was built and the two did a very useful job in the Sudan for about six
[KISUMU NOT MWANZA]
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months until the African Inland Mission stations there were closed, and the missionaries withdrawn. The missions’ aircraft were also licenced on that frequency and I contacted them occasionally. It is most reassuring to be able to communicate with someone in times of trouble, and plenty of folks in Africa were in that situation.
But trouble was also brewing in the Belgian Congo, just across the Lake. Six months earlier, the Belgian Government had advised the missionaries and other settlers to leave, but many were dedicated to their work and some felt they were quite indespensible [sic]. The Belgiauns [sic] had handed over the reins of Government and administration hurriedly to a totally ill-equipped and unprepared Congolese. The consequences of withdrawal by the Belgians were clearly predictable but they succumbed to political pressures from all directions. There was human slaughter on a big scale, and the only information coming out of the Congo was on the frequency of 7150 operated by Mission stations, and also shared with East African amateurs. It was in Kisumu that I received a message from a mission at an Agricultural Station which read:-
“We are being menaced by 100,000 hostile savages. We have their chief as hostage and expect annihilation within one hour. We have ammunition but no guns, please advise Kamina”.
The amateurs among the DCA staff in Nairobi, of whom Viv Slight was one, had set up a W/T link to the Belgian Coast Station at Ostend, using a communications booth in the D.C.A. Communications centre and a powerful DCA transmitter at R.A.F. Eastleigh.. I relayed the message direct to them on the aeronautical W/T channel, and Nairobi passed it straight to Ostend, with a steady flow of other messages. Ostend relayed it to Brussels who passed it to the Military where it was relayed on it’s final leg back to Africa, to the Belgian Paratroop Base at Kamina. Within 20 minutes of my receiving the message at Kisumu, the paratroopers were airborne and the Agricultural Station was liberated. Hardly had I cleared the message when I received a correction to it which advised:
“Not one hundred thousand savages, only ten thousand”
When I passed this to Nairobi, the reply was “What’s the bloody difference”
There were many such stories during the evacuation of Europeans from the Congo. Uganda was the main escape route and DCA Nairobi asked that any aircraft available and pilots who could make it, should get to Entebbe and help in the evacuation regardless of Certificates of Airworthiness and Pilot’s licences. One of my ex-pilot friends evacuated about thirty people in several trips in a Rapide aircraft. The last aircraft he had flown was a Beaufighter during the war. Some thousands were got out from the Congo, one way or another, mostly via Kampala and Kisumu. The Kenya Girls’ High School in Nairobi (known as the Boma) was turned into a Medical Reception Centre the records of which show the dreadful experiences and medical remedial action taken. Wendy reminded me that she and all the other girls who were not taking G.C.E..s were sent home a week before the term was due to end, to maked [sic] room for the refugees. At Kisumu I met many who came out by road. Two middle-aged ladies came to my Control Tower and one phoned her parents in
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the United States with a terrible story of pillage and rape. A third, more elderly, who had three American Doctorate degrees – Medicine, Divinity and a PhD. – had devoted her entire working life to helping and teaching Africans, but she said a lifetime had made only a superficial advance from their savagery.
Most of our memories of Kisumu were of happier days. There was an excellent social club but we were not members due only to the lack of time. The children made good use of the swimming pool, the lake being too dangerous, not only with its hippo and crocs. but with Bilharzia and hook worm. Hilda enjoyed her painting and drawing and we even managed to take a few photographs.
After nearly three years at Kisumu, Colin was still at the Prince of Wales School in Nairobi and with Wendy at the ‘Boma’ we were not seeing very much of either. And so a transfer was arranged and we packed up our household once again and moved to Nairobi, to a lovely house in Nairne Road, near Wendy’s school.
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[underlined] D.C.A. HEADQUARTERS [/underlined]
It was then June 1960, the Mau Mau emergency was still with us, but 84 Squadron had finished their bombing of the Aberdares which had raised the eyebrows of a few ‘hasbeens’ like myself. I had talked with the crews of the R.A.F. Lincolns some time earlier at R.A.F. Eastleigh and it all seemed very unreal to me. Perfect weather, ceiling and visibility generally unlimited and no enemy opposition from either the air or ground. Bombing over the bush was a matter of a timed run at a specific speed from a firmly identified point on the ground. Hardly a challenge for the Chaddertons and Fosters of this world and I don’t know what comprised a tour. It reminded me of O.T.U. where I saw the log book of a fellow-instructor with 40 ops. to his credit. His first tour ops were shown in the normal way, Benghazi 0340, Benghazi 0345, Benghazi 0342, Benghazi 0350, about 6 pages of Benghazi and no other target. But then, there are those among us who never bombed B.G., so the song goes. I could visualise the log books with several pages of ‘Aberdares 0125…”. Some of the Africans reckoned it was “mzuri sana” (very good) for the terrorists, the bombing just laid on a supply of fresh meat without their having to hunt for it, but there was probably more to it than that.
My place of work was the Communications Centre in the High Commission Building, on the top floor, above the Inland Revenue office. My duties were those of Telecomms. Supt. i/c a watch, responsible for the operation of the telecommunications system. We were not really concerned with aeroplanes, only messages about their movements. We had Radio Teleprinter circuits with Johannesburg, Khartoum, Der es Salaam, Entebbe, and Gan, and teleprinters on line to R.A.F. Eastleigh, Wilson Airport, Nairobi (Embakasi) and the Flight Information Centre next door. Our internal communications, that is within East Africa, were mainly by W/T links, to Iringa, Songea, Mbeya, Mwanza, Tanga, Dodoma, Arusha, Kisumu etc. Every teleprinter link had a standby W/T channel and most of these were resorted to in the early mornings, about 4 to 6 am. Brazaville [sic] and Leopoldville in the Congo were only on W/T but there was little traffic to the west and none to the east except Gan. With Gan, we operated an emergency channel with a test message every twenty minutes, to supplement the R.A.F. network if required, but they seemed to manage quite well without us. We handled about 20,000 incoming messages per day in the Tape Relay Centre, and apart from one or two all had to be relayed out again and logged. We also had three ground to Air operating booths, two of which were always manned, working aircraft, one on HF/RT and the other HF/WT. The European Radio Officers preferred the latter, where often three messages per minute were handled for long periods.
As soon as an aircraft left, say, Khartoum, a message would be sent on the Fixed Service by RTTY to the Tape Relay centre which should reach F.I.C. within a few minutes of being originated, requiring two relays, at Khartoum and Nairobi Tape Relay Centres. The system was that the pilot would not need to call Nairobi until he reached the Flight Information Region Boundry [inserted] Boundary [/inserted] at 4 degrees North, as Nairobi F.I.C. should have already received all the information by teleprinter. However, this being Africa and therefore supposedly not very efficient, the pilot would call Nairobi as soon as he could after take-off, on HF/RT. On the older propeller jobs, (the real aeroplanes), this would have been
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carried out by the Radio Officer on W/T., where just a few groups in code meant a great deal, for example:-.
ZGU de VPKKL Nairobi this is VPKKL
QTN STKM 0201Z I departed Khartoum at 0201 GMT
QAH 24 TTT QBH My height is 24,000 ft. below cloud
QRE HKNA 0718 I am estimating Nairobi Airport at 0718
QRX FIR I will call you again at the Flight Information Boundary
The Radio Officer would write those 14 groups onto a pad and his Clerk would put two copies through the hatch to the Air Traffic Controller.
The Clerk would spend most of his time putting carbon paper between the pages, it was fast going during the busy periods, but was even faster before HF/RT was introduced.
The aircraft would remain in constant contact with Khartoum on VHF until it reached 4 deg. N. when Nairobi would become responsible. Many aircraft were still using W/T at the time. There was no really conscious use of code, it was as commonplace as plain language and to a radio operator the two were synonimous, [sic] as were the many technical and other abbreviations. One example which comes to mind was at a Board of Enquiry into an accident where an aircraft had crashed into Mt. Kilimanjaro. An elderly judge asked the Ground Radio Officer if there had been any radio message, and the R/O replied “Yes, I last worked the aircraft on C.W. at 0247” “What is C.W.?” asked the Judge, and the reply “C.W. is Charlie Whisky your worship” and the Judge nearly gave up, maybe thinking whether Irish or Scotch.
Some Radio Officers preferred to transcribe the morse and speech messages straight onto a teleprinter which produced a simultaneous page copy in front of the controller, but this method was not very popular. With several aircraft calling at the same time it was easy to make a mistake but too slow to correct it on the teleprinter. The F.I.C. Controller operated the VHF himself. The whole set-up was very well thought out and we were very well equipped. Communications were our line of business and we were highly organised.
The tour of duty was rather longer in Nairobi, where one had to work for 4 years to earn 6 month’s leave, compared to only 2 1/2 years in Tanganyika. I believe there was some reduction for the Kenya coastal strip. These were the rules established when East Africa was supposed to be an unhealthy and hostile place, and most of the Europeans were Administration officials. I always felt the home leave terms were over-generous, as we also enjoyed three weeks of “local leave” each year with railway warrants provided to any part of east Africa. Where there was no railway to our particular ‘holiday resort’ or we chose to travel by car we could claim car mileage costs. Most people preferred to go on leave by sea, depending upon the time of year, possibly home on a 10 day voyage via suez, returning on a 3 week cruise via the Cape of Good Hope, on Union Castle liners. Some preferred the long way round both ways, spending as much time at sea as possible and thus economising
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on accommodation costs in the U.K. My only experience of sea travel had been the four troop-ships and Hilda claimed she couldn’t swim; we wanted to spend as much time as possible with the folks back home so we chose to travel by air every time.
Within a year of our return to Nairobi, June 1961, political unrest was well to the fore and getting worse. Alice, my step-mother, was a Senior Secretary to an African Minister in the Secretariat, and felt it was getting too dangerous to remain. Luigi and Mary had already retired to Italy and Alice was preparing to join them. Most of us were expecting the balloon to go up at any moment and people were getting jittery. We had been close to the hiatus in the Congo and the more recent mutinies of the armies of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda, and Europeans were beginning to leave. The weight of evidence of impending disaster was overwhelming and towards the end of June Hilda returned with the four youngest children to U.K., Colin remaining at the Prince of Wales School as a boarder. Alice and Brian returned to Italy shortly after and my father moved in with me at Nairne Road. My father and I had become very involved with emergency communications for the settlers up-country, which dominated our lives for the next few years, but this is a story unto itself and is dealt with in the chapter “Laikipia Security Network”. The mutinies referred to occurred soon after the British Forces had left Kenya, and the emergency was declared officially over. Some European Service personnel remained as advisers to the Kenya army - there was no Kenya Navy and the Kenya Air Force existed mainly on paper but with a few light aircraft. We awoke one morning to the news that the three separate armies many hundreds of miles apart, had thrown out their European officers and declared themselves independent of any authority. Within 48 hours and before they could organise themselves and cause any damage, very small forces of British troops appeared simultaneously near Nairobi, Jinja and Dar es Salaam, subdued and disarmed the lot, without any loss of life or limb. I recall a cartoon in the East African Standard, showing Jomo Kenyatta with both arms raised to paratroopers dropping from aircraft and the caption “How good it is to welcome old friends” - His arch-enemies for 10 years or so. I saw several hundred African soldiers sitting on the grass at Wilson Airport with three European soldiers guarding them with machine guns. There was a large pile of rifles and other weapons nearby, also guarded.
Life was not all traumatic, however, we had the occasional laugh. One of our officers, MacDonald, was on official leave of absence quite frequently and we understood he was masterminding a very hush-hush communications link direct to U.K. from Government House and even satellites had been mentioned furtively. This was before the days of the Sputnik when satellites were a part of science fiction. He was one of the [underlined] firt [sic] [/underlined] to retire and as he was leaving he let us into the secret. Mac. had indeed spent a great deal of time at Government House. He was a master baker and was responsible literally for the icing of the cake. He told us also that when he joined the Dept. he stated that his qualifications included a final City & Guilds Certificate. They did, he confided, as a Master Baker, but not in telecommunications.
One Sunday morning in October on duty at the Comm. Centre I found my African Supervisor was monitoring Reuter on teleprinter, and looking over his shoulder I read on the page copy that thousands of Africans armed to the teeth were surrounding the High Commission building and holding hostage the
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Europeans working inside. The report gave more detail of riots and demonstrations and gave the impression that we were really in trouble. I went out through a window and onto the flat roof of the High Commission building and gingerly looked over the parapet entitled to expect a hail of bullets. On the road was a police car with two officers watching a group of about 20 Africans, some of them supporting two banners on which was written “Wazungu Rudi Uliya” (Europeans return to Europe). That was the extent of the demonstration reported to the entire world in Reuter’s message. Had it occured [sic] in Cambridge it would not even have received a mention in the free local papers.
My tour of duty ended in December and I relinquished the house, my father moving into Plums Hotel. A nine hour flight to London, and I was home for Christmas.
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[underlined] Dec. ’61 ON LEAVE [/underlined]
Hilda and Anne came to London and I met them at Paddington. We intend to spend a week with Joan and enjoy a holiday in London, but Hilda had a rather worrying cold so we limited our stay to two days.
The next six months or so were spent on leave. With the exception of Colin who was in the R.A.F., the whole family was together in Wales at Glaslyn. My father was in Nairobi, and his regular letters referred to increasing unrest. He was working flat-out in building the ‘Watson Wonders’ and he asked me to take back 500 B7G valve holders and 150 modulation chokes
In May ’62 I said goodbye to the family and returned to Kenya. As I was unaccompanied, Sid Worthy the Chief Engineer asked me if I would housewarm for him whilst he was on his 6 months leave. This meant that he paid the rent but could just walk out without packing up his household and walk back into the same apartment on his return. There was a tendency for senior officers who were permanently based in Nairobi to try and retain the same house or apartment once they had found the right one. Rent was in fact 10% of salary and it was well worth it. My father moved in with me and together we carried on with the transmitters, having rented a workshop next to Stephen Ellis in Victoria Street. After only 3 months in the apartment I received a letter from Sid telling me he was returning immediately, could he please have his flat only a few days hence!. The following morning we were going up-country and I could see my father was a more than little depressed. He was driving like a madman down the Nairobi escarpment and I insisted that he let me do the driving. He told me he had to go to Mombassa [sic] next day, having received a telegram from Alice that she and Brian were returning on the Union Castle. This was supposed to be a surprise to him and I did not doubt that it was so, but Alice admitted later that she had in fact booked return tickets on the homeward trip. She had been totally dishonest in her statements about her intentions which had resulted in Hilda and the children staying in Wales. Our safari was cut short and we returned to Nairobi the same day, a 500 mile round trip. Alice’s return meant a complete change in plan; clearly she and my father expected to share my accommodation but with Sid’s return they had no option but to move into an hotel again. They were lucky in obtaining a couple of rooms at Plums, after only two nights in the flat. I moved into Woodlands Hotel, but applied for a housing allocation as my family had decided to return to Kenya. Hilda and the children rejoined [sic] me and we moved into a house at Likoni Lane, resuming a normal life except that it was dominated by the Laikipia network and work at the Comm. Centre. Within a year of my return I was promoted to Asst. Signals Officer and took over from Mike Harding As [sic] Officer in charge of the Communications Centre. This I had tried to avoid for a long time, not the responsibility, but the working hours. The new post meant working office hours and for the first time in my life I was working a five-day-week. On watches it had been a four-day cycle of say monday afternoon, tuesday morning and all tuesday night, then off duty until friday afternoon. The 2 1/2 days off within every 4 days had suited me very well and was a very popular roster with everyone. Office hours curtailed my visits up-country except at week-ends, but I did have every evening free. Very soon, each European Radio Supt. In charge of a watch had an African trainee assistant. Shortly afterwards one joined me. They were all supposedly bright boys from Secondary School and we delegated the routine work to them as much as possible. Their presence was resented by the old-timers among the
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wireless operators, who knew what they were doing and were very good operators, but their educational background was inadequate for the senior posts. Africanisation was the policy dictated to us and we bowed to the inevitable. I trusted most of my Africans, and there were about 180 of them working on the 4-day Watch roster at the Communications centre. Although many of them had served with the British Army both during and after the war, I could not completely lose sight of the fact that some had taken part in the Lare massacre when an African village was set ablaze and almost everyone slaughtered as they tried to escape. The majority of my staff were from the three main problem tribes, the Kikuyu, Meru and Embu, and a few of the Luo tribe from Nyanza.
My father’s farm had been abandoned long ago. It was not possible to obtain reliable labour during the Emergency, and the whole of the European settled areas was to be handed over to the Africans. There were already very few farmers left in the Trans-Nzoia and the Eldoret areas, the latter being mainly from South Africa. The Laikipia farmers were the last to hold out, except perhaps for the bigger ranches near Athi River.
Our next home leave was in June 1964 and the story of my activity over the three years leading up to it is synonymous with that of the Laikipia Security Network. The network seemed to priority over everything, but lives were at stake. Occasionally Hilda and the Children would go up-country with me, and one memorable week-end was spent with Tony Dyer and Family at their lovely home facing Mount Kenya. One afternoon Tony asked the children if they would like to go to a polo match and they took off in Tony’s Cessna from their own front door, landing at the side of the pitch. One of Tony’s sons was killed some months later whilst taking a gun out of the back of his vehicle. It was never discovered how the gun came to be loaded and with the safety catch off. Hilda and the children stayed too at the farm of Dr. Anne Spoerry, at Ol Kalau. Anne’s loo was a traditional type in the bushes down the garden, very comfortable and lined with bookshelves, full of the Lancet and other medical journals. Anne was a wonderful character. Only once did we go to the coast for a holiday, and this was two weeks spent at Likoni, near Mombassa [sic]. Unfortunately we chose to go in the rainy season but it was a welcome break. We took Chippy, our cockerel, and it followed us around everywhere, afraid of absolutely nothing. Chippy returned home one day in Nairobi with a broken beak and was unable to peck for food. Fortunately Jean and Dick Chalcroft came to stay overnight with us and Dick fitted a new lower section to the beak with the plastic resin we used in making dipole aerials.. It took an hour to cure, or set, and Jean and Dick held Chippy during that period, and again whilst they filed down the surplus plastic and polished the result. Chippy was ravenous and began to feed straight away, but was very aggressive towards humans, except for Jean and Dick, who took him back to their farm at Molo. I saw Chippy several times after that at the farm, lording it over the hens, and not another cockerel in sight.
One day I bought a petrol/paraffin engine-driven alternator and a bank of batteries, a complete 32 volt lighting set in fact, too good to miss for £25 in Nairobi. The dealer said the engine wouldn’t start although it had just been thoroughly overhauled. I knew that Jean and Dick were without power on their farm although their house was wired for a 32 volt DC system such as this. I knew too of Jean’s prowess with anything mechanical and I took the whole lot straight up to the farm at Molo. At 10pm. on the Saturday Jean started stripping down the engine whilst I was linking together the 26 alkaline cells
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and checking the house wiring connected to my car battery. Jean, assisted by Dick slogged on until 5am. in the light of an Alladin lamp, but she had discovered the trouble long before that. The timing was exactly 180 degrees out of phase. At 5am, just before dawn, the batteries being flat, Jean cranked the engine which roared into life, literally, we were deficient of a silencer for the exhaust. The batteries were taking a charge and we changed from petrol to paraffin and switched on a few lights in the house. The following evening the Chalcrofts were very proud of their lighting system. That sort of effort and co-operation did give one a great deal of satisfaction.
My recollections of work in D.C.A. over that period are very few.
We seldom talked of the war, but in the middle of one night I somehow got chatting to the F.I.C. Controller, Sqdn Ldr. Anderson DFC & Bar, who had also been in 5 Group on Lancasters. Andy said we were sometimes like a lot of sheep, he recalled one night having reached his ETA, all was very quiet except that markers had been dropped 20 miles to the south. Within minutes bombs were crashing down so Andie turned south for five minutes and joined in. Next day it was found that the target was 20 miles north of where most of the bombing had taken place. My reply was just “Politz”, we had done exactly the same thing, followed the flock. We talked together of flying during the war, several times, but my memories of the actual events are more vivid now, after 45 years, than they were 25 years ago. Perhaps because there was not a great deal in East Africa to remind me of it, compared to today, living 4 miles from Wyton on the approach to Alconbury. To see the Lancaster of the Battle of Britain Memorial Flight fly over gives me rather more than a lump in my throat at times. Pathfinder House is not what it was with Don Bennet, either, it is now the place where I pay my rates, but they at least have a picture of a Lancaster on the wall near the Cashier’s office. A couple of years ago I asked one of the cashiers why it was called Pathfinder House, she had no idea, I asked what the aeroplane was and the answer was the same. I let the matter drop.
I had taken over the comm. Centre from Mike Harding who had retired prematurely, and his immediate predecessor had been “Bing” Crosby, ex Royal Signals. Bing was in Headquarters just along the corridor and came into my office every day to inspect an object pickled in a sealed jar which he had left on the shelf when he was promoted. Although he urged us to take good care of it, he used to look at it and say to it “You useless ruddy thing”, or words to that effect. Finally, on retirement, he came and collected it and let us into the secret, with the parting words “Oh don’t worry, the other one’s fine, you only need one you know”.
Alice and my father had left in May for Italy, to stay with Mary and Luigi. My own feelings were that he should have stayed in Kenya, possibly up country with Jean or with one of his many other friends among the Settlers. He had worked unceasingly on the network for over 4 years, but Alice insisted upon their return to Europe. In June ’64 it was time for home leave again. We were reluctant this time because there was so much happening up country and we expected it to be our final tour in East Africa together, unless I returned and carried on with communications on a commercial basis. This was still an option, communications had kept me very busy and with lots of ‘job satisfaction’, but it was DCA who had paid my salary. I still had a family to support, and there was a great deal of uncertainty in Kenya. And so it was we flew to London yet again, and joined Hilda’s Mum at Glaslyn.
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[underlined] ON LEAVE June 1964 [/underlined]
Before leaving for Wales we bought a second-hand Vanguard from a dealer in Putney which was to prove very useful in the next few months. At the end of our leave it was sold to the local Policeman for the same price.
A month or two before we returned, the house next to Aunt Doll had become vacant and was put on the market for £500. It was small and in shocking state, but a real snip so we bought it. Five months was spent in refurbishing it, building a bathroom, kitchen, replastering, new fireplace, rewiring etc. I remember John mixing at least a ton of concrete manually, he was a tremendous help. Electricity at the house had not been used for many years, and what little wiring remained, mostly twin flex, we ripped out. Electrical contractors quoted £900 to rewire, which was totally ridiculous, and finally John and I did it in one day, having spent about £50 on materials through an advert in Exchange & Mart. We tried to buy the field - or even part of it - at the back - of the house, but our lawyer said it was quite impossible to find out who owned the land. Many years later it transpired that it had in fact been owned for at least a hundred years by members of his own family.
Visits were paid to my other in Barnoldswick and to Joan and Ken in London, but the greater part of my leave was spent on the ‘new house’.
At the end of April Hilda’s Mum moved into her new home and made comfortable. From the house there was a wonderful view of the mountain separating the Neath and Rhonda valleys, with the river within 25 yards in the foreground. Perhaps it is only fair to mention the road between the house and river, but when the bypass was built a few years later this road carried little traffic.
In November ’64 I returned to Kenya unaccompanied, and being so, moved into Woodlands Hotel. The following day I was in touch with Laikipia and also back at work. I relieved Mike Harding as Asst. Signals Officer in Headquarters, Deputy to ‘Spud’ Murphy who was Telecommunications Officer (Operations). The job was just a matter of dealing with the steady flow of paper-work. Every piece of paper coming in was registered in Central Registry and filed by the Clerk. If he couldn’t decide which file to put it, he would open a new one. The file was then delivered - and booked out - to the officer thought to be the one who should deal with it. The officer would either add his comments as a minute and pass on the file to someone he thought might not return it to him, or if he felt he was authorised to make a decision, draft a letter for his immediate superior. Very occasionally, on an external matter he might even sign the letter “for the Director of Civil Aviation”. I was expected to finalise all matters concerning the operational aspect of the Telecommunications side of DCA, including all staff problems, their examinations and promotions.
Europeans were leaving the Directorate almost every week and being replaced by Africans. Those with African proteges training to take over the senior posts were most vulnerable. The Africans thought it was easy to sit back and authorise someone to go on leave, or to promote or reprimand another. The newcomers could read the many returns and forms but whereas a European officer could do every job subordinate to his own, the assistant had neither the experience, qualifications nor ability to do those jobs. In some cases the African was promoted and his former boss remained as his assistant. It was
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obvious who did the actual work. I found the work uninteresting, mainly it seemed just a matter of going through the motions and staying out of trouble by being non-committal, which was completely out of character. My main thoughts were with the 5190 Network, something that really mattered.
