2
25
47
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1405/26420/LRobinsonFA33520v1.2.pdf
708f1dc7bd64207eea63cd6cffe934ff
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Robinson, F A
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2019-06-17
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Robinson, FA
Description
An account of the resource
Three items. The collection concerns Squadron Leader F A Robinson (b.1920, 33520 Royal Air Force) and contains his log books and a poem. He flew over 130 daylight operations with 1 PRU and 543 Squadron.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by P A Robinson and catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
F A Robinson’s flying log book for pilots. One
Description
An account of the resource
Flying log book for F A Robinson covering the period from 8 September 1938 to 22 January 1951. Detailing his flying training and operations flown, includes flight certificates, congratulatory messages and notes of appreciation from senior officers, a poem about 'Gremlins', newspaper clippings, photograph of a radar installation. He was stationed at RAF Cranwell (RAF College), RAF Old Sarum (S of AC), Abbeville (2 Squadron), RAF Odiham/Hendon (ROC Flt), RAF Hatfield/ Hendon (116 Squadron & 24 Squadron), RAF Benson/St. Eval (1 PRU & 543 Squadron). Aircraft flown in were Tutor, Hart, Hind, Audax, Hector, Lysander, Magister, Master, Roc, Stinson, Proctor, Spitfire, Anson, Wellington, Expediter, Oxford, Gladiator, Blenheim, Harvard, Tiger Moth, Hornet Moth, Meteor, Vampire. He flew over 130 daylight operations with 1 PRU and 543 Squadron. Photographic operations were flown over Le Havre, Honfleur, Cherbourg, Boulogne, Abbeville, Zeebrugge, Cap Gris Nez, Rotterdam, Antwerp, Ostend, Charleroi, Douai, Den Helder, Amsterdam, Lille, Bethune, St Omer, Leipzig, Ruhr, Flushing, Gronigen, Heppel, