1
25
38
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/189/2493/LCaseyJ2219470v1.1.pdf
620c98aafe151a45e5c4968e353df57d
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Casey, John
J Casey
John Casey
Description
An account of the resource
14 items. Collection contains an oral history interview with Sergeant John Casey (- 2016, 2217470, Royal Air Force), an escape map, logbook, service documentation, a wallet and photographs. John Casey served as an air gunner on 61 Squadron in 1944-45.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by John Casey and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-06-10
2015-11-19
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Casey, J
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
John Casey's flying log book for navigators, air bombers, air gunners and flight engineers
Description
An account of the resource
Navigators, air bombers, air gunners and flight engineers flying log book for Sergeant John Casey from 26 February 1944 to 8 October 1945. Detailing training schedule and operations flown. Served at 7 Air Gunnery School followed by training at 29 Operational Training Unit on Wellington, 1654 Heavy Conversion Unit on Stirling and No 5 Lancaster Finishing School. Aircraft flown were Anson, Martinet, Wellington, Stirling and Lancaster. He carried out a total of 22 daylight and night-time operations with 61 Squadron at RAF Skellingthorpe as an air gunner on the following targets in Germany, Netherlands, and Norway: Bergen, Bohlen, Dortmund-Ems Canal, Dresden, Flushing, Giessen, Heilbronn, Leuna, Lutzkendorf, Mittelland Canal, Munich, Nordhausen, Nuremberg, Politz, Rositz, Tønsberg and Würzburg. His pilot on operations was Flight Lieutenant Bain. The log book records a Cook's tour and Operation Dodge flights. Also contained is a newspaper cutting on the history of 61 Squadron and two pages of calculations.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LCaseyJ2219470v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1945
1944-10-19
1944-10-20
1944-10-23
1944-10-28
1944-10-29
1944-11-16
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-04
1944-12-05
1944-12-06
1944-12-07
1945-01-07
1945-01-08
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-01-16
1945-01-17
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-19
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-02-22
1945-02-24
1945-03-14
1945-03-15
1945-03-16
1945-03-17
1945-04-04
1945-04-08
1945-04-09
1945-04-25
1945-04-26
1945-05-16
1945-09-13
1945-09-15
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Norway
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Giessen (Hesse)
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Leuna
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nordhausen (Thuringia)
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Würzburg
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Norway--Bergen
Norway--Tønsberg
England--Lincolnshire
1654 HCU
29 OTU
61 Squadron
83 Squadron
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
Cook’s tour
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Martinet
Operation Dodge (1945)
Operational Training Unit
RAF Coningsby
RAF North Luffenham
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF Stormy Down
RAF Syerston
RAF Wigsley
Stirling
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/407/6865/LAnsellHT1893553v1.1.pdf
edfc366bd5e7a30081d45f021fab8420
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Ansell, Henry
Henry Ansell
H T Ansell
Description
An account of the resource
28 items. The collection concerns Sergeant Henry Thomas Ansell, DFM (b. 1925, 1893553 Royal Air Force) and contains his logbook, his release book, a school report, two German language documents and several photographs, his medals and other items. Henry Ansell served as a flight engineer with 61 Squadron and 83 Squadron Pathfinders.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Vicki Ansell and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-07-30
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Ansell, HT
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Harry Thomas Ansell's flying log book for flight engineers
Description
An account of the resource
The log book covers the training and operational duties of Flight Engineer Sergeant Harry Thomas Ansell, from 14 April 1944 to 24 May 1945. He trained at RAF Torquay, RAF St Athan, RAF Stockport and was stationed at RAF Wigsley, RAF Syerston, RAF Skellingthorpe and RAF Coningsby. Aircraft flown in were Stirling and Lancaster. He flew 34 operations with 61 Squadron, 15 daylight and 19 night, and 18 night operations with 83 Squadron. Targets in Belgium, France, Germany and Norway were Limoges, Prouville, Vitry, Doullens, Chalindrey, Villeneuve-St-Georges, Caen, Revigny, Courtrai, Kiel, Donges, Saint-Cyr, Lyons, Stuttgart, Cahienes, Joigny-Laroche, Pas de Calais, Bois de Cassan, Saint-Leu-d'Esserent, Secqueville, Châtellerault, Bordeaux, Rüsselsheim, Königsberg, Rollencourt, Brest, Le Havre, Darmstadt, Boulogne, Bremerhaven, Rheydt, Munich, Heilbronn, Glessen, Politz, Merseberg, Brux, Karlsruhe, Ladbergen, Dresden, Rositz, Gravenhorst, Bohlen, Horten Fiord, Molbis and Lutskendorf. His pilot on operations was Flight Lieutenant Inness.
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Norway
Great Britain
England--Buckinghamshire
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Devon
England--Greater Manchester
England--Lancashire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Yorkshire
Wales--Vale of Glamorgan
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Belgium--Kortrijk
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Brest
France--Caen
France--Calais
France--Chalindrey
France--Châtellerault
France--Creil
France--Doullens
France--Joigny
France--Le Havre
France--Limoges
France--L'Isle-Adam
France--Paris
France--Saint-Nazaire
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Hörstel
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Munich
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Rüsselsheim
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Wettin
Norway--Horten
Russia (Federation)--Kaliningrad (Kaliningradskai︠a︡ oblastʹ)
Germany--Böhlen
France--Lyon
Russia (Federation)
France--Bordeaux (Nouvelle-Aquitaine)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LAnsellHT1893553v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1945
1944-06-19
1944-06-20
1944-06-23
1944-06-24
1944-06-25
1944-06-27
1944-06-28
1944-06-29
1944-07-12
1944-07-13
1944-07-14
1944-07-15
1944-07-18
1944-07-19
1944-07-20
1944-07-21
1944-07-23
1944-07-24
1944-07-25
1944-07-26
1944-07-27
1944-07-28
1944-07-29
1944-07-30
1944-07-31
1944-08-01
1944-08-02
1944-08-05
1944-08-07
1944-08-08
1944-08-09
1944-08-10
1944-08-11
1944-08-12
1944-08-13
1944-08-14
1944-08-26
1944-08-27
1944-08-31
1944-09-05
1944-09-10
1944-09-11
1944-09-12
1944-09-13
1944-09-14
1944-09-18
1944-09-19
1944-09-20
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-04
1944-12-06
1944-12-10
1944-12-21
1944-12-22
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1945-01-16
1945-01-17
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-06
1945-02-07
1945-02-08
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-15
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-02-23
1945-02-24
1945-03-20
1945-03-21
1945-04-07
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944
1945
1654 HCU
61 Squadron
83 Squadron
aircrew
Bennett, Donald Clifford Tyndall (1910-1986)
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
bombing of the Pas de Calais V-1 sites (24/25 June 1944)
Distinguished Flying Medal
flight engineer
George VI, King of Great Britain (1895-1952)
Heavy Conversion Unit
Initial Training Wing
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Pathfinders
RAF Coningsby
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF St Athan
RAF Stockport
RAF Syerston
RAF Torquay
RAF Wigsley
Stirling
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/408/7366/SChattertonJ159568v10310.2.jpg
432a60e34f31043191f886a970dc15c5
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/408/7366/SChattertonJ159568v10311.2.jpg
ae25c3444c9fef4f81636692738771c7
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Chatterton, John. 44 Squadron operations order book
Description
An account of the resource
Collection consists of 521 items which are mostly Operations orders, aircraft load and weight tables and bomb aimers briefings for 44 Squadron operations between January 1944 and April 1945. <br /><br />The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by M J Chatterton and catalogued by Nigel Huckins. <br /><br />This collection also contains items concerning Dewhurst Graaf and his crew, and Donald Neil McKechnie and his crew. Additional information on <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/109020/">Dewhurst Graaf</a> and <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/115642/">Donald Neil McKechnie</a> is available via the IBCC Losses Database.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-03-14
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Chatterton, J
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[Underlined] HEILBRONN. [/underlined]
DATE 4-12-44.
BDEFGHJOP
ACQ RSTUVXY
[Table of bomb loads]
PETROL 1650 1650
DISTRIBUTOR .5- 15yds.
T.V. 1385 1000
BOMB WEIGHT [Deleted] 1385 1000 [/deleted] 11,985 12,272.
ALL UP. WEIGHT. [Deleted] 65,065 65,352 [/deleted] 64,705 64,992.
[Table of Preselect]
ZERO. 1900 H-H+5
15 heavy 18 light WINDOWS. Start 0700E Stop 0600E.
TIME TO TARGET. 3 hrs. [Deleted] TARGET A.U.W [/deleted]
BOMBING HEIGHTS. [Deleted] 6-7000 [/deleted] 11-14000
210lbs – Window BDEFGHJOACQ 15 heavy – “MC” (antifighter)
342lbs – Rest 18 heavy “A” (flak)
Nav. 1300
Capt. 1330
Main. 1400
[Page break]
[Underlined] No Yellows to cancel [/underlined] as they are being used to mark 56 Base marking base.
[Underlined] Marking [/underlined] 6 Mosquitoes.
H-11 Primary blind markers Green TI on centre of town.
H-9.7.5 Flares. Blind Visual.
Marking Point. Red TI assessed & backed up.
If innaccurate [sic] another R.T.I. will be dropped & controller will direct bombing on to it.
H-2 – Greens backed up [inserted] Red TI. [/inserted] if Marking Point cannot be found
If Greens innaccurate [sic] any built up area will be marked with Red TI’s.
W S & D H-5 - Adjust wind for bomb load carried.
12,500’
[Underlined] Sector. Height Overshoot [/underlined]
106-123 12,200-12,600 8secs.
Basic delay for ‘B’ LOAD.
6 secs.
Small Δ – [therefore symbol] accuracy to be stressed.
Reminder re levelling. Bombsights already levelled for 54,000lbs & must not be touched. Snag book is not being filled in correctly & some bomb aimers are not even putting their snags in the book!!!
NB [symbol] Crews must know the correct drift on bombing run – High winds.
Air Bombers [underlined] must [/underlined] bomb accurately on [underlined] correct heading [/underlined] & [underlined] with correct overshoot. [/underlined]
Aim centre bomb of stick on markers. [Underlined] ORBIT PORT [/underlined]
[Underlined] Bombing Instructions will be:- [/underlined]
Reds as planned
Greens backed up by Reds.
Reds direct.
Minimum Bombing Ht. 4000’.
Max T.O.T. 12 mins.
[Calculations]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Bomb aimers briefing 4 December 1944 - Heilbronn
Description
An account of the resource
Indicates two bomb loads, one for three the other for sixteen aircraft. Details weights, preselection settings and other information. At the bottom window information and briefing times. On the reverse, Mosquito marking with timings and bombing instructions and warnings as well as maximum bombing heights and time on target. At the bottom annotated weight calculations.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-12-04
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Two sides form document partially filled in on front and handwritten on reverse
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Service material
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
SChattertonJ159568v10310, SChattertonJ159568v10311
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Germany--Heilbronn
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-12-04
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Anne-Marie Watson
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
briefing
Mosquito
target indicator
Window
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany--Heilbronn
Title
A name given to the resource
Heilbronn [place]
Description
An account of the resource
This page is an entry point for a place. Please use the links below to see all relevant documents available in the Archive.
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/959/9400/PPopeKMJ18010057.2.jpg
301f7c4000c89426c6c40ea8b67aba24
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Pope, Kenneth. Album
Description
An account of the resource
79 items. The album concerns Sergeant Kenneth Malcom John Pope, (b. 1924, 1876733 Royal Air Force). He completed 32 operations as a flight engineer with 467 Squadron from RAF Waddington. The album contains his log book, photographs, letters, and newspaper cuttings about the operations he took part in.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Susan Elizabeth Kelly and catalogued by Trevor Hardcastle.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
K M J Pope
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018-02-15
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
Americans Take Saarlautern and Push on Beyond
R.A.F. DROP 3500 TONS OF SAAR SUPPLIES
BOMBERS IN GREAT STRENGTH, FOLLOWING A 36-HOUR NON-STOP ATTACK ON GERMANY, FLEW OUT OVER THE EAST COAST BEFORE IT WAS LIGHT TO-DAY, SHORTLY AFTER ALL THE GERMAN MEDIUM-WAVE STATIONS WERE OFF THE AIR.
More than 3500 tons of bombs were dropped by R.A.F. Bomber Command in last night’s attack on [underlined] “Heilbronn” [/underlined] and Karlsruhe-two railway centres which have been packed with supplies and reserves being rushed up to Saar.
Karlsruhe is the nearest large town to the south-western front,where the United States 7th Army is pounding the Nazi defences.
Both attacks began simultaneously. Bombing was concentrated, and large fires were seen.
[inserted] X [/inserted] At Heilbonn, fighters were up in great numbers and there were several combats.
Besides these two heavy attacks the transport centre of Hagen, some 15 miles south of Dortmund, was also bombed.
Returning crews reported that flames from Karlsruhe could be seen for 70 miles. “Three-quarters of a mile of solid fire.” was the description of the town given by a Canadian airman. Some jet-propelled enemy aircraft seen.
Nearly 4000 Allied bombers and fighters had blasted Nazi rail towns as the last of the big twin R.A.F. force left Reich territory last night.
[underlined]
Eleventh Operation
HEILBONN
Monday Night December 4th 1944
Airborne 6hrs 40mins.
[/underlined]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Eleventh operation Heilbronn
Description
An account of the resource
A handwritten note giving brief details of the operation and a relevant newspaper cutting titled 'American Take Saarlauten and push on beyond. R.A.F. drop 3500 tons on Saar supplies'.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PPopeKMJ18010057
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Germany--Heilbronn
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-12-04
1944-12-05
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One handwritten note and a newspaper cutting
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Andy Hamilton
bombing
Me 262
propaganda
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/105/9434/LAmbroseBG1604870v1.1.pdf
1a5e8468db59f1bd1c383f4c6c486278
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Ambrose, Basil
B G Ambrose
Basil G Ambrose
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-06-29
Description
An account of the resource
18 items. The collection consists of an oral history interview with Basil George Ambrose (1923 – 2016, 1604870 Royal Air Force), his log book, a page from his service book and 15 photographs. Basil Ambrose was a flight engineer flying Lancasters with 467 Squadron Royal Australian Air Force from RAF Waddington between September 1944 and March 1945 and with 617 Squadron from RAF Woodhall Spa.
The collection was been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Basil Ambrose and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Ambrose, BG
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Requires
A related resource that is required by the described resource to support its function, delivery, or coherence.
6 March 1942: Joined RAF as a trainee turner
Posted to RAF Sealand, qualified turner
Posted to RAF St Athan, Flight Engineer training
5 July – 8 September 1944: RAF Swinderby, 1660 HBCU, flying Stirling aircraft
8 September 1944: Promoted to Sergeant
22 – 26 September 1944: RAF Syerston, Lancaster Finishing School, flying Lancaster aircraft
29 September 1944 – 23 March 1945: RAF Waddington, 467 (RAAF) Squadron, flying Lancaster aircraft
Commissioned, promoted to Pilot Officer
November 1945 Promoted to Flying Officer
22 April 1945 – 9 January 1946: RAF Woodhall Spa, 617 Squadron, flying Lancaster aircraft
11 January 1946 – 15 April 1946: Detached with 617 Sqn to Digri, India Command
28 May – 1 July 1946: 617 Squadron RAF Binbrook
October 1946: 1604870 Flying Officer B.G. Ambrose released from Service
<p>Basil George Ambrose was born on 24<sup>th</sup> June 1923 in Derby Street, Reading, the youngest of five children. He attended Wilson Road School near Reading’s football Ground. In 1937, when he was just 14 years old, he left school and took up employment as an apprentice turner at the Pulsometer. He was paid five shillings a week, half of which he had to give back to pay for his indenture training.</p>
<p>Although engineering was a reserve occupation, on 6<sup>th</sup> March 1942, he was able to join the RAF as a trainee turner. On completion of training, he passed out as a Leading Aircraftsman and was posted to RAF Sealand. Whilst there, he applied, and was accepted, for Flight Engineer training at St Athan.</p>
<p>His first ever flight was memorable in that he took the opportunity to join an old family friend (a test pilot at St Athan) who was taking a Beaufighter up for an air test. While airbourne over the Bristol Channel he witnessed a long line of merchant ships, all nose to tail as far as the eye could see, the ships were readying for the for the D Day landings.</p>
<p>On 7the June 1944, he completed his Flight Engineer training and joined the HBCU at RAF Swinderby, before moving on to the Lancaster Finishing School at RAF Syerston. In September 1944, Sergeant Ambrose and his crew, now fully trained, joined 467 Squadron (RAAF) at RAF Waddington. </p>
<p>On just his second operational flight, tasked with destroying enemy field guns in Holland, his aircraft had to drop below the cloud base at just 4000 feet. Almost immediately, the aircraft alongside them was hit by ack-ack and went down in flames. Basil’s aircraft returned safely, but the mission ended in failure.</p>
<p>Just over a fortnight later, his first ever night operation proved even more eventful, one they were all very fortunate to survive. En-route to Brunswick, a fire in the cabin set alight the blackout curtains surrounding the pilot and navigator. Basil had to use two extinguishers to put out the fire. The events caused significant delay and at their estimated time of arrival on target, they were still approximately 40 miles away. By the time they got there all the other aircraft had gone through and were on their way home. Basil’s aircraft was now completely alone over the target and although they were able to drop their bombs successfully, the aircraft was illuminated by a whole cone of search lights from the ground, plus an enemy fighter aircraft was fast coming in from the port side. The skipper took evasive action by immediately putting the aircraft into a 5000 feet dive and Basil found himself pinned to the cabin ceiling by the ‘G’ force; conversely when the aircraft pulled out of the dive, he was forced down to the cabin floor. The evasive manoeuvre was repeated one more time before they managed to lose the searchlights and the fighter. The trip home was conducted at low level without further alarm. In all, Basil and his crew went on to record thirty operations together. </p>
<p>After 467 Squadron, Basil was commissioned as a Pilot Officer and was posted to 617 Squadron in April 1945. He was never to fly operationally again although with 617 Squadron he served for a brief period in Digri, India. Basil reached the rank of Flying Officer and was demobbed in 1948.</p>
<p>Basil returned to the Pulsometer and finally qualified as a turner. After a short period working in Birmingham, he settled in Reading with his wife Jean and two children. He continued to work in engineering, eventually moving into the engineering safety field. He retired from his final position of Chief Safety Advisor for Greater London Council in 1981.<a href="https://www.getreading.co.uk/news/local-news/war-veteran-still-swing-90-4802178"></a></p>
Chris Cann
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Basil Ambrose’s flying log book for navigators, air bombers, air gunners, flight engineers
Description
An account of the resource
Navigators, air bombers, air gunners and flight engineers flying log book for Basil Ambrose, flight engineer, covering the period from 5 July 1944 to 11 July 1946. Detailing engineers training, flying training and operations flown and post war operations. He was stationed at RAF St Athan, RAF Swinderby, RAF Syerston, RAF Waddington, RAF Woodhall Spa, RAF Binbrook and Digri India. Aircraft flown in were Stirling, Lancaster, Lincoln and Oxford. He flew a total of 30 Operations, seven day and 23 night with 467 squadron. He then flew Operation Exodus to Juvincourt and Reine, Operation Dodge to Bari and Operation Spasm to Berlin with 617 squadron, Targets were, Walcheren, Brunswick, Nuremberg, Flushing, Harburg, Duren, Dortmund-Ems Canal, Trondheim, Munich, Ems-Weser Canal, Wurzburg, Wesel, Heilbronn, Giessen, Urft dam, Houffalaize, Baux, Siegen, Karlsruhe and Bohlen. His pilot on operations was Flight Lieutenant Sheridan.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
37 colour prints
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LAmbroseBG1604870v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1945
1946
1944-10-14
1944-10-15
1944-10-19
1944-10-20
1944-10-23
1944-11-11
1944-11-16
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-11-23
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-04
1944-12-05
1944-12-06
1944-12-07
1944-12-09
1944-12-11
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1945-01-04
1945-01-05
1945-01-07
1945-01-08
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1945-01-16
1945-01-17
1945-02-01
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-04
1945-02-07
1945-02-08
1945-02-19
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-02-22
1945-02-24
1945-03-07
1945-03-08
1945-03-16
1945-03-17
1945-03-20
1945-03-21
1945-03-23
1945-03-24
1945-05-09
1945-05-10
1945-05-11
1945-10-05
1945-11-05
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Pakistan
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
Belgium--Houffalize
France--Les Baux-de-Provence
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Giessen (Hesse)
Germany--Harburg (Landkreis)
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Siegen
Germany--Wesel (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Germany--Würzburg
Italy--Bari
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Netherlands--Walcheren
Norway--Trondheim
Pakistan--Digri
Wales--Glamorgan
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Urft Dam
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
France--Juvincourt-et-Damary
1660 HCU
467 Squadron
617 Squadron
aircrew
bombing
flight engineer
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Lincoln
Operation Dodge (1945)
Operation Exodus (1945)
Oxford
RAF Binbrook
RAF St Athan
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
RAF Waddington
RAF Woodhall Spa
Stirling
training
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/959/9608/PPopeKMJ18010002.1.pdf
f8aae5d3c6237c614ac1634b002c65a3
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Pope, Kenneth. Album
Description
An account of the resource
79 items. The album concerns Sergeant Kenneth Malcom John Pope, (b. 1924, 1876733 Royal Air Force). He completed 32 operations as a flight engineer with 467 Squadron from RAF Waddington. The album contains his log book, photographs, letters, and newspaper cuttings about the operations he took part in.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Susan Elizabeth Kelly and catalogued by Trevor Hardcastle.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
K M J Pope
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018-02-15
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Kenneth Pope's flying log book for navigators, air bombers, air gunners and flight engineers
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PPopeKMJ18010002
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
Description
An account of the resource
Royal Air Force flying log book for Sergeant Kenneth Pope, flight engineer, covering the period 25 September 1944 to 17 May 1945, detailing training, and operations flown. He was stationed at RAF Winthorpe, RAF Syerston, RAF Waddington. Aircraft flown were the Stirling and Lancaster. He flew 32 operations with 467 Squadron, five night time and 27 daylight. Targets in Germany, Netherlands, Norway and Poland were Bremen, Knolle Dyke, Brunswick, Nuremberg, Flushing, Bergen, Duren, Dortmund Ems Canal, Trondheim, Munich, Heilbronn, Giessen, Erft Dam, Gdynia, Politz, Rheydt, Merseburg Leuna, Most, Siegen, Dresden, Rositz, Ems Weser Canal, Sassnitz, Harburg, Dortmund, Lutzendorf, Wurzburg, Wesel and Farge. <span>His pilots on operations were </span><span data-ccp-props="{"201341983":0,"335559739":200,"335559740":276}">Squadron Leader Deignan, Flight Lieutenant Cross and Flight Lieutenant Colley. </span>The log book is well annotated with information about diversions, feathered engines, anti-aircraft fire and fighters.
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Giessen (Hesse)
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Sassnitz
Germany--Schleiden (Kreis)
Germany--Siegen
Germany--Würzburg
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Norway--Bergen
Norway--Trondheim
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1945
1944-10-06
1944-10-07
1944-10-14
1944-10-15
1944-10-19
1944-10-20
1944-10-23
1944-10-28
1944-10-29
1944-11-16
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-11-23
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-04
1944-12-06
1944-12-07
1944-12-10
1944-12-11
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1944-12-19
1944-12-21
1944-12-22
1944-12-27
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1945-01-16
1945-01-17
1945-02-01
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-15
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-03-06
1945-03-07
1945-03-08
1945-03-12
1945-03-14
1945-03-15
1945-03-16
1945-03-17
1945-03-23
1945-03-24
1945-03-27
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
1661 HCU
467 Squadron
aircrew
anti-aircraft fire
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
flight engineer
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Lancaster Mk 1
Lancaster Mk 3
RAF Syerston
RAF Waddington
RAF Winthorpe
Stirling
training
-
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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/777/10527/MFalgateD136896-160407-040003.1.jpg
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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/777/10527/MFalgateD136896-160407-040005.1.jpg
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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/777/10527/MFalgateD136896-160407-040006.1.jpg
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115e120ea264f185981e02e04e92b040
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Falgate, Donald
D Falgate
Description
An account of the resource
69 items. The collection concerns Squadron Leader Don Falgate (136896 Royal Air Force) and consists of 68 pre-war, wartime, and post-war photographs and a handwritten detailed account of his tour. Don Falgate trained in Canada and flew operations as a bomb aimer with 463 Squadron from RAF Waddington.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Paul Falgate and catalogued by Trevor Hardcastle.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-04-07
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Falgate, D
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Details of tour
Description
An account of the resource
A handwritten account of Don Falgate's tour between 10 September 1944 and 7 April 1945. The account includes his observations and calculations about the percentage of aircraft lost. He carried out a total of 32 day and night-time operations on following targets in France, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Norway and Poland: Le Havre, Stuttgart, Boulogne, Bremerhaven, Rheydt, Wilhelmshaven, Bremen, Flushing, Brunswick, Nuremburg, Bergen, Homberg, Dusseldorf, Dortmund Ems Canal, Weser Ems Canal, Harburg, Duren, Heilbronn, Munich, Politz, Houffalize, Siegen, Bohlen, Mitteland Canal, Dortmund, Wesel, Nordhausen and Moblis (Leipzig).
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Don Falgate
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Six photocopied sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Personal research
Text. Diary
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MFalgateD136896-160407-04
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1945
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Belgium--Houffalize
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Le Havre
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Homberg (Kassel)
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nordhausen (Thuringia)
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Siegen
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Wesel (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Norway--Bergen
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
463 Squadron
bombing
Do 217
Gibson, Guy Penrose (1918-1944)
Master Bomber
Me 109
RAF Waddington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/286/17755/LKirbyH1637087v1.1.pdf
f5d1d4f26477231c35ba4d430b6f4fd0
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Kirby, Harold
Harold V A Kirby
H V A Kirby
Harold Kirby
H Kirby
Description
An account of the resource
Nine items. Two oral history interviews with Warrant Officer Harold Kirby (1923 - 2022, 1637087 Royal Air Force), his log book, photographs and documents. He flew operations as a flight engineer with 467, 97 and 156 Squadrons.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-07-10
2015-09-21
2016-06-11
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Kirby, H
Requires
A related resource that is required by the described resource to support its function, delivery, or coherence.
Warrant Officer Harold Kirby 1637087 was born in Kilbourne, Loncon in 1923, his job after leaving school was in the accounting department at London Electric Supplies. He initially tried to volunteer for the RAF but failed the medical, at that time. He was subsequently drafted in 1942. Skill training started with training as a Flight Mechanic, but during this was asked to volunteer to rain as a Flight Engineer. His first posting was as an Aircraft Fitter at No.460 Squadron, RAF Binbrook, although only for 6 months.
After Flight Engineer training at St Athan and then training on the Short Stirling and then the Lancaster with 1661 Heavy Conversion Unit at RAF Winthorpe, the first solo flight for the crew, the port landing gear would not lock, during the landing the gear collapsed, although there were no injuries.
First operational unit was No.467 Squadron at RAF Waddington a mainly Australian Squadron, the crew were here for July and August 1944, One operation 3/4th August 1944, to the V1 storage site at Trossy Saint Maximin had another bomber flying above their aircraft and dropping their bombs, one going through the wing, narrowly missing vital structures, this resulted in a gear up landing, due to hydraulic loss, but again there were no injuries resulting.
He was then posted along with the crew to No 97 Squadron, based at RAF Coningsby a pathfinder squadron, tasked to mark the targets for other aircraft,
In total two tours were completed before the end of the European war, after finishing as a Flight Engineer, Harold trained as a RADAR mechanic, before leaving the RAF.
Andy St.Denis
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Title
A name given to the resource
Harold Kirby’s flight engineers log book
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One colour photocopy of a booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LKirbyH1637087v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1944-07
1944-08
1945
1944-07-12
1944-07-13
1944-07-17
1944-07-20
1944-07-21
1944-07-22
1944-07-23
1944-07-24
1944-07-25
1944-07-26
1944-07-27
1944-07-28
1944-07-29
1944-07-30
1944-08-01
1944-08-02
1944-08-03
1944-08-19
1944-08-24
1944-08-25
1944-08-26
1944-08-27
1944-08-29
1944-08-30
1944-08-31
1944-09-18
1944-09-19
1944-09-23
1944-09-24
1944-10-14
1944-10-15
1944-10-28
1944-10-29
1944-11-06
1944-11-07
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-11-23
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-04
1944-12-05
1944-12-06
1944-12-07
1944-12-09
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1944-12-19
1945-01-07
1945-01-08
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-02-07
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-02-22
1945-03-03
1945-03-04
1945-03-05
1945-03-06
1945-03-07
1945-03-20
1945-03-21
1945-03-22
1945-04-08
1945-04-09
1945-04-16
1945-04-17
1945-04-18
1945-04-19
1945-04-25
1945-04-26
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Great Britain
Norway
Poland
Russia (Federation)
Belgium--Kortrijk
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Czech Republic--Chomutov
Czech Republic--Plzeň
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
France--Caen
France--Calmont
France--Creil Region
France--Givors
France--Hesdin
France--La Pallice
France--Lens
France--L'Isle-Adam
France--Villers-Bocage (Calvados)
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Giessen (Hesse)
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Leipzig Region
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Munich
Germany--Sassnitz
Germany--Stuttgart
Norway--Bergen
Norway--Tønsberg
Norway--Trondheim
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Russia (Federation)--Kaliningrad (Kaliningradskai︠a︡ oblastʹ)
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Description
An account of the resource
Flight engineers log book (Copy) for H Kirby covering the period from 26 April 1944 to 24 May 1945. Detailing his flying training and operations flown. He was stationed at RAF Winthorpe, RAF Syerston, RAF Waddington and RAF Coningsby. Aircraft flown in were Stirling and Lancaster. He flew a total of 44 operations. 6 daylight and 10 night operations with 467 squadron and 28 night operations with 97 squadron pathfinder force. Targets were Culmont Chalindrey, Caen, Courtrai, Kiel, Stuttgart, Givors, Cahagny, Siracourt, Cassan, Trossy St Maxim, La Pallice, Darmstadt, Konigsberg, Rollencourt, Mönchengladbach, Munster, Brunswick, Bergen, Dortmund-Ems Canal, Trondheim, Munich, Heilbronn, Giessen, Gdynia, Politz, Ladbergen, Dresden, Gravenhorst, Bohlen, Sassnitz, Hamburg, Lutzkendorf, Pilsen, Komatau and Tonsberg. His pilot on operations was Flying Officer Ryan.
1661 HCU
467 Squadron
8 Group
97 Squadron
aircrew
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
Bombing of Trossy St Maximin (3 August 1944)
crash
flight engineer
forced landing
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Lancaster Mk 3
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Pathfinders
pilot
RAF Coningsby
RAF Syerston
RAF Waddington
RAF Winthorpe
Stirling
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
V GROUP NEWS
[Stamp]
No 29. December, 1944
[Page break]
V GROUP NEWS
No 29. December, 1944.
[Page break]
Foreword by the A.O.C.
In this foreword I say Goodbye to 5 Group after two years of command, covering a period when the Group, in common with the other Groups in Bomber Command, has seen much hard fighting and very great damage inflicted on Germany. In particular, the Winter campaigns of 1942/43 and 1943/44 will be looked back upon in future years as outstanding examples of sustained courage and endurance on the part of the crews, some of whom made 12 or more attacks on Berlin alone. In those days neither the training organisation nor the factories could maintain a sufficient flow of crews and aircraft to keep pace with losses, and Squadrons were often 25% below establishment; but it was those campaigns, with the parallel campaigns by the U.S. forces, which were then arriving in strength, which finally put Germany on the defensive in the air. They forced her to turn over her production from bombers to fighters and to draw off for the protection of her industries many hundreds of aircraft which she badly needed to support her battle fronts. They marked the beginning of her decline as an Air Power.
During 1943 the new equipment which was beginning to come along was still far from perfect. There were no A.P.I’s to watch over course keeping; Gee and the D.R. Compass were still being introduced, and H.2.S. was yet to come; while systems of target marking were in their infancy. The past two years have, therefore, been periods of development and training which have had to be continued while a major campaign was in progress. In spite of the hard knocks which the Group has had to take, progress has been steady until, nowadays, targets are seldom missed when conditions are reasonably satisfactory.
The special technique against small targets which has been built up in this Group, based upon low level marking and off-set bombing, has achieved results which, in terms of bombs per acre over the target area, are unsurpassed by any other bombing force in the World. For this state of affairs, all in the Group share the credit – the aircrew for having down to a heavy training task at a time when they might hope that their period of arduous training lay behind them – the ground crews who have never failed to get an aircraft into the air if it was humanly possible to do so – the specialists in every branch for their ingenuity in servicing highly complicated mechanisms – and finally the whole body of personnel whose determination that the Group should never pull less than its full weight has been a great incentive to me personally and I believe to all the other senior officers throughout the Group.
It is, as a team, that the work has been done, and in saying Goodbye to its members, I include every officer, airman and airwoman in the Group. I thank you all for your extraordinary exertions over two difficult years and ask you to accept that the honour, which H.M. The King recently bestowed upon me as Air Officer Commanding, is a tribute to the growing list of targets destroyed and thus to the work of everyone in the Group.
I wish you all Good Luck.
V” group news. No. 29. December, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] tactics
December has been marked by the first serious attempts by the G.A.F. to intercept Bomber Command aircraft in daylight. On two separate occasions formations of 30 to 40 ME.109’s and FW.190’s attacked bomber gaggles and succeeded in destroying several bombers before the fighter escort came to the rescue. The enemy fighters showed a marked disinclination to attack the main gaggles which tightened formation when attacked, but concentrated on picking off stragglers and aircraft in the thinly spaced parts of the bomber stream. Although corkscrewing by stragglers proved effective in some cases, the main gaggles carried out no combat manoeuvres. Several fighters were claimed destroyed or damaged, including a claim by one mid-upper gunner of two destroyed – a good effort.
Although during these attacks some bombers fired a few Green Verey cartridges the fighter escorts never saw them. Crews should therefore in future continue firing Greens until it is obvious that the fighter escort has seen and engaged the enemy.
German night fighters are still expending considerable energy and fuel without achieving much success, and have again failed this month to offer effective opposition even to deep penetrations. There are signs, however, that the lack of success over Germany may tempt the enemy to resume intruder activity over this country. With the large number of aircraft now operating and with no IFF in use it will be very difficult to detect intruders returning with the main stream, particularly if the return route to the Group area is from the North Sea. Suitable action is being taken to deal with this danger, but crews must remain on the alert over this country, particularly when circling the airfield lights preparatory to landing, and should view with extreme suspicion any twin-engined aircraft seen, even if it is burning navigation lights.
V” group news. No. 29. December, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] operations
[Underlined] HEILBRONN – 4/5TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bombers:- Town - W/Cdr. Smith
Marshalling Yards – W/Cdr. Shorthouse.
A force of 292 aircraft took off to attack the town and marshalling yards. Nos. 53 and 55 Bases and 106 Squadron were detailed to attack the town. Aircraft were spread over an 85° sector, and crews were to aim at the red markers, delaying release as ordered.
No.56 Base was to attack the marshalling yards, which were to be marked with Yellow T.I., aircraft to aim at the T.I. and delay release dor4 seconds.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined]
[Underlined] TOWN [/underlined] Weather over the target varied between no cloud and 5/10ths alt. cu. at 12/14,000 feet. Illumination and marking went according to plan, and the marking was assessed as accurate. The markers cannot be plotted on the night photographs. An initial tendency for the bombing to undershoot was corrected by the Master Bomber, and a good sector attack developed. An area of 2000 X 1500 yards has been wiped out, and on the West side damage is severe and widespread. Only the outermost suburbs to the South and West have escaped lightly.
[Underlined] MARSHALLING YARDS [/underlined] One Yellow T.I. was assessed as 100 yards South of the Marking Point, but the Master Bomber was unable to distinguish it from flares burning on the ground, so did not issue any instructions. Crews also had difficulty in identifying the marker, and approximately 50% attacked the town instead. Subsequent reconnaissance has revealed only limited damage to the yards.
[Underlined] GIESSEN – 6/7TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Benjamin.
Target – Marshalling yards and town some 35 miles North of Frankfurt. Force 265 aircraft, the majority on the marshalling yards.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Normal marking and illumination were used. The marshalling yards were 1 1/2 miles South of the town, thus presenting a difficult marking problem. The solution was to select a common marking point to the South of the yards, and issue the marshalling yard force with two false wind vectors calculated to spread the bombs up the centre of the yard. The force on the town was to carry out normal overshoot procedure on a common heading.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Blind marking and illumination were good. One Red T.I. dropped visually is known to have been placed accurately on the marking point, while another has been plotted about 1 1/2 miles East of the town. It is apparent that the majority of crews attacked
“V” GROUP NEWS. No. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
the accurate T.I. while a small minority (which proved to be inexperienced crews) were attracted by the inaccurate marker. Photographs have shown that two sticks of incendiaries fell across the accurate T.I., one in the early stages of the attack, and another later. Only careless and slipshod bombing drill and failure to adhere strictly to briefing instructions could have been responsible for this.
Fortunately these loose sticks did not obliterate the accurate marker and a good concentration developed.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined]
[Underlined] MARSHALLING YARDS [/underlined] A heavy concentration fell on these yards, which almost entirely destroyed the round houses, and cause very considerable damage to rolling stock. At the Southern end of the yard, three tail bridges over the roadway were destroyed or very badly damaged, as were also the important fly-over bridges. The standard of concentration was equal to that on French marshalling yards.
[Underlined] TOWN [/underlined] The town has suffered heavily throughout, the main city area to the North being almost completely devastated by fire. Included in this devastation were a rubber works, the arsenal, the gas and water works, engineering works, and the power station.
[Underlined] URFT DAM – 8TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
The Urft Dam lies a few miles south of Duren. In the event of an enemy withdrawal, he might well blow up the dam and flood the surrounding country, thus seriously impeding Allied ground forces.
206 aircraft were despatched in an attempt to breech the crest of the dam overflow, and so forestall any action by the enemy at a critical period. The dam itself was too strong to be destroyed even by ‘Tallboy’ bombs.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] The main force were to attack in pairs of squadrons at five minutes [sic] intervals. Crews were to bomb visually.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Unfortunately 6 – 9/10ths cloud at 6 – 8,000 feet was encountered over the target, and only 128 aircraft identified and bombed. Due to weather conditions bombing was scattered and although hits were claimed, the dam was not breached.
[Underlined] URFT DAM – 11TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
This target was again attacked in daylight by 233 aircraft.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Similar to previous attack, though the overall T.O.T. was shorter. Aircraft carrying 12,000 lb bombs were to attack last.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Once again the weather for bombing was bad, cloud being 5 – 9/10ths at 6 – 8000 feet. 176 aircraft bombed through gaps in the cloud, and claimed hits. Army ground reports claim six hits on the spillway, bit the hoped for erosion had not taken place, although some reduction in the water level was apparent.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] OSLO FIORD – 13/14TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Benjamin.
Sixty-one aircraft of No.54 Base were detailed to attack enemy shipping in Oslo Fiord. The chief target was the cruiser Koln. It was known that this ship had been very active recently, but the chief difficulty lay in locating it, as it returned to different berths after each operation.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] No.54 Base provided their own illumination and marking. In the light of flares, Mosquitoes were to mark a selected position near the supposed anchorage of the ship, and the Lancasters were to aim visually.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] The target was reported to have moved North from the briefed position. This made visual identification extremely difficult, and bombing results were not observed. The force started to bomb in the vicinity of the proximity markers. On instructions from the Master Bomber, bombing was shifted to a large merchant vessel in the centre of the harbour. A little later, a cruiser believed to be the Koln was identified lying some two miles West of the marking point, and those crews who had not already bombed were ordered to attack the new target. Bomb splashes were observed round the cruiser, but no damage has been established.
[Underlined] MUNICH – 17/18TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Stubbs.
289 aircraft took off to attack this very important target, determined to atone for the last attack which was only partially successful. The illuminating and marking plan was normal, except that the visual Red T.I. were to be backed up with a White T.I. flashing ‘V’. The attack was to be in two man sectors, and bombing on the Red markers with overshoot as ordered.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather over the target was clear with good visibility. Marking and illumination went according to plan, and a good concentration of Red T.I. was achieved. Except for an initial stick of incendiaries which fell across the markers, crews reported good bombing and a successful sector attack. Although the town is of more substantial construction than other targets attacked successfully by this Group, day cover shows very considerable areas of severe damage spreading out from the main station, and covering the old centre of the town.
[Underlined] GDYNIA – 18/19TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/Cdr. Woodroffe.
This large Polish port is the main base for what remains of the elusive German Fleet, and at the time of the attack all except two of the larger operational units were present, as well as a large concentration of U-boats, and merchant shipping. 227 aircraft attacked the target.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] The target was out of range of Mosquitoes, so all marking was carried out by Lancasters. The target was to be illuminated blindly, and by the light of these flares a picked force of
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
the best bombing crews were to attack the pocket battleship LUTZOW visually. Marking for the main attack was to be a stick of Red and Green T.I. dropped visually at the South Western side of the docks. The Master Bomber was to select the most accurate of these T.I’s and instruct the main force to bomb it with a false wind vector.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather over the target was clear, but with moderate visibility and a smoke screen late in the attack. A few crews identified the LUTZOW and bombed her, and the remainder joined in the main attack. Illumination and marking was good, and the most Southerly T.I. was accurately backed up. Due, however, to an error of calculation before take-off (a reciprocal wind was used), the Master Bomber’s navigator issued a strong wind vector, and the main weight of the attack fell to the North and West of the berth where the main naval units were lying. Although day photographs show no damage to the main fleet, and old SCHLESIEN class battleship is down by the stern, and damage is visible to warehouses, floating docks and merchant shipping.
Instead of an outstanding success the Group achieved some slight damage incommensurate with the weight of the attack. This attack affords a good example, which all should note, of the far reaching effect of small mistakes.
[Underlined] POLITZ – 21/22ND DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/Cdr. Woodroffe.
207 aircraft took off to attack the synthetic oil plant, one of the most important and most heavily defended targets in Germany. It had already been attacked by American heavy bombers, but was back in full production at the time of the attack.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] The target was to be marked blindly with Yellow T.I. and White flashing ‘V’. In the light of flares, the marking point was to be marked with a stick of Red and Green T.I. The Master Bomber was to pick out the most suitable T.I. and order main force to bomb it with a false wind vector set on the bombsight.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather at the target was clear, but an extensive smoke screen was in action which made visual identification of the target very difficult. In addition to this, a number of flares did not light until they struck the ground, and others ignited just above the ground. These were confused with the Yellow proximity T.I. and added still further to the difficulties of the Master Bomber and visual markers. Nevertheless, Marker I, identifying what he considered to be the marking point, dropped his stick of Red and Green T.I’s. The Master Bomber called for an assessment, and three separate and independent assessments were made, two of 200 yards North, and one of 200 yards N.E. On the basis of this, the Master Bomber instructed Link I to work out a wind vector assuming the T.I’s to be 300 yards North of the marking point. This was then issued, and the main force called in to attack.
Night photographs show that the markers were centred some 2,000 yards North of the target and the main weight of the bombing was displaced accordingly.
The bomb aimer of the marker aircraft which dropped the stick of Red and Green T.I’s claims to have identified visually the marking point in relation to three well defined pin points, and there is no evidence to show why the markers fell so far North.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] ST. VITH – 26TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by 8 (P.F.F.) Group.
The target was a concentration of armour, troops and supplies inside the salient made by the new German thrust on the Western Front. Conditions for take-off were bad with very poor visibility, and only 26 aircraft took off for the attack.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Target was to be marked by Oboe aircraft with Red T.I, backed up with salvoes of Red and Green T.I. Bombing was to be direct on the markers, or as ordered by the Master Bomber.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Crews reported marking accurate and on time, and bombing was well concentrated.
[Underlined] RHEYDT – 27TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by 8 (P.F.F.) Group.
44 aircraft took off in conditions of poor visibility to attack the marshalling yards South of Munchen Gladbach, which were handling a large volume of military traffic for the German thrust on the Western Front.
[Underlined] PLAN] [/underlined] The method was controlled Oboe ground marking. The aiming point was to be marked initially with Red T.I., backed up with salvoes of Red and Green T.I. A Master Bomber was to direct the bombing.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather over the target was clear, and the first wave had no difficulty in identifying visually. The target was soon covered in a dense pall of smoke which tended to obscure the markers, but all crews reported a good concentration of bombing. P.R.U. cover shows severe damage in the yards, with a slight spread of bombing into the town area.
[Underlined] OSLO FIORD – 28/29TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bombers: S/Ldr. Benjamin and W/Cdr. Petty.
Two forces totalling 67 aircraft took off to attack shipping in Oslo Fiord. The larger force had for its target the cruiser Koln, lying off Horten on the West side of the Fiord, and the secondary force was to bomb any shipping seen off Moss on the Eastern shore.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Due to the very bright moon it was decided to dispense with flare illumination. The marking force was to drop Wanganui flares and Flame Floats near any large vessel seen, and the main force was to attack visually, running up-moon.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather over the target area was clear, but a thin layer of cloud at 15/20,000 feet diffused the moonlight, and made deceptive shadows on the water. Neither force could identify shipping clearly, but several large ships were bombed with unobserved results. One large merchantman off Moss may have been damaged by several near misses, and a small ship seen on the early night photographs had disappeared by the close of the attack.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] HOUFFALIZE – 30/31ST DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
The target was a concentration of enemy armour, troops and supplies concentrated In and around a village a few miles North of Bastogne. 156 aircraft took off for an attack in the early hours of the morning.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] The aiming point was to be marked with Red T.I. by Oboe aircraft, and crews were ordered to bomb direct. Due to the proximity of friendly troops, crews were ordered not to bomb unless the Red T.I. were positively identified.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] 5 – 8/10ths cloud was encountered at the target, and only 90 aircraft bombed, reporting a good concentration of bombing around the markers. The remaining aircraft were unable to identify the Red T.I. so brought their bombs back to Base, as ordered.
[Underlined] OSLO FIORD – 31ST DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
A force of 28 aircraft took off in search of shipping, especially the cruiser Koln, in the Fiord, including 12 aircraft of No.617 Squadron carrying 12,000 lb Tallboy bombs.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Marker aircraft were to illuminate the area and mark the ships and cruiser with Wanganui Flares and Flame Floats. Bombing was to be visual in the light of further flares. The Tallboy bombs were fused .5 seconds delay so that they would explode 100 feet under water. The remaining aircraft carried 1000 lb MC/GP bombs fused TD .025.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather over the target area was clear, and the cruiser, together with several merchantmen were claimed as identified. The cruiser was under way during the attack, which made marking and bombing very difficult. Results of the attack on the cruiser were unobserved, but a near miss on a large ship by a Tallboy swung her 90° to starboard and brought her to a standstill.
[Underlined] SPECIAL OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] IJMUIDEN – 15TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
The target was the concrete E/R boat pens, and was attacked by No.617 Squadron carrying 12,000 lb Tallboy bombs. Hits were obtained and the pens suffered further severe damage.
[Underlined] ROTTERDAM – 29TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
No.617 Squadron carried out another precision attack with 12,000 lb Tallboy bombs, the target being the concrete E. boat pens. Crews reported concentrated bombing, and P.R.U. cover confirms a heavy concentration of craters on and around the target, and two out of the three sections of the pens have been severely damaged by direct hits.
[Underlined] OSLO – 31ST DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
No.627 Squadron celebrated New Year’s Eve by a pinpoint attack by 12 aircraft on the Gestapo Headquarters in Oslo. The attack
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
was carried out in two waves of six aircraft, and all the first wave reported successful bombing. The second wave was hampered by smoke and dust from the bomb bursts, but two aircraft identified the target and bombed. Flak was intense and all the aircraft were hit, but returned to base safely. Rumours current in Stockholm suggest that the attack was highly successful.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Diagram] gardening
Unfavourable weather caused many operations to be cancelled at the beginning of the month, but when conditions improved on the 14th December the Group Gardeners ‘set to’ at such a pace that our previous record of 520 vegetables was in danger of being beaten before the end of the year.
Reviewing the month’s activity, all Gardeners have been most decidedly successful in planting 415 vegetables by 84 sorties in little over a fortnight. This total, 35.6% of the Command effort (1162), places 5 Group well in the can of Gardening operations, and is a commendable achievement befitting the end of a hard but memorable year of war.
[Underlined] 55 BASE [/underlined]
55 Base evenly distributed their effort by most Squadrons operating nine sorties each, visiting a selection of Kattegat and Eastern Baltic areas. On one occasion this was combined with a Group bombing force on an important Naval Base, which, in conjunction with 106 Squadron’s lay, a few days before, produced some highly satisfactory results, denying the use of the Port to the enemy and closing his Exercise Areas for U-boats and surface craft outside. Southern Norway also received attention in co-operation with other Groups, directed primarily against the movement of troops and material for the Wehrmacht from Norway to Denmark. There is conclusive evidence to show that shipping in the Fjords was seriously held up. The closing of the main ports and the consequent dislocation of traffic, had an even greater importance than the actual number of casualties caused.
[Underlined] 54 BASE. [/underlined]
54 Base have surpassed previous records by the excellent performance of 106 Squadron and the Mosquitos of 627 Squadron.
[Underlined] Fine Work by Metheringham. [/underlined]
R.A.F. Station, Metheringham, have repeatedly succeeded in lifting eleven maximum loads under difficult conditions, and on one occasion raised their record to fifteen Gardeners loaded at short notice and ready by ‘take-off’ time. These results cannot be obtained without the co-operation and hard work of the Ground and Armament staffs, who are to be congratulated on a fine month’s work.
[Underlined] 174 Vegetables Planted by a Single Squadron. [/underlined]
106 Squadron have had the busiest month of any Gardening Squadron on record, and have successfully planted a total of 174 vegetables for 36 sorties.
[Underlined] An Outstanding Operation. [/underlined]
Quite the most outstanding operation performed by 106 Squadron was their lone visit to the Eastern Baltic in the Privet and Spinach areas, when 15 Gardeners delivered their loads off an enemy port on a round trip of 1810 miles. Taking into consideration that no other Gardeners were in operation on this night, it stands as one of the greatest Squadron penetrations, and all who took part are to be congratulated on their effort.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GARDENING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] Mosquitos. [/underlined]
627 Squadron were able to perform their first operation with Mosquitos on the 29th December, when Gardeners were briefed for an important river target, high on the priority list. Four Gardeners were very successful in planting their vegetables in the correct area without opposition, while three others unfortunately had difficulty in the area and returned with their loads. This unusual method of Gardening promises well for the future, as specially selected areas can be planted where it is bound to cause the greatest inconvenience and damage to enemy traffic. The results of this small scale planting were most effectively obtained for the cost of eight Vegetables. Time, opportunity and weather permitting, will tell its own story with regard to the menacing effects of Mosquito Gardening in the forthcoming year.
[Underlined] SQUADRON SORTIES. [/underlined]
[Table of Gardening Sorties by Squadron]
[Underlined] 5 GROUP CALENDAR – 1944. VEGETABLES SUCCESSFULLY PLANTED [/underlined]
January 25
February Nil
March Nil
April 388
May 520
June 30
July 64
August 260
Sept. 77
October 316
November 126
December 415
[Underlined] Total Planted – 2221 [/underlined]
[Underlined] GROUP MONTHLY SUMMARIES – DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
No.5 Group 415
No.6 Group 232
No.1 Group 212
No.3 Group 168
No.4 Group 135
[Underlined] GARDENING POINTS. [/underlined]
(i) Only one Vegetable had to be jettisoned “Safe”. This was done in the correct manner.
(ii) All Gardeners unable to pin-point their target by H2S or ‘Visual’ returned with their load in the correct manner, or laid in Secondary Gardens.
(iii) 97.4% of the Vegetables dropped were planted successfully.
(iv) 12 Gardening areas were visited this month, covering a mileage flown of 98,230 miles in 7 nights.
[Underlined] CONCLUSION. [/underlined]
Although it is difficult to appreciate the results of our efforts without conclusive proof of sinkings or damage, it is firmly believed that many plantings have brought great success. It is estimated that at present the rate of sinking and/or damage, to enemy ships stands at 46 Vegetables per ship. It can therefore be satisfactorily assessed that, by planting 2221 Vegetables in the past twelve months, 5 Group alone have accounted for no less than [underlined] 48 ships SUNK [/underlined] or [underlined] DAMAGED. [/underlined] This figure gives at least one ship per week, and does not take into account the dislocation of shipping caused through closed ports, ships waiting to be discharged, extensive minesweeping operations and heavy
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GARDENING. [/underlined]
repair work, combined with the feeling that it will be for ever unsafe to travel at sea until the bitter struggle ceases.
In conclusion it may be safely be said that it has been a splendid Gardening Year, and that all Gardeners have indeed maintained their high standard of efficiency; let us continue to do so, and face the year of 1045 with ever increasing zeal to destroy and annoy our enemy’s shipping.
[Underlined] THE FOLLOWING CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN REPORTED. [/underlined]
A German steamer was mined and sunk five miles SW of South Langeland about 15th November, 1944.
German BRYNGE was mined and sunk in Kalundborg Fyord in Summer of 1942. This ship was reported as mined in July 1941.
German MAGDELINE VINNEN (4594 G.T.) was in dock in November, 1944, for extensive repairs after mining.
German TELDE was under repair after being mined. This ship was reported as mined on 13th October, 1943.
Danisg VIBORG (2028 G.T.) was mined (i) on 1st September, 1944, (ii) on 17th September, 1944. The vessel reached port under her own power and as far as can be seen she is undamaged.
A Danish broadcast of 13th December, 1944, reported that wreckage of the motor vessel GRETE (51 G.T) was found North of Laeso in the Kattegat.
The Danish PHONIX (895 G.T.) struck a mine and grounded off Hals on 4th November, 1944.
An unidentified German vessel was also damaged by a mine off Hals on 4th November, 1944.
The German steamer CONSTANZA was heavily damaged by a mine off Kullen on 1st December, 1944.
Several overlapping reports give the following casualties in Oslo Fjord during November, 1944:-
(a) A tug mined and sunk in Horten Inner harbour on 29th November.
(b) The SVEIN (119 G.T.) damaged by a mine off Gulholmen on 16th November.
(c) Two M.T.B’s sunk by mines in the harbour at Horten on 29th November.
(d) A small merchant ship mined and sunk near Veslos, Horten.
An unidentified Finnish vessel of about 1000 G.T. was damaged by a mine in Oslo Fjord on 14th December, 1944.
A Swedish broadcast on 18th December reported that the Norwegian EGORVUS arrived at Bergen on 4th December. The ship was badly damaged aft, probably by a mine.
A German ship HERMINA was sunk by a mine in Stettiner Haff on 19th August, 1944.
The German S.S. ARION (2297 G.T.) was damaged by a mine near Nordenham in the Weser estuary during October, 1944.
The German hospital ship MONTE ROSE (13,882 G.T.) arrived Moss in Oslo Fjord on 12th November following repairs at Akers to make good damage caused by mining.
The Norwegian NINA (1,487 G.T.) was damaged by a mine off Schultzegrund on 27th October, 1944.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] signals
1944 was a memorable year in the Signals life of the Group, and we can look back with satisfaction on such accomplishments as the general installation of V.H.F. R/T equipment and Loran into all aircraft in the Group; the improvements obtained by the Coningsby Radar Development Party in the performance of H2S Mark III; and the evolution of the ideal technique of W/T control in the target area. Let us take each of these four items in turn, and see if there are any lessons to be learnt.
[Underlined] V.H.F. R/T. [/underlined]
When No.617 Squadron were carrying out training for their famous attack on the German Dams, it became obvious that the existing bomber R/T (T.R.1196) was incapable of providing the efficient inter-aircraft R/T communication required, owing to severe interference experienced at night on the frequency band used. The V.H.F. R/T set T.R.1143 was therefore fitted, and gave excellent results. V.H.F. R/T was used by 617 Squadron for several other special operations. In April, 1944, 5 Group began operating as a separate force on special targets – carrying out their own marking and controlling. It was decided that aircraft of the Illuminating and Controlling team should be equipped with V.H.F. R/T and the remainder of the force be controlled by W/T.
[underlined] H2S Interference. [/underlined]
All Lancaster aircraft of Nos.83 and 97 Squadrons were, therefore, equipped with T.R.1143 V.H.F. R/T sets. This was the first occasion on which V.H.F. R/T sets had been fitted to aircraft carrying the H2S equipment, and on the first operation it was found that very severe interference was caused to the V.H.F. R/T by the H2S. Test proved that the interference was being picked up by the base of the V.H.F. aerial which protruded through the aircraft skin near the H2S set. All V.H.F. aerials were immediately mounted outside the aircraft skin and this cured the trouble.
[Underlined] Main Force Fitting Programme. [/underlined]
In June 1944 it was decided to fit all the remaining aircraft of 5 Group with V.H.F. R/T, and by the end of July this fitting programme was completed – thanks to the good work of a small 26 Group fitting party, and to the enthusiastic support of individual Squadron Signal Sections.
[Underlined] Removal of S.B.A. [/underlined]
To ease the burden on these sections and to put an end to much useless waste of energy and material, S.B.A. equipment was removed from all 5 Group aircraft.
[Underlined] Inadvertent Radiation of Intercomm. [/underlined]
Airborne R/T equipment is normally operated by the pilot, and he must be able to change from receive to transmit with the
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
minimum of trouble. A small “press to speak” switch is therefore mounted on the control wheel, the mere pressing of which actuates a relay which causes the V.H.F. R/T to radiate. Occasionally relays come out of adjustment and occasionally pilots squeeze the “press to speak” switch unknowingly. It is not surprising, therefore, that we soon had cases of crew intercomm. being radiated continuously in the target area – almost completely ruining the control R/T. The ease with which the unwitting culprits were tracked down by their nicknames indicated a somewhat lax crew discipline.
The first countermeasure was an order to the effect that all transmitter crystals were to be removed from main force aircraft. This action proved to be an effective cure, but placed an added burden on the Wireless Mechanics. Bardney produced the answer – the fitting of a simple switch in the transmitter H.T. circuit – accessible from inside the aircraft. In all main force aircraft this switch is sealed in the off position after each D.I. check. In aircraft which may have to transmit the switch is placed in the on position. This scheme still left 20 or 30 aircraft liable to radiate intercom., and in spite of careful briefing and especial care of relays, the inevitable occurred and another operation was nearly ruined by one of the Illuminating Force radiating intercom. throughout the attack. Woodhall Spa produced the cure this time in the shape of a neon indicator which illuminated the words “Check VHF” everytime [sic] the V.H.F. R/T set was in the transmit condition.
[Underlined] Enemy Freya Interference. [/underlined]
During an attack in September, unusually severe interference was experienced from enemy Freya transmissions occurring on our V.H.F. R/T frequencies. With the prospect of an increasing number of operations over Freya Territory, this interference constituted a serious threat, and Headquarters, Bomber Command, made immediate arrangements for R.A.E. Farnborough to find a cure. Tests soon proved that the inclusion of a simple device known as a “series limitor” would completely eliminate Freya interference.
[Underlined] All aircraft change over to American SCR.522 sets. [/underlined]
Fortunately for 5 Group this modification coincided with the decision of higher authority to refit all our aircraft with the American V.H.F. R/T set SCR.552. This new set was already fitted with the series limitor. During the night of the 16th October the colossal task of setting up and changing 350 aircraft V.H.F. R/T sets was accomplished without a hitch. All pilots expressed themselves as highly satisfied with the excellent performance of the American sets, but there was a general complaint regarding the fact that the incoming V.H.F. R/T signals tended to swamp crew intercom. We were told to adjust the pre-set volume control in the set!
[Underlined] Effect of Icing on V.H.F. R/T Aerials. [/underlined]
The advent of winter and resulting increase in icing risks was brought home on the night 19/20th October when a large number of V.H.F. R/T aerials broke off. Our friends at R.A.E. once more came into the breach and quickly produced a modified form of mounting for the whip aerials so that they really could whip and thus prevent ice accretion. All aircraft are now being so modified as fast as the necessary parts arrive.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] Pilots’ Manual Volume Control. [/underlined]
No matter how carefully the pre-set volume control was adjusted it was found that it was impossible to cater for all requirements, and pilots continued to complain of the loud V.H.F. R/T signals jamming vital crew intercom. As a result of a unanimous demand from Bases made at the November Group Signals Conference, a number of volume controls were received for trial. These trials resulted in an immediate plea for general fitting throughout all Group aircraft, and this was acceded to.
[Underlined] R/T Speech Training. [/underlined]
The best R/T equipment – like the ordinary trunk telephone must be met half way with properly articulated speech. The average airman does not possess a natural telephone voice but the excellent R/T speech training unit at Woodlands, Stanmore, soon remedies this. During 1944 [underlined] 140 [/underlined] pilots of 5 Group have benefited from the instruction given by this School.
[Underlined] FINALE. [/underlined]
The closing days of 1944 thus found the final chapter of our V.H.F. R/T story completed – a pilots’ volume control – no more inadvertent radiation of intercom. – no more Freya or H2S interference – no more broken aerials – just perfectly clear R/T at a strength to suit all pilots.
It has been an interesting story and it is hoped that those about to sample the joys of V.H.F. R/T in bomber aircraft will benefit from our experiences.
[Underlined] THE DEVELOPMENT OF W/T CONTROL TECHNIQUE. [/underlined]
At first sight it would appear to be a simple matter to arrange for one aircraft to control 250 other aircraft in the target area by W/T. The T.1154/R.1155 W/T equipment carried by our Lancasters is very efficient and easy to manipulate, and the W/T frequencies available to the Group are as clear of interference as one can expect these days. It was found by grim experience, however, that the accuracy of tuning by the average operator was below the standard required for control purposes. On more than one occasion, we regret to say, the control operator was as much as 30 kc/s off frequency – with the result that few aircraft received the control signals.
[Underlined] Crystal Monitor. [/underlined]
It was found that the only certain way of ensuring that the control operator was precisely on frequency was to resurrect the crystal monitor type 2, and make him tune the transmitter by plugging his phones into the crystal monitor and tuning his transmitter to the dead space.
[Underlined] Crystal Controlled Transmitters. [/underlined]
This scheme proved a complete cure, but was rather cumbersome and profiting by Binbrook’s experiments, a number of Controllers’ W/T transmitters were modified for crystal control. All that was necessary was to plug the appropriate crystal into the master oscillator grid circuit. This certainly simplified the tuning problem, but deprived the operator of listening-through facilities, and also his ability to hear his own morse. This latter failing resulted in the transmission of poor morse, so the scheme was abandoned and we reverted to the crystal monitor.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] Transmission of Perfect Morse. [/underlined]
The job of finding W/T operators capable of transmitting perfect morse under rather nerve wracking conditions was slightly more difficult that the problem of accurate tuning. Operators who produced copy-book morse in the Squadron Training Room were sometimes found to possess nerves when they remembered that 250 other operators and several ground stations including Group Headquarters were hanging on every dot they made. A special test for Controller Operators was therefore introduced, covering morse, tuning ability, and correct procedure. During 1944, a total of 170 W/T Operators in the Group successfully passed the rigorous test, and many of these operators have since proved themselves on actual controlled operations.
[Underlined] Control Procedure. [/underlined]
To ensure that all aircraft W/T receivers are accurately tuned, the control operator transmits six callsigns a few minutes before target time. This transmission also enables the deputy control operator to check the tuning, and also to take over control if the transmissions are not heard. Thereafter throughout the attack, the control operator transmits two callsigns every minute unless control code signals are being handled. This scheme was evolved to enable W/T operators to concentrate on their tail warning device without missing any W/T signals.
[Underlined] Control Code. [/underlined]
To ensure speed and security, a special three-letter code covering all eventualities likely to arise during the illuminating, locating, marking and destroying of targets was evolved. A new code is used for each operation.
[Underlined] Deliberate Enemy Jamming. [/underlined]
To counter possible attempts by the enemy to jam the control frequency, an elaborate system of alternative frequencies and W/T guards is laid on for each operation, but happily, so far (touching wood) we have only been ‘jostled’ into doing this on two occasions and each time the scheme worked satisfactorily. We now realise just how effective 100 Group’s Countermeasure ‘Jostle’ really is!
[Underlined] Enemy Spoofing. [/underlined]
The Hun is quite capable of attempting to spoil a controlled attack by putting out spoof transmissions on our frequencies. To counter such attempts operators are reminded of the challenge procedure used with SD.0182 verification tables. No such attempt has, however, ever been made.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined]
With the experience of 170 successful controlled attacks behind us in 1944, it can be said that we now have a system which is guaranteed to produce excellent morse, precisely on frequency and at the exact time required. It has resulted in the birth of a brand of wireless operator of an efficiency far exceeding that attained in the old days of perpetual W/T silence. The never failing manner in which diversion signals, wind messages and ‘target attacked’ signals are handled reflects the effect which the 5 Group Signals procedure has had on its wireless operators. Their morale was never higher and their keenness never greater. They are a credit to the Radio Schools, O.T.U’s and Conversion Units who produced them. May they keep it up in 1945.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] H.2.S. MARK III. [/underlined]
In August, 1944, it was decided to exploit the blind bombing potentialities of H2S Mark III to the full, and resultant action took two parallel courses, viz:-
(a) An intensive training programme for set operators, with the object of thoroughly familiarising them with the equipment.
(b) Considerable cleaning up of the equipment to obtain increased accuracy, improved presentation and high sensitivity. This latter programme consisted of the selection of the most efficient units from the available H2S equipment and their embodiment into one aircraft installation, coupled with a detailed bench setting procedure.
This work naturally clashed with the prevailing shortage of Radar Mechanics. This was overcome by attachments from the Headquarters, Bomber Command, Radar Development Party, and from No.53 Base, as a result of a decision to curtail the fitting of H2S within that Base. Bench and workshop accommodation was extended in sympathy with the manpower increase.
Flight tests and H2S photography soon demonstrated that the scanner was a definite weakness in the equipment. Severe gaps appeared in the P.P.I. presentation, which made an accurate bombing run exceedingly difficult. Two mechanics under T.R.E. direction constructed a scanner tester with which the scanners could be tested on the ground. The gaps in the polar diagram were filled in by means of a sheet of perspex mounted on the face of the mirror, the ideal position of which was fond by trial and error. This treatment was successful with approximately 50% of the scanners.
[Underlined] The Perfect Scanner. [/underlined]
At this time a perfect scanner was loaned to Coningsby by T.R.E., and flight trials soon demonstrated that the adjective “perfect” was not an exaggeration. As a result, action was taken with our local manufacturer to cast a mirror to the perfect mirror. Trials with the cast mirror were carried out with the resultant paradox that the polar diagram was an improvement over the original. The production of cast mirrors was extended, and operational results proved that the presentation obtained was the best ever.
This labour reaped its dividends in no uncertain fashion; the ability of the operators to obtain best results from the equipment under operational conditions, coupled with the increased efficiency and accuracy of the equipment, were producing remarkably low bombing errors. Figures of a 300 yards error on the live bombing range were by no means uncommon. A still more satisfying substantiation, of course, came from the raid results.
[Underlined] H2S MARK IIIE. [/underlined]
In parallel with this improvement programme, two mechanics have been attached to T.R.E. to construct two sets of H2S Mark IIIE under T.R.E direction. Their work was completed in November, and the equipment transferred to Coningsby, where flight trials proved that it was vastly superior to H2S Mark III, and possessed the added advantage of requiring a less detailed setting up procedure. It is hoped to continue this story at a later date.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
As the operational policy of ‘evasion’ developed, Radar transmissions became more and more restricted, and as a reult [sic] it was decided to install Loran in all aircraft of No.5 Group. This was a bold decision, because the equipment had not been adequately proved operationally, and the prospects of jamming were menacing.
The fitting was carried out in two phases, as equipment became available. Firstly in Nos. 53 and 54 Bases, and finally in Nos. 55 and 56. Each programme was completed rapidly as a result of excellent co-operation between the Engineering and Signals Branches.
[Underlined] Teething Troubles. [/underlined]
Initial results were not so good; Loran required longer manipulation than Gee, and while targets were within Gee coverage, the new equipment did not offer much temptation. Furthermore, the divider circuits were temperamental and suitable areas for training were too far away to allow training flights to be carried out. However, a successful raid on Munich proved the worth of the equipment, and instated it as a very necessary aid outside the limits of Gee coverage. Each navigator was issued with a screwdriver and was instructed in the art of setting dividers in the air.
The trailing aerial was a nuisance. One very vicious specimen, which brought matters to a head “collected large lumps of Window, which jammed the aerial when the wireless operator attempted to wind it in when approaching the target. He succeeded in cutting it away whereupon it jammed the bomb doors; it was cut loose again and it wrapped itself around the rear turret”. Experiments were carried out, as a result of which it was found practicable to use the 27 ft. forward suspension of the T.R.1196 aerial and a suitable loading unit. This modification has been passed to Bomber Command.
A similar aerial was developed for Mosquito aircraft, for which the internal aerial for Loran had proved unsatisfactory.
H2S interference has been experienced. A modification to suppress the receiver during the H2S transmissions has been found successful on the bench, and is undergoing air tests.
[Underlined] Prospects. [/underlined]
It is a simple device to maintain, and in these days of acute shortage of Radar Mechanics, that is an important factor. It does not radiate any energy and is therefore quite safe to use on our deepest penetrations. We look forward to doing great things with Loran in 1945.
[Underlined] TELECOMMUNICATIONS. [/underlined]
1944 saw the final completion of the Base organisation, and the resolution of all queries concerning the positioning of Ops. switchboards and the occupation of Secon huts – both of which caused a considerable amount of heartburn and one time or another. The year saw only one new change, and this was the introduction of a new scheme to speed up the passing of operational information to Bases and Stations. New? We were told that we were going back to 1939 by introducing this scheme but whether new or old it has served one purpose very well.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
Prior to January, 1944, all operational “gen” had been passed by “scrambler” to Base or parent stations, and passed on by the latter to stations or satellites, and a very cumbersome and doubtful method it was. On at least one occasion the omission of the word “if” nearly wrecked an operation. Delays were excessive and the whole system needed a thorough overhaul.
It was decided, therefore, to enlist the aid of the teleprinter network, and the first move at Group was to put an ops. teleprinter in a specially built cubicle adjacent to the Ops. planning room. Bases and Stations were then asked to take similar action, which by hook or by crook they speedily carried out. The final step was to arrange for a simultaneous broadcast to all Bases and Stations and this presented some difficulties, because half the Group was still in the parent/satellite stage. Nevertheless, the difficulties were soon overcome, and the scheme became a working proposition.
The advantages have been manifest from the outset. Messages are handed to the teleprinter operator as soon as they are written out, and are teleprinted at once. The broadcast remains set up as long as planning continues, and handles no other traffic; it is strictly unidirectional. The moment messages are received at Bases and Stations they are handed into the Ops. Room. Thus the overall delay has been cut to the absolute minimum. At the same time speech circuits and “scrambler” phones have been relieved of a tremendous load, and are free for conferences and for the passing of sudden changes of planning detail. In addition to these points, the broadcast network has proved so efficient that operations can now be laid on at extremely short notice, e.g. thirty minutes between time of laying on and time of Flight Planning, a state of affairs quite unthinkable more than 12 months ago.
[Underlined] SIGNALS SECURITY. [/underlined]
Now that the Hun has lost his radiolocation network in France and the Low Countries, it is more than ever necessary that the maintenance of R/T, W/T and Radar silence should be strictly applied in accordance with briefing instructions. He must also never be allowed to note the difference between an operational and a non-operational day. In this connection, the following inadvertent radiation of intercom. on H/F R/T was actually heard by Waddington during a recent daylight operational take off:-
First Dim Wit: “What is going on down there?”
Second Dim Wit: “It is an Ops take off.”
First Dim Wit: “Where are we?”
Second Dim Wit: “Waddington.”
First Dim Wit: “I suppose their satellite is u/s.”
Needless to say, callsigns were not employed in this tea-time chatter otherwise there would have been most serious repercussions for someone.
[Underlined] CODES AND CYPHERS. [/underlined]
1944 saw a radical change in the cypher policy in Bomber Command. In January all cypher facilities were withdrawn from Stations, and Group assumed the responsibility for this traffic, transmitting it to Bases in plain language either by “scrambler”, teleprinter or postagram.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
This released two Section Officers from each Base, who were replaced by one Flight Officer, who became a librarian of all secret and confidential publications.
Early in the year R.A.F. Cypher Sergeants were posted into the Group to gain experience before overseas service, and they are now doing vital work in our forward communications in the battle zone.
Life went on uneventfully at Group until shortly before ‘D’ Day, when only the chosen few and the cypher officers knew the actual time and date of the invasion.
And then again, from early in September until the sinking of the Tirpitz, the Group Cypher Office enjoyed a spell of heavy traffic. After some difficulty in obtaining speedy transmission of messages, direct communication was obtained with Archangel, thus making it possible to deliver in Russia deciphered messages within one hour of origination.
It is occasions like these that relieve the dull monotony of a Cypher Officer’s life – the perpetual routine messages and amending and checking of documents – and make them feel that they are perhaps of some slight use.
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
Throughout December a large decrease in the number of W/T Controllers’ tests, due to adverse weather conditions, has shown that every available opportunity must be taken by the wireless operator (air) to carry out these tests. This requires good co-operation between the Signals Leader and the Squadron and Flight Commanders, and Signals Leaders must ensure that they carry out their part in placing all their requirements before these people, who will do their best to meet these requirements.
During December, 20 tests were carried out, and of these, 16 passed as fit for W/T Controller’s duties. The Squadrons who carried out these successful tests were:-
83 Squadron – 4
97 Squadron – 1
44 Squadron – 2
57 Squadron – 4
630 Squadron – 2
227 Squadron – 1
50 Squadron – 2
Controlled Operations.
Reception of W/T messages transmitted by the W/T Links was again very satisfactory. The standard of operating by the Link operators was quite good, though there is still room for improvement in procedure. Study of 5 Group Air Staff Instructions Sigs/1, and constant practice will eliminate these small mistakes. The transmission of the “Target Attacked” signals presents no problems to our operators, and we are
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
happy to state that up to date there have been no failures in this respect – keep it up.
[Underlined] Group W/T Exercise. [/underlined]
Despite the re-arranging of sections and times of this exercise, the results are far from satisfactory. Signals Leaders must have a drive on getting every Wireless Operator (Air) in their squadrons to take part in at least one exercise per month. The number of crews per squadron are such that, even if they have been operating the previous night there should still be available a quota of operators to carry out these exercises the following morning. If they are being detailed for other duties, point out the requirements of this exercise to your Squadron Commander. He will co-operate.
[Underlined] Points for Signals Leaders. [/underlined]
During the past year, Wireless Operators (Air) of this Group have shown that they can carry out most duties assigned to them, but a summary of the year’s work reveals that there are still a few loopholes in their work which require filling up. For instance, the number of manipulation failures for the year was 20. Now this is a very small percentage of the sorties flown, but it can and must be reduced until in 5 Group such a thing as a manipulation failure ceases to exist. Never let it be said that the equipment is better than the man. Also, the reception of, and action on, diversion messages still leaves much to be desired. These, and other weak points can only be overcome by proper instruction and practice.
[Underlined] Categorisation. [/underlined]
Now that the majority of Squadrons have an Analysis Officer attached for categorisation duties, the results of their labour should soon be forthcoming and all Wireless Operators categorised when they arrive on the Squadron, and at their 10, 20 and 30 sortie checks. The standard categorisation paper has met with universal approval and it now rests with the Signals Leader and his assistant to ensure that these tests are carried out as instructed.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] navigation
[Underlined] REVIEW OF NAVIGATION FOR THE YEAR, 1944. [/underlined]
During the past 12 months many innovations and improvements in Navigation have been initiated by No. 5 Group. The most notable of these are:-
(i) Introduction of the A.P.I. attachment, which ensures more accurate windfinding for bombing.
(ii) Introduction of the A.P.I. and A.P.I. attachment windfinding drills.
(iii) A reduction in the practice bombing vector error from 9 m.p.h. in January to 3.4 m.p.h. in December as a result of (i) and (ii) above. Also a corresponding decrease in the operational bombing wind finding errors, although this fact is difficult to determine for obvious reasons.
(iv) New log and chart work procedure, in which all duplication of work is eliminated.
(v) Introduction of the Categorisation scheme.
(vi) Appointment of Navigation Analysis Officers.
(vii) Reduction of the “Spread” of aircraft on operations from a concentration box 100 miles x 50 miles in January to a concentration box 50 miles x 25 miles in December. (Room for still more improvement here).
(viii) Elimination of Astro and a consequent increased amount of time available for teaching more essential subjects.
The most notable of these new activities were the Categorisation Scheme, coupled with the appointment of Analysis Officers and the monumental decrease in bombing wind finding errors. They have greatly increased the standard of navigation and bombing accuracy.
This improvement in navigation must continue and be accelerated. Suggestions as to how the present standard and technique can be further improved will be welcomed. So, go to it, and don’t be afraid to voice your opinions and suggestions – and make sure that 1945 is a year of Victory.
[Underlined] IMPORTANCE OF ACCURATE TRACK KEEPING AND TIMING. [/underlined]
The general standard of track keeping and timing which was achieved on the shorter range operations is still being maintained on the longer range sorties we are now undertaking. There are [underlined] STILL, [/underlined] however, a few STRAGGLERS. No matter what is said or done either by Group Headquarters or the Station and Squadron Navigation Officers the percentage of stragglers still remains the same. A few of them are unavoidable, e.g. genuine compass failure, late take off, failure of all Navigation instruments combined with sudden wind change; but the majority are due either to poor and indifferent navigation or else a lack of understanding of modern tactics.
Aircraft in the concentration enjoy first the protection afforded by other aircraft, second the protection of “Window” and
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
third the protection of the countermeasures provided by No.100 Group aircraft. It is therefore impossible for a fighter, once he has got into the stream, to home on to an individual aircraft in that concentration. On the other hand, it will be very simple for the fighter to home on to any straggler, because that aircraft will be isolated from the concentration and will therefore stand out. This applies to aircraft who are out in timing, as well as off track.
Concentration in both track keeping and timing is also a safeguard against flak. It is obvious that a compact mass of aircraft will completely black out a Cathode Ray tube, and make it impossible for any one aircraft to be singled out for attack. Also it is equally obvious that the chance of being hit is considerably diminished as all aircraft are passing through the defended area in a very short space of time.
So now you know!! Keep on track and on time throughout the whole operation and minimise tour chance of being shot down.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING VECTOR ERRORS. [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by squadrons this month is 4 m.p.h. exactly. This figure is an increase of .2 m.p.h. on last month’s figure. It is only fair to state, however, that much of the practice bombing this month has been done by the new crews, and this fact may account for the slight increase in the vector error. Remember the goal we set ourselves last month – an average vector error of below 3 m.p.h. Can we achieve it? The answer is YES – but only if EVERY navigator does his very best on every exercise. Let us start the New Year well and achieve our goal in the first month.
[Table of Average Practice Vector Errors by Squadron]
97 Squadron have been rising rapidly in this table and have now reached second place. Well done, and it is hoped that your ambition does not end there, but that you will go on and beat 9 Squadron, who have held the lead for seven consecutive months.
No.56 Base are still in the bottom half of the list. Next month we hope to see all their squadrons at least six places higher. What about it, No.56 Base?
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] THIS MONTH’S Bouquets [Drawing]
The names of the eight navigators, two from each Base, who submitted the best work this month are set out below. They have been chosen for their consistently accurate and methodical work, which includes good track keeping and timing, constant wind velocity and ETA checks and log and chart work of a very high order.
F/Sgt. Leigh – 106 Squadron
S/Ldr. Burnside – 97 Squadron
F/O. Reeves – 61 Squadron
F/Sgt. Edwards – 467 Squadron
F/Sgt. Treadwell – 189 Squadron
Sgt. Smith – 49 Squadron
W/O. Rose – 619 Squadron
F/Lt. De Friend DFM – 57 Squadron
P/O Searle, 227 Squadron, who has appeared in the last two summaries and W/O Murray, 50 Squadron, who appeared in the last summary, have both again submitted work of an exceptionally high standard. This is an excellent performance on the part of these two navigators and we congratulate them.
They have been omitted from this month’s list however, so as to give the remainder of the Group a chance!
[Underlined] UNION NEWS. [/underlined]
F/Lt. De Friend, D.F.M. – No.57 Squadron Navigation Officer, to be Station Navigation Officer, Fulbeck. Now S/Ldr.
[Underlined] ANALYSIS AND CATEGORISATION. [/underlined]
The Navigation Analysis is going very well. Analysis Officers on all Squadrons are doing an important job in a very efficient manner. Theirs is a tiresome and tedious job, but, if it is done conscientiously and well, it will pay handsome dividends in the form of better and more accurate navigation. It is to be hoped that all navigators are taking advantage of this extra service and are liaisoning [sic] with the analysis officers. Listen to what they have to say, note where you lost marks on your last sortie, and then follow their recommendations, and those if the Station Navigation Officer.
Lack of system is causing an appreciable loss of marks to some navigators, this applies particularly to the new crews. Working to a system will halve your navigational difficulties. The time to complete each cycle of operations is left for you to decide, but it is always best to work on an easy fraction of an hour, e.g. 10, 12 or 15 minutes. No system should have a time interval of more than 15 minutes.
The categorisation scheme has been in operation for 4 months
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
now and is well established. It is interesting to note that over this period, the number of “A+” and “A” category navigators has risen from 116 (12 Squadrons) to 203 (14 Squadrons), and the number of “C” and “D” category navigators has been reduced from 63 (12 Squadrons) to 28 (14 Squadrons). These figures are very encouraging. We should, however, have NO “C” or “D” navigators in the Group. Station Navigation Officers and Analysis Officers must concentrate on these crews until they reach at least the “B” category.
[Underlined] BRIEFING. [/underlined]
It has often been said that a really first class briefing is half the operation. Whether that statement is strictly accurate or not is difficult to say, but it is a fact that a well briefed crew has a far better chance of completing a successful sortie, no matter how adverse the conditions, than a badly briefed crew.
One or two navigation briefings which have been attended during the last month have been below the standard required. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers must pay particular attention to this aspect of their work. The most noticeable faults of briefing officers are:-
(i) Speaking too quickly;
(ii) Not raising their voice;
(iii) Speaking with a cigarette or pipe in the mouth;
(iv) Rushing through important details and not repeating them at least once;
(v) Failing to give a little advice on navigational details, particularly to the inexperienced navigators.
Navigation officers, do any of these faults apply to you? If so, then remedy them immediately, and give your navigators a chance. Squadron Navigation Officers should detail two deputies and train them to give a good briefing, so that a high standard will always be maintained.
Navigators do you always get the most out of each briefing? Do you listen to all the valuable information and advice given you and do you use it, or are you one of those people who knows all the answers and just don’t listen to the briefing officer. If so, then revise your ideas immediately. No matter how rushed you are, always listen to the Briefing Officer and make notes of all the important points. That extra 10 minutes attention in the briefing room will save you many a headache on the operation. Once you are airborne it is too late to remember something which you forgot to ask in the briefing room.
[Underlined] SAFETY HEIGHTS. [/underlined]
With the present tactics of flying low over parts of the Continent, it is essential to know the safety heights along the route. Do YOU always note the safety heights along the track and also for a distance 20 or 30 miles either side of track, just in case? Mark the spot heights in feet, on your plotting chart. This will act as a double check.
Several reports have been received from crews in recent weeks of aircraft crashing into high ground when flying low. None of these reports have yet been corroborated, but they may be true. So take warning and don’t end your days on the side of a mountain. It’s too cold this weather anyway.
Remember that spot heights on a topographical map of the Continent are always given in metres, with the exception of the Straits
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
of Dover sheet. All spot heights for Great Britain are given in feet.
[Underlined] SELF-ANALYSIS CHART. [/underlined]
Here is the second analysis chart fir you to complete. If you missed the fist one for any reason look it up now and answer those questions too.
(i) Have you read and do you know all the Air Staff Instructions and 5 Group Drills which apply to YOU?
(ii) Do you know all your compass drills?
(iii) Do you know the maximum coverage of each Gee chain and which is the best chain to use over (a) North Western Germany, (b) Southern France, (c) Frisian Islands, (d) Paris area, (e) North West Denmark?
(iv) Do you know the maximum height at which H2S should be switched on?
(v) Do you know the position on the return journey of an operation, from which you are allowed to relax your timing? Do you know why you are allowed to relax timing from this position, and why this position was chosen?
(vi) Do you know [underlined] all [/underlined] the Group flight plan speeds for climbing, diving, straight and level flight, with and without a bomb load?
(vii) Do you always fill in your Form 2330 correctly and hand it to the Me. Officer on return?
(viii) Do you always pass the drift to the pilot after each alteration of course, especially on the run up to the target?
(ix) Do you always check your altimeter with the pilot’s when descending, and do you regularly check your A.S.I. with the pilot’s? When there is a discrepancy between the two A.S.I’s which do you take as being accurate?
(x) Do you always make allowance for time of turn when altering course, e.g. 1/4 minute before E.T.A. for turns up to 30°, 1/2 minute between 31° and 60°, and 3/4 minute between 61° and 100°
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] radar nav:
[Underlined] REVIEW FOR THE YEAR 1944. [/underlined]
During the past 12 months considerable strides have been made by No.5 Group both with the introduction of new Radar navigational aids, and in the use of those that existed prior to the beginning of the year. The most notable have been:-
(i) The introduction of H2S MK.II into Nos. 44, 207 and 619 Squadrons.
(ii) The introduction of H2S MK.III into No.54 Base.
(iii) The introduction of an H2S categorisation scheme at Coningsby in order to ascertain the most efficient blind marker crews.
(iv) Experiments at Coningsby to determine the efficiency of H2S MK.III and the production of specially selected MK.III equipment to give far more efficient blind marking than before.
(v) Incorporation of the 184 indicator in H2S MK.III, which has enabled a blind bombing technique of releasing direct on the response to the developed to a high standard of proficiency. [sic]
(vi) The introduction of H2S photography both on MK.II and MK.III squadrons from which it has been possible to ascertain the positions of release of mines and T.I’s and also give us considerable H2S cover of the Continent.
(vii) The introduction of the R.F. Unit 27 for use with the Gee receiver.
(viii) Consequent upon the invasion of Europe, the introduction of Continental Gee chains which give more accurate coverage over Western Germany.
(ix) The introduction of Loran, which has resulted in long distance fixing, and a consequent improvement in D.R. navigation.
(x) The appointment of Station Radar Navigation Officers who are responsible for the application of, and training in, Radar Navigational aids throughout the Group.
Most notable of the above activities were the experiments at Coningsby, which have resulted in a considerable decrease in blind marking errors, and have produced equipment which has given far better responses on the H2S MK.III P.P.I. than ever before. Coupled with this is the introduction of Loran into the whole of the aircraft in No.5 Group, which has further raised the standard of navigation, and resulted in fixes being obtained over various areas of enemy territory with considerable success and without enemy interference of any kind. This was an ambitious scheme as it involved the fitting of all aircraft and the training of all navigators within a period of six to eight weeks, and great credit is due to the Radar sections and Loran Instructors for carrying it out without a hitch.
This improvement in navigation must continue and be accelerated in the forth coming year, not only by the introduction of new Radar
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
navigational aids, but by the raising of the standard of efficiency of the present equipment. Suggestions as to how this can be done will be welcome. Do not be afraid to let us have your ideas and opinions. No matter how trivial they may seem to you, they may have far reaching effects if applied throughout the whole Group. If you do this far better Radar navigation facilities may come into being, and possibly help to win the victory this year.
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
The majority of operators have made good use of this aid during the month and much information has been obtained on the operational value of the chain.
A summary of results obtained on the three long range operations is as follows:-
[Underlined] MUNICH [/underlined] Rate 4 signals, particularly the Master signal, were weaker than usual with considerable splitting, thus decreasing the value of the S.S. Chain as a whole on this particular sortie. Rate 5 signals were much stronger than previously reported, perhaps due to the southerly route taken. Investigations have been made into the possible causes of the difficulties experienced and have rather indicated that weather conditions were the primary cause of the Rate 4 signals’ weakness, as the worst meteorological conditions lay between the Rate 4 Master Station and the route taken. A plot of the first and last fixes taken on this operation indicates, however, that despite the difficulties outlined, Loran could have been used from 0400E on the outward route on 0700E on the return route. It is apparent from this plot that many operators did not make full use of this aid, and it can only be assumed that they did not persevere with the equipment to ensure fixing at frequent intervals.
The procedure of watching the signals and taking readings between splitting cannot be too highly stressed. A visit to the Radar Section at night now and again and watching the S.S. Loran Chain on the bench set will prove of great value if you wish to become really efficient on this excellent navigational aid.
[Underlined] GDYNIA & POLITZ [/underlined] Much to the surprise of the majority of Loran operators exceptional coverage was obtained on these attacks. Although the routes lay mainly outside the service area, signals were strong and fairly easily recognisable, and a considerable number of operators were able to obtain fixes from the Danish Coast to the target and return. Once again, however, the first and last fixes plotted indicate that operators are not persevering. It is appreciated that many little difficulties crop up in flight but when Loran is the only aid available there can be little excuse for not endeavouring to use it.
It should be possible to obtain a first and last fix plot which shows a concentration of fixes at the point of entry into the service area and another concentration at the target. Whether or not this can be achieved is entirely up to the skill and initiative of every individual operator.
The main snags encountered on operations this month were:-
(i) Incorrect alignment of dividers.
(ii) Dampness.
(iii) H2S interference.
(iv) Difficulties with the trailing aerial.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
Divider trouble appears to be an inherent fault of this equipment and has occurred more frequently in the past few weeks due to dampness. Switching the set on and leaving it for a little while to dry out may cure the trouble due to dampness. If the set does not react, then it is up to the operator to carry out the correct alignment procedure. Screwdrivers are trickling through slowly, and when all operators are equipped failures due to divider trouble should be things of the past.
In addition to divider trouble, there are still some operators who report equipment unserviceable although on check nothing can be found wrong. In the majority of these cases the remedy is simple such as turning up the brilliance, switching on the master switch, or checking and replacing blown fuses – small points but essential ones, and if you know your Loran Aircraft Drill you should have little trouble from this source.
As regards snags (ii) to (iv) the Radar Sections are working out means of counteracting efficiently the snags which have cropped up from these sources, and we expect to hear of their solution any day. 55 Base are busy with a fixed aerial which has already been used on operations with success.
Further trials are to be carried out and if successful it is intended to adopt this aerial throughout Group.
[Underlined] GEE. [/underlined]
Gee has again proved the most valuable navigation aid during the month, although from maximum fix plots it is evident that operators are still failing to obtain maximum coverage from the Continental chains.
With little or no jamming reported on the Continental chains there should be little difficulty in obtaining fixes to maximum range, and the spread between maximum fixes obtained by squadrons should be less than 1/2 a degree and not 3 degrees as is the case at the present time. The fact that all squadrons are also using Loran should not prevent operators from obtaining an occasional Gee fix as a check.
Due to circumstances beyond control, one of the Ruhr Gee Chain Stations has had to be moved away from the vicinity of the front line. This Stations [sic] has been re-sited and the Ruhr Chain has been renamed the Cologne Chain. Topographical Charts have been issued but once the front line is again stabilised it is anticipated the Ruhr Chain will once again come into being.
News has also been received of new lattice charts to a scale of one million. These charts covering the London-Berlin and London-Munich areas will give the lattice lines for the Continental Gee chains and they should be in general use by the end of January.
Navigators are reminded that the Eastern Chain is now phased for a point in the North Sea, and that inaccuracies occur in the chain South of a line Calais to Frankfurt. If you are flying below this line remember the fixes you obtain should be from either the Ruhr or Reims Chain and [underlined] not [/underlined] the Eastern Chain.
[Underlined] H2S [/underlined]
H2S Mark II have been used on two occasions during the month, and operators, despite their various activities with Gee and Loran,
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
managed to obtain good results on the equipment. This is evident from the excellent P.P.I. photographs which have been produced both of the targets and landmarks on track. It is, however, evident from H2S reports that many operators are still failing to use H2S (when they can) for a check on the target. Although you are bombing visually, there is no reason why you should not set up your H2S for blind bombing – the Air Bomber’s remark “Bombs gone” will serve as an admirable check on your estimation of the release point on H2S.
The highlight of this month’s activities with H2S Mark III has been the introduction of H2S Mark IIIE which gives much more clearly defined response and incorporates sector scan. So far blind bombing errors on this equipment have averaged .4 of a mile. In addition a new scanner has been manufactured which is practically perfect, and it is anticipated will give far better reception on the P.P.I. than before. Further tests are being carried out before any general statement as to its efficiency is made.
Intense interest has been shown in this Group’s challenge to 8 (P.F.F.) Group for an inter-Group Blind Bombing Competition which 8 (P.F.F.) Group have accepted.
The final details of the competition are almost complete and the contest will take place during January on the neutral Bombing Range. Good luck 54 Base and may the best side win.
H2S Photography has improved considerably during the month with both Mark II and Mark III squadrons producing excellent results. Revised H2S Photographic Instructions have been issued, and every operator should visit the Photographic Section and acquaint himself with the provisions laid down in these instructions.
Once again the reputation of the Group has been maintained on Gardening sorties. Both photographs and plots indicate that plantings have been in the correct furrows. These results indicate that despite restrictions, operators can still use H2S efficiently when required.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] air bombing
1944 has been a year of exceptional progress from the bombing aspect of the activities of the Group. The average crew error for December 1943 was 295 yards at 20,000 feet, and our present results have not been achieved without a sustained effort on the part of everybody concerned to reduce that figure to the present error of 171 yards at 20,000 feet.
Changes have taken place in equipment and methods of training during the past year, and all possible means of improving the bombing accuracy of the Group have been investigated and, where possible, put into operation. The more important changes were as follows:-
The introduction of a completely new method of Bombing Analysis and the provision of a tour-expired Air Bomber to conduct the analysis on each squadron.
The categorisation of all crews on their ability to bomb accurately.
The installation of the Mark XIVA Bombsight.
A drive on the crew aspect of bombing training and the installation of Automatic Observers and sensitive skid recorders in selected squadrons to determine the errors due to inaccurate flying.
Permission to build two new targets at Wainfleet was obtained, and clearance for local dropping of T.I’s was granted.
A quarterly inter-squadron bombing competition was started, the winning squadron to hold a splendid trophy presented by Lord Camrose.
Crews were instructed to bomb on briefed tracks to provide training in operational methods.
An extension of flashlight targets took place early in the year but other commitments have caused the reduction of flashlight facilities at the present time.
Improved methods of transmitting bombing results from ranges has provided means of early analysis and assessment.
The two most notable events were the introduction of the new form of bombing analysis and the system of categorisation of crews on their ability to bomb accurately. Bombing analysis provides a method of determining the source of errors and has produced an excellent standard of wind finding, and bombsight maintenance, but it will not provide the maximum benefit until every captain studies the analysis of the exercises completed by his crew, and ensures that everything possible is being done to eliminate errors.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
The categorisation of crews, although based on practice bombing only, does give an indication of a crew’s ability on operations. When a crew obtains an A+ or A category it proves three things:-
(i) The Captain can make an accurate bombing run with no skidding turns or sudden changes in the flying attitude of the aircraft.
(ii) The Navigator can find a good wind.
(iii) The Air Bomber knows how to use his bombsight correctly and can guide the bombsight graticule [underlined] on [/underlined] to the target and not merely in the vicinity of the target.
It is reasonable to suppose that a bombing team displaying these qualities on a practice target can reproduce similar efficiency on a real precision target, but it would be unreasonable to suppose that a crew obtaining ‘C’ or ‘D’ category results during practice will obtain better results on a real target. Therefore it is essential that Squadron Commanders and Flight Commanders make every effort to provide these low category crews with as many opportunities as possible to improve their position.
The weather experienced recently, plus unavoidable commitments has reduced the time available for training, but a study of the summary of practice bombing illustrates the disparity in the number of bombs dropped by various squadrons.
During the coming year it will be more necessary than ever to maintain steady progress in bombing accuracy, targets will grow smaller and more valuable to the enemy. It is certain that the Hun will make strenuous efforts to defend them; his defences can be outwitted, but it is all of no avail if the percentage of bombs required to demolish a target fails to hit that target. A continuance of progress already made, and a repetition of the excellent co-operation existing between our crews, armourers and bombsight maintenance staffs will make an early end to the War something more than wishful thinking.
[Underlined] BOMBING RANGES. [/underlined]
The lifting of black-out restrictions on certain areas is causing some confusion in the identification of bombing ranges at night, and it is only by good fortune that serious accidents have been avoided. Bombing Leaders must make sure that crews taking off on a night bombing detail are conversant with the lighting arrangements at the Practice target. The installation of illuminated signal arrows on all Bomber Command ranges should eliminate any doubts concerning identification, and it is expected that all crews know the provisions of 5 Group Air Staff Instruction BL.24.
Another point which is not receiving the necessary attention is the firing of smoke-puffs during a practice bombing exercise. At least one smoke-puff [underlined] must [/underlined] be fired during every exercise, and to enable the range staff to find an accurate wind the smoke-puff must be fired directly over the range signals area. Some smoke-puffs intended for Epperstone have been fired over Nottingham, and the Hill’s Mirror (Observation) is not sufficiently mobile to cope with these approximations.
[Underlined] THE “LORD CAMROSE” TROPHY. [/underlined]
The trophy, awarded to the squadron producing the best average crew error over a period of three months, is leaving Skellingthorpe
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBER. [/underlined]
for Bardney. No.9 Squadron has achieved an outstanding result with an average crew error of 127 yards for 570 bombs, during the months of October, November and December. No.50 Squadron made a gallant attempt to retain the trophy for the third successive occasion, but their average crew error of 139 yards for 420 bombs during the same period only took them to second place.
No.9 Squadron’s success was made possible by the hard work and co-operation of all concerned with the bombing effort, and it will be necessary for other squadrons to obtain extraordinarily good results if the trophy is to change hands at the end of March.
Well done No.9 Squadron!!!
[Underlined] BOMBING ANALYSIS. [/underlined]
56 Base (S/Ldr. Walmsley) is making efforts to find ways and means of obtaining a true wind for purposes of bombing analysis. The method now adopted seems promising and after an extended trial it might be worthy of adoption by all Bases. A smoke-puff is fired at the commencement of the exercise and the wind found is recorded at the range. At the end of the exercise, when times and headings are passed to the Range, the A.P.I. wind used for the exercise and the A.P.I. wind found from the positions recorded during the exercise are both transmitted to the Range. All three winds are then sent on the same signal as the bombing results e.g.
SP 300/40
API 290/39
MAPI 305/42
If a squadron carries out four exercises it can be seen that twelve winds are easily available for analysis purposes.
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] SQUADRON AVERAGE BOMBING ERROR FOR 8 EXERCISES. [/underlined]
1st 97 80
2nd 463 87
3rd 9 89
4th 630 95
5th 50 97
6th 467 106
7th 207 107
8th 619 108
9th 49 116
The remaining squadrons did not complete sufficient exercises to submit an entry.
No.97 Squadron have headed the Group competition after being placed second last month. Their effort during this month was undoubtedly the best in the Group, both in numbers and quality, and the Squadron is to be congratulated on the results. The efficiency of a squadron is reflected in the condition of its various Sections, and the Bombing Section at 97 Squadron H.Q. is an example of what it should be.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] DECEMBER’S OOUSTANDING CREW ERRORS. [/underlined]
SQDN. PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR ERROR AT 20,000 FT. IN YARDS
44 F/O Daggett F/O Sharpe F/O Hindlay 55
50 F/O Lillies F/O Skinner Sgt Tye 71
189 F/O Herbert F/O Cottier F/O Skinner 43
207 F/O Cook F/S Boddy F/S D’Arcy 75
227 F/O Skipworth Sgt Steadman Sgt Ward 72
617 F/O Leavitt F/S Oldman F/O Withams 49
F/O Flatman F/O Kelly F/O McKie 53
F/L Dobson F/O Johnstone P/O Knight 55
619 F/L Brown F/S Meakin F/O Thanes 68
5 LFS F/O Blair F/S Bethune F/S McShane 74
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORISATION [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categorisations by Base]
Crews are categorised on the average crew error of their last three bombing exercises and the following limitations apply to the various categories:-
A+ 85 yards or less
A 140 yards or less
B 210 yards or less
C 280 yards or less
D Over 280 yards
All A+ crews can be congratulated on the exceptional standard of accuracy and efficiency attained by the bombing teams. It is not just luck which produces results, methodical work and attention to detail is the basis of accurate bombing.
[Underlined] AIR BOMBER QUIZ [/underlined]
1. What are the safety heights for the release of a 4000 lb. bomb over land and water?
2. What suction recordings must be obtained to ensure full bombsight serviceability?
3. What prevents condensation on the lens of the collimator?
4. Is it possible to do a “lights” check with bomb doors closed?
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE. [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Results by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] engineering
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES FOR THE YEAR 1944. [/underlined]
On the completion of the first full year of Base Organisation, progress can now be reviewed. For inclusion in this Summary such a review must necessarily be very brief, but it is the intention to produce one in detail under separate cover so that lessons learnt during the year can be made clear, and faults can be analysed and suggestions made for improvements.
53 and 54 Bases have completed a full year unhindered by unheavals [sic]. 51 Base after a long period of excellent work in the Group transferred their affection wholly to 7 Group on formation of the separate training group. 56 Base, which was the original 52 Base at Scampton had unfortunately to break down their organisation at Scampton and rebuild it on new ground at Syerston. This did not retard progress to a great extent, but the smooth running efficiency of the Base Organisation was some weeks getting into its stride again. 55 Base is our only Base which is formed on a war-time station, and has been functioning as such for the latter half of the year; the problems of the economical and efficient running of this type of Base vary from those which are housed on stations built to peace-time design.
The basic principle behind the original scheme of Base organisation is the economy in man power, material and equipment, and this economy has been implemented in the Bases in 5 Group since their formation.
Conservation of equipment is the key note of serviceability. The least line of resistance is to remove an unserviceable item of equipment from an aircraft and fit a new item from the main stores caring little of what happens to the unserviceable item removed, which is returned to the main stores for ultimate transfer to a Repairable Equipment Depot. There is no doubt that up to a point, serviceability can be maintained with this short-sighted outlook; but by this means much equipment is en route between stations and R.E.D’s and between R.E.D’s and repair contractors, and much more is heaped up outside these various places waiting repair. So there must come a day when many particular items are in very short supply. By taking full advantage of the Base organisation and the repair facilities of the Base Major Servicing Sub-sections, the unserviceable item removed can be repaired and kept in circuit. It can be used time and time again, maintained in a serviceable condition, and a good Base can pay a dividend rather than rely on a subsidy. Such conservation of equipment has been made possible by the formation of the Base specialist repair bays, i.e. hydraulics, pneumatics, tyres, brakes, sparking plugs, propellers, metal repairs, modifications, power plants, instrument and electrical sections.
Much thought has been given to the building and improvement of these specialist bays and, for instance, the spark plug cleaning is now in its correct perspective. Due to a large amount of pressure and powers of local purchase being brought to bear, ideal cleaning and test equipment is available in Bases in this Group, and Bases are
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ENGINEERING. [/underlined]
capable of catering for cleaning and testing up to a thousand plugs a day. As Base organisation was a scheme devised subsequent to the building and planning of stations, no designed housing for the various sections was available; therefore improvisation of certain other rooms, buildings and sections has been necessary by local initiative. The equipment required for the repair and testing od the hundreds of components has not been available through Service sources, as the requirement at the time of Base sub-section organisation was not known to higher authority. Therefore local initiative was brought to bear again, and Base major servicing sections are now in possession of excellent test equipment which will cater for the efficient testing of the various services.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
[Table of 5 LFS Serviceability]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] training
[Underlined] PROGRESS DURING THE YEAR. [/underlined]
There were numerous changes and developments in training throughout 1944 to meet operational requirements and to deal with new equipment, particularly Radar devices. As a background to all that was new there was a constant pressure on basic flying and operational procedure in an endeavour to improve standards and enable crews to raid successfully in more rigorous conditions.
On other pages of this Summary, developments in training are dealt with in detail. The main task has been to produce sufficient crews of a good standard to do the job, and at the same time to form new squadrons.
The year opened with the Training Units in the throes of conversion to Stirling aircraft and the L.F.S. in its infancy. This 2-type training on 4 engined aircraft created many problems which made the life of aircrew under training extremely strenuous. New, at the end of the year a change-over is again in progress, but squadrons fortunately have a surplus of crews to help them through the Winter months until “all through” Lancaster training is in full swing.
Among the many new features introduced into training, the Categorisation of aircrew members was perhaps the most interesting and represents an attempt to increase the individual efficiency by frequent detailed tests of his ability and analysis of his results. As an essential part of this policy, various instructors and Analysis Officers were appointed to squadrons and the value of their work was soon evident.
Crew members thus have the opportunity of finding out quickly where they are wrong, why they are wrong and what they can do to improve their efficiency. Squadron Commanders and Specialist Officers can also place their fingers quickly on the weak spots in crews.
The year also saw the introduction of No.5 Group Aircraft Drills, Check Lists in aircraft, and the addition of several new and important Air Staff Instructions; one of the latest and most important being “Precautions against Hazards in Conditions of Cumulo Nimbus Cloud”.
Other new features were the production of the new Lancaster Aircrew Quiz and the standard No.5 Group Link Trainer Syllabus which was produced to meet the particular requirements of four engined pilots. All these things provide sufficient material for crews to “find the answers” if they are in doubt and give instructors the facts necessary for the production of high standard crews.
Figures are not the final measure of effort, and “figure chasing” invariably defeats its purpose. They do, however, provide a basis for comparison and do indicate if an effort is being made. The final measure comes in the assessment of raid damage, the casualty lists and the squadron record of early returns and abortive sorties.
It is interesting to note, therefore, that parallel to the
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING. [/underlined]
increase in sorties flown and bombs dropped, training hours and figures have also improved. The total of practice bombs dropped has increased and the error has gone down. Assessable fighter affiliation exercises have more than doubled themselves, and in particular, night affiliation grew from nothing to a satisfactory total of nearly 350 exercises in the first month of the Winter. Navigation errors came down. Link Trainer hours rose steadily and instrument flying standards improved – a little slowly perhaps but the ground was ploughed.
There must be no relaxation in training during 1945. It has no saturation point.
[Underlined] EVENTS DURING DECEMBER. [/underlined]
The exceptionally bad weather during December made regular training difficult, but despite this, Squadron Instructors completed 102 Category Checks, leaving 159 Category Checks to be done to give every pilot in the Group a Category. There are now 185 pilots in the Group holding Categories. Nos. 54 and 55 Bases are well behind the other Bases in their category tests. The following table shows the state of categorisation of pilots in the Group:-
[Underlined] CATEGORY OF PILOTS. [/underlined]
[Table of Pilot Categories by Base]
Total squadron training amounted to 2200 hours – a very big increase on the previous month owing to the weather. Of this total 1650 hours were by day and 550 by night. The average per squadron was 122 hours. Six squadrons were very low on the list – No.61 Squadron did 50 hours; 189 Squadron 58 hours; 227 Squadron 64 hours; 630 Squadron 65 hours; 44 Squadron 85 hours. It is hoped all these squadrons will double their efforts during January.
[Underlined] NO. 5 L.F.S. REPORT. [/underlined]
No. 5 L.F.S. produced 73 crews for squadrons at an average of 13 hours per crew. The Unit flew 1100 hours. Loran training was given during December, and bombing results showed improvement on November.
[Underlined] 1690 B.D.T. FLIGHT. [/underlined]
The Flight was “grounded” by weather for 14 days, but they flew whenever squadrons asked for details. A total of 252 day details and 91 night details were flown. This included 97 da details and 41 night details for No.75 Base.
Total hours for the Flight were 323, and the average hours per aircraft on charge was 24. Pilots averaged 18 hours per month.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] INSTRUMENT FLYING AND LINK [/underlined]
During the Winter of 1943 there was definite evidence that the standard of instrument flying was not sufficient to meet all the requirements of operational flying in conditions of adverse weather, and special attention was paid to this phase of flying throughout 1944. A summary of the action taken to improve instrument flying throughout the Group is tabulated below:-
(i) More flying on primary instruments, by the inclusion of specific exercises in the Heavy Conversion Units, and the inclusion of a test on this point in the Pilot’s Category Check.
(ii) A revival of the use of the “hood” to provide more genuine I.F. practice in the air in day light.
(iii) The issue of a standard 5 Group Link Trainer Syllabus to meet the particular requirements of pilots of four engined aircraft (corkscrew on instruments, and flying on primary instruments only, etc.).
(iv) A modification to the Link Trainer to enable the Artificial Horizon and Directional Gyro to be “toppled” during an exercise.
(v) The introduction of a new type Artificial Horizon with a reduced turn error.
(vi) The acquisition of additional Link Trainers and Instructors towards the end of the year, which now gives each squadron one machine and one instructor.
The effort made is revealed by the fact the Squadron Link Trainer hours rose from 495 hours in December, 1943, to 1804 hours in December, 1944 – just short of a four-fold increase. The new squadrons and new Link Trainers now make more practice easier, and the acid test is the squadron average spread equally over all pilots and flight engineers on strength, and most of all, the quality of the instrument flying.
December was the best month to date and congratulations go to Nos. 49, 467 and 50 Squadrons for having reached the target for pilots on the Link Trainer. This was the third consecutive month in which No.49 Squadron has reached their target. No.44 Squadron went very close to the squadron target of 132 hours, but the bulk of the time was done by the flight engineers, the pilots being below the average with a total of 44 hours.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] LINK TRAINER TIMES. [/underlined]
[Table of Link Trainer Hours by Base and Squadron]
GRAND TOTAL – 1804 hrs.
ACTUAL AVERAGE PER SQUADRON – 78.8 hrs.
REQUIRED AVERAGE PER SQUADRON – 132 hrs.
+ SQUADRONS WHERE LINK TIMES ARE FAR TOO LOW.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
second thoughts for pilots
[Underlined] SWINGING ON TAKE-OFF. [/underlined]
There have been two swinging accidents on take off recently and on each occasion the Pilot flagrantly ignored the Lancaster Swinging Drill (No.5 Group Aircraft Drill No.5). Read the Drill through carefully again and make sure that both you and your Flight Engineer know it thoroughly.
[Underlined] FIDO LANDINGS. [/underlined]
The average hold-off tends to be too long and the landing too far up the runway. This is largely because Pilots, having an exaggerated idea of the bumpiness in the box, come in at too high an airspeed – 115 m.p.h. I.A.S. is quite sufficient. Check this tendency particularly when returning with full bomb load.
On the circuit “glare” makes it difficult to see other aircraft on the same level, or slightly above. Ensure a careful “circuit look-out” normally is maintained and that navigation, upper and lower identification lights are on.
Turn your cockpit lighting on full before entering the funnel. This will enable you to read your instruments in the glare on the approach.
[Underlined] OVERSHOOTING. [/underlined]
The following are the commonest causes of overshooting:-
(i) Airspeed too high on the approach into wind. It should be 120m.p.h. with a moderately laden aircraft on the initial approach, and [underlined] 105 – 110 m.p.h. over the boundary. [/underlined] With an all up weight of 55,000 lbs to 58,000 lbs. it should be 120 m.p.h. on the initial approach and [underlined] 115 m.p.h. over the boundary. [/underlined]
(ii) Too high over boundary. You should not be above 25 – 50 feet over the boundary by day or in the Green of the G.P.I. by night.
(iii) Throttles left open too long after the initial check thus prolonging the float.
[Underlined] LOSS OF CONTROL. [/underlined]
Straight and level instrument flying is fairly sound with the amount of practice that the average pilot has during training and operations, but instrument flying with Artificial Horizon or A.S.I. u/s, steep turns, combat manoeuvres, etc. are known to be weak through lack of practice. There is no reason why this weakness should exist as there are ample opportunities for instrument practice on N.F.T’s and training flights generally.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] CUMULO NIMBUS CLOUD. [/underlined]
Take special note of the new Air Staff Instruction Trg/6 – “Precautions against Hazards in conditions of Cumulo Nimbus Cloud”. This instruction contains three main points:-
(i) A Safety Area for climbing and descending.
(ii) A maximum height above which the aircraft is not to fly until it enters the Safety Area.
(iii) A minimum ”cross country” height above the cloud after climbing in the Safety Area.
Make sure you can see clear skies above by day or stars by night before climbing in the Safety Area. Do not fly in Cumulo Nimbus cloud. Turn round and fly clear.
[Drawing] Do [underlined] you [/underlined] always catch the “LATTICE LINE SPECIAL”
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] gunnery
[Underlined] “DECLINE AND FALL OF THE G.A.F.” [underlined]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
4/5.12.44 “P” – 106 Squadron – JU. 88
4/5.12.44 “Q” – 61 Squadron – ME.410
4/5.12.44 “M” – 189 Squadron – JU. 88
6/7.12.44 “V” – 630 Squadron -JU. 88
6/7.12.44 “B” – 57 Squadron – ME.110
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
6/7.12.44 “L” – 97 Squadron – JU. 88
6/7.12.44 “F” – 463 Squadron – ME.110
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
4/5.12.44 “A” – 619 Squadron – FW.190
4/5.12.44 “W” – 207 Squadron – JU. 88
4/5.12.44 “B” – 463 Squadron – JU. 88
6/7.12.44 “S” – 227 Squadron – JU. 88
6/7.12.44 “D” – 463 Squadron – JU. 88
6/7.12.44 “S” - 44 Squadron – ME.410
6/7.12.44 “O” – 619 Squadron – ME.110
6/7.12.44 “D” – 49 Squadron – FW.190
All the above claims have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
There was a marked increase in the number of combats this month, though the majority took place on the first two operations of of [sic] the month; the targets being Heilbronn and Giessen respectively. These two nights contributed 82 combats to the total of 101 for the whole of the month, and it will be noted that all the successes claimed were registered on these two nights.
Five enemy aircraft are claimed as Destroyed, two Probably Destroyed and eight Damaged. Five cases were noted of gunners firing on enemy aircraft attacking another Lancaster, and in one case the fighter was destroyed. In all the other cases the enemy aircraft broke off his attack. These gunners are to be congratulated on their vigilance and offensive spirit. See the fighter first and shoot first are the two best axioms for gunners; it has been proved that they pay.
[Underlined] RESULTS OF C.G.S. COURSES [/underlined]
F/O MacIntosh – 207 Sqdn – Cat. “B”
F/O Van Beck – 619 Sqdn – Cat “B”
F/O Ray – 97 Sqdn – Cat. “B”
P/O Hansom – 83 Sqdn – Cat. “B”
F/O Burnham – 467 Sqdn – Cat. “B”
P/O Annandale – 50 Sqdn. – Cat. “B”
It is good to note that the standard of candidates selected
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GUNNERY [/underlined]
for C.G.S. courses has been such as to show a return of 9 Cat. “B”s out of the last 9 nominations. Keep this up Gunnery Leaders, and submit to your Base Gunnery Leader any gunner who possesses the necessary qualifications for C.G.S. Gunners who have been categorised as “A+” on Squadrons should be automatic selections as candidates for C.G.S.
[Underlined] REVIEW OF ADVANCEMENT IN EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING DURING 1944 [/underlined]
1944 marked the advent of new training equipment and new ideas on training, which have resulted in a marked improvement in training on Squadrons.
The most important items are as under:-
1. Standard Free Gunnery Trainer.
2. Flash Trainer.
3. Turret Manipulation Assessor.
4. Skeet Ranges.
5. Self-towed Drogue.
6. Categorisation of Air Gunners.
7. Gunnery Analysis Officers.
8. Infra-Rad Photography on Night Fighter Affiliation Exercises.
9. A.G.L.T.
Of the above items, Categorisation of Gunners has gone ahead in Conversion Units and on Squadrons and every Squadron gunner now has a category. 92 Group have now followed suit and are now categorising gunners on similar lines.
Gunnery Analysis Officers were instituted on the basis of one Officer per Squadron, whose duties are to supervise and co-ordinate all training, both practical and theoretical, on Squadrons. These duties include Skeet Range shooting and assessment of all cine gyro assessor films. Each Officer has attended the Skeet Range Shooting Course and an Aessment [sic] Course at 1690 B.D.T. Flight.
[Underlined] GUNNERY AIR TRAINING [/underlined]
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION – ORDER OF MERIT [/underlined]
The Order of Merit is based on the following system of marking:-
Night Affiliation (Camera and Infra-Red Film) – 10 points.
Night Affiliation (without Camera) – 8 points.
Day Affiliation (Gyro and Camera) – 5 points.
Day Affiliation (Camera only) – 3 points.
Day Affiliation (without Camera) – 1 point.
[Table of Fighter Affiliation Order of Merit by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GUNNERY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF AIR TRAINING EXERCISES. [/underlined]
[Table of Air Training Exercises by Squadron]
[Underlined] TOTAL OF AFFILIATION EXERCISES FOR DECEMBER – 502 [/underlined]
Bad weather and operational commitments have brought the total of Fighter Affiliation details for the month down with a rush; this month’s total being less than half of the total for November. Even with this low total, it is very satisfactory to note that [underlined] Night Affiliation exercises totalled 111, [/underlined] eleven of which were with Infra Red film. It is to be hoped that squadrons will fit the camera to the maximum number of aircraft carrying out Night Affiliation.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] armament
This year 1944 has seen the introduction into the Group of many new items of equipment and stores; a review of the changes and the part taken by Armament personnel in producing the right answers, or getting the inevitable gremlins out of new equipment will not come amiss in this issue.
[Underlined] BOMBS. [/underlined]
This subject is overshadowed by Tallboy; the introduction of this large egg has been most successful but has entailed a lot of hard work and hard thinking for armament personnel. Other bombs which arrived are the American series A.N.-M.44, 58, 59, 64, 65 and 76.
[Underlined] CLUSTER PROJECTILES. [/underlined]
The long awaited incendiary clusters have arrived in the form of Nos. 4, 14, 15 and A.N.M.17. So far these clusters have proved a mixed blessing, and have not yet replaced our old friend (or enemy) the S.B.C.
Handling clusters in the open resulted in many attempts to devise a satisfactory lay-out, but no really satisfactory method, providing adequate protection against weather and damage during handling, was evolved.
The A.O.C. came to the rescue with the Large Incendiary Store House Scheme. Successful trials have been carried out which indicate that this scheme will solve all our troubles, and damaged clusters will become a thing of the past, or a case of excessive handling.
[Underlined] BOMB GEAR. [/underlined]
The introduction of hydraulic winches has saved much sweat and many man-hours.
Modification No.74 has been incorporated to enable 18 bombs (20 when No.13 Station adaptors is available) to be dropped in one stick.
The Type N. Release slip arrived fortunately in small numbers, as snags were soon found to exist. No.53 Base have done a lot of work and finally produced a modification which it is expected will eliminate the danger of accidental release during bombing-up and de-bombing.
[Underlined] MARKER STORES. [/underlined]
Since No.5 Group has carried out its own target marking, many stores have been introduced, considerably complicating armament work in No.54 Base, and calling for local modifications to meet ever changing operational requirements.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ARMAMENT. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FUZES AND PISTOLS. [/underlined]
The introduction of new stores has brought with it a corresponding increase in the variety of Fuzes and Pistols. The quantity necessitated the approval of an additional storehouse.
[Underlined] BOMB HANDLING AND STORAGE. [/underlined]
Stacking trucks have made their appearance, and have proved useful tools. The cry is for more and we hope to see more during 1945.
Equipment for handling S.B.C’s including the heavy transporter (once again modified) is arriving, and all stations should be fully equipped early in 1945. Some of this equipment can be used in handling cluster projectiles and mines.
[Underlined] MINES. [/underlined]
The variety has increased and is still increasing, calling for carefully planned storage so that any type can be made available at very short notice.
[Underlined] TURRETS. [/underlined]
The F.N. 121 has arrived in small numbers. No.56 Base found some snags in the Servo Feed and initiated remedial action.
[Underlined] GUNS. [/underlined]
Great strides were made at the beginning of the year in solving the gun freezing problem. Experiments were carried out with various types of anti-freeze oil, both for the turret hydraulic system and for the guns themselves. Gun ejection seals were introduced and extensive firing trials carried out on operations to ascertain whether, in fact, it was the accumulation of ice on the breech block which caused failures, or the freezing of static oil in the Palmer Firing Gear. Attempts were made to raise the internal temperature of the turret by the use of first, the Galley heater, which proved unsuccessful, and secondly, with ducted heating both to the rear and mid-upper turrets. This type of heating has proved more successful, and is being incorporated in production aircraft, many of which are already in service.
[Underlined] MODIFICATIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS. [/underlined]
Apart from those already mentioned, Armament personnel were responsible for many bright ideas, some of which are reported below.
A de-belting and cleaning machine for .303 ammunition was designed an manufactured by R.A.F. Station, Swinderby. It is understood that Bomber Command is interested in this machine which has been working satisfactorily for some months.
The enlarging of trigger guards to enable gunners to have easy access to the triggers when wearing thick gloves. Now a Bomber Command modification.
Modification to F.N. 120 turrets to enable gunners to wear the pilot type parachute submitted by R.A.F. Waddington, now as a Command Modification.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ARMAMENT. [/underlined]
Heating for the Palmer Firing Valve Box, submitted by East Kirkby and issued as a Command modification.
Re-positioning of the MK.IIC C.G.S. Junction Box to enable the ‘C’ type parachute to be used in F.N.121 turrets. Submitted by R.A.F. Station, Waddington, and issued as a Bomber Command modification.
Improvements of Bomber Command Mod. No.3 to increase the Gunner’s vision, submitted by R.A.F. Waddington, and at present being investigated by Bomber Command.
All electrical firing gear in turrets. This modification submitted by Metheringham was at first turned down due to the inability to obtain the necessary solenoids. M.A.P. have recently shown interest in this modification and have requested full particulars.
The re-positioning of F.N. 50 Solenoids and the shortening of the Bowden Cable. This modification was submitted by R.A.F. Station, Bardney, as a means of preventing the Bowden Firing Cable from catching on the armour plating and causing run-away guns. Although not accepted, an alternative modification was incorporated in production.
East Kirkby were responsible for a modification to the No.44 Bomb pistol which facilitates the fitting of safety wires. Now a Command modification.
R.A.F. Station, Bardney, were responsible for the design and manufacture of a triple adaptor to enable 3 X 500 lb. bombs to be carried on the four centre stations of the Lancaster bomb bay. This modification aroused great interest both at Headquarters, Bomber Command, and at the Air Ministry, but was eventually turned down as the Ministry of Aircraft Production had, at this time, a similar development under way to achieve the same purpose. This adaptor took the form of a quintuple carrier slung across the bomb bay. It is understood that progress with this development is satisfactory.
Due to the delay in the manufacture of the new Heavy S.B.C. Transporter a protective plate to prevent damage to 4 lb. incendiary bomb tails when carried in S.B.C’s was introduced by R.A.F. Station, East Kirkby, and has since been issued as a Bomber Command modification.
[Underlined] BOMBING RANGES. [/underlined]
To meet the increased number of bombing targets required for practice bombing, personnel at Wainfleet Range erected two additional targets at Ingoldmells and Wrangle, the former was initially used as a dive bombing target. The range personnel worked hard to keep this target in repair and put up a tough fight against the sea assisted by well aimed bombs.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES TABLE. [/underlined]
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A – MANIPULATION B – MAINTENANCE C – ICING D – TECHNICAL E – ELECTRICAL F – OBSCURE
[Page break]
[Drawing] flying control
A year ago, the “5 Group Quick Landing Scheme” was introduced, following trials at Skellingthorpe. During the year developments in the scheme have speeded up the landing times. In September, 1943, the Group average was 3.67 minutes. On the introduction of the scheme this average fell to 2.66 minutes in January, 1944. Since May, 1944, when it fell to 1.99 minutes, the figure has remained below 2 minutes and in December, 1944, reached its lowest level, 1.61 minutes.
The main alteration to the original scheme took place at the end of September, on the introduction of the Command Standard Landing Procedure, when the Group scheme was amended to bring it into line with the Command Scheme by advancing the initial call-up point to the funnel, increasing the height at the initial call and renaming the calling positions.
Developments in airfield lighting have assisted in this reduction of landing times, mainly in conditions of poor visibility. Sodium lights in the funnel and on the flarepath have been of great value. Speedier clearance of the runway and perimeter track have been assisted by the introduction of directional arrows and illuminated dispersal numbers.
Tarmac and asphalt used in the surfacing of runways and perimeter tracks have improved serviceability, though considerable difficulties have arisen in the case of satellite airfields carrying two squadron traffic.
Radar developments during the year foreshadow and entire change in flying control methods, when much of the present use of lighting will be subordinated to control through Radar. The increased heavy traffic in all areas of Bomber Command makes such development vitally necessary.
[Underlined] LANDING TIMES FOR DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
[Table of Landing Times by Base and Station]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] photography
[Underlined] ANALYSIS DAY PHOTOGRAPHY – DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
[Table of Day Photographic Analysis Ranked by Squadron]
[Underlined] ANALYSIS NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHY – DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
[Table of Night Photography Analysis Ranked by Squadron]
This photographic inter-squadron ladder is produced on the number of failures (excluding “Target Conditions” “T.C.”) incurred during the past month, as a percentage of the number of events.
+ 617 and 627 Squadrons are omitted from the ladder in view of the relatively low number of attempts of each.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] aircrew safety
[Underlined] THE PAST YEAR. [/underlined]
The drive to save lives of ditching bomber crews and crews forced to bale out or crash land was continued. It is hard to establish how many lives were lost due to ignorance of procedure, Safety Drills or equipment, but a review of successful incidents shows a trend towards better knowledge and understanding of the drills and a decline in the number of stupid mistakes.
The year saw the ‘K’ type personal dinghy come and go. It also saw the completion of successful trials in 5 Group of the prototype Back-type parachute, which it is hoped will soon be available to all heavy bomber crews. As an interim measure the Seat-type parachute was made compulsory for Pilots and Rear Gunners.
An ingenious “Warning horn” for emergency in the air was devised within the Group and tested successfully. It has been forwarded to Bomber Command for approval and general adoption. The horn gives audible warning to all crew members to bale out or prepare for ditching when the intercomm. has failed.
[Underlined] INTO THE SEA. [/underlined]
One known ditching occurred in the Group during December – an aircraft (believed to be of 189 Squadron), returning to a diversion airfield after attacking Politz, came down in the sea about 5 miles N.W. of Banff. No signals were received from this aircraft, the incident being reported from land, and in spite of an extensive search no survivors were picked up though an aircraft wheel was seen.
[Underlined] CRASH STATIONS. [/underlined]
There have been several crashes recently in the vicinity of airfields during return from operations in bad weather. Captains of aircraft are reminded of the “Crash Landing Drill” (Appendix ‘C’ to Drill No.8 of 5 Group Aircraft Drills refers). This Drill says “The Pilot is to order ‘Crash Stations’ as soon as a crash is imminent or probable, i.e. landing in bad visibility or when the aircraft has suffered damage which is likely to make a normal landing difficult”.
[Underlined] PARACHUTES. [/underlined]
It has been noticed that a lot of pilots and rear gunners are still not using the Seat-type parachutes on all flights. This is now compulsory. See Air Staff Instruction Trg./7.
[Underlined] DRILLS. [/underlined]
A reminder that Saturday morning is still the Safety Drill morning. Get a practice done once a week and you won’t get your feet wet if you have to ditch. It’s cold in the North Sea these days.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] accidents
In reviewing flying accidents for the past 12 months, it is only fair to record what the Group has achieved in effecting a reduction in the actual rate of accidents during the period. This is best shown pictorally by means of the following graph:-
[Graph of Aircraft Damaged per 10,000 hours through 1944.]
The graph is self-evident and the consistent decrease in the rate throughout practically the whole year is something of which we can be proud. At the same time, without wishing to belittle the efforts of the those who have been responsible for achieving this reduction, we must not be misled by these figures into thinking that the accident rate is by any means satisfactory.
The hard fact still remains that in 12 months 360 aircraft were seriously damaged in flying accidents. Of these4 125 were totally destroyed including 60 cases in which one or more members of the crew received fatal injuries. In squadrons you can probably recall a fatal crash and perhaps a taxying collision and you may even have been involved in an accident yourself. We at Group as onlookers see most of the game; the accidents we can call to mind are not just isolated instances and it is for this reason that the above figures are quoted: to emphasise the serious consequences of accidents and to make quite clear that great effort is still required if we are to fulfil our aim of entirely eliminating unnecessary loss of lie and unnecessary damage to aircraft.
[Underlined] CAUSE AND PREVENTION. [/underlined]
If you have read past issues of ‘V’ Group News you will have seen repeated references to taxying accidents. It is not surprising therefore, that when examining all the avoidable accidents which have occurred during the year, we find that no less than 32% occurred whilst taxying. Barely is there the slightest excuse for this type of accident, particularly as Air Staff Instructions give adequate advice as to the means of safe taxying. Read Flying Control 24.
Overshoots and heavy landings together accounted for 22% of the avoidable accidents. These two causes have been linked together because
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ACCIDENTS. [/underlined]
the root cause of each often lies in the approach and a good approach is dependent to a very great extent upon speed. Remember that when landing heavily laden there is no need for an excessively high final approach speed: 115 m.p.h. but never faster.
The next most serious cause from the point of view of numbers was swinging during take off and landing, accounting for 16% of the total. Once again we repeat the warning to open throttles slowly, easily and smoothly, and do not open up to full throttle before travelling 500 yards down the runway irrespective of your load.
A reminder to Squadron Commanders. Do not forget Air Staff Instruction Ops.2/47. This will help materially in the general drive to keep accidents down to a minimum.
[Underlined] THE NEW YEAR. [/underlined]
Thank you for the results achieved in 1944. You have proved what can be done and it only remains for this success to be continued and bettered in 1945.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] equipment
[Underlined] USE OF EQUIPMENT. [/underlined]
The Powers that Be are becoming very anxious about the large quantity of Service Equipment which is being mis-used. Instances quoted are Navigation Bags used for weekend holdalls, blankets as table coverings, etc. Equipment Officers can help the Station Commanders to stop this mis-use by pointing out any irregularities that come to their notice.
[Underlined] DISCREPANCIES IN BARRACK INVENTORIES. [/underlined]
Attention is drawn to Headquarters, Bomber Command, letter BC/50816/E.1 dated 19th December, 1944. If the station has not already broken down the Barrack Inventory into site inventories, under A.M.O. A.559/43, this should be done at once.
[Underlined] IN RETROSPECT. [/underlined]
The Equipment Officers and their staffs very rarely see the result of their work. Nevertheless the work they have put in during the last year has certainly helped the Group’s achievements. Without their good work this Group would not have done as much as it has. The New Year motto for the Equipment Section is “We get ‘em, you smash ‘em – we getcha some more!”
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
education [Drawing]
During December, Bomber Command opened its own E.V.T. school at Bourne. The aim is to train instructors for E.V.T. work after the cessation of hostilities with Germany. Groups are being asked to supply 10 instructors for each course, so that it is essential that a steady influx of volunteers is forthcoming from stations. Lists are submitted from Stations monthly, and the last two or three returns have not brought in nearly enough names to ensure the success of the scheme. There should always be publicity on stations asking for volunteers, and the importance of the work must be impressed on suitable candidates. It is realised that some men are put off by the fact that conditions of service have not yet been published, and by the idea the E.V.T. work might postpone demobilisation. It is thought that conditions of service will not be unfavourable, and great emphasis must be laid on the fact that no one will be kept in the service after they are due to be demobilised. It is clear that to postpone demobilisation after a person’s group is named to leave the service would destroy the whole foundation on which the scheme has been built.
The end of December makes a logical break in the winter programme, when the work of the last three months can be reviewed. Many stations have produced fairly good results, no station has done all that can be done even under present conditions. Classes at Lincoln have been well attended, there have been successful classes on stations. Some very good work has been done with aircrew cadets and handicraft and music clubs have flourished. There are still many deficiencies however. There are some stations where no classes are organised for Matriculation. It cannot be that on a station of strength 1000, there are not six people who want to take this important examination. The only explanation is bad publicity and lack of drive on the part of the Education Officer. Some stations have, as yet, no facilities for woodwork, while suggestions for the formation of cookery classes and instruction in Home Nursing for W.A.A.F. have brought little result. In some cases there is an inclination to wait for this Headquarters to arrange lectures and not enough initiative of the part of stations to obtain good lecturers themselves.
To an outside observer, the difference in the standard of News Rooms is very surprising. It is realised that some stations have better facilities for display and more comfortable furniture than others, although this is not always the fault of circumstances, but rather a lack of interest and initiative. Sometimes this deficiency is not on the side of the Education Officer, but often that officer is to blame for not making the best of his opportunities. There should be a frequent alteration of display material, with news and topical articles up to date. There is not enough variety of topics and far too many maps reproducing the same localities. One large map of Europe and one of the Far East are sufficient for keeping the War Fronts up to date. The large number of airmen using the News Rooms is a proof that far more time and attentions should be given by the officers concerned in making the rooms really first class.
The service as a whole has shown a greater realisation of the importance of education in the last six months. It is up to Education Officers to take advantage of this increased interest and to make their work attractive and appealing to the personnel of their station.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] decorations
The following IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.L. BLUNSDON DFC
P/O A.F. JONES DFC
F/O R.C. LAKE DFC
F/L E.F.A. JONES DFC
S/L A.G. WILLIAMS DFC
F/SGT A.H. HORRY DFM
P/O J.E. STOWELL DFC
P/O E. SHIELDS DFC
P/O D. MacINTOSH DFC
P/O W.D. TWEDDLE DFC
F/O R.C. HARVEY DFC
F/O F. SOWERBY DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/O J.H.C. BRAHAM DFC
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O A.J. WALKER DFC
F/O T.H.J. PLAYFORD DFC
W/O L.J. HAZELL DFC
P/O N. EVANS DFC
A/F/L R.E. KNIGHTS, DFC DSO
F/O A.E. KELL, DFC BAR TO DFC
W/C J.B. TAIT, DSO & 2 BARS, DFC & BAR 3RD BAR TO DSO
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O S.J. BRISTOW
F/O N. STOCKWELL DFC
SGT H. McKNOX DFM
F/SGT A.J. FROST DFM
F/SGT E.R. BOLAND DFM
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O H.F. ARNOLD DFC
F/O L.M. PEDERSON DFC
P/O J.C. FLEMING DFC
P/O J.A. CASTLES DFC
F/SGT E.R.G. HAINES DFM
F/SGT J. CHRISTIAN DFM
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON (CONTD) [/underlined]
SGT J. SKIDMORE DFM
SGT J.A. RICHARDS DFM
W/O L.W.J. THOMAS DFM
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L R.N. QUINN, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O F.N. DAVIS DFC
F/O W.J. DAVIS DFC
A/F/O N. BALLANCE DFC
F/SGT F.A. KIRBY DFM
F/SGT E.T. MANNING DFM
F/SGT H. LEWIS DFM
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O O.C. THOMAS DFC
F/O W.F. MARTIN DFC
F/SGT M.J. THORNE DFM
F/O K.E. BLY DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O D.W. SIMMONS DFC
W/O V.G. BURGESS DFC
F/SGT J.H. KEENAN DFM
W/O A.F.C. HARROW DFC
SGT J.A. LYON DFM
P/O E.J.H. ROBERTS DFC
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O P.W. ALLWOOD DFC
A/F/O P.C. CORNISH DFC
F/O T.P. JUPP, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/SGT I.O. HARRIS DFM
F/O L. HATCHER, AFM DFC
F/SGT G.S. HAZELTINE DFM
F/O R. HOBBS DFC
F/O R.E.H. FOOTE, DFC BAR TO DFC
A/W/O W.G. TROTTER DFC
F/SGT M. BRENNAN DFM
W/O J.E. HUDSON DFC
P/O V.J. ROBLEY DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J.A. PEARCE DFC
A/W/O G.D. MOIR DFC
A/F/L N.N. PARKER DFC
A/F/L G.H. LAING, DFC BAR TO DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON (CONTD) [/underlined]
F/SGT G. BROWN DFM
W/O A.J. CROLL, DFM DFC
W/O F.H. GREEN DFC
A/F/L G.H.R. POLSON, DFC, DFM BAR TO DFC
F/O P.J. HUMPHREYS DFC
F/SGT D.S. NICHOLLS DFM
F/SGT J.D. McINGLIS DFM
A/S/L T.H. MAKEPEACE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/SGT W. MANDERSON DFM
F/SGT R. MOORE DFM
P/O A.A. AVELINE DFC
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/O J. NETHERWOOD DFC
F/O L. COEN DFC
A/S/L J.W. ALLINSON
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O W. McINTOSH, DFM, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O E. OAKES DFC
P/O C.B. SUTHERLAND, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O G.D. CHESWORTH DFC
P/O J.S. COOK DFC
W/O G.W.J. AINSWORTH DFC
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O W.G. EVANS DFC
W/O T.J. McLEAN, DFM DFC
A/F/O J. GINGLES, DFM DFC
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L R.L. BARTLEY, DFC BAR TO DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L R.E. MILLICHAP DFC
F/L J.W. MARTIN DFC
F/O J.W. LENNON DFC
F/O M.A.J. BEAUDOIN DFC
A/F/L D.E. HAWKER DFC
F/O G.J. BATE DFC
F/O L.A.V. WOOD DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] war savings
[Table of War Savings by Station]
[Underlined] GRAND TOTAL NATIONAL SAVINGS FOR DECEMBER, 1944 - £6,476. 7. 11d.
A- Approximate number of pence per head.
B – Approximate percentage of personnel saving.
C – Total savings.
[Page break]
It Happens Every Day!!
When A.C.W. Mary Jones arrived at Station Z,
She saw the Station Signals Off., and unto him she said,
“I’ve nine days leave to come, good sir, and it would be a boon
“If I could have it right away. My boy friend’s sailing soon”.
Without delay the woeful Waaf was whisked upon her way,
And when her time was up she sent a message reading “Pray
“Extend my leave a further week; the ship is still in port”.
The Signals Off. agreed to this – he was a decent sort.
But when the girl requested yet a further forty-eight,
He quite forgot his decency and telegraphed, irate,
“Return at once to unit”, but the errant maiden tarried,
And wired “I want another fortnight more, for I am getting married,
“The church is fixed; the guests are warned. This afternoon at two
“By special licence we’ll be wed. Our hours of bliss are few
“So please agree”. Defeated he confirmed this new request,
And fourteen days ensued of peace, with no word from the pest.
On day fifteen a gentle knock upon his office door
Announced that Mary Smith (nee Jones), was back in camp once more,
And wished to have an interview, which he with some elation
Agreed to give, because he wished a fuller explanation.
The genial soul was quite prepared to overlook the past;
A little talk was his intent, and so he gently gassed,
And maundered on, and moralised for quite a lengthy spell.
‘Mongst other things – “My dear”, he said, “I’m pleased to see you well;
“And now that you are back you’ll do your very best I know.
“The section’s very under-staffed. We need you ever so!”.
He stopped at last. The girl then spoke. (You’ll guess her purpose maybe).
“Oh sir” I’d like my ticket please” I’m going to have a baby!”
ANON. (Circa 1945.).
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
war effort
[Table of Aircraft and Sorties Carried out by Squadron]
[Underlined] NOTES: [/underlined] Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “Successful Sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties, Nos. 9, 49, 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another Squadron, the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons. Squadrons above establishment are calculated on an establishment of 20.
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Dublin Core
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Title
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V Group News, December 1944
5 Group News, December 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 29, December 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and articles on tactics, operations, gardening, signals, navigation, this month's bouquets, radar navigation, air bombing, engineering, training, second thoughts for pilots, gunnery, armament, flying control, photography, aircrew safety, accidents, equipment, education, decorations, war savings, it happens every day, and war effort.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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1944-12
Contributor
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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68 printed sheets
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eng
Type
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Text
Identifier
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-18
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
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Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Kattegat (Baltic Sea)
Belgium--Houffalize
Belgium--Saint-Vith
Denmark--Kalundborg
Denmark--Langeland
England--Lincolnshire
Germany--Euskirchen (Kreis)
Germany--Giessen (Hesse)
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Munich
Germany--Rheydt
Netherlands--Ijmuiden
Netherlands--Rotterdam
Norway--Oslo
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Germany--Urft Dam
Temporal Coverage
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1944-12
5 Group
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
demobilisation
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
flight engineer
Gee
gremlin
H2S
Lancaster
Master Bomber
mine laying
Mosquito
navigator
Pathfinders
pilot
radar
rivalry
Tallboy
training
wireless operator
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
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Transcription
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[Drawing]
1
9
4
5 GROUP NEWS
No 30 JANUARY
[Boxed] NO EXTRACTS OR QUOTATIONS MAY BE MADE FROM THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE AUTHORITY OF THE GROUP INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, 5 GROUP. COMMUNICATION TO UNAUTHORISED PERSONS IS A BREACH OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT. COPIES NOT REQUIRED FOR RECORD PURPOSES AFTER CIRCULATION ARE TO BE DESTROYED AS SECRET WASTE IN ACCORDANCE WITH A.M.O. A.411/41. [/boxed]
[Page Break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
[Boxed] In our last issue Air Marshal Sir R.A. Cochrane, K.B.E., C.B., A.F.C., bade farewell to the Group after two years of command. As many know, Air Marshal Cochrane left us to take up the appointment of Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Transport Command. We wish him every success in his new sphere.
It is unfortunate that his successor, Air Vice Marshal Constantine, C.B.E., D.S.O., is unable to write a Foreword this month. At the time of going to press he is suffering from a bad bout of influenza, and we wish him a speedy recovery. Air Vice Marshal Constantine has come to us from Headquarters, Bomber Command, so we are by no means strangers. In welcoming his to the Group we assure him of our close co-operation and support for the future. [/boxed]
[Page break]
Famous Last Words
[Drawing] Navigator: “Pilot, you are below the safety height for this area”
Pilot: “To hell with that, I’m not going to fly in cloud” [Drawing]
These actually were the last words that this pilot ever spoke. Immediately afterwards, the aircraft struck a hillside, six of the crew being killed. The seventh member, although badly injured, survived to tell the tale. Here is his account.
“It was on the attack on Heilbronn on the night 4/5th December, 1944. The attack was successful and after bombing we set course for position ‘D’ descending in steps as briefed. Just South of Strasbourg the Navigator told the Captain that we were below safety height and the Captain replied that he wanted to get out of cloud. This was the last speech over the intercom., and I have no idea of the height of the aircraft. Immediately after this remark the aircraft hit a hillside. I was thrown out of my turret and landed under the mid-upper turret. I eventually regained consciousness, not knowing how long I had been there or where I was. After calling out the names of the other members of the crew for 15 minutes I decided to sit in the aircraft until daylight owing to inclement weather. Daylight arrived with a heavy fall of snow, but it did allow me to find my boot which I had lost, and with great difficulty, owing to my right arm and left hand being broken, put my boot on and jump out of the aircraft. The aircraft was broken in half, the break being behind the wings. The mid-upper gunner was dead in his turret and the others were 15 – 20 yards from the aircraft. After convincing myself that all were dead I set course SW by the aid of my compass.”
Here is a perfect example of the gross disobedience and stupidity of the Captain being responsible for the death of himself and five other members of the crew. It has happened hundreds of times before and will happen as many times in future, unless YOU guard against it.
The flight plan is issued for your safety. It is the best efforts of the planning staffs to safeguard you from your twon [sic] main hazards – the enemy and the weather.
KNOW. YOUR. FLIGHT. PLAN, AND. STICK. TO. IT.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] operations
[Underlined] DORTMUND EMS CANAL – 1st JANUARY. [/underlined]
The stretch of canal at LADBERGEN, newly repaired, was once again attacked, this time in daylight. Force employed – 102 Lancasters and 2 Mosquitos.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Two Mosquitos of No.54 Base were to mark the aiming point with Red T.I. cascading at 5,000 feet, burning for 12 minutes at H – 4. The leading Lancasters of No.54 Base were also to drop Red T.I. on the aiming point.
[Underlined] AIMING [/underlined] (a) Using the T.I’s as a guide to identification, crews were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the Western branch of the canal. Care was to be exercised not to overshoot, as the Western branch was the primary objective.
(b) Normal gaggle formation was to be maintained until the Bomb Aimer could see the target. During the bombing run, aircraft on the flanks would automatically converge towards the centre. Immediately after bomb release, flank aircraft were to resume normal gaggle formation. Bombing heights 9,000 – 12,000 feet. Bomb load 14 x 1000lb MC/G.P.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] The weather at the target was clear, with good visibility, and crews identified the target visually. Once again the bombing was very concentrated, but results could not be assessed on the spot, as a large proportion of delay-action bombs was used. Owing to the frequency with which this target has been attacked, and the vast number of bomb craters, it is impossible accurately to estimate the degree of concentration, but it is apparent that as good a concentration was achieved on this daylight attack as on any of the night attacks.
The Western arm of the canal was breached once more, over a considerable distance, and there is much flooding both to the East and West of the canal.
[Underlined] MITTELAND CANAL – 1/2nd JANUARY [/underlined]
Master Bomber – Wing Commander Smith
Aerial reconnaissance showed that the Germans were making frantic efforts to put this canal back into commission. When repairs were about complete, it was decided to make a further attack on the stretch of the canal at GRAVENHORST, to deny the enemy this important artery of communications. The attack was carried out at night. Force employed – 152 Lancasters and 5 Mosquitos.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Target to be marked blind by Lancasters with T.I. Green. Flares to be dropped in target area, in the light of which the aiming point was to be marked by Mosquitos with Red T.I. Crews to aim centre bomb of stick at the M.P.I. of the Red T.I. or as directed by the Master Bomber. Bombing heights 9,000 – 12,000 feet.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather clear, with good visibility. The blind marking and illumination went according to plan, and a very good concentration of Red T.I. was dropped 150 yards from the aiming point. Once again a very large proportion of delay-action 1,000lb MC/G.P. bombs was used. The attack was an outstanding success, and a tremendous concentration was achieved on and around the aiming point. The canal and its embankments have almost been obliterated, in fact to such an extent that their course in places can hardly be distinguished. Many barges have been destroyed or left stranded. Both this canal and the stretch of the Dortmund Ems canal at LADBERGEN, attacked during the afternoon, are still 100% unserviceable four weeks after the attack.
[Underlined] ROYAN – 4/5th JANUARY [/underlined]
Master Bomber – Wing Commander Smith
A surprise attack was made against the German garrison at Royan, on the French West coast at the mouth of the Gironde. The 5 Group raid was later followed by an attack by No.1 Group.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] A suitable marking point was selected, and the target was divided into seven sectors. One or two Squadrons were allotted to each sector. Bases were to spread their aircraft evenly over the allotted sectors and height bands. Bombing was to be carried out by means of a timed overshoot of the markers. Bombing heights 6,000 – 10,000 feet. Marking and illumination sequence as normal. Bomb load 1 x 4,000lb + max. 500lb MC/G.P.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather: no cloud, but some ground haze. After some preliminary delay and difficulty with the marking, the Mosquitos succeeded in dropping 2 Red T.I’s 100 yards 220 degrees, and a third Red T.I. 180 yards 190 degrees from the marking point. The main force was then called in to bomb with overshoots as planned, and a good sector attack developed, in spite of some aircraft having to make more than one bombing run.
It is not possible to distinguish on the P.R.U. cover, the 5 Group from the 1 Group attack which followed soon after, but damage is well spread throughout the town, and is severe.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] The planned T.O.T. was 10 minutes, but investigation reveals that about 80% of all aircraft bombed over a T.O.T. of 5 minutes. This caused a high concentration of aircraft and was chiefly due to the unforeseen and unavoidable hitch in the preliminary marking. The result was that many of the earlier aircraft had to go round again, and some were seen flying on reciprocal courses to the planned bombing headings. The consequent risk of collision may largely have accounted for our loss of six aircraft, as the defences were practically negligible.
[Underlined] HOUFFALIZE – 5/6th JANUARY [/underlined]
Houffalize was an enemy strong point in the Ardennes salient. The aim of this attack was to destroy enemy troops, armour and supplies concentrated in and around the village. Force employed – 131 Lancasters.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Oboe Mosquitos of No.8 Group were to mark the target with Red T.I. These T.I’s were to be backed up by four Lancasters of No.54 Base dropping Green T.I’s. The main force were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the Red T.I’s. or failing this, at the M.P.I. of all the Green T.I’s. Bombing heights 9,000 – 12,000 feet. Bomb load 1 x 4,000lb H.C. + max. 500 lb MC/G.P. Crews were warned of the proximity of allied forces, and strict instructions were given that bombs were not to be dropped unless the T.I. Red and/or Green were positively identified.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather 8/10ths thin cloud inlayers 4,000/10,000 feet, with good visibility. A good concentration of Red and Green T.I’s was put down on the target, and the Master Bomber ordered the main force to bomb direct as planned. The majority were able to do so, but some 30 aircraft were unable to obtain satisfactory bombing runs on account of the cloud conditions and quite rightly brought their bombs back. Reconnaissance, and later the capture of the village, proved that it was virtually destroyed.
[Underlined] MUNICH – 7/8th JANUARY [/underlined]
Master Bomber – Squadron Leader Stubbs.
Two attacks were made on Munich this night, the first one by 216 aircraft of No.5 Group, and the second by some 370 aircraft of Nos. 1, 6 and 8 Groups.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Blind markers were to drop T.I. Red on the marking point; these were to be followed by a small number of flares. The accuracy of the Greens was to be assessed by Mosquitos of No.54 Base. This assessment was then to be passed to the Master Bomber, who was to order the backers up to drop Red T.I. in relation to this assessment. The Master Bomber was then to select the most accurate markers, on which to issue his bombing orders. Blind marking with high bursting T.I’s was to be used as an emergency.
Main force crews were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the most accurate T.I. with delay as ordered. Bombing heights 17,250 – 20,000 feet. Bomb load 1 x 4,000lb + max. 4lb incendiary clusters.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather: broken medium cloud in early stages of attack. Later clear, with moderate visibility. The Lancasters dropped several Red T.I’s accurately in the target area; Mosquitos then went in dropping Green T.I’s. The most accurate one, some 200 yards North of the marking point, was then backed up on the Master Bomber’s instructions, and the main force ordered to bomb the centre of the Green T.I’s with overshoot as ordered. Crew reports indicate a heavy and successful sector attack, but no photographic cover has yet been obtained to confirm this.
[Underlined] POLITZ – 13/14th JANUARY [/underlined]
Master Bomber: Squadron Leader Benjamin
This was No.5 Group’s second attack on this first priority oil target, and it was confidently expected that, given favourable conditions, amends would be made for the attack which went astray on December 21/22nd, 1944.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Blind marking, flare illumination and Mosquito visual marking in normal sequence. Skymarking was provided for, should cloud conditions preclude visual marking. A suitable marking point was selected, and crews were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the markers as directed by the Master Bomber, using a false wind vector to bring the bombs on to the aiming point. Bombing heights 15,500 feet to 17,750 feet. Bomb load 1 x 4,000lb H.C. + max. 500lb G.P.
The Master Bomber was to transmit a false wind vector to the main force at H – 5. The vector was to be calculated on a forecast bombing wind, which would be either confirmed or corrected at H-15 on W/T from 5 Group Headquarters. A vector wind, to be set on the bombsight, was issued to crews before take-off. This was based on forecast winds, and was to be used if the vector bombing wind transmitted by the Master Bomber was not received.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather: there was no cloud in the target area, but a smoke screen was in operation. In addition, the snow covered ground made visual identification of the marking point difficult. Proximity T.I. Green were dropped punctually near the target, and flares followed. Several Red T.I. were dropped wide by the Mosquitos, but subsequent ones were more accurate, one 50 yards and 155 degrees and a second 300 yards 290 degrees from the marking points (plotted from night photographs). The accurate markers were backed up, and the main force was ordered to bomb as planned.
Crews reported a good concentration, but an investigation of the winds used for bombing indicated that the attack once again miscarried. A serious mistake was made in the calculation of the false vector, and the wind thus used resulted in the displacement of the M.P.I. of the bombs some 1,000 yards S.E. of the aiming point. This is borne out by plots of strike photographs. The vector wind issued by the Master Bomber was transmitted several minutes late. A fair proportion of crew, those who bombed in the first waves, used the vector wind set on the bombsight before take-off. There is therefore a prospect that a proportion of the weight of the attack fell on the target, but while no P.R.U. cover has yet been obtained, there is sufficient evidence from night photographs and analysis of the winds used, to indicate that this attack may prove to be a disappointing failure.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] Success against this type of target, now amongst the most heavily defended in Germany, depends to a large extent on initial surprise. The losses incurred on this attack were 2 Lancasters, or 0.9% of the total force, but this low loss rate cannot be expected to continue, if the target has to be revisited several times before success is achieved.
[Underlined] LEUNA – 14/15th JANUARY [/underlined]
Master Bomber: Squadron Leader Stubbs
A force of 219 aircraft was despatched to attack the priority one synthetic oil plant at LEUNA, near Merseburg.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] It was anticipated that the target would be covered by a thin layer of cloud, and therefore, in addition to the normal illumination and blind marking procedure, arrangements were made for high-bursting Red T.I’s to be dropped blind over the selected marking point, during the T.O.T. If cloud conditions permitted, Mosquitos were to mark the marking point with T.I. Green. The Master Bomber was to instruct the main force at which markers they were to aim.
The main force were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the markers selected by the Master Bomber, delaying release for 12 seconds, attacking on a common heading of 120°.
Bombing Heights 15,500 – 17,750 feet. Bomb load 1 x 4000lb H.C. + maximum 500lb MC/G.P. (10% long delay).
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather at target: 10/10ths thin stratus at about 1,000 feet. Hazy; poor visibility. Blind markers and flares went down on time, and in the light of the latter the Mosquito markers were able to identify the target area through the thin cloud. The first Green T.I., assessed as 250 yards N.W. of the marking points (and plotted 300 yards 282°) was backed up, and the Master Bomber instructed the main force to aim at the resulting concentration, delaying release for 14 seconds.
Crew reports of the attack were enthusiastic. P.R.U. photographs so far obtained only cover the Northern portion of the plant, but they reveal that this section has been heavily hit, and almost all important installations damaged. On the date of photography (21.1.45) there were no signs of productive activity, and economic experts estimate
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
that production will be restricted to about 25% for one to two months.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] It must be borne in mind that this target was attacked later in the night by other Groups in the Command. They, however, encountered worse weather in the target area, and obtained no night photographs with ground detail.
[Underlined] BRUX – 16/17th JANUARY [/underlined]
Master Bomber: Squadron Leader Benjamin
The synthetic oil plant at BRUX was the third oil target to be attacked by the Group within a week. Force employed – 230 aircraft.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] The target was to be marked by blind markers with T.I. Green, followed by flare illumination. If cloud conditions permitted, a selected marking point was then to be marked visually by Mosquitos with Red T.I. The Master Bomber was then, if possible, to assess the markers, and instruct the main force at which group of T.I’s they should aim. T.I. Green bursting above the cloud, were to be dropped over the target as a last resort by the Blind Markers. The main force were to aim their bombs as ordered by the Master Bomber, on a heading of 118°, delaying release by 13 seconds. Bombing heights 14,000 – 16,750 feet. Bomb load 1 x 4,000lb H.C. + maximum MC/G.P. (10% long delay).
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather 10/10ths strato cu; tops 3,000 feet. Two Mosquito visual markers flew below cloud and were able to identify the oil plant; they dropped their Red T.I’s but these were almost invisible from above the cloud. The Master Bomber therefore decided on sky marking, and told the Flare Forces to retain their flares. A good concentration of green skymarkers was dropped, and the Master Bomber ordered the main force to bomb direct either the Red T.I’s if visible or the glow of fires.
No bombing results were seen, and no indication of the accuracy of the attack could be obtained from night photographs owing to cloud. Photographic cover since obtained is partly cloud obscured, but shows very heavy fresh damage, especially to the Power Station, Cooling Tower, organic sulphur remover plant and pump houses. It is also possible that the most important Winkler Generator (Priority I) has been considerably damaged.
Despite the difficult marking conditions the results of this attack may be considered highly satisfactory.
[Underlined] ATTACKS BY NOS. 617 AND 9 SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] BERGEN – 12th JANUARY [/underlined]
Sixteen Lancasters from each of 617 and 9 Squadrons took off to attack the U-boat pens, a floating dock and shipping at Bergen.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Three aircraft of No.617 Squadron were each to select a ship (in known positions) with Tallboy fused .5 seconds. Three more No.617 Squadron aircraft were to attack a floating dock, in which was a submarine. The remaining 617 aircraft and all No.9 Squadron aircraft were to attack the pens with Tallboy fused 11 seconds delay. No.617 Squadron (using the S.A.B.S.) were to aim direct, and No.9 Squadron (using the Mark XIV) were to select a suitable aiming point off the target and calculate a false wind vector to shift the bombs onto the target. The Squadrons were to be escorted by Mustangs.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather clear: good visibility.
[Underlined] No.617 Squadron. [/underlined] Two of the three aircraft detailed to
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
bomb shipping attacked. The aircraft detailed to attack the floating dock found it visible only from directly overhead; it could not be seen from sufficient distance away for a satisfactory bombing run to be made, so these aircraft also attacked shipping. Of the ten aircraft whose target was the Pens, only three attacked: four did not bomb because smoke from previous bombs obscured the target, the remainder experienced other troubles.
[Underlined] No.9 Squadron. [/underlined] Fourteen aircraft attacked the primary target. One aircraft was unable to identify the selected aiming point owing to smoke, and one aircraft is missing.
No.617 Squadron claim one ship sunk; three ships received near misses. A good concentration of Tallboys was put down on the Pens, and the attack is reported as the best yet made on them. Pens No.2 and 3 were both hit, and photos show two (possibly three) direct hits.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] Several snags arose during this operation. No.617 Squadron, using the S.A.B.S. must be able to see the aiming point clearly. On this occasion, several aircraft could not bomb, in spite of making several orbits, as the target was obscured by smoke from earlier bombs. No.9 Squadron were more lucky, and their offset aiming point remained visible during nearly the whole of the attack.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Drawing] navigation
[Underlined] STANDARD OF NAVIGATION FOR JANUARY. [/underlined]
Navigation during January (when the majority of targets were long range) was the highest standard for any month. This shows that Navigation, which has stood still for so long, is now moving again, and in the right direction. This is good – let us keep it moving, and in the same direction.
An analysis has been made of the width and length of the Bomber stream during January. To deal first with track-keeping. The average width of the streams going to the target was 25 miles; on the return journey, it was 25 1/2 miles. (The former figure does not include supporters, who normally take a different route). The maximum permissible width of the stream is 10 miles, therefore we still have a long way to go. However, considering that the majority of operations were against long range targets and that on a number of occasions the true wind velocity differed vastly from that forecast, these results are satisfactory.
Now to deal with timing. The average length of the stream going to the target was 50 miles, permissible length being 36 miles. On the return journey it was 64 miles, permissible length being 37 miles. It will be noted that the standard of timing going to the target is very good, particularly considering the deep penetrations and the varying winds encountered. On the return journey, however, the standard of timing is NOT good. Crews are STILL racing back to liberated territory. It is easier to maintain accurate timing on the return journey because Navigators know the true wind velocities and can therefore make allowances. But in a number of instances they do not make the necessary allowance, and consequently concentration suffers. It is a well known fact that aircraft who lag behind the main stream are easy prey for enemy fighters, also those who stick their necks out ahead of the mainstream give the enemy that little bit of extra warning which is so vital to him. Captains and Navigators have been told this time and again, but a few tend to completely ignore all warnings.
In the last three years Navigation has progressed beyond expectation; immense strides have been made in windfinding, track keeping, the air plot, navigational aids and navigation technique. All these improvements should have resulted in perfect timing, but they haven’t – yet! Navigators, you must do everything in your power to remove this deficiency, because only when our timing is as good as all other items of Navigation can we say that we are doing a 100% job.
At this stage it is well to recall the aim we set ourselves 3 months ago. That is, a concentration of no greater dimensions than 50 miles X 20 miles. Well, we have almost achieved that. When we do in fact achieve it, then we shall set ourselves a new goal, until finally we reach perfection. DON’T say this cannot be done, we set ourselves what was thought to be an impossible goal in practice bombing wind finding – and we achieved it. On this same reasoning there is no reason why we should not obtain perfect track keeping and timing – but remember, this depends entirely on YOU.
Read this entire paragraph through again, then set yourselves a goal – and, finally make sure you achieve it.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
Station and Squadron Navigation officers must ensure that all new crews are made aware of the great importance of accurate track keeping and timing. These officers must see that all new crews know the goal we have set ourselves and that they must help us to achieve it.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING VECTOR ERRORS. [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by Squadrons this month is 4 m.p.h. exactly, the same as last month. We are STILL not getting any nearer our goal of 3 m.p.h. This goal can and must be obtained if we are to play our full part in the bombing team. Let us then get on with the job and achieve our goal immediately.
[Table of Ranked Average Vector Error by Squadron]
It is good to see that No.56 Base have made a big improvement in their Vector Errors and are now in the top half of the list. No. 55 Base, with the exception of one Squadron, have slipped very badly, and are now in the bottom half of the table. This is not their usual place of residence; it is to be hoped that they do not intend staying there.
An excellent example of consistently accurate windfinding was given by F/O Chorney, Navigator, No.9 Squadron. He recently arrived on the Squadron from Conversion Unit and completed, with his crew, three high level bombing exercises in the first few days on the Squadron. The Vector Errors, converted to 20,000 feet were as follows:-
First Exercise – 14 yards or 2/3 m.p.h.
Second Exercise – 16 yards or 4/5 m.p.h.
Third Exercise – 6 yards or 3/10 m.p.h.
This is really first class windfinding, and it enabled the Bomb Aimer to obtain some perfect bombing results. No. 9 Squadron are always leading the Group in bombing vector errors. What about some other Squadron making a really determined effort to oust them from their position of honour?
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined]
[Drawing] THIS MONTH’S Bouquets [Drawing]
The names of the eight Navigators, two from each Base, who submitted the best work this month are set out below. They have been chosen for their consistently accurate and methodical work, which includes good track keeping and timing, constant wind velocity and E.T.A. checks and log and chart work of a very high order.
1. W/O Murray – No.50 Squadron
2. F/O Harris – No.463 Squadron
3. F/O Pilkington – No.227 Squadron
4. F/O Hassall – No. 49 Squadron
5. F/L Williamson – No.619 Squadron
6. F/S Baker – No.630 Squadron
7. F/L Hatch – No. 97 Squadron
8. F/L Westphal – No. 83 Squadron
[Underlined] MET. INFORMATION. [/underlined]
It has been the practice in this Group for nearly 3 years to get the Station Met. Officer on each Station to give a brief review of the Met. situation to Navigators every morning. Everyone has agreed that this has been most useful to Navigators, particularly the wind distribution information. Two Squadrons in the Group have improved on this system, and it is now the responsibility of each Navigator in turn to obtain from the Met. Officer the “story” for the night, and then give the information, more fully, to the Navigators. This system has a double benefit. It necessitates each individual Navigator taking a keen interest in Met., thereby considerably improving his knowledge; also it provides Navigators with valuable practice in lecturing, practice which almost everyone needs. In each Squadron the Navigation Officer is present, and he is the judge on the effectiveness of the lecture and the ability of the lecturer.
This new system has provoked great competition throughout the two Squadrons and its adoption by other Squadrons is strongly recommended. All Navigation Officers are urged to give this system a trial.
All Navigators are provided with a Form 2330 before take-off, and are asked to make observations of the weather and fill in the back of the form. This is a big task for anyone because it necessitates spending a considerable amount of time away from Navigation – time which can be ill afforded. However, it is vital that the Met. Staff obtain an accurate picture of the weather encountered on route and at the target. If they do not receive this information, then it is obvious that their future forecasting will suffer.
Here is a difficult problem which has to be solved. No. 55 Base appear to have the answer. Each Navigator is given a specific
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
area in which to make accurate observations of the weather and it is necessary for him to give information only for this area. Consequently each Navigator need only concentrate on this item for a few moments of the operation, and naturally he is therefore more determined to do that amount of work thoroughly. The result is that Navigators need only spend two minutes at the most observing the weather, while on the other hand the Met. Officer is assured much valuable and accurate information. The Met. Officers of No.55 Base are very pleased with the reports they have received under this new scheme; they consider they are more complete and accurate than those received under the old scheme.
All Bases are urged to give this method a trial.
[Underlined] SELF ANALYSIS CHART. [/underlined]
Here is the third and final Self Analysis Chart for you to complete. If you missed the first two for any reason look them up immediately and answer those questions too.
(i) Do you know how Gee coding is indicated on the main time base and how to apply the corrections?
(ii) On entering the aircraft do you always note the ‘A’ error of the D.R. compass?
(iii) Do you check through your Navigation Order Book regularly to ensure that you are conversant with all orders?
(iv) Do you know how to adjust the presets on the Loran receiver, and do you know what faults are attributable to wrongly adjusted presets.
(v) Do you always remember to switch on your ‘Z’ equipment before take off?
(vi) Do you always carry out your preflight test in accordance with Appendix ‘B’ of Aircraft Drill No.9.
(vii) Do you know the three standard methods for windfinding and issue of bombing winds, which were issued recently?
(viii) Do you always remember to alter your V.S.C. when you pass the central position of two isogonals; and do you check regularly that the variation has been set in the right direction? (Don’t laugh at the second half of this question, to date some 20 instances have occurred of Navigators straying badly from concentration, and one actually returning early, as a result of setting the variation the wrong way).
(ix) Do you always make sure that you fully understand the procedure for bombing windfinding and issue of bombing winds, for each operation? (This question is most important, lack of knowledge of the procedure by a large number of crews on a recent operation, had a disastrous effect on the bombing accuracy).
If you have answered all the questions truthfully you will now be able to categorise yourself. The system of marking is in the November Summary.
Did you make note of all the points on which you lost marks, and did you rectify those mistakes immediately?
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] Question (v) of last month’s Summary was incorrectly worded, it should read as follows:- “Do you know the position on the return journey of an operation from which you are allowed to relax the Group timing. Do you know why you are allowed to relax Group timing from this position and why this position was chosen”.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION ORDER BOOKS. [/underlined]
All navigation order books have been standardised during the month, and by the time this Summary reaches Squadrons all new order books should be completed.
This is the first time we have had standardisation in order books. Now that we have brought them up to date we must keep them so. Squadron Navigation Officers must see that all documents marked for inclusion in the Order Book are inserted immediately.
You will find a great deal of valuable information in this book. The rigid adherence to all these orders is a necessity and is vital to the safety of the aircraft. Don’t rush through the enclosures, read them carefully and make a note of all items of major importance. Let you [sic] motto be to “read, mark, learn and digest”.
Make a habit of going through the order book once a week, thus keeping yourself up to date.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS. [/underlined]
F/Lt. Beattie, D.F.C. Nav. Leader No.5 L.F.S. posted to Transport Command.
F/Lt. Bowes, D.F.C. No.5 L.F.S. to be Nav. Leader.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Drawing] radar nav:
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
In view of the nature of the targets attacked by this Group during the month, and to prevent early warning of the approach of a bomber stream, H2S Mark II was not used on any of the bombing operations.
It has also been necessary to cut down the use of H2S Mark III to the absolute minimum that will allow accurate approach and target marking.
Many operators have expressed strong opinions regarding these restrictions, and the view is held that H2S is redundant, or that the efficiency of crews is decreasing. Don’t be misled by these opinions but judge by results. One can bring up many arguments for and against the current policy, but few set operators will fail to agree that the whole success of many of Five Group’s attacks has been solely sue to the element of surprise. Radar silence has helped considerably to bring this about. Another factor partly due to Radar silence has been the very low loss rate suffered by the Group.
[Underlined] H2S Mark II [/underlined]
A number of Gardening operations have been carried out by Squadrons equipped with H2S Mark II during the month, and the standard attained by the crews indicated that individual operators are still maintaining their efficiency on the set, despite the difficulties in obtaining sufficient training.
P.P.I. photographs indicate that good approaches have been made and excellent lays obtained. In this connection Station Radar Navigation Officers are to be congratulated on the conscientious manner in which they are plotting the photographs of the release points. All the plots are checked at this Headquarters, and so far, only one has been found to be incorrect.
H2S mining is, and will continue, to play a great part in the strangling of the enemy’s shipping lanes and to ensure that not one single mine is laid outside these channels it is intended to develop mining teams in each of the five Squadrons of No.55 Base in the very near future. Crews will, therefore, be tested on their ability with H2S on arrival on these Squadrons, and the best will be selected to receive highly concentrated training in all aspects of mining with H2S.
These teams will be given the best possible equipment available to the main force, and every effort will be made to keep it in a high state of serviceability.
Preceeding [sic] crews have set a high standard in H2S mining in the Group, but it is hoped with the development of these mining teams an even higher standard will be reached. It is therefore up to each and everyone concerned wo make this scheme a practical success.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] H 2 S Mark III [/underlined]
Despite the restrictions on the use of H2S Mark III which have been necessary, and the low serviceability, there has been some excellent blind marking during the month. The majority of the targets were small, but fortunately gave compact responses useful for blind bombing. One target in particular – BRUX - was a completely new H2S target for No.54 Base, with little or no landmarks in the vicinity to check. This in no way deterred the marker and flare force, and they were able to find and mark it with their usual precision.
The new Mark IIIE equipment has been tried successfully on operations during the month. The mark, which gives a far better definition than previous marks, and has the added advantage of sector scan, is expected to be used increasingly during the next few months, and we are confidently expecting even more accurate target marking with it in the near future.
[Underlined] H2S Photography [/underlined]
A new Air Staff Instruction relating to H2S photography has been issued recently, and all set operators should be now aware of its contents. If you are not, ask your Station Radar/Nav. for a copy and study it carefully.
It can hardly be said that the P.P.I. photographs taken during the month were of a high standard, and it is evident that set operators are not carrying out the correct photographic procedure. It is appreciated that the Bantam Camera is only makeshift equipment until the Automatic Camera arrives, but excellent results have been obtained by those operators sufficiently keen to find out where they released their T.I’s, flares, bombs or mines. P.P.I. photographs are the only means of ascertaining where the attack developed if 10/10 cloud prevailed and therefore they are as much an operational photograph as the ordinary F24 bomb release photograph. Unfortunately many crews fail to realise this, and the photographs now being received look as if they have just been taken haphazardly in the target area.
One photograph taken anywhere in the target area is insufficient for plotting purposes, and operators must see that they carry out the provisions of A.S.I. Nav.17 to the letter – i.e. one photograph on the run-up 10-15 miles away from the target, and another within 30 seconds of the T.I., flare, bomb or mine release. Unless you take these two photographs and they are plottable, the whole film will be classed as a MANIPULATION failure and questions will be asked.
The majority of P.P.I. photographic failures during the month have been due to:-
(i) Insufficient gain.
(ii) Insufficient exposure.
(iii) Failure to wind the film over (two exposures on one negative).
(iv) Failure to set shutter.
(v) Too large 10 mile zero.
In taking P.P.I. photographs remember maximum contrast is necessary so that towns may be distinguished among the ground returns, and the illumination must be sufficient to register on the film. A complete revolution of the scan must also be given for the exposure as the afterglow is too faint to produce an image, and the
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION [/underlined]
photograph is formed gradually as the scan revolves.
H2S Training
To enable crews to obtain more training in the use of H2S Mark II it has been decided to allow the equipment to be used on the return route from all operations from a position of longitude determined by this Headquarters. Station Radar/Navigation Officers are to ensure that every advantage is taken of this facility.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
The Continental Gee Chains continued to give good service during January, with the majority of operators obtaining coverage on both chains to 1000E.
There were, nevertheless, many conflicting reports on jamming experienced on these chains, but many navigators expressed the opinion that the enemy was transmitting a complete set of locked spurious pulses. To ascertain if this was so it has been decided that on the Squadrons holding H2S cameras one navigator is to take photographs of the Gee tube on future operations. R.A.F. Station, Fulbeck, have carried out ground tests to decide the best exposure, and it has been found that with the green filter removed, gain normal and brilliance high, 1/25 second is sufficient. Until this evidence is forthcoming no move can be made to counteract the menace.
There is one point, however, that navigators should remember. By reference to your D.R. position, you have a sound idea of the lattice values to give a fix, and is these values are set up on the Gee Indicator there should be no difficulty in defeating locked spurious pulses jamming.
With the successful elimination of the salient in the West the “C” slave of the Cologne Chain has been returned to its original position, and the Ruhr Chain is once again transmitting. Cologne Chain Fixing Charts are therefore being withdrawn, and the Ruhr Chain Charts re-issued. In addition the maintenance periods have been re-adjusted, and the Ruhr and Rheims Chain now give 24 hours service.
The Northern Chain was again used most successfully and gave excellent coverage to 1300E, but unfortunately there is evidence of errors in the fixes given by this Chain. The Radar Navigational Aids Control were approached with information on the approximate inaccuracies and their conclusions indicate that the errors experienced are more likely to be due to natural causes than in the Transmitting Stations.
For instance at 5600N 0600E an error of ± .02 in reading on the North Eastern Chains gives a maximum error in fix of approximately 6 nautical miles. The same reading tolerance on the Northern Chain in the same area gives a maximum error in fix of approximately 17 nautical miles.
It might be argued on mathematical grounds that such errors should be evenly distributed about the true track, but the evidence of test flights etc., seems to indicate that under any given conditions most navigators will have a definite bias on one side or the other, and that this bias is influenced far more by local conditions than by the individual.
On this case the average error of all fixes was approximately 126°/10 nautical miles and it would appear the local conditions influencing the bias were:-
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[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION [/underlined]
(i) Weak “A” pulse on the Northern Chain and navigators would thus set a low reading when lining up the leading edges of the pulses. The amount of this error depends on the difference in amplitude of the signals.
(ii) A wind change to Westerly giving a starboard drift.
In view of the above it is therefore considered unlikely that errors exist in the Northern Chain.
Navigators may do well to ponder over the above facts, which indicate the necessity for reading off co-ordinates accurately to ensure that no discrepancies arise when changing over from one Gee chain to another.
Work is still progressing on the damaged Eastern Chain Tower, and corrections to be made to the B, C and D readings on this chain will continue to be issued when the route taken by aircraft is in an area where considerable fixing errors are likely to be encountered.
[Underlined] LORAN [/underlined]
Loran has proved by far the most useful Radar navigational aid during the month, excellent coverage having been obtained on all operations.
It is gratifying to note that since the introduction of this aid, increasing use if being made of the navigational facilities it affords, and navigators are quite confident as to its accuracy. With more and more reliance being placed on Loran it is anticipated that in future routeing will be more carefully considered so as to simplify fixing and if possible to run along lattice lines.
It is noted from operational reports that it is not always possible to check Loran fixes against Gee or H2S. Should any Navigation Analysis Officer note any discrepancies in Loran fixes which it is thought may be due to errors in ground stations, information will be welcome at this Headquarters. It may be possible to correct the ground stations for such an error, provided information is forthcoming.
The following are comments on the major operations carried out during the month:-
[Underlined] MUNICH – 7/8th January, 1945. [/underlined]
Both R4 and R5 signal strength was good and maximum coverage obtained was approximately from 03.00E to the target. It is however, noted that operators are still not making maximum use of the equipment as the spread between first fixes is in the region of 8 degrees. This may be due to some navigators placing more reliance on Gee fixes. It is emphasised that operators must use Loran to its maximum coverage, particularly as training flights are not possible over this country, and Gee must only be used as a check. Sky waves can be tricky, and the more experience one has in fixing with them, the simpler the identification becomes. Jamming in this area was practically negligible and splitting of signals did not present any serious difficulties to the operators. The only jamming reported appeared to be due to static or W/T transmissions and only resulted in an increase of grass or waving of the traces.
[Underlined] PILITZ – 13/14th January, 1945. [/underlined]
The Rate 5 signal strength again restricted coverage on
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[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION [/underlined]
this operation, although most operators managed to obtain fixes outside the theoretical limits of the S.S. Chain. A plot of first fixes on this operation is much more concentrated than before. This indicates that where Gee coverage is likely to be erratic, operators are resorting to Loran and trying to obtain full use of the facilities it affords. Rate 5 signals presented difficulties throughout the route due to fluctuations in strength, but spitting and jamming was practically non-existent. Routeing along R4 lattice lines where possible in this area would no doubt be helpful.
[Underlined] LEUNA – 14/15th January, 1945, and
BRUX 16/17th January, 1945. [/underlined]
Both R4 and R5 signal strength was good, and coverage was obtained to the target. Once again navigators expressed their preference for Gee, the first fixes plotted in the majority of cases being at the limits of Gee coverage. Set operators can do a lot to remove this prejudice by obtaining accurate Loran position lines and urging the navigator to use them in preference to Gee. It is appreciated that Gee position lines are obtained simultaneously and are simpler to plot, but with the increased attention the enemy is paying to the Continental Gee Chains, more interest shown in Loran may result in dividends.
Intermittent splitting was reported by the majority of crews, but in no way did this interfere with the fixing. A number of operators reported jamming at approximately 10E. This appeared to consist of spurious pulses or sine waves, but did not last long enough to cause any serious difficulties.
The policy adopted by this Group of instructing Loran operators to correct dividers in the air is having excellent results, and practically 75% of all alignment troubles are being cleared up during flight. Much of the success of this is due to the Loran Instructors and Radar Officers on the Squadrons and it is hoped that before long operators will be 100% efficient. To assist in this a simple fault finding table is being issued to all operators shortly.
All Loran operators will be interested to hear that steps are being taken to extend S.S. Loran coverage North for 250 miles. This will considerably simplify training over this country, and will mean that S.S. Loran can be used on night operations from Bases. It will only then be necessary to use Gee for homing and other duties requiring accurate and easy fixing.
The [sic] provide this S.S. coverage one of the Homing Chain stations has had to be closed down, and position lines only can now be obtained from this chain.
The question of serviceability checks on Loran has been discussed recently, and it has been decided that the navigator shall carry out the pre-flight tests. This in no way relieves the Air Bomber of his responsibilities in regard to Loran, and a good Air Bomber will always be present when the navigator carries out the tests. Squadron Loran Instructors must therefore ensure that both navigators and Ait Bombers are capable of carrying out the pre-flight tests.
Tests have been carried out with a fixed aerial and loading unit on the last five operations. These tests have proved quite successful and the signal strength has been equally as good as with a trailing aerial. Air Ministry have been approached for permission to manufacture the Loading Units and it is anticipated the whole of the Group will be equipped shortly. The provision of such a fixed aerial will considerably simplify the use of Loran and enable operators to fix
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION [/underlined]
in the target area.
One further word in regard to Loran Training – Air Bombers, in view of the fact that they are the set operators, must be given equal if not more instruction than the navigators, and the Squadron Navigation and Bombing Leaders must co-operate fully in this connection.
[Underlined] Loran in Mosquitos [/underlined]
Better results are now being obtained by the Mosquito navigators. Difficulties due to an inefficient aerial system have been overcome, and Loran has been used successfully for tracking into the target.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] tactics
The main interest this month from the tactical point of view was the attack on Bergen by Nos.9 and 617 Squadrons, when several aircraft were intercepted by enemy fighters when withdrawing from the target area. An escort of Mustangs accompanied the force, but was unable to come to their assistance; this was due mainly to the aircraft being dispersed over a considerable area after orbitting [sic] the target. The enemy fighters, however, did not have everything their own way. One Lancaster was attacked continuously for 16 minutes by no less than five fighters, but got away with only moderate damage, while another survived three attacks without sustaining any damage whatsoever. All crews would do well to note the points brought out by this attack.
(i) A fighter escort cannot protect stragglers or widely dispersed aircraft.
(ii) A resolute crew, well trained in gunnery and combat manoeuvres, can give a very good account of itself, even when singled out for concerted attack.
(iii) The corkscrew is a very effective combat manoeuvre in daylight as well as night.
The golden rule, however, is still DO NOT STRAGGLE. Combat manoeuvres are unnecessary and dangerous if aircraft are in gaggle.
Our night tactics of evasion and rapid loss of height from the target are still keeping our losses to fighters very low, but the last attack on Karlsruhe showed once again that if the fighters do contact the bomber stream either en route or over the target they are just as deadly as ever. Crews should, if possible, increase their vigilance near the target as the enemy, particularly since the successful jamming of his A.I. by Window and other means, is making every effort at target interception, where a concentration of aircraft is assured.
A small number of combats is still being reported with jet-propelled aircraft. Reports generally are inconclusive, but although it seems unlikely that the enemy is using jet-propelled fighters at night in any numbers, it is possible that some form of rocket or liquid jet projectile is being used. Crews should pay close attention to such phenomena and report in particular if a suspected jet fighter makes any attempt to follow the aircraft, or carry out a definite attack.
[Underlined] WISHFUL THINKING [/underlined]
A captain of aircraft was heard to remark that he had heard upward firing cannon in German night fighters were no longer being used as they interfered with the master unit for the compass. He has since been reported missing.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] air bombing
The past month has not provided many opportunities for crews to display their bombing skill either on the Ranges or on Germany, but it is hoped that the slack periods have been used to full advantage and that new and inexperienced crews now have a full understanding of what is expected of them in the target area.
There are still too many examples of bomb loads being scattered over considerable distances from the target for no apparent reason, and the manipulation failures that still happen from time to time are difficult to understand in view of the fact that the Air Bomber has plenty of time to check and double check every switch on his panel on the way to the target. Be prepared for any swift change in the tactics to be employed over the target, and if the change involves any alterations to bombsight settings, make sure that they are done accurately.
The importance of accurate “flying for bombing” has often been stressed, and if any doubts still exist among Pilots the following example should help to dispel them.
F/O McDonnell and crew, No.9 Squadron, have completed three bombing exercises since their arrival from No.5 L.F.S. and obtained the following results:-
[Table of Errors on Exercises]
Errors in yards converted to 20,000 ft.
These results show a fine understanding between the members of the bombing team, F/O McDonnell (P), F/O Fricker (A/B), and F/O Chorney (Nav.) which is all the more remarkable as F/O Fricker did not join the crew until the end of L.F.S. training. The errors speak for themselves and require no comment, but the fact that F/O McDonnell was a Staff Pilot at a Bombing and Gunnery School before coming to No.5 Group should provide food for thought.
Good results, operational or training, are obtainable only if every member of the bombing team realises the importance of his own contribution to the combined effort, and it is the Captain’s duty to ensure that his crew make every effort to obtain results similar to those mentioned above.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS. [/underlined]
F/O Jones has been appointed Bombing Leader of No.44 Squadron in place of F/Lt. Lowry, now tour-expired.
F/Lt. Foulkes has moved to No.617 Squadron and F/Lt. Arkieson has taken over the Bombing Leader’s duties at No.630 Squadron.
F/Lt. Wake, ex No.106 Squadron and No.1660 H.C.U. has been appointed Bombing Leader of No.61 Squadron in place of F/Lt. Nugent.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] BOMBING ANALYSIS. [/underlined]
No.9 Squadron, Bardney, have carried their Bombing Analysis a step further than the majority of Squadrons in the Group, and there is no doubt that their methods are producing results.
Each crew has its own file which contains all the practice bombing results, including the Forms 3073 and signals giving the quadrant readings. In addition, a sheet of tracing paper with the graticule cross in the centre, is kept in the file and all bombs dropped by the crew are re-aligned on a common heading and transferred to the tracing paper. Therefore, when a crew has completed five exercises, there are approximately 30 bombs shown on their sheet and as they are all re-aligned on to a common heading it is easy to detect any tendency of the Air Bomber to sight slightly off the target.
These sheets do indicate that some Air Bombers consistently sight to one side of the target and steps can then be taken to eradicate this tendency.
Bombs dropped with a proven instrument error are marked in a different colour and can then be ignored when assessing the Air Bomber’s accuracy of sighting.
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION. [/underlined]
The following results have been received, all from No.56 Base.
S/Ldr. Walmsley, DFC – 119 yards
120 yards
150 yards (A.S.I. error)
F/Lt. Lewis (189 Sqdn.) – 123 yards
F/Lt. Gibson, DFC (49 Sqdn.) – 125 yards
No.56 Base would welcome a little competition from Bombing Leaders in other Bases.
[Underlined] BIG CHIEF COMETITION. [/underlined]
W/Cdr. Milward (No.619 Sqdn.) 61 yards.
An excellent exercise, which has seldom been beaten by any entrant in this competition.
[Underlined] QUIZ. [/underlined]
1. Which is the sighting angle flexible drive, the top or the bottom one?
2. In what respects does the normal 30 lb. I.B. differ from that used in the ‘J’ type cluster?
3. How is the heating device in No.13 bomb station controlled?
4. What are the Air Bomber’s duties in an aircraft joining the circuit after an operational flight?
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] THE MONTH’S BEST EXERCISES. [/underlined]
SQDN. PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR CREW ERROR
9 F/O McDonnell F/O Fricker F/O Chorney 75, 63, 34
44 F/O Coventry F/S Gibson Sgt Ayre 39
57 F/O Pauline Sgt Cartwright Sgt Hole 47
61 F/O Cain F/S Lewis F/O Williams 75
F/O Crocombe F/S Devine F/O Reeves 78
227 F/O Osborne F/S Rochman F/S Kydd 74
617 F/O Flatman F/O Kelly F/O Mackie 72
F/L Lancey F/S Perry W/O Robin 80
619 F/O De Marco F/S Johnston F/S Sharman 65
F/O Davis F/S Page F/S Cook 66
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
[Table of Squadron Bombing Competition Results]
No.83 Squadron head the January competition with a clear lead over the remainder of the Squadrons, six of whom failed to qualify.
No.61 Squadron have shown a great improvement over last month, when they failed to qualify. It would not be unexpected if they finish at the head of the table next month.
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF CREWS [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
For the month of January No.55 Base were credited with 52 ‘C’ categories, the correct number was 23.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE. [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice by Squadron]
No.627 Squadron:- 134 bombs with an average error of 77 yards, and 70 T.I’s with an average error of 139 yards.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] signals
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
The W/T control of operations during January maintained the high standard which is now characteristic of our W/T Controllers’ Operators. A pleasing feature of this operating is the accuracy of tuning and timing now being obtained by all Link aircraft. These are very important points, and this accuracy is now even more important than ever, as the time of opening W/T watch has been curtailed, thus allowing a much shorter time for the Main Force aircraft to be properly tuned to the Link aircraft. This should present no great problem to Wireless Operators, but it will require constant practice and training to maintain the standard now expected.
[Underlined] W/T CONTROLLERS’ TESTS. [/underlined]
During January, 48 Wireless Operators (Air) took part in the W/T Controllers’ Test, as laid down in 5G. S.S.I. No.13, and out of this number 32 passed as fit for control duties. The percentage of failures (33 1/3) is a measure of the severity of the test. The failures can be classified under two headings, viz. inaccuracy in tuning, and incorrect procedure. The first of these faults can be eliminated by practice tuning in the Squadron W/T Training Room, and the second by more thorough scrutiny of Air Staff Instructions, Part VI, Sigs/1, Page 7, para.10. Signals Leaders please note!
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION. [/underlined]
Categorisation of all Wireless Operators (Air) in the Group is being carried out enthusiastically by all Squadrons. The results at the end of January are as follows:-
[Table of Wireless Operator (Air) Categorisations by Squadron]
To ensure that this categorisation is being carried out in accordance with the instructions laid down in 5 Group letter 5G/S.14466/Sigs. dated
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
5th December, 1944, the Group Signals Leader, when visiting Squadrons, will check some of the Wireless Operators as to their eligibility for their category.
[Underlined] GROUP W/T EXERCISE. [/underlined]
The Group W/T Exercise during January was, like the curate’s egg, good and bad in parts. The frequency (5220 kc/s) is not very suitable, being rather overcrowded, and efforts are being made to obtain another one for this exercise. The geographical position of some squadron installations, in relation to this Headquarters, makes reception of each other’s signals very difficult, but this is, perhaps, within limits, quite useful in training operators to work under difficult conditions. After each exercise a signal is now being despatched to each Base and Squadron concerned, giving a summary of the exercise.
[Underlined] APOLOGY. [/underlined]
In last month’s summary, in our appreciation of the work done by Radio Schools, O.T.U’s and Conversion Units in producing the type of Wireless Operator we require, we inadvertently left out the (O) A.F.U’s and 5 L.F.S. As continuity is essential throughout all training, the work done by these units is obviously on a par with the others. We regret this omission and assure these units that their work is just as much appreciated.
[Underlined] SIGNALS FAILURES. [/underlined]
The signals failures percentage, against the 1,572 sorties flown during January, was 3.684. This shows an increase of 0.501 against the figure for December. Approximately 75% of the defects are attributed to faulty equipment and are, presumably, unavoidable. There was one servicing failure and one due to manipulation. Despite this increase in failures, not one sortie was cancelled as the result of a signals defect. There were three early returns, all of which were caused by faulty equipment. One revelation worthy of note is that there was only one T.R.1196 failure throughout the month – never has T.R.1196 serviceability been so high.
[Underlined] V.H.F. R/T. [/underlined]
The V.H.F. R/T serviceability shows a decrease against the figures for December. Of the 33 T.R.5043 defects, eight were due to broken whip aerials. Six of these aerials had been repositioned in accordance with B.C.S.P. No.10 (R.T.I.M. No.833), but owing to our inability to obtain the correct rubber grummets and paxolin plates, unsatisfactory substitutes had to be used. A very careful watch must be kept on existing non-standard V.H.F. aerial fittings. Meanwhile, further efforts are being made to obtain the correct items.
[Underlined] RADAR. [/underlined]
[Underlined] AMALGAMATION. [/underlined]
A considerable amount of attention was focussed this month on the problem of amalgamation of the Communications and Radar Maintenance Branches. Following a conference with No.56 Base representatives, a visit was paid to Linton-on-Ouse in No.6 Group, where a scheme is working with great success, and much useful information was gained. With this as a basis, an experiment was commenced in No.56 Base, from which some measure of success is expected.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] EMPLOYMENT OF WIRELESS OPERATORS
(W.A.A.F.) IN RADAR. [/underlined]
Following up a suggestion by Mr. Wardley-Smith, of T.R.E., a scheme was put into effect in No.49 Squadron, Fulbeck, whereby ten Wireless Operators (W.A.A.F.) were attached to A.G.L.T. Daily Servicing Parties, and the R. & I. Section, No.49 Squadron, were warned that after one month’s training, six Radar Mechanics would be withdrawn from the squadron. A T.R.E. P.D.S. member has been attached to Fulbeck to observe the experiment, which is progressing favourably.
In view of the increasing employment of Wireless Operators in Radar duties, a series of courses was commenced at Bardney for their benefit. The duration of the course is a fortnight, and will cover Radar principles, Loran and Gee. Relevant films will be shown and practical work given. Although no startling results are expected, it is hoped to stimulate interest, and provide for any further knowledge.
[Underlined] LORAN [/underlined]
A most welcome chapter in the Loran story occurred last month, when Air Ministry decontrolled the supply of the equipment. This permitted immediate action to renew the rapidly dwindling stocks of spares and to silence the cynics who were saying that no sooner is an installation proved than the equipment goes off the market.
[Underlined] H.2.S. MARK III. [/underlined]
As a result of the shortage of Radar personnel, the decision was made last October to curtail the fitting of H.2S. in No.53 Base, and concentrate personnel thrown up, into No.54 Base, with the object of obtaining the best from the H.2.S. available. Since that date, efforts have been made to legalise the position of these Radar mechanics. On January 19th official approval was given with the birth of the No.5 Group Special Radar Development Party, vacancies for which were given up by No.53 Base. Much good work has been done already by the party in their unofficial capacity, and continued and increasing success will be expected in the future, now that it is legalised.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] gardening
The Group Gardeners operated on two nights this month, visiting the Eastern Gardens, and planted the small but effective total of 143 vegetables.
Bad weather limited the Command output to 668 vegetables, which is well below the present monthly lift, and clearly demonstrated the importance of taking every available opportunity to plant in good weather, so that the enemy’s minesweeping force may be employed to its maximum capacity and never allowed to relax for one moment.
[Underlined] COMMAND SUMMARY OF VEGETABLES PLANTED. [/underlined]
No. 1 Group – 235
No. 5 Group – 143
No. 4 Group – 137
No. 6 Group – 119
No. 3 Group – 34
[Underlined] GREAT STRENGTH RETURNS THE PENNY. [/underlined]
After months of hard work, and heavy Gardening operations, combined with the menacing effects of our Group’s bombing visits to the Oslo Fjord areas, interesting news is now coming to hand of some of the disturbing results achieved.
The main trooping ports in Oslo Fjord were closed on various occasions and the enemy has had to bring less suitable ports into use, and employ extra shipping in the effort to carry out his programme of transporting troops from Norway to Denmark. The Harbour Master of this district has been working overtime to compete with his difficulties in keeping an ‘Open Port’, and has bitterly complained that 12 mines exploded without warning between the 8th and 25th October, 1944.
A new transport the “DARES”, estimated at 7,000 tons, has joined the Oslo – Aarhus run, but she is reported to have returned to Aarhus on 2nd January with damage to her engines caused by mine. The “DONAU”, 9035 tons, also employed on this run, was sunk by sabotage in Oslo Fjord on 16th January, and the 6,360 tons “ULANGA” was last reported in floating dock as a result of bomb damage received during the bombing attack on shipping on New Year’s Eve.
Two more large transports, the “WINRICH VON KNIPRODE” (10,123 tons) and the “MAR DEL PLATA” (7,340 tons) have also been damaged by collision and marine risk, and so the enemy’s valuable fleet of twelve large transports has, for the time being, been reduced to seven.
The attack with bombs on 28/29th December also reduced the available shipping by sinking the “NORDVARD”, when 70 Germans were lost, damaging the “ANGAMOS”, an ex-Danish fruitship, and breaking the back of
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GARDENING. [/underlined]
an oil lighter, the “SAONE”, now reported aground off the port of HORTEN. Three more ships were also sunk off MOSS.
THE FOLLOWING CASUALTIES HAVE ALSO BEEN REPORTED:-
“ROALNDSECK”, 1,845 tons, was damaged by an explosion on 17th January, after loading horses and material for Oslo; her cargo was unloaded subsequently and she was expected to dock for repairs.
The German vessel “GOTENHAFEN” was damaged by a mine prior to 27th November, 1944, and returned to Hamburg to discharge.
A minesweeper was sunk by a magnetic mine near Arundal, Norway, on 3rd January, 1945.
A German Auxiliary, believed minelayer, was mined and sunk 4 miles North of Rosnaes Light, at the Northern entrance to the Great Belt, on 5th January, 1945.
The Danish “FREDERICKSHAVN” 1,480 tons, damaged by a mine off Halls on 19th November, 1945.
The Norwegian S.S. “KONG TRYGVE”, 1,141 tons, mined at Moen and towed to Copenhagen.
The German “MARTHA HALM”, 984 tons, mined near Aarhus (probably November, 1944).
Norwegian “MARVEL”, 1,566 tons, slightly damaged by a mine off Kullen on 17th October, 1944.
“DORIANA” Danish Schooner, mined and sunk in Femersund late November, 1944.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] training
[Underlined] TRAINING ACTIVITIES DURING JANUARY [/underlined]
It was a month of snow, hail, fog and ice, but despite this the amount of training by Squadrons showed an increase on the December figures.
Squadrons did 3245 hours training – 2868 hours by day and 377 hours by night – giving an average od 180 hours per Squadron compared with 122 hours in December.
Some of the Squadrons occupying the lowest place in the training lists in December improved their position very much – in particular No.44 Squadron which recorded a total above the Squadron average.
The lowest Lancaster Squadrons were No.227 Squadron (99 hours), No.9 Squadron (124 hours), No.189 Squadron (140 hours) and No.57 Squadron (141 hours). Thus for the second consecutive month Nos. 227 and 189 Squadrons were behind in their training. No.9 Squadron is also showing low figures and for the last two months has done scarcely any air gunnery training. Fighter affiliation can always be included on bombing exercises.
No.627 Mosquito Squadron is lowest of all with 56 hours, but when its aircraft situation improves the training hours are expected to jump.
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF PILOTS [/underlined]
There are now 273 pilots in the Group holding categories, leaving 142 yet to be categorised. The remaining pilots on Group strength are those not liable for categorisation because they have done more than 20 sorties in the main force and over 30 in No.54 Base Squadrons.
During the month 171 categories were given to pilots on New Crew and 10/20 Sortie Checks. No.54 Base showed good progress and are making up leeway rapidly now the Base has facilities for categorisation. This Base has also introduced Categorisation into No.627 Mosquito Squadron. The following table shows the state of Categorisation in the Group:-
[Underlined] RECORD OF CATEGORISATION [/underlined]
[Table of Pilot Categorisation by Base]
Total Categorised in January = [underlined] 171 [/underlined]
Total Categorised in Group = [underlined] 273 [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING [/underlined]
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] The “percentage categorised” is based on recorded pilot strength on 31st January. This includes pilots not liable for categorisation.
[Underlined] ERRATA: [/underlined] Apologies to No.55 Base for an error which incorrectly put the Base “well behind in categorisation” in last month’s summary.
[Underlined] NO.5 L. F. S. REPORT [/underlined]
No.5 L.F.S. produced 49 crews for Squadrons at an average of 15 hours per crew, and its aircraft flew 840 hours. The crew total was the lowest in the Unit’s history because of the weather, and accommodation at Syerston is now at its maximum.
There are still approximately 160 crews to be trained by the L.F.S. before it disappears, and its last days are going to be strenuous. It is estimated by 1st April, 1945, the Staff will be able to say “D.C.O.” and pack their bags.
[Underlined] NO. 1690 B.D.T. FLIGHT [/underlined]
There were 13 days during the month unfit for fighter affiliation – about the same as December – but fighter affiliation results were mush better. The Flight did 398 details, of which 332 were by day and 66 by night. The night details included 21 for No.75 Base.
The total hours for the Flight were 354 and the average hours per aircraft was 25. Pilots averaged 24 hours for the month.
The fine affiliation record which has been established by No.1690 B.D.T. Flight is still being marred by accidents. There were three again last month in the Flight, two the month before, and three the month before that.
[Underlined] INSTRUMENT FLYING AND LINK [/underlined]
There was a further improvement in Link times. The average Squadron time has gone up from 78 hours in December to 101 hours in January but Nos. 9, 463, 97 and 617 Squadrons are still lagging behind.
[Table of Link Times by Base and Unit]
GRAND TOTAL (Including 5 LFS and 1690) = 2173:
ACTUAL AVERAGE/SQUADRON = 101 hours. REQUIRED AVERAGE/SQUADRON = 132 hours.
+ Marks the Squadrons where times are TOO LOW.
˨ 1690 B.D.T.F. and No.5 L.F.S. excluded from Base average.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
second thoughts for pilots
[Underlined] “GEORGE” MARK VIII [/underlined]
The Auto Pilot Mark VIII is the latest and best type of “George”. One of our S.D. Squadrons has used it for 90% of all its operational flying time in recent months. Points to note:-
(i) Trim your aircraft BEFORE putting “George” in.
(ii) If “George flies one wing low, trim out with rudder bias.
(iii) Keep the trim indicator on the air pressure gauge central by adjusting the elevator trim.
(iv) When reporting unserviceability, give full information including behaviour of aircraft, air pressure and outside air temperature. Whenever possible take the mechanic up on an air test.
(v) Exercise “George” at every opportunity. The more it is used the better it is.
(vi) Read Pilots Noted General A.P.2095, Part IIIG – Auto Pilot, Mark VIII.
[Underlined] FIRST AID [/underlined]
Investigations into emergency landings at Woodbridge show that first aid in the air can do a lot to help the recovery of injured aircrew. Remember:-
(i) Keep the patient comfortable, warm and on oxygen.
(ii) Always use the First Aid dressing. Know when and how to apply a tourniquet.
(iii) One Ampoule of morphia is sufficient for a person in pain.
(iv) Do not remove flying clothing unless it is absolutely necessary to allow the wound to be dressed. Flying clothing provides warmth and a certain amount of splinting.
(v) The M.O. has a lot of useful tips. Talk to him.
FLY YOUR CORKSCREW – DON’T SKID ALL OVER THE SKY!
UP PORT
[Drawings]
IS LIKE THIS – [underlined] NOT [/underlined] LIKE THIS!
N.C.M.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] accidents
The first month of the year produced a “score” of 28 aircraft damaged in the Group. 11 were totally destroyed, 1 was Cat. ‘B’, 8 were Cat. ‘AC’ and 7 were Cat. ‘A’. Of the total, 14 were the result of technical failures, collisions on operations, or high winds, while one was unavoidably damaged when it hit birds in flight. 5 accidents are still “obscure”, leaving 8 accidents classed as definitely avoidable.
This shows a welcome drop in the “avoidable” rate, and even allowing for some of the “obscure” accidents eventually being classified accurately, the total is still well below the previous monthly average. This is a big step in the right direction at the beginning of the year. Here are the details:-
[Underlined] Squadrons. [/underlined]
[List of Avoidable Accident Type Numbers]
[Underlined] TAXYING ETC. [/underlined]
These accidents maintain their notorious position. Never a month but brings its depressing tale of careless taxying and M.T. collisions, and although, as a rule, severe damage is not sustained, these incidents are never excusable. Log Books are endorsed in “red” for careless taxying every month, and we can only repeat once again that it is folly and gross disobedience of orders to taxy at night without searching thoroughly ahead with taxying light or Aldis lamp.
[Underlined] HIGH GROUND ACCIDENTS. [/underlined]
A Lancaster proceeded on a short navigation cross country recently. The pilot was briefed to set course over base at 4,000 feet. The aircraft left a base in this Group to fly due West for some 60 miles and back again. It must have been apparent to the pilot and navigator that the safety height near the end of the outward leg was much higher than at base, yet this crew descended through cloud and hit a hill in level flight, with all the engines under power. The hill was some 1,700 feet high. There were no survivors.
In spite of all that has been done to stamp out this “suicidal” descent through cloud, these incidents still occur, and by no means as seldom as is generally realised. All pilots and navigators take heed.
Another accident this month points almost the same moral. The results of the investigation are not yet forward, but it would appear that a Lancaster returning from an operation flew low in bad visibility, and hit a wireless mast. The pilot may have simply been trying to break cloud without checking his safety height, or he may have misread his altimeter, but in any case there is every indication that this was another completely avoidable fatal accident. Although the truth will
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ACCIDENTS. [/underlined]
never be completely known, the circumstances of this crash provide a warning to all. [Underlined] Do not [/underlined] come down to low heights in bad visibility to see the ground. Height spells safety every time, and good instrument flying clinches it.
[Underlined] STAR AWARDS. [/underlined]
The table below shows the avoidable accident position this month. This is, as usual, subject to revision when all accidents have been thoroughly investigated.
[Table of Avoidable Accidents by Unit with Star Award]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] gunnery
Enemy fighter activity was comparatively slight during the month of January, 1945, and a total of only 38 combats took place over this period. Of these, 3 enemy aircraft are claimed destroyed, one of these being reported as a jet aircraft, and 5 are claimed as damaged.
Of the 38 combats, 9 were reported following the daylight operation on Bergen when Lancasters of Nos.617 and 9 Squadrons were repeatedly attacked by F.W.190’s. Crews from these Squadrons claimed 4 F.W.190’s damaged, and these have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command. During these encounters the Hun made full use of the sun, and it is wondered how many Gunners went prepared, armed with spectacles, anti-glare. Each gunner is entitled to draw one pair of these spectacles on his clothing card, and it is hoped that Squadron Gunnery Leaders will check that Gunners are fully equipped.
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
14/15.1.45 “W” 189 Sqdn – ME.109
14/15.1.45 “M” 467 Sqdn – 1 Jet aircraft.
16/17.1.45 “D” 630 Sqdn – JU. 88
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
12.1.45 “U” 617 Sqdn – FW.190
12.1.45 “W” 617 Sqdn – FW.190
12.1.45 “S” 9 Sqdn – FW.190
12.1.45 “J” 9 Sqdn - FW.190
13/14.1.45 “M” 61 Sqdn – JU. 88
[Underlined] GUNNERY AIR TRAINING [/underlined]
The Order of Merit is based on the following system of marking:-
Night Affiliation (Camera and Infra-Red Film) 10 points.
Night Affiliation (Without Camera) 8 points.
Day Affiliation (Camera and Gyro) 5 points
Day Affiliation (Camera only) 3 points
Day Affiliation (Without Camera) 1 point.
[Table of Air Training Scores Ranked by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GUNNERY [/underlined]
No.467 Squadron are to be congratulated on going to the top of the ladder, and also for completing 32 Night Affiliation exercises. Certain squadrons are still making scant use of their Gyro Assemblies, and it is hoped that next month’s returns will show an improvement in this respect.
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF AIR TRAINING EXERCISES [/underlined]
[Table of Affiliation Exercises by Squadron]
[Underlined] Total number of Affiliation exercises for January = 878 [/underlined]
In spite of 14 days of inclement weather which prohibited all flying, the total of Affiliation exercises shows a very creditable increase on the December total. Night Affiliation exercises are increasing steadily, and Infra-Red films are being taken more frequently. Self-towed drogue exercises have been completed by certain Squadrons, and it is hoped that next month Squadrons will use every endeavour to get the maximum number of crews carrying out this exercise. This is the one exercise where the gunner has the opportunity of firing his guns at a target whilst carrying out combat manoeuvres.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] armament
[Underlined] INCENDIARY STOREHOUSES. [/underlined]
Covered storage for cluster projectiles containing 4 lb incendiary bombs has now been provided at all stations and the layouts should be in full working order.
Present stocks of clusters are low, but stations must be prepared to receive larger quantities which will test the efficiency of the organisation and layout of these stores. Full information is contained in the following letters and signal:-
5G/402/17/Org. dated 3.11.44.
5G/621/14/Armt. dated 3.1.45.
5G/621/14/Armt. dated 21.1.45.
Signal R.911 dated 27.1.45.
5G/621/14/Armt. dated 4. 2.45.
Particular attention is drawn to the need for careful handling of uncased cluster projectiles in order to avoid damage to either the cluster tail or the tails of the 4 lb. bombs.
[Underlined] DEFECT REPORTS. [/underlined]
We are well aware that preparing six copies of a defect report in accordance with A.P. 2608A and B.C.A.S.I’s causes a certain amount of inconvenience but unless these reports are submitted on every occasion, complete information on any one subject is not available. Instances have occurred where the ingenuity of Armament personnel has produced excellent modifications, but when forwarded to higher authority the reason for the modification is not understood because no defect reports have been rendered. Although “pen pushing” is not popular amongst Armament Technical personnel, it is, as you will see, necessary.
[Underlined] S.B.C’s. [/underlined]
Our old friend the S.B.C. is still called upon to perform its duty in delivering showers of 4 lb incendiary bombs upon our enemies. If reliable functioning of this equipment is to be ensured, the various tests and inspections laid down must be carried out conscientiously, more particularly so if S.B.C’s have not been used recently.
[Underlined] MAN-POWER. [/underlined]
The foregoing remarks will undoubtedly raise the question of lack of man-power. This deficiency is well known and aircrew cadets have been posted to units to assist armament personnel. These cadets are strong, healthy and intelligent and after elementary training, if armament personnel issue clear and concise instructions, they are quite capable of dealing with many of the jobs requiring unskilled and semi-skilled labour, thus relieving trained armament personnel to perform the more intricate technical duties.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES TABLE [/underlined]
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A – MANIPULATION B – MAINTENANCE C – ICING D – TECHNICAL E – ELECTRICAL F – OBSCURE
[Page break]
[Drawing] flying control
[Underlined] LANDING TIMES FOR JANUARY, 1945. [/underlined]
[Table of Landing Times by Base and Station]
During the recent heavy snowstorms and frost, the fall on occasions reached five inches. Snow plans have been revised and were put into operation early, with a consequent higher degree of serviceability. Methods employed varied considerably because of local conditions and the amount of manpower available. The three methods generally used were “sand and salt”, ploughing and rolling. Sand and salt proved excellent under conditions of small falls, rolling where the fall was medium but a heavy fall required ploughing. Salting brought with it difficulties of drainage clearance and ordinary mechanical brushing was not always equal to the task. Similarly, the “Snowgo” was not of great assistance in conditions where the fall of snow was fine and a strong wind prevailed, but was of use following ploughing.
Except in the morning following the heaviest fall, stations maintained a high degree of serviceability. All stations were able to keep their runways serviceable and in only a few cases was there not a subsidiary runway available by the afternoon following overnight fall. In one or two cases lighting difficulties followed on the thaw, but were tackled promptly and except in one case were remedied at an early stage. The position was complicated by the high wind causing damage to outer circuit and funnel lighting.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] FLYING CONTROL. [/underlined]
The P.W.D. has developed a new form of lighting, evolved from the F.I.D.O. installation. The apparatus is portable and is intended to assist aircraft in lining-up on the approach under conditions of poor visibility. Petrol from a 40-gallon drum is pumped manually through a 50-yards feed pipe into a pre-heater at the end of a 20-feet burner line which is pegged into the ground. The intense flame far exceeds the sodium burners in brilliancy and penetration. Following successful trials by 2nd T.A.F., various lay-outs are being tested at Balderton. When the most successful form has been found, a demonstration will be arranged.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] aircrew safety
[Underlined] DITCHINGS. [/underlined]
One known ditching occurred this month and another possible one was reported at the same time and in the same area. An aircraft, believed of 617 Squadron was seen to ditch on the 12th approximately 15 miles off the Norwegian coast. The ditching was seen by a number of crews and was well covered by prompt sighting reports. A Warwick standing by for just such an eventuality was quickly in position, and in making a dummy run saw the crew on the wing of the aircraft with no dinghy visible. As the airborne lifeboat was dropped, the aircraft sank. One man was seen to board the lifeboat and all but two of the others were seen to be making their way towards it. A Lindholme dinghy was then dropped to the two stationary members after which the Warwick, owing to the presence of enemy fighters had to withdraw.
In a position just North of the above ditching, an aircraft which was seen to be on fire over the target was believed to have ditched. A further lifeboat was dropped in darkness over the believed position.
In spite of intensive searches for these lifeboats and survivors from other incidents, nothing was found and it is believed that the survivors were found and picked up by the enemy.
[Underlined] HEAD INJURIES. [/underlined]
A medical report from the Emergency Landing Runways states:- “The majority of eye and face injuries are caused by perspex fragments, the eyes and upper head being involved more than the head below the eyes”. Most injuries have been caused by enemy action and the carrying of goggles (to be used whenever possible) by all crew members cannot be too strongly emphasised.
[Underlined] FIRST AID. [/underlined]
The above report also states “First Aid has, on the whole improved, but is still not up to the standard of the Americans. It was felt that poor First Aid was chiefly due to night condition, but that this is not the case has been proved by recent R.A.F. daylight raids. There is still the occasional casualty who has bled to death from a limb arterial wound and which could have been prevented by a properly placed tourniquet”.
Aircrew Safety Officers should institute a drive to improve the standard of First Aid.
[Underlined] THREE GOLDEN RULES. [/underlined]
When in doubt of your ability to:-
(i) Reach an airfield – initiate Emergency and Distress messages.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
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[Underlined] AIRCREW SAFETY. [/underlined]
(ii) Fly the aircraft – order your crew to “Put on parachutes”.
(iii) Land safely – order your crew to “Crash Landing Stations”.
A little time spent in studying for your own safety will afford you more time to study for your enjoyment.
[Underlined] THE DIVIDENDS. [/underlined]
Air Ministry report that 2161 aircrew (923 R.A.F. and 1238 Americans) were rescued in Home Waters during 1944 making a total, since the War began, of 5,467.
During last December 41 aircrew were rescued – this represents 19.3% of the aircrew involved in known ditchings.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] engineering
[Underlined] SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
January produced only 1572 sorties; weather conditions were the retarding factor. The peack [sic] serviceability reached during January was 95.8% of Lancasters on charge: the balance of unserviceable aircraft was made up of aircraft undergoing Major Inspection and aircraft undergoing modification for special commitments. It was singularly fortunate that during this bad weather spell quite a number of aircraft became due, or almost due, for Major Inspection.
[Underlined] ENGINE FAILURES [/underlined]
[Underlined] FLAME TRAPS. [/underlined]
Much progress has been made with the methods of cleaning flame traps, and it is hoped that now local instructions have been given to C.T.O’s to remove flame traps at 150 or 225 hours according to the time available, and also to change the flame traps at any time they are suspected of being choked, that another source of engine failure has been eliminated. Under a scheme evolved by Messrs. Rolls Royce, these flame traps can be cleaned quite successfully in under half an hour. 53 Base are experimenting with their own washing bath and if successful this scheme will be introduced into each Base Major Servicing Section to cater for flame traps throughout the Base.
[Underlined] COOLING DUCTS. [/underlined]
Unfortunately, much unserviceability is being caused by the failure of the one-piece cooling duct and many hours are consumed in changing them after few flying hours. Command are controlling the supply of replacements but the situation is becoming serious owing to the extremely short life of this type of duct.
[Underlined] FAILURE OF NO.2 FUEL TANK. [/underlined]
The work entailed in changing No.2 tank is fully realised. The frequency with which these tanks spring a leak does not decrease, and many high speed tank changes have taken place to get the aircraft off on Ops to time. Although Mod.1179 was introduced with a view to reducing the number of No.2 tank failures, insufficient of these modified tanks have been received in the Service to make themselves felt.; as a result of enquiries, it seems pretty certain that many modified tanks are now coming through. No instance is known of a tank failing subsequent to the incorporation of Mod.1179.
[Underlined] CONTROL OF M.T. [/underlined]
In view of A.M.O. A.30/45, the complete responsibility of the maintenance organisation of Mechanical Transport now rests with the Engineer Branch. Due to a number of reasons which are well known to many, immediate improvements cannot be expected, nor will the position be eased without hard work and perfect co-operation. The broad policy has already been defined by Bomber Command Engineer Staff, and early in February it is anticipated that this Group will be in a position to request the attendance of the Command Engineer Officer to discuss the proposals for placing the M.T. maintenance on a sound footing. Man power is the obvious problem, and even with an increase in maintenance establishment the actual bodies will not be available for some time, if at all.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ENGINEERING. [/underlined]
This control of transport maintenance is an added responsibility to the already hard pressed C.T.O., but it was the natural course of events that this transfer of responsibility should take place as the first major consideration of the C.T.O. is the serviceability of aircraft, and with an inefficient mechanical transport section, the serviceability suffers considerably. C.T.O’s, in their own interests, must endeavour to give as much thought as possible to this transport problem without detracting from their personal interest in the operational efficiency of the aircraft.
[Underlined] FLIGHT ENGINEERS [/underlined]
[Underlined] FUEL GAUGES [/underlined]
A demonstration to prove the accuracy of petrol gauges was laid on at Coningsby on the 25th January, but unfortunately the weather intervened and it was agreed that it would be unsafe to carry out these trials; it was most disappointing as it was hoped that the accuracy or otherwise of these gauges would be proved once and for all. The demonstration will be laid on again at some future date, but in the meantime Flight Engineers can do much to help to prove the statement that these petrol gauges are sufficiently accurate to be relied upon. In the new Flight Engineer’s log (B.C. Form 10) on page 3 under the heading “Flowmeter Reading” four columns will be found; all Flight Engineers, in future, must record in these columns petrol gauge readings throughout the trip, paying particular attention to the reading just before landing and then checking the reading again when the aircraft is parked in dispersal. Care must be taken to read the gauge in the tail down position for this check. With the information gained from Flight Engineer’s Logs, and the results of the demonstration, it will be decided if gauge reading should replace dips to ascertain the fuel remaining in an aircraft after a trip.
[Underlined] PETROL CONSUMPTION. [/underlined]
Petrol consumption throughout the Group has shown a marked improvement over the past twelve months, but occasions still arise in squadrons where two or three aircraft use 210 gallons per hour when all other aircraft use an average of 180 gallons per hour. The Flight Engineer Leader must investigate these cases thoroughly. Points to note are air speeds, revs and boost used and A.S.I. in climb and descent. He must check the last six trips of these aircraft; if he finds high consumption in all cases he must report it to the C.T.O. If, however, he comes to the conclusion that it is the pilot and flight engineer to blame, he must report this to the Commanding Officer of the squadron who will undoubtedly see that the erring pilot and flight engineer receive instructions on engine handling.
[Underlined] FRESH RECRUITS. [/underlined]
When a new Flight Engineer reports to a squadron be must be thoroughly examined by the Flight Engineer Leader to ascertain if he is quite capable of carrying out his duties. Questions should be selected from the 5 Group Lancaster Quiz. If it is found that he is weak in any subject, instruction must be given him without delay. If convenient, the Flight Engineer Leader or his deputy should fly with him on his first N.F.T. or cross-country, to check him on aircraft drills and the way in which he handles throttles, rev levers and his fuel tank manipulation in the air. Any faults must be remedied before he becomes operational.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
[Table of 5 L.F.S. Aircraft Serviceability]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] photography
During the month of January, 54.6% of the night attempts produced successful ground detail photographs, a good figure for this time of the year, and an increase of 8% upon the previous month.
Examination of the table shown on the following page will reveal an improvement in the failures recorded, 5.62% as compared with December, 1944, 9.2% and November, 1944, 12.4%. It should, however, be clearly remembered that discarding the “bomb-door operation” of the F.24 camera is probably one of the causes for this reduction.
The descriptive list still contains many failures which should never occur, and it is hoped that the efforts of all concerned will result in a steady monthly decrease of all technical failures.
Photographers are again reminded that inability to trace the real cause generally results in a failure being classed as “obscure – photographic”. Therefore every effort must be made to root out the causes and to effect cures for future operations.
Now that all units except Nos. 83, 97 and 627 Squadrons are using 100% composite film, it will demand all the skill of the photographers and full supervision of the N.C.O’s to ensure that the attention to detail in making up the composite films, and their final processing is carried out in accordance with B.C. Composite Film Instructions. There is no room for slap dash work when working with colour film. Extreme care in making up the film, correct preparation of solutions, and exact time and temperature during processing are essential. Photographers are reminded that this branch of R.A.F. Photography was introduced by photographers of this Group, and the standards set must be maintained by all Bases.
