1
25
27
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1918/45594/YCrawfordJ[Ser -DoB]v1.pdf
7a96a93f820e668840dc899996c68726
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Crawford, Jack 416818
John Crawford
J Crawford
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-08-08
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Crawford, J
Description
An account of the resource
18 items. The collection concerns Warrant Officer John "Jack" Crawford (416818 Royal New Zealand Air Force) and contains his diaries, documents, correspondence and photographs. He flew operations as a wireless operator/ air gunner with 189 Squadron and was killed 4 March 1945. <br /><br />The collection was loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by john Herbert and catalogued by Lynn Corrigan.<br /><br /><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW220471175 BCX0">Additional information on John "Jack" Crawford</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW220471175 BCX0"> is available via the <a href="https://losses.internationalbcc.co.uk/loss/105207/">IBCC Losses Database.</a></span>
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Jack Crawford's trip book
My trip book
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
John 'Jack' Crawford
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Canadian Air Force
Royal New Zealand Air Force
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Diary
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
YCrawfordJ[Ser#-DoB]v10001
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1942-06-11
1942-06-20
1942-06-22
1942-07-14
1942-07-21
1943-03-06
1943-04-02
1943-05-03
1943-12-16
1944-08-30
1944-08-31
1944-09-10
1944-09-11
1944-09-12
1944-09-13
1944-09-17
1944-09-27
1944-09-28
1944-10-05
1944-10-06
1944-10-07
1944-10-11
1944-10-17
1944-10-18
1944-10-19
1944-10-20
1944-10-23
1944-11-11
1944-11-12
1944-11-22
1944-11-23
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-04
1944-12-05
1944-12-10
1944-12-11
1944-12-31
1945-01-03
1945-01-04
1945-01-05
1945-01-07
1945-01-08
1945-01-16
1945-01-17
1945-02-17
1945-03-01
1945-03-02
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Belgium
Belgium--Houffalize
Canada
Alberta
Alberta--Calgary
Alberta--Edmonton
British Columbia
British Columbia--Vancouver
Manitoba
Manitoba--Winnipeg
Nova Scotia
Nova Scotia--Halifax
Ontario
Ontario--Ottawa
Québec
Québec--Montréal
Saskatchewan
Czech Republic
Czech Republic--Most
France
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Le Havre
Germany
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Hörstel
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Siegen
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Great Britain
England--Gloucestershire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Oxfordshire
England--Staffordshire
Netherlands
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Norway
Norway--Trondheim
Panama
Panama--Panama Canal
Russia (Federation)
Russia (Federation)--Kaliningrad (Kaliningradskai︠a︡ oblastʹ)
United States
Illinois
Illinois--Chicago
New York (State)
New York (State)--New York
Description
An account of the resource
Covering the period 3 December 1941 to 1945 it details Jack's initial training, sailing from New Zealand to Canada and subsequent train journey, visiting a fox farm, canoeing, taking exams and getting the results and trips in the snow. Qualifying as a wireless operator and travel to Britain on the RMS Mauretania, the continuation of training, posting to 50 Squadron and marriage to Edna. Provides details of 28 operations to Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway and Russia including Houffalize, Brux, Boulogne, Le Havre, Bremen, Brunswick, Dortmund-Ems canal, Darmstadt, Gravenholst, Harburg oil refinery, Heilbronn, Kaiserslautern, Karlsruhe, Munich, Nuremberg, Stuttgart, Wilhelmshaven, Flushing, Trondheim and Koningsberg. It includes a leave pass, berthing card, travel map, sketches, photograph and other memorabilia.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending text-based transcription
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
50 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
aircrew
Anson
bale out
bombing
Catalina
ground personnel
Initial Training Wing
Ju 88
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
love and romance
Nissen hut
Operational Training Unit
RAF Barford St John
RAF Coningsby
RAF Scampton
RAF Sutton Bridge
RAF Syerston
RAF Upper Heyford
training
Wellington
wireless operator / air gunner
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1475/44270/MSiddleWE1038438-151208-030001.2.jpg
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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1475/44270/MSiddleWE1038438-151208-030002.2.jpg
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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1475/44270/MSiddleWE1038438-151208-030003.2.jpg
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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1475/44270/MSiddleWE1038438-151208-030004.2.jpg
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Siddle, William Elliot
W E Siddle
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-12-08
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Siddle, WE
Description
An account of the resource
Two items. The collection concerns Sergeant William Elliot Siddle (1038438 Royal Air Force) and contains documents and research. He flew operations as a pilot with 9, 83 and 97 Squadrons.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Chris Wilson and catalogued by Trevor Hardcastle.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
WILLIAM ELLIOTT SIDDLE
1038438 FLT Sgt
Information below is from:
a) A book called Lancaster Valour, The Valour and the Truth by Clayton Moore published by Compaid Graphics 1995 in co-operation with Yorkshire Air Museum ISBN no 09517965 6 9
[Clayton Moore was a Canadian (and not to be confused with the actor who played the “Lone Ranger”) and he was the tail gunner in “Bill Siddles” Lancaster crew}
b) Flying certificate for Instrument Flying issued to Embryo Pilot William E. Siddle by the Army Air Forces Advanced Flying School, Moody Field, Georgia on the 28 Day of September, 1942
c) Flying certificate issued to W.E Siddle by the United States Army Forces Advanced Flying School Moody field Georgia U.S.A on the 9th Day of October, 1942
d) Obituary from the Cumberland and Westmoreland Herald 1970
e) Royal Air Force Service and Release Book for Flight Lieutenant 149619 W.E. Siddle.
f) book called Lincolnshire Airfields in the Second World War by Patrick Otter
[underlined] Information [/underlined]
William E. Siddle, otherwise known as “Bill” joined the RAF in or around 1942 aged 22 and was trained to fly by the United States Army at their Flying School at Moody Field, Georgia in September/October 1942
He was a Sergeant when he attended operational flying training at Upper Heyford and he formed his crew in June 1943.
Navigator- Dick Lodge
Flight Engineer- Reg Mosely
Mid Upper Gunner- Dick Jones
Wireless Operator- Clem Culley
Bomb Aimer- Ken Mills
Tail Gunner- Clayton Moore (Canadian)
21 July, 1943 The crew’s first posting was with 9 Squadron of 5 Group Bomber Command at Bardney Lincolnshire. Bardney Airfield was opened in April 1943. Squadron Code was WS
27 July, 1943 Hamburg Lancaster DV-198 (WS/U) This was the crew’s first operational flight Then
[page break]
28 July, 1943 Hamburg Lancaster ED-666 (WS/G)
2 August, 1943 Hamburg Lancaster ED-654 (WS/W)
9 August, 1943 Mannheim Lancaster DV-198 (WS/U)
27 August, 1943 Nurenburg Lancaster ED-975 (WS/Y)
30 August, 1943 Munchen Gladbach Lancaster ED-975 (WS/Y)
5 September, 1943 Mannheim Lancaster ED-975 (WS/Y)
6 September, 1943 Munich Lancaster ED-975 (WS/Y)
On this Munich trip the plane was badly hit by flak. Bill was given priority landing as they were losing fuel and they nearly made it back to Bardney but Bill had to put the plane down in a field in Minting as all engines failed. Everyone survived although Bill lost teeth from being flung through the windscreen; Mosely, Hill and Jones had back injuries; Lodge broke his arm getting off the downed plane. Moore was found still in his rear turret under a hedge and he suffered concussion. There is a picture of the crashed ED-975 in Moore’s book.
26 September, 1943 new crew with Jock Wilson, Mick Machin and Gerry Parker (American) replacing Mosely, Hill and Jones respectively took ED-499 (WS/X) on a night flying test. Bill found he could not land and took 9 attempts. Bill then kicked everyone else out expect the flight engineer and after checking the landing gear went straight back up and made a number of landings to get his nerve back. Bill only got a telling off.
22 October, 1943 Kassell Lancaster CV-340 (WS/Q)
2 November, 1943 Crew allocated “Spirit of Russia” Lancaster EE-136 (WS/R)
10 November, 1943 Modane Lancaster EE-136 (WS/R) short on fuel Bill landed in Cambridgeshire and the field forgot to tell Bardney and so all reported missing!
General shortages of crews and crew members stopped Bill and his crew flying together. Jones (who had returned to the crew after recovering from the Minting crash) flew 2 Dec as spare mid upper gunner with WS/C and did not return/shot down. Parker, the American was then made the permanent mid upper gunner. Lodge the Navigator returned to the crew 20 December, 1943.
23 December, 1943 Berlin EE-136
29 December, 1943 Berlin EE-136
5 January, 1944 Stettin EE-136
January, 1944 Braunschweig EE-136
Entire Crew applied to join the Pathfinders
Crew went to PFF Navigation Training Unit at RAF Station Upwood, Cambs
[page break]
3 February, 1944 Crew Posted to 83 Squadron based at Wyton, Cambridgeshire.
15 February, 1944 Berlin Lancaster JB-309 (OL/N)
20 February, 1944 Leipzig Lancaster ND-494 (OL/G) (plane badly hit by flak)
Crew allocated ND-464 (OL/S)
15 March, 1944 end of 2 week training
18 March, 1944 Frankfurt Lancaster ND-390 (OL/V)
24 March, 1944 Berlin Lancaster ND-400 (OL/Q) (72 bombers lost on that raid as met office’s projected wind speeds all wrong- Bill’s navigator Lodge realised something wrong and set new course to adjust to actual very high wind speeds but others did not)
26 March, 1944 Essen Lancaster ND-402 (OL/R)
Bill made Flying Officer and received a DFC at the age of 23
March 1944 83 Squadron transferred from Eight Group to Five
Group’s 97 Squadron- Groups Special Marker Force based in Coningsby, Lincolnshire
March/April 1944? La-Chapelle Paris Lancaster ND-400 (OL/Q)
26 April, 1944 Schweinfurt Lancaster ND-464 (OL/S)
28 April, 1944 St Medard en Jalles nr Bordeax
1 May, 1944 St Martin Du Touch (OL/S)
8 May, 1944 Lanveoc Lancaster ND-551 (OL/V) (German airfield in France)
11 May, 1944 Bourg-Leopold Belgium Lancaster ND-464 (OL/S)
1 June, 1944 Saumur Lancaster ND-464 (OL/S)
6 June, 1944 La Parnelle Lancaster ND-464 (OL/S)
Invasion of Europe- Bill volunteered for a second tour- crew did too.
7 June, 1944 Caen Lancaster ND-464 (OL/S)
10 June, 1944 Orleans Lancaster ND-933
Daylight Raid formation training
21 June, 1944 Wesselling, Cologne Lancaster ND-464 (OL/S)
Crew Changes- Gerry Parker (American) transferred and replaced by Paddy Blanche who after 1 trip transferred to 617 Squadron and replaced by Hine as mid upper gunner.
23 July, 1944 St Vitry le Francoise Lancaster
[page break]
Bill was awarded a bar to his DFC and promoted to Flight Lieutenant due to his actions during this raid as “by skilful and evasive tactics, Flight Lieutenant Siddle manoeuvred his aircraft and continued to make a steady run, although his aircraft was plainly visible in the light of flares around the target” (Obituary says June 1944)
No date Wizerne
23 July, 1944 Keil (from Wyton base) Lancaster ND-400 (OL/Q)
24 July, 1944 Stuttgart (from Wyton base) Lancaster ND-400 (OL/Q)
Crew changes- Hine and Culley (wireless op) left- Alan McDonald (Canadian) new wireless op but no mid upper gunner as shortage.
26 July, 1944 Givors Lancaster PB-230 (OL/V)
July/August 1944- crew shortages meant enforced inactivity
September 1944- crew allocated new plane PB-368 (new OL/S)
10 September, 1944 Munchen Gladbach Lancaster PB-368 (OL/S)
11 September, 1944 Darmstadt Lancaster PB-368 (OL/S)
12 September, 1944 Stuttgart Lancaster PB-368 (OL/S)
Crew Change- Bill Trotter joins as mid upper gunner
19 September, 1944 Stuttgart Lancaster PB-368 (OL/S)
23 September, 1944 Munster Lancaster PB-368 (OL/S)
27 September, 1944 Kaiserslaughtern Lancaster PB-368 (OL/S)
October was spent training in OL/S
This is the end of the information found in the tail gunners book (Clayton Moore). Clayton had done 45 runs and head injuries in the Minting crash were catching up on him with increasing headaches and sight problems. Clayton went back to Canada. At this time only 3 of the original crew remained. Siddle (pilot), Lodge (navigator) and Moore (tail gunner).
Bill Siddle remained on active service until the cessation of hostilities having completed more than 60 operational sorties.
His last day of service was 1 April, 1946.
He died in 1970 aged 48.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
William Elliot Siddle
Description
An account of the resource
Bill Siddle's time in the RAF pieced together by research. He was a pilot who flew the Lancaster with 9 and 83 Squadrons. He was commissioned in 1944, was awarded the DFC and Bar and completed more than 60 operations. He left the service in 1946 and died in 1970.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943-07-21
1943-07-27
1943-07-28
1943-08-02
1943-08-09
1943-08-27
1943-08-30
1943-09-05
1943-09-06
1943-10-22
1943-11-02
1943-11-10
1943-12-23
1943-12-29
1943-12-29
1944-01-05
1944-02-03
1944-02-15
1944-02-20
1944-03-15
1944-03-18
1944-03-24
1944-03-26
1944-04-26
1944-04-28
1944-05-01
1944-05-08
1944-05-11
1944-06-01
1944-06-06
1944-06-07
1944-06-10
1944-06-21
1944-07-23
1944-07-23
1944-07-24
1944-09-10
1944-09-11
1944-09-12
1944-09-19
1944-09-23
1944-09-27
1946-04-01
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
United States
Georgia--Moody Air Force Base
Great Britain
England--Oxfordshire
Germany
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Munich
Germany--Kassel
Germany--Berlin
England--Cambridgeshire
France
France--Modane
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Poland--Szczecin
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Essen
France--Paris
Germany--Schweinfurt
Germany--Wesseling
France--Bordeaux (Nouvelle-Aquitaine)
France--Lanvéoc
France--Saumur
France--Orléans
France--Caen
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
France--Givors
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Belgium--Leopoldsburg
Belgium
Poland
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
United States Army Air Force
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Personal research
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Four typewritten pages
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MSiddleWE1038438-151208-030001, MSiddleWE1038438-151208-030002, MSiddleWE1038438-151208-030003, MSiddleWE1038438-151208-030004
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
William Cragg
83 Squadron
9 Squadron
aircrew
bombing of Hamburg (24-31 July 1943)
bombing of Kassel (22/23 October 1943)
bombing of the Normandy coastal batteries (5/6 June 1944)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Lancaster
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
Pathfinders
pilot
RAF Bardney
RAF Coningsby
RAF Upper Heyford
RAF Upwood
RAF Wyton
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2343/43566/LDrinkellWG55113v1.2.pdf
5ddb59da6662778456a01234cce7a641
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Drinkell, William George
Description
An account of the resource
23 items. The collection concerns Squadron Leader William George Drinkell (b. 1921, 55113 Royal Air Force) and contains his log books and photographs.
He flew operations as a pilot with 50 Squadron.
The collection was loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Jill Harris and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2022-06-27
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Drinkell, WG
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
William George Drinkell's Royal Canadian Air Force pilot's flying log book. One
Requires
A related resource that is required by the described resource to support its function, delivery, or coherence.
transcribe p97 endorsement
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending text-based transcription
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LDrinkellWG55113v1
Description
An account of the resource
Pilot’s Flying Log book for Flt Lt William Drinkell from 11th June 1942 to 31st March 1947. Initial flying training in Canada and USA. Advanced pilot training in England with 6 AFU, 14 OTU, and LFS before operational posting to 50 Squadron. Post war posting to 108 OTU and then Australia (243 Squadron) Hong Kong (96 Squadron) and Japan as part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF).
Served at RAF Halton, RAF Wittering, RAF Hornchurch, RAF Eastchurch, RAF Harrogate, RAF Little Rissington, RAF Market Harborough, RAF Scampton, RAF Wiglsey, RAF Syerston, RAF Skellingthorpe, RAF Wymeswold, RAF Castle Donington,
Aircraft flown were DH 82 Tiger Moth, Stearman, Valiant, Harvard, Commodore, Catalina, Anson, Oxford, Wellington X, Stirling III, Norseman (C64), Lancaster, Dakota, Sea Otter, Auster, York, Sunderland.
Carried out 5 day and 27 night operations with 50 Squadron to Darmstadt, Bremerhaven, Rheydt, Kaiserslautern, Munster, Wilhelmshaven, Bremen, Nuremberg, Flushing docks, Bergen, Dusseldorf, the Dortmund-Ems Canal, the Mitteland Canal, Harburg, Duren, Heilbronn, the Urft Dam, Heimbach, Munich, Politz, Houffalize, Leuna, Brux, Siegen, the Rositz Oil Refinery, the Bohlen Synthetic Oil Plant, Wurzburg. He also carried out two Operation Exodus flights.
Awarded the DFC after an operation during which his aircraft was hit by bombs from another aircraft above him. He successfully flew his aircraft back to England. Includes various newspaper clippings.
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Canada
New Brunswick
New Brunswick--Moncton
Prince Edward Island
Prince Edward Island--Charlottetown
United States
Michigan
Michigan--Grosse Ile
Florida
Florida--Pensacola
Great Britain
England--Buckinghamshire
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Essex
England--Kent
England--Yorkshire
England--Gloucestershire
England--Leicestershire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
Germany
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Altenburg (Thuringia)
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Leuna
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Munich
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Siegen
Germany--Urft Dam
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Germany--Würzburg
Poland
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Belgium
Belgium--Houffalize
Czech Republic
Czech Republic--Most
Netherlands
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Norway
Norway--Bergen
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-09-11
1944-09-12
1944-09-18
1944-09-19
1944-09-20
1944-09-23
1944-09-24
1944-09-26
1944-09-27
1944-10-05
1944-10-06
1944-10-19
1944-10-20
1944-10-23
1944-10-28
1944-10-29
1944-11-02
1944-11-04
1944-11-06
1944-11-11
1944-11-16
1944-12-04
1944-12-09
1944-12-11
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1944-12-21
1944-12-22
1944-12-30
1944-12-31
1945-01-01
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1945-01-16
1945-02-01
1945-02-07
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-14
1945-02-15
1945-03-05
1945-03-06
1945-03-07
1945-03-08
1945-03-16
1945-03-17
1945-04-23
1945-05-08
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Nick Cornwell-Smith
14 OTU
1654 HCU
18 OTU
50 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
aircrew
Anson
bomb struck
bombing
C-47
Catalina
Commodore
Distinguished Flying Cross
Flying Training School
Fw 190
Gibson, Guy Penrose (1918-1944)
Harvard
Heavy Conversion Unit
Initial Training Wing
Ju 88
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Operation Exodus (1945)
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
pilot
RAF Castle Donington
RAF Little Rissington
RAF Market Harborough
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF Syerston
RAF Wigsley
RAF Wymeswold
Stearman
Stirling
Sunderland
Tiger Moth
training
Wellington
York
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/194/43037/MAdamsHG424504-170215-020028.1.jpg
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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/194/43037/MAdamsHG424504-170215-020031.1.jpg
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Adams, Herbert
Herbert Adams
H Adams
Herbert G Adams
Description
An account of the resource
88 items. Collection concerns Herbert George Adams DFC, Legion d'Honour (b. 1924, 424509 Royal Australian Air Force). He flew operations as a navigator with 467 Squadron. Collection contains an oral history interview, photographs of people and places, several memoirs about his training and bombing operations, letters to his family, his flying logbook and notes on navigation.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Herbert Adams and catalogued by Nigel Huckins and Trevor Hardcastle.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-02-15
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Adams, HG
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Plotting map and logs for operation to Kaiserslautern
Description
An account of the resource
Map and logs.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Herbert Adams
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-09-27
1944-09-28
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-09-27
1944-09-28
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
Germany
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Australian Air Force
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Map. Navigation chart and navigation log
Map
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One map, three log sheets
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MAdamsHG424504-170215-020028, MAdamsHG424504-170215-020029, MAdamsHG424504-170215-020030, MAdamsHG424504-170215-020031
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
467 Squadron
bombing
Lancaster
RAF Waddington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2417/42749/LEvansD2-1593692v1.2.pdf
f8326c03ab5f28e49d0f04334d64c055
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Evans, Donald
Description
An account of the resource
31 items. The collection concerns Warrant Officer Donald Evans (b. 1925, 1593692 Royal Air Force) and contains his log book, documents, objects and photographs. He flew operations as a flight engineer with 106 and 83 Squadrons.
The collection was loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Michael Evans and catalogued by Barry Hunter,
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2021-11-15
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Evans, D-2
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Donald Evans RAF navigator’s, air bomber’s, air gunner’s and flight engineer’s flying log book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LEvansD2-1593692v1
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
D Evans’s Flight Engineer’s Flying Log Book covering the period from 19 June 1944 to 26 June 1947, detailing his flying training and operations flown as Flight Engineer. He was stationed at RAF St Athan (4 SoTT), RAF Winthorpe (1661 HCU), RAF Syerston (5 LFS), RAF Metheringham (106 Squadron), RAF Warboys (PNTU), RAF Coningsby and RAF Hemswell (83 Squadron). Aircraft flown in were Stirling, Lancaster and Lincoln. He flew on 13 night operations with 106 Squadron and 11 with 83 Squadron, total 24 (but his total in log book is 25). Targets were Munster, Karlsruhe, Kaiserlauten, Brunswick, Bergen, Dusseldorf, Dortmund-Ems canal, Hamburg, Trondheim, Munich, Horten, mining (Danzig Bay), Bohlen, Lutzkendorf, Wurtsburg, Molbis, Cham and Komotau. Post war he flew on one Exodus operation, one Cooks Tour operation and 3 Dodge operations. His pilots on operations were Flying Officer Anderson, Flight Lieutenant Brown and Flight Lieutenant Watts. The four final pages of his log book are filled with autographs from his colleagues.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Language
A language of the resource
ita
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Terry Hancock
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Czech Republic
Germany
Great Britain
Norway
Czech Republic--Chomutov
England--Huntingdonshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
Germany--Borna (Leipzig)
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Cham
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Munich
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Würzburg
Norway--Bergen
Norway--Horten
Norway--Trondheim
Wales--Glamorgan
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-09-23
1944-09-26
1944-09-27
1944-10-14
1944-10-28
1944-11-03
1944-11-04
1944-11-11
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-11-26
1944-12-14
1944-12-17
1945-02-19
1945-02-20
1945-02-23
1945-03-03
1945-03-05
1945-03-07
1945-04-14
1945-03-16
1945-04-07
1945-05-17
1945-04-18
106 Squadron
1661 HCU
83 Squadron
aircrew
bombing
Cook’s tour
flight engineer
Heavy Conversion Unit
Initial Training Wing
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Lancaster Mk 1
Lancaster Mk 3
Lincoln
mine laying
Operation Dodge (1945)
Operation Exodus (1945)
Pathfinders
RAF Bridlington
RAF Coningsby
RAF Full Sutton
RAF Hemswell
RAF Metheringham
RAF Snaith
RAF St Athan
RAF Syerston
RAF Warboys
RAF Winthorpe
Stirling
training
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2417/42598/NEvansD2-211115-01.2.jpg
798e9a75e93b4da7aba1a23331593544
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Evans, Donald
Description
An account of the resource
31 items. The collection concerns Warrant Officer Donald Evans (b. 1925, 1593692 Royal Air Force) and contains his log book, documents, objects and photographs. He flew operations as a flight engineer with 106 and 83 Squadrons.
The collection was loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Michael Evans and catalogued by Barry Hunter,
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2021-11-15
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Evans, D-2
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Lancasters Pound Kaiserslautern
Description
An account of the resource
A newspaper cutting about an operation at the railway yards.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One newspaper cutting
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
NEvansD2-211115-01
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending text-based transcription
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Lancaster
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1440/37403/LMouritzFA427346v1.2.pdf
ca40487b78234775235f519d95430f3f
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Mouritz, Francis Arthur
F A Mouritz
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-09-13
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Mouritz, FA
Description
An account of the resource
Four items. The collection concerns Flying Officer Frank Mouritz (1923 - 2021, 427346 Royal Australian Air Force) and contains an oral history interview, pages from his log book and two photographs.
He flew 34 operations as a pilot with 61 Squadron and flew QR-M 'Mickey the Moocher' in 1945.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Francis Arthur Mouritz and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Frank Mouritz's Royal Australian Air Force flying log book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LMouritzFA427346v1
Description
An account of the resource
A partial Royal Australian Air Force Flying log book for F A Mouritz. Covers (with gaps) the period from 27 September 1944 to 18 April 1945. He was stationed at RAF Skellingthorpe with 61 Squadron flying Lancasters. The log book details eight night operations although individual entries are numbered, the highest of which is 34 indicating his total operations for his tour. Targets listed are Kaiserlauten, Mittelland Canal, Royan, Houffalize, Munich, Politz, Nordhausen and Pilsen. His pilot for his first 'second dickie' operation was Flight Lieutenant King.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form: no better quality copies are available.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Frank Mouritz
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Mittelland Canal
France--Royan
Belgium--Houffalize
Germany--Munich
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Poland
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-09-27
1944-09-28
1945-01-01
1945-01-02
1945-01-04
1945-01-05
1945-01-06
1945-01-07
1945-01-08
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-04-04
1945-04-05
1945-04-17
1945-04-18
61 Squadron
aircrew
Anson
bombing
Ju 88
Lancaster
nose art
Oxford
pilot
RAF Skellingthorpe
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1389/35980/LBarberT1047323v2.2.pdf
45149aecb9614bc718c3adfbc7621fe3
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Connock, Mike
Michael Connock
M Connock
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-02-24
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Connock, M
Description
An account of the resource
Eight items. The collection concerns (Royal Air Force) and contains people who served with 50 and 61 Squadrons at RAF Skellingthorpe.
They include:
W Dixon
GR Williamson
BV Robinson
GA Walker
L Barber
HJ Whitwell
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Mike Connock and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
T Barber’s Royal Canadian Air Force Flying Log Book. Two
Description
An account of the resource
T. Barber’s Royal Canadian Air Force Flying Log Book for Aircrew other than Pilot from 27th June 1943 to 6th May 1945 detailing his training, operations and instructional duties as an Air Bomber. He was stationed at RCAF Station Paulson (No. 7 Bombing and Gunnery School), RCAF Station Portage la Prairie (No.7 Air Observer School), RAF Penrhos (No. 9 (Observers) Advanced Flying Unit, RAF North Luffenham (29 OTU), RAF Winthorpe (1661 HCU), RAF Syerston (No. 5 Lancaster Finishing School), RAF Skellingthorpe (50 Squadron) and RAF Desborough (84 OTU). Aircraft in which flown: Anson I, Anson IV, Bolingbroke, Wellington III, Stirling and Lancaster. He flew a total of 35 operations (8 day, 27 night). Targets in Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Norway and Poland were: Bergen, Bohlen, Boulogne, Bremen, Bremerhaven, Brüx, Dortmund, Dortmund-Emms canal, Dresden, Düren, Düsseldorf, Essen, Flushing, Gdynia, Giessen, Harburg, Heilbronn, Homberg, Houffalize, Kaiserslautern, Karlsruhe, Mittelland-Emms canal, Munich, Münster, Pölitz, Rheydt, Rositz, Sassnitz, Siegen, Urft dam and Weser-Emms canal. His pilot on operations was Flying Officer Firmin.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1945
1944-09-17
1944-09-18
1944-09-19
1944-09-20
1944-09-23
1944-09-24
1944-09-26
1944-09-27
1944-09-28
1944-10-06
1944-10-07
1944-10-23
1944-10-28
1944-10-29
1944-11-01
1944-11-02
1944-11-03
1944-11-04
1944-11-05
1944-11-06
1944-11-07
1944-11-11
1944-11-12
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-12-04
1944-12-05
1944-12-06
1944-12-07
1944-12-08
1944-12-09
1944-12-27
1944-12-30
1944-12-31
1945-01-01
1945-01-02
1945-01-16
1945-01-17
1945-02-01
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-15
1945-02-19
1945-02-20
1945-03-05
1945-03-06
1945-03-07
1945-03-11
1945-03-12
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
Canada
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Great Britain
Norway
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
England--Lincolnshire
England--Northamptonshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Rutland
Belgium--Houffalize
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
Germany--Altenburg (Landkreis)
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Essen
Germany--Euskirchen (Kreis)
Germany--Giessen (Hesse)
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Homberg (Kassel)
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Munich
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Sassnitz
Germany--Siegen
Germany--Weser-Ems Region
Manitoba--Dauphin Area
Manitoba--Portage la Prairie
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Norway--Bergen
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Wales--Gwynedd
Netherlands
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Manitoba
Czech Republic--Most
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
David Leitch
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LBarberT1047323v2
1661 HCU
29 OTU
50 Squadron
84 OTU
Advanced Flying Unit
Air Observers School
aircrew
Anson
Bolingbroke
bomb aimer
bombing
Bombing and Gunnery School
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Lancaster Mk 1
Operational Training Unit
RAF Desborough
RAF North Luffenham
RAF Penrhos
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF Syerston
RAF Winthorpe
Stirling
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2086/34534/SWeirG19660703v070001.2.pdf
5210abcb0a501aaeee7869deed8d6c2e
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Weir, Greg. Britt, Leo
Description
An account of the resource
Two items. Collection concerns Flt Lt Leo Britt (Royal Australian Air Force). A Halifax pilot, he flew operations on 462 Squadron between November 1944 and April 1945. Collection contains his log book and a list of aircraft lost on 192 and 462 Squadrons.
The collection was catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-04-26
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Weir, G
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
L Britt’s flying log book for pilots
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
SWeirG19660703v070001
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Description
An account of the resource
Flying log book for L Britt covering the period from 27 May 1943 to 11 February 1953. Detailing his flying training and operations flown. He was stationed at RAAF Benalla (11 EFTS), RAAF Deniliquin (7 SFTS), RAF Babdown Farm (15 P AFU), RAF Moreton in Marsh (21 OTU), RAF Marston Moor (1652 HCU), RAF Driffield and RAF Foulsham (462 Squadron). Aircraft flown in were DH 82, Wirraway, Anson, Oxford, Wellington, Halifax, Mustang, Dakota, Vampire, Lincoln. He flew 21 night-time operations with 462 Squadron. Targets were Sterkrade, Soest, Essen, Duisberg, Kiel, Mannheim, Weisbaden, Ruhr area, Bonn, Kaiserlauten, Munich, Frankfurt, Munster, Kassel, Stade, Bremerhaven, Boizenberg, Neuruffin, Augsberg, Flensberg. He also flew on seven Cook's Tours. His pilot for his first 'second dickie' operation was Flying Officer Rate. This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-12-05
1944-12-06
1944-12-12
1944-12-13
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1945-01-16
1945-01-17
1945-02-01
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-04
1945-02-05
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-28
1945-03-01
1945-03-13
1945-03-14
1945-03-15
1945-03-16
1945-03-19
1945-03-20
1945-03-27
1945-03-28
1945-03-29
1945-03-30
1945-04-13
1945-04-14
1945-04-15
1945-04-16
1945-04-18
1945-04-19
1945-05-02
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Australia
Great Britain
Germany
England--Gloucestershire
England--Norfolk
England--Yorkshire
Germany--Augsburg
Germany--Bonn
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Essen
Germany--Flensburg
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Kassel
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Munich
Germany--Neuruppin
Germany--Soest
Germany--Stade (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Wiesbaden
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Germany--Oberhausen (Düsseldorf)
Germany--Boizenburg
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike French
1652 HCU
21 OTU
462 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
aircrew
Anson
bombing
C-47
Cook’s tour
Flying Training School
Halifax
Halifax Mk 2
Halifax Mk 3
Halifax Mk 5
Harvard
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lincoln
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
P-51
pilot
RAF Acaster Malbis
RAF Driffield
RAF Foulsham
RAF Marston Moor
RAF Moreton in the Marsh
RAF Watchfield
RAF Worksop
Tiger Moth
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1835/33172/LProbynEA1896412v1.1.pdf
7b0fed06931a54c984eaa1495490eba7
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Probyn, Ernest Arthur
E A Probyn
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-04-23
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Probyn, EA
Description
An account of the resource
61 items. The collection concerns Ernest Arthur Probyn (Royal Air Force) and contains his log book, documents, photographs, diary and a scrapbook. He flew operations as a rear gunner with 61 Squadron.<br /><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/2044">Probyn, Ernest. Scrapbook</a> <br /><br />The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by P Probyn and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
E A Probyn’s flying log book for navigators, air bombers, air gunners and flight engineers
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LProbynEA1896412v1
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
Flying log book for navigators, air bombers, air gunners, flight engineers for E A Probyn, air gunner, covering the period from 3 January 1944 to 27 July 1945 and 7 to 11 August 1967. Detailing his flying training and operations flown. He was stationed at RAF Pembrey, RAF Silverstone, RAF Turweston, RAF Swinderby, RAF Syerston, RAF Skellingthorpe and RAF Cosford. Aircraft flown in were Anson, Wellington, Stirling, and Lancaster. He flew a total of 36 operations with 61 Squadron, 7 daylight and 29 night. Targets were Brest, Dortmund-Ems Canal, Karlsruhe, Kaiserslautern, Wilhelmshaven, Bremen, Flushing, Brunswick, Bergen, Dusseldorf, Homberg, Harburg, Trondheim, Munich, Urft Dam, Gdynia, Politz, Oslo Fjord, Houffalize, Royan, Siegen, Rositz, Ladbergen, Bohlen, Lutzkendorf, Wesel and Nordhausen. He also took part in Operation Exodus. His pilot on operations was Flight Lieutenant Boon.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-09-05
1944-09-23
1944-09-24
1944-09-26
1944-09-27
1944-09-28
1944-10-05
1944-10-06
1944-10-07
1944-10-14
1944-10-15
1944-10-28
1944-10-29
1944-11-01
1944-11-02
1944-11-03
1944-11-04
1944-11-05
1944-11-11
1944-11-12
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-11-23
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-09
1944-12-10
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1944-12-19
1944-12-21
1944-12-22
1944-12-28
1944-12-29
1944-12-30
1944-12-31
1945-01-04
1945-01-05
1945-02-01
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-14
1945-02-15
1945-03-03
1945-03-04
1945-03-05
1945-03-06
1945-03-07
1945-03-08
1945-03-12
1945-03-20
1945-03-21
1945-03-22
1945-03-23
1945-03-24
1945-04-04
1967
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Oslofjorden
Belgium--Houffalize
England--Buckinghamshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Northamptonshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Shropshire
Germany--Braunschweig
France--Brest
France--Royan
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Euskirchen Region
Germany--Harburg (Landkreis)
Germany--Homberg (Kassel)
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Leipzig Region
Germany--Merseburg Region
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nordhausen (Thuringia)
Germany--Siegen
Germany--Thuringia
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Germany--Wesel (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Norway--Bergen
Norway--Trondheim
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Wales--Carmarthenshire
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
1660 HCU
17 OTU
61 Squadron
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
Heavy Conversion Unit
Horsa
Ju 88
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Me 410
Operation Exodus (1945)
Operational Training Unit
RAF Cosford
RAF Pembrey
RAF Silverstone
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
RAF Turweston
Stirling
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2044/33092/PProbynEA17010012.1.jpg
fc809987e9d4d11fbd1993d7301bbf7f
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Probyn, Ernest. Scrapbook
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-04-23
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Probyn, EA
Description
An account of the resource
42 items. Scrapbook containing photographs and clippings.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Lincoln Cathedral and Two Target Photos
Description
An account of the resource
Three photos from an album.
Photo 1 is a low level oblique aerial photo of Lincoln Cathedral, captioned 'Photo of Lincoln Minster taken from rear turret'.
Photo 2 is a vertical aerial photograph of Royan during a bombing operation. The coastline is visible. It is annotated '4170 SKELL.4/5.1.45//NT (C) 8" 7100 211° 0404 Royan.H 1 HC4000 (M) IN, 4GP500 DT, 12MC500DT. 23 secs. F/L. Boon H.61.'
Photo 3 is a vertical aerial photograph of Kaiserslautern. No detail is visible and much of the image has been obscured by a bright light. It is annotated '3069 SKELL. 27/28.9.44.//NT (C) 8" 5300 <-- 110°0112 Kaiserslautern 'A'.A 27x4. C15secs. F/O Boon.A.61'.
The two photo are captioned 'Two photographs taken over target area with aid of photo flash'.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Three b/w photographs on an album page
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PProbynEA17010012
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Lincoln
France--Royan
Germany--Kaiserslautern
France
Germany
England--Lincolnshire
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-09-27
1944-09-28
1945-01-04
1945-01-05
61 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
Lancaster
RAF Skellingthorpe
target photograph
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/194/27308/MAdamsHG424504-170215-18.1.2.pdf
f84a07cf11d58d276e6bb7b814145502
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Adams, Herbert
Herbert Adams
H Adams
Herbert G Adams
Description
An account of the resource
88 items. Collection concerns Herbert George Adams DFC, Legion d'Honour (b. 1924, 424509 Royal Australian Air Force). He flew operations as a navigator with 467 Squadron. Collection contains an oral history interview, photographs of people and places, several memoirs about his training and bombing operations, letters to his family, his flying logbook and notes on navigation.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Herbert Adams and catalogued by Nigel Huckins and Trevor Hardcastle.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-02-15
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Adams, HG
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Description
An account of the resource
Page from Herbert Adam's flying logbook for September 1944 on 467 Squadron with his first eight operations.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
H G Adams
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One double page handwritten extract
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MAdamsHG424504-170215-18
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
France
France--Le Havre
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-09-10
1944-09-12
1944-09-17
1944-09-18
1944-09-19
1944-09-23
1944-09-26
1944-09-27
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Title
A name given to the resource
Page from flying log book
467 Squadron
bombing
Lancaster
RAF Waddington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/194/27307/MAdamsHG424504-170215-12.2.pdf
6a8404dcfb160514dad854d71051a338
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/194/27307/MAdamsHG424504-170215-13.1.pdf
f6e1ba2a9557fc9cc5e6b4e269889bd5
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Adams, Herbert
Herbert Adams
H Adams
Herbert G Adams
Description
An account of the resource
88 items. Collection concerns Herbert George Adams DFC, Legion d'Honour (b. 1924, 424509 Royal Australian Air Force). He flew operations as a navigator with 467 Squadron. Collection contains an oral history interview, photographs of people and places, several memoirs about his training and bombing operations, letters to his family, his flying logbook and notes on navigation.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Herbert Adams and catalogued by Nigel Huckins and Trevor Hardcastle.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-02-15
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Adams, HG
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
BERT ADAMS
Rank Sergeant ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE
467 LANCASTER SQUADRON NAVIGATOR
OPERATIONS
Le Havre – 10/9/44.
Stuttgart – 12/9/44.
Boulogne – 17/9/44.
Bremerhaven – 17/9/44.
Munchen-Gladbach – 19/9/44.
Dortmund-Ems – 23/9/44.
Karlsuhe – 26/9/44.
Kaiserslautern – 27/9/44.
Wilhelmshaven – 5/10/44.
Bremen – 6/10/44.
Knolle Dyke – 7/10/44.
Nuremnurg [sic] – 19/10/44.
Walcheren Is. – 23/10/44.
Bergen – 28/10/44.
Flushing – 30/10/44.
Dusseldorf – 2/1144.
Ems-Weser Canal – 6/11/44.
Harbourg – 11/11/44.
Duren – 16/11/44.
Dortmund-Ems Canel [sic] – 21/11/44.
Trondheim – 22/11/44.
Urft Dam – 11/12/44.
Munich – 17/12/44.
Gdynia – 18/12/44.
Rheydt – 27/12/44.
Dortmund-Ems – 1/1/45.
Royan – 4/1/45.
Munich – 7/1/45.
Brux – 16/1/45.
[page break]
BERT ADAMS
R.A.A.F. 424504
467 LANCASTER SQUADRON WADDINGTON
NAVIGATOR
10.9.44 Le Havre (France) 3.55 hrs 11 x 1000, 4 x 500 [inserted] lb bombs [/inserted] Had a good trip, except [deleted] part [/deleted] [inserted] PORT OUTER MOTOR [/inserted] packed up over target
12.9.44 Stuttgart 6.50 hrs night 1 x 4000 + 13 “J” clusters Bombed 3 mins late, saw 4 fighters Junkers 88, and unident, lots of coksrews. [sic]
14.9.44 Wainfleet 1.10 hrs night abandoned – poor vis, had to get down to 500 ft to get home
17.9.44 Boulogne 3.25 hrs day. 11 x 1000, 4 x 500
18.9.44 Bremerhaven 4.45 hrs night 18 cans incends no fighters after us, not much flak
19.9.44 Munchen-Gladbach 5.05 hrs night 1 x 2000 + 12 “J” clusters good trip to target, had to orbit 3 times for [deleted]sn[/deleted] [inserted]m[/inserted]arking, [inserted] delay [/inserted], very nearly collided, cloud very low on return T on edge of Ruhr.
23.9.44 Dortmund-Ems Canal 5.25 night 14 x 1000 crook trip for Nav – no aids & winds wrong had to orbit T, get down 6300’ to bomb, come home off track over Rotterdam, lots of flak
26.9.44 Karlsruhe 6.50 hrs night 18 cans incends saw no fighters, not much A/A, had to bomb on glare of fires
[page break]
467 Lancaster Squadron ….. Operations
27.9.44 Kaiserlautern 6.20 hrs night 18 cans incends hit target very well, saw no fighters plenty of small flak, but no hits
5.10.44 Wilhelmshaven 5.05 hrs day 18 cans incends
10/10 cloud over T, bombed on inst, got left behind formation on on [sic] the way home.
6.10.44 Bremen 4.55 hrs night 18 cans incends fairly well defended target, attack very effective
7.10.44 Knolle Dyke 3.10 hrs day 14 x 1000, 2 sticks of 7 out in formation, two bombing runs. no flak hit us, but there was a fair bit
19.10.44 Nuremberg 8.10 hrs night 1 x 2000 + 12 “J” clusters extremely quiet trip, no shearch [sic] lights or fighters.
23.10.44 Flushing 3.20 hrs day 14 x 1000 weather frightfully bad, bombed from min ht. 4000’ just under cloud, flak pretty accurate, most kites holed, 3 lost. come home at zero feet.
28.10.44 Bergen (Norway) 7.30 hrs night 12 x 1000 hard nav trip, flak very severe, monotonous sea trip, diverted to Marston Moor
30.10.44 Walcheren Is (Holland) 3.20 hrs day 14 x 1000 good trip except around Target, cloud crook, had to do 8 cicuits [sic] negligible flak, good nav trip
[page break]
467 LANCASTER SQUADRON …… OPERATIONS
2.11.44 Dusseldorf 5.20 hrs night 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500 got off late, but made up, flak inaccurate, but fighters very active, full moon no cloud. saw 13 kites go down, but din’t [sic] see any fighters ourselves.
6.11.44 Ems-Weser Canal 5.25 hrs night 14 x 1000 set course 10 mins late, marker got [inserted] no [/inserted] joy, had to bring bombs home. fighters active, few went down, weather extremly [sic] rough on way home
11.11.44 Harburg 5.35 hrs night 1 x 4000, 6 x 1000, 6 x 500 tactics changed twice, mess up all together. Got off o.k. & had fair trip – Nearly collided on way out – nearest escape yet! Frank Eyres crew missing (same billet as us) Bods came in two hours late, kept us awake!!!
16.11.44 Duren 5.25 hrs day 12 x 1000 Very nice nav trip. Ran into predicted flak 3 or 4 miles part of the track on way out, very close collected a few holes, none serious to kite or crew. vis very crook on return
21.11.44 Dortmund-Ems Canal 6.10 hrs night 13 x 1000 Fair trip had to come down to 3800’ to bomb because of cloud + nice bombing
[page break]
467 LANCASTER SQUADRON …. OPERATIONS
22.11.44 Trondheim (Norway) 10.55 hrs night 9 x 1000 Bombs brought home – target obscured by smoke screen. Off track on way home, loked [sic] as not enough juice, but wind changed and we just made it.
11.12.44 Urft Dam 6.05 hrs day 14 x 1000 Sorry we had to fly strange kite (F), very poor climber, got to target late. Did two runs but couldn’t bomb – clouds. Feathered engine on way home. Could only do 140 jettsoned [sic] 2 to land, back over an hour late.
17.12.44 Munich 9.45 hrs night 1 x 4000, 9 cans, 1 munroe
18.12.44 Gdynia (Special target – pocket battleship (“LUTZOW”) 10 x 1000 S.A.P. 9.40 hrs night
27.12.44 Rheydt 5.00 hrs day 14 x 1000
1.1.45 Dortmund-Ems Canal 6.40 hrs day 11 x 1000, 4 x 500 diverted to Strubby
4.1.45 Royan (France) 6.30 hrs night 1 x 4000, 16 x 500
7.1.44 [sic] Munich 8.45 hrs night 1 x 4000, 6 clusters
16.1.44 [sic] Brux 10.00 hrs night 1 x 4000 12 x 5
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
List of Bert Adams operations
Description
An account of the resource
List of 29 operations as navigator on Lancaster of 467 Squadron between 10 September 1044 and 16 January 1945. Includes comments on each sortie with bomb load, flight times, fighters seen, weather, anti-aircraft fire, aircraft shot down.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Five page typewritten document
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Personal research
Text. Memoir
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MAdamsHG424504-170215-12, MAdamsHG424504-170215-13
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Norway
Netherlands
France
Poland
Czech Republic
Germany
France--Le Havre
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Germany--Bremen
Netherlands--Walcheren
Norway--Bergen
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Hamburg Region
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Norway--Trondheim
Germany--Euskirchen Region
Germany--Munich
Poland--Gdynia
Germany--Rheydt
France--Royan
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Czech Republic--Most
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-09-10
1944-09-12
1944-09-17
1944-09-19
1944-09-23
1944-09-26
1944-09-27
1944-10-05
1944-10-06
1944-10-07
1944-10-19
1944-10-23
1944-10-28
1944-10-30
1944-11-02
1944-11-06
1944-11-11
1944-11-16
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-12-11
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1944-12-27
1945-01-01
1945-01-04
1945-01-07
1945-01-16
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
H G Adams
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Tricia Marshall
467 Squadron
aircrew
bombing
incendiary device
Ju 88
navigator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/194/27300/LAdamsHG424504v1.1.pdf
7cfa3247f6218dfe621eadcd2e692793
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Adams, Herbert
Herbert Adams
H Adams
Herbert G Adams
Description
An account of the resource
88 items. Collection concerns Herbert George Adams DFC, Legion d'Honour (b. 1924, 424509 Royal Australian Air Force). He flew operations as a navigator with 467 Squadron. Collection contains an oral history interview, photographs of people and places, several memoirs about his training and bombing operations, letters to his family, his flying logbook and notes on navigation.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Herbert Adams and catalogued by Nigel Huckins and Trevor Hardcastle.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-02-15
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Adams, HG
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
H G Adams’ Royal Australian Air Force observer’s air gunner’s and W/T operator’s flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
Royal Australian Air Force observer’s air gunner’s and W/T operator’s flying log book for H G Adams, navigator, covering the period from 11 May 1943 to 23 August 1945. Detailing his flying training, operations flown and instructor duties. He was stationed at RAAF Cootamundra, RAAF Evans Head, RAAF Parkes, RAF Llandwrog, RAF Lichfield, RAF Swinderby, RAF Syerston, RAF Waddington and RAF Wigsley. Aircraft flown in were, Anson, Battle, Wellington, Stirling and Lancaster. He flew a total of 29 operations with 467 squadron, 10 daylight and 19night operations. Targets were, Le Havre, Stuttgart, Boulogne, Bremerhaven, Monchen Gladbach, Dortmund-Ems Canal, Karlsruhe, Kaiserlautern, Wilhelmshaven, Bremen, Flushing, Bergen, Walcheren, Dusseldorf, Ems-Weser Canal, Harburg, Duren, Trondheim, Urft Dam, Munich, Gdynia, Rheydt, Royan and Brux. His pilot on operations was Flying officer G-Buchanan.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Creator
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Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Format
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One booklet
Language
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eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LAdamsHG424504v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Australian Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Australia
Czech Republic
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Poland
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Staffordshire
France
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Le Havre
France--Royan
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Euskirchen Region
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Munich
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Netherlands--Walcheren
New South Wales--Cootamundra
New South Wales--Evans Head
New South Wales--Parkes
Norway--Bergen
Norway--Trondheim
Poland--Gdynia
Norway
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Urft Dam
New South Wales
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Czech Republic--Most
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944-09-10
1944-09-12
1944-09-13
1944-09-17
1944-09-18
1944-09-19
1944-09-20
1944-09-23
1944-09-24
1944-09-26
1944-09-27
1944-09-28
1944-10-08
1944-10-16
1944-10-17
1944-10-19
1944-10-20
1944-10-23
1944-10-28
1944-10-29
1944-10-30
1944-11-02
1944-11-06
1944-11-11
1944-11-16
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-11-23
1944-12-11
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1944-12-19
1944-12-27
1945-01-01
1945-01-04
1945-01-07
1945-01-08
1945-01-16
1945-01-17
1945-06-19
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
1654 HCU
1660 HCU
27 OTU
467 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
air gunner
Air Observers School
aircrew
Anson
Battle
bomb aimer
Bombing and Gunnery School
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
navigator
Operational Training Unit
RAF Lichfield
RAF Llandwrog
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
RAF Waddington
RAF Wigsley
Stirling
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/194/27209/MAdamsHG424504-170215-01.2.pdf
1081940cd3d5fc25972f96a05b4902d4
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Adams, Herbert
Herbert Adams
H Adams
Herbert G Adams
Description
An account of the resource
88 items. Collection concerns Herbert George Adams DFC, Legion d'Honour (b. 1924, 424509 Royal Australian Air Force). He flew operations as a navigator with 467 Squadron. Collection contains an oral history interview, photographs of people and places, several memoirs about his training and bombing operations, letters to his family, his flying logbook and notes on navigation.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Herbert Adams and catalogued by Nigel Huckins and Trevor Hardcastle.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-02-15
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Adams, HG
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[inserted] (There is some duplication of notes for Ops [symbol] 1 to [symbol] 14 as I wrote something at different times (years apart.)) [/inserted]
[inserted] [symbol] Soon after we feathered that engine over “A” Flight commander flew up on our wing top & feathered 3 engines & kept up with us! He was giving us some assurance that a lightly loaded Lancaster could fly level (for a while) on 1 engine … reassurance for a new crew [/inserted]
My navigation Logs & Charts of our operations with 467 (RAAF) Squadron at Waddington, near Lincoln, from 10.9.44 to 16.1.45, with extracts from a publication giving some details of every operation by 467 & 463 Squadrons from 10.9.44 to 25.4.45.
[circled 1] [underlined] LE HAVRE, 10.9.44 [/underlined] 21 from 467, 20 from 463 as part of 992 bombers on 8 different German strong points outside of Le Havre. The targets were accurately marked and bombed, with no losses from Waddington. We took off at 1522, flew to Syerston (nearby), then did a radius of action on a track of 260oT so as to be back at Syerston at 1604 at 8000’. The winds were about what was forecast, 025/15; we bombed at 1723 at 12100’, bomb load was 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500 lb H.E. Two minutes after we dropped our bombs our Port Outer motor stopped (stray AA – fire?), we feathered the prop & flew home OK on 3 engines, airborne for 3h 55 min.
[symbol] On 11.9.44, 218 bombers from 5 Group attacked the German positions still holding out at Le Havre, with no losses. 2 British divisions were attacking Le Havre & the German garrison surrendered a few hours after the raid. The British wished to capture the port intact, but the German garrison had laid mines, and blown up most of the docks, and so it was several weeks before the port could be used.
DAMSTADT, 11.9.44. 226 Lancasters from 5 Group bombed at night, losing 1 crew (all K.I.A.) from 463 Sqdn. Our pilot, Peter Gray-Buchanan, did his “Second Dickie” on this raid.
[circled 2] [underlined] STUTTGART, 12.9.44. [/underlined] 20 from 467, 14 from 463, of 204 from [underlined] 5 Group [/underlined]. (On the same night 378 Lancasters bombed Frankfurt with success.) Post-war, a German expert – Heinz Bardau – wrote that the northern & western parts of Stuttgart city were erased in this concentrated attack… a [underlined] fire-storm resulted [/underlined], with 1171 people killed, the city’s highest fatality figure for the war.
[page break]
STUTTGART (Con’t)
467 Sqdn lost 2 crews (F/L D. Brown, 5 KIA, 2 POW, F/O Bright. 5 KIA, 2 POW.)
We took off at 1916 & set course at 1919, staying at 2500’ until 2137 when we began climbing, to 16000’ by 2233. Our last GEE fix was at 2232 and the next (after bombing OK at 2316) at 0022… so nearly 2 hours of Dead Reckoning with some map reading. (The Germans jammed our GEE receiver so that the screen was filled with “Grass”). The actual winds were about as forecast 160/15 at the target. Our bomb load was 1 x 4000 lb “cookie” & 13 J clusters (of incendiaries). Two minutes after bombing our gunners saw a fighter (they think a Do217) at about 400 yards, so we began to “corkscrew”. We continued corkscrewing until 2329, seeing one plane (unidentified) at about 50 yards! and another with a light on (!). We were airborne for 6h 51 min.
[circled 3] [underlined] BOULOGNE. 17.9.44. [/underlined] We took off at 0806 & flew to Syerston, then did a Radius of Action (on track of 260oT) to return to Syerston at 0837 at 6000’, where we did a circuit to port to lose height & get into formation at 3000! We had an uneventual [sic] trip to the target where we bombed at 8100’, dropping 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500 lb. We were airborne for 3h 26 min. 19 Lancs from each of 467 & 463 joined 762 bombers dropping more than 3000 tons of H.E. bombs on German positions around Bologne in preparation for an attack by Allied troops. The German garrison surrendered soon after the raid.
[circled 4] [underlined] BREMERHAVEN 18.9.44. [/underlined] 19 Lancs from each of 467 & 463 were part of a total of [underlined] 206 from 5 Group [/underlined], with no losses from Waddington. The post-war assessors found that this 5-Group attack, with less than 900 tons of bombs, started a [underlined] fire-storm [/underlined] which destroyed 2750 buildings in the main port area, & that [underlined] 30000 [/underlined] people were made homeless & had to live in the open until evacuated several days later.
[page break]
Extracts from a publication giving some details of every wartime operation by 467 & 463 Squadrons (loaned by Sam Nelson) RED = Daylight. BLACK = Night BLUE = We weren’t on it.
[circled 1] 10-9-44 LE HAVRE 21 from 467, 20 from 463 as part of 992 bomber raid on 8 different German strongpoints outside Le Havre. The targets were accurately marked and bombed. No losses.
D. 3h 55m. 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500. 12000’ (We lost P.O. engine during bomb-run).
Day 11-9-44. LE HAVRE. 218 bombers from 5 Group attacked German positions still holding out at Le Havre. Two British divisions were now attacking Le Havre and the German garrison surrendered a few hours later. The British wished to capture the port intact as a supply port for the armies, but the German garrison had proved spiteful – they had mined and blown up most of the docks, and it was a number of weeks before the port could be used.
[inserted] Night [/inserted] 11-9-44 DAMSTADT. 226 Lancasters of 5 Group.
Our pilot (Peter Gray-Buchanan) did his “second dickie”. 1 A/C from 463 lost (7 KIA).
[circled 2] 12-9-44 STUTTGART. 20 of 467, 14 of 463, of 204 from 5 Group. (Same night 378 Lancasters on Frankfurt … with success.) Post war, a German expert, Heinz Bardau, wrote that the Northern + Western parts of the city were erased in this concentrated attack, & that a fire-storm resulted … 1171 people killed. Stuttgart’s highest fatality figure for the war. 467 lost 2 crews: F/L D. Brown .. 5 KIA, 2 POW; F/O Bright … 5 KIA, 2 POW.
F 6h 50m 1 x 4000 + 13 J clusters. 15750’
[circled 3] 17-9-44. BOULOGNE. 19 from 467, 19 from 463, of 762 bombers dropping more than 3000 tons of H.E. bombs on German positions around Boulogne in preparation for an attack by Allied troops. The German garrison
[page break]
surrendered soon afterwards.
D. 3h 25 m. 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500. 8100’
[circled 4] 18-9-44 BREMERHAVEN. 19 of 467, 19 of 463, of 206 from 5-Group. No losses from Waddington. The post-war assessors found that this 5-Group attack, with less than 900 tons of bombs, started a fire-storm which destroyed 2750 buildings in the main port area, & that 30000 people were made homeless & lived in the open until evacuated several days later.
D 4h 45m. 18 cans (incendiaries – 150 per can). 15250’
[circled 5] [inserted] 19-9-44 [/inserted] RHEYDT/MUNCHEN-GLADBACH. 19 of 467, 16 of 463, of 227 Lancasters of 5-Group bombing the twin towns. German reports state that only between 267 and 271 people were killed. 467 lost one Lanc, crashing on returning (4 KIA, 1 POW, 2 evaded, including pilot, F/O Findlay) Master Bomber was W/C Guy Gibson, VC, DSO, DFC (of Dambusters fame) flying a Mosquito … which crashed in flames near the Dutch coast. He and his navigator (S/L J.N. Warwick, DFC) were killed and buried at Steenbergen-en-Kriesland. (Orbited target for 17mm – marking delay). 11000’
D 5h 5m 1 x 2000 + 12 J clusters.
[circled 6] 23-9-44 DORTMUND-EMS CANAL (Aqueduct). 19 of 467, 17 of 463, of 136 Lancs. from 5-Group mounting a special attack on the aqueduct at Ladbergen on the Dortmund-Ems Canal. The canal was breached, but losses were heavy 10% of the force were lost. 467 lost F/O G.A. Brown and crew. (5 KIA. 2 POW). (Orbited target losing height for 15 min extra there. Meant to bomb 14000’ but 6400’ due to cloud)
C 5h 25m 14 x 1000
[page break]
[inserted] On the unused back of one of the logsheets are some sketches (rough) of GEE BOX & the kind of blips, scales etc, displayed [/inserted]
(BREMERHAVEN, Con’t).
We took off at 1832, orbited base until 1844, when we set course at 2000’. At 1915 we needed to alter course southwards to regain our track as the winds were from about 085oT rather than 060oT (forecast). Our last GEE fix (before jamming) was on track near turning point A, and we’d climbed to 15000’, from which height we bombed at 2103. Our bomb load was 18 cans of incendiaries. The Lancaster bomb-bay, (quite long & wide, under the floor) had 14 ‘hooks’, so to use 18 cans, 3 of the hooks had a framework added to hold 3 cans side by side. The bomb-aimer could select all 14 hooks to release independently, usually at fairly short time intervals to produce a “stick” of bombs usefully spread. Each can of incendiaries released 150 small bombs about 5 cm diameter & about 40 cm long, each capable of starting a fire.
It was an easy trip for navigation, with GEE only jammed for about 1/2 hr before & after the target. We were airborne for 4h 46 min.
[circled 5] [underlined] RHEYDT/MUNCHEN-GLADBACH. 19.9.44 [/underlined] 19 Lancs from 467, & 16 from 463 were part of a total of 227 from 5 Group bombing the twin-towns. German reports state that only between 267 & 271 people were killed. 467 Sqdn lost one Lanc. crashing on returning (4 KIA but pilot, F/O Findlay, & one other evaded, & the 7th was imprisoned). The Master-Bomber was W/C Guy Gibson VC, DSO, DFC, of Dambuster fame, flying a Mosquito which crashed in flames near the Dutch coast. He and his navigator (S/L J.N. Warwick, DFC) were killed and buried at Steenbergen-en-Kriesland. We took off at 1856 and did a Radius-of-Action (track 260oT) to arrive back at Base at 1913, at 2000’. The winds were about as predicted, we kept close to track & time, and arrived at target at 2139 at 11000’, but were told to [underlined] orbit [/underlined] (to port) due to marking problems. At 2148 we were told to [underlined] orbit again, [/underlined] until, at 2151 we we [sic] told to “attack Green spot fires direct”, which we did at 2155, at 11000’.
[page break]
[photograph] D-Dog at Waddington, 1944
[photograph] [symbol] Peter at pilots window
[photograph] Our gunners
Left: Ken Nicholls, Rear Gunner
Right: Ray Giles, Mid-Upper Gunner
[page break]
RHEYDT/MUNCHEN-GLADBACH (Con’t).
At 2159 1/2 I logged “a/c hit ground – explosion – flame & smoke”
At 2201 1/2 I logged “a/c on ground, bears 000o, 2 min (51o23’, 05o51’E).
At 2211 we saw an unidentified fighter so went into the corkscrew routine, at about 51o30’N 05o00’E.
At 2213 1/2 , while in starbord [sic] turn saw unidentified fighter above us, at about 51o31’N 04o53’E, so continued to corkscrew.
At 2221, I logged “possible a/c hit ground 3 mi on port beam, about 51o32 1/2’N 04o19’E. Our bomb-load was 1 x 2000 lb & 12 “J” clusters. We were airborne for 5h 5 min.
[circled 6] [underlined] DORTMUND-EMS CANAL [/underlined]. 23.9.44. 19 from 467 & 17 from 463 of total 136 Lancs from 5 Group mounted a special attack on the aquaduct at Ladbergen. The canal was breached, but losses were heavy … 10% of the force. 467 Sqdn lost F/O G.A. Brown & crew (5 KIA, 2 POW).
We took off at 1906, did the usual Radius-of-Action to be back at Base at 1931 at 2000’. We crossed the Channel at 4000’ then climbed to 6000’, keeping nicely to track until 2047. GEE was being jammed, and the next 2 fixes showed us 10 & 20 mi North of track … they may have been wrong. We continued by dead-reckoning through cloud climbing to 14000’ and arriving at the target on time at 2148. (We were told by Master-Bomber at 2146 “to bomb 150 ft N.W. of Red Target Indicator (flare)” J. But we were in thick cloud, so [underlined] orbited to port [/underlined] losing height … very dangerous in cloud. At 2155 the Master-Bomber said “cloud base is 8000’, come in and bomb”, but we were still in cloud & had to do [underlined] another orbit [/underlined], losing height to 6300’, so that finally we could see the target at bombed at 2203 from 6400’.
At 2205 I logged “a/c hit ground & exploded 8 mi S.E. of [symbol], (at about 51o59’N 07o53’E.”
At 2228 1/2 I logged “crossed river; a/c hit ground, port beam, 3 mi.”
At 2229 “a/c directly under us hit ground, 52o15’N 06o11’E.”
At 2231 1/2 I logged “a/c hit ground ahead about 10 mi” [brackets]
At 2236 1/2 I logged “a/c (same one?) on port beam, 5 mi [brackets] 52o10’N 06o00’E
[page break]
DORTMUND-EMS CANAL (Con’t).
After leaving the target area, the winds must have been stronger than predicted from the South.
At 2253 I logged “Strong searchlights ahead … Bomb-Aimer thinks its Rotterdam” (about 10 mi North of desired track). So we immediately turned 40o to port, but copped some flak.
At 2303 we saw searchlights over the OVER FLAKKEE area, and at 2304 got our first GEE fix since our last good one at 2047 putting us about 11 mi north of track.
Our bomb-load was 14 x 1000 lb. We were airborne for 5h 25 min.
[underlined] CALAIS. 24.9.44. [/underlined] 8 from 467, & 7 from 463 of a total 188 from 5 Group. 8 were shot down, including 1 from 467 Sqdn, F/O R.A. Jones (3 KIA & 4 POW).
[circled 7] [underlined] KARLSRUHE 26.9.44 [/underlined]. 17 from 467, 14 from 463 of a total 227 from 5 Group. A short German report states “that there was damage throughout the city & lists several important buildings destroyed”. 467 Sqdn lost F/O K. Miller (1 KIA, 6 POW).
We took off at 0055 & did the usual radius-of-action to be back at base at 0113 at 3000’. The winds were much as predicted and we kept close to track & timing, our last reliable GEE fix was at 0337; we arrived at target at 0408 and Master-Bomber told us to “bomb direct on mixed Red & Green T.1’s” But we had 10/10 cloud below us, so we “went round again” & managed to bomb at 0414 from 11500’. Our first reliable GEE fix on the way home was at 0444, only just over 1 hour of jamming.
Our bomb-load was 18 cans of incendiaries, and we were airborne for 6h 50 mins.
[circled 8] [underlined] KAISERLAUTERN 27.9.44 [/underlined] 16 from 467, 15 from 463 of a total of 217 from 5 Group, did the only major raid of the war by Bomber Command. 909 tons of bombs were dropped causing widespread damage to this medium-sized city. A local German report complained that the town was not a military objective, but went on to list a catalogue of small factories destroyed. We took off at 2205,
[page break]
24-9-44. CALAIS. 8 of 467, 7 of 463, of 188 from 5-Group. 8 were shot down. 467 lost F/O R. A. Jones & crew (3 KIA, 4 POW)
[circled 7] 26-9-44 KARLSRUHE. 17 of 467, 14 of 463, of 227 from 5-Group. A short German report states that there was damage throughout the city & lists several important buildings destroyed. 467 lost F/O K. Miller & crew (1 KIA, 6 POW).
J 6h 50m 18 cans incendiaries 11500’
[circled 8] 27-9-44 KAISERLAUTERN. 16 of 467, 15 of 463, of 217 from 5-Group on Kaiserlautern, a medium-sized city, in the only major raid on it by Bomber Command during the war. 909 tons of bombs were dropped a widespread damage was caused. A local German report complains that the town was not a military object, but goes on to list a catalogue of small factories destroyed.
H 6h 20m 18 cans incendiaries 4000’
(Sept. Summary: 467 flew 199 sorties; lost 6 crews (23 KIA, 17 POW, 2 Ev.) 4 tours completed.)
[circled 9] 5-10-44 WILHELMSHAVEN 17 of 467, 16 of 463, of 227 from 5-Group. 10/10 cloud, marking by H2S. The Wilhelmshaven Diary states that only 12 people died and one bomber was shot down. 467 lost 1 crew (they ditched … hadn’t got to the target … at about 11 am. They were finally rescued about 5pm next day. After short leave, they returned to ‘ops, and were all Killed-in-Action on the Harburg raid.
(This was the only ‘trip’ on which we were allowed to use H2S (they thought enemy fighters could use its transmission to find us). We couldn’t see the markers, so bombed by H2S.)
C. 5h 5m. 18 cans incendiaries. 15000’ (We flew to target in formation escorted by long-range Mustangs
[page break]
did a Radius of Action to be back at base at 2228 at 3000’. We stayed at 3000’ until 0010, then climbed to 4500’ and stayed at 4500’ until close to target, when told to bomb from 4000’, which we did (1 1/2 min early), dropping 18 cans of incendiaries. We kept close to track all the way and only lost GEE for an hour. We were airborne for 6h 20 min.
[circled 9] [underlined] WILHELMHAVEN. [/underlined] 17 of 467, 16 of 463, of 227 from 5-Group, a daylight raid flying in formation to the target, escorted by long-range Mustang fighters. The met. forcast [sic] was for considerable cloud at the target, and we were given the most unusual priorities for bombing:-
(i) drop them visually if target is clear;
(ii) use H2S if target is obscured; or (!)
(iii) drop when you see another bomber drop its load.
We took off at 0755, did a Radius of Action to be back at base at 0811 to join formation at 1500’. My GEE set was not working, but being in formation I didn’t have to navigate anyway. Ted Pickard, the new assistant Nav. Officer, criticised my lack of effort to have some practice. At 1010 we began to climb to 15000’ at the target where at 1106 there was 10/10 cloud below. Our Bomb Aimer & I operated the H2S and aimed at the NW corner of the town and dropped our bombs at 1110 and noticed two other Lancasters dropped theirs immediately after. We flew home independently, but other Lancs were visible so we followed the stream. At 1212 I took over flying a plane for the first & only time, keeping straight & level without much trouble for half an hour. We did a bit of map-reading for the last 1/2 hour, and landed at 1306, being airborne for 5h 5 min. Our bomb-load was 18 cans of incendiaries. The Wilhelmshaven Diary states that only 12 people died and that 1 bomber was shot down. 467 lost 1 crew … they ditched before the target at about 11 am & were (finally) rescued about 1700 the next day. After short leave they resumed ops., but were all K.I.A. on the HARBURG raid on 11.11.44. Our bomb-load was 15 cans of incendiaries
[page break]
[circled 10] [underlined] BREMEN [/underlined] 17 of 467 Sq., 18 of 463 Sq., of 246 from 5 Group, a night raid on 6.10.44, with bomb-load 18 cans of incendiaries dropped from 17250’. Air borne at 1736 & did Return of Action arriving back at base at 1753 at 5000’. A good navigation trip keeping close to desired track, but winds were lighter than expected, so, despite reducing air-speed twice (10 mph each time) we did a 60o – 120o triangle to lose 7 min. This was the last of 32 major Bomber Command raids on Bremen of the war. This raid, based on the 5 Group marking method, was an outstanding success. 1021 tons of bombs were dropped, of which 868 tons were incendiaries. A detailed report (local) is available which was compiled by an official who stated that: “the night was clear, with 3/4 full moon. A huge fire area was started. Classed as destroyed were 4859 houses, 42 factories, 2 shipyards, the Focke-Wulf works & the Siemens-Schubert electrical works. The transport network was seriously disrupted.” This raid, by no more than 1/4 of Bomber Command (& hardly mentioned in the British War History) had finished Bremen … it was not attacked again in the war.
We landed at 2233 after a trip of 4hr 55 min.
[circled 11] [underlined] FLUSHING [/underlined] (WEST DYKE on WALCHEREN ISLAND in the Scheldt Estuary.) 12 of 467, & 11 of 463 of a total of 121 of 5 Group, a daylight raid on 7.10.44. We each did 2 runs dropping a stick of 7 each run (all 1000 lb HE bombs). The sea-wall was breached and virtually all the island was flooded except the rest of the sea-wall, the central tour (Middleburgh) & the town of Flushing. English newspapers had a photo of the flooded island the next day. We had no losses despite plenty of A.A. [inserted] [two indecipherable words] [/inserted]. On the same day 846 of Bomber Command attacked Kleve-Emerich & Kembs Dams. 617 Sqn. used Tallboys (12000 lb bomb) on Kembs to destroy the floodgates to [underlined] prevent [/underlined] the Germans flooding the valley in the face of the American & French advance.
We were airborn for 3h 10 min.
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[circled 10] 6-10-44 BREMEN. 17 of 467, 18 of 463, of 246 from 5-Group. This was the last of 32 major Bomber Command raids on Bremen during the war. The raid, based on the 5-Group marking method, was an outstanding success. 1021 tons of bombs were dropped of which 868 tons were incendiaries. A detailed local report is available which was compiled by an official who stated that the night was clear with 3/4 full moon … A huge fire area was started. Classed as destroyed were 4859 houses, 42 factories, 2 shipyards, the Focke-Wulfe works and the Siemens Schubert electrical works. The transport network was seriously disrupted. This raid, by no more than 1/4 of Bomber Command (and hardly mentioned in British (War) History, had finished Bremen and the city was not attacked again by Bomber Command.
D 4h 55m 18 cans incendiaries 17250’
[circled 11] 17-10-44 FLUSHING (WALCHEREN ISLAND – WEST DYKE)
12 of 467, 11 of 463, of 121 from 5-Group to successfully breach the sea-wall near Flushing. No losses. (The same day 846 of Bomber Command attacked Kleve Emerich & Kembs Dams … 617 Squadron used ‘Tallboy’ bombs on Kembs. (The idea was to destroy the floodgates to [underlined] prevent [/underlined] the Germans flooding the Rhine valley in the face of French & American advances … this was done OK.)
D 3h 10m 2 sticks of 7 x 1000 6100’ Extra 6 min. orbit for 2nd stick.
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DAY 11-10-44 FLUSHING. 14 of 467, 20 of 463, of 115 from 5-Group attacked gun positions on N. bank of Scheldt Estuary near Flushing. No losses from Waddington.
[deleted] NIGHT [/deleted] [inserted] DAY [/inserted] 14-10-44 DUISBURG Bomber command sent 1013 heavy bombers, and 473 fighters, Americans sent 1251 heavy bombers and 749 fighters … the raid was carried out on a directive from Allied H.Q. to show the Germans the power of Bomber Commands.
NIGHT 14-10-44 BRUNSWICK 19 of 467, 20 of 463 to join 233 of 5 Group. The most effective of numerous raids on Brunswick. Using the 5-Group low-level marking method, Brunswick was finally destroyed. A German report simply lists the number of hectares burnt out. 23000 people were rescued from air-raid shelters and only 200 perished. A special train was sent from Bavaria to help feed the 80000 homeless.
DAY 17-10-44 WESTKAPELLE 2 of 467, 9 of 463 of 47 from 5-Group attacking sea-wall at Westkapelle. Bombing appeared to be accurate but no report is available. No losses.
[circled 12] 19-10-44 NUREMBERG (& DUISBURG) 20 of 467, 20 of 463, of 263 from 5-Group with 7 Mosquitoes in a special low-level-marked attack on Nuremberg. The target was completely cloud-covered and low-level marking could not be used. The raid was effective but not the ‘knockout’ as hoped. (There were 103 bombers from another Group on Stuttgart and other targets, losing only 0.9%). 467 lost F/O E. Rodwell & crew (7 KIA)
D 8h 10m 1 x 2000 + 12 J clusters. 17400’
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On 11-10-44, 16 of 467, 20 of 463 of total 115 (all 5 Group) attacked big gun positions on the bank of [underlined] Scheldt Estuary [/underlined], near Flushing. The big guns prevented a sea attack to open the Estuary for Allied supply shipping (a minefield had to be cleared too), and they menaced the Canadian Army who were attacking south of the Estuary, but couldn’t match these big guns for range. I think the weather was bad, poor visibility maybe no great harm done to the guns.
On 14-10-44 there was a big daylight raid on [underlined] Duisberg [/underlined], carried out as a directive from Allied H.Q. to show the Germans the power of Allied Air Power. Bomber Command sent 1013 heavies & 413 fighters, the Americans sent 1251 heavies & 749 fighters.
That night, (14-10-44) 5 Group sent 19 of 467 Sq & 20 of 463 Sq of a total of 233, to [underlined] Brunswick [/underlined], using the 5 Group low-level marking method, Brunswick was finally destroyed. A German report simply lists the number of hectares burnt out. 23000 people were rescued from air-raid shelters & only 200 perished. Special train sent from Bavaria to help feed the 80000 homeless.
On 17-10-44, 2 of 467, & 9 of 463 Sq. of total of 47 of 5 Group attacked the sea-wall again near Westkapelle on Walcheren Island. Bombing appeared to be accurate but no report was available.
[circled 12] [underlined] NUREMBERG [/underlined]. 5 Group sent 20 of 467 Sq. & 20 of 463 Sq of a total of 263 with 7 Mosquitos to do low-level marking. There was total cloud cover which prevented the low-level marking. The raid was effective but not the knock-out hoped for. The rest of Bomber Command raided Stuttgart & other nearby targets, only losing 0.9%. 467 Sq. lost F/O Rodwell & crew (7 KIA). We took off at 1713, did a Radius of Action coming back to base at 1718 at 2000’. We reduced speed to 150 mph but still had to lose 6 min doing 60oL, 120oR, then got to [symbol] OK but had to orbit as directed.
Bombed 15 min late at 17400’ on Red & Green Target [deleted] [indecipherable word] flares [/deleted]
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Our bomb-load was 1 x 2000 lb HE, and 12 ‘J’ clusters (incendiary). After leaving the target we descended to 6000’, & flew on dead-reckoning, south of Stuttgart & Strasbourg for 2 hours until I got the first GEE fix, nearly 20 miles north of our track, but safely over France. Sid discovered that we had one of the ‘J’ bombs “hung-up”. We went to the jettison area in the Channel & tried to release it manually … did 2 orbits as we kept trying, but without success. So we flew on home to base at 4000’, landing after 8hr 9 min airborne, by far our longest flight so far.
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[inserted] [symbol] Don Coults (Engineer went to Ireland to visit his parents there. [/inserted]
After our 11th Op at Flushing we went on the usual 6-day leave, after only about 4 weeks after we started our tour. The crews were put on a roster for leave, usually each 6 weeks, but you could go earlier if a few crews before you on the list went missing.
A few items from a diary I kept then … 7th Oct: On our return from the Flushing op, we “shot-up” the ‘drome (low level) for W/C. Brill who was going home to Australia. Wrote up log book. Went to a dance with Jackie from our Mess.
8th:- Applied for leave passes. Got paid. Packed.
9th:- Collected subsistence money, & petrol coupons for bike, [symbol] got leave passes. Caught train to London, missed by Ken. Booked in at A.C.F. Club for the night. Ken arrived at 10 pm. We booked in for the rest of the leave. Nice room.
10th. Had breakfast at the Boomerang Club. I looked around & spotted Kirk Beddie from Mendooran. I’ll just go back in time to our first couple of operations to relate a coincidence. When our 8 new crews arrived together, our Nav. Leader, F/Lt Arnold Eastman, was still doing Ops himself, yet was responsible for in-service training of the navigators (especially us new ones). So he delegated the checking of log & charts, and giving advice to some of his senior navigators (Who’d lasted, say 10 ops or more). The first one who helped me twice was called Scotty – I didn’t find out his surname, it was strictly teacher & pupil, especially as he looked elderly … moustache & bald patch … (actually he was about 26). I didn’t see him again at Waddington – we had about 300 air-crew Flight sergeants there.
Anyway, at the Boomerang club, I said good-day to Kirk, we told each other what we’d been doing … he was well into a tour as captain of Sunderland crew – doing Atlantic patrols.
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I remarked that it was a coincidence that the only two fliers [sic] from Mendooran should be on leave at the same place & time. He said ‘-“Oh no, there’s another Mendooranite over here, Vernon Gall, who was the teller at the Bank of NSW there.” I replied that I didn’t know him. Kirk said:- “Well you might not have met him as you were at High School at Mudgee when your parents came to Mendooran, then you worked in Sydney, went into the Army, then the Air Force – you rarely were in Mendooran. Well, what do you know – there he is, I’ll bring him over & introduce you.” Kirk came back with Scotty. We laughed about that coincidence! After the war, when I bought the sports depot in Mudgee & transferred my bank a/c to the Bank of NSW there, Scotty was the teller.
[symbol] At the Club I also met Joe Barber & Eric Gentle who’d been with me at Cootamundra. Ken saw 4 chaps he knew at Lichfield, and I met Rupe Brown the Australian ground-crew corporal who looked after the 3 Lancs & ground crews at our dispersal corner. We went to a play, but didn’t enjoy it - - too serious. Back at A.C.F. played table-tennis with Ken & darts with Sid.
11th: Got some free theatre tickets with Sid & the play was quite enjoyable. Cinema after lunch .. Red Skelton in “Bathing Beauty”, very funny. Game of darts at the Club. Met Jack Freer, who played the saxophone on the ship across the Pacific.
12th. Ken & I got tickets for a play … a good comedy. Darts at the club after supper.
13th Got tickets for a show on Monday. Bought a wireless for £12/3/4.
[symbol] After the war, I found that Ray Meers (Rear Gunner) & Lindsay Francis (Wireless-Operator-Gunner, of Mendooran had both done tours with B.C. about the same time as I.
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14th. Bought more Xmas cards. Had lunch with Peter Dunn from Mudgee at the Club. Saw a newsreel, went to the Windmill theatre, a few beers with Ken, Supper, then table-tennis.
15th. Rupe left to return to Waddington (he’d shared our room
Visited Mme Tussauds waxworks Museum .. very good.
Walked through the Zoo. Saw a newsreel.
16th. At Boomerang Club met Ken Vidler’s crew (I think they were killed a bit later.) Walked the Embankment, saw Cleopatra’s Needle, down Whitehall, got a glimpse of 10 Downing St (cordoned off by Police). Saw the show we’d booked “Happy & Glorious”, easily the best show we’d been to. Had a few drinks with 2 girls who sleep in the railway station at Gloucester Road to be safe from air raids – they’d been doing that for years!
17th: Rain all day. Went cinema that featured 3 films … 4 1/4 hours. Had a steak (!) for 5/- then another film; couldn’t find the ‘steak’ cafe again.
18th. Packed, Sid came back from Exeter & Bristol. Played crib on the train with Sid, all the way to Lincoln. Lunch at 3, collected bike & rode back to camp.
19th. Flew at once for high-level-bombing practice … too much low cloud, so we got a fighter & did some affiliation practice. Then lunch & briefing at 1.30 for a “trip” to Nuremberg, the scene of one of B.C.’s worst losses sometime earlier, when about 500 heavies were caught below high cloud, searchlights lit them up & (from memory) nightfighters, mainly, & flak brought down 49 for a loss rate of 9%. This time it was cloud below us and 467 only lost 1 crew, F/O Rodwell’s … all KIA.
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[circled 13] 23-10-44 FLUSHING. 21 of 467, 20 of 463 of 121 from 5-Group attacked gun positions near Flushing. Visibility was bad and the bombing scattered.
D 3h 20m. 14 x 1000. Briefed to bomb at 6500’ but forced to descend (bad visibility). Bombed at 4000’
[circled 14] BERGEN 28-10-44. 20 of 467, 15 of 463, of 237 from 5-Group, to attack U-boat pens at Bergen. Target was cloud-covered and master-bomber called off the attack after only 47 planes had bombed … from below 5000’ (Mountains within 10 miles of track nearly 4500’!)
D 7h 30m. 12 x 1000 Briefed to bomb at 9000’. Orbited once [inserted] extra 6 min there [/inserted] and lost height using GEE to avoid mountains … bombed at 3800’ Diverted to Marston Moor on return (fog over Waddington). Returned next day.
[inserted] (On our final run there was AA fire from [underlined] above [/underlined] us (mountains) as well as below!) [/inserted]
[circled 15] 30-10-44 WALCHEREN ISLAND. 13 of 467, 13 of 463, of 102 from 5-Group attacked gun positions near Walcheren. The attack was successful and the Allied ground forces commenced their attack on 31st. No losses
Briefed to bomb at 6000’. Cloud over target. Two orbits made – 20 min over target area – bombed at 3500’.
D 3h 20m. 14 x 1000.
OCT ’44 SUMMARY: 467 flew 157 sorties, lost 2 crews (7 KIA, 7 Ev): 5 tours completed, incl. (C.O.) W/C. Brill completing his 2nd tour. 1 crew ditched, rescued & returned.
DAY 1-11-44 HOMBERG. 19 of 467, 17 of 463, of 226 from 5-Group attacked the Meerbeck oil plant at Homberg. Marking was scattered + only 159 planes attempted to bomb. No losses from Waddington.
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After nearly 2 hours on the way home we tried to jettison a J-Cluster (incendiary) which had “hung-up”. We turned back to try to realease [sic] it manually, but failed. So we brought it home & it was safely removed. We landed 1/2 hour late, time airborn was 8hr 9 min. Our bomb-load was 1 x 2000 lb HE & 12 ‘J’ clusters dropped from 17400’.
[circled 13] [underlined] FLUSHING [/underlined] 5 Group sent 121 incl. 21 of 467 Sq & 20 of 463, to attack big gun positions near Flushing on Walcheren Island on 23.10.44. Visibility was bad & the bombing was “scattered”. We took off at 1429, did a Radius of Action & got back to base at 1434 at 2000’. Had a good navigation trip but had to descent from 6500’ to 4000’ to see the target. 1 1/2 min before we bombed our gunners reported a Lanc. hit the sea behind us (I plotted it at 56o33’N, 03o27’E). Quite a few planes were lost and a lot of A.A. damage – we had many holes. Our bomb load was 14 of 1000 lb HE, and 1 of them “hung-up”. We tried to jettison it but couldn’t. We were airborn [sic] for 3h. 19 min.
[circled 14] [underlined] BERGEN (NORWAY) [/underlined] 5-Group sent 237 of which 20 from 467 Sq + 15 from 463, on 28-10-44 to attack U-boat pens at night. We took off at 2221 & did a Radius of Action & got back to base at 2250 at 1500’ which we maintained until 0120 (up till then we were over the N. Sea) when we climbed to 9000’ & increased speed to 180 mph as we were 3 min behind time. When we got to the target we were in cloud. The master bomber told us to come down to 5000’ … we had to orbit carefully as there were mountains East of Bergen over 4000’. I used GEE position lines to descend safely away from mountains to 3800’ when we bombed … about 10 min after the planned time. It was nice to have GEE all the way (no jamming like over Germany) & we kept nicely to track all the way. Our bomb load was 12 x 1000 lb HE. There was plenty of flak around Bergen … some from mountain tops nearly level with us! There was a lot of cloud (& maybe smoke-screen) at the target … master bomber cancelled the raid after only 47 of us bombed
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30.10.44. [symbol] 15 WALCHEREN ISLAND (FLUSHING). 13 from 467 Sqdn & 13 from 463 of 102 total (all 5 Group), daylight raid on big gun emplacements on the Southern edge of Walcheren Island. The Germans also held the Southern banks of the Scheldt Estuary. The Allies had always wanted to capture Antwerp (50 miles inland, the biggest port for unloading tanks & other heavy equipment). While ever these big guns covered both sides of the Estuary, the Allies couldn’t go in to clear the minefields. In fact the Canadian army trying to take the South bank was held up by bad weather (flooded terrain), lack of petrol & ammunition (Patton was partly to blame along with Eisenhower) for so long that eventually, [inserted] our [/inserted] [deleted] Armies [/deleted] [inserted] Marines [/inserted] took Antwerp from the East & finally [inserted] 8 NOV [/inserted] captured Walcheren Island by “sailing” through gaps in the sea-wall from the East! It then took [inserted] nearly [/inserted] another month to clear the mines & winter had set in … too late to use Antwerp for the big offensive they may have been able to mount had they cleared Antwerp 3 months earlier.
We took off at 1340, did a R. of A. & got back to base at 1356 at 1500’. The navigation was easy & we stayed on-track & on-time to the target. We’d been told to bomb at 6000’, but found cloud below, so had to orbit [inserted] twice [/inserted] lose height to 3500’, finally bombing 22 min later than planned. Our bomb load was 14 x 1000 lb HE. We had no losses. The attack was successful, and the Canadian army began their attack along the S. bank the next day.
We dropped 14 x 1000 lb HE; the flight took 3h 20 min. For October, 467 Sq. flew 157 sorties, lost 2 crews (7 KIA, 7 Evaded); 5 tours were completed; 1 crew ditched, were rescued & returned.
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Nov 1st. 226 Lancs of 5 Group (19 from 467 & 17 from 463), in daylight, raided the Meerbeck oil plant near Homberg. Weather was bad, the marking was scattered and only 159 attempted to bomb. No losses from Waddington.
2.11.44 [symbol] 16. DUSSELDORF. 5 Group was part of a big raid (992) by Bomber Command, 15 from 467, 15 from 463. Detailed German reports listed 5000 buildings destroyed, many of them industrial & production works. There were other raids that night too … a total of 1131 sorties. We took off at 1651, 15 min. late. We climbed to 17000’ & increased speed to 170 mph to catch up. At 1920 (at 18000’) we were “coned” by searchlights … very dangerous as ‘flak’ then could be fired visually. We shook them off & bombed at 1925, & I noted that an aircraft was hit about 10 mi ahead, our heading 220o.T. On the way home in the next 26 min, I made 12 more log entries of aircraft crashing to the ground with estimates of their bearing & distance from us.
The RAF had set up 2 more GEE “chains” based in Europe. I tried the RUHR chain, but found the readings “wouldn’t plot”.
Our bomb-load was 11 x 1000 lb & 4 x 500 lb HE.
The trip took 5h 20 min.
467 Sqdn lost F/O Langridge & crew (3 KIA, 5 evaded).
Dusseldorf taken (on Cook’s tour 19.6.45
[two photographs]
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[circled 16] 2-11-44. DUSSELDORF. 15 of 467, 15 of 463 as part of 992 of Bomber Command. Detailed German reports list 5000 buildings destroyed, many of them industrial & production works. (There were other raids that night too … a total of 1131 sorties.) 467 lost F/O L. Langridge & crew (3 KIA, 5 evaded).
C. 5h 20m. 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500. 18000’
NIGHT 4-11-44 DORTMUND-EMS CANAL. 12 of 467, 12 of 463, of 174 from 5-Group attacked the canal near Munster. The banks of the canal were breached again. A report from Albert Speer to Hitler dated 11.11.44 was captured at the end of the war. Speer stated that the raids on the Dortmund-Ems canal, with attacks on the rail system, produced more serious setbacks to the German war industry at this time than any other type of bombing.
[circled 17] 6-11-44. EMS-WESER CANAL. 19 of 467, 16 of 463, of 235 from 5-Group attacked near the junction of the Ems-Weser and Mittland canals, near Gravenhorst. Markers had considerable difficulty in finding the junction due to ground haze, until a low-flying Mosquito (pilot: F/L L.C. de Vigne, and Aust. navigator, S/L. F. Boyle of 627 Sqdn) found and marked the target with such accuracy that the marker fell into the water and was soon extinguished. Only 31 planes bombed before the Master-Bomber ordered the raid be abandoned. 10 planes lost in the raid, 3 crews from 463 (all KIA). Waddington was fog bound on return & most planes were diverted to Seething. We were perhaps the last to land (in v. poor visibility).
D 5h 25m. 14 x 1000 (but did not bomb). Orbited target once, for extra 10 min. over it.
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4.11.44. 174 Lancs of 5 Group, 12 each from 467 & 463 Sqdns, attacked the Dortmund-Ems Canal, near Munster. The banks of the canal were breached again. A report from Albert Speer to Hitler dated 11.11.44 was captured at the end of the war. Speer stated then:- “that the raids on the Dortmund-Ems Canal, with attacks on the rail system, produced more serious setbacks to the German war industry, at this time, than any other type of bombing.” (In early 1945, the raids on oil targets may have been even more damaging to their war effort.)
6.11.44 [symbol] 17. EMS-WESER CANAL. 235 of 5 Group, 19 from 467, 16 from 463 attacked the Ems-Weser junction with the Mittland Canal, near Gravenhorst. The markers had considerable difficulty finding the junction due to ground haze, until a low-flying Mosquito (pilot: F/Lt L.C. de Vigne, & Australian navigator, S/Ldr F. Boyle of 627 Sqdn) found & marked the target with such accuracy that the marker landed in the canal & was soon extinguished. Only 31 planes bombed before the Master-Bomber abandoned the raid. 10 planes were lost, 3 of them from 463 Sqdn (all KIA).
We were supposed to take off at 1633 but actually took off 28 min late, so once we climbed to 11000’ we boosted our I.A.S. to 180 mph & were on-time by 1915. I logged a Lanc. crashing at 1923 1/2; we had to orbit twice [inserted] (12 min) [/inserted], at the target (due to the marking problem) … very dangerous. Logged 4 more planes crashing [deleted] at [/deleted] in the target area, & another at 1943, after we’d left the target without bombing. I couldn’t get any “joy” on either of the 2 new GEE chains. The trip took 5h. 25 min. We brought back our 14 x 1000 lb H.E. bombs.
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The weather deteriorated on the way back … the bumps were so bad that I had to hold all my navigation gear down to stop them hitting the roof, & brace my knees under the nav. table to avoid joining them there. The visibility at Waddington was bad due to fog, and most of our planes were diverted to Strubby; however, Peter did an abbreviated circuit (so he could actually keep the runway in sight) & then came in as if in a Tiger Moth, almost clipping the caravan stationed near the “funnel” (where they might use a Verey to send-you-round-again), but he landed safely … and then they closed the airfield.
Besides getting the 2 new GEE chains (RHEIMS & RHUR) to help with navigation over Germany, we now had LORAN fitted. It was similar in some ways to GEE, but depened [sic] on the radio signals being reflected from the ionosphere (only at night). The stations were widely separated … I think England, Norway, Italy … and each single reading had to be made & timed, then another [deleted] one [/deleted] tuned-in, read & timed … probably 2 min or more later, & the running -fix method used. On 9.11.44 we did at [sic] Cross-Country, using Loran, over England, ending with some high-level bombing practice … 3 1/4 hrs trip. The trailing aerial had to be used to receive Loran signals.
11.11.44 [symbol] 18. HARBURG. A 5-Group raid of 237 planes, + 8 marker Mosquitos, 19 from 467, 14 from 463 … a night raid on the Rhenania-Ossag oil refinery, near Hamburg. This refinery had been raided several times by American daylight bombers. We took off at 1627, did a R. of A. to be back a [sic] base at 1634 at 3000’.
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(HARBURG)
We climbed to 15000’ & later to 16000’ to get out of cloud, & kept nicely to track all the way to the target, getting a bit behind time all the way (no worries we were over the sea nearly all the way). We bombed 8 min late from 16000’. Our WOP (Eric) told us the Master Bomber said to bomb the centre of the Red Target Indicators (there were 4), but to ignore outside Indicators which were dummies (set up by the Germans). Half an hour before the target I wanted to use LORAN, but Eric (our WOP) said he’d been ordered not to use the trailing aerial. I relied on Dead-Reckoning from the target and got my first GEE fix 50 min later about 15 mi. N. of track.
Our bomb-load was 1 x 4000 lb “cookie”, 6 x 1000 lb, & 6 x 500 lb H.E. We could still see the plant burning from 100 mi away on our way back. Our squadron lost F/O Fedderson’s crew (7 KIA) & F/O Eyre’s crew (6 KIA, 1 POW) … one of these killed was Geoff (“Bushie”) Goodfellow, their navigator, one of my best friends … we played a lot of cards together & we bunked opposite each other in our room. He came from Tooraweenah (father ran the “Mountain View” hotel there), & he said I was the only person he’d met that had even heard of the place, let alone been there, which I had.
F/L Kynoch’s plane was hit & badly damaged, but he crash-landed it at Manston (an emergency ‘drome on the coast) & he & the crew survived.
The flight lasted 5h. 35 min.
On 13.11.44 we did our “20 SORTIE CHECK”, on a flight of 55 min. We’d only done 18 ops plus the 2 BULLSEYES at Lichfield & Swinderby.
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[circled 18] 11-11-44 HARBURG. 19 of 467, 14 of 463, of 237 from 5-Group, plus 8 Marker Mosquitos attacked the Rhenania-Ossag oil refinery at Harburg (near Hamburg). This had been attacked several times by American (day) bombers. Brunwig’s ‘History of Hamburg & Harburg’ (air-raids), gives the raid a brief mention. (We could still see the plant burning 100 miles away on our way home.)
467 lost F/O. M. Fedderson & crew (7 POW), and F/O. T. Eyre & crew [inserted] (G Goodfellow was the Nav) [/inserted] (6 KIA, 1 POW). F/L Kynoch’s plane was hit and badly damaged – he crash-landed at Manston (an emergency ‘drome on the coast).
D 5h 35m. 1 x 4000 + 6 x 1000 + 6 x 500 16000’
[circled 19] 16-11-44 DUREN. 15 of 467, 15 of 463, as part of 1188 from Bomber Command, attacked Duren, Julich & Heinsburg in support of the American 1st & 9th armies which were about to advance on this area. Raids were made by 1239 American heavy bombers on targets in the same area. (this was the biggest raid we took part in … there were planes to the horizon all the way, heaps of fighter escorts.) 9400 tons of bombs dropped. The result was disappointing. Heavy rain and wet ground prevented much of the tank assault and slowed the supplies of artillery ammunition and the armies’ advance was slow and costly. (For our part, the centre of Duren was reduced to rubble.) G/C. Bonham-Carter, O/C of Waddington led our Group, as ‘second dickie’ to the crew who had bombed the wrong target on a daylight raid on Flushing (23-10-44?), killing some Canadians.
D 5h 25m. 12 x 1000. 10500’
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16.11.44 [symbol] 19. DUREN (daylight). 15 planes from 467, & 15 from 463, were part of a big effort by Bomber Command (1188 planes) attacking Duren, Julich & Heinsburg in support of the 1st & 9th American Armies which were about to advance in this area. Raids were made on other targets in this area by 1239 American heavy bombers. This was by far the biggest raid we took part in … there were planes to the horizon all the way with heaps of fighter escort … [deleted] B [/deleted] 9400 tons of bombs were dropped, but the result was disappointing. Heavy rain & boggy ground prevented most of the tank attack and slowed supplies of artillery ammunition with the result that the advance was slow & costly. For our part, the centre of Duren was reduced to rubble – it may have needed bulldozers to clear a path through it! The base commander at Waddington, Gp/Capt Bonham-Carter, led 5 Group as ‘second dickie’ to one of our crews who had bombed the wrong “target” (a smoke-generator) on an earlier daylight raid near Flushing on 23.10.44, killing some Canadian army men.
The navigation was easy. Our bomb-load was 12 x 1000 lb H.E. dropped from 10500’. Flight time: 5h 25 min.
[two photographs]
Snaps of Duren taken on the “Cook’s Tour” I did on 19.6.45.
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Extracts from Diary –
18.11.44 navigators briefing at 1.30 for a v. long trip. Not enough time for preparation. Our crew just got out to the “kite” when the trip was “scrubbed” …joy! After tea we went down to the local Horse & Jockey (Hotel). Saw a bloke about his car, & bought it for £3 … a little Morris 8 HP Sedan
19.11.44 To navigation section before lunch for another briefing, to the same place as yesterday, more time for preparation & less to do. No lunch … sandwiches at briefing … then it was scrubbed again. Collected car.
20.11.44. Went to briefing for another daylight raid on the Dortmund-Ems canal, but it was scrubbed. Went to town with Ken Nichols & Ken (of ground crew) … wanted to go to the theatre, but all seats were sold, so we went to the cinema & saw “White Cliffs of Dover.”
21.11.44. Briefed again for the same canal raid as yesterday, chart was already done. [symbol] It was scrubbed at the 11th hour & we missed lunch … again had sandwiches in the briefing room.
21.11.44 [symbol] 20 DORMUND-EMS CANAL
We took off at 1726, did a R. of A. & got back to base at 1754 at 2000’. The winds were light & fairly consistently Westerly at first, then N.W. It was easy to keep on track & close on-time. At 2020 I logged “Lanc, crashed & blew-up 15 mi. astern”. We’d been at 10250’ until 2058 when WOP told us to descent to 3-4000’ … we did so, fast, and bombed at 2103. At 2108 I logged: “Aircraft crashed below us 3 mi. past other target.” At 2232 we jettisoned a hang-up bomb in the sea. Landed at base at 2337, time airborne 6h 11 min. Our bomb-load was 13 x 1000 lb H.E.
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21.11.44. [symbol] 20. DORTMUND-EMS CANAL, near LADBERGEN.
15 from 467, 15 from 463 bombed Dortmund-Ems & Mittland Canals; as part of Bomber Command maximum effort of 1345 heavy bombers attacking 6 targets in this general area.
No losses for 5-Group.
We took off at 1726, did a R. of A. getting back to base at 1754 at 2000’. I had a good navigation trip, GEE from England lasted until 2020, then the RUHR chain worked to the target area. I logged a Lanc. blowing-up 15 mi astern at 2020. We were briefed to bomb at 10500’ but, 5 min before out T.O.T our W.O.P. (Eric) got word that we descend to 3 – 4000’ to get below cloud. We descended quickly & bombed 5 min later at 4500’; then began climbing again into the clouds. Tried Loran for fixing without success. We had a bomb hang-up, but jettisonned [sic] it in the sea at 2222.
Our bomb load was 13 x 1000 lb H.E.
The trip took 6h 10 min.
[photograph]
This is an enlargement of the smaller print of the area bombed repeatedly … DORTMUND EMS CANAL.
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[photograph] Open bomb-bay of a Lanc. loaded with 1000 lb H.E. bombs. Bomb-aimer could select each one to drop separately at predetermined intervals (usually close together as a “stick”.)
[photograph] Our Mid-upper gunner Ray Giles, near his turret – 2 Browning .303 machine guns
[photograph] Lanc’s in formation on a daylight raid. Nearest is PO-J
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On a low-level “Cooks Tour” from Wigsley on 19th June, 1945 (after war’s end in Europe), I took some photos with the old box Kodak.
[two photographs]
The Dortmund Ems canal where it was built above a stream, shown clearly in the left photo. The embankments here were bombed repeatedly, 8 times I think. We did 3 of Ops there and one at the nearby Ems-Weser canal.
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Broken bridges over the Rhine at Duisberg – we didn’t bomb there, but 5 Group did.
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The Krupps works at Essen, which was regularly bombed by the RAF during most of the war. Including some 1000 – bomber raids.
[photograph] Wrecked bridges at Cologne, another regular RAF target; somehow the Cathedral survived.
[photograph] The railway marshalling yards at Hamm received plenty of “attention”
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Dusseldorf was regularly bombed … we did our 16th Op. there
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[circled 20] 21-11-44. DORTMUND-EMS CANAL, (near LADBERGEN). 15 of 467, 15 of 463 as part of 1345 Bomber Command heavies attacked 6 targets in this general area. 5-Group targets were the Mitteland and Dortmund-Ems canals … without loss.
D 6h 10m. 13 x 1000. Briefed to bomb at 10250’, got 5 min warning by radio to descend to cloud base … bombed at 4500’.
[circled 21] 23-11-44. TRONDHEIM. 16 of 467, 4 of 463 of 171 from 5-Group, incl. 7 Mosquito Markers, to attack U-boat pens at Trondheim. The target was covered b y a smokescreen and could not be marked. The Master Bomber ordered the raid abandoned. No losses. (The weather was bad; big wind changes. Many jettisoned bombs in North Sea or diverted to North Scotland due to fuel shortage … we were the only one to return to Waddington with bombs still aboard.)
D 10h 55m. 9 x 1000 (brought home).
26-11-44 MUNICH (Our rear gunner, K. Nickols, went on this trip as ‘spare bod’.) 270 Lancs from 5-Group, 467 lost F/O Findlay & crew (crashed – out of fuel … their Nav. vomited and blocked his oxygen supply, went unconscious and they got lost in cloud. But all survived the crash and were flown home by the Americans on 1.12.44.
NOVEMBER SUMMARY 467 did 148 sorties, lost 4 crews (9 KIA, 8 POW, 11 Ev) 8 tours expired. 2 were badly wounded.
NIGHT 4-12-44 HIELBRONN. 282 from 5-Group (Main force attacked Karlsruhe). 467 lost F/O J. Plumridge & crew (6 KIA. 1 POW). F/L Bill Kynock & crew attacked by fighter, rear gunner killed (F/S R. Steele), and plane badly damaged (we think it was ‘D’.), crash landed at Manston (emergency airfield).
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23.11.44 [symbol] 21. TRONDHEIM (Norway). 5-Group sent 171 planes (including 7 Mosquito markers) to attack the U-boat facilities there. This was a very long trip mostly over the North Sea at low-level (1000’) in bad weather, rain & severe wind-changes. Tankers topped us up with petrol at the end of the runway before we took off at 1609, 12 min late. GEE ran out at 1848 … over 2 hours before we’d reach the target. We were unable to identify where we crossed the coast, so we continued on northwards and at 2050 saw the target lit up by flares to our left. A wind velocity to use for bombing was received by radio, and at 2055 we saw yellow Target Indicators about 10 mi to Port. We turned to a Westerly course. At 2102 we were told to abandon the raid as a smoke-screen obscured the target. We continued by Dead Reckoning & B.A. (Sid) identified a pin-point at 2112. We descended from 9000’ to 1000’, and at about 2130 discovered that the earlier pin-point was wrong, giving a new one near Smolen Island. At 2248 I got my first GEE fix (after 1 1/2 hr since the target) … about 50 mi NW of where we thought we’d be … big wind change. Pilot (Peter) & I decided to aim to land at LEUCHARS (Nth Scotland) as we had a head-wind. Then, at 0024 I got a good fix & found the wind had eased & changed to NE, and by 2130 was from the NW & getting faster. Pilot & Engineer consulted with me & we decided to try for Waddington, cutting our speed back from 190 to 170 mph. The wind held about NW & increased to about 45 mph, so we reached base OK & landed at 0302, with only about 80 gallons left. Most of our planes jettisonned [sic] bombs in the North Sea, or landed at Leuchars. We were the sole plane to bring our bombs home to Waddington. Trip-time 10h 53 min.
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26.11.44. 5-Group sent 270 heavies to MUNICH. Our rear-gunner, Ken Nicholls went as a “spare-bod” in place of a sick crewman. One of the 467 crews crashed, out of fuel. Their navigator had vomited and blocked his oxygen supply, he went unconscious, and they were lost in cloud. They all survived the crash-landing and were flown back by the Americans on 1.12.44.
November summary for 467 Sqdn: 148 sorties, 4 crews lost (9 KIA, 8 POW, 11 Evaded); 8 tours expired. 2 men were badly wounded.
4.12.44 (night). HEILBRONN was attacked by 282 from 5 Group, while the main force of Bomber Command attacked Karlsruhe. 467 Sqdn lost F/O Plumridge & crew (6 KIA, 1 POW). F/Lt Bill Kynoch’s plane was attacked by a fighter, his rear-gunner killed (F/Sgt R. Steele) & the plane badly damaged … we think it was our favourite “D”. They crash landed at the emergency ‘drome, Manston, & we heard that “D” was a write-off.
6.12.44. GIESSEN (night) attacked by 255 of 5-Group (19 from each of 467 & 463 sqdns) while the rest of Bomber Command bombed Osnabruck & Leuna (oil plant).
8.12.44 URFT DAM [symbol] 1. 205 of 5-Group (10 of 467, 15 of 463). 9/10 cloud over target, no result observed. No loss.
10.12.44 URFT DAM [symbol] 2. 5-Group (15 [inserted] each [/inserted] of 467 & 463). All were recalled before the target due to bad weather & visibility.
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More extracts from Diary.
23.11.44. No operations on. Went to Lincoln with Peter & Don in my car to see about getting Peter’s car fixed. Went to the pictures.
Feeling very crook … terrible cough.
24.11.44. Went on sick parade. The Dr. reckoned I was OK for flying … I didn’t. had heard there was to be a long trip that night & saw the Dr. again .. he put me into Sick Quarters & I slept!!! about 20 hours a day. Our crew wasn’t listed for the operation that night, but our rear-gunner, Ken Nichols, opted to go with Bill Kynock’s crew … but the trip was scrubbed anyway. Ken visited me.
25.11.44. Still in sick-quarters. No ops. Ken, Don & Rupe came to see me, then they went to an ENSA concert on the base.
26.11.44. Out of sick-quarters. Ken went with Kynoch’s crew to MUNICH in crook weather. It was OK at the target, quiet & a good ‘prang’. Went over to [deleted] 3 Sqdn [/deleted] SICK QUARTERS to see Ted Pickerd who’d been our Navigation analysis ‘joker’ for some months. Played pontoon, won 10/- Kynoch’s crew were diverted to Langham.
27.11.44. Went to Swinderby & got 3 gal of petrol in the car. Ken & Kynocks crew came back from Langham.
28.11.44. No ops. Made up a list of comments on ops that had to be done … big job. Flew to Thornaby [deleted] to bring [/deleted] & back in ‘D’ [deleted] back [/deleted] with a ferry crew for their plane.
Navigators party on tonight … too bad Ted Pickerd is still in sickquarters. Des Sands (o i/c A flight … Sqn Ldr, DFM on 2nd or 3rd tour) Lionel Hart & I took others in cars, the rest used bikes. Wionderful show. Bags of beer & fun.
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NIGHT 6-12-44 GIESSEN 19 of 467, 19 of 463, of 255 from 5-Group. (Main force attacked Osnabruck & Leuna).
DAY 8-12-44. URFT DAM [symbol] 1. 10 of 467, 15 of 463 of 205 from 5-Group. 9/10 cloud over target and no result observed. No loss.
DAY 10-12-44 URFT DAM [symbol] 2. 15 of 467, 15 of 463 … 5-Group. All recalled before reaching target due to bad weather and visibility.
[circled 22] 11-12-44 URFT DAM [symbol] 3. 15 of 467, 15 of 463, of 233 from 5-Group, with Mosquito Markers. Hits observed but no breach seen. (We brought our bombs home, despite doing an orbit … (hoping for gap in clouds) … against orders … extra 7 min. in target area. Very accurate radar-directed flak; we lost P.O. motor.).
F 6h 5m. 14 x 1000 (brought home) (9750’)
[circled 23] 17-12-44 MUNICH. 22 of 467, 19 of 463 of 280 from 5-Group, with 8 Mosquito Markers. (Main force attacked Duisburg, Ulm and Munster … a total of 1310 heavies, 1.1% loss.) Reconnaissance showed severe damage. 467 lost F/O T. Evans & crew (all 7 Ev) … they collided after bombing with an engine on fire.
M 9h 45m 1 x 4000 + 9 cans + 1 MONROE 11750’
[circled 24] 18-12-44 GDYNIA. 19 of 467, 15 of 463 of 236 from 5-Group. 2 crews from each flight attacked 2 pocket Battleships anchored near the port (which was the main target) … we hit “Lutzow” with 3 of our bombs (& 1 v. close in water) nicely near funnel area. Considerable damage to port area.
M 9h 45m. 10 x 1000 S.A.P.
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29.11.44. No ops. Went into Lincoln to try to register car … no joy; had to go to Sleaford, but no time. Tore around garages [inserted] for [/inserted] a battery & brake adjusters, but no joy. Finished off the navigation comments from yesterday. Decided to sell my autocycle & got a buyer. Played pontoon, won 3/-.
30.11.44. No ops. Went to Sleaford, got car registered & oil changed. Got coupons for petrol to go on leave, packed up, got leave pass, laundry & shoes. Went into Lincoln with Ken & got petrol & a new battery. Saw about trains for Ray & Eric for tomorrow.
1.12.44. Went out to our dispersal where mechanics helped get new battery in & working after a lot of trouble … bludged a couple of gallons of petrol from Ken (ground crew). Left at 10.10, had lunch at Nottingham & then went on to Birmingham, getting to where Don was staying at 3.30. had tea there, played solo until 1.30 am, went down to “Old Farm” at [inserted] ? Wesley [/inserted] Westly Castle for the night.
2.12.44. Duck eggs for breakfast! Lunch at Police Station (don had been a policeman in Birmingham before he enlisted for air crew.) Then tea at Mrs Benlays (friend of Don). Met Ken & Mrs Smith & Margaret from next door. Played solo. Went to Police Club for drinks. More solo ‘till 2 am. Slept next door at Smiths.
3.12.44. Breakfasts on both at Smiths & Benlays. Called at jewellers for Ken’s watch, but no luck. Set off for Swindon. Lunch at Swan’s Nest in Stratford. Looked over Shakespeare’s birthplace, got postcards & saw Home Guard parade. Went on to “Stow-in-the-Wold” & stayed the night in a nice little pub. Played darts, crib & drank beer.
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[photograph] Engineer Don Coutts & Mid Upper Gunner Ray Giles, Birmingham
[photograph] Rear Gunner, Ken Nichols, & Ray Giles at Benlay’s place at Birmingham where we stayed on leave 1/2 Dec ’44.
[photograph] Ray Giles, at Benlays’ place, Birmingham
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More from the Diary.
4.12.44. Rachel Swindon for dinner. Found our way out to Clyffe-Pyhard & saw Bunty Duff & got back just before dark. Had tea at fish & chip shop & went to pictures – saw Jon Hall & Maria Montez in ‘Cobra Woman’.
5.12.44 After breakfast towed an Engineers car to get it started. Bought side-lamp for car. Reached Slough via Reading for lunch & called [deleted] on [/deleted] at Margaret Vyner’s place … she was in London meeting Hugh Marlowe, home from France on 72-hours leave. Saw Mrs Vyner & Hugo, had afternoon tea & went to Slough, booked in at Salthill Hotel & had tea. At pub, picked up 2 girls & took them home but got lost on the way back. Turned in at 12.30.
6.12.44. Looked around a lot of shops in Slough & finally got some bulbs for dash-lights. Met an old Aussie-Scot, Macintosh for yarn & drinks; he showed us his home at 26 Windsor Rd. Slough. Drove to Windsor & looked over Eton College on Founders Day, … going for 504 years. Saw Windsor Castle & had tea there. Played cards with Ken, before & after tea.
7.12.44. After breakfast caught train to London & booked in at A.C.F. Club. Met Scottie Gall & Kirk Beddie again; had steak (!) & mushrooms at Athens Cafe; went to pictures & saw “Casanova Brown”. More steak with onions then a variety show at the Empire in Finsbury Park. Went back tp pub at Gloucester Rd & saw girls we knew from last leave in London. Also ran into Syd & Peter.
8.12.44. Arranged to meet Peter on the way to Cambridge. Got car at Slough & was 1 hr late in meeting Peter. Had lunch at Cambridge Arms. Saw a good picture “Love Story”. Met a navigator I knew at Brighton … Cameron, who’d done 35 ops in Mosquitos. More steak & onions for supper.
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9.12.44. Looked at some of Cambridge University … not much to see. Had lunch at roadside pub and got to Lincoln about 4.30. collected photos, had drinks at the Saracens head & went to a show at the Royal Theatre. Peter’s car had a flat tyre. Got battle-dress from cleaners & put overcoat in. A good leave
10.12.44. Welcomed back to nav. section. No ‘war’ today. had an interview for commission with Group-Captain Bonham-Carter. W/Cdr Bill Brill had told us not to apply for a commission until we’d done about 20 “trips”. But after he left, in October, the new C.O. W/Cdr J.K. Douglas invited anyone interested in a commission to apply, regardless of the number of ops. I did, but didn’t impress him with my answers (especially when I said “probably not” to his question “would I be more use to the air force with a commission?”. He didn’t recommend me. But Bonham-Carter said something like this: “I have 2 W’ Cdrs here, at 467 & 463; one C.O. recommends virtually all applicants after they’ve done 20 trips; the other (Douglas) likes to interview them at depth & knocks a few back. I have to make the final decision. You seem to be doing well. I’ll look at you again next month.” (He saw me in Mid-January with only one Op (Brux) to go, and recommended me without any further questioning.)
11.12.44. Took laundry & boots down but didn’t have time to check them in … there’s “war” on. Went to briefing room & sorted out Gee charts. The briefing was hurried; the plane we got, (F), was slow, climbed poorly, and we were late getting to the target.
(con’t on next page)
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11.12.44 [symbol] 22. URFT DAM No 3. Daylight raid by 233 from 5-Group (15 each from 467 & 463 Sqdns), with Mosquitos doing the marking. Hits were observed but no breach seen. We brought our bombs back despite doing an orbit (against orders) hoping for a gap in the clouds … we spent 7 minutes extra over the target, and experienced very accurate radar-directed flak just after leaving. We lost our Port-Outer motor.
We took off at 1205, did a R. of A. returning to base at 1219, at 6000’. We climbed to 12000’ & “cruised” at 170 mph, but gradually got behind time (5 min late at 1350) but only 3 min. late at the target. This plane, F, would not go any faster with our bomb-load of 14 x 1000 lb. H.E. Pilot feathered our Port Outer motor at 1554 (maybe some flak damage). Jettisonned [sic] 2 bombs at 1645 which took extra time … ending up 47 min. late home. Flight time 6h 5 min.
17.12.44 [symbol] 23. Night-raid on MUNICH by 280 from 5-Group, (22 from 467, 19 from 463), with 8 Mosquito markers. The rest of Bomber Command attacked Duisberg, Ulm & Munster, a total of 1310 ‘heavies’, for a 1.1% loss rate. Reconnaissance showed severe damage. 467 lost F/O T. Evans & crew (all 7 Evaded) … they collided after bombing with an engine on fire; they baled out before the plane crashed.
We took off at 1636, 3 min late, and immediately began climbing on course, south for Reading, then into France near Le Havre, mostly at 4000’, very bumpy, tried 5000’ to get out of cloud, then down to 3000’ & back to 4000’. As we neared the SW corner of Switzerland we climbed to 15000’ & skirted its southern border, seeing lights on in some villages.
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We had a good navigation trip to the target, keeping close to track & timing OK. We used GEE until 2026, then some LORAN fixes (some inaccurate) but sighted target at 2152, descended to 12000’ to bomb at 2211.
At 2214 I logged “air-to-air firing up – qr. to beam”
At 2215 1/2 “ “ “aircraft went in 40 mi ahead”.
We began descending in steps to 5500’ & continued to use LORAN until 2350 when GEE came good.
I got very airsick about 2250 (first time since Cootamundra!), and at about 2310 saw flak coming up from Mulhouse, so we turned to Port to avoid it. At 0110, the GEE box went unserviceable (U/S), and we read PUNDITS back to base where we landed at 0220. Flight time was 9h 45 min, bomb load was 1 x 4000 lb “cookie” & 9 cans of incendiaries & 1 Monroe.
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18.11.44. [symbol] 24. GYDNIA (“A” Target: Pocket Battleship LUTZOW).
A 5-Group raid, 236 planes, 19 of 467 & 15 of 463 Sqdn, on the Naval base. Considerable damage to the port area was reported. Two crews from each flight of both squadrons were to arrive at their targets … two pocket battleships, 9 min before the rest of the Group were to start bombing; the markers & the accompanying flare-force (they dropped lots of long-burning flares to light up the area for the Markers) arrived then too. We were supposed to see the battleships in the light of the flares & do our bombing between 2151 & 2156. Our bomb-load was 10 x 1000 S.A.P (Semi-Armour Piercing) bombs … unlikely to be really damaging, although the decks of the pocket-battleships were much thinner than on “real” battleships (although they had 16” guns, the same.)
We took off at 1712, already 10 min later than planned, & flew at about 3 – 4000’ at 180 mph until 2000, when we climbed to 11500’. GEE had given out at 1850, but LORAN was OK & I got good signals at 1920, but we hadn’t been given Loran charts that covered beyond 56oN. So it was dead-reckoning & the hope of a pin-point later. Then, at 2055 1/2, I got a Loran fix, on track, just below the 56oN latitude, which could be plotted. I got another dubious fix at 2105 1/2, about 5 mi Sth of track, then another good one at 2122 1/2, on track again. I got another good Loran fix at 2133 which allowed me to estimate the wind velocity at 190/23. We turned on dead-reckoning 3 min late at point E, & arrived at point F, on dead-reckoning 2 min late, and steered visually for our target. At 2150, Syd, our Bomb-Aimer, reported a smoke screen starting over the battleships area. The flares went down at 2150 1/2, but didn’t penetrate the smokescreen. At 2153 our Pilot, Peter, decided to “go-round” again. As we turned Syd saw the Lutzow, [indecipherable word] behind us now. We flew North East
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for a while, did a timed run, using his stop-watch, to be back over our target at 2158. But again, the smoke-screen obscured our target. We turned Northwards & repeated the timed run. All this time we experienced a lot of radar-predicted flak, close enough to keep rocking our plane. While we were doing this 3rd orbit, Peter said: “If we can’t bomb this time, we’ll go round again and lose height to bomb at low-level.” Syd said: “Geez, that would be bloody dangerous.” At 2206, the target was clear & we bombed accurately. On the photograph which we saw back at base the next day, 3 of our bombs hit the deck amidships, one very close to the funnel, and a 4th bomb right alongside in the water. We’d actually bombed from 11750’ at 150 mph (I.A.S.), heading 260oT. At 2208 I logged: “Lanc. crashed Stb. Bow, 20 mi.” We crossed the coast at 2216 and got a Loran fix at 2222 1/2, only 3 mi. S. of track. The rest of the trip home was uneventful, we kept close to track and landed at 0303, flight-time 9h 51 min.
[drawing of area map]
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I did some research about the Lutzow & Admiral von Sheer. They were both damaged and the Lutzow was towed to Swinemunde, the Admiral von Sheer to Keil, where, on the night of 9/10 April ’45, a raid using 591 planes, sank the von Sheer, and so severely damaged the light cruised Emden & the heavy cruiser Hippo, that their crews then scuttled them … they were unable to put to sea. Then on the night of 16/17 April, 617 Squadron attacked Swinemunde, & effectively disposed of Germany’s last pocket battleship, Lutzow, although I read that its crew also finally scuttled it, as it was beyond repair
[symbol] [underlined] 25 [/underlined]. 27-12-44. 5-Group sent 200 planes (15 of 467 & 12 of 463) to bomb [underlined] RHEYT [/underlined] (our [symbol] 25 trip), the railway yards there, part of Munchen-Gladbach, where we’d done our 5th trip. We took off at 1204, did a R. of A. to be back at base at 1220 at 6000’. We were supposed to fly in formation but there was a lot of confusion … we finally flew individually until 1309 when we joined the formation. Near the target, the other planes began turning towards the target long before reaching the GEE lattice line we were told to follow. We did as we’d been told, and bombed at 1505 1/2 from 17200’. The trip home was uneventful, the navigation easy, as we had GEE all the way, using the RHUR chain over Germany. We had some flak going close just after the target at 1512 1/2. We landed at 1705, flight-time was 5h., bomb-load was 14 x 1000 lb. H.E.