Sqdn. Ldr. Anderson was still with us and when he went on two week’s leave to the coast he asked me to sleep at his house, which made a welcome change from staying at the hotel. At about 3am on the third night there was a hullabaloo outside and a pounding on the door. “Police, open up”. I opened up, 9mm. Mauser ready, to be greeted by an African Police Inspector and about 15 Askari with enough weaponry to start a rebellion. Andy had told the Police he would be away for two weeks and would they please keep an eye on the house? I told them he had asked me to sleep there but they were not convinced. All my documents were at the hotel and eventually the Inspector ‘phoned the Acting Director of Civil Aviation at his house - Dickie Dixon, my old antagonist from Entebbe. Dickie was not amused, he never was, with me, but the Inspector was satisfied. A few nights later, about 10pm. I was lying on the bed reading, the house in darkness except for a small reading lamp. I heard footsteps on the gravel outside and quickly extinguished the light. I heard a key turning in the lock of the pateo [sic] door. By this time I was off the bed and standing at the bedroom door, left hand on the hall light switch and my Mauser in the right, cocked and with the safety-catch off. When the outside door opened I switched on the light and was startled to identify the intruder as Jimmie Sanson, whom I had not seen since we were in Kisumu. If he had been carrying a gun I might have blown his head off before it became unrecognisable. Andy had done it again, asking Jimmie also to keep an eye on the house. That night my car had been in Andy’s garage. On the following nights I left the car in full view outside, and with the a few lights in the house switched on.
For several years I had held one of the very few Flight Radio Officer Licences in the Department and frequently flew as Radio Officer first on the Anson VPKKK and later on its replacement, the Heron. On my last trip on the Heron we did a “tour of inspection” with visiting officials from ICAO in Montreal. Whilst supposedly inspecting the runways here and the Met. Station there, a V.O.R., D.M.E. and other aids to Aviators, in reality we enjoyed a visit to Zanzibar, flew around inside the Ngoro-ngoro crater, an extinct volcano well stocked with wild life, witnessed a specially-staged lion kill in Tsavo West National Park, and entered into the spirit of a very expensive ‘Cook’s Tour’. A few weeks later I did another tour of airports, inspecting the Telecomm. aspect and also giving morse tests to operators who were otherwise already qualified for promotion. I knew most of the staff and the stations also. 16 years previously I had first visited Iringa, which was then run by ‘Blossom’, Mrs. Brown, the only lady Radio Officer in DCA. Blossom was an ex-WREN officer who had specialised during the war in Japanese morse. I think she told me there were about 120 characters in their morse alphabet, and she used to transcribe in Jap. characters for hours on end. It was someone else’s job to translate them into English. Blossom had left some years previously. The morse tests were interesting, first the candidate sent for 10 minutes at 25 w.p.m. of 5-letter and figure groups, which was recorded on tape. The second test was 10 minutes of plain language, and the third receiving for 10 minutes of automatic morse. The fourth test was for the candidate to receive the morse recorded in the first two tests, without telling them of it’s origin. Many complained that the
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fourth test was unfair, the morse being very poor and difficult to read. Some found it difficult to believe the poor morse was their own! In general, the morse was, in fact, very good, most of the old-timers having been British Army trained, during the war.
Soon after the invasion of Zanzibar I flew there in the DCA Anson piloted by Capt. Casperuthus. The two Air Traffic Controllers had been deported to Mombassa [sic] and almost all the Telecomms. equipment was faulty. The teleprinter on line to Dar es Salaam still worked, however, and this was taken over by an African from Tanganyika. Zanzibar and Tanganyika became known as Tanzania and for the very first time customs and immigration formalities were introduced between the two. I recall paying customs duty in Dar es Salaam on 200 cigarettes bought in Zanzibar, although the price was the same in both places, and duty had been paid already to the same authority, the new government of Tanzania. There was no rational explanation to some of the politics in East Africa. Rumours were rife that a huge Russian biplane bomber made secret trips at night without contacting DCA, the aviation authority, and the machine was said to be in a particular hangar. We were intrigued by this and taxied very close to the hangar, a ‘deliberate mistake’, and took photographs of the aircraft. It was a biplane about three times the wingspan of a Tiger Moth, but we were not able to find anyone who had actually seen it airborne.
By May 1965 I was recovering transmitters from Settlers who were leaving the country, and these sets were more than meeting the demand for new ones. I felt that by the end of the year there would be very few Europeans left, and in that atmosphere of intense anti-climax I gave 6 months notice of my retirement. The leave earned would take me to just over my 44th. birthday when compensation for loss of office would be at its peak. Looking at this in more detail, compensation would have been reduced by £2,000 per year of delay. There was really little choice but to go.
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[underlined] JOB HUNTING [/underlined]
I returned home finally on the 11th. of November 1965 and joined Hilda and the family at Glaslyn, except for Colin who was in the R.A.F. in Aden. My father and Alice were settled in Voghera in Northern Italy. There was plenty of time to look for a job, as I was on full pay for about six months and could not really afford to start work until April. Had I started before that, it would have meant paying income tax at the U.K. rate for the previous year on my world income, so I was advised, probably wrongly.
I wrote many letters, one offering my services to O’Dorian of Redeffusion [sic]. They were at that time considering establishing a Radio Relay system in the African areas of Nairobi. Other firms were also interested and the City Council was monitoring a pilot scheme which I.A.L. had fitted about a year previously. The pilot scheme had been put out to tender and my father had submitted a bid to provide for a four-program system. The contract went to I.A.L. on the grounds that they had shown confidence in Kenya by being established there for many years and were a reputable firm. My father was invited to comment and said I.A.L.’s presence was nothing to do with confidence, they were wholly-owned by B.O.A.C. and were there to do aircraft radio maintenance for E.A. Airways also owned by B.O.A.C. As for being a reputable company, so are Marks and Spencers but like I.A.L. they have no experience in Radio Relay. I had seen the pilot scheme at Kaloleni. Each house had a loudspeaker on the wall with volume control, and the system was wired in D8 cable and flex, with no protective devices. Reception was poor and quality was that of a typical bus station P.A. system. I gave O’dorian [sic] a detailed report of what I thought could be achieved in Nairobi and also the whole of Kenya, together with the engineering detail, resources required, budgets etc. The report was mainly the result of my father’s efforts of two years previously, updated. I included my report of I.A.L.’s one programme pilot scheme the performance of which could induce the Council to reach only one conclusion about Radio Relay. One of not to bother with it. Transistor radios were then on the market at 40 shillings giving good world-wide reception, Moscow being a necessity. I mentioned too the near to impossibility of collecting payment from individual subscribers. Payment would have to be made by the authorities. O’Dorian thanked me for my interest and appreciated the report and said he would be in touch. About a month later he wrote again and said they had decided not to pursue any interest in Kenya.
I also tried West London Telefusion who I knew at working level in 1947, and had an interview in Blackpool with their M.D., and Personnel Manager, for a new post as Development Manager in Taunton, Somerset. The job was to establish a cable T.V. system. I was offered the job after a prolonged interview and at a good salary. I accepted there and then and was advised to start looking for a house around Taunton. Only the starting date was uncertain, but they agreed to confirm the appointment in writing and provide a detailed Terms of Reference. I was very surprised indeed a few weeks later when a letter from Mr Wilkinson said he was very sorry but had decided not to proceed with the Taunton project and all development was under review. I realised that cable TV was popular in fringe areas but more and more repeaters were being provided and the need for cable was reducing all the time. I am writing this in 1993 and the concept of cable TV has developed from the 1966 “amplified aerial” to a single coaxial cable providing over 30 T.V. channels, radio and telephone, and
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most recently, scanned T.V. Security Systems. The technological advances in Relay since its inception in my father’s time, around 1928 have meant many fresh starts for the industry.
I had an interview with Aero Electronics at Crawley – to whom I had a letter of introduction, and was offered the job of Development Engineer & Manager! I felt this was aiming rather high. The interview took place in a large country house, alongside which was a fairly new factory with lots of activity, and a sketch of which appeared on Aero Electronics letter heading. I later found that the factory had no connection with Aero Electronics, which was in fact a one-man show. The job would have been responding to overseas enquiries received mainly via the Board of Trade, designing a system and providing equipment, winding up with a quotation. On the face of it a very interesting prospect, but with no back-up of any sort, and relying upon other firms’ equipment. I felt it to be somewhat dicey, particularly when I was asked if I could type! I had to say it was a job for a team, not one man.
From Crawley I went to see G.E.C. at Coventry for interview as a “Production Team Leader”. The job turned out to be the leader of a team of about 12 assemblers and wiremen constructing telephone exchanges – one at a time. I was shown one being assembled and spent an hour with the Team Leader on one particular exchange which comprised thirty 7’ racks of relay panels, counters uniselectors, jack fields etc. As far as I could see it was just a matter of ensuring each item was in the right place and wired-in correctly. Turning down the job was the right decission [sic] for the wrong reason. There seemed to be thousands of people around all moving at the same time, and the environment depressed me. Although I was only vaguely aware of it at the time, that type of system would be giving way to electronic exchanges within a year or two.
Next stop was Redifon in Wandsworth, who were advertising for Test and Installation engineers. The job was described accurately but was basically testing H/F and M/F equipment at the end of the production line, with very occasional trips into the field on installation and commissioning work. There was great competition for the field work. I was offered the job but the Personnel manager told me to think very carefully, Wandsworth was a terrible place to live in. I was given two weeks to think it over, and turned down the offer. I asked the Personnel Manager what happened to the job I was offered in 1957. The requirement was for an engineer who had a PMG1 licence to operate on ships and an MCA Flight Radio Officers Licence to operate on aircraft. He was to take equipment to sea and into the air to ensure there were no problems, and if there were, to resolve them. That job really appealed to me and could very well have become what I cared to make it. Maybe. He looked up my file and told me the vacancy was not filled and the post was withdrawn.
I saw a job advertised for a Telecommunications Engineer for Gambia, 18 month tour, £3500 per year + 25% gratuity, and applied for it. A week later I was called for interview. I didn’t think there was the slightest chance of this happening, having applied out of interest and an expences [sic] paid trip to London. The interview went well and soon after my return to Wales a letter arrived asking me to confirm my acceptance on a salary of £2500. I was in a quandry [sic], I didn’t really want to go to Zambia, but wrote to the Crown Agents and pointed out the discrepancy between the advert of £3500 and offer of £2500.
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They regretted their mistake in the advert, and on those grounds I was able to decline
I applied for an advertised post of Signals Officer at the Ministry of Aviation’s Communications Centre at Croydon for which my D.C.A. experience fitted me well. The interview went off very well and I found that in some respects E. Africa was more up to-date than was the practice at Croydon. At the end of the interview they said they would write to me. About a week later their letter arrived and advised that I had not been selected but only because a more senior post would shortly become available and I was already short-listed for it. Good news indeed, but having heard nothing further after four months by which time we had moved house to Cambridge, I wrote to them. In their reply I was told that the letter offering me the job had been returned to them marked “Gone away”. As Communications Officer in charge at Croydon life would have been rather different.
Becoming more and more disillusioned with U.K. I went to see the Overseas Services Resettlement Bureau at Eland House, Victoria. I saw a Mr. Williams who was ex-Malaysia P.& T and we chatted for a while about the prospects of settling down to a job in the U.K. I had to agree that after 18 years in East Africa I was not impressed with what I saw in Britain nor with the people who occupied it, it was a vastly different place to the one I had left in 1948. He was quite right in saying that I first had to decide whether I wanted to stay and if so to make the best of it. What job did I want? I told him I had hoped to join Pye Telecomm’s technical sales dept. I knew Pye aeronautical equipment and felt I could fit in there, but had written and been advised there were no vacancies. “Did I still want the job?”. Having replied yes please he picked up the phone, and said “get me Ernie Munns at Pye”. Moments later he greeted someone in what I assumed was Malay, then switched to English “look Ernie, I’ve another bloody Colonial here, thinks Pye’s the ultimate., When can you see him?” We agreed 2pm the following day at Pye Telecommunications, Newmarket Rd., Cambridge. More words in Malay between them and he wished me luck.
I liked the friendly environment at Pye and was interviewed by Ernie Munns, head of Systems Planning Dept. and his deputy, Cyril Foster. The interview was constantly interrupted by the telephone and people barging in for instant decisisons [sic]. I recall Ernie asking whether I would be prepared to write a paper for a semi-technical customer on the relative merits of conventional VHF links and Tropospheric scatter and I said “yes”! Fortunately the phone rang and both interviewers were involved, which gave me a few minutes to think about it. I had heard of Tropo-scatter, but that was about all. I awoke to the question of “how would you go about it?” I replied that I would read up the subject in the Pye library. It must have been written up many times, I would study it and probably be able to quote a learned authority. I agreed that I didn’t know all the answers, and Ernie said “Thank god for that, one or two around here think they do”. I was told that my application was opportune, if I joined them I would be in the Aeronautical team headed by Cyril, which was currently preparing a factory order for equipment to re-equip 22 airports and several other sites in Iran, plus a lot of other orders for aviation equipment. Basically the job was block-planning of systems to meet the customers’ operational requirement, prepare quotations, to engineer the job in detail and to project manage the order to its conclusion. This was the sort of job offered by
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Aero Electronics but at Pye there was full backing from experts in all fields. The second part of the interview was with Cyril and the Personnel manager who said he would write to me with the result. The letter arrived a few days later offering me the post at £1250 per year and to start preferably on the first of April. This was gladly accepted. Hilda and I went to Cambridge and after a week’s run around by Estate Agents we found a nice 4-bedroomed house at 14 Greystoke Rd. near Cherry Hinton which was to be ready by the end of March.
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[underlined] AT PYE TELECOMMUNICATIONS [/underlined]
The first two years at Pye were spent as a Project Engineer in Systems Planning Dept, not in the Aviation team as hoped, but in Duncan Kerr’s team doing general systems. Also in the team were Jim Bucknell, Ian Douglas, and Mike Bavistock who had also joined Pye on April first. Duncan was away most of the time drumming up contracts with the Scottish Police forces but on our first day Mike and I did meet him briefly and he gave us two pink files. ‘Take one each’ said Duncan. ‘Turkey 10th Slice is now an order and needs a flimsy, and the Libya quote needs revalidating’. Mike and I hadn’t a clue on Pye methods and we decided to work together, providing a mutual back-up. It quickly transpired that we had something in common, Mike had been in the Gambia for three tours whilst I was in East Africa. I told him of my experience with the Crown Agents for the Gambia job and he had seen the advert for what had in fact been his post. He was not amused when he saw his £2500 a year job advertised with a salary of £3500.
Of the 36 people in the department, no-one was particularly helpful, in retrospect mainly because they were themselves under great pressure and had problems of their own. I saw the Chief Clerk, - later known as the Admin Group Leader – and said ‘Duncan wants me to do a flimsy, what’s a flimsy?’ He was most unhelpful although he was responsible for the admin. aspect of many hundreds of them. His philosophy was that he wasn’t going to help anyone who was on a bigger salary than his own. I had to go to Export Sales to find out what a flimsy looked like. It turned out to be an all-singing and dancing instruction to every dept. detailing all the action required in designing, manufacturing inspecting packing shipping and invoicing and even installation of a customer’s order. All the information available was entered on the forms and circulated around the departments. The initial circulation was programmed to take six weeks. The system was designed in detail and all the engineering information added with ammendments. [sic] Eventually there were so many ammendments [sic] I had to completely rewrite the flimsy after six weeks, and finally there was an issue 4. The job was eventually engineered by Dickie Wainwright – ex East African P.& T., following a departmental re-organisation, and I picked it up again at the delivery stage having moved to the Systems Installation Dept.
My performance on my first task in Pye was not at all brilliant, and about 18 months later when the installation was finished I issued a memo entitled “Lessons Learned on Turkey 10th Slice”. I started with saying that a week of training in Pye methods would have saved a great deal of cost and misunderstanding and went on to discuss the contract itself. The contract stated that ‘The Turkish Version of the contract shall be deemed to be the official version’, and it seemed there were many anomalies all to the advantage of the Turks, in particular to our agent, a chap called Avidor, who in fact translated the Turkish contract into English!. The system originally quoted was for a microwave chain the length of Turkey with a dozen or so links carrying teleprinter and telephones. We were awarded only the links, the radio parts of which were main and standby. One rediculous [sic] requirement in the Turkish version was that they wanted the main link in one place and the standby in another. We were providing main and standby transmitters etc within a link, not a completely seperate [sic] standby link. The whole thing was quite rediculous, [sic] no
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wonder it was given to one of the new boys and everyone else steered clear. The title of the contract simply meant that it was the 10th slice – or part – of a multi-million dollar allocation of N.A.T.O. funds. I don’t know how many slices there were, but one was enough for us.
With Mike’s first job, revalidating a quotation might on the face of it seem more straight-forward. It is just a matter of extending the date on which the offer expires, or is it?! The engineers who did the quotation with many versions over a period of 10 years, and the half dozen salesmen involved over different periods had all either left or moved on somewhere. Now they were all out of picture, it was Mike’s job, and he was on his own. Revalidation implied that he must thoroughly understand the customer requirement. The quotation comprised 18 volumes of A4 size, each 2” thick, plus a mountain of minutes of meetings and correspondance [sic] over a period of 10 years. Undertakings made in good faith years ago could well be quite impossible to honour, requiring endless variations to the tender document. Every change required approval from others in Pye. Every aspect had to be checked. Equipment from other manufacturers was included and confirmation of availability and price had to be obtained, every move documented and absolutely every aspect of the tender was Mike’s direct responsibility. When I think back to those days, I remember how every letter and memo originated had to be written out in longhand for the team’s typist to action. I understand the office system did not change in the next 25 years although there is much less of it. Mike asked me to sit in at his very first meeting on this project, the main purpose of which was to put him in the picture and answer any queries he might have. One item in the quote was ‘2 years Bavister £2000’ What’s that asks Mike. The finance dept man said it’s an accountancy term, just leave it in but add 10%. Two others had totally different ideas and finally a fellow woke up and said “I’m Bavister, I’m supposed to go out there for two years to help the customer”. There followed a discussion on the price of whether it was 2 or should be 20 thousand and which department accepted the responsibility. Mike asked why we are using scramblers bought from Redifon at £1200 each when we can make them. It turned out they were actually ours, produced in Cambridge for T.M.C. who sold them to Redifon who in turn mounted them on a panel with their label, and sold them back to Pye at about 10 times the price.
The Libya communication system itself was very good, a policeman on a camel with a hand-held portable could talk through a local Base station and several UHF links and an HF SSB link to his HQ 3000 miles away if required. Mike Bavistock saw the project through two revalidations and the tender’s final acceptance, and the production stage, over a period of 4 years. He went on to do many other big projects before deciding to resign and return to Africa to try and regain his sanity.
When I joined the department, one half prepared quotations and everything else with the exception of the detailed engineering. The other half were responsible for engineering and nothing else. The system was sound, one person should not have to divert his thinking from conditions of sale to pricing to shipping to the specific connections on a 131 way socket. After a while the system was changed whereby one man did the lot, and with a dozen or more projects on hand at any one time constant re-orientation was getting me down and I asked for a transfer to Systems Installation Dept. Meanwhile I pressed on
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doing many quotations and made sure I did not get involved with detailed engineering design or anything else which could delay my transfer. In fact I feigned some excentricity [sic] and got away with it. The pressure however was high and there was a great deal of jeolousy [sic] and backbiting in the department.
At one stage I did a couple of Fireman’s callout schemes and these were done on the electric typewriter by a typist who normally did only the conditions of sale. The only difference was in the number of base stations and portables, and the finance. Together using the same basic tape we could rattle off a quotation in half an hour. We made about 20 spare copies and sent them to Home salesmen who were not already in the know, to help them secure orders from their local fire services. This was very rewarding to Pye.
One monday [sic] morning I was given the job of providing a quotation to meet a requirement for the Yugoslavian police, to be ready by 4 pm on friday [sic] . It was a big job and I would have three chaps to assist me but I was not to make a start until the go-ahead was received from International Marketing Dept. At 2.15 pm I was told to forget it, it would not be possible to complete it in time. On Wednesday at 10 am I was told the job was on and vital, top priority. Drop everything and get on wth [sic] it. I would not have any assistants and would have to complete it myself. So one man had two days and two nights to do a job which was too much for 4 men in 5 days and 4 nights. I worked almost non-stop, all day and all night, mostly at home, and on the thursday [sic] I asked for a typist to be available for friday [sic] night. By 5 pm on friday [sic] the document was ready for typing, a very long technical description and equipment schedules. The prices had not been agreed with the finance dept, so I used standard Export price with 15% mark-up for luck. No signatures of approval were obtained from Snr. Management although a quote for over £100,000 needed signatures from three Directors and finally the Company Secretary. I did ‘phone Bert Ship who was responsible for determining delivery time and I put 5 months instead of his 9. The typist did not materialise, and as a last resort I took an office typewriter to my daughter Wendy’s home and she typed it overnight.
At 7 am on the saturday [sic] I assembled a batch of relavant [sic] publicity material and technical leaflets, and made 10 copies of the whole document, four of which I signed and gave to the Salesman at 9 am. He translated the Technical Description and schedules into Italian on his way to London Airport by road and to Milan by air. It was retyped into Italian on the Sunday and presented to the client in Rome on the Monday [sic] , by Pye Italy. A month later the Salesman told me we had got the job and thanked me, but there was no other official recognition. I was amused to have signed it myself, having cut through all authorities and proceedures. [sic] One copy of the file was circulated around for approvals by Mike Loose and this was completed a few days before we got the contract. Not all jobs were like that.
One particular quotation was done for Frank Mills, a salesman responsible for dealing with government departments in Wales. I had first known Frank when he was Provincial Police Signals Officer at Mwanza in Tanganyika when I was in charge of the airport. Prior to that he had been a Radio Officer with D.C.A. in East Africa. Frank had told me of his lucky escape when he went to Musoma on a routine inspection. An african [sic] sold him a live snake in a sack for a shilling and Frank decided its skin would make a good present. An 8 foot python for a shilling. First the python had to be killed and whilst still in the sack was placed in an empty 40 gallon storage drum. A pipe was connected between his
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landrover [sic] exhaust and the drum, and the engine left running. After an hour the python was removed and made ready for skinning, but first let’s take a few photographs. Off came Frank’s bush jacket, and the python wound round his chest and neck, with Frank gripping the snake’s head and looking it square in the eyes. The photos were taken and the snake lowered to the ground. It was sweaty work and Frank sat on the back of the landrover [sic] drinking a cool beer. After a few minutes the python slid away into the bush. However, Frank had arranged to collect the quotation at 1.30 pm. and as the hour approached it was ready in triplicate except for the three front labels. All the typists and secretaries were enjoying their lunch break, most of them sitting at their desks knitting or reading. Not one of them would type the labels, so I used a spare manual machine and typed them myself. It was their right to stop work between 1 and 2 and they would excercise [sic] that right regardless of everything else. Most of them didn’t speak to me for weeks. This childish attitude was only too prevalant [sic] throughout the organisation and was completely foreign to me. However, Frank collected his quotation and we had a short chat about old times. Tragically he was killed in a road accident next day whilst on the way to see his customer with the quotation.
After my 2 years or so in Systems Planning, Bill Bainbridge one of the two Field Controllers in Systems resigned to start his own business, Cambridge Towers, and I was fortunate in succeeding him. At the same time Harry Langley Head of Systems Installation moved into Sales and D.A.D. Smith took over as Manager of Systems Installation Dept., (S.I.D.). I got on very well with Harry Langley, he had been with the Kenya Police as a Radio technician seconded from the Home Office. Howard (Jimmie) James was the other Field Controller and between us we managed all S.I.D. projects, mainly installing and commissioning systems in the field, about 60% being overseas. In theory we had a Project Engineer heading each Installation team but as each was involved in several jobs at any one time it was never possible just to sit back and let the P.E. get on with it. He was likely to be abroad when most required.
[underlined] IRAN [/underlined]
One of the first jobs allocated to me in S.I.D. was the Iranian Airports project, Pye being a member of a consortium with Marconi, C & S Antennas, Redifon, G.E.C. and S.T.C. All came together as the Irano-British Airports Consortium to re-equip the major airports and aviation facilities in Iran. This was the project mentioned to me at my interview when applying to join Pye and Cyril Foster and Allan Breeze had devoted their last two years entirely to it, and much of 5 years before that. Allan in fact eventually went to Iran to commission the F.I.C. console. I had a great respect for him when we went to Iran together and whilst I was struggling along in French he was talking in Farsi with the hotel staff. He had been quietly studying it in Cambridge and could even read it, which was a tremendous achievement.
I became suspicious when I received a memo from D.A.D. Smith the Departmental Manager enclosing a change-note and asking me to confirm that we could still carry out our installation committment [sic] in Iran for the £85,700 he had quoted. A change-note was a notification from a Lab. making a minor change in the design or manufacture of a piece of equipment. In this case it refered [sic] to a resistor which would make no difference to anything except the parts list.
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[photograph of the head and shoulders of a man]
[Arabic writing]
[stamp]
[Arabic writing] G. Watson [Arabic writing]
[signature]
[Arabic writing] JSB/100/14/6/T [Arabic writing]
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Not “will the change-note make any difference?” His subtle phraseology was making me responsible for the whole installation amount, not just a possible minor differe [deleted r [/deleted] nce. His figure was derived by taking 5% of the factory transfer price of the equipment which had no real relationship to the cost of fitting it, and was totally unrealistic.