H. 2. S. photography and the equipment, is not yet receiving the attention that is necessary. This branch of photography is as important as the normal F.24 photography, and Senior N.C.O’s are to see to it that all their staff are skilled in producing the best results in the shortest possible time. The local manufacture of perspex trays and fixed vertical enlargers should do much to solve dark-room problems.
It is not enough to produce good photographs, unless they are available for the Air Staff in the shortest possible time, and in this respect the S.I.O’s and Photographic N.C.O’s should remember that A.C.I.U. waits for all films to arrive before commencing their analysis. This is being delayed unnecessarily because some films are not reaching this Headquarters until five and six days after the raid, and in some cases failure films are as much as 14 days overdue. All films, whether ground detail, target conditions, or technical failures, must reach this Headquarters within the time limits prescribed in B.C.Ph.I’s.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHY [/underlined]
[Underlined] ANALYSIS – NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHY – JANUARY, 1945. [/underlined]
[Table of Night Photography Results Ranked by Squadron]
This photographic inter-squadron ladder is produced on the number of failures (excluding those due to Target Conditions –“T.C.”) incurred during the past month, as a percentage of the number of attempts.
NOTE + (Armt. I = Armt. [underlined] Technical [/underlined] Failures.
(Armt.II = No flash illumination – presumed flash failures.
Owing to the limited number of Day operational sorties during the month of January, 1945, a ladder will not be compiled.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] decorations
Supplement No.36866 to London Gazette dated 29th December, 1944.
The KING has been graciously pleased to give orders for the following promotion in, and appointments to, the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire:-
To be Additional Knight Commander of the Military Division of the said Most Excellent Order:-
Air Vice Marshal The Honourable Ralph Alexander Cochrane, C.B., C.B.E., A.F.C., Royal Air Force.
To be Additional Officer of the Military Division of the Military Division [sic] of the said Most Excellent Order:-
Wing Commander Walter Edward Dunn (35210), Royal Air Force.
To be Additional Members of the Military Division of the said Most Excellent Order:-
Acting Squadron Leader Edwin Maurice Undery (79198) R.A.F.V.R.
Acting Flight Lieutenant Henry Rutter Locke (101687) R.A.F.V.R.
The KING has been graciously please to approve the award of the British Empire Medal (Military Division) to the undermentioned:-
560272 Flight Sergeant Frank Haines, Royal Air Force.
The following IMMEDIATE award were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 54 BASE [/underlined]
W/C J. WOODROFFE, DFC & BAR DSO
W/C M.A. SMITH DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O I.H. BYERS DFC
F/SGT G.F. CARTWRIGHT DFM
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/C J.A. INGHAM, DFC, AFC DSO
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O S.V. GEORGE DFC
SGT W.T. STOKES DFM
F/L W.M. KYNOCH DFC
SGT D.J. ALLEN CGM
[Underlined] 227 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT R.H. PAYNE DFM
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] DECORATIONS [/underlined]
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.F. LEWIS DFC
F/O R.G.W. GROSS DFC
F/O B. GRIFFITHS DFC
P/O E.C. REDFERN DFC
P/O G.F. MAULE DFC
P/O W.J. SHEPPARD DFC
F/O J.D. MELROSE DFC
P/O B. TAYLOR DFC
P/O W.R. HORNE, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O J.A. PETERSON DFC
F/O C.H. SHEPHERD DFC
F/O J.W. MOORE DFC
W/O C.B. WATTS DFC
F/O A.R. DEARDEN, DFM DFC
F/SGT R.D. KERR DFM
SGT S.G.D.L. MAJOR DFM
F/O S.A. MORRIS DFC
P/O A.M. HOLMES DFC
SGT A.L. CUNNINGHAM DFM
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT F.A. WELLS DFM
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L A.E.W. WYNARD, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O P.M. ABBOTT DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L H.G. McLEOD DFC
F/L H.W.T. ENOCH DFC
F/O E.R. OLIVER DFC
F/O E.H.E. HEARN, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O A. GEORGE DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O C. SHILLAW DFC
P/O C.V. ALLEN DFC
F/O E. GLOVER DFC
F/O N.J. MacDONALD DFC
F/O J.S. BEARD DFC
F/O M.T. CLARKE DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.J. LING DFC
F/O S. PARKER DFC
F/O H.L. INNISS DFC
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O A.J. BOOKER DFC
P/O C. SUMMERSCALES DFC
W/O M.F. INGMIRE DFC
F/L W.E. SIDDLE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/L A.C. MacDONALD DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O G.J. WOOLNOUGH DFC
P/O W. HARVEY DFC
W/O G.O. EDMUNDS DFC
F/L W.G. COOPER, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O R.B. CANEVER DFC
P/O A. McCRACKEN DFC
F/SGT R. SMITH DFM
F/L C.C. SHERRING DFC
F/O H.W. HAGGERSTON DFC
F/L W.G. ROGERS DFC
F/O W.E. CLAYFIELD DFC
W/O G.A. CARVELL DFC
F/L W.M. REID, DFC BAR TO DFC
S/L W.G. WISHART, DFC & BAR DSO
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O E.W. MacDONALD DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.K. BRADY DFC
F/O J.A. GIDDENS DFC
F/O F. PARKER DFC
P/O N.A. FERGUSON DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.E. HATTAM DFC
F/O B.K. PURDY DFC
F/L G. GARDEN DFC
F/L A.R.H. MORRIS DFC
F/O G.M. DENHOLM DFC
F/O K. SCHULTZ, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O R.W. BOARD DFC
F/L D.J. JOHNSTONE DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L W.L. BRILL, DSO, DFC BAR TO DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O N.J. ERB DFC
F/O A.W. ALLISON DFC
SGT J. PALIN DFM
P/O V.A. BAGGOTT DFC
F/L D.F. McLAUGHLAN DFC
P/O S.J. HAYTON DFC
P/O H.R. PURSER DFC
P/O L.W. WEAVER DFC
P/O C. DEAN DFC
P/O B.F. KENT DFC
F/O S.A. SEMPLE DFC
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O D.H. CHENEY DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O W.G. STEVENS DFC
P/O A.B. NEILSON DFC
P/O J.R. HILL DFC
P/O K.H. YOUDALE DFC
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT W.W.M. DEBOOS, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/L J.B. MITCHELL DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O A.R. KERR DFC
P/O W.K. GOODHEW DFC
F/O H. LONG DFC
P/O D.R. MALLISON DFC
P/O M.A. SWAIN DFC
P/O R.P. MITCHELL DFC
F/O R.L. McCANN DFC
F/SGT E.J. BROWNE DFM
W/C BLOME-JONES DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
war effort
[Table of Aircraft, Sorties and Results Ranked by Squadron]
[Underlined] NOTES: [/underlined] Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “Successful Sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties, Nos. 9, 49, 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another Squadron, the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons. Squadrons above establishment are calculated on an establishment of 20.
[Page break]
[Drawing] equipment
[Underlined] COLD WEATHER. [/underlined]
The whole country has recently had one of the coldest spells in human memory; in fact in Lincolnshire we thought it much colder. At any rate Equipment Officers managed to keep their stations fairly warm. In view of the strictness of the regulations on rationing of coal and coke they are to be congratulated.
Equipment Officers should look to their fuel stocks; there may be another cold spell.
[Underlined] THEFT. [/underlined]
Equipment Officers should check every now and again the registered mail book. A case has come to light where an N.C.O. Equipment Assistant made it his job to collect the registered mail and also by some means managed to get the blue I.V’s given to him. Thus by destroying certain of the blues he was able to get away with quite a number of watches.
So carry out surprise checks on the registered mail.
[Underlined] CONFERENCE. [/underlined]
The Group Equipment Officers’ Conference was held this month at Bomber Command. Many points of interest were discussed and the minutes which have been received at this Headquarters will be passed to Base Equipment Officers in due course.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] A LETTER FROM “A DEAD CITY”
We publish below a letter written from Brunswick to a German Soldier on 17th November, 1944. The names and address shown are entirely fictitious, but the letter itself is authentic.
Beckenwerker Strasse 157
Braunschweig
Nov 17
My Dear Karl,
I would have replied to your last letter earlier but in consequence of the great raid on Braunschweig we were without light or water for a long time and we are still without gas. Braunschweig was completely reduced to dust and ashes by a heavy night raid on the 15th. October. We were very lucky – the Forchaus is still standing quite undamaged. The Kraft Durch Freude Hall and factory bay and a hostel were destroyed. It is said that Braunschweig is the most severely damaged town, apart from Darmstadt. Gauleiter Lauterbacher called Braunschweig “the dead city”. Its innumerable citizens were charred or burned in their cellars, there are even yet any number of missing. The numbers of dead runs to about a thousand. All the same the victims are few when considering the destruction. We are at present completely cut off from the world; as our station is destroyed, as well as the signal box and the installations, no trains are arriving here.
We are weary of the war and hope it will end soon. God keep you.
Emma.
Reference is made to the attack by aircraft of this Group on the night of 14/15th October, 1944, which was dealt with in detail and photographs published in the November issue of the NEWS.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Drawing] war savings
[Table of War Savings by Station]
GRAND TOTAL NATIONAL SAVINGS FOR JANUARY, 1945 - £8,711 13. 6d.
A – Approximate number of pence per head.
B – Approximate percentage of personnel saving.
C – Total savings.
[Page break]
[Underlined] DISTRIBUTION LIST. [/underlined]
[Underlined] EXTERNAL. [/underlined]
No. 53 Base … 28
No. 54 Base … 28
No. 55 Base … 24
No. 56 Base … 20
No. 75 Base (“For Attention Base Intelligence Officer”) … 4
Headquarters, Bomber Command … 6
Headquarters, Bombe Command – Eng. Staff … 1
Dr. B.G. Dickens, O.R.S., H.Q. B.C. … 1
Headquarters, Flying Training Command … 1
H.Q., P.F.F., Wyton … 1
P.N.Z.A.F. Headquarters, Strand, W.C. (vis H.Q. B.C.) … 1
R.A.A.F. Overseas Headquarters, Kodak House, 63 Kingsway, W.C.2 …2
Air Ministry, T.O.I. … 1
Air Ministry (D.D.T. Nav.) … 2
W/Cdr. Nairn M.A.P., Map Room, 6123, Thames House, Millbank, S.W. 1
A/Cdr. H.L. Patch, C.B.E., Air Ministry (D.Arm.R.), King Charles Street, Whitehall … 1
G/Capt. C. Dann, O.B.E., M.A.P., Millbank … 1
Air Chief Marshal Sir E.R. Ludlow-Hewitt, K.C.B., C.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C., A.D.C., 136, Richmond Hill, Richmond, Surrey. … 1
Air Marshal The Hon. Sir R.A. Cochrane, K.B.E., C.B., A.F.C., A.O.C.-in-C., Transport Command … 1
Air Vice Marshal Coryton, C.B., M.V.O., D.F.C., A.O.C. 3rd Tactical Air Force, South East Asia … 1
Air Commodore H.V. Satterly, C.B.E., D.F.C., Headquarters, No.54 Base 1
S/Ldr. D.A. Green, D.S.O., D.F.C., Bomber Command Tactical School, Finningley … 1
Headquarters, No.92 Group … 6
Headquarters, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 21, 23, 25, 54, 91, Groups 1
Headquarters, No.29 Group … 12
Nos. 11, 14, 16, 18 O.T.U’s … 1
No. 16 O.T.U. (Intelligence Section) … 2
S.I.O., No.27 O.T.U., Lichfield … 1
S.I.O., No.29 O.T.U., Bruntingthorpe … 1
T.A.D.U., Cardington … 1
Director of Studies, Advanced Armament Course, Fort Halstead, Nr. Sevenoaks, Kent … 1
R.A.F. Station, Jurby … 1
R.A.F. Station, Manby … 1
R.A.F. Station, Silverstone … 2
N.C.O. i/c Bombing Range, Wainfleet … 1
No. 93 M.U. … 1
R.A.F. Staff College … 1
Polish Air Force Staff College, Beach Hotel, Weston-Super-Mare 1
Empire Air Navigation School, Shawbury … 2
No.25 Group, School of Air Sea Rescue … 1
92 Group Navigation & Signals Instructors’ School, Little Horwood, Nr. Bletchley, Bucks … 1
Aircrew School, Balderton … 2
Bomber Command Instructors’ School, Finningley … 2
[Underlined] INTERNAL. [/underlined]
A.O.C. … 1
S.O.A. …1
OPS. 1 … 1
S.MET.O. … 1
C.S.O. … 2
O.R.S. … 1
G.T.I. … 1
G.F.C.O. … 1
P.R.O. … 1
OPS. RECORD BOOK … 2
CIRCULATION … 4
FILE … 1
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 30. JANUARY, 1945.
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
[Stamp]
9 Wadd.
10 Skell.
6 Bdy.
2 Minuted.
Dublin Core
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V Group News, January 1945
5 Group News, January 1945
Description
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Five Group Newsletter, number 30, January 1945. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and articles on famous last words, operations, navigation, this month's bouquets, radar navigation, tactics, air bombing, signals, gardening, training, second thoughts for pilots, accidents, gunnery, armament, flying control, aircrew safety, engineering, photography, decorations, war effort, equipment, a letter from a dead city, war savings,
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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1945-01
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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59 printed sheets
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eng
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Text
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MStephensonS1833673-160205
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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Belgium
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Great Britain
Norway
Poland
Germany--Braunschweig
England--Lincolnshire
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Ladbergen
Germany--Mittelland Canal
France--Royan
Belgium--Houffalize
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Germany--Leuna
Czech Republic--Most
Norway--Bergen
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1945-01
5 Group
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Lancaster
Master Bomber
mine laying
Mosquito
navigator
pilot
radar
rivalry
Tallboy
training
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/743/19703/MCleggPV[DoB]-150710-010001.pdf
e92546a0df93cd6e5c1d97fe9cd36a63
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Clegg, Peter Vernon
P V Clegg
Description
An account of the resource
Eight items and five sub-collections. Main collection contains a log of Pathfinder operations from RAF Wyton 1943 -1944, histories of the Avro repair facility at Bracebridge Heath, and Langar, a biography of Squadron Leader David James Baikie Wilson, biography of Squadron Leader Lighton Verdon-Roe, a book - Test Pilots of A.V. Roe & Co Ltd - S.A. 'Bill' Thorn, and two volumes of book - Roy Chadwick - no finer aircraft designer, Sub-collections contain a total of 29 items concerning the Aldborough Dairy and Cafe as well as biographical material, including log books for Alan Gibson, Peter Isaacson, Alistair Lang and Charles Martin. <br /><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1772">Aldborough Dairy and Cafe</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1768">Gibson, Alan</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1769">Isaacson, Peter</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1770">Lang, Alastair</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1771">Martin, Charles</a><br /><br /><br />The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Peter Clegg and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2015-07-02
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
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Clegg, PV
Transcribed document
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Transcription
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[Photograph] – Joan Gardiner [indecipherable word] WAAF Pat Dey of 156 PFF Sqn.
[page break]
* While at School near Berchtesgarten, [sic] Hitler & his entourage used to pass the gates frequently. The School would line the road and salute ‘Heil Hitler’ when his car passed. One day he slowed and stopped, noticing Pat Dey did not salute. He asked her ‘why’? She said: “Because I am English!”
She worked for an Australian boss before the War began. One day she said she wanted a few minutes to go and sign on for the RAF. He said: “don’t be silly – War is a man’s job – you’ll never be able to stomach it.” How wrong he was!
She worked at Bomber Command HQ at High Wycombe before 156 Sqn, on bombing raid plotting. She was fluent in German.
At 156 Sqn she got to know A V-M Don Bennett – C-in-C of the Pathfinder Group at Wyton, and became a family friend, doing baby-sitting for them.
Page 1
Example of ‘Met’ chit used in Ops briefings.
Form 2324.
METEOROLOGICAL OFFICE, [indecipherable word]
LOCAL FORECAST from [indecipherable word] hours 2/3/44 date.
ROUTE FORECAST [indecipherable word] TO [indecipherable word] till [indecipherable word] hours [indecipherable word] date.
Time of Origin: [indecipherable word] hours [indecipherable words]
[underlined] SURFACE WIND: [/underlined] NW to WNW, 10-15 knots. Gusting locally to 20 knots.
{underlined] UPPER WIND: [/underlined] 2000 feet 310 degs 35 knots. 5000 feet 300 degs 40 knots.
[underlined] WEATHER: [/underlined] Wintry showers, isolated this morning but more widespread this afternoon.
[underlined] VISIBILITY: [/underlined] Mainly 4 to 8 miles but 1 to 3 miles in showers.
[underlined] CLOUD: [/underlined] Small amounts of Sc (Stratocumulus) at 2/3000ft top 4/5000ft this morning apart from local increase in showers to 6/10
[page break]
Page 2
[underlined] 26TH APRIL 1943 [/underlined]
DUISBURG.
Paramatta. 133M & 356H. & 72 P.F.F. [missing] will be dropped at Position ‘A’ 5145N 0642E. by [missing] Mosquitos Squadron.
[missing] exact A/P with Ground markers T.I Red [missing] as backers up will keep the A/P marked with T.I Green throughout
[missing] their bombs with maximum precision at the T.I red if these are [missing] centre of cluster of T.I Green. ZERO = 0215
[list T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPHS. REMARKS.]
[missing] with small amounts of cloud 10/10ths to E. of target. At the beginning [missing] selected crews were attacking good concentration was [missing] of main force attacked fires spread until finally area [missing] mainly ENE of red T.I’s. 14 photographs attempted.
[page break]
Page 3
[underlined] 27TH APRIL 1943 [/underlined]
DORTMUND.
Paramatta. Zero Hour. 0200 hrs.
Flares to be dropped short of target by Mosquitos 4 mls. E of [missing]
[missing] Red & Green T.I’s.
[missing] of special a/c will attack Soest as first running [missing] target. T.I. Yellow to be dropped at position C to [missing].
[list T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPHS. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 28th APRIL 1943 [/underlined]
Stand down.
[missing] of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Group laid mines. 23 a/c are missing.
[page break]
4
[underlined] 29th APRIL 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 09.35HRS. [/underlined] STAND DOWN.
[underlined] 30TH APRIL 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940HRS. [/underlined] Target received – ESSEN.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical (meaning Oboe-guided) Wanganui. 290 Heavies to 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups. & 35 P.F.F/ (8 Mosquitos.) Tracking flares red steady will be dropped on track 5 mins short of the release point at position A as telephoned. (51’45’N 06’56’E). Tracking flares green steady will be dropped on track 2 1/2 mins short of release point at 5137N 0657E.
Release point flares will be red with green stars with one white for longer burning.
Main force a/c to [indecipherable word] tracking flares as guide for bombing run up should aim bombs at release point flares on exact heading 200M & 165mph indicated.
All flares will ignite at 16000ft.
Zero hour. 2359. Changed to 0230.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Owing to height of cloud both navigational & release point flares went into cloud very quickly & all a/c bombed on white flares on approximate position. White flares seen. Glow of fires seen below cloud, large white explosion lit up underside of cloud at 0305 hrs.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 12 a/c missing over ESSEN. 1 from 1 Group, 5 from 4 Group, 5 from 5 Group, 1 from 405. late of 7 squadron over BOCHOLT.
Photographic Cover shows further damage to KRUPPS. Attack gave rise to serious annoyance among the authorities. Described as “terror raid by Jewish and Bolshevic [sic] air pirates.”!
[page break]
5
[underlined] 1ST MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1100HRS. [/underlined] Target. DUISBURG. ‘D’
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Same as for ESSEN 30th April/1st May. Zero hour. 0005.
[deleted] Route – Base – 53’17N 02’12E. – EGMOND – 5200N [/deleted]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 1300HRS. [/underlined] OPS CANCELLED
[underlined] 2nd MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0931HRS. [/underlined] Target – Area 1. DUISBURG. Area 2. BREMEN.
[underlined] METHOD. Area I. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta - Ground Marking. Zero hour 0030hrs. Landmark T.I’s Yellow will be dropped at 5141N 0645E. Mosquitoes will mark exact A/P with T.I. red. Other P.F.F. a/c acting as backers up will keep A/P marked with T.I. Green.
Main Force to aim bombs at T.I. red if visible otherwise at centre of area covered by T.I Green.
[underlined] Area II. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground marking. Landmark flares red steady will be dropped by early a/c only at 5405N 0750E. Landmark T.I. Yellow will be dropped at 5400N 0855E. by all P.F.F. a/c. target will be marked with ground markers T.I. Green.
Main Force a/c to aim their bombast centre of area covered by all T.I. Green. No attempt at visual identification to be made. Flares white & Ground markers T.I. [deleted] Green [/deleted] Red will also be dropped in target area for use of PFF a/c only. Landmark T.I. Yellow to be dropped at 5345N 0835E.
[underlined] 1800HRS. [/underlined] Briefed.
[underlined] 2026 HRS. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta on Area I confirmed.
[underlined] 2110 HRS. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[page break]
6
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 3RD MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940 HRS. [/underlined] Target. Area I DUISBURG. Area II BREMEN
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Area I. Musical Paramatta unless further met. Information makes sky-marking necessary. Zero hour 0030 hrs. Method as for yesterday. Mosquitoes, - Z-3, Z, Z+7, Z+13, Z+19, Z+25, Z+31, Z+37, Z+43. Area II. Newhaven Ground marking. As for yesterday.
[underlined] 1800HRS. [/underlined] Briefing
[underlined] 1801 HRS. [/underlined] OPS. CANCELLED.
[page break]
7
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 4TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0932HRS. [/underlined] Target – DORTMUND. A/P 160° 350yds from ‘A’
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta. 0100HRS. Zero. 116 Mediums + 388 heavies + 71 PFF Mosquitoes will drop landmark ground markers T.I. Yellow at 5152N 0726E. Mosquitoes will then accurately mark exact A/P with ground marker T.I. Green at Z-3, Zero, Z+7, Z+13, Z+19, Z+25, Z+31, Z+37. Other P.F.F. a/c acting as backers up will keep A/P marked throughout attack with T.I. red.
Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at T.I. Green if visible, if not at centre of pattern of T.I. red. A small attack for training purposes will be carried out on Rheine at Z+20.
[underlined] 1800HRS. [/underlined] Briefed. A.O.C’s message to crews read. Photographs of line up taken.
F/L LANG AND SGT. CLARK SINCE REPORTED SAFE.
[page break]
8
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
‘T’ first a/c to return to base made three unsuccessful attempts to land after which owing to the aerodrome being ‘red’ all a/c were either diverted to Honiley or went of their own accord. Visibility there was found to be even worse than Warboys and a/c which had not already been instructed to land elsewhere were told to return and land at Marham. Finally landing at Marham, Chedworth, Sleap, Honeybourne, Stanton Harcourt, Whitchurch, High Ercall, Pershore and one ‘J’ baled out successfully. Interrogations then proceeded during the following day until 1900 hrs!
[underlined] SUMMARY [/underlined] 4 a/c missing P.F.F. 1 from 83, 1 of 156, 2 of 35. 30 a/c missing from Command. Owing to the misconduct of W/C Donaldson who, according to the Main Force, apparently dropped his Red T.I.s on the Dutch coast, he said as far as night photographs show succeeded in developing up to 6 mls. North of the target.
[page break]
9.
[underlined] 5TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations – 156 Squadron returned to base at various times during the day.
[underlined] 6TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1012 HRS. [/underlined] Stand down for P.F.F. with the exception of 109 Squadron.
[underlined] 7TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1008 HRS. [/underlined] Target – DUISBURG Backers-up not required – 6 Main Force only.
[underlined] 1040 HRS. METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta or Musical Wanganui depending on later met: information. If [underlined] Musical Paramatta [/underlined] Mosquitoes will drop preliminary warning groundmarkers T.I. yellow at 5145N 0644E. Mosquitoes will then mark exact A/P with groundmarkers T.I. red which will be dropped at Z-5, Z, Z+5, Z+10, Z+15, Z+20. These groundmarkers will each burn for 7 minutes. No backers up. Main Force to aim bombs with max. precision at T.I. red. If [underlined] Musical Wanganui. [/underlined] Mosquitoes will drop tracking flares red steady at 5145N 0644E. 2nd tracking flares green steady will be dropped on track at 5136N 0645E.
Release point flares red with green stars and white stars for longer burning will be dropped at Z, Z+5, Z+10, Z+15, Z+20. All flares igniting at 16000ft. Main Force a/c will aim their bombs with max. precision at centre of release point flares on exact heading of 200°M IAS 143kts with bomb sights set for height, air speed & zero wind.
195 heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 Group + 17 (L) P.F.F. + 7 Mosquitoes.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 1745 HRS. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[page break]
10.
[underlined] 8TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0930HRS. [/underlined} MAKE & MEND. Tunis and Bizerta [sic] fallen.
[underlined] 9TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000HRS. [/underlined} Target – DUISBURG. [underlined] METHOD [/underlined] Musical Wanganui. 87 mediums + 355 heavies + 8 Mos. + 31 PFF = 482 a/c. Zero. 0200hrs. Tracking flares red steady will be dropped on track at 5150N 0644E. Tracking flares green steady will be dropped on track at 5138N 0644E. Release point flares will be red with green stars with flares white for longer burning. Main Force a/c should aim bombs at centre of release point flares on heading 200°M at IAS 165mph (143kts) with bombsight set for true height, airspeed & zero wind. All flares igniting at 16,000ft.
Mosquitoes will drop release point flares at Z, Z+5, Z+10, Z+15, +20, +25, +30, +35.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
A/C sent to Wyton for take off as Warboys runway was u/s.
[underlined] 1800HRS. [/underlined] Briefing.
[underlined] 1805HRS. [/underlined] Probability of change of method to Musical Paramatta.
[underlined] 2220 HRS. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[page break]
11.
[underlined] 10TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0937HRS. [/underlined] No operations in Command tonight.
[underlined] 11TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0941HRS. [/underlined] Target – BOCHUM. [underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta. 115 Mediums + 431 Heavies + 100 PFF. Zero hour 0015HRS.
[underlined] WORLD’S RECORD WEIGHT CARRYING ATTACK. [/underlined]
Mosquitoes with ground mark A/P with T.I. red at Z-3, Z+1, Z+7, Z+12, Z+17, Z+22, Z+27, Z+32, Z+37.
These will be backed up by other P.F.F aircraft dropping groundmarkers T.I. Green.
Main Force a/c should drop their bombs on the T.I. red if these are seen, otherwise at the estimated centre of the area covered by T.I. Greens. Length of attack Z – Z+45.
Preliminary warning Ground markers T.I. Yellow will be dropped by Mosquitoes at 5146N 0712E.
[underlined] 1726HRS. [/underlined] Area 2. DUISBURG. Main Force crews only will be required if Area 2.
[underlined] 1810HRS. [/underlined] Backers-up scrubbed.
[underlined] 1820HRS. [/underlined] P.F.F. cancelled except for 109 Squadron.
[underlined] 1726HRS. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] for DUISBURG. To be Musical Wanganui. As for method 9th May 1943. Sortie information as for 12th May 1943.
[underlined] 12TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1017HRS. [/underlined] Target – DUISBURG. 8 backers up with their best bomb aimers & 10 Main Force.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta. 120M + 437H. – 89 PFF + 9 Mos: Zero. 0200hrs. Landmarkers T.I. Yellow will be dropped by all Mosquitos [sic] at 5140N 0645E. Exact aiming point will be marked by Mosquitoes with T.I. red at Z-3, Z+1, Z+7, Z+12, Z+22, Z+27, Z+32, Z+37. to be backed up by other PFF dropping T.I. Green. Main Force should aim bombs at T.I. red if visible otherwise at the centre of the pattern of all T.I. Green.
[page break]
12.
[underlined] 12TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET: DUISBURG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 35 a/c missing – 4 P.F.F. Very good concentration on A/P shown by photographs. 1560 tons of bombs dropped – greatest weight achieved against any city in a single attack.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] All crews reported good concentration of markers & fires. One large explosion with big orange glow lasting 6 to 7 sec: at about 0216hrs. Glow of fires seen from Dutch Coast on homeward journey.
[underlined] DAYLIGHT COVER. [/underlined] This shows that the central area of DUISBURG itself is wrecked. Main railway station almost completely destroyed. Centre of DUISBURG-RUHRORT burned out. [indecipherable words]
[page break]
13.
[underlined] 0950HRS. [/underlined] Target – Bochum a/c ‘Q’. PLZEN.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Area I. Musical Paramatta. 104 M + 300 Heavies + 35 PFF + 8 Mos: Area II. Newhaven Groundmarking.
‘Y’ a/c will drop T.I. Yellow at 51°29N 0940E to be backed up by 156 Squadron. ‘Y’ a/c will drop T.I. White at 51°00N 11°02E to be backed up by all P.F.F. Target to be marked blindly by T.I. Green and sticks of White flares. 3L/83, 1L/97, 5L/156, will act as visual markers & will, if A/P is positively identified mark A/P with Red T.Is. If further illumination is necessary a further stick of flares may be used.
Backers up will aim T.I. reds at the exact centre of T.I. red visible. Main Force may for training purpose identify the A/P for themselves in the light of flares, otherwise at the centre of all T.I. red visible. T.I. White and T.I. Yellow will be dropped as navigational aids at the same positions on the route home.
[underlined] 1800HRS. [/underlined] Briefing
[underlined] PLZEN – RESULTS. [/underlined] Main concentration was North of the SKODA WORKS – eleven photographs plotted on the works. Although therefore some damage must have been done, no very important results are expected.
[underlined] BOCHUM. [/underlined] Heavy and well concentrated attack. Smoke from fires on the following day prevented good photographs from being taken, but the industrial area on the N.W. of the city centre has been badly hit and the central area largely devastated.
[page break]
14.
[underlined] TARGETS: PLZEN AND BOCHUM [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY PLZEN. [/underlined] Early arrivals pinpointed works & early T.I. reds dropped on western edge of works & some to N.W. Attack later spread until area 8 x 10mls was covered. Smoke screen which came into operation prevented later pinpointing.
[underlined] BOCHUM. [/underlined] Ground haze prevented identification of ground detail. This a/c was early on the target & no final assessment of success of the raid can be given, but glow of fires could be seen from the Dutch Coast.
[page break]
15.
[underlined] 14TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations – Training. “Interrogation of Prisoners of War” shown to R.A.F. & WAAF personnel. Berlin attacked by 12 Mosquitoes.
[underlined] 15TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations in P.F.F. Command: gardening (mine laying). 2 Group 3 Mosquitoes attack on Berlin and 19 Lancasters attack the Ruhr with 6 Mosquitoes of 2 Group. 1 a/c of 4 Group missing on gardening.
[underlined] 16TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations. Attack on the Moehne, [sic] Sorper, [sic] & Eder dams by 19 Lancasters.
[underlined] 17TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations.
[underlined] 18TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations. Dinghy drill at “The Pike and Eel”.
[underlined] 19TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations. T.I. demonstration at Lakenheath and Rushford Ranges by P.F.F. for benefit of new crews in Bomber Command. S/L Grant in ‘P.’ and W/O Busby in ‘X’ from 156.
[underlined] 20TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations.
[underlined] 21ST MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations.
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16.
[underlined] 22ND MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations. M.I.9 Lecture by F/O Grainger.
[underlined] 23RD MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940HRS. [/underlined] MAXIMUM effort on DORTMUND.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta.
Mosquitoes will drop groundmarkers T.I. Yellow at 5145N 0728E as an aid to Navigation.
Mosquitoes will mark the exact A/P with T.I. red at Z-2, Z+1, Z+8, Z+14, Z+20, Z+26, Z+32, Z+38, Z+44, Z+50, Z+56. These will be backed up by P.F.F. a/c with T.I. Green.
Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at the T.I. red if these are visible otherwise at the estimated centre of the area covered by all T.I. Green.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 163 Mediums + 535 Heavies + 119 P.F.F. = 817 a/c.
[underlined] list by Squadron of aircraft numbers, roles and losses involved [/underlined]
[underlined] BRIEFING. [/underlined] 1800HRS. – New briefing room.
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17
[underlined] TARGET: DORTMUND [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Markers confined to an area with a diameter of about 1 mile. Main Force covered Red T.I. area tailing off to the N & NE 4-5mls. in pear-shaped pattern. The intense glow & smoke from fires in the later stages prevented red T.Is from being seen.
Heavy flak. Moderate “predicted” at first – tailed off in quality & quantity. Negligible L/F. Moderate S/Ls (searchlights) sometimes in cones – mostly singly.
[page break]
18.
[underlined] 24TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1940HRS. [/underlined] MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 25TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000HRS. [/underlined] Target – DÜSSELDORF.
underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta. Groundmarkers T.I. Yellow will be dropped at 5100N 0634E throughout period of attack as an aid to navigation, & backed up by LANCASTER backers up. Mosquitoes will mark the exact A/P with groundmarkers T.I. red at:- Z-2, Z+1, Z+8, Z+14, Z+20, Z+26, Z+32, Z+38, Z+44, Z+50. Other P.F.F. a/c acting as backers up will keep the A/P marked with Green T.Is. Main Force a/c should aim their bombs exactly at the T.I red if visible otherwise at the estimated centre of the pattern of T.I. Green. Groundmarkers T.I. Yellow will be dropped at 5117N 0630E by practice ‘Y’ a/c as an aid to navigation.
[underlined] EFFORTS. [/underlined] 155 Mediums + 513 Heavies + 117 P.F.F. = 785 a/c. Zero hour – 0130HRS.
[underlined] BRIEFING. [/underlined] 1800HRS.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 759 a/c attacked:
[underlined] list by Group, of aircraft numbers involved and missing [/underlined]
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19.
[underlined] TARGET: DÜSSELDORF [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY {/underlined] Very conflicting reports received from crews. Early crews unable to see any markers below cloud layer at 8/10,000ft. Apparent gap in T.I. reds in early part of attack seemed to result in scattering of Green T.Is into red T.is reported dropped at 0207hrs and 0210 1/2 hrs. about 1 1/2mls apart resulted in two Green T.I. areas. If these do not agree with Mosquito then enemy is using decoys. Fires reported by last a/c to cover area about 1 1/2mls in diameter.
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20
[underlined] 26TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000 HRS. [/underlined] Target – COLOGNE. Area 2. DUISBERG.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] MUSICAL PARAMATTA. Ground marking with red T.I. by Mosquitoes and Green T.I.s by backers up. Preliminary warning Yellow T.I. will be dropped by fire raisers of 7 Squadron using ‘Y’ only at 5105N 0025E. These will be maintained by backers up of 7, 35, 83 and 156 Squadron who will aim their Yellow T.I. at those previously dropped. Mosquitoes will then act as precision ground markers and will drop their red T.I. in salvo on the A/P.
Then PFF a/c will act as Backers up aiming their Green T.I. at the Red T.I. if seen otherwise at the estimated centre of the pattern of Green T.I. visible overshooting by 2 seconds in either case.
Fire-raisers and main force will aim their bombs at the Red T.I. if visible otherwise at the centre of all the Green T.I.s visible otherwise at the centre of all the Green T.I.s visible using ‘Y’ as an aid if fitted. ‘Y’ a/c may, if no T.I.s are seen, drop their bombs blind on ‘Y’.
[underlined] AFTERNOON. [/underlined] KING GEORGE and QUEEN ELIZABETH visit Wyton to meet Air Crews. Representatives of each PFF squadron present. F/L COOK and Crew from 156 Squadron.
[underlined] 1800 HRS. [/underlined] Briefing. ‘Y’ F/L COOK to carry Dictaphone.
[underlined] 2153 HRS. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED
[page break]
21.
[underlined] TARGET: COLOGNE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 27TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1010 HRS. [/underlined] Target – ESSEN.
[underlined] Method [/underlined] Musical Wanganui or Musical Paramatta according to weather conditions. No Backers-up on ‘Y’ type a/c required from 150.
[underlined] 1800 HRS. [/underlined] Briefing
[underlined] 2045 HRS. [/underlined] Method to be Musical Wanganui.
[page break]
22.
[underlined] TARGET: ESSEN [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Good concentration achieved with incendiaries inclined to fall short. Good fires seen through breaks in cloud. Flak reports vary – generally considered moderate barrage. 3 a/c hit – ‘B’ F/O PRICHARD – both by flak and another Lancaster over the target. S/L’s few, occasionally small cones through breaks in cloud. ‘B’ F/O PRICHARD carried the dictaphone, but it was broken on return.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing [/underlined]
14 Mosquitoes of 2 Group attacked JENA (ZEISS works) in daylight – 3 missing.
[underlined] 28TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations for P.F.F. Bombing, fighter affiliation and other training. 12 a/c of 2 Group on Zeebrugge missing. [missing sentence]
[page break]
23.
[underlined] 29TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] METHOD [/underlined] MUSICAL PARAMATTA. Preliminary warning Yellow T.I will be dropped by 2S/7 + 2H/35 special a/c at 5059N 5626E This will be maintained by ‘Y’ type backers up. Mosquitoes will then act as precision groundmarkers dropping Red T.I. in salvo on the A/P.
Other P.F.F. a/c will act as Backers up aiming their Green T.I. at the Red T.I. if seen, otherwise at the estimated centre of all green T.I. visible and overshooting by 1 second in either case.
Landmarkers Yellow T.I. will be dropped by ‘Y’ a/c at 5033N 0723E on the route home as an aid to navigation and to help the main force avoid defended areas on leaving the target.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK [/underlined] 113 Mediums + 479 Heavies + 117 P.F.F. Zero hour = 0045 hrs. Dictaphone carried by ‘Y’ F/L COOK, but failed to work.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] The most concentrated raid of the war.
[underlined] list by Group, aircraft numbers involved and missing [/underlined]
[page break]
24.
[underlined] TARGET: WUPPERTAL [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] It is considered by all crews that this attack achieved a good concentration of T.I. marking & consequently good fires were started around this concentration. The fire raising technique appears to have been very successful in the early part of [words missing]
[page break]
25.
[underlined] 30TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0947 HRS. [/underlined] Stand down for all P.F.F. Squadrons.
[underlined] 31ST MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0948 HRS. [/underlined] All Squadrons stood down.
[underlined] 1ST JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0952 HRS. [/underlined] No operations in P.F.F. Training only. Sgt. Wedd lecture on “New Guinea”
[underlined] 2ND JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
No operations in P.F.F.
[underlined] 3RD JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
No operations for 156 Squadron.
[underlined] 4TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940 HRS. [/underlined] Target BOCHUM. Secondary Target MUNSTER. GOODWOOD effort.
[underlined] METHOD for BOCHUM. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta. Mosquitoes will drop Groundmarkers T.I. Yellow at Position A 5148N 0713E. as an aid to navigation. Backers up will keep Position A marked also with T.I. Yellow. Mosquitoes will mark the exact A/P with Groundmarkers T.I. Red at Z-3, Z, Z+7, Z+12, Z+17, Z+22, Z+27, Z+32, Z+37, Z+42. Backers up will keep A/P marked with Groundmarkers T.I. Green. Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at the T.I. red if visible otherwise at the centre of the pattern of T.I. Green.
For information P.F.F. are carrying out a separate attack on MUNSTER from Z+25 to Z+35 using red and green T.I.s
[missing words]
[page break]
26.
[underlined] 5TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1002 HRS. [/underlined] Target OBERHAUSEN. 15 main force only.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Wanganui. Tracking flares red steady will be dropped by all Mosquitoes at Position A 5142N 0615E.
Tracking flares green steady will be dropped by all Mosquitoes at Position B. 5136N 0652E.
Release point flares red with green stars & white for longer burning will be dropped by all Mosquitoes to ignite at 18,000ft in such a position that all main force a/c aiming their bombs at them on a heading of 199M. at 143kts I.A.S. will hit the A/P.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 272 heavies + 43 P.F.F. Zero hour: 0100hrs.
[underlined] 1538 hrs. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[underlined] 6TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1030 HRS. [/underlined] Targets OBERHAUSEN & MUNSTER.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and targets [/underlined]
[underlined] METHODS. Munster. [/underlined] ‘Y’ a/c only will attack at Z+10 & Z+12. by special equipment. [underlined] Oberhausen. [/underlined] Tracking flares red steady will be dropped by all Mosquitoes on Track 8.5 N. Mls. short of the release point.
Release point flares red with green stars & white for longer burning will be dropped by all Mosquitoes to ignite at 18,000ft so that all main force a/c aiming [missing words]
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27
[underlined] 6TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined] (CONT:)
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 274 heavies + 38 P.F.F. Zero hour: 0100hrs.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 1800 HRS. [/underlined] Briefing.
[underlined] 1803 HRS. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[page break}
28
[underlined] 7TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 12.15 HRS. [/underlined] Target MÜNSTER: 1 ‘Y’ + 3 visual marker. + 6 main force. Target MÜLHEIM: 11 Backers-up.
[underlined] METHOD MULHEIM. [/underlined] Yellow T.I. will be dropped by special a/c of 7 & 35 squadron on their way to Munster at Position A. 5150N 0637E. This will be maintained by Backers-up of 35 and 405 Squadron who will aim their Yellow T.I. at those previously dropped.
Mosquitoes will then act as precision groundmarkers and will drop their red T.I. in salvo on the A/P.
Other P.F.F. a/c will act as backers up aiming their Green T.I. at the red T.I. if seen otherwise at the estimated centre of all the Green T.I. visible overshooting by 3 seconds in either case.
Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at the red T.I.s if visible otherwise at the estimated centre of all Green T.I.s visible.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 120 Mediums + 576 Heavies + 49 P.F.F. Zero hour: 0100 HRS. Z - Z+50.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers and type involved [/underlined]
[underlined] MÜNSTER. [/underlined] All blind marker illuminators of 7 & 35 squadron will drop T.I. Yellow blindly at Position A. 5150N 0637E as a navigational aid to a/c attacking Mülheim.
‘Y’ a/c will act as finders and will mark the target area blindly with Green T.I. proceeding on the same heading for 10 seconds before releasing a stick of flares at 4 seconds interval. The Visual Markers will then mark the A/P with red T.I.
Main Force a/c are permitted to identify the A/P visually in the light of flares for [missing words] release their bombs at the estimated centre
[page break]
29.
[underlined] 7TH June 1943 [/underlined] (CONT.)
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 69 heavies of P.F.F. Zero hour: 0100 HRS.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
P.F.F. a/c are to fly strictly between the height limits of 15,800ft and 16,200ft between meridians 0600E and 0700E on the route to & from the target.
[underlined] 1900 HRS. [/underlined] Zero hour now 0115 hrs.
[underlined] 2200 HRS. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
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30
[underlined] TARGETS: MÜNSTER AND MÜLHEIM [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
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31
[underlined] 8TH June 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1040 HRS. [/underlined] Target – MÜNSTER. PFF only.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Blind bombing by P.F.F. ‘Y’ a/c.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined]
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
G/Capt. Collings assumed Command 156 Squadron.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Fighter Command intruders over Dutch aerodromes from midnight – 0300 HRS.
[underlined] 1900 HRS. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 9TH June 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1115 HRS. [/underlined] Targets for 156 Squadron – MÜNSTER 1 [indecipherable number] + 10 main force. ESSEN 10 Backers Up.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] ESSEN. Mixed Musical Paramatta.
Preliminary warning flares Green steady will be dropped by Mosquitoes at Position 5137N 0730E. 4 nautical miles to S/B of main force track. Mosquitoes will then drop release point flares red with green stars & white for [missing words] by all Mosquitoes with red T.Is.
[page break]
32
[underlined] 9TH June 1943 [/underlined] (CONT:)
Other P.F.F. backers-up will drop their Green T.I on the red T.I visible. If groundmarkers are invisible backers-up will revert to main force aiming their bombs at the centre of the release point flares on a heading of [missing] at 143kts. and bringing their Green T.I. back.
[underlined] MÜNSTER. [/underlined] Skymarking and groundmarking by special a/c for non ‘Y’ a/c. Special ‘Y’ a/c will drop flares green with red stars then T.I red. If cloud conditions are suitable for groundmarking no flares will be dropped. Other ‘Y’ a/c will bomb by aid of their special equipment.
[underlined] 2155 HRS. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[underlined] 10TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1940 HRS. [/underlined] MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 11TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1055 HRS. [/underlined] TARGETS RECEIVED. Area I. DUSSELDORF. MUNSTER (Y a/c.) Area II. BREMEN. Area III EMDEN.
[underlined] METHODS. MUSICAL PARAMATTA. [/underlined] DUSSELDORF.
Preliminary warning Yellow T.I will be dropped at 5101N 0633E. by Mosquitoes, and backed up by other P.F.F. a/c.
Mosquitoes will act as precision groundmarkers dropping Red T.I on the exact A/P. They will also drop sky markers red with green stars & white igniting at 14000ft.
Other P.F.F. a/c will act as backers-up aiming their Green T.I at the Red T.I seen otherwise at the centre of all Green T.I overshooting by 3 seconds in either case. If groundmarkers are not visible backers-up will revert to main force bringing their T.Is back.
Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at the Red T.Is seen otherwise at the centre of all Green T.Is visible. If release point flares are used a/c should bomb on a heading of 042M at 143kts.
[page break]
33
[underlined] 11TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined] (CONT:)
[underlined] MUNSTER. [/underlined]
‘Y’ a/c will act as finders marking the target area with Yellow T.I proceeding on the same heading for 10 seconds before releasing a stick of flares at 5 secs. interval.
Visual markers will mark the A/P with red T.I after positive visual identification in the light of flares.
Main Force a/c are permitted to identify visually for practice purposes, otherwise they will aim their bombs at the estimated centre of all T.I reds visible or at the centre of all Yellow T.I seen with with an overshoot of 3 seconds. All ‘Y’ a/c should bomb blindly on ‘Y’
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined]
DUSSELDORF. 148 mediums + 612 heavies + 44 P.F.F. Zero hour 0120 hrs.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[underlined] MÜNSTER. [/underlined] 69 heavies of P.F.F. Zero hour 0120 hrs.
[underlined] list of aircraft roles, aircraft numbers and Squadron [/underlined]
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34
[underlined] TARGETS: MÜNSTER AND DÜSSELDORF [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
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35
[underlined] 12TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1040 HRS. [/underlined] Target – BOCHUM.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta.
Yellow T.I will be dropped by the first 2 Mosquitoes only at 5142N 0712E. Mosquitoes then act as precision groundmarkers dropping Red T.I in salvo on the A/P.
Other P.F.F. a/c will act as Backers-up, aiming Green T.I at the Red T.I if seen, otherwise at the centre of all Green T.I visible overshooting by 3 seconds in either case.
Main Force a/c will aim their bombs at the T.I Red if seen, otherwise at the estimated centre of all T.I Green visible.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 429 Heavies + 64 P.F.F.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
Thin layer of 7/10ths cloud at about 10/12,000ft over the target did not prevent Ground-markers from being seen. T.Is do not appear to have been dropped with the usual accuracy. 25 a/c missing. P.F.F. 1-97 F/S Thomas. 1-83 F/O Tilbury.
[underlined] Photographs. 18th June. [/underlined]
Damage is widespread and severe. In the central city area. 130 acres of business and residential property have been devastated, some 700 buildings having been destroyed or damaged.
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36
[underlined] TARGET: BOCHUM. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 13TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 10.10 HRS. [/underlined] STAND DOWN. Marham only operating and small amount of gardening.
[underlined] 14TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000 HRS. [/underlined] Target – OBERHAUSEN. All Squadrons stood down except for 109 – figures 6 + 2.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 17 a/c on Oberhausen. 1 a/c on gardening.
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37
[underlined] 15TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940 HRS. [/underlined] All P.F.F. stood down. “BULLSEYE” exercise with T.I demonstration. 5 a/c. Q G/C COLLINGS. D F/S RYAN. F/O LUTZ. F/S WINTERBON. F/L MANDENO.
[underlined] 1740 HRS. [/underlined] BULLSEYE Scrubbed.
[underlined] 16TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1025 HRS. [/underlined] Target – KREFELD-UERDINGEN. Derby Effort.
[underlined] 1355 HRS. [/underlined] Target changed to COLOGNE.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined]
Green flares steady will be dropped by ‘Y’ a/c at Position 5105N 0620E. All ‘Y’ a/c will drop flares Red/Green stars and white to ignite at 18,000ft in such a position that other a/c aiming their bombs on a heading of 117M at 143kts I.A.S. should hit the A/P.
‘Y’ a/c will also drop groundmarkers T.I. Green.
Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at the estimated centre of the skymarkers, but if T.I Green can be seen through cloud at the centre of all T.I Greens visible in preference to the skymarkers.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
All crews bombed on sky markers, but no results seen. 3 a/c attacked Last Resorts.
[underlined] GERMAN COMMUNIQUE. [/underlined] 17TH JUNE 1943.
During last night British Bombers attacked Western Germany & bombs were dropped on residential areas particularly in COLOGNE causing casualties among the population and damage to buildings including 4 hospitals & 3 churches.
[page break]
38.
[underlined] TARGET: COLOGNE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
39
[underlined] 17TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
BULLSEYE exercise and T.I demonstration.
Q. G/C COLLINGS. D. F/S RYAN. L. F/S WINTERBON. E. F/O LUTZ. H. F/S ROSE.
S/Ls ineffective owing to cloud. T.I demonstration at Rushford Range with Red T.Is backed up by Green T.Is and White T.Is to simulate incendiaries. T.I Yellow dropped at Lakenheath as preliminary warning groundmarkers. T.Is very well placed at both ranges.
[underlined] 18TH June 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
[underlined] 19TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET [/underlined] LE CREUSOT.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
MONTCHANIN
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined]
Special a/c [deleted] will /[deleted] of 7 & 35 Squadrons will drop the following on route:-
A) Flares green steady at 4920N 0045W. B) T.I Yellow at 4730N 0110E. C) T.I red at 4705N 0310E. On the way home D) T.I red at 4800N 0202E.
[underlined]LE CRUESOT. [/underlined]
1. [indecipherable digit] S/7 + 2H/35 will blindly illuminate the target with long sticks of flares white
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40
2. Remaining illuminators [sic] will continue to illuminate the target with long sticks of flares white dropped after definite visual identification and will release their HE. on the A/P.
3. All above illuminator a/c (in 1 & 2) will carry on to MONTCHANIN and will illuminate it with sticks of flares white at 6 second intervals whilst in a rate 1 turn to the left around the Southern edge of the [symbol]. (triangle symbol meaning target)
4. Main Force Stirlings and Halifaxes [sic] will drop their bombs with maximum accuracy on the A/Ps detailed only after definite visual identification in the light of flares marking 2 or more bombing runs as necessary. Bombs to be brought back if A/Ps are not definitely identified.
[underlined] MONTCHANIN. [/underlined]
1. Illuminator a/c will illuminate the A/P as detailed above (Para. 2.)
2. 3L/83 + 3L/156 will after definite visual identification drop T.I Green on the exact A/P.
3. Blind illuminators, visual markers, & main force Lancasters will aim bombs at the A/P using T.I Green as a guide.
4. All a/c are to leave the target by 0215 hrs.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] LE CREUSOT 244 Heavies of 3, 4 and 6 Groups. MONTCHANIN 26 Heavies of P.F.F.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
Some crews report seeing blue flashes from the target area and are sure that a proportion of the effort fell on the target. Smoke from the Le Creusot attack floated across the target towards the end of the attack. Markers were not necessary in existing conditions. W/O BROWN ‘M’ took a photograph of the A/P.
23rd June 1943. Cover received to date shows no hits on MONTCHANIN.
[page break]
41
[underlined] TARGET: MONTCHANIN [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 20TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
156 stood down.
56 Lancasters of 5 Group & 4 Lancasters of P.F.F attacked the old Zeppelin works at Friedrichshaven [sic] now used as an R.D.F. equipment factory. Many buildings were seen to be hit. Subsequent photographs showed severe damage to parts of the works. The Lancasters continued from Friedrichshaven [sic] and landed in North Africa.
[page break]
42
[underlined] 21ST JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET. [/underlined] KREFELD.
[underlined] METHOD. MUSICAL PARAMATTA. [/underlined]
I. Mosquitoes will act as precision ground-markers dropping Red T.I in salvo on the A/P. To guard against the possibility of technical failure of Mosquitoes, selected ‘Y’ a/c in 2 waves will mark the A/P with Yellow T.I with the aid of special equipment only if, on arrival, no red T.Is are seen.
II. Backers-Up aim Green T.I at Red T.I, if seen, otherwise at the estimated centre of the concentration of Yellow T.I. If Backers-Up can see neither Red nor Yellow T.Is they should aim Green T.Is at the centre of the pattern of Green T.Is.
III. Main Force a/c are to aim their bombs at the T.I red if seen, otherwise at the centre of the concentration of T.I Green. T.I Yellow should be ignored.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] Zero hour: 0130 hrs. 108 mediums + 474 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 114 P.F.F. = 696 a/c.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[page break
43
[underlined] NIGHT FIGHTER ACTIVITY. [/underlined]
8 Mosquito Night Fighters operating in the Bomber Stream. 8 Intruder Mosquitoes operating at GILZE RIJEN, VENLO, DEELEN, TWENTE ENTSCHEDE, [sic] BERGEN ALKMAAR, ST. TROND, FLORENNES. Free lance Mosquitoes will be operating at LAON and DIZIER.
[underlined] 0240HRS. [/underlined] Wellington from Upper Heyford crashed on No.I runway. Operational a/c to land on No.3.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
All crews report an excellent attack with markers well concentrated, no strays. Bombing effort confined to an area 1 1/2 mls. square. A few Yellow T.Is were dropped unnecessarily were by 156 Squadron!
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
Photographs. 24th June. Damage is extremely heavy & concentrated in the centre of the city, particularly round the Adolf Hitler Platz. Out of 1,100 acres of fully built-up town area it is estimated that about 900 acres have been devastated. There is also severe damage to the industries on the N.E. side of the town & to barracks on the N.W.
Reinforcements both for fire and police services are said to have been requested as far afield as Dortmund and Munster. The number of people killed is thought to have been around 2,000.
[page break]
44
[underlined] TARGET: KREFELD [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
45
[underlined] 22ND JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000HRS. [/underlined] Target: [deleted] OBERHAUSEN. [/deleted] GELSENKIRCHEN.
[underlined] 1320HRS. [/underlined] Target: MULHEIM.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] MUSICAL PARAMATTA.
I. Preliminary warning T.I Yellows will be dropped by Mosquitoes at 5143N 0652E 7 statute miles to port of main force track.
II. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] will mark the exact A/P with T.I Red at Z-3, Z+1. 7, 13, 19, 25, 31, 36.
III. [underlined] Backers Up [/underlined] will keep the A/P marked with T.I. Green.
IV. [underlined] Main Force a/c [/underlined] aim there bombs at T.I Red if visible otherwise at the estimated centre of the pattern of T.I Green.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 54 mediums + 437 heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 63 P.F.F. = 554 a/c. Zero hour 0120 hrs.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined]
6 to 8 Beaufighters will be operating on the Bomber Command route. Mosquitoes and Bostons will be operating over Dutch airfields from 2359 – 0330hrs
[page break]
46.
[underlined] TARGET: MULHEIM [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Marker concentration was good, the Greens spread over an area radius 1 mile. The main attack was also concentrated, with incendiaries tending to fall short at the beginning. The last a/c over the target reports a fire area about 2 mls, square in which 3 large fires were burning. Large explosions reported in the [symbol] area at 0122, 0134 and 0147 hrs.
[underlined] 23RD JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0955 hrs. [/underlined] Make and Mend.
[page break]
47
[underlined] 24TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000 HRS. [/underlined] Target – ELBERFELD. A/P ‘A’
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta.
I. T.I Yellow will be dropped by [underlined] special a/c [/underlined] at 5059N 0626E by special equipment if serviceable, otherwise aiming their T.I at those already dropped. 4 special a/c attacking at Z+2 will arrive at Pos: A 2 mins early – drop their markers, do a rate 1 orbit before proceeding to the target.
II. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] then drop T.I red in salvo on the A/P.
III. [underlined] Backers-Up [/underlined] aim Green T.I at red if seen otherwise the estimated centre of Green T.I.
IV. [underlined] Main Force [/underlined] aim bombs at T.I red if seen otherwise at centre of all T.I Green visible.
V. T.I Yellow will be dropped by [underlined] special a/c [/underlined] on return at 5033N 0723E by means of their special equipment.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 102 Mediums + 441 Heavies + 76 P.F.F. = 619 a/c. 630 a/c. took off. 517 a/c attacked primary. 25 a/c attacked last resort.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[underlined] INTRUDERS & FIGHTERS. [/underlined]
Intruders will be operating in the Bomber Command stream. A wing of Spitfires will meet bombers on return covering the route for a/c returning late.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
33 a/c are missing.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined] [incomplete]
[page break]
48
[underlined] TARGET: ELBERFELD. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY [/underlined]
In the early stages both markers and main force were well concentrated although incendiaries again tended to undershoot. Later smoke up to 9000ft made it difficult to see markers except when cascading, & therefore concentration of main force tended to fall off incendiaries stretching [missing words]
[page break]
49
[underlined] 25TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
P.F.F. stood down except for 109 Squadron.
Target GELSENKIRCHEN.
[list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, missing]
[underlined] 26TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0943HRS. [/underlined] 156 Squadron stood down. Mosquitoes of P.F.F attacked DUISBURG AND HAMBURG.
[underlined] 27TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down. Lecture on ‘ESCAPE’ by F/L Yelland given to Air Crew.
[underlined] 28TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET: [/underlined] COLOGNE.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Mixed Musical Paramatta and Wanganui.
I. Preliminary warning flares Green steady will be dropped by Mosquitoes on track at 5041N 0647E 18.7 statute mls. short of release point.
II. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] mark release point with flares red with green stars and white at Z-4, Z, Z+5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35. They will also mark the A?P with T.I red at the same times.
III. [underlined] Backers-Up [/underlined] A/P marked with T.I Green only if red are visible. Otherwise they will revert to Main Force. [missing sentence]
[page break]
50
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 85 Mediums + 437 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 73 P.F.F. Zero hour 0140 hrs. T.O.T. Z to Z + 40.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined]
9 Mosquitoes + 2 Bostons 0030-0315. 6-8 Beaufighters operating in Main Bomber stream.
[underlined] TARGET: COLOGNE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY [/underlined] 10/10ths cloud over the [symbol] with tops 7/8,000ft. Competent a/c crews to bomb on either markers or cascading T.I reds before they disappeared through cloud. Early a/c on [symbol] report that opening markers were late. All T.I Green brought back. No accurate estimate of attack can be given. Explosions reported 0158, 0211 & 0244.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 12/97 & 24/35 missing. 25 a/c in Command [missing]
[page break]
51
[underlined] 29TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
[underlined] 30TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
[underlined] 1ST JULY 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 2ND JULY 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
[underlined] 3RD JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1005 hrs. [/underlined] Target – COLOGNE.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Musical Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] 1. Mosquitoes [/underlined] will drop preliminary warning flares Green steady on track at 5045N 0648 1/2E. 14 1/2 nautical mls short
[underlined] 2. Mosquitoes [/underlined] will drop sky-markers red with green stars and white at Z-4, Z, Z+5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40. They will also drop T.I red on the exact A/P at the same times.
[underlined] 3. [/underlined] If these T.I Red are visible through cloud, [underlined] Backers-Up [/underlined] will keep the A/P marked with T.I Green. If none are visible Backers-Up revert to main force and bring T.Is back.
[underlined] 4. [/underlined] Main Force aim bombs at :- 1. T.I Red if visible. 2. Centre of T.I Green. 3. Release Point flares heading [indecipherable digits] M I.A.S. 143 kts.
[underlined] 5. [/underlined] All flares to ignite at 12,000ft.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 94 Mediums + 525 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 72 P.F.F. Zero hour 0130hrs.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
52
[underlined] TARGET: COLOGNE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] There appeared to be a time lag of 2 minutes between the sky-markers dropped at 0114 hrs and ground-markers at 0116 hrs. Marker concentration good. Main attack reasonable, but again tending to undershoot as much as 2-3 mls. but in built up area. Smoke seen rising at 0116 hrs made early crews suspect a smoke screen. Smoke at end of attack up to 15,000ft. Fires seen from 40 mls away. One a/c ‘Y’ F/L Cook bombed last resort BONN/HANGELAR A/D. (aerodrome) Bombs hung up over the target and as they were near the end of the attack Captain decided not to run in again. Fires were started on the A/D where a/c beaming nav lights were seen circling.
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined]
3 Mosquitoes on Venlo, 3 on Gilze Rijen, 3 on St. Trond, 3 on Florennes, 2 on [indecipherable word], 2 on [indecipherable word], 6 Beaufighters operating in B. Command stream.
[underlined] RESULTS.] 30 a/c missing. P.F.F. 1 of 97, 1 0f 405, 1 0f 35. 4 group. 4H + 4W [missing words]
[page break]
53
[underlined] 4TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
Target: HAGEN.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta.
1. T.I Yellow will be dropped by [underlined] ‘Y’ a/c [/underlined] on route to the target at 5153N 0724E (to keep clear of MÜNSTER).
2. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] will drop T.I red in salvo on the exact A/P at Z-3, Z+1, 7, 12, 17, 22.
3. [underlined] Backers-Up [/underlined] aim T.Is and bombs at the T.I red if visible, otherwise at the centre of the concentration of T.I Green overshooting by 2 seconds in either case.
4. [underlined] Main Force [/underlined] a/c aim their bombs at the T.I red if visible, otherwise at the estimated centre of the pattern of T.I Green.
[underlined] 5. Y a/c [/underlined] drop T.I Yellow on the return route at 5048N 0716E (to keep clear of COLOGNE)
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined]
39 Mediums + 309 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 44 P.F.F.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] BRIEFING [/underlined] 1800 hrs.
[underlined] 1810 hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 5TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1025 hrs. [/underlined] Target: ESSEN. 139 squadron. 4 a/c HAMBURG. 4 a/c COLOGNE.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Sky-marking.
1. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] will drop tracking flares red steady on track at Pos: 5047N 0658E [missing words] release point.
[page break]
54
[underlined] 2. Mosquitoes [/underlined] drop tracking flares GREEN steady at 5138N 0659E 10 nautical miles short of release point.
3. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] drop release point flares red with green stars & flares white at 0126, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55.
[underlined] 4. Main Force [/underlined] aim bombs at centre of release point flares on heading 197M at 143 kts I.A.S.
If this method is used BACKERS-UP bring green T.Is back.
[underlined] 5. [/underlined] All flares will ignite at 16,000ft.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 398 Heavies & 41 P.F.F. = 439 a/c.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
Zero hour = 0130 hrs. T.O.T. Z to Z+30.
BRIEFING. 1800 hes.
1805 hrs. OPERATIONS CANCELLED
[underlined] 6TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
Target:- ESSEN. Main Force only. ‘A’ S/L MANSFIELD 156 squadron.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Wanganui.
[underlined] 1315 hrs. Operations cancelled. 139 Squadron 4 a/c on COLOGNE 4 a/c DUSSELDORF.
[underlined] 7TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down except for 139 Squadron. 4 a/c DUISBERG. 4 a/c COLOGNE
[page break]
55
[underlined] 8TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1030 HRS. [/underlined] Target COLOGNE.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Musical Wanganui and Paramatta.
[underlined] 1. [/underlined] Preliminary warning flares Green steady will be dropped by all Mosquitoes on track at 5041N 0640E 18.2 nautical mls. short of release point.
[underlined] 2. [/underlined] Release point flare red with green stars and flares white will be dropped by Mosquitoes at:- 0110, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40. They will also mark the A/P with red T.Is at the same time.
[underlined] 3. [/underlined] If the latter are visible Backers-Up will keep the A/P marked with T.I Green.
[underlined] 4. [/underlined] Main Force a/c bomb in the following order of preference:- 1) T.I Red. 2) Centre of T.I Green. 3) Centre of release point flares on exact heading of 023M at a speed of 143 kts.
All flares ignite at 17,000ft. red T.Is cascade from 10,000ft. green T.Is cascade from 3,000ft until Z+15, then one T.I Green from each Backer-Up will cascade from 10,000ft.
[underlined] 5. [/underlined] T.I Yellow will be dropped by 2L/7 at 5040N 0715E. These will be backed up by all Lancasters of 97 Squadron & 1 B/U of 83 Squadron.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 435 Heavies + 55 P.F.F.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
Zero hour = 0110 hrs. T.O.T. Z to Z+35.
[underlined] 1800 hrs. [/underlined] Effort reduced. Z to Z+20 T.O.T.
[page break]
56
[underlined] TARGET: COLOGNE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Sky-markers were late, the first one being seen at 0115 hrs. owing to 10/10ths cloud very little was seen of the attack, but large explosions were observed at 0115, 0117 and 0122 hrs. One crew bombed on Green T.Is seen to cascade at 0109 hrs. and one bombed on E.T.A. Glow of fires seen to be starting beneath cloud.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[list by group, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
3 Mosquitoes of P.F.F. attacked DUISBURG. Nil missing
[underlined] Gardening. [/underlined]
[words missing]
[page break]
57
[underlined] 9TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] GELSENKIRCHEN.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] To sky-mark the Release Point.
[underlined] 1 [/underlined] Tracking flares red steady will be dropped by Mosquitoes 20 1/2 m. short of Release point at 5153N 0708E.
[underlined] 2 [/underlined] Tracking flares Green steady will be dropped by Mosquitoes 11.4 n.m. short of release point at 5144N 0705E.
[underlined] 3 [/underlined] Release point flares red/green and flares white will be dropped by Mosquitoes, so that main force a/c on a heading of 196M at 143 kts I.A.S. will hit the A/P.
[underlined] 4 [/underlined] All flares to ignite at 17,000ft.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 426 Heavies + 32 P.F.F. Zero hour 0110 hrs.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Target identified by sky-markers. Glow of fires seen through cloud indicated reasonably concentrated attack.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[list by group, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
58
[underlined] 10TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down. Invasion of Sicily announced.
[underlined] 11TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] TURIN.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] 1. [/underlined] Route markers Green steady will be dropped by ‘Y’ a/c at 4544N 0553E. These will be backed up by Backers-Up only if they are able to identify the lake visually.
[underlined] 2. ‘Y’ a/c [/underlined] will act as Finders and mark the [symbol] area with Yellow T.I proceeding on the same heading & releasing stick of flares at 6 seconds interval. 1st bundle to be dropped in salvo with Yellow T.I.
[underlined] Visual Markers [/underlined] then mark A/P with Red T.I when they have definitely identified it, using Yellow T.I as guide only. They will [underlined] not [/underlined] drop Red T.I unless absolutely certain of the A/P.
[underlined] Backers-Up [/underlined] aim Green T.I at centre of all Red T.I visible or centre of Green overshooting by 2 seconds in either case. Last resort – aim Green T.Is at the centre of all Yellow T.Is if visible.
[underlined] Non-marker a/c. [/underlined] aim bombs at Red T.I if seen, otherwise at the centre of all Green T.Is. [deleted] If [/deleted]
If on arrival at the [symbol] area cloud conditions make it impossible to see T.Is all ‘Y’ a/c will mark the release point with flares red/green stars. In these circumstances squadrons to detail 1/2 their special a/c to mark after Zero & the other 1/2 to orbit & mark after Z+9. Backers-Up then revert to non-markers & along with other main force aim bombs on heading 126M at 143 kts.
[underlined] 3. [/underlined] Route markers flares Green steady as in Para 1. Zero hour 0120 hrs.
[underlined] 1725 hrs. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled
[page break]
59
[underlined] 12TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target. [/underlined] TURIN.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground marking. As for 11th July 1943.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 422 Heavies + 57 P.F.F.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0040 hrs. T.O.T. Z to Z+30.
[underlined] BRIEFING. [/underlined] 1815 hrs.
[underlined] 1600 HRS. [/underlined] Figures changed. F. R. M. Z. N to go as Main Force. 224 Lancs of 1 & 5 Groups + 57 P.F.F.
[underlined] Alteration to Method. [/underlined] Zero hour. 1045 hrs T.O.T. Z to Z+15.
[underlined] 1. [/underlined] Route marker flares Green steady will be dropped on Lake Annecy backed up by Backers-Up.
[underlined] 2. [/underlined] Route markers Yellow T.I will be dropped by ‘Y’ a/c of 156 squadron backed up by Backers-Up of 156 squadron at 4544N 0305E.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Yellow T.Is from blind markers all fell in town area. Red T.Is reported very accurate. The first 2 bundles of Reds fell about 1 ml. apart one either side of the river – the 3rd fell close to the Red on the A/P. All Red markers & subsequently Green markers reported excellent concentration. Main Force attack well concentrated, practically no run back except for a few incendiaries. Route marking also reported very good, both Lake Annecy and Lake Bourget marked on run to target.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 295 a/c detailed. 1 Group 108 Lancs. [missing words]
[page break]
60
[underlined] TARGET: - TURIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base. Bradwell Bay – Dungeness – Cayeux – Lake Annecy – TURIN – 4544N 0305E – 4630N 0110W – 4630N 0250W – 4700N 0600W – 4830N 0630W – ST. EVAL – Base.
[page break]
61 [inserted] No pages for July 13th – 22nd (On leave?) [/inserted]
[underlined] 23RD JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] HAMBURG or MUNCHEN GLADBACH. A/C required 3 B/M, 13 B/Up, 5 Non-markers.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta or Wanganui.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 55 Mediums + 610 Heavies + 110 P.F.F.
[underlined] 1800 hrs. [/underlined] Briefing
[underlined] 1830 hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 24TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target. [/underlined] HAMBURG. 139 Squadron. 4 a/c DUISBERG. 3 a/c KIEL. 2 a/c LÜBECK. 2 a/c BREMEN. 2 a/c Target to be advised.
[underlined] Requirements. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles] Our figures increased to 24 a/c.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
1. Route markers T.I. Yellow will be dropped by special a/c at 5411N 0850E.
2. Target will be marked by visual markers with T.I. Red, backed up by T.I. Green. Long sticks of flares white and T.I. yellow may be seen in the target area, for the exclusive benefit of P.F.F. only.
3. Main Force attack T.I. Red visible or centre of T.I. Green.
4. [missing words] T.I. Yellow will be dropped by special a/c at 5343N 0836E.
[page break]
62
[underlined] TARGET: HAMBURG [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base. 5400N 0300E – 5445N 0700E – 5355N 0945E – Hamburg – 5315N 1000E – 5435N 0600E – 5400N 0300E – Base.
[page break]
63
[underlined] MESSAGE TO CREWS FROM THE C-in-C. [/underlined]
Hamburg is the 2nd largest city in Germany, the most important port and a vital war industrial area. It was the place whence the rot started which spread throughout Germany in 1918. It was the last part of Germany to adhere to Germany and may well be the first to come unstuck. It has been bombed before but not as you, and still more the Germans, understand bombing. To-night, you start the real battle of Hamburg, and you are going to write it off. This is no ordinary or routine operation and each one of you will, I know, do your utmost.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 76 Mediums + 604 Heavies + 116 P.F.F.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Weather over the target was nil cloud with fair visibility. This enabled, although a smoke screen was in operation, our visual markers to pinpoint tributaries and built up area and to put 3 x T.I. Red which were already down on the target. These were positioned one to the West, one Central and one well to the East. His own T.I. Red was placed along with the centre one. Later a/c report that a good concentration was achieved for a target of this description, but that the attack was diverted roughly by the Alsten, 75% falling on the West and 25% to the east. Exceedingly good fires were seen and a large explosion was observed at 0108 hrs. Smoke was rising over the target in a large column up to 18/20,000ft.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
No a/c missing from P.F.F. 12 a/c missing in Command. ‘Windows’ carried for the first time proved presumably to be a success. “Zephyr” also used for the first time.
6 Beaufighters operated S. of line 5300N and W. of 0700E from 0200-0230 hrs. 13 Mosquitoe [sic] intruders operating from 2330-0330 over A/Fs. [missing words]
[page break]
64
[underlined] German Broadcast. [/underlined]
A strong formation of British bombers a terror raid against Hamburg last night. The population suffered heavy losses and considerable damage was caused to residential quarters and cultural monuments and public buildings. According to reports so far available 17 of the attacking bombers were shot down by the Air Defences of N.W. German Coastal areas and in the Norwegian area.
[underlined] 25TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] U.S.A.A.F. [/underlined] Fortresses attacked HAMBURG in daylight and North German Coastal areas including ROSTOCK, KIEL and LÜBECK.
[underlined] 0958 hrs. [/underlined] Target: HAMBURG – Alternative ESSEN.
[underlined] 1150 hrs. [/underlined] A/C required of 156 Squadron. 3 B/Markers. 1 V/Marker. 11 B/Up. 5 N/Markers.
[underlined] Methods. [/underlined] HAMBURG. Newhaven Ground-marking. ESSEN. Musical Paramatta.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] HAMBURG. 71 Mediums + 538 Heavies + 97 P.F.F. = 706 a/c. ESSEN. 71 Mediums + 538 Heavies + 85 P.F.F. = 694 a/c.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
Zero hour. 0030 hrs.
[underlined] 1800 hrs. [/underlined] Briefing. Area I Cancelled.