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[deleted] [circled [indecipherable number]] [/deleted] NIGHT 21-12-44. POLITZ. 17 of 467, 17 of 463, of 207 from 5-Group attacked synthetic oil plant. 3 Lancs lost over Europe, but 5 crashed in England on return … 90% of airfields were fogbound … most were diverted to Scotland, but some were so short on fuel they had to try to land in fog. (F.L. Kynoch crashed ‘M’ at Waddington, but no injuries.)
[circled 25] 27-12-44 RHEYDT. 15 of 467, 12 of 463, of 200 from 5-Group, attacked railway yards at Rheydt. No loss
C 5h 0m. 14 x 1000. 17200’
DAY 28-12-44 MOSS SHIPPING (OSLO FIORD). 4 of 467, 6 of 463 of 67 from 5-Group attacked a large naval unit off Oslo Fiord. No direct hits claimed.
30-12-44 HOUFFALIZE. 12 of 467, 12 of 463 of 166 from 5-Group attacked the German supply bottleneck at Houffalize. Cloud obscured target. (Main force of 500 heavies attacked Kalh-Nord railway yards near Cologne … results obscured by cloud.)
DEC ’44 SUMMARY. December ended in a long spell of cold, fog & snow which restricted operations and serviceability. 467 flew 172 sorties, losing 2 crews + 1 gunner. (7 KIA, 1 POW, 7 Ev) 8 crews finished tours. 1 crew crashlanded [sic] and were rescued.
(The 2 Lanc. Squadrons (467 & 463) had learnt that the 5-Group method of marking was the most cost-effective way of striking heavy flows to the enemy. From 17.8.44 (when Bomber Command returned to attacks on Germany proper, after the many short trips for 2nd Front, a total of 72881 sorties from which 696 aircraft were lost (… about 1%). In this period of 137 days [deleted] 467 & 463 [/deleted] [inserted] Bomber Command [/inserted] made 530 sorties per day (av.) & lost 5.1 planes per day (av.) … 265708 tons of bombs were dropped.
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[circled 26] 1-1-45. DORTMUND-EMS CANAL 18 of 467, 5 of 463 of 102 from 5-Group, breached the canal near Ladbergen, (the Germans had repaired the canal again.) They were using an enormous number of slave labourers (‘Todt’ workers … 40000 we heard) to repair these vital links in their transport system. (And so when the barges began to run again they ‘knew’ the Lancs would soon come, and they were ready with AA & fighters … it was a hot spot.)
(On this trip F/O Merv Bache got an immediate DSO … their B/A. was Sam Nelson (WaggaWagga) … onfire, [sic] crashed just inside Allied lines … they’d all baled out in time. F/S Thompson of 9 Sqdn. got a posthumous VC also.)
B 6h 40m. 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500. 10900’
Landed at STRUBBY on return, due to fog.
NIGHT 1.1.45 MITTELLAND CANAL (GRAVENHORST). 4 of 467, 6 of 463, of 152 from 5-Group with 5 Mosquitos. No loss. During all this period, Waddington, and most of England, was deep in snow. Aircraft were buried in snow, and runways could not be kept open for them. Landing on icy runways was difficult. (On 1.1.45, Bomber Command flew 598 sorties day & night, and 5 planes crashed trying to land.)
[page break]
More about the DORTMUND-EMS on 1/1/45.
Many years after the war I got to know Sam Nelson, (also a golfer), who was the Bomb Aimer in Merv Bache’s crew. He told me that his navigator was in the process of writing a small book covering their ‘troubles’ that day. I mentioned that I still had my logs & charts, including for that day, so I posted them to him, with the result that parts of my log & chart were photocopied (reduced size) and included in his book … and I received a copy; later a few more pages were sent about what happened to their crew members thereafter. Several of their crew had a reunion in Canberra just at the time when they refurbished the Lancaster display in the War Museum. They told the staff of their “trouble” on 1/1/45, and were given the privilege of going inside the Lanc, even though it was not then open to the public.
I’ve made a “pocket” at the back of this folder for that book.
On pages 33/4 of that book is some details about a major German air attack on Allied aircraft & airfields on the same morning as our daylight raid on the Dortmund-Ems Canal. It may have been fortunate for us that most of their fighters were otherwise-occupied that morning.
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[circled 27] 4.1.45. ROYAN (S. France).
8 of 467, 16 of 463, of 344 Lancs & 7 Mosquitoes. F/O R. Eggins (467) had a mid-air collision with another Lanc., they baled out & were rescued.
Stubborn German garrison holding out at Royan prevented Allies from using Bordeaux as a port. (the Americans had kept a big force in that area, hoping to capture Bordeaux much earlier.) Bomber Command was ordered to bomb the town. It appears that the order was cancelled, but that order not received by the Squadrons concerned. But the French people there were told of the cancellation. As a result 700 French people were killed & soured relations with Britain.
We took off at [deleted] 0122 [/deleted] 0104, did the usual Radius of Action to be back at base at 0140 at 2000’. We flew southwards crossing the coast near Portsmouth. We had GEE all the way 7 so kept nicely on-track; the winds mainly from NNE varied between 35 & 60 mph.
When just short of the target we got a message at 0359 1/2 “do not bomb for 2 min.” We were due there in about 1 min. I wrote “Have to orbit I think.” Then at 0400 1/2 we were told “Come in & bomb”, which we did at 0401 without having to orbit, at 6250’.
We had an easy trip home, airborne for 6h. 30m. Our bomb load was 1 x 4000 (“Cookie”), & 16 x 500 lb HE.
On the back of my chart are several diagrams showing what the displays looked like on the GEE-BOX, and an indication of the curves on our GEE Charts.
[page break]
NIGHT. 5-1-45 HOUFFALIZE. 10 of 467, 8 of 463, of 131 from 5 Group, with 9 Mosquitos attacked supply bottleneck at Houffalize in the Ardennes. Target was hit with great accuracy. No loss. (Main force of 664 attacked Hannover, losing [underlined] 4.7%. [/underlined])
[circled 28] 7-1-45 MUNICH. 11 of 467, 16 of 463, of 645 Lancs. and 9 Mosquitos. This was the last major raid on Munich by Bomber Command; the industrial area was severely damaged. 467 lost F/O W. McNamee & crew (all KIA) … Severe icing caused high fuel consumption … they ran out of fuel and baled out over the sea 5 mi. from Eye, but were not found.
V 8h 45m. 1 x 4000 + 6 J clusters.
(The winds on this trip were forecast at about 80 mph from NW, so the route to the target was direct across Germany, then home south of Switzerland. (Usually, on Munich trips, we’d go out south of Switzerland, hiding from radar behind the mountains – maybe – then come home, faster across Germany.) The winds, in places, exceeded 100 mph. We were forced to ‘waste time’ on the way to the target (dangerous over Germany!). We took 3 hours to reach Munich loaded, then 6 hours to come home empty!)
[inserted] I haven’t got my log & chart for this trip – mislaid when I was teaching ATC cadets at Forest Hills [/inserted]
NIGHT 13-1-45 POLITZ. 17 of 467, 14 of 463, of 218 Lancs & 7 Mosquitos from 5-Group, attacked the oil plant near Stettin. Intended to be [inserted] a [/inserted] blind H2S attack, but the target was clear and the 5-Group low-level-marking was used in an accurate attack. Photo-reconnaissance stated that the oil plant was reduced to rubble. No loss from Waddington.
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NIGHT 14-1-45 MERSBERG-LEUNA. 14 of 467, 14 of 463 of 573 Lancs & 14 Mosquitos attacked the synthetic oil plant at Leuna. Albert Speer wrote … “this was the most damaging raid on the synthetic oil industry”. (The remainder of Bomber Command raided Grevenbroich & Dulmen … a total of 1214 sorties.)
[circled 29] 16-1-45 BRUX. 16 of 467, 12 of 463 of 231 Lancs & 6 Mosquitos of 5-Group, attacked the synthetic oil plant in western Czecho-slovakia [sic] (the plant had P.O.W. camps quite close by). The raid was a complete success. Speer also mentions this raid “as a particularly severe setback to oil production”. (Bomber Command attacked 4 other targets this night with a total of 1238 bombers. All were successful … the loss rate was 2.4% (about 30). No loss from Waddington.
D 10h. 0m. 1 x 4000 + 12 x 500 (Not dropped – bomb circuit U.S.) 14250’
(The bombing circuit was faulty – we made 3 orbits of the target, taking 20 mins, but could not remedy the trouble. We set out for home with bombs aboard and flew home at fairly low altitude – varying between 4500’ & 8500’, our airspeed 15 – 20 mph slower than the rest of the force. Then we had to make a diversion into the North Sea jettison area to manually release one bomb fitted with anti-handling fuse. The result was that we were last home, nearly an hour late. As this was our last trip we were ‘expected’ to come home faster than usual & be ‘first home’ … many thought we were unlucky enough to ‘get the chop’ on our last trip. The aircraft had severe problems (besides the bomb circuit and resulted in a tragic crash on 2.2.45, killing all but one of the crew … included were T. Paine & W. Robinson from Mudgee.)
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I met Chris Jarret at a University conference in the 60’s and heard from him what happened to them in ‘D’ on the night of 2-2-45.
He was lucky to survive, although it was easy for the Bomb-Aimer to be first out when told to “Bale-Out”. The next man out would have been Tom Paine, the Rear Gunner, & he told me that he was the only other one to get out & open his ‘chute in time to avoid death, but that Tom landed over the crest of a hill & was killed by the plane crashing & bombs exploding near him, while Chris had landed on the other side of the hill.
Tom Paine was in my classes at Mudgee High right from 1st year in 1936.
Bill Robinson must have started in 1935 as he was a year ahead of us; but I can remember him as the school was rather small (about 400) compared to the 1000+ when I taught there in the ‘60s.
[page break]
NIGHT 22-1-45. GELSENKIRCHEN. 0 from 467, 1 from 463. (photographic)
JANUARY SUMMARY. The month ended with heavy snow and bad visibility. 467 did 90 sorties losing 3 crews (7 KIA, 14 Ev.) 4 crews ‘tour-expired’.
NIGHT 1-2-45 SIEGEN (Railway Yards) 21 of 467, 19 of 463 of 271 from 5-Group. 467 lost one crew – the navigator was our A-flight commander, Des Sands DFM, an Australian in the RAF on his second tour … he survived, parachuted, captured.
NIGHT 2-2-45 KARLSRUHE. 19 of 467, 16 of 463, of 250 from 5-Group. 467 lost 2 crews (14 KIA (incl. a ‘second dickie’ pilot) 1 POW. ‘D’ was one of the two. F/O A. Robinson [inserted] (pilot) [/inserted] and Rear Gunner – Tom Paine – went to school with me at Mudgee High – Tom was in the same class. (See extract from ‘The Bulletin’ for story by Bomb-Aimer survivor, whom I met accindentally [sic] at an external studies school at UNE (Armidale) in the ‘60’s.)
NIGHT 7-2-45 DORTMUND-EMS CANAL (near LADBERGEN)
13 from 467. 467 lost c.o. W/C J. K. Douglas & crew (+ second dickie Bomb-aimer) … 3 KIA, 4 POW, 1 Ev.
NIGHT. 8-2-45 POLITZ. 15 of 467, 16 of 463 of 163 total (5-Group was 1st ‘Wave’, other groups followed and put this important oil plant out of action for the remainder of the war. 1020 bombers attacked other targets including Krefeld.
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13-2-45 DRESDEN. 17 of 467, 19 of 463 of 144 Lancs and 9 Mosquitos from 5-Group attacked Dresden as the 1st wave of a 2-part attack, dropping 800 tons. The second wave, 3 hours later, dropped 1800 tons, mostly incendiaries, causing a devastating fire-storm. German report says that more than 50000 people died.
14-2-45 ROSITZ. 16 of 467, 16 of 463 of 224 Lancs + 8 Mosquitos from 5-Group, attacked the oil refinery near Leipzig. The rest of Bomber Command attacked 4 other targets – a total of 1316 ‘heavies’, loss rate 1.7%.
19-2-45 BOHLEN. 19 of 467, 16 of 463 of 254 Lancs and 6 Mosquitos from 5-Group. Raid was unsuccessful. The Master Bomber, W/C E.A. Benjamin DFF + Bar, was shot down by flak & killed. Only superficial damage was caused.
20-2-45 MITTLELAND CANAL near GRAVENHORST. 10 of 467, 10 of 463, of 154 Lancs & 11 Mosquitos of 5-Group … raids on the canal by now were called “the milk run”. A comment (in the Waddington report) … “5-Group had bombed the canal so often that the Germans could leave their guns aimed ready for the next raid”. The Master Bomber abandoned this raid when it could not be marked properly due to heavy low cloud. (The Main Force – of B.C. – did 4 raids using H2S. Total of 1283 sorties, loss rate 1.7%)
21-2-45 MITTLELAND CANAL (again). 10 of 467, 10 of 463 of 165 Lancs & 12 Mosquitos from 5-Group. Weather was clear, and the canal was breached.
[page break]
The Main Force raided 4 other targets, 1110 sorties; losses 3.1%. 463 Sq. lost their C.O. W/C Forbes on his last trip of 2nd Tour … shot down by German nightfighter ace, Major H.W. Schnaufer.
NIGHT 23-2-45. PFORZHEIM. 1 of 463 (Photo) 367 Lancs of 1, 6 & 8 groups. 1825 tons of bombs dropped … “The 3rd most effective raid of the war … killed 17000, and 83% of the town destroyed by a fire-storm.
DAY 24-2-45 DORTMUND-EMS CANAL. 18 of 467, 11 of 463, of 166 Lancs & 4 Mosquitos from 5-Group … The target was obscured by cloud and the raid abandoned. No Loss.
FEBRUARY SUMMARY. The weather was often bad. 467 did 158 sorties, lost 5 crews + 3 who baled out + 3 “2nd dickies”. (25 KIA, 15 POW, 1 Ev.) 3 tours expired. 1 Crew crashed in training.
NIGHT 3-3-45. DORTMUND-EMS CANAL. 15 of 467, 15 of 463, of 212 Lancs + 10 Mosquitos of 5-Group breached the aqueduct near Ladbergen in 2 places, putting it out of action until after the war’s end. 467 lost F/O R.T. Ward and crew (7 KIA); F/O R.B. Eggins & crew (6 KIA, 1 POW), and the C.O. W/C E. Langlois & crew (5 KIA, 2 POW) … he had only become C.O. on 9th Feb. 8 Lancs lost over Ger. 20 over U.K.[inserted] loss [/inserted] 3.6%
(This night the Luftwaffe mounted “Operation Gisela” sending 200 night fighters to follow various bomber forces into England (& so not being detected). They took the British defences by surprise and they shot down 20 bombers over England (some were Lancaster training planes … a couple at Wigsley, where I was Duty Navigator in the control tower!) The bomb dump at Waddington was attacked but wasn’t blown up. 3 German fighters crashed flying too low.
[page break]
NIGHT 5-3-45 BOHLEN 15 of 467, 15 of 463 of 248 from 5-Group, attacked synthetic oil refinery. Target was cloudy but some damage. Bomber Command made 1223 sorties for 31 lost over Germany and 10 crashed in England … “visibility had detiorated [sic] for returning aircraft”. (Percy Jobson, of Wagga Wagga, a friend of hockey years, was shot down, parachuted, on this trip … a big write up given.)
NIGHT 6-3-45. SASSNITZ - - a port on the Baltic Sea.
NIGHT 7-3-45 HARBURG. oil refinery (5-Group). Bomber Command total (on various targets): 1276, loss 41 (3.2%)
DAY 11-3-45 ESSEN by 1079 bombers … the largest day raid by B.C. … “paralysed Essen until the Americans entered. 467 lost 1 crew (all KIA) on collision with a Hurricane near base in F.A. training.
DAY 12-3-45 Dortmund. 1108 planes, record tonnage 4851 tons … with fighter escorts, over 2000 planes … “put the city out of the war”.
NIGHT 14-3-45 LUTZKENDORF. 5-Group attack on oil refinery, losing 18 (7.4%). Main Force of 568 attacked Zweibrucken & Homburg & other minor targets … 2.8% loss
NIGHT 16-3-45 WURZBURG. 5-Group, 225 Lancs & 11 Mosquitos, dropped 1207 tons with great accuracy in 17 minutes … 89% of industrial part of city destroyed. 467 lost F/O Thomas & crew (6 KIA, 1 POW). Main force attacked NUREMBERG with 480 planes, losing 28 (4.2%), due to night-fighters joining the bomber stream before the target
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DAY 19-3-45 ARNSBERG RAILWAY VIADUCT. 37 Lancs of 617 and 9 Sqdns (and 1 photo Lanc. from 463) dropped 6 ‘Grand Slam’ 10-ton bombs … the ‘earthquake-effect’ collapsed the viaduct … the film was spectacular.
NIGHT. 20-3-45 BOHLEN. 5-Group. The main force was on Hemingstedt with 675 planes, loss rate 1.9%.
DAY 22-3-45 BREMEN. 5-Group. Rail bridge.
NIGHT. 23-3-45 WESEL. 5-Group. 1000 tons in 9 minutes from 9000’ … as close army support … “British Army crossed the river before the bombers had left the area”, and Wesel was in British hands before midnight (the bombing ended at 2239). Wesel claims it was the most heavily bombed town in Germany … 97% of buildings destroyed in main town area; population reduced from 250000 at outbreak of war, to 1900 in May ’45.
DAY 27-3-45 FARGE Oil Storage, 5-Group plus 2 of 617 attacking U-Boat shelters with 23’-thick concrete roof. 2 of the Grand-Slam bombs penetrated the roof and brought down thousands of tons of concrete and rubble, rendering the shelter ineffective.
MARCH SUMMARY 467 flew 185 sorties, lost 4 crews (24 KIA, 4 POW), 4 crews completed tours.
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DAY 4-4-45 NORDHAUSEN. 5-Group … Military barracks Many ‘forced labourers killed’.
DAY 6-4-45 IJMUIDEN … on ships … raid abandoned due to bad weather.
NIGHT 7-4-45 MOLBIS. Benzol plant … “all production ceased”.
NIGHT 8-4-45 LUTZKENDORF. 5-Group. Oil refinery. ‘Put out of action until end of war’. Main force was on Hamburg 440 planes, & other targets, total of 918 planes … 1.3% loss.
DAY 9-4-45 HAMBURG .. oil storage (5-Group) and 617 Sq attacked U-Boat shelters with Grand Slam bombs, and Tallboy bombs. Both raids successful. On this raid German ME 152 & 153 jet fighters attacked the Lancs for the first time.
NIGHT 16-4-45 PILSEN 5-Group. Rail Yards.
NIGHT 18-4-45 KOMOTAU 5-Group.
DAY 23-4-45 FLENSBURG Railway yards. (Abandoned – cloud)
NIGHT 25-4-45 TONSBERG Oil Refinery & U Boat pens (Norway)
463 Sq. lost the last Lancaster of the war (crew survived)
3300 Lancasters lost in the whole war.
467 Sq from Nov ’42 to 26 Apr ’45 – flew 4188 sorties, used 214 Lancs. lost 110 by enemy action, 4 damaged – crashlandings but recovered. 590 KIA. 117 POW. 8E Ev. 5 DSO, 146 DFC. 2 CGM. 36 DFM
[page break]
[underlined] 467 SQUADRON – R.A.A.F. [/underlined]
467 Squadron was formed at SCAMPTON, LINCOLNSHIRE 7-11-42.
Moved to BOTTESFORD by 30-11-1942. Moved to WADDINGTON 11-11-1943.
Bottesford Station Commanding Officers: G/C. SWAIN, F.R.O: OBE: DFC.
From 3.3.43. – G/C. McKECKNIE, W.N: DFC.
[underlined] 467 SQAUDRON moved to WADDINGTON 12.11.43 [/underlined]
Waddington Station Commanding Officers:
16.4.43. G/C. S.C. ELWORTHY, CCB, CBE, DSO, MVO, DFC, AFC, MA.
31.3.44. G/C. D.W. BONHAM-CARTER, CB, DFC.
14.4.45. G/C. E.D. McK. NELSON, CB.
1.8.45 G/C. D.D. CHRISTIE, AFC.
24.8.45. G/C. A.E. TAYLOR.
467 SQUADRON COMMANDERS:
7.11.42. W/C. C.L. COMM, DSO, DFC. _ _ _ KIA 16.8.43.
19.8.43. W/C. J.R. BALMER, DFC, OBE. _ _ _ KIA 11.5.44.
12.5.44. W/C. W.L. BRILL, DSO, DFC & Bar _ _ _ Died 1964.
12.10.44. W/C. J.K. DOUGLAS, DFC, AFC. _ _ KIA 8.2.45.
9.2.45. W/C. E. le P. LANGLOIS _ _ KIA 3.4.45.
4.3.45. W/C. I.H. HAY, DFC. _ _ To disbandment.
467 STATION ADJUTANTS: F/L. BURFIELD_CARPENTER.
F/L. A.D. McDONALD (A18121): F/L. J.M.W. LOVE.
467 SQUADRON moved to RAF METHERINGHAM 16.6.45 and were disbanded there October, 1945.
[underlined] 467 STATISTICS COMPILED FROM OPERATIONAL RECORD BOOKS [/underlined].
First Operational Sortie – 2/3.1.1943 – To FURZE _ Minelaying.
Last Operational Sortie – 26/26.4.45 – to TONSBURG.
[underlined] OPERATIONAL SORTIES ATTEMPTED [/underlined]:
No. of a/c actually took off on operations: 3977
No. of Operational sorties completed: 3795
No. of Operational sorties failed: 182
[underlined] REASON FOR FAILURE OF SORTIE [/underlined]:
a/c failed to return – listed missing 105
a/c early return due to Engine Failure: 28
a/c early return due to Electrical Failure: 10
a/c “ “ “ to Armament Failure: 9
a/c “ “ “ to Oxygen Failure: 9
a/c “ “ “ to Instruments, radio, intercom failure: 12
a/c “ “ “ to Ice in flight & ice damage: 6
a/c “ “ “ to Navigational Error: [underlined] 3 [/underlined]
[underlined] 182 [/underlined]
No. of Sorties completed in a/c damaged by Enemy Action: 230
No. of Aircrew listed in Operational Record Books as flown on ops from 467 Sqdn, RAAF: (inc. RAF, RNZAF, RCAF): 1814
No. of Aircrew listed in ORB’s as War Casualty from 467 Sq: (includes) RAAF, RAF, RNZAF, RCAF): 760
No. of whole crews posted to 467 Sq. for Ops: 258
No. of whole crews finished tour of ops – 30 or more: 74
No. of whole crews lost on Ops: 115
No. of whole crews still operating when hostilities ceased 8.5.45. and not tour expired: 31
No. of whole crews posted to other Squadrons during tour: 34
No. of whole crews with no Ops. before hostilities ceased: 4
No. of crews from 53 Base who flew on ops from 467 Sqdn and not listed as posted to 467 Sqdn. 6
[page break]
[inserted] Extract of “WAR” List for an Operation … late 1944. [/inserted]
F/S J.W. Singer (Can) – Sgt A. Carson – [missing name]
PB. 193 ‘W’ – F/O R.J. Harris – P/O J.T. Adair – Sgt T. Andrews – Sgt R. Walker
P/O H.F.C. Parsons – F/L R.W. Cook – Sgt S. Saunders
EE.136 – F/O A.L. Keely – F/S W. Chorny (Can) – Sgt A.E. Wotherspoon – Sgt C.H. Connwell
F/S L.W. Tanner – Sgt S.D. Chambers – Sgt J.E. Johnson
LM.713 – F/O C. Newton (Can) – Sgt P. Grant – Sgt W. Gregory – Sgt E.H. Cooper (Can)
Sgt R. Flynn (Can) – Sgt L.G. Kelly – Sgt R.S. Stevens (Can)
LM.715 ‘O’ – F/O R.W. Ayrton (Aus) – Sgt M.J. Herkes – Sgt H.K. Huddlestone – Sgt D.K. Chalcraft
F/S N. Bardsley – Sgt W. Scott – Sgt J.A.W. Davies
ME.809 – F/O R.C. Lake – P.O J.A. Peterson (Can) – Sgt R.W. Baird – Sgt R.A. Morton
W/O G.B. Watts (Can) – F/S G.E. Parkinson – P/O R.D. Kerr (Can)
No. 467 Squadron, Second Wave
NF.908 ‘C’ – F/L J.K. Livingstone – F/L D.O. Sands – F/O E.G. Parsons – F/O R.N. Browne
P/O W.D. McMahon (Aus) – F/O J. Pendergast – F/O T.C. Taylor
PB306 – F/O R.J. Mayes (Aus) – F/O L.J. Hart (Aus) – Sgt D.H. Hamilton – F/S J. Manning
F/S A.R. Edgar (Aus) – F/S J.G. Muir (Aus) – F/S K.W. Cary (Aus)
LM.100 ‘D’ – F/O P.R. Gray-Buchanan (Aus) – F.S. H.G. Adams (Aus) – Sgt D.M. Coutts – F/S J.R. Giles (Aus)
F/S B.J. Payne (Aus) – F/S E.J. Taylor (Aus) – F/S K. Nichols (Aus)
PD.215 ‘F’ – F/O L. Landridge (Aus) – F/S D.G. Beverley (Aus) – Sgt J. Halstead – Sgt D.J. Allen
F/S K.C. Woollam (Aus) – F/S W.C. Denny (Aus) – Sgt B.A. Davies
LM.542 ‘K’ – F/O T.A. Gummersall (Aus) – F/S L.C.C. Chalcraft (Aus) – Sgt J. Clemons – F/S E.R. Baldwin (Aus)
F/O F.A. York (Aus) – F/S S.J. Anders (Aus) – F/S W.H. Bradbury (Aus)
LM.233 ‘M’ – F/O J.J. Sheridan (Aus) – F.S G.W. Gould (Aus) – Sgt B.J. Ambrose – Sgt J. Hodgson
F/S A. Raymond (Aus) – F/S W. Branagh (Aus) – Sgt R. Ward
LM.677 – F/O J.J.J. Cross (Aus) – F/S D.F. Edwards (Aus) – Sgt K.M. Pope – F.S W.K. Perry (Aus)
F/O V.L. Drouyn (Aus) – F/S W.V. Maurer (Aus) – F/S M.D. Wilkie (Aus)
NF.910 – F/O G.H. Stewart (Aus) – F/O R. Faulks (Aus) – Sgt G. Hopwood – F/S D.J. Morland (Aus)
F/S R. Galov (Aus) – F/S M.J.H. West (Aus) – F/S F.H. Skuthorpe (Aus)
NF.917 ‘Q’ – F/O R.S. Forge (Aus) – F/O H.M. Bissell (Aus) – Sgt W.C. Bradley – Sgt H. R. Harvey
F/O R.H. Darwin (Aus) – F/S E.J. O’Kearney (Aus) – Sgt R. Haire
ND.473 – F/O R.H. Mellville (Aus) – F/S J.L. Klye (Aus) – Sgt R.J. Brady – F/S D.D. Suter (Aus)
F/S J.F. Tongue (Aus) – F/S B.T. Hoskin (Aus) – F/S R.C.M. Newling (Aus)
NF.908 – F/O L.R. Pedersen (Aus) – F/S J.S. Hodgson (Aus) – Sgt D.R. Ba.dry [sic] – Sgt E.W. Durrant
F/S P.K. Garvey (AUS) – F/S V.J.M. McCarthy (AUS) – Sgt A.E. Dearns
NN.714 – F/O E.B. Rowell (Aus – F/S R.L. Morris (Aus) – Sgt A.J. Halls – Sgt. A Thomson
F/S D.J. Taylor (Aus) – F/S A.S. Smith (Aus) – Sgt A. Thomson
F/S D.J. Taylor (Aus) – F/S A.S. Smith (Aus) – Sgt J. Hodge
No. 463 Squadron, Third Wave
ND.133 ‘X’ – W/C W.A. Forbes (Aus) – F/O J.A. Costello – P/O W.A. Martin – F/S A.J. Norman
F/O W.J. Grime – P/O W. McLeod – P/O K.L. Worden
PD.311 ‘O’ – F/O P.J. Bowell (Aus) – F/S E.A. Petersen (Aus) – Sgt W. Forster – F/S W.H.J. Butcher (Aus)
F/S W. Plumb (Aus) – W/O J.R. Williams (Aus) – F/S I.D. Dutfiield [sic] (Aus)
LM.130 ‘N’ – F/O A.G. Stutter (Aus) – F/S P.L. Wilkinson (Aus) – Sgt H. Walsh – F/S M.F. Woodgate (Aus)
F/S P. O’Loughlin (Aus) – F/S D.J. Browning (Aus) – F/S H.R. Holmes (Aus)
PD.337 ‘L’ – F/O F.H. Smith (Aus) – Sgt E. Moss – ?
F/S B.A. Donaghue (Aus) – F/S R.T. Simonson (Aus) – F/S E.R. Cameron (Aus)
ND.977 – F/O G.T. White (Aus) – F/S G.D. Smith (Aus) – Sgt C. Jackson – Sgt V.G. Dunn
F/S H. Robinson (Aus) – F/S J.J.B. Middleton (Aus) – Sgt W. S. Bayne
PD.330 ‘F’ – F/O K.P. Brady (Aus) – F/S E.D. Rees – Sgt C.R. Levy – F/S G. Berglund (Aus)
F/S G.W. Boyes – F/S J.D. Stevens (Aus) – F/S J.E. Cox (Aus)
MD.332 – F/O B. Ward-Smith (Aus) – F/O R.W. Markham (Aus) – Sgt E. Taylor – F/S A.J. Tyson (Aus)
[page break]
[underlined] 5 Group, [/underlined] the biggest of 6 in Bomber Command.
Our 467 squadron was one of 18 Lancaster squadrons the Group. They were:-
9 at Bardney
227 at Balderton
[missing number] 4 (Rhod.) “ Spilsby
[underlined] 463 & 467 “ Waddington [/underlined]
49 “ Fulbeck
619 at Strubby
50 & 61 “ Skellingthorpe
630 “ East Kirkby
57 “ East Kirkby
617, 627 “ Woodhall Spa [symbol] Mosquitos
83 & 97 (Pathfinders) Coningsby
106 Metheringham
189 Fulbeck
207 Spilsby
[underlined] Some notable raids [/underlined]:
1944 Sept. 12/13. First operational use of [underlined] Loran [/underlined].
“ 23/4. Dortmund-Ems canal breached by [underlined] Tallboy [/underlined] (12000 lb bomb, designed by Barnes Wallis).
Oct. 3 Sea wall at Westkapelle (Walcheren Is) breached.
“ 14/5 Biggest night ops by Bomber Command of the war.
“ 23/4. Part of 1055 plane raid on Essen.
“ 25 “ “ 771 “ “ “ “, finishes it.
Nov. 2/3 “ “ 992 “ “ “ Dusseldorf.
“ 4/5. 174 Lancs breach Dortmund-Ems canal again.
“ 12 Tirpitz sank at Tromso by 9 & 617 Sqdns.
1945 Jan 1/2. 157 Lancs breach Mittleand canal.
“ 4/5. raid on Royan kills many French civilians.
“ 7/8. Part of 654 a/c; last raid on Munich.
Mar 14. Bielefeld aquaduct [sic] broken using Barnes Wallis’s new 22000 lb Grand Slam bomb. by 617 Sqdn.
“ 27. U-boat shelter at Farge blown up using the Grand Slam bomb, by 617 Sqdn.
Feb. 20/21 First of 36 consecutive night raids on Berlin by Mosquitos of 627 Sqdn.
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[circled 8]
[underlined] 5 Group [/underlined] Sqdns. As at 22.3.45.
Lanc I, III
9 Bardney
44 (Rhod.) Spilsby
49 Fulbeck.
50 Skellingthorpe
57 East Kirkby
61 Skellingthorpe
106 Metheringham
189 Fulbeck.
207 Spilsby
227 Balderton
463 [brackets] RAAF Waddington
407 RAAF Waddington [/brackets]
619 Strubby
630 East Kirkby
[symbol] 617 Woodhall Spa.
[brackets] 83 PFF Coningsby
97 PFF Coningsby [/brackets]
627 Woodhall Spa. Mosquito IV, XX, 25.
(83, 97 & 627 on loan from 8 Group.)
[inserted] [underlined] 1944. [/underlined] [/inserted]
Sept 12/13 First operational use of LORAN.
“ 23/4. Dortmund Ems canal breached by Tallboy (12000 lb).
Oct 3. Sea wall at Westkapelle (Walcheren Is) breached.
14/15 BC. biggest night ops of war.
23/24. 1055 raid on Essen. 25th 771 on Essen finishes it.
Nov 2/3. 992 on Dusseldorf.
4/5. 174 breach Dortmund Ems canal again.
12. Tirpitz sank at Tromas by 9 & 617 Sq.
Jan 1/2. 157 breach Mittleand Canal.
[inserted] 1945
Jan 4/5 Royan – many French casualties.
7/8 Last raid on Munich 654 a/c
Mar 14. Bielefeld aqueduct broken … Grand Slam 22000 lb.
27 U boat shelter at Farge successful using “ “ “
Feb. 20/21 first of 36 consecutive night raids on Berlin by mosquitos. [/inserted]
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Extracts from “The Hardest Victory – RAF Bomber Command in WW II by Dennis Richards. (Hodder & Stoughton, 1944.)
1944. March to June. The Transportation Plan, preparatory to OVERLORD … the invasion in Normandy. As part of the plan to convince the Germans that the landing would be in the Pas de Calais, far more bridges and railway workshops and marshalling yards were attacked North of the Seine than South of it. In this phase Bomber Command dealt with 37 of the railway centres, 8th American Air Force heavies 26, & AEAF (fighters, fighter-bombers, light & medium bombers, & recon. aircraft, a mixture of RAF & USAAF squadrons) 20. Bomber command dropped nearly 45000 tons on these centres, twice the tonnage of the other 2 put together. Harris in “Bomber Command” wrote:- “Bomber Command’s night bombing proved to be rather more accurate, much heavier in weight & more concentrated than the American daylight attacks, a fact which was afterwards clearly recognised by SHAEF when the time came (later) for the bombing of German troop concentrations within a mile or so of our own troops.”
In this phase, Bomber Command made 69 attacks, 9000 sorties & lost 198 planes (1.8%). They did enormous damage. In the end about 2/3 of the 37 centres were classed as completely out of action for a month or more, and the remainder as needing only some further “attention” from fighter-bombers.
Unhappily, the toll of friendly civilian lives was sometimes more than the “prescribed” limit of 100 – 150 per raid … (Coutrai 252, Lille 456, Ghent 482), but overall the total was much less than the 10000 “limit”.
The attacks on rail centres by all 3 air forces proved catastrophic for the Germans. Only about 12% of rolling stock was fit for use. A division from Poland took 3 days to get to West Germany, then 4 weeks to the Normandy battlefront!
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A particularly important raid, both in technique & results, was that on 5/6 Apr. (’43) on the Gnome et Rhône aero-works at Toulouse. 144 Lancs from 5 Group, with Leonard Cheshire of 617 SQN doing the initial marking at low level from a Mosquito. 2 Lancs of 617 reinforced the marking with great accuracy & this led to a raid which completely destroyed the factory. Thenceforth, Harris normally entrusted 5 Group (the largest in the Command) with its own marking, independent of the Pathfinder Force.
Bomber Command’s biggest task just before the invasion was to help silence the enemy’s coastal batteries … most nights since 24/25 May, & for deception purposes many of them outside the intended invasion area. But as D-Day neared, so the assault stepped up. On 2/3 June, 271 bombers attacked 4 batteries in the Pas de Calais (where the Germans most expected the invasion). On 3/4 June, 135 bombers attacked batteries at Calais & Winereux. On 4/5 June, 257 a/c attacked … this time in the invasion area. On 5/6 June (when invasion fleet was under way) Bomber Command put on max. effort … 1136 a/c (1047 attacked) [inserted] 5000 + tons of bombs. [/inserted] against [deleted] the [/deleted] 10 of the main batteries on the invasion coast. Other air formations & naval bombardment also attacked there & between them 9 of the 10 batteries were made incapable of sustained fire against the invasion forces.
In the week after D-Day, B.C. flew 3500 sorties to prevent reinforcements getting to the front. In the most skilful attack, 8/9 June. Lancs of 83 Sqn lit up railway tunnel at Saumur, then marked by Mosquitos, then 25 Lancs of 617 Sqn. dropped new 12000 lb “Tallboys” [inserted] [symbol] designed by Barnes Wallis. [/inserted] blocked the tunnel & delayed the Panzers.
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During the struggle in Normandy, B.C. operated in strength close to battlefield. 14/15 Jun, 337 vs troops & vehicles at Aunay & Evrecy (near Caen). 30 Jun first B.C. daylight there … 266 Lancs & Halis & a few Mosquitos & Spitfire escort bombed a road junction at Villers-Bocage from 4000’ & frustrated a panzer attack. Of B.C.’s 5 other attacks in close support the biggest was 18 Jul .. GOODWOOD (max effort) … 1056 from B.C., 863 of AEAF & 8th A.F. to help the push SE of Caen towards Falaise …. but had bad weather & unsubdued anti-tank guns stopped the offensive (only 6 miles max.). But it impressed the Germans … Von Kluge who’d just replaced Rommel, wrote to Hitler on 21 Jul:- “There is no way by which, in the face of the enemy air forces’ complete command of the air, we can discover a form of strategy which will counterbalance the annihilating effects [underlined] unless we withdraw [/underlined] from the battlefield. Whole armoured formations allotted to counter-attack were caught beneath bomb carpets of the greatest intensity so that they could be got out of the torn-up ground only by prolonged effort … The psychological effect of such a mass of bombs coming down with all the power of elemental nature on the fighting forces, especially the infantry, is a factor which has to be taken into very serious consideration. It is immaterial whether such a carpet catches good troops or bad. They are more or less annihilated, and above all their equipment is shattered ...”
(He suicided a month later when Hitler wouldn’t allow a withdrawal)
On 7/8 Aug. 1019 a/c of B.C. raided 5 points in advance of Allied troops … helping Canadian 1st Army to open the way to Falaise.
Allies had 14000 a/c against German 1000 in those weeks.
25 Aug. Paris was free. 3 Sept. Brit 2nd Army in Brussels.
Resumption of oil targets delayed by V-1 threat.
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[circled 4] Jan (1944)
Hitler had hoped to begin V-1s vs London as ‘New Year present’ but damage to ‘ski” sites, & Fiesler works at Kassel & their own trouble with getting the bomb to operate reasonably – caused set-backs. Allied bombing of railways held up delivery of launchers & bomb components.
12/13 Jun first V-1 attacks. 7 of 55 sites managed to fire total of 10 … of which 3 reached England. But they improved. Bet. 15/16 & 16/17 Jun. 144 crossed Kentish coast & 73 reached London.
Operation CROSSBOW … B.C. + AEAF + 8th A.F. attacked V-1 sites from mid June to mid-August … using 40% of B.C. strength Targets were the modified launch sites, supply depots, & ‘large sites’ (V-2 rockets [deleted] maybe [indecipherable word] [/deleted]. B.C. attacked these day & night. B.C. flew 16000 sorties, 59000 tons vs the V-1 targets only losing 131 a/c ([symbol] 1%).
By mid-Aug, less need [symbol] defences (AA & fighters redeployed & more effect … + proximity fuses [symbol] [symbol] 20% reaching target; + balloons + finally our armies overrunning the launching sites.
Every day but one from 5 to 11 Sept Harris sent out 300 or more a/c to bomb [deleted] h [/deleted] [underlined] Le Havre [/underlined] area. (We did our [underlined] first trip [/underlined] on 10 [deleted] 8 [/deleted] Sept. 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500 lb.) that day 992 sorties. Total for the week 2500 sorties, 9750 tons … the ground attack after the last air raid on 11 Sept. succeeded & only c. 50 fatalaties [sic]. [inserted] (our 3rd) [/inserted] [underlined] Boulogne [/underlined] [inserted] we dropped 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500 lb. [/inserted] had become the next objective. We were in big raid on 17 Sept. by 762 a/c, opening the way for attack by Canadian army, … garrison gave in on 22 Sept, in diary of captured German officer: “Sometimes one could despair of everything if one is at the mery [sic] of the RAF without any protection. It seems as if all fighting is useless & all sacrifices in vain.”
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Germans still held Dunkirk & Ostend … it became clear that key to faster supply to our armies was Antwerp, 40 miles up R. Scheldt. Allies captured Antwerp on 4 Sept. but Germans still held river banks, South Beveland & [underlined] Walcheren Is. [/underlined] dominating its approach from the sea. Allies tried, MARKET GARDEN, airborne troops to capture bridges over Maas, Wasl & lower Rhine … a disaster, losing 1st Airborne Div’n. [symbol] Try to open the Sheldt Estuary. B.C. began attacks on Walcheren Is. in 3rd week of Sept. Hitting batteries proved difficult. Canadian army told to capture Is. … their C.O. suggested bombing might breach its sea-walls & flood some low-lying batteries. Oct 2nd .. leaflets & broadcast to locals. Oct 3. .. Pathfinder Mosquitos in waves of 30 created a big gap in wall 60’ thick at top & 204’ at base. (617 Sqn with Tallboys not needed … took ‘em home!)
Many parts of Is. now flooded, but no surrender. Further attacks on walls on Oct 7, 11 & 17. We did our [underlined] 11th op [/underlined] [inserted] on 7 OCT. [/inserted] on [underlined] Flushing dyke [/underlined] walls, 2 sticks of 7 x 1000 lb, 2 runs at fairly low alt. & achieved a good breach.
We also bombed gun batteries on [underlined] Walcheren [/underlined] Is again on Oct. 23 (14 x 1000 lb) and Oct 30 (14 x 1000 lb) … [underlined] our 13th op [/underlined].
The plan was to take Wal. Is by amphibious assault & to ‘soften it up’, B.C. raided c 277 on Oct 28; then on Oct 29 with 358 a/c, then on [underlined] Oct 30 with 110 a/c [/underlined]. [inserted] [underlined] our 15th [/underlined] [/inserted] (us). On 1 Nov. Canadian & Scottish troops began a week of hard fighting … Royal marines sailed landing craft through the gaps in the sea-walls. B.C. flew 2000+ sorties in 14 raids there, 9000 tons of bombs … only lost 11 a/c ([symbol] 0.4%).
Antwerp not used for another 19 days … time taken to clear the estuary of mines.
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B.C. continued to attack towns in Germany & coastal targets in the autumn & winter of 1944.
On [inserted] 12th [/inserted] Sept. we did our [underlined] 2nd trip [/underlined] on [underlined] Stuttgart [/underlined] (1 x 4000 lb + 13 J clusters). (Our skipper had been [deleted] there [/deleted] [inserted] to [underlined] Danstadt [/underlined] [/inserted] the previous night as “2nd-dickie”). Then our [underlined] 4th [/underlined] on Bremerhaven on 18 Sept. (18 cans). & 5th on Munchen-Gladbach the next night 19 Sept (1 x 2000 lb + 12 J clusters) on which Guy Gibson as master bomber went missing (KIA). Our [underlined] 6th on [/underlined] 23 Sept. was our first of 4 raids on [underlined] Dortmund [/underlined] Ems canal “the vital link between the Ruhr & North Sea”. (14 x 1000 lb). B.C. did about 10 raids on the canal, “each time draining the canal for several miles & leaving scores of barges stranded. And this was not simply a one-off piece of temporary damage. As soon as, by the effort of 4000 (Todt) labourers, the canal was once more fully working, B.C. breached it again - & went on doing so as required until the end of the war.” (It was a fairly “dicey” target – they [underlined] knew [/underlined] we’d be coming & [underlined] where [/underlined] (where the aqueduct was above ground level.)
Sept 26. Op [symbol] 7 on Karlsruhe (18 cans)
“ 27 [symbol] 8 “ Kauserlauten (18 cans).
Oct 6 [symbol] 10. Bremen (18 cans)
Oct 5. Daylight formation (!) on Wilhelmshaven (18 cans). - - cloud obscured target & we (& others) bombed by H2S … the only time we used it on ops … mostly we were denied its use because they reckoned German fighter &/or flak could pick us up from its transmission.
Oct. 19. Op [symbol] 12. Nuremburg (1 x 2000 lb + 12 J clusters).
Oct 28 op 14 Bergen (Norway) U-boat pens … but brought bombs back due to smokescreen over target. Had to descend to near mountain tops to clear cloud – did so safely using GEE.
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“In the last quarter of 1944, nearly half the tonnage dropped by B.C. was aimed at Urban areas in general rather than on more specific targets. … eg. Stuttgart, Nuremburg; [underlined] Dusseldorf (our 16th [/underlined] on Nov 2nd, 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500) Munich our [underlined] 23rd [/underlined] on Dec. 17 (1 x 4000 + 9 cans + 1 monroe). & [underlined] Munich [/underlined] again our 28th on Jan 7th (1 x 4000 + 6 J clusters).
Our [underlined] 18th [/underlined] on 11 Nov. on Harburg oil refinery (near Hamburg) caused huge fire visible 100 miles on way home (1 x 4000+ 6 x 1000 + 6 x 500 lb).
16 Nov, Our 19th a daylight on [underlined] Duren [/underlined], part of a huge effort to react to battle of bulge destroyed the town to rubble. (12 x 1000 lb).
Our 24th Gdynic .. Dec 18, on Pocket Battleship ‘Lutzow’ (also there the P.B. Admiral Von Sheer) … may have caused enough damage to have Latzow towed (?) to Swinemunde where 617 Sqn finished it off on 16/17 April ’45 (10 x 1000 SA.P.).
5 Group. HQ Grantham, then Moreton Hall, near Swinderby.
[underlined] AOC’s [/underlined] Harris 11.9.39. Bottomley 22.11.40.
Slessor 12-5-41. Coryton 25.5.42. Cochrane 28.2.43
Constantine 16.1.45.
A/C. Hampdens, Manchesters, Lancasters, Mosquitos.
[underlined] B.C. casualties, Aircrew [/underlined] Operational K. 47120
Died as POW 138
Missing now safe. 2868
POW “ “ 9784
Wounded. 4200
[underlined] Non-operational [/underlined]
K. 8090
Wounded 4200
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A brief summary of the Bache crew’s experiences after the Operation to the Dortmund-Ems Canal on 1st January 1945.
A number of entries in the 160 pages that I wrote during 1945 in the second of my three war diaries refer to events connected with, or as a result of, the Bache crew’s experiences on 1st January of that year. (The three diaries contain a total of some 420 pages which cover only some sections of my overseas service in the RAAF, mainly while travelling to and while in Canada doing my navigator training, the Operation on 1st January 1945, that period which is summarised below and my trip back home from England. Unfortunately they do not cover any of the crew’s other Operational Sorties in detail but an amount of information on these is available from other sources in my possession)
The following very short summary makes use of extracts from some of the entries in my second diary, (other than from the 17 pages which contributed to my chronicle of events directly associated with our 16th Operation on 1st January 1945). It then goes on to refer to information that I have received since from various members of our crew covering their individual moves after the crew broke up in May 1945, plus each one’s post war status.
However, for the sake of brevity, this summary does not include any detailed references to those of our Operational Sorties which we flew between 19th February and 18th April 1945 – and some other of the events in which the crew were involved between January and May of that year – but which were not as a direct consequence of the Operation on 1-1-45 These matters may (possibly?) be covered at some future date.
So, picking up this account from a point part way through January 1945 –
My additional navigational duties during 1945.
During the period early in 1945 when our crew was non-operational, while we waited for Ernie and Cec to recover from their injuries received on 1st January, I was employed in the squadron’s navigation section in various ways. Some of these duties continued after we returned to Ops – particularly on the occasions where our crew was not flying on that Op.
Amongst other things, I had been requested by the squadron navigation leader to assist him by looking after the navigation Order Book, which covered matters such as changes in navigational procedures as these came through from No 5 Group Headquarters, as well as setting up an improved system for bringing this information to the notice of the navigators on the squadron. I was also asked to devise ways of drawing attention to cases or areas in which we should take steps to improve navigational performance.
I “dreamed up” a cartoon type character of a navigator who I named “Ayling-Rouse” (who was something like a mixture of the infamous idiotic pilot character, P/O Prune and the well known ancient Chinese philosopher, Confucius) to assist with this and it seemed to be quite successful in getting the guys’ attention! – the style being recommended for use elsewhere in the Group.
I was also shown by the section’s navigation assessment officer how to assess the squadron navigator’s Operational flying log sheets and plotting charts – and learned how to get the navigators away on “cross-country” training flights etc.
I was then introduced by the squadron navigation leader to Operational navigation briefing procedures and other of his duties – and taken to some of the pre-Operation navigational planning conferences, which were held via a Group telephone hook up between
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the various squadrons just prior to our squadron Navigators Briefing for the Op. concerned.
As an upshot of all this, I was made deputy navigation leader and eventually stood in for the squadron navigation leader on occasions – including the conducting of the Navigators Briefing and the navigation specialist officer’s briefing contribution at the Main Briefing which followed, for those of No. 467 Squadron’s crews who were to participate in the daylight Bomber Command attack on “Hitler’s Hideout” at Berchtesgaden, in April 1945.
As it turned out – like so many other planned attacks – this Operation had to be “scrubbed” (ie cancelled) at the last minute because of bad weather in the target area – but was carried out a day or so later by 359 Lancasters – of which some were from other squadrons in No 5 Group and some from Nos. 1 and 8 Groups. However it so happened that Nos. 463 and 467 Squadrons were not available to go there with them on that day due to our station’s involvement in an attack on Tonsberg in Norway which required take-off later in the same afternoon.
(As a result of the additional navigation section work which I had carried out while our crew was “off Ops” waiting for the return of Cec and Ernie and also after we returned to Ops, the squadron navigation leader, when he was informed by the squadron commander early in May that the Bache crew had been selected as one of several crews for a voluntary posting from No. 467 Squadron to Transport Command, tried to convince me not to go with them. He indicated that I was being recommended for a navigation leader’s training course – and would then probably go with the squadron on its intended transfer to the Far East theatre of War.
However, because of the close crew bonds developed during our earlier Operations – and particularly as a result of the events on 1st January 1945, I decided to stick with Merv, Sam and Cec in their transfer to Transport Command.)
Ernie returns to the crew and we return to Operations.
As events turned out, Ernie was declared fit for flying after several weeks and we resumed Ops with him back with us on 19th February, as by this time we were starting to “champ upon the bit” again. However we had to make use of the substitute wireless operators – Cec still being out of action.
Merv’s promotion and his new role on the squadron.
By then Merv had been promoted to the rank of Flight Lieutenant and on occasions had acted as O/C of our “A” Flight, then as O/C “B” Flight, to which our crew was transferred some time in March.
Cec returns to the crew for our trip in “S Sugar”
According to my diary, Cec – who had been recovering from his ankle injury in the RAF hospital at Wroughton, near Crewe, (as was Ernie after they were both transferred from the hospital in Holland) – was flown back to the squadron by Merv and I when he has discharged from there on 22nd February.
However he did not stay, but went to a convalescence place near Liverpool and remained unfit for flying for the remainder of our Operational Sorties – rejoining the crew just in time for our flight to Jouvincourt in France in PO-S on 6th May to bring a planeload of ex-prisoners of war back to England.
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End of the war in Europe and its effects on No. 467 Squadron.
Hostilities in Europe ceased on 7th May 1945 and No. 467 Squadron was one of the Bomber Command squadrons selected for transfer to the Far East theatre of War.
Part of the Bache crew transfer to Transport Command.
Cec then joined Merv, Sam (who had been commissioned in February) and I, in our transfer on 11th May from No 467 Squadron of Bomber Command to Transport Command – to which we were posted as one of five “part-crews” from Waddington.
(These crews were taken from those who were apparently classified as “nominally tour expired” – ie those who had carried out 28, but in our case 25, Operations).
We went to the recently transferred RAAF No. 466, ex No. 4 Group Bomber Command Halifax squadron at Driffield for Transport Command flying training.
Sam’s Departure from Driffield.
We thought that the bomb-aimers who were transferred with us to No. 466 Squadron would have been trained as load masters for Transport Command flying crew “cargo supervision etc”, but were informed shortly after arrival on No. 466 Squadron that it had been decided they were now not required.
So Sam was to leave us! However the blow was softened considerably when he received notification that, because of his long period of service in the RAAF (including time served as a medical orderly in ground staff in the New Guinea theatre of war), he was to be repatriated back to Australia where he would be eligible for discharge from the Service.
He was first of all transferred to the Australian Aircrew Holding Centre at Brighton, on the south coast of England – to await a draft back home aboard a troopship.
Merv, Cec and I continue Transport Command training on No. 466 Squadron.
Merv, Cec and I continued on with No. 466 Squadron at Driffield – where we picked up an Australian Second Pilot (Merv becoming Senior Pilot) – and then converted to and flew in their Halifax bombers.
We then went with the squadron when it relocated to RAF Bassingbourn in September.
From Halifaxes to Liberators.
At Bassingbourne the squadron converted from Halifaxes to 4 engine Liberator bomber type aircraft – American designed and built – and a somewhat different aircraft from the 4 engine British designed and built heavy bombers in which we had previously flown. (It was not long before I christened the Liberator “the Flying Brick” after comparing its flying characteristics with those of our beloved Lancasters).
After we had completed a number of familiarisation exercises in the UK we were scheduled to undertake training flights and later, service transport operations, between UK and India.
The end of World War II in the Far East and the disbanding of 466 Squadron.
We were about to carry out our first training flight to India when the war in the Pacific area suddenly ended – resulting in the squadron being disbanded on 26th October 1945.
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So the four of us, including the Australian Second Pilot, were transferred to Brighton for repatriation back home and discharge from the RAAF.
Our return to Australia.
As things turned out, all the Australian members of our crew, except for Sam, who had left England much earlier – finished up finally going back to Australia together on the same ship – the Athlone Castle.
Our return by sea to Australia is another story – including us becoming involved in a Mutiny aboard the first ship, the Orion, on which we were embarked – and from which we were later disembarked again, back in England, after it broke down in the Bay of Biscay!
Return Home and Post War
Sam
Sam, who received his promotion to Flying Officer in August, returned to Sydney in NSW for discharge from the RAAF. He and his wife, Valda, now live in Wagga, N.S.W.
Merv
Merv returned to Adelaide in South Australia for discharge as a Flight Lieutenant. He and his wife, Ethel, continued to live there until he died in 1974.
Cec
Cec returned to Brisbane in Queensland, for discharge, by which time he had been promoted to the rank of Flying Officer. He married Dawn there and they continued to live in Brisbane, but later moved northwards to Caloundra, on the Sunshine Coast in Queensland – where he died from a war related complaint in 1997.
Les
Les, Jim and Ernie remained at Waddington – Les transferring to No 463 Squadron to join Jack Blair’s crew (also ex 467 Squadron, on which they had done 24 Ops prior to the end of the war in Europe). They subsequently moved with the squadron to RAF Skellingthorpe in July. Here he remained until the war in the Pacific concluded, after which No. 463 Squadron was disbanded on 25th September 1945 and all of its RAAF personnel were repatriated back to Australia. He had the rank of Pilot Officer when he was discharged.
Les married and he and his wife, Norma, now live at Seymour, Victoria.
Jim
Jim remained on No. 467 Squadron at Waddington after Merv, Sam, Cec and I left for Transport Command – and while there joined F/O C F Stewart’s crew (which had done 6 Ops on 467 Squadron prior to the end of hostilities in Europe) – as mid upper gunner.
They were posted to No. 463 Squadron, which was also located at Waddington, on 4th June – and went with this squadron when it was relocated to RAF Skellingthorpe on 3rd July.
They remained with No. 463 Squadron until it was disbanded on 25th September 1945 – after which Jim was transferred to Brighton along with all its other Australian members and then returned to Australia for discharge from the RAAF. He was promoted to the rank of Warrant Officer sometime during this period.
Jim married and he and his wife, June, live in Sydney, N.S.W.
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Australian War Memorial
Page 1 of [missing number]
No. 467 Squadron
No. 467 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force was formed at Scampton in the United Kingdom on 7 November 1942. Although intended as an Australian squadron under Article XV of the Empire Air Training Scheme, the majority of its personnel were originally British. The replacement of these men with Australians was a gradual process and it was only towards the end of the war that the squadron gained a dominant Australian character.
The squadron relocated to Bottesford on 23 November 1942 and commenced operations on 2 January 1943. A year later it moved to Waddington, which remained the squadron’s home until the end of the war. Equipped with Avro Lancaster heavy bombers, and forming part of 5 Group, RAF Bomber Command, the squadron’s operational focus for much of the war was the strategic bombing offensive against Germany. Bombing almost entirely by night, it participated in all of the major campaigns of the offensive including the battles of the Ruhr, Berlin and Hamburg. In addition to Germany, the squadron also attacked targets in France, Italy, Norway and Czechoslovakia. On 20 June 1943, 467 was the first Bomber Command squadron to participate in the “shuttle service” where aircraft would leave the United Kingdom, bomb a European target, and then fly on to an airfield in North Africa. There they would refuel and rearm and then bomb another target on their return flight to Britain. The German port of Friederichshafen was the outbound target, and the Italian port of Spezia the inbound one.
In addition to the strategic bombing offensive, 467 Squadron was also employed in support of ground operations prior to, and during the D-Day landing, during the drive out of the Normandy beachhead in mid-1944, and during the crossing of the Rhine in March 1945. The squadron also participated in the offensive to remove the threat posed by Germany’s terror weapons and participated in raids on the weapons research facility at Peenemende, and on V1 flying bomb and V2 rocket assembly and launch sites in France.
467 Squadron’s last bombing raid of the war was an attack on the oil refinery and tankerage at Vallo in Norway. Even before the cessation of hostilities, the squadron was employed to ferry liberated Allied prisoners of war from Europe to Britain and it continued in this role after VE Day. The squadron was one of several identified to form “Tiger Force”, Bomber Command’s contribution to the strategic bombing campaign against Japan. It relocated to Metheringham to prepare for this role, but the war against Japan ended before “Tiger Force” was deployed. 467 Squadron disbanded on 30 September 1945.
Between January 1942 and April 1945, 467 Squadron flew 3,833 sorties and dropped 17,578 tons of bombs. It suffered heavily in the course of its operations – 760 personnel were killed, of whom 284 were Australian, and 11 [missing number] aircraft were lost.
References AWM 64, RAAF formation and unit rolls [2 symbols] ORMF 0118, Roll 95 [2 symbols] 1/426 December 1942 – December 1943 [2 symbols] 1/427 January – December 1944 [2 symbols] 1/428 January – October 1945 [2 symbols] 1/435A December 1942 – March 1945; Units of the Royal Australian Air Force; a concise history. Volume 3, bomber units, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1995).; H.M. Blundell, They flew from Waddington! 463 – 467 Lancaster Squadrons, Royal Australian Air Force, (Sydney: W. Homer, 1975).
Category Unit
http://www.awm.gov.au/unit/U59451/
4/10
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Title
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463 & 467 Squadron Notes on Ops
Description
An account of the resource
Extracts from publications giving details of all operations by 467 and 463 Squadrons from 10 September 1944 to 25 April 1945. Details include number of aircraft, target, bombloads and losses. Interspersed are details of operations carried out by Herbert Adam's crew on 467 Squadron between 10 September 1944 and 16 January 1945 which include many extracts from his diary describing operations and daily activities. Included are photographs of aircraft, crew members, air to ground views, targets, cook's tour and a map diagram. Details of 5 Group Squadrons, Extracts from books and a summary of Bache crew's experiences after operation to Dortmund Ems canal.