I studied the draft contract and drew up an installation plan, and after a few days replied to my manager that “if the work can be carried out in the 12 month time scale as in the contract my estimate of costs is not £87500 but £250,000. I believed the work would take at least 5 years, it would not be possible to co-ordinate the many scores of officials with their different loyalties and the organisations involved. The final cost could very well be double the £250K. The end customer was the Iranian Director General of Civil Aviation, represented by Aerodrome Development Consultants Ltd., (A.D.C.) apparently a private firm, but wholly-owned by the then British Board of Trade and staffed by their officials. They were more than loyal to their Iranian masters.
After a great deal of arguement [sic] with A.D.C. and other Consortium members about methods, division of responsibilies [sic] , consequential losses and costs etc., the quotation was accepted including my price of £250K, and the contract signed. I was to live with that contract for exactly 10 years and have been sorely tempted many times to record the frustrations, stupidities and almost impossible business of working with the Iranians whilst retaining any degree of sanity.
It was the custom in Pye at the time, and a very good one, that before work was started on a major quotation, the comments of people with recent similar experience were sought as to its desireability, [sic] and with the question “Do we want the job?”. The file, an informal one came to me and in answer to that question I wrote in a light-hearted moment, “pas avec un barge pole.” I didn’t know that our masters Philips in Holland were involved until a minute came from them asking ‘vos ist ein barge pole’? This surprised everyone as the Dutch generally have no sense of humour where money is concerned.
One year from the signing of the contract, bang on time, we airfreighted the 26 racks of equipment and a mass of other material for installation at Meherabad airport, a direct flight from Stansted to Teheran where it was to be fitted. The pilot spent 36 hours under armed guard first for not having a “Certificate of no objection” from Iranian Airlines and secondly for paying a parking fee for only a 12 hours stay. There were many problems with that first consignement [sic] which provided a good pointer to the difficulties to follow. It was 12 months before the equipment was released from Customs and then it was stored in the open air outside the Meherabad receiving station for 6 months. Soon after that first air shipment I returned to Iran and spent 6 weeks studying the first 12 airport installations, including Meherabad, and re-formulating detailed plans. Meherabad was the main International Airport and included the Flight Information Centre. One problem at the F.I.C. was how to fit a 24 ft control console manned by 6 people whilst maintaining a full service on the old console which occupied the same floor space. In addition the contract stated that 12 racks would be fitted in the old equipment room on the fourth floor and 14 in a new equipment room on the second floor. This really was quite impossible and I was keeping the problem to myself. When I was discussing with the Iranians the work involved in their own equiupment [sic] room,
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they became extremely worried because their wiring was an absolute shambles with hundreds of multipair cables actually threading their way in and out and through racks which we had to replace with no interuption [sic] in the service.
They finally startled me by laying down the law and insisting that we stay right out of their old equipment room, and they would knock down walls between six offices on the second floor to house all 26 racks. This area was very close to FIC and made our job not only possible, but easy. Also the change was their firm requirement and we charged them £17,500 extra for the priveledge [sic] .
On Kushi Nostrat mountain, Marconi were to fit a Radar scanner, which we were to link to Meherabad by a 7GHz link, but the only way to reach the site was by helicopter, unless one was a mountaineer. There were no civilian helicopters in Iran and it was only when I put the problem to A.D.C. that I found the Radar stn. was to be at Kushi Basm and not Kushi Nostrat, a totally different mountain. This had an access road and Meherabad was a line-of-sight path of 32 miles. At a critical distance was a salt pan and we were supposed to go round this desert on a dog leg using a microwave link repeater. There was no suitable location for the repeater because of the “change” in location of the Radar site. This resulted in another variation to contract for a frequency and space diversity single link, less equipment than in the original contract but we got away with charging £18,000 more. Some of the problems were pathetic, others amusing. When I checked the earthing and lightening arrestor system at Meherabad I found the one inch copper earth lead was terminated not with an earth mat in the ground but to a spike stuck in a concrete plantpot on the first floor verandah. That was and probably is still there and highly dangerous. Incredible but true.
At Bandar Abbas Airport I prepared a detailed installation plan which together with others was discussed later at a monthly progress meeting in London. It bore no resemblance to a plan prepared by Redifon two years previously and we realised that since Redifon’s visit a new airport had been built about 9 miles away. More variatons [sic] to contract. There were 260 of them finally. At Bandar Abbas, the port of which was the main base of the Iranian Navy, I was with the Provincial Governor, an Iranian Air Force General and the Airport Manager. All three agreed it was permissible for me to use my camera. Later when an army corporal confiscated the camera they all denied it and simultaneously lost their ability to speak fairly good english, resorting to french in discussion with me. I had already met the works manager in charge of the extensive building operations who spoke excellent english and was apparently all-powerful. He not only recovered my camera from the army but also gave me a fine selection of photographic prints together with detailed architect plans of all the buildings. I did not see the three senior chaps again but the works manager put a car and driver at my disposal. I think he must have been related to someone important, maybe the Shah-in-Shah, or maybe he was a member of the secret police, there is no knowing.
A consignment of Redifon transmitters was held up in Customs for over two years with a documentation problem, and even the fixer employed was quite ineffective. To clear through customs it was necessary to get 120 signatures and rubber stamp impressions on the release document and this had to be done in a single day. This was finally achieved after the Shah had decreed that the equipment must be released, but the chap on the gate seemed to resent this interferance [sic] and refused to release it. The document with the signatures was out
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of date the following day so the man’s boss supported him and the equipment remained a part of the scenery. A week or two later, another department came into the act and gave notice that if Redifon did not remove it within 7 days, it would be sold off by police auction. Redifon did not appreciate my suggestion that we should go to the auction. The problem had arisen because one small item of equipment was refered [sic] to as a “tone transmitter”, the word transmitter being anathma [sic] to Middle east types. It did not appear on the schedule [deleted] d [/deleted] of approved tranmitters [sic] and was regarded with grave suspicion.
It took four months to amend the contract to exclude the tone transmitter and substitute a tone oscillator, - the same thing -, but even then 36 copies of the invoice had to be changed and re-submitted.
The Consortium offices belonged to the G.E.C.O.S. agent who kindly trebbled [sic] the size of them at the Consortium’s expence [sic] . All the members’ staff in Iran moved in and made themselves comfortable. About three weeks later a gang of workmen with demolition equipment reduced the new buildings to rubble and said “sorry, no planning permission”. Two months later the lawyers proved that all the proper authority and permissions were completely in order. The gang returned and said “sorry, ok you build”.
Despite all the red tape in Iran it was generally possible to get results eventually, the main difficulty was often finding out just which palms had to be greased. Our man in Iran for three years was Mike Cherry and he was successful in getting an amateur radio licence, with the call-sign EP2MC. Mike fitted an SSB125 transceiver in the office in Teheran and I was in daily contact with him from both my house and the office in Cambridge. By using very carefull [sic] phraeseology [sic] I was kept right up to date with progress in the field.
I was talking with Mike from the office one evening on 14 MHz when Dr. Westhead the Chief Executive came in and asked who I was talking with. I replied “to Mike Cherry, our man in Teheran, Sir”. He grimaced and said “Ah well, ask a stupid question..” The public telephone system to Iran was diabolical most of the time. I used to book a call for 4.30 am the following day and take it from home, which saved a great deal of time in both places. Teheran time was 2 1/2 hours ahead of U.K. On most occasions the Post Office telephoned several times during the night to confirm the call or advise of delays, which was very tiresome.
Monthly progress meetings were held in London, and at one of them I was asked to quote for additional work at Esfahan during the 2500 year celebrations, which were to take place before the new equipment was fitted. They required to talk with aircraft and I suggested they should do so on a mobile set which would be quite adequate. Our team would already be on site with the mobiles so without any fuss I quoted £300 which was put forward. At a board meeting a week later this was confirmed and the Pye member of the Board, Pat Holden who was also our International Marketing Director promptly withdrew it as I had not gone through the proper channels. The next day he sent for me and instructed me to cancel my quotation, and with a great thumping of the table told me to increase it £3000. Then followed a lecture that “we are here to make money, add a nought”. I told him the job would take about an hour and £300 was more than adequate. £30,000 was utterly rediculous. [sic] I told him “I was doing no such thing, put it in writing through the head of my department and meanwhile you are clear to return to earth”. I then excused myself and left him
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to it. I returned to my own desk 20 minutes later to find a note asking me to go and see the boss, not surprisingly. I told him exactly what had happened and he laughed. I said I thought I had burned my boats with Pat Holden and David Smith my boss said “far from it, he admires you for standing up to him and asks you to forget it.” I took no further action in this and in the event there was no income at all, but the job took only 30 minutes for one engineer.
Another equally challenging job was the installation and commissio [deleted] m [/deleted] ning of a UHF system within the London Stock Exchange. This employed 520 adjascent [sic] channels. The Base Stations in the basement comprised a transmitter and receiver for each channel, all being combined into one “radiating feeder”. About 600 pocketphones on the Stock Exchange floor were used by dealers working into this system. An invitation to tender for this job had been received by Pye about two years previously and comments invited from all technical departments. It was unanimously agreed that the job was quite impossible and must not be attempted. Pye did not quote for it and the contract was awarded to S.T.C. Mobile division. Nearly two years later Pye or Philips aquired [sic] that organisation and half the installation had been fitted. About 60 channels were in use and very unsatisfactory. Dealers received messages intended for others and signals faded out at the crutial [sic] moment. Firms were receiving wrong messages and transfering [sic] and buying shares erroneously through these faults. The task of bringing the job to a conclusion was allocated to me and I chose my favourite team of Nick Fox, Aussie Peters and Jack Faulkener.
There was a local Service Dept. depot at the Stock Exchange of four engineers who were struggling to get the system working and we took over from them. On arrival there was a flap on, a dealer had acted on a false message and bought some tens of thousand shares for which he had no client and he was stuck with them. He said he was going to sue Pye for his loss. He dropped that idea next day when he sold them at a profit. The main problem was loss of signals into the pocketphones on the Stock Exchange floor but we were not allowed onto the floor during dealing times to make tests. Eventually we were given an ultimatum to either fix it or remove it and face an enormous claim for damages.
This was very serious indeed and I reported back to Cambridge. The Engineering Director, Frank Grimm showed me a copy of his comments of two years ago when he said the job was quite rediculous [sic] and impossible, and that was the end of it. No-one wanted to know, “It’s your problem Cliff, get on with it”. So it was back to the Stock Exchange, and I demanded permission to see for myself what was actually happening by being on the floor during dealing hours, otherwise there was nothing more we could do. The Chairman gave permission, quite unprecedented and we were then able to make a more scientific approach. We stayed on that evening and with Jack Faulkener in the basement at the transmitters we measured signal strengths which were astonishingly high and with no blind spots. Jack reduced the base station transmitter power at the input to the antenna system until even with the antenna completely isolated the signals were far more than adequate. This provide the mathematicians were all wrong and we were all barking up the wrong tree. We then carried out the most elementary test of all, whilst receiving properly on a pocketphone we transmitted on other pocketphones – on other channels – at a distance of ten feet. We had found the reason for the problem, simple R/F blocking which should have been checked in the Lab. at a very early stage. That evening we modified 6
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pocketfones [sic] , fitting a 2 pf. capacitor at the receiver input and completely bipassing [sic] the transmitter output stage. They worked perfectly, and with no blocking even at 2’ distance between portables. We had found the answer and the next day, friday, [sic] we recovered all the 160 pocketfones [sic] and over the weekend modified the lot. Everything worked as it should and the customers were delighted. We had received no co-operation from anyone in Cambridge but word soon reached Cambridge that all was well. We deliberately kept them in the dark until I issued a formal report. I had of course no authority to modify equipment but deliberately flouted this on the grounds that someone had to do something constructive or we would have been thrown out of the Stock Exchange. It did not improve my popularity with the people who could influence my career.
In 1979 after being responsible for some dozens of major projects three more Field Controllers were appointed, Dave Buller Mike Simpson and Clive Otley and I felt that a change was long overdue. Relationships with the Departmental Manager and his yes-man deputy Joe were deteriorating rapidly. I transfered [sic] back to Systems Planning Dept. and overnight became a specialist in Radio Frequency propagation. I was in a small team headed by Dave Warford, and including Lewis Wicker and John Ewbank, and a trainee. Our job was to plan Radio Links and area coverage systems, within the parameters laid down by D.T.I.
At the outset my knowledge of R/F propagation (or Electromagnetic Radiation) was limited to my practical experience of what had been achieved and what had failed to work. The theoretical aspect was highly mathematical but fortunatly [sic] the subject was well written up and the principles well established. Dave Warford and Lewis Wicker were a great help in getting me onto the right lines.
A typical job would be a request from a salesman asking whether a radio link on a particular frequency band would work between two specific sites and if so what aerial height would be required? The first step would be to study the Ordnance Survey maps of 1:50000 scale, and plotting all the contours on the direct line between the points. From this information a profile of the earth’s surface would be prepared including the earth’s curvature
[inserted] To be continued [/inserted]
159
[page break]
[underlined] Dresden 13 – 14 February 1945 [/underlined]
At the end of January 1945, the Royal Air Force and the USAF 8th Air Force were specifically requested by the Allied Joint Chiefs of Staff to carry out heavy raids on Dresden, Chemnitz and Leipzig. It was not a personal decision by Sir Arthur Harris. The campaign should have begun with an American daylight raid on Dresden on February 13th, but bad weather over Europe pre-vented [sic] any American operation. It thus fell to Bomber Command to carry out the first raid on the night of February 13th. 769 Lancasters and 9 Mosquitoes were dispatched in two separate attacks on Dresden and at the same time a further 368 R.A.F aircraft attacked the synthetic oil plant at Bohlen near Leipzig. A few hours after the RAF raids 311 bombers of the 8th US Air force attacked Dresden. The following day (15 February 1945) the USAF despatched 211 bombers to bomb Dresden and a further 406 bombers on the 2nd March.
As an economic centre, Dresden ranked sixth in importance in pre-war Germany. During the war several hundred industrial plants of various sizes worked full-time in Dresden for the German War machine, Among them were such industrial giants as the world famous Zeiss-Ikon AG (Optics and cameras). This plant alongside the plant in Jena was one of the principle centres of production of field glasses for the Armies, aiming sights for the Panzers and Artillery, periscopes for U-boats, bomb and gun sights f or the Luftwaffe. Dresden was also one of the key centres of the German postal and telegraphic system and a crucial East West transit point with its 7 bridges crossing the Elbe at its widest point.
In February 1945 the war was far from over. The Western Allies had not yet crossed the Rhine, Germany still controlled extensive territories, and Bomber Command lost more than 400 bombers after Dresden. The war was at its height, the Allies were preparing for the land battles which would follow their crossing the Rhine, the Russians were poised on the Oder. This destruction of Dresden meant a considerable reduction in the effectiveness of the German Armed forces.
The Germans followed Hitler even after the liberation of Auschwitz in January 1945 when its horrors were broadcast to the world. They continued to follow Hitler even after they watched the thousands of living skeletons from concentration camps being herded westward in early 1945.
A quote from former POW Col H E Cook (USAAF Rtd) "on 13/14 Feb 1945 we POWs were shunted into the Dresden marshalling yards where for nearly 12 hours German troops and equipment rolled in and out of Dresden. I saw with my own eyes that Dresden was an armed camp: thousands of German troops, tanks and artillery and miles of freight cars …. transporting German logistics towards the East to meet the Russians.”
[signed] Jim[?] Broom [/signed]
[page break]
[curriculum vitae page 1]
[page break]
[curriculum vitae page 2]
[page break]
[autographed photograph of Lancaster bomber]
[page break]
[history of Jack Railton and Emma Sharpe]
[page break]
[history of George Henry Watson]
[page break]
[history of Herbert Kilham]
[page break]
[history of Herbert Kilham continued]
[page break]
[photograph of male]
[page break]
[history of George Henry Watson]
[page break]
[history of Jack Railton and family]
[page break]
[history of Jack Railton and family continued]
[page break]
[history of Cliff Stark’s early years]
[page break]
[letter from LMS railway to C.W. Watson page 1]
[page break]
[letter from LMS Railway to C.W.Watson page 2]
[page break]
[letter from LMS Railway to C.W. Watson]
Dublin Core
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Title
A name given to the resource
Just Another Tailend Charlie
Description
An account of the resource
A memoir written by Cliff Watson divided into 20 chapters.
The Earliest Years.
Born in Barnoldswick, then in Yorkshire, now in Lancashire in 1922. His father ran a wireless business until 1926. He describes his years at schools and a move to Norwich. The family then moved to London where he started an apprenticeship as an accountant.
Joining Up.
Cliff left the accountants to work in his father's radio business. Initially he was rejected by the RAF because he wore spectacles. He reapplied and passed various written, oral and medical examinations. Initial training was at Torquay then Newquay. Once training was complete he sailed from Greenock to South Africa.
Southern Rhodesia.
After acclimatisation in South Africa, Cliff and his colleagues were put on a sleeper train to Bulawayo in Southern Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. Training commenced on Tiger Moths but he was 'scrubbed' or rejected. He was reselected as an air gunner and completed a course in Moffat, also in South Rhodesia. Hospitality in Rhodesia and South Africa was described as generous and excellent.
Postscript.
Cliff describes a run-in with a training corporal who took a dislike to him. Despite faked evidence he proved his points and emerged with a clean record and passed his exams.
Operational Training.
In August 1942 he sailed back to the UK. He was sent to Bournemouth for assessment, then on to RAF Finningley for training then RAF Bircotes for operations. Next was a move to RAF Hixon and its satellite airfield at Seighford. He married Hilda on 1st March 1943 during a week's leave.
Second Time to Africa.
He was then sent to West Kirby, Liverpool to join a ship sailing to Algiers, for further training. Their destination became Blida where they started operations on Tunis and Monserrato airfield. They then moved to a desert strip to the east by 250 kms. From there they continued operations into Italy. Later they moved to Kairouan and continued operations into Italy, mainly Sardinia and Sicily. Each operation is described in great detail.
He has included a letter in Arabic with instructions to take the bearer to British soldiers for a reward. At the end of his tour they sailed back to Greenock.
Screened.
After some leave Cliff's next posting was at Operational Training Unit Desborough where he helped train new gunners. Due to an argument with an officer he was sent to RAF Norton for correctional training. On his return his case was reviewed and the severe reprimand was removed from his record.
Scampton.
Scampton was Cliff's next operational base then Winthorpe for its Heavy Conversion Unit on Stirlings, followed by Syerston on Lancasters then Bardney.
227 Squadron.
Cliff joined 227 squadron at Bardney. Again he covers in detail each operation. His flight was later transferred to Balderton. During this period he was awarded the DFC.
Final Leg.
His squadron was transferred to Gravely at the end of the war. He did a photography course and was transferred to Handforth. There was little work, some unpleasantness and eventually a period of extended leave, a spell at Poynton looking after prisoners then demob.
Back to Civvy Street.
Cliff returned to Whitehaven to revitalise a radio company. He gives great detail about the improvements made. Later he set up a similar enterprise at Maryport. Wired radio services were set to become less popular and financially worthwhile so seeing the writing on the wall he decided to emigrate.
Kenya.
Cliff and family flew to Nairobi, then bus to Kitale where his father was.
Hoteli King George.
Dissatisfied with life on his father's farm, Cliff took a job as a prison officer. He and his family moved to Nairobi. He relates several stories about prisoners and their better qualities but in the end he gets restless and leaves.
Civil Aviation.
Cliff joined the East African Directorate of Civil Aviation in April 1951 as a radio officer. He and his family were relocated to Mbeya, 900 miles from Nairobi. His skills as a radio engineer were well used in this remote location. After 2.5 years the family returned to UK on leave. On his return he was posted to Mwanza, also in Tanganyika. He describes in great detail a royal visit. They left on leave in June 1957 and collected a VW Beetle for transport to Kenya. Their next move was to Entebbe. This was not a happy posting and led to a transfer to Kisumu in Kenya. After three years they transferred to Nairobi to spend more time with their children, who were at boarding school there.
D.C.A. Headquarters.
His role here was Telecomms superintendent. He describes in detail the operations of his section. This was an unsettled period in Kenya with many Europeans returning home.
Dec' 61 on Leave.
Leave was spent at their house in Wales then in May 1962 Cliff returned alone to Nairobi. His family did return later. By this time his father had abandoned his farm and was building radios.
On Leave June 1964.
He bought another house in Wales and spent his leave restoring it. His wife's mother moved in. In November 1964 Cliff returned alone to Nairobi. he left within a year due to the worsening situation.
Job Hunting.
Several electronics firms were approached offering Cliff's services. He attended an interview with Pye who quickly offered him employment.
At Pye Telecommunications.
He found his colleagues unhelpful. A great deal of time was spent on a Turkish quotation that had been in progress for 10 years. A quotation to the Iranian Directorate of Civil Aviation contained complications leading to Cliff revising the quotation. Later there was a complicated installation job at the London Stock Exchange. Eventually Pye pulled out from the bid but a rival company won it, only to be taken over by Pye. At first the system was troubled but after a simple modification it worked perfectly.
Dresden 13-14 February 1945.
A one page description of the bombing of Dresden.
Curriculum Vitae.
Cliff Watson's CV, dated 1976.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Cliff Watson DFC
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1989-06
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
192 typewritten sheets and photographs
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Memoir
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
SWatsonC188489v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Huntingdon
England--Yorkshire
England--Norwich
England--London
England--Torquay
England--Newquay
England--Birkenhead
Scotland--Greenock
Sierra Leone--Freetown
South Africa--Durban
Zimbabwe--Bulawayo
South Africa--Mahikeng
Zimbabwe--Harare
Singapore
South Africa--Cape Town
England--Bournemouth
France--Paris
Algeria--Algiers
Algeria--Blida
Tunisia--Tunis
Italy--Sardinia
Italy--Cagliari
Tunisia--Bizerte
Italy--Monserrato
Italy--Decimomannu
Italy--Trapani
Italy--Palermo
Italy--Naples
Italy--Rome
Italy--Lido di Roma
Italy--Tiber River
Italy--Alghero
Italy--Castelvetrano
Italy--Pantelleria Island
Tunisia--Sūsah
Italy--Syracuse
Italy--Messina
Italy--Salerno
Italy--Bari
Italy--Comiso
Italy--Crotone
Italy--Pomigliano d'Arco
Italy--Paola
Italy--Battipaglia
England--Desborough
Norway--Bergen
Netherlands--Walcheren
Germany--Hamburg
Norway--Oslo
Belgium--Houffalize
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Berchtesgaden
England--Whitehaven
Kenya
England--Yeovil
Kenya--Nairobi
Kenya--Kitale
Tanzania--Mbeya
Tanzania--Mwanza
Uganda--Entebbe
Kenya--Kisumu
England--Cambridge
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Düsseldorf
Zimbabwe--Gweru
Zimbabwe
South Africa
Sierra Leone
France
Algeria
Tunisia
Italy
Netherlands
Germany
Norway
Poland
Belgium
Tanzania
Uganda
Iran
North Africa
Germany--Nuremberg
Iran--Tehran
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Germany--Homburg (Saarland)
Tunisia--Munastīr
Tunisia--Qayrawān
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Cornwall (County)
England--Cumberland
England--Devon
England--Hampshire
England--Huntingdonshire
England--Norfolk
England--Northamptonshire
England--Somerset
England--Lancashire
Italy--Capri Island
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Peter Bradbury
109 Squadron
142 Squadron
150 Squadron
1661 HCU
227 Squadron
25 OTU
30 OTU
5 Group
617 Squadron
84 OTU
9 Squadron
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Albemarle
Anson
anti-aircraft fire
B-17
B-24
Beaufighter
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
C-47
Defiant
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
ditching
FIDO
flight engineer
Flying Training School
Gee
ground personnel
Halifax
Harvard
Heavy Conversion Unit
Hudson
Hurricane
Initial Training Wing
Ju 87
Ju 88
lack of moral fibre
Lancaster
mess
military discipline
Morse-keyed wireless telegraphy
Mosquito
navigator
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
Pathfinders
prisoner of war
RAF Balderton
RAF Bardney
RAF Bawtry
RAF Catfoss
RAF Desborough
RAF Eastleigh
RAF Farnborough
RAF Finningley
RAF Graveley
RAF Hemswell
RAF Hixon
RAF Holme-on-Spalding Moor
RAF Milltown
RAF Norton
RAF Scampton
RAF Seighford
RAF Strubby
RAF Syerston
RAF Waddington
RAF Wick
RAF Winthorpe
RAF Wyton
searchlight
Spitfire
sport
Stirling
Sunderland
Tiger force
Tiger Moth
training
Wellington
wireless operator / air gunner
Women’s Auxiliary Air Force
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1309/18551/PWatsonC17010069.2.jpg
e0cdc676cea1574630a2adad9c4b570a
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Watson, Clifford. Scrapbook
Description
An account of the resource
Clifford Watson's scrapbook containing photographs and documents.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Watson, C
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
P Foothes
[Signature]
[Signature]
Hampton
J H Eaglestone
H Fitchwell
[Signature]
Crew signatures and mates.
21 Dec 44 Raided Politz and diverted to Milltown Scotland, due to fog over base
22 Dec 44 Flew to Wick to pick up crew that had crashed the previous night and written their Lancaster aircraft off. They were room mates of ours. Spent the whole of Christmas at Wick, fog cleared on the 27 Dec 44 and we returned to base.