[missing words]
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65
[underlined] TARGET: ESSEN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base – 5313N 0253E – 5153N 0638E – Essen – Nordwijk [sic] – 5300N 0210E – Base.
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined] Mosquitoes. 4 a/c DEELEN. 4 a/c TWENTE. 4 a/c GILZE RIJEN. 4 a/c VENLO. 3 a/c BERGEN. 3 a/c LIPPSTADT. 3 a/c ST. TROND.
[missing words] Bomber Command track.
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66
[underlined] 2330 hrs. BOMBER COMMAND BROADCAST. [/underlined] Mussolini has resigned and Bagdolio [sic] has taken his place.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Large patch of alto. cum: and industrial haze prevented a clear view of the main attack. Route markers (T.I. Yellow) appear to have been dropped accurately with good concentration. All crews reported good concentration of T.I. Reds and Greens around target area. Several large fires seen, and 2 huge explosions at approx. 0036 hrs & 0105 hrs. Moderate, erratic heavy flak over the target and slight amount of light flak. Results: P.F.F. 3 missing. 25 a/c in Command.
[underlined] 26TH JULY 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] 1015 hrs. [/underlined] MAKE & MEND for P.F.F. except for 139 Squadron. 6 Mosquitoes on HAMBURG.
[underlined] U.S.A.A.C. [/underlined]
[underlined] HAMBURG. [/underlined] 127 Fortresses took off to attack the ship yards and aero engine factory.
[underlined] HANNOVER. [/underlined] 122 Fortresses took off to attack the Tyre & Rubber Factory & Synthetic Rubber works.
P.F.F. 6 Mosquitoes on HAMBURG.
[underlined] 27TH JULY 1943. [/underlined]
[deleted] [underlined] 0948 hrs. Target: HAMBURG. [/underlined] [/deleted] [underlined] P. I. [indecipherable letter] [/underlined]
[deleted] [underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] [/deleted]
[underlined[ ESSEN. [/underlined] Considerable fresh damage on KRUPPS. Many fires burning throughout town.
[underlined] HAMBURG. [/underlined] Considerable damage seen outside smoke area – including BLOHM & VOSS works.
[underlined] ELBERFELD. [/underlined] Almost complete destruction throughout the town.
[underlined] GELSENKIRCHEN. {/underlined] A [missing words]
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67
[underlined] 27TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0948 hrs. [/underlined] Target: HAMBURG.
[underlined] A/C Requirements. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK [/underlined] 76 Mediums + 591 Heavies + 112 P.F.F. Zero hour 0100 hrs.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
Route markers T.I. Yellow will be dropped at 5418N 0840E by 7 & 405 Squadrons. Route markers T.I. Yellow will also be dropped at 5352N 1025E by 35 Squadron. Blind markers mark target with T.I. Yellow by ‘Y’ equipment. Visual markers cancelled, become Backers-Up. Backers-Up aim Green T.I at Yellow T.I on Green T.I. Re-centrers – qualified ‘Y’ Backers-Up spread evenly throughout the attack to drop Green T.I by means of special equipment if it is functioning properly.
[underlined] MESSAGE FROM C-IN-C. [/underlined] The Battle of HAMBURG continues – your opening blow was first rate – it may take 1/2 a dozen for the knock out, but knock out it will be, final & complete. Photo’s of ESSEN yesterday – mostly smoke covered but sufficient to show your devastation in & around KRUPPS and to the housing areas around the A/P. In the last 5 months you have inflicted upon Germany the greatest continuous series of military disasters in history. At present that fact is only just beginning to dawn upon the exponents of the more archaic forms of warfare, but it has dawned on Germany and resonates throughout Germany. From inflicting military disasters you are now proceeding to administer catastrophies. [sic] If you keep it up, and I know you will, you will be saving the lives of millions in the other forces of the United Nations & in the Occupied Countries and you will have Germany on her knees before the leaves have fallen. I will not ask you to do your best. I know you always [missing words]
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[underlined] TAREGET: - HAMBURG [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – 5448 0430E – 5407N 1025E – 5342N 1025E – [symbol] – 5320N 0930E – 5435N 0620E – 5448N 0430E – Base.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] The Yellow T.Is dropped by blind-markers were generally well placed & concentrated. Backers-Up seem to have had little difficulty in placing their Greens amongst the Yellows, although in later stages Green T.Is fell into smoke. Early crews report that on arrival flares were still
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69
[underlined] 28TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
P.F.F. No operations for 156 Squadron. 4 Mos: of P.F.F. attacked HAMBURG. Fires still burning.
[underlined] 29TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
Target: Area I. HAMBURG. 4’Y’. B/M 2‘Y’ Re-C. 13 B/Up. 2 N/M. II. [underlined] SOLINGEN [/underlined] & REMSCHEID. 9 B/Up. 2 N/M.
Area I. Paramatta Zero. 0045 hrs. Area II. Musical Paramatta. z 0115 hrs.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] Area I. 92 M + 590 Heavies + 116 P.F.F.
Area I. Confirmed.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta.
i. Route markers T.I. Red with flares Red will be dropped at 5413N 0850E
ii. Special a/c will ground mark the A/P with T.I. Yellow.
iii. Backers-Up back up the initial ground marking with T.I. Green.
iv. Main Force a/c aim bombs at the centre of all Green & Yellow T.I visible.
v. Route markers T.I. Red & flare Red will be dropped at 5340N 0848E
vi. Spoof markers T.I. Yellow to attract night fighters will be dropped at 5332N 0733E
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Weather – Nil cloud, ground vis: impaired by much smoke haze. Early crews found many fires still burning on arrival. Yellow T.Is were dropped slightly early at approx.: 0037 hrs. Concentration fair – some dropped S. of river about 1 1/2 [indecipherable word] from main concentration. Green T.Is good. Tendency to undershoot later. Main Effort good with large fires left burning, but observation of results hampered by smoke.
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70
[underlined] TARGET: HAMBURG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base 5430N 0500E – 5430N 0700E – 5403N 0944E – Hamburg – 5323N 0938E – 5430N 0630E – 5430N 0500E – Base.
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[underlined] 30TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1005 hrs. [/underlined] MILAN. 2’Y’ 5 B/Up. GENOA 3 ‘Y’ 5 B/Up. TURIN 3’Y’ 5 B/Up.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] TURIN and Milan – Newhaven Ground-marking. GENOA. Illumination.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 100 Lancasters of 1 & 5 Groups + P.F.F. Zero hour. 0135 hrs TURIN. 0155 hrs. MILAN & GENOA.
[underlined] 1745 hrs. [/underlined] 156 squadron – Operations cancelled.
[list by Group of aircraft numbers and types] attacked REMSCHEID. Markers became concentrated as attack developed and smoke rose to 10000ft. 15 a/c are missing.
[underlined] 31ST JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940 hrs. [/underlined] Target: HAMBURG.
[underlined] A/C Requirements. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
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[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 70 Mediums + 437 Heavies + 73 P.F.F = 580 a/c. Zero hour 0200. T.O.T. Z-3 to Z+44.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
Route markers T.I. Red will be dropped off track at 5250N 0840E by 156 Squadron.
Spoof markers T.I. Yellow will be dropped at 5342N 0835E on the homeward journey by Mosquitoes of 139 squadron.
[underlined] ROUTE. [/underlined] Base – 5430N 0515E – 5245N 0725E – 5245N 1000E – HAMBURG – 5400N 1000E – 5430N 0700E – 5430N 0500E – Base.
[underlined] INTRUDER ACTIVITY. [/underlined] 2 Mos: Leeuwarden. 2 Mos: Twente Entschede.[sic] 4 Mos: Vetchta. 3 Mos: Vetchta 3 Mos: Schleswig-Jagel. 3 Mos: Ardorf. 3 Mos: Westland/Sylt. [sic]
[underlined] 2050 hrs. [/underlined] Squalls & Thunderstorm warning.
[underlined] 2250 hrs. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[underlined] 1ST AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down. 15 Stirlings. 3 Group. 14 Wellingtons. 4 Group. Minelaying.
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73
[underlined] 2ND AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: HAMBURG. & HARBURG. Alternative KIEL.
[underlined] A/C Requirements. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking. Zero hour 0200 hrs.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 74 Mediums + 575 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups. + 100 P.F.F. on [deleted] DA [/deleted] HAMBURG and HARBURG.
[underlined] 1755 hrs. [/underlined] Area I confirmed.
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined] 26 Mosquitoes and 6 Beaufighters operating in the Bomber stream.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
10 Lancasters out of 21 attacked the primary. A bank of Cu.Nim. covered the coast at Pos: A up to 17,000’ – breaks occurred between this point and the last turning point before the target (5300N 1000E) where a large area of Cu. Nim. Cloud, base about 10,000’, tops above 25,000’ was encountered giving severe icing, electrical and thunder storms. 10 a/c managed to penetrate to the target area where some bombed on Special Equipment. One a/c bombed below cloud and reported some fires still burning. 9 a/c attacked last resorts or jettisoned and 2 a/c returned early.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] [list by Group, Squadrons, aircraft numbers, roles and missing]
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74
[underlined] TARGET: HAMBURG [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: - CROMER – 5422N 0400E – 5420N 0700E – 5345N 0832E – 5300N 1000E – HAMBURG – 5400N 1000E – 5430N 0700E – 5422N 0400E – CROMER.
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75
[underlined] 3RD AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Make and Mend.
[underlined] 4TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Targets: TURIN, GENOA & MILAN.
A/C Required: 8 Y + 9 B/Up.
Method: Newhaven Groundmarking. Zero hours. TURIN = 0120 hrs. GENOA & MILAN: 0145 hrs.
150 Heavies of 1 & 5 Groups (50 a/c each [symbol])
[underlined] 1755 hrs. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[underlined] 5TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: MILAN. 7 & 156 squadrons only required. [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
Route. Base – Reading – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – N. end of Lake Bourget – [symbol] – return same route.
[underlined] 1756 hrs. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
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76
[underlined] 6TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: MILAN. 83 squadron will provide a Raid Commentator. 156 squadron will provide a reserve Raid Commentator.
BULLSEYE. Z. F/S Slade.
Route: Wrexham – Sevenake (I.R.A) – 5020N 0050W – N. Foreland – Westminster Bridge (I.R.A) – Odstone Down – Otmoor – (T.I. Demonstration.)
[underlined] 1755 hrs. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[underlined] 7TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: TURIN, GENOA, MILAN.
A/C Required. TURIN/GENOA [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles] MILAN. [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
Route markers flares Green steady will be dropped at 4547N0550E out & back.
[underlined] MILAN. [/underlined]
Blind markers Mark A/P with T.I Red flares White. Backers-Up mark visually with T.I. Green or aim Green at T.I. Red or T.I Green already down.
[underlined] TURIN & GENOA. [/underlined] Method the same.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 50 a/c of 1 & 5 Groups on each [symbol]. Zero: TURIN: 0100 hrs. [missing words]
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[underlined] TARGETS: MILAN – GENOA – TURIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route. Base – Reading – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – N. end of Lake Bourget – [symbol] – return same route.
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78
[underlined] SUMMARIES. [/underlined]
Primary: GENOA.
Nil cloud – good visibility. All crews report a good concentration, docks and harbours clearly seen in the light of flares. Smoke screen was in operation, but blowing out to sea. Fires started and glow was seen quite a distance from the target.
[underlined] Primary: MILAN. [/underlined]
Nil cloud – good visibility. Attack was reported well concentrated with one load of Red T.Is about 5 mls. to the N.W. One large explosion believed Gas Works seen at 0124 hrs.
[underlined] Primary: TURIN. [/underlined]
Few patches of cloud, but great visibility. Attack was considered the worst concentration of the three. One large and about five small fires seen by a/c on homeward route from GENOA.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 2 a/c of 5 Group missing.
[underlined] 8TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down. 35 & 405 Squadrons on Italy. later cancelled.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0040 hrs. T.O.T. Z to Z+30.
[underlined] BRIEFING. [/underlined] 1815 hrs.
[underlined] 1600 HRS. [/underlined] Figures changed. F. R. M. Z. N to go as Main Force. 224 Lancs of 1 & 5 Groups + 57 P.F.F.
[underlined] Alteration to Method. [/underlined] Zero hour. 1045 hrs T.O.T. Z to Z+15.
[underlined] 1. [/underlined] Route marker flares Green steady will be dropped on Lake Annecy backed up by Backers-Up.
[underlined] 2. [/underlined] Route markers Yellow T.I will be dropped by ‘Y’ a/c of 156 squadron backed up by Backers-Up of 156 squadron at 4544N 0305E.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Yellow T.Is from blind markers all fell in town area. Red T.Is reported very accurate. The first 2 bundles of Reds fell about 1 ml. apart one either side of the river – the 3rd fell close to the Red on the A/P. All Red markers & subsequently Green markers reported excellent concentration. Main Force attack well concentrated, practically no run back except for a few incendiaries. Route marking also reported very good, both Lake Annecy and Lake Bourget marked on run to target.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 295 a/c detailed. 1 Group 108 Lancs. [missing words]
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79
[underlined] 9TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: MANNHEIM.
[underlined] A/C required. [/underlined] ] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] NEWHAVEN GROUNDMARKING.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 400 Heavies of 1, 4, 5, & 6 Groups + 53 P.F.F. Zero hour. 0130 hours.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Area I. Leverkusen. Area II. Ludwigshaven [sic]. Changed to MANNHEIM. Early arrivals found a thin layer of cloud at about 8,000ft. This began to break up and late arrivals reported as little as 3/10ths. Attack started reasonably concentrated with T.I. Reds covering an area approx: 2mls. across – later the raid tended to scatter with a [indecipherable word] of markers in the centre and the main attack again tending to undershoot. One large explosion at 0137 hrs lasting well over a minute. Defences slight to moderate H/F. Not more than 50 S/Ls. Crews report that on the way out to the target on the leg Bradwell Bay & Dungeness, they were illuminated and in the case covered for 5 mins: by our own S/Ls in spite of the fact that the appropriate letter of the period was repeatedly flashed. It is requested that strong protests be made.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] P.F.F. 2 missing. 5 Group: 2 missing. 1 Group: 2 missing. 6 Group: 1 missing.
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[underlined] TARGET: MANNHEIM. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route. Base – Bradwell Bay – Dungeness – Le Touquet – Mannheim – 4920 0820E – Le Touquet – Dungeness – Bradwell Bay – Base.
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[underlined] 10TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: NÜRBURG.
[underlined] A/C required. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 573 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5, & 6 Groups + 106 P.F.F. Zero hour. 0100 hrs.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] NEWHAVEN GROUNDMARKING.
[underlined] 1. [/underlined] Spoof-markers T.I. Red and T.I. Green will be dropped by 139 Squadron on MANNHEIM.
[underlined] 2. [/underlined] Blindmarkers mark the A/P with T.I. Red & flares White. Visual Markers identify and drop T.I. Yellow. Backers-Up use T.I. Green. Non-markers aim at centre of T.I. Green.
[underlined] 3. [/underlined] On route home B/Markers of 83 drop 1 x 250 lb. Incen: at 4919N 0826E backed up by Backers-Up of 156 squadron also with 1 x 250 lb I.B.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Red markers scattered over target on track principally in two batches. Greens attempted to concentrate, doing so principally on the Eastern loads of Reds, but still covered an area 5 x 3mls. Cloud prevented any accurate observation and little was observed except some glow of fires on cloud when crews were in the Karlsruhe area.
F/S STEPHENS. ‘Z’. On his first flight from this squadron had two combats, first with an Me 110. M/U/G & T/G both opened fire – captain reports accurate fire by Gunners. E/A (enemy aircraft) did not return fire. 2 minutes later an Me 109 [deleted] attacked [/deleted] approached. T/G got in a burst – E/A did not attack.
F/O SHANAHAN. ‘R’. Gee ‘Y’ and W/T all failed & on the return route the Navigator F/O Stafford used D/R (direct reckoning) to return to base.
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[underlined] TARGET: NÜRNBURG [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route – Beachy Head – Le Treport – 4935N 1040E – NÜRNBURG – 4917N 0826E – Le Treport – Beachy Head.
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[underlined] 11TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
[underlined] 12TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Targets: MILAN and TURIN. [underlined] 139 Squadron – 8 Mos: BERLIN [/underlined] 156 squadron required for MILAN only.
[underlined] A/C Required – MILAN. [/underlined] [underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 439 Heavies + 66 P.F.F.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] TURIN. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking. Zero hour. 0115 hrs.
W/C WHITE ‘S’ to act as Raid Commentator.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
One or two crews reported a small amount of thin patchy cloud. The majority report nil cloud & good vis: with slight ground haze. In the initial stages of the attack T.I Reds dropped by B/Markers were somewhat scattered, but the general opinion is that this was put right by the T.I. Y. & the excellent instructions of the Master of Ceremonies, which resulted in the T.I.G. falling in a good concentration. The main force achieved a fair concentration with perhaps a tendency to fall a bit short, but summarising up the results the blame can be placed on the R.A.F if the Italians in MILAN don’t pack in to-morrow & use the excellent fires started for their peace celebrations.
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[underlined] TARGET: MILAN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route. Base – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – N. end of Lake Bourget – MILAN – 4520N 0905E - S. end of Lake Bourget – Cabourg – Selsey Bill.
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[underlined] 13TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
156 squadron stood down: MAKE & MEND for Command.
[underlined] 14TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
156 squadron stood down. 7, 83 and 156 squadron attacked MILAN. 139 squadron attacked BERLIN.
[underlined] 15TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: MILAN.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking. Zero hour 0015 hrs.
[underlined] A/C REQUIRED. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 150 Heavies + 49 P.F.F. Note: No a/c to cross the French Coast before 2140 hrs.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Green T.Is well concentrated in area about 2mls. across at worst. Crews report T.I. Yellow very accurately dropped on actual A/P. Main attack reasonably concentrated with some incendiaries tending to fall short as usual. Large fires reported by later a/c.
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86
[underlined] TARGET: MILAN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
10 Lancasters – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – N. end Lake Bourget – 4540N 0912E – MILAN – 4520N 0905E – S. end of Lake Bourget – Carbourg – Selsey Bill.
3 Lancasters – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – N. end Lake Bourget – MILAN – 4520N 0905E – S. end of [missing words]
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87
[underlined] 16TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Stand down for 156 squadron.
[underlined] 17TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: PEENEMUNDE. [/underlined] R.D.F. Experimental Establishment.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Shifters [/underlined] are A/P movers.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] 0015 hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+40.
[underlined] Phase I. [/underlined] A/P. ‘F’
Blind markers mark A/P with T.I. Red & flares White. Make 2nd run to drop bombs. Visual markers mark exact A/P with T.I. Yellow. Backers-Up aim Green T.I. at T.I. Yellow or T.I. Red. Non-marker a/c go in with the Blind-markers using their anti-personnel bombs against defences – then make a second run & aim H.E. at the Centre of T.I. Green.
[underlined] Phase II. [/underlined] A/P ‘B’.
At Z+24 Shifters move the A/P.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 430 heavies + 94 P.F.F.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] T.I. Reds rather scattered up the length of the target, with a lot about 2mls. [missing word] the W. of A/P ‘B’ of the T.I. Yellows one load overshot slightly & fell in woods S. of A/P ‘F’ and load of T.I. Green also fell in woods to the S. of A/P ‘F’. One load of Green T.Is also fell [missing words] along lay-out. Main attack
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88
[underlined] TARGET: PEENEMUNDE. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route. – Cromer – 5520N 0829E – 5441N 1320E – RUDEN ISLAND – PEENEMUNDE – MANDO ISLAND – 5500N 0500E – CROMER.
First shifter reported attack at that time concentrated on A/Ps ‘B’ & ‘F’ and subsequently attacked
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89
[underlined] 17TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined] (Cont:)
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
41 a/c missing – A large number of combats were seen and the majority of losses may probably be attributed to this cause, as defences over the target were negligible.
[underlined] 18TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
P.I.U. report on PEENUMUNDE.
75% damage to works. A/P ‘F’ practically wiped out – living quarters. A/P ‘B’ Southern hanger hit. workshops hit. A/P ‘E’ Damaged. A/P ‘A’ Not hit.
[underlined] 19TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] TURIN. All Lancasters. ALESSANDRIA. U/T ‘Y’ a/c. BERLIN Mosquitoes.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground marking.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 511 heavies + 90 P.F.F on TURIN. 18 P.F.F on Alessandria.
[underlined] 1655 hrs: [/underlined] Ops cancelled.
[underlined] 20TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
Command Combined ‘BULLSEYE’ 3 a/c T.I. dropping. 2 a/c full sortie.
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[underlined] 21ST AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
[underlined] 22ND AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
underlined] Target: [/underlined] LEVERKUSEN.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 419 Heavies + 50 P.F.F.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hour [/underlined] 2300 hrs. T.O.T. Z-4 to Z+36.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
Owing to weather over the target being from 8/10ths to 10/10ths cloud with tops 16/17000ft (most crews reporting 10/10ths), no T.I. Red were seen on bombing. Crews were compelled to bomb on E.T.A. and Special Equipment. Fires, which seemed to be mainly incendiaries, were scattered over a very wide area. No T.I. Green were dropped by this squadron.
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Only 4 Mosquitoes worked, the remainder having technical troubles. Only 2 heavy crews (both non-markers) claim to have bombed on T.Is. All backers-up claim to have brought back their T.I but one a/c J/7 F/L Amekstein returned with only [indecipherable word] T.I. So the other fellow presumably went with the bombs. All crews except the two mentioned above dropped on E.T.A on fires
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91
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Southwold – Knocke [sic] – 5025N 0705E – 5042N 0730E – Leverkusen – 5103N 0620E – Nordwijk [sic] – 5235N 0330E – Hainsboro’ – Base.
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92
[underlined] 23RD AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required.[/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 516 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups led by 127 a/c P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2345 hrs. T.O.T. Z-3 to Z+40.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta.
1. Mosquitoes drop T.I. Red at 5250N 0652E & Green T.I at 5235N 0702E as route markers. Blind markers of 83 squadron drop Red spot fires at 5217N 1232E – backed up by 97 squadron.
2. Blind markers mark A/P with T.I. Red.
3. Backers-Up aim Greens at the centre of T.I. Reds overshooting by 2 seconds, or if no reds seen at the centre of T.I. Green.
4. Re-centres use special equipment.
5. Non-markers aim bombs at centre of T.I. Reds or T.I. Greens.
Master of Ceremonies will be in operation from Z-1 to Z+10. 1L/405.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
T.I. dropping on the whole was good with no cloud and only a slight haze over the target. The first Reds appeared to form two points of attack east & West. The first Greens dropped midway between, around which the attack developed. Later re-centrers are of the opinion that the attack drifted slightly South as [indecipherable word] by their Special Equipment. Later fires, however, covered the whole area and the attack is considered a success. The Hun appeared to defend the target by the employment of a large concentration of S/L’s to operating with night fighters as flak was only moderate.
[page break]
93
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base – Hainsboro’ – 5305N 0220E – EGMOND – 5250N 1347E – BERLIN – 5250N 1340E – 5420N 1225E – MANDO – 5420N 0300E – HULKHAM BAY – Base.
[page break]
94
[underlined] ‘F’ F/S STEVENS. [/underlined]
On approaching the target at 19,000ft our a/c was covered by a large number of S/Ls. Bombs were dropped in the centre of Red T.Is and almost at once our a/c was badly hit by flak. The inter-comm was rendered u/s and the S/B outer caught fire. The navigator and M/U/G were badly and the port wing severely damaged. The S/B outer was at once feathered. Almost immediately an enemy fighter attacked ‘F’ killing the Rear-Gunner Sgt. Atkee. Evasive action was taken & the fighter lost. As the navigator was u/s. and there was no inter-comm. The pilot steered more or less due North. About 5 minutes later the port outer engine caught fire and was feathered. Pilot carried on for about 1 1/2 hrs. losing height down to 7,000ft. The W/Op. hence succeeded in repairing the morse key and got a fix. The pilot turned on to 280 and the navigator who had been bandaged up by the W/Op. managed to plot the fix and give a course for home. During passage through the Baltic the crew had been warned to prepare for ditching. Order was cancelled when Captain discovered rear gunner trapped in his turret. The W/Op continued to get fixes until the English Coast was reached when the pilot made a safe landing at ATTLEBRIDGE aerodrome.
Captain. F.S Stevens. Bomb Aimer. [missing] Navigator. Sgt. Clegg. M/U/Gunner. [missing] W/Operator. Sgt. Stocks. Rear Gunner. Sgt. Atkee. F/Engineer. [missing]
F/S Stevens, Sgt Clegg and Sgt. Stocks have received an immediate award of the D.F.M.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 726 detailed – 58 missing.
[list by Group, aircraft type and numbers involved, roles and numbers missing]
[page break]
95
[underlined] 24TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All P.F.F. squadrons stood down except 139 Squadron. Command – Gardening. P.R.U. pilot who was over Berlin to broadcast in the 9 o’clock news.
[underlined] 25th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Make and Mend for all Squadrons.
[underlined] 26th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MANNHEIM. All squadrons except 105 & 109 required.
[underlined] A/C Requirements. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] 1128 hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 27th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined]NÜRNBERG.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] method. [/underlined] {deleted] Paramatta. [/deleted] Newhaven.
[words missing] bomb (500 or 1000 MC) on HEILBRONN
[page break]
96
[underlined] TARGET: NÜRNBERG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Beachy Head – 5005N 0125E – 4856N 1100E – NURNBERG – 4938N 1108E – 5005N 0126E – Beachy Head – Base.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
In the early stages of the attack the Red T.Is were rather scattered, but one or two reports give the impression that the majority fell slightly to the S & SE of the A/P. later Backers-Up and Recentrers appear to have somewhat corrected this, as later [words missing]
[page break]
97
there is every probability that a wide area of the town was covered. Fires are reported to be widely spread, but on built-up area. One Visual marker ‘Y’ F/L Cook did not drop his T.I yellow owing to interference by a cone of S/Ls which held & dazzled him on the bombing run. His second attempt was spoilt by smoke & fire.
Defences – Flak very mild – S/Ls active co-operating with fighters. Large amount of fighter activity.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[list by Group, aircraft type and numbers involved, roles and numbers missing]
Photographs show main Concentration – P.F.F. E & SE – Main Force very scattered SE & E.
[underlined] 28th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
[underlined] 29th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
[underlined] 30th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down. Other squadrons MUNCHEN GLADBACH. SPECIAL TARGET IN FRANCE. [words missing]
[page break]
98
[list by Group, aircraft type and numbers involved, roles and numbers missing]
[underlined] SPECIAL TARGET IN FRANCE. [/underlined]
[list by Group, aircraft type, numbers involved and numbers missing]
[underlined] 31ST AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Ordinary Paramatta.
Routemarkers T.I.G. at 5152N 1143E by blind markers of 83 squadron backed up by backers up of 156 squadron. Blind markers mark A/P with T.I. Red. Backers-Up aim T.I. Green at T.I. Red on centre of T.I. Green. Re-centres use special equipment to re-centre. Non-markers aim HE at centre of T.I. Red. Route markers T.I. Green at 5152N 1143E by blind markers of 83 squadron backed up by 156 squadron.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 534c heavies + 102 P.F.F. Zero hour. 2330 hrs.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles] [words missing]
[page break]
99
[underlined] BERLIN. 31ST AUGUST 1943 [/underlined] (Cont:)
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: HAPPISBURGH – 5322N 0323E – 5147N 1108E – 5217N 1405N [sic] – BERLIN – 5100N 0930E – 5030N 0720E – CAYCUX – BEACHY HEAD.
[page break]
100
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
7 – 10/10ths thin strato-cum: tops about 5,000ft. While some Red T.Is were dropped on time, owing to late arrivals, blind markers were active for about 20 minutes. Red T.Is scattered, but generally at the beginning in two sections about 4 mls. apart. As the raid progressed the markers became still more scattered. Some of the backers-up finding no T.Is to guide them.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
German broadcast. “Re-organised Berlin Ack-Ack defences inflicted extremely heavy losses on the attackers. British bomber formations were dispersed & mostly had to jettison their bombs. Effective defences prevented the Bomber a/c from making a concentrated attack”.
[list by Group, aircraft type and numbers involved, roles and numbers missing]
F/S FRY. ‘P’ Combat with unidentified T/E E/A. M/U/G opened fire. No results observed.
F/O WRIGHT ‘T’ M/U/G opened fire on unidentified T/E E/A at 400yds range & T/G opened fire immediately afterwards. No return fire experienced from E/A which dived steeply to starboard & disappeared. An explosion was seen on the deck behind 30/60 seconds afterwards.[deleted] During [/deleted] E/A claimed as probably destroyed.
[underlined] SPECIAL TARGET IN N.W. FRANCE. [/underlined]
41 a/c detailed – Nil missing.
[underlined] BRAUWEILER. [/underlined]
8 Group. 5 Mosquitoes [missing word] Missing.
[page break]
101
[underlined] 2ND SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] 5028N 0354E. Special target in France.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 30 Mediums + 11 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2200 hours.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
10 a/c attacked dropping 10 x T.I. Green. 60 x 1000 G.P. Weather was 9/10ths thin strato-cum tops 8,000ft. Good concentration of markers with one load of Green T.Is at the most 1/2 ml. off.
One large explosion at about 2203 hrs lit up cloud for about 3 seconds. No other large explosions seen.
One heavy flak gun about every 2 minutes.
[underlined] 3RD SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
102
[underlined] Method [/underlined] Paramatta.
Routemarkers red spot fires at Pos: 5238N 0820E.
Preliminary warning markers. T.I. Yellow at Brandenburg.
Blind-markers drop T.I. red.
Backers-Up keep A/P marked with T.I. Green.
Non-markers aim bombs at the centre of T.I. Red.
Y Backers-Up act as normal backers-up unless cloud conditions make it necessary to revert to Wanganui.
Routemarkers T.I. Red L/B. at 5432N 1334E.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2315 hrs.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 244 heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 81 P.F.F.
‘U’ F/O Foderingham and 5 of crew crashed at Snetterton Heath.
[underlined] 1630 hrs. [/underlined] Briefing. SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, secretary of State for Air, attended briefing and gave a talk on the progress of the war.
[underlined] SUMMARY [/underlined]
Weather over the target was chiefly nil cloud, but with occasional whisps [sic] of very thin cloud at varying heights, with moderate to good visibility.
At the start of the attack, T.I. Reds covered an area of approx. 3 sq. m. but as later good concentration of Reds was achieved, which was backed up admirably by T.I. Greens to form a light cluster. Ground fires and many explosions were seen around the T.I. Concentration, with smoke rising up to approx: 19,000ft. The general impression is that the attack was a success & far exceeds the previous raids. Flak was only moderate, but the S/Ls were as active as usual, working in cones, track indicating & for illumination for fighters.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
‘R’. F/O SHANAHAN. Missing from 156. F/L Stafford. W/O Collins. Sgt. Hoyle. F/S Denyer. F/S Wilson. W/O Dodds, 3/L of 7 Squadron.
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103
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Great Yarmouth – 5245N 0330E – EGMOND – 5240N 0900E – Brandenburg – Berlin – 5233N 13422E – 5555N 1325E – 5800N 1100E -5700N 0600E – Brancaster.
[page break]
104
[underlined] 4TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
156 Stood down.
[underlined] 5TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MANNHEIM. Area II. MUNICH. Area I.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] I & II. Newhaven.
Area II.
Routemarkers T.I. Reds L/B at 4933N 0608E.
Blind-markers mark A/P with T.I. Red after a timed check from KAISERSLAUTERN.
Visual markers mark A/P with T.I. Green & Yellow if seen. no overshoot. Later Backers-up aim T.I. Green at the centre of all T.I. Green overshooting by 2 seconds.
Re-centrers after Z+12 drop T.I. Green by means of special equipment.
Non-markers may identify visually or aim at centre of T.I. Reds.
Routemarkers T.I. Red Spot at 4928N 0608E.
[underlined] A/C Required [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
491 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 107 P.F.F. T.O.T. Z-4 to Z+36.
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base – Reading – Beachy Head – 4952N 0040E – 4937N 0300E – Kaiserslautern – Mannheim – 4919E [sic] 0830E – 4937N 0300E – 4952N 0040E – Beachy Head – Reading Base. Backers-Up & Re-centrers from 4937N 0300E – Mannheim.
[page break]
105
[underlined] TARGET: MANNHEIM. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Beachy Head – 4952N 0040E – 4937N 0300E – (KAISERSLAUTERN V/M. B/M & N/M) – MANNEHEIM – 4919N 0830E – 4937 0300E – 4952N 0040E – Beachy Head – Base.
[page break]
106
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
The blind-markers achieved a good concentration and were mainly on time although some were still visible at 2313 hrs. The yellows were in the centre of a very good concentration of greens. Later a/c report a large number of good fires and it is estimated that this is the best attack made on this target. A number of explosions were reported principally from 2259/2303hrs. One N/F claimed destroyed.
“X” F/S HEWITT.
KAISERSLAUTERN. 2312 hrs. 19000ft. S/E a/c was sighted by T/G doing a diving attack from Port quarters up, & opened fire at range of 150 yds firing orange tracer which passed underneath the Lancaster: T/G & M/U/G fired 4 & 2 second bursts respectively. Strikes observed on E/A’s port wing & fuselage & E/A was seen in flames in a shallow dive which became steeper & subsequently E/A burst into flames on the ground. E/A DESTROYED.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
3 a/c missing from P.F.F.
E/156. F/O PRICHARD. 2 of 7 squadron.
P.F.F.
This was undoubtedly one of the best “Y” attack the P.F.F. have ever achieved. The timing throughout was good. The ‘Y’ a/c were reasonably concentrated – probably due largely to the fact that only 10 dropped T.I’s and all those a/c who were doubtful about their ‘Y’ bombing brought their T.I back. The town was thus successfully illuminated for the Visual markers who all appear to have identified the A/P and bombed it accurately. The backing up and recentring was well maintained and accurate throughout the raid.
[page break]
107
[underlined] 6TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET: [/underlined] MUNICH.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined]
362 Heavies + 74 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
[underlined] ZERO HOUR. [/underlined] 2330 hrs.
[underlined] BRIEFING: [/underlined] 1530 hrs.
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined] 6 Beaus operating in the Bomber stream. 2 Mosquitoes over the main target.
[underlined] 2155 hrs. [/underlined] Warning from Group. German Intruder a/c are definitely expected to be very active tonight at time of return, especially between 0300 – dawn. All stations are warned to have defences ready to meet these intruders who are expected to be over here in force. It is stressed that this is no ordinary warning.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
7/10 – 9/10ths thin stratus 8/10000ft moderate to good visibility. Cloud interfered with technique. Reds seemed quite concentrated. Greens in early stages were well concentrated were considered by later crews to be more scattered although cloud prevented adequate observation. The glow of fires were seen from 160/200 mls. away. One large explosion at 2335 hrs. ONE N/FIGHTER CLAIMED AS DESTROYED.
[underlined] H/156. S/L COATES. [/underlined]
Detailed as a BACKER-UP. At the beginning of the bombing run tracer was observed coming from port quarters down passing under the wing of the Lancaster. Captain was weaving slightly to S/B & increased his turn to a steep diving turn to S/B . 2 bursts of approx. 3-8 seconds duration were fired by E/A, hits being scored
[page break]
108
[underlined] TARGET: MUNICH. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Beachy Head – 5000N 0115E – Freiburg – 4740N 1006E – MUNICH – 4758N 1145E – 4806N 0735E – 4806N 0235E – Cabourg – Belsey Bill – Reading - Base
on port inner engine, S/B tail plane, & port side of fuselage & bomb bays. Gunners were blinded by the brightness of E/A’s tracer & no member of the crew sighted the E/A. T/G opened fire simultaneously with the E/A’s second burst giving a 2-second burst towards the judged apparent notion of where the E/A would be. E/A was not observed to break away. Both [missing words]
[page break]
109
[underlined] Z/156. F/L MANIFOLD [/underlined]
Detailed as Backer-Up. 18mls. S.W. of the target when doing gentle weaving action S/E (Single-Engined) E/A (Enemy Aircraft) sighted by T/G on the S/B quarter 20 down, making a quarter attack, range 800yds. T/G gave directions to Captain “Down port, up S/B” T/G opened fire at 400yds range with 2-3 second burst, all guns being in operation. Flash was observed on E/A who immediately broke his attack, climbing to port quarter and smoke & sparks were seen trailing backwards. This was confirmed by the M/U/G & the W/Op. who was standing in the astrodome. When positioned on the port beam above, flames enveloped the E/A which dived vertically down through the clouds & an explosion was seen through cloud by members of the crew as fighter hit ground. THIS A/C DEFINITELY CLAIMED AS DESTROYED.
T./G. F/O CURRIE. M/U/G Sgt. ROSIE.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
404 a/c despatched.
[list by Group, aircraft numbers & types involved and aircraft missing]
[underlined] 7TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
35 squadron. PONGO.
[page break]
110
[underlined] 8TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] 156 squadron. 4 B/M. 8 B/U. 5 N/M.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 335 Heavies + 82 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta..
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0010hrs.
[underlined] 1745hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED
[underlined] 1745hrs. ITALIANS SIGN ARMISTICE – UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER. [/underlined]
[underlined] 9TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN. Alternative FRANKFURT
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 356 Heavies + 97 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] BERLIN. Paramatta. FRANKFURT. Newhaven.
[underlined] Zero hour.. [/underlined] Berlin. 0115hrs. Frankfurt 0200hrs.
[underlined] 1645hrs. [/underlined] Berlin Confirmed.
[underlined] 1800hrs. [/underlined] Zero hour changed to 0130hrs.
[underlined] 2107hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[page break]
111
[underlined] 10TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 11TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
No operations.
[underlined] 12TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
No operations.
[underlined] 13TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
156 stood down. 5 Mosquitoes 139 Squadron on DUISBERG. 5 Mosquitoes 139 Squadron on COLOGNE.
[underlined] 14TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
8 Mosquitoes 139 squadron on BERLIN. 1 Mosquito missing
T.I. Demonstration at RUSHFORD. F/S PALMER 156. observing a/c.
[underlined] 15TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target:- [/underlined] MONTLUÇON
156 & 83 Squadrons stood down except for F/S Fry from N.T.U. (Navigation Training Unit)
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 314 Heavies + 64 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2330hrs.
[page break]
112
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
[underlined] Target: MONTLUÇON. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
Attack a great success. P.I.U. photographs show a large amount of damage to the DUNLOP RUBBER TYRE FACTORY.
[list by Group, aircraft numbers & types involved]
5 U.S.A. Fortresses took part under the control of 3 Group. 3 a/c missing.
[underlined] DORTMUND-EMS CANAL. [/underlined] [underlined] words missing? [/underlined]
8 Lancasters of 5 Group carried out an attack on the embanked stretch of the canal, 4mls. E. of GREVEN using 12,000lb. Thick ground haze made identification extremely difficult. Of the 3 a/c which returned only 2 succeeded in identifying the target. 6 Mosquitoes of Fighter Command escorted the Lancasters (617 Squadron.)
7 Mosquitoes of 139 Squadron on BERLIN.
[underlined] 16TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MODANE. (French Alps.)
[underlined] A/C Required [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
113
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 304 Heavies + 66 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Visual Groundmarking.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0001hrs.
[underlined] TARGET: MODANE. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Selsey Bill – Carbourg – 4735N 0045E – 4512N 0535E – MODANE – 4735N 0120E – Carbourg – Selsey Bill.
[page break]
114
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Weather over the target varied from nil to 3/10ths patchy cloud at about 10,000ft with good vis: in the early stages of the attack, but smoke, presumably from T.Is interfered in the later stages. Our 3 visual markers identified the A/P visually by the river and marshalling yards clearly in the moonlight. T.I. Reds were extremely well concentrated with the exception of one which was dropped approx.: 2m. S.W. on a hillside. The main concentration of T.I. Reds was backed up by the Backers-Up dropping T.I. Green. Some fires were seen burning around the A/P & many bomb explosions were seen around the marshalling yard & river. A large proportion of the main force appeared to drop their bombs wide on the hillside. The general opinion is, however, that the attack was a success.
A. F/S FRY.
T/E (Twin Engined) Single tail aircraft reported by T/G flying parallel on port quarter 15 up range 700yds. As aircraft was not definitely identified our Lanc:: turned S/B. Then a/c turned in making a beam attack & T/G gave instructions to turn port. M/U opened fire. No strikes observed.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
From photographs plotted a cluster of P.F.F. are on the A/P and one or two main force. The rest are scattered to the E & NE, towards the town.
[underlined] 17TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
156 squadron stood down.
N.T.U. on “BULLSEYE” 7 a/c.
[page break]
115
[underlined] 18TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
STAND DOWN.
[underlined] 19TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 20TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
STAND DOWN.
[underlined] 21ST SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
ALL HEAVY SQUADRONS STOOD DOWN.
Bullseye & T.I. Demonstration.
[list aircraft letters and ranks and names of pilots]
[underlined] 22ND SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Targets: [/underlined] AREA I. HANNOVER. – SPOOF: OLDENBURG. AREA II BOCHUM.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] HANNOVER.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] BOCHUM. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles] [information missing]
[page break]
116
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
615 Heavies + 29 Mediums + 82 P.F.F on HANNOVER. 31 P.F.F. on OLDENBURG.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
[deleted] Route marke [/deleted]
[underlined] 1630hrs.. [/underlined] Area I Confirmed.
[underlined] Intruder Activity. [/underlined]
[list of aircraft numbers, aircraft type and targets]
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2130hrs
[underlined] T.O.T.. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+25.
[underlined] SUMMARY. HANNOVER. [/underlined]
Judged by the position of the Yellow T.Is blind markers tended to overshoot. Green T.Is generally well concentrated. Fires in an area about 3mls x 1 mile. on track across target – could be seen from Enemy Coast on return. Red T.Is dropped over STEINHUDER LAKE 2117h
[underlined] OLDENBURG. [/underlined]
Nil cloud – good visibility.
Reds well concentrated, greens scattered. Some fires reported in target area.
[underlined] ‘Y’ S/L COOK. [/underlined]
After second run over target and bombs had been dropped a load of incendiaries fell on the Lancaster dropped by a Halifax. Port outer engine set on fire & hydraulic gear for both turrets severed – gear u/s – ‘Y’ smashed. Incendiaries burning in the a/c which W/Op threw out of the flare Shute. Shortly after leaving the target attacked by [words missing] u/s & the inter-comm. Evasive action taken.
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[underlined] TARGET: HANNOVER. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] ROUTE. [/underlined] 12 Lancasters: Cromer – 5350N 0400E – (5240N 0920E B/Ms, U/Ms, N/Ms) – HANNOVER – 5210N 0945E – 5350N 0400E – Cromer.
4 Lancasters: Cromer – 5350N 0400E – 5309N 0645E – OLDENBURG – 5420N 0620E 5420N 0 [indecipherable digit] 00E – Wells.
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118
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] HANNOVER - OLDENBURG. [/underlined] The spoof raid was successful – bombing not very concentrated. A few Mosquitoes strayed out towards Bremen defences, but the correct town was hit & the raid undoubtedly attracted some fighters & this assisted the main operation. Preliminary reports of the main attack were most encouraging, but this optimism was not justified by the photo plot or daylight recco. Three crews who aimed visually were very near the A/P but the majority of blind markers overshot the aiming point by 3-4mls. & unfortunately it was their markers which the backers-up maintained. For once the main force did not undershoot the markers to any great extent, with the result that most of the bombing took place to the SE of the town & a PRU a/c reported that no fires were burning in Hannover town centre. Photographs however prove that there were some fires burning [deleted] round [/deleted] around the A/P & it is probable that considerable damage was done. Although probably only a small proportion of the total bomb load fell on the town, it seems unlikely that there was any large scale devastation as was first expected.
P.F.F. 1 missing.
[underlined] 23RD SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGETS. [/underlined] MANNHEIM & DARMSTADT.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] HANNOVER.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 541 heavies & mediums of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 78 PFF on Mannheim. 29 a/c of PFF on Darmstadt.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2130hrs.
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119
[underlined] TARGETS: MANNHEIM & DARMSTADT. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE:- BASE – CLACTON – 5058N 0254E – 4955N 0750E – Target – (4920N 0843E DARMSTADT) – 49 [indecipherable digits] 0820E – 4800N 0400E – 4830 0030W – 4920N 0040W – SELSEY BILL – READING – BASE.
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120
[underlined] SUMMARY. MANNHEIM. [/underlined]
Nil cloud, good visibility. Blind markers well concentrated and accurate. Visual markers claimed to have identified A.P. without any doubt. Green markers well concentrated apart from occasional strays. Main force effort caused good fires with incendiaries undershooting considerably. Large explosion seen at 2156hrs in North end of target. 1 a/c attacked last resort DARMSTADT as nothing seen at MANNHEIM on arrival.
[underlined] DARMSTADT. [/underlined]
Red marker concentration reasonably good although some fell well away. Green T.Is generally good. Ground fires seen starting as a/c left. One large explosion seen at 2135hrs – believed gas holder, also seen by Mannheim crews.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
2 a/c of P.F.F. missing, both of 97 Squadron. Photographic plot shows a very bad scatter to the N.W. back along track, and although a high proportion of photographs are unplottable because of fire-tracks, it seems that the main force bombing spread back badly. A P.R.U. sortie the following afternoon reported fires still burning in the town.
[list by Groups, of aircraft missing]
[underlined] 24TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
156 squadron stood down. Mine-laying by 1, 3 and 6 Groups. 8 Group. 4 Mosquitoes on DUISBERG.
[underlined] 25TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] KIEL.
[underlined] A/C required: [/underlined] 8 B/M. 6 Supporters.
Zero hour [missing words] later changed to 0230hrs.
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121
[underlined] 26TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Area I. HANNOVER. AREA II. BOCHUM.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
Area I. 5 B/M. 2 V/M. 4 B/U. 7 Supporters. [underlined] Spoof [/underlined] 1 B/M. 2 Supporters. Area II. 2 B/U. 90 Supporters.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
Area I. 578 Heavies + 23 Mediums + 89 P.F.F. Area II. 354 Heavies + 42 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0030hrs.
[underlined]1730hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 27TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Area I. HANNOVER. AREA II. KIEL.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] HANNOVER.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
590 Heavies + 24 Mediums + 89 P.F.F. 28 on BRUNSWICK.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2330hrs.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] HANNOVER.
Nil cloud – good vis: T.I. Yellows fairly concentrated, estimated about 3 loads of Red T.Is dropped and Greens backed up well. Incendiaries were reported as falling short about 30% of the effort being short of [missing words]
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122
[underlined] TARGETS: HANNOVER & BRUNSWICK. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE. Base – Southwold – 5237N 0330E – Egmond – 5235N 0800E – 5234N 0900E – [symbol] – 5210N 0945E – 5238N 0800E – Egmond – Southwold – Base.
Brunswick [missing words]
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123
and could be seen from the Dutch Coast on the homeward run
[underlined] Brunswick. [/underlined]
Reds seemed rather scattered. Green T.Is away from the Reds. Some fires seen as a/c left. Many night fighters flames were seen over CELLE and the target & the attack is therefore considered to have been successful as a “Spoof”.
[underlined] German Intruders. [/underlined] Operated over this country. Bombs dropped on warboys aerodrome.
[underlined] RESULTS: [/underlined]
38 a/c missing [list by Group of aircraft missing]
From preliminary reports attack appeared to fall to the NE. N & NW.
[underlined] 28TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
[underlined] 29TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET: [/underlined] BOCHUM.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Musical Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] 2045HRS.
[underlined] A/C required: [/underlined] [list by squadron of aircraft numbers & roles] [words missing]
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124
[underlined] TARGET: BOCHUM.[/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 372 Heavies + 24 Mediums + 45 P.F.F.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
1 a/c ‘2’ Sgt Maclean landed at Newmarket short of petrol. ‘C’ F/S Ray [deleted] landed [/deleted] attempted to land at Downham Market but overshot and crashed at Wimbotsham.
Weather over the target was clear & enabled Paramatta to be used. 1st T.I. Red dropped on time. All crews bombed on ground markers except one who bombed skymarker at 2054hrs. The T.I. concentration was good, with the exception of 2 x T.I. Green which were reported dropped at 2053 4/5mls. NE. Many fires were started but had a scatter of several miles and undershooting.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
High standard of accuracy was achieved by markers. From photographic cover since received it is seen that a large amount of damage was done and the raid proved to be very successful.
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125
[underlined] 30TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET.[/underlined] STETTIN.
156 squadron required.
[underlined] 1255HRS. [/underlined] OPERATIONS cancelled.
[underlined] 1ST OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] STUTTGART.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 6 B/M. 2 V/M. 1 B/U. 3 Supporters. Spoof. 2 B/M. 2 Supporters.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 523 Heavies + 81 P.F.F. 32 P.F.F. on Spoof.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2235hrs. T.O.T. Z-4 to Z+25.
[underlined] 1340hrs. [/underlined] Area I. Scrubbed. Area II. Hagen. [underlined] Zero hour [/underlined] 2100hrs. [underlined] A/C required: [/underlined] 4 Supporters. [underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 209 Heavies + 37 P.F.F. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-3 to Z+12.
[underlined] 1450hrs. [/underlined] Area I still on.
[underlined] 1615hrs. [/underlined] Area I scrubbed.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
9 – 10/10ths cloud tops 5/6,000ft. Despite cloud conditions T.Is clearly discernible on ground. Three out of four crews report first Red T.Is dropped on time, followed 1/2 a minute later by first greens. Early T.I.G well placed with slight tendency to overshoot. Fires starting & 2 crews report a large explosion at 2103hrs.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
There was a gap in the mosquito marking early in the attack, but this was covered by the Backers-Up who kept the A/P marked throughout the attack. Accuracy of mosquitoes & B/Up alike was of a high standard.
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126
[underlined] TARGET: HAGEN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – 5310N 0150E – Egmond – 5145N 0800E – HAGEN – 5030N 0730E – 5020N 0132E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
[underlined] 2ND OCTOBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MUNICH.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 203 Heavies of 1 & 5 Groups + 86 P.F.F
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2230 hours. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+14.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
Weather nil cloud – good vis: B/markers more concentrated than previously. Visual markers seemed rather scattered. Green T.Is were well concentrated in centre of yellows. Good fires were reported well concentrated in target area with incendiaries undershooting as usual. Large explosions at 2231 & 2239hrs. Main force a/c arrived in [symbol] area as much as 20 mins early doubling the time of the attack & allowing night fighters to get organised.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[list by Groups, of aircraft missing]
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127
[underlined] TARGET: MUNICH. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Harwich – 5125N 0230E – 4950N 0310E – 4826N 0745E – 4128N 1052E – 4800N 1120E – MUNICH – 4810N 1151E – 4945N 1280E – 4808N 0733E – Cayeux – Beachy Head – Base.
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128
[underlined] 3RD OCTOBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] KASSEL.
139 Squadron. HANNOVER.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 467 Heavies + 87 P.F.F. Spoof. HANNOVER. 10 Mosquitoes.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2115hrs. [underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] Z-25.h.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+23.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
Nil cloud. Ground visibility. Although flares illuminated town, many of the Yellow T.Is seemed to fall to the E. No red T.Is were seen dropped. Green T.Is seemed reasonably well concentrated. Ground fires were started with much of the effort falling short as usual and as a consequence it is anticipated that the Henschel works will have been well attacked. One very large explosion seen by some crews when about 100mls. from the target at about 2200hrs. The spoof attack on Hannover very successful as lanes of N/F flares laid across town & S/Ls in Ruhr area seemed to [indecipherable word] a/c in Hannover direction.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Timing of all marker crews were good the attack opening shortly before the scheduled time & the A/P marking was maintained. General tendency of B/Markers was to undershoot & the spread of PFF was roughly from the A/P to 2 1/2m ESE. Main force do not appear to have followed P.F.F. & although great destruction was caused in the town there was a bad scatter N. P.I.U. showed fires burning the next day.
[list by Groups, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
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129
[underlined] TARGET: KASSEL [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE:- Base – Cromer – 5320N 0400E – N. tip of TEXEL – 5228N 0910E – 5147N 0340E – KASSEL – 5112N 0938E – 5030N 0720E – 5018N 0132E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
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130
[underlined] 4TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target:[/underlined] FRANKFURT A/MAIN. [underlined] SPOOF [/underlined] LUDWIGSHAVEN: Area II. STUTTGART.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C required: [/underlined] Area I.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 361 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5, & 6 Groups + 67 P.F.F. Spoof: 50 Heavies of 1 Group + 12 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2130hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+18. Spoof. Z-9 to Z-7.
[underlined] Summary. FRANKFURT. [/underlined]
Nil cloud, good visibility. T.I. Yellow seemed reasonably well concentrated. 3 red T.I’s fell in target area well concentrated – covered area about 1ml. square. 1 Red T.I. dropped about 3-4 mls. South – Did not attract attack – did not seem to be decoy. Green T.I’s backed up well. Many fires burning some good. Generally not very concentrated. Incendiaries a little more concentrated than usual. One large red explosion at 2137hrs.
[underlined] LUDWIGSHAVEN. [/underlined]
Nil cloud – slight haze. Reds occupied triangular area about 2ml. sides: greens about same area – fires starting up – results seem good for general number detailed.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] The results of the Spoof [symbol] were very bad due mainly to bad manipulation. There is however evidence of some marking on the A/P, although most of the attack probably missed the mark. A considerable amount of bombing
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131
[underlined] TARGET: FRANKFURT & LUDWIGSHAVEN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Reading – Beachy Head – 5020N 0135E – 4934N 0752E – Frankfurt – 5016N 0845E -5020N 0135E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
Spoof: As above – 4934N 0752E – LUDWIGSHAVEN – 5010N 0900E – 5 [indecipherable digits] N 0845E – [indecipherable word]
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132
[underlined] 5TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] GELSENKIRCHEN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Parraamatta. [sic]
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] 156 squadron Supporters only. Stand down requested.
[underlined] 6TH OCTOBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRANKFURT-AM-MAIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 156 squadron. 6 B/M. 2 V/M. 9 B/Up. 4 Supporters.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2130hrs.
[underlined] 1650hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 7TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] STUTTGART.
[underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] FRIEDRICHSHAVEN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0005hrs.
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133
Mosquitoes will also carry out attacks on MUNICH & AACHEN.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
262 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 and 6 Groups + 66 P.F.F. 16 P.F.F. on Friedrichshaven.
[underlined] Route. STUTTGART. [/underlined]
Base – Reading – Beachy Head – 5004N 0122E – 4822N 0542E – 4800N 0750E – STUTTGART – 4852N 0920E – 4840N 0500E – 5004N 0122E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
[underlined] FRIERICHSHAVEN. [/underlined]
Base – Reading – Beachy Head – 5004N 0122E – 4822N 0542E – 4800N 0750E – 4800N 0900E – [symbol] – 4851N 0828E – 4840N 0500E – 5004N 0122E – B. Head – Reading – Base.
[underlined] SUMMARY. STUTTGART [/underlined]
10/10ths cloud. T.I’s visible through cloud. The first Yellows fell on time followed by a further batch some 6-10mls. to the N.E. These followed the marker for 2 separate attacks, both concentrations being backed up by T.I.G. There are no reports of T.Is being dropped outside either of these concentrations. Some a/c dropped sky-markers in preference to T.I’s but generally these were so scattered that they could not be aimed at. Two crews report seeing Red T.Is but in view of cloud conditions it was impossible to identify them with certainty. Glow of good fires was seen above both concentrations & from one particularly large fire in the Northern area smoke was rising above cloud level.
[underlined] FRIERICHSHAVEN. [/underlined] 10/10ths cloud. 1st red T.I’s dropped on time & were seen as a glow above cloud. Only one captain (Q.) was able to make any definite report as to concentration, which he described as good by both Greens & Reds. Two crews report greenish-blue explosion at 0001hrs.
[underlined] RESULTS. PFF [/underlined] The weather was not very suitable for ground-marking and this resulted resulted [sic] in a certain amount of confusion amongst the B/Markers, some of whom dropped their T.I.Y. while others correctly resorted to emergency Wanganui & dropped release point lanes. The result seems to have been 2 separate concentrations about 5-6ms apart on track. No PRU results are so far to hand.
[list by Groups, of aircraft missing]
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134
[underlined] TARGETS: STUTTGART + FRIEDRICHSAVEN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.] [missing information]
[page break]
135
[underlined] 8TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] HANNOVER. 139. BERLIN & MANNEHEIM & AACHEN. 105 & 109. KÖLN.
[underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] BREMEN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
391 Heavies + 25 mediums of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 79 PFF. on HANNOVER. 100 Stirlings + 25 PFF on Bremen. 8 Mosquitoes of 139 on Berlin.
[underlined] Zero hours. [/underlined] HANNOVER. 0130hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+ 20. BREMEN. 0115hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+ BERLIN. 0120hrs.
[underlined] Summary: [/underlined] HANNOVER.
Nil cloud – good vis: Markers of all types were put down well and are reported by all crews as being accurate. Early arrivals reported a few reds backed up by one load of Greens about 3m. N. of [symbol], but these were fortunately ignored. At 0140hrs a few reds were also reported well to the W. of the concentrations but by this time fires were burning very well over the entire area of the centre of the town. One large explosion reported at 0142hrs.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined] HANNOVER. [underlined] BREMEN. [/underlined]
[list by Groups, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
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136
[underlined] TARGETS: HANNOVER & BREMEN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Routes: Base – 5320N 0350E – N. tip of Texel – 5225N 0800 – 5240N 0948E – HANNOVER – 5156N 0918E – [missing information]
[page break]
137
[underlined] 9TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
No operations for heavies. 6 Mosquitoes on BERLIN. [deleted] 4 Mosquitoes on COLOGNE. 4 Mosquitoes on DUISBERG. [/deleted]
[underlined] 10TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 11TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 12TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 13TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
8 Group: 4 Mosquitoes COLOGNE. 4 Mosquitoes DUISBERG. MAKE AND MEND ALL OTHER SQUADRONS.
[page break]
138
[underlined] 14TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 15TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 16TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
8 Group. 9 Mosquitoes on DORTMUND. 91 Group. 4 Whitleys – Leaflets. 92 Group. 4 Wellingtons – Leaflets. MAKE AND MEND ALL OTHER SQUADRONS.
[underlined] 17TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
8 Group. 6 Mosquitoes on BERLIN. 3 Mosquitoes on AACHEN. 1 Group. 12 Wellingtons mine-laying. 3 Group. 32 Stirlings mine-laying. 6 Group. 5 Wellingtons mine-laying. 91 Group. 2 Whitleys – Leaflets. 93 Group. 7 Wellingtons – Leaflets. 1 Whitley – Leaflets.
[page break]
139
[underlined] 18TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Area I HANNOVER. Area II. GELSENKIRCHEN. 139. BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: Area I. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
293 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 64 P.F.F. 8 Mosquitoes of 139 squadron on BERLIN.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2015hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+14.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
9/10ths cloud, tops 15/17000ft. 4 crews reported Red T.I’s dropped at 2011hrs & 2016hrs, but the majority of crews bombed either the glow of Green T.I’s on the glow on cloud in the area where T.I Yellow & Green had been seen cascading. One visual marker (‘X’ S/L Manifold) came below cloud and bombed the centre of two cluster of greens approx: 2mls apart. Only one crew reported seeing a sky-marker at 2014hrs. Incendiaries scattered over a wide area. One very large explosion at approx.: 2015hrs.
[underlined] results. [/underlined]
[list by Groups, of aircraft numbers involved and missing]
[page break]
140
[underlined] TARGET: HANNOVER. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route: [/underlined] Base – Cromer – 5320N 0350E – N. end of Texel – 5240N 0948E – HANNOVER – 5155N 0920E – 5233N 0436E – 5245N 0330E – Southwold – Base.
[underlined] V/M. [/underlined] After N. end of Texel – 5225N 0820E – 5255N 0835E – 5246N 0849E – 5240N 0948E for route-marking to aid Mosquitoes on Berlin.
[underlined] 19TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] AUGSBURG. [underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] MUNICH
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 3 B/M. 2 V/M. 6 B/Up. 8 Supporters. MUNICH 2 B/M.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 497 Heavies + 83 P.F.F. on Augsburg. 15 Heavies of 1 group + 26 PFF on Munich.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2200hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+18. MUNICH. Z-13. [missing information]
[page break]
141
[underlined] 20TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Area I. LEIPZIG. Area II STETTIN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
83 squadron to operate from Warboys.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 281 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 72 P.F.F. on LEIPZIG. 10 Mosquitoes of 139 squadron on BERLIN.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2100hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+11.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 8/10 – 10/10ths cloud. Yellow & Green T.I’s were seen by most crews generally very scattered. The attack seems to have concentrated over an area of at least 100 square miles. Some fires were seen – unable to say in what part of HUNLAND!
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] The attack was completely spoiled by bad weather especially that encountered en-route. Many a/c were iced up & lost their A.S.I.s & other instruments. Also owing to external ice the special equipment went u/s on several a/c & only 3 a/c (R. P/O Slaper & X. S/L Manifold/156) dropped emergency Wanganui flares. A few a/c dropped Yellow T.I & these were widely scattered. Like P.F.F the main force found the weather too much for them with the result that no concentration at all was achieved. The Germans have admitted some damage in Leipzig but there is no reason to suppose that this was anything but the incidental damage which is inevitable in a big raid.
[underlined] Losses. [/underlined] [deleted] KASSEL. [/deleted]
[list by Group, of aircraft losses]
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142
[underlined] TARGET: LEIPZIG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Cromer – 5320N 0350E – N. end of TEXEL – 5253N 0740E – 5236N 1152E – 5202N 1242E – LEIPZIG – 5106N 1211E – 5253N 0740E – N. end of TEXEL – 5320N 0350E – Cromer – Base.
[underlined] 21ST OCTOBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND for all Heavy Squadrons.
8 Group. 1 Mosquito DORTMUND. 3 Mosquitoes BUDERICH (NW. Dusseldorf.) 1 Mosquito AACHEN. 3 Mosquitoes EMDEN
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143
[underlined] 22ND OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] KASSEL..
[underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] FRANKFURT AM MAIN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 474 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 79 P.F.F. on KASSEL. 36 P.F.F. on FRANKFURT.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2055hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+16. Z-25 to Z-16 on FRANKFURT.
[underlined] Summary. KASSEL. [/underlined]
Nil cloud. Good vis: apart from one load of Yellow T.I’s which fell at 2044hrs 5 mins early – the Yellows were accurate and well placed. At least 3 loads of T.I. Red were dropped accurately placed & well concentrated. Green T.I’s backing up very well. Crews on Frankfurt attack on passing Kassel reported very good fires burning. Large explosion seen about 2100hrs. Crews consider a good raid.
[underlined] FRANKFURT. [/underlined] Nil cloud. First Red T.I. fell about 2 mins: early. Red T.I’s intended to scatter over town area. Green T.I’s generally West not good concentration.
[underlined] Results. P.F.F. [/underlined] Technically this was probably the best attack P.F.F. has ever carried out, certainly the best Newhaven against a defended German target. The illuminating and blind-marking was excellently done with a slight tendency to overshoot. All nine visual markers identified the A/P – of the 8 who dropped T.I’s 6 [indecipherable word] so far plotted all within 1ml. of the A/P. The B/Up were nearly as accurate, & there was a good crop of supporter photographs on and around the A/P.
[list by Groups, aircraft types, numbers involved, roles and aircraft missing] [missing information]
[page break]
144
[underlined] TARGET: KASSEL & FRANKFURT. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
145
[underlined] 23RD OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
All heavy squadrons MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 24TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
All heavy squadrons stood down.
2 a/c required for BULLSEYE. ‘P’ F/L Stannard. ‘F’ Sgt. Turner.
[underlined] 1620hrs. [/underlined] Bullseye cancelled.
[underlined] 25TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND for all heavies.
[underlined] 26TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND for all heavy squadrons.
FIDO Demonstration at Graveley.
[underlined] 27TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
35 Squadron on LEVERKUSEN – Scrubbed later.
All other heavies stood down.
[page break]
146
[underlined] 28TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavy squadrons.
[underlined] 29TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavy squadrons.
[underlined] 30TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target.: [/underlined] LUDWIGSHAVEN. 35 on Leverkusen.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 8 B/M – 2 V/M. 6 B/U. 4 Supporters.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2015hrs.
[underlined] 1613hrs. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[underlined] 31ST OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
All heavies stood down.
[underlined] 1ST NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavy squadrons.
[underlined] 2ND NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all squadrons.
[page break]
147
[underlined] 3RD NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] DUSSELDORF.
[underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] COLOGNE.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
DUSSELDORF. [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
COLOGNE. [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Musical Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] Paramatta.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 1945hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-3 to Z+20. [underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] Z-10 to Z-1.
Serrate will be on – Mosquitoes and Beaufighters.
[underlined] SUMMARY. DUSSELDORF. [/underlined]
Nil cloud – good vis: apart from slight haze. The first reds T.I’s & sky markers fell about one minute late. After the first red T.I. had fallen at 1944hrs there was a lapse of about 10 minutes before further reds were dropped. Subsequently concentration of markers appeared to be good and fires in compact area were taking a good hold as the later crews left the target.
[underlined] KÖLN [/underlined] Nil cloud. Considerable haze. Red T.I’s were dropped five minutes early while N/156 was covered by S/Ls. Subsequent Reds fell in line N to S. about 8/10mls in length. Greens were well concentrated around the S. concentration which it is feared may have been BONN.
[underlined] Last Resort. OVERHIT area. [/underlined] T/156. Primary not attacked as first Red T.I’s were dropped early & were ignored by a/c which continued on track for 8 minutes before turning back. After [deleted] about [/deleted] 2 minutes it was decided to drop bombs as otherwise a/c would have
[page break]
148
[underlined] TARGET: DUSSELDORF & COLOGNE. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
1 a/c BONN area – L/156 – Last resort.
Primary not attacked for similar reasons to T/156.
[page break]
149
[underlined] RESULTS: [/underlined]
[underlined] DUSSELDORF. [/underlined]
P.F.F. 8 Group. [list of aircraft type, numbers involved and missing]
[list by Groups, of aircraft type, numbers involved and missing]
[underlined] KÖLN [/underlined]
P.F.F. 8 Group. [list of aircraft type, numbers involved and missing]
[underlined] 4TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
Make & Mend.
[underlined] 5TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] 6TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
Mosquitoes on BOCHUM, DUISBERG, DUSSELDORF.
‘K’ W/C WHITE ‘X’ S/L MANIFOLD Hooded flare demonstration at RUSHFORD.
[page break]
150
[underlined] 7TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] AUGSBURG.
[underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] MUNICH.
[underlined] A/C required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 524 heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 70 PFF. on AUGSBURG. 15 Heavies of 1 Group + 41 PFF.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] AUGSBURG – Newhaven. MUNICH – Parramatta.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0300hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+16.
Serrate will be on – Mosquitoes & Beaufighters. Mosquitoes also operating North & South of Augsburg against Night fighters.
[underlined] Briefing [/underlined] 1700hrs.
[underlined] 2120hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED. 10/10ths cloud over the target.
‘BULLSEYE’ ‘N’ F/O DOCHERTY.
[page break]
151
[underlined] 8TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] AUGSBURG.
[underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] MUNICH.
[underlined] A/C required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 339 Heavies + 72 P.F.F on AUGSBURG. 15 Heavies + 42 P.F.F on MUNICH.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] AUGSBURG – Newhaven. MUNICH – Paramatta.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 03015hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] AUGSBURG. Z-6 to Z+!2. MUNICH. Z-12 to Z.
12 Beaufighters operating in the Bomber stream. 12 Mosquitoes intruding.
[underlined] 2205hrs. [/underlined] OPERATION CANCELLED.
[underlined] 9TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRIEDRICHSHAVEN.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
152
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 312 Lancasters + 90 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0400hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+12.
[underlined] A/P [/underlined] The main shed of the old Zeppelin works. Possibility of diversions.
[underlined] 1700hrs. [/underlined] MAIN OPERATION cancelled.
[underlined] 10TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] KÖNIGSBERG.
[underlined] Alternative: [/underlined] DANZIG.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 8 B/M. 2 V/M. 3 B/Up. 8 Supporters.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2100hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+10.
[underlined] Briefing [/underlined] 1330hrs.
[underlined] 1345hrs [/underlined] Area I & II both cancelled. [underlined] Target: [/underlined] MODANE.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 240 Heavies of 1 & 5 Groups + 75 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0300hrs. . [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-7 to Z+12.
[underlined] 1645hrs. [/underlined] Zero hour changed to 0100hrs.
[underlined] 1730hrs. [/underlined] Briefing.
[page break]
153
[underlined] TARGET: - MODANE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Base – Reading – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – 4735N 0045E – 4512N 0542E – MODANE – 4735N 0120E – Cabourg – Selsey Bill – Reading – Base.
[page break]
154
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Nil cloud – slight haze in the valley. First red T.I dropped at approx.: 0057hrs. on or near the A/P. Further reds slightly overshot & a few fell on the mountain side, one very early in the attack – main concentration then formed near bend in river by eastern marshalling yard, greens falling mostly in this area with the exception of one which fell 1-2mls. South. Our visual markers arrived late over the target having been misled by river in valley S. of MODANE. One arrived in time to identify visually, later smoke filled the valley. Some incendiaries overshot to the North.
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] The marking of the target was excellent – timing however was bad & most a/c arrived late. It was intended that the first visual markers should endeavour to visually mark the A/P by moonlight only & if necessary the 2nd lot of visuals should identify by the light of flares dropped by B/Markers.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
The raid was no doubt a great success from every point of view. A large number of plotted photographs show that the largest part of the attack fell exactly where it was intended. Crews reported fires and a number of explosions of varying sizes & some crews are of the opinion that an ammunition train blew up. There is no doubt that full photographic cover of the area will show extensive damage to the marshalling yards & tunnel entrance. The far reaching results of this excellent raid will be felt & much appreciated by the allied armies fighting in Italy.
No a/c were missing from Command.
[underlined] 11TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRIEDRICHSHAVEN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 7 B/M. 3 V/M. 4 B/Up. 7 Supporters.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2230hrs.
[underlined] 1825hrs. [/underlined] MAIN OPERATION CANCELLED.
[underlined] CANNES. [/underlined] attacked by 4 & 6 Group + 35 & 97 squadrons. 4 a/c missing ANTWERP viaduct attacked by 10 Lancs. of 617 squadron.
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155
[underlined] 12TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[underlined] 13TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[underlined] 14TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[underlined] 15TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[underlined] 16TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target:[/underlined] AREA I. LUDWIGSHAVEN. AREA II. LEVERKUSEN. SPOOF FRANKFURT.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] Area I. Now Leverkusen. 2 B/Up. 6 supporters. Area II. Ludwigshaven. 7 B/M. 1 V/M. 5 B/Up. 6 Supporters. Frankfurt. 3 B/M.
[underlined] Zero hours. [/underlined] Area I. 2000hrs. Area II. 2020hrs. Spoof 2010-12hrs
[underlined] Methods. [/underlined] Area I. Paramatta, Area II. Newhaven.
[missing timing] OPERATIONS cancelled.
[page break]
156
[underlined] 17TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940hrs. [/underlined] All heavies MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 1210hrs.[/underlined] 156 required for target MANNHEIM ‘B’.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list of 156 squadron ‘Y’ aircraft numbers involved]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 70 + P.F.F.
[underlined] Method.. [/underlined] Blind-bombing by means of ‘Y’.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs.
[underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] Mosquitoes of 139 squadron will carry out a spoof attack on BONN. at 1935hrs.
[underlined] TARGET: MANNHEIM. ‘B’ [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: base – reading – Beachy Head – 5010N [missing information]
[page break]
157
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Varying amounts of cloud 7/10ths to nil. The majority of the attack covered an area about 2-2mls. across but some reports show a wide scatter by a few a/c. At about 2007hrs a large explosion resulted in a large fire. Some other fires reported at 2005hrs approximately one red T.I seen dropped about NNW of the target. This was seen by nearly all crews but there are conflicting opinions as to whether dummy or not. Bombing was much hampered by moisture freezing on inside of Perspex. One a/c attacked SCHIFFERSTADT mistaking it for MANNHEIM.
[underlined] 18TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGETS: [/underlined] BERLIN. MANNHEIM.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] BERLIN. Lancasters.
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
Halifaxes [sic] & some Lancasters on MANNHEIM.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] PARAMATTA.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2100hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+12.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 379 Heavies of 1, 3, 5, & 6 Groups + 70 P.F.F.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] A number of crews experienced difficulty with special equipment in identifying Brandenburg, and therefore the Red T.I’s were scattered, and were dropped over a rather longer period of time than briefed. Green T.I’s were difficult to see owing to cloud but were more concentrated than the Red. While thick cloud made observation of results difficult later crews reported seeing glows of fires on cloud. At approximately 2112hrs a large explosion. Spoof fighter flares were considered inaccurate – some crews reporting them having been dropped on the route out of the [symbol]. Apparently only 2 or 3 skymarkers were released.