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H G Adams
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Seventy eight page handwritten book
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Memoir
Text. Personal research
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MAdamsHG424504-170215-01
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
France
France--Le Havre
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Pas-de-Calais
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Germany
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Braunschweig
Netherlands
Netherlands--Walcheren
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Germany--Nuremberg
Norway
Norway--Bergen
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Germany--Hamburg
Norway--Trondheim
Germany--Munich
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Harburg (Landkreis)
Germany--Giessen (Hesse)
Germany--Euskirchen (Kreis)
Poland
Poland--Gdynia
Belgium
Belgium--Houffalize
France--Royan
Germany--Merseburg
Czech Republic
Czech Republic--Most
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Siegen
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Pforzheim
Germany--Sassnitz
Germany--Essen
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Halle an der Saale
Germany--Würzburg
Germany--Wesel (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Germany--Nordhausen (Thuringia)
Netherlands--IJmuiden
Germany--Flensburg
Norway--Tønsberg
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Czech Republic--Plzeň
Germany--Herne (Arnsberg)
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-09
1944-10
1944-11
1944-12
1945-01
1945-02
1945-03
1945-04
1944-04-05
1944-04-06
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
1944-06-30
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Tricia Marshall
463 Squadron
467 Squadron
5 Group
air gunner
aircrew
bombing
bombing of Toulouse (5/6 April 1944)
Cook’s tour
Gibson, Guy Penrose (1918-1944)
Grand Slam
H2S
killed in action
Lancaster
Mosquito
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
nose art
RAF Waddington
searchlight
tactical support for Normandy troops
Tallboy
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1321/26954/LLatimerJF1551478v1.1.pdf
63e5be776c4ee948864e178c5d15224f
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Latimer, James Ferguson
J F Latimer
Description
An account of the resource
Four items. An oral history interview with Warrant Officer Jim Latimer (1923 - 2020, 1551478 Royal Air Force) his log book, and photographs. He flew operations as a bomb aimer with 102 and 462 Squadrons.
The collection was catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2019-09-28
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Latimer, JF
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Description
An account of the resource
J F Latimer’s air bomber’s flying log book covering the period from 9 March 1943 to 8 March 1945. Detailing his flying training and operations flown as air bomber. He was stationed at RCAF Fingal (4 B&GS), RCAF Port Albert (31 ANS), RCAF Jarvis (1 B&GS), RAF Skaebrae (1476 Advanced Ship Recognition Course), RAF Mona (8 OAFU), RAF Moreton-in-Marsh (21 OTU), RAF Marston Moor (1652 HCU), RAF Pocklington (102 Squadron), RAF Driffield and RAF Foulsham (462 RAAF Squadron), Aircraft flown in were Anson, Bolingbroke, Wellington and Halifax. He flew four daylight and four night-time operations with 102 Squadron and five daylight and twenty two night-time operations with 462 RAAF Squadron, a total of 35. Targets were Foret de Nieppe, Villers Bocage, De Bruyere, Somain, Brunswick, Eindhoven, Sterkrade, Wemars Capelle, Soesterberg, Le Havre, Gelsenkirchen, Nordstein, Kiel, Boulogne, Duisburg, Wilhelmshaven, Hanover, Essen, Ostkapelle, Domberg, Soest, Hamburg, Sylt, Koblentz, Bonn, Mainz, Rheine, Heilbronn, Neuss, Kaiserlautern, Mannheim and Dortmund. <span>His pilots on operations were </span>Flight Sergeant Mitchell, Flying Officer Sanderson, Squadron Leader Jackson, Flying officer Wther [?], Flying Officer Boyd, Flying Officer Anderson, Flying Officer McIndle and Flight Lieutenant James. This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Title
A name given to the resource
J F Latimer’s Royal Canadian Air Force Flying Log Book for Aircrew other than Pilot
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LLatimerJF1551478v1
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Terry Hancock
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1944-07-28
1944-07-30
1944-08-03
1944-08-07
1944-08-08
1944-08-11
1944-08-12
1944-08-13
1944-08-15
1944-08-18
1944-08-19
1944-08-25
1944-09-03
1944-09-09
1944-09-11
1944-09-12
1944-09-13
1944-09-15
1944-09-16
1944-10-15
1944-10-18
1944-10-21
1944-10-23
1944-10-25
1944-10-28
1944-10-29
1944-12-08
1944-12-09
1945-01-01
1945-01-16
1945-01-17
1945-01-21
1945-01-22
1945-01-28
1945-02-18
1945-02-22
1945-02-23
1945-03-01
1945-03-02
1945-03-03
1945-03-05
1945-03-06
1945-03-08
1945-03-09
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Canada
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
England--Gloucestershire
England--Yorkshire
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Dieppe
France--Le Havre
France--Somain
France--Villers-Bocage (Calvados)
Germany--Bonn
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Essen
Germany--Freising
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Koblenz
Germany--Mainz (Rhineland-Palatinate)
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Neuss
Germany--Oberhausen (Düsseldorf)
Germany--Rheine
Germany--Soest
Germany--Sylt
Netherlands--Eindhoven
Netherlands--Oostkapelle
Netherlands--Soesterberg
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Ontario
Wales--Anglesey
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Germany--Freising
100 Group
102 Squadron
1652 HCU
21 OTU
462 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
Air Observers School
aircrew
Anson
Bolingbroke
bomb aimer
bombing
Bombing and Gunnery School
bombing of Luftwaffe night-fighter airfields (15 August 1944)
Halifax
Halifax Mk 3
Heavy Conversion Unit
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
RAF Driffield
RAF Foulsham
RAF Marston Moor
RAF Mona
RAF Moreton in the Marsh
RAF Pocklington
RCAF Fingal
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/258/26884/LVaseyJ179596v1.2.pdf
3ae4de7621904346299103153a2c4eb7
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Ganney, Keith
Keith Ganney
K Ganney
Description
An account of the resource
23 items. An oral history interview with Flying Officer Keith Ganney (b. 1922, 1324929 Royal Air Force), his log books, documents and photographs. He flew operations as a bomb aimer with 57 Squadron.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Keith Ganney and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-03-01
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Ganney, K
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
J Vasey’s pilot’s log book
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LVaseyJ179596v1
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Nine photocopied sheets
Description
An account of the resource
Pilot’s flying log book for J Vasey covering the period from 20 July 1942 to 28 April 1946. Detailing his flying training and operations flown as pilot. He was stationed at RAF Cambridge (22 EFTS) RCAF Neepawa (35 EFTS), RCAF Weyburn (41 SFTS), RAF Shellingford (3 EFTS), RAF Church Lawford (18 PAFU), RAF Fiskerton (1514 BAT Flight), RAF Silverstone (17 OTU), RAF Swinderby (1654 HCU), RAF East Kirkby (57 Squadron), RAF Syerston (5 LFS), RAF Finningley (BCIS), RAF Wigsley (1654 HCU), RAF Welford (1336 TSCU), RAF Palam (353 Squadron), RAF Meiktelia (10 Squadron). He had two Red Endorsements. Aircraft flown in were Tiger Moth, Anson, Oxford, Wellington, Halifax, Lancaster and Dakota.
He flew a total of 30 operations with 57 Squadron (24 by night and six by day), targets were Darmstadt, Koningsberg, Bergoneuse, Stuttgart, Bremerhaven, Rheydt, Munster, Karlsruhe, Kaiserlauten, Bremen, Brunswick, Nuremburg, Dusseldorf, Dortmund-Ems Canal, Hamburg, Gravenhorst, Trondheim, Munich, Heinbach dam, Oslo, Royan, Leuna, Siegen, Cologne, Wilhelmshaven, Veerk, Homburg, Duren and Ladbergen. His pilot for his first 'second dickie' operation was Squadron Leader Fairburn. After December 1944 he instructed and then flew transport operations in the Far East.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form: no better quality copies are available.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1944-08-25
1944-08-26
1944-08-27
1944-08-29
1944-08-30
1944-08-31
1944-09-12
1944-09-13
1944-09-17
1944-09-18
1944-09-19
1944-09-20
1944-09-23
1944-09-24
1944-09-26
1944-09-27
1944-09-28
1944-10-05
1944-10-06
1944-10-07
1944-10-11
1944-10-14
1944-10-15
1944-10-19
1944-10-20
1944-11-01
1944-11-02
1944-11-03
1944-11-06
1944-11-07
1944-11-11
1944-11-12
1944-11-16
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-11-23
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-08
1944-12-10
1944-12-29
1944-12-30
1945-01-01
1945-01-04
1945-01-05
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1945-02-01
1945-02-02
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
Germany
Great Britain
Norway
France--Royan
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Homburg (Saarland)
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Hörstel
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Ladbergen
Germany--Leuna
Germany--Munich
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Siegen
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Norway--Oslo
Norway--Trondheim
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Terry Hancock
1654 HCU
17 OTU
57 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
aircrew
Anson
bombing
C-47
Distinguished Flying Cross
Flying Training School
Halifax
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
pilot
RAF Church Lawford
RAF East Kirkby
RAF Finningley
RAF Fiskerton
RAF Silverstone
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
RAF Wigsley
Tiger Moth
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/308/24681/LMottersheadF422232v1.1.pdf
f76801c86e1314e5d06be70cf352a3ad
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Mottershead, Frank
F Mottershead
Description
An account of the resource
Eleven items. An oral history interview with Frank Mottershead (422232 Royal Australian Air Force), photographs and his log book. He flew operations as a wireless operator with 463 Squadron.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Frank Mottershead and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-04-30
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Mottershead, F
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Frank Mottershead’s observer’s and air gunner’s flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
Observer’s and air gunner’s flying log book for F Mottershead, wireless operator, covering the period from 29 April 1943 to 9 April 1945. Detailing his flying training and operations flown. He was stationed at RCAF Calgary, RCAF Mossbank, RCAF Pat Bay, RAF Lichfield, RAF West Freugh, RAF Syerston and RAF Waddington. Aircraft flown in were Norseman, Fort II, Bolingbroke, Anson, Hampden, Wellington, Stirling and Lancaster. He flew a total of 30 operations with 463 squadron, 6 daylight and 24 night. Targets were Rheydt, Dortmund, Calais, Karlsruhe, Kaiserslauten, Wilhelmshaven, Bremen, Flushing, Brunswick, Bergen, Harburg, Duren, Ladbergen, Munich, Heilbronn, Geissen, Gdynia, Houffalize, Mitteland Canal, Politz, Brux, Dresden, Rositz, Bohlen, Wesel, Ijmuiden and Hamburg. His pilots on operations were Flying Officer Smith and Flight Lieutenant Huxtable.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LMottersheadF422232v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
Canada
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Alberta--Calgary
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Belgium--Houffalize
British Columbia--Vancouver Island
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Staffordshire
France--Calais
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Giessen (Hesse)
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Leipzig Region
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Munich
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Wesel (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Netherlands--IJmuiden
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Norway--Bergen
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Scotland--Wigtownshire
Germany--Hamburg
Saskatchewan
Alberta
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Czech Republic--Most
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1945
1944-09-19
1944-09-20
1944-09-23
1944-09-24
1944-09-26
1944-09-27
1944-09-28
1944-10-05
1944-10-06
1944-10-11
1944-10-14
1944-10-15
1944-10-23
1944-10-28
1944-10-29
1944-11-11
1944-11-16
1944-11-21
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-04
1944-12-06
1944-12-18
1944-12-19
1944-12-30
1945-01-01
1945-01-02
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-01-16
1945-01-17
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-15
1945-02-19
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-03-20
1945-03-21
1945-03-23
1945-03-24
1945-04-06
1945-04-09
1654 HCU
27 OTU
463 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
aircrew
Anson
Bolingbroke
bombing
Bombing and Gunnery School
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
Hampden
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Operational Training Unit
RAF Lichfield
RAF Syerston
RAF Waddington
RAF West Freugh
Stirling
training
Wellington
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/496/19743/LCookeWH2220169v1.1.pdf
a7bbedefc460e05481466090e4aaa801
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cooke, William
William H Cooke
W H Cooke
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Cooke, WH
Description
An account of the resource
15 items. An oral history interview with William Cooke (2220169 Royal Air Force), log book and other service material, medals, photographs and memorabilia. He flew operations with 49 Squadron as an air gunner.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by and catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
William H Cooke’s navigators, air bombers and air gunners flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
Navigators, air bombers and air gunners flying log book for W H Cooke, air gunner, covering the period from 3 November 1943 to 15 June 1945. Detailing his flying training and operations flown. He was stationed at RAF Bishops Court, RAF Upper Heyford, RAF Winthorpe, RAF Syerston, RAF Fiskerton, RAF Fulbeck, RAF Kolar and RAF Dhubalia. Aircraft flown in were, Anson, Wellington, Stirling, Lancaster and Liberator. He flew a total of 29 operations with 49 squadron, 8 daylight and 21 night. He also flew 2 operations with 99 squadron. Targets were, Givors, Trossey-St-Maxim, St Leu D’Esserent, Coquesville, Chattelerault, Brunswick, Ouilly, Deelan, Le Havre, Darmstadt, Stuttgart, Boulogne, Bremerhaven, Munchen-Gladbach, Munster, Karlsruhe, Kaiserslautern, Nurnburg, Bergen, Homberg, Dusseldorf, Ladbergen, Gravenhorst, Heilbronn, Geissen, Heinbach, Munich and Bilin. His pilot on operations was Flying Officer Parkin.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1943-08-06
1945-06-15
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LCookeWH2220169v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Oxfordshire
Germany
France
Norway
Burma
Great Britain
India
Netherlands
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Burma--Mon State
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Caen
France--Châtellerault
France--Givors
France--Le Havre
France--Normandy
France--Oise
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Giessen (Hesse)
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Homberg (Kassel)
Germany--Hörstel
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Steinfurt (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Germany--Stuttgart
India--Bengal
India--Kolar (District)
Netherlands--Gelderland
Northern Ireland--Down (County)
Norway--Bergen
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
France--Creil
Great Britain
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1945
1944-07-26
1944-07-27
1944-08-07
1944-08-08
1944-08-09
1944-08-10
1944-08-11
1944-08-12
1944-08-13
1944-08-14
1944-08-15
1944-09-10
1944-09-11
1944-09-12
1944-09-13
1944-09-17
1944-09-18
1944-09-19
1944-09-20
1944-09-23
1944-09-24
1944-09-27
1944-09-28
1944-10-19
1944-10-20
1944-10-28
1944-10-29
1944-11-01
1944-11-02
1944-11-03
1944-11-04
1944-11-05
1944-11-06
1944-11-07
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-12-04
1944-12-06
1944-12-10
1944-12-11
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1945-06-12
1945-06-15
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
16 OTU
1661 HCU
49 Squadron
99 Squadron
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
B-24
bombing of Luftwaffe night-fighter airfields (15 August 1944)
Bombing of Trossy St Maximin (3 August 1944)
crash
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
radar
RAF Bishops Court
RAF Fiskerton
RAF Fulbeck
RAF Syerston
RAF Upper Heyford
RAF Winthorpe
Stirling
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/743/19703/MCleggPV[DoB]-150710-010001.pdf
e92546a0df93cd6e5c1d97fe9cd36a63
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Clegg, Peter Vernon
P V Clegg
Description
An account of the resource
Eight items and five sub-collections. Main collection contains a log of Pathfinder operations from RAF Wyton 1943 -1944, histories of the Avro repair facility at Bracebridge Heath, and Langar, a biography of Squadron Leader David James Baikie Wilson, biography of Squadron Leader Lighton Verdon-Roe, a book - Test Pilots of A.V. Roe & Co Ltd - S.A. 'Bill' Thorn, and two volumes of book - Roy Chadwick - no finer aircraft designer, Sub-collections contain a total of 29 items concerning the Aldborough Dairy and Cafe as well as biographical material, including log books for Alan Gibson, Peter Isaacson, Alistair Lang and Charles Martin. <br /><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1772">Aldborough Dairy and Cafe</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1768">Gibson, Alan</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1769">Isaacson, Peter</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1770">Lang, Alastair</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1771">Martin, Charles</a><br /><br /><br />The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Peter Clegg and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-07-02
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Clegg, PV
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[Photograph] – Joan Gardiner [indecipherable word] WAAF Pat Dey of 156 PFF Sqn.
[page break]
* While at School near Berchtesgarten, [sic] Hitler & his entourage used to pass the gates frequently. The School would line the road and salute ‘Heil Hitler’ when his car passed. One day he slowed and stopped, noticing Pat Dey did not salute. He asked her ‘why’? She said: “Because I am English!”
She worked for an Australian boss before the War began. One day she said she wanted a few minutes to go and sign on for the RAF. He said: “don’t be silly – War is a man’s job – you’ll never be able to stomach it.” How wrong he was!
She worked at Bomber Command HQ at High Wycombe before 156 Sqn, on bombing raid plotting. She was fluent in German.
At 156 Sqn she got to know A V-M Don Bennett – C-in-C of the Pathfinder Group at Wyton, and became a family friend, doing baby-sitting for them.
Page 1
Example of ‘Met’ chit used in Ops briefings.
Form 2324.
METEOROLOGICAL OFFICE, [indecipherable word]
LOCAL FORECAST from [indecipherable word] hours 2/3/44 date.
ROUTE FORECAST [indecipherable word] TO [indecipherable word] till [indecipherable word] hours [indecipherable word] date.
Time of Origin: [indecipherable word] hours [indecipherable words]
[underlined] SURFACE WIND: [/underlined] NW to WNW, 10-15 knots. Gusting locally to 20 knots.
{underlined] UPPER WIND: [/underlined] 2000 feet 310 degs 35 knots. 5000 feet 300 degs 40 knots.
[underlined] WEATHER: [/underlined] Wintry showers, isolated this morning but more widespread this afternoon.
[underlined] VISIBILITY: [/underlined] Mainly 4 to 8 miles but 1 to 3 miles in showers.
[underlined] CLOUD: [/underlined] Small amounts of Sc (Stratocumulus) at 2/3000ft top 4/5000ft this morning apart from local increase in showers to 6/10
[page break]
Page 2
[underlined] 26TH APRIL 1943 [/underlined]
DUISBURG.
Paramatta. 133M & 356H. & 72 P.F.F. [missing] will be dropped at Position ‘A’ 5145N 0642E. by [missing] Mosquitos Squadron.
[missing] exact A/P with Ground markers T.I Red [missing] as backers up will keep the A/P marked with T.I Green throughout
[missing] their bombs with maximum precision at the T.I red if these are [missing] centre of cluster of T.I Green. ZERO = 0215
[list T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPHS. REMARKS.]
[missing] with small amounts of cloud 10/10ths to E. of target. At the beginning [missing] selected crews were attacking good concentration was [missing] of main force attacked fires spread until finally area [missing] mainly ENE of red T.I’s. 14 photographs attempted.
[page break]
Page 3
[underlined] 27TH APRIL 1943 [/underlined]
DORTMUND.
Paramatta. Zero Hour. 0200 hrs.
Flares to be dropped short of target by Mosquitos 4 mls. E of [missing]
[missing] Red & Green T.I’s.
[missing] of special a/c will attack Soest as first running [missing] target. T.I. Yellow to be dropped at position C to [missing].
[list T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPHS. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 28th APRIL 1943 [/underlined]
Stand down.
[missing] of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Group laid mines. 23 a/c are missing.
[page break]
4
[underlined] 29th APRIL 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 09.35HRS. [/underlined] STAND DOWN.
[underlined] 30TH APRIL 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940HRS. [/underlined] Target received – ESSEN.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical (meaning Oboe-guided) Wanganui. 290 Heavies to 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups. & 35 P.F.F/ (8 Mosquitos.) Tracking flares red steady will be dropped on track 5 mins short of the release point at position A as telephoned. (51’45’N 06’56’E). Tracking flares green steady will be dropped on track 2 1/2 mins short of release point at 5137N 0657E.
Release point flares will be red with green stars with one white for longer burning.
Main force a/c to [indecipherable word] tracking flares as guide for bombing run up should aim bombs at release point flares on exact heading 200M & 165mph indicated.
All flares will ignite at 16000ft.
Zero hour. 2359. Changed to 0230.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Owing to height of cloud both navigational & release point flares went into cloud very quickly & all a/c bombed on white flares on approximate position. White flares seen. Glow of fires seen below cloud, large white explosion lit up underside of cloud at 0305 hrs.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 12 a/c missing over ESSEN. 1 from 1 Group, 5 from 4 Group, 5 from 5 Group, 1 from 405. late of 7 squadron over BOCHOLT.
Photographic Cover shows further damage to KRUPPS. Attack gave rise to serious annoyance among the authorities. Described as “terror raid by Jewish and Bolshevic [sic] air pirates.”!
[page break]
5
[underlined] 1ST MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1100HRS. [/underlined] Target. DUISBURG. ‘D’
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Same as for ESSEN 30th April/1st May. Zero hour. 0005.
[deleted] Route – Base – 53’17N 02’12E. – EGMOND – 5200N [/deleted]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 1300HRS. [/underlined] OPS CANCELLED
[underlined] 2nd MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0931HRS. [/underlined] Target – Area 1. DUISBURG. Area 2. BREMEN.
[underlined] METHOD. Area I. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta - Ground Marking. Zero hour 0030hrs. Landmark T.I’s Yellow will be dropped at 5141N 0645E. Mosquitoes will mark exact A/P with T.I. red. Other P.F.F. a/c acting as backers up will keep A/P marked with T.I. Green.
Main Force to aim bombs at T.I. red if visible otherwise at centre of area covered by T.I Green.
[underlined] Area II. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground marking. Landmark flares red steady will be dropped by early a/c only at 5405N 0750E. Landmark T.I. Yellow will be dropped at 5400N 0855E. by all P.F.F. a/c. target will be marked with ground markers T.I. Green.
Main Force a/c to aim their bombast centre of area covered by all T.I. Green. No attempt at visual identification to be made. Flares white & Ground markers T.I. [deleted] Green [/deleted] Red will also be dropped in target area for use of PFF a/c only. Landmark T.I. Yellow to be dropped at 5345N 0835E.
[underlined] 1800HRS. [/underlined] Briefed.
[underlined] 2026 HRS. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta on Area I confirmed.
[underlined] 2110 HRS. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[page break]
6
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 3RD MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940 HRS. [/underlined] Target. Area I DUISBURG. Area II BREMEN
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Area I. Musical Paramatta unless further met. Information makes sky-marking necessary. Zero hour 0030 hrs. Method as for yesterday. Mosquitoes, - Z-3, Z, Z+7, Z+13, Z+19, Z+25, Z+31, Z+37, Z+43. Area II. Newhaven Ground marking. As for yesterday.
[underlined] 1800HRS. [/underlined] Briefing
[underlined] 1801 HRS. [/underlined] OPS. CANCELLED.
[page break]
7
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 4TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0932HRS. [/underlined] Target – DORTMUND. A/P 160° 350yds from ‘A’
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta. 0100HRS. Zero. 116 Mediums + 388 heavies + 71 PFF Mosquitoes will drop landmark ground markers T.I. Yellow at 5152N 0726E. Mosquitoes will then accurately mark exact A/P with ground marker T.I. Green at Z-3, Zero, Z+7, Z+13, Z+19, Z+25, Z+31, Z+37. Other P.F.F. a/c acting as backers up will keep A/P marked throughout attack with T.I. red.
Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at T.I. Green if visible, if not at centre of pattern of T.I. red. A small attack for training purposes will be carried out on Rheine at Z+20.
[underlined] 1800HRS. [/underlined] Briefed. A.O.C’s message to crews read. Photographs of line up taken.
F/L LANG AND SGT. CLARK SINCE REPORTED SAFE.
[page break]
8
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
‘T’ first a/c to return to base made three unsuccessful attempts to land after which owing to the aerodrome being ‘red’ all a/c were either diverted to Honiley or went of their own accord. Visibility there was found to be even worse than Warboys and a/c which had not already been instructed to land elsewhere were told to return and land at Marham. Finally landing at Marham, Chedworth, Sleap, Honeybourne, Stanton Harcourt, Whitchurch, High Ercall, Pershore and one ‘J’ baled out successfully. Interrogations then proceeded during the following day until 1900 hrs!
[underlined] SUMMARY [/underlined] 4 a/c missing P.F.F. 1 from 83, 1 of 156, 2 of 35. 30 a/c missing from Command. Owing to the misconduct of W/C Donaldson who, according to the Main Force, apparently dropped his Red T.I.s on the Dutch coast, he said as far as night photographs show succeeded in developing up to 6 mls. North of the target.
[page break]
9.
[underlined] 5TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations – 156 Squadron returned to base at various times during the day.
[underlined] 6TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1012 HRS. [/underlined] Stand down for P.F.F. with the exception of 109 Squadron.
[underlined] 7TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1008 HRS. [/underlined] Target – DUISBURG Backers-up not required – 6 Main Force only.
[underlined] 1040 HRS. METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta or Musical Wanganui depending on later met: information. If [underlined] Musical Paramatta [/underlined] Mosquitoes will drop preliminary warning groundmarkers T.I. yellow at 5145N 0644E. Mosquitoes will then mark exact A/P with groundmarkers T.I. red which will be dropped at Z-5, Z, Z+5, Z+10, Z+15, Z+20. These groundmarkers will each burn for 7 minutes. No backers up. Main Force to aim bombs with max. precision at T.I. red. If [underlined] Musical Wanganui. [/underlined] Mosquitoes will drop tracking flares red steady at 5145N 0644E. 2nd tracking flares green steady will be dropped on track at 5136N 0645E.
Release point flares red with green stars and white stars for longer burning will be dropped at Z, Z+5, Z+10, Z+15, Z+20. All flares igniting at 16000ft. Main Force a/c will aim their bombs with max. precision at centre of release point flares on exact heading of 200°M IAS 143kts with bomb sights set for height, air speed & zero wind.
195 heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 Group + 17 (L) P.F.F. + 7 Mosquitoes.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 1745 HRS. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[page break]
10.
[underlined] 8TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0930HRS. [/underlined} MAKE & MEND. Tunis and Bizerta [sic] fallen.
[underlined] 9TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000HRS. [/underlined} Target – DUISBURG. [underlined] METHOD [/underlined] Musical Wanganui. 87 mediums + 355 heavies + 8 Mos. + 31 PFF = 482 a/c. Zero. 0200hrs. Tracking flares red steady will be dropped on track at 5150N 0644E. Tracking flares green steady will be dropped on track at 5138N 0644E. Release point flares will be red with green stars with flares white for longer burning. Main Force a/c should aim bombs at centre of release point flares on heading 200°M at IAS 165mph (143kts) with bombsight set for true height, airspeed & zero wind. All flares igniting at 16,000ft.
Mosquitoes will drop release point flares at Z, Z+5, Z+10, Z+15, +20, +25, +30, +35.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
A/C sent to Wyton for take off as Warboys runway was u/s.
[underlined] 1800HRS. [/underlined] Briefing.
[underlined] 1805HRS. [/underlined] Probability of change of method to Musical Paramatta.
[underlined] 2220 HRS. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[page break]
11.
[underlined] 10TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0937HRS. [/underlined] No operations in Command tonight.
[underlined] 11TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0941HRS. [/underlined] Target – BOCHUM. [underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta. 115 Mediums + 431 Heavies + 100 PFF. Zero hour 0015HRS.
[underlined] WORLD’S RECORD WEIGHT CARRYING ATTACK. [/underlined]
Mosquitoes with ground mark A/P with T.I. red at Z-3, Z+1, Z+7, Z+12, Z+17, Z+22, Z+27, Z+32, Z+37.
These will be backed up by other P.F.F aircraft dropping groundmarkers T.I. Green.
Main Force a/c should drop their bombs on the T.I. red if these are seen, otherwise at the estimated centre of the area covered by T.I. Greens. Length of attack Z – Z+45.
Preliminary warning Ground markers T.I. Yellow will be dropped by Mosquitoes at 5146N 0712E.
[underlined] 1726HRS. [/underlined] Area 2. DUISBURG. Main Force crews only will be required if Area 2.
[underlined] 1810HRS. [/underlined] Backers-up scrubbed.
[underlined] 1820HRS. [/underlined] P.F.F. cancelled except for 109 Squadron.
[underlined] 1726HRS. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] for DUISBURG. To be Musical Wanganui. As for method 9th May 1943. Sortie information as for 12th May 1943.
[underlined] 12TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1017HRS. [/underlined] Target – DUISBURG. 8 backers up with their best bomb aimers & 10 Main Force.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta. 120M + 437H. – 89 PFF + 9 Mos: Zero. 0200hrs. Landmarkers T.I. Yellow will be dropped by all Mosquitos [sic] at 5140N 0645E. Exact aiming point will be marked by Mosquitoes with T.I. red at Z-3, Z+1, Z+7, Z+12, Z+22, Z+27, Z+32, Z+37. to be backed up by other PFF dropping T.I. Green. Main Force should aim bombs at T.I. red if visible otherwise at the centre of the pattern of all T.I. Green.
[page break]
12.
[underlined] 12TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET: DUISBURG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 35 a/c missing – 4 P.F.F. Very good concentration on A/P shown by photographs. 1560 tons of bombs dropped – greatest weight achieved against any city in a single attack.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] All crews reported good concentration of markers & fires. One large explosion with big orange glow lasting 6 to 7 sec: at about 0216hrs. Glow of fires seen from Dutch Coast on homeward journey.
[underlined] DAYLIGHT COVER. [/underlined] This shows that the central area of DUISBURG itself is wrecked. Main railway station almost completely destroyed. Centre of DUISBURG-RUHRORT burned out. [indecipherable words]
[page break]
13.
[underlined] 0950HRS. [/underlined] Target – Bochum a/c ‘Q’. PLZEN.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Area I. Musical Paramatta. 104 M + 300 Heavies + 35 PFF + 8 Mos: Area II. Newhaven Groundmarking.
‘Y’ a/c will drop T.I. Yellow at 51°29N 0940E to be backed up by 156 Squadron. ‘Y’ a/c will drop T.I. White at 51°00N 11°02E to be backed up by all P.F.F. Target to be marked blindly by T.I. Green and sticks of White flares. 3L/83, 1L/97, 5L/156, will act as visual markers & will, if A/P is positively identified mark A/P with Red T.Is. If further illumination is necessary a further stick of flares may be used.
Backers up will aim T.I. reds at the exact centre of T.I. red visible. Main Force may for training purpose identify the A/P for themselves in the light of flares, otherwise at the centre of all T.I. red visible. T.I. White and T.I. Yellow will be dropped as navigational aids at the same positions on the route home.
[underlined] 1800HRS. [/underlined] Briefing
[underlined] PLZEN – RESULTS. [/underlined] Main concentration was North of the SKODA WORKS – eleven photographs plotted on the works. Although therefore some damage must have been done, no very important results are expected.
[underlined] BOCHUM. [/underlined] Heavy and well concentrated attack. Smoke from fires on the following day prevented good photographs from being taken, but the industrial area on the N.W. of the city centre has been badly hit and the central area largely devastated.
[page break]
14.
[underlined] TARGETS: PLZEN AND BOCHUM [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY PLZEN. [/underlined] Early arrivals pinpointed works & early T.I. reds dropped on western edge of works & some to N.W. Attack later spread until area 8 x 10mls was covered. Smoke screen which came into operation prevented later pinpointing.
[underlined] BOCHUM. [/underlined] Ground haze prevented identification of ground detail. This a/c was early on the target & no final assessment of success of the raid can be given, but glow of fires could be seen from the Dutch Coast.
[page break]
15.
[underlined] 14TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations – Training. “Interrogation of Prisoners of War” shown to R.A.F. & WAAF personnel. Berlin attacked by 12 Mosquitoes.
[underlined] 15TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations in P.F.F. Command: gardening (mine laying). 2 Group 3 Mosquitoes attack on Berlin and 19 Lancasters attack the Ruhr with 6 Mosquitoes of 2 Group. 1 a/c of 4 Group missing on gardening.
[underlined] 16TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations. Attack on the Moehne, [sic] Sorper, [sic] & Eder dams by 19 Lancasters.
[underlined] 17TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations.
[underlined] 18TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations. Dinghy drill at “The Pike and Eel”.
[underlined] 19TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations. T.I. demonstration at Lakenheath and Rushford Ranges by P.F.F. for benefit of new crews in Bomber Command. S/L Grant in ‘P.’ and W/O Busby in ‘X’ from 156.
[underlined] 20TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations.
[underlined] 21ST MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations.
[page break]
16.
[underlined] 22ND MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations. M.I.9 Lecture by F/O Grainger.
[underlined] 23RD MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940HRS. [/underlined] MAXIMUM effort on DORTMUND.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta.
Mosquitoes will drop groundmarkers T.I. Yellow at 5145N 0728E as an aid to Navigation.
Mosquitoes will mark the exact A/P with T.I. red at Z-2, Z+1, Z+8, Z+14, Z+20, Z+26, Z+32, Z+38, Z+44, Z+50, Z+56. These will be backed up by P.F.F. a/c with T.I. Green.
Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at the T.I. red if these are visible otherwise at the estimated centre of the area covered by all T.I. Green.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 163 Mediums + 535 Heavies + 119 P.F.F. = 817 a/c.
[underlined] list by Squadron of aircraft numbers, roles and losses involved [/underlined]
[underlined] BRIEFING. [/underlined] 1800HRS. – New briefing room.
[page break]
17
[underlined] TARGET: DORTMUND [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Markers confined to an area with a diameter of about 1 mile. Main Force covered Red T.I. area tailing off to the N & NE 4-5mls. in pear-shaped pattern. The intense glow & smoke from fires in the later stages prevented red T.Is from being seen.
Heavy flak. Moderate “predicted” at first – tailed off in quality & quantity. Negligible L/F. Moderate S/Ls (searchlights) sometimes in cones – mostly singly.
[page break]
18.
[underlined] 24TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1940HRS. [/underlined] MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 25TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000HRS. [/underlined] Target – DÜSSELDORF.
underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta. Groundmarkers T.I. Yellow will be dropped at 5100N 0634E throughout period of attack as an aid to navigation, & backed up by LANCASTER backers up. Mosquitoes will mark the exact A/P with groundmarkers T.I. red at:- Z-2, Z+1, Z+8, Z+14, Z+20, Z+26, Z+32, Z+38, Z+44, Z+50. Other P.F.F. a/c acting as backers up will keep the A/P marked with Green T.Is. Main Force a/c should aim their bombs exactly at the T.I red if visible otherwise at the estimated centre of the pattern of T.I. Green. Groundmarkers T.I. Yellow will be dropped at 5117N 0630E by practice ‘Y’ a/c as an aid to navigation.
[underlined] EFFORTS. [/underlined] 155 Mediums + 513 Heavies + 117 P.F.F. = 785 a/c. Zero hour – 0130HRS.
[underlined] BRIEFING. [/underlined] 1800HRS.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 759 a/c attacked:
[underlined] list by Group, of aircraft numbers involved and missing [/underlined]
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19.
[underlined] TARGET: DÜSSELDORF [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY {/underlined] Very conflicting reports received from crews. Early crews unable to see any markers below cloud layer at 8/10,000ft. Apparent gap in T.I. reds in early part of attack seemed to result in scattering of Green T.Is into red T.is reported dropped at 0207hrs and 0210 1/2 hrs. about 1 1/2mls apart resulted in two Green T.I. areas. If these do not agree with Mosquito then enemy is using decoys. Fires reported by last a/c to cover area about 1 1/2mls in diameter.
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[underlined] 26TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000 HRS. [/underlined] Target – COLOGNE. Area 2. DUISBERG.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] MUSICAL PARAMATTA. Ground marking with red T.I. by Mosquitoes and Green T.I.s by backers up. Preliminary warning Yellow T.I. will be dropped by fire raisers of 7 Squadron using ‘Y’ only at 5105N 0025E. These will be maintained by backers up of 7, 35, 83 and 156 Squadron who will aim their Yellow T.I. at those previously dropped. Mosquitoes will then act as precision ground markers and will drop their red T.I. in salvo on the A/P.
Then PFF a/c will act as Backers up aiming their Green T.I. at the Red T.I. if seen otherwise at the estimated centre of the pattern of Green T.I. visible overshooting by 2 seconds in either case.
Fire-raisers and main force will aim their bombs at the Red T.I. if visible otherwise at the centre of all the Green T.I.s visible otherwise at the centre of all the Green T.I.s visible using ‘Y’ as an aid if fitted. ‘Y’ a/c may, if no T.I.s are seen, drop their bombs blind on ‘Y’.
[underlined] AFTERNOON. [/underlined] KING GEORGE and QUEEN ELIZABETH visit Wyton to meet Air Crews. Representatives of each PFF squadron present. F/L COOK and Crew from 156 Squadron.
[underlined] 1800 HRS. [/underlined] Briefing. ‘Y’ F/L COOK to carry Dictaphone.
[underlined] 2153 HRS. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED
[page break]
21.
[underlined] TARGET: COLOGNE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 27TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1010 HRS. [/underlined] Target – ESSEN.
[underlined] Method [/underlined] Musical Wanganui or Musical Paramatta according to weather conditions. No Backers-up on ‘Y’ type a/c required from 150.
[underlined] 1800 HRS. [/underlined] Briefing
[underlined] 2045 HRS. [/underlined] Method to be Musical Wanganui.
[page break]
22.
[underlined] TARGET: ESSEN [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Good concentration achieved with incendiaries inclined to fall short. Good fires seen through breaks in cloud. Flak reports vary – generally considered moderate barrage. 3 a/c hit – ‘B’ F/O PRICHARD – both by flak and another Lancaster over the target. S/L’s few, occasionally small cones through breaks in cloud. ‘B’ F/O PRICHARD carried the dictaphone, but it was broken on return.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing [/underlined]
14 Mosquitoes of 2 Group attacked JENA (ZEISS works) in daylight – 3 missing.
[underlined] 28TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations for P.F.F. Bombing, fighter affiliation and other training. 12 a/c of 2 Group on Zeebrugge missing. [missing sentence]
[page break]
23.
[underlined] 29TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] METHOD [/underlined] MUSICAL PARAMATTA. Preliminary warning Yellow T.I will be dropped by 2S/7 + 2H/35 special a/c at 5059N 5626E This will be maintained by ‘Y’ type backers up. Mosquitoes will then act as precision groundmarkers dropping Red T.I. in salvo on the A/P.
Other P.F.F. a/c will act as Backers up aiming their Green T.I. at the Red T.I. if seen, otherwise at the estimated centre of all green T.I. visible and overshooting by 1 second in either case.
Landmarkers Yellow T.I. will be dropped by ‘Y’ a/c at 5033N 0723E on the route home as an aid to navigation and to help the main force avoid defended areas on leaving the target.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK [/underlined] 113 Mediums + 479 Heavies + 117 P.F.F. Zero hour = 0045 hrs. Dictaphone carried by ‘Y’ F/L COOK, but failed to work.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] The most concentrated raid of the war.
[underlined] list by Group, aircraft numbers involved and missing [/underlined]
[page break]
24.
[underlined] TARGET: WUPPERTAL [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] It is considered by all crews that this attack achieved a good concentration of T.I. marking & consequently good fires were started around this concentration. The fire raising technique appears to have been very successful in the early part of [words missing]
[page break]
25.
[underlined] 30TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0947 HRS. [/underlined] Stand down for all P.F.F. Squadrons.
[underlined] 31ST MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0948 HRS. [/underlined] All Squadrons stood down.
[underlined] 1ST JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0952 HRS. [/underlined] No operations in P.F.F. Training only. Sgt. Wedd lecture on “New Guinea”
[underlined] 2ND JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
No operations in P.F.F.
[underlined] 3RD JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
No operations for 156 Squadron.
[underlined] 4TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940 HRS. [/underlined] Target BOCHUM. Secondary Target MUNSTER. GOODWOOD effort.
[underlined] METHOD for BOCHUM. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta. Mosquitoes will drop Groundmarkers T.I. Yellow at Position A 5148N 0713E. as an aid to navigation. Backers up will keep Position A marked also with T.I. Yellow. Mosquitoes will mark the exact A/P with Groundmarkers T.I. Red at Z-3, Z, Z+7, Z+12, Z+17, Z+22, Z+27, Z+32, Z+37, Z+42. Backers up will keep A/P marked with Groundmarkers T.I. Green. Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at the T.I. red if visible otherwise at the centre of the pattern of T.I. Green.
For information P.F.F. are carrying out a separate attack on MUNSTER from Z+25 to Z+35 using red and green T.I.s
[missing words]
[page break]
26.
[underlined] 5TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1002 HRS. [/underlined] Target OBERHAUSEN. 15 main force only.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Wanganui. Tracking flares red steady will be dropped by all Mosquitoes at Position A 5142N 0615E.
Tracking flares green steady will be dropped by all Mosquitoes at Position B. 5136N 0652E.
Release point flares red with green stars & white for longer burning will be dropped by all Mosquitoes to ignite at 18,000ft in such a position that all main force a/c aiming their bombs at them on a heading of 199M. at 143kts I.A.S. will hit the A/P.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 272 heavies + 43 P.F.F. Zero hour: 0100hrs.
[underlined] 1538 hrs. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[underlined] 6TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1030 HRS. [/underlined] Targets OBERHAUSEN & MUNSTER.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and targets [/underlined]
[underlined] METHODS. Munster. [/underlined] ‘Y’ a/c only will attack at Z+10 & Z+12. by special equipment. [underlined] Oberhausen. [/underlined] Tracking flares red steady will be dropped by all Mosquitoes on Track 8.5 N. Mls. short of the release point.
Release point flares red with green stars & white for longer burning will be dropped by all Mosquitoes to ignite at 18,000ft so that all main force a/c aiming [missing words]
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27
[underlined] 6TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined] (CONT:)
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 274 heavies + 38 P.F.F. Zero hour: 0100hrs.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 1800 HRS. [/underlined] Briefing.
[underlined] 1803 HRS. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
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28
[underlined] 7TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 12.15 HRS. [/underlined] Target MÜNSTER: 1 ‘Y’ + 3 visual marker. + 6 main force. Target MÜLHEIM: 11 Backers-up.
[underlined] METHOD MULHEIM. [/underlined] Yellow T.I. will be dropped by special a/c of 7 & 35 squadron on their way to Munster at Position A. 5150N 0637E. This will be maintained by Backers-up of 35 and 405 Squadron who will aim their Yellow T.I. at those previously dropped.
Mosquitoes will then act as precision groundmarkers and will drop their red T.I. in salvo on the A/P.
Other P.F.F. a/c will act as backers up aiming their Green T.I. at the red T.I. if seen otherwise at the estimated centre of all the Green T.I. visible overshooting by 3 seconds in either case.
Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at the red T.I.s if visible otherwise at the estimated centre of all Green T.I.s visible.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 120 Mediums + 576 Heavies + 49 P.F.F. Zero hour: 0100 HRS. Z - Z+50.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers and type involved [/underlined]
[underlined] MÜNSTER. [/underlined] All blind marker illuminators of 7 & 35 squadron will drop T.I. Yellow blindly at Position A. 5150N 0637E as a navigational aid to a/c attacking Mülheim.
‘Y’ a/c will act as finders and will mark the target area blindly with Green T.I. proceeding on the same heading for 10 seconds before releasing a stick of flares at 4 seconds interval. The Visual Markers will then mark the A/P with red T.I.
Main Force a/c are permitted to identify the A/P visually in the light of flares for [missing words] release their bombs at the estimated centre
[page break]
29.
[underlined] 7TH June 1943 [/underlined] (CONT.)
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 69 heavies of P.F.F. Zero hour: 0100 HRS.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
P.F.F. a/c are to fly strictly between the height limits of 15,800ft and 16,200ft between meridians 0600E and 0700E on the route to & from the target.
[underlined] 1900 HRS. [/underlined] Zero hour now 0115 hrs.
[underlined] 2200 HRS. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[page break]
30
[underlined] TARGETS: MÜNSTER AND MÜLHEIM [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
31
[underlined] 8TH June 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1040 HRS. [/underlined] Target – MÜNSTER. PFF only.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Blind bombing by P.F.F. ‘Y’ a/c.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined]
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
G/Capt. Collings assumed Command 156 Squadron.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Fighter Command intruders over Dutch aerodromes from midnight – 0300 HRS.
[underlined] 1900 HRS. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 9TH June 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1115 HRS. [/underlined] Targets for 156 Squadron – MÜNSTER 1 [indecipherable number] + 10 main force. ESSEN 10 Backers Up.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] ESSEN. Mixed Musical Paramatta.
Preliminary warning flares Green steady will be dropped by Mosquitoes at Position 5137N 0730E. 4 nautical miles to S/B of main force track. Mosquitoes will then drop release point flares red with green stars & white for [missing words] by all Mosquitoes with red T.Is.
[page break]
32
[underlined] 9TH June 1943 [/underlined] (CONT:)
Other P.F.F. backers-up will drop their Green T.I on the red T.I visible. If groundmarkers are invisible backers-up will revert to main force aiming their bombs at the centre of the release point flares on a heading of [missing] at 143kts. and bringing their Green T.I. back.
[underlined] MÜNSTER. [/underlined] Skymarking and groundmarking by special a/c for non ‘Y’ a/c. Special ‘Y’ a/c will drop flares green with red stars then T.I red. If cloud conditions are suitable for groundmarking no flares will be dropped. Other ‘Y’ a/c will bomb by aid of their special equipment.
[underlined] 2155 HRS. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[underlined] 10TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1940 HRS. [/underlined] MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 11TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1055 HRS. [/underlined] TARGETS RECEIVED. Area I. DUSSELDORF. MUNSTER (Y a/c.) Area II. BREMEN. Area III EMDEN.
[underlined] METHODS. MUSICAL PARAMATTA. [/underlined] DUSSELDORF.
Preliminary warning Yellow T.I will be dropped at 5101N 0633E. by Mosquitoes, and backed up by other P.F.F. a/c.
Mosquitoes will act as precision groundmarkers dropping Red T.I on the exact A/P. They will also drop sky markers red with green stars & white igniting at 14000ft.
Other P.F.F. a/c will act as backers-up aiming their Green T.I at the Red T.I seen otherwise at the centre of all Green T.I overshooting by 3 seconds in either case. If groundmarkers are not visible backers-up will revert to main force bringing their T.Is back.
Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at the Red T.Is seen otherwise at the centre of all Green T.Is visible. If release point flares are used a/c should bomb on a heading of 042M at 143kts.
[page break]
33
[underlined] 11TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined] (CONT:)
[underlined] MUNSTER. [/underlined]
‘Y’ a/c will act as finders marking the target area with Yellow T.I proceeding on the same heading for 10 seconds before releasing a stick of flares at 5 secs. interval.
Visual markers will mark the A/P with red T.I after positive visual identification in the light of flares.
Main Force a/c are permitted to identify visually for practice purposes, otherwise they will aim their bombs at the estimated centre of all T.I reds visible or at the centre of all Yellow T.I seen with with an overshoot of 3 seconds. All ‘Y’ a/c should bomb blindly on ‘Y’
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined]
DUSSELDORF. 148 mediums + 612 heavies + 44 P.F.F. Zero hour 0120 hrs.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[underlined] MÜNSTER. [/underlined] 69 heavies of P.F.F. Zero hour 0120 hrs.
[underlined] list of aircraft roles, aircraft numbers and Squadron [/underlined]
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[underlined] TARGETS: MÜNSTER AND DÜSSELDORF [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
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35
[underlined] 12TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1040 HRS. [/underlined] Target – BOCHUM.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta.
Yellow T.I will be dropped by the first 2 Mosquitoes only at 5142N 0712E. Mosquitoes then act as precision groundmarkers dropping Red T.I in salvo on the A/P.
Other P.F.F. a/c will act as Backers-up, aiming Green T.I at the Red T.I if seen, otherwise at the centre of all Green T.I visible overshooting by 3 seconds in either case.
Main Force a/c will aim their bombs at the T.I Red if seen, otherwise at the estimated centre of all T.I Green visible.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 429 Heavies + 64 P.F.F.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
Thin layer of 7/10ths cloud at about 10/12,000ft over the target did not prevent Ground-markers from being seen. T.Is do not appear to have been dropped with the usual accuracy. 25 a/c missing. P.F.F. 1-97 F/S Thomas. 1-83 F/O Tilbury.
[underlined] Photographs. 18th June. [/underlined]
Damage is widespread and severe. In the central city area. 130 acres of business and residential property have been devastated, some 700 buildings having been destroyed or damaged.
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36
[underlined] TARGET: BOCHUM. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 13TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 10.10 HRS. [/underlined] STAND DOWN. Marham only operating and small amount of gardening.
[underlined] 14TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000 HRS. [/underlined] Target – OBERHAUSEN. All Squadrons stood down except for 109 – figures 6 + 2.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 17 a/c on Oberhausen. 1 a/c on gardening.
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37
[underlined] 15TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940 HRS. [/underlined] All P.F.F. stood down. “BULLSEYE” exercise with T.I demonstration. 5 a/c. Q G/C COLLINGS. D F/S RYAN. F/O LUTZ. F/S WINTERBON. F/L MANDENO.
[underlined] 1740 HRS. [/underlined] BULLSEYE Scrubbed.
[underlined] 16TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1025 HRS. [/underlined] Target – KREFELD-UERDINGEN. Derby Effort.
[underlined] 1355 HRS. [/underlined] Target changed to COLOGNE.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined]
Green flares steady will be dropped by ‘Y’ a/c at Position 5105N 0620E. All ‘Y’ a/c will drop flares Red/Green stars and white to ignite at 18,000ft in such a position that other a/c aiming their bombs on a heading of 117M at 143kts I.A.S. should hit the A/P.
‘Y’ a/c will also drop groundmarkers T.I. Green.
Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at the estimated centre of the skymarkers, but if T.I Green can be seen through cloud at the centre of all T.I Greens visible in preference to the skymarkers.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
All crews bombed on sky markers, but no results seen. 3 a/c attacked Last Resorts.
[underlined] GERMAN COMMUNIQUE. [/underlined] 17TH JUNE 1943.
During last night British Bombers attacked Western Germany & bombs were dropped on residential areas particularly in COLOGNE causing casualties among the population and damage to buildings including 4 hospitals & 3 churches.
[page break]
38.
[underlined] TARGET: COLOGNE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
39
[underlined] 17TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
BULLSEYE exercise and T.I demonstration.
Q. G/C COLLINGS. D. F/S RYAN. L. F/S WINTERBON. E. F/O LUTZ. H. F/S ROSE.
S/Ls ineffective owing to cloud. T.I demonstration at Rushford Range with Red T.Is backed up by Green T.Is and White T.Is to simulate incendiaries. T.I Yellow dropped at Lakenheath as preliminary warning groundmarkers. T.Is very well placed at both ranges.
[underlined] 18TH June 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
[underlined] 19TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET [/underlined] LE CREUSOT.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
MONTCHANIN
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined]
Special a/c [deleted] will /[deleted] of 7 & 35 Squadrons will drop the following on route:-
A) Flares green steady at 4920N 0045W. B) T.I Yellow at 4730N 0110E. C) T.I red at 4705N 0310E. On the way home D) T.I red at 4800N 0202E.
[underlined]LE CRUESOT. [/underlined]
1. [indecipherable digit] S/7 + 2H/35 will blindly illuminate the target with long sticks of flares white
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40
2. Remaining illuminators [sic] will continue to illuminate the target with long sticks of flares white dropped after definite visual identification and will release their HE. on the A/P.
3. All above illuminator a/c (in 1 & 2) will carry on to MONTCHANIN and will illuminate it with sticks of flares white at 6 second intervals whilst in a rate 1 turn to the left around the Southern edge of the [symbol]. (triangle symbol meaning target)
4. Main Force Stirlings and Halifaxes [sic] will drop their bombs with maximum accuracy on the A/Ps detailed only after definite visual identification in the light of flares marking 2 or more bombing runs as necessary. Bombs to be brought back if A/Ps are not definitely identified.
[underlined] MONTCHANIN. [/underlined]
1. Illuminator a/c will illuminate the A/P as detailed above (Para. 2.)
2. 3L/83 + 3L/156 will after definite visual identification drop T.I Green on the exact A/P.
3. Blind illuminators, visual markers, & main force Lancasters will aim bombs at the A/P using T.I Green as a guide.
4. All a/c are to leave the target by 0215 hrs.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] LE CREUSOT 244 Heavies of 3, 4 and 6 Groups. MONTCHANIN 26 Heavies of P.F.F.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
Some crews report seeing blue flashes from the target area and are sure that a proportion of the effort fell on the target. Smoke from the Le Creusot attack floated across the target towards the end of the attack. Markers were not necessary in existing conditions. W/O BROWN ‘M’ took a photograph of the A/P.
23rd June 1943. Cover received to date shows no hits on MONTCHANIN.
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[underlined] TARGET: MONTCHANIN [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 20TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
156 stood down.
56 Lancasters of 5 Group & 4 Lancasters of P.F.F attacked the old Zeppelin works at Friedrichshaven [sic] now used as an R.D.F. equipment factory. Many buildings were seen to be hit. Subsequent photographs showed severe damage to parts of the works. The Lancasters continued from Friedrichshaven [sic] and landed in North Africa.
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[underlined] 21ST JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET. [/underlined] KREFELD.
[underlined] METHOD. MUSICAL PARAMATTA. [/underlined]
I. Mosquitoes will act as precision ground-markers dropping Red T.I in salvo on the A/P. To guard against the possibility of technical failure of Mosquitoes, selected ‘Y’ a/c in 2 waves will mark the A/P with Yellow T.I with the aid of special equipment only if, on arrival, no red T.Is are seen.
II. Backers-Up aim Green T.I at Red T.I, if seen, otherwise at the estimated centre of the concentration of Yellow T.I. If Backers-Up can see neither Red nor Yellow T.Is they should aim Green T.Is at the centre of the pattern of Green T.Is.
III. Main Force a/c are to aim their bombs at the T.I red if seen, otherwise at the centre of the concentration of T.I Green. T.I Yellow should be ignored.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] Zero hour: 0130 hrs. 108 mediums + 474 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 114 P.F.F. = 696 a/c.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[page break
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[underlined] NIGHT FIGHTER ACTIVITY. [/underlined]
8 Mosquito Night Fighters operating in the Bomber Stream. 8 Intruder Mosquitoes operating at GILZE RIJEN, VENLO, DEELEN, TWENTE ENTSCHEDE, [sic] BERGEN ALKMAAR, ST. TROND, FLORENNES. Free lance Mosquitoes will be operating at LAON and DIZIER.
[underlined] 0240HRS. [/underlined] Wellington from Upper Heyford crashed on No.I runway. Operational a/c to land on No.3.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
All crews report an excellent attack with markers well concentrated, no strays. Bombing effort confined to an area 1 1/2 mls. square. A few Yellow T.Is were dropped unnecessarily were by 156 Squadron!
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
Photographs. 24th June. Damage is extremely heavy & concentrated in the centre of the city, particularly round the Adolf Hitler Platz. Out of 1,100 acres of fully built-up town area it is estimated that about 900 acres have been devastated. There is also severe damage to the industries on the N.E. side of the town & to barracks on the N.W.
Reinforcements both for fire and police services are said to have been requested as far afield as Dortmund and Munster. The number of people killed is thought to have been around 2,000.
[page break]
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[underlined] TARGET: KREFELD [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
45
[underlined] 22ND JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000HRS. [/underlined] Target: [deleted] OBERHAUSEN. [/deleted] GELSENKIRCHEN.
[underlined] 1320HRS. [/underlined] Target: MULHEIM.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] MUSICAL PARAMATTA.
I. Preliminary warning T.I Yellows will be dropped by Mosquitoes at 5143N 0652E 7 statute miles to port of main force track.
II. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] will mark the exact A/P with T.I Red at Z-3, Z+1. 7, 13, 19, 25, 31, 36.
III. [underlined] Backers Up [/underlined] will keep the A/P marked with T.I. Green.
IV. [underlined] Main Force a/c [/underlined] aim there bombs at T.I Red if visible otherwise at the estimated centre of the pattern of T.I Green.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 54 mediums + 437 heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 63 P.F.F. = 554 a/c. Zero hour 0120 hrs.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined]
6 to 8 Beaufighters will be operating on the Bomber Command route. Mosquitoes and Bostons will be operating over Dutch airfields from 2359 – 0330hrs
[page break]
46.
[underlined] TARGET: MULHEIM [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Marker concentration was good, the Greens spread over an area radius 1 mile. The main attack was also concentrated, with incendiaries tending to fall short at the beginning. The last a/c over the target reports a fire area about 2 mls, square in which 3 large fires were burning. Large explosions reported in the [symbol] area at 0122, 0134 and 0147 hrs.
[underlined] 23RD JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0955 hrs. [/underlined] Make and Mend.
[page break]
47
[underlined] 24TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000 HRS. [/underlined] Target – ELBERFELD. A/P ‘A’
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta.
I. T.I Yellow will be dropped by [underlined] special a/c [/underlined] at 5059N 0626E by special equipment if serviceable, otherwise aiming their T.I at those already dropped. 4 special a/c attacking at Z+2 will arrive at Pos: A 2 mins early – drop their markers, do a rate 1 orbit before proceeding to the target.
II. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] then drop T.I red in salvo on the A/P.
III. [underlined] Backers-Up [/underlined] aim Green T.I at red if seen otherwise the estimated centre of Green T.I.
IV. [underlined] Main Force [/underlined] aim bombs at T.I red if seen otherwise at centre of all T.I Green visible.
V. T.I Yellow will be dropped by [underlined] special a/c [/underlined] on return at 5033N 0723E by means of their special equipment.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 102 Mediums + 441 Heavies + 76 P.F.F. = 619 a/c. 630 a/c. took off. 517 a/c attacked primary. 25 a/c attacked last resort.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[underlined] INTRUDERS & FIGHTERS. [/underlined]
Intruders will be operating in the Bomber Command stream. A wing of Spitfires will meet bombers on return covering the route for a/c returning late.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
33 a/c are missing.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined] [incomplete]
[page break]
48
[underlined] TARGET: ELBERFELD. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY [/underlined]
In the early stages both markers and main force were well concentrated although incendiaries again tended to undershoot. Later smoke up to 9000ft made it difficult to see markers except when cascading, & therefore concentration of main force tended to fall off incendiaries stretching [missing words]
[page break]
49
[underlined] 25TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
P.F.F. stood down except for 109 Squadron.
Target GELSENKIRCHEN.
[list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, missing]
[underlined] 26TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0943HRS. [/underlined] 156 Squadron stood down. Mosquitoes of P.F.F attacked DUISBURG AND HAMBURG.
[underlined] 27TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down. Lecture on ‘ESCAPE’ by F/L Yelland given to Air Crew.
[underlined] 28TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET: [/underlined] COLOGNE.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Mixed Musical Paramatta and Wanganui.
I. Preliminary warning flares Green steady will be dropped by Mosquitoes on track at 5041N 0647E 18.7 statute mls. short of release point.
II. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] mark release point with flares red with green stars and white at Z-4, Z, Z+5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35. They will also mark the A?P with T.I red at the same times.
III. [underlined] Backers-Up [/underlined] A/P marked with T.I Green only if red are visible. Otherwise they will revert to Main Force. [missing sentence]
[page break]
50
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 85 Mediums + 437 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 73 P.F.F. Zero hour 0140 hrs. T.O.T. Z to Z + 40.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined]
9 Mosquitoes + 2 Bostons 0030-0315. 6-8 Beaufighters operating in Main Bomber stream.
[underlined] TARGET: COLOGNE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY [/underlined] 10/10ths cloud over the [symbol] with tops 7/8,000ft. Competent a/c crews to bomb on either markers or cascading T.I reds before they disappeared through cloud. Early a/c on [symbol] report that opening markers were late. All T.I Green brought back. No accurate estimate of attack can be given. Explosions reported 0158, 0211 & 0244.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 12/97 & 24/35 missing. 25 a/c in Command [missing]
[page break]
51
[underlined] 29TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
[underlined] 30TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
[underlined] 1ST JULY 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 2ND JULY 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
[underlined] 3RD JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1005 hrs. [/underlined] Target – COLOGNE.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Musical Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] 1. Mosquitoes [/underlined] will drop preliminary warning flares Green steady on track at 5045N 0648 1/2E. 14 1/2 nautical mls short
[underlined] 2. Mosquitoes [/underlined] will drop sky-markers red with green stars and white at Z-4, Z, Z+5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40. They will also drop T.I red on the exact A/P at the same times.
[underlined] 3. [/underlined] If these T.I Red are visible through cloud, [underlined] Backers-Up [/underlined] will keep the A/P marked with T.I Green. If none are visible Backers-Up revert to main force and bring T.Is back.
[underlined] 4. [/underlined] Main Force aim bombs at :- 1. T.I Red if visible. 2. Centre of T.I Green. 3. Release Point flares heading [indecipherable digits] M I.A.S. 143 kts.