[page break]
Hope you have a MERRY CHRISTMAS and a HAPPY NEW YEAR
Hoothers
Pete
[inserted] Mid upper here. [/inserted]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Christmas Card and crew notes
Description
An account of the resource
A Christmas Card signed by Pete 'Mid Upper here'. In it is described an attack on Politz on 21.12.44 and diverted to RAF Milltown due fog. Then on 22.12.44 he flew to RAF Wick to pick up a crew that had crashed there. There are several signatures.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-12-27
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One printed card with handwritten annotations
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PWatsonC17010069
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Poland
Great Britain
Scotland--Moray
Scotland--Highlands
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-12
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Tricia Marshall
Claire Monk
Requires
A related resource that is required by the described resource to support its function, delivery, or coherence.
Workflow A completed
bombing
crash
Lancaster
RAF Milltown
RAF Wick
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/286/17755/LKirbyH1637087v1.1.pdf
f5d1d4f26477231c35ba4d430b6f4fd0
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Kirby, Harold
Harold V A Kirby
H V A Kirby
Harold Kirby
H Kirby
Description
An account of the resource
Nine items. Two oral history interviews with Warrant Officer Harold Kirby (1923 - 2022, 1637087 Royal Air Force), his log book, photographs and documents. He flew operations as a flight engineer with 467, 97 and 156 Squadrons.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-07-10
2015-09-21
2016-06-11
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Kirby, H
Requires
A related resource that is required by the described resource to support its function, delivery, or coherence.
Warrant Officer Harold Kirby 1637087 was born in Kilbourne, Loncon in 1923, his job after leaving school was in the accounting department at London Electric Supplies. He initially tried to volunteer for the RAF but failed the medical, at that time. He was subsequently drafted in 1942. Skill training started with training as a Flight Mechanic, but during this was asked to volunteer to rain as a Flight Engineer. His first posting was as an Aircraft Fitter at No.460 Squadron, RAF Binbrook, although only for 6 months.
After Flight Engineer training at St Athan and then training on the Short Stirling and then the Lancaster with 1661 Heavy Conversion Unit at RAF Winthorpe, the first solo flight for the crew, the port landing gear would not lock, during the landing the gear collapsed, although there were no injuries.
First operational unit was No.467 Squadron at RAF Waddington a mainly Australian Squadron, the crew were here for July and August 1944, One operation 3/4th August 1944, to the V1 storage site at Trossy Saint Maximin had another bomber flying above their aircraft and dropping their bombs, one going through the wing, narrowly missing vital structures, this resulted in a gear up landing, due to hydraulic loss, but again there were no injuries resulting.
He was then posted along with the crew to No 97 Squadron, based at RAF Coningsby a pathfinder squadron, tasked to mark the targets for other aircraft,
In total two tours were completed before the end of the European war, after finishing as a Flight Engineer, Harold trained as a RADAR mechanic, before leaving the RAF.
Andy St.Denis
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Title
A name given to the resource
Harold Kirby’s flight engineers log book
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One colour photocopy of a booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LKirbyH1637087v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1944-07
1944-08
1945
1944-07-12
1944-07-13
1944-07-17
1944-07-20
1944-07-21
1944-07-22
1944-07-23
1944-07-24
1944-07-25
1944-07-26
1944-07-27
1944-07-28
1944-07-29
1944-07-30
1944-08-01
1944-08-02
1944-08-03
1944-08-19
1944-08-24
1944-08-25
1944-08-26
1944-08-27
1944-08-29
1944-08-30
1944-08-31
1944-09-18
1944-09-19
1944-09-23
1944-09-24
1944-10-14
1944-10-15
1944-10-28
1944-10-29
1944-11-06
1944-11-07
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-11-23
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-04
1944-12-05
1944-12-06
1944-12-07
1944-12-09
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1944-12-19
1945-01-07
1945-01-08
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-02-07
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-02-22
1945-03-03
1945-03-04
1945-03-05
1945-03-06
1945-03-07
1945-03-20
1945-03-21
1945-03-22
1945-04-08
1945-04-09
1945-04-16
1945-04-17
1945-04-18
1945-04-19
1945-04-25
1945-04-26
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Great Britain
Norway
Poland
Russia (Federation)
Belgium--Kortrijk
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Czech Republic--Chomutov
Czech Republic--Plzeň
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
France--Caen
France--Calmont
France--Creil Region
France--Givors
France--Hesdin
France--La Pallice
France--Lens
France--L'Isle-Adam
France--Villers-Bocage (Calvados)
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Giessen (Hesse)
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Leipzig Region
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Munich
Germany--Sassnitz
Germany--Stuttgart
Norway--Bergen
Norway--Tønsberg
Norway--Trondheim
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Russia (Federation)--Kaliningrad (Kaliningradskai︠a︡ oblastʹ)
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Description
An account of the resource
Flight engineers log book (Copy) for H Kirby covering the period from 26 April 1944 to 24 May 1945. Detailing his flying training and operations flown. He was stationed at RAF Winthorpe, RAF Syerston, RAF Waddington and RAF Coningsby. Aircraft flown in were Stirling and Lancaster. He flew a total of 44 operations. 6 daylight and 10 night operations with 467 squadron and 28 night operations with 97 squadron pathfinder force. Targets were Culmont Chalindrey, Caen, Courtrai, Kiel, Stuttgart, Givors, Cahagny, Siracourt, Cassan, Trossy St Maxim, La Pallice, Darmstadt, Konigsberg, Rollencourt, Mönchengladbach, Munster, Brunswick, Bergen, Dortmund-Ems Canal, Trondheim, Munich, Heilbronn, Giessen, Gdynia, Politz, Ladbergen, Dresden, Gravenhorst, Bohlen, Sassnitz, Hamburg, Lutzkendorf, Pilsen, Komatau and Tonsberg. His pilot on operations was Flying Officer Ryan.
1661 HCU
467 Squadron
8 Group
97 Squadron
aircrew
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
Bombing of Trossy St Maximin (3 August 1944)
crash
flight engineer
forced landing
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Lancaster Mk 3
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Pathfinders
pilot
RAF Coningsby
RAF Syerston
RAF Waddington
RAF Winthorpe
Stirling
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1273/17685/LDrayFJ3033110v1.2.pdf
f9585e997b0beafe6d6e0d1204c9afd3
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Dray, F J
Description
An account of the resource
One item. F J Dray's log book. He flew a tour of operations as an air gunner with 576 Squadron from RAF Fiskerton.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Robert Dray and catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-05-21
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Dray, FJ
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
F Dray’s flying log book for navigators, air bombers, air gunners, flight engineers
Description
An account of the resource
Flying log book for navigators, air bombers, air gunners, flight engineers for F Dray, air gunner, covering the period from 23 March 1944 to 22 April 1945. Detailing his flying training and operations flown. He was stationed at RAF Bishops Court, RAF Hixon, RAF Ingham, RAF Sandtoft, RAF Hemswell and RAF Fiskerton. Aircraft flown in were, Anson, Wellington, Halifax and Lancaster. He flew a total of 30 operations with 576 squadron. Targets were, Merseburg, Essen, Ludwigshafen, Koblenz, Gelsenkirchen, Nuremberg, Royan, Munich, Duisburg, Stuttgart, Weisbaden, Politz, Dresden, Dortmund, Pforzheim, Kassel, Misburg, Hildesheim, Paderborn, Hamburg, Lutzkendorf, Keil, Plauen, Heligoland and Bremen. <span>His pilot on operations was</span><span> </span>Pilot Officer Carter.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LDrayFJ3033110v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
Germany
Great Britain
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
England--Lincolnshire
England--Staffordshire
France--Royan
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Essen
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Hannover Region
Germany--Helgoland
Germany--Hildesheim
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Koblenz
Germany--Ludwigshafen am Rhein
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Paderborn
Germany--Pforzheim
Germany--Plauen
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Wiesbaden
Northern Ireland--Down (County)
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Great Britain
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1945
1944-12-06
1944-12-07
1944-12-12
1944-12-15
1944-12-22
1944-12-29
1944-12-30
1945-01-02
1945-01-03
1945-01-04
1945-01-07
1945-01-08
1945-01-22
1945-01-28
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-02-22
1945-02-23
1945-02-24
1945-03-08
1945-03-09
1945-03-11
1945-03-12
1945-03-15
1945-03-16
1945-03-17
1945-03-22
1945-03-24
1945-03-27
1945-03-31
1945-04-04
1945-04-05
1945-04-09
1945-04-10
1945-04-11
1945-04-18
1945-04-22
1667 HCU
30 OTU
576 Squadron
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
bombing of Helgoland (18 April 1945)
Halifax
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Operational Training Unit
RAF Bishops Court
RAF Fiskerton
RAF Hemswell
RAF Hixon
RAF Ingham
RAF Sandtoft
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1243/16573/LAllenBW1898094v1.1.pdf
679a2b07209e6ff41cd9653debb5e2a6
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Allen, Bert
B W Allen
Description
An account of the resource
22 items. the collection concerns Bert Allen (1923 - 1993, 1898094 Royal Air Force) and contains his log book and photographs, including some taken in Mauripur and Mumbai. He flew operations as an air gunner with 207 Squadron from RAF Spilsby. He was subsequently posted to India and was demobbed in 1946.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Mathew Allen and catalogued by Peter Adams.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018-05-03
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Allen, BW
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
B W Allen’s flying log book for navigators, air bombers, air gunners, flight engineers
Description
An account of the resource
Flying log book for navigators, air bombers, air gunners, flight engineers for B W Allen, air gunner, covering the period from 15 April 1944 to 1 June 1945. Detailing his flying training and operations flown. He was stationed at RAF Pembrey, RAF Turweston, RAF Silverstone, RAF Swinderby, RAF Syerston and RAF Spilsby. Aircraft flown in were, Anson, Wellington, Stirling and Lancaster. He flew a total of 20 Operations with 207 squadron, 3 daylight and 17 night operations. Targets were, Dortmund Ems canal, Royan, Brux, Siegen, Karlsruhe, Ladbergen, Politz, Dresden, Rositz, Bohlen, Gravenhorst, Essen, Wurzburg, Wesel, Nordhausen, Molbis, Lutzkendorf and Cham. His pilot on operations was Flying Officer Howard. The log book also contains a poppy leaf dropped from the Lancaster at the opening of the Green Park Memorial.
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text. Log book and record book
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LAllenBW1898094v1.pdf
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
England--Buckinghamshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Northamptonshire
England--Nottinghamshire
France--Royan
France--Vienne (Department)
Germany--Cham
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Essen
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Lower Saxony
Germany--Nordhausen (Thuringia)
Germany--Rossbach (Merseburg-Querfurt)
Germany--Saxony
Germany--Siegen
Germany--Thuringia
Germany--Wesel (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Germany--Würzburg
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Wales--Carmarthenshire
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1945
1945-01-01
1945-01-05
1945-01-16
1945-01-17
1945-02-01
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-07
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-19
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-02-24
1945-03-11
1945-03-16
1945-03-17
1945-03-20
1945-03-21
1945-03-23
1945-03-24
1945-04-04
1945-04-07
1945-04-08
1945-04-09
1945-04-17
1945-04-18
1945-05-15
1660 HCU
17 OTU
207 Squadron
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Operational Training Unit
RAF Pembrey
RAF Silverstone
RAF Spilsby
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
RAF Turweston
Stirling
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1231/15136/LSmithWJ1141900v1.1.pdf
ddd0f90a01e8c4fff87ca9722048f791
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Smith, Walter John
W J Smith
Wally Smith
Description
An account of the resource
22 Items. The collection concerns Flight Sergeant Walter John Smith (1141900, Royal Air Force) and contains his log book and photographs. He flew 51 operations as a flight engineer with 12 and 463 Squadrons.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Andy Smith and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-04-21
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Smith, WJ
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Walter John Smith’s navigator’s, air bomber’s and air gunner’s flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
Navigator’s, air bomber’s and air gunner’s flying log book for Walter John Smith, flight engineer, covering the period from 22 April 1943 to 7 March 1945. Detailing his flying training and operations flown. He was stationed at RAF Lindholme, RAF Wickenby, RAF Winthorpe, RAF Syerston and RAF Waddington. Aircraft flown in were, Halifax, Lancaster and Stirling. He completed 31-night operations with 12 squadron and 20 operations with 463 squadron Royal Australian Air Force, 5 Daylight and 15 Night. Targets were, Dortmund, Dusseldorf, Wuppertal, Bochum, Krefeld, Mulheim, Gelsenkirchen, Cologne, Turin, Hamburg, Mannheim, Milan, Peenemunde, Berlin, Nurnberg, Munchen-Gladbach, Munich, Hannover, Hagen, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Givors, Trossy St Maximim, Russelsheim, Stettin, Koenigsberg, Boulogne, Karlsruhe, Wilhelmshaven, Nuremburg, Harburg, Dortmund Ems canal, Urft Dam, Politz, Houffalize and Siegen. His pilots on operations were Flying Officer Wright, Wing Commander Craven and Squadron Leader Radford.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LSmithWJ1141900v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Poland
Russia (Federation)
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Belgium--Houffalize
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Yorkshire
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Creil
France--Givors
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Euskirchen Region
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Hagen (Arnsberg)
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Harburg (Landkreis)
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Krefeld
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Mülheim an der Ruhr
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Peenemünde
Germany--Rüsselsheim
Germany--Siegen
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Germany--Wuppertal
Italy--Milan
Italy--Turin
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Poland--Szczecin
Russia (Federation)--Kaliningrad (Kaliningradskai︠a︡ oblastʹ)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Urft Dam
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1945
1943-05-23
1943-05-24
1943-05-25
1943-05-29
1943-05-30
1943-06-11
1943-06-12
1943-06-13
1943-06-21
1943-06-22
1943-06-23
1943-06-24
1943-06-25
1943-06-26
1943-06-28
1943-06-29
1943-07-03
1943-07-04
1943-07-08
1943-07-09
1943-07-10
1943-07-12
1943-07-13
1943-07-24
1943-07-25
1943-07-27
1943-07-28
1943-07-29
1943-07-30
1943-08-09
1943-08-10
1943-08-12
1943-08-13
1943-08-17
1943-08-18
1943-08-23
1943-08-24
1943-08-27
1943-08-28
1943-08-30
1943-08-31
1943-09-01
1943-09-03
1943-09-04
1943-09-05
1943-09-06
1943-09-07
1943-09-27
1943-09-28
1943-09-29
1943-09-30
1943-10-01
1943-10-02
1943-10-03
1943-10-04
1943-10-05
1944-07-24
1944-07-25
1944-07-26
1944-07-27
1944-07-28
1944-07-29
1944-07-31
1944-08-03
1944-08-12
1944-08-13
1944-08-17
1944-08-18
1944-08-29
1944-08-30
1944-09-03
1944-09-26
1944-10-05
1944-10-20
1944-10-21
1944-11-11
1944-11-12
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-12-08
1944-12-21
1944-12-22
1945-01-05
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-02-01
1945-02-07
1945-02-08
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
12 Squadron
1656 HCU
1661 HCU
27 OTU
463 Squadron
aircrew
bombing
bombing of Hamburg (24-31 July 1943)
Bombing of Peenemünde (17/18 August 1943)
Bombing of Trossy St Maximin (3 August 1944)
flight engineer
Halifax
Halifax Mk 2
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Lancaster Mk 1
Lancaster Mk 3
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
RAF Lichfield
RAF Lindholme
RAF Syerston
RAF Waddington
RAF Wickenby
RAF Winthorpe
Stirling
training
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1213/15106/LDonaldsonDW70185v1.1.pdf
1a7c7740b88e474aee2629a899eb7201
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Donaldson, David
David Donaldson
D Donaldson
Description
An account of the resource
309 Items and a sub-collection of 51 items. Concerns Royal Air Force career of Wing Commander David Donaldson DSO and bar, DFC. A pilot, he joined the Royal Air Force Reserve in 1934. Mobilized in 1939. he undertook tours on 149, 57 and 156 and 192 Squadrons. He was photographed by Cecil Beaton at RAF Mildenhall in 1941. Collection contains a large number of letters to and from family members, friends as well as Royal Air Force personnel. Also included are personal and service documents, and his logbooks. In addition, there are photographs of family, service personnel and aircraft. After the war he became a solicitor. The collection also contains an oral history interview with Frances Grundy, his daughter.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Anna Frances Grundy and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-06-02
2022-10-17
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Donaldson, D
Grundy, AF
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
Cutting from the Times that was attached to the page with the entry for October 23rd 1940
THE TIMES WEDENESDAY DECEMBER 30 1953
[Photograph of a stone archway] The gatehouse entrance to St. Osyth’s Priory.
SALE OF ST. OSYTH’S PRIORY ESTATE
NEW OWNER’S PLANS
St. Osyth’s Priory estate, on the Colne estuary, near Colchester, Essex, has been bought by Mr Somerset de Chair. He intends to preserve the priory, which is in excellent architectural condition and includes a flint and ashlar gatehouse erected in 1475.
This historic place was bought in 1949 by the Loyal Order of Ancient Shepherds Friendly Society from Brigadier-General K. J. Kincaid-Smith for £30,000. It was then planned to build a war memorial in the grounds and to restore the thirteenth-century chapel.
St. Osyth’s Priory derives its name from Osyth, granddaughter of Penda, King of Mercia. When the Danes sacked the property, they killed the nuns and beheaded the Prioress Osyth. The priory was founded by Richard de Balmeis, Bishop of London, in 1118, on the site of a nunnery, but the earliest surviving building is the small chapel, with its fine groined arches supported on slender pillars.
Mr. de Chair informed The Times yesterday that he hoped to work the priory farm, and might convert the gatehouse into a pied-à-terre.
Lofts and Warner. Of London, and Percival and Co., of Sudbury, have acted as agents for the vendors in the sale of the estate.
[Page break]
Newspaper cutting that was attached to the summary page for April 1943
THE COURSE OF NATURE
THE “MIRACLE OF SPRING”
FROM A CORRESPONDENT
The fine weather since Easter has brought things on. There is again the miracle of Spring. It is perhaps a minor miracle compared with April 1943, when by St. George’s Day the trees were leafy as in June, and the hedges heavy with the scent of hawthorn, so that many, seeing and smelling the billowing masses of white blossom, were content that this was out, and, not waiting for the following month’s exit to give permission, too hurriedly cast their clouts.
If in the woods there is as yet no density of green above, nor bridal white of wild cherry blossom, there is no lack of green and white below, for the bluebells, soon to bloom, have raised a thousand gleaming dark green spears, in contrast to which there are the dainty pale green shamrock leaves of wood sorrel, graced by pendant silver bells, most delicately veined. Pendant, too, on a dull or cloudy day, but raise and opening wide to the sun, are the white wood anemones, which now make a starry heaven underneath the trees. There are other stars, the glossy bright gold stars of the celandines, and, in ever-widening constellations, the “milky way” of primroses. In woodland, too, as well as in meadows, one finds the “lady-smocks all silver white” (though more usually the palest shade of mauve) as well as “violets blue,” which may be pale wood violets if the spur is darker than the petals or dark wood violets if the spur is paler, and it is often a creamy white. Such is the absurdity of some English names. Add to these the quaintly attractive green flowers of the moschatel, the small white flowers of the barren strawberry, and, where the ground drops to the merest trickle of a woodland stream, the pale gold of the golden saxifrage, and one has, indeed, a few short weeks from ice and snow, “the miracle of Spring.”
[Page break]
THE TIMES
THE REGISTER [Crest]
DEBATE: THE HUTTON REPORT page 80 ▪ COURT & SOCIAL: MANOR OF DULWICH page 82
OBITUARIES
WING COMMANDER DAVID DONALDSON
Pilot who bombed Hitler’s invasion barges in Calais harbour and flew with the Pathfinders
[Photograph of a pilot leaning against the wing of an aircraft] Donaldson with a Wellington of 149 Squadron: the type was the mainstay of Bomber Command earlier in the war
IN WHAT was, given the cruel statistics of wartime flying, a remarkably long career on bombing operations, David Donaldson flew his first raids during the Battle of Britain in September 1940, when Bomber Command’s techniques were in their infancy, and he was still there at the end. He participated in Pathfinder ops in 1941, by which time the whole strategic air offensive had taken on a much more scientific cast and was beginning to achieve results. And he was still airborne over enemy territory on electronic countermeasures missions in the last months of the war, by which time the RAF, and the US Army Air Forces were masters of the skies over Western Europe.
In four tours of operations, Donaldson flew 86 sorties, a figure which put him well above the average survival chances. During Bomber Command’s worst days in 1941 and 1942 (if one discounts the virtual suicide missions against heavily defended German naval bases in December 1939), the average life in the command was as low as eight sorties.
David William Donaldson was born in 1915 at Southampton, a son of the managing director of the Thorneycroft shipyard. He was educated at Charterhouse and Trinity College, Cambridge, where he was a keen rower. Taking a boat over to Germany with the First Trinity Boat Club in the mid-1930s, he enjoyed the hospitality of boat clubs in the Rhineland – and at the same time became sharply aware of the culture of aggression that was taking over the German psyche with the advent of Hitler.
In 1934 he joined the RAF Volunteer Reserve as a weekend pilot, and did much of his flying training at Hamble. After graduating at Cambridge he had joined a firm of solicitors in London. But his articles were interrupted in September 1939 when he was called up.
After basic training he did operational training on Wellington bombers and on September 20 was sent to 149 (Wellington) Squadron at Mildenhall, Suffolk. No 149 had already been involved in some desperate missions: the forlorn-hope attack on German shipping at Wilhelmshaven on December 18, 1939; the equally hopeless attempt to stem the German advance in the Low Countries in May 1940; and a brave but futile transalpine lunge at Genoa in June after Italy had opportunistically entered the war on the German side. Now it was ordered to attack invasion barges which had been collected in Channel ports, and Donaldson’s first sortie was a daytime raid on Calais harbours.
With the end of the Battle of Britain, No 149 was redirected to strategic bombing. This was soon to be revealed as far too dangerous against flak and fighter defences by day, and was therefore conducted by night, which (frequent) bad weather made locating targets extremely difficult in the state of development of navigational aids at the time.
During the winter of 1940-41 the main effort was against targets in the relatively close Ruhr, but there was a much longer sortie, to Berlin, in vile weather, in October. This ended with Donaldson’s Wellington becoming completely lost on the return trip. At length, with fuel running perilously low, he achieved a casualty free forced manding at St. Osyth, near Clacton.
There were further attacks on northern Italian industrial cities, one of which, an attack on the Fiat works at Turin, Donaldson was asked by the BBC to describe a radio broadcast in December 1940. Instead of dwelling on the difficulties of such a mission, he eloquently described the majesty of the snow covered Alps for his audience.
Donaldson won his DFC for a highly successful raid on Merignac aerodrome, near Bordeaux, which he bombed from a height of 1,500ft, destroying its large hangars. Further publicity for these early efforts by Bomber Command came from his featuring in a series of propaganda photographs taken by Cecil Beaton, entitled A Day in the Life of a Bomber Pilot. Once of these, which features the aircrew of a 149 Squadron Wellington at Mildenhall, adorns the cover of a recently published video of the 1941 propaganda film Target for Tonight.
Donaldson was “rested” after completion of his tour in March 1941. But there was still plenty of flying to be done. He was seconded to the Air Ministry to help buy aircraft in the US. This turned out to involve hazardous ferry flying across the Atlantic of American aircraft that had been purchased, notably the invaluable Hudson long-range patrol bomber for Coastal Command.
In September Donaldson returned to operations with 57 Squadron, another Wellington unit. Bomber Command was faring no better than it had been earlier in terms of results, and an improvement in German air defences was increasing the rate of losses among aircrew, with corresponding effects on RAF morale. No 57 was roughly handled. In a raid over Düsseldorf in October, Donaldson’s aircraft was badly shot up and limped home without hydraulics. The undercarriage could not be lowered and the sortie ended with a crash landing at Marham. After several more raids Donaldson succumbed to the strain and at the end of the year was admitted to hospital.
After a period of sick leave he was posted as group tactical officer to 3 Group, but in July 1942 the air beckoned again when he was posted to No 15 Operational Training Unit for six months as a flight commander. Though this was not supposed to be a frontline unit, he did get in one operational trip, to Düsseldorf, during this period.
Then, in January 1943, he was appointed a flight commander to 156 Squadron, one of the original units of the Pathfinder Force, which had been making strides in the improvement of bombing through its marking techniques since its formation under the Australian Don Bennett six months previously. The four-engined Lancaster was now the mainstay of Bomber Command and both the weight and accuracy of the air offensive began to assume a different dimension. With No 156 Donaldson carried out 23 raids, and was awarded the DSO and promoted to wing commander at the end of his tour. Bennett himself said of Donaldson, “He has provided an example of determination and devotion to duty which it would be difficult to equal.”
Rested again in June 1943, Donaldson commanded a conversion unit and then went as a staff officer to No 100 (Special Duties) Group. The air war had changed out of all recognition and the need to be able to jam and confuse the enemy’s radars and radio direction beacons was well recognised.