[page break]
158
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Naisboro’ – 5310N 0400E – 5240N 0900E – 5225N 1235E – BERLIN – 5233N 1350E – 5212N 1350E – 5100N 0930E – 5030N 0720E – CAYEUX – Beachy Head – Base.
Two Cuckoos landed Warboys. W/C Adams. 49 squadron 5 Group. Sgt Shearer. 101 squadron 1 Group.
[underlined] Results. BERLIN. [/underlined] 450 a/c detailed [underlined] MANNHEIM. [/underlined] 401 a/c detailed. [missing information]
[page break]
159
[underlined] 19TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
156 squadron stood down.
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] LEVERKUSEN. 3, 4 & 6 Groups. 10 Mosquitoes + 6 Halifaxes from P.F.F.
[underlined] Results: [/underlined] 5 a/c missing of 267 a/c.
[underlined] 20TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 21ST NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND
[underlined] 22ND NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Sky-marking & Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required [/underlined] [list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 612 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 121 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+20.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 10/10ths cloud tops 10/12,000ft – layers to 20,000ft. First skymarkers were dropped punctually & thereafter fell in unbroken succession throughout attack forming two clusters about 4mls. apart N & S. Some Red & Green T.I’s were seen cascading but quickly disappeared into cloud. A few crews reported seeing Red & Yellows dropped together. Good fires were started which were visible for at least 100mls. many crews reported an unusually large explosion at 2022hrs.
[page break]
160
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base. Cromer. – 5310N 0400E – 5240N 0900E – 5236N 1221E – BERLIN – 5225N 1350E -5200N 1350E – 5223N 1200E – 5240N 0900E – 5310N 0400E – CROMER. BASE.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] [list by Groups of aircraft types and numbers missing]
P.F.F. – “The squeals of the enemy point to a most highly successful attack”.
[page break]
161
[underlined] 23RD NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Paramatta.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 329 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 90 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+15.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 9/10ths cloud. All crews report good concentration with skymarkers in a line approx.: N & S. about 1 ml. in length – one isolated about 4m. N.E. Glow of fires over whole area & smoke seen coming through cloud.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined] German Communiqué – 1300hrs. 24.11.43. On the evening of 23 November the Reich capital was again attacked by strong British formations. This terror raid caused more damage in several districts. In addition to residential districts, numerous public buildings, including churches, welfare institutions & cultural monuments were destroyed. Fighter formations & A.A of the Luftwaffe in spite of difficult conditions for defence shot down 19 E/A.
[list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
P.F.F. [list of aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
[page break]
162
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Cromer – 5310N 0400E – 5240N 0900E – 5236N 1221E – BERLIN – 5225N 1350E – 5200N 1350E – 5223N 1200E – 5240N 0900E – 5310N 0400E – Cromer – Base.
[page break]
163
[underlined] 24TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[deleted] Target: [/deleted] MAKE & MEND ALL HEAVIES
[underlined] 25TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] LANCASTERS – BERLIN. HALIFAXES – FRANKFURT.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 2 Primary B/Markers. 4 Sec: B/Markers. 6 Supporters.
[underlined] FRANKFURT. [/underlined] [list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] BERLIN. 2115hrs. FRANKFURT 2000hrs.
[underlined] Z1340hrs. [/underlined] Zero hours changed Berlin – 1345hrs Frankfurt – 0230hrs.
[underlined] 1450hrs. [/underlined] Zero hours changed again BERLIN – 0400hrs. FRANKFURT – 0245hrs. T.O.T. Z-5 to Z+10.
[underlined] 2230hrs. [/underlined] BERLIN cancelled – Supporters transferred to Frankfurt.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] NEWHAVEN
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] [deleted] 426 [/deleted] [inserted] 215 [/inserted] Heavies + 33 P.F.F.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] Apparently winds were much stronger than given in Met. Forecast. This combined with conditions of 9-10/10ths cloud varying from 19/15,000ft has obviously resulted in a scattered attack. Most crews report seeing Red T.I’s going quickly into cloud, but it is thought that these are just as likely to have been sky-markers in their initial stages as any attempt on the part of the Hun to simulate T.I. Red. One crew reports being able to see below cloud on return and to have seen fairly good fires burning. Many crews report a large fire burning in France – believed to be Lille.
[page break]
164
[underlined] TARGET: FRANKFURT. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: BASE – Reading – Beachy Head – 5020N 0130E 5015N 0800E – FRANKFURT – 5000N 0100E – 4945N 0900E – 5020N 0130E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
[underlined] RESULTS & SUCCESS.. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. Analysis. [/underlined] It is inevitable that an attack carried out under unexpected cloud conditions such as those over Frankfurt must spread very badly. Many main force were reduced to bombing on what markers they could see before they disappeared into cloud.
P.F.F. [list of aircraft type, numbers involved and missing] [list by Groups, of aircraft type, numbers involved and missing]
[page break]
165
[underlined] 26TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Targets: [/underlined] BERLIN. STUTTGART.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] STUTTGART. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] BERLIN – Paramatta. STUTTGART – Newhaven.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] BERLIN – 384 Heavies + 74 P.F.F. STUTTGART – 170 Heavies + 31 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hours: [/underlined] BERLIN. 2115hrs [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+12. STUTTGART. 2030hrs [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+8.
[underlined] SUMMARIES. BERLIN. [/underlined]
Large break occurred in cloud over [symbol]. One salvo of Red & Yellow T.I’s seen at 2113hrs and although small clusters of T.I. Red fell to the N.W. & to the S.E. the main backing up appears to have concentrated [indecipherable word] the T.I. Red & yellow. Later in the attack incendiaries seemed to be undershooting but fires were burning in the centre of the city.
[underlined] STUTTGART. [/underlined]
8-9/10ths thin cloud tops 8,000ft. Sky-markers & T.I. Yellow were dropped on time and also some T.I. Red were seen cascading. There was a concentration of T.I. Yellow & T.I. Green covering a fairly wide area. Good fires were seen burning through cloud. Few signs of night fighters over the [symbol] but great activity of all sorts – flak, S/Ls & many fighter flares around Frankfurt.
[underlined] ROUTE – BERLIN.[/underlined]
BASE – READING – BEACHY HEAD – 5020N 0130E – 5020N 0910E – 5215N 1210E – BERLIN – 5240N 1350E – [missing information]
[page break]
166
[underlined] TARGETS: BERLIN AND STUTTGART. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.] [missing information]
[page break]
167
[underlined] 26TH NOVEMBER 1943 (cont:) [/underlined]
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. Analysis. [/underlined] The only Special B/Markers to bomb dropped his T.I’s 8mls. N.W. of the A/P. These T.I’s attracted a considerable proportion of backing up and bombing, but luckily the attack appeared to have spread mostly to the SE of this position under the influence of normal ‘Y’ a/c. The centre of the area marked by B/Markers appears to have been about 5mls. W. of the A/P. Considerable damage has clearly been caused in the area to the North & West of the Tiergarten.
[underlined] BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
[underlined] STUTTGART. [/underlined]
[list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
[underlined] 27TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
ALL HEAVIES MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
168
[underlined] 28TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
All Heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 29TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
All Heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 30TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MUNICH
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] BERLIN.
[list of 156 squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2015hrs.
[underlined] 1551hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 1ST DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] LEIPZIG.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 6 Primary B/M. 5 Sec: B/M. 2 V/M. 3 B/U. 5 Supporters.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs.
[underlined] 2233hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[page break]
169
[underlined] 2ND DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 543 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 107 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs. altered later to 2006hrs.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Paramatta.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
5/10ths cloud tops 5,000ft. First Red T.I’s were apparently dropped at 2004hrs. and owing to different cloud cover conditions varying reports have been submitted by crews some not seeing T.I’s. Opinions generally seems to be that Markers were scattered along a line running approximately 3m. N-S with concentrations at extremities. From Special equipment observations it seems that the Southern concentration was probably in the centre of the city. Last [deleted] er [/deleted] B/Up on confirm that the fires confirmed with there [sic] impressions. Several crews reported dense clouds of smoke rising.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Plotted photographs cannot show a complete picture due to the cloud cover but it is probable that the greatest part of the raid was dropped in the S.E outskirts of Berlin.
[list by Groups, of aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing] [missing information]
[page break]
170
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: - BASE – HAISBORO’ – 5250N 0330E – 5235N 0440E – 5238N 1004E – 5236N 1220E – BERLIN – 5230N 1350E – 5255N 1350E – 5238N 1004E – 5235N 0440E – 5250N 0330E – HAISBORO’ – BASE.
[page break]
171
[underlined] 3RD DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Area I. LEIPZIG. Area II. BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 465 Heavies + 106 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0400hrs.
Mosquitoes of 627 and 139 squadrons will carry on from 5225N 1225E to BERLIN following a Spoof attack.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
10/10ths thin cloud – tops above 6,000ft. First T.I’s and sky-markers fell about 3 minutes early. A good concentration of T.I. Red developed and, according to experienced crews the best concentration of sky markers yet achieved. There was a slight overshoot of one T.I. Red to the South. T.I. Green backed up well though a few followed the overshoot. However in its later stages the concentration seemed to tighten up. Several explosions were seen, one large one at 0403hrs approximately – glow of many fires was seen & black smoke rising through cloud. Fighter flares seen on the way in. Out from the target route markers S. of Koblenz were very scattered some being dropped N. of Frankfurt. It seems that the HUN is becoming familiar with this route into the target and that night fighters wait near Hannover for routemarkers then follow the Bomber stream.
[underlined] Success. & Results. [/underlined]
Daylight cover confirms the success of the attack. The W. area of the city was covered by smoke rising to a great height & in the E. half of the target area upwards of 20 good fires were still burning furiously.
[page break]
172
[underlined] TARGET: LEIPZIG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: BASE – HAISBORO’ – 5250N 0330E – 5235N 0435E – 5240N 0810E – 5225N 1222E – LEIPZIG – 5105N 1205E – 5015N 0740E – 5010N 0130E – BEACHY HEAD – READING – BASE.
[list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing] [missing information]
[page break]
173
[underlined] 4TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
All heavies MAKE & MEND.
8 Group, 9 Mos: FLAMBURG. 5 Primary. 1, 3, & 4 Groups mine-laying.
[underlined] 5TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 6TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 7TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND. SECURITY FILMS SHOWN.
[underlined] 8TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 9TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
174
[underlined] 10TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 11TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 12TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 13TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 14TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 15TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
175
[underlined] 16TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 400 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 91 P.F.F. + 15 Mosquitoes.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Wanganui & Paramatta.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 10/10ths thick cloud about 7,000ft. First red T.I’s & Sky-markers dropped early at 1956hrs. Early in the attack concentration of sky markers appeared to be fairly good, but in the later stages more ragged, stretching across the [symbol] from E – W. From H2S observations it would appear that the main weight of the attack fell on the centre of the city. Thick cloud prevented observation of T.I’s on the ground except as a vague glow. Many crews reported dummy Red T.I’s several miles to the N & NE of the target. Numerous fighter flares were seen from the Dutch coast to beyond the [symbol]. ‘Spoof’ fighter flares were seen being dropped & 2 crews report seeing fighters heading for them. Fighters were also reported as crossing the Dutch coast to the first turning point at sea to meet the a/c.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[list by Groups, of aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing
Visibility on return was extremely bad and a number of a/c crashed on landing.
[deleted] 19.12.43 [/deleted]
[page break]
176
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – 5250N 0330E – 5235N 0440E – 5238N 1005E – 5238N 1220E – BERLIN – 5243N 1400E – 5455N 1143E – 5525N 0938E – 5523N 0825E – 5510N 0700E – Base.
[page break]
177
[underlined] 17TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 18TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 19TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
One crew of 5 Group – mission 16/17-12-43 reported picked up by launches looking for ‘W’ F/L Aubert.
[underlined] 20TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRANKFURT.[underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] MANNHEIM.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[underlined] FRANKFURT. [/underlined] [list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 600 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5, & 6 Groups + 93 P.F.F. on Frankfurt. 27 Heavies P.F.F. + 30 Heavies of 1 Group on Mannheim.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] FRANKFURT 1935 MANNHEIM 1925.
Intruders operating.
[page break]
178
[underlined] TARGETS: FRANKFURT AND MANNHEIM. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE. Base – Southwold – 5130N 0440E – 5032N 0510E – 5015N 0730E – FRANKFURT/MANNHEIM – (5005N 0905E 4930N 0902E) 5030N 0900E – 5032N 0510E – 5130N 0440E 5215N 0300E – Southwold – Base.
[page break]
179
[underlined] 20TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined] (CONT:)
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] FRANKFURT.
6-9/10ths strato cm. with large breaks. First T.I. Yellows dropped on time. Some crews report they dropped early and one fell short over Wiesbaden. One of our supporters bombed these. T.I. Yellows then formed a rather scattered line E – W across the target. Backers up on later in the attack reported a circular concentration of T.I. Yellow with T.I. Red falling NW at approx: 1932hrs & others up to 10m. NE. T.I. Green were dropped approx: in the centre of the Yellows. Fires were very scattered following 2 concentrations but burning well. Large explosion 1947hrs.
[underlined] MANNHEIM. [/underlined]
2-3/10ths cloud. Red T.I’s dropped very accurately & well backed up by Greens. From visual identification crews report that Reds fell between marshalling yards & Rhine. Good fires started.
[underlined] P.F.F. RESULTS. [/underlined] FRANKFURT.
The timing of the B/Markers was very good. Owing to cloud conditions no visual markers were able to identify the A/P. backers up had great difficulty in selecting the centre of T.I. Yellow as these were confused with the flames. The flares drifted rapidly Eastwards & tended to produce an overshoot & considerable scatter. Plotted photographs stretch from the A/P up to 5m. E & SE.
[underlined] MANNHEIM. [/underlined] Little of the attack can have fallen in Ludwigshaven but it is probable that some damage was caused to parts of MANNHEIM. Photographs show 3-8mls. overshoot .
P.F.F. 3 missing. Command 42 a/c.
[underlined] 21ST DECEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
180
[underlined] 22ND DECEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 23RD DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 353 Heavies 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 90 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Paramatta.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2045hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+12.
Mosquitoes Spoof on Leipzig – Fighter flares on Berlin & Routemarking.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] put back to 0400hrs.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] Attack opened on time the first reds being seen at 0357.5hrs. Red T.I’s visible as a glow on cloud well concentrated. At 0407hrs 11 skymarkers seen over [symbol]. One Green fell to E of main concentration. Dummy reds seen to N.W. From H2S observations it would appear that the attack began well on the A/P with a tendency to spread slightly to the E & SE. Several large explosions reported – one at 0410hrs.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
16 a/c missing.
[page break]
181
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – 5220N 0300E – 5030N 0608E – 5033N 0940E – 5050N 1227E – 5205N 1310E – [symbol] – 5302N 1327E – 5235N 0943E – 5240N 0300E – Southwold – Base.
[page break]
182
[underlined] 24TH DECEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE and MEND all Heavies.
CHRISTMAS EVE.
[hand drawing of holly] [underlined] 25TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET.[/underlined] BERLIN. Present from BUTCH.
[underlined] 1000hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED!!
[underlined] 26TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND
[underlined] 27TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[underlined] Message from A.O.C. [/underlined] All crews to fly today to blow the alchohol [sic] out of their lungs.
BATTLE CRUISER ‘SCHARNHORST’ sunk off NORWAY.
[underlined] 28TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[page break]
183
[underlined] 29TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 604 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 106 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+18.
[underlined] Spoof Attacks. [/underlined] Leipzig & Magdeburg. By Mosquitoes.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Wanganui and Paramatta.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 10/10ths cloud – tops 6/10,000ft. The first T.I’s & skymarkers were dropped punctually at 1958hrs or slightly before T.I’s disappeared quickly into cloud, but a good concentration of skymarkers was achieved in a line E to W. H2S observations appear to indicate that the concentration was slightly to the SE of the centre of the city. Two crews report seeing T.I. Red & skymarkers 20m. S. of Berlin at 1949hrs. There are few definite reports of fires burning as glow was difficult to distinguish from that of Red T.I’s. Fighter flares mostly seen between Dummer See [sic] & Leipzig.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Reports are consistent in reporting a reasonable concentration. The enemy has become remarkably reticent on the results of the recent raids on Berlin. All the evidence however seems to point to this raid being successful.
19 a/c missing.
[page break]
184
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Cromer – 5320N 0400E – 5230N 0820E – 5137N 1220E – [symbol] – 5302N 1327E – 5300N 1145E – 5245N 0830E – 5320N 0400E – Cromer – Base.
[page break]
185
[underlined] 30H DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 31ST DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRANKFURT.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 156 Squadron. 8 P.B/M. 2 V/M. 3 B.B/U. 2 V.B/U. 6 Supporters.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 508 a/c of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups. 110 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 1945hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+15.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed.
[underlined] 1459hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 1ST JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] WHITEBAIT.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 369 a/c of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 87 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0300hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+12.
[page break]
186
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: Base – Southwold – 5240N 0330E – 5238N 0438E – 5250N 0912E – 5236N 1220E – BERLIN – 5210N 1338N [sic] – 5050N 1210E – 5030N 0720E – 5030N 0135E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] First sky-markers dropped on time, T.I’s were invisible owing to cloud. Skymarkers fairly concentrated at the beginning, tending to scatter over a line about 4mls. N – S. No fires seen. Large explosion at 0306hrs.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[missing information] P.F.F. Success. Impossible to assess results [missing information]
[page break]
187
[underlined] 2ND JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 320 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 85 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0315hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+14.
Changed to 0245hrs owing to change of route.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
[blank]
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Practically impossible to assess success of raid but crews were more optimistic than on the previous nights raid in their reports. Main force groups report the concentration of release point flares as good.
8 Group 10 missing Command 18 missing
[page break]
188
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: Base – Southwold – 5245N 0330E – 5250N 0850E – 5325N 1240E – BERLIN – 5210N 1310E – 5150N 1030E – 5230N 0820E – 5245N 0330E – Southwold Base.
[page break]
189
[underlined] 3RD JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 4TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 5TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] STETTIN. [underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 325 Heavies 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 92 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven or Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0345hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+12.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Nil cloud, vis: good, haze nil, snow on ground, cloud bank crossed target. Short duration. Apart from one or two reports of Red & Green T.I’s being dropped early, particularly T.I. Green, the markers achieved a good concentration. White flares were considered unnecessary due to very good visibility & snow. The visual marker definitely identified the A/P. Red T.I’s were considered a little scattered with some falling on the islands on the E. side of the River Oder in the Freihafen area. Attack generally considered very concentrated & successful. One large explosion seen about 0409hrs.
[page break]
190
[underlined] TARGET: STETTIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE. BASE – 5600N 0600E – 5600N 1300E – 5405N 1323E – STETTIN – 5325N 1450E – 5500N 1505E – 5600N 1300E – 5600E [sic] 0600E – Base.
[underlined] RESULTS & SUCCESS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Doubtless a good attack – plotted night photographs & crews reports are most optimistic. Judging by plotted photographs from this group there seems to have been a slight spread to the west [missing words]
[page break]
191
[underlined] 6TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 7TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 8TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Z633.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 156 Squadron. 3 B.M.I. 1 V/M. 3 Supporters.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2030hrs.
[underlined] 1605hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 9TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 10TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
192
[underlined] 11TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 12TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 13TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 14TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BRUNSWICK.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 416 of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 93 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven. or Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 1915hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+12.
[page break]
193
[underlined] TARGET: BRUMSWICK. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: Base – Haisboro’ – 5305N 0400E – 5250N 0930E – BRUNSWICK – 5200N 1030E – 5230E [sic] 0820E – 5305N 0400E – Haisboro’ – Base.
[page break]
194
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
First markers. Green T.I’s & skymarkers R/Green stars were reported dropped at 1907.5hrs. The concentration was considered good at the commencement, stringing out in a line of attack 5/7 miles long subsequently. There appears to have been a gap of about 7 mins from approx: 1912 – 1919hrs in the skymarkers, with but an occasional Green T.I after 1912hrs. There is a suspicion that dummy T.I. Reds were dropped. One marker dropped T.I. Yellow over the target, together with T.I. Green & sky-markers at 1907hrs. No concrete results to report due to cloud & only small glow seen by crews on return journey, although last backer up reports good glow on cloud. Magdeburg ‘spoof’ considered too near. Many N/F flares over target in line of track in & particularly out. Concentration of N/F N & NE of Hannover.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
38 a/c missing.
[underlined] 15TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 16TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 17TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
195
[underlined] 18TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 19TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 20TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 659 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 112 P.F.F. & Mosquitoes.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 1935hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+18.
[underlined] SUMMARY [/underlined]
10/10ths cloud tops 8,000ft with small breaks. First skymarkers & T.I. Red were dropped on time. T.I.’s disappeared very quickly into cloud, & sky markers formed two concentrations, one big & one small, which were soon joined in a line about 2 – 3 miles long running approx.: parallel to track NW – SE. According to H2S checking the larger concentration was over the centre of the city, possibly a little to the E. There was a gap in the sky-marking of about 3 mins – 1944 – 1947hrs. Large explosion seen in S. part of [symbol]. 1942hrs.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Difficult to assess results owing to cloud.
[page break]
196
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: base – 5425N 0400E – 5245N 0800E – 5337N 1055E – 5328N 1240E – BERLIN – 5220N 1330E – 5138N 1220E – 5207N 0750E – 5338N 0532E – 5340N 0400E – Cromer – Base.
[page break]
197
[underlined] 21ST JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MAGDEBURG.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 560 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 117 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven or Wanganui if necessary.
[underlined] Zero. [/underlined] 2300hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+18. [underlined] Berlin [/underlined] 2253hrs.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
Thin layer cloud 8-8/10ths – clear to SE. Some crews report T.I. Red dropped with T.I. Green in fairly good concentration. The T.I. Red is reported short of target. Skymarkers were well concentrated and in general bombing good, although incendiaries reported well to S. of [symbol]. Fires burning well with smoke well up to 12,000ft. Glow of fires seen at coast on return. Large explosion at 2309hrs.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] 9 a/c missing. It is feared that the main weight of the raid fell to the East and S.E of the town, and little damage is likely in the town centre.
[underlined] Command. [/underlined] 54 a/c missing.
[page break]
198
[underlined] TARGET: MAGDEBURG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
199
[underlined] 22ND JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 23RD JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 24TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies make & mend.
[underlined] 25TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRANKFURT
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
156 Squadron. 3 B.M.I. I V/M. 4 B.B.U. 2 Vis: B/U. 9 Supporters.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 638 Heavies + 107 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method [/underlined] Newhaven – Emergency Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2050hrs.
Mosquitoes precede Main attack dropping Window. Other Mosquitoes to act as spoof markers on Stuttgart & Karlsruhe.
[underlined] 1635hrs. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[underlined] 2125hrs. [/underlined] N.T.U. a/c F/L [indecipherable word] crashed at Ramsey.
[page break}
200
[underlined] 26TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 27TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 422 Lancasters of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 84 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2030hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+12.
Mosquitoes drop Window from Dummer See to Berlin. Mosquitoes drop route-markers. Mosquitoes drop spoof fighter flares. 12 Mosquitoes attach AACHEN with T.I. Green & bombs.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] The attack opened on time & two of the early crews reported a good initial concentration of R/P flares. Later there was a spread in a line or crescent formation, variously reported at different times in the attack as being E – W and N – S and from 1/2 ml to as much as 8mls. in length. T.Is quickly disappeared in cloud. Glows of good fires was seen and some crews reported this as being visible for 100mls. after leaving the target. One crew reported a large fire 30m. S.W. of Berlin. Routemarker flares red steady were reported as accurately placed except at Pos: Q which was thought to be about 10mls. S. of track. Crews [missing information]
[page break]
201
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Cromer – 5345N 0430E – 5155N 1010E – 5237N 1158E – 5235N 1150E – BERLIN – 5215N 1350E – 5050N 1210E – 5030N 0735E – 5020N 0132E – Dungeness – Bradwell Bay – Base.
[page break]
202
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 1 a/c P.F.F. missing.
[underlined] P.F.F. Analysis. [/underlined] There is no evidence of the concentration achieved and crews’ reports vary considerably. It appears however that there was a considerable spread up and down wind as would be expected, and that the initial marking was rather spread but tended to become more concentrated later. Owing to complete lack of photographic evidence of all kinds it is impossible to give any accurate estimate of the success achieved. There is every reason to expect however that this raid has added further considerable damage to the already extensive devastation.
[underlined] 28TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 566 Heavies + 113 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0315hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+15.
Mosquitoes drop window & drop T.I. Red on Hannover.
[page break]
203
[underlined] Target: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Cromer – 5510N 0700E – 5510N 1035E – Berlin – 5223N 1345E – 5235N 1405E – 5510N 1010E – 5510N 0700E – Cromer – Base.
4 Halifaxes P.F.F. Sylt. 63 Stirlings of 3 Group Mine-laying Sylt area.
[page break]
204
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
First R/P flares fell at 0309/0310hrs. The attack then opened on time. Crews report that a good concentration of R/P flares was achieved and well maintained throughout although there were a few to the South of the main concentration. Most crews reported that the glow of T.I’s could be seen below cloud but attack was apparently Wanganui. One very big explosion was seen at 0314hrs, second at 0325hrs, third at 0349hrs and one a/c saw one at 0400hrs when well away from the target. The 0325hrs. explosion reported to be vivid green. Spoof flares & Yellow T.Is seen.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
P.F.F. 6 a/c missing. Command. 43 missing
[underlined] P.F.F. Summary. [/underlined] Again very difficult to assess owing to lack of observation of results and night photographs, but crews who have been to Berlin a number of times during the series of attacks were unanimous in considering it the best attack on Berlin so far. A very impressive fire area was seen by later crews & the glow on the clouds could be seen for a distance of 165mls. on the homeward journey. Many impressive explosions were reported in the target area & one at Z-1 was unanimously reported as being the largest & most violent explosion a lot of the crews taking part in the attack had seen. [deleted] When [/deleted]
[page break]
205
[underlined] 29TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 30TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Goodwood on BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 392 heavies + 94 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2015hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+12.
Mosquitoes to drop window & spoof fighter flares on target, also spoof red flares. Mosquitoes to act as fire watchers after attack. Mosquitoes also drop T.I. Red & Green on Brunswick.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 10/10ths st.cm. tops 12,000ft. Skymarker concentration from the beginning was very good with a few strays, & this concentration appears to have been maintained throughout the attack. Little was seen of results while a/c were over the target but on the way home later crews report a large glow from the target. One crew reported a dummy T.I. Red at least 10mls. N. of the target, darker in colour than our own – fell very slowly before going into cloud. Our own T.Is were only visible for approx.: 30 before disappearing in cloud.
[page break]
206
[underlined] Target: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: Base – 5435N 0500E – 5438N 1100E – BERLIN – 5200N 1325E -5200N 0920E – 5240N 0800E – 5250N 0400E – Southwold – Base.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] P.F.F. 8 a/c missing
Thick cloud over the target made results exceptionally difficult to judge, but main force crews were enthusiastic as to the concentration of R/P flares. The glow of large fires was seen in the later half of [missing words]
[page break]
207
[underlined] 31ST JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 1ST FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 2ND FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 3RD FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
Newish crews required for Cross Country and T.I. Demonstration at Whittlesey and Rushford Ranges. ’W’ W/O Trotter. Marker. ‘H’ F/O Cameron. ‘S’ Sgt. Cuthilll. ‘L’ F/S Doyle. ‘F’ P/O Samson.
2105hrs. Exercise abandoned owing to enemy activity.
[underlined] 4TH FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[page break]
208
[underlined] 5TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend. Mosquitoes on BERLIN.
[underlined] 6TH FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavy a/c of P.F.F. to take part in Navigational exercise.
1245hrs. Exercise postponed on account of weather.
“SOMEBODY TALKED” security film shown in Officers’ Mess.
[underlined] 7TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
Navigation exercise postponed.
“SOMEBODY TALKED” shown in Sergeants’ Mess.
[underlined] 8TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
Navigational exercise to take place.
[list of navigational exercise aircraft identifier letter and pilots]
[missing information]
[page break]
209
[underlined] 9TH FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend. T.I. trials scrubbed.
[underlined] 10TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
VISIT OF KING & QUEEN.
1245. King & Queen visited Ops Room.
G/Capt. Collins posted to R.A.F. Bourne. G/Capt. Searby to R.A.F. Warboys.
[underlined] 11TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 12TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
All heavies P.F.F. Navigational Exercise.
1613hrs. Exercise cancelled.
[underlined] 13TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN. Spoof: FRANKFURT-ON-ODER.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] BERLIN: 2 P.B.M. 4 B.B.U. 3 V.B.U. 5 Supporters. FRANKFURT: 2Y. BB/U.
[page break]
210
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 594 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 91 P.F.F.
[underlined] 1555hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 14TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 15TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN. [underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] FRANKFURT-ON-ODER.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
BERLIN. 2 P.B.M. 3 B.B.U. 6 V.B.U. 4 Supporters. FRANKFURT. 3 B.M. 3 B.U. Kiel Fjord: - 4 a/c of 35 Squadron.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 703 heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 96 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2115hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+20.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta & Wanganui mixed.
[underlined] Route: [/underlined] Base – 5450N 1100E – 5525N 0700E – 5510N 1000E – 5430N 1230E – [symbol] – 5210N 1250E – 5240N 1100E – 5240N 0855E – 5340N 0400E – Haisboro’ – Base.
Mosquitoes dropping spoof route-markers – fighter flares – window. 6 [deleted] / [/deleted] M/139 act as firewatchers after main attack is over.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] The attack appeared to have opened early, some crews reported seeing first Wanganui flares & Red T.Is as early as 2110hrs. Reports on concentration of Wanganui flares vary considerably, some stating they fell in tight cluster while others say they were very scattered. The general impression, however, is that they spread but in a line or arc SW/NE. Owing to thick 10/10ths cloud T.Is were not visible for long & possibly for the same reason no glow of good fires could
[page break]
211
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN & FRANKFURT-ON-ODER. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
212
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
P.F.F. Missing 7 a/c
[underlined] P.F.F. Analysis. [/underlined]
Results difficult to assess although a glow of fires was reported crews did not think they were as plentiful as on previous attacks. Mosquitoes over the target after the attack finished however report large areas of effective fires burning in the city, and the column of smoke which rose to 20,000ft was particularly impressive. T.I. is practically impossible to say for certain which area of Berlin received the main weight of the attack, but crews who checked the position on navigational aids were of the opinion that the attack opened slightly to the West of the city area & spread in later stages towards the centre.
[underlined] 16TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required 1st Wave. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] 2nd Wave. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hours: [/underlined] 1st Wave. 2125hrs. 2nd Wave 2330hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+8.
[underlined] Strength of Attack: [/underlined] 57 P.F.F. + 280 Main Force. 55 P.F.F. + 270 main Force.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] 1503hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[page break]
213
[underlined] 17TH FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN. [underlined] Alternative: [/underlined] LEIPZIG.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
156. 1st Wave: 3 P.B.M. 3 B.B.U. 2 V.B.U. 4 supporters. 2nd Wave: 3 P.B.M. 3 B.B.U. 1. V.B.U. 2 Supporters.
[underlined] Strength of Attack: [/underlined] 615 Heavies + 110 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hours: [/underlined] 1st Wave: 2135hrs. LEIPZIG. 2150hrs. 2nd Wave: 0055hrs. LEIPZIG. 0005hrs.
[underlined] 1600hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 18TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 156: 8 P.B.M. 4 B.B.U. 4 V.B.U. 5 Supporters.
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] 0330hrs.
[underlined] Routes: [/underlined] Alternative route home for a/c on [symbol] after Z+8.
[underlined] 1215hrs [/underlined] Snow Warning.
[underlined] 1639hrs. [/underlined] ALL OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 19TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] LEIPZIG.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
214
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 736 Heavies 0f 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 108 P.F.F. 4H/35 + 50 Stirlings gardening Kiel Fjord.
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] 0400hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+19.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Wanganui & paramatta.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
First Wanganui flares and red T.Is dropped about 4” early. A good concentration of Wanganui flares quickly formed in oval formation NE/SW. One load of skymarkers fell 5 to 10mls South of main concentration but was not backed up. Skymarking was well maintained until 0405hrs when there was a gap of about 4 minutes after which marking was resumed but more sparsely than before. Another gap of a few minutes occurred at about 0400hrs. Only a vague glow of T.I’s was visible through cloud.
Glow of good fires could be seen through cloud in later stages with dense clouds of black smoke rising above 10,000ft. large explosions reported at 0358, 0435 & 0438hrs.
[page break]
215
[underlined] Target: LEIPZIG [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
216
[underlined] 20TH FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] STUTTGART.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method [/underlined] Mixed Wanganui & Paramatta.
[underlined] Strength of Attack: [/underlined] 597 Heavies + 103 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] 0400hrs.
[page break]
217 (last page)
Feb 20th, 1944.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
[photograph] F/S WINTERSON. [photograph] P/O GROVE. [photograph] SGT. SMITH. [photograph] SGT. DUCHENÉ [photograph] SGT. BEMBRIDGE. F/O. RYAN. [photograph] F/O. GENTLE. [photograph] SGT. WALEMBY. [photograph] SGT. HEDGE. [photograph] F/L AUBERT. [photograph] F/L SAMUEL. [photograph] F/S FISHER. [photograph] F/L MACKAY. [photograph] F/O PETRIDES. [photograph] P/O HALPERIN. [photograph] F/S HOOPER.
[page break]
Names of the 5 photographs from BOTTOM LINE OF PREVIOUS PAGE.
F/L LITTLE, F/O FLYNN, SGT .JONES, SGT. MACLACHLAN, SGT. TRUMAM
[photograph] F/O SMITH. [photograph] P/O SMITH. [photograph] F/O PHILPS. [photograph] SGT. CORDRAY. [photograph] F/O GOODWIN. [photograph] SGT. MARSHALL. [photograph] F/L VINCENT. [photograph] SGT. CLARKE. [photograph] SGT. HATWELL. [photograph] SGT. SWINNEY. [photograph] SGT. HODGES. [photograph] S/L SAMMY HALL. [photograph] F/L YOUNG. [photograph] SGT. [indecipherable name]. [photograph] P/O [indecipherable name]. [photograph] SGT. [indecipherable name] [missing photograph] SGT. HODGES. [photograph] SGT. [indecipherable name]. [photograph] W/C DUIGAN. [photograph] SGT. KING. [photograph] S/L MANDENO. [photograph] Sgt. Forbes. [photograph] [indecipherable name]. [photograph] SGT. CURTIS. [5 indecipherable names]
[page break]
[photograph] SGT. MARSON. [photograph] SGT. WILLETT. [photograph] SGT. OTTEY. [photograph] SGT. EDWARDS. [photograph] SGT. SHACKLADY. [photograph] SGT. BOWMAN. [photograph] SGT. BROWN. [photograph] F/S STEWART. [photograph] SGT. HAVARD. [photograph] SGT. HANDLEY. [photograph] SGT. THORINGTON. [photograph] P/O KERRY. [photograph] P/O CARTER. [photograph] SGT. DURAT. [photograph] SGT. DALTON. [photograph] SGT. CHAPMAN. P/O ROBERTS [photograph] P/O THOMPSON. [photograph] SGT. WILKINSON. [photograph] F/L CRAMPTON. [photograph] SGT. SCOTT. [photograph] F/O WOODSEND. [photograph] P/O BAGG. [photograph] SGT. LEADER.
[page break]
[photograph] W/C DONALDSON. [photograph] S/L LAWSON. [photograph] F/O DRAKE. [photograph] SGT. LAWRENCE. [photograph] F/L VERDON ROE. [photograph] F/S BANKS. [photograph] F/O TOWNSEND. [photograph] P/O JOLLY. [photograph] S/L GRIMSTON. [photograph] F/S VOLANTE. [photograph] F/L MACPHERSON. [photograph] F/L KEARS. [photograph] P/O MOLLER. [photograph] F/S PRICE. [photograph] SGT. BARNHAM. [photograph] P/O BARCLAY. [photograph] W/C WOMERSLEY. [photograph] F/S GILES. [photograph] SGT. YOUNG. [photograph] F/S ELCORTE. [photograph] W/O GREAVES.
[page break]
[photograph] SGT. WALLIS. [photograph] SGT. WALDER. [photograph] F/S CASE. [photograph] F/S McLENNAN. [photograph] F/S TREMBLAY. [photograph] S/L MOIR. [photograph] F/O INNES. [photograph] SGT. BRAMLEY. [photograph] SGT. MACPINLAY. [photograph] SGT. HAZELGRAVE. [photograph] SGT. WEBB. [photograph] SGT. FOLLAND. [photograph] S/L GRANT. [photograph] P/O WALKER. [photograph] SGT. SALTER. [photograph] SGT. DOBSON. [photograph] SGT. IRWIN. [photograph] F/S WHITE. [photograph] SGT. [indecipherable name] [photograph] [missing name]
[page break]
[photograph] F/O GOODLEY. P/W. [photograph] S/L BALL. [photograph] P/O GINGER JONES. P/W. [photograph] F/SGT. PERCY. [photograph] SGT. THOMPSON. [photograph] W/C HOOLWAY. [photograph] F/S HART. [photograph missing] P/O TURK. [photograph] F/O LUFF. [photograph] F/S HEAP. [photograph] P/O HORAN. [photograph] F/S ATKIN. [photograph] W/O SAUNDERS. [photograph] F/O McKENNA. [photograph] SGT. CHAPMAN. [photograph] P/O DAVIES. [photograph] F/S HOLDERNESS. [photograph] F/S McHUGH. [photograph] SGT. MURRAY. [photograph] F/L LANG. [photograph] F/L GREY. [photograph] F/S RIDINGS. [photograph] Sgt. LEE. [photograph] F/S VENN. [photograph] Sgt WOOD.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Description
An account of the resource
Operational Record ledger created by Pat Falkinder (nee Day). Running log book which includes briefing, targeting, crews and methods of prosecution for various bombing operations. It includes a photographs of Pat Day in uniform and several aircrew.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Robin Christian
David Bloomfield
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
224 photocopied sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCleggPV[DoB]-150710-01
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
Title
A name given to the resource
Operational Record ledger
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
Czech Republic
Denmark
France
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Belgium--Antwerp
Belgium--Florennes
Belgium--Sint-Truiden
Belgium--Zeebrugge
Czech Republic--Plzeň
Denmark--Manø Island
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Southwold
France--Bourget Lake
France--Cannes
France--Cayeux-sur-Mer
France--Laon
France--Modane
France--Montchanin
France--Montluçon
France--Saint-Dizier (Haute-Marne)
Germany--Augsburg
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Bocholt
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Bonn
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Elberfeld
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Freiburg im Breisgau
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Jena
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kassel
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Koblenz
Germany--Krefeld
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Lübeck
Germany--Ludwigshafen am Rhein
Germany--Magdeburg
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Mülheim an der Ruhr
Germany--Munich
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Oberhausen (Düsseldorf)
Germany--Oldenburg
Germany--Peenemünde
Germany--Rostock
Germany--Schifferstadt
Germany--Soest
Germany--Stuttgart
Italy--Genoa
Italy--Milan
Italy--Turin
Netherlands--Breda
Netherlands--Leeuwarden
Netherlands--Texel
Netherlands--Venlo
Poland--Gdańsk
Poland--Szczecin
Russia (Federation)--Kaliningrad (Kaliningradskai︠a︡ oblastʹ)
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Hamburg
Russia (Federation)
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Germany--Frankfurt (Oder)
Netherlands--Twente
England--Suffolk
156 Squadron
anti-Semitism
B-17
bombing
bombing of Hamburg (24-31 July 1943)
Bombing of Peenemünde (17/18 August 1943)
briefing
ground personnel
Halifax
incendiary device
Lancaster
mine laying
Mosquito
Pathfinders
RAF Wyton
Scharnhorst
target indicator
Women’s Auxiliary Air Force
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/496/19743/LCookeWH2220169v1.1.pdf
a7bbedefc460e05481466090e4aaa801
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cooke, William
William H Cooke
W H Cooke
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Cooke, WH
Description
An account of the resource
15 items. An oral history interview with William Cooke (2220169 Royal Air Force), log book and other service material, medals, photographs and memorabilia. He flew operations with 49 Squadron as an air gunner.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by and catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
William H Cooke’s navigators, air bombers and air gunners flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
Navigators, air bombers and air gunners flying log book for W H Cooke, air gunner, covering the period from 3 November 1943 to 15 June 1945. Detailing his flying training and operations flown. He was stationed at RAF Bishops Court, RAF Upper Heyford, RAF Winthorpe, RAF Syerston, RAF Fiskerton, RAF Fulbeck, RAF Kolar and RAF Dhubalia. Aircraft flown in were, Anson, Wellington, Stirling, Lancaster and Liberator. He flew a total of 29 operations with 49 squadron, 8 daylight and 21 night. He also flew 2 operations with 99 squadron. Targets were, Givors, Trossey-St-Maxim, St Leu D’Esserent, Coquesville, Chattelerault, Brunswick, Ouilly, Deelan, Le Havre, Darmstadt, Stuttgart, Boulogne, Bremerhaven, Munchen-Gladbach, Munster, Karlsruhe, Kaiserslautern, Nurnburg, Bergen, Homberg, Dusseldorf, Ladbergen, Gravenhorst, Heilbronn, Geissen, Heinbach, Munich and Bilin. His pilot on operations was Flying Officer Parkin.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1943-08-06
1945-06-15
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LCookeWH2220169v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Oxfordshire
Germany
France
Norway
Burma
Great Britain
India
Netherlands
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Burma--Mon State
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Caen
France--Châtellerault
France--Givors
France--Le Havre
France--Normandy
France--Oise
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Giessen (Hesse)
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Homberg (Kassel)
Germany--Hörstel
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Steinfurt (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Germany--Stuttgart
India--Bengal
India--Kolar (District)
Netherlands--Gelderland
Northern Ireland--Down (County)
Norway--Bergen
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
France--Creil
Great Britain
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1945
1944-07-26
1944-07-27
1944-08-07
1944-08-08
1944-08-09
1944-08-10
1944-08-11
1944-08-12
1944-08-13
1944-08-14
1944-08-15
1944-09-10
1944-09-11
1944-09-12
1944-09-13
1944-09-17
1944-09-18
1944-09-19
1944-09-20
1944-09-23
1944-09-24
1944-09-27
1944-09-28
1944-10-19
1944-10-20
1944-10-28
1944-10-29
1944-11-01
1944-11-02
1944-11-03
1944-11-04
1944-11-05
1944-11-06
1944-11-07
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-12-04
1944-12-06
1944-12-10
1944-12-11
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1945-06-12
1945-06-15
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
16 OTU
1661 HCU
49 Squadron
99 Squadron
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
B-24
bombing of Luftwaffe night-fighter airfields (15 August 1944)
Bombing of Trossy St Maximin (3 August 1944)
crash
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
radar
RAF Bishops Court
RAF Fiskerton
RAF Fulbeck
RAF Syerston
RAF Upper Heyford
RAF Winthorpe
Stirling
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1391/24512/LDunmoreG635201v1.2.pdf
7c8da56611c596e153043f6ebb2f76fd
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Dunmore, George
G Dunmore
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-05-26
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Dunmore, G
Description
An account of the resource
17 Items concerning Flight Lieutenant George Dunmore DFM (5601) who flew 45 operations as a flight engineer on Lancaster with 83 Squadron at RAF Scampton and then as part of the Pathfinder Force at RAF Wyton. Commissioned in 1944 he continued to serve in the general duties branch as flight engineer and then equipment branch until 1967. The collection contains his logbook, an account of a maximum effort operation, official documents and letters, a history of an individual aircraft, pathfinder certificate, recommendation for DFM, career notes as well as photographs and memorabilia. A sub-collection of 58 photographs of aircraft under repair or being manufactured in factories.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Louise Dunmore and catalogued by Nigel Huckins
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
George Dunmore’s RAF Observer’s and Air Gunner’s Flying log book
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LDunmoreG635201v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
Flying Officer G. Dunmore’s RAF Observer’s and Air Gunner’s Flying Log Book, from 25th June 1942 to 3rd October 1943, recording operations as a flight engineer with 83 Squadron RAF, mainly as part of the Pathfinder Force. Aircraft in which flown: Lancaster I, Lancaster III. He was stationed at RAF Scampton and RAF Wyton and flew a total of 45 operations (44 night, 1 day) on the following targets in Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy and Poland: Berlin, Bremen, Danzig, Duisburg, Dusseldorf, Essen, Frankfurt, Genoa, Hamburg, Karlsruhe, Kassel, Mannheim, Mulheim, Munich, Nurnburg and Heilbronn, Osnabruck, Pilsen, Pointe de Coubre, River Gironde, Saarbrucken, Spezia, St Nazaire, Turin, Vegesack, Wilhelmshaven and Wuppertal. His pilots on operations were Flight Sergeant Calvert, Wing Commander Elliot, Flight Lieutenant Partridge, Squadron Leader Daniels, Wing Commander Shaw DFC, Squadron Leader Swift, Flying Officer Tilbury, Pilot Officer Davies and Flight Lieutenant Garvey DFC.
Includes several crew listings and various comments on operations, including: 'DIVE IN EXCESS OF 450 M.P.H!!', 'SOUND RECORDING MADE ON BOMBING RUN - BROADCAST BY BBC' (3/4/43), and 'THE GREAT TORNADO' (Hamburg 2/8/43).
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
David Leitch
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Lincolnshire
Italy--Po River Valley
France--Gironde Estuary
France--Pointe de la Coubre
France--Saint-Nazaire
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kassel
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Mülheim an der Ruhr
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Osnabrück
Germany--Saarbrücken
Germany--Vegesack
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Germany--Wuppertal
Italy--Genoa
Italy--La Spezia
Italy--Turin
Poland--Gdańsk
Czech Republic--Plzeň
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1942
1943
1942-06-25
1942-06-26
1942-06-28
1942-06-29
1942-06-30
1942-07-02
1942-07-03
1942-07-08
1942-07-11
1942-07-14
1942-07-15
1942-07-19
1942-07-21
1942-07-22
1942-07-23
1942-07-26
1942-07-27
1942-08-09
1942-09-01
1942-09-02
1942-09-03
1942-09-06
1942-09-10
1942-09-11
1942-12-08
1942-12-09
1942-12-20
1942-12-21
1942-12-22
1943-02-28
1943-03-22
1943-03-23
1943-03-27
1943-03-28
1943-03-29
1943-03-30
1943-04-02
1943-04-03
1943-04-04
1943-04-11
1943-04-14
1943-04-15
1943-04-16
1943-04-17
1943-04-26
1943-05-25
1943-05-26
1943-05-29
1943-05-30
1943-06-11
1943-06-12
1943-06-22
1943-06-23
1943-07-12
1943-07-13
1943-07-24
1943-07-25
1943-07-27
1943-07-28
1943-08-02
1943-08-03
1943-08-07
1943-08-08
1943-08-27
1943-08-28
1943-08-31
1943-09-01
1943-09-05
1943-09-06
1943-09-07
1943-10-02
1943-10-03
1943-10-04
83 Squadron
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
bombing
bombing of Hamburg (24-31 July 1943)
flight engineer
Lancaster
Lancaster Mk 1
Lancaster Mk 3
Pathfinders
RAF Scampton
RAF Wyton
training
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/308/24681/LMottersheadF422232v1.1.pdf
f76801c86e1314e5d06be70cf352a3ad
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Mottershead, Frank
F Mottershead
Description
An account of the resource
Eleven items. An oral history interview with Frank Mottershead (422232 Royal Australian Air Force), photographs and his log book. He flew operations as a wireless operator with 463 Squadron.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Frank Mottershead and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-04-30
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Mottershead, F
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Frank Mottershead’s observer’s and air gunner’s flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
Observer’s and air gunner’s flying log book for F Mottershead, wireless operator, covering the period from 29 April 1943 to 9 April 1945. Detailing his flying training and operations flown. He was stationed at RCAF Calgary, RCAF Mossbank, RCAF Pat Bay, RAF Lichfield, RAF West Freugh, RAF Syerston and RAF Waddington. Aircraft flown in were Norseman, Fort II, Bolingbroke, Anson, Hampden, Wellington, Stirling and Lancaster. He flew a total of 30 operations with 463 squadron, 6 daylight and 24 night. Targets were Rheydt, Dortmund, Calais, Karlsruhe, Kaiserslauten, Wilhelmshaven, Bremen, Flushing, Brunswick, Bergen, Harburg, Duren, Ladbergen, Munich, Heilbronn, Geissen, Gdynia, Houffalize, Mitteland Canal, Politz, Brux, Dresden, Rositz, Bohlen, Wesel, Ijmuiden and Hamburg. His pilots on operations were Flying Officer Smith and Flight Lieutenant Huxtable.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LMottersheadF422232v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
Canada
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Alberta--Calgary
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Belgium--Houffalize
British Columbia--Vancouver Island
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Staffordshire
France--Calais
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Giessen (Hesse)
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Leipzig Region
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Munich
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Wesel (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Netherlands--IJmuiden
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Norway--Bergen
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Scotland--Wigtownshire
Germany--Hamburg
Saskatchewan
Alberta
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Czech Republic--Most
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1945
1944-09-19
1944-09-20
1944-09-23
1944-09-24
1944-09-26
1944-09-27
1944-09-28
1944-10-05
1944-10-06
1944-10-11
1944-10-14
1944-10-15
1944-10-23
1944-10-28
1944-10-29
1944-11-11
1944-11-16
1944-11-21
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-04
1944-12-06
1944-12-18
1944-12-19
1944-12-30
1945-01-01
1945-01-02
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-01-16
1945-01-17
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-15
1945-02-19
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-03-20
1945-03-21
1945-03-23
1945-03-24
1945-04-06
1945-04-09
1654 HCU
27 OTU
463 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
aircrew
Anson
Bolingbroke
bombing
Bombing and Gunnery School
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
Hampden
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Operational Training Unit
RAF Lichfield
RAF Syerston
RAF Waddington
RAF West Freugh
Stirling
training
Wellington
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1405/26420/LRobinsonFA33520v1.2.pdf
708f1dc7bd64207eea63cd6cffe934ff
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Robinson, F A
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2019-06-17
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Robinson, FA
Description
An account of the resource
Three items. The collection concerns Squadron Leader F A Robinson (b.1920, 33520 Royal Air Force) and contains his log books and a poem. He flew over 130 daylight operations with 1 PRU and 543 Squadron.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by P A Robinson and catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
F A Robinson’s flying log book for pilots. One
Description
An account of the resource
Flying log book for F A Robinson covering the period from 8 September 1938 to 22 January 1951. Detailing his flying training and operations flown, includes flight certificates, congratulatory messages and notes of appreciation from senior officers, a poem about 'Gremlins', newspaper clippings, photograph of a radar installation. He was stationed at RAF Cranwell (RAF College), RAF Old Sarum (S of AC), Abbeville (2 Squadron), RAF Odiham/Hendon (ROC Flt), RAF Hatfield/ Hendon (116 Squadron & 24 Squadron), RAF Benson/St. Eval (1 PRU & 543 Squadron). Aircraft flown in were Tutor, Hart, Hind, Audax, Hector, Lysander, Magister, Master, Roc, Stinson, Proctor, Spitfire, Anson, Wellington, Expediter, Oxford, Gladiator, Blenheim, Harvard, Tiger Moth, Hornet Moth, Meteor, Vampire. He flew over 130 daylight operations with 1 PRU and 543 Squadron. Photographic operations were flown over Le Havre, Honfleur, Cherbourg, Boulogne, Abbeville, Zeebrugge, Cap Gris Nez, Rotterdam, Antwerp, Ostend, Charleroi, Douai, Den Helder, Amsterdam, Lille, Bethune, St Omer, Leipzig, Ruhr, Flushing, Gronigen, Heppel, Cologne, Weert, Calais, Dunkirk, Nurnberg, Dortmund, Ems, Kiel, Emden, Cuxhaven, Franco-Spanish border, Brest, Bordeaux, St Nazaire, Ploumanac, Le Croisic, Ushant, St Lannion, Lorient, St Nazaire, Douarnez Bay, Pt Duraz, Morlaix, Toulouse, St Malo, Poissy, Lubeck, Travemunde, North German ports, Dortmund, Cologne, Stuttgart, Heilbronn, Frankfurt, Mezieres, Essen, Amsterdam, Swinemunde, Hamburg, Brussels, Liege, Gironde ports, La Pallice, Martha, Saarbrucken, Mealte, Aachen, Rouen, Alten fiord. The log book also lists his post war flights.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike French
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LRobinsonFA33520v.1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Norway
Belgium--Antwerp
Belgium--Brussels
Belgium--Charleroi
Belgium--Ostend
Belgium--Zeebrugge
England--Cornwall (County)
England--Hampshire
England--Hertfordshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Middlesex
England--Oxfordshire
England--Surrey
England--Wiltshire
France--Abbeville
France--Béthune
France--Brest
France--Calais
France--Cherbourg
France--Le Croisic
France--Douai
France--Douarnenez
France--Dunkerque
France--Le Havre
France--Honfleur
France--Lannion
France--Lille
France--Lorient
France--Charleville-Mézières
France--Morlaix
France--La Pallice
France--Poissy
France--Rouen
France--Toulouse
France--Ouessant Island
Germany--Aachen
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Cuxhaven
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Lübeck
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Saarbrücken
Netherlands--Amsterdam
Netherlands--Den Helder
Netherlands--Groningen
Netherlands--Rotterdam
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Netherlands--Weert
Norway--Altafjord
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Saarbrücken
France--Saint-Malo
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
Belgium--Liège
France--Bordeaux (Nouvelle-Aquitaine)
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
France--Ouessant Island
France--Saint-Nazaire
France--Cap Gris Nez
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1940-05-13
1940-05-14
1940-07-10
1940-07-11
1940-07-12
1940-07-23
1940-07-24
1940-07-29
1940-07-30
1940-08-02
1940-08-03
1940-08-06
1940-08-07
1940-08-10
1940-08-11
1940-08-14
1940-08-15
1940-08-18
1940-08-19
1940-09-11
1940-09-13
1940-09-18
1941-08-10
1941-08-17
1941-08-18
1941-08-19
1941-08-21
1941-08-22
1941-08-26
1941-08-27
1941-08-31
1941-09-02
1941-09-04
1941-09-16
1941-09-21
1941-09-22
1941-09-23
1941-09-26
1941-09-28
1941-10-02
1941-10-06
1941-10-13
1941-10-20
1941-10-23
1941-11-01
1941-11-03
1941-11-06
1941-11-12
1941-11-14
1941-11-18
1941-11-20
1941-11-24
1941-11-25
1941-12-01
1941-12-05
1941-12-07
1941-12-11
1941-12-13
1941-12-15
1941-12-19
1942-01-02
1942-01-04
1942-01-06
1942-01-09
1942-01-11
1942-01-12
1942-01-15
1942-01-16
1942-01-24
1942-01-26
1942-01-28
1942-02-02
1942-02-03
1942-02-05
1942-02-07
1942-02-08
1942-02-10
1942-02-11
1942-02-18
1942-02-19
1942-02-27
1942-03-05
1942-03-09
1942-03-24
1942-03-26
1942-03-27
1942-03-29
1942-04-02
1942-04-06
1942-04-12
1942-04-14
1942-04-16
1942-04-25
1942-04-30
1942-05-03
1942-05-06
1942-05-16
1942-05-18
1942-05-24
1942-05-28
1942-06-06
1942-06-17
1942-06-21
1942-06-22
1942-07-08
1942-07-18
1942-07-30
1942-08-06
1942-08-17
1942-08-18
1942-08-19
1942-08-23
1942-08-28
1942-09-11
1942-09-18
1942-10-04
1942-11-09
1942-11-10
1943-01-18
1943-06-25
1943-09-03
1943-09-05
1943-09-09
1943-09-13
1943-09-14
1943-09-19
1943-09-24
1943-09-26
1943-09-29
1943-10-09
1943-10-16
543 Squadron
aircrew
Anson
Blenheim
bombing
Flying Training School
Gneisenau
gremlin
Harvard
Lysander
Magister
Meteor
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
Photographic Reconnaissance Unit
pilot
Proctor
RAF Benson
RAF Cranwell
RAF Hatfield
RAF Hendon
RAF Odiham
RAF St Eval
Scharnhorst
Spitfire
Tiger Moth
Tirpitz
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1321/26954/LLatimerJF1551478v1.1.pdf
63e5be776c4ee948864e178c5d15224f
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Latimer, James Ferguson
J F Latimer
Description
An account of the resource
Four items. An oral history interview with Warrant Officer Jim Latimer (1923 - 2020, 1551478 Royal Air Force) his log book, and photographs. He flew operations as a bomb aimer with 102 and 462 Squadrons.
The collection was catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2019-09-28
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Latimer, JF
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Description
An account of the resource
J F Latimer’s air bomber’s flying log book covering the period from 9 March 1943 to 8 March 1945. Detailing his flying training and operations flown as air bomber. He was stationed at RCAF Fingal (4 B&GS), RCAF Port Albert (31 ANS), RCAF Jarvis (1 B&GS), RAF Skaebrae (1476 Advanced Ship Recognition Course), RAF Mona (8 OAFU), RAF Moreton-in-Marsh (21 OTU), RAF Marston Moor (1652 HCU), RAF Pocklington (102 Squadron), RAF Driffield and RAF Foulsham (462 RAAF Squadron), Aircraft flown in were Anson, Bolingbroke, Wellington and Halifax. He flew four daylight and four night-time operations with 102 Squadron and five daylight and twenty two night-time operations with 462 RAAF Squadron, a total of 35. Targets were Foret de Nieppe, Villers Bocage, De Bruyere, Somain, Brunswick, Eindhoven, Sterkrade, Wemars Capelle, Soesterberg, Le Havre, Gelsenkirchen, Nordstein, Kiel, Boulogne, Duisburg, Wilhelmshaven, Hanover, Essen, Ostkapelle, Domberg, Soest, Hamburg, Sylt, Koblentz, Bonn, Mainz, Rheine, Heilbronn, Neuss, Kaiserlautern, Mannheim and Dortmund. <span>His pilots on operations were </span>Flight Sergeant Mitchell, Flying Officer Sanderson, Squadron Leader Jackson, Flying officer Wther [?], Flying Officer Boyd, Flying Officer Anderson, Flying Officer McIndle and Flight Lieutenant James. This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Title
A name given to the resource
J F Latimer’s Royal Canadian Air Force Flying Log Book for Aircrew other than Pilot
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LLatimerJF1551478v1
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Terry Hancock
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
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One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1944-07-28
1944-07-30
1944-08-03
1944-08-07
1944-08-08
1944-08-11
1944-08-12
1944-08-13
1944-08-15
1944-08-18
1944-08-19
1944-08-25
1944-09-03
1944-09-09
1944-09-11
1944-09-12
1944-09-13
1944-09-15
1944-09-16
1944-10-15
1944-10-18
1944-10-21
1944-10-23
1944-10-25
1944-10-28
1944-10-29
1944-12-08
1944-12-09
1945-01-01
1945-01-16
1945-01-17
1945-01-21
1945-01-22
1945-01-28
1945-02-18
1945-02-22
1945-02-23
1945-03-01
1945-03-02
1945-03-03
1945-03-05
1945-03-06
1945-03-08
1945-03-09
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Canada
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
England--Gloucestershire
England--Yorkshire
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Dieppe
France--Le Havre
France--Somain
France--Villers-Bocage (Calvados)
Germany--Bonn
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Essen
Germany--Freising
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Koblenz
Germany--Mainz (Rhineland-Palatinate)
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Neuss
Germany--Oberhausen (Düsseldorf)
Germany--Rheine
Germany--Soest
Germany--Sylt
Netherlands--Eindhoven
Netherlands--Oostkapelle
Netherlands--Soesterberg
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Ontario
Wales--Anglesey
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Germany--Freising
100 Group
102 Squadron
1652 HCU
21 OTU
462 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
Air Observers School
aircrew
Anson
Bolingbroke
bomb aimer
bombing
Bombing and Gunnery School
bombing of Luftwaffe night-fighter airfields (15 August 1944)
Halifax
Halifax Mk 3
Heavy Conversion Unit
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
RAF Driffield
RAF Foulsham
RAF Marston Moor
RAF Mona
RAF Moreton in the Marsh
RAF Pocklington
RCAF Fingal
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/194/27209/MAdamsHG424504-170215-01.2.pdf
1081940cd3d5fc25972f96a05b4902d4
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Adams, Herbert
Herbert Adams
H Adams
Herbert G Adams
Description
An account of the resource
88 items. Collection concerns Herbert George Adams DFC, Legion d'Honour (b. 1924, 424509 Royal Australian Air Force). He flew operations as a navigator with 467 Squadron. Collection contains an oral history interview, photographs of people and places, several memoirs about his training and bombing operations, letters to his family, his flying logbook and notes on navigation.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Herbert Adams and catalogued by Nigel Huckins and Trevor Hardcastle.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-02-15
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Adams, HG
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[inserted] (There is some duplication of notes for Ops [symbol] 1 to [symbol] 14 as I wrote something at different times (years apart.)) [/inserted]
[inserted] [symbol] Soon after we feathered that engine over “A” Flight commander flew up on our wing top & feathered 3 engines & kept up with us! He was giving us some assurance that a lightly loaded Lancaster could fly level (for a while) on 1 engine … reassurance for a new crew [/inserted]
My navigation Logs & Charts of our operations with 467 (RAAF) Squadron at Waddington, near Lincoln, from 10.9.44 to 16.1.45, with extracts from a publication giving some details of every operation by 467 & 463 Squadrons from 10.9.44 to 25.4.45.
[circled 1] [underlined] LE HAVRE, 10.9.44 [/underlined] 21 from 467, 20 from 463 as part of 992 bombers on 8 different German strong points outside of Le Havre. The targets were accurately marked and bombed, with no losses from Waddington. We took off at 1522, flew to Syerston (nearby), then did a radius of action on a track of 260oT so as to be back at Syerston at 1604 at 8000’. The winds were about what was forecast, 025/15; we bombed at 1723 at 12100’, bomb load was 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500 lb H.E. Two minutes after we dropped our bombs our Port Outer motor stopped (stray AA – fire?), we feathered the prop & flew home OK on 3 engines, airborne for 3h 55 min.
[symbol] On 11.9.44, 218 bombers from 5 Group attacked the German positions still holding out at Le Havre, with no losses. 2 British divisions were attacking Le Havre & the German garrison surrendered a few hours after the raid. The British wished to capture the port intact, but the German garrison had laid mines, and blown up most of the docks, and so it was several weeks before the port could be used.
DAMSTADT, 11.9.44. 226 Lancasters from 5 Group bombed at night, losing 1 crew (all K.I.A.) from 463 Sqdn. Our pilot, Peter Gray-Buchanan, did his “Second Dickie” on this raid.
[circled 2] [underlined] STUTTGART, 12.9.44. [/underlined] 20 from 467, 14 from 463, of 204 from [underlined] 5 Group [/underlined]. (On the same night 378 Lancasters bombed Frankfurt with success.) Post-war, a German expert – Heinz Bardau – wrote that the northern & western parts of Stuttgart city were erased in this concentrated attack… a [underlined] fire-storm resulted [/underlined], with 1171 people killed, the city’s highest fatality figure for the war.
[page break]
STUTTGART (Con’t)
467 Sqdn lost 2 crews (F/L D. Brown, 5 KIA, 2 POW, F/O Bright. 5 KIA, 2 POW.)
We took off at 1916 & set course at 1919, staying at 2500’ until 2137 when we began climbing, to 16000’ by 2233. Our last GEE fix was at 2232 and the next (after bombing OK at 2316) at 0022… so nearly 2 hours of Dead Reckoning with some map reading. (The Germans jammed our GEE receiver so that the screen was filled with “Grass”). The actual winds were about as forecast 160/15 at the target. Our bomb load was 1 x 4000 lb “cookie” & 13 J clusters (of incendiaries). Two minutes after bombing our gunners saw a fighter (they think a Do217) at about 400 yards, so we began to “corkscrew”. We continued corkscrewing until 2329, seeing one plane (unidentified) at about 50 yards! and another with a light on (!). We were airborne for 6h 51 min.
[circled 3] [underlined] BOULOGNE. 17.9.44. [/underlined] We took off at 0806 & flew to Syerston, then did a Radius of Action (on track of 260oT) to return to Syerston at 0837 at 6000’, where we did a circuit to port to lose height & get into formation at 3000! We had an uneventual [sic] trip to the target where we bombed at 8100’, dropping 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500 lb. We were airborne for 3h 26 min. 19 Lancs from each of 467 & 463 joined 762 bombers dropping more than 3000 tons of H.E. bombs on German positions around Bologne in preparation for an attack by Allied troops. The German garrison surrendered soon after the raid.
[circled 4] [underlined] BREMERHAVEN 18.9.44. [/underlined] 19 Lancs from each of 467 & 463 were part of a total of [underlined] 206 from 5 Group [/underlined], with no losses from Waddington. The post-war assessors found that this 5-Group attack, with less than 900 tons of bombs, started a [underlined] fire-storm [/underlined] which destroyed 2750 buildings in the main port area, & that [underlined] 30000 [/underlined] people were made homeless & had to live in the open until evacuated several days later.
[page break]
Extracts from a publication giving some details of every wartime operation by 467 & 463 Squadrons (loaned by Sam Nelson) RED = Daylight. BLACK = Night BLUE = We weren’t on it.
[circled 1] 10-9-44 LE HAVRE 21 from 467, 20 from 463 as part of 992 bomber raid on 8 different German strongpoints outside Le Havre. The targets were accurately marked and bombed. No losses.
D. 3h 55m. 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500. 12000’ (We lost P.O. engine during bomb-run).
Day 11-9-44. LE HAVRE. 218 bombers from 5 Group attacked German positions still holding out at Le Havre. Two British divisions were now attacking Le Havre and the German garrison surrendered a few hours later. The British wished to capture the port intact as a supply port for the armies, but the German garrison had proved spiteful – they had mined and blown up most of the docks, and it was a number of weeks before the port could be used.
[inserted] Night [/inserted] 11-9-44 DAMSTADT. 226 Lancasters of 5 Group.
Our pilot (Peter Gray-Buchanan) did his “second dickie”. 1 A/C from 463 lost (7 KIA).
[circled 2] 12-9-44 STUTTGART. 20 of 467, 14 of 463, of 204 from 5 Group. (Same night 378 Lancasters on Frankfurt … with success.) Post war, a German expert, Heinz Bardau, wrote that the Northern + Western parts of the city were erased in this concentrated attack, & that a fire-storm resulted … 1171 people killed. Stuttgart’s highest fatality figure for the war. 467 lost 2 crews: F/L D. Brown .. 5 KIA, 2 POW; F/O Bright … 5 KIA, 2 POW.
F 6h 50m 1 x 4000 + 13 J clusters. 15750’
[circled 3] 17-9-44. BOULOGNE. 19 from 467, 19 from 463, of 762 bombers dropping more than 3000 tons of H.E. bombs on German positions around Boulogne in preparation for an attack by Allied troops. The German garrison
[page break]
surrendered soon afterwards.
D. 3h 25 m. 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500. 8100’
[circled 4] 18-9-44 BREMERHAVEN. 19 of 467, 19 of 463, of 206 from 5-Group. No losses from Waddington. The post-war assessors found that this 5-Group attack, with less than 900 tons of bombs, started a fire-storm which destroyed 2750 buildings in the main port area, & that 30000 people were made homeless & lived in the open until evacuated several days later.
D 4h 45m. 18 cans (incendiaries – 150 per can). 15250’
[circled 5] [inserted] 19-9-44 [/inserted] RHEYDT/MUNCHEN-GLADBACH. 19 of 467, 16 of 463, of 227 Lancasters of 5-Group bombing the twin towns. German reports state that only between 267 and 271 people were killed. 467 lost one Lanc, crashing on returning (4 KIA, 1 POW, 2 evaded, including pilot, F/O Findlay) Master Bomber was W/C Guy Gibson, VC, DSO, DFC (of Dambusters fame) flying a Mosquito … which crashed in flames near the Dutch coast. He and his navigator (S/L J.N. Warwick, DFC) were killed and buried at Steenbergen-en-Kriesland. (Orbited target for 17mm – marking delay). 11000’
D 5h 5m 1 x 2000 + 12 J clusters.
[circled 6] 23-9-44 DORTMUND-EMS CANAL (Aqueduct). 19 of 467, 17 of 463, of 136 Lancs. from 5-Group mounting a special attack on the aqueduct at Ladbergen on the Dortmund-Ems Canal. The canal was breached, but losses were heavy 10% of the force were lost. 467 lost F/O G.A. Brown and crew. (5 KIA. 2 POW). (Orbited target losing height for 15 min extra there. Meant to bomb 14000’ but 6400’ due to cloud)
C 5h 25m 14 x 1000
[page break]
[inserted] On the unused back of one of the logsheets are some sketches (rough) of GEE BOX & the kind of blips, scales etc, displayed [/inserted]
(BREMERHAVEN, Con’t).
We took off at 1832, orbited base until 1844, when we set course at 2000’. At 1915 we needed to alter course southwards to regain our track as the winds were from about 085oT rather than 060oT (forecast). Our last GEE fix (before jamming) was on track near turning point A, and we’d climbed to 15000’, from which height we bombed at 2103. Our bomb load was 18 cans of incendiaries. The Lancaster bomb-bay, (quite long & wide, under the floor) had 14 ‘hooks’, so to use 18 cans, 3 of the hooks had a framework added to hold 3 cans side by side. The bomb-aimer could select all 14 hooks to release independently, usually at fairly short time intervals to produce a “stick” of bombs usefully spread. Each can of incendiaries released 150 small bombs about 5 cm diameter & about 40 cm long, each capable of starting a fire.
It was an easy trip for navigation, with GEE only jammed for about 1/2 hr before & after the target. We were airborne for 4h 46 min.
[circled 5] [underlined] RHEYDT/MUNCHEN-GLADBACH. 19.9.44 [/underlined] 19 Lancs from 467, & 16 from 463 were part of a total of 227 from 5 Group bombing the twin-towns. German reports state that only between 267 & 271 people were killed. 467 Sqdn lost one Lanc. crashing on returning (4 KIA but pilot, F/O Findlay, & one other evaded, & the 7th was imprisoned). The Master-Bomber was W/C Guy Gibson VC, DSO, DFC, of Dambuster fame, flying a Mosquito which crashed in flames near the Dutch coast. He and his navigator (S/L J.N. Warwick, DFC) were killed and buried at Steenbergen-en-Kriesland. We took off at 1856 and did a Radius-of-Action (track 260oT) to arrive back at Base at 1913, at 2000’. The winds were about as predicted, we kept close to track & time, and arrived at target at 2139 at 11000’, but were told to [underlined] orbit [/underlined] (to port) due to marking problems. At 2148 we were told to [underlined] orbit again, [/underlined] until, at 2151 we we [sic] told to “attack Green spot fires direct”, which we did at 2155, at 11000’.
[page break]
[photograph] D-Dog at Waddington, 1944
[photograph] [symbol] Peter at pilots window
[photograph] Our gunners
Left: Ken Nicholls, Rear Gunner
Right: Ray Giles, Mid-Upper Gunner
[page break]
RHEYDT/MUNCHEN-GLADBACH (Con’t).
At 2159 1/2 I logged “a/c hit ground – explosion – flame & smoke”
At 2201 1/2 I logged “a/c on ground, bears 000o, 2 min (51o23’, 05o51’E).
At 2211 we saw an unidentified fighter so went into the corkscrew routine, at about 51o30’N 05o00’E.
At 2213 1/2 , while in starbord [sic] turn saw unidentified fighter above us, at about 51o31’N 04o53’E, so continued to corkscrew.
At 2221, I logged “possible a/c hit ground 3 mi on port beam, about 51o32 1/2’N 04o19’E. Our bomb-load was 1 x 2000 lb & 12 “J” clusters. We were airborne for 5h 5 min.
[circled 6] [underlined] DORTMUND-EMS CANAL [/underlined]. 23.9.44. 19 from 467 & 17 from 463 of total 136 Lancs from 5 Group mounted a special attack on the aquaduct at Ladbergen. The canal was breached, but losses were heavy … 10% of the force. 467 Sqdn lost F/O G.A. Brown & crew (5 KIA, 2 POW).
We took off at 1906, did the usual Radius-of-Action to be back at Base at 1931 at 2000’. We crossed the Channel at 4000’ then climbed to 6000’, keeping nicely to track until 2047. GEE was being jammed, and the next 2 fixes showed us 10 & 20 mi North of track … they may have been wrong. We continued by dead-reckoning through cloud climbing to 14000’ and arriving at the target on time at 2148. (We were told by Master-Bomber at 2146 “to bomb 150 ft N.W. of Red Target Indicator (flare)” J. But we were in thick cloud, so [underlined] orbited to port [/underlined] losing height … very dangerous in cloud. At 2155 the Master-Bomber said “cloud base is 8000’, come in and bomb”, but we were still in cloud & had to do [underlined] another orbit [/underlined], losing height to 6300’, so that finally we could see the target at bombed at 2203 from 6400’.