[underlined] 5. [/underlined] All flares to ignite at 12,000ft.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 94 Mediums + 525 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 72 P.F.F. Zero hour 0130hrs.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
52
[underlined] TARGET: COLOGNE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] There appeared to be a time lag of 2 minutes between the sky-markers dropped at 0114 hrs and ground-markers at 0116 hrs. Marker concentration good. Main attack reasonable, but again tending to undershoot as much as 2-3 mls. but in built up area. Smoke seen rising at 0116 hrs made early crews suspect a smoke screen. Smoke at end of attack up to 15,000ft. Fires seen from 40 mls away. One a/c ‘Y’ F/L Cook bombed last resort BONN/HANGELAR A/D. (aerodrome) Bombs hung up over the target and as they were near the end of the attack Captain decided not to run in again. Fires were started on the A/D where a/c beaming nav lights were seen circling.
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined]
3 Mosquitoes on Venlo, 3 on Gilze Rijen, 3 on St. Trond, 3 on Florennes, 2 on [indecipherable word], 2 on [indecipherable word], 6 Beaufighters operating in B. Command stream.
[underlined] RESULTS.] 30 a/c missing. P.F.F. 1 of 97, 1 0f 405, 1 0f 35. 4 group. 4H + 4W [missing words]
[page break]
53
[underlined] 4TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
Target: HAGEN.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta.
1. T.I Yellow will be dropped by [underlined] ‘Y’ a/c [/underlined] on route to the target at 5153N 0724E (to keep clear of MÜNSTER).
2. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] will drop T.I red in salvo on the exact A/P at Z-3, Z+1, 7, 12, 17, 22.
3. [underlined] Backers-Up [/underlined] aim T.Is and bombs at the T.I red if visible, otherwise at the centre of the concentration of T.I Green overshooting by 2 seconds in either case.
4. [underlined] Main Force [/underlined] a/c aim their bombs at the T.I red if visible, otherwise at the estimated centre of the pattern of T.I Green.
[underlined] 5. Y a/c [/underlined] drop T.I Yellow on the return route at 5048N 0716E (to keep clear of COLOGNE)
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined]
39 Mediums + 309 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 44 P.F.F.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] BRIEFING [/underlined] 1800 hrs.
[underlined] 1810 hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 5TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1025 hrs. [/underlined] Target: ESSEN. 139 squadron. 4 a/c HAMBURG. 4 a/c COLOGNE.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Sky-marking.
1. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] will drop tracking flares red steady on track at Pos: 5047N 0658E [missing words] release point.
[page break]
54
[underlined] 2. Mosquitoes [/underlined] drop tracking flares GREEN steady at 5138N 0659E 10 nautical miles short of release point.
3. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] drop release point flares red with green stars & flares white at 0126, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55.
[underlined] 4. Main Force [/underlined] aim bombs at centre of release point flares on heading 197M at 143 kts I.A.S.
If this method is used BACKERS-UP bring green T.Is back.
[underlined] 5. [/underlined] All flares will ignite at 16,000ft.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 398 Heavies & 41 P.F.F. = 439 a/c.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
Zero hour = 0130 hrs. T.O.T. Z to Z+30.
BRIEFING. 1800 hes.
1805 hrs. OPERATIONS CANCELLED
[underlined] 6TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
Target:- ESSEN. Main Force only. ‘A’ S/L MANSFIELD 156 squadron.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Wanganui.
[underlined] 1315 hrs. Operations cancelled. 139 Squadron 4 a/c on COLOGNE 4 a/c DUSSELDORF.
[underlined] 7TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down except for 139 Squadron. 4 a/c DUISBERG. 4 a/c COLOGNE
[page break]
55
[underlined] 8TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1030 HRS. [/underlined] Target COLOGNE.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Musical Wanganui and Paramatta.
[underlined] 1. [/underlined] Preliminary warning flares Green steady will be dropped by all Mosquitoes on track at 5041N 0640E 18.2 nautical mls. short of release point.
[underlined] 2. [/underlined] Release point flare red with green stars and flares white will be dropped by Mosquitoes at:- 0110, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40. They will also mark the A/P with red T.Is at the same time.
[underlined] 3. [/underlined] If the latter are visible Backers-Up will keep the A/P marked with T.I Green.
[underlined] 4. [/underlined] Main Force a/c bomb in the following order of preference:- 1) T.I Red. 2) Centre of T.I Green. 3) Centre of release point flares on exact heading of 023M at a speed of 143 kts.
All flares ignite at 17,000ft. red T.Is cascade from 10,000ft. green T.Is cascade from 3,000ft until Z+15, then one T.I Green from each Backer-Up will cascade from 10,000ft.
[underlined] 5. [/underlined] T.I Yellow will be dropped by 2L/7 at 5040N 0715E. These will be backed up by all Lancasters of 97 Squadron & 1 B/U of 83 Squadron.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 435 Heavies + 55 P.F.F.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
Zero hour = 0110 hrs. T.O.T. Z to Z+35.
[underlined] 1800 hrs. [/underlined] Effort reduced. Z to Z+20 T.O.T.
[page break]
56
[underlined] TARGET: COLOGNE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Sky-markers were late, the first one being seen at 0115 hrs. owing to 10/10ths cloud very little was seen of the attack, but large explosions were observed at 0115, 0117 and 0122 hrs. One crew bombed on Green T.Is seen to cascade at 0109 hrs. and one bombed on E.T.A. Glow of fires seen to be starting beneath cloud.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[list by group, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
3 Mosquitoes of P.F.F. attacked DUISBURG. Nil missing
[underlined] Gardening. [/underlined]
[words missing]
[page break]
57
[underlined] 9TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] GELSENKIRCHEN.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] To sky-mark the Release Point.
[underlined] 1 [/underlined] Tracking flares red steady will be dropped by Mosquitoes 20 1/2 m. short of Release point at 5153N 0708E.
[underlined] 2 [/underlined] Tracking flares Green steady will be dropped by Mosquitoes 11.4 n.m. short of release point at 5144N 0705E.
[underlined] 3 [/underlined] Release point flares red/green and flares white will be dropped by Mosquitoes, so that main force a/c on a heading of 196M at 143 kts I.A.S. will hit the A/P.
[underlined] 4 [/underlined] All flares to ignite at 17,000ft.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 426 Heavies + 32 P.F.F. Zero hour 0110 hrs.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Target identified by sky-markers. Glow of fires seen through cloud indicated reasonably concentrated attack.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[list by group, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
58
[underlined] 10TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down. Invasion of Sicily announced.
[underlined] 11TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] TURIN.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] 1. [/underlined] Route markers Green steady will be dropped by ‘Y’ a/c at 4544N 0553E. These will be backed up by Backers-Up only if they are able to identify the lake visually.
[underlined] 2. ‘Y’ a/c [/underlined] will act as Finders and mark the [symbol] area with Yellow T.I proceeding on the same heading & releasing stick of flares at 6 seconds interval. 1st bundle to be dropped in salvo with Yellow T.I.
[underlined] Visual Markers [/underlined] then mark A/P with Red T.I when they have definitely identified it, using Yellow T.I as guide only. They will [underlined] not [/underlined] drop Red T.I unless absolutely certain of the A/P.
[underlined] Backers-Up [/underlined] aim Green T.I at centre of all Red T.I visible or centre of Green overshooting by 2 seconds in either case. Last resort – aim Green T.Is at the centre of all Yellow T.Is if visible.
[underlined] Non-marker a/c. [/underlined] aim bombs at Red T.I if seen, otherwise at the centre of all Green T.Is. [deleted] If [/deleted]
If on arrival at the [symbol] area cloud conditions make it impossible to see T.Is all ‘Y’ a/c will mark the release point with flares red/green stars. In these circumstances squadrons to detail 1/2 their special a/c to mark after Zero & the other 1/2 to orbit & mark after Z+9. Backers-Up then revert to non-markers & along with other main force aim bombs on heading 126M at 143 kts.
[underlined] 3. [/underlined] Route markers flares Green steady as in Para 1. Zero hour 0120 hrs.
[underlined] 1725 hrs. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled
[page break]
59
[underlined] 12TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target. [/underlined] TURIN.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground marking. As for 11th July 1943.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 422 Heavies + 57 P.F.F.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0040 hrs. T.O.T. Z to Z+30.
[underlined] BRIEFING. [/underlined] 1815 hrs.
[underlined] 1600 HRS. [/underlined] Figures changed. F. R. M. Z. N to go as Main Force. 224 Lancs of 1 & 5 Groups + 57 P.F.F.
[underlined] Alteration to Method. [/underlined] Zero hour. 1045 hrs T.O.T. Z to Z+15.
[underlined] 1. [/underlined] Route marker flares Green steady will be dropped on Lake Annecy backed up by Backers-Up.
[underlined] 2. [/underlined] Route markers Yellow T.I will be dropped by ‘Y’ a/c of 156 squadron backed up by Backers-Up of 156 squadron at 4544N 0305E.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Yellow T.Is from blind markers all fell in town area. Red T.Is reported very accurate. The first 2 bundles of Reds fell about 1 ml. apart one either side of the river – the 3rd fell close to the Red on the A/P. All Red markers & subsequently Green markers reported excellent concentration. Main Force attack well concentrated, practically no run back except for a few incendiaries. Route marking also reported very good, both Lake Annecy and Lake Bourget marked on run to target.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 295 a/c detailed. 1 Group 108 Lancs. [missing words]
[page break]
60
[underlined] TARGET: - TURIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base. Bradwell Bay – Dungeness – Cayeux – Lake Annecy – TURIN – 4544N 0305E – 4630N 0110W – 4630N 0250W – 4700N 0600W – 4830N 0630W – ST. EVAL – Base.
[page break]
61 [inserted] No pages for July 13th – 22nd (On leave?) [/inserted]
[underlined] 23RD JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] HAMBURG or MUNCHEN GLADBACH. A/C required 3 B/M, 13 B/Up, 5 Non-markers.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta or Wanganui.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 55 Mediums + 610 Heavies + 110 P.F.F.
[underlined] 1800 hrs. [/underlined] Briefing
[underlined] 1830 hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 24TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target. [/underlined] HAMBURG. 139 Squadron. 4 a/c DUISBERG. 3 a/c KIEL. 2 a/c LÜBECK. 2 a/c BREMEN. 2 a/c Target to be advised.
[underlined] Requirements. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles] Our figures increased to 24 a/c.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
1. Route markers T.I. Yellow will be dropped by special a/c at 5411N 0850E.
2. Target will be marked by visual markers with T.I. Red, backed up by T.I. Green. Long sticks of flares white and T.I. yellow may be seen in the target area, for the exclusive benefit of P.F.F. only.
3. Main Force attack T.I. Red visible or centre of T.I. Green.
4. [missing words] T.I. Yellow will be dropped by special a/c at 5343N 0836E.
[page break]
62
[underlined] TARGET: HAMBURG [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base. 5400N 0300E – 5445N 0700E – 5355N 0945E – Hamburg – 5315N 1000E – 5435N 0600E – 5400N 0300E – Base.
[page break]
63
[underlined] MESSAGE TO CREWS FROM THE C-in-C. [/underlined]
Hamburg is the 2nd largest city in Germany, the most important port and a vital war industrial area. It was the place whence the rot started which spread throughout Germany in 1918. It was the last part of Germany to adhere to Germany and may well be the first to come unstuck. It has been bombed before but not as you, and still more the Germans, understand bombing. To-night, you start the real battle of Hamburg, and you are going to write it off. This is no ordinary or routine operation and each one of you will, I know, do your utmost.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 76 Mediums + 604 Heavies + 116 P.F.F.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Weather over the target was nil cloud with fair visibility. This enabled, although a smoke screen was in operation, our visual markers to pinpoint tributaries and built up area and to put 3 x T.I. Red which were already down on the target. These were positioned one to the West, one Central and one well to the East. His own T.I. Red was placed along with the centre one. Later a/c report that a good concentration was achieved for a target of this description, but that the attack was diverted roughly by the Alsten, 75% falling on the West and 25% to the east. Exceedingly good fires were seen and a large explosion was observed at 0108 hrs. Smoke was rising over the target in a large column up to 18/20,000ft.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
No a/c missing from P.F.F. 12 a/c missing in Command. ‘Windows’ carried for the first time proved presumably to be a success. “Zephyr” also used for the first time.
6 Beaufighters operated S. of line 5300N and W. of 0700E from 0200-0230 hrs. 13 Mosquitoe [sic] intruders operating from 2330-0330 over A/Fs. [missing words]
[page break]
64
[underlined] German Broadcast. [/underlined]
A strong formation of British bombers a terror raid against Hamburg last night. The population suffered heavy losses and considerable damage was caused to residential quarters and cultural monuments and public buildings. According to reports so far available 17 of the attacking bombers were shot down by the Air Defences of N.W. German Coastal areas and in the Norwegian area.
[underlined] 25TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] U.S.A.A.F. [/underlined] Fortresses attacked HAMBURG in daylight and North German Coastal areas including ROSTOCK, KIEL and LÜBECK.
[underlined] 0958 hrs. [/underlined] Target: HAMBURG – Alternative ESSEN.
[underlined] 1150 hrs. [/underlined] A/C required of 156 Squadron. 3 B/Markers. 1 V/Marker. 11 B/Up. 5 N/Markers.
[underlined] Methods. [/underlined] HAMBURG. Newhaven Ground-marking. ESSEN. Musical Paramatta.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] HAMBURG. 71 Mediums + 538 Heavies + 97 P.F.F. = 706 a/c. ESSEN. 71 Mediums + 538 Heavies + 85 P.F.F. = 694 a/c.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
Zero hour. 0030 hrs.
[underlined] 1800 hrs. [/underlined] Briefing. Area I Cancelled.
[missing words]
[page break]
65
[underlined] TARGET: ESSEN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base – 5313N 0253E – 5153N 0638E – Essen – Nordwijk [sic] – 5300N 0210E – Base.
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined] Mosquitoes. 4 a/c DEELEN. 4 a/c TWENTE. 4 a/c GILZE RIJEN. 4 a/c VENLO. 3 a/c BERGEN. 3 a/c LIPPSTADT. 3 a/c ST. TROND.
[missing words] Bomber Command track.
[page break]
66
[underlined] 2330 hrs. BOMBER COMMAND BROADCAST. [/underlined] Mussolini has resigned and Bagdolio [sic] has taken his place.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Large patch of alto. cum: and industrial haze prevented a clear view of the main attack. Route markers (T.I. Yellow) appear to have been dropped accurately with good concentration. All crews reported good concentration of T.I. Reds and Greens around target area. Several large fires seen, and 2 huge explosions at approx. 0036 hrs & 0105 hrs. Moderate, erratic heavy flak over the target and slight amount of light flak. Results: P.F.F. 3 missing. 25 a/c in Command.
[underlined] 26TH JULY 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] 1015 hrs. [/underlined] MAKE & MEND for P.F.F. except for 139 Squadron. 6 Mosquitoes on HAMBURG.
[underlined] U.S.A.A.C. [/underlined]
[underlined] HAMBURG. [/underlined] 127 Fortresses took off to attack the ship yards and aero engine factory.
[underlined] HANNOVER. [/underlined] 122 Fortresses took off to attack the Tyre & Rubber Factory & Synthetic Rubber works.
P.F.F. 6 Mosquitoes on HAMBURG.
[underlined] 27TH JULY 1943. [/underlined]
[deleted] [underlined] 0948 hrs. Target: HAMBURG. [/underlined] [/deleted] [underlined] P. I. [indecipherable letter] [/underlined]
[deleted] [underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] [/deleted]
[underlined[ ESSEN. [/underlined] Considerable fresh damage on KRUPPS. Many fires burning throughout town.
[underlined] HAMBURG. [/underlined] Considerable damage seen outside smoke area – including BLOHM & VOSS works.
[underlined] ELBERFELD. [/underlined] Almost complete destruction throughout the town.
[underlined] GELSENKIRCHEN. {/underlined] A [missing words]
[page break]
67
[underlined] 27TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0948 hrs. [/underlined] Target: HAMBURG.
[underlined] A/C Requirements. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK [/underlined] 76 Mediums + 591 Heavies + 112 P.F.F. Zero hour 0100 hrs.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
Route markers T.I. Yellow will be dropped at 5418N 0840E by 7 & 405 Squadrons. Route markers T.I. Yellow will also be dropped at 5352N 1025E by 35 Squadron. Blind markers mark target with T.I. Yellow by ‘Y’ equipment. Visual markers cancelled, become Backers-Up. Backers-Up aim Green T.I at Yellow T.I on Green T.I. Re-centrers – qualified ‘Y’ Backers-Up spread evenly throughout the attack to drop Green T.I by means of special equipment if it is functioning properly.
[underlined] MESSAGE FROM C-IN-C. [/underlined] The Battle of HAMBURG continues – your opening blow was first rate – it may take 1/2 a dozen for the knock out, but knock out it will be, final & complete. Photo’s of ESSEN yesterday – mostly smoke covered but sufficient to show your devastation in & around KRUPPS and to the housing areas around the A/P. In the last 5 months you have inflicted upon Germany the greatest continuous series of military disasters in history. At present that fact is only just beginning to dawn upon the exponents of the more archaic forms of warfare, but it has dawned on Germany and resonates throughout Germany. From inflicting military disasters you are now proceeding to administer catastrophies. [sic] If you keep it up, and I know you will, you will be saving the lives of millions in the other forces of the United Nations & in the Occupied Countries and you will have Germany on her knees before the leaves have fallen. I will not ask you to do your best. I know you always [missing words]
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[underlined] TAREGET: - HAMBURG [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – 5448 0430E – 5407N 1025E – 5342N 1025E – [symbol] – 5320N 0930E – 5435N 0620E – 5448N 0430E – Base.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] The Yellow T.Is dropped by blind-markers were generally well placed & concentrated. Backers-Up seem to have had little difficulty in placing their Greens amongst the Yellows, although in later stages Green T.Is fell into smoke. Early crews report that on arrival flares were still
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69
[underlined] 28TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
P.F.F. No operations for 156 Squadron. 4 Mos: of P.F.F. attacked HAMBURG. Fires still burning.
[underlined] 29TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
Target: Area I. HAMBURG. 4’Y’. B/M 2‘Y’ Re-C. 13 B/Up. 2 N/M. II. [underlined] SOLINGEN [/underlined] & REMSCHEID. 9 B/Up. 2 N/M.
Area I. Paramatta Zero. 0045 hrs. Area II. Musical Paramatta. z 0115 hrs.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] Area I. 92 M + 590 Heavies + 116 P.F.F.
Area I. Confirmed.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta.
i. Route markers T.I. Red with flares Red will be dropped at 5413N 0850E
ii. Special a/c will ground mark the A/P with T.I. Yellow.
iii. Backers-Up back up the initial ground marking with T.I. Green.
iv. Main Force a/c aim bombs at the centre of all Green & Yellow T.I visible.
v. Route markers T.I. Red & flare Red will be dropped at 5340N 0848E
vi. Spoof markers T.I. Yellow to attract night fighters will be dropped at 5332N 0733E
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Weather – Nil cloud, ground vis: impaired by much smoke haze. Early crews found many fires still burning on arrival. Yellow T.Is were dropped slightly early at approx.: 0037 hrs. Concentration fair – some dropped S. of river about 1 1/2 [indecipherable word] from main concentration. Green T.Is good. Tendency to undershoot later. Main Effort good with large fires left burning, but observation of results hampered by smoke.
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70
[underlined] TARGET: HAMBURG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base 5430N 0500E – 5430N 0700E – 5403N 0944E – Hamburg – 5323N 0938E – 5430N 0630E – 5430N 0500E – Base.
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71
[underlined] 30TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1005 hrs. [/underlined] MILAN. 2’Y’ 5 B/Up. GENOA 3 ‘Y’ 5 B/Up. TURIN 3’Y’ 5 B/Up.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] TURIN and Milan – Newhaven Ground-marking. GENOA. Illumination.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 100 Lancasters of 1 & 5 Groups + P.F.F. Zero hour. 0135 hrs TURIN. 0155 hrs. MILAN & GENOA.
[underlined] 1745 hrs. [/underlined] 156 squadron – Operations cancelled.
[list by Group of aircraft numbers and types] attacked REMSCHEID. Markers became concentrated as attack developed and smoke rose to 10000ft. 15 a/c are missing.
[underlined] 31ST JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940 hrs. [/underlined] Target: HAMBURG.
[underlined] A/C Requirements. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
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[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 70 Mediums + 437 Heavies + 73 P.F.F = 580 a/c. Zero hour 0200. T.O.T. Z-3 to Z+44.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
Route markers T.I. Red will be dropped off track at 5250N 0840E by 156 Squadron.
Spoof markers T.I. Yellow will be dropped at 5342N 0835E on the homeward journey by Mosquitoes of 139 squadron.
[underlined] ROUTE. [/underlined] Base – 5430N 0515E – 5245N 0725E – 5245N 1000E – HAMBURG – 5400N 1000E – 5430N 0700E – 5430N 0500E – Base.
[underlined] INTRUDER ACTIVITY. [/underlined] 2 Mos: Leeuwarden. 2 Mos: Twente Entschede.[sic] 4 Mos: Vetchta. 3 Mos: Vetchta 3 Mos: Schleswig-Jagel. 3 Mos: Ardorf. 3 Mos: Westland/Sylt. [sic]
[underlined] 2050 hrs. [/underlined] Squalls & Thunderstorm warning.
[underlined] 2250 hrs. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[underlined] 1ST AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down. 15 Stirlings. 3 Group. 14 Wellingtons. 4 Group. Minelaying.
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73
[underlined] 2ND AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: HAMBURG. & HARBURG. Alternative KIEL.
[underlined] A/C Requirements. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking. Zero hour 0200 hrs.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 74 Mediums + 575 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups. + 100 P.F.F. on [deleted] DA [/deleted] HAMBURG and HARBURG.
[underlined] 1755 hrs. [/underlined] Area I confirmed.
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined] 26 Mosquitoes and 6 Beaufighters operating in the Bomber stream.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
10 Lancasters out of 21 attacked the primary. A bank of Cu.Nim. covered the coast at Pos: A up to 17,000’ – breaks occurred between this point and the last turning point before the target (5300N 1000E) where a large area of Cu. Nim. Cloud, base about 10,000’, tops above 25,000’ was encountered giving severe icing, electrical and thunder storms. 10 a/c managed to penetrate to the target area where some bombed on Special Equipment. One a/c bombed below cloud and reported some fires still burning. 9 a/c attacked last resorts or jettisoned and 2 a/c returned early.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] [list by Group, Squadrons, aircraft numbers, roles and missing]
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74
[underlined] TARGET: HAMBURG [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: - CROMER – 5422N 0400E – 5420N 0700E – 5345N 0832E – 5300N 1000E – HAMBURG – 5400N 1000E – 5430N 0700E – 5422N 0400E – CROMER.
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75
[underlined] 3RD AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Make and Mend.
[underlined] 4TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Targets: TURIN, GENOA & MILAN.
A/C Required: 8 Y + 9 B/Up.
Method: Newhaven Groundmarking. Zero hours. TURIN = 0120 hrs. GENOA & MILAN: 0145 hrs.
150 Heavies of 1 & 5 Groups (50 a/c each [symbol])
[underlined] 1755 hrs. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[underlined] 5TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: MILAN. 7 & 156 squadrons only required. [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
Route. Base – Reading – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – N. end of Lake Bourget – [symbol] – return same route.
[underlined] 1756 hrs. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
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76
[underlined] 6TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: MILAN. 83 squadron will provide a Raid Commentator. 156 squadron will provide a reserve Raid Commentator.
BULLSEYE. Z. F/S Slade.
Route: Wrexham – Sevenake (I.R.A) – 5020N 0050W – N. Foreland – Westminster Bridge (I.R.A) – Odstone Down – Otmoor – (T.I. Demonstration.)
[underlined] 1755 hrs. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[underlined] 7TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: TURIN, GENOA, MILAN.
A/C Required. TURIN/GENOA [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles] MILAN. [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
Route markers flares Green steady will be dropped at 4547N0550E out & back.
[underlined] MILAN. [/underlined]
Blind markers Mark A/P with T.I Red flares White. Backers-Up mark visually with T.I. Green or aim Green at T.I. Red or T.I Green already down.
[underlined] TURIN & GENOA. [/underlined] Method the same.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 50 a/c of 1 & 5 Groups on each [symbol]. Zero: TURIN: 0100 hrs. [missing words]
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[underlined] TARGETS: MILAN – GENOA – TURIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route. Base – Reading – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – N. end of Lake Bourget – [symbol] – return same route.
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[underlined] SUMMARIES. [/underlined]
Primary: GENOA.
Nil cloud – good visibility. All crews report a good concentration, docks and harbours clearly seen in the light of flares. Smoke screen was in operation, but blowing out to sea. Fires started and glow was seen quite a distance from the target.
[underlined] Primary: MILAN. [/underlined]
Nil cloud – good visibility. Attack was reported well concentrated with one load of Red T.Is about 5 mls. to the N.W. One large explosion believed Gas Works seen at 0124 hrs.
[underlined] Primary: TURIN. [/underlined]
Few patches of cloud, but great visibility. Attack was considered the worst concentration of the three. One large and about five small fires seen by a/c on homeward route from GENOA.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 2 a/c of 5 Group missing.
[underlined] 8TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down. 35 & 405 Squadrons on Italy. later cancelled.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0040 hrs. T.O.T. Z to Z+30.
[underlined] BRIEFING. [/underlined] 1815 hrs.
[underlined] 1600 HRS. [/underlined] Figures changed. F. R. M. Z. N to go as Main Force. 224 Lancs of 1 & 5 Groups + 57 P.F.F.
[underlined] Alteration to Method. [/underlined] Zero hour. 1045 hrs T.O.T. Z to Z+15.
[underlined] 1. [/underlined] Route marker flares Green steady will be dropped on Lake Annecy backed up by Backers-Up.
[underlined] 2. [/underlined] Route markers Yellow T.I will be dropped by ‘Y’ a/c of 156 squadron backed up by Backers-Up of 156 squadron at 4544N 0305E.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Yellow T.Is from blind markers all fell in town area. Red T.Is reported very accurate. The first 2 bundles of Reds fell about 1 ml. apart one either side of the river – the 3rd fell close to the Red on the A/P. All Red markers & subsequently Green markers reported excellent concentration. Main Force attack well concentrated, practically no run back except for a few incendiaries. Route marking also reported very good, both Lake Annecy and Lake Bourget marked on run to target.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 295 a/c detailed. 1 Group 108 Lancs. [missing words]
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79
[underlined] 9TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: MANNHEIM.
[underlined] A/C required. [/underlined] ] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] NEWHAVEN GROUNDMARKING.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 400 Heavies of 1, 4, 5, & 6 Groups + 53 P.F.F. Zero hour. 0130 hours.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Area I. Leverkusen. Area II. Ludwigshaven [sic]. Changed to MANNHEIM. Early arrivals found a thin layer of cloud at about 8,000ft. This began to break up and late arrivals reported as little as 3/10ths. Attack started reasonably concentrated with T.I. Reds covering an area approx: 2mls. across – later the raid tended to scatter with a [indecipherable word] of markers in the centre and the main attack again tending to undershoot. One large explosion at 0137 hrs lasting well over a minute. Defences slight to moderate H/F. Not more than 50 S/Ls. Crews report that on the way out to the target on the leg Bradwell Bay & Dungeness, they were illuminated and in the case covered for 5 mins: by our own S/Ls in spite of the fact that the appropriate letter of the period was repeatedly flashed. It is requested that strong protests be made.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] P.F.F. 2 missing. 5 Group: 2 missing. 1 Group: 2 missing. 6 Group: 1 missing.
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[underlined] TARGET: MANNHEIM. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route. Base – Bradwell Bay – Dungeness – Le Touquet – Mannheim – 4920 0820E – Le Touquet – Dungeness – Bradwell Bay – Base.
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81
[underlined] 10TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: NÜRBURG.
[underlined] A/C required. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 573 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5, & 6 Groups + 106 P.F.F. Zero hour. 0100 hrs.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] NEWHAVEN GROUNDMARKING.
[underlined] 1. [/underlined] Spoof-markers T.I. Red and T.I. Green will be dropped by 139 Squadron on MANNHEIM.
[underlined] 2. [/underlined] Blindmarkers mark the A/P with T.I. Red & flares White. Visual Markers identify and drop T.I. Yellow. Backers-Up use T.I. Green. Non-markers aim at centre of T.I. Green.
[underlined] 3. [/underlined] On route home B/Markers of 83 drop 1 x 250 lb. Incen: at 4919N 0826E backed up by Backers-Up of 156 squadron also with 1 x 250 lb I.B.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Red markers scattered over target on track principally in two batches. Greens attempted to concentrate, doing so principally on the Eastern loads of Reds, but still covered an area 5 x 3mls. Cloud prevented any accurate observation and little was observed except some glow of fires on cloud when crews were in the Karlsruhe area.
F/S STEPHENS. ‘Z’. On his first flight from this squadron had two combats, first with an Me 110. M/U/G & T/G both opened fire – captain reports accurate fire by Gunners. E/A (enemy aircraft) did not return fire. 2 minutes later an Me 109 [deleted] attacked [/deleted] approached. T/G got in a burst – E/A did not attack.
F/O SHANAHAN. ‘R’. Gee ‘Y’ and W/T all failed & on the return route the Navigator F/O Stafford used D/R (direct reckoning) to return to base.
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[underlined] TARGET: NÜRNBURG [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route – Beachy Head – Le Treport – 4935N 1040E – NÜRNBURG – 4917N 0826E – Le Treport – Beachy Head.
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83
[underlined] 11TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
[underlined] 12TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Targets: MILAN and TURIN. [underlined] 139 Squadron – 8 Mos: BERLIN [/underlined] 156 squadron required for MILAN only.
[underlined] A/C Required – MILAN. [/underlined] [underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 439 Heavies + 66 P.F.F.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] TURIN. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking. Zero hour. 0115 hrs.
W/C WHITE ‘S’ to act as Raid Commentator.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
One or two crews reported a small amount of thin patchy cloud. The majority report nil cloud & good vis: with slight ground haze. In the initial stages of the attack T.I Reds dropped by B/Markers were somewhat scattered, but the general opinion is that this was put right by the T.I. Y. & the excellent instructions of the Master of Ceremonies, which resulted in the T.I.G. falling in a good concentration. The main force achieved a fair concentration with perhaps a tendency to fall a bit short, but summarising up the results the blame can be placed on the R.A.F if the Italians in MILAN don’t pack in to-morrow & use the excellent fires started for their peace celebrations.
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[underlined] TARGET: MILAN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route. Base – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – N. end of Lake Bourget – MILAN – 4520N 0905E - S. end of Lake Bourget – Cabourg – Selsey Bill.
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[underlined] 13TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
156 squadron stood down: MAKE & MEND for Command.
[underlined] 14TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
156 squadron stood down. 7, 83 and 156 squadron attacked MILAN. 139 squadron attacked BERLIN.
[underlined] 15TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: MILAN.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking. Zero hour 0015 hrs.
[underlined] A/C REQUIRED. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 150 Heavies + 49 P.F.F. Note: No a/c to cross the French Coast before 2140 hrs.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Green T.Is well concentrated in area about 2mls. across at worst. Crews report T.I. Yellow very accurately dropped on actual A/P. Main attack reasonably concentrated with some incendiaries tending to fall short as usual. Large fires reported by later a/c.
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86
[underlined] TARGET: MILAN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
10 Lancasters – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – N. end Lake Bourget – 4540N 0912E – MILAN – 4520N 0905E – S. end of Lake Bourget – Carbourg – Selsey Bill.
3 Lancasters – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – N. end Lake Bourget – MILAN – 4520N 0905E – S. end of [missing words]
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87
[underlined] 16TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Stand down for 156 squadron.
[underlined] 17TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: PEENEMUNDE. [/underlined] R.D.F. Experimental Establishment.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Shifters [/underlined] are A/P movers.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] 0015 hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+40.
[underlined] Phase I. [/underlined] A/P. ‘F’
Blind markers mark A/P with T.I. Red & flares White. Make 2nd run to drop bombs. Visual markers mark exact A/P with T.I. Yellow. Backers-Up aim Green T.I. at T.I. Yellow or T.I. Red. Non-marker a/c go in with the Blind-markers using their anti-personnel bombs against defences – then make a second run & aim H.E. at the Centre of T.I. Green.
[underlined] Phase II. [/underlined] A/P ‘B’.
At Z+24 Shifters move the A/P.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 430 heavies + 94 P.F.F.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] T.I. Reds rather scattered up the length of the target, with a lot about 2mls. [missing word] the W. of A/P ‘B’ of the T.I. Yellows one load overshot slightly & fell in woods S. of A/P ‘F’ and load of T.I. Green also fell in woods to the S. of A/P ‘F’. One load of Green T.Is also fell [missing words] along lay-out. Main attack
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[underlined] TARGET: PEENEMUNDE. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route. – Cromer – 5520N 0829E – 5441N 1320E – RUDEN ISLAND – PEENEMUNDE – MANDO ISLAND – 5500N 0500E – CROMER.
First shifter reported attack at that time concentrated on A/Ps ‘B’ & ‘F’ and subsequently attacked
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[underlined] 17TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined] (Cont:)
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
41 a/c missing – A large number of combats were seen and the majority of losses may probably be attributed to this cause, as defences over the target were negligible.
[underlined] 18TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
P.I.U. report on PEENUMUNDE.
75% damage to works. A/P ‘F’ practically wiped out – living quarters. A/P ‘B’ Southern hanger hit. workshops hit. A/P ‘E’ Damaged. A/P ‘A’ Not hit.
[underlined] 19TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] TURIN. All Lancasters. ALESSANDRIA. U/T ‘Y’ a/c. BERLIN Mosquitoes.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground marking.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 511 heavies + 90 P.F.F on TURIN. 18 P.F.F on Alessandria.
[underlined] 1655 hrs: [/underlined] Ops cancelled.
[underlined] 20TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
Command Combined ‘BULLSEYE’ 3 a/c T.I. dropping. 2 a/c full sortie.
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[underlined] 21ST AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
[underlined] 22ND AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
underlined] Target: [/underlined] LEVERKUSEN.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 419 Heavies + 50 P.F.F.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hour [/underlined] 2300 hrs. T.O.T. Z-4 to Z+36.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
Owing to weather over the target being from 8/10ths to 10/10ths cloud with tops 16/17000ft (most crews reporting 10/10ths), no T.I. Red were seen on bombing. Crews were compelled to bomb on E.T.A. and Special Equipment. Fires, which seemed to be mainly incendiaries, were scattered over a very wide area. No T.I. Green were dropped by this squadron.
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Only 4 Mosquitoes worked, the remainder having technical troubles. Only 2 heavy crews (both non-markers) claim to have bombed on T.Is. All backers-up claim to have brought back their T.I but one a/c J/7 F/L Amekstein returned with only [indecipherable word] T.I. So the other fellow presumably went with the bombs. All crews except the two mentioned above dropped on E.T.A on fires
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[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Southwold – Knocke [sic] – 5025N 0705E – 5042N 0730E – Leverkusen – 5103N 0620E – Nordwijk [sic] – 5235N 0330E – Hainsboro’ – Base.
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[underlined] 23RD AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required.[/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 516 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups led by 127 a/c P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2345 hrs. T.O.T. Z-3 to Z+40.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta.
1. Mosquitoes drop T.I. Red at 5250N 0652E & Green T.I at 5235N 0702E as route markers. Blind markers of 83 squadron drop Red spot fires at 5217N 1232E – backed up by 97 squadron.
2. Blind markers mark A/P with T.I. Red.
3. Backers-Up aim Greens at the centre of T.I. Reds overshooting by 2 seconds, or if no reds seen at the centre of T.I. Green.
4. Re-centres use special equipment.
5. Non-markers aim bombs at centre of T.I. Reds or T.I. Greens.
Master of Ceremonies will be in operation from Z-1 to Z+10. 1L/405.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
T.I. dropping on the whole was good with no cloud and only a slight haze over the target. The first Reds appeared to form two points of attack east & West. The first Greens dropped midway between, around which the attack developed. Later re-centrers are of the opinion that the attack drifted slightly South as [indecipherable word] by their Special Equipment. Later fires, however, covered the whole area and the attack is considered a success. The Hun appeared to defend the target by the employment of a large concentration of S/L’s to operating with night fighters as flak was only moderate.
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[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base – Hainsboro’ – 5305N 0220E – EGMOND – 5250N 1347E – BERLIN – 5250N 1340E – 5420N 1225E – MANDO – 5420N 0300E – HULKHAM BAY – Base.
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94
[underlined] ‘F’ F/S STEVENS. [/underlined]
On approaching the target at 19,000ft our a/c was covered by a large number of S/Ls. Bombs were dropped in the centre of Red T.Is and almost at once our a/c was badly hit by flak. The inter-comm was rendered u/s and the S/B outer caught fire. The navigator and M/U/G were badly and the port wing severely damaged. The S/B outer was at once feathered. Almost immediately an enemy fighter attacked ‘F’ killing the Rear-Gunner Sgt. Atkee. Evasive action was taken & the fighter lost. As the navigator was u/s. and there was no inter-comm. The pilot steered more or less due North. About 5 minutes later the port outer engine caught fire and was feathered. Pilot carried on for about 1 1/2 hrs. losing height down to 7,000ft. The W/Op. hence succeeded in repairing the morse key and got a fix. The pilot turned on to 280 and the navigator who had been bandaged up by the W/Op. managed to plot the fix and give a course for home. During passage through the Baltic the crew had been warned to prepare for ditching. Order was cancelled when Captain discovered rear gunner trapped in his turret. The W/Op continued to get fixes until the English Coast was reached when the pilot made a safe landing at ATTLEBRIDGE aerodrome.
Captain. F.S Stevens. Bomb Aimer. [missing] Navigator. Sgt. Clegg. M/U/Gunner. [missing] W/Operator. Sgt. Stocks. Rear Gunner. Sgt. Atkee. F/Engineer. [missing]
F/S Stevens, Sgt Clegg and Sgt. Stocks have received an immediate award of the D.F.M.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 726 detailed – 58 missing.
[list by Group, aircraft type and numbers involved, roles and numbers missing]
[page break]
95
[underlined] 24TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All P.F.F. squadrons stood down except 139 Squadron. Command – Gardening. P.R.U. pilot who was over Berlin to broadcast in the 9 o’clock news.
[underlined] 25th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Make and Mend for all Squadrons.
[underlined] 26th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MANNHEIM. All squadrons except 105 & 109 required.
[underlined] A/C Requirements. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] 1128 hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 27th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined]NÜRNBERG.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] method. [/underlined] {deleted] Paramatta. [/deleted] Newhaven.
[words missing] bomb (500 or 1000 MC) on HEILBRONN
[page break]
96
[underlined] TARGET: NÜRNBERG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Beachy Head – 5005N 0125E – 4856N 1100E – NURNBERG – 4938N 1108E – 5005N 0126E – Beachy Head – Base.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
In the early stages of the attack the Red T.Is were rather scattered, but one or two reports give the impression that the majority fell slightly to the S & SE of the A/P. later Backers-Up and Recentrers appear to have somewhat corrected this, as later [words missing]
[page break]
97
there is every probability that a wide area of the town was covered. Fires are reported to be widely spread, but on built-up area. One Visual marker ‘Y’ F/L Cook did not drop his T.I yellow owing to interference by a cone of S/Ls which held & dazzled him on the bombing run. His second attempt was spoilt by smoke & fire.
Defences – Flak very mild – S/Ls active co-operating with fighters. Large amount of fighter activity.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[list by Group, aircraft type and numbers involved, roles and numbers missing]
Photographs show main Concentration – P.F.F. E & SE – Main Force very scattered SE & E.
[underlined] 28th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
[underlined] 29th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
[underlined] 30th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down. Other squadrons MUNCHEN GLADBACH. SPECIAL TARGET IN FRANCE. [words missing]
[page break]
98
[list by Group, aircraft type and numbers involved, roles and numbers missing]
[underlined] SPECIAL TARGET IN FRANCE. [/underlined]
[list by Group, aircraft type, numbers involved and numbers missing]
[underlined] 31ST AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Ordinary Paramatta.
Routemarkers T.I.G. at 5152N 1143E by blind markers of 83 squadron backed up by backers up of 156 squadron. Blind markers mark A/P with T.I. Red. Backers-Up aim T.I. Green at T.I. Red on centre of T.I. Green. Re-centres use special equipment to re-centre. Non-markers aim HE at centre of T.I. Red. Route markers T.I. Green at 5152N 1143E by blind markers of 83 squadron backed up by 156 squadron.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 534c heavies + 102 P.F.F. Zero hour. 2330 hrs.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles] [words missing]
[page break]
99
[underlined] BERLIN. 31ST AUGUST 1943 [/underlined] (Cont:)
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: HAPPISBURGH – 5322N 0323E – 5147N 1108E – 5217N 1405N [sic] – BERLIN – 5100N 0930E – 5030N 0720E – CAYCUX – BEACHY HEAD.
[page break]
100
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
7 – 10/10ths thin strato-cum: tops about 5,000ft. While some Red T.Is were dropped on time, owing to late arrivals, blind markers were active for about 20 minutes. Red T.Is scattered, but generally at the beginning in two sections about 4 mls. apart. As the raid progressed the markers became still more scattered. Some of the backers-up finding no T.Is to guide them.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
German broadcast. “Re-organised Berlin Ack-Ack defences inflicted extremely heavy losses on the attackers. British bomber formations were dispersed & mostly had to jettison their bombs. Effective defences prevented the Bomber a/c from making a concentrated attack”.
[list by Group, aircraft type and numbers involved, roles and numbers missing]
F/S FRY. ‘P’ Combat with unidentified T/E E/A. M/U/G opened fire. No results observed.
F/O WRIGHT ‘T’ M/U/G opened fire on unidentified T/E E/A at 400yds range & T/G opened fire immediately afterwards. No return fire experienced from E/A which dived steeply to starboard & disappeared. An explosion was seen on the deck behind 30/60 seconds afterwards.[deleted] During [/deleted] E/A claimed as probably destroyed.
[underlined] SPECIAL TARGET IN N.W. FRANCE. [/underlined]
41 a/c detailed – Nil missing.
[underlined] BRAUWEILER. [/underlined]
8 Group. 5 Mosquitoes [missing word] Missing.
[page break]
101
[underlined] 2ND SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] 5028N 0354E. Special target in France.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 30 Mediums + 11 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2200 hours.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
10 a/c attacked dropping 10 x T.I. Green. 60 x 1000 G.P. Weather was 9/10ths thin strato-cum tops 8,000ft. Good concentration of markers with one load of Green T.Is at the most 1/2 ml. off.
One large explosion at about 2203 hrs lit up cloud for about 3 seconds. No other large explosions seen.
One heavy flak gun about every 2 minutes.
[underlined] 3RD SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
102
[underlined] Method [/underlined] Paramatta.
Routemarkers red spot fires at Pos: 5238N 0820E.
Preliminary warning markers. T.I. Yellow at Brandenburg.
Blind-markers drop T.I. red.
Backers-Up keep A/P marked with T.I. Green.
Non-markers aim bombs at the centre of T.I. Red.
Y Backers-Up act as normal backers-up unless cloud conditions make it necessary to revert to Wanganui.
Routemarkers T.I. Red L/B. at 5432N 1334E.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2315 hrs.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 244 heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 81 P.F.F.
‘U’ F/O Foderingham and 5 of crew crashed at Snetterton Heath.
[underlined] 1630 hrs. [/underlined] Briefing. SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, secretary of State for Air, attended briefing and gave a talk on the progress of the war.
[underlined] SUMMARY [/underlined]
Weather over the target was chiefly nil cloud, but with occasional whisps [sic] of very thin cloud at varying heights, with moderate to good visibility.
At the start of the attack, T.I. Reds covered an area of approx. 3 sq. m. but as later good concentration of Reds was achieved, which was backed up admirably by T.I. Greens to form a light cluster. Ground fires and many explosions were seen around the T.I. Concentration, with smoke rising up to approx: 19,000ft. The general impression is that the attack was a success & far exceeds the previous raids. Flak was only moderate, but the S/Ls were as active as usual, working in cones, track indicating & for illumination for fighters.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
‘R’. F/O SHANAHAN. Missing from 156. F/L Stafford. W/O Collins. Sgt. Hoyle. F/S Denyer. F/S Wilson. W/O Dodds, 3/L of 7 Squadron.
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103
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Great Yarmouth – 5245N 0330E – EGMOND – 5240N 0900E – Brandenburg – Berlin – 5233N 13422E – 5555N 1325E – 5800N 1100E -5700N 0600E – Brancaster.
[page break]
104
[underlined] 4TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
156 Stood down.
[underlined] 5TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MANNHEIM. Area II. MUNICH. Area I.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] I & II. Newhaven.
Area II.
Routemarkers T.I. Reds L/B at 4933N 0608E.
Blind-markers mark A/P with T.I. Red after a timed check from KAISERSLAUTERN.
Visual markers mark A/P with T.I. Green & Yellow if seen. no overshoot. Later Backers-up aim T.I. Green at the centre of all T.I. Green overshooting by 2 seconds.
Re-centrers after Z+12 drop T.I. Green by means of special equipment.
Non-markers may identify visually or aim at centre of T.I. Reds.
Routemarkers T.I. Red Spot at 4928N 0608E.
[underlined] A/C Required [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
491 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 107 P.F.F. T.O.T. Z-4 to Z+36.
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base – Reading – Beachy Head – 4952N 0040E – 4937N 0300E – Kaiserslautern – Mannheim – 4919E [sic] 0830E – 4937N 0300E – 4952N 0040E – Beachy Head – Reading Base. Backers-Up & Re-centrers from 4937N 0300E – Mannheim.
[page break]
105
[underlined] TARGET: MANNHEIM. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Beachy Head – 4952N 0040E – 4937N 0300E – (KAISERSLAUTERN V/M. B/M & N/M) – MANNEHEIM – 4919N 0830E – 4937 0300E – 4952N 0040E – Beachy Head – Base.
[page break]
106
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
The blind-markers achieved a good concentration and were mainly on time although some were still visible at 2313 hrs. The yellows were in the centre of a very good concentration of greens. Later a/c report a large number of good fires and it is estimated that this is the best attack made on this target. A number of explosions were reported principally from 2259/2303hrs. One N/F claimed destroyed.
“X” F/S HEWITT.
KAISERSLAUTERN. 2312 hrs. 19000ft. S/E a/c was sighted by T/G doing a diving attack from Port quarters up, & opened fire at range of 150 yds firing orange tracer which passed underneath the Lancaster: T/G & M/U/G fired 4 & 2 second bursts respectively. Strikes observed on E/A’s port wing & fuselage & E/A was seen in flames in a shallow dive which became steeper & subsequently E/A burst into flames on the ground. E/A DESTROYED.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
3 a/c missing from P.F.F.
E/156. F/O PRICHARD. 2 of 7 squadron.
P.F.F.
This was undoubtedly one of the best “Y” attack the P.F.F. have ever achieved. The timing throughout was good. The ‘Y’ a/c were reasonably concentrated – probably due largely to the fact that only 10 dropped T.I’s and all those a/c who were doubtful about their ‘Y’ bombing brought their T.I back. The town was thus successfully illuminated for the Visual markers who all appear to have identified the A/P and bombed it accurately. The backing up and recentring was well maintained and accurate throughout the raid.
[page break]
107
[underlined] 6TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET: [/underlined] MUNICH.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined]
362 Heavies + 74 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
[underlined] ZERO HOUR. [/underlined] 2330 hrs.
[underlined] BRIEFING: [/underlined] 1530 hrs.
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined] 6 Beaus operating in the Bomber stream. 2 Mosquitoes over the main target.
[underlined] 2155 hrs. [/underlined] Warning from Group. German Intruder a/c are definitely expected to be very active tonight at time of return, especially between 0300 – dawn. All stations are warned to have defences ready to meet these intruders who are expected to be over here in force. It is stressed that this is no ordinary warning.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
7/10 – 9/10ths thin stratus 8/10000ft moderate to good visibility. Cloud interfered with technique. Reds seemed quite concentrated. Greens in early stages were well concentrated were considered by later crews to be more scattered although cloud prevented adequate observation. The glow of fires were seen from 160/200 mls. away. One large explosion at 2335 hrs. ONE N/FIGHTER CLAIMED AS DESTROYED.
[underlined] H/156. S/L COATES. [/underlined]
Detailed as a BACKER-UP. At the beginning of the bombing run tracer was observed coming from port quarters down passing under the wing of the Lancaster. Captain was weaving slightly to S/B & increased his turn to a steep diving turn to S/B . 2 bursts of approx. 3-8 seconds duration were fired by E/A, hits being scored
[page break]
108
[underlined] TARGET: MUNICH. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Beachy Head – 5000N 0115E – Freiburg – 4740N 1006E – MUNICH – 4758N 1145E – 4806N 0735E – 4806N 0235E – Cabourg – Belsey Bill – Reading - Base
on port inner engine, S/B tail plane, & port side of fuselage & bomb bays. Gunners were blinded by the brightness of E/A’s tracer & no member of the crew sighted the E/A. T/G opened fire simultaneously with the E/A’s second burst giving a 2-second burst towards the judged apparent notion of where the E/A would be. E/A was not observed to break away. Both [missing words]
[page break]
109
[underlined] Z/156. F/L MANIFOLD [/underlined]
Detailed as Backer-Up. 18mls. S.W. of the target when doing gentle weaving action S/E (Single-Engined) E/A (Enemy Aircraft) sighted by T/G on the S/B quarter 20 down, making a quarter attack, range 800yds. T/G gave directions to Captain “Down port, up S/B” T/G opened fire at 400yds range with 2-3 second burst, all guns being in operation. Flash was observed on E/A who immediately broke his attack, climbing to port quarter and smoke & sparks were seen trailing backwards. This was confirmed by the M/U/G & the W/Op. who was standing in the astrodome. When positioned on the port beam above, flames enveloped the E/A which dived vertically down through the clouds & an explosion was seen through cloud by members of the crew as fighter hit ground. THIS A/C DEFINITELY CLAIMED AS DESTROYED.
T./G. F/O CURRIE. M/U/G Sgt. ROSIE.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
404 a/c despatched.
[list by Group, aircraft numbers & types involved and aircraft missing]
[underlined] 7TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
35 squadron. PONGO.
[page break]
110
[underlined] 8TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] 156 squadron. 4 B/M. 8 B/U. 5 N/M.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 335 Heavies + 82 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta..
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0010hrs.
[underlined] 1745hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED
[underlined] 1745hrs. ITALIANS SIGN ARMISTICE – UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER. [/underlined]
[underlined] 9TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN. Alternative FRANKFURT
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 356 Heavies + 97 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] BERLIN. Paramatta. FRANKFURT. Newhaven.
[underlined] Zero hour.. [/underlined] Berlin. 0115hrs. Frankfurt 0200hrs.
[underlined] 1645hrs. [/underlined] Berlin Confirmed.
[underlined] 1800hrs. [/underlined] Zero hour changed to 0130hrs.
[underlined] 2107hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[page break]
111
[underlined] 10TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 11TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
No operations.
[underlined] 12TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
No operations.
[underlined] 13TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
156 stood down. 5 Mosquitoes 139 Squadron on DUISBERG. 5 Mosquitoes 139 Squadron on COLOGNE.
[underlined] 14TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
8 Mosquitoes 139 squadron on BERLIN. 1 Mosquito missing
T.I. Demonstration at RUSHFORD. F/S PALMER 156. observing a/c.
[underlined] 15TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target:- [/underlined] MONTLUÇON
156 & 83 Squadrons stood down except for F/S Fry from N.T.U. (Navigation Training Unit)
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 314 Heavies + 64 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2330hrs.
[page break]
112
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
[underlined] Target: MONTLUÇON. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
Attack a great success. P.I.U. photographs show a large amount of damage to the DUNLOP RUBBER TYRE FACTORY.
[list by Group, aircraft numbers & types involved]
5 U.S.A. Fortresses took part under the control of 3 Group. 3 a/c missing.
[underlined] DORTMUND-EMS CANAL. [/underlined] [underlined] words missing? [/underlined]
8 Lancasters of 5 Group carried out an attack on the embanked stretch of the canal, 4mls. E. of GREVEN using 12,000lb. Thick ground haze made identification extremely difficult. Of the 3 a/c which returned only 2 succeeded in identifying the target. 6 Mosquitoes of Fighter Command escorted the Lancasters (617 Squadron.)
7 Mosquitoes of 139 Squadron on BERLIN.
[underlined] 16TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MODANE. (French Alps.)
[underlined] A/C Required [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
113
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 304 Heavies + 66 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Visual Groundmarking.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0001hrs.
[underlined] TARGET: MODANE. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Selsey Bill – Carbourg – 4735N 0045E – 4512N 0535E – MODANE – 4735N 0120E – Carbourg – Selsey Bill.
[page break]
114
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Weather over the target varied from nil to 3/10ths patchy cloud at about 10,000ft with good vis: in the early stages of the attack, but smoke, presumably from T.Is interfered in the later stages. Our 3 visual markers identified the A/P visually by the river and marshalling yards clearly in the moonlight. T.I. Reds were extremely well concentrated with the exception of one which was dropped approx.: 2m. S.W. on a hillside. The main concentration of T.I. Reds was backed up by the Backers-Up dropping T.I. Green. Some fires were seen burning around the A/P & many bomb explosions were seen around the marshalling yard & river. A large proportion of the main force appeared to drop their bombs wide on the hillside. The general opinion is, however, that the attack was a success.
A. F/S FRY.
T/E (Twin Engined) Single tail aircraft reported by T/G flying parallel on port quarter 15 up range 700yds. As aircraft was not definitely identified our Lanc:: turned S/B. Then a/c turned in making a beam attack & T/G gave instructions to turn port. M/U opened fire. No strikes observed.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
From photographs plotted a cluster of P.F.F. are on the A/P and one or two main force. The rest are scattered to the E & NE, towards the town.
[underlined] 17TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
156 squadron stood down.
N.T.U. on “BULLSEYE” 7 a/c.
[page break]
115
[underlined] 18TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
STAND DOWN.
[underlined] 19TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 20TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
STAND DOWN.
[underlined] 21ST SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
ALL HEAVY SQUADRONS STOOD DOWN.
Bullseye & T.I. Demonstration.
[list aircraft letters and ranks and names of pilots]
[underlined] 22ND SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Targets: [/underlined] AREA I. HANNOVER. – SPOOF: OLDENBURG. AREA II BOCHUM.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] HANNOVER.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] BOCHUM. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles] [information missing]
[page break]
116
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
615 Heavies + 29 Mediums + 82 P.F.F on HANNOVER. 31 P.F.F. on OLDENBURG.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
[deleted] Route marke [/deleted]
[underlined] 1630hrs.. [/underlined] Area I Confirmed.
[underlined] Intruder Activity. [/underlined]
[list of aircraft numbers, aircraft type and targets]
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2130hrs
[underlined] T.O.T.. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+25.
[underlined] SUMMARY. HANNOVER. [/underlined]
Judged by the position of the Yellow T.Is blind markers tended to overshoot. Green T.Is generally well concentrated. Fires in an area about 3mls x 1 mile. on track across target – could be seen from Enemy Coast on return. Red T.Is dropped over STEINHUDER LAKE 2117h
[underlined] OLDENBURG. [/underlined]
Nil cloud – good visibility.
Reds well concentrated, greens scattered. Some fires reported in target area.
[underlined] ‘Y’ S/L COOK. [/underlined]
After second run over target and bombs had been dropped a load of incendiaries fell on the Lancaster dropped by a Halifax. Port outer engine set on fire & hydraulic gear for both turrets severed – gear u/s – ‘Y’ smashed. Incendiaries burning in the a/c which W/Op threw out of the flare Shute. Shortly after leaving the target attacked by [words missing] u/s & the inter-comm. Evasive action taken.
[page break]
117
[underlined] TARGET: HANNOVER. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] ROUTE. [/underlined] 12 Lancasters: Cromer – 5350N 0400E – (5240N 0920E B/Ms, U/Ms, N/Ms) – HANNOVER – 5210N 0945E – 5350N 0400E – Cromer.
4 Lancasters: Cromer – 5350N 0400E – 5309N 0645E – OLDENBURG – 5420N 0620E 5420N 0 [indecipherable digit] 00E – Wells.
[page break]
118
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] HANNOVER - OLDENBURG. [/underlined] The spoof raid was successful – bombing not very concentrated. A few Mosquitoes strayed out towards Bremen defences, but the correct town was hit & the raid undoubtedly attracted some fighters & this assisted the main operation. Preliminary reports of the main attack were most encouraging, but this optimism was not justified by the photo plot or daylight recco. Three crews who aimed visually were very near the A/P but the majority of blind markers overshot the aiming point by 3-4mls. & unfortunately it was their markers which the backers-up maintained. For once the main force did not undershoot the markers to any great extent, with the result that most of the bombing took place to the SE of the town & a PRU a/c reported that no fires were burning in Hannover town centre. Photographs however prove that there were some fires burning [deleted] round [/deleted] around the A/P & it is probable that considerable damage was done. Although probably only a small proportion of the total bomb load fell on the town, it seems unlikely that there was any large scale devastation as was first expected.
P.F.F. 1 missing.
[underlined] 23RD SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGETS. [/underlined] MANNHEIM & DARMSTADT.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] HANNOVER.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 541 heavies & mediums of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 78 PFF on Mannheim. 29 a/c of PFF on Darmstadt.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2130hrs.
[page break]
119
[underlined] TARGETS: MANNHEIM & DARMSTADT. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE:- BASE – CLACTON – 5058N 0254E – 4955N 0750E – Target – (4920N 0843E DARMSTADT) – 49 [indecipherable digits] 0820E – 4800N 0400E – 4830 0030W – 4920N 0040W – SELSEY BILL – READING – BASE.
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120
[underlined] SUMMARY. MANNHEIM. [/underlined]
Nil cloud, good visibility. Blind markers well concentrated and accurate. Visual markers claimed to have identified A.P. without any doubt. Green markers well concentrated apart from occasional strays. Main force effort caused good fires with incendiaries undershooting considerably. Large explosion seen at 2156hrs in North end of target. 1 a/c attacked last resort DARMSTADT as nothing seen at MANNHEIM on arrival.
[underlined] DARMSTADT. [/underlined]
Red marker concentration reasonably good although some fell well away. Green T.Is generally good. Ground fires seen starting as a/c left. One large explosion seen at 2135hrs – believed gas holder, also seen by Mannheim crews.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
2 a/c of P.F.F. missing, both of 97 Squadron. Photographic plot shows a very bad scatter to the N.W. back along track, and although a high proportion of photographs are unplottable because of fire-tracks, it seems that the main force bombing spread back badly. A P.R.U. sortie the following afternoon reported fires still burning in the town.
[list by Groups, of aircraft missing]
[underlined] 24TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
156 squadron stood down. Mine-laying by 1, 3 and 6 Groups. 8 Group. 4 Mosquitoes on DUISBERG.
[underlined] 25TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] KIEL.
[underlined] A/C required: [/underlined] 8 B/M. 6 Supporters.
Zero hour [missing words] later changed to 0230hrs.
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121
[underlined] 26TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Area I. HANNOVER. AREA II. BOCHUM.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
Area I. 5 B/M. 2 V/M. 4 B/U. 7 Supporters. [underlined] Spoof [/underlined] 1 B/M. 2 Supporters. Area II. 2 B/U. 90 Supporters.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
Area I. 578 Heavies + 23 Mediums + 89 P.F.F. Area II. 354 Heavies + 42 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0030hrs.
[underlined]1730hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 27TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Area I. HANNOVER. AREA II. KIEL.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] HANNOVER.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
590 Heavies + 24 Mediums + 89 P.F.F. 28 on BRUNSWICK.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2330hrs.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] HANNOVER.
Nil cloud – good vis: T.I. Yellows fairly concentrated, estimated about 3 loads of Red T.Is dropped and Greens backed up well. Incendiaries were reported as falling short about 30% of the effort being short of [missing words]
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122
[underlined] TARGETS: HANNOVER & BRUNSWICK. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE. Base – Southwold – 5237N 0330E – Egmond – 5235N 0800E – 5234N 0900E – [symbol] – 5210N 0945E – 5238N 0800E – Egmond – Southwold – Base.
Brunswick [missing words]
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123
and could be seen from the Dutch Coast on the homeward run
[underlined] Brunswick. [/underlined]
Reds seemed rather scattered. Green T.Is away from the Reds. Some fires seen as a/c left. Many night fighters flames were seen over CELLE and the target & the attack is therefore considered to have been successful as a “Spoof”.