In June 1944, just after D-Day, Donaldson was back in the air again in command of 192 (SD) Squadron. Flying a mixture of Wellingtons, Halifaxes and Mosquitoes, over the remaining months of the war No 192 sought out and jammed the enemy’s radio and communication systems using methods ranging from the well-tried “window” – dropping steel foil strips – to more sophisticated electronic deception techniques.
Leading the Squadron in a Halifax III, Donaldson flew 25 more sorties, some of them in daytime. On one daylight operation he was attacked by two Bf109s. Rather than trying to shoot it out against the cannon armed fighters with the Halifax’s 303in machineguns, Donaldson chose to evade the foe by violent and skilful evasive action, and brought his aircraft and crew safely home. He was awarded his second DSO in July 1945.
Donaldson had no ambition to further a career in the RAF and on demobilisation he resumed his law articles and qualified as a solicitor. After four years in the City firm Parker Garrett he joined National Employers Mutual Insurance, where he was at first company secretary and later a director. He left NEM to become chairman of an industrial tribunal, which he greatly enjoyed, presiding over some notable cases. He finally retired in 1987.
His wife Joyce, whom he married when she was a WAAF officer during the war, died in 1996. He is survived by a daughter and two sons.
Wing Commander David Donaldson, DSO and Bar, DFC, wartime bomber pilot and solicitor, was born on January 31, 1915. He died on January 15, 2004, aged 88.
[Page break]
DAVID AND THE RAF
My brother David’s very distinguished wartime career with the RAF – two DSOs and a DFC, and promotion to Wing Commander at 28 – warrants a separate appendix to these family notes. He has kindly helped me to compile it by giving me the run of his log books, and I have supplemented them from a number of other sources.
He became interested in flying in he early 1930s. I recall him taking his small brother of 9 or 10 to an air show at Eastleigh and abandoning him while he went up as a passenger in a Tiger Moth doing aerobatics. That may well have given him the incentive to join the RAF Volunteer Reserve in 1934 as a weekend pilot. He did much of his training at Hamble on the Solent. When war broke out in September 1939 he was called up immediately and had to abandon his legal training. He spent the “phoney war” towing target drogues at a bombing and gunnery school at Evanton in Scotland. His log books show him rated as an “average” pilot.
At the end of April 1940, just before the Germans attacked in the West, he went to Brize Norton for immediate training (earning an “above-average” rating) and then to Harwell for operational training on Wellingtons, the main twin-engined heavy bomber of the early war years. On 20th September, just as the Battle of Britain was ending, he was posted to his first operational squadron, No 149, part of No 3 Group, at the big pre-war station at Mildenhall. His first operational sortie was over Calais towards the end of September, no doubt to attack the invasion barges.
Over the following five months he took part in some 31 night raids. The German defence at this time was relatively feeble by comparison with what was to follow, and so the tour was correspondingly tolerable; however bitter experience had shown that day bombing was much too costly, and the night bombing techniques were very inaccurate. His first raid on Berlin, at the end of October, was particularly eventful; they got hopelessly lost on their return, came in over Bristol, and ended up over Clacton as dawn was breaking with very little fuel left. There both the Army and the Navy opened up on them, and even the Home Guard succeeded in putting a bullet through the wing. They eventually made a forced crash landing at St. Osyth. The Home Guard commander, a retired general, entertained him generously and he finally got back to Mildenhall where his Group Captain forgave him for the damaged aircraft and advised him to go out and get drunk. He took the advice, and in the pub he met a WAAF whom he married eight months later (maybe that is why he remembers that particular day so well.)
The gauntlet of Friendly Fire seems to have been a not uncommon hazard to be faced. On another occasion, when he had to make three circuits returning to Mildenhall, the airfield machine gunners opened fire on him from ground level; he thought they were higher up and judged his height accordingly, and narrowly missed the radio masts which were not, as he thought, below him.
The longest raids on this tour were trips of over ten hours to Italy: to Venice, which they overflew at low level, and to the Fiat works at Turin. He described the latter raid, and the spectacular views of the Alps it afforded, in a BBC broadcast in December 1940. The commonest targets were the Ruhr and other German cities, and some raids were made at lower level on shipping in French ports. The raid which won him the DFC was on 22nd November, on Merignac aerodrome near Bordeaux, which “difficult target he attacked from a height of 1,500 feet and successfully bombed hangars, causing large fires and explosions. As a result of his efforts the task of following aircraft was made easier … He has at all times displayed conspicuous determination and devotion to duty.”
It was at Mildenhall that he featured in a series of propaganda photos by Cecil Beaton,
[Page break]
= 2 =
“A Day in the Life of a Bomber Pilot”; they were given a good deal of publicity and in fact David appears in one of them on the cover of a recently published video of the 1941 propaganda film “Target for Tonight”, also made with the help of 149 Squadron – though he did not take part in the film. Beaton describes the occasion at some length in his published diaries, though he has thoroughly scrambled the names and personalities, and he “demoted David from captain to co-pilot in his scenario.
On completion of this tour, early in March 1941, David was detached on secondment to the Air Ministry to assist with buying aircraft in North America, and later to ferry aircraft within North America and across the Atlantic – he flew the Atlantic at least twice in Hudsons, taking 12 hours or more.
The “chop rate” 1 in Bomber Command increased substantially during the first half of 1941. This coupled with increasing doubts about the value of the results obtained led to a serious decline in aircrew morale. During the summer of 1941 the Germans had considerable success with intruders – fighter aircraft attacking the bombers as they took off or landed at their own bases. At the end of September David returned to No 3 Group and joined No 57 Squadron at Feltwell, still with Wellingtons. His third raid, over Dusseldorf on October 13th, was particularly difficult; they were badly shot up and with their hydraulics out of action they crash landed at Marham on their return. After two more raids the strain finally proved too much and he was admitted to hospital just before Christmas 1941; for the next two months he was there or on sick leave. From then until mid-July he was Group Tactical Officer at HQ No 3 Group, and not directly involved in operations. In July 1942 he was posted to No 15 Operational Training Unit, at Harwell and Hampstead Norris, where he spent six months as a flight commander flying Ansons and Wellingtons, though he did participate in one raid on Dusseldorf while he was there.
In spite of the appointment of Harris in early 1942 and the introduction of the Gee radio navigational aid, results were still considered disappointing, particularly over the Ruhr, and serious questions were raised about the future of Bomber Command. To improve matters, in August 1942 the elite Pathfinder Force was set up under Don Bennett, albeit in the face of considerable opposition from most of the group commanders who were reluctant to lose their best crews to it. At least initially, all the crews joining it had to be volunteers, and to be ready to undertake extended tours. Their task was to fly ahead of the Main Force in four waves; the Supporters, mainly less experienced crew carrying HE bombs, who were to saturate the defences and draw the flak; the Illuminators, who lit up the aiming point with flares; and the Primary Markers and Backer Up who marked the aiming point with indicators. Their methods became more and more refined as the war went on. The increased accuracy required of them, and their position at the head of the bomber stream, inevitably exposed them to greater danger and a higher casualty rate than those of the Main Force.
No 156 Squadron was one of the original units in the Force; it operated from the wartime airfield of Warboys with Wellingtons until the end of 1942 and thereafter with 4-engined Lancasters, the very successful heavy bomber which was the mainstay of Bomber Command in the later years. The squadron flew a total of 4,584 sorties with the loss of 143 aircraft – a ratio of 3.12%. David joined it in January 1943, again as a flight commander. In the following four months he carried out a further 23 raids (all but one as a pathfinder) in Lancasters. The log books note occasional problems – “coned 2”, “shot up on way
1 The average sortie life of aircrew in the Command was never higher than 9.2 and at one time was as low as eight, and during the dark days of 1941-1943 the average survival chances of anyone starting a 30-sortie tour was consistently under 40% and sometimes under 30%. In one disastrous raid, on Nuremburg in March 1944, 795 planes set out, 94 were shot down and another 12 crashed in Britain. During the war as a whole, out of some 125,000 aircrew who served with Bomber Command, 55,000 died.
2 “Coned” – caught in a cone of converging searchlights, as experience which says put him off hunting for life.
[Page break]
= 3 =
in”, “slight flak damage”, and so on. Much of the period became known as the Battle of the Ruhr, though other targets were also being attacked. He told me once that the raid he was really proud to have been on was the one where instead of marking the targeted town (I think Dortmund) they marked in error a nearby wood, which the main force behind them duly obliterated; only after the war did the Germans express their admiration for the British Intelligence which had identified the highly secret installation hidden in the wood …
One of the pages in his log book has a cutting from the Times inserted, evidently dated some years later, recalling how in April 1943 the spring came very early and the hedges were billowing with white hawthorn blossom. This puzzled me until I read in a book on 156 Squadron how that blossom had come to have the same significance for them as the Flanders poppies of the 1914-1918 war.
David was promoted to Wing Commander half way through the tour (pathfinders rated one rank above the comparable level elsewhere), and awarded the DSO towards the end of it. The recommendation for this said that he had “at all times pressed home his attacks with the utmost determination and courage in the face of heavy ground defences and fighters. As a pilot he shows powers of leadership and airmanship which have set an outstanding example to the rest of the squadron” – and Bennett himself added, noting that David had just flown four operational sorties in the last five days, “he has provided an example of determination and devotions to duty which it would be difficult to equal.”
On the end of this tour in June 1943, he was sent to command No 1667 Conversion Unit at Lindholme and later Faldingworth. In December 1943 he transferred to a staff appointment at the headquarters of the newly formed 100 (SD) Group at West Raynham and later Bylaugh Hall. At this stage in the war the methods of attack and defence were growing increasingly complex, and this group was formed as a Bomber Support Group, including nightfighters, deceptive measures, and radio countermeasures (RCM). In June 1944, just after D-Day, he was given command of No 192 (SD) Squadron based at Foulsham, another wartime airfield. This squadron had been formed in January 1943 as a specialist RCM unit, and it pioneered this type of operation in Bomber Command; it flew more sorties and suffered more losses (19 aircraft) than any other RCM squadron. While RCM and electronic intelligence were its primary purpose, its aircraft often carried bombs and dropped them on the Main Force targets. RCM took a number of forms – swamping enemy radar and jamming it with “window” tinfoil, looking for new radar types and gaps in its coverage, deceptive R/T transmissions to nightfighters and so on – and one of the attractions of the work was the considerable measure of autonomy, and the freedom to plan their own operations. These extended to tasks such as searching for V2 launch sites (recorded as “whizzers” in David’s log book) and trying to identify the radio signals associated with them, and supporting the invasion of Walcheren in September. The squadron was equipped with Wellingtons (phased out at the end of 1944), Halifaxes and Mosquitoes, plus a detachment of USAAF Lightnings.
This role was the climax of his career, and lasted until the end of the war and after. It involved him in 25 operational sorties, all in Halifax IIIs, the much improved version of this initially disappointing 4-engined heavy bomber. They carried special electronic equipment and an extra crew member known as the Special Operator. The record of these sorties in the log books, for the most part so formal and statistical up to this point, becomes a little more anecdotal: “rubber-necking on beach “ (when he took two senior officers to see the breaching of the dykes at Walcheren), “Munster shambles”, “Lanc blew up and made small hole in aircraft [but only] 4 lost out of 1200!” The furthest east he went was to Gdynia in Poland; on returning from there he had the privilege of becoming the first heavy aircraft to land at Foulsham using the FIDO fog dispersal system. “Finger Finger Fido” was the cryptic comment in the log book.
[Page break]
= 4 =
A number of these sorties were daytime; on one of them, on September 13th, he was chased home by two ME109s which made six attacks on him. One of them opened fire but thanks to violent evasive action his aircraft was undamaged: his own gunners never got a chance to fire. No doubt it was skill of this sort, as well as his survival record, which gave his crew great faith in David’s ability to get them home safely. An encounter on December 29th 1944, on a Window patrol over the Ruhr, was not quite so satisfying; they claimed to have damaged a Ju88 which subsequently proved to be an unhurt Mosquito X from Swannington – and the Mosquito had identified them as a Lancaster. The log book entry concludes “Oh dear. FIDO landing, flew into ground. What a day.”
He was awarded a bar to his DSO in July 1945. The recommendation, made in March, recorded that “since being posted to his present squadron he has carried out every one of his sorties in the same exemplary fashion and has set his crews an extremely high standard of devotion to duty and bravery. This standard has had a direct influence on the whole specialist work of the squadron.
“He has been personally responsible for the planning of all the sorties carried out by his special duty unit and by his brilliant understanding and quick appreciation of the everchanging nature of the investigational role of his squadron, much of the success of the investigations performed by his aircraft can be attributed to him. He has shown himself to be fearless and cool in the face of danger, and towards the end of his tour made a point of putting himself on the most arduous and difficult operations.
“Both on the ground and in the air he has been untiring and has not spared himself in his efforts to get his squadron up to the high standard which it has now reached.”
The squadron was disbanded in September, by which time David had completed 501 hours of operations against the enemy in 86 sorties, the great majority of them as captain of his aircraft, He had no ambition to make a permanent career in the RAF; he has commented to Richard that this fact gave him a degree of independence in his dealing with his superiors that he thinks they appreciated and valued. He was demobilised in November and returned to his interrupted law studies.
…….
I showed these notes to David, who thought them well written but suggested that they gave a twisted view of the reality – a reaction that I can understand. Since then, however, I have managed to contact one man who flew with David: HB (Hank) Cooper DSO DFC, who first met David in 149 Squadron which he joined in January 1941 as a wireless operator / air gunner for his first tour, and later did two tours as a Special Operator in 192 Squadron, the second of them under David’s command. On two occasions he flew as a member of David’s crew.
He has written of David that “he was always completely fearless and outstandingly brave and pressed home his attacks to the uttermost. As the Squadron’s CO he generated loyalty and warmth, he was an outstanding model to follow. He spent much trouble and time encouraging his junior air crews as well as helping and seeing to the needs of the ground technicians who serviced the aircraft, generally in cold and difficult conditions. He was completely non-boastful, in fact he belittled his own actions (which were always of the highest order) when discussing air operations. (That rings very true!) He was an outstanding squadron commander in all respects, much liked and completely respected by all his air crews and ground crews.”
GND
March 2002
[Page break]
Temple Bar 1217
TEL. Extn. 2631
Correspondence on the subject of this letter should be addressed to:-
PS. THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
AIR MINISTRY S. 7. E.
and should quote the reference:-
S.7.e/79693.
[Crest] AIR MINISTRY,
LONDON, W.C.2.
26 March, 1949.
Sir,
I am directed to refer to your letter dated 21st March, 1949, regarding those awards due to you in respect of your service in the 1939/45 World War, and to inform you that your entitlement to the 1939/45 Star, Air Crew Europe Star with the France and Germany Clasp, and the War Medal has been established. These awards will be despatched to you shortly.
2. It is regretted that as you did not complete three years wartime non-operational service in the United Kingdom, the Defence Medal cannot be authorised. The Air Efficiency Award will not be ready for issue for some time. Application will not be necessary, but I am to request that you will notify this Department of any change in your permanent address, so that the award may be sent to you as soon as it becomes available.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
[Signature]
Wing Commander D.W. Donaldson, D.S.O., D.F.C.,
1a, Crescent Place,
London, S.W.3.
[Crest] Rep’d 29/3/49 & pointed out total of No of service in UK was 3 yrs 4 mth 120 day
[Page break]
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Dublin Core
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Title
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David Donaldson's pilot's flying log book. One
Identifier
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LDonaldsonDW70185v1
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Description
An account of the resource
Pilots flying log book for David W Donaldson. This is a newly bound compilation of 3 log books covering the period from 12 March 1938 to 19 September 1945. Detailing his flying training, operations flown, Instructor duties and special duties flying. He was stationed at RAF Hamble, RAF Hanworth, RAF Evanton, RAF Brize Norton, RAF Harwell, RAF Mildenhall, RAF Feltwell, RAF Wyton, RAF Exning, RAF Hampstead Norris, RAF Warboys, RAF Lindholme, RAF West Raynham, RAF Bylaugh Hall and RAF Foulsham. Aircraft flown were, Cadet, B2, Hart, Hind, Magister, Henley, Oxford, Wellington, Hudson, Mentor, Anson, Lancaster, Tiger Moth, Halifax, Proctor and Moth Minor. He flew a total of 86 Night operations, 31 with 149 squadron, 5 with 57 squadron, 1 with 15 OTU, 23 With 156 squadron and 26 with 192 squadron. Targets were, Calais, Le Havre, Flushing, Essen, Gelsenkirchen, Cologne, Berlin, Munich, Hamburg, Duisburg, Merignac, Mannheim, Turin, Bordeaux, Lorient, Bremen, Venice, Wilhelmshaven, Hannover, Brest, Cherbourg, Dunkirk, Dusseldorf, Emden, Milan, Nurnberg, Stuttgart, St Nazaire, Kiel, Frankfurt, Spezia, Dortmund, Pilsen, Munster, North Sea, Walcheren, Bochum, Hagen, Merseburg, Gdynia, Wiesbaden, Politz, Chemnitz, Ladbergen, Dessau, Stade, Moblis and Berchtesgarten. His first or second pilots on operations were Pilot Officer Woollatt, Pilot Officer Morrison, Flying Officer Henderson, Sergeant Horn, Pilot Officer Garton, Pilot Officer Pelletier, Sergeant Wilson, Flight Lieutenant Meir, Major Leboutte, Flying Officer Parr, Wing Commander Chisholm and Wing Commander Willis. The log book contains newspaper clippings and a summary of his exploits written by his brother.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1940-09-25
1940-10-01
1940-10-02
1940-10-09
1940-10-10
1940-10-13
1940-10-14
1940-10-15
1940-10-16
1940-10-21
1940-10-22
1940-10-23
1940-10-24
1940-11-06
1940-11-07
1940-11-08
1940-11-09
1940-11-13
1940-11-14
1940-11-15
1940-11-16
1940-11-17
1940-11-18
1940-11-19
1940-11-20
1940-11-22
1940-11-23
1940-11-28
1940-11-29
1940-12-04
1940-12-05
1940-12-08
1940-12-09
1940-12-20
1940-12-21
1940-12-23
1940-12-24
1940-12-28
1940-12-29
1941-01-02
1941-01-03
1941-01-09
1941-01-10
1941-01-12
1941-01-13
1941-01-29
1941-01-30
1941-02-10
1941-02-11
1941-02-12
1941-02-14
1941-02-15
1941-02-21
1941-02-22
1941-02-24
1941-02-25
1941-02-26
1941-02-27
1941-03-01
1941-03-02
1941-09-30
1941-10-01
1941-10-03
1941-10-13
1941-10-14
1941-10-22
1941-10-23
1941-11-26
1941-11-27
1942-09-10
1942-09-11
1943-02-13
1943-02-14
1943-02-15
1943-02-19
1943-02-20
1943-02-24
1943-02-25
1943-02-26
1943-03-08
1943-03-09
1943-03-10
1943-03-11
1943-03-12
1943-03-13
1943-03-22
1943-03-23
1943-03-27
1943-03-28
1943-03-29
1943-03-30
1943-04-04
1943-04-05
1943-04-10
1943-04-11
1943-04-13
1943-04-14
1943-04-26
1943-04-27
1943-05-04
1943-05-05
1943-05-12
1943-05-13
1943-05-14
1943-05-23
1943-05-24
1943-05-25
1943-05-26
1943-06-12
1943-06-13
1943-12-21
1943-12-22
1944-09-03
1944-09-13
1944-10-03
1944-10-25
1944-11-04
1944-11-05
1944-11-18
1944-12-04
1944-12-05
1944-12-06
1944-12-07
1944-12-18
1944-12-19
1944-12-29
1944-12-30
1945-01-05
1945-01-06
1945-01-28
1945-01-29
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-14
1945-02-15
1945-03-03
1945-03-04
1945-03-07
1945-03-08
1945-04-02
1945-04-03
1945-04-07
1945-04-08
1945-04-25
1945-04-26
1945-05-12
1945-06-23
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Anne-Marie Watson
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Netherlands
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Czech Republic--Plzeň
England--Berkshire
England--Cambridgeshire
England--London
England--Hampshire
England--Norfolk
England--Oxfordshire
England--Suffolk
England--Yorkshire
France--Brest
France--Calais
France--Cherbourg
France--Dunkerque
France--Le Havre
France--Lorient
France--Saint-Nazaire
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Berchtesgaden
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Chemnitz
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Dessau (Dessau)
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Hagen (Arnsberg)
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Leipzig Region
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Stade (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Steinfurt Region (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Wiesbaden
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Italy--Milan
Italy--La Spezia
Italy--Turin
Italy--Venice
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Netherlands--Walcheren
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Scotland--Ross and Cromarty
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
France--Bordeaux (Nouvelle-Aquitaine)
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
France--Mérignac (Gironde)
100 Group
149 Squadron
15 OTU
156 Squadron
1667 HCU
192 Squadron
57 Squadron
Air Observers School
aircrew
Anson
bombing
Bombing and Gunnery School
Cook’s tour
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Service Order
Flying Training School
Gee
Halifax
Heavy Conversion Unit
Hudson
Lancaster
Magister
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
Pathfinders
pilot
Proctor
RAF Brize Norton
RAF Evanton
RAF Feltwell
RAF Foulsham
RAF Hampstead Norris
RAF Harwell
RAF Lindholme
RAF Mildenhall
RAF Warboys
RAF West Raynham
RAF Wyton
Tiger Moth
training
Wellington
-
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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1186/11758/AWatsonC170628.2.mp3
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Watson, Clifford
C Watson
Description
An account of the resource
Five items. Two oral history interviews with Flying Officer Clifford Watson DFC (1922 - 2018, 1384956, 188489 Royal Air Force), a memoir, his service and release book, and a scrapbook containing photographs and documents. He flew operations as an air gunner with 150 and 227 Squadrons.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Clifford Watson and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2017-06-28
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
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Watson, C
Transcribed audio recording
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Transcription
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CB: My name is Chris Brockbank and today is the 28th of June 2017 and I am with Clifford Watson at Fenstanton near Huntingdon to talk about his life and times in the RAF. So, what were your first recollections of life, Cliff?
CW: I was born in Barnoldswick, 1922 about three years after my father returned from the war, he opened a radio shop and was building radios and he was getting kits of radios from Pye in Cambridge and I went to the local infant school which was about fifty yards away from the shop. Two years later, my sister joined me there, that’s about the age of ten, my family moved to Keighley in Yorkshire, my father was engineer and manager of the radio relay system. Three years later we moved to Norwich where he established another radio relay firm rather, few years there we moved to London. Went to school at the age of ten, I was at the local elementary school in Norwich. At the age of thirteen, I went to the Norwich junior technical school and two years later to Unthank college in Norwich which a very different curriculum. I hated English literature there but I got a credit in the school’s certificate, by reading, another book overnight and I took the exam with a different book from the one I’ve been studying, I’d read it overnight and I got a credit. When I left the college at sixteen, I was, I was then, what’s the word? I was then with a firm of accountants in St Paul’s Churchyard and when I used to look out, yes, the war had just started and I used to look out through the window into that churchyard, there were a number of graves there and on one of them there was a double cross and it said neath this SOD, is another SOD, Adolf Hitler, it didn’t actually say SOD of course, it said it, yes, well, then the Blitz started and the family firm was in real trouble cause all the engineers had been called up, well, most of them, so I abandoned accountancy and went and helped the family firm in Battersea, I’d been there just a few months when four ladies came for a job, one of whom was a lady of eighteen and Hilda became my future wife, right from now.
CB: I stop, I stop for a minute. Just going back from your school days, what were the things you excelled at there?
CW: Well, at the elementary school, the age of thirteen, I wanted to get to the Norwich junior Tech but I needed recommendation for that, I had to do something and show that I was capable. My father got me a kit of parts for a radio, agreed it was a simple radio, it was from a [unclear] by Telecom, [unclear], I built the radio and gave a talk on it, demonstrating the thing working and I drew the circuit on the blackboard as I went along, told them how it worked, and that secured me a recommendation for the tech but there of course it was all physics, chemistry, mechanics and so on and two years there onto Unthank college, very different, I had, I carried on with tuition, with tuition in chemistry, physics I enjoyed, maths I enjoyed and all went well, that gave me five credits which gave me access to training as an accountant.
CB: Ok. You were talking a bit earlier about the shortage of engineers because they’ve been called up, so, your father tried to engage ladies, how did that go?
CW: Well, my father at that time was in Abyssinia and there was a manager there with little technical knowledge and instead of being a foreman with about six wiremen, there was me and four fourteen year old schoolboys and we were working on overhead lines, I was working about fifteen hours a day, I was earning, yes, fifty shillings a, yes, fifty shillings a week, at the end of the Blitz, well, almost the end of the Blitz, I’d had enough, and I thought the manager was, oh, I, one evening I was, I filled in my paperwork for the day, I put it in the secretary’s tray and there was an official looking document with my name on it and the manager was trying to, it was case it was the Ministry of Labour to get Clifford Watson exempt from callup. And I was furious, I tore the thing up, the next day, instead of going to work in overalls, I went in my best suit, well, my one and only suit and that’s when I went up town [unclear] made a beeline first for the Fleet Air Arm and things worked from there.
CB: So, when you went to, when you tried for the Fleet Air Arm, what happened? You went to the recruiting office.