At 2205 I logged “a/c hit ground & exploded 8 mi S.E. of [symbol], (at about 51o59’N 07o53’E.”
At 2228 1/2 I logged “crossed river; a/c hit ground, port beam, 3 mi.”
At 2229 “a/c directly under us hit ground, 52o15’N 06o11’E.”
At 2231 1/2 I logged “a/c hit ground ahead about 10 mi” [brackets]
At 2236 1/2 I logged “a/c (same one?) on port beam, 5 mi [brackets] 52o10’N 06o00’E
[page break]
DORTMUND-EMS CANAL (Con’t).
After leaving the target area, the winds must have been stronger than predicted from the South.
At 2253 I logged “Strong searchlights ahead … Bomb-Aimer thinks its Rotterdam” (about 10 mi North of desired track). So we immediately turned 40o to port, but copped some flak.
At 2303 we saw searchlights over the OVER FLAKKEE area, and at 2304 got our first GEE fix since our last good one at 2047 putting us about 11 mi north of track.
Our bomb-load was 14 x 1000 lb. We were airborne for 5h 25 min.
[underlined] CALAIS. 24.9.44. [/underlined] 8 from 467, & 7 from 463 of a total 188 from 5 Group. 8 were shot down, including 1 from 467 Sqdn, F/O R.A. Jones (3 KIA & 4 POW).
[circled 7] [underlined] KARLSRUHE 26.9.44 [/underlined]. 17 from 467, 14 from 463 of a total 227 from 5 Group. A short German report states “that there was damage throughout the city & lists several important buildings destroyed”. 467 Sqdn lost F/O K. Miller (1 KIA, 6 POW).
We took off at 0055 & did the usual radius-of-action to be back at base at 0113 at 3000’. The winds were much as predicted and we kept close to track & timing, our last reliable GEE fix was at 0337; we arrived at target at 0408 and Master-Bomber told us to “bomb direct on mixed Red & Green T.1’s” But we had 10/10 cloud below us, so we “went round again” & managed to bomb at 0414 from 11500’. Our first reliable GEE fix on the way home was at 0444, only just over 1 hour of jamming.
Our bomb-load was 18 cans of incendiaries, and we were airborne for 6h 50 mins.
[circled 8] [underlined] KAISERLAUTERN 27.9.44 [/underlined] 16 from 467, 15 from 463 of a total of 217 from 5 Group, did the only major raid of the war by Bomber Command. 909 tons of bombs were dropped causing widespread damage to this medium-sized city. A local German report complained that the town was not a military objective, but went on to list a catalogue of small factories destroyed. We took off at 2205,
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24-9-44. CALAIS. 8 of 467, 7 of 463, of 188 from 5-Group. 8 were shot down. 467 lost F/O R. A. Jones & crew (3 KIA, 4 POW)
[circled 7] 26-9-44 KARLSRUHE. 17 of 467, 14 of 463, of 227 from 5-Group. A short German report states that there was damage throughout the city & lists several important buildings destroyed. 467 lost F/O K. Miller & crew (1 KIA, 6 POW).
J 6h 50m 18 cans incendiaries 11500’
[circled 8] 27-9-44 KAISERLAUTERN. 16 of 467, 15 of 463, of 217 from 5-Group on Kaiserlautern, a medium-sized city, in the only major raid on it by Bomber Command during the war. 909 tons of bombs were dropped a widespread damage was caused. A local German report complains that the town was not a military object, but goes on to list a catalogue of small factories destroyed.
H 6h 20m 18 cans incendiaries 4000’
(Sept. Summary: 467 flew 199 sorties; lost 6 crews (23 KIA, 17 POW, 2 Ev.) 4 tours completed.)
[circled 9] 5-10-44 WILHELMSHAVEN 17 of 467, 16 of 463, of 227 from 5-Group. 10/10 cloud, marking by H2S. The Wilhelmshaven Diary states that only 12 people died and one bomber was shot down. 467 lost 1 crew (they ditched … hadn’t got to the target … at about 11 am. They were finally rescued about 5pm next day. After short leave, they returned to ‘ops, and were all Killed-in-Action on the Harburg raid.
(This was the only ‘trip’ on which we were allowed to use H2S (they thought enemy fighters could use its transmission to find us). We couldn’t see the markers, so bombed by H2S.)
C. 5h 5m. 18 cans incendiaries. 15000’ (We flew to target in formation escorted by long-range Mustangs
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did a Radius of Action to be back at base at 2228 at 3000’. We stayed at 3000’ until 0010, then climbed to 4500’ and stayed at 4500’ until close to target, when told to bomb from 4000’, which we did (1 1/2 min early), dropping 18 cans of incendiaries. We kept close to track all the way and only lost GEE for an hour. We were airborne for 6h 20 min.
[circled 9] [underlined] WILHELMHAVEN. [/underlined] 17 of 467, 16 of 463, of 227 from 5-Group, a daylight raid flying in formation to the target, escorted by long-range Mustang fighters. The met. forcast [sic] was for considerable cloud at the target, and we were given the most unusual priorities for bombing:-
(i) drop them visually if target is clear;
(ii) use H2S if target is obscured; or (!)
(iii) drop when you see another bomber drop its load.
We took off at 0755, did a Radius of Action to be back at base at 0811 to join formation at 1500’. My GEE set was not working, but being in formation I didn’t have to navigate anyway. Ted Pickard, the new assistant Nav. Officer, criticised my lack of effort to have some practice. At 1010 we began to climb to 15000’ at the target where at 1106 there was 10/10 cloud below. Our Bomb Aimer & I operated the H2S and aimed at the NW corner of the town and dropped our bombs at 1110 and noticed two other Lancasters dropped theirs immediately after. We flew home independently, but other Lancs were visible so we followed the stream. At 1212 I took over flying a plane for the first & only time, keeping straight & level without much trouble for half an hour. We did a bit of map-reading for the last 1/2 hour, and landed at 1306, being airborne for 5h 5 min. Our bomb-load was 18 cans of incendiaries. The Wilhelmshaven Diary states that only 12 people died and that 1 bomber was shot down. 467 lost 1 crew … they ditched before the target at about 11 am & were (finally) rescued about 1700 the next day. After short leave they resumed ops., but were all K.I.A. on the HARBURG raid on 11.11.44. Our bomb-load was 15 cans of incendiaries
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[circled 10] [underlined] BREMEN [/underlined] 17 of 467 Sq., 18 of 463 Sq., of 246 from 5 Group, a night raid on 6.10.44, with bomb-load 18 cans of incendiaries dropped from 17250’. Air borne at 1736 & did Return of Action arriving back at base at 1753 at 5000’. A good navigation trip keeping close to desired track, but winds were lighter than expected, so, despite reducing air-speed twice (10 mph each time) we did a 60o – 120o triangle to lose 7 min. This was the last of 32 major Bomber Command raids on Bremen of the war. This raid, based on the 5 Group marking method, was an outstanding success. 1021 tons of bombs were dropped, of which 868 tons were incendiaries. A detailed report (local) is available which was compiled by an official who stated that: “the night was clear, with 3/4 full moon. A huge fire area was started. Classed as destroyed were 4859 houses, 42 factories, 2 shipyards, the Focke-Wulf works & the Siemens-Schubert electrical works. The transport network was seriously disrupted.” This raid, by no more than 1/4 of Bomber Command (& hardly mentioned in the British War History) had finished Bremen … it was not attacked again in the war.
We landed at 2233 after a trip of 4hr 55 min.
[circled 11] [underlined] FLUSHING [/underlined] (WEST DYKE on WALCHEREN ISLAND in the Scheldt Estuary.) 12 of 467, & 11 of 463 of a total of 121 of 5 Group, a daylight raid on 7.10.44. We each did 2 runs dropping a stick of 7 each run (all 1000 lb HE bombs). The sea-wall was breached and virtually all the island was flooded except the rest of the sea-wall, the central tour (Middleburgh) & the town of Flushing. English newspapers had a photo of the flooded island the next day. We had no losses despite plenty of A.A. [inserted] [two indecipherable words] [/inserted]. On the same day 846 of Bomber Command attacked Kleve-Emerich & Kembs Dams. 617 Sqn. used Tallboys (12000 lb bomb) on Kembs to destroy the floodgates to [underlined] prevent [/underlined] the Germans flooding the valley in the face of the American & French advance.
We were airborn for 3h 10 min.
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[circled 10] 6-10-44 BREMEN. 17 of 467, 18 of 463, of 246 from 5-Group. This was the last of 32 major Bomber Command raids on Bremen during the war. The raid, based on the 5-Group marking method, was an outstanding success. 1021 tons of bombs were dropped of which 868 tons were incendiaries. A detailed local report is available which was compiled by an official who stated that the night was clear with 3/4 full moon … A huge fire area was started. Classed as destroyed were 4859 houses, 42 factories, 2 shipyards, the Focke-Wulfe works and the Siemens Schubert electrical works. The transport network was seriously disrupted. This raid, by no more than 1/4 of Bomber Command (and hardly mentioned in British (War) History, had finished Bremen and the city was not attacked again by Bomber Command.
D 4h 55m 18 cans incendiaries 17250’
[circled 11] 17-10-44 FLUSHING (WALCHEREN ISLAND – WEST DYKE)
12 of 467, 11 of 463, of 121 from 5-Group to successfully breach the sea-wall near Flushing. No losses. (The same day 846 of Bomber Command attacked Kleve Emerich & Kembs Dams … 617 Squadron used ‘Tallboy’ bombs on Kembs. (The idea was to destroy the floodgates to [underlined] prevent [/underlined] the Germans flooding the Rhine valley in the face of French & American advances … this was done OK.)
D 3h 10m 2 sticks of 7 x 1000 6100’ Extra 6 min. orbit for 2nd stick.
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DAY 11-10-44 FLUSHING. 14 of 467, 20 of 463, of 115 from 5-Group attacked gun positions on N. bank of Scheldt Estuary near Flushing. No losses from Waddington.
[deleted] NIGHT [/deleted] [inserted] DAY [/inserted] 14-10-44 DUISBURG Bomber command sent 1013 heavy bombers, and 473 fighters, Americans sent 1251 heavy bombers and 749 fighters … the raid was carried out on a directive from Allied H.Q. to show the Germans the power of Bomber Commands.
NIGHT 14-10-44 BRUNSWICK 19 of 467, 20 of 463 to join 233 of 5 Group. The most effective of numerous raids on Brunswick. Using the 5-Group low-level marking method, Brunswick was finally destroyed. A German report simply lists the number of hectares burnt out. 23000 people were rescued from air-raid shelters and only 200 perished. A special train was sent from Bavaria to help feed the 80000 homeless.
DAY 17-10-44 WESTKAPELLE 2 of 467, 9 of 463 of 47 from 5-Group attacking sea-wall at Westkapelle. Bombing appeared to be accurate but no report is available. No losses.
[circled 12] 19-10-44 NUREMBERG (& DUISBURG) 20 of 467, 20 of 463, of 263 from 5-Group with 7 Mosquitoes in a special low-level-marked attack on Nuremberg. The target was completely cloud-covered and low-level marking could not be used. The raid was effective but not the ‘knockout’ as hoped. (There were 103 bombers from another Group on Stuttgart and other targets, losing only 0.9%). 467 lost F/O E. Rodwell & crew (7 KIA)
D 8h 10m 1 x 2000 + 12 J clusters. 17400’
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On 11-10-44, 16 of 467, 20 of 463 of total 115 (all 5 Group) attacked big gun positions on the bank of [underlined] Scheldt Estuary [/underlined], near Flushing. The big guns prevented a sea attack to open the Estuary for Allied supply shipping (a minefield had to be cleared too), and they menaced the Canadian Army who were attacking south of the Estuary, but couldn’t match these big guns for range. I think the weather was bad, poor visibility maybe no great harm done to the guns.
On 14-10-44 there was a big daylight raid on [underlined] Duisberg [/underlined], carried out as a directive from Allied H.Q. to show the Germans the power of Allied Air Power. Bomber Command sent 1013 heavies & 413 fighters, the Americans sent 1251 heavies & 749 fighters.
That night, (14-10-44) 5 Group sent 19 of 467 Sq & 20 of 463 Sq of a total of 233, to [underlined] Brunswick [/underlined], using the 5 Group low-level marking method, Brunswick was finally destroyed. A German report simply lists the number of hectares burnt out. 23000 people were rescued from air-raid shelters & only 200 perished. Special train sent from Bavaria to help feed the 80000 homeless.
On 17-10-44, 2 of 467, & 9 of 463 Sq. of total of 47 of 5 Group attacked the sea-wall again near Westkapelle on Walcheren Island. Bombing appeared to be accurate but no report was available.
[circled 12] [underlined] NUREMBERG [/underlined]. 5 Group sent 20 of 467 Sq. & 20 of 463 Sq of a total of 263 with 7 Mosquitos to do low-level marking. There was total cloud cover which prevented the low-level marking. The raid was effective but not the knock-out hoped for. The rest of Bomber Command raided Stuttgart & other nearby targets, only losing 0.9%. 467 Sq. lost F/O Rodwell & crew (7 KIA). We took off at 1713, did a Radius of Action coming back to base at 1718 at 2000’. We reduced speed to 150 mph but still had to lose 6 min doing 60oL, 120oR, then got to [symbol] OK but had to orbit as directed.
Bombed 15 min late at 17400’ on Red & Green Target [deleted] [indecipherable word] flares [/deleted]
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Our bomb-load was 1 x 2000 lb HE, and 12 ‘J’ clusters (incendiary). After leaving the target we descended to 6000’, & flew on dead-reckoning, south of Stuttgart & Strasbourg for 2 hours until I got the first GEE fix, nearly 20 miles north of our track, but safely over France. Sid discovered that we had one of the ‘J’ bombs “hung-up”. We went to the jettison area in the Channel & tried to release it manually … did 2 orbits as we kept trying, but without success. So we flew on home to base at 4000’, landing after 8hr 9 min airborne, by far our longest flight so far.
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[inserted] [symbol] Don Coults (Engineer went to Ireland to visit his parents there. [/inserted]
After our 11th Op at Flushing we went on the usual 6-day leave, after only about 4 weeks after we started our tour. The crews were put on a roster for leave, usually each 6 weeks, but you could go earlier if a few crews before you on the list went missing.
A few items from a diary I kept then … 7th Oct: On our return from the Flushing op, we “shot-up” the ‘drome (low level) for W/C. Brill who was going home to Australia. Wrote up log book. Went to a dance with Jackie from our Mess.
8th:- Applied for leave passes. Got paid. Packed.
9th:- Collected subsistence money, & petrol coupons for bike, [symbol] got leave passes. Caught train to London, missed by Ken. Booked in at A.C.F. Club for the night. Ken arrived at 10 pm. We booked in for the rest of the leave. Nice room.
10th. Had breakfast at the Boomerang Club. I looked around & spotted Kirk Beddie from Mendooran. I’ll just go back in time to our first couple of operations to relate a coincidence. When our 8 new crews arrived together, our Nav. Leader, F/Lt Arnold Eastman, was still doing Ops himself, yet was responsible for in-service training of the navigators (especially us new ones). So he delegated the checking of log & charts, and giving advice to some of his senior navigators (Who’d lasted, say 10 ops or more). The first one who helped me twice was called Scotty – I didn’t find out his surname, it was strictly teacher & pupil, especially as he looked elderly … moustache & bald patch … (actually he was about 26). I didn’t see him again at Waddington – we had about 300 air-crew Flight sergeants there.
Anyway, at the Boomerang club, I said good-day to Kirk, we told each other what we’d been doing … he was well into a tour as captain of Sunderland crew – doing Atlantic patrols.
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I remarked that it was a coincidence that the only two fliers [sic] from Mendooran should be on leave at the same place & time. He said ‘-“Oh no, there’s another Mendooranite over here, Vernon Gall, who was the teller at the Bank of NSW there.” I replied that I didn’t know him. Kirk said:- “Well you might not have met him as you were at High School at Mudgee when your parents came to Mendooran, then you worked in Sydney, went into the Army, then the Air Force – you rarely were in Mendooran. Well, what do you know – there he is, I’ll bring him over & introduce you.” Kirk came back with Scotty. We laughed about that coincidence! After the war, when I bought the sports depot in Mudgee & transferred my bank a/c to the Bank of NSW there, Scotty was the teller.
[symbol] At the Club I also met Joe Barber & Eric Gentle who’d been with me at Cootamundra. Ken saw 4 chaps he knew at Lichfield, and I met Rupe Brown the Australian ground-crew corporal who looked after the 3 Lancs & ground crews at our dispersal corner. We went to a play, but didn’t enjoy it - - too serious. Back at A.C.F. played table-tennis with Ken & darts with Sid.
11th: Got some free theatre tickets with Sid & the play was quite enjoyable. Cinema after lunch .. Red Skelton in “Bathing Beauty”, very funny. Game of darts at the Club. Met Jack Freer, who played the saxophone on the ship across the Pacific.
12th. Ken & I got tickets for a play … a good comedy. Darts at the club after supper.
13th Got tickets for a show on Monday. Bought a wireless for £12/3/4.
[symbol] After the war, I found that Ray Meers (Rear Gunner) & Lindsay Francis (Wireless-Operator-Gunner, of Mendooran had both done tours with B.C. about the same time as I.
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14th. Bought more Xmas cards. Had lunch with Peter Dunn from Mudgee at the Club. Saw a newsreel, went to the Windmill theatre, a few beers with Ken, Supper, then table-tennis.
15th. Rupe left to return to Waddington (he’d shared our room
Visited Mme Tussauds waxworks Museum .. very good.
Walked through the Zoo. Saw a newsreel.
16th. At Boomerang Club met Ken Vidler’s crew (I think they were killed a bit later.) Walked the Embankment, saw Cleopatra’s Needle, down Whitehall, got a glimpse of 10 Downing St (cordoned off by Police). Saw the show we’d booked “Happy & Glorious”, easily the best show we’d been to. Had a few drinks with 2 girls who sleep in the railway station at Gloucester Road to be safe from air raids – they’d been doing that for years!
17th: Rain all day. Went cinema that featured 3 films … 4 1/4 hours. Had a steak (!) for 5/- then another film; couldn’t find the ‘steak’ cafe again.
18th. Packed, Sid came back from Exeter & Bristol. Played crib on the train with Sid, all the way to Lincoln. Lunch at 3, collected bike & rode back to camp.
19th. Flew at once for high-level-bombing practice … too much low cloud, so we got a fighter & did some affiliation practice. Then lunch & briefing at 1.30 for a “trip” to Nuremberg, the scene of one of B.C.’s worst losses sometime earlier, when about 500 heavies were caught below high cloud, searchlights lit them up & (from memory) nightfighters, mainly, & flak brought down 49 for a loss rate of 9%. This time it was cloud below us and 467 only lost 1 crew, F/O Rodwell’s … all KIA.
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[circled 13] 23-10-44 FLUSHING. 21 of 467, 20 of 463 of 121 from 5-Group attacked gun positions near Flushing. Visibility was bad and the bombing scattered.
D 3h 20m. 14 x 1000. Briefed to bomb at 6500’ but forced to descend (bad visibility). Bombed at 4000’
[circled 14] BERGEN 28-10-44. 20 of 467, 15 of 463, of 237 from 5-Group, to attack U-boat pens at Bergen. Target was cloud-covered and master-bomber called off the attack after only 47 planes had bombed … from below 5000’ (Mountains within 10 miles of track nearly 4500’!)
D 7h 30m. 12 x 1000 Briefed to bomb at 9000’. Orbited once [inserted] extra 6 min there [/inserted] and lost height using GEE to avoid mountains … bombed at 3800’ Diverted to Marston Moor on return (fog over Waddington). Returned next day.
[inserted] (On our final run there was AA fire from [underlined] above [/underlined] us (mountains) as well as below!) [/inserted]
[circled 15] 30-10-44 WALCHEREN ISLAND. 13 of 467, 13 of 463, of 102 from 5-Group attacked gun positions near Walcheren. The attack was successful and the Allied ground forces commenced their attack on 31st. No losses
Briefed to bomb at 6000’. Cloud over target. Two orbits made – 20 min over target area – bombed at 3500’.
D 3h 20m. 14 x 1000.
OCT ’44 SUMMARY: 467 flew 157 sorties, lost 2 crews (7 KIA, 7 Ev): 5 tours completed, incl. (C.O.) W/C. Brill completing his 2nd tour. 1 crew ditched, rescued & returned.
DAY 1-11-44 HOMBERG. 19 of 467, 17 of 463, of 226 from 5-Group attacked the Meerbeck oil plant at Homberg. Marking was scattered + only 159 planes attempted to bomb. No losses from Waddington.
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After nearly 2 hours on the way home we tried to jettison a J-Cluster (incendiary) which had “hung-up”. We turned back to try to realease [sic] it manually, but failed. So we brought it home & it was safely removed. We landed 1/2 hour late, time airborn was 8hr 9 min. Our bomb-load was 1 x 2000 lb HE & 12 ‘J’ clusters dropped from 17400’.
[circled 13] [underlined] FLUSHING [/underlined] 5 Group sent 121 incl. 21 of 467 Sq & 20 of 463, to attack big gun positions near Flushing on Walcheren Island on 23.10.44. Visibility was bad & the bombing was “scattered”. We took off at 1429, did a Radius of Action & got back to base at 1434 at 2000’. Had a good navigation trip but had to descent from 6500’ to 4000’ to see the target. 1 1/2 min before we bombed our gunners reported a Lanc. hit the sea behind us (I plotted it at 56o33’N, 03o27’E). Quite a few planes were lost and a lot of A.A. damage – we had many holes. Our bomb load was 14 of 1000 lb HE, and 1 of them “hung-up”. We tried to jettison it but couldn’t. We were airborn [sic] for 3h. 19 min.
[circled 14] [underlined] BERGEN (NORWAY) [/underlined] 5-Group sent 237 of which 20 from 467 Sq + 15 from 463, on 28-10-44 to attack U-boat pens at night. We took off at 2221 & did a Radius of Action & got back to base at 2250 at 1500’ which we maintained until 0120 (up till then we were over the N. Sea) when we climbed to 9000’ & increased speed to 180 mph as we were 3 min behind time. When we got to the target we were in cloud. The master bomber told us to come down to 5000’ … we had to orbit carefully as there were mountains East of Bergen over 4000’. I used GEE position lines to descend safely away from mountains to 3800’ when we bombed … about 10 min after the planned time. It was nice to have GEE all the way (no jamming like over Germany) & we kept nicely to track all the way. Our bomb load was 12 x 1000 lb HE. There was plenty of flak around Bergen … some from mountain tops nearly level with us! There was a lot of cloud (& maybe smoke-screen) at the target … master bomber cancelled the raid after only 47 of us bombed
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30.10.44. [symbol] 15 WALCHEREN ISLAND (FLUSHING). 13 from 467 Sqdn & 13 from 463 of 102 total (all 5 Group), daylight raid on big gun emplacements on the Southern edge of Walcheren Island. The Germans also held the Southern banks of the Scheldt Estuary. The Allies had always wanted to capture Antwerp (50 miles inland, the biggest port for unloading tanks & other heavy equipment). While ever these big guns covered both sides of the Estuary, the Allies couldn’t go in to clear the minefields. In fact the Canadian army trying to take the South bank was held up by bad weather (flooded terrain), lack of petrol & ammunition (Patton was partly to blame along with Eisenhower) for so long that eventually, [inserted] our [/inserted] [deleted] Armies [/deleted] [inserted] Marines [/inserted] took Antwerp from the East & finally [inserted] 8 NOV [/inserted] captured Walcheren Island by “sailing” through gaps in the sea-wall from the East! It then took [inserted] nearly [/inserted] another month to clear the mines & winter had set in … too late to use Antwerp for the big offensive they may have been able to mount had they cleared Antwerp 3 months earlier.
We took off at 1340, did a R. of A. & got back to base at 1356 at 1500’. The navigation was easy & we stayed on-track & on-time to the target. We’d been told to bomb at 6000’, but found cloud below, so had to orbit [inserted] twice [/inserted] lose height to 3500’, finally bombing 22 min later than planned. Our bomb load was 14 x 1000 lb HE. We had no losses. The attack was successful, and the Canadian army began their attack along the S. bank the next day.
We dropped 14 x 1000 lb HE; the flight took 3h 20 min. For October, 467 Sq. flew 157 sorties, lost 2 crews (7 KIA, 7 Evaded); 5 tours were completed; 1 crew ditched, were rescued & returned.
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Nov 1st. 226 Lancs of 5 Group (19 from 467 & 17 from 463), in daylight, raided the Meerbeck oil plant near Homberg. Weather was bad, the marking was scattered and only 159 attempted to bomb. No losses from Waddington.
2.11.44 [symbol] 16. DUSSELDORF. 5 Group was part of a big raid (992) by Bomber Command, 15 from 467, 15 from 463. Detailed German reports listed 5000 buildings destroyed, many of them industrial & production works. There were other raids that night too … a total of 1131 sorties. We took off at 1651, 15 min. late. We climbed to 17000’ & increased speed to 170 mph to catch up. At 1920 (at 18000’) we were “coned” by searchlights … very dangerous as ‘flak’ then could be fired visually. We shook them off & bombed at 1925, & I noted that an aircraft was hit about 10 mi ahead, our heading 220o.T. On the way home in the next 26 min, I made 12 more log entries of aircraft crashing to the ground with estimates of their bearing & distance from us.
The RAF had set up 2 more GEE “chains” based in Europe. I tried the RUHR chain, but found the readings “wouldn’t plot”.
Our bomb-load was 11 x 1000 lb & 4 x 500 lb HE.
The trip took 5h 20 min.
467 Sqdn lost F/O Langridge & crew (3 KIA, 5 evaded).
Dusseldorf taken (on Cook’s tour 19.6.45
[two photographs]
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[circled 16] 2-11-44. DUSSELDORF. 15 of 467, 15 of 463 as part of 992 of Bomber Command. Detailed German reports list 5000 buildings destroyed, many of them industrial & production works. (There were other raids that night too … a total of 1131 sorties.) 467 lost F/O L. Langridge & crew (3 KIA, 5 evaded).
C. 5h 20m. 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500. 18000’
NIGHT 4-11-44 DORTMUND-EMS CANAL. 12 of 467, 12 of 463, of 174 from 5-Group attacked the canal near Munster. The banks of the canal were breached again. A report from Albert Speer to Hitler dated 11.11.44 was captured at the end of the war. Speer stated that the raids on the Dortmund-Ems canal, with attacks on the rail system, produced more serious setbacks to the German war industry at this time than any other type of bombing.
[circled 17] 6-11-44. EMS-WESER CANAL. 19 of 467, 16 of 463, of 235 from 5-Group attacked near the junction of the Ems-Weser and Mittland canals, near Gravenhorst. Markers had considerable difficulty in finding the junction due to ground haze, until a low-flying Mosquito (pilot: F/L L.C. de Vigne, and Aust. navigator, S/L. F. Boyle of 627 Sqdn) found and marked the target with such accuracy that the marker fell into the water and was soon extinguished. Only 31 planes bombed before the Master-Bomber ordered the raid be abandoned. 10 planes lost in the raid, 3 crews from 463 (all KIA). Waddington was fog bound on return & most planes were diverted to Seething. We were perhaps the last to land (in v. poor visibility).
D 5h 25m. 14 x 1000 (but did not bomb). Orbited target once, for extra 10 min. over it.
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4.11.44. 174 Lancs of 5 Group, 12 each from 467 & 463 Sqdns, attacked the Dortmund-Ems Canal, near Munster. The banks of the canal were breached again. A report from Albert Speer to Hitler dated 11.11.44 was captured at the end of the war. Speer stated then:- “that the raids on the Dortmund-Ems Canal, with attacks on the rail system, produced more serious setbacks to the German war industry, at this time, than any other type of bombing.” (In early 1945, the raids on oil targets may have been even more damaging to their war effort.)
6.11.44 [symbol] 17. EMS-WESER CANAL. 235 of 5 Group, 19 from 467, 16 from 463 attacked the Ems-Weser junction with the Mittland Canal, near Gravenhorst. The markers had considerable difficulty finding the junction due to ground haze, until a low-flying Mosquito (pilot: F/Lt L.C. de Vigne, & Australian navigator, S/Ldr F. Boyle of 627 Sqdn) found & marked the target with such accuracy that the marker landed in the canal & was soon extinguished. Only 31 planes bombed before the Master-Bomber abandoned the raid. 10 planes were lost, 3 of them from 463 Sqdn (all KIA).
We were supposed to take off at 1633 but actually took off 28 min late, so once we climbed to 11000’ we boosted our I.A.S. to 180 mph & were on-time by 1915. I logged a Lanc. crashing at 1923 1/2; we had to orbit twice [inserted] (12 min) [/inserted], at the target (due to the marking problem) … very dangerous. Logged 4 more planes crashing [deleted] at [/deleted] in the target area, & another at 1943, after we’d left the target without bombing. I couldn’t get any “joy” on either of the 2 new GEE chains. The trip took 5h. 25 min. We brought back our 14 x 1000 lb H.E. bombs.
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The weather deteriorated on the way back … the bumps were so bad that I had to hold all my navigation gear down to stop them hitting the roof, & brace my knees under the nav. table to avoid joining them there. The visibility at Waddington was bad due to fog, and most of our planes were diverted to Strubby; however, Peter did an abbreviated circuit (so he could actually keep the runway in sight) & then came in as if in a Tiger Moth, almost clipping the caravan stationed near the “funnel” (where they might use a Verey to send-you-round-again), but he landed safely … and then they closed the airfield.
Besides getting the 2 new GEE chains (RHEIMS & RHUR) to help with navigation over Germany, we now had LORAN fitted. It was similar in some ways to GEE, but depened [sic] on the radio signals being reflected from the ionosphere (only at night). The stations were widely separated … I think England, Norway, Italy … and each single reading had to be made & timed, then another [deleted] one [/deleted] tuned-in, read & timed … probably 2 min or more later, & the running -fix method used. On 9.11.44 we did at [sic] Cross-Country, using Loran, over England, ending with some high-level bombing practice … 3 1/4 hrs trip. The trailing aerial had to be used to receive Loran signals.
11.11.44 [symbol] 18. HARBURG. A 5-Group raid of 237 planes, + 8 marker Mosquitos, 19 from 467, 14 from 463 … a night raid on the Rhenania-Ossag oil refinery, near Hamburg. This refinery had been raided several times by American daylight bombers. We took off at 1627, did a R. of A. to be back a [sic] base at 1634 at 3000’.
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(HARBURG)
We climbed to 15000’ & later to 16000’ to get out of cloud, & kept nicely to track all the way to the target, getting a bit behind time all the way (no worries we were over the sea nearly all the way). We bombed 8 min late from 16000’. Our WOP (Eric) told us the Master Bomber said to bomb the centre of the Red Target Indicators (there were 4), but to ignore outside Indicators which were dummies (set up by the Germans). Half an hour before the target I wanted to use LORAN, but Eric (our WOP) said he’d been ordered not to use the trailing aerial. I relied on Dead-Reckoning from the target and got my first GEE fix 50 min later about 15 mi. N. of track.
Our bomb-load was 1 x 4000 lb “cookie”, 6 x 1000 lb, & 6 x 500 lb H.E. We could still see the plant burning from 100 mi away on our way back. Our squadron lost F/O Fedderson’s crew (7 KIA) & F/O Eyre’s crew (6 KIA, 1 POW) … one of these killed was Geoff (“Bushie”) Goodfellow, their navigator, one of my best friends … we played a lot of cards together & we bunked opposite each other in our room. He came from Tooraweenah (father ran the “Mountain View” hotel there), & he said I was the only person he’d met that had even heard of the place, let alone been there, which I had.
F/L Kynoch’s plane was hit & badly damaged, but he crash-landed it at Manston (an emergency ‘drome on the coast) & he & the crew survived.
The flight lasted 5h. 35 min.
On 13.11.44 we did our “20 SORTIE CHECK”, on a flight of 55 min. We’d only done 18 ops plus the 2 BULLSEYES at Lichfield & Swinderby.
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[circled 18] 11-11-44 HARBURG. 19 of 467, 14 of 463, of 237 from 5-Group, plus 8 Marker Mosquitos attacked the Rhenania-Ossag oil refinery at Harburg (near Hamburg). This had been attacked several times by American (day) bombers. Brunwig’s ‘History of Hamburg & Harburg’ (air-raids), gives the raid a brief mention. (We could still see the plant burning 100 miles away on our way home.)
467 lost F/O. M. Fedderson & crew (7 POW), and F/O. T. Eyre & crew [inserted] (G Goodfellow was the Nav) [/inserted] (6 KIA, 1 POW). F/L Kynoch’s plane was hit and badly damaged – he crash-landed at Manston (an emergency ‘drome on the coast).
D 5h 35m. 1 x 4000 + 6 x 1000 + 6 x 500 16000’
[circled 19] 16-11-44 DUREN. 15 of 467, 15 of 463, as part of 1188 from Bomber Command, attacked Duren, Julich & Heinsburg in support of the American 1st & 9th armies which were about to advance on this area. Raids were made by 1239 American heavy bombers on targets in the same area. (this was the biggest raid we took part in … there were planes to the horizon all the way, heaps of fighter escorts.) 9400 tons of bombs dropped. The result was disappointing. Heavy rain and wet ground prevented much of the tank assault and slowed the supplies of artillery ammunition and the armies’ advance was slow and costly. (For our part, the centre of Duren was reduced to rubble.) G/C. Bonham-Carter, O/C of Waddington led our Group, as ‘second dickie’ to the crew who had bombed the wrong target on a daylight raid on Flushing (23-10-44?), killing some Canadians.
D 5h 25m. 12 x 1000. 10500’
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16.11.44 [symbol] 19. DUREN (daylight). 15 planes from 467, & 15 from 463, were part of a big effort by Bomber Command (1188 planes) attacking Duren, Julich & Heinsburg in support of the 1st & 9th American Armies which were about to advance in this area. Raids were made on other targets in this area by 1239 American heavy bombers. This was by far the biggest raid we took part in … there were planes to the horizon all the way with heaps of fighter escort … [deleted] B [/deleted] 9400 tons of bombs were dropped, but the result was disappointing. Heavy rain & boggy ground prevented most of the tank attack and slowed supplies of artillery ammunition with the result that the advance was slow & costly. For our part, the centre of Duren was reduced to rubble – it may have needed bulldozers to clear a path through it! The base commander at Waddington, Gp/Capt Bonham-Carter, led 5 Group as ‘second dickie’ to one of our crews who had bombed the wrong “target” (a smoke-generator) on an earlier daylight raid near Flushing on 23.10.44, killing some Canadian army men.
The navigation was easy. Our bomb-load was 12 x 1000 lb H.E. dropped from 10500’. Flight time: 5h 25 min.
[two photographs]
Snaps of Duren taken on the “Cook’s Tour” I did on 19.6.45.
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Extracts from Diary –
18.11.44 navigators briefing at 1.30 for a v. long trip. Not enough time for preparation. Our crew just got out to the “kite” when the trip was “scrubbed” …joy! After tea we went down to the local Horse & Jockey (Hotel). Saw a bloke about his car, & bought it for £3 … a little Morris 8 HP Sedan
19.11.44 To navigation section before lunch for another briefing, to the same place as yesterday, more time for preparation & less to do. No lunch … sandwiches at briefing … then it was scrubbed again. Collected car.
20.11.44. Went to briefing for another daylight raid on the Dortmund-Ems canal, but it was scrubbed. Went to town with Ken Nichols & Ken (of ground crew) … wanted to go to the theatre, but all seats were sold, so we went to the cinema & saw “White Cliffs of Dover.”
21.11.44. Briefed again for the same canal raid as yesterday, chart was already done. [symbol] It was scrubbed at the 11th hour & we missed lunch … again had sandwiches in the briefing room.
21.11.44 [symbol] 20 DORMUND-EMS CANAL
We took off at 1726, did a R. of A. & got back to base at 1754 at 2000’. The winds were light & fairly consistently Westerly at first, then N.W. It was easy to keep on track & close on-time. At 2020 I logged “Lanc, crashed & blew-up 15 mi. astern”. We’d been at 10250’ until 2058 when WOP told us to descent to 3-4000’ … we did so, fast, and bombed at 2103. At 2108 I logged: “Aircraft crashed below us 3 mi. past other target.” At 2232 we jettisoned a hang-up bomb in the sea. Landed at base at 2337, time airborne 6h 11 min. Our bomb-load was 13 x 1000 lb H.E.
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21.11.44. [symbol] 20. DORTMUND-EMS CANAL, near LADBERGEN.
15 from 467, 15 from 463 bombed Dortmund-Ems & Mittland Canals; as part of Bomber Command maximum effort of 1345 heavy bombers attacking 6 targets in this general area.
No losses for 5-Group.
We took off at 1726, did a R. of A. getting back to base at 1754 at 2000’. I had a good navigation trip, GEE from England lasted until 2020, then the RUHR chain worked to the target area. I logged a Lanc. blowing-up 15 mi astern at 2020. We were briefed to bomb at 10500’ but, 5 min before out T.O.T our W.O.P. (Eric) got word that we descend to 3 – 4000’ to get below cloud. We descended quickly & bombed 5 min later at 4500’; then began climbing again into the clouds. Tried Loran for fixing without success. We had a bomb hang-up, but jettisonned [sic] it in the sea at 2222.
Our bomb load was 13 x 1000 lb H.E.
The trip took 6h 10 min.
[photograph]
This is an enlargement of the smaller print of the area bombed repeatedly … DORTMUND EMS CANAL.
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[photograph] Open bomb-bay of a Lanc. loaded with 1000 lb H.E. bombs. Bomb-aimer could select each one to drop separately at predetermined intervals (usually close together as a “stick”.)
[photograph] Our Mid-upper gunner Ray Giles, near his turret – 2 Browning .303 machine guns
[photograph] Lanc’s in formation on a daylight raid. Nearest is PO-J
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On a low-level “Cooks Tour” from Wigsley on 19th June, 1945 (after war’s end in Europe), I took some photos with the old box Kodak.
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The Dortmund Ems canal where it was built above a stream, shown clearly in the left photo. The embankments here were bombed repeatedly, 8 times I think. We did 3 of Ops there and one at the nearby Ems-Weser canal.
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Broken bridges over the Rhine at Duisberg – we didn’t bomb there, but 5 Group did.
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The Krupps works at Essen, which was regularly bombed by the RAF during most of the war. Including some 1000 – bomber raids.
[photograph] Wrecked bridges at Cologne, another regular RAF target; somehow the Cathedral survived.
[photograph] The railway marshalling yards at Hamm received plenty of “attention”
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Dusseldorf was regularly bombed … we did our 16th Op. there
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[circled 20] 21-11-44. DORTMUND-EMS CANAL, (near LADBERGEN). 15 of 467, 15 of 463 as part of 1345 Bomber Command heavies attacked 6 targets in this general area. 5-Group targets were the Mitteland and Dortmund-Ems canals … without loss.
D 6h 10m. 13 x 1000. Briefed to bomb at 10250’, got 5 min warning by radio to descend to cloud base … bombed at 4500’.
[circled 21] 23-11-44. TRONDHEIM. 16 of 467, 4 of 463 of 171 from 5-Group, incl. 7 Mosquito Markers, to attack U-boat pens at Trondheim. The target was covered b y a smokescreen and could not be marked. The Master Bomber ordered the raid abandoned. No losses. (The weather was bad; big wind changes. Many jettisoned bombs in North Sea or diverted to North Scotland due to fuel shortage … we were the only one to return to Waddington with bombs still aboard.)
D 10h 55m. 9 x 1000 (brought home).
26-11-44 MUNICH (Our rear gunner, K. Nickols, went on this trip as ‘spare bod’.) 270 Lancs from 5-Group, 467 lost F/O Findlay & crew (crashed – out of fuel … their Nav. vomited and blocked his oxygen supply, went unconscious and they got lost in cloud. But all survived the crash and were flown home by the Americans on 1.12.44.
NOVEMBER SUMMARY 467 did 148 sorties, lost 4 crews (9 KIA, 8 POW, 11 Ev) 8 tours expired. 2 were badly wounded.
NIGHT 4-12-44 HIELBRONN. 282 from 5-Group (Main force attacked Karlsruhe). 467 lost F/O J. Plumridge & crew (6 KIA. 1 POW). F/L Bill Kynock & crew attacked by fighter, rear gunner killed (F/S R. Steele), and plane badly damaged (we think it was ‘D’.), crash landed at Manston (emergency airfield).
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23.11.44 [symbol] 21. TRONDHEIM (Norway). 5-Group sent 171 planes (including 7 Mosquito markers) to attack the U-boat facilities there. This was a very long trip mostly over the North Sea at low-level (1000’) in bad weather, rain & severe wind-changes. Tankers topped us up with petrol at the end of the runway before we took off at 1609, 12 min late. GEE ran out at 1848 … over 2 hours before we’d reach the target. We were unable to identify where we crossed the coast, so we continued on northwards and at 2050 saw the target lit up by flares to our left. A wind velocity to use for bombing was received by radio, and at 2055 we saw yellow Target Indicators about 10 mi to Port. We turned to a Westerly course. At 2102 we were told to abandon the raid as a smoke-screen obscured the target. We continued by Dead Reckoning & B.A. (Sid) identified a pin-point at 2112. We descended from 9000’ to 1000’, and at about 2130 discovered that the earlier pin-point was wrong, giving a new one near Smolen Island. At 2248 I got my first GEE fix (after 1 1/2 hr since the target) … about 50 mi NW of where we thought we’d be … big wind change. Pilot (Peter) & I decided to aim to land at LEUCHARS (Nth Scotland) as we had a head-wind. Then, at 0024 I got a good fix & found the wind had eased & changed to NE, and by 2130 was from the NW & getting faster. Pilot & Engineer consulted with me & we decided to try for Waddington, cutting our speed back from 190 to 170 mph. The wind held about NW & increased to about 45 mph, so we reached base OK & landed at 0302, with only about 80 gallons left. Most of our planes jettisonned [sic] bombs in the North Sea, or landed at Leuchars. We were the sole plane to bring our bombs home to Waddington. Trip-time 10h 53 min.
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26.11.44. 5-Group sent 270 heavies to MUNICH. Our rear-gunner, Ken Nicholls went as a “spare-bod” in place of a sick crewman. One of the 467 crews crashed, out of fuel. Their navigator had vomited and blocked his oxygen supply, he went unconscious, and they were lost in cloud. They all survived the crash-landing and were flown back by the Americans on 1.12.44.
November summary for 467 Sqdn: 148 sorties, 4 crews lost (9 KIA, 8 POW, 11 Evaded); 8 tours expired. 2 men were badly wounded.
4.12.44 (night). HEILBRONN was attacked by 282 from 5 Group, while the main force of Bomber Command attacked Karlsruhe. 467 Sqdn lost F/O Plumridge & crew (6 KIA, 1 POW). F/Lt Bill Kynoch’s plane was attacked by a fighter, his rear-gunner killed (F/Sgt R. Steele) & the plane badly damaged … we think it was our favourite “D”. They crash landed at the emergency ‘drome, Manston, & we heard that “D” was a write-off.
6.12.44. GIESSEN (night) attacked by 255 of 5-Group (19 from each of 467 & 463 sqdns) while the rest of Bomber Command bombed Osnabruck & Leuna (oil plant).
8.12.44 URFT DAM [symbol] 1. 205 of 5-Group (10 of 467, 15 of 463). 9/10 cloud over target, no result observed. No loss.
10.12.44 URFT DAM [symbol] 2. 5-Group (15 [inserted] each [/inserted] of 467 & 463). All were recalled before the target due to bad weather & visibility.
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More extracts from Diary.
23.11.44. No operations on. Went to Lincoln with Peter & Don in my car to see about getting Peter’s car fixed. Went to the pictures.
Feeling very crook … terrible cough.
24.11.44. Went on sick parade. The Dr. reckoned I was OK for flying … I didn’t. had heard there was to be a long trip that night & saw the Dr. again .. he put me into Sick Quarters & I slept!!! about 20 hours a day. Our crew wasn’t listed for the operation that night, but our rear-gunner, Ken Nichols, opted to go with Bill Kynock’s crew … but the trip was scrubbed anyway. Ken visited me.
25.11.44. Still in sick-quarters. No ops. Ken, Don & Rupe came to see me, then they went to an ENSA concert on the base.
26.11.44. Out of sick-quarters. Ken went with Kynoch’s crew to MUNICH in crook weather. It was OK at the target, quiet & a good ‘prang’. Went over to [deleted] 3 Sqdn [/deleted] SICK QUARTERS to see Ted Pickerd who’d been our Navigation analysis ‘joker’ for some months. Played pontoon, won 10/- Kynoch’s crew were diverted to Langham.
27.11.44. Went to Swinderby & got 3 gal of petrol in the car. Ken & Kynocks crew came back from Langham.
28.11.44. No ops. Made up a list of comments on ops that had to be done … big job. Flew to Thornaby [deleted] to bring [/deleted] & back in ‘D’ [deleted] back [/deleted] with a ferry crew for their plane.
Navigators party on tonight … too bad Ted Pickerd is still in sickquarters. Des Sands (o i/c A flight … Sqn Ldr, DFM on 2nd or 3rd tour) Lionel Hart & I took others in cars, the rest used bikes. Wionderful show. Bags of beer & fun.
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NIGHT 6-12-44 GIESSEN 19 of 467, 19 of 463, of 255 from 5-Group. (Main force attacked Osnabruck & Leuna).
DAY 8-12-44. URFT DAM [symbol] 1. 10 of 467, 15 of 463 of 205 from 5-Group. 9/10 cloud over target and no result observed. No loss.
DAY 10-12-44 URFT DAM [symbol] 2. 15 of 467, 15 of 463 … 5-Group. All recalled before reaching target due to bad weather and visibility.
[circled 22] 11-12-44 URFT DAM [symbol] 3. 15 of 467, 15 of 463, of 233 from 5-Group, with Mosquito Markers. Hits observed but no breach seen. (We brought our bombs home, despite doing an orbit … (hoping for gap in clouds) … against orders … extra 7 min. in target area. Very accurate radar-directed flak; we lost P.O. motor.).
F 6h 5m. 14 x 1000 (brought home) (9750’)
[circled 23] 17-12-44 MUNICH. 22 of 467, 19 of 463 of 280 from 5-Group, with 8 Mosquito Markers. (Main force attacked Duisburg, Ulm and Munster … a total of 1310 heavies, 1.1% loss.) Reconnaissance showed severe damage. 467 lost F/O T. Evans & crew (all 7 Ev) … they collided after bombing with an engine on fire.
M 9h 45m 1 x 4000 + 9 cans + 1 MONROE 11750’
[circled 24] 18-12-44 GDYNIA. 19 of 467, 15 of 463 of 236 from 5-Group. 2 crews from each flight attacked 2 pocket Battleships anchored near the port (which was the main target) … we hit “Lutzow” with 3 of our bombs (& 1 v. close in water) nicely near funnel area. Considerable damage to port area.
M 9h 45m. 10 x 1000 S.A.P.
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29.11.44. No ops. Went into Lincoln to try to register car … no joy; had to go to Sleaford, but no time. Tore around garages [inserted] for [/inserted] a battery & brake adjusters, but no joy. Finished off the navigation comments from yesterday. Decided to sell my autocycle & got a buyer. Played pontoon, won 3/-.
30.11.44. No ops. Went to Sleaford, got car registered & oil changed. Got coupons for petrol to go on leave, packed up, got leave pass, laundry & shoes. Went into Lincoln with Ken & got petrol & a new battery. Saw about trains for Ray & Eric for tomorrow.
1.12.44. Went out to our dispersal where mechanics helped get new battery in & working after a lot of trouble … bludged a couple of gallons of petrol from Ken (ground crew). Left at 10.10, had lunch at Nottingham & then went on to Birmingham, getting to where Don was staying at 3.30. had tea there, played solo until 1.30 am, went down to “Old Farm” at [inserted] ? Wesley [/inserted] Westly Castle for the night.
2.12.44. Duck eggs for breakfast! Lunch at Police Station (don had been a policeman in Birmingham before he enlisted for air crew.) Then tea at Mrs Benlays (friend of Don). Met Ken & Mrs Smith & Margaret from next door. Played solo. Went to Police Club for drinks. More solo ‘till 2 am. Slept next door at Smiths.
3.12.44. Breakfasts on both at Smiths & Benlays. Called at jewellers for Ken’s watch, but no luck. Set off for Swindon. Lunch at Swan’s Nest in Stratford. Looked over Shakespeare’s birthplace, got postcards & saw Home Guard parade. Went on to “Stow-in-the-Wold” & stayed the night in a nice little pub. Played darts, crib & drank beer.
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[photograph] Engineer Don Coutts & Mid Upper Gunner Ray Giles, Birmingham
[photograph] Rear Gunner, Ken Nichols, & Ray Giles at Benlay’s place at Birmingham where we stayed on leave 1/2 Dec ’44.
[photograph] Ray Giles, at Benlays’ place, Birmingham
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More from the Diary.
4.12.44. Rachel Swindon for dinner. Found our way out to Clyffe-Pyhard & saw Bunty Duff & got back just before dark. Had tea at fish & chip shop & went to pictures – saw Jon Hall & Maria Montez in ‘Cobra Woman’.
5.12.44 After breakfast towed an Engineers car to get it started. Bought side-lamp for car. Reached Slough via Reading for lunch & called [deleted] on [/deleted] at Margaret Vyner’s place … she was in London meeting Hugh Marlowe, home from France on 72-hours leave. Saw Mrs Vyner & Hugo, had afternoon tea & went to Slough, booked in at Salthill Hotel & had tea. At pub, picked up 2 girls & took them home but got lost on the way back. Turned in at 12.30.
6.12.44. Looked around a lot of shops in Slough & finally got some bulbs for dash-lights. Met an old Aussie-Scot, Macintosh for yarn & drinks; he showed us his home at 26 Windsor Rd. Slough. Drove to Windsor & looked over Eton College on Founders Day, … going for 504 years. Saw Windsor Castle & had tea there. Played cards with Ken, before & after tea.
7.12.44. After breakfast caught train to London & booked in at A.C.F. Club. Met Scottie Gall & Kirk Beddie again; had steak (!) & mushrooms at Athens Cafe; went to pictures & saw “Casanova Brown”. More steak with onions then a variety show at the Empire in Finsbury Park. Went back tp pub at Gloucester Rd & saw girls we knew from last leave in London. Also ran into Syd & Peter.
8.12.44. Arranged to meet Peter on the way to Cambridge. Got car at Slough & was 1 hr late in meeting Peter. Had lunch at Cambridge Arms. Saw a good picture “Love Story”. Met a navigator I knew at Brighton … Cameron, who’d done 35 ops in Mosquitos. More steak & onions for supper.
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9.12.44. Looked at some of Cambridge University … not much to see. Had lunch at roadside pub and got to Lincoln about 4.30. collected photos, had drinks at the Saracens head & went to a show at the Royal Theatre. Peter’s car had a flat tyre. Got battle-dress from cleaners & put overcoat in. A good leave
10.12.44. Welcomed back to nav. section. No ‘war’ today. had an interview for commission with Group-Captain Bonham-Carter. W/Cdr Bill Brill had told us not to apply for a commission until we’d done about 20 “trips”. But after he left, in October, the new C.O. W/Cdr J.K. Douglas invited anyone interested in a commission to apply, regardless of the number of ops. I did, but didn’t impress him with my answers (especially when I said “probably not” to his question “would I be more use to the air force with a commission?”. He didn’t recommend me. But Bonham-Carter said something like this: “I have 2 W’ Cdrs here, at 467 & 463; one C.O. recommends virtually all applicants after they’ve done 20 trips; the other (Douglas) likes to interview them at depth & knocks a few back. I have to make the final decision. You seem to be doing well. I’ll look at you again next month.” (He saw me in Mid-January with only one Op (Brux) to go, and recommended me without any further questioning.)
11.12.44. Took laundry & boots down but didn’t have time to check them in … there’s “war” on. Went to briefing room & sorted out Gee charts. The briefing was hurried; the plane we got, (F), was slow, climbed poorly, and we were late getting to the target.
(con’t on next page)
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11.12.44 [symbol] 22. URFT DAM No 3. Daylight raid by 233 from 5-Group (15 each from 467 & 463 Sqdns), with Mosquitos doing the marking. Hits were observed but no breach seen. We brought our bombs back despite doing an orbit (against orders) hoping for a gap in the clouds … we spent 7 minutes extra over the target, and experienced very accurate radar-directed flak just after leaving. We lost our Port-Outer motor.
We took off at 1205, did a R. of A. returning to base at 1219, at 6000’. We climbed to 12000’ & “cruised” at 170 mph, but gradually got behind time (5 min late at 1350) but only 3 min. late at the target. This plane, F, would not go any faster with our bomb-load of 14 x 1000 lb. H.E. Pilot feathered our Port Outer motor at 1554 (maybe some flak damage). Jettisonned [sic] 2 bombs at 1645 which took extra time … ending up 47 min. late home. Flight time 6h 5 min.
17.12.44 [symbol] 23. Night-raid on MUNICH by 280 from 5-Group, (22 from 467, 19 from 463), with 8 Mosquito markers. The rest of Bomber Command attacked Duisberg, Ulm & Munster, a total of 1310 ‘heavies’, for a 1.1% loss rate. Reconnaissance showed severe damage. 467 lost F/O T. Evans & crew (all 7 Evaded) … they collided after bombing with an engine on fire; they baled out before the plane crashed.
We took off at 1636, 3 min late, and immediately began climbing on course, south for Reading, then into France near Le Havre, mostly at 4000’, very bumpy, tried 5000’ to get out of cloud, then down to 3000’ & back to 4000’. As we neared the SW corner of Switzerland we climbed to 15000’ & skirted its southern border, seeing lights on in some villages.
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We had a good navigation trip to the target, keeping close to track & timing OK. We used GEE until 2026, then some LORAN fixes (some inaccurate) but sighted target at 2152, descended to 12000’ to bomb at 2211.
At 2214 I logged “air-to-air firing up – qr. to beam”
At 2215 1/2 “ “ “aircraft went in 40 mi ahead”.
We began descending in steps to 5500’ & continued to use LORAN until 2350 when GEE came good.
I got very airsick about 2250 (first time since Cootamundra!), and at about 2310 saw flak coming up from Mulhouse, so we turned to Port to avoid it. At 0110, the GEE box went unserviceable (U/S), and we read PUNDITS back to base where we landed at 0220. Flight time was 9h 45 min, bomb load was 1 x 4000 lb “cookie” & 9 cans of incendiaries & 1 Monroe.
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18.11.44. [symbol] 24. GYDNIA (“A” Target: Pocket Battleship LUTZOW).
A 5-Group raid, 236 planes, 19 of 467 & 15 of 463 Sqdn, on the Naval base. Considerable damage to the port area was reported. Two crews from each flight of both squadrons were to arrive at their targets … two pocket battleships, 9 min before the rest of the Group were to start bombing; the markers & the accompanying flare-force (they dropped lots of long-burning flares to light up the area for the Markers) arrived then too. We were supposed to see the battleships in the light of the flares & do our bombing between 2151 & 2156. Our bomb-load was 10 x 1000 S.A.P (Semi-Armour Piercing) bombs … unlikely to be really damaging, although the decks of the pocket-battleships were much thinner than on “real” battleships (although they had 16” guns, the same.)
We took off at 1712, already 10 min later than planned, & flew at about 3 – 4000’ at 180 mph until 2000, when we climbed to 11500’. GEE had given out at 1850, but LORAN was OK & I got good signals at 1920, but we hadn’t been given Loran charts that covered beyond 56oN. So it was dead-reckoning & the hope of a pin-point later. Then, at 2055 1/2, I got a Loran fix, on track, just below the 56oN latitude, which could be plotted. I got another dubious fix at 2105 1/2, about 5 mi Sth of track, then another good one at 2122 1/2, on track again. I got another good Loran fix at 2133 which allowed me to estimate the wind velocity at 190/23. We turned on dead-reckoning 3 min late at point E, & arrived at point F, on dead-reckoning 2 min late, and steered visually for our target. At 2150, Syd, our Bomb-Aimer, reported a smoke screen starting over the battleships area. The flares went down at 2150 1/2, but didn’t penetrate the smokescreen. At 2153 our Pilot, Peter, decided to “go-round” again. As we turned Syd saw the Lutzow, [indecipherable word] behind us now. We flew North East
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for a while, did a timed run, using his stop-watch, to be back over our target at 2158. But again, the smoke-screen obscured our target. We turned Northwards & repeated the timed run. All this time we experienced a lot of radar-predicted flak, close enough to keep rocking our plane. While we were doing this 3rd orbit, Peter said: “If we can’t bomb this time, we’ll go round again and lose height to bomb at low-level.” Syd said: “Geez, that would be bloody dangerous.” At 2206, the target was clear & we bombed accurately. On the photograph which we saw back at base the next day, 3 of our bombs hit the deck amidships, one very close to the funnel, and a 4th bomb right alongside in the water. We’d actually bombed from 11750’ at 150 mph (I.A.S.), heading 260oT. At 2208 I logged: “Lanc. crashed Stb. Bow, 20 mi.” We crossed the coast at 2216 and got a Loran fix at 2222 1/2, only 3 mi. S. of track. The rest of the trip home was uneventful, we kept close to track and landed at 0303, flight-time 9h 51 min.
[drawing of area map]
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I did some research about the Lutzow & Admiral von Sheer. They were both damaged and the Lutzow was towed to Swinemunde, the Admiral von Sheer to Keil, where, on the night of 9/10 April ’45, a raid using 591 planes, sank the von Sheer, and so severely damaged the light cruised Emden & the heavy cruiser Hippo, that their crews then scuttled them … they were unable to put to sea. Then on the night of 16/17 April, 617 Squadron attacked Swinemunde, & effectively disposed of Germany’s last pocket battleship, Lutzow, although I read that its crew also finally scuttled it, as it was beyond repair
[symbol] [underlined] 25 [/underlined]. 27-12-44. 5-Group sent 200 planes (15 of 467 & 12 of 463) to bomb [underlined] RHEYT [/underlined] (our [symbol] 25 trip), the railway yards there, part of Munchen-Gladbach, where we’d done our 5th trip. We took off at 1204, did a R. of A. to be back at base at 1220 at 6000’. We were supposed to fly in formation but there was a lot of confusion … we finally flew individually until 1309 when we joined the formation. Near the target, the other planes began turning towards the target long before reaching the GEE lattice line we were told to follow. We did as we’d been told, and bombed at 1505 1/2 from 17200’. The trip home was uneventful, the navigation easy, as we had GEE all the way, using the RHUR chain over Germany. We had some flak going close just after the target at 1512 1/2. We landed at 1705, flight-time was 5h., bomb-load was 14 x 1000 lb. H.E.
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[deleted] [circled [indecipherable number]] [/deleted] NIGHT 21-12-44. POLITZ. 17 of 467, 17 of 463, of 207 from 5-Group attacked synthetic oil plant. 3 Lancs lost over Europe, but 5 crashed in England on return … 90% of airfields were fogbound … most were diverted to Scotland, but some were so short on fuel they had to try to land in fog. (F.L. Kynoch crashed ‘M’ at Waddington, but no injuries.)
[circled 25] 27-12-44 RHEYDT. 15 of 467, 12 of 463, of 200 from 5-Group, attacked railway yards at Rheydt. No loss
C 5h 0m. 14 x 1000. 17200’
DAY 28-12-44 MOSS SHIPPING (OSLO FIORD). 4 of 467, 6 of 463 of 67 from 5-Group attacked a large naval unit off Oslo Fiord. No direct hits claimed.
30-12-44 HOUFFALIZE. 12 of 467, 12 of 463 of 166 from 5-Group attacked the German supply bottleneck at Houffalize. Cloud obscured target. (Main force of 500 heavies attacked Kalh-Nord railway yards near Cologne … results obscured by cloud.)
DEC ’44 SUMMARY. December ended in a long spell of cold, fog & snow which restricted operations and serviceability. 467 flew 172 sorties, losing 2 crews + 1 gunner. (7 KIA, 1 POW, 7 Ev) 8 crews finished tours. 1 crew crashlanded [sic] and were rescued.
(The 2 Lanc. Squadrons (467 & 463) had learnt that the 5-Group method of marking was the most cost-effective way of striking heavy flows to the enemy. From 17.8.44 (when Bomber Command returned to attacks on Germany proper, after the many short trips for 2nd Front, a total of 72881 sorties from which 696 aircraft were lost (… about 1%). In this period of 137 days [deleted] 467 & 463 [/deleted] [inserted] Bomber Command [/inserted] made 530 sorties per day (av.) & lost 5.1 planes per day (av.) … 265708 tons of bombs were dropped.
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[circled 26] 1-1-45. DORTMUND-EMS CANAL 18 of 467, 5 of 463 of 102 from 5-Group, breached the canal near Ladbergen, (the Germans had repaired the canal again.) They were using an enormous number of slave labourers (‘Todt’ workers … 40000 we heard) to repair these vital links in their transport system. (And so when the barges began to run again they ‘knew’ the Lancs would soon come, and they were ready with AA & fighters … it was a hot spot.)
(On this trip F/O Merv Bache got an immediate DSO … their B/A. was Sam Nelson (WaggaWagga) … onfire, [sic] crashed just inside Allied lines … they’d all baled out in time. F/S Thompson of 9 Sqdn. got a posthumous VC also.)
B 6h 40m. 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500. 10900’
Landed at STRUBBY on return, due to fog.
NIGHT 1.1.45 MITTELLAND CANAL (GRAVENHORST). 4 of 467, 6 of 463, of 152 from 5-Group with 5 Mosquitos. No loss. During all this period, Waddington, and most of England, was deep in snow. Aircraft were buried in snow, and runways could not be kept open for them. Landing on icy runways was difficult. (On 1.1.45, Bomber Command flew 598 sorties day & night, and 5 planes crashed trying to land.)
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More about the DORTMUND-EMS on 1/1/45.
Many years after the war I got to know Sam Nelson, (also a golfer), who was the Bomb Aimer in Merv Bache’s crew. He told me that his navigator was in the process of writing a small book covering their ‘troubles’ that day. I mentioned that I still had my logs & charts, including for that day, so I posted them to him, with the result that parts of my log & chart were photocopied (reduced size) and included in his book … and I received a copy; later a few more pages were sent about what happened to their crew members thereafter. Several of their crew had a reunion in Canberra just at the time when they refurbished the Lancaster display in the War Museum. They told the staff of their “trouble” on 1/1/45, and were given the privilege of going inside the Lanc, even though it was not then open to the public.
I’ve made a “pocket” at the back of this folder for that book.
On pages 33/4 of that book is some details about a major German air attack on Allied aircraft & airfields on the same morning as our daylight raid on the Dortmund-Ems Canal. It may have been fortunate for us that most of their fighters were otherwise-occupied that morning.
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[circled 27] 4.1.45. ROYAN (S. France).
8 of 467, 16 of 463, of 344 Lancs & 7 Mosquitoes. F/O R. Eggins (467) had a mid-air collision with another Lanc., they baled out & were rescued.
Stubborn German garrison holding out at Royan prevented Allies from using Bordeaux as a port. (the Americans had kept a big force in that area, hoping to capture Bordeaux much earlier.) Bomber Command was ordered to bomb the town. It appears that the order was cancelled, but that order not received by the Squadrons concerned. But the French people there were told of the cancellation. As a result 700 French people were killed & soured relations with Britain.
We took off at [deleted] 0122 [/deleted] 0104, did the usual Radius of Action to be back at base at 0140 at 2000’. We flew southwards crossing the coast near Portsmouth. We had GEE all the way 7 so kept nicely on-track; the winds mainly from NNE varied between 35 & 60 mph.
When just short of the target we got a message at 0359 1/2 “do not bomb for 2 min.” We were due there in about 1 min. I wrote “Have to orbit I think.” Then at 0400 1/2 we were told “Come in & bomb”, which we did at 0401 without having to orbit, at 6250’.
We had an easy trip home, airborne for 6h. 30m. Our bomb load was 1 x 4000 (“Cookie”), & 16 x 500 lb HE.
On the back of my chart are several diagrams showing what the displays looked like on the GEE-BOX, and an indication of the curves on our GEE Charts.
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NIGHT. 5-1-45 HOUFFALIZE. 10 of 467, 8 of 463, of 131 from 5 Group, with 9 Mosquitos attacked supply bottleneck at Houffalize in the Ardennes. Target was hit with great accuracy. No loss. (Main force of 664 attacked Hannover, losing [underlined] 4.7%. [/underlined])
[circled 28] 7-1-45 MUNICH. 11 of 467, 16 of 463, of 645 Lancs. and 9 Mosquitos. This was the last major raid on Munich by Bomber Command; the industrial area was severely damaged. 467 lost F/O W. McNamee & crew (all KIA) … Severe icing caused high fuel consumption … they ran out of fuel and baled out over the sea 5 mi. from Eye, but were not found.
V 8h 45m. 1 x 4000 + 6 J clusters.
(The winds on this trip were forecast at about 80 mph from NW, so the route to the target was direct across Germany, then home south of Switzerland. (Usually, on Munich trips, we’d go out south of Switzerland, hiding from radar behind the mountains – maybe – then come home, faster across Germany.) The winds, in places, exceeded 100 mph. We were forced to ‘waste time’ on the way to the target (dangerous over Germany!). We took 3 hours to reach Munich loaded, then 6 hours to come home empty!)
[inserted] I haven’t got my log & chart for this trip – mislaid when I was teaching ATC cadets at Forest Hills [/inserted]
NIGHT 13-1-45 POLITZ. 17 of 467, 14 of 463, of 218 Lancs & 7 Mosquitos from 5-Group, attacked the oil plant near Stettin. Intended to be [inserted] a [/inserted] blind H2S attack, but the target was clear and the 5-Group low-level-marking was used in an accurate attack. Photo-reconnaissance stated that the oil plant was reduced to rubble. No loss from Waddington.
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NIGHT 14-1-45 MERSBERG-LEUNA. 14 of 467, 14 of 463 of 573 Lancs & 14 Mosquitos attacked the synthetic oil plant at Leuna. Albert Speer wrote … “this was the most damaging raid on the synthetic oil industry”. (The remainder of Bomber Command raided Grevenbroich & Dulmen … a total of 1214 sorties.)
[circled 29] 16-1-45 BRUX. 16 of 467, 12 of 463 of 231 Lancs & 6 Mosquitos of 5-Group, attacked the synthetic oil plant in western Czecho-slovakia [sic] (the plant had P.O.W. camps quite close by). The raid was a complete success. Speer also mentions this raid “as a particularly severe setback to oil production”. (Bomber Command attacked 4 other targets this night with a total of 1238 bombers. All were successful … the loss rate was 2.4% (about 30). No loss from Waddington.
D 10h. 0m. 1 x 4000 + 12 x 500 (Not dropped – bomb circuit U.S.) 14250’
(The bombing circuit was faulty – we made 3 orbits of the target, taking 20 mins, but could not remedy the trouble. We set out for home with bombs aboard and flew home at fairly low altitude – varying between 4500’ & 8500’, our airspeed 15 – 20 mph slower than the rest of the force. Then we had to make a diversion into the North Sea jettison area to manually release one bomb fitted with anti-handling fuse. The result was that we were last home, nearly an hour late. As this was our last trip we were ‘expected’ to come home faster than usual & be ‘first home’ … many thought we were unlucky enough to ‘get the chop’ on our last trip. The aircraft had severe problems (besides the bomb circuit and resulted in a tragic crash on 2.2.45, killing all but one of the crew … included were T. Paine & W. Robinson from Mudgee.)
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I met Chris Jarret at a University conference in the 60’s and heard from him what happened to them in ‘D’ on the night of 2-2-45.
He was lucky to survive, although it was easy for the Bomb-Aimer to be first out when told to “Bale-Out”. The next man out would have been Tom Paine, the Rear Gunner, & he told me that he was the only other one to get out & open his ‘chute in time to avoid death, but that Tom landed over the crest of a hill & was killed by the plane crashing & bombs exploding near him, while Chris had landed on the other side of the hill.
Tom Paine was in my classes at Mudgee High right from 1st year in 1936.
Bill Robinson must have started in 1935 as he was a year ahead of us; but I can remember him as the school was rather small (about 400) compared to the 1000+ when I taught there in the ‘60s.
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NIGHT 22-1-45. GELSENKIRCHEN. 0 from 467, 1 from 463. (photographic)
JANUARY SUMMARY. The month ended with heavy snow and bad visibility. 467 did 90 sorties losing 3 crews (7 KIA, 14 Ev.) 4 crews ‘tour-expired’.
NIGHT 1-2-45 SIEGEN (Railway Yards) 21 of 467, 19 of 463 of 271 from 5-Group. 467 lost one crew – the navigator was our A-flight commander, Des Sands DFM, an Australian in the RAF on his second tour … he survived, parachuted, captured.
NIGHT 2-2-45 KARLSRUHE. 19 of 467, 16 of 463, of 250 from 5-Group. 467 lost 2 crews (14 KIA (incl. a ‘second dickie’ pilot) 1 POW. ‘D’ was one of the two. F/O A. Robinson [inserted] (pilot) [/inserted] and Rear Gunner – Tom Paine – went to school with me at Mudgee High – Tom was in the same class. (See extract from ‘The Bulletin’ for story by Bomb-Aimer survivor, whom I met accindentally [sic] at an external studies school at UNE (Armidale) in the ‘60’s.)
NIGHT 7-2-45 DORTMUND-EMS CANAL (near LADBERGEN)
13 from 467. 467 lost c.o. W/C J. K. Douglas & crew (+ second dickie Bomb-aimer) … 3 KIA, 4 POW, 1 Ev.
NIGHT. 8-2-45 POLITZ. 15 of 467, 16 of 463 of 163 total (5-Group was 1st ‘Wave’, other groups followed and put this important oil plant out of action for the remainder of the war. 1020 bombers attacked other targets including Krefeld.
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13-2-45 DRESDEN. 17 of 467, 19 of 463 of 144 Lancs and 9 Mosquitos from 5-Group attacked Dresden as the 1st wave of a 2-part attack, dropping 800 tons. The second wave, 3 hours later, dropped 1800 tons, mostly incendiaries, causing a devastating fire-storm. German report says that more than 50000 people died.
14-2-45 ROSITZ. 16 of 467, 16 of 463 of 224 Lancs + 8 Mosquitos from 5-Group, attacked the oil refinery near Leipzig. The rest of Bomber Command attacked 4 other targets – a total of 1316 ‘heavies’, loss rate 1.7%.
19-2-45 BOHLEN. 19 of 467, 16 of 463 of 254 Lancs and 6 Mosquitos from 5-Group. Raid was unsuccessful. The Master Bomber, W/C E.A. Benjamin DFF + Bar, was shot down by flak & killed. Only superficial damage was caused.
20-2-45 MITTLELAND CANAL near GRAVENHORST. 10 of 467, 10 of 463, of 154 Lancs & 11 Mosquitos of 5-Group … raids on the canal by now were called “the milk run”. A comment (in the Waddington report) … “5-Group had bombed the canal so often that the Germans could leave their guns aimed ready for the next raid”. The Master Bomber abandoned this raid when it could not be marked properly due to heavy low cloud. (The Main Force – of B.C. – did 4 raids using H2S. Total of 1283 sorties, loss rate 1.7%)
21-2-45 MITTLELAND CANAL (again). 10 of 467, 10 of 463 of 165 Lancs & 12 Mosquitos from 5-Group. Weather was clear, and the canal was breached.
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The Main Force raided 4 other targets, 1110 sorties; losses 3.1%. 463 Sq. lost their C.O. W/C Forbes on his last trip of 2nd Tour … shot down by German nightfighter ace, Major H.W. Schnaufer.
NIGHT 23-2-45. PFORZHEIM. 1 of 463 (Photo) 367 Lancs of 1, 6 & 8 groups. 1825 tons of bombs dropped … “The 3rd most effective raid of the war … killed 17000, and 83% of the town destroyed by a fire-storm.
DAY 24-2-45 DORTMUND-EMS CANAL. 18 of 467, 11 of 463, of 166 Lancs & 4 Mosquitos from 5-Group … The target was obscured by cloud and the raid abandoned. No Loss.
FEBRUARY SUMMARY. The weather was often bad. 467 did 158 sorties, lost 5 crews + 3 who baled out + 3 “2nd dickies”. (25 KIA, 15 POW, 1 Ev.) 3 tours expired. 1 Crew crashed in training.