[underlined] German Intruders. [/underlined] Operated over this country. Bombs dropped on warboys aerodrome.
[underlined] RESULTS: [/underlined]
38 a/c missing [list by Group of aircraft missing]
From preliminary reports attack appeared to fall to the NE. N & NW.
[underlined] 28TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
[underlined] 29TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET: [/underlined] BOCHUM.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Musical Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] 2045HRS.
[underlined] A/C required: [/underlined] [list by squadron of aircraft numbers & roles] [words missing]
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124
[underlined] TARGET: BOCHUM.[/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 372 Heavies + 24 Mediums + 45 P.F.F.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
1 a/c ‘2’ Sgt Maclean landed at Newmarket short of petrol. ‘C’ F/S Ray [deleted] landed [/deleted] attempted to land at Downham Market but overshot and crashed at Wimbotsham.
Weather over the target was clear & enabled Paramatta to be used. 1st T.I. Red dropped on time. All crews bombed on ground markers except one who bombed skymarker at 2054hrs. The T.I. concentration was good, with the exception of 2 x T.I. Green which were reported dropped at 2053 4/5mls. NE. Many fires were started but had a scatter of several miles and undershooting.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
High standard of accuracy was achieved by markers. From photographic cover since received it is seen that a large amount of damage was done and the raid proved to be very successful.
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125
[underlined] 30TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET.[/underlined] STETTIN.
156 squadron required.
[underlined] 1255HRS. [/underlined] OPERATIONS cancelled.
[underlined] 1ST OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] STUTTGART.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 6 B/M. 2 V/M. 1 B/U. 3 Supporters. Spoof. 2 B/M. 2 Supporters.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 523 Heavies + 81 P.F.F. 32 P.F.F. on Spoof.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2235hrs. T.O.T. Z-4 to Z+25.
[underlined] 1340hrs. [/underlined] Area I. Scrubbed. Area II. Hagen. [underlined] Zero hour [/underlined] 2100hrs. [underlined] A/C required: [/underlined] 4 Supporters. [underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 209 Heavies + 37 P.F.F. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-3 to Z+12.
[underlined] 1450hrs. [/underlined] Area I still on.
[underlined] 1615hrs. [/underlined] Area I scrubbed.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
9 – 10/10ths cloud tops 5/6,000ft. Despite cloud conditions T.Is clearly discernible on ground. Three out of four crews report first Red T.Is dropped on time, followed 1/2 a minute later by first greens. Early T.I.G well placed with slight tendency to overshoot. Fires starting & 2 crews report a large explosion at 2103hrs.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
There was a gap in the mosquito marking early in the attack, but this was covered by the Backers-Up who kept the A/P marked throughout the attack. Accuracy of mosquitoes & B/Up alike was of a high standard.
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126
[underlined] TARGET: HAGEN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – 5310N 0150E – Egmond – 5145N 0800E – HAGEN – 5030N 0730E – 5020N 0132E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
[underlined] 2ND OCTOBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MUNICH.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 203 Heavies of 1 & 5 Groups + 86 P.F.F
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2230 hours. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+14.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
Weather nil cloud – good vis: B/markers more concentrated than previously. Visual markers seemed rather scattered. Green T.Is were well concentrated in centre of yellows. Good fires were reported well concentrated in target area with incendiaries undershooting as usual. Large explosions at 2231 & 2239hrs. Main force a/c arrived in [symbol] area as much as 20 mins early doubling the time of the attack & allowing night fighters to get organised.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[list by Groups, of aircraft missing]
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127
[underlined] TARGET: MUNICH. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Harwich – 5125N 0230E – 4950N 0310E – 4826N 0745E – 4128N 1052E – 4800N 1120E – MUNICH – 4810N 1151E – 4945N 1280E – 4808N 0733E – Cayeux – Beachy Head – Base.
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128
[underlined] 3RD OCTOBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] KASSEL.
139 Squadron. HANNOVER.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 467 Heavies + 87 P.F.F. Spoof. HANNOVER. 10 Mosquitoes.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2115hrs. [underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] Z-25.h.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+23.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
Nil cloud. Ground visibility. Although flares illuminated town, many of the Yellow T.Is seemed to fall to the E. No red T.Is were seen dropped. Green T.Is seemed reasonably well concentrated. Ground fires were started with much of the effort falling short as usual and as a consequence it is anticipated that the Henschel works will have been well attacked. One very large explosion seen by some crews when about 100mls. from the target at about 2200hrs. The spoof attack on Hannover very successful as lanes of N/F flares laid across town & S/Ls in Ruhr area seemed to [indecipherable word] a/c in Hannover direction.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Timing of all marker crews were good the attack opening shortly before the scheduled time & the A/P marking was maintained. General tendency of B/Markers was to undershoot & the spread of PFF was roughly from the A/P to 2 1/2m ESE. Main force do not appear to have followed P.F.F. & although great destruction was caused in the town there was a bad scatter N. P.I.U. showed fires burning the next day.
[list by Groups, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
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129
[underlined] TARGET: KASSEL [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE:- Base – Cromer – 5320N 0400E – N. tip of TEXEL – 5228N 0910E – 5147N 0340E – KASSEL – 5112N 0938E – 5030N 0720E – 5018N 0132E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
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130
[underlined] 4TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target:[/underlined] FRANKFURT A/MAIN. [underlined] SPOOF [/underlined] LUDWIGSHAVEN: Area II. STUTTGART.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C required: [/underlined] Area I.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 361 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5, & 6 Groups + 67 P.F.F. Spoof: 50 Heavies of 1 Group + 12 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2130hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+18. Spoof. Z-9 to Z-7.
[underlined] Summary. FRANKFURT. [/underlined]
Nil cloud, good visibility. T.I. Yellow seemed reasonably well concentrated. 3 red T.I’s fell in target area well concentrated – covered area about 1ml. square. 1 Red T.I. dropped about 3-4 mls. South – Did not attract attack – did not seem to be decoy. Green T.I’s backed up well. Many fires burning some good. Generally not very concentrated. Incendiaries a little more concentrated than usual. One large red explosion at 2137hrs.
[underlined] LUDWIGSHAVEN. [/underlined]
Nil cloud – slight haze. Reds occupied triangular area about 2ml. sides: greens about same area – fires starting up – results seem good for general number detailed.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] The results of the Spoof [symbol] were very bad due mainly to bad manipulation. There is however evidence of some marking on the A/P, although most of the attack probably missed the mark. A considerable amount of bombing
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131
[underlined] TARGET: FRANKFURT & LUDWIGSHAVEN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Reading – Beachy Head – 5020N 0135E – 4934N 0752E – Frankfurt – 5016N 0845E -5020N 0135E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
Spoof: As above – 4934N 0752E – LUDWIGSHAVEN – 5010N 0900E – 5 [indecipherable digits] N 0845E – [indecipherable word]
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132
[underlined] 5TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] GELSENKIRCHEN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Parraamatta. [sic]
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] 156 squadron Supporters only. Stand down requested.
[underlined] 6TH OCTOBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRANKFURT-AM-MAIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 156 squadron. 6 B/M. 2 V/M. 9 B/Up. 4 Supporters.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2130hrs.
[underlined] 1650hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 7TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] STUTTGART.
[underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] FRIEDRICHSHAVEN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0005hrs.
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133
Mosquitoes will also carry out attacks on MUNICH & AACHEN.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
262 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 and 6 Groups + 66 P.F.F. 16 P.F.F. on Friedrichshaven.
[underlined] Route. STUTTGART. [/underlined]
Base – Reading – Beachy Head – 5004N 0122E – 4822N 0542E – 4800N 0750E – STUTTGART – 4852N 0920E – 4840N 0500E – 5004N 0122E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
[underlined] FRIERICHSHAVEN. [/underlined]
Base – Reading – Beachy Head – 5004N 0122E – 4822N 0542E – 4800N 0750E – 4800N 0900E – [symbol] – 4851N 0828E – 4840N 0500E – 5004N 0122E – B. Head – Reading – Base.
[underlined] SUMMARY. STUTTGART [/underlined]
10/10ths cloud. T.I’s visible through cloud. The first Yellows fell on time followed by a further batch some 6-10mls. to the N.E. These followed the marker for 2 separate attacks, both concentrations being backed up by T.I.G. There are no reports of T.Is being dropped outside either of these concentrations. Some a/c dropped sky-markers in preference to T.I’s but generally these were so scattered that they could not be aimed at. Two crews report seeing Red T.Is but in view of cloud conditions it was impossible to identify them with certainty. Glow of good fires was seen above both concentrations & from one particularly large fire in the Northern area smoke was rising above cloud level.
[underlined] FRIERICHSHAVEN. [/underlined] 10/10ths cloud. 1st red T.I’s dropped on time & were seen as a glow above cloud. Only one captain (Q.) was able to make any definite report as to concentration, which he described as good by both Greens & Reds. Two crews report greenish-blue explosion at 0001hrs.
[underlined] RESULTS. PFF [/underlined] The weather was not very suitable for ground-marking and this resulted resulted [sic] in a certain amount of confusion amongst the B/Markers, some of whom dropped their T.I.Y. while others correctly resorted to emergency Wanganui & dropped release point lanes. The result seems to have been 2 separate concentrations about 5-6ms apart on track. No PRU results are so far to hand.
[list by Groups, of aircraft missing]
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134
[underlined] TARGETS: STUTTGART + FRIEDRICHSAVEN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.] [missing information]
[page break]
135
[underlined] 8TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] HANNOVER. 139. BERLIN & MANNEHEIM & AACHEN. 105 & 109. KÖLN.
[underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] BREMEN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
391 Heavies + 25 mediums of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 79 PFF. on HANNOVER. 100 Stirlings + 25 PFF on Bremen. 8 Mosquitoes of 139 on Berlin.
[underlined] Zero hours. [/underlined] HANNOVER. 0130hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+ 20. BREMEN. 0115hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+ BERLIN. 0120hrs.
[underlined] Summary: [/underlined] HANNOVER.
Nil cloud – good vis: Markers of all types were put down well and are reported by all crews as being accurate. Early arrivals reported a few reds backed up by one load of Greens about 3m. N. of [symbol], but these were fortunately ignored. At 0140hrs a few reds were also reported well to the W. of the concentrations but by this time fires were burning very well over the entire area of the centre of the town. One large explosion reported at 0142hrs.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined] HANNOVER. [underlined] BREMEN. [/underlined]
[list by Groups, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
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136
[underlined] TARGETS: HANNOVER & BREMEN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Routes: Base – 5320N 0350E – N. tip of Texel – 5225N 0800 – 5240N 0948E – HANNOVER – 5156N 0918E – [missing information]
[page break]
137
[underlined] 9TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
No operations for heavies. 6 Mosquitoes on BERLIN. [deleted] 4 Mosquitoes on COLOGNE. 4 Mosquitoes on DUISBERG. [/deleted]
[underlined] 10TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 11TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 12TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 13TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
8 Group: 4 Mosquitoes COLOGNE. 4 Mosquitoes DUISBERG. MAKE AND MEND ALL OTHER SQUADRONS.
[page break]
138
[underlined] 14TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 15TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 16TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
8 Group. 9 Mosquitoes on DORTMUND. 91 Group. 4 Whitleys – Leaflets. 92 Group. 4 Wellingtons – Leaflets. MAKE AND MEND ALL OTHER SQUADRONS.
[underlined] 17TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
8 Group. 6 Mosquitoes on BERLIN. 3 Mosquitoes on AACHEN. 1 Group. 12 Wellingtons mine-laying. 3 Group. 32 Stirlings mine-laying. 6 Group. 5 Wellingtons mine-laying. 91 Group. 2 Whitleys – Leaflets. 93 Group. 7 Wellingtons – Leaflets. 1 Whitley – Leaflets.
[page break]
139
[underlined] 18TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Area I HANNOVER. Area II. GELSENKIRCHEN. 139. BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: Area I. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
293 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 64 P.F.F. 8 Mosquitoes of 139 squadron on BERLIN.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2015hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+14.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
9/10ths cloud, tops 15/17000ft. 4 crews reported Red T.I’s dropped at 2011hrs & 2016hrs, but the majority of crews bombed either the glow of Green T.I’s on the glow on cloud in the area where T.I Yellow & Green had been seen cascading. One visual marker (‘X’ S/L Manifold) came below cloud and bombed the centre of two cluster of greens approx: 2mls apart. Only one crew reported seeing a sky-marker at 2014hrs. Incendiaries scattered over a wide area. One very large explosion at approx.: 2015hrs.
[underlined] results. [/underlined]
[list by Groups, of aircraft numbers involved and missing]
[page break]
140
[underlined] TARGET: HANNOVER. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route: [/underlined] Base – Cromer – 5320N 0350E – N. end of Texel – 5240N 0948E – HANNOVER – 5155N 0920E – 5233N 0436E – 5245N 0330E – Southwold – Base.
[underlined] V/M. [/underlined] After N. end of Texel – 5225N 0820E – 5255N 0835E – 5246N 0849E – 5240N 0948E for route-marking to aid Mosquitoes on Berlin.
[underlined] 19TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] AUGSBURG. [underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] MUNICH
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 3 B/M. 2 V/M. 6 B/Up. 8 Supporters. MUNICH 2 B/M.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 497 Heavies + 83 P.F.F. on Augsburg. 15 Heavies of 1 group + 26 PFF on Munich.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2200hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+18. MUNICH. Z-13. [missing information]
[page break]
141
[underlined] 20TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Area I. LEIPZIG. Area II STETTIN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
83 squadron to operate from Warboys.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 281 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 72 P.F.F. on LEIPZIG. 10 Mosquitoes of 139 squadron on BERLIN.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2100hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+11.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 8/10 – 10/10ths cloud. Yellow & Green T.I’s were seen by most crews generally very scattered. The attack seems to have concentrated over an area of at least 100 square miles. Some fires were seen – unable to say in what part of HUNLAND!
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] The attack was completely spoiled by bad weather especially that encountered en-route. Many a/c were iced up & lost their A.S.I.s & other instruments. Also owing to external ice the special equipment went u/s on several a/c & only 3 a/c (R. P/O Slaper & X. S/L Manifold/156) dropped emergency Wanganui flares. A few a/c dropped Yellow T.I & these were widely scattered. Like P.F.F the main force found the weather too much for them with the result that no concentration at all was achieved. The Germans have admitted some damage in Leipzig but there is no reason to suppose that this was anything but the incidental damage which is inevitable in a big raid.
[underlined] Losses. [/underlined] [deleted] KASSEL. [/deleted]
[list by Group, of aircraft losses]
[page break
142
[underlined] TARGET: LEIPZIG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Cromer – 5320N 0350E – N. end of TEXEL – 5253N 0740E – 5236N 1152E – 5202N 1242E – LEIPZIG – 5106N 1211E – 5253N 0740E – N. end of TEXEL – 5320N 0350E – Cromer – Base.
[underlined] 21ST OCTOBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND for all Heavy Squadrons.
8 Group. 1 Mosquito DORTMUND. 3 Mosquitoes BUDERICH (NW. Dusseldorf.) 1 Mosquito AACHEN. 3 Mosquitoes EMDEN
[page break]
143
[underlined] 22ND OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] KASSEL..
[underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] FRANKFURT AM MAIN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 474 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 79 P.F.F. on KASSEL. 36 P.F.F. on FRANKFURT.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2055hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+16. Z-25 to Z-16 on FRANKFURT.
[underlined] Summary. KASSEL. [/underlined]
Nil cloud. Good vis: apart from one load of Yellow T.I’s which fell at 2044hrs 5 mins early – the Yellows were accurate and well placed. At least 3 loads of T.I. Red were dropped accurately placed & well concentrated. Green T.I’s backing up very well. Crews on Frankfurt attack on passing Kassel reported very good fires burning. Large explosion seen about 2100hrs. Crews consider a good raid.
[underlined] FRANKFURT. [/underlined] Nil cloud. First Red T.I. fell about 2 mins: early. Red T.I’s intended to scatter over town area. Green T.I’s generally West not good concentration.
[underlined] Results. P.F.F. [/underlined] Technically this was probably the best attack P.F.F. has ever carried out, certainly the best Newhaven against a defended German target. The illuminating and blind-marking was excellently done with a slight tendency to overshoot. All nine visual markers identified the A/P – of the 8 who dropped T.I’s 6 [indecipherable word] so far plotted all within 1ml. of the A/P. The B/Up were nearly as accurate, & there was a good crop of supporter photographs on and around the A/P.
[list by Groups, aircraft types, numbers involved, roles and aircraft missing] [missing information]
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144
[underlined] TARGET: KASSEL & FRANKFURT. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
145
[underlined] 23RD OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
All heavy squadrons MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 24TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
All heavy squadrons stood down.
2 a/c required for BULLSEYE. ‘P’ F/L Stannard. ‘F’ Sgt. Turner.
[underlined] 1620hrs. [/underlined] Bullseye cancelled.
[underlined] 25TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND for all heavies.
[underlined] 26TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND for all heavy squadrons.
FIDO Demonstration at Graveley.
[underlined] 27TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
35 Squadron on LEVERKUSEN – Scrubbed later.
All other heavies stood down.
[page break]
146
[underlined] 28TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavy squadrons.
[underlined] 29TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavy squadrons.
[underlined] 30TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target.: [/underlined] LUDWIGSHAVEN. 35 on Leverkusen.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 8 B/M – 2 V/M. 6 B/U. 4 Supporters.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2015hrs.
[underlined] 1613hrs. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[underlined] 31ST OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
All heavies stood down.
[underlined] 1ST NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavy squadrons.
[underlined] 2ND NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all squadrons.
[page break]
147
[underlined] 3RD NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] DUSSELDORF.
[underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] COLOGNE.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
DUSSELDORF. [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
COLOGNE. [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Musical Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] Paramatta.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 1945hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-3 to Z+20. [underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] Z-10 to Z-1.
Serrate will be on – Mosquitoes and Beaufighters.
[underlined] SUMMARY. DUSSELDORF. [/underlined]
Nil cloud – good vis: apart from slight haze. The first reds T.I’s & sky markers fell about one minute late. After the first red T.I. had fallen at 1944hrs there was a lapse of about 10 minutes before further reds were dropped. Subsequently concentration of markers appeared to be good and fires in compact area were taking a good hold as the later crews left the target.
[underlined] KÖLN [/underlined] Nil cloud. Considerable haze. Red T.I’s were dropped five minutes early while N/156 was covered by S/Ls. Subsequent Reds fell in line N to S. about 8/10mls in length. Greens were well concentrated around the S. concentration which it is feared may have been BONN.
[underlined] Last Resort. OVERHIT area. [/underlined] T/156. Primary not attacked as first Red T.I’s were dropped early & were ignored by a/c which continued on track for 8 minutes before turning back. After [deleted] about [/deleted] 2 minutes it was decided to drop bombs as otherwise a/c would have
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148
[underlined] TARGET: DUSSELDORF & COLOGNE. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
1 a/c BONN area – L/156 – Last resort.
Primary not attacked for similar reasons to T/156.
[page break]
149
[underlined] RESULTS: [/underlined]
[underlined] DUSSELDORF. [/underlined]
P.F.F. 8 Group. [list of aircraft type, numbers involved and missing]
[list by Groups, of aircraft type, numbers involved and missing]
[underlined] KÖLN [/underlined]
P.F.F. 8 Group. [list of aircraft type, numbers involved and missing]
[underlined] 4TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
Make & Mend.
[underlined] 5TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] 6TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
Mosquitoes on BOCHUM, DUISBERG, DUSSELDORF.
‘K’ W/C WHITE ‘X’ S/L MANIFOLD Hooded flare demonstration at RUSHFORD.
[page break]
150
[underlined] 7TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] AUGSBURG.
[underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] MUNICH.
[underlined] A/C required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 524 heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 70 PFF. on AUGSBURG. 15 Heavies of 1 Group + 41 PFF.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] AUGSBURG – Newhaven. MUNICH – Parramatta.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0300hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+16.
Serrate will be on – Mosquitoes & Beaufighters. Mosquitoes also operating North & South of Augsburg against Night fighters.
[underlined] Briefing [/underlined] 1700hrs.
[underlined] 2120hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED. 10/10ths cloud over the target.
‘BULLSEYE’ ‘N’ F/O DOCHERTY.
[page break]
151
[underlined] 8TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] AUGSBURG.
[underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] MUNICH.
[underlined] A/C required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 339 Heavies + 72 P.F.F on AUGSBURG. 15 Heavies + 42 P.F.F on MUNICH.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] AUGSBURG – Newhaven. MUNICH – Paramatta.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 03015hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] AUGSBURG. Z-6 to Z+!2. MUNICH. Z-12 to Z.
12 Beaufighters operating in the Bomber stream. 12 Mosquitoes intruding.
[underlined] 2205hrs. [/underlined] OPERATION CANCELLED.
[underlined] 9TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRIEDRICHSHAVEN.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
152
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 312 Lancasters + 90 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0400hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+12.
[underlined] A/P [/underlined] The main shed of the old Zeppelin works. Possibility of diversions.
[underlined] 1700hrs. [/underlined] MAIN OPERATION cancelled.
[underlined] 10TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] KÖNIGSBERG.
[underlined] Alternative: [/underlined] DANZIG.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 8 B/M. 2 V/M. 3 B/Up. 8 Supporters.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2100hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+10.
[underlined] Briefing [/underlined] 1330hrs.
[underlined] 1345hrs [/underlined] Area I & II both cancelled. [underlined] Target: [/underlined] MODANE.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 240 Heavies of 1 & 5 Groups + 75 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0300hrs. . [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-7 to Z+12.
[underlined] 1645hrs. [/underlined] Zero hour changed to 0100hrs.
[underlined] 1730hrs. [/underlined] Briefing.
[page break]
153
[underlined] TARGET: - MODANE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Base – Reading – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – 4735N 0045E – 4512N 0542E – MODANE – 4735N 0120E – Cabourg – Selsey Bill – Reading – Base.
[page break]
154
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Nil cloud – slight haze in the valley. First red T.I dropped at approx.: 0057hrs. on or near the A/P. Further reds slightly overshot & a few fell on the mountain side, one very early in the attack – main concentration then formed near bend in river by eastern marshalling yard, greens falling mostly in this area with the exception of one which fell 1-2mls. South. Our visual markers arrived late over the target having been misled by river in valley S. of MODANE. One arrived in time to identify visually, later smoke filled the valley. Some incendiaries overshot to the North.
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] The marking of the target was excellent – timing however was bad & most a/c arrived late. It was intended that the first visual markers should endeavour to visually mark the A/P by moonlight only & if necessary the 2nd lot of visuals should identify by the light of flares dropped by B/Markers.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
The raid was no doubt a great success from every point of view. A large number of plotted photographs show that the largest part of the attack fell exactly where it was intended. Crews reported fires and a number of explosions of varying sizes & some crews are of the opinion that an ammunition train blew up. There is no doubt that full photographic cover of the area will show extensive damage to the marshalling yards & tunnel entrance. The far reaching results of this excellent raid will be felt & much appreciated by the allied armies fighting in Italy.
No a/c were missing from Command.
[underlined] 11TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRIEDRICHSHAVEN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 7 B/M. 3 V/M. 4 B/Up. 7 Supporters.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2230hrs.
[underlined] 1825hrs. [/underlined] MAIN OPERATION CANCELLED.
[underlined] CANNES. [/underlined] attacked by 4 & 6 Group + 35 & 97 squadrons. 4 a/c missing ANTWERP viaduct attacked by 10 Lancs. of 617 squadron.
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155
[underlined] 12TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[underlined] 13TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[underlined] 14TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[underlined] 15TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[underlined] 16TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target:[/underlined] AREA I. LUDWIGSHAVEN. AREA II. LEVERKUSEN. SPOOF FRANKFURT.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] Area I. Now Leverkusen. 2 B/Up. 6 supporters. Area II. Ludwigshaven. 7 B/M. 1 V/M. 5 B/Up. 6 Supporters. Frankfurt. 3 B/M.
[underlined] Zero hours. [/underlined] Area I. 2000hrs. Area II. 2020hrs. Spoof 2010-12hrs
[underlined] Methods. [/underlined] Area I. Paramatta, Area II. Newhaven.
[missing timing] OPERATIONS cancelled.
[page break]
156
[underlined] 17TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940hrs. [/underlined] All heavies MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 1210hrs.[/underlined] 156 required for target MANNHEIM ‘B’.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list of 156 squadron ‘Y’ aircraft numbers involved]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 70 + P.F.F.
[underlined] Method.. [/underlined] Blind-bombing by means of ‘Y’.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs.
[underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] Mosquitoes of 139 squadron will carry out a spoof attack on BONN. at 1935hrs.
[underlined] TARGET: MANNHEIM. ‘B’ [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: base – reading – Beachy Head – 5010N [missing information]
[page break]
157
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Varying amounts of cloud 7/10ths to nil. The majority of the attack covered an area about 2-2mls. across but some reports show a wide scatter by a few a/c. At about 2007hrs a large explosion resulted in a large fire. Some other fires reported at 2005hrs approximately one red T.I seen dropped about NNW of the target. This was seen by nearly all crews but there are conflicting opinions as to whether dummy or not. Bombing was much hampered by moisture freezing on inside of Perspex. One a/c attacked SCHIFFERSTADT mistaking it for MANNHEIM.
[underlined] 18TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGETS: [/underlined] BERLIN. MANNHEIM.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] BERLIN. Lancasters.
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
Halifaxes [sic] & some Lancasters on MANNHEIM.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] PARAMATTA.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2100hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+12.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 379 Heavies of 1, 3, 5, & 6 Groups + 70 P.F.F.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] A number of crews experienced difficulty with special equipment in identifying Brandenburg, and therefore the Red T.I’s were scattered, and were dropped over a rather longer period of time than briefed. Green T.I’s were difficult to see owing to cloud but were more concentrated than the Red. While thick cloud made observation of results difficult later crews reported seeing glows of fires on cloud. At approximately 2112hrs a large explosion. Spoof fighter flares were considered inaccurate – some crews reporting them having been dropped on the route out of the [symbol]. Apparently only 2 or 3 skymarkers were released.
[page break]
158
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Naisboro’ – 5310N 0400E – 5240N 0900E – 5225N 1235E – BERLIN – 5233N 1350E – 5212N 1350E – 5100N 0930E – 5030N 0720E – CAYEUX – Beachy Head – Base.
Two Cuckoos landed Warboys. W/C Adams. 49 squadron 5 Group. Sgt Shearer. 101 squadron 1 Group.
[underlined] Results. BERLIN. [/underlined] 450 a/c detailed [underlined] MANNHEIM. [/underlined] 401 a/c detailed. [missing information]
[page break]
159
[underlined] 19TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
156 squadron stood down.
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] LEVERKUSEN. 3, 4 & 6 Groups. 10 Mosquitoes + 6 Halifaxes from P.F.F.
[underlined] Results: [/underlined] 5 a/c missing of 267 a/c.
[underlined] 20TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 21ST NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND
[underlined] 22ND NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Sky-marking & Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required [/underlined] [list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 612 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 121 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+20.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 10/10ths cloud tops 10/12,000ft – layers to 20,000ft. First skymarkers were dropped punctually & thereafter fell in unbroken succession throughout attack forming two clusters about 4mls. apart N & S. Some Red & Green T.I’s were seen cascading but quickly disappeared into cloud. A few crews reported seeing Red & Yellows dropped together. Good fires were started which were visible for at least 100mls. many crews reported an unusually large explosion at 2022hrs.
[page break]
160
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base. Cromer. – 5310N 0400E – 5240N 0900E – 5236N 1221E – BERLIN – 5225N 1350E -5200N 1350E – 5223N 1200E – 5240N 0900E – 5310N 0400E – CROMER. BASE.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] [list by Groups of aircraft types and numbers missing]
P.F.F. – “The squeals of the enemy point to a most highly successful attack”.
[page break]
161
[underlined] 23RD NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Paramatta.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 329 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 90 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+15.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 9/10ths cloud. All crews report good concentration with skymarkers in a line approx.: N & S. about 1 ml. in length – one isolated about 4m. N.E. Glow of fires over whole area & smoke seen coming through cloud.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined] German Communiqué – 1300hrs. 24.11.43. On the evening of 23 November the Reich capital was again attacked by strong British formations. This terror raid caused more damage in several districts. In addition to residential districts, numerous public buildings, including churches, welfare institutions & cultural monuments were destroyed. Fighter formations & A.A of the Luftwaffe in spite of difficult conditions for defence shot down 19 E/A.
[list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
P.F.F. [list of aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
[page break]
162
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Cromer – 5310N 0400E – 5240N 0900E – 5236N 1221E – BERLIN – 5225N 1350E – 5200N 1350E – 5223N 1200E – 5240N 0900E – 5310N 0400E – Cromer – Base.
[page break]
163
[underlined] 24TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[deleted] Target: [/deleted] MAKE & MEND ALL HEAVIES
[underlined] 25TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] LANCASTERS – BERLIN. HALIFAXES – FRANKFURT.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 2 Primary B/Markers. 4 Sec: B/Markers. 6 Supporters.
[underlined] FRANKFURT. [/underlined] [list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] BERLIN. 2115hrs. FRANKFURT 2000hrs.
[underlined] Z1340hrs. [/underlined] Zero hours changed Berlin – 1345hrs Frankfurt – 0230hrs.
[underlined] 1450hrs. [/underlined] Zero hours changed again BERLIN – 0400hrs. FRANKFURT – 0245hrs. T.O.T. Z-5 to Z+10.
[underlined] 2230hrs. [/underlined] BERLIN cancelled – Supporters transferred to Frankfurt.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] NEWHAVEN
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] [deleted] 426 [/deleted] [inserted] 215 [/inserted] Heavies + 33 P.F.F.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] Apparently winds were much stronger than given in Met. Forecast. This combined with conditions of 9-10/10ths cloud varying from 19/15,000ft has obviously resulted in a scattered attack. Most crews report seeing Red T.I’s going quickly into cloud, but it is thought that these are just as likely to have been sky-markers in their initial stages as any attempt on the part of the Hun to simulate T.I. Red. One crew reports being able to see below cloud on return and to have seen fairly good fires burning. Many crews report a large fire burning in France – believed to be Lille.
[page break]
164
[underlined] TARGET: FRANKFURT. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: BASE – Reading – Beachy Head – 5020N 0130E 5015N 0800E – FRANKFURT – 5000N 0100E – 4945N 0900E – 5020N 0130E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
[underlined] RESULTS & SUCCESS.. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. Analysis. [/underlined] It is inevitable that an attack carried out under unexpected cloud conditions such as those over Frankfurt must spread very badly. Many main force were reduced to bombing on what markers they could see before they disappeared into cloud.
P.F.F. [list of aircraft type, numbers involved and missing] [list by Groups, of aircraft type, numbers involved and missing]
[page break]
165
[underlined] 26TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Targets: [/underlined] BERLIN. STUTTGART.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] STUTTGART. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] BERLIN – Paramatta. STUTTGART – Newhaven.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] BERLIN – 384 Heavies + 74 P.F.F. STUTTGART – 170 Heavies + 31 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hours: [/underlined] BERLIN. 2115hrs [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+12. STUTTGART. 2030hrs [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+8.
[underlined] SUMMARIES. BERLIN. [/underlined]
Large break occurred in cloud over [symbol]. One salvo of Red & Yellow T.I’s seen at 2113hrs and although small clusters of T.I. Red fell to the N.W. & to the S.E. the main backing up appears to have concentrated [indecipherable word] the T.I. Red & yellow. Later in the attack incendiaries seemed to be undershooting but fires were burning in the centre of the city.
[underlined] STUTTGART. [/underlined]
8-9/10ths thin cloud tops 8,000ft. Sky-markers & T.I. Yellow were dropped on time and also some T.I. Red were seen cascading. There was a concentration of T.I. Yellow & T.I. Green covering a fairly wide area. Good fires were seen burning through cloud. Few signs of night fighters over the [symbol] but great activity of all sorts – flak, S/Ls & many fighter flares around Frankfurt.
[underlined] ROUTE – BERLIN.[/underlined]
BASE – READING – BEACHY HEAD – 5020N 0130E – 5020N 0910E – 5215N 1210E – BERLIN – 5240N 1350E – [missing information]
[page break]
166
[underlined] TARGETS: BERLIN AND STUTTGART. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.] [missing information]
[page break]
167
[underlined] 26TH NOVEMBER 1943 (cont:) [/underlined]
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. Analysis. [/underlined] The only Special B/Markers to bomb dropped his T.I’s 8mls. N.W. of the A/P. These T.I’s attracted a considerable proportion of backing up and bombing, but luckily the attack appeared to have spread mostly to the SE of this position under the influence of normal ‘Y’ a/c. The centre of the area marked by B/Markers appears to have been about 5mls. W. of the A/P. Considerable damage has clearly been caused in the area to the North & West of the Tiergarten.
[underlined] BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
[underlined] STUTTGART. [/underlined]
[list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
[underlined] 27TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
ALL HEAVIES MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
168
[underlined] 28TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
All Heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 29TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
All Heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 30TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MUNICH
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] BERLIN.
[list of 156 squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2015hrs.
[underlined] 1551hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 1ST DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] LEIPZIG.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 6 Primary B/M. 5 Sec: B/M. 2 V/M. 3 B/U. 5 Supporters.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs.
[underlined] 2233hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[page break]
169
[underlined] 2ND DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 543 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 107 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs. altered later to 2006hrs.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Paramatta.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
5/10ths cloud tops 5,000ft. First Red T.I’s were apparently dropped at 2004hrs. and owing to different cloud cover conditions varying reports have been submitted by crews some not seeing T.I’s. Opinions generally seems to be that Markers were scattered along a line running approximately 3m. N-S with concentrations at extremities. From Special equipment observations it seems that the Southern concentration was probably in the centre of the city. Last [deleted] er [/deleted] B/Up on confirm that the fires confirmed with there [sic] impressions. Several crews reported dense clouds of smoke rising.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Plotted photographs cannot show a complete picture due to the cloud cover but it is probable that the greatest part of the raid was dropped in the S.E outskirts of Berlin.
[list by Groups, of aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing] [missing information]
[page break]
170
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: - BASE – HAISBORO’ – 5250N 0330E – 5235N 0440E – 5238N 1004E – 5236N 1220E – BERLIN – 5230N 1350E – 5255N 1350E – 5238N 1004E – 5235N 0440E – 5250N 0330E – HAISBORO’ – BASE.
[page break]
171
[underlined] 3RD DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Area I. LEIPZIG. Area II. BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 465 Heavies + 106 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0400hrs.
Mosquitoes of 627 and 139 squadrons will carry on from 5225N 1225E to BERLIN following a Spoof attack.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
10/10ths thin cloud – tops above 6,000ft. First T.I’s and sky-markers fell about 3 minutes early. A good concentration of T.I. Red developed and, according to experienced crews the best concentration of sky markers yet achieved. There was a slight overshoot of one T.I. Red to the South. T.I. Green backed up well though a few followed the overshoot. However in its later stages the concentration seemed to tighten up. Several explosions were seen, one large one at 0403hrs approximately – glow of many fires was seen & black smoke rising through cloud. Fighter flares seen on the way in. Out from the target route markers S. of Koblenz were very scattered some being dropped N. of Frankfurt. It seems that the HUN is becoming familiar with this route into the target and that night fighters wait near Hannover for routemarkers then follow the Bomber stream.
[underlined] Success. & Results. [/underlined]
Daylight cover confirms the success of the attack. The W. area of the city was covered by smoke rising to a great height & in the E. half of the target area upwards of 20 good fires were still burning furiously.
[page break]
172
[underlined] TARGET: LEIPZIG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: BASE – HAISBORO’ – 5250N 0330E – 5235N 0435E – 5240N 0810E – 5225N 1222E – LEIPZIG – 5105N 1205E – 5015N 0740E – 5010N 0130E – BEACHY HEAD – READING – BASE.
[list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing] [missing information]
[page break]
173
[underlined] 4TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
All heavies MAKE & MEND.
8 Group, 9 Mos: FLAMBURG. 5 Primary. 1, 3, & 4 Groups mine-laying.
[underlined] 5TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 6TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 7TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND. SECURITY FILMS SHOWN.
[underlined] 8TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 9TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
174
[underlined] 10TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 11TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 12TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 13TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 14TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 15TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
175
[underlined] 16TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 400 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 91 P.F.F. + 15 Mosquitoes.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Wanganui & Paramatta.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 10/10ths thick cloud about 7,000ft. First red T.I’s & Sky-markers dropped early at 1956hrs. Early in the attack concentration of sky markers appeared to be fairly good, but in the later stages more ragged, stretching across the [symbol] from E – W. From H2S observations it would appear that the main weight of the attack fell on the centre of the city. Thick cloud prevented observation of T.I’s on the ground except as a vague glow. Many crews reported dummy Red T.I’s several miles to the N & NE of the target. Numerous fighter flares were seen from the Dutch coast to beyond the [symbol]. ‘Spoof’ fighter flares were seen being dropped & 2 crews report seeing fighters heading for them. Fighters were also reported as crossing the Dutch coast to the first turning point at sea to meet the a/c.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[list by Groups, of aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing
Visibility on return was extremely bad and a number of a/c crashed on landing.
[deleted] 19.12.43 [/deleted]
[page break]
176
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – 5250N 0330E – 5235N 0440E – 5238N 1005E – 5238N 1220E – BERLIN – 5243N 1400E – 5455N 1143E – 5525N 0938E – 5523N 0825E – 5510N 0700E – Base.
[page break]
177
[underlined] 17TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 18TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 19TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
One crew of 5 Group – mission 16/17-12-43 reported picked up by launches looking for ‘W’ F/L Aubert.
[underlined] 20TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRANKFURT.[underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] MANNHEIM.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[underlined] FRANKFURT. [/underlined] [list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 600 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5, & 6 Groups + 93 P.F.F. on Frankfurt. 27 Heavies P.F.F. + 30 Heavies of 1 Group on Mannheim.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] FRANKFURT 1935 MANNHEIM 1925.
Intruders operating.
[page break]
178
[underlined] TARGETS: FRANKFURT AND MANNHEIM. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE. Base – Southwold – 5130N 0440E – 5032N 0510E – 5015N 0730E – FRANKFURT/MANNHEIM – (5005N 0905E 4930N 0902E) 5030N 0900E – 5032N 0510E – 5130N 0440E 5215N 0300E – Southwold – Base.
[page break]
179
[underlined] 20TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined] (CONT:)
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] FRANKFURT.
6-9/10ths strato cm. with large breaks. First T.I. Yellows dropped on time. Some crews report they dropped early and one fell short over Wiesbaden. One of our supporters bombed these. T.I. Yellows then formed a rather scattered line E – W across the target. Backers up on later in the attack reported a circular concentration of T.I. Yellow with T.I. Red falling NW at approx: 1932hrs & others up to 10m. NE. T.I. Green were dropped approx: in the centre of the Yellows. Fires were very scattered following 2 concentrations but burning well. Large explosion 1947hrs.
[underlined] MANNHEIM. [/underlined]
2-3/10ths cloud. Red T.I’s dropped very accurately & well backed up by Greens. From visual identification crews report that Reds fell between marshalling yards & Rhine. Good fires started.
[underlined] P.F.F. RESULTS. [/underlined] FRANKFURT.
The timing of the B/Markers was very good. Owing to cloud conditions no visual markers were able to identify the A/P. backers up had great difficulty in selecting the centre of T.I. Yellow as these were confused with the flames. The flares drifted rapidly Eastwards & tended to produce an overshoot & considerable scatter. Plotted photographs stretch from the A/P up to 5m. E & SE.
[underlined] MANNHEIM. [/underlined] Little of the attack can have fallen in Ludwigshaven but it is probable that some damage was caused to parts of MANNHEIM. Photographs show 3-8mls. overshoot .
P.F.F. 3 missing. Command 42 a/c.
[underlined] 21ST DECEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
180
[underlined] 22ND DECEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 23RD DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 353 Heavies 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 90 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Paramatta.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2045hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+12.
Mosquitoes Spoof on Leipzig – Fighter flares on Berlin & Routemarking.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] put back to 0400hrs.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] Attack opened on time the first reds being seen at 0357.5hrs. Red T.I’s visible as a glow on cloud well concentrated. At 0407hrs 11 skymarkers seen over [symbol]. One Green fell to E of main concentration. Dummy reds seen to N.W. From H2S observations it would appear that the attack began well on the A/P with a tendency to spread slightly to the E & SE. Several large explosions reported – one at 0410hrs.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
16 a/c missing.
[page break]
181
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – 5220N 0300E – 5030N 0608E – 5033N 0940E – 5050N 1227E – 5205N 1310E – [symbol] – 5302N 1327E – 5235N 0943E – 5240N 0300E – Southwold – Base.
[page break]
182
[underlined] 24TH DECEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE and MEND all Heavies.
CHRISTMAS EVE.
[hand drawing of holly] [underlined] 25TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET.[/underlined] BERLIN. Present from BUTCH.
[underlined] 1000hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED!!
[underlined] 26TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND
[underlined] 27TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[underlined] Message from A.O.C. [/underlined] All crews to fly today to blow the alchohol [sic] out of their lungs.
BATTLE CRUISER ‘SCHARNHORST’ sunk off NORWAY.
[underlined] 28TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[page break]
183
[underlined] 29TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 604 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 106 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+18.
[underlined] Spoof Attacks. [/underlined] Leipzig & Magdeburg. By Mosquitoes.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Wanganui and Paramatta.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 10/10ths cloud – tops 6/10,000ft. The first T.I’s & skymarkers were dropped punctually at 1958hrs or slightly before T.I’s disappeared quickly into cloud, but a good concentration of skymarkers was achieved in a line E to W. H2S observations appear to indicate that the concentration was slightly to the SE of the centre of the city. Two crews report seeing T.I. Red & skymarkers 20m. S. of Berlin at 1949hrs. There are few definite reports of fires burning as glow was difficult to distinguish from that of Red T.I’s. Fighter flares mostly seen between Dummer See [sic] & Leipzig.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Reports are consistent in reporting a reasonable concentration. The enemy has become remarkably reticent on the results of the recent raids on Berlin. All the evidence however seems to point to this raid being successful.
19 a/c missing.
[page break]
184
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Cromer – 5320N 0400E – 5230N 0820E – 5137N 1220E – [symbol] – 5302N 1327E – 5300N 1145E – 5245N 0830E – 5320N 0400E – Cromer – Base.
[page break]
185
[underlined] 30H DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 31ST DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRANKFURT.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 156 Squadron. 8 P.B/M. 2 V/M. 3 B.B/U. 2 V.B/U. 6 Supporters.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 508 a/c of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups. 110 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 1945hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+15.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed.
[underlined] 1459hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 1ST JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] WHITEBAIT.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 369 a/c of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 87 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0300hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+12.
[page break]
186
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: Base – Southwold – 5240N 0330E – 5238N 0438E – 5250N 0912E – 5236N 1220E – BERLIN – 5210N 1338N [sic] – 5050N 1210E – 5030N 0720E – 5030N 0135E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] First sky-markers dropped on time, T.I’s were invisible owing to cloud. Skymarkers fairly concentrated at the beginning, tending to scatter over a line about 4mls. N – S. No fires seen. Large explosion at 0306hrs.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[missing information] P.F.F. Success. Impossible to assess results [missing information]
[page break]
187
[underlined] 2ND JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 320 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 85 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0315hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+14.
Changed to 0245hrs owing to change of route.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
[blank]
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Practically impossible to assess success of raid but crews were more optimistic than on the previous nights raid in their reports. Main force groups report the concentration of release point flares as good.
8 Group 10 missing Command 18 missing
[page break]
188
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: Base – Southwold – 5245N 0330E – 5250N 0850E – 5325N 1240E – BERLIN – 5210N 1310E – 5150N 1030E – 5230N 0820E – 5245N 0330E – Southwold Base.
[page break]
189
[underlined] 3RD JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 4TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 5TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] STETTIN. [underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 325 Heavies 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 92 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven or Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0345hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+12.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Nil cloud, vis: good, haze nil, snow on ground, cloud bank crossed target. Short duration. Apart from one or two reports of Red & Green T.I’s being dropped early, particularly T.I. Green, the markers achieved a good concentration. White flares were considered unnecessary due to very good visibility & snow. The visual marker definitely identified the A/P. Red T.I’s were considered a little scattered with some falling on the islands on the E. side of the River Oder in the Freihafen area. Attack generally considered very concentrated & successful. One large explosion seen about 0409hrs.
[page break]
190
[underlined] TARGET: STETTIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE. BASE – 5600N 0600E – 5600N 1300E – 5405N 1323E – STETTIN – 5325N 1450E – 5500N 1505E – 5600N 1300E – 5600E [sic] 0600E – Base.
[underlined] RESULTS & SUCCESS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Doubtless a good attack – plotted night photographs & crews reports are most optimistic. Judging by plotted photographs from this group there seems to have been a slight spread to the west [missing words]
[page break]
191
[underlined] 6TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 7TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 8TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Z633.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 156 Squadron. 3 B.M.I. 1 V/M. 3 Supporters.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2030hrs.
[underlined] 1605hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 9TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 10TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
192
[underlined] 11TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 12TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 13TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 14TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BRUNSWICK.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 416 of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 93 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven. or Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 1915hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+12.
[page break]
193
[underlined] TARGET: BRUMSWICK. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: Base – Haisboro’ – 5305N 0400E – 5250N 0930E – BRUNSWICK – 5200N 1030E – 5230E [sic] 0820E – 5305N 0400E – Haisboro’ – Base.
[page break]
194
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
First markers. Green T.I’s & skymarkers R/Green stars were reported dropped at 1907.5hrs. The concentration was considered good at the commencement, stringing out in a line of attack 5/7 miles long subsequently. There appears to have been a gap of about 7 mins from approx: 1912 – 1919hrs in the skymarkers, with but an occasional Green T.I after 1912hrs. There is a suspicion that dummy T.I. Reds were dropped. One marker dropped T.I. Yellow over the target, together with T.I. Green & sky-markers at 1907hrs. No concrete results to report due to cloud & only small glow seen by crews on return journey, although last backer up reports good glow on cloud. Magdeburg ‘spoof’ considered too near. Many N/F flares over target in line of track in & particularly out. Concentration of N/F N & NE of Hannover.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
38 a/c missing.
[underlined] 15TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 16TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 17TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
195
[underlined] 18TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 19TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 20TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 659 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 112 P.F.F. & Mosquitoes.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 1935hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+18.
[underlined] SUMMARY [/underlined]
10/10ths cloud tops 8,000ft with small breaks. First skymarkers & T.I. Red were dropped on time. T.I.’s disappeared very quickly into cloud, & sky markers formed two concentrations, one big & one small, which were soon joined in a line about 2 – 3 miles long running approx.: parallel to track NW – SE. According to H2S checking the larger concentration was over the centre of the city, possibly a little to the E. There was a gap in the sky-marking of about 3 mins – 1944 – 1947hrs. Large explosion seen in S. part of [symbol]. 1942hrs.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Difficult to assess results owing to cloud.
[page break]
196
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: base – 5425N 0400E – 5245N 0800E – 5337N 1055E – 5328N 1240E – BERLIN – 5220N 1330E – 5138N 1220E – 5207N 0750E – 5338N 0532E – 5340N 0400E – Cromer – Base.
[page break]
197
[underlined] 21ST JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MAGDEBURG.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 560 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 117 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven or Wanganui if necessary.
[underlined] Zero. [/underlined] 2300hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+18. [underlined] Berlin [/underlined] 2253hrs.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
Thin layer cloud 8-8/10ths – clear to SE. Some crews report T.I. Red dropped with T.I. Green in fairly good concentration. The T.I. Red is reported short of target. Skymarkers were well concentrated and in general bombing good, although incendiaries reported well to S. of [symbol]. Fires burning well with smoke well up to 12,000ft. Glow of fires seen at coast on return. Large explosion at 2309hrs.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] 9 a/c missing. It is feared that the main weight of the raid fell to the East and S.E of the town, and little damage is likely in the town centre.
[underlined] Command. [/underlined] 54 a/c missing.
[page break]
198
[underlined] TARGET: MAGDEBURG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
199
[underlined] 22ND JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 23RD JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 24TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies make & mend.
[underlined] 25TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRANKFURT
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
156 Squadron. 3 B.M.I. I V/M. 4 B.B.U. 2 Vis: B/U. 9 Supporters.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 638 Heavies + 107 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method [/underlined] Newhaven – Emergency Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2050hrs.
Mosquitoes precede Main attack dropping Window. Other Mosquitoes to act as spoof markers on Stuttgart & Karlsruhe.
[underlined] 1635hrs. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[underlined] 2125hrs. [/underlined] N.T.U. a/c F/L [indecipherable word] crashed at Ramsey.
[page break}
200
[underlined] 26TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 27TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 422 Lancasters of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 84 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2030hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+12.
Mosquitoes drop Window from Dummer See to Berlin. Mosquitoes drop route-markers. Mosquitoes drop spoof fighter flares. 12 Mosquitoes attach AACHEN with T.I. Green & bombs.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] The attack opened on time & two of the early crews reported a good initial concentration of R/P flares. Later there was a spread in a line or crescent formation, variously reported at different times in the attack as being E – W and N – S and from 1/2 ml to as much as 8mls. in length. T.Is quickly disappeared in cloud. Glows of good fires was seen and some crews reported this as being visible for 100mls. after leaving the target. One crew reported a large fire 30m. S.W. of Berlin. Routemarker flares red steady were reported as accurately placed except at Pos: Q which was thought to be about 10mls. S. of track. Crews [missing information]
[page break]
201
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Cromer – 5345N 0430E – 5155N 1010E – 5237N 1158E – 5235N 1150E – BERLIN – 5215N 1350E – 5050N 1210E – 5030N 0735E – 5020N 0132E – Dungeness – Bradwell Bay – Base.
[page break]
202
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 1 a/c P.F.F. missing.
[underlined] P.F.F. Analysis. [/underlined] There is no evidence of the concentration achieved and crews’ reports vary considerably. It appears however that there was a considerable spread up and down wind as would be expected, and that the initial marking was rather spread but tended to become more concentrated later. Owing to complete lack of photographic evidence of all kinds it is impossible to give any accurate estimate of the success achieved. There is every reason to expect however that this raid has added further considerable damage to the already extensive devastation.
[underlined] 28TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 566 Heavies + 113 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0315hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+15.
Mosquitoes drop window & drop T.I. Red on Hannover.
[page break]
203
[underlined] Target: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Cromer – 5510N 0700E – 5510N 1035E – Berlin – 5223N 1345E – 5235N 1405E – 5510N 1010E – 5510N 0700E – Cromer – Base.
4 Halifaxes P.F.F. Sylt. 63 Stirlings of 3 Group Mine-laying Sylt area.
[page break]
204
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
First R/P flares fell at 0309/0310hrs. The attack then opened on time. Crews report that a good concentration of R/P flares was achieved and well maintained throughout although there were a few to the South of the main concentration. Most crews reported that the glow of T.I’s could be seen below cloud but attack was apparently Wanganui. One very big explosion was seen at 0314hrs, second at 0325hrs, third at 0349hrs and one a/c saw one at 0400hrs when well away from the target. The 0325hrs. explosion reported to be vivid green. Spoof flares & Yellow T.Is seen.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
P.F.F. 6 a/c missing. Command. 43 missing
[underlined] P.F.F. Summary. [/underlined] Again very difficult to assess owing to lack of observation of results and night photographs, but crews who have been to Berlin a number of times during the series of attacks were unanimous in considering it the best attack on Berlin so far. A very impressive fire area was seen by later crews & the glow on the clouds could be seen for a distance of 165mls. on the homeward journey. Many impressive explosions were reported in the target area & one at Z-1 was unanimously reported as being the largest & most violent explosion a lot of the crews taking part in the attack had seen. [deleted] When [/deleted]
[page break]
205
[underlined] 29TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 30TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Goodwood on BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 392 heavies + 94 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2015hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+12.
Mosquitoes to drop window & spoof fighter flares on target, also spoof red flares. Mosquitoes to act as fire watchers after attack. Mosquitoes also drop T.I. Red & Green on Brunswick.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 10/10ths st.cm. tops 12,000ft. Skymarker concentration from the beginning was very good with a few strays, & this concentration appears to have been maintained throughout the attack. Little was seen of results while a/c were over the target but on the way home later crews report a large glow from the target. One crew reported a dummy T.I. Red at least 10mls. N. of the target, darker in colour than our own – fell very slowly before going into cloud. Our own T.Is were only visible for approx.: 30 before disappearing in cloud.
[page break]
206
[underlined] Target: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: Base – 5435N 0500E – 5438N 1100E – BERLIN – 5200N 1325E -5200N 0920E – 5240N 0800E – 5250N 0400E – Southwold – Base.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] P.F.F. 8 a/c missing
Thick cloud over the target made results exceptionally difficult to judge, but main force crews were enthusiastic as to the concentration of R/P flares. The glow of large fires was seen in the later half of [missing words]
[page break]
207
[underlined] 31ST JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 1ST FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 2ND FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 3RD FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
Newish crews required for Cross Country and T.I. Demonstration at Whittlesey and Rushford Ranges. ’W’ W/O Trotter. Marker. ‘H’ F/O Cameron. ‘S’ Sgt. Cuthilll. ‘L’ F/S Doyle. ‘F’ P/O Samson.
2105hrs. Exercise abandoned owing to enemy activity.
[underlined] 4TH FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[page break]
208
[underlined] 5TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend. Mosquitoes on BERLIN.
[underlined] 6TH FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavy a/c of P.F.F. to take part in Navigational exercise.
1245hrs. Exercise postponed on account of weather.
“SOMEBODY TALKED” security film shown in Officers’ Mess.
[underlined] 7TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
Navigation exercise postponed.
“SOMEBODY TALKED” shown in Sergeants’ Mess.
[underlined] 8TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
Navigational exercise to take place.
[list of navigational exercise aircraft identifier letter and pilots]
[missing information]
[page break]
209
[underlined] 9TH FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend. T.I. trials scrubbed.
[underlined] 10TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
VISIT OF KING & QUEEN.
1245. King & Queen visited Ops Room.
G/Capt. Collins posted to R.A.F. Bourne. G/Capt. Searby to R.A.F. Warboys.
[underlined] 11TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 12TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
All heavies P.F.F. Navigational Exercise.
1613hrs. Exercise cancelled.
[underlined] 13TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN. Spoof: FRANKFURT-ON-ODER.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] BERLIN: 2 P.B.M. 4 B.B.U. 3 V.B.U. 5 Supporters. FRANKFURT: 2Y. BB/U.
[page break]
210
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 594 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 91 P.F.F.
[underlined] 1555hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 14TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 15TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN. [underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] FRANKFURT-ON-ODER.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
BERLIN. 2 P.B.M. 3 B.B.U. 6 V.B.U. 4 Supporters. FRANKFURT. 3 B.M. 3 B.U. Kiel Fjord: - 4 a/c of 35 Squadron.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 703 heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 96 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2115hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+20.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta & Wanganui mixed.
[underlined] Route: [/underlined] Base – 5450N 1100E – 5525N 0700E – 5510N 1000E – 5430N 1230E – [symbol] – 5210N 1250E – 5240N 1100E – 5240N 0855E – 5340N 0400E – Haisboro’ – Base.
Mosquitoes dropping spoof route-markers – fighter flares – window. 6 [deleted] / [/deleted] M/139 act as firewatchers after main attack is over.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] The attack appeared to have opened early, some crews reported seeing first Wanganui flares & Red T.Is as early as 2110hrs. Reports on concentration of Wanganui flares vary considerably, some stating they fell in tight cluster while others say they were very scattered. The general impression, however, is that they spread but in a line or arc SW/NE. Owing to thick 10/10ths cloud T.Is were not visible for long & possibly for the same reason no glow of good fires could
[page break]
211
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN & FRANKFURT-ON-ODER. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
212
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
P.F.F. Missing 7 a/c
[underlined] P.F.F. Analysis. [/underlined]
Results difficult to assess although a glow of fires was reported crews did not think they were as plentiful as on previous attacks. Mosquitoes over the target after the attack finished however report large areas of effective fires burning in the city, and the column of smoke which rose to 20,000ft was particularly impressive. T.I. is practically impossible to say for certain which area of Berlin received the main weight of the attack, but crews who checked the position on navigational aids were of the opinion that the attack opened slightly to the West of the city area & spread in later stages towards the centre.
[underlined] 16TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required 1st Wave. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] 2nd Wave. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hours: [/underlined] 1st Wave. 2125hrs. 2nd Wave 2330hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+8.
[underlined] Strength of Attack: [/underlined] 57 P.F.F. + 280 Main Force. 55 P.F.F. + 270 main Force.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] 1503hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[page break]
213
[underlined] 17TH FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN. [underlined] Alternative: [/underlined] LEIPZIG.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
156. 1st Wave: 3 P.B.M. 3 B.B.U. 2 V.B.U. 4 supporters. 2nd Wave: 3 P.B.M. 3 B.B.U. 1. V.B.U. 2 Supporters.
[underlined] Strength of Attack: [/underlined] 615 Heavies + 110 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hours: [/underlined] 1st Wave: 2135hrs. LEIPZIG. 2150hrs. 2nd Wave: 0055hrs. LEIPZIG. 0005hrs.
[underlined] 1600hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 18TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 156: 8 P.B.M. 4 B.B.U. 4 V.B.U. 5 Supporters.
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] 0330hrs.
[underlined] Routes: [/underlined] Alternative route home for a/c on [symbol] after Z+8.
[underlined] 1215hrs [/underlined] Snow Warning.
[underlined] 1639hrs. [/underlined] ALL OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 19TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] LEIPZIG.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
214
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 736 Heavies 0f 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 108 P.F.F. 4H/35 + 50 Stirlings gardening Kiel Fjord.
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] 0400hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+19.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Wanganui & paramatta.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
First Wanganui flares and red T.Is dropped about 4” early. A good concentration of Wanganui flares quickly formed in oval formation NE/SW. One load of skymarkers fell 5 to 10mls South of main concentration but was not backed up. Skymarking was well maintained until 0405hrs when there was a gap of about 4 minutes after which marking was resumed but more sparsely than before. Another gap of a few minutes occurred at about 0400hrs. Only a vague glow of T.I’s was visible through cloud.
Glow of good fires could be seen through cloud in later stages with dense clouds of black smoke rising above 10,000ft. large explosions reported at 0358, 0435 & 0438hrs.
[page break]
215
[underlined] Target: LEIPZIG [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
216
[underlined] 20TH FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] STUTTGART.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method [/underlined] Mixed Wanganui & Paramatta.
[underlined] Strength of Attack: [/underlined] 597 Heavies + 103 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] 0400hrs.
[page break]
217 (last page)
Feb 20th, 1944.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
[photograph] F/S WINTERSON. [photograph] P/O GROVE. [photograph] SGT. SMITH. [photograph] SGT. DUCHENÉ [photograph] SGT. BEMBRIDGE. F/O. RYAN. [photograph] F/O. GENTLE. [photograph] SGT. WALEMBY. [photograph] SGT. HEDGE. [photograph] F/L AUBERT. [photograph] F/L SAMUEL. [photograph] F/S FISHER. [photograph] F/L MACKAY. [photograph] F/O PETRIDES. [photograph] P/O HALPERIN. [photograph] F/S HOOPER.
[page break]
Names of the 5 photographs from BOTTOM LINE OF PREVIOUS PAGE.
F/L LITTLE, F/O FLYNN, SGT .JONES, SGT. MACLACHLAN, SGT. TRUMAM
[photograph] F/O SMITH. [photograph] P/O SMITH. [photograph] F/O PHILPS. [photograph] SGT. CORDRAY. [photograph] F/O GOODWIN. [photograph] SGT. MARSHALL. [photograph] F/L VINCENT. [photograph] SGT. CLARKE. [photograph] SGT. HATWELL. [photograph] SGT. SWINNEY. [photograph] SGT. HODGES. [photograph] S/L SAMMY HALL. [photograph] F/L YOUNG. [photograph] SGT. [indecipherable name]. [photograph] P/O [indecipherable name]. [photograph] SGT. [indecipherable name] [missing photograph] SGT. HODGES. [photograph] SGT. [indecipherable name]. [photograph] W/C DUIGAN. [photograph] SGT. KING. [photograph] S/L MANDENO. [photograph] Sgt. Forbes. [photograph] [indecipherable name]. [photograph] SGT. CURTIS. [5 indecipherable names]
[page break]
[photograph] SGT. MARSON. [photograph] SGT. WILLETT. [photograph] SGT. OTTEY. [photograph] SGT. EDWARDS. [photograph] SGT. SHACKLADY. [photograph] SGT. BOWMAN. [photograph] SGT. BROWN. [photograph] F/S STEWART. [photograph] SGT. HAVARD. [photograph] SGT. HANDLEY. [photograph] SGT. THORINGTON. [photograph] P/O KERRY. [photograph] P/O CARTER. [photograph] SGT. DURAT. [photograph] SGT. DALTON. [photograph] SGT. CHAPMAN. P/O ROBERTS [photograph] P/O THOMPSON. [photograph] SGT. WILKINSON. [photograph] F/L CRAMPTON. [photograph] SGT. SCOTT. [photograph] F/O WOODSEND. [photograph] P/O BAGG. [photograph] SGT. LEADER.