CW: Well, I couldn’t get further than the door at the Fleet Air Arm.
CB: What did the man say?
CW: Can I help you, lad? That’s when I put on my Yorkshire accent [laughs] which wasn’t difficult at the time. The following, about a week later, I went to industrial house and there was very young [unclear] there, there’s a fairly big hall, half a dozen doors, each leading into a fairly small office and in each place there was I think five Lieutenant and a sergeant, when I went in, we were given a form which I filled in and I was given a card with a number on it and it was the number above the door or two numbers in fact, the doors were numbered and there was another number, when that number comes up on that [unclear] or those two numbers come up, you go through that door and I was interviewed by the officer and the sergeant and they said, this is a very, very preliminary interview, just want to give you some idea of how things go, and they asked a few questions: What did your father do? What do you do? Why do you want to join the RAF? And so on. Ok, there was an interview, there were about fifty people waiting and it was very pleasant, very pleasant too, they said, alright, we wish you luck, and you should hear from us within a few weeks. So I went back home, letter came, report to some place near Euston and I went there, we had three one-hour written papers and then an interview and a medical. At the interview I remember two questions, one was, which is colder, minus 40 Fahrenheit or minus 40 Centigrade? I pretended to work it out, I said, same thing, same temperature, well, I knew the answer, I didn’t need to work it out, but I pretended to do. Right, he said you’re, you know, in a flimsy belt, you’re half a mile offshore, a breeze is trying to take you, what was it [unclear] get it right, the breeze is trying to take you inshore, the tide is taking you out of shore, so in practice you stay put, you’re infested with alligators, all sorts of, animals in the sea but you’ve got to get ashore, what do you do? I said, I think the answer you want is that I lower the boat in the sea, increase the tide, the effect of the tide and reduce the windage, I think that’s your answer but I don’t like it and he laughed, yeah, he did laugh, he said, quite right. That was the two questions. [laughs] After that, that was about the interview, we already had the three written papers and there was nothing there particularly tricky and then there was a medical, half a dozen or so medical people, we went to each one and everything seemed alright, said, right, good show, we’ll let you know and I had a letter, a few weeks later, telling me to where to report but before I reported, I was to see a dentist for one filling and, two fillings and one extinct
CB: extraction
CW: One extraction. I did that and two fillings and one extraction at a cost of three shillings. Imagine today. Anyhow, I don’t question. And that was it. Eventually I was told where to report, meanwhile two other chaps locally had found that I was joining, I joined the RAF, so had they and the three of us got together and we travelled to Newquay together and in fact to Rhodesia together but years later, the one, the first one became captain of a Stirling and disappeared on his first trip. The other one, like me, came off the pilot’s course, I nearly said failed but I don’t agree with that term, I came off the pilot’s course with the other fellow and then carried on. He became a rear-gunner of a Stirling and they were shot up on all three trips which he did, different crew each time, first trip he ditched in the sea, two, he plus two survived, second trip they had to bail out, he and one other survived, third trip, they landed tail heavy, the turret came adrift with him in it, the aircraft bounced, blew up, killing everyone on board and Tommy woke up in hospital, that was there, carry on. [unclear] Whilst in Rhodesia, we were seven weeks at sea getting to Rhodesia, oh, getting to Durban and in Durban we had no money, we’d handed all the English currency in and they were to exchange it for local currency when we got to were [unclear] we were going and on the main track in Durban with no money and outside a Barclay’s bank was a rotary insignature, insignia and it said, Durban welcomes local visiting Rotarians, well, I wasn’t a Rotarian but my father was, I went in, could I see the manager please? I had an introduction card from Battersea Rotary. Let’s see the manager, please, well, the three of us walked in, saw the manager and I said, I’d like to borrow a couple of quid and send it back to you when we get to wherever it is we’re going. He reached into a drawer and gave each of us an envelope with the equivalent of ten pounds in each, he said, that with a compliment to a Rotary, don’t try to send it back, he said, you’re in Africa now, that was it.
CB: We’ll stop there just for a moment. Just quickly before we go on to your, more details of your flying training, Clifford, you mentioned the fact that you were interested in joining the Navy, as Fleet Air Arms, so-
CW: The reason, the reason I went to the Navy was the first one, all I wanted to do was fly and Fleet Air Arm needs pilots, it said, and as you’d heard, I got no further than the door, Fleet Air Arm pilots don’t work, that’s it, and I did, and that was the end of my naval experience. All I wanted to do was fly, that’s all, fighter pilot of course, but that didn’t matter, if anybody had said you prefer bombers or fighters, we’d seen plenty of fighters, it would have been fighters.
CB: There was a glamour in being a fighter pilot
CW: Mh?
CB: There was a glamour in being a fighter pilot at that time.
CW: Oh, everybody, all the boys wanted to be
CB: But, after being rejected
CW: Well, having seen bombers going down in flames and fighters getting away with it, fine, naturally they wanted to be fighter pilots
CB: Yeah. So, the effect of the rejection of the navy man, made you do what?
CW: So, the?
CB: The effect of talking with the man from the navy, that, what was the effect of that on you? You went home and then what?
CW: It didn’t worry me, except that I had this ridge across my nose, and I thought there’s no point in going into the RAF medical with a ridge on my nose
CB: From your glasses
CW: But, from the, yes, from the bridge as, but that disappeared, was only just a mark, so I left my glasses off and it made no difference, I passed the medical alright, in fact, quite often during the war I did wear glasses and I wore them flying in place of the goggles. The goggles were there but didn’t really need them, cause I did wear glasses, I remember a briefing one day and I put the glasses on and one of the officers was looking at that [laughs], a rear gunner wearing glasses? Oh, dear me! They made no difference,
CB: Just going to your experience in Rhodesia, so you did pilot training, how many hours did you do?
CW: Oh, I did eight hours flying with five different instructors and then, in six weeks, and a day or two before the end of six weeks, I got in a further three hours with a sergeant pilot who claimed to have been a Hurricane pilot in North Africa which we didn’t believe, so at eleven hours they were still, let’s get it right, yes, after six weeks, out of the course of fifty, there were still thirty on the course, only fifteen of whom had gone solo and I was one of the other fifteen who hadn’t and that fifteen had to see a fly test and everybody was scrubbed, everyone failed. Well, of that fifteen, twelve of us notified a grievance, we went through the grievance procedure, why had we failed? Why had I failed? And the CO pretended to look up his notebook, Watson you failed on two counts, a, you did wheel landings instead of three pointers, secondly you took off and climbed at half throttle. Well, I said, firstly, I landed exactly as I was instructed and secondly, if it took off and climbed at half throttle, I prefer a miracle and we could all do with one of them, I spoke twice out there, I remember and that was it, there was no appeal, everybody was taken off for some silly reason. A year later, Wing Commander Powell, Speedy Powell, who was in charge of all flying training became our group captain in North Africa and I was about to tell him it was a scam when he told me, he said, no, you didn’t fail, he said, they were just not in a SFTS, he says, to cope with the numbers from EFTS and there were hundreds of you waiting after EFTS to go to SFTS, so they established an air gunner training school and observer training school at Moffat near Gwelo. We were given the option of an observer course and they said, there’ll be a little, there could be a delay in getting on to the observer course, maybe a week or two delay, well, we’d already met people the previous night who’d been there for six months waiting for the thing, so they were not, they were dishonest, there was only one thing to do, and that was re-muster to air gunner and we, there were forty five of us on the course, there’s a picture of that with all those chaps in there.
CB: So, you became an air gunner
CW: Yes, it was an, I think it was an eight weeks course
CB: And where was that held?
CW: That was at Gwelo, aerodrome was called Moffat, at Gwelo near Marandellas in Rhodesia, I spent quite a lot of time on the farm at Marandellas, where there was a little girl called Wendy and I remember repairing a puncture on her bicycle, we had to do something in return for the hospitality. Everybody seemed to pass the air gunner course, I won’t comment too much on that [laughs]
CB: So, did you get your brevet at the end of that course or did you get it later?
CW: Oh, at the end of the course
CB: Then what?
CW: Yes, the two instructors there, they weren’t even qualified air gunners [laughs], I should delete that,
CB: What did you do the training on for air gunnery?
CW: They were Anson aircraft and Anson aircraft, yes, and there was a scarf ring with a Vickers gas operated guns and the only firing we did was on the beam at a drill [unclear] by a Miles Magister, Miles Master, which was, she was
CB: So, how did you get on with it?
CW: Oh, it’s rather, on the way back, we came via Cape Town and whilst we were in the transit camp the three of us went to, went to, oh my Gosh, I can’t recall the name, Muizenberg yes, we were in the beach in Muizenberg and a lady came to us about ten o’clock, she said, look, chaps, what are you doing for lunch? So, well, we’re not [laughs] see that big house over there? Come and see me there half past eleven, come and have lunch with us and we did, at the door ask for Mrs Macbeth. Ask for Mrs Macbeth, right, we duly went to the door and I asked for Mrs Shakespeare [laughs] Many, many years later I was on the [unclear] talking to an amateur in South Africa, I told him where I was and he said he was in Muizenberg and I said, I remember Muizenberg and I told him about that, he said, that place is now a guest house and that’s where I stay and that’s where I’m speaking from, not only that, but he said, whereabouts are you in Mbeya? And I told him, and I said, I’m in what’s the boys quarters at the back of the transferring station in the back of the cottage there in the boys quarters and he said, have a look through the, can you see the back door of the cottage? And I bent down, Yes, yeah, he said, is there a hole in the door, about a foot off the floor, in the middle? Yeah. He said, if you’d been down and looked through that hole, you’ll see a mark on the wall back, there’s a passageway, a mark on the wall. Have a look and I did, and it’d been, it had been plastered over, he said, that’s where my gun went off when I was careless, he was stationed there during the war. And, now, there were two coincidences, million to one, millions to one, infinitely to one, he was told about Mrs Shakespeare and we’d, he’d sat in the same seat during the war. Amazing. [unclear], Rhodesia was a wonderful place.
CB: And the local families, when you had time off, when you had time off from training, what did the local families do?
CW: Oh, on the farm? Oh, they were farmers, we tried to help out on farm, I did a bit of wiring whilst I was there, a lot of wires on pylons and they were in a bit of a state and I did a bit of tidying up there, I remember that
CB: Did they feed you?
CW: Oh yes, yes, was wonderful, Marandellas, that was. Yes, we were entertained quite royally in Rhodesia.
CB: So, we were talking about your holding point at Cape Town when that, what happened there? From Cape Town what happened?
CW: Well, from Cape Town we got on the boat and came back. It was a passenger liner, we’d gone out to Durban in the Mooltan, that was a cargo ship and we were down in, on the bottom deck, about three decks below, coming back we were on the Empress of Bermuda and there were people on it from the Middle East and quite a few Italian prisoners and we came back straight ten days, straight line ten days, the U-boats didn’t stand a chance, going out we had a terrific escort and must have been a dozen ships in that convoy, a dozen navy ships, coming back we were on our own and in a straight line [laughs]
CB: Cause it was fast
CW: It was fast, yes
CB: So, where did you dock?
CW: Where did we dock? Yes, Greenock, came back to Greenock, we had to carry our own kit bag, get our kit bag off the ship, we had full pack, a suitcase, and in fact we had two kit bags and we had to hang them over, one was for the flying kit, which was exactly as it was when we left, we didn’t even open the stuff, we didn’t need it in Rhodesia
CB: Because of the warmth.
CW: Mh?
CB: Because it was so warm.
CW: Yeah. We were and we lined up on the dock with all our kit and our red cap came along and recalled us to attention, right turn, double march, we just stood there with mouths open, double march, with all that clobber? there were no trollies, anything like that, we had to walk. I think we went straight to a train, I think the train is coming to the dock, I’ve got that picture, got on the train and we went back to West Kirby on the wirral. And that was it. From there, train down to Brighton and from, actually managed my pay book said I was, air gunner UT wireless op, which is what I said I wanted to do and he said, well, you can have the wireless op course if you wish, but it means going back to where they say, and you lose your tapes and you go back to where they say, forget that, he said, apply for another pilot’s course when you’ve done a couple of tours. Yes, oh yes, we were at Brighton, I was at Brighton for three weeks in a hotel, we would go in one direction, couple of miles and we’d have a lecture, then a few miles more and do a bit of swimming and that sort of thing, somewhere else do a bit of drill, bit of PT here there, just filling in time which all we wanted to do was get on. [pause] and we were posted straight to OTUs and I went to Finningley near Doncaster and that’s when I skivved off for Christmas and went to see my mother and got caught up in the time, was called out. Doncaster, there was an ENSA concert whilst we were there and the posters gave the impression that it was a real variety concert and they made it very clear, once you are in, you stay in, you don’t come out [unclear], you stay in, watch it, ok, it wasn’t a variety concert, it was an orchestra playing there, all playing classical music which was not really our kettle of fish. The only other ENSA concert I saw was at Kairouan when the Queen Mary came up, you know, the flat top thing, the Queen Mary came and there was a double grand piano on the back and a trailer where the pianist lived, it was Rawicz and Landauer and that was very good, I just sat there on my notebooks watching the, this on the piano and that was a real, they played stuff which appealed to us.
CB: Just to clarify the point, the Queen Mary is an aircraft recovery trailer.
CW: Yes, it was a big flat top carrying anything, tanks, aircraft
CB: So, you appreciated the music
CW: Yes, yes, it was good, was very good, but they were the only two ENSA concerts I saw
CB: So how long were you at the OTU?
CW: That’s a good point, about three months
CB: And you, what were you flying there?
CW: That was Wimpeys. Some Wimpey 1 Cs and then Wimpy 3s, mostly 3s.
CB: And from there where did you go?
CW: I gotta think.
CB: So, after the OTU you went to an HCU.
CW: No, no, we were on Wimpys. From 25 OTU Finningley we went to 30 OU, 30 OTU at Hickson, in Stafford and there we did more cross countries and whilst there we did three trips to France and then we were, then we joined, we went from there, we were there about three months, we went to 150 Squadron at Snaith. We didn’t do any flying from Snaith, one flight from Snaith was being detached overseas, they didn’t say where, we went to, one flight has to go, to go overseas, the other flight stays over Germany, so if you’d both give a preference of what you want to do and we opted to stay over Germany which meant of course that we went overseas. Our entire crew had trained overseas and we wanted to stay in England for a while but, no, from there we went back to West Kirby, back to West Kirby and we boarded a big, boarded a ship and on the deck there was some very big crates and the address Murmansk, it had been partly painted out, the name partly painted out. I said, Crickey, surely enough, we found later that they’d written Murmansk and partly rubbed it out so that the enemy looking at that thought we were going to Murmansk but that’s, that was what they said but we didn’t. We then from there down the Clyde, into the Med, then we went to Algiers, the troop ship just ahead of us was torpedoed and staggered into [unclear] and all the air gunners were on the deck of our troop ship, one air gunners, we’ve never seen the Oerlikon guns before, anyhow, that was it, and we disembarked in Algiers and in Algiers, yes, from Algiers we were stationed thirty miles south at Blida and there was a cargo ship unloading bombs and the bombs were put on ordinary bomb trolleys and trundled with tractors all the way to Blida and Blida is a very busy place, the Americans were there with all sorts of funny aircraft and we operated from Blida on Wimpys.
CB: Ok, we will stop there for a minute. Two, three disappointments in the RAF, yeah.
CW: No, two
CB: Two
CW: One was coming off the pilot’s course
CB: Yeah.
CW: [unclear] on 227 Squadron I was, the gunnery leader disappeared after a couple of weeks and I was a warrant officer then and I became acting gunnery leader and I stayed that way for six months as a flying officer doing the job and the wing commander commented on that and the adjutant oh, Cliff hadn’t done the gunnery leader course, so he said, better do the gunnery leader course. Couple of weeks later, I went up to Yorkshire somewhere and on the course thirty of us arrived to do it, we were given a test on arrival, we arrived on Sunday afternoon, Monday morning we all had a test and at the end of that we were divided into two flights, A and B, fifteen in each, I was in B flight and B flight was told to assemble in the hut next door, in the next hut, we did that, and we were each, we are not recording?
CB: Yeah, it’s ok.
CW: No, not.
CB: You don’t want to?
CW: No.
CB: No, ok. So you had a trip from Sir Archibald Sinclair. What did he say?
CW: Well, Archibald Sinclair thought we would be pleased at coming back through Sicily, Italy, France and so on, we weren’t amused but at Kairouan our diet was bully beef and biscuits. Each morning one member of the crew would go to the mess tent, collect two tins of bully and if we wanted, a few biscuits but they were big biscuits about six inches in diameter, but we used to go into the [unclear] city and I saw, we saw there once, oh, we had a Volkswagen there, a Volkswagen which had been abandoned, we shouldn’t really have gone anywhere near it, we were in big trouble for doing that, anyhow we went to this Volkswagen and one of the chaps fixed it, we more or less pinched the petrol, hundred octane petrol which didn’t do the engine any good and we used that at Kairouan, eventually it was confiscated by the military police, anyway in Kairouan, in
CB: Kairouan
CW: In Kairouan there was a vegetable stall in the market and there were some watermelons and we were admiring those, and the chap invited me to take one so I took it and gave it to him, he cut it up and we enjoyed this watermelon, it was lovely, I thought we could do with some of these back on camp, I bought two hundred of them [laughs] and oddly enough we could afford two hundred between us and we gave them in at the mess tent, some went over to the officer’s mess but when it came to use these watermelons, they were not watermelons at all, they were marrows, that didn’t matter to much because we stuffed them with bully beef, well the cooks did, how on earth, we loaded those watermelons into the Volkswagen but they turned out to be marrows we got there so, how that happened we don’t know, we just can’t understand. But, that was Kairouan, it was from Kairouan we saw this armada of Dakotas and gliders and they were going to Sicily and of course, soon after that we took off. A very interesting operations from, in North Africa, we felt we were dealing there with the Germans, with the military as apart from civilians, bombing them from four or five miles up, we were right down there with them, was a better feeling somehow, we felt we were a little bit nearer.
CB: What were your targets?
CW: Well, there’s a list of them here. In North Africa, all in North Africa, oh no, there’s a page full here.
CB: Ok.
CW: Tunis, Monserrato, Decimomannu, Tunis, Tunis again, Bizerta, Trapani and then there Villa Credo, Palermo, Napoli, Cagliari, Rome, Alghero, Castelvetrano, Chieti or something, Borezzo, Pantelleria, Sardinia, Sardinia, Sicily, Pantelleria, Napoli, Pantelleria, Pantelleria, that was in one night, twice to Pantelleria that night, Siracuse, Pantelleria, Messina, Napoli, Siracuse, Rome, Salerno, Bari, San Giovanni, Messina, Trapani.
CB: So, we are talking about largely mainland bombing, are we, what’s the balance between daylight and night bombing?
CW: This was all night bombing.
CB: All night bombing. Right.
CW: All night bombing.
CB: And how did you conduct the operations? Were you in a bomber’s stream or
CW: No.
CB: Were you in formation? Just as a gaggle.
CW: We’d take off one after the other independent to navigation all on the same route, ETA time on bombing, all the same, but operating independently, at maximum effort there, there were only twenty-six of us
CB: Right, how did you keep a sufficient spatial distance?
CW: What, from the others?
CB: Yeah.
CW: I didn’t even see them.
CB: Right. And you were all set the same height to operate from, were you?
CW: Yeah. Yes, yeah.
CB: And you, the speed was dictated in advance?
CW: Same, was the same, maximum economic cruising speed, it was the same for everybody.
CB: What would that be?
CW: I don’t know, it wasn’t my problem.
CB: No.
CW: One sixty-five knots. And, you can’t quote that, I’m not sure. I was the rear gunner.
CB: Right. Of course, yeah. So, in an operation, after dropping the bombs, you made your own way back
CW: Yes
CB: How easy was it to find the airfield that you started off from?
CW: Well, if, the navigator was pretty good, it was all dead reckoning now, there were no navigational leads at all or no electronic aids, then the navigator had a drift sight, I had a drift sight in the rear turret, I could, coming back over the sea, could drop a flame float, put the guns on that and of course, with the wind on the side and so on, we’re crabbing along, relative to the ground, the nose is not going straight forward, it’s on the
CB: You’d forward the deflection.
CW: There was a deflection
CB: To the navigator.
CW: And I could measure that deflection on the thing at the side and I would tell the navigator, we got sort of three degrees starboard drift or whatever and he would plot that, he could also measure the drift on his drift sight, and it was good, and of course, you hit the North Africa coast, and can see it and fly along if [unclear], if you’re too far east when you hit it but there were no other aids.
CB: So, the role of the gunner is to defend the aircraft. How many times were you attacked by German or Italian aircraft?
CW: No German aircraft, we saw a couple of Italian aircraft, one came up and we looked at it and looked as how it was, be a bit offensive, I fired at the bloke but he cleared off, we’d no trouble in North Africa. We got a bit closer to the enemy attacking, we were supposed to be strategic air force, that was the title but a lot of our work was tactical
CB: Supporting the army
CW: Supporting the army, attacking trains
CB: Yeah
CW: And so on. Low level stuff
CB: When you say, low level, what height are we talking about?
CW: Three hundred feet. Attacking a train at three hundred feet, there’d be three of us, we did two trips like that on the railway line from Suez up to Tunis, a German troop train on there, there’d be three of us, one aircraft would go directly above and bomb it and invariably stop it, stop the train. We would come upon the right, two hundred yards and strafing it, the train was stopped, the Jerries got off at the other side and they tried to get away a bit and that’s when the other fellow came in, number three, blazing with the front turret, and one beam gun and that was it, the three of us would carry on, turn round and then it depends what had to be done then, we didn’t want to derail, we didn’t try to derail the train, anything like that
CB: No, cause you needed the line
CW: We wanted the line for the army
CB: Army did, yeah, so
CW: One of the last things, in Tunis the Germans were evacuating from Bizerte, Bizerte?
CB: Yeah.
CW: Yes. And we was attacking the troop ships, we cut it down, well, I don’t know if it was us or one of them, anyway one of us caught a direct hit on a troop ship, which turned back and beached. And about a thousand British soldiers got off it. Three of them were killed, three British soldiers were killed by us but that was, that ship was full of POWs and it should have been lit up, by international law it should have been well illuminated
CB: Like a hospital ship
CW: But it wasn’t, there were no lights and there was nothing to tell us there were British on board, as far as we were concerned it was a German.
CB: Yeah.
CW: Anyhow, it beached, three thousand troops got off it and we met some of them in Tunis and we weren’t very popular
CB: No
CW: Because we’d killed three of their chaps but they didn’t think [unclear] the rest of us had done lucky [unclear] to be here, they did a good job and they didn’t think so
CB: Cause the Germans were evacuating with ships but also aircraft, so, did you have any role in trying to intercept the aircraft that were escaping? They had the big transport planes, the Arado
CW: We didn’t see any German aircraft, having said that I, I’ve got a vague idea we did once, there were two, one night we were on the way to Italy and at briefing they gave us position of a U-boat reported on, reported, a U-boat in that position and briefing officer, he said, if you see it, make it crash-dive, said, don’t try to bomb it, cause you won’t hit it, I wonder [unclear], speak for yourself, mate [laughs] just divert off normal track to that U-boat, if you see it, make it crash-dive, do a couple of circuits when you get to that spot and try and do that and we saw it and we went for it but we didn’t see it crash-dive but it, when we saw it, the bomb aimer saw the shape, it was just submerged, and he saw this cigar shape, we went down on it, and it’s big trouble when we got back. Can’t you tell a U-boat from a Royal Navy submarine? [laughs] How could we?
CB: No. No way. It’s a good thing you didn’t hit it then, with your bombs.
CW: The bloke was right. Don’t try to bomb it, you won’t hit it.
CB: No, Yeah. On that topic
CW: Speaking of submarines
CB: On that topic of U-boats, the U-boat base was at La Spezia in North West Italy, did you bomb La Spezia?
CW: I don’t think so. I don’t recall the name, no, it’s not here, we were told there was a refueling base, U-boat refueling at Alghero, refueling base, there’s a, oh dear, what do you call it?
CB: A long jetty
CW: A long jetty out, U-boat refuel at the end of the jetty and the oil is trundled down there, if there’s no U-boat there destroy the jetty, but try not to damage the town, strafe it but don’t, no, no bombs, use them on the jetty, and we did and we strafed the town but there was no U-boat there. It was an innocent fishing village but we were told that the U-boat refueling
CB: And this is before the Italian surrender of course, isn’t it?
CW: Oh yes, yes.
CB: In 1943. Yeah. Ok, so you, what else did you do during your tour?
CW: In Africa? Well, it was interesting, but we felt we were part of the war there. Between Sicily and mainland there are ferries going all the time and we bombed both terminals, we put [unclear] to the [unclear], to the, and we hit those terminals.
CB: You’d be flying at a higher level for that, what level would you be flying at?
CW: Six thousand feet was our normal bombing height. We were halfway there on Sunday, that was at three thousand feet.
CB: Were you? What sort of flak did you encounter?
CW: On Italy? A bit of light flak, that was all. On Rome, probably however six thousand and that was supposed to be an open city, we weren’t supposed to fight.
CB: What were you bombing? What were you bombing in Rome?
CW: On Rome, on the city, we dropped leaflets,
CB: Ah.