NIGHT 3-3-45. DORTMUND-EMS CANAL. 15 of 467, 15 of 463, of 212 Lancs + 10 Mosquitos of 5-Group breached the aqueduct near Ladbergen in 2 places, putting it out of action until after the war’s end. 467 lost F/O R.T. Ward and crew (7 KIA); F/O R.B. Eggins & crew (6 KIA, 1 POW), and the C.O. W/C E. Langlois & crew (5 KIA, 2 POW) … he had only become C.O. on 9th Feb. 8 Lancs lost over Ger. 20 over U.K.[inserted] loss [/inserted] 3.6%
(This night the Luftwaffe mounted “Operation Gisela” sending 200 night fighters to follow various bomber forces into England (& so not being detected). They took the British defences by surprise and they shot down 20 bombers over England (some were Lancaster training planes … a couple at Wigsley, where I was Duty Navigator in the control tower!) The bomb dump at Waddington was attacked but wasn’t blown up. 3 German fighters crashed flying too low.
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NIGHT 5-3-45 BOHLEN 15 of 467, 15 of 463 of 248 from 5-Group, attacked synthetic oil refinery. Target was cloudy but some damage. Bomber Command made 1223 sorties for 31 lost over Germany and 10 crashed in England … “visibility had detiorated [sic] for returning aircraft”. (Percy Jobson, of Wagga Wagga, a friend of hockey years, was shot down, parachuted, on this trip … a big write up given.)
NIGHT 6-3-45. SASSNITZ - - a port on the Baltic Sea.
NIGHT 7-3-45 HARBURG. oil refinery (5-Group). Bomber Command total (on various targets): 1276, loss 41 (3.2%)
DAY 11-3-45 ESSEN by 1079 bombers … the largest day raid by B.C. … “paralysed Essen until the Americans entered. 467 lost 1 crew (all KIA) on collision with a Hurricane near base in F.A. training.
DAY 12-3-45 Dortmund. 1108 planes, record tonnage 4851 tons … with fighter escorts, over 2000 planes … “put the city out of the war”.
NIGHT 14-3-45 LUTZKENDORF. 5-Group attack on oil refinery, losing 18 (7.4%). Main Force of 568 attacked Zweibrucken & Homburg & other minor targets … 2.8% loss
NIGHT 16-3-45 WURZBURG. 5-Group, 225 Lancs & 11 Mosquitos, dropped 1207 tons with great accuracy in 17 minutes … 89% of industrial part of city destroyed. 467 lost F/O Thomas & crew (6 KIA, 1 POW). Main force attacked NUREMBERG with 480 planes, losing 28 (4.2%), due to night-fighters joining the bomber stream before the target
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DAY 19-3-45 ARNSBERG RAILWAY VIADUCT. 37 Lancs of 617 and 9 Sqdns (and 1 photo Lanc. from 463) dropped 6 ‘Grand Slam’ 10-ton bombs … the ‘earthquake-effect’ collapsed the viaduct … the film was spectacular.
NIGHT. 20-3-45 BOHLEN. 5-Group. The main force was on Hemingstedt with 675 planes, loss rate 1.9%.
DAY 22-3-45 BREMEN. 5-Group. Rail bridge.
NIGHT. 23-3-45 WESEL. 5-Group. 1000 tons in 9 minutes from 9000’ … as close army support … “British Army crossed the river before the bombers had left the area”, and Wesel was in British hands before midnight (the bombing ended at 2239). Wesel claims it was the most heavily bombed town in Germany … 97% of buildings destroyed in main town area; population reduced from 250000 at outbreak of war, to 1900 in May ’45.
DAY 27-3-45 FARGE Oil Storage, 5-Group plus 2 of 617 attacking U-Boat shelters with 23’-thick concrete roof. 2 of the Grand-Slam bombs penetrated the roof and brought down thousands of tons of concrete and rubble, rendering the shelter ineffective.
MARCH SUMMARY 467 flew 185 sorties, lost 4 crews (24 KIA, 4 POW), 4 crews completed tours.
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DAY 4-4-45 NORDHAUSEN. 5-Group … Military barracks Many ‘forced labourers killed’.
DAY 6-4-45 IJMUIDEN … on ships … raid abandoned due to bad weather.
NIGHT 7-4-45 MOLBIS. Benzol plant … “all production ceased”.
NIGHT 8-4-45 LUTZKENDORF. 5-Group. Oil refinery. ‘Put out of action until end of war’. Main force was on Hamburg 440 planes, & other targets, total of 918 planes … 1.3% loss.
DAY 9-4-45 HAMBURG .. oil storage (5-Group) and 617 Sq attacked U-Boat shelters with Grand Slam bombs, and Tallboy bombs. Both raids successful. On this raid German ME 152 & 153 jet fighters attacked the Lancs for the first time.
NIGHT 16-4-45 PILSEN 5-Group. Rail Yards.
NIGHT 18-4-45 KOMOTAU 5-Group.
DAY 23-4-45 FLENSBURG Railway yards. (Abandoned – cloud)
NIGHT 25-4-45 TONSBERG Oil Refinery & U Boat pens (Norway)
463 Sq. lost the last Lancaster of the war (crew survived)
3300 Lancasters lost in the whole war.
467 Sq from Nov ’42 to 26 Apr ’45 – flew 4188 sorties, used 214 Lancs. lost 110 by enemy action, 4 damaged – crashlandings but recovered. 590 KIA. 117 POW. 8E Ev. 5 DSO, 146 DFC. 2 CGM. 36 DFM
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[underlined] 467 SQUADRON – R.A.A.F. [/underlined]
467 Squadron was formed at SCAMPTON, LINCOLNSHIRE 7-11-42.
Moved to BOTTESFORD by 30-11-1942. Moved to WADDINGTON 11-11-1943.
Bottesford Station Commanding Officers: G/C. SWAIN, F.R.O: OBE: DFC.
From 3.3.43. – G/C. McKECKNIE, W.N: DFC.
[underlined] 467 SQAUDRON moved to WADDINGTON 12.11.43 [/underlined]
Waddington Station Commanding Officers:
16.4.43. G/C. S.C. ELWORTHY, CCB, CBE, DSO, MVO, DFC, AFC, MA.
31.3.44. G/C. D.W. BONHAM-CARTER, CB, DFC.
14.4.45. G/C. E.D. McK. NELSON, CB.
1.8.45 G/C. D.D. CHRISTIE, AFC.
24.8.45. G/C. A.E. TAYLOR.
467 SQUADRON COMMANDERS:
7.11.42. W/C. C.L. COMM, DSO, DFC. _ _ _ KIA 16.8.43.
19.8.43. W/C. J.R. BALMER, DFC, OBE. _ _ _ KIA 11.5.44.
12.5.44. W/C. W.L. BRILL, DSO, DFC & Bar _ _ _ Died 1964.
12.10.44. W/C. J.K. DOUGLAS, DFC, AFC. _ _ KIA 8.2.45.
9.2.45. W/C. E. le P. LANGLOIS _ _ KIA 3.4.45.
4.3.45. W/C. I.H. HAY, DFC. _ _ To disbandment.
467 STATION ADJUTANTS: F/L. BURFIELD_CARPENTER.
F/L. A.D. McDONALD (A18121): F/L. J.M.W. LOVE.
467 SQUADRON moved to RAF METHERINGHAM 16.6.45 and were disbanded there October, 1945.
[underlined] 467 STATISTICS COMPILED FROM OPERATIONAL RECORD BOOKS [/underlined].
First Operational Sortie – 2/3.1.1943 – To FURZE _ Minelaying.
Last Operational Sortie – 26/26.4.45 – to TONSBURG.
[underlined] OPERATIONAL SORTIES ATTEMPTED [/underlined]:
No. of a/c actually took off on operations: 3977
No. of Operational sorties completed: 3795
No. of Operational sorties failed: 182
[underlined] REASON FOR FAILURE OF SORTIE [/underlined]:
a/c failed to return – listed missing 105
a/c early return due to Engine Failure: 28
a/c early return due to Electrical Failure: 10
a/c “ “ “ to Armament Failure: 9
a/c “ “ “ to Oxygen Failure: 9
a/c “ “ “ to Instruments, radio, intercom failure: 12
a/c “ “ “ to Ice in flight & ice damage: 6
a/c “ “ “ to Navigational Error: [underlined] 3 [/underlined]
[underlined] 182 [/underlined]
No. of Sorties completed in a/c damaged by Enemy Action: 230
No. of Aircrew listed in Operational Record Books as flown on ops from 467 Sqdn, RAAF: (inc. RAF, RNZAF, RCAF): 1814
No. of Aircrew listed in ORB’s as War Casualty from 467 Sq: (includes) RAAF, RAF, RNZAF, RCAF): 760
No. of whole crews posted to 467 Sq. for Ops: 258
No. of whole crews finished tour of ops – 30 or more: 74
No. of whole crews lost on Ops: 115
No. of whole crews still operating when hostilities ceased 8.5.45. and not tour expired: 31
No. of whole crews posted to other Squadrons during tour: 34
No. of whole crews with no Ops. before hostilities ceased: 4
No. of crews from 53 Base who flew on ops from 467 Sqdn and not listed as posted to 467 Sqdn. 6
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[inserted] Extract of “WAR” List for an Operation … late 1944. [/inserted]
F/S J.W. Singer (Can) – Sgt A. Carson – [missing name]
PB. 193 ‘W’ – F/O R.J. Harris – P/O J.T. Adair – Sgt T. Andrews – Sgt R. Walker
P/O H.F.C. Parsons – F/L R.W. Cook – Sgt S. Saunders
EE.136 – F/O A.L. Keely – F/S W. Chorny (Can) – Sgt A.E. Wotherspoon – Sgt C.H. Connwell
F/S L.W. Tanner – Sgt S.D. Chambers – Sgt J.E. Johnson
LM.713 – F/O C. Newton (Can) – Sgt P. Grant – Sgt W. Gregory – Sgt E.H. Cooper (Can)
Sgt R. Flynn (Can) – Sgt L.G. Kelly – Sgt R.S. Stevens (Can)
LM.715 ‘O’ – F/O R.W. Ayrton (Aus) – Sgt M.J. Herkes – Sgt H.K. Huddlestone – Sgt D.K. Chalcraft
F/S N. Bardsley – Sgt W. Scott – Sgt J.A.W. Davies
ME.809 – F/O R.C. Lake – P.O J.A. Peterson (Can) – Sgt R.W. Baird – Sgt R.A. Morton
W/O G.B. Watts (Can) – F/S G.E. Parkinson – P/O R.D. Kerr (Can)
No. 467 Squadron, Second Wave
NF.908 ‘C’ – F/L J.K. Livingstone – F/L D.O. Sands – F/O E.G. Parsons – F/O R.N. Browne
P/O W.D. McMahon (Aus) – F/O J. Pendergast – F/O T.C. Taylor
PB306 – F/O R.J. Mayes (Aus) – F/O L.J. Hart (Aus) – Sgt D.H. Hamilton – F/S J. Manning
F/S A.R. Edgar (Aus) – F/S J.G. Muir (Aus) – F/S K.W. Cary (Aus)
LM.100 ‘D’ – F/O P.R. Gray-Buchanan (Aus) – F.S. H.G. Adams (Aus) – Sgt D.M. Coutts – F/S J.R. Giles (Aus)
F/S B.J. Payne (Aus) – F/S E.J. Taylor (Aus) – F/S K. Nichols (Aus)
PD.215 ‘F’ – F/O L. Landridge (Aus) – F/S D.G. Beverley (Aus) – Sgt J. Halstead – Sgt D.J. Allen
F/S K.C. Woollam (Aus) – F/S W.C. Denny (Aus) – Sgt B.A. Davies
LM.542 ‘K’ – F/O T.A. Gummersall (Aus) – F/S L.C.C. Chalcraft (Aus) – Sgt J. Clemons – F/S E.R. Baldwin (Aus)
F/O F.A. York (Aus) – F/S S.J. Anders (Aus) – F/S W.H. Bradbury (Aus)
LM.233 ‘M’ – F/O J.J. Sheridan (Aus) – F.S G.W. Gould (Aus) – Sgt B.J. Ambrose – Sgt J. Hodgson
F/S A. Raymond (Aus) – F/S W. Branagh (Aus) – Sgt R. Ward
LM.677 – F/O J.J.J. Cross (Aus) – F/S D.F. Edwards (Aus) – Sgt K.M. Pope – F.S W.K. Perry (Aus)
F/O V.L. Drouyn (Aus) – F/S W.V. Maurer (Aus) – F/S M.D. Wilkie (Aus)
NF.910 – F/O G.H. Stewart (Aus) – F/O R. Faulks (Aus) – Sgt G. Hopwood – F/S D.J. Morland (Aus)
F/S R. Galov (Aus) – F/S M.J.H. West (Aus) – F/S F.H. Skuthorpe (Aus)
NF.917 ‘Q’ – F/O R.S. Forge (Aus) – F/O H.M. Bissell (Aus) – Sgt W.C. Bradley – Sgt H. R. Harvey
F/O R.H. Darwin (Aus) – F/S E.J. O’Kearney (Aus) – Sgt R. Haire
ND.473 – F/O R.H. Mellville (Aus) – F/S J.L. Klye (Aus) – Sgt R.J. Brady – F/S D.D. Suter (Aus)
F/S J.F. Tongue (Aus) – F/S B.T. Hoskin (Aus) – F/S R.C.M. Newling (Aus)
NF.908 – F/O L.R. Pedersen (Aus) – F/S J.S. Hodgson (Aus) – Sgt D.R. Ba.dry [sic] – Sgt E.W. Durrant
F/S P.K. Garvey (AUS) – F/S V.J.M. McCarthy (AUS) – Sgt A.E. Dearns
NN.714 – F/O E.B. Rowell (Aus – F/S R.L. Morris (Aus) – Sgt A.J. Halls – Sgt. A Thomson
F/S D.J. Taylor (Aus) – F/S A.S. Smith (Aus) – Sgt A. Thomson
F/S D.J. Taylor (Aus) – F/S A.S. Smith (Aus) – Sgt J. Hodge
No. 463 Squadron, Third Wave
ND.133 ‘X’ – W/C W.A. Forbes (Aus) – F/O J.A. Costello – P/O W.A. Martin – F/S A.J. Norman
F/O W.J. Grime – P/O W. McLeod – P/O K.L. Worden
PD.311 ‘O’ – F/O P.J. Bowell (Aus) – F/S E.A. Petersen (Aus) – Sgt W. Forster – F/S W.H.J. Butcher (Aus)
F/S W. Plumb (Aus) – W/O J.R. Williams (Aus) – F/S I.D. Dutfiield [sic] (Aus)
LM.130 ‘N’ – F/O A.G. Stutter (Aus) – F/S P.L. Wilkinson (Aus) – Sgt H. Walsh – F/S M.F. Woodgate (Aus)
F/S P. O’Loughlin (Aus) – F/S D.J. Browning (Aus) – F/S H.R. Holmes (Aus)
PD.337 ‘L’ – F/O F.H. Smith (Aus) – Sgt E. Moss – ?
F/S B.A. Donaghue (Aus) – F/S R.T. Simonson (Aus) – F/S E.R. Cameron (Aus)
ND.977 – F/O G.T. White (Aus) – F/S G.D. Smith (Aus) – Sgt C. Jackson – Sgt V.G. Dunn
F/S H. Robinson (Aus) – F/S J.J.B. Middleton (Aus) – Sgt W. S. Bayne
PD.330 ‘F’ – F/O K.P. Brady (Aus) – F/S E.D. Rees – Sgt C.R. Levy – F/S G. Berglund (Aus)
F/S G.W. Boyes – F/S J.D. Stevens (Aus) – F/S J.E. Cox (Aus)
MD.332 – F/O B. Ward-Smith (Aus) – F/O R.W. Markham (Aus) – Sgt E. Taylor – F/S A.J. Tyson (Aus)
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[underlined] 5 Group, [/underlined] the biggest of 6 in Bomber Command.
Our 467 squadron was one of 18 Lancaster squadrons the Group. They were:-
9 at Bardney
227 at Balderton
[missing number] 4 (Rhod.) “ Spilsby
[underlined] 463 & 467 “ Waddington [/underlined]
49 “ Fulbeck
619 at Strubby
50 & 61 “ Skellingthorpe
630 “ East Kirkby
57 “ East Kirkby
617, 627 “ Woodhall Spa [symbol] Mosquitos
83 & 97 (Pathfinders) Coningsby
106 Metheringham
189 Fulbeck
207 Spilsby
[underlined] Some notable raids [/underlined]:
1944 Sept. 12/13. First operational use of [underlined] Loran [/underlined].
“ 23/4. Dortmund-Ems canal breached by [underlined] Tallboy [/underlined] (12000 lb bomb, designed by Barnes Wallis).
Oct. 3 Sea wall at Westkapelle (Walcheren Is) breached.
“ 14/5 Biggest night ops by Bomber Command of the war.
“ 23/4. Part of 1055 plane raid on Essen.
“ 25 “ “ 771 “ “ “ “, finishes it.
Nov. 2/3 “ “ 992 “ “ “ Dusseldorf.
“ 4/5. 174 Lancs breach Dortmund-Ems canal again.
“ 12 Tirpitz sank at Tromso by 9 & 617 Sqdns.
1945 Jan 1/2. 157 Lancs breach Mittleand canal.
“ 4/5. raid on Royan kills many French civilians.
“ 7/8. Part of 654 a/c; last raid on Munich.
Mar 14. Bielefeld aquaduct [sic] broken using Barnes Wallis’s new 22000 lb Grand Slam bomb. by 617 Sqdn.
“ 27. U-boat shelter at Farge blown up using the Grand Slam bomb, by 617 Sqdn.
Feb. 20/21 First of 36 consecutive night raids on Berlin by Mosquitos of 627 Sqdn.
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[circled 8]
[underlined] 5 Group [/underlined] Sqdns. As at 22.3.45.
Lanc I, III
9 Bardney
44 (Rhod.) Spilsby
49 Fulbeck.
50 Skellingthorpe
57 East Kirkby
61 Skellingthorpe
106 Metheringham
189 Fulbeck.
207 Spilsby
227 Balderton
463 [brackets] RAAF Waddington
407 RAAF Waddington [/brackets]
619 Strubby
630 East Kirkby
[symbol] 617 Woodhall Spa.
[brackets] 83 PFF Coningsby
97 PFF Coningsby [/brackets]
627 Woodhall Spa. Mosquito IV, XX, 25.
(83, 97 & 627 on loan from 8 Group.)
[inserted] [underlined] 1944. [/underlined] [/inserted]
Sept 12/13 First operational use of LORAN.
“ 23/4. Dortmund Ems canal breached by Tallboy (12000 lb).
Oct 3. Sea wall at Westkapelle (Walcheren Is) breached.
14/15 BC. biggest night ops of war.
23/24. 1055 raid on Essen. 25th 771 on Essen finishes it.
Nov 2/3. 992 on Dusseldorf.
4/5. 174 breach Dortmund Ems canal again.
12. Tirpitz sank at Tromas by 9 & 617 Sq.
Jan 1/2. 157 breach Mittleand Canal.
[inserted] 1945
Jan 4/5 Royan – many French casualties.
7/8 Last raid on Munich 654 a/c
Mar 14. Bielefeld aqueduct broken … Grand Slam 22000 lb.
27 U boat shelter at Farge successful using “ “ “
Feb. 20/21 first of 36 consecutive night raids on Berlin by mosquitos. [/inserted]
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Extracts from “The Hardest Victory – RAF Bomber Command in WW II by Dennis Richards. (Hodder & Stoughton, 1944.)
1944. March to June. The Transportation Plan, preparatory to OVERLORD … the invasion in Normandy. As part of the plan to convince the Germans that the landing would be in the Pas de Calais, far more bridges and railway workshops and marshalling yards were attacked North of the Seine than South of it. In this phase Bomber Command dealt with 37 of the railway centres, 8th American Air Force heavies 26, & AEAF (fighters, fighter-bombers, light & medium bombers, & recon. aircraft, a mixture of RAF & USAAF squadrons) 20. Bomber command dropped nearly 45000 tons on these centres, twice the tonnage of the other 2 put together. Harris in “Bomber Command” wrote:- “Bomber Command’s night bombing proved to be rather more accurate, much heavier in weight & more concentrated than the American daylight attacks, a fact which was afterwards clearly recognised by SHAEF when the time came (later) for the bombing of German troop concentrations within a mile or so of our own troops.”
In this phase, Bomber Command made 69 attacks, 9000 sorties & lost 198 planes (1.8%). They did enormous damage. In the end about 2/3 of the 37 centres were classed as completely out of action for a month or more, and the remainder as needing only some further “attention” from fighter-bombers.
Unhappily, the toll of friendly civilian lives was sometimes more than the “prescribed” limit of 100 – 150 per raid … (Coutrai 252, Lille 456, Ghent 482), but overall the total was much less than the 10000 “limit”.
The attacks on rail centres by all 3 air forces proved catastrophic for the Germans. Only about 12% of rolling stock was fit for use. A division from Poland took 3 days to get to West Germany, then 4 weeks to the Normandy battlefront!
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A particularly important raid, both in technique & results, was that on 5/6 Apr. (’43) on the Gnome et Rhône aero-works at Toulouse. 144 Lancs from 5 Group, with Leonard Cheshire of 617 SQN doing the initial marking at low level from a Mosquito. 2 Lancs of 617 reinforced the marking with great accuracy & this led to a raid which completely destroyed the factory. Thenceforth, Harris normally entrusted 5 Group (the largest in the Command) with its own marking, independent of the Pathfinder Force.
Bomber Command’s biggest task just before the invasion was to help silence the enemy’s coastal batteries … most nights since 24/25 May, & for deception purposes many of them outside the intended invasion area. But as D-Day neared, so the assault stepped up. On 2/3 June, 271 bombers attacked 4 batteries in the Pas de Calais (where the Germans most expected the invasion). On 3/4 June, 135 bombers attacked batteries at Calais & Winereux. On 4/5 June, 257 a/c attacked … this time in the invasion area. On 5/6 June (when invasion fleet was under way) Bomber Command put on max. effort … 1136 a/c (1047 attacked) [inserted] 5000 + tons of bombs. [/inserted] against [deleted] the [/deleted] 10 of the main batteries on the invasion coast. Other air formations & naval bombardment also attacked there & between them 9 of the 10 batteries were made incapable of sustained fire against the invasion forces.
In the week after D-Day, B.C. flew 3500 sorties to prevent reinforcements getting to the front. In the most skilful attack, 8/9 June. Lancs of 83 Sqn lit up railway tunnel at Saumur, then marked by Mosquitos, then 25 Lancs of 617 Sqn. dropped new 12000 lb “Tallboys” [inserted] [symbol] designed by Barnes Wallis. [/inserted] blocked the tunnel & delayed the Panzers.
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[circled 3]
During the struggle in Normandy, B.C. operated in strength close to battlefield. 14/15 Jun, 337 vs troops & vehicles at Aunay & Evrecy (near Caen). 30 Jun first B.C. daylight there … 266 Lancs & Halis & a few Mosquitos & Spitfire escort bombed a road junction at Villers-Bocage from 4000’ & frustrated a panzer attack. Of B.C.’s 5 other attacks in close support the biggest was 18 Jul .. GOODWOOD (max effort) … 1056 from B.C., 863 of AEAF & 8th A.F. to help the push SE of Caen towards Falaise …. but had bad weather & unsubdued anti-tank guns stopped the offensive (only 6 miles max.). But it impressed the Germans … Von Kluge who’d just replaced Rommel, wrote to Hitler on 21 Jul:- “There is no way by which, in the face of the enemy air forces’ complete command of the air, we can discover a form of strategy which will counterbalance the annihilating effects [underlined] unless we withdraw [/underlined] from the battlefield. Whole armoured formations allotted to counter-attack were caught beneath bomb carpets of the greatest intensity so that they could be got out of the torn-up ground only by prolonged effort … The psychological effect of such a mass of bombs coming down with all the power of elemental nature on the fighting forces, especially the infantry, is a factor which has to be taken into very serious consideration. It is immaterial whether such a carpet catches good troops or bad. They are more or less annihilated, and above all their equipment is shattered ...”
(He suicided a month later when Hitler wouldn’t allow a withdrawal)
On 7/8 Aug. 1019 a/c of B.C. raided 5 points in advance of Allied troops … helping Canadian 1st Army to open the way to Falaise.
Allies had 14000 a/c against German 1000 in those weeks.
25 Aug. Paris was free. 3 Sept. Brit 2nd Army in Brussels.
Resumption of oil targets delayed by V-1 threat.
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[circled 4] Jan (1944)
Hitler had hoped to begin V-1s vs London as ‘New Year present’ but damage to ‘ski” sites, & Fiesler works at Kassel & their own trouble with getting the bomb to operate reasonably – caused set-backs. Allied bombing of railways held up delivery of launchers & bomb components.
12/13 Jun first V-1 attacks. 7 of 55 sites managed to fire total of 10 … of which 3 reached England. But they improved. Bet. 15/16 & 16/17 Jun. 144 crossed Kentish coast & 73 reached London.
Operation CROSSBOW … B.C. + AEAF + 8th A.F. attacked V-1 sites from mid June to mid-August … using 40% of B.C. strength Targets were the modified launch sites, supply depots, & ‘large sites’ (V-2 rockets [deleted] maybe [indecipherable word] [/deleted]. B.C. attacked these day & night. B.C. flew 16000 sorties, 59000 tons vs the V-1 targets only losing 131 a/c ([symbol] 1%).
By mid-Aug, less need [symbol] defences (AA & fighters redeployed & more effect … + proximity fuses [symbol] [symbol] 20% reaching target; + balloons + finally our armies overrunning the launching sites.
Every day but one from 5 to 11 Sept Harris sent out 300 or more a/c to bomb [deleted] h [/deleted] [underlined] Le Havre [/underlined] area. (We did our [underlined] first trip [/underlined] on 10 [deleted] 8 [/deleted] Sept. 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500 lb.) that day 992 sorties. Total for the week 2500 sorties, 9750 tons … the ground attack after the last air raid on 11 Sept. succeeded & only c. 50 fatalaties [sic]. [inserted] (our 3rd) [/inserted] [underlined] Boulogne [/underlined] [inserted] we dropped 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500 lb. [/inserted] had become the next objective. We were in big raid on 17 Sept. by 762 a/c, opening the way for attack by Canadian army, … garrison gave in on 22 Sept, in diary of captured German officer: “Sometimes one could despair of everything if one is at the mery [sic] of the RAF without any protection. It seems as if all fighting is useless & all sacrifices in vain.”
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Germans still held Dunkirk & Ostend … it became clear that key to faster supply to our armies was Antwerp, 40 miles up R. Scheldt. Allies captured Antwerp on 4 Sept. but Germans still held river banks, South Beveland & [underlined] Walcheren Is. [/underlined] dominating its approach from the sea. Allies tried, MARKET GARDEN, airborne troops to capture bridges over Maas, Wasl & lower Rhine … a disaster, losing 1st Airborne Div’n. [symbol] Try to open the Sheldt Estuary. B.C. began attacks on Walcheren Is. in 3rd week of Sept. Hitting batteries proved difficult. Canadian army told to capture Is. … their C.O. suggested bombing might breach its sea-walls & flood some low-lying batteries. Oct 2nd .. leaflets & broadcast to locals. Oct 3. .. Pathfinder Mosquitos in waves of 30 created a big gap in wall 60’ thick at top & 204’ at base. (617 Sqn with Tallboys not needed … took ‘em home!)
Many parts of Is. now flooded, but no surrender. Further attacks on walls on Oct 7, 11 & 17. We did our [underlined] 11th op [/underlined] [inserted] on 7 OCT. [/inserted] on [underlined] Flushing dyke [/underlined] walls, 2 sticks of 7 x 1000 lb, 2 runs at fairly low alt. & achieved a good breach.
We also bombed gun batteries on [underlined] Walcheren [/underlined] Is again on Oct. 23 (14 x 1000 lb) and Oct 30 (14 x 1000 lb) … [underlined] our 13th op [/underlined].
The plan was to take Wal. Is by amphibious assault & to ‘soften it up’, B.C. raided c 277 on Oct 28; then on Oct 29 with 358 a/c, then on [underlined] Oct 30 with 110 a/c [/underlined]. [inserted] [underlined] our 15th [/underlined] [/inserted] (us). On 1 Nov. Canadian & Scottish troops began a week of hard fighting … Royal marines sailed landing craft through the gaps in the sea-walls. B.C. flew 2000+ sorties in 14 raids there, 9000 tons of bombs … only lost 11 a/c ([symbol] 0.4%).
Antwerp not used for another 19 days … time taken to clear the estuary of mines.
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B.C. continued to attack towns in Germany & coastal targets in the autumn & winter of 1944.
On [inserted] 12th [/inserted] Sept. we did our [underlined] 2nd trip [/underlined] on [underlined] Stuttgart [/underlined] (1 x 4000 lb + 13 J clusters). (Our skipper had been [deleted] there [/deleted] [inserted] to [underlined] Danstadt [/underlined] [/inserted] the previous night as “2nd-dickie”). Then our [underlined] 4th [/underlined] on Bremerhaven on 18 Sept. (18 cans). & 5th on Munchen-Gladbach the next night 19 Sept (1 x 2000 lb + 12 J clusters) on which Guy Gibson as master bomber went missing (KIA). Our [underlined] 6th on [/underlined] 23 Sept. was our first of 4 raids on [underlined] Dortmund [/underlined] Ems canal “the vital link between the Ruhr & North Sea”. (14 x 1000 lb). B.C. did about 10 raids on the canal, “each time draining the canal for several miles & leaving scores of barges stranded. And this was not simply a one-off piece of temporary damage. As soon as, by the effort of 4000 (Todt) labourers, the canal was once more fully working, B.C. breached it again - & went on doing so as required until the end of the war.” (It was a fairly “dicey” target – they [underlined] knew [/underlined] we’d be coming & [underlined] where [/underlined] (where the aqueduct was above ground level.)
Sept 26. Op [symbol] 7 on Karlsruhe (18 cans)
“ 27 [symbol] 8 “ Kauserlauten (18 cans).
Oct 6 [symbol] 10. Bremen (18 cans)
Oct 5. Daylight formation (!) on Wilhelmshaven (18 cans). - - cloud obscured target & we (& others) bombed by H2S … the only time we used it on ops … mostly we were denied its use because they reckoned German fighter &/or flak could pick us up from its transmission.
Oct. 19. Op [symbol] 12. Nuremburg (1 x 2000 lb + 12 J clusters).
Oct 28 op 14 Bergen (Norway) U-boat pens … but brought bombs back due to smokescreen over target. Had to descend to near mountain tops to clear cloud – did so safely using GEE.
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“In the last quarter of 1944, nearly half the tonnage dropped by B.C. was aimed at Urban areas in general rather than on more specific targets. … eg. Stuttgart, Nuremburg; [underlined] Dusseldorf (our 16th [/underlined] on Nov 2nd, 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500) Munich our [underlined] 23rd [/underlined] on Dec. 17 (1 x 4000 + 9 cans + 1 monroe). & [underlined] Munich [/underlined] again our 28th on Jan 7th (1 x 4000 + 6 J clusters).
Our [underlined] 18th [/underlined] on 11 Nov. on Harburg oil refinery (near Hamburg) caused huge fire visible 100 miles on way home (1 x 4000+ 6 x 1000 + 6 x 500 lb).
16 Nov, Our 19th a daylight on [underlined] Duren [/underlined], part of a huge effort to react to battle of bulge destroyed the town to rubble. (12 x 1000 lb).
Our 24th Gdynic .. Dec 18, on Pocket Battleship ‘Lutzow’ (also there the P.B. Admiral Von Sheer) … may have caused enough damage to have Latzow towed (?) to Swinemunde where 617 Sqn finished it off on 16/17 April ’45 (10 x 1000 SA.P.).
5 Group. HQ Grantham, then Moreton Hall, near Swinderby.
[underlined] AOC’s [/underlined] Harris 11.9.39. Bottomley 22.11.40.
Slessor 12-5-41. Coryton 25.5.42. Cochrane 28.2.43
Constantine 16.1.45.
A/C. Hampdens, Manchesters, Lancasters, Mosquitos.
[underlined] B.C. casualties, Aircrew [/underlined] Operational K. 47120
Died as POW 138
Missing now safe. 2868
POW “ “ 9784
Wounded. 4200
[underlined] Non-operational [/underlined]
K. 8090
Wounded 4200
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A brief summary of the Bache crew’s experiences after the Operation to the Dortmund-Ems Canal on 1st January 1945.
A number of entries in the 160 pages that I wrote during 1945 in the second of my three war diaries refer to events connected with, or as a result of, the Bache crew’s experiences on 1st January of that year. (The three diaries contain a total of some 420 pages which cover only some sections of my overseas service in the RAAF, mainly while travelling to and while in Canada doing my navigator training, the Operation on 1st January 1945, that period which is summarised below and my trip back home from England. Unfortunately they do not cover any of the crew’s other Operational Sorties in detail but an amount of information on these is available from other sources in my possession)
The following very short summary makes use of extracts from some of the entries in my second diary, (other than from the 17 pages which contributed to my chronicle of events directly associated with our 16th Operation on 1st January 1945). It then goes on to refer to information that I have received since from various members of our crew covering their individual moves after the crew broke up in May 1945, plus each one’s post war status.
However, for the sake of brevity, this summary does not include any detailed references to those of our Operational Sorties which we flew between 19th February and 18th April 1945 – and some other of the events in which the crew were involved between January and May of that year – but which were not as a direct consequence of the Operation on 1-1-45 These matters may (possibly?) be covered at some future date.
So, picking up this account from a point part way through January 1945 –
My additional navigational duties during 1945.
During the period early in 1945 when our crew was non-operational, while we waited for Ernie and Cec to recover from their injuries received on 1st January, I was employed in the squadron’s navigation section in various ways. Some of these duties continued after we returned to Ops – particularly on the occasions where our crew was not flying on that Op.
Amongst other things, I had been requested by the squadron navigation leader to assist him by looking after the navigation Order Book, which covered matters such as changes in navigational procedures as these came through from No 5 Group Headquarters, as well as setting up an improved system for bringing this information to the notice of the navigators on the squadron. I was also asked to devise ways of drawing attention to cases or areas in which we should take steps to improve navigational performance.
I “dreamed up” a cartoon type character of a navigator who I named “Ayling-Rouse” (who was something like a mixture of the infamous idiotic pilot character, P/O Prune and the well known ancient Chinese philosopher, Confucius) to assist with this and it seemed to be quite successful in getting the guys’ attention! – the style being recommended for use elsewhere in the Group.
I was also shown by the section’s navigation assessment officer how to assess the squadron navigator’s Operational flying log sheets and plotting charts – and learned how to get the navigators away on “cross-country” training flights etc.
I was then introduced by the squadron navigation leader to Operational navigation briefing procedures and other of his duties – and taken to some of the pre-Operation navigational planning conferences, which were held via a Group telephone hook up between
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the various squadrons just prior to our squadron Navigators Briefing for the Op. concerned.
As an upshot of all this, I was made deputy navigation leader and eventually stood in for the squadron navigation leader on occasions – including the conducting of the Navigators Briefing and the navigation specialist officer’s briefing contribution at the Main Briefing which followed, for those of No. 467 Squadron’s crews who were to participate in the daylight Bomber Command attack on “Hitler’s Hideout” at Berchtesgaden, in April 1945.
As it turned out – like so many other planned attacks – this Operation had to be “scrubbed” (ie cancelled) at the last minute because of bad weather in the target area – but was carried out a day or so later by 359 Lancasters – of which some were from other squadrons in No 5 Group and some from Nos. 1 and 8 Groups. However it so happened that Nos. 463 and 467 Squadrons were not available to go there with them on that day due to our station’s involvement in an attack on Tonsberg in Norway which required take-off later in the same afternoon.
(As a result of the additional navigation section work which I had carried out while our crew was “off Ops” waiting for the return of Cec and Ernie and also after we returned to Ops, the squadron navigation leader, when he was informed by the squadron commander early in May that the Bache crew had been selected as one of several crews for a voluntary posting from No. 467 Squadron to Transport Command, tried to convince me not to go with them. He indicated that I was being recommended for a navigation leader’s training course – and would then probably go with the squadron on its intended transfer to the Far East theatre of War.
However, because of the close crew bonds developed during our earlier Operations – and particularly as a result of the events on 1st January 1945, I decided to stick with Merv, Sam and Cec in their transfer to Transport Command.)
Ernie returns to the crew and we return to Operations.
As events turned out, Ernie was declared fit for flying after several weeks and we resumed Ops with him back with us on 19th February, as by this time we were starting to “champ upon the bit” again. However we had to make use of the substitute wireless operators – Cec still being out of action.
Merv’s promotion and his new role on the squadron.
By then Merv had been promoted to the rank of Flight Lieutenant and on occasions had acted as O/C of our “A” Flight, then as O/C “B” Flight, to which our crew was transferred some time in March.
Cec returns to the crew for our trip in “S Sugar”
According to my diary, Cec – who had been recovering from his ankle injury in the RAF hospital at Wroughton, near Crewe, (as was Ernie after they were both transferred from the hospital in Holland) – was flown back to the squadron by Merv and I when he has discharged from there on 22nd February.
However he did not stay, but went to a convalescence place near Liverpool and remained unfit for flying for the remainder of our Operational Sorties – rejoining the crew just in time for our flight to Jouvincourt in France in PO-S on 6th May to bring a planeload of ex-prisoners of war back to England.
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End of the war in Europe and its effects on No. 467 Squadron.
Hostilities in Europe ceased on 7th May 1945 and No. 467 Squadron was one of the Bomber Command squadrons selected for transfer to the Far East theatre of War.
Part of the Bache crew transfer to Transport Command.
Cec then joined Merv, Sam (who had been commissioned in February) and I, in our transfer on 11th May from No 467 Squadron of Bomber Command to Transport Command – to which we were posted as one of five “part-crews” from Waddington.
(These crews were taken from those who were apparently classified as “nominally tour expired” – ie those who had carried out 28, but in our case 25, Operations).
We went to the recently transferred RAAF No. 466, ex No. 4 Group Bomber Command Halifax squadron at Driffield for Transport Command flying training.
Sam’s Departure from Driffield.
We thought that the bomb-aimers who were transferred with us to No. 466 Squadron would have been trained as load masters for Transport Command flying crew “cargo supervision etc”, but were informed shortly after arrival on No. 466 Squadron that it had been decided they were now not required.
So Sam was to leave us! However the blow was softened considerably when he received notification that, because of his long period of service in the RAAF (including time served as a medical orderly in ground staff in the New Guinea theatre of war), he was to be repatriated back to Australia where he would be eligible for discharge from the Service.
He was first of all transferred to the Australian Aircrew Holding Centre at Brighton, on the south coast of England – to await a draft back home aboard a troopship.
Merv, Cec and I continue Transport Command training on No. 466 Squadron.
Merv, Cec and I continued on with No. 466 Squadron at Driffield – where we picked up an Australian Second Pilot (Merv becoming Senior Pilot) – and then converted to and flew in their Halifax bombers.
We then went with the squadron when it relocated to RAF Bassingbourn in September.
From Halifaxes to Liberators.
At Bassingbourne the squadron converted from Halifaxes to 4 engine Liberator bomber type aircraft – American designed and built – and a somewhat different aircraft from the 4 engine British designed and built heavy bombers in which we had previously flown. (It was not long before I christened the Liberator “the Flying Brick” after comparing its flying characteristics with those of our beloved Lancasters).
After we had completed a number of familiarisation exercises in the UK we were scheduled to undertake training flights and later, service transport operations, between UK and India.
The end of World War II in the Far East and the disbanding of 466 Squadron.
We were about to carry out our first training flight to India when the war in the Pacific area suddenly ended – resulting in the squadron being disbanded on 26th October 1945.
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So the four of us, including the Australian Second Pilot, were transferred to Brighton for repatriation back home and discharge from the RAAF.
Our return to Australia.
As things turned out, all the Australian members of our crew, except for Sam, who had left England much earlier – finished up finally going back to Australia together on the same ship – the Athlone Castle.
Our return by sea to Australia is another story – including us becoming involved in a Mutiny aboard the first ship, the Orion, on which we were embarked – and from which we were later disembarked again, back in England, after it broke down in the Bay of Biscay!
Return Home and Post War
Sam
Sam, who received his promotion to Flying Officer in August, returned to Sydney in NSW for discharge from the RAAF. He and his wife, Valda, now live in Wagga, N.S.W.
Merv
Merv returned to Adelaide in South Australia for discharge as a Flight Lieutenant. He and his wife, Ethel, continued to live there until he died in 1974.
Cec
Cec returned to Brisbane in Queensland, for discharge, by which time he had been promoted to the rank of Flying Officer. He married Dawn there and they continued to live in Brisbane, but later moved northwards to Caloundra, on the Sunshine Coast in Queensland – where he died from a war related complaint in 1997.
Les
Les, Jim and Ernie remained at Waddington – Les transferring to No 463 Squadron to join Jack Blair’s crew (also ex 467 Squadron, on which they had done 24 Ops prior to the end of the war in Europe). They subsequently moved with the squadron to RAF Skellingthorpe in July. Here he remained until the war in the Pacific concluded, after which No. 463 Squadron was disbanded on 25th September 1945 and all of its RAAF personnel were repatriated back to Australia. He had the rank of Pilot Officer when he was discharged.
Les married and he and his wife, Norma, now live at Seymour, Victoria.
Jim
Jim remained on No. 467 Squadron at Waddington after Merv, Sam, Cec and I left for Transport Command – and while there joined F/O C F Stewart’s crew (which had done 6 Ops on 467 Squadron prior to the end of hostilities in Europe) – as mid upper gunner.
They were posted to No. 463 Squadron, which was also located at Waddington, on 4th June – and went with this squadron when it was relocated to RAF Skellingthorpe on 3rd July.
They remained with No. 463 Squadron until it was disbanded on 25th September 1945 – after which Jim was transferred to Brighton along with all its other Australian members and then returned to Australia for discharge from the RAAF. He was promoted to the rank of Warrant Officer sometime during this period.
Jim married and he and his wife, June, live in Sydney, N.S.W.
Page 4
[page break]
Australian War Memorial
Page 1 of [missing number]
No. 467 Squadron
No. 467 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force was formed at Scampton in the United Kingdom on 7 November 1942. Although intended as an Australian squadron under Article XV of the Empire Air Training Scheme, the majority of its personnel were originally British. The replacement of these men with Australians was a gradual process and it was only towards the end of the war that the squadron gained a dominant Australian character.
The squadron relocated to Bottesford on 23 November 1942 and commenced operations on 2 January 1943. A year later it moved to Waddington, which remained the squadron’s home until the end of the war. Equipped with Avro Lancaster heavy bombers, and forming part of 5 Group, RAF Bomber Command, the squadron’s operational focus for much of the war was the strategic bombing offensive against Germany. Bombing almost entirely by night, it participated in all of the major campaigns of the offensive including the battles of the Ruhr, Berlin and Hamburg. In addition to Germany, the squadron also attacked targets in France, Italy, Norway and Czechoslovakia. On 20 June 1943, 467 was the first Bomber Command squadron to participate in the “shuttle service” where aircraft would leave the United Kingdom, bomb a European target, and then fly on to an airfield in North Africa. There they would refuel and rearm and then bomb another target on their return flight to Britain. The German port of Friederichshafen was the outbound target, and the Italian port of Spezia the inbound one.
In addition to the strategic bombing offensive, 467 Squadron was also employed in support of ground operations prior to, and during the D-Day landing, during the drive out of the Normandy beachhead in mid-1944, and during the crossing of the Rhine in March 1945. The squadron also participated in the offensive to remove the threat posed by Germany’s terror weapons and participated in raids on the weapons research facility at Peenemende, and on V1 flying bomb and V2 rocket assembly and launch sites in France.
467 Squadron’s last bombing raid of the war was an attack on the oil refinery and tankerage at Vallo in Norway. Even before the cessation of hostilities, the squadron was employed to ferry liberated Allied prisoners of war from Europe to Britain and it continued in this role after VE Day. The squadron was one of several identified to form “Tiger Force”, Bomber Command’s contribution to the strategic bombing campaign against Japan. It relocated to Metheringham to prepare for this role, but the war against Japan ended before “Tiger Force” was deployed. 467 Squadron disbanded on 30 September 1945.
Between January 1942 and April 1945, 467 Squadron flew 3,833 sorties and dropped 17,578 tons of bombs. It suffered heavily in the course of its operations – 760 personnel were killed, of whom 284 were Australian, and 11 [missing number] aircraft were lost.
References AWM 64, RAAF formation and unit rolls [2 symbols] ORMF 0118, Roll 95 [2 symbols] 1/426 December 1942 – December 1943 [2 symbols] 1/427 January – December 1944 [2 symbols] 1/428 January – October 1945 [2 symbols] 1/435A December 1942 – March 1945; Units of the Royal Australian Air Force; a concise history. Volume 3, bomber units, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1995).; H.M. Blundell, They flew from Waddington! 463 – 467 Lancaster Squadrons, Royal Australian Air Force, (Sydney: W. Homer, 1975).
Category Unit
http://www.awm.gov.au/unit/U59451/
4/10
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
463 & 467 Squadron Notes on Ops
Description
An account of the resource
Extracts from publications giving details of all operations by 467 and 463 Squadrons from 10 September 1944 to 25 April 1945. Details include number of aircraft, target, bombloads and losses. Interspersed are details of operations carried out by Herbert Adam's crew on 467 Squadron between 10 September 1944 and 16 January 1945 which include many extracts from his diary describing operations and daily activities. Included are photographs of aircraft, crew members, air to ground views, targets, cook's tour and a map diagram. Details of 5 Group Squadrons, Extracts from books and a summary of Bache crew's experiences after operation to Dortmund Ems canal.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
H G Adams
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Seventy eight page handwritten book
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Memoir
Text. Personal research
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MAdamsHG424504-170215-01
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
France
France--Le Havre
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Pas-de-Calais
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Germany
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Braunschweig
Netherlands
Netherlands--Walcheren
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Germany--Nuremberg
Norway
Norway--Bergen
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Germany--Hamburg
Norway--Trondheim
Germany--Munich
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Harburg (Landkreis)
Germany--Giessen (Hesse)
Germany--Euskirchen (Kreis)
Poland
Poland--Gdynia
Belgium
Belgium--Houffalize
France--Royan
Germany--Merseburg
Czech Republic
Czech Republic--Most
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Siegen
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Pforzheim
Germany--Sassnitz
Germany--Essen
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Halle an der Saale
Germany--Würzburg
Germany--Wesel (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Germany--Nordhausen (Thuringia)
Netherlands--IJmuiden
Germany--Flensburg
Norway--Tønsberg
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Czech Republic--Plzeň
Germany--Herne (Arnsberg)
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-09
1944-10
1944-11
1944-12
1945-01
1945-02
1945-03
1945-04
1944-04-05
1944-04-06
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
1944-06-30
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Tricia Marshall
463 Squadron
467 Squadron
5 Group
air gunner
aircrew
bombing
bombing of Toulouse (5/6 April 1944)
Cook’s tour
Gibson, Guy Penrose (1918-1944)
Grand Slam
H2S
killed in action
Lancaster
Mosquito
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
nose art
RAF Waddington
searchlight
tactical support for Normandy troops
Tallboy
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1490/27527/BHillREHillREv10001.2.jpg
c9c55dcaa9d58eadf5229e9efaaec4c9
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1490/27527/BHillREHillREv10002.2.jpg
5c5c891fdde5ae8350f8a9da41fd7321
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Mitchell, Mitch
John Ernest Francis Mitchell
J E F Mitchell
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-02-27
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Mitchell, JEF
Description
An account of the resource
59 items. Flight Lieutenant John Ernest Francis 'Mitch' Mitchell. Joined the RAF as a boy entrant in 1934 and trained as a wireless operator. Flew on Vickers Virginia, Handley Page Heyford and Whitley before the war. Completed an operational tour on Whitley 1939-41. After being rested he flew a second tour of operations as a wireless operator with 207 Squadron before retraining as a pilot post war. Collection contains his flying logbooks, memoires of his air force career and first operations, lists of his operations, correspondence and photographs.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by C A Wood and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[centred] WHAT’S IN A NAME? [/centred]
Back in 1944, when the war seemed to be dragging on forever, (was it really [underlined] only [/underlined] 5 years since Europe had erupted into a blood-bath?) I chanced to meet, within the space of a few weeks, three men who, although very different in looks, ways and demeanor, [sic] shared one thing in common – their names – they were a trio of John Mitchells!
In June of ’44 I was the Wireless Operator of a Lancaster crew that arrived at Spilsby in Lincolnshire for the purpose of flying operationally against Fortress Europe as members of 207 Squadron. On reporting to the Signals Office, I was introduced to the Signals Officer, F/Lt John Mitchell, a veteran, relatively speaking (26 years of age!) and an RAF regular, who sported the DFC, and had survived a tour on Whitleys, which had started on literally the FIRST day of hostilities, when the crew of which he was a member force-landed near Amiens, in France, having carried out the first leaflet raid of the war, on Essen. He had also chalked up many operational hours on Lancasters, and was looked upon as something of a role model to we aspiring your aviators.
Our acquaintance ended abruptly when, on December 4th, we were shot down on our 18th mission, following a raid on Heiloronn in the Ruhr.
Some 45 years later Mitch and I became re-united in the most bizarre fashion. My wife Gill and I had acquired a rural property in the village of Girton, about 7 miles from Newark, in Nottinghamshire, when by chance I encountered this chap with distinctly military bearing, and in the ensuing conversation, I had the nagging feeling that this was not our first meeting. Then, about half an hour after his departure, the penny dropped and with a jolt I realised that I had been talking to none other than my old wartime colleague Mitch! Yes, he looked different – for starters the former sandy wavy hair no longer was, but the voice, which was one of authority and resonance, was the give-away. Unlike appearances, voices often don’t change much over the years – and his certainly hadn’t!
Promptly I scanned the local telephone directory, and ‘phoned his number. When he answered my ring, I merely said “207 Squadron”. The silence was palpable – then, in somewhat muted tones he said:- “Who is this?” On being enlightened, he too turned back his mental clock of 45 years, and the old memories came flooding back.
Mitch invited Gill and myself to his house in nearbye[sic] Collingham, where he and his wife Joan had lived for many years, and were pillars of the local community. By chance it was Mitches 65th birthday – yet another co-incidence, and soon, with the aid of his old Flying Log Books, we were immersed in nostalgia, turning back the clock to those heady days in 1944, when so many of our friends came and went with alarming frequency, and our young minds struggled to come to terms with the mayhem and carnage with which we were confronted.
Subsequent to our being shot down, I finished up at Stalag Luft 1, up on the Baltic coast, where I soon struck up an acquaintance with my second Mitch., F/Lt John Mitchell, a Canadian former Spitfire pilot. He was my regular companion on our daily constitutional walks around the camp perimeter fence. He ‘sold’ me Canada, in particular the farm on the northern shores of Lake Superior that was his ‘ancestral home’. He also talked a lot about a squadron friend, P/O Gillespie Magee, who had been killed way back
[page break]
in 1941. He had been a talented poet, and Mitch quoted to me verbatim a poem this pal of his had written. It was called ‘High Flight’, and I was so moved by its beauty that I wrote it down in my P.O.W. Log Book. Many years later I was to discover that ‘High Flight’ was a widely published poem, an all-time classic.
Mitch and I lost touch after repatriation. I have yet to visit Canada, but if I ever do, who knows, I may still be able to track down my old buddy on his dream farm – he made it sound so idyllic.
When men are herded to ether in prison camps, life is such a tenuous thing, with the future so uncertain. So it is not surprising that the vast majority, irrespective of colour, code or creed, instinctively turn to a higher being for spiritual sustenance. In this respect I was no different, and on my first visit to the hut that served as the camp chapel, I fell immediately under the thrall of the Padre, a New Zealander by the name of – yes, you’ve guessed it – John Mitchell! This saintly man had been originally taken prisoner at Dunkirk. Being a non-combatant, he had the option of being repatriated, but refused it, choosing to stay behind bars, and administer to ‘his lads’. That, to my mind, is the definition of a true hero.
I still have a bible, signed by him, and in times of doubt or stress I turn to it for comfort and sometimes inspiration. After all these years, the force of his personality is still evident, and I feel priveleged[sic] to have known a man who truly ‘walked with God’.
So these three John Mitchells, so different in many ways, but who all served their respective countries in the common cause, the fight for freedom, are impinged indelibly on my mind.
I still see Mitch number one frequently, as he lives only three miles up the road. He retired as a Squadron Leader Pilot, and after the war flew numerous types of aircraft, the favourite (after the Lancaster, of course) seems to have been that old faithful the Shackleton.
Now in his Eighties, he still plays golf three days a week, and is President of the Collingham Croquet Club, of which I too am a member.
Often we wander off down memory lane, and the conversations usually start with – “Do you remember?”
[inserted by hand] ROY E. HILL
EX F/LT. RAFVR. [inserted by hand]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
What's in a name?
Description
An account of the resource
Recounts meeting three men named John Mitchell in the space of a few weeks. The first was a signals officer at RAF Spilsby when the author was a wireless operator on Lancaster. He relates some of his experiences surviving two tours on Whitley and Lancaster. The author goes on to describe meeting this John Mitchell 45 years later. The author was shot down on his eighteenth operation later in 1944 and made a prisoner of war where he made friends with a Canadian former Spitfire pilot named John Mitchell. In addition during a visit to the camp chapel he met a New Zealand padre named John Mitchell who was taken prisoner at Dunkirk. The three different John Mitchells who served their respective countries were impinged upon the author's mind.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
R E Hill
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Two page handwritten document
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Memoir
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
BHillREHillREv1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Newark (Nottinghamshire)
Germany
Germany--Heilbronn
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1944-12-04
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Sue Smith
207 Squadron
aircrew
Lancaster
pilot
prisoner of war
RAF Spilsby
shot down
Spitfire
Stalag Luft 1
Whitley
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1505/28856/SDaviesLA1581024v10004.2.pdf
b3df53ab0cf582d58504080a267c232d
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Davies, Leslie and Jack
Leslie Alfred Davies
L A Davies
John Richard Davies
J R Davies
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-04-28
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Davies, LA-JR
Description
An account of the resource
49 items. Collection concerns Leslie Alfred Davies (1922-1996, 1581024 Royal Air Force) and his brother John Richard Davies ( - 1944, 1580941). Leslie served as a Lancaster navigator on of 50 Squadron completing his tour of 30 operations in March 1945. John served a Lancaster bomb aimer on 166 Squadron He was killed in action 3 August 1944. Collection consists of Leslie's crew's individual logbooks and biographies, operational histories, photographs of people, aircraft and a grave, documents and correspondence. <br /><br />The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Murray Davies and catalogued by Nigel Huckins. <br /><br />Additional information on John Richard Davies is available via the <a href="https://losses.internationalbcc.co.uk/loss/105795/">IBCC Losses Database.</a>
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Robert Smith flying log book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
SDaviesLA1581024v10004
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
Flying log book for R M Smith, flight engineer, covering the period from August 1944 to 16 November 1945. Detailing his flying training and operations flown. He was stationed at RAF St Athan, RAF Wigsley, RAF Syerston and RAF Skellingthorpe. Aircraft flown in were Stirling, Lancaster, and Oxford. He flew a total of 30 operations with 50 Squadron. 5 daylight and 25 night. Targets were Flushing, Nuremberg, Dusseldorf, Harburg, Dortmund-Ems Canal, Duren, Munich, Heilbronn, Gdynia, Politz, Houffalize. Royan, Merseburg, Karlsruhe, Dresden, Bohlen, Mitteland Canal and Bremen. His pilot on operations was Flight Lieutenant Jones. This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1945
1944-10-07
1944-10-11
1944-10-17
1944-10-18
1944-11-02
1944-11-03
1944-11-06
1944-11-07
1944-11-11
1944-11-12
1944-11-16
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-04
1944-12-05
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1944-12-19
1944-12-21
1944-12-22
1944-12-30
1944-12-31
1945-01-01
1945-01-02
1945-01-04
1945-01-05
1945-01-07
1945-01-08
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-19
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-02-22
1945-02-24
1945-03-05
1945-03-06
1945-03-07
1945-03-08
1945-03-10
1945-03-11
1945-03-22
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Belgium--Houffalize
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
France--Royan
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Harburg (Landkreis)
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Leipzig Region
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nuremberg
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Wales--Vale of Glamorgan
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
1654 HCU
50 Squadron
aircrew
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
flight engineer
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Oxford
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF St Athan
RAF Syerston
RAF Wigsley
Stirling
training
Window
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1505/28858/SDaviesLA1581024v10007.2.pdf
efdd956e8f0ca559504f18f9ad4afe07
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Davies, Leslie and Jack
Leslie Alfred Davies
L A Davies
John Richard Davies
J R Davies
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-04-28
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Davies, LA-JR
Description
An account of the resource
49 items. Collection concerns Leslie Alfred Davies (1922-1996, 1581024 Royal Air Force) and his brother John Richard Davies ( - 1944, 1580941). Leslie served as a Lancaster navigator on of 50 Squadron completing his tour of 30 operations in March 1945. John served a Lancaster bomb aimer on 166 Squadron He was killed in action 3 August 1944. Collection consists of Leslie's crew's individual logbooks and biographies, operational histories, photographs of people, aircraft and a grave, documents and correspondence. <br /><br />The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Murray Davies and catalogued by Nigel Huckins. <br /><br />Additional information on John Richard Davies is available via the <a href="https://losses.internationalbcc.co.uk/loss/105795/">IBCC Losses Database.</a>
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Flight Sergeant G Jarmy's bomb aimer log book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
SDaviesLA1581024v10007
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
Flying log book for G Jarmey, bomb aimer, covering the period from 29 August 1943 to 8 July 1945. Detailing his flying training, operations flown and instructor duties. He was stationed at RCAF Fingal, RCAF London, RAF Moreton Valance, RAF Husbands Bosworth, RAF Wigsley, RAF Syerston, RAF Skellingthorpe and RAF Upper Heyford. Aircraft flown in were Anson, Bolingbroke, Wellington, Stirling, Lancaster and Oxford. He flew a total of 32 operations with 50 Squadron, 6 daylight and 26 night. Targets were Wilhelmshaven, Bremen, Flushing, Nuremberg, Dusseldorf, Mitteland Canal, Harburg, Duren, Dortmund-Ems Canal, Munich, Heilbronn, Gdynia, Politz, Houffalize, Royan, Merseburg, Karlsruhe, Dresden, and Bohlen. His pilot on operations was Flight Lieutenant Jones. This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1945
1944-10-05
1944-10-06
1944-10-07
1944-10-11
1944-10-19
1944-10-20
1944-11-02
1944-11-03
1944-11-06
1944-11-07
1944-11-11
1944-11-12
1944-11-16
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-04
1944-12-05
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1944-12-19
1944-12-21
1944-12-22
1944-12-30
1944-12-31
1945-01-01
1945-01-02
1945-01-04
1945-01-05
1945-01-07
1945-01-08
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-19
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-02-22
1945-02-24
1945-03-05
1945-03-06
1945-03-07
1945-03-08
1945-03-20
1945-03-21
1945-03-22
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
Canada
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Belgium--Houffalize
England--Gloucestershire
England--Leicestershire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Oxfordshire
France--Royan
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Harburg (Landkreis)
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Leipzig Region
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Ontario--London
Ontario--Toronto Region
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Ontario
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Fighter Command
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
14 OTU
16 OTU
1654 HCU
50 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
Air Observers School
aircrew
Anson
Bolingbroke
bomb aimer
bombing
Bombing and Gunnery School
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
RAF Husbands Bosworth
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF Syerston
RAF Upper Heyford
RAF Wigsley
RCAF Fingal
Stirling
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1505/28859/SDaviesLA1581024v10008.2.pdf
ed8bf40534d07483bcb8ccc0be856f7f
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Davies, Leslie and Jack
Leslie Alfred Davies
L A Davies
John Richard Davies
J R Davies
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-04-28
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Davies, LA-JR
Description
An account of the resource
49 items. Collection concerns Leslie Alfred Davies (1922-1996, 1581024 Royal Air Force) and his brother John Richard Davies ( - 1944, 1580941). Leslie served as a Lancaster navigator on of 50 Squadron completing his tour of 30 operations in March 1945. John served a Lancaster bomb aimer on 166 Squadron He was killed in action 3 August 1944. Collection consists of Leslie's crew's individual logbooks and biographies, operational histories, photographs of people, aircraft and a grave, documents and correspondence. <br /><br />The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Murray Davies and catalogued by Nigel Huckins. <br /><br />Additional information on John Richard Davies is available via the <a href="https://losses.internationalbcc.co.uk/loss/105795/">IBCC Losses Database.</a>
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Sergeant E Marrs air gunner/wireless operator's flying log book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
SDaviesLA1581024v10008
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
Flying log book for E Marrs, wireless operator, covering the period from 12 September 1943 to 10 September 1946. Detailing his flying training, operations flown and post war flying with 10 Squadron. He was stationed at RAF Barrow, RAF Madley, RAF Mona, RAF Market Harborough, RAF Wigsley, RAF Syerston, RAF Skellingthorpe and RAF Broadwell and India. Aircraft flown in were Dominie, Proctor, Anson, Wellington, Stirling, Lancaster, Halifax, and Dakota. He flew a total of 30 operation with 50 Squadron, 5 daylight and 25 night. Targets were Bremen, Flushing, Nuremberg, Dusseldorf, Mitteland Canal, Harburg, Duren, Dortmund-Ems Canal, Munich, Heilbronn, Gdynia, Politz, Houffalize, Royan, Merseburg, Karlsruhe, Dresden, and Bohlen. His pilot on operations was Flight Lieutenant Jones. <br /><br />This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1945
1946
1944-10-07
1944-10-11
1944-10-19
1944-10-20
1944-11-02
1944-11-03
1944-11-06
1944-11-07
1944-11-11
1944-11-12
1944-11-16
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-04
1944-12-05
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1944-12-19
1944-12-21
1944-12-22
1944-12-30
1944-12-31
1945-01-01
1945-01-02
1945-01-04
1945-01-05
1945-01-07
1945-01-08
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-19
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-02-22
1945-02-24
1945-03-05
1945-03-06
1945-03-07
1945-03-08
1945-03-20
1945-03-21
1945-03-22
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Belgium--Houffalize
England--Cumbria
England--Herefordshire
England--Leicestershire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Oxfordshire
France--Royan
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Harburg (Landkreis)
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Leipzig Region
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nuremberg
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Wales--Anglesey
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
10 Squadron
14 OTU
1654 HCU
4 Group
5 Group
50 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
C-47
Dominie
Halifax
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Lancaster Mk 1
Lancaster Mk 3
Operational Training Unit
Proctor
RAF Barrow in Furness
RAF Madley
RAF Market Harborough
RAF Mona
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF Syerston
RAF Wigsley
Stirling
training
Wellington
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1505/28860/SDaviesLA1581024v10009.2.pdf
a2e0bbb31054fe7d0db6a7ef6c0fd7d9
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Davies, Leslie and Jack
Leslie Alfred Davies
L A Davies
John Richard Davies
J R Davies
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-04-28
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Davies, LA-JR
Description
An account of the resource
49 items. Collection concerns Leslie Alfred Davies (1922-1996, 1581024 Royal Air Force) and his brother John Richard Davies ( - 1944, 1580941). Leslie served as a Lancaster navigator on of 50 Squadron completing his tour of 30 operations in March 1945. John served a Lancaster bomb aimer on 166 Squadron He was killed in action 3 August 1944. Collection consists of Leslie's crew's individual logbooks and biographies, operational histories, photographs of people, aircraft and a grave, documents and correspondence. <br /><br />The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Murray Davies and catalogued by Nigel Huckins. <br /><br />Additional information on John Richard Davies is available via the <a href="https://losses.internationalbcc.co.uk/loss/105795/">IBCC Losses Database.</a>
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
SDaviesLA1581024v10009
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
Description
An account of the resource
Flying log book for navigator’s air bomber air gunner’s flight engineers for G J Mellafont, air gunner, covering the period from 25 February 1944 to 10 September 1946. Detailing his flying training and operations flown. He was stationed at RAF Andreas, RAF Husbands Bosworth, RAF Market Harborough, RAF Scampton, RAF Wigsley, RAF Syerston and RAF Skellingthorpe. Aircraft flown in were Anson, Wellington, Stirling, Lancaster and Dakota. He flew a total of 29 operations with 50 Squadron, 5 daylight and 24 night. Targets were Flushing, Dusseldorf, Gravenhorst, Harburg, Dortmund-Ems Canal, Munich, Heilbronn, Gdynia, Politz, Houffalize, Royan, Merseburg, Karlsruhe, Dresden, Bohlen, Mitteland Canal, Ladbergen, Harburg and Bremen. His pilot on operations was Flight Lieutenant Jones.<br /><br /> This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Belgium--Houffalize
England--Leicestershire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
France--Royan
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Harburg (Landkreis)
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Leipzig Region
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Munich
Great Britain Miscellaneous Island Dependencies--Isle of Man
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1945
1946
1944-10-07
1944-10-11
1944-11-02
1944-11-03
1944-11-06
1944-11-07
1944-11-11
1944-11-12
1944-11-16
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-04
1944-12-05
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1944-12-19
1944-12-21
1944-12-22
1944-12-30
1944-12-31
1945-01-01
1945-01-02
1945-01-04
1945-01-05
1945-01-07
1945-01-08
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-19
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-02-22
1945-02-24
1945-03-05
1945-03-06
1945-03-07
1945-03-08
1945-03-20
1945-03-21
1945-03-22
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Title
A name given to the resource
G J Mellefont air gunner log book
14 OTU
50 Squadron
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
C-47
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Operational Training Unit
RAF Andreas
RAF Husbands Bosworth
RAF Market Harborough
RAF Scampton
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF Syerston
RAF Wigsley
Stirling
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1505/28863/BDaviesMJDaviesLAv1.1.pdf
763f7838c00c66324015cd1da0a86c44
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Davies, Leslie and Jack
Leslie Alfred Davies
L A Davies
John Richard Davies
J R Davies
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-04-28
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Davies, LA-JR
Description
An account of the resource
49 items. Collection concerns Leslie Alfred Davies (1922-1996, 1581024 Royal Air Force) and his brother John Richard Davies ( - 1944, 1580941). Leslie served as a Lancaster navigator on of 50 Squadron completing his tour of 30 operations in March 1945. John served a Lancaster bomb aimer on 166 Squadron He was killed in action 3 August 1944. Collection consists of Leslie's crew's individual logbooks and biographies, operational histories, photographs of people, aircraft and a grave, documents and correspondence. <br /><br />The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Murray Davies and catalogued by Nigel Huckins. <br /><br />Additional information on John Richard Davies is available via the <a href="https://losses.internationalbcc.co.uk/loss/105795/">IBCC Losses Database.</a>
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Leslie Alfred Davies and crew
Description
An account of the resource
Biographies of navigator Leslie Davies and all his crew. Includes photographs of Lancaster, 50 Squadron, his crew, Leslie Davies himself, training course photographs. Covers his tour from 7 October 1944 to 22 March 1945. List his crew and aircraft used on operations. Followed by biography of Leslie Alfred Davies early life, training and post tour marriage. Continues with biography of pilot Frederick David Jones including early life, training in Canada, operations and later life. Followed by biographies of Norman Parrinder, tail gunner; George Jarmy, bomb aimer; Gilbert John Mellefont, mid-upper gunner; Ernest Marrs, wireless operator and Robert M Smith, flight engineer. Continues with description of the tour including map with targets and descriptions of many of their 30 operations before concluding comments on groundcrew and bomber command in general. Contains many photographs including targets, aircraft, one of battleship SMS Schleswig-Holstein, several of remains of Lancaster bombers, groundcrew at work, bombs, anti-aircraft guns and the bomber command memorial in Green Park London.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
M J Davies
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Eighty-two page document
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
BDaviesMJDaviesLAv1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Civilian
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-10-07
1945-03-22
1943-08-02
1945-02-16
1945-01-14
1944-11-21
1944-09-27
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1944-10-07
1944-10-11
1944-10-19
1944-11-02
1944-11-06
1944-11-11
1944-11-16
1944-11-21
1944-11-26
1944-12-04
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1944-12-21
1945-01-01
1945-01-04
1945-01-05
1945-01-07
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-02-02
1945-02-08
1945-02-13
1945-02-19
1945-02-21
1945-02-24
1945-03-05
1945-03-20
1945-03-22
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
South Africa
South Africa--Port Alfred
Wales--Gwynedd
England--Leicestershire
Canada
New Brunswick--Moncton
United States
Oklahoma
Oklahoma--Ponca City
Great Britain Miscellaneous Island Dependencies--Isle of Man
France
Ontario--St. Thomas
England--Lancashire
England--Barrow-in-Furness
England--Herefordshire
Wales--Vale of Glamorgan
Netherlands
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Germany
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Munich
Germany--Heilbronn
Poland
Poland--Gdynia
Scotland--Aberdeenshire
Belgium
Belgium--Houffalize
France--Royan
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Bremen
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Ontario
New Brunswick
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
10 Squadron
14 OTU
1654 HCU
50 Squadron
6 BFTS
Advanced Flying Unit
aerial photograph
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
anti-aircraft fire
Bolingbroke
bomb aimer
bomb trolley
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
Bombing of Trossy St Maximin (3 August 1944)
British Flying Training School Program
C-47
crash
Distinguished Flying Cross
FIDO
flight engineer
Flying Training School
George VI, King of Great Britain (1895-1952)
ground crew
Halifax
Heavy Conversion Unit
incendiary device
Ju 88
killed in action
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Lancaster Mk 1
Me 262
memorial
military service conditions
missing in action
Mosquito
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
petrol bowser
pilot
RAF Banff
RAF Barrow in Furness
RAF Husbands Bosworth
RAF Llandwrog
RAF Madley
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF St Athan
RAF Syerston
RAF Wigsley
reconnaissance photograph
service vehicle
Stirling
target indicator
training
V-1
V-weapon
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1505/28878/LDaviesLA1581024v1.1.pdf
5dc683c3518902902e9b933aa91a9a29
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Davies, Leslie and Jack
Leslie Alfred Davies
L A Davies
John Richard Davies
J R Davies
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-04-28
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Davies, LA-JR
Description
An account of the resource
49 items. Collection concerns Leslie Alfred Davies (1922-1996, 1581024 Royal Air Force) and his brother John Richard Davies ( - 1944, 1580941). Leslie served as a Lancaster navigator on of 50 Squadron completing his tour of 30 operations in March 1945. John served a Lancaster bomb aimer on 166 Squadron He was killed in action 3 August 1944. Collection consists of Leslie's crew's individual logbooks and biographies, operational histories, photographs of people, aircraft and a grave, documents and correspondence. <br /><br />The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Murray Davies and catalogued by Nigel Huckins. <br /><br />Additional information on John Richard Davies is available via the <a href="https://losses.internationalbcc.co.uk/loss/105795/">IBCC Losses Database.</a>
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Leslie Davies observer’s and air gunner’s flying log book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LDaviesLA1581024v1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
Observer’s and air gunner’s flying log book for L A Davies, navigator, covering the period from 4 August 1943 to 16 April 1945 and from 26 September 1948 to 13 June 1953 with no. 5 reserve flying school. He was stationed at RAF Port Alfred, RAF Llandwrog, RAF Husbands Bosworth, RAF Market Harborough, RAF Wigsley, RAF Syerston, RAF Skellingthorpe and RAF Castle Bromwich. Aircraft flown in were Anson, Wellington, Stirling, and Lancaster. His pilot on operations was Flying Officer Jones. He flew a total of 30 operations with 50 Squadron, 5 daylight and 25 night. Targets were Flushing, Nuremburg, Dusseldorf, Gravenhorst, Harburg, Duren, Dortmund-Ems Canal, Munich, Heilbronn, Gdynia, Politz, Houffalize, Mittelland Canal, Royan, Merseburg, Karlsruhe, Dresden, Bohlen, Ladbergen and Bremen.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Cara Walmsley
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Poland
South Africa
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Belgium--Houffalize
England--Leicestershire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--West Midlands
France--Royan
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Harburg (Landkreis)
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Leipzig Region
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nuremberg
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
South Africa--Port Alfred
Wales--Gwynedd
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1944-10-07
1944-10-11
1944-10-19
1944-10-20
1944-11-02
1944-11-03
1944-11-06
1944-11-07
1944-11-11
1944-11-12
1944-11-16
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-04
1944-12-05
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1944-12-19
1944-12-21
1944-12-22
1944-12-30
1944-12-31
1945-01-01
1945-01-02
1945-01-04
1945-01-05
1945-01-07
1945-01-08
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-19
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-02-22
1945-02-24
1945-03-05
1945-03-06
1945-03-07
1945-03-08
1945-03-20
1945-03-21
1945-03-22
14 OTU
1654 HCU
50 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
Air Observers School
aircrew
Anson
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Lancaster Mk 1
Lancaster Mk 3
navigator
Operational Training Unit
RAF Castle Bromwich
RAF Husbands Bosworth
RAF Llandwrog
RAF Market Harborough
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF Syerston
RAF Wigsley
Stirling
training
Wellington