[page break]
[photograph] W/C DONALDSON. [photograph] S/L LAWSON. [photograph] F/O DRAKE. [photograph] SGT. LAWRENCE. [photograph] F/L VERDON ROE. [photograph] F/S BANKS. [photograph] F/O TOWNSEND. [photograph] P/O JOLLY. [photograph] S/L GRIMSTON. [photograph] F/S VOLANTE. [photograph] F/L MACPHERSON. [photograph] F/L KEARS. [photograph] P/O MOLLER. [photograph] F/S PRICE. [photograph] SGT. BARNHAM. [photograph] P/O BARCLAY. [photograph] W/C WOMERSLEY. [photograph] F/S GILES. [photograph] SGT. YOUNG. [photograph] F/S ELCORTE. [photograph] W/O GREAVES.
[page break]
[photograph] SGT. WALLIS. [photograph] SGT. WALDER. [photograph] F/S CASE. [photograph] F/S McLENNAN. [photograph] F/S TREMBLAY. [photograph] S/L MOIR. [photograph] F/O INNES. [photograph] SGT. BRAMLEY. [photograph] SGT. MACPINLAY. [photograph] SGT. HAZELGRAVE. [photograph] SGT. WEBB. [photograph] SGT. FOLLAND. [photograph] S/L GRANT. [photograph] P/O WALKER. [photograph] SGT. SALTER. [photograph] SGT. DOBSON. [photograph] SGT. IRWIN. [photograph] F/S WHITE. [photograph] SGT. [indecipherable name] [photograph] [missing name]
[page break]
[photograph] F/O GOODLEY. P/W. [photograph] S/L BALL. [photograph] P/O GINGER JONES. P/W. [photograph] F/SGT. PERCY. [photograph] SGT. THOMPSON. [photograph] W/C HOOLWAY. [photograph] F/S HART. [photograph missing] P/O TURK. [photograph] F/O LUFF. [photograph] F/S HEAP. [photograph] P/O HORAN. [photograph] F/S ATKIN. [photograph] W/O SAUNDERS. [photograph] F/O McKENNA. [photograph] SGT. CHAPMAN. [photograph] P/O DAVIES. [photograph] F/S HOLDERNESS. [photograph] F/S McHUGH. [photograph] SGT. MURRAY. [photograph] F/L LANG. [photograph] F/L GREY. [photograph] F/S RIDINGS. [photograph] Sgt. LEE. [photograph] F/S VENN. [photograph] Sgt WOOD.
Dublin Core
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Description
An account of the resource
Operational Record ledger created by Pat Falkinder (nee Day). Running log book which includes briefing, targeting, crews and methods of prosecution for various bombing operations. It includes a photographs of Pat Day in uniform and several aircrew.
Contributor
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Robin Christian
David Bloomfield
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
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224 photocopied sheets
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Identifier
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MCleggPV[DoB]-150710-01
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
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1943
1944
Title
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Operational Record ledger
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Spatial Coverage
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Belgium
Czech Republic
Denmark
France
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Belgium--Antwerp
Belgium--Florennes
Belgium--Sint-Truiden
Belgium--Zeebrugge
Czech Republic--Plzeň
Denmark--Manø Island
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Southwold
France--Bourget Lake
France--Cannes
France--Cayeux-sur-Mer
France--Laon
France--Modane
France--Montchanin
France--Montluçon
France--Saint-Dizier (Haute-Marne)
Germany--Augsburg
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Bocholt
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Bonn
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Elberfeld
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Freiburg im Breisgau
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Jena
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kassel
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Koblenz
Germany--Krefeld
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Lübeck
Germany--Ludwigshafen am Rhein
Germany--Magdeburg
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Mülheim an der Ruhr
Germany--Munich
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Oberhausen (Düsseldorf)
Germany--Oldenburg
Germany--Peenemünde
Germany--Rostock
Germany--Schifferstadt
Germany--Soest
Germany--Stuttgart
Italy--Genoa
Italy--Milan
Italy--Turin
Netherlands--Breda
Netherlands--Leeuwarden
Netherlands--Texel
Netherlands--Venlo
Poland--Gdańsk
Poland--Szczecin
Russia (Federation)--Kaliningrad (Kaliningradskai︠a︡ oblastʹ)
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Hamburg
Russia (Federation)
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Germany--Frankfurt (Oder)
Netherlands--Twente
England--Suffolk
156 Squadron
anti-Semitism
B-17
bombing
bombing of Hamburg (24-31 July 1943)
Bombing of Peenemünde (17/18 August 1943)
briefing
ground personnel
Halifax
incendiary device
Lancaster
mine laying
Mosquito
Pathfinders
RAF Wyton
Scharnhorst
target indicator
Women’s Auxiliary Air Force
-
Dublin Core
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Title
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[Picture]
V
GROUP
NEWS
No 26 SEPTEMBER 1944
Copies sent to Stns.
[Stamp] Base Copy.
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
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FOREWORD BY A.O.C.
September was a most successful month and a reward for the hard work which all ranks have put in throughout the Summer. The Group secured two prizes for which many have striven since the early days of the War, the Tirpitz and the Dortmund-Ems Canal. The attack on the Tirpitz was splendidly undertaken by Nos. 9 and 617 Squadrons and appears to have been highly successful in spite of a most efficient smoke screen. The attack on the Dortmund-Ems Canal has earned the following message from the Secretary of State for Air.
“The War Cabinet have instructed me to convey to you and to all concerned their congratulations on the outstanding success achieved in the recent attack on the Dortmund-Ems Canal. Pressed home with great determination against strong opposition and in difficult weather it constituted yet another major blow against German War economy.”
These two attacks have once more shown the remarkable efficiency of the 12,000 lb. “Tallboy” bomb when it hits the target.
The Group has achieved an equally high measure of success in attacks against German cities. During September alone, an area of nearly 3,000 acres has been burnt out. Such results can only be achieved if the marking is accurately placed and if the incendiaries are spread evenly over the whole area to be burnt. With a small force of Group strength there are no loads to be spared and if incendiaries go wide or are over-concentrated on certain sectors, it must be at the expense of the total area destroyed. Examples are Stuttgart where too high a percentage of loads fell wide of their sectors and Kaiserslautern where crews allowed themselves to be deflected inwards by the fires raging in the central sector, thus allowing the equally important areas on either side to escape.
I want to impress on crews that area bombing calls for every bit as much accuracy as attacks on the smallest factory or railway targets. In attacks on these targets during the Summer crews achieved remarkably small errors, and similar accuracy is needed on these large targets if they are to be burnt out from end to end leaving no gaps calling for an uneconomical return visit. Each crew in fact is given a small area of his own to burn and if his load falls on his neighbour’s patch, his own area may well escape destruction, and this has happened on some of our recent attacks.
The problems of lining up the aircraft on the correct heading after allowing for drift and of carrying out the overshoot procedure, are not easy to solve but instructions have recently been issued which should help crews in this matter. If an even spread of incendiaries can be achieved we should be able, with our normal effort, to burn out nearly 1,000 acres on each attack. This will represent a tremendous achievement, and one which will bring nearer the end of the War.
No.51 Base has also put out a great effort in training 161 crews during the month. This has enabled all squadrons to be kept up to establishment and had provided a margin from which new squadrons are already starting to be formed. I congratulate all concerned.
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[Drawing] OPERATIONS
[Underlined] BREST – 2ND SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber – Wing Commander Humphreys.
Operations in September opened with an attack on the dry docks and shipping in Brest Harbour by 67 Lancasters of Nos. 52 and 55 Bases, in daylight on September 2nd. There was no marking for this attack, which was carried out visually and according to plan. Officers who have since visited Brest say that the concentration of bomb craters around the two docks in such that it is almost impossible to get across this area on foot. Both ships are shattered by many bombs.
[Underlined] DEELEN AIRFIELD – 3RD SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
103 Lancasters from Nos. 52 and 55 Bases, plus No. 106 Squadron, took off to attack Deelen airfield in daylight. Two Mosquitoes from No.54 Base went ahead of the main force to mark the target with smoke. One Mosquito fitted with an A.P.I. was detailed to find a bombing wind and pass it to the Master Bomber Two smoke bombs were assessed as being on the aiming point but no trace of markers was seen on strike photographs. No. 106 Squadron bombs were fused T.D. 0.025 while both 52 and 55 Bases carried a load of 1,000 lb. and 500 ln bombs all fused half an hour delay, with the object of avoiding smoke and thereby allowing each crew to have a clear run up to the target. This was the first occasion on which we have used the half hour delay fuse against an airfield target. Unfortunately there was much cloud so that the experiment was not conclusive.
RESULTS Only partial cover was obtained, but concentrations of bombs were seen to have fallen on the S.W. and Eastern intersections of the runways, and at least 60 craters are seen in the partial cover of the runways.
[Underlined] BREST – 5TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:– Wing Commander Simpson.
The United Stated Forces investing Brest were meeting stiff opposition from the defences around Brest. These enemy batteries were the target for 60 aircraft of No. 53 Base in daylight on September 5th. There were four aiming points, A.B.C. and D, to be marked by 7 Mosquitoes of No.627 Squadron. Crews were to bomb visually.
RESULTS All aiming points were attacked, a fair concentration being achieved, with the exception of some loose bombing on A. and B., several bombs falling as much as 400 – 500 yards to the West. A full interpretation from photographic cover was unobtainable owing to the difficulty of distinguishing between the Lancaster and previous attacks.
[Underlined] MUNCHEN GLADBACH – 9/10TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Squadron Leader Owen.
Nos. 52 and 55 Bases provided 113 Lancasters to attack this target on the Western fringe of the Ruhr; in conditions of cloudless weather and good visibility.
PLAN For this attack, as area of the town was selected and a suitable marking point chosen, upwind from it. The marking point was to be marked with T.I’s dropped by Mosquitoes in the light of flares, after which the
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main force, tracking over the T.I’s on pre-determined headings through a sector of 90° were to aim their bombs at the T.I., but delay release for a certain number of seconds. The aircraft were divided throughout the sector and each division given its own band. In this way the incendiary load would be spread evenly over the selected target area.
Should the 54 Base Mosquitoes find it impossible to locate their marking point then they were to back up yellow Oboe T.I’s dropped in the centre of the target area by P.F.F. Mosquitoes, and the main force were to bomb the yellow and red direct, without delaying release. The Oboe T.I’s were dropped on time, but visual marking was delayed owing to the first and second flare waves dropping their flares too far to the South and South East over open country. The Master Bomber, therefore, ordered the third flare wave to drop their flares on the Oboe T.I’s, and by their aid, Marker II was able to identify and mark the marking point. The main force were then called in to attack.
RESULTS Photographs show enormous volumes of smoke coming from a very large number of fires scattered throughout the centre of the built up area of the town. Large new areas of complete devastation, mostly by fires, are seen all around the main railway station. This was a successful attack, but the Mosquito markers would have been aided had a more conspicuous marker point been chosen.
[Underlined] LE HAVRE – 10TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by P.F.F.
Defences at Le Havre which were holding up the besieging Allied Forces were attacked by 108 Lancasters from Nos. 52 and 55 Bases in cloudless weather in daylight on September 10th. Aiming points were marked by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. and the attack went according to plan.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows that all areas have been heavily cratered in a widespread fashion. It was noticeable that there were no craters North of the Northern limits of the target area.
[Underlined] LE HAVRE – 11TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by P.F.F.
A force of 101 aircraft from Nos. 53 and 55 Bases, plus 106 Squadron, again attacked the defences at Le Havre in good weather in daylight on 11th September. Here again the marking was carried out by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. and P.R.U. cover confirms the success of the attack, showing that all aiming points were well covered. Once again no bombs were seen outside the Northern limits of the target area.
[Underlined] DARMSTADT – 11/12TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Simpson.
The weather in the target area was clear with some ground haze.
PLAN The “fanning out” method employed against Munchen Gladbach was again planned for this attack, each Base being allotted a separate sector. On this occasion, leading aircraft of the flare force assumed the additional role of blind markers and, in addition to illuminating the target for the Mosquitoes, were to drop T.I. green in the centre of the target area. Mosquitoes were then to mark the marking point with T.I. Red, and the main force in their allotted height bands were again to aim their bombs at the Red, delaying release. To ensure the distribution of the incendiary load over the whole of the required area the first wave was to delay 20 seconds, the second wave 10 seconds, and the third wave 8 seconds. As on a previous occasion the green T.I’s from the Lancaster markers were to be backed up by the Mosquitoes, if the latter were unable to locate their own marking point, and the centre of
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these two sets of T.I’s was to be bombed direct by the main force. Flares were dropped accurately and on time, and the markers successfully dropped their red T.I’s on the marking point. The attack then proceeded according to the primary plan.
RESULTS Photographs show the main area of the city to be completely gutted. On the whole a highly successful attack but something went wrong with the Northern edge which has escaped devastation. Investigation into the reason is not yet complete.
[Underlined] STUTTGART – 12/13TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Squadron Leader Owen.
The target was heavily attacked by a force of 195 Lancasters from all Bases, in good weather on 12/13th September.
PLAN The target had suffered severe and wide spread damage from previous R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. attacks, and so a plan of attack was required to cover the remaining comparatively undamaged areas.
A marking point was therefore chosen, and sectors allotted to each Base in which bombing headings were to be evenly distributed, in order to cover the whole of the undamaged area.
No.54 Base Mosquitoes were to mark the big railway yards with T.I. Red and Red Spot fires, with the help of illumination from the flare force.
Appropriate delays were ordered, and blind markers were again dropped by 54 Base Lancasters as an initial guide to the Mosquitoes, and as an insurance if the latter failed to locate their marking point.
Flares were dropped accurately and punctually. Marking was completed successfully and the attack was carried out in accordance with the primary plan.
RESULTS Photographic cover shows new areas of damage round the aiming point, in the Bad Constadt district, and at Fueurbach to the North of Stuttgart, in addition to several important industrial works.
Plots show that, although a fair concentration of incendiaries was obtained within the sectors planned, the main weight in the later part of the attack tended to spread to the East and North. The reasons for this are being investigated.
[Underlined] BOULOGNE – 17TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:– Provided by P.F.F.
The garrison at Boulogne was putting up a heavy resistance against the Canadians attacking the town and harbour, and two forces comprising 199 aircraft from all Bases were detailed to attack the specific aiming points.
PLAN All aiming points were marked by full P.F.F. Oboe marking. The first two forces were timed to attack in two separate waves, the first at 0830 hours and the second at 0940 hours. In view of the proximity of our own troops, crews were carefully briefed to make their run up from a well defined pin-point on the coast and use was made of the Navigator’s Master Bomber switch.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows well bombing concentrated around the aiming points.
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[Underlined] BREMERHAVEN – 18/19TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Woodroffe.
207 Lancasters from all Bases and 7 Mosquitoes took part in a heavy and devastating attack on the town and harbour installations at Bremerhaven, in cloudless weather conditions, with good visibility.
PLAN There were five aiming points, lying in a rough direction from N.N.W. to S.E.E. on the Eastern bank of the river. Marking procedure for this target was to be similar to that for the preceding targets, but its shape restricted the use of sectors and it was therefore planned that part of the force would attack on defined tracks over the Mosquitoes’ T.I’s, with the appropriate delay in the release of the bombs, whilst others would aim direct at these T.I’s with a false wind vector applied to the bombsight. Illumination and marking was carried out without any hitches, and the attack was completed according to plan.
RESULTS The two most closely built up areas North and South of the harbour entrances have been completely devastated. Most of the warehouses and dockside buildings have been gutted. This was a model for an incendiary attack.
[Underlined] MUNCHEN GLADBACH AND RHEYDT – 19/20TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Gibson.
A further heavy attack was carried out on this target by 227 aircraft from all Bases in the Group, the intention being to complete the destruction of this enemy industrial centre.
PLAN There were three forces – Red (53 Base plus 106 Squadron), Green (52 Base), and Yellow (55 Base), each force being allotted separate height bands and its own Marking Point, each of which was to be illuminated by flares and marked with Red, Green and Yellow T.I’s respectively. The aiming point of the Red force was the primary target and was to be fully controlled. If the green or yellow targets could not be successfully attacked aircraft were to be ordered to attack the red target.
There was a hitch with the marking for the Red Force. In the light of accurately placed flares, the Master Bomber went in to drop his T.I’s on the Red Marking Point, but his markers hung up. He then called the markers to come in. Number one marker had trouble with exhaust studs and Markers 2 and 3 could not identify. As no Red markers were down, the Master Bomber ordered the Red Force to bomb the green T.I’s which were dropped on time. Later, however, Marker number one identified and marked his target. The order to bomb the green T.I’s was cancelled and the force were then ordered to bomb the red T.I’s. The yellow marking point was punctually and accurately marked, and the Yellow force completed their attack as planned.
RESULTS Considerable additional damage over the whole N.W. perimeter of the town is revealed adding to the already severe and widespread damage. This almost completes the destruction of the town. There is little additional damage in Rheydt.
Plots of night photographs and the incendiary plot show that although the incendiary sticks dropped early in the attack fell near the aiming point, a spread rapidly developed both to the South and W.S.W. and at the end of the attack, an area from S.E. to West was covered. No markers were plotted in these areas. No explanation for this wide spread beyond and outside the planned sectors has yet been arrived at.
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[Underlined] DORTMUND-EMS CANAL, HANDORF AIRFIELD AND MUNSTER – 23/24TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Red Target: Wing Commander Woodroffe.
Green Target: Squadron Leader Owen.
A large force comprising 254 aircraft from all Bases in the Group was detailed to attack these targets, the first two being the primaries and the last, Munster, an alternative, should the weather present difficulties for marking and attack. Unfortunately 10/10ths cloud was encountered in the target area with base 8,000 ft.
PLAN No.53 Base plus 106 Squadron and 617 Squadron were ordered to attack the red target (Dortmund-Ems Canal) and Nos. 52 and 55 Bases the green target (Handorf Airfield). If the red target were not marked, the red force, excluding the Tallboy aircraft, were to attack the green target, or if the green target was not marked, the yellow target. Similarly, the green force were to attack the yellow target as an alternative.
RESULTS [Underlined] Dortmund-Ems Canal [/underlined] – Although the portion of the canal marked and attacked was some 7 miles North of the planned aiming point, a very successful attack ensued, and both branches of the embanked portion of the canal were breached. A stretch of 18 miles of the canal is now dry, and over 100 barges are stranded. A splendid result. Of the red force, 82 Lancasters attacked the primary, and 12 the alternative.
[Underlined] Handorf Airfield [/underlined] – The marker force experienced difficulty in identifying the target area, and after an unsuccessful attempt, the main force was ordered to bomb the alternative. 20 Lancasters and 2 Mosquitoes claim to have attacked the primary, and 61 Lancasters attacked the alternative. There was no new damage to the alternative.
[Underlined] CALAIS – 24TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by P.F.F.
30 Lancasters of 53 Base were ordered to attack defence positions at Calais in daylight on 24th September. Marking was to be carried out throughout the attack by Oboe Mosquitoes of P.F.F.
RESULTS Weather conditions were unfavourable, there being 10/10ths cloud, base between 2/3,000 feet. In view of this the Master Bomber cancelled the attack. This order was not received by 8 aircraft of the force, who carried out the attack visually having identified their respective aiming points.
[Underlined] KARLSRUHE – 26/27TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Simpson.
Force employed – 216 Lancasters, 11 Mosquitoes. Weather conditions experienced over the target were 8 – 10/10ths cloud 6 – 8,000 feet.
PLAN In order that the whole weight of the attack should fall on previously undamaged areas of the town, a marking point was selected, to be marked with red T.I’s and each Base was allotted a sector or track, radiating from the marking point. Main force crews were to aim their bombs at the red T.I’s and delay for the detailed number of seconds. The usual blind marking technique was ordered to ensure against the failure of the Mosquitoes to locate and mark the aiming point visually.
Cloud conditions and poor visibility prevented the visual markers from identifying the marking point and consequently the secondary plan was resorted to.
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RESULTS P.R.U. photographs reveal a large area of gutted buildings extending over many blocks. This devastation spreads on both sides of the main East to West road through the city around the closely built up area, for a distance of 1,500 yards by 500 yards to 1,000 yards. There are many scattered incidents of destruction beyond this central area, and a large number of commercial and administrative buildings have been destroyed. This is a great triumph for the blind markers.
[Underlined] KAISERLAUTERN – 27/28TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Squadron Leader Owen.
207 Lancasters and 10 Mosquitoes from all Bases in the Group were to attack the industrial centre and railway workshops. The attack was carried out in weather conditions of 2 – 8/10ths thin stratus at 3,000 feet and 10/10ths cloud at 7,000 feet.
PLAN The railway workshops were to be attacked with ‘J’ bombs using a false wind vector on the bombsight, and the town by the normal method of overshooting.
RESULTS The illumination and marking on both areas were accurate and punctual.
The damage inflicted on the town, confined chiefly to a narrow belt across the centre of the area id disappointing in relation to the number of aircraft used. Investigation shows that over 70% of the aircraft bombed on headings within a small sector, and were not evenly spread over the whole sector as planned, thus little damage was sustained by the Northern and Southern outskirts. Greater attention should be paid at briefing to explaining the details of the plan of attack, and the importance of aircraft adhering to their briefed bombing headings must be strongly emphasised. The attack on the railway workshops achieved a greater measure of success.
[Underlined] SPECIAL ATTACK BY NO. 617 AND NO. 9 SQUADRONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] ATTACK ON THE GERMAN BATTLESHIP TIRPITZ – SEPTEMBER 15TH. [/underlined]
Previous attempts made by aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm and midget submarines to sink the Tirpitz had proved unsuccessful. It was considered that a force of Lancasters carrying Tallboy bombs and other special bombs would have a good chance of inflicting severe damage to the battleship, if not sinking her, provided the element of surprise could be achieved, so that aircraft could carry out their bombing run before the smoke screen, which was known to be capable of covering the ship and fiord in which she lay within 10 minutes, could be brought into operation.
On September 11th, 38 Lancasters and 2 Liberators took off and with the exception of one aircraft of No. 9 Squadron, which had to return to base, all arrived at Archangel or in that area. Weather conditions were appalling, with rain and low cloud, and some crews were unable to locate the advanced base and had to land on other airfields and even in open country. But for a very high standard of airmanship many more aircraft might have been damaged or lost.
It was hoped that by approaching the target from the South, the necessary element of surprise would be achieved. Tallboy aircraft were to attack first, as it was essential that they should see and aim at the Tirpitz visually. The aircraft carrying the special bombs did not depend on visual sighting of the target. A separate plan and aiming data were provided for them. The plan consisted of the selection of two clearly identifiable landmarks close to the target, at which the bomb aimers could aim, using false settings on their bombsights. Two lakes, one on either side of the fiord were chosen for this purpose. Each aircraft was given a separate track, with the intention of covering an area of 750 yards X 750 yards with the target at its centre.
The flight plan proceeded as detailed until the approach to the target area, when the Tallboy force had to make a last minute alteration of course, as they were west of track.
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The leading Tallboy aircraft saw the Tirpitz clearly when 8 minutes flying time away from it, but by the time the first bombing run was made, the smoke screen was already in operation, and later aircraft found the target area completely obscured. Some aircraft were able to aim their bombs before the last traces of the Tirpitz disappeared under the smoke screen, but others had to aim at the gun flashes and light flak seen through the smoke screen. Others, unable to identify the target, took their bombs back to the advanced base.
The six aircraft carrying the special load aimed their bombs at the planned aiming points, but were unable to observe any results.
The majority of bombing frame photographs are unplottable due to smoke but the release point frames of thirteen of the Tallboy aircraft have been plotted, and the calculated strike position of the bombs indicate that at least one direct hit, and three near misses are probable. Neither the bombing nor release point frames of the aircraft carrying the special load are plottable, as they are obscured by smoke.
Subsequent P.R.U. photographs show a large rent in the starboard side of the ship forward, covering much of the forecastle. Apart from this hit the explosion of some 6,000 lbs of Torpex at a depth of 60 feet within a few yards of the ship’s side cannot fail to have given her a severe shaking, and at least one of the near misses was very close.
This was a highly successful operation carried through in spite of considerable difficulties.
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[Drawing] GARDENING
The Group Gardening effort this month has been on a small scale, and has only called for two operations in which a total of 77 vegetables were successfully planted, although crews stood by for other operations which were cancelled owing to adverse weather conditions.
It is interesting to note that in our first operation this month, the Gardeners from 44 Squadron were co-ordinated into the main force attack on an important German Port, and planted visually by the light of the Flare Force, close to the docks in a channel 800 yards wide, from 12,000 feet.
The second operation, performed by 57 and 630 Squadrons, was a normal H 2 S high lay off the entrance to important German shipping channels where 53 selected vegetables were successfully planted. Unfortunately H/57 had trouble with H 2 S equipment after trying local repairs to within 20 minutes of the target, and then correctly returned with a complete load.
The Command effort totalled 748 vegetables, mostly planted in the Baltic and Kattegat area, with the object of continuing the present dislocation of enemy shipping routes, and preventing troop movements from Scandinavia to the mainlands of the European offensive.
It can be estimated that at present the figures for vegetables planted per ships sunk, stand at 47 to 1. This is an encouraging figure when taking into account the number of Gardening sortied made, and bearing in mind that this does not include the loss to war effort while sweeping measures are put in hand and completed in each area, or the number of ships that are severely damaged and can only be repaired under difficult conditions, or the all-important morale effect on those who “go down to the sea in ships”.
The following extract from the “News Digest” of 28th September reveals the present state of our enemy’s imagination:
“Norway – German fear of Paratroops. British bombers have recently flown over Oslofjord dropping mines.”
“…The Germans are nervous because they think that paratroops were dropped at the same time as the mines. After the first attack some weeks ago, Oslo harbour was closed to all traffic for two days. Since then many attacks have been made, and the harbour has been closed every time. Even the Bygde ferries have, at times, had to stop their traffic. Large-scale raids have been carried out in Cjelleras, and even as far away as Lillestrom there have been raids for paratroops”.
It is also reported that all ships entering narrow channels in the Kiel area have to place two strong cables round their bottoms, and so sail until they are out of the area. This is done in order to facilitate the salvaging of a ship by cranes or other salvage devices in case she is bombed or mined.
In other words, our enemy has developed the minephobic complaint to a very high degree, and with our present increase in stocks he will receive further innoculations [sic] as, and where, we may decide in the future.
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WAR EFFORT
[Table of Sorties, Tonnage and Hours by Squadron]
Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “Successful sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties Nos. 9, 49, 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another Squadron the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons.
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[Drawing] TACTICS
The main tactical development of this month has been the withdrawal of early warning devices, i.e. MONICA and BOOZER, and the limitation in the use of H.2.S. It is now known that Hun night fighters can home upon these devices. In the circumstances, therefore, there was no alternative but to withdraw them. MONICA is in the process of modification and may be reissued eventually, but in its absence, crews must exert the utmost vigilance in their search.
It must be appreciated that, although German C.G.I. is getting very much shorter warning of an approaching raid, the number of targets to which a bomber force may be going is also decreasing, making the night fighter controller’s job easier. He also has his night fighter squadrons concentrated into a smaller area and their transfer from one area to another is consequently easier. Bearing these factors in mind, there can be no doubt that the German night fighter will constitute our main problem during the coming months. The following steps should be taken to ensure utmost efficiency in combatting the enemy’s defensive measures.
(i) [Underlined] Night Vision Training. [/underlined]
No opportunity should be lost of training crews in night vision. Night vision efficiency is something which can be improved with practice. Remember, with the withdrawal of the early warning devices, it is now your eyes and night vision versus the night vision aided by A.I. of the enemy night fighter. On the other hand, you have seven pairs of eyes where he has one. This advantage must be exploited to the utmost.
(ii) [Underlined] Increased Banking Search. [/underlined]
Surprise remains the night fighter’s most important weapon. The only effective counter to surprise from behind and below is a constant banking search, and captains must increase the frequency with which they carry out this banking search.
(iii) [Underlined] Corkscrew. [/underlined]
The 5 Group Corkscrew continues to be a very effective fighting manoeuvre. A scrutiny of recent combat reports, however, reveals that there is little doubt that the Hun night fighters now expect the corkscrew and anticipate it. Out of 94 combats reported the enemy fighter opened fire only 37 times, and in many cases was seen to make a feint attack, sufficient to persuade the Lancaster’s captain to corkscrew, and then to hold off and wait until the manoeuvre was completed. The existence of a combat report proves that the corkscrew was successful, but it is considered that where no combat report exists, i.e. where the bomber has been shot down, the fighter’s tactics have been successful. In other words, he waited until the corkscrew has been completed and the aircraft has resumed course, and has then closed in and opened fire.
You are no longer safe in assuming, therefore, that one cycle of a corkscrew will throw off the fighter. Should the gunners lose the fighter in a corkscrew, a banking search should be carried out as soon as course is resumed, to ensure that he is not directly under the
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aircraft.
A new German night fighter, the H.E.219, is now known to carry two fixed astral guns, oblique upwards firing. It is believed that these fire at an angle of 65° upwards and forwards and are fired by the pilot. This adds further weight to the necessity for constant banking search.
To summarise:-
1. Learn how to use your eyes at night!
2. Carry out the correct search to find the enemy.
3. When you have found him – don’t lose him!
[Cartoon]
THE MAN WHO EMNTIONED THE TARGET AT FLIGHT PLANNING!
[Underlined] WITH APOLOGIES TO H.M. BATEMAN [/underlined]
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[Drawing] SIGNALS
[Underlined] W/T DISCIPLINE. [/underlined]
On the night 27/28th. September, 217 aircraft of this Group attacked Kaiserslautern. In accordance with recent practice, very strict W/T, R/T and Radar silence was ordered en route to and from the target. Wireless Operators should have been well aware of the vital need for strict W/T silence on this occasion, in view of the unusual measures taken. In spite of this, however, five Wireless Operators of this Group broke W/T silence during the period 0114 to 0325. Their transmissions took the form of such senseless remarks as “INT WOP – HOW ARE YOU – BANG ON – IMI – GOOD SHOW – INT CUP OF TEA.”
What satisfaction these inane natterbugs got out of their efforts it is hard to see. The enemy, deprived of his usual means of detecting the stream, might easily have obtained bearings on these continuous transmissions, with the result that five brainless Operators would have been the direct cause of the loss of several Group aircraft and many of their comrades.
Despite energetic enquiry and investigation, it has not been possible – so far – to track down the culprits; they are obviously not the type who would own up. If they are found, however, they may rest assured that never again will they have the opportunity to jeopardise their comrades. That such incidents must never occur again has been made perfectly plain.
The Wireless Operators of 5 Group have had the privilege, since the attack on the Dams, of a fair amount of interesting W/T operating. This makes it all the more incomprehensible, therefore, that a few of them should adopt this culpable form of keybashing. It is known, however, that the vast majority of Wireless Operators are responsible men, who feel just as strongly about this “black” as does the C.S.O. It is hard that their good name should have been sullied by the action of so few, and all must now combine to ensure that such flagrant breaches of W/T discipline never occur again.
[Underlined] CONTROLLERS’ OPERATORS. [/underlined]
The hope expressed in last month’s summary that a healthy competition between Bases would develop, has now materialised. In fact, it is almost a full time job for one man at Group Headquarters to book and supervise these exercises. Signals Leader should note that many a good exercise is spoilt by failure of the Operators to pay attention to detail. Before an operator takes part in any of these exercises, he should know 5 G.S.I. No. 12 backwards. In this connection, the main points to watch are:-
(1) The number of times call signs should be sent.
(2) How often the text of a message should be repeated.
In next month’s issue, it is intended to publish a table showing the number of exercises completed by Bases.
[Underlined] REGRADING. [/underlined]
The Group Signals Leader examined a large number of wireless Operators during the month, and claimed he was more or less up to date on regrading before proceeding on leave. Perhaps it is not generally known that the main purpose of this leave was to see for the first time Gilmour Junior – of the ‘transmitter’ variety we believe. It is known, however, that during the past fortnight quite a formidable queue of W/Ops Grade II has been forming, and every endeavour will be made to deal with these as soon as possible.
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[Underlined] GROUP EXERCISES. [/underlined]
These have taken place regularly throughout the month, and the high standard of operating maintained. They still reveal, however, that morse practice and more morse practice is essential. It is hoped that the recent quiet spell has been taken advantage of in this connection.
[Underlined] SIGNALS FAILURES. [/underlined]
The Signals failure percentage continues to increase, the figure for September being 2.459. Over the past 3 months the percentage has risen steadily. On reading through the defects summary however, it can be seen that over 90% of the trouble is still attributable to component failures. The long spell of no maintenance faults has broken, one Squadron having no less than three such failures. There are still quite a number under the heading miscellaneous – the “remarks” column being “No fault found”. This type of alleged failure must stop. There were two manipulation failures which could easily have been avoided, in one case an incorrect VHF channel was selected, in the other, the type 51 Junction box switch was in the wrong position.
It is most gratifying to see that not one failure of VR.101, i.e. output valve V8, was reported throughout the month. It appears that the recent glut of V8 failures can be attributed either to faulty manufacture or wartime materials.
[Underlined] V.H.F. [/underlined]
There have been many essential changes in the V.H.F. policy during the past month, the reason being, an operation on HANDORF airfield, night 23/24th September, when very heavy FREYA interference was experienced on the TR.1143 equipment. This setback made it quite clear that the series noise limiting diode modification had to be carried out on all the new SCR.522 equipments prior to their debut into 5 Group Lancasters and Mosquitoes. The modification is quite simple, the only difficulty being the realigning of the four I.F. stages and all Squadrons not possessing a suitable 12 m/c oscillator. It was decided, therefore, that the Americans be asked to incorporate the modifications for us, and this they most willingly agreed to. The result is, at the time of going to press, only 35 of the 435 SCR.522’s held, now require to be modified.
For 100% suppression of all noise, it has also been found necessary to filter the 150 volt Dynamotor output with a 5 uf electrolytic 200 volts D.C.W. Capacitor. If this equipment is readily available through R.A.F. sources, in such a large quantity the modification will be carried out locally. Failing this the U.S. Air Force has again expressed willingness to assist.
[Underlined] NOISE SUPPRESSION MODIFICATION. SCR.522. [/underlined]
Briefly the Noise Limiting modification functions as follows:- A double diode is inserted in series with the output from the 2nd Detector, one section of the valve is biassed by a portion of the average D.C. voltage developed by this detector. When normal speech is being received, the bias is such as to allow the diode to conduct, i.e. the diode becomes a low impedance. When any pulse waveform is impressed on the incoming required signal the diode anode is biassed more negative and cuts off; hence it offers a high impedance to the interfering pulse. The other half of the valve holds the A.V.C. to zero until the average D.C. voltage developed by the A.V.C. diode exceeds the delay voltage. The A.V.C. voltage, after the modification, is derived from the primary of the last I.F. transformer. Changes are also made in the I.F. Grid circuits, to reduce cross modulation effects caused by the grid current as the result of high noise voltage pulses.
[Underlined] BLIND MARKING – CONINGSBY’S SPECIAL RADAR EFFORT. [/underlined]
The story may now be told of the work done at Coningsby to improve the performance of MK.III H2S. During the latter half of July, it was decided that efforts should be made to improve the efficiency of our offensive Radar devices. Hs” MK.III was selected for particular attention, the main requirement was for an accurate Blind Bombing Instrument, and immediate steps were taken to improve MK.III H2S to enable it to perform this function. T.R.E. aided us in every way possible, to enable this commitment to be undertaken without impairing operational serviceability.
The greatest difficulty which had to be overcome was the tendency of the presentation on the screen to disintegrate or disappear at the shorter ranges. It was felt by T.R.E. that this was due to the inefficiency of the scanners, and therefore, scanners received the first attention. Those which had previously
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given the best results were carefully selected, and thorough checks made against specifications, at the same time the best Units of the equipment were subjected to a detailed and exacting overhaul for power output, tuning, and accurate calibration of height and range markers. When one complete installation had been fully tested in this manner, it was placed in an aircraft, and one of the most experienced crews commenced bombing trials on Wainfleet, and on several inland towns. The results obtained on these trials are compared here with results which were obtained previous to these experiments. The average error obtained at Wainfleet for 5 bombs was 316 yards as compared to a previous error of 1,193 yards. A second crew dropped 6 bombs with an average error of 1.6 miles with the ordinary Mk. III H 2 S equipment, and on using the improved equipment reduced this error to 800 yards. On inland towns the bombing results were similar to those on Wainfleet, an average error of 700 and 500 yards being obtained with the special equipment, whilst errors of 1,600 and 2,000 yards were obtained with the standard equipment.
It was decided from these figures that the experiments and improvements were making more accurate bombing possible, and a further 6 aircraft were similarly equipped, and the best Operators assigned to these aircraft. Further training and trials were carried out, and the results gave additional proof that the experiments were on the right road. The final assurance that all this concentration on improvements and selection of all Units and Operators was improving the bombing was soon forthcoming. The operations were conducted against Konigsberg, Darmstadt, Stuttgart, and Karlsruhe were most successful, the average error of the proximity markers being 550 yards.
These results do not by any means mark the successful conclusion of the experiments, but rather indicate that we are just beginning, and the coming few months will see an ever increasing improvement in both equipment and crews.
It is desired at this point to express our appreciation for the assistance which has been rendered by T.R.E. and H.Q.B.C. and for the close co-operation by all concerned at Coningsby without whose help none of this work would have been possible.
[Underlined] GEE. [/underlined]
Gee maintained its usual high standard of serviceability through September. Of the 2386 sorties reported for the month, 62 difficulties were experienced for a percentage serviceable of 97.4 as compared with 97.26 for August.
The supply of Gee remains a very critical problem, although the position has eased up slightly. The new aerial loading unit is apparently becoming available shortly, and a few have already been received in new aircraft. The supply of R.F. Units Type 27 has also improved and an effort is being made to fit all Squadrons completely in the near future.
A modification which enables the simultaneous presentation of signals and calibration pips on the screen has been submitted by 617 Squadron, and forwarded to Headquarters Bomber Command for approval.
[Underlined] H 2 S. [/underlined]
Although for obvious reasons the use of H 2 S Mark II was restricted this month, a total of 819 sorties was completed and out of these 90.7 per cent were free of technical difficulty. A switch unit which allows the equipment to be switched on and off at altitude has been developed by T.R.E. This should soon be in production.
H.2.S. Mark III is not so badly affected by this restriction, and during September, a total of 135 sorties was reported. Twelve difficulties were experienced, which brings serviceability back to 91.2 per cent, an increase of 2.3 above last month. The work which has been undertaken on the H.2.S. Mark III at Coningsby has served to familiarise the Radar Mechanics even more with the equipment, and the benefits thus derived should bring the serviceability to a much higher standard from day to day.
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[Underlined] MONICA. [/underlined]
Unfortunately Monica has had to be removed from all aircraft, but it is hoped only temporarily, pending the introduction of a modification developed by 53 Base and T.R.E. This modification is being pursued at T.R.E. with the assistance of a Radar Officer from this Group.
Before it was restricted, Monica IIIA reached its highest serviceability. Of the 139 sorties completed, only one defect was experienced, giving a percentage serviceable of 99.3. This provides a record which will require a great deal of effort if it is to be bettered on the re-installation of the equipment.
Monica V was, however, not far behind, for out of 99 sorties only one difficulty occurred, giving a serviceability of 99 per cent – another record which we will endeavour to equal.
[Underlined] FISHPOND. [/underlined]
Fishpond, due to the restriction on H 2 S, was also used to a lesser extent during September. Despite this, it rendered a very satisfactory service for 722 sorties out of 796 reported, a percentage of 90.7. Training of operators has increased the usefulness of the equipment, and every effort should be made to aid those operators in quickly interpreting the picture on the screen.
[Underlined] A. G. L. (T) [/underlined]
During the second week of September, A.G.L. (T) became operational and up to the end of the month 70 sorties had been completed. Of these, 20 developed difficulty which gives a percentage serviceable of 71.5. Nine of these defects were due to components in the A.G.L. (T) installation itself, whilst H 2 S, Fishpond and the power supply were responsible for the remaining eleven.
Although this standard of serviceability leaves a great deal to be desired, October should bring about an encouraging improvement, in view of the experience which has now been gained by servicing personnel. It is very gratifying to note the enthusiasm with which this new device has been received, on the part of both the air and ground crews. As it becomes increasingly familiar and serviceability steadily climbs, this enthusiasm will grow and the full benefit will be derived from it.
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[Drawing] AIR BOMBING
The month of September has provided some excellent results from the attacks on German towns, and despite adverse weather conditions on one or two occasions the determination of crews provided better results than were, at first anticipated.
Incendiaries formed the greater part of the bomb loads, and the previous difficulties experienced in aiming the 4 lb I.B. have been largely overcome by the use of the new wind conversion factors for bombs of low T.V. However, it is still very necessary for Air Bombers to adhere strictly to the “delay release” times supplied at briefing, and Bombing Leaders must ensure that the importance of this is stressed.
Another point which cannot be stressed too often is the necessity for not dropping any bombs until either the Controller has given the order to bomb, or ‘H’ hour has arrived and no instructions have been received from the Controller. You will be briefed to adopt the latter alternative is it has been decided that there will be no orbiting in the target area. The reasons for these instructions should be apparent; the difficulties of the Mosquito markers are greatly increased if a few stray ‘cookies’ are dropping while they are searching for the marking point, and a load of 4 lb. I.B’s can be very dazzling to the low-flying markers.
The destruction of towns and cities behind the actual battle-front will have a direct effect upon the results of the hard battles which the ground forces will have to undertake soon. The enemy will be denied the use of his most essential means of transport, shelter for his reserves, and what remains of his armament production in the previously attacked areas. To achieve this, all Air Bomber must make sure that their bombs hit the areas they are intended for, and that means constant practice, a thorough knowledge of all equipment, and the ability to conform strictly to the plan of attack.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING. [/underlined]
Although the amount of practice bombing has increased considerably during the past six months, there is still a large number of details being cancelled because of snags which could have been avoided.
Now that the winter months are approaching, and opportunities for bombing will decrease, it is essential that the best advantage be taken of every chance to complete an exercise.
Quite a large number of faults which cause an abandonment of an exercise could have been prevented if the air bomber had thoroughly checked his equipment before take-off.
First of all make certain that the auto-selector box on the Light series carrier has been reset to No.1. The ground crew will usually attend to that, but there are occasions when it has been missed.
Examine the bombs and change any that have damaged tail fins. At the same time see that the safety pins have been withdrawn.
Test your bombsight on the ground and make sure that you have an emergency computor [sic]. In the event of a bombsight failure you can still derive some benefit from the exercise.
[Underlined] BOMBING ANALYSIS. [/underlined]
The provision of Bombing Analysis Officers on Squadrons and Conversion Units has proved of great value during the past few months, ensuring speedy
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assessment of exercises and the abolition of inevitable errors which occurred when Bombing Leaders were unable to devote sufficient time to this very important duty.
However, there are still one or two points not receiving the attention required:-
(i) Crews must be given a detailed analysis of their exercises. It is not always possible to have the Pilot, Navigator and Air Bomber present during the actual analysis, but they should see the plot as soon as possible.
(ii) Form 3073 must be completed, and the details supplied must be accurate. It will then afford the Analysis Officer, and the Bombsight Maintenance Staff, the maximum amount of assistance. It should be possible for the Squadron Commander to pick up a Form 3073 relating to an analysed exercise and thereby obtain a complete account of the bombing and any relevant comments from the Bombing Leader.
(iii) Do not forget that new crews have had very little experience in bombing from a Lancaster, and an accurate analysis will be of the greatest assistance to them.
(iv) When a bombsight fault has been discovered, inform the Instrument Section [underlined] immediately, [/underlined] and give them all the information you can. If necessary, produce the bomb plot and explain the errors. The Bombsight maintenance staff will appreciate all the assistance you can give them.
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ [/underlined]
1. What action would you take if you obtained maximum starboard drift on the sighting head with zero wind set on the computor [sic]?
2. What is the procedure on landing at a strange airfield with 500 lb bombs (37 pistol) still on the aircraft?
3. Why is it essential to conform to the briefed air speed when making a “Wanganui” attack?
4. How does the Flight Engineer check the suction and what readings would you require to ensure that the bombsight was serviceable?
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER [/underlined]
[Underlined] S/Ldr Mansbridge [/underlined] has left Group Headquarters and is now on a Staff Officers’ Course.
[Underlined] F/Lt Abbott [/underlined] (49 Squadron) is carrying out Group Bombing Leader’s duties.
[Underlined] S/Ldr Murtough [/underlined] (53 Base) has gone to Manby to take charge of the Bombing Leaders’ Courses.
[Underlined] F/Lt McCarthy [/underlined] (1654 C.U.) has gone to 53 Base and has been replaced by [underlined] F/Lt Kennedy [/underlined] (463 Squadron)
[Underlined] F/O Grime [/underlined] is doing Bombing Leader’s duties at 463 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/Lt Harris [/underlined] (5 L.F.S.) has met with an unfortunate accident, and [underlined] F/O Wilkie [/underlined] (1661 C.U.) has taken over the Bombing Section at Syerston.
[Underlined] COURSES [/underlined]
The Group had three Air Bombers on No.91 Bombing Leaders’ Course, F/O Moreton (106 Squadron) was 6th, P/O Muhl (207 Squadron) 8th, and F/O Pyle (1661 C.U.) 10th, all obtaining “B” categories.
The bombing analysis courses are proceeding satisfactorily, and our
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candidates have all received excellent assessments. If any Squadron or Conversion Unit has not appointed a Bombing Analysis Officer who has completed the course, please apply for an early vacancy.
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
[Underlined] Squadron Average Error [/underlined]
1st 97 61 yards
2nd 630 64 yards
3rd 619 71 yards
4th 83 74 yards
5th 467 77 yards
6th 207 81 yards
7th 9 89 yards
8th 49 90 yards
9th 463 93 yards
10th 61 113 yards
11th 44 114 yards
12th 50 117 yards
13th 57 118 yards
14th 122 yards
September has produced a 100% entry in the Squadron Bombing Competition and 97 Squadron are at the top with an average error, for 8 exercises, of 61 yards.
This is an excellent result and 97 are to be congratulated, more especially as quite a lot of their bombing was carried out by Flight Engineers.
With the exception of 619 Squadron, 52 Base have slipped down the ladder, but assurances have been received from 44 and 49 Squadrons that this is only a temporary lapse, and every effort will be made to return to their former positions.
106 Squadron are handicapped by having many unexperienced crews on their strength and consequently are at the bottom of the list. However, the keenness which is apparent on the station is sure to produce better results.
Competition should be very keen during October; 97 Squadron will be ‘all out’ to keep on top, and it will need a very special effort from the “Main Force” to depose them. Given suitable weather, all records should be broken.
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
[Underlined] Con. Unit Average Error [/underlined]
1st 1654 56 yards
2nd 1660 65 yards
3rd 1661 72 yards
4th 5 L.F.S. 85 yards
1661 Conversion Unit, after leading for two successive months, have gone down to third place, and 1654 Conversion Unit have taken over the top position with an average error of 56 yards.
[Underlined] “BIGCHIEF” COMPETITION [/underlined]
The only entry this month comes from 51 Base:-
G/Capt Coats (Swinderby) – 103 yards
[Underlined] “LEADER” COMPETITION [/underlined]
This competition has only produced one entrant also:-
F/Lt Foulkes (630 Squadron) – 158 yards
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[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Errors by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
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[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE RANGES [/underlined]
Wainfleet plotted 4945 bombs and 111 T.I’s dropped from 921 aircraft.
It is obvious that the Range staff have had a busy time, and to ensure accurate plotting, crews must conform to range procedure.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] S/Ldr Wonham [/underlined] (55 Base) extends a hearty welcome to 44 and 619 Squadrons. The rivalry between the Squadrons, on Practice Bombing matters, is very keen and errors have shown a steady decrease during the past few months.
[Underlined] F/Lt Foulkes [/underlined] (630 Squadron) has equipped an excellent Bombing Analysis room. Points concerning Bombing, which need stressing, are emphasised by humorous cartoons, and the room itself is kept very clean and tidy.
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORIES [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
* Excluding 617 and 627 Squadrons.
A+ 85 yards or less.
A 140 yards or less.
B 210 yards or less.
C 280 yards or less.
D Over 280 yards.
The number of “D” category crews has decreased from 41 in August, to 15 for this month. This is a considerable improvement, but it is not good enough – there should be no “D” crews on an Operational Squadron, and Bombing Leaders must give careful attention to these errors.
[Underlined] SEPTEMBER’S OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS [/underlined]
SQDN OR CON UNIT PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR ERROR AT 20,000’ IN YARDS
9 F/O Marsh F/O Carr - 78
44 P/O Evans Sgt Harper F/S Hunter 73
49 F/O Furber F/S Gentleman F/O Hassell 75
50 F/S Wonders F/S Earle F/S Minchin 79
97 F/O Woolnough W/O Shearwood F/O Haggerston 57
F/L Shorter F/S Betts P/O Aveline 57 – 79
467 F/O Jones F/S Burns F/S Michelmore 74
617 F/L Knights F/O Rogers F/O Playford 74
F/O Levy F/S Peck F/O Fox 78
F/O Stout F/O Rupert F/O Graham 59
F/O Joplin F/S Hebbard F/S Fish 70
F/L Hamilton F/O Rogers P/O Jackson 72
F/O Leavitt Sgt Oldham F/O Withams 73
619 F/O Cottman F/S Coster F/S Murray 71
1654 F/O Gray F/O Aitken Sgt Adams 62
F/O Denton F/O Goebel Sgt Kneebone 77
F/O Brammer Sgt White W/O Davies 69
P/O Dockworth F/S Quealy F/S Kenward 43
F/O Langridge F/O Cavanagh F/S Diggins 65
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OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS (continued)
SQDN OR CON UNIT PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR ERROR AT 20,000’ IN YARDS
1660 P/O Le Marquand Sgt Bowen Sgt Ransom 56
Sgt Sargent Sgt Walters F/S Symes 67
Sgt Keen Sgt Hurst Sgt Fidler 62
Lt Evenson Sgt BJorcy P/O Carling 61
P/O Penman F/S Dash P/O Pointon 78
F/S Cox F/S Smitherwaite Sgt Taylor 68
F/O Downing F/O Harrison P/O Semark 64
Lt Howes Sgt Johnston F/O Butterfield 78
1661 F/S Wonders F/S Earle F/S Minchin 78
F/O James Sgt Longhurst P/O Jeffreys 70
F/O Gillegin Sgt Jenden Sgt Elliott 58
P/O Smith F/S Scott F/O Sweeney 77
F/O Caryer F/O Arnett P/O Grassie 71
5 L.F.S. P/O Aryton Sgt Herkes F/S Bardsley 65
P/O Le Marquand Sgt Bowers Sgt Ransom 78
Owing to the large number of crew errors below 100 yards, it is only possible to publish those below 80 yards. Congratulations are due to F/L Shorter and crew (97 Squadron), F/S Wonders and crew (50 Squadron) and P/O Le Marquand and crew (now of 49 Squadron) for their consistently good bombing during the month.
[Underlined] THE “LORD CAMROSE” BOMBING TROPHY [/underlined]
The “Lord Camrose” trophy remains at Skellingthorpe for another three months.
50 Squadron’s average crew error for the months of July, August and September is 148 yards at 20,000 feet. Well done 50 Squadron!
463 Squadron are the runners up with an average error of 153 yards at 20,000 feet.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING. [/underlined]
The complete summary of practice bombing results for the month of September provides some very interesting facts and comparisons.
The number of bombs dropped is the best ever, and 9 Squadron are to be congratulated on their magnificent effort in dropping 789. However, it will be noted that 61 Squadron dropped only 96 and assuming the Squadron strength to be 25 crews, that gives an average of 4 bombs per crew for one month. This compares unfavourably with the other Squadrons in the same Base, and it is essential that crews have the maximum amount of bombing training permitted by operational commitments and weather conditions.
Crew errors have declined slightly this month, the average being 9 yards less than that of August. This is a step in the right direction and it is hoped that there will be a steady reduction in errors until we can get our average error down to less than 150 yards. It can be done, 50 Squadron have proved it by obtaining an average crew error of 148 yards for the last three months.
The number of bombsight errors has increased from 42 in August to 90 in September, but the proportion of bombsight errors to exercises completed remains the same. Close co-operation between the Bombing Analysis Officer and the Instrument Section will help to bring bombsight serviceability up to a satisfactory level.
Our practice bombing has improved considerably during the past six months, from 275 to 183 yards at 20,000 feet and this improvement is apparent in the results of the attacks on German targets. However, it is possible to reach an even higher standard of accuracy but it means constant practice on the part of every member of the bombing team.
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[Drawing] NAVIGATION
Almost all attacks this month have been on German objectives and navigators have done a good job on these longer range targets. Radar restrictions have necessitated flying considerable distances outside Gee range, and with winter approaching we must be prepared to fly even greater distances on D.R. alone. To achieve the high standard of navigation necessary for correct timing at the target, your D.R. navigation must be as sound and as complete as possible.
Mathematical accuracy, constant checking of D.R. positions and constant w/v checks, are the keynote of efficient D.R. navigation. Unfortunately very few navigators comply with all these points, and cases still occur of navigators not obtaining one D.R. position between their last Gee fix and the target.
Timing has been stressed frequently but on the coming long range operations it will be of paramount importance. By comparing forecast winds with winds found it is nearly always possible after the first hour’s flying to tell whether the aircraft will arrive at the target on time or not. If no moveable zero hour is being employed, then the earlier you can adjust your air speed, the easier it will be for you to arrive at the target at your scheduled time. During the winter months of last year it was not unusual to experience a spread of 15 – 20 minutes in the time over the target or along the route. With the concentration of enemy defences YOU CANNOT afford to fly in a bomber stream some 60 miles in length.
[Underlined] WIND FINDING. [/underlined]
The broadcast wind velocity scheme has not been used this month. Crews detailed to find correct bombing winds have put in some very good work, however, particular mention being due to 49 Squadron on the night 26/27th (Karlsruhe).
[Underlined] EXAMPLE OF GOOD “PILOT” NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
On the night of 27/28th September, 1944 (Kaiserlauten) F/O Nunns, Pilot of 630 Squadron gave an excellent example of “Pilot” Navigation. His aircraft was hit by flak on the return journey when some 150 miles inside France. He ordered the crew to abandon aircraft and was about to bale out himself when he managed to regain control. He decided to bring the aircraft back to base himself. Levelling out the aircraft and putting in “George” he went back to the navigator’s compartment and studied the log and chart carefully. From the information on the chart he was able to ascertain the aircraft’s present approximate position, and from the flight plan the courses to steer to reach base and the times on each leg. He flew the courses stated for the requisite amount of time and (strangely enough!) reached the base area. He was able to identify the beacons en route from the navigator’s flimsy and was thus able to “map read” the last few miles to base by this method.
This was a great effort and praise is due to both the pilot and also to his navigator who must have kept a complete and tidy chart to enable F/O Nunns to reach base the way he did.
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF NAVIGATORS. [/underlined]
During the month of August it was decided to categorise navigators. Navigation does not lend itself easily to categorisation, mainly because it is impossible to lay down a procedure which will cater for every eventuality. It therefore will depend upon common sense and judgement of navigation officers.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION ANALYSIS OFFICERS. [/underlined]
It is essential that all navigator’s operational logs and charts are thoroughly analysed immediately after each raid, and the results of that analysis made known to the navigation team as soon as possible, so that mistakes made will not be repeated. The analysis of logs and charts has always been the responsibility of Station and Squadron Navigation Officers; the present frequency of operations makes this an impossible task. It has therefore been decided to appoint one Navigation Analysis Officer to each Squadron, whose whole time duty it will be to analyse very thoroughly each log and chart.
By these appointments it is hoped to bring to light the errors and omissions of each navigator within 24 hours of completing a sortie. The Station Navigation Officer will thus be able to point out to each Navigator the “error of his ways” immediately, and will thus ensure that the mistake is not repeated.
Navigation Officers have a very big job in front of them and much hard work will be required.
[Underlined] APPROACH OF WINTER – WHAT IT MEANS! [/underlined]
Apart from all the well-known discomforts, the approach of winter means that OLD MAN WIND – the Navigator’s greatest enemy – will start hitting out again in force and will do all he can to land you in mischief. Low pressure systems are more prevalent in winter time, and therefore stronger winds have to be combated. Longer range targets means passing over territory which cannot at the moment, be too well explored by the Met. man, therefore you may pass over a front with a consequent wind change or run into a low pressure system which has not been forecast by the Met. Section. All this means that every individual Navigator must have a very thorough understanding of wind system. He must be able to interpolate for wind changes and must anticipate any sudden change of wind velocity. In last month’s summary attention was drawn to the Berlin raid of last Winter. We do not want this to happen again.
Get to know the wind system; visit the Met. man regularly and discuss the subject with him. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers should arrange constant lectures on this subject for the benefit of their Navigators. Wind is your biggest enemy.
[Underlined] O.R.S. INFORMATION. [/underlined]
A word about the O.R.S. information which is taken from you at interrogation. Numerous instances are occurring of incorrect information being forwarded to Group Headquarters. For example, an aircraft’s position is given as 4720N when it should be 4920N. These inaccuracies are obvious but other smaller inaccuracies are not so obvious. The concentration diagrams prepared from this information do not present a true picture of the situation, also many statistics prepared by O.R.S. are equally inaccurate and are therefore of no value.
All this O.R.S. information is collected and collated for your benefit and ultimate safety so do make sure that you give the CORRECT information and SEE that the Interrogator logs it correctly.
[Underlined] ATTACK ON TIRPITZ. [/underlined]
Navigators of 9 and 617 Squadrons had an opportunity during the month of showing their skill as “real” Navigators. The occasion was the attack on Tirpitz in Northern Waters and the landing at advanced bases in Russia. This operation, undertaken under difficult weather conditions and in total darkness, called for a very high standard of Navigation. It was anticipated that Gee would be received as far as 63° or 64°N; this was in fact correct. The remaining 1,000 miles over enemy occupied territory and enemy waters had to be tackled without the aid of Radar fixing facilities. Map reading was of course the most accurate method of fixing available, but this was very difficult over mountainous country studded with lakes and rivers. Nevertheless Air Bombers did some excellent work. Good use was also made of drifts
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and astro shots. Unfortunately the low pressure system which could not be accurately positioned by Met., was encountered over the most difficult part of the route. This meant that winds became much stronger than forecast and also a considerable lowering of cloud base. Nevertheless, practically all the Navigators noted this sudden strengthening and varying of the wind velocity and were able to combat it successfully.
It was anticipated that a little trouble might be experienced with the P4 Compasses in these Northern latitudes. Every precaution was therefore taken before the aircraft left this country, compasses were swung and as much deviation was removed before take-off for this operation. It was gratifying to note, however, that not one single instance of compass failure or excessive deviation occurred.
The Air Bombers and Navigators of 9 and 617 Squadrons did an excellent job on this operation, under the most difficult conditions. They brought back with them much valuable information on the performance of compasses, Northern chain Gee range at varying heights etc. – information which will be of considerable importance in the planning of future operations.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING W/VS [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by all Squadrons and Conversion Units this month is shown below.
Average Error of Squadrons – 4.7
Average Error of C. Units – 5.0
These figures show an improvement for the Squadrons of 1.8 m.p.h. and for the Conversion Units of 1.6 m.p.h. This is excellent and the ideal overall average of 5 m.p.h. has been reached. Let us now try and reduce this ideal over-all to 4 m.p.h.
[Table of Vector Error by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
It will be noted that 9 and 50 Squadrons are holding two of the first three places for the fourth month is succession. A very creditable performance. There still appears to be little improvement in the errors obtained by the three Squadrons from 54 Base. Come along now, let us see them at the top of the list next month.
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[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr. Mould, DFC – Base Nav. Officer, Scampton to be Base Nav. Officer, Syerston.
S/Ldr. Bray, DFC – Station Nav. Officer, Dunholme to be Station Nav. Officer, Strubby.
S/Ldr. Warwick, DFC – Base Navigation Officer, Coningsby missing on operations.
[Cartoon] “HERE IS THE BOMBING WIND – AND THIS IS P/O VECTOR READING IT!”
N.M.
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[Drawing] RADAR NAV.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
The most outstanding feature regarding 2 S this month has been the severe restrictions placed upon its use for operations.
It is realised that with these restrictions of H 2 S, navigation is bound to suffer slightly, particularly during the autumn months as no one can be too certain of the ranges on Gee. Operators must therefore make the best of the limited use of H 2 S on each operation. This Headquarters will welcome any ideas on how to obtain maximum efficiency from H 2 S during the limited periods it is available.
There are one or two points regarding the restrictions which must be stressed at the present time. Firstly, operators, if they are allowed to use H 2 S on any part of the flight, must make sure that it is switched on below 6,000 feet or else circuit breakdowns may occur. Secondly, close watch must be maintained on the scanner position when turned off, as wander is likely particularly during tactical manoeuvres.
It must be pointed out that despite restrictions on H 2 S on operations, no relaxation in training can be allowed and every effort must be made to see that operators remain proficient in its use. Experiments are being carried out to develop some kind of sector scan and if successful, operators may be able to make use of H 2 S throughout the whole flight. Sector scan requires a high standard of proficiency in H 2 S particularly in the interpretation of the P.P.I., and although training in sector can cannot be given at the moment, operators may do well to bear the problem in mind.
Experiments are also going ahead with the Mark II H 2 S scanner to try and improve the bombing picture on the P.P.I. This is being done by altering the pitch of the scanner to concentrate the beam and alter the polar diagram. If successful it may be possible to modify other Mark II equipment gradually. This will only be done if the range is not seriously restricted and its navigational use is not affected.
Blind bombing technique in the Group has developed further in the past few weeks and considerable success has been obtained by 83 and 97 Squadrons on the last few operations. To indicate the high standard which these two Squadrons have attained, a resume’ of their flare and blind marking errors on operations is given.
[Underlined] KOENIGSBERG. 26/27 AUGUST, 1944. [/underlined]
This was the first operation on which the specially selected H 2 S Mark III equipment was used and F/Lt. Baker, Blind Marker crew of 97 Squadron dropped his marker 400 yds. south of the Aiming Point. Had the whole attack been based on this marker it might have been slightly more successful.
[Underlined] KOENIGSBERG. 29/30th AUGUST, 1944. [/underlined]
An extremely successful operation with the centre of the blind illuminating flares being plotted extremely close to the centre of the town. The blind proximity marker released by a crew of 97 Squadron was reported 600 yds. south of the aiming point although no photograph was obtained.
[Underlined] DARMSTADT. 11/12th SEPTEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
An excellent operation with highly successful blind illumination
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provided by 83 and 97 Squadrons. The direct release method of marking and blind bombing was used and photographs gave the following results:-
F/O TAYLOR 97 SQUADRON AIMING POINT.
F/LT. HIGGS 97 SQUADRON 1,300 yds.
F/O EATON 97 SQUADRON 1,300 yds.
F/O SIMPSON 97 SQUADRON 1,300 yds.
F/LT. BAKER 97 SQUADRON 1.75 n.m.
[Underlined] STUTTGART. 12/13th SEPTEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Blind marking was carried out by the direct release method with a G.P.I. check from PFORZHEIM. The following successful results were obtained:-
F/LT. AMES 97 SQUADRON 600 yds. From Town Centre.
F/LT. HIGGS 97 SQUADRON 1,000yds. From Town Centre.
F/LT. SHORTER 97 SQUADRON 2,500 yds From Town Centre.
F/O. SIMPSON 97 SQUADRON 2,500 yds. From Town Centre.
F/LT. LAING 97 SQUADRON 2,500 yds. From Town Centre.
[Underlined] BREMERHAVEN 18/19th SEPTEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
A most successful sortie. Of the Primary Blind Markers F/Lt. Kelly of 83 Squadron dropped his T.Is. 500 yds. from the Aiming Point whilst F/Lt. Laing and F/Lt. Lines of 97 Squadron both had errors of less than 1 nautical mile. The Flare Force too was remarkably accurate, illuminating the target area to such effect that the Mosquito aircraft had no difficulty in marking the Aiming Point. The Flare Force photographs showed that F/O Gamble, 83 Squadron, F/O Price, 83 Squadron and F/O Canever of 97 Squadron had Aiming Points, whilst S/Ldr. Hatcher had an error of 1,400 yds.
[Underlined] MUNCHEN GLADBACH 19/20th SEPTEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Technical failures prevented the plotting of many flare force photographs, but P.R.U. cover shows considerable damage in the target area, proving that the flare force illumination was of its usual high order.
[Underlined] KARLSRUHE. [/underlined]
Cloud prevented the plotting of photographs, but P.R.U. cover shows very extensive damage in the most closely built up area of the town. P.P.I. photographs indicate that the accuracy of the blind markers was to the order of 1,000 yds. and 400 yds. respectively.
[Underlined] KAIDERSLAUTERN. [/underlined]
Using the direct release method with a G.P.I. check on SAABRUCKEN, W/C. Ingham of 83 Squadron dropped his flares 1,500 yards, F/Lt. Edwards, 83 Squadron 1.3 miles and F/O Simpson 1.25 miles respectively from the flare aiming point. By this illumination, the low level Mosquitos were able to mark the target accurately.
Great credit is due to the two marking Squadrons for the success obtained on these operations. The majority of the results were obtained on the specially selected and tuned up sets thus proving that not only have crews to be selected, but also the equipment. In addition, the results have been obtained only through particularly extensive training, and the enthusiasm of the crews carrying it out.
If we are to maintain these excellent results, the two squadrons must be provided with crews of a suitable type; Crews selected are carrying on high tradition and are directly responsible for the success of all future operations.
[Underlined] P.P.I. PHOTOGRAPHY. [/underlined]
The standard of P.P.I. photography has been raised slightly during the month and several good photographs have been received at this Headquarters. F/Lt. Dobbie of 97 Squadron obtained an excellent photograph
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of KAISERLAUTERN when on the operation to KARLSRUHE. This was of considerable assistance to set operators in their identification of this target on a later raid.
Very little gardening has been carried out this month. But so far the results received are up to the usual 5 Group standard. A paper on the plotting od H 2 S mining photographs has been received and copies are being sent to the gardening squadrons for their attention. This report supplements the report S.121 on the plotting of “Y” photographs and is based on data from No. 4 and 6 Groups who have carried out the majority of H 2 S gardening sorties.
[Underlined] GEE. [/underlined]
Increased importance has been placed on the use of Gee this month due to the restrictions placed on the use of H 2 S. Thus the necessity for that very last fix is again well to the forefront. Operators must make every effort to read through the jamming and make maximum use of position lines where fixes cannot be obtained.
On the majority of operations during the month a considerable increase in ranges have been noticed due to the swift advance of the allied armies, capturing large areas of country in which Gee jamming equipment was sited. This at once extended the ranges obtainable over France and Belgium to the limits of the territory held, but no marked improvement was shown further north where enemy interference in Holland and N. West Germany, though varying in intensity from day to day, was nearly always at maximum intensity when heavy bombers were operating.
On the Eastern Chain it has been noted that the enemy has transferred a considerable amount of his jamming to the 27 unit and that greater range is being obtained on the Unit 25. Weakness of pulses only restricts range on the Unit 25.
The average range on the North Eastern Chain has been stabilised at about 6°E with the limiting factor being the weakness of the “A” pulse.
The Southern Chain appears to be giving the best results now that German jamming has ceased with fixes as far as 7°E. These ranges may drop during the Autumn due to meteorological conditions. The limiting factor on this chain appears to be the weakness of the “C” pulse.
There have been few reports on the Channel chain, but it would appear that the limits of its coverage are between 5 and 6° with little jamming. The general complaint on the use of this chain are that the topographical lattice maps suppled are unsuited for heavy bomber navigation.
Two Squadrons had the opportunity of using the Northern Chain at its extreme limits this month. The flight was carried out at low level and signals were received as far as 64 °N, but the small cut of the lattice lines did not enable fixes to be plotted accurately at that range. These results were as much as expected, and confirm the reports of Costal [sic] Command who do the most flying in that area.
The low level at which we are now flying over France may restrict Gee range somewhat but it is thought that the short ranges obtained by navigators on the operation on KAISERLAUTERN was due to the poor propagation properties of the atmosphere. These properties are most noticeable during the months of October and November, and it may well be that our Gee range on the present chains may be restricted to 5°E throughout these months.
However, to counteract this we have news of further chains which are being provided on the Continent and as soon as information is received at this Headquarters it will be passed to Squadrons.
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
Tests are still being carried out by Bomber Command as to the suitability of the use of the Homing and S.S. Chains for Bomber Command Navigation.
Until the results of these tests are known no action is being taken regarding the training of navigators.
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[Drawing] ENGINEERING
Large number of movements have taken place or about to take place which are liable to upset calculations, but it is apparent that the operational effort has not suffered as a result. 52 Base is about to leave the Group complete with R.A.F. Stations, Scampton, Fiskerton and Dunholme. The good work which we associate with such stations will now be associate with other stations within the Group. 55 Base now comprises as many squadrons as 53 Base, i.e. five full squadrons each, and No. 5 L.F.S., Syerston, comes within a Base Organisation.
[Underlined] OPERATIONAL DEFECTS. [/underlined]
The operational effort was not quite so high as the previous month, but the aircraft were available had the weather given us a fair chance. The percentage of operational failures due to Engineer faults was 0.94 which is an improvement on the previous months. Out of this total, 0.24% were abortive sorties and 0.7% were early returns. Special mention must be made to No. 54 Base as a whole and they are given the ‘Big Hand’ for producing the record of having no operational failures due to matters concerning the Engineers during September. 49 Squadron also are to be congratulated for similar reasons.
[Underlined] MAINTENANCE – 5 GROUP SERVICING SECTION [/underlined]
Appreciation of the efforts of No. 5 Group Servicing Section is recorded and the good work which is carried out by them under very often difficult conditions. C.T.O’s should realise the personal problems and difficulties of these mobile parties which are moved about at a moment’s notice to wherever the ‘shoe pinches’ within the Group. The sum total of the work carried out by these few men during the last four months comprises eight Major Inspections, thirty initial checks and 120 rebuilt power plants. During September two gangs were in operation as Major Inspection gangs solely for the first time, and their activities within the Group are apparent. Apart from the above work, four base hydraulic bays have been completed, two during the last four months. The instrument personnel have built and installed 110 second pilot’s instrument panels in Stirling aircraft of Conversion Units during the last three months.
[Underlined] FORMS 765C. [/underlined]
The remarks by the Specialist Officer concerned at para. 11 of the 765C are still far too brief and in many cases incomplete, and invariably give no indication whether relevant modifications are embodied or not. It is pointed out once more that care and thought in rendering Forms 765C will prove of assistance in attempting to establish the cause of failures and recommending action for preventing recurrences of such failures.
[Underlined] INSTRUMENTS AND ELECTRICAL. [/underlined]
Bombsight maintenance continues at a high standard throughout the Group, and accuracy of a high order is being achieved, mainly due to the effective liaison existing between Electrical Officers and Bombing Leaders. Bombing Analysis courses are now open to Base Electrical Officers, and two have, up to the time of writing, completed the course. The course has proved very valuable in assisting Electrical Officers in diagnosing the causes of bombing errors, particularly instrument errors, and we can now look forward to an even higher standard of accuracy. As it will be a long time before all Electrical Officers will be able to attend the course Base Electrical Officers should instruct their junior officers in the art of analysing a bombing plot.
Mk.XIVA bombsights are now arriving in large numbers and the Group Instrument Servicing Van is having a busy time in instructing personnel in
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the differences between the XIV and the XIVA. The new computor [sic] is not all that could be desired, the great majority of them (about 95%) needing retuning or the replacing of defective parts, and are generally requiring about twice the number of man hours to rectify. The matter has been taken up with higher authority and it is hoped that results of our ‘moans’ will soon be evident. In the meantime a thorough check must be given to every computor [sic] and 1022 action taken in every case of faulty design, or workmanship.
A word or two regarding defect action would not come amiss. Far too many defective items of equipment are being returned to stores without 1022 or 1023 action being taken. It must be impressed again on all officers that it is only by taking the correct official procedure that rectification action can be taken. It is of no earthly use just to tell the Group Specialist Officer that such and such is giving trouble if there is no 1022 backing. The Group Specialist Officer of course wants to know what is giving trouble but any report that he may make will be shot down if it is not supported by a 1022. A case in point concerns the low insulation of gun heaters. Only two cases have been reported to Command out of the hundred or so which have occurred. So let us have some more 1022’s.
After putting in a considerable amount of work in their respective sections the Electrical and Instrument personnel of 52 Base have had to evacuate their quarters and move to Syerston and start again from scratch. No doubt their experience will serve them well in producing even better sections.
Command Modification No. 74 is now completed throughout the Group and a word of praise must be given to those men who formed the Group pool to produce the modified bomb aimer’s panels. They worked long hours and did an excellent job of work. All Bases were represented so they will each have a good man to start their own modification gang cracking.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of Training Unit Serviceability]
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Many applications have been made in the past by Flight Engineers to change over to Transport Command; This Command is now prepared to accept Flight Engineers for flying duties provided they have completed two operational tours and one tour of instructional duties. Flight Engineers who are eligible should make application through the usual channels at their unit.
Log keeping has improved throughout this Group, but it is noticed that many engineers do not record atmospheric temperatures and airframe serial letter and numbers; this has been pointed out before. Flight Engineer Leaders must insist that this omission is remedied.
Defect reports still come through showing the cause as manipulation trouble on the part of the Flight Engineer, in many cases these result in a cancellation or early return. Points for the Flight Engineer Leader to instruct on are as follows:-
[Underlined] Starter Motor burnt out: [/underlined] if correct drill had been used this would have been avoided.
[Underlined] Overheating of Engines: [/underlined] early returns are made because of supposed overheating; on examination, these temperatures prove to be within the engine limitations.
[Underlined] Misbehaviour of Engines: [/underlined] black smoke from exhaust; on this trip other crews reported same conditions but attributed this to atmospheric conditions on flying through cloud. Had this Flight Engineer checked all his gauges he would have been able to inform his Captain that engines were quite normal and this early return would have been avoided.
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[Drawing] AIR SEA RESCUE
With the liberation of countries in Western Europe, the flow back to England of aircrew who have been shot down is increasing – not only in numbers, but in speed. It is strongly rumoured that one, who was shot down on the outward trip, managed, with the assistance of a jeep and a flip from Paris, to arrive back before the Main Force!
These evaders tell amazing stories – some are good and reveal level-headedness, fine crew discipline and a sound knowledge of Safety Drills. Others are the reverse, and the following extracts from reports by 5 Group aircrew tell their own story.
[Underlined] Crew shot down on 6th June, 1944. [/underlined]
“The executive order was “We’ve been hit kids, get out”.
“My parachute was only fixed by the right buckle”.
“Informant had known for some time that the left clip was loose, but had neglected to have it repaired”.
[Underlined] Crew shot down on 24/25th July, 1944. [/underlined]
“The executive order was “Get to Hell out of this as quickly as possible”.
“The informant did not leave his turret (Mid-Upper) very speedily as he experienced some difficulty in locating the footbar”.
[Underlined] Crew shot down on 3/4th May, 1944. [/underlined]
“The W/Op noticed as he passed, that the Navigator’s altimeter was reading 1,000 feet. He therefore pulled his rip cord while still in the aircraft. He gathered the canopy in his arms and went out head first, receiving a kick on the behind from the pilot”.
[Cartoon] DO YOU KNOW YOUR DRILLS? – OR DO [underlined] YOU [/underlined] HAVE TO BE KICKED OUT?? N.M.
[Underlined] Crew shot down on 7/8th August, 1944. [/underlined]
“The Mid Upper Gunner was moving so quickly that he overshot the exit and fell against the rear turret. He returned with some difficulty to the exit, which he opened. He then took his parachute from his stowage and fastened it on”.
“The pilot had to go back from his seat for his parachute which the Navigator had failed to give him”.
[Underlined] CHECK YOUR ESCAPE HATCH! [/underlined]
There have been too many incidents where the front hatch has
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jammed or taken a long time to open. The Air Bomber’s pre-flight drill calls for a check on this hatch. A check does not mean that the Air Bomber looks to see that the hatch is there, but means that he is to check its ease of release and that it is correctly fastened afterwards.
The parachute drill (5 Group Aircraft Drills) states that the hatch is to be JETTISONED, not pulled up inside the aircraft where it is liable to obstruct the exit.
[Underlined] CHECK YOUR PARACHUTE! [/UNDERLINED]
An unfortunate incident occurred during the month when a Hurricane Pilot, not wearing his own parachute, collided with a Martinet and was forced to abandon his aircraft.
The pilot did not get clear until he was at about 3,000 ft. and, although he pulled the rip cord immediately, he was killed on impact with the ground.
An examination of the parachute harness also showed that it was far too loose for the wearer.
Each member of air-crew flying fighters or bombers, must check his parachute for serviceability and fitting before every flight.
[Underlined] EVASION [/underlined]
No less than 25 aircrew of No. 50 Squadron, missing since the beginning of May, are reported to have evaded capture and returned safely to this country.
Successful evasion depends upon:
(i) Your will to evade.
(ii) Your physical fitness.
(iii) An up to date knowledge of the military situation.
(iv) the latest advice which your Intelligence Officer will give you.
Consider these things beforehand and avoid Dulag Luft.
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[Drawing] PHOTOGRAPHY
The total number of failures on Night Photography has decreased to 5.93%. Failures on Day Photography amount to 4.07%. The decrease over the previous month in respect of Night Photography has occurred chiefly on the Armament side. The prevailing target conditions, when smoke from incendiary loads obscured the target, has made it impossible in many cases to determine whether a flash has or has not exploded correctly. This is a recurrence of conditions which existed during last winter. Manipulation failures have shown an increase in the last two months, in 83 and 97 Squadrons. In the past this type of failure has been very low in this Group, and it is to be hoped that the steps now being taken by the Bombing Leaders will eliminate them in these two Squadrons.
The supply of High Speed Night Film has now materially increased and Squadrons are to use this film on all operations. In view of the fact that we are now entering a period of the year when light conditions will often be poor, the use of this film will help to ensure sufficient exposure. It will, of course, save a lot of magazine reloading.
The supply of H 2 S cameras has grown considerably during the past month and promises to continue doing so. These cameras are not constructed for service work or to be handled by service personnel; great care will therefore have to be exercised in the handling and operating of them. A number of H 2 S photographs received have been unsharp and sometimes of poor quality. This poor workmanship will have to be remedied and a special effort by Photographic N.C.O’s in this direction is required.
No. 5 Group Headquarters now hold a K.20 camera for use on hand held obliques. Any station requiring the use of this camera is to inform the Group Photographic Officer who will make arrangements for the camera to be forwarded. Two days’ notice will be required.
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[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF PHOTOGRAPHY [/underlined]
[Table of Photographic Analysis by Squadron]
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[Drawing] ARMAMENT
[Underlined] WINTER [/underlined]
Once more the annual reminder which you are no doubt tired of hearing, but a warning which must be even more carefully heeded this year than ever before.
Listed below are a few points which will require your personal attention during the coming months if an increase in failures is to be avoided.
[Underlined] Gun Heaters. [/underlined] Are all your aircraft fitted with gun heaters? The Electrical Officers are giving this matter their personal attention and the fitting of heaters is going ahead. Take a personal interest in this matter yourself, see that the Electrical Branch are given every assistance.
[Underlined] Duct Heaters. [/underlined] New aircraft are now arriving with ducted heating to both rear and mid-upper turrets. Have you any of these aircraft? If so, go and have a look at one and get the “gen” on how it works.
[Underlined] Browning Guns. [/underlined] Has your gun maintenance been allowed to slip during the summer months? If so, now is the time to tighten up. All new guns must be very carefully checked; all grease must be removed, particularly from the breach block, firing pin and spring, etc. and guns must be lubricated in accordance with B.C.A.S.I. Pt.2, Section 14, Leaflet No.6, Issue No. 1.
[Underlined] Gun Covers. [/underlined] Have you an adequate supply of gun and turret covers? All Units should now have manufactured the cover for the Direct Vision Aperture in the F.N. 120. This Headquarters’ letter 634/4/Armt. dated 12th May, 1944 refers.
[Underlined] Cluster Projectiles. [/underlined] Wet Cluster Projectiles may cause functioning failures due to ice accretion on the mechanism or from rust. See that full use is made of all available tarpaulins. Recommendations have been made to Headquarters, Bomber Command for an increase in establishment of Covers, Water proof, Large and Small.
[Underlined] Bomb Trollies. [/underlined] Are all your trollies fitted with mud guards to prevent S.B.C. release slips from becoming splashed with mud and water during transportation?
[Underlined] Welfare. [/underlined] During Winter months Armourers will be working long hours in bad weather conditions. See that they are properly equipped with warm clothing, gloves, oil skins, and gum boots etc. A warm and contented man will work better than one half frozen.
[Underlined] SMALL BOMB CONTAINERS. [/underlined]
The month of September saw the return, after a long absence, of the Small Bomb Container. With the introduction of the Cluster Projectile, relief was felt by all Armament Officers as it was thought we had seen the last of the “very difficult to handle” Small Bomb Container. Unfortunately the shortage of Cluster Projectiles has necessitated our return to this item of equipment, consequently a large number of headaches have resulted.
With the introduction of the new Twin Adaptors the Incendiary load has been considerable [sic] increased and it is now possible to carry 20 S.B.C’s on the Lancaster. This increase in bomb load means that far more work is entailed in the preparation of the required number of S.B.C’s for an
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operation and it has been found necessary to seek outside labour to assist in the filling. Unfortunately it is still necessary to fill the Mk. VA. S.B.C. by hand, but small numbers of 50 pack Incendiaries are now being received and it is hoped that in the near future the boxes of 30 x 4lb. Incendiaries will entirely disappear. This step will be welcomed by all.
[Cartoon] THIS – OR THIS?? N.M.
[Underlined]
[Underlined] CLUSTER PROJECTILES – HANDLING. [/underlined]
The organisation for the handling of Cluster Projectiles still requires a lot of attention on some Stations. Quantities of Roller Conveyors are now held on all Stations and this equipment, suitably raised from the ground on tail unit boxes or cluster projectile cases, provides an excellent method for the handling and fusing of cluster projectiles.
This equipment, suitably laid out, can provide multi unloading, fusing and loading points, and can cut down the man handling required to the barest minimum, and the saving in time will be considerable.
[Underlined] SALVAGE. [/underlined]
The problem of returning salvage has now become a major one, and when one considers that approximately, 4,000 boxes of 4lb. Incendiaries are thrown up from one operation on a 2 Squadron Station, it is obvious that careful attention must be given to the organisation for the return of this salvage. All 2 Squadron Station have now been supplied with additional labour kindly loaned to us by the Army. This additional labour, if correctly employed, should prevent the accumulation of any large quantity of salvage. When lorries deliver explosives to you let your motto be “They shall not return empty.”
All smaller salvage, i.e. nose plugs, transit caps from tail pistols etc., should be placed in bins and not left lying around to form a permanent menace to bomb trolley tyres. Bins are easily obtainable and sufficient should be placed in the bomb store to enable an ample supply to be available at all fusing and handling points.
[Underlined] HEAVY TYPE TRANSPORTERS. [/underlined]
There is at present a deficiency of approximately 2,500 transporters in this Group, including those sent away under Bomber Command’s instructions, for modification. Bomber Command have promised that every effort is being made to expedite the manufacture of new type heavy transporters and early issues are expected. In the meantime, continual care must be exercised in the loading of cluster projectiles on to bomb trolleys to ensure that no tail units are damaged.
[Underlined] THIS MONTH’S BOOBS – BOMBING LEADERS PLEASE NOTE. [/underlined]
Two boobs by Air Bombers this month were responsible for complete bomb loads being returned to Base.
1. Bomb Aimer failed to fully rotate the Distributor Drum Switch with the result that no contact was made – FULL
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BOMB LOAD RETURNED.
2. Bomb Aimer set drum switch half way between “Distributor” and “Single and Salvo” – FULL BOMB LOAD RETURNED.
Eight other manipulation failures resulted in 8 photoflashes being returned due to the Isolation switch not being made.
[Underlined] QUIZ. [/underlined]
Is your A.P. 2264A fully amended? If so where would you find the information on the Bomb, Smoke, Aircraft, 100 lb. Mk.1?
[Drawing] WAR SAVINGS
(a) Approximate savings in pence per head.
(b) Approximate percentage of personnel saving.
(c) Total savings for the month.
[Table of War Savings by Base and Station]
TOTAL: £5,722.14s. 3d.
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[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES TABLE [/underlined]
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A – Manipulation. B – Maintenance. C – Icing. D. – Technical. E – Electrical. F. – Obscure.
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[Drawing] GUNNERY
[Underlined] THIS MONTH’S BAG [/underlined]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
[Underlined] A/C Letter Sqdn Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
“E” 630 11/12 Sept. T/E
“B” 57 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
“T” 57 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
“O” 83 23rd Sept. S/E
“R” 630 23rd Sept. T/E
“U” 207 26/27 Sept. ME410
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
[Underlined] A/C Letter Sqdn Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
“H” 50 11/12 Sept. ME110
“D” 207 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
“X” 467 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
[Underlined] A/C Letter Sqdn Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
“J” 106 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
“J” 61 11/12 Sept. ME.109
“Y” 9 26/27 Sept. ME.410
Confirmation of these claims, by Headquarters Bomber Command, is awaited.
There was a total of 119 combats during the month’s operations which shows a slight increase on last month’s figure. Of these 8 are claimed as destroyed 3 as probably destroyed and 4 as damaged. The largest number of combats occurred on the night 11/12th September, when Darmstadt was the target. Out of 39 combats the Group claimed 3 destroyed, 3 probably destroyed and 2 damaged – an excellent return. During the month, tracer was removed from the first 300 rounds, with a view to assisting the gunner in his sighting. Reports have since been submitted by Bases, and these are now under consideration. If the test has convinced gunners that accurate shooting can only be applied through the sight, it has certainly been worth while.
Early Warning Devices, with the exception of Fishpond, have been temporarily suspended, so once again the gunner has got to rely on his ability to see under night conditions and on his mental alertness. Even with the E.W.D. several instances occurred of enemy aircraft approaching and attacking unobserved, and without the E.W.D’s we must expect more instances of this. To arm ourselves against this, we must make use of every opportunity of training under night conditions, either at night with night affiliation, or simple exercises on the ground, or by day in the Night Vision rooms. Whilst on the subject of night vision, it is painful to have to record that two instances of Lancaster firing on Lancaster were reported during the month. In each instance the aggressor was identified as a Lancaster by the gunners. It was fortunate that no serious casualties resulted from these attacks, but it does stress the fact that more aircraft recognition under night conditions is called for.
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[Underlined] ODD JOTTINGS [/underlined]
Instances have occurred of guns being fired in dispersals and seriously damaging other aircraft. Gunners must make certain that all guns are on “SAFE” before unloading or testing.
Instructions are to be issued shortly regarding the wearing of Pilot type parachutes by rear gunners. This will come into force when sufficient quantities of this type of parachute are available.
Fighter affiliation exercises with Gyro Camera have shown a big increase on last month’s figures, and Squadrons are to be congratulated. It is hoped that it will be possible in the near future, to issue an extra Gyro Camera assembly to each Squadron.
[Underlined] SQUADRON GUNNERY LEADERS [/underlined]
9 Squadron F/Lt Gabriel
50 Squadron F/Lt Mills
61 Squadron F/Lt Glover
463 Squadron F/Lt Winston
467 Squadron F/O Ellis
44 Squadron F/Lt Clarke
619 Squadron F/Lt Waterhouse
83 Squadron S/Ldr Poole
97 Squadron S/Ldr Sherring
106 Squadron F/Lt Sullivan
617 Squadron F/Lt Armstrong
57 Squadron F/Lt Taylor
630 Squadron F/Lt Cass
207 Squadron F/Lt Wardle
49 Squadron F/Lt Wynyard
[Underlined] AIR TRAINING [/underlined]
[Table of Air Training by Squadron]
GRAND TOTAL OF FIGHTER AFFILIATION EXERCISES FOR SEPTEMBER:- [underlined] 2535 [/underlined]
* 49 Squadron employed on special training.
[Page break]
[Drawing] TRAINING
[Underlined] RECORD OUTPUT [/underlined]
This was the last month of the full Summer Training Programme, and the number of crews produced was the highest on record. A total of 162 pilots (161 full crews) was posted to Squadrons and provided ample surplus for the forthcoming expansion.
Weather was patchy towards the end of the month, but despite this and some difficulties with power plants and tyres, the Stirling Conversion Units flew an average of 2,000 hours each. No. 5 L.F.S. did a total of just over 2,000 hours. The accident rate improved for the third successive month.
No.1668 Lancaster Conversion Unit is getting into its stride and flew 700 hours. The first course is due to pass out early next month. No. 1669 Halifax Conversion Unit which also formed under the control of 5 Group, made rapid progress once the Staff had the airfield to themselves. The first course enters on 7th October.
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION [/underlined]
Fighter Affiliation continued to increase and 1690 B.D.T. Flight gave day and night affiliation on over 1,000 details, exercising 2450 gunners compared with 2100 for August.
Night affiliation with Hurricanes is growing from infancy into a robust child. 1690 B.D.T. Flight affiliated with 60 Squadron crews at night, exercising 120 gunners, double the total last month. The Hurricanes averaged 41 hours per aircraft.
The monthly target for night affiliation from now on is 600 details. If 300 crews do two night details each, and 9 of the 12 Hurricanes average 3 details each on approximately 21 fit nights in a month, the results will be 600 details, 1200 gunners exercised, and a figure ten-fold greater than this month!
Incidentally, 1690 B.D.T. Flight packed its bags once again, and is now located at R.A.F. Station, Metheringham.
[Underlined] SQUADRON TRAINING [/underlined]
The provision of an instructor for each Squadron, instead of instructors allocated to Bases, will give Squadrons a greater opportunity of supervising closely all new crews, and picking up any deficiencies which arise because of the shortness of the course at the L.F.S.
It is essential that Squadron Training Pilots forward their reports on new crews through the usual channels to Base Headquarters so that the Base Air Staff Officer can submit to this Headquarters at the end of each month a summary of opinion on the standard of training and points requiring attention. 10 and 20 sortie checks are essential for all crews in Squadrons throughout the Group, and Squadron Training Pilots are to give them special attention.
No.106 Squadron now has a new function as the “Nursery” for the two P.F.F. Squadrons in 54 Base. Outstanding crews under training in 51 Base and L.F.S. are being selected for P.F.F. duties in 5 Group, and are posted to 106 Squadron for experience and training, after which they proceed to either 83 or 97 Squadron to provide the necessary experience and for supervising the new crews.
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[Underlined] LINK TRAINER TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of Link Trainer Times by Base, Squadron and Conversion Unit]
GRAND TOTAL:- Pilots: 1463 hours
F/Engineers: 965 hours
There was again an increase in Link Trainer Times for the month by both Pilots and Flight Engineers. The Pilots went up by about 100 hours and the Flight Engineers by about 40 hours.
Every little helps, but 140 hours among 21 Units represents an average increase of about 7 hours per Unit.
It should be possible to increase this four-fold now that the more doubtful weather is approaching. Each Squadron in particular should get its Pilots’ Link times up to the 50/60 hour mark.
[Underlined] SPECIAL NOTE [/underlined]
Pilots and Link Trainer Instructors should take special note of the modification to topple the Artificial Horizon and spin the Directional Gyro, and make sure it is used on every exercise.
[Page break]
[Drawing] ACCIDENTS
The 26 aircraft damaged during August gave us a rate of 7.3 per 10,000 flying hours, one of the best rates the Group has ever attained, and good enough to put us in second place in the Command Accident ladder.
September’s total is 23, made up as follows:- 6 Cat. AC; 5 Cat. B; 12 Cat. E. Quite a number of aircraft were damaged to a lesser extent and repaired more or less “on the spot”. They, happily, do not count against us, and the “rate” should be close to August’s good figures. Flying hours will decide.
11 of the month’s accidents were avoidable.
[Underlined] SQUADRONS: [/underlined] Overshoots landing – 2; Heavy Landings – 1; Miscellaneous – 2.
[Underlined] 51 BASE: [/underlined] Swings Landing – 2; overshoots landing – 2; Taxying – 1.
[Underlined] 1690 Flight: [/underlined] Miscellaneous – 1.
None of these accidents have any special features except perhaps the collision between a Hurricane engaged on affiliation with a Lancaster, and a Master of another Group. From details at present available the Hurricane pilot appears to have been “shooting away” the Master who was taking close an interest in the exercise. Both single aircraft engined aircraft crashed, but the Master pilot escaped by parachute. 1690 pilots take note. Extreme care is required when dealing with these other aircraft which very often have pupil pilots aboard, and do not always do what you would expect.
In addition to the accidents above, there have been 7 minor taxying accidents in the Group this month. In each instance the damage was soon repaired, but that is not the point. Each one was completely avoidable, and required a certain amount of valuable time and labour to put right. With the coming of the darker nights and poorer weather it is most important, yes, essential, that this tendency to careless taxying is stamped out. Last winter’s taxying story was a sorry tale. It must not be duplicated this year.
The period for the second award of the Silver Lancaster has just ended. As soon as all accident reports are forward the result will be published. It looks like another close race.
[Table of Avoidable Accidents and Star Awards by Squadron]
The above table includes minor avoidable accidents which are not listed in the review above. The damage was Cat. A in each instance. 51 Base Units are not given STAR awards.
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SECOND THOUGHTS for PILOTS
[Underlined] INSTRUMENT FLYING. [/underlined]
(i) Take your place in the drive on instrument flying. Nights grow longer and you’ll be getting both dark take-offs and dark returns.
(ii) Give yourself 5 – 10 minutes on your primary instruments – Turn and Bank, A.S.I. and Altimeter – on every N.F.T. Cover up the artificial horizon and cage the gyro.
(iii) Practice the corkscrew on instruments. Its [sic] easy to “mock up” a hood for instrument flying in day-light. Fold a map, fit it on your helmet and draw goggles on to your forehead. The goggles and strap will hold the map in place. Don’t forget to have a member of the crew keeping a look out for other aircraft.
(iv) Get your quota of Link hours in. The new device to topple the artificial horizon and spin the gyro will put you on your mettle.
[Underlined] TAXYING. [/underlined]
(i) Take things steadily on the ground. The autumn and winter in the past have always produced a sorry tale of bogged aircraft and taxying accidents.
(ii) Look up Air Staff Instruction F.C. 24 for the duties and responsibilities of all aircrew when taxying.
(iii) Use the landing light on the Lancaster and man the Aldis light. Modifications to the landing light are under consideration in an attempt to further increase its usefulness as an aid to taxying.
(iv) Remember you get the illusion at night that you are taxying slowly when you are in fact going fast. CO-OPERATION – CAUTION – CONTROL are the three principles to apply to taxying.
[Underlined] THE LAST 100 FEET. [/underlined]
(i) Wind velocity decreases proportionately from 1,500 feet to ground level because of the friction of the ground. This is most pronounced at night.
(ii) Its [sic] possible to have a wind of gale force at 1,500 feet and dead calm at ground level at night. Its [sic] also possible for the wind direction to be 50° different between 1,500 feet and the ground.
(iii) So watch your approaches. In a very strong wind, increase your air speed by 5/10 m.p.h. and check for drift. The last 100 feet can be difficult if you don’t appreciate the circumstances.
(iv) A word on landings. Your Check Landing Card is a valuable record for [underlined] YOU. [/underlined] Don’t wait until your crew complains your landings are not too good. Inspect your Check Landing Card once a fortnight and see that it is up to date.
[Page break]
[Drawing] FLYING CONTROL
This month has seen the introduction of a Bomber Command Standard Landing Procedure which aims to provide a simple and standard landing drill, and which will give reasonably good landing times. It is hoped that this procedure will be adopted by other Commands, and that it will eventually be used at every airfield in the British Isles. This Group, however, has been permitted to retain its two R/T channels of communication, and the landing procedure, previously employed by 5 Group, has been substantially modified to bring it in to line with the new Standard Procedure.
In the near future, it is hoped that a directif will be issued to all Flying Control Officers laying down a standard technique of handling aircraft. At present there are two schools of thought. One in which one officer in the Watch Office controls aircraft on both Studs ‘A’ and ‘B’. Secondly where one officer in the Watch office feeds aircraft into the circuit on Stud ‘A’ and a second officer controls aircraft on Stud ‘B’, and gives instructions where necessary should aircraft be too closely or too loosely spaced. Trials are at present being carried out on both these schemes and the details will be issued on which scheme proves itself to be the safest and most efficient.
One word here about flying discipline. At some stations in the Group, breaches of flying discipline in the circuit are reports to Squadron Commanders, who take immediate action with the aircrew concerned. No matter how good or how safe a landing procedure might be, if crews don’t play fair and obey instructions to the letter then one might just as well give up the idea of trying to speed up the rate of landing, and at the same time maintain an adequate safety margin. If every crew takes its turn, plays fair and used its common-sense it will be landed within the minimum time and with perfect safety.
[Underlined] Marking Circuit Points. [/underlined]
It is appreciated that in the past there has been some difficulty in determining when an aircraft exactly reaches the various points of call around the circuit. The problem of marking these points to suit all runways is not an easy one, and several experiments have been carried out as yet with little success. It is hoped, however, that the end is now in sight and that very soon “call-up” and “check” points for use with every runway will be marked around the circuit.
[Underlined] SEPTEMBER LANDING TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of Landing Times by Station]
[Page break]
[Drawing] EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] UNIT RETURNS. [/underlined]
Cases have occurred where serviceable equipment returned to the U.E.D. has arrived in an unserviceable state. In most cases the cause has been careless packing. Equipment Officers should realise that this almost amounts to sabotage as not only is time and labour wasted at the receiving end, but equipment, which has taken the manufacturers valuable man-hours to make, is useless to the service until more man-hours are spent in repair.
Therefore watch this and thus save labour.
[Underlined] Q. FORM. [/underlined]
The Q Form has been amended and the old “U” has been broken down into “U.1” (awaiting spares, work held up) and “U.2” (awaiting spares but work proceeding). Up to now this Group has had a good record, so Equipment Officers should continue to keep both “U.1” and “U.2” out of the Q Form.
[Underlined] MECHANICAL SWEEPERS. [/underlined]
Instances are still occurring where Mechanical Sweepers are unserviceable for some considerable time owing to the delay in obtaining spares. Owing to the very acute rubber shortage it is essential that runways be swept regularly. All Bases should ensure that at least one set of brushes and other frequently required spares are held, and Equipment Officers should give the subject their personal attention.
[Underlined] SURPLUS FIRE CRASH TENDER. [/underlined]
Several Bases are holding one surplus Crash Tender for use within the Group in an emergency. When this is required it is frequently found that the vehicle is unserviceable and in consequence a Station is left with only one Crash Tender standing by, which is totally inadequate. It is essential that these vehicles are kept serviceable, and all demands for spares required to render vehicles serviceable are to be sent by I.O.R. signal and hastened where any undue delay occurs.
[Page break]
[Drawing] DECORATIONS
The following IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/S. R. HARTLEY CGM
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.E.P. OXBORROW DFC
F/O. B.J. DOBSON DFC
F/O. J.E. WHITE DFC
F/O. W.C. FREESTONE DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/L. D.R. STUBBS DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
P/O. P. AINLEY DFC
P/O. A.C. MCKELLAR DFC
SGT. L.J. CHAMPION DFM
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
P/O. M. MCNEILL DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
S/L. H.B. LOCKE, DFC DSO
S/L. S.M.P. PARKES DSO
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. C.W. KIPFER DFC
F/O. H.E. SAYEAU DFC
F/O. W.N. REDMAN DFC
F/L. M.H. PARRY AFC DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O. R.C. DAVIE DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O. P.N. HERBERT DFC
F/O. F.N. CHANDLER DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/S. C.H. STEWART DFM
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/W/C G.W. CURRY, DFC DSO
The following NON_IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.R. HANCOCK DFC
SGT. T.W. POWELL DFM
SGT. J.H. MCCREERY DFM
F/O. R.W. MATTHEWS DFC
P/O. P.E. PLOWRIGHT DFC
W/O. R. LAWSON DFC
F/O. S.C. MATTHEWS DFC
F/O. S.J. MANCEKIVELL, DFM DFC
F/O. J.S. MIDDLETON DFC
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/L. N.H. STEPHENSON DFC
P/O. E.P. BURDEN DFC
P/O. J. HALL DFC
P/O. J.S. DEAN DFC
P/O. W. FARADAY DFC
P/O. R.B. FARREN DFC
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
1st Lt. J.F. STEVENS DFC
F/O. A.V. PATCHETT DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
P/O. E. BERRY
F/O. J.C.D. GUTHRIE DFC
F/S. L. HOWARTH DFM
F/O. D.T. WATKINS DFC
P/O. G. EARNSHAW DFC
P/O. J.L. BENDIX DFC
W/O. G.W. MORREY DFC
P/O. J.H. COLE DFC
F/S. R. VICKERSTAFFE DFM
F/S. N.F. BACON DFM
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON. [/Underlined]
P/O. A.E. NICKLIN DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.R. ANDERSON, DFM DFC
F/L. J. BREAKLEY DFC
W/O. J.A. LEWIS DFC
W/O. T. DOWYER DFC
P/O. A.G. WILLIAMS DFC
F/S. E.A. DAVIDSON DFM
SGT. A. KANE DFM
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[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/S. J. HARRISON DFM
P/O. J.H. WILKINSON DFC
F/S. H.D.K. LEWIS DFM
P/O. J.W. SCOTT DFC
S/L. W.A.G. GALLIENNE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/L. C.A.S. DREW, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/S. B.A. MANNING DFM
F/S. F. COOPER DFM
S/L. J.F. MITCHELL D.F.C. BAR TO DFC
F/L. D.H. PIDDING, D.F.C. BAR TO DFC
W/O. C.A. RUSSELL DFC
F/L. R.W. WESTON DFC
F/S. N. MACHIN DFM
F/O. O. HALLIKAS DFC
F/O. A. DRINKALL DFC
F/L. J.N.C. WRIGHT, DRF. BAR TO DFC
P/O. G.K. CHAPMAN DFC
F/S. R.C.T. LODGE DFM
P/O. M. MACDONALD DFC
P/O. W WARBURTON DFC
F/O. G.J. LINDSAY DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O. W.M. REID DFC
F/S. R.C. WOOLLFORD DFM
F/S. D. BOLLAND DFM
F/S. H. TOWNSLEY DFM
P/O. G.D. HOOTON DFC
F/S. K.S. RANDLE DFM
P/O. C.W. LACY DFC
F/O. J.J. ROGERSON DFC
F/L. C.W. SHIRES DFC
W/O. J.T. STANTON, DFM DFC
F/O. R.L.C. LASHAM DFC
F/S. D.P. GANNINGS DFM
F/L. T.H. MACKEPEACE DFC
F/S. R.J. BOWEN DFM
F/O. B.J. LINDSAY DFC
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
W/O. E.K. PIERCY DFC
P/O. B.F. DURRANT DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.T.H. GIDDENS DFC
F/O. R.Y. KENYON DFC
F/S. D.A. DEAR DFM
F/S. W. CHARLESWORTH DFM
F/S. K.E. BOONE DFM
P/O. F.W. BLAKE DFC
P/O. C.A. SKINNER DFC
P/O. A.W. HALLAM DFC
P/O. S. JOHNSON DFC
F/O. R.K. ESSERY DFC
P/O. S.W. CARTER DFC
P/O. J.M. DENTON DFC
F/O. R.W. JEW
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON. [/underlined] (Contd.)
P/O. G.V. MALON DFC
P/O. D.G.J. GRIFFITHS DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.W. MUDDLE DFC
F/O. K. SCHULTZ DFC
F/O. E.T. PICKERD DFC
SGT. A.V. WING DFM
P/O. G.F. FLANAGAN DFC
F/O. J.D.H. BILLAM DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. H.C.J. BENTLEY DFC
F/O. B. HAWES DFC
F/O. A.T. YOUDAN DFC
P/O. J. WESLEY DFC
P/O. L.S. AINSWORTH DFC
F/O. D.L. HARRIS DFC
F/O. J.S.A. MARSHALL DFC
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/L. D. RODGER DFC
W/O. A. RUSHTON DFC
W/O. R. SMITH DFC
W/O. J.W. HUTTON DFC
F/O. S.R. CLARKE DFC
F/S. W. HUME DFM
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. N.D. KENNEDY DFC
F/O. K.R. MAKIN DFC
F/L. S.E.J. JONES, DFM DFC
F/S. T. FLEETWOOD DFM
F/S. P.V.J. LOWEN DFM
P/O. J.G. NOBLE DFC
F/S. T. AITKEN DFM
F/O. R.W. WOOD DFC
SGT. H. WATERSON DFM
SGT. A. MCINULTY DFM
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/L. L.C.E. De VIGNE DFC
F/O. A.E. RICHARDS DFC
S/L. R.F. ELLIOTT, DSO, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O. S.F. PARLATO DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/L. R.O. CULVERT, DFC & BAR BAR TO DFC
F/L. E.R. BUTLER, DFC & BAR BAR TO DFC
F/O, A. KUZMA DFC
P/O. D.W. ALLEN DFC
P/O. A.J. PAYNE DFC
P/O. A.J. LUCAS DFC
[Page break]
A TRIP TO RUSSIA
On the 11th September, 1944, Lancasters of 9 and 617 Squadrons together with two Liberators attached from Transport Command, took off for YAGODNIK, an airfield near Archangel. The Liberators re-fuelled at Lossiemouth before leaving, and the hospitality extended by this Station was very much appreciated by the ground staff who were passengers in these aircraft.
The weather at first was good, but when about 150 miles from Archangel considerable low cloud and rain were encountered. Aircraft flew just above tree tops over the most desolate country imaginable – lakes, forests and swamps. Map reading was impossible; weather conditions alone made this too difficult, and in addition it was found that maps of the area were inaccurate – many villages and even railway lines being omitted.
The Archangel area was reached after about 10 hours flying, and with endurance becoming low and with no radio aids available, it was necessary for aircraft to land quickly. Some were fortunate enough to locate airfields quickly, whilst others searched through cloud and heavy rain.
Several aircraft landed at a small airfield named KEG ISLAND. Some of the crews of these aircraft originally thought they had landed at YAGODNIK and were unable to find out the whereabouts of the other aircraft. For some time they thought they were the sole survivors of the force. Later, however, all aircraft were located, though in all six had crash landed. In spite of this nobody was hurt and in the weather conditions it must be considered miraculous that no lives were lost. It was a great tribute to the skill of the pilots and navigators that so many masterly landings were made.
The Russians had originally expected some 250 guests but last minute alterations had increased this to 325. In addition, the crews of the crashed aircraft had to be located and collected from outlying districts.
In the circumstances the Russians performed wonders in giving all available help. A major diversion in this country often causes somewhat of an upheaval, but the Russians placed transport aircraft at the disposal of the Commanding Officer and even dropped a parachutist to direct the crew of one aircraft which had crash landed in a morass. In this particular case the “blind led the blind” for a while as the guide lost his way!
Eventually all crews and serviceable aircraft collected at Yagodnik where accommodation and re-fuelling facilities existed. Yagodnik is an island and is in the middle of the river Dvina, about 20 miles from Archangel It can only be reached from that city by air or river. The accommodation consisted of a paddle steamer which was moored to the river bank, and several underground huts. These huts provide warmth in winter but the absence of any kind of ventilation and the fact that a large brick fireplace forms a major part of the accommodation leads to a degree of stuffiness difficult to bear, and appears to form a breeding ground for various forms of life. The first few nights produced a large number of bug eaten victims until a form of insert [sic] killer, generously given by some American friends in the this country, was used.
Entertainment was provided by the Russians in the form of cinema shows, dances, etc., and on one occasion a lecture on a Russian composer which started 55 minutes late, lasted for 75 minutes, and was a complete mystery from start to finish to the British members of the audience.
The mush publicised football match also took place and proved a huge success. A football match in Russia produces much ceremony including the exchange of bouquets by the opposing captains before the start of game, and a tune somewhat similar to “See the conquering hero comes” has to be played each time the home team scores a goal. Apparently it is also possible for
[Page break]
the weary player to be replaced by a reserve – or was it the fear of possible repercussions that caused two members to retire from the game and be replaced by the Commanding Officer and the local Station Commander? The latter was so fed with passes by his triumphant tam that a glancing blow off his knee which scored a goal must have caused him considerable relief as it enabled the game to be continued under normal conditions! In spite of all this our Allies showed that they thoroughly understood the game and were indeed very capable players.
The major job of servicing and re-fuelling the aircraft for the operation was tackled by the maintenance crews in a whole hearted manner – they worked for 48 hours almost without a break and their keeness and cheerfulness was what one would expect of such a grand team. It was refreshing to see all trades helping where help was most needed. The following instances will give some idea of what difficulties were overcome. With bowsers available it took exactly 18 hours to re-fuel the aircraft alone. A spare engine was carried in the Liberators and as no crane was available to remove this from the aircraft, a ramp of trees with blankets on top had to be built so that the engine could be slid down.
Meantime a Mosquito had arrived in Yagodnik for P.R.U. duties and after a favourable report from the pilot the operation took place on the 15th September.
Both take off and landing were in accordance with the usual 5 Group high traditions, 28 aircraft taking off in 23 minutes and 27 landing in 30 minutes – one aircraft having flown direct to U.K.
The details of the operation are given elsewhere. As aircraft became re-fuelled and serviceable they returned to the U.K., until finally the two Liberators remained and they were held up for about a week.
While waiting for their aircraft to be re-fuelled some of the crews went into Archangel by minesweeper and were entertained by the R.A.F. Mission there. This measure of hospitality extended to them can be gained by the fact that one member on his return decided to jump in the river fully clothed, in an endeavour to return to the city. The sobering influence of the Dvina soon dissuaded him.
The final return to the U.K. was made under variable but much better conditions than the outward journey.
Finally a few impressions of this Northern outpost of the U.S.S.R. as seen in a fleeting visit may be interesting. It is of course, quite impossible to form balanced judgements, or to provide a real comparison between social and economic conditions seen in Archangel and those to which we are accustomed in Great Britain. After all, Archangel is far to the North of the vast land mass which constitutes the U.S.S.R., and was for some period cut off from the rest of Russia by the Finnish-German advances. Bearing all this in mind, it can hardly be described as a health resort. There was not a great deal of food, the clothing of the civilians was poor, and the roads, houses, sanitation and drainage, the latter where they existed, were far below anything generally to be seen in this country. However, we found that the organisation to provide the essentials of war was good, and all the technical teams we encountered were capable and willing workers. The system of privilege is apparent; extra food and clothing are the reward of rank in the armed forces and of position in civil works. But even in the inferior living conditions at Archangel we found among the Russians an intense patriotism, and a belief in the future of Russia after the war. All Russians’ energies seem directed towards the future.
Our hosts, with the limited facilities at their disposal, did all they could for our comfort, and for this we were all very grateful.
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[Boxed] [Underlined] “V” GROUP NEWS” [/underlined]
The cover of this month’s News was designed by S/Ldr. N Floyd Wilson of Headquarters No. 5 Group. Each month the cover will be changed, and all artists in the Group are invited to submit specimen designs. The best design will be selected each month and will be adopted for the cover of the current issue. [/boxed]
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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V Group News, September 1944
5 Group News, September 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 26, September 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about operations, gardening, war effort, tactics, signals, air bombing, navigation, radar navigation, engineering, air sea rescue, photography, armament, war savings, gunnery, training, accidents, second thoughts for pilots, flying control, equipment, decorations and a trip to Russia.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-09
Contributor
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Anne-Marie Watson
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
56 printed sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MStephensonS1833673-160205-17
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Norway
Russia (Federation)
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Brest
France--Calais
France--Le Havre
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Stuttgart
Netherlands--Arnhem
Norway--Kåfjord (Troms fylke)
Russia (Federation)--Arkhangelʹskai︠a︡ oblastʹ
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-09
5 Group
617 Squadron
9 Squadron
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Conspicuous Gallantry Medal
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
flight engineer
fuelling
Gee
Gibson, Guy Penrose (1918-1944)
H2S
Lancaster
Master Bomber
mine laying
Mosquito
navigator
Oboe
Pathfinders
petrol bowser
pilot
radar
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
service vehicle
Tallboy
Tirpitz
training
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/408/7515/SChattertonJ159568v10407.1.jpg
1588af80feee77fe0e0b688059ebdeae
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/408/7515/SChattertonJ159568v10408.1.jpg
0456eff55aef53ff25609cdbdd278e7f
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Chatterton, John. 44 Squadron operations order book
Description
An account of the resource
Collection consists of 521 items which are mostly Operations orders, aircraft load and weight tables and bomb aimers briefings for 44 Squadron operations between January 1944 and April 1945. <br /><br />The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by M J Chatterton and catalogued by Nigel Huckins. <br /><br />This collection also contains items concerning Dewhurst Graaf and his crew, and Donald Neil McKechnie and his crew. Additional information on <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/109020/">Dewhurst Graaf</a> and <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/115642/">Donald Neil McKechnie</a> is available via the IBCC Losses Database.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-03-14
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Chatterton, J
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
DATE 27-9-44
K. [Underlined] KAISERSLAUTERN [/underlined]
Q.F.R.G.U. V.A.T.L.X.J.S. H.O.Y.P.M.
[Table of bomb loads]
PETROL 1600 1600 1600
DIISTRIBUTOR 15yds .15
T.V. 1000 1000 1000
BOMB WEIGHT 12.288. 8.300. 8.460.
[Table of All Up Weights]
[Table of Preselect]
[Table of aircraft heights] NIL
TIME OFF 2115. ZERO. 0100 H – H+2 H+2 - H+4
WINDOWS. 8 NEW + 2 OLD. or 18 OLD. NICKELS. - EFFORT. 200 +.
TARGET A.U.W. 60,000 56,000 56000. TARGET HEIGHT. 794’
BOMBING HEIGHTS. 4000 – [indecipherable] 5500
COLOUR FILM: F.G.M.J.A.O.T.V.
PRESET W S & D. Western 028/13 Eastern 285/31
Photo-flash – burst 2000’ above target level.
bottom A/C – 4000 – 4500.
[Page break]
[Table of aircraft height, heading, delay and wave with flash identified]
J.A.V.S.X. Western A.P.
[Underlined] 2 Winds [/underlined]
1st Easterly – Inc loads
2nd Westerly – Vector Wind
H – 8 Winds
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Bomb aimers briefing 27 September 1944 - Kaiserslautern.
Description
An account of the resource
Shows three bomb loads for five, seven and five aircraft respectively. Details distributor and preselection settings, Window, bombing heights, weights and other details. On the reverse a table showing aircraft number, height, heading and delay
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-09-27
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Two sides front form document partially filled in on the reverse handwritten
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Service material
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
SChattertonJ159568v10407,
SChattertonJ159568v10408
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-09-27
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Anne-Marie Watson
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
briefing
Window
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/376/6925/PHouriganM18030095.2.jpg
f4067095c4a41978993d5f172ce10959
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/376/6925/PHouriganM18030096.2.jpg
f23628c0f6da621da1a68caf8e0a1b1a
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Hourigan, Margaret
Margaret Hourigan
M Hourigan
Description
An account of the resource
158 items. An oral history interview with Margaret Hourigan (1922 - 2023, 889775 Royal Air Force) and 156 target photographs taken by 50 and 61 Squadron aircraft during 1944. Margaret Hourigan served in the Women's Auxiliary Air Force as a plotter with Fighter Command before being posted to RAF Waddington and RAF Skellingthorpe with Bomber Command.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Margaret Hourigan and catalogued by Trevor Hardcastle.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2019-04-16
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Hourigan,M
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Kaiserslautern
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-09-27
1944-09-28
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PHouriganM18030095, PHouriganM18030096
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-09-27
1944-09-28
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Description
An account of the resource
Target photograph of Kaiserslautern. Little detail visible, appears urban area, structures are visible. Captioned '5°F', '8B', '3036 SKELL.27/28.9.44.//NT.8" 4250 [arrow] 096° 0110 KAISERSLAUTERN 'A'.W.27X4.15secs.F/O AMEY.W.50.'. On the reverse '[underlined] F/O AMEY 27/28.9.44. KAISERLAUTERN [/underlined]'. 'Extra frame on B/D'.
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Hourigan, Margaret. Folder PHouriganM1803
50 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
RAF Skellingthorpe
target photograph
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Title
A name given to the resource
Kaiserslautern [place]
Description
An account of the resource
This page is an entry point for a place. Please use the links below to see all relevant documents available in the Archive.
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/167/2445/LAllenDJ1880966v1.1.pdf
9e5a668d1c670d39cf4e1ba2b8204224
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Allen, Derrick
Derrick Allen
D J Allen
Description
An account of the resource
75 items. The collection covers the career of Flight Sergeant Derrick John Allen (1880966 Royal Air Force) who was a mid-upper gunner on 467 Royal Australian Air Force Squadron at RAF Waddington in 1944-45. Collection contains his logbook, Royal Air Force documentation, notes on air gunners course and photographs of various aircrew. Collection also contains maps and photographs covering the loss of his Lancaster near Spa in Belgium from which he successfully bailed out on 2 November 1944. There is also an oral history interview with his family.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Judy Hodgson and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-08-30
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Allen, DJ
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Derrick Allen's flying log book for navigators, air bombers, air gunners, flight engineers
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LAllenDJ1880966v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Description
An account of the resource
Navigator’s, air bomber’s, air gunner’s and flight engineer’s flying log book for Flight Sergeant Derrick Allen air gunner, covering the period from 11 February 1944 to 25 April 1945. Detailing training and operations flown. He was stationed at London, RAF Bridlington, RAF Bridgnorth, RAF Pembrey, RAF Silverstone, RAF Wigsley, RAF Syerston, RAF Waddington, RAF Strubby, RAF Blyton, RAF Cardington, RAF St. Athan and RAF Spanhoe. Aircraft flown were, Anson, Wellington, Stirling, Lancaster and C-47. He flew a total of 19 operations with 467 Squadron, 6 daylight and 13 night, his aircraft was shot down on his ninth operation to Dusseldorf, when Pilot and Rear Gunner were killed, he abandoned aircraft. Targets were, Kaiserslautern, Wilhelmshaven, Bremen, Walcheren, Brunswick, Homberg, Dusseldorf, Ladbergen, Politz, Dresden, Chemnitz, Dortmund-Emms Canal, Sassnitz, Harburg, Essen, Komotau and Tonsberg. His pilots on operations were pilot Officer Landridge, Flight Lieutenant Evans and Flying Officer Rodinson.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Czech Republic
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Czech Republic--Chomutov
England--Bedfordshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--London
England--Northamptonshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Shropshire
England--Yorkshire
Germany--Essen
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Chemnitz
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Harburg (Landkreis)
Germany--Homberg (Kassel)
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Sassnitz
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Norway--Tønsberg
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Wales--Vale of Glamorgan
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1945
1944-09-27
1944-09-28
1944-10-05
1944-10-06
1944-10-07
1944-10-11
1944-10-14
1944-10-15
1944-10-30
1944-11-01
1944-11-02
1945-02-07
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-15
1945-03-03
1945-03-04
1945-03-06
1945-03-07
1945-03-08
1945-03-11
1945-04-18
1945-04-19
1945-04-25
1945-04-26
1654 HCU
17 OTU
467 Squadron
619 Squadron
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
bale out
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
C-47
Heavy Conversion Unit
Initial Training Wing
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Lancaster Mk 1
Lancaster Mk 3
Operational Training Unit
RAF Blyton
RAF Bridgnorth
RAF Bridlington
RAF Cardington
RAF Pembrey
RAF Silverstone
RAF Spanhoe
RAF St Athan
RAF Strubby
RAF Syerston
RAF Waddington
RAF Wigsley
shot down
Stirling
training
Wellington