CW: Then we bombed the marshalling yards then down the Tiber to the Lido di Roma, seaplane base and we bombed that, we didn’t see any seaplanes, but we bombed the, we hit the hangars.
CB: So, what level of accuracy would you say you normally achieved?
CW: I would say pretty good, it wasn’t carpet bombing anywhere, we had, it was pinpoint bombing. Mind you, there were only twenty-six of us, maximum twenty-six.
CB: How many did you lose?
CW: We did lose one or two, we lost five percent, it was twenty-odd when maybe one wouldn’t get back, the losses were the same as over Europe, on average, which I know that’s surprising, probably for different reasons.
CB: So, you came to the end of your tours, then what?
CW: When we finished in, when we finished at Kairouan, we went on the Queen Mary up to Tunis, we had a spot of leave on one occasion, just after Tunis was liberated, or just after Jerry was kicked out, we went up to Tunis, there were several canteens and that’s where the bomb aimer ran into trouble, there were five of us, the canteen was crowded and four blokes got up just as we sort of got near the table, they got up and we sat down but there were five of us, so then the bomb aimer saw a spare chair a few yards away, picked it up, place was crowded, he put it over his head and walked towards our table and some happy soldier looked up, saw the chair hovering over his head, it went round and it gave such a [unclear], knocked him out, well, almost knocked him out, knocked him down, silly devil with a chair over his head.
CB: Yeah.
CW: And the red caps came and he was arrested and put in jail and the, was in at the police station and we moved from where we were staying to a hotel next to the police station, at 49 Rue De Serbie, I remember that address and Chadderton was in jail, was in prison, well we went into [unclear], the canteens were all crowded but there was another we came to, officers only, so, our tapes were just on one arm, on an elastic band, off with the tapes, off with the hat, and we went in, into the, into this posh hotel and sat there having a beer. About half an hour later, the bomb aimer, he almost turned white. I looked round and Speedy Powell was there, our group captain [laughs]. And of course, we got an [unclear], hello chaps, I didn’t realize you chaps were all commissioned [laughs], what are you drinking? [laughs] I thought, oh Crickey, we are in trouble here, so, I like to see a bit of initiative, jolly good, very good show, chaps [laughs], he spoke like that, Speedy Powell [laughs].
CB: How were you notified about
CW: He said, I’m going back, when you’re going back to Kairouan, he said, couple of days? He said, I’m going back tomorrow, give you a lift if you like and he did, he took us back to Kairouan. But first of all, we went to that prison, to the police station and he got Chadderton out, 49 Rue De Serbie, that’s where we were.
CB: So, you got back to camp, then what?
CW: Well, we got back and our tour was nearly finished, whilst at Blida we’d sleep, it was a question of crew but one aircraft per crew, you stuck to the same aircraft, that was yours whilst you’re here, well, there was no vacancy at the when we got there, we’d a spare week waiting for the aircraft and we went to a place called Setif on the coast, a big hotel there and we stayed in that hotel at RAF expense for a week, that was good. And the rooms were already occupied and there was real French entertainment, you see what I mean [laughs], that was, that shouldn’t have been really, anyhow sorry I digress.
CB: That’s alright. So, how did you know that you were at the end of your tour?
CW: We’d done two tours, we’d done, I think it was fifty four trips there, we could have come back after thirty five, it was normally thirty over Europe and thirty-five in the Med but we could opt to stay and do, carry on, which I preferred, and we did fifty-five, in fact we did more than that because a trip under three hours and there are quite a few, well, there are several, a trip under three hours only counted as a half [laughs], so you’d do trips to, well, like those trips to Pantelleria and Lampedusa just under three hours, but it was, you only, was credited with a half, and again you see, if you can’t take a joke, shouldn’t have joined [laughs], there was a Luftwaffe base on Lampedusa and we didn’t know it, we didn’t see it, we were bombing the harbour.
CB: So, did nobody attack the airfield?
CW: No, we didn’t do, I don’t think, I don’t know, we knew there was one, we were not told of any airfield, our job was the harbour
CB: So, you reached the end of the tour, what happened then?
CW: Well, we went on the Queen Mary to Tunis, then
CB: From Tunis, yeah
CW: And then in lorries to Algiers onto a troop ship and back to England, back to Greenock.
CB: What was it like on the troop ship?
CW: I’m just trying to think, yes, well, it was full of troops, I don’t think there were any Germans aboard
CB: Prisoners?
CW: I don’t, don’t remember much about it, the first troop ship coming back that was Empress of Bermuda, what was that airport we got from?
US: Bengasi?
CW: Down the road
US: Where are we?
CW: Mh?
US: Where are we?
CW: Monarch
US: Stansted?
CW: Monarch of Bermuda, that was, I think that was the, it was on that trip Monarch of Bermuda and they’re luxury airliners
CB: Right
CW: Luxury liners
CB: Yeah
CW: And it was good
CB: As a warrant officer, what facilities did you have? Sharing a room or four to a room?
CW: Oh, it didn’t make any difference,
CB: Right.
CW: Rank didn’t really mean very much and the skipper was the squadron leader, the only time we called him sir was if we had to, if there was any VIP nearby then, we might call him sir, otherwise it was Chess, his name was Chester, squadron leader Chester, he never did an OTU, he was- we’re on this thing.
CB: Yeah, go on. We’re stopping for a moment. We’ve restarted as you arrived in Greenock, what happened then?
CW: Well, we’ve come back from
CB: From Tunis. So, you’ve returned from North Africa to Greenock at the end of your two tours.
CW: Yes, from there we went by train down to Brighton, and of course and there it felt it split up and I was posted to, yes, I was posted to 84 OTU and second day I was there I was given a schedule of duties, lecture on the Browning gun, lecture on combat manoeuvre, the corkscrew and so on and I had this schedule, I said, I don’t like this, I haven’t done a course on the Browning gun, I’ve been using one for two tours but I’ve never done a course on it, what’s this corkscrew business? You’ve never heard of the corkscrew? No, what is it? The corkscrew, yes, on a bottle, well, I became an instructor on the corkscrew after I’d had some instruction and combat tactics, what can you do except move and fight it out, he said, what you need is an air gunner course, yes, I said, by all means, ok, I’ve done the job but that doesn’t make me a good instructor, no, I’m not instructing, so they gave me eight sprog air gunner trainees, to shepherd, I became a course shepherd and in doing that, I gradually picked up what really goes on and the corkscrew, you know about the corkscrew
CB: Yeah.
CW: I’d love to do another one [laughs], well, eventually we had, there was a complete crew and we went to Winthorpe and converted to Stirlings and on Stirlings we did a week of circuits and bumps and then cross-countries and then the first cross-country we went North towards Scotland to a bomb site, a bombing range rather, did an exercise there and on the way, or maybe the way back over Yorkshire, you’ll be attacked by a Hurricane, we need a good picture, make sure your guns are on safe and get a good picture of the Hurricane. We were attacked and the rear gunner hadn’t the vaguest idea, he said, weave skipper, weave, he was yelling, weave, it’s coming, it’s nearer and I thought, what the hell is that? He got no idea and the aircraft came from down starboard quarter, came right at us and then came in again and same again from the port quarter, nothing happened, and it came in, I was mid upper by that [unclear], it came in from the beam on the starboard and I gave, well by then was a textbook type of commentary winding up its corkscrew starboard go and nothing happened and the aircraft went underneath, came up on the quarter, more textbook but corkscrew port go, and that time we went dump up [unclear] up board, up starboard, down starboard, that was obviously the screen pilot the instructor.
CB: Ah.
CW: That was good. When, then, he said, on the way back, we’re going down on a raft off the Lincolnshire coast, we’re supposed to fire, strafe that raft but that’s what you’re supposed to do but don’t do that, there’ll be, there are seals on the raft, they live there, I knew that, they’ve been there dozens of times, just give a short burst in midair, fire at the moon, fire as it were , we did that and I just fired a short burst with one gun [laughs], cause they had to be cleaned afterwards, I fired a short burst, the rear gunner didn’t, ok, rear gunner, says the screen pilot, oh, no sir, the guns are faulty, I felt, Christ, was sort of physiology is that? They weren’t US, they were faulty, mid upper gunner, have a look, go and fix him. I went back to the rear turret, opened the flimsy door, and [unclear] pushed him aside, the guns weren’t even cocked, I said, where is your cocking toggle? He said, he didn’t understand, he didn’t know what a cocking toggle was, well, his hat was there, his fancy hat, remember that hat was there but took [unclear] the cockpit, number three gun I saw the thing, cause it was on safe, so I took the safety catch off and I yelled at him, now pull the trigger, botch the trigger, pull it, and he did, he nearly fell off the seat, he would have done if he hadn’t been tied down, said, now do the same as that to the other three, they’re the other two guns, cause one was a camera gun, and he hadn’t the vaguest idea so I did the same to the number four gun, fired that and he just, he hadn’t a clue, and ok but we’d fired from the rear turret. Next morning, the gunnery leader when I booked in as it were, he showed me a report from the screen pilot, do you agree with this? And it was that the rear gunner, he doubted if the rear gunner had had any operational training, did I agree? I said, not only I agree, I don’t believe he went to gunnery school, if he did, he didn’t learn anything literally and that’s what he wanted to know. I said, I’d like to see his logbook, well, it was the end of the month and the logbooks were in the flight office so I went to get them and I got them for the whole crew and I looked at this fellow’s logbook, he’d done no flying at all except at Winthorpe circuits and bumps, and the odd cross-country, that cross-country would have entered but there was nothing there except circuits and bumps but in the back was a certificate that he’d completed the air gunner course, very sad. Anyhow, we got rid of him, I said, he’s finished, that fellow, he’s not flying in my rear turret. I developed a little problem; would you mind if I?
CB: We’ll stop
CW: Nip up there for a second?
CB: So, you find the gunnery school
CW: Is that off?
CB: It’s on now, yeah, right
CW: Rear gunner had the faintest idea and he was sent to Eastchurch, he’d finished
CB: Now
CW: Now on the grapevine, all the information everybody seemed to know what was going on and the chap, the warrant officer on the clay pigeon shooting asked me what was happening, and in fact I didn’t know but he said, look, I want to join a crew and in fact he did, he joined our crew but he was a mid-upper gunner and I said, that’s fine, show me, you can have the mid-upper, I’ll have the rear, if they gunnery leader will agree and he did and the skipper agreed and we acquired a very good mid-upper gunner. Pete Foolkes, Pete Foolkes who eventually went to Canada, and stayed in and joined the Canadian Air Force, nice bloke.
CB: So that’s how you got into mid-upper, sorry, rear gunner, that’s how you became a rear gunner.
CW: I’ve always been a rear gunner.
CB: Yeah, quite.
CW: It was just that
CB: On the Stirling.
CW: I preferred the rear turret.
CB: Did you feel more comfortable with four guns?
CW: [laughs] That’s quite right, the mid upper did just have two, didn’t he, did?
CB: Yeah.
CW: I wasn’t too familiar with the mid-upper, I think you’re right, it’s bound to be [laughs].
CB: There was only space for two. There was only space for two guns.
CW: Yeah. Yes, yeah.
CB: So, you were at the OTU, after the OTU where did you go?
CW: Oh, OTU, right I’m with it again, we that was
CB: Winthorpe
CW: That was a conversion course
CB: Yes
CW: After an OTU.
CB: Alright, a conversion course
CW: A conversion course at Winthorpe
CB: Yes
CW: Well, from there, we went to Bardney
CB: Yeah.
CW: The skipper was promoted to squadron leader and he became flight commander, of A flight and A flight it worked in, with I think it was up at 9 squadron for a few weeks, I did the odd trips with, I think the first two trips from Bardney as part of 9 Squadron really at [unclear], from there we went to Strubby, did a couple from there and then on to Balderton, where the Americans had just left Balderton we moved in and B flight was already at Balderton. We then became a complete squadron of two flights and we operated from there, first trip was on Bergen, I did six trips with that squadron leader, first trip was on Bergen, and we were told to be a very careful run on a specific point in the docks, whatever’s there at that point, if anything, that’s the point to hit, be very careful and we went to the East and coming back, westerly course over Bergen, on the bombing run and there was an awful bang, a bit, wing went down, nose went down, we went down and the skipper, he was trying to hold back on the control column, nothing much was happening and we were going down and it was the navigator who went forward, crawled forward and turned it tail heavy, turned the elevator back and we came out and we came out at three thousand feet. What the bang was we’ve no idea, there was no damage anywhere but of course, the bomb doors were open and we came out at three thousand feet but we came out of it on quite a steep climb and we climbed up to eight thousand and the bomb aimer woke up, say skipper, can you go round again, we still got the goddam bomb [laughs] and Ted was the navigator, [unclear], oh, we are going round again and he pulled the jettison toggle and the bomb rolled [unclear], the bomb just went in the sea, complete waste of time the whole thing and we then came back and landed at Milltown and [unclear] Bergen.
CB: Where is Milltown in Scotland?
CW: Oh, Bergen, 28th of October 1944. Squadron leader Chester.
CB: So, this is with 9 Squadron.
CW: Oh no, no, that was all in the [unclear] of 227.
CB: Oh it was, right.
CW: Bergen, the next one was another fiasco to Walcheren. Walcheren, that was on the Zuiderzee and we were to bomb the sea wall, bomb the, not the sea wall, the, what it was called?
CB: The dikes.
CW: Dike, we were to bomb the dike and ahead of us, mind you, I’m in the rear, I didn’t see all this, there was another Lanc ahead and he went across the dike, stick the bombs right across and of course they all went in the sea, it only needed one bomb on the dike but they all went in the sea and our skipper, I can understand him, he thought, well what a ruddy silly way to destroy the dike, we were in the destruction business afterall, so we went round to the east and came in and went over the dike and dropped a whole stick of bombs all the way along the dike and destroyed it for half a mile, all they wanted us to do was make a hole in it so the water could come through, that’s what we were supposed to do, dug a hole in it and we were actually briefed to bomb a gun emplacement but that gun emplacement was already under water and the barrels were sticking out, there was no point in bombing that, we’d no secondary target so we decided, the skipper decided to do the job that he thought the others were going to do and we destroyed that wall for half a mile and it took, what was it? The pioneer corps I think it was, the pioneer corps took six months after the war to repair it and the skipper was in real trouble for doing that but that was a second trip on there. Next one was an ordinary trip to Hamburg and then Harburg which was a subsidiate, well, in the suburbs of Hamburg, that was long after the destruction of Hamburg, Heindbark, oh, that was a dam, Politz [laughs], Politz, a night raid of course, they were all night raids, Politz on the Baltic, night raid and the navigator, five minutes to Politz but everything was quiet, but by that time there should have been some action ahead, and two minutes to Politz, bomb doors open, ok, bomb doors open, and we, everybody thought, well, we are running up on Politz and we were over Politz and was absolute dead quiet, everything was quiet and then it started twenty miles to the south, fireworks below, twenty miles south and, oh Crickey, we’re twenty miles north of the target, and both the skipper, both the navigator and bomb aimer said, we are over Politz, we’re over the coast, but down there’s not over the coast, we are, we are over Politz, and the skipper wouldn’t have it, everybody is bombing there, we’ll join them and we did, and we destroyed an awful lot of good agricultural land. It was Pathfinder force, no, we weren’t using 5 Group Pathfinders, it was 8 Group Pathfinders, they put the markers down in the wrong place and that agricultural land was in a hell of a mess [laughs]
CB: [unclear]
CW: Many years later, I was talking to the air traffic controller in Nairobi, I was in charge of the con centre at night and we were having a little natter, and he mentioned the, he said, he told me, one night, when everybody bombed twenty miles south where they should have done, and I said, that was Politz was it? Politz! Yes, yeah! We were there at the same time and didn’t know it of course. But the interesting things like that you, happen, Politz, Houffalize, Houffalize, oh, that was the Falaise gap, yes, that’s when Jerry broke through, the Falaise gap, and it was very foggy, there was a film made with that raid, which was a lot of rubbish.
CB: Cause we are talking about France now in July ’44
CW: Yes, well, this was December ’44, Houffalize
CB: That’s not Falaise, is it?
CW: Mh?
CB: That’s not Falaise?
CW: Houffalize.
CB: Houffalize, right. Yeah.
CW: Wasn’t that the Falaise gap?
CB: No.
CW: Well, what was Houffalize?
CB: This is after Arnhem you are talking about now?
CB: [unclear] check it out. Yeah.
CW: Karlsruhe then Politz, Rositz, this is, can’t read that, these were spare boat trips, our skipper had finished by then
CB: Right.
CW: He did six and
CB: Where did he go?
CW: He went on a board of, no, he went on a summary of evidence, he was helpless, in fact at a reunion, many years later, the wing commander said, Chester was the biggest disaster that our squadron had, oh, he wouldn’t have said that if he didn’t mean it
CB: No.
CW: He got rid of him.
CB: Who was he replaced by?
CW: He was replaced with wing commander Balme, BALME, wing commander Balme, although he didn’t take up the point position of flight commander but he was there as a supernumerary, he did the job but didn’t sort of get recognition as a flight commander because he was more senior, I saw him in hospital in Nairobi, wing commander Balme.
CB: So, how many more ops did you do after that change?
CW: I did exactly twenty.
CB: Twenty, did you? Twenty more? Twenty in total? Ok.
CW: I was crazy to do with seventy-six, that was the number of ops, but I counted the halves as whole ones.
CB: Yeah.
CW: I don’t accept that it was half,
CB: It was a [unclear].
CW: Half a tour because
CB: Half an op. So, what caused the end of the twenty? Was it?
CW: Had finished D-Day.
CB: Right. No, ended the war, VE Day
CW: VE Day, sorry, VE Day.
CB: Yeah. So, from VE Day
CW: D-Day occurred when I was at OTU as instructor
CB: Yes
CW: VE Day, D Day, then we went to Molbice, Leipzig,
CB: Leipzig, yeah.
CW: With flight lieutenant Hobson to Leipzig, seven hours, Lutgendorf and Leipzig again, I went to Leipzig three times in all, twice on our own behalf and once with the Yanks [laughs]. Because we diverted to Norwich on one occasion, on one of those occasions, to, and Norwich, not Norwich airport as I knew it then but Horsham St Faith which became Norwich airport
CB: Which became Norwich airport, yeah.
CW: And that’s where I got the idea of a washing machine, that’s a different thing, and in Norwich, what a weird hang-up, I don’t know, not mentioned that have I?
CB: No
CW: No. We diverted to Norwich, and we were resting in a lounge, and very early morning a top sergeant came in, he said, say bud, who’s the headman? I said, him, woke up, what’s the problem? He said, we can’t get the overload tank off. Oh, don’t worry about that, the fighter engineer overload tank, we didn’t know what a tank, yeah, sure, it’s downgrade thing, and the bomb aimer woke up, I did describe it. Crikey that’s odd, that’s a four thousand pounder, no, don’t make bombs that big, that’s a four thousand pound bomb, what do you want, leave it! What are you doing? Anyhow, the skipper sent the flight engineer and the bomb aimer out to go out to look, they tried to take it off, it was, and the tannoy blared everybody to evacuate a mile from the Lancaster [laughs], oh dear, while we were three days in Norwich, which I’d welcomed because I’ve been to school there and I went to see an old girlfriend, Joyce, used to go to school with Joyce, and I went to see her in number one Chester Street and the warrant officer came to the door, I met Joyce and it was good, and he was flying Lysanders, anyhow and a crew came up from Balderton and moved the, took the bomb off [laughs]
CB: That’s why you were there so long because they hadn’t got anybody to move the bomb.
CW: No, they wouldn’t, they, the thing was on its own, they wouldn’t go near it after that.
CB: No
CW: But our own chaps came and shifted it
CB: Cause it would have been fused at that point, would it?
CW: No, it couldn’t have been, it wouldn’t have been.
CB: No. So, when you went on a, when you went
CW: The bomb aimer should have checked when we landed, make sure it’s got, in fact he should have checked before we landed,
CB: Before you landed, yeah.
CW: After we supposed we had dropped it, he should check
CB: So, thinking of fusing, when you got airborne with a full load, at what point were the bombs fused, ready for dropping?
CW: On the bombing run.
CB: Cause what I meant was that this bomb, if all the other bombs went, why would this one not be fused? So, there was a pin extraction job to do.
CW: [unclear] that’s a good point
CB: Cause the hang-up and the fusing are not related.
CW: I haven’t given thought to that one, I wouldn’t think it was fused, I don’t think it could have been
CB: I can’t see how it couldn’t have been, if you’ve dropped all the other bombs, but I don’t know of course, cause I wasn’t there.
CW: I think we bombed, I think we bombed out now, with the [unclear] if they were not fused, could be done,
CB: Yeah, the answer is I don’t know, something worth looking at but I would have thought that the fusing would’ve taken place in a, some time before release, all of them together, that’s what I meant
CW: Normally
CB: But had you dropped
CW: minutes to when you start the serious
CB: On the running
CW: left, left, steady business, yeah
CB: But on that particular op, did you drop bombs in earnest?
CW: I don’t remember, but I think we did
CB: Rather than dispose of them at sea?
CW: I’m not sure which raid it was actually was on
CB: Anyway, so, we’ve got to VE Day, what happened then?
CW: We got to VE Day
CB: You all stood down
CW: Oh, the war was about to end, isn’t it?
CB: Yeah.
CW: But Leipzig was the last raid,
CB: So, did you take part in Operation Manna to supply the Dutch civilians?
CW: No.
CB: And did you?
CW: [clears throat] long after the war I went to a reunion and there was a fellow there, he said he’d been shot down three months before the end of the war, he’d been shot down, he was looked after by a German family who was, didn’t like it. He was released, he left the family and joined when the Americans got close he joined the Americans and they got him back to Mildenhall by air and from there he hitchhiked back to Balderton, this is what he said, got back to Balderton and he said he arrived just in time to take part in Operation Manna and to bring prisoners back from Germany. And I listened to all this, he was a gunner, an air gunner, well, I didn’t recognize the bloke which that was not conclusive, I said, who was your skipper? Oh, he said, I didn’t have a permanent skipper, I did all the spare boat trips, remember Mcgilleyfrey, gunnery leader? Yeah, I said, who could forget? Mcgilleyfrey, I said, yeah, he said, who could forget old gilley. I said, remember Cliff Watson? No. I said, I was acting gunnery leader over that period, Mcgilleyfrey I’ve just invented, 5 group did not take part in Operation Manna, and what was the other point? And we didn’t bring prisoners, neither did we bring prisoners back from Germany, we didn’t take part in that and they came back from Belgium in any case, not Germany. I’d like to see your logbook, oh, he said, I’ll go and get it, he went out to his car and we never saw him again, but there’s lots of things like that going on. The navigator was at a reunion and he, there was a chap giving a talk on his experience in Malta, and one of the, he said, one of the chaps there was in Malta and he said that bloke’s talking an absolute load of rubbish, nothing of what he said actually happened. And I said, I was there, he’s challenged him, and he was on a lecture tour all over the place, lecturing on all this had happened to him in Malta and all a lot of nonsense
CB: Amazing.
CW: I worked with a chap in Nairobi like that, oh, he’d been everywhere, he’d flown Sunderlands from Belfast down to Southampton, from the factory in Belfast to Southampton, he’d been torpedoed in the Pacific, he’d done everything, he was working as a radio officer in Nairobi and we kept a card index system of his [unclear] [laughs]. It was a medical book, not a word of truth in any of it, he had on his briefcase, Slate VC, and he created the impression and deliberately set about to do so the impression that he had a VC, his name was Vivien Charles Slate, the VC was his initials, Slate VC, Vivien Charles [laughs] and everybody thought he had a VC, except some of us who knew better, oh, he’d flown everything, he wasn’t even a pilot, he’d been a pilot, a wireless op, he’d done it all, in actual fact he’d done nothing, he was a traffic control assistant, ok, might have done a good job, but [unclear] done [laughs], Slate VC
CB: Just quickly for background, the repatriation was Operation Exodus, just for the tape. That’s been fascinating, so I’m gonna stop the tape now. Thank you very much because you’ve had a good run and we’ll pick up the other bits later. Thank you very much indeed, Clifford.
CW: Oh, it’s a pleasure.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Interview with Clifford Watson. One
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Chris Brockbank
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-06-28
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Type
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Sound
Identifier
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AWatsonC170628, PWatsonC1704
Format
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01:57:17 audio recording
Language
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eng
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Description
An account of the resource
Clifford Watson at first wanted to join the navy because of a high demand in pilots. After being rejected, he joined the RAF and was sent to Rhodesia for pilot training, but then remustered to become an air gunner. He flew seventy-six ops in total. Was posted to North Africa and recounts various episodes: targeting enemy trains; flying operations over Italy; the accidental targeting of a ship full of British prisoners of war during the German evacuation of North Africa. Flew to Bergen with 9 Squadron and operations targeting dams in Holland. Recounts an operation to Politz on the Baltic, where they bombed the wrong target.
Contributor
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Peter Schulze
Steph Jackson
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Norway
Poland
South Africa
Netherlands
Tunisia--Qayrawān
Zimbabwe
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
Netherlands--Walcheren
Norway--Bergen
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
North Africa
Tunisia
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944-10-28
227 Squadron
25 OTU
30 OTU
84 OTU
9 Squadron
air gunner
aircrew
bombing
entertainment
Operational Training Unit
RAF Balderton
RAF Bardney
RAF Finningley
RAF Hixon
RAF Strubby
RAF Winthorpe
training
Wellington
-
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Staves, Malcom Ely
M E Staves
Description
An account of the resource
77 items. The collection concerns Flying Officer Malcom Staves (1924 - 2012, 1591418, 203137 Royal Air Force) and contains his log book, items, documents, photographs, and training notebooks. He flew operations as a wireless operator with 207 Squadron. <br /><br />There is also a sub collection concerning Flight Lieutenant <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1020">D A MacArthur.</a><br /><br />The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Christina Chatwin and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-02-26
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Staves, ME
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[underlined] RAID ASSESS )MENT MEETING. HELD ON 10th. FEB/45 [/underlined]
[underlined] LADBERGEN. 7/8th. February 1945. [/underlined]
C.O. [missing letters]over details of weather experienced. Cloud possibly made attack ineffective and in any case difficult to assess results.
Defences stronger than previously.
[underlined] S/L.ROSSIETTER. [/underlined] 44/E. was cancelled due to defective spark-ing plugs in port outer engine.
[underlined] C.O. [/underlined] In the case of “probable” A/C. “made up” crews are to be allotted to the A/C which is most likely to become serviceable.
[underlined] GARDENING (Forget-me-nots). 7/8th. Feb/45. [/underlined]
[underlined] C.O. [/underlined] Not satisfactory attack. Training thought to be insufficient or faulty.
[underlined] F/O.STANCER. (207 Squadron). [/underlined] One crew took wrong reference point.
44 Squadron crews – Faulty camera manipulation and P. .I. photographs only taken of vicinity and not yet plotted, 44/C landed away.
[underlined] C.O. [/underlined] 44/C landed Carnaby. Why?
[underlined] S/L.FERGUSON. [/underlined] 44/C landed Carnaby with engine u/s. Had three good engines and no apparent reason for landing away.
[underlined] C.O. [/underlined] Will S/L.Ferguson supply reason for 44/c landing away?
I will speak to Squadron Commanders after this meeting to discuss methods to raise standard of gardening.
[underlined] POLITZ. 8/9th. Feb/45. [/underlined]
[underlined] C.O. [/underlined] No. 1 Group attacking later say target was a mass of flames looking as if our attack was successful. However, 50% of photographs which were plotted reveal errors of over 1.000 yards. Possibly errors were caused by enemy decoy markers.
One crew bombed direct without having run up on markers and another bombed on wrong heading.
[underlined] W/C.BLACK. [/underlined] These were pilot’s errors due to new inexperienced crews who have been spoken to on the matter and are unlikely to repeat the errors. In the second case he did not continue his turn after passing over T.I’s to get on correct heading. When B/A said “Now” pilot straightened out without attempting to correct heading.
[underlined] C.O. [/underlined] Flak over Sweden increased. One A/C seen shot down over Sweden.
[underlined] S/L.HARISON. [/underlined] Possibly lowest we’ve been over Sweden.
[underlined] W/C.BLACK. [/underlined] Crews reported definitely shot at.
[underlined] C.O. [/underlined] In future consider Swedish flak at Flight Planning. There were two early returns. 1.u/s Bombsight. 2. u/s Oil Gauge. 207/L.
[underlined] P/O.YOUNG. [/underlined] Servicibility [sic] of instruments is mentioned at briefings
(continued)
[page break]
[underlined] RAID ASSESSMENT MEETING. 10/2/45. [/underlined] (continued) [underlined] SHEET. 2. [/underlined]
[underlined] C.O. [/underlined] One A/C of 44 Squadron abortive as late.
[underlined] S/L [missing word]. [/underlined] This was due to faulty D.R.Navigation.
[underlined] GENERAL. [/underlined]
[underlined] C.O. [/underlined] Overshoots. Crews to be reminded that they may have to return and land on shorter runway. Some crews seem to think that call-up height is 1.200 ft instead of correct height of 2.000 ft. Some crews landing without R.T.
[underlined] F/L.DOUGHTY. [/underlined] Caused by window as A/C are coming back with window on aerial. A/C unable to “get through” without aerial and would not know of u/s aerial until return.
[underlined] C.O. [/underlined] 44 Squadron Gunners are letting off rounds on airfields. S/LFERGUSON to report.
[underlined] C.O. [/underlined] Five crews from each Squadron to be detailed for E.T.R. procedure and for wind finding.
Any improvement in number of crews using H2S ?
[underlined] F/O.WALLACE. [/underlined] Only four or five crews from each Squadron.
[underlined] [missing letter]/L.BAUD. [/underlined] Low level of return was reason for not using H2S on last operation.
[underlined] F/O.WALLACE. [/underlined] The only way we can test the instrument is by operation in the air. Therefore it is essential that H2S be tested in air whenever possible.
[underlined] C.O. [/underlined] It is now to be an [underlined] order [/underlined] that crews use H2S whenever possible.
[page break]
[inserted] File [/inserted]
[underlined] RAID ASSESSMENT MEETING. 16th. FEBRUARY 1945. [/underlined]
[underlined] ROSITA – 14/15th. FEB/45. [/underlined]
1. [underlined] C.O. [/underlined] There was delay in take-off caused by Navigators waiting for Met. winds.
[underlined] F/O.STEELE. [/underlined] Amendment to winds came through late and had to be written on blackboards in briefing rooms.
[underlined] C.O. [/underlined] If amendment to Met. winds comes through before one hour previous to “first time off” then it is in order to pass the information to Navigators direct. Amendments coming through within one hour of take-off are to be referred to the station Navigation Office-r [sic] for him to decide whether the information is sufficiently important to be passed to crews.
2. [underlined] C.O. [/underlined] Further delay caused by an A/C. becoming bogged, due to standing on a French drain. Crews are not to stop on these drains.
[underlined] S/L.HOWES. [/underlined] Captain of this A/C. has been spoken to on the matter.
[underlined] C.O. [/underlined] Two tractors should have been there.
[underlined] S/L.GARDINER. [/underlined] Tankers were sent first, then second tractor sent.
[underlined] C.O. [/underlined] Drill should be to turn A/C. immediately, in view of uncertainty as to speed with which bogged A/C. can be moved.
[underlined] W/C.NEWMARSH. [/underlined] Suggested not too long a line of A/C. be allowed to build up between end of runway and intersection.
[underlined] C.O. [/underlined] Agreed! 4-5 A/C. a suitable number. Will speakto [sic] S/LDR.Gardiner about this.
3. [underlined] C.O. [/underlined] These delays resulted in only 8 A/C. of 44 Squadron and 11 of 207 Squadron doing support run over target.
4. There were three early returns in 207 Squadron, crews having been instructed to return from Position ‘C’ if there was no chance of making up time.
[underlined] S/L.HOWES. [/underlined] F/O’s Howard and [indecipherable word] could not have made up time and were justified in returning. Not so in the case of F/[missing letter].Downing.
F/O.Howard was the only one to attempt to cut across over LONDON area, or to East of LONDON. It is thought that it would be helpful if a ruling could be obtained as to whether it is permissible for late A/C. to do this.
[underlined] S/L.HARRISON AND S/L.GARDINER. [/underlined] Prior/clearance would be necessary.
5. [underlined] C.O. [/underlined] Supporting A/C. were affected by icing on Perspex having come down through cloud to bombing height.
[underlined] S/L.FERGUSON. [/underlined] This/icing was not severe and should have cleared before bombing.
[underlined] F/O.BAKER. [/underlined] Thought crews slow to use de-icing equipment. Possibily [sic] forgot to use it.
(continued)
[page break]
[underlined] Page 2. [/underlined]
[underlined] HARBURG. [/underlined] (1) Marking carried out slightly too early controller ordering “Come in and bomb” at H-3. Winds were passed at H-5. The fact that some crews arrived early increased time over target. Heavy losses due to fighters – 13 in Group, 2 from this Station.
(2) F/Lt.Linnett reported that three aircraft of 207 Squadron had large errors shown by photographs but this was due to pilots carrying out turns at the time of photograph, to avoid other aircraft.
(3) 44 Bombing Leader said that several aircraft had difficulty in keeping straight and level after bombing for this reason.
(4) Headings in 44 Squadron were mainly O.K. 207/H attacked practically on reciprocal of correct heading W/Op had difficulty with W.T. and had to rely on “magic eye”.
(5) S/Ldr.[indecipherable name] thought routeing over Hamburg may have upset headings.
(6) 207/V had no photograph of bombing as film was expended during jettison action on way to target. This action was necessary to reduce load owing to engine trouble.
[underlined] TAXYING. [/underlined] (1) C.O. stated that taxying of both squadrons is still too fast owing to aircraft leaving dispersals too late.
This possibly due to crews not entering aircraft early enough. They should be in aircraft 10 minutes before time to leave. a contributory cause may be that first aircraft off is taking off too soon.
[underlined] R.T. DISCIPLINE. [/underlined]
(1) C.O. stated that R.T. discipline bad and that too much chattering is going on.
[underlined] E.R.T. and LANDING PROCEDURE. [/underlined]
(1) 207 Squadron aircraft have been returning early possibly due to desire to get back “while the going’s good”.
S/Ldr.[indecipherable name] said that crews while willing to adjust speed are disinclined to carry out “dog-legs”.
[page break]
[underlined] Page 3. [/underlined]
[underlined] E.R.T. and LANDING PROCEDURE (contd). [/underlined]
(2) C.O. reported that last return was complete shambles. This was thought to be due to0 the Funnel not being switched on rather than the fact that lighting was originally on quarter strength. Crews must have [missing letter].D.M. set on D.R. compass. S/Ldr.Ferguson had [missing letter].D.M. set O.K. and found runway alright although lighting was rather dim and aircraft on [indecipherable word] looked bright by comparison. He had to overshoot twice owing to being too close to other aircraft. Aerodrome was visible at distance of 10 miles at 2000 ft although not recognisable. S/Ldr.Ferguson considered quarter strength sufficient on a dark night.
[underlined] R/T. FAILURES. [/underlined]
(1) F/Lt.Doughty said all failures were due to loss of aerials. W/Op should go over to 1155 and briefed each time to do this. It takes 3 minutes to change over.
(2) W/Cmdr.Newmarsh and S/Ldr.Bird considered 1155 unsatisfactory owing to background of noise and suggest such aircraft wait until other aircraft have landed. C.O. ruled that crews must go over to Marconi and if reception is not good enough then wait until end.
(3) W/Cmdr.Newmarsh said that one of the main troubles is that crews do not realise soon enough that R/T is not working properly.
[page break]
File
[underlined] RAID ASSESSMENT MEETING. 16th. FEBRUARY 1945. [/underlined]
[underlined] DRESDEN – 13/14th. FEB/45 [/underlined]
1. [underlined] C.O. [/underlined] There was one swing on take-off (F/O.Craig of 44 Squadron). Caused by starboard inner engine failure. Odd that this should result in a swing to port.
[underlined] S/L.FERGUSON. [/underlined] F/O.Craig reports that he had full rudder control. Possibily [sic] he anticipated starboard inner engine cutting(because fuel lights came on) thereby causing swing to port.
[underlined] C.O. [/underlined] Squadron Commanders to brief crews concerning swings on take-off, particularly with regard to slow opening of throttles and straightening of tail wheel.
2. [underlined] C.O. [/underlined] E.T.R. procedure went wrong. E.T.R. had to be amended to 0308. In the case of the ROSITZ raid the following night, the E.T.R. again had to be amended and 7 crews from this station did not receive the amendment. This was due to non-compliance with instructions to return Group Frequency for second broadcast and presumably crews assumed there would be no amendment. E.T.R. discipline evidently slacking off,
[underlined] W/C.NEWMARSH. [/underlined] Found to be well ahead of Flight Plan timing on return trip. Possibly due to fairly prolonged period of increased speed at time of “coming down in steps”.
[underlined] P/O.STANCER. [/underlined] Thought to be better to keep to Flight Plan [underlined] timing [/underlined], unless it becomes necessary to reduce speed by more than 5-10 mph, in which case it would be preferable to keep to planned [underlined] speeds [/underlined].
[underlined] S/L.HOWES. [/underlined] Considered crews are trying to keep to E.T.R. procedure but that they are experiencing difficulty. Scheme would work successfully if it were a question of keeping to either Flight Plan times [underlined] OR [/underlined] speeds.
[underlined] C.O. [/underlined] F/O. Stancer to take this matter up with Group using the ROSITZ operation as an example.
3. [underlined] F/O.STANCER. [/underlined] Crews are now operating H2S wherever possible.
4. [underlined] S/L. GARDINER. [/underlined] Some crews are still entering circuits below 2000 ft.
[underlined] C.O. [/underlined] Further briefing on this point is necessary in view of call-up height having been 1200 ft some time previously.
5. [underlined] S/L.HARRISON. [/underlined] Read over P.R.U. report confirming that this operation was successful.
6. [underlined] C.O. [/underlined] Still reports of incendiary bombs being jettisoned on track.
[underlined] S/L.FERGUSON. [/underlined] Crews were specifically briefed again about keeping bomb doors closed. No reports of jettisoned I/B’s after ROSITZ attack. Always reported after Incendiary attacks.
[page break]
[underlined] Raid Assessment Meeting. 16th. February 1945. (contd) SHEET 2. [/underlined]
6. [underlined] C.O. [/underlined] Fighter activity again slight.
[underlined] F/L.CLARKE. [/underlined] Two combats in 44 Squadron. One A/C. reporting a S/E. A/C. carrying diffused light in belly presumably for the purpose of blinding bomber crews.
7. [underlined] C.O. [/underlined] A lot of dust is present on the runways.
[underlined] S/L.GARDINER. [/underlined] Runways are brushed once a fortnight, difficulty being experienced in obtaining a driver from M.T. Section. The top surface is in need of repair.
[underlined] C.O. [/underlined] See about getting a driver from M.T. Also see that a Control Officer goes round the airfield half an hour before take-off to ensure it is cleared of workmen.
[inserted] [INTELLIGENCE stamp] [/inserted]
[page break]
[underlined] RAID ASSESSMENT MEETING 9 th MARCH 1945. [/underlined]
DEFECTS: (1) S/L Rossiter mentioned that engine defects usually occur between 360 – 395 hours. Engine defects not considered to be due to bad handling by flight engineers.
[inserted vertically] [INTELLIGENCE stamp] [/inserted vertically]
(2) 207/H D.R. compass U/S owing to break in supply lead due to being struck or hung on by someone. Pilot had experienced slight trouble with it before, but did not consider it sufficiently serious to report. W/C Black to interview this Pilot.
(3) 44/C Compass U/S due to failure of master unit. This had been reported 3 days previously..Caused Pilot to fly over Rhur [sic] and run the gauntlet of considerable Flak defences. Eventually he had to return without bombing.
(4) 44/M Crew reported failure of bomb release mechanism. W/C Newmarsh said electrical section unable to discover any technical failure. S/L Bird of the opinion that crew did not carry out drill correctly owing to excitement.
(5) 207/X Had valve trouble on Gee indicator.
(6) One mine hung up. Orders are that a percentage check of mines loaded is to be carried out.
SASSNITZ. (1) Gardening errors were high. F/O.Stancer reported that crews did not obtain best possible photographs. On this occasion they were briefed by F/Sgt.Bremage and F/O. Baker. F/Lt.Linnett mentioned that all new crews are lectured on the camera and its use. Crew of 44/Q did not carry out correct drill which is marked on the camera. This crew mined successfully on the previous gardening operation. Commanding Officer pointed out that it is finally the responsibility of the Bombing or Gardening Leader that the release points are correctly worked out.
(2) Swedish flak reported by W/Cmdr.Newmarsh to be less than encountered on previous operations. S/Ldr.Harrison pointed out that searchlights apparently more active this time.
[page break]
[underlined] RAID ASSESSMENT MEETING. 23rd MARCH 1945. [/underlined]
[indecipherable word] 20/21 March, 1945.
1) C.O. went over Flight Plan which seemed to have been correct strategy.
2) S/Ldr. BAUD reported three small deviations from Flt. Plan by 44/[indecipherable letter]-F/L.JORY, 44/N – P/O.DALTON, 44/A – F/O. WALKER. F/L. JORY denied that he was 500 ft. below planned height in front line area. S/Ldr. BAUD said that where Captains and Navigators disagree , there is no alternative but to take the written evidence of the Navigator.
CO., ruled that Navigator must use Captains readings. CO., remarked thatin [sic] this instance it appeared that some crews had commenced descent slightly too soon and that it is very important to keep correct heights, particularly over front line areas.
3) S/Ldr. BAUD reported one slight deviation in 207 Squdn. By 207/V – F/Lt. VERRALLS who was too high at 090E. This was justifiable as the purpose was to gain cloud cover.
4) CO., remarked that the T.I’s on the spoof target of HALLE were inaccurate and F/LO. LINNETT said they were 4 miles West of the Town.
5) F/Lt. LEATHER reported that some crews on BOHLEN bombed early. Squadron Bombing Leaders reported that [indecipherable word] from Spilsby did this.
6) C.O. mentioned that attack was successful. The value of bombing photographs was instanced in this raid as it was immediately apparent that it was unnecessary to attack BOHLEN again the succeeding night.
7) Intruder activity ceased at 22.45 and did not, after all, interfere with take – off at 23.15.
8) F/O.KING, 2078 Squadron, reported that in each of the last two operations M.T.drivers had no clue as to the positions of the dispersals. C.O. ruled that new drivers are not to be put on night duty.
9) S/Ldr.BAUD reported that majority of crews endeavour to keep to E.T.R.
But two or three are not doing so. On This operation three of 44 Squadron were back early and one was late, five of 207 Squadron were in excess of 7 minutes one way or the other.
C.O. remarked that it will be necessary to order early crews to “Bograt”.
10) S/Ldr.GARDNER reported that Control had no difficulties on this night. S/Ldr.BIRD said that Channel “B” was noisy. C.O. said that take-off was slow.
11)
S/Ldr.BAUD said track keeping was mostly O.K. Winds were the main snag. 207/X was late in spite of having flown correct speeds. The A.S.I. is being checked but no report yet received. Different crews had experienced the same trouble with the same aircraft.
[underlined] “HAMBURG D.P.A.G.” [/underlined] 21/22 March, 1945.
1) C.O. went over Flight Plan. Question was raised at Flight Planning as to whether it would be better to come down to 3-5000 feet over Kiel Canal or keep high and risk fighters. A.O.C. decided to accept risk of light flak. Some crews experienced considerable light flak over the canal and others none – possibly due to patchy cloud conditions. One Ju.88 was seen over Hamburg and another enemy aircraft before the target was reached.
[page break]
[underlined] Page 2. [/underlined]
2) Engineering Officer reported flak damage to 44/J and 44/H.
3) F/Lt.JORY saw one aircraft crash in Kiel Canal area. Aircraft concerned was to starboard of track.
4) C.O. and S/Ldr.FERGUSON discussed the difficulty caused because one aircraft in target area had V.H.F. on “transmit”.
5) P/O.JONES reported that all 44 Squadron bombed as planned. F/Lt.LINNETT said two crews of 207 Squadron bombed direct. W/Cmdr.BLACK had told these crews that bombing is to be as planned unless instructions are received to the contrary.
6) C.O. remarked that most photographs were good. S/Ldr.BIRD said one crew of 44 Squadron had 6000 yards undershoot due to trouble with the bombsight which the Bomb Aimer could not correct. F/Lt.LINNETT explained that one error (2700 yards undershoot) was due to photograph being affected by the aircraft being in a dive, also due to over anxiety of new crew.
7) S/Ldr.FERGUSON reported difficulty in climbing to specified bombing height adding that he just reached correct height in time and that he was in a lower height band than some.
S/Ldr.BAUD reported that 4 crews from this Station bombed below correct height. Wind velocity in target area was 3300/50 i.e. from port quarter.
[underlined] DEFECTS. [/underlined]
1) F/Lt.KENNEDY reported one early return (44/Y) due to U/S rear turret. Caused by small hole in main pressure gauge pipe resulting from chaffing. This is inspected at every minor inspection. MA.P. have the matter in hand.
2) Engineering Officer reported an early return (44/S) due to loss of oil pressure and coolant overheating. The overheating was due to radiator flap being closed but no cause can be found for the other defect. Pilot (F/Lt. SIMONS) said gauge read zero. The gauge is serviceable.
3) F/Lt. HERBERT reported one A/C had trouble with Master Bomb Switch which, having been checked “on” was subsequently found to be knocked “off”. Thought to be caused by Engineer knocking the switch while in the act of windowing. 44/A – F/O. WALKER struck sea on way back. No instrument failure evident. S/Ldr. BIRD said it was due to “low flying”.
S/Ldr. BAUD said 44 Squadron were under a misapprehension as to the purpose of the master bombing switch which should be always be locked “ON” except in certain circumstances. C.O. ruled that instructions should be given at Navigators Briefing.
4) F/Lt. HERBERT said that ultra – violet lighting in aircraft, though not required at present may be necessary in future.
(End.
[page break]
(Date) 2/3.2.45 (Aircraft Type & Number) Lancaster I PD.782(Crew) F/O. CHAMBERS F.E., Sgt. Tait A, Sgt. Davies J.H., F/Sgt. Mirfin R.J., Sgt. Jewish W.H.R., Sgt. Sutherland D, F/Sgt. Walsh D.W.A. (Duty) Bombing (Time Up) 20.26 (Time Down) 03.46 (Details of Sortie or Flight) [underlined] BOMBING ATTACK KARLSRHUE. [/underlined] Bomb load 1 x 4000 Minol + 1800 x 4 lb incendiaries. 10/10th cloud over target. Target identified by one big red glow from fires. Bombed at 23.31 hrs. from 13.000 ft. heading 1100 IAS.175 mph. Centre of red glow + basic delay of 8 secs. One big glow. One green T.I. and two reds seen going down many miles to port. High oil temperature on both outer engines. This delayed us. Engine trouble prevented us from catching up withthe [sic] main bombing force in time to the supporting run and also from reaching the bombing height laid down – 16.000 feet. SORTIE COMPLETED. (Reference) 1 [deleted] 4 [/deleted]
(Date) 7/8.2.45 (Aircraft Type & Number) Lancaster I LL.902 (Crew) F/O. Watters. D.R., Sgt. Henderson J., Sgt. Stewart J.M., Sgt. Moore R., Sgt. Staveaz M.E., Sgt. Verney E., Sgt. Watkins. C.H. (Duty) Bombing (Time Up) 20.52 (Time Down) 03.23 (Details of Sortie or Flight) [underlined] BOMBING ATTACK LADBERGEN. [/underlined] Bomb load 14 x 1000 MC. Fzd. 8/10th. St. Cu. Tops 8-10.000’. Target identified by illuminating flares: Red and Green T.I.’s: Gee. Bombed at 00.02 1/2 hours from 11.500 ft. heading 0640 IAS. 160 m.p.h. Glow of red T.I.S.’s (Controller instructed “bomb first red T.I. as you go in”). SORTIE COMPLETED. (Reference) 1 [deleted] 4 [/deleted]
(Date) 7/8.2.4.5 [sic] (Aircraft Type & Number) Lancaster I PA.183 (Crew) F/O.Chambers, Sgt. Taito A., Sgt. Davies J.A., F/Sgt. Mirfin R.J., Sgt. Jewiss W.H.R., Sgt. Sutherland D., F/Sgt. Walsh D.W.A. (Duty) Bombing (Time Up) 20.59 (Time Down) 03.35 (Details of Sortie or Flight) [underlined] BOMBING ATTACK LADBERGEN. [/underlined] Bomb load 14 x 1000 MC. Fzd. 53A 10/10ths cloud. Target identified by two Red and Green T.I.’s Gee. Bombed at 00.04 hrs. from 10.000’ heading 0420 IAS. 180 mph. Westerly red T.I. In cloud until 10 sec. before release. Observation impossible. Defences considerably stopped [sic] up. SORTIE COMPLETED. (Reference) 1 [deleted] 4 [/deleted]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Raid Assessments
Description
An account of the resource
Five 'raid assessments' carried out at RAF Spilsby. Detail of problems encountered in each operation. Final sheet is an extract from Operations Record Book by three different Lancasters.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1945
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
13 photocopied sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Service material
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MStavesME203137-160226-350001,
MStavesME203137-160226-350002,
MStavesME203137-160226-350003,
MStavesME203137-160226-350004,
MStavesME203137-160226-350005,
MStavesME203137-160226-350006,
MStavesME203137-160226-350007,
MStavesME203137-160226-350008,
MStavesME203137-160226-350009,
MStavesME203137-160226-350010,
MStavesME203137-160226-350011,
MStavesME203137-160226-350012,
MStavesME203137-160226-350013
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Great Britain
Poland
Sweden
England--Lincolnshire
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Steinfurt (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Germany--Thuringia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1945-02
1945-03
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Steve Baldwin
207 Squadron
44 Squadron
aircrew
anti-aircraft fire
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
flight engineer
H2S
incendiary device
Lancaster
Lancaster Mk 1
mine laying
navigator
RAF Spilsby
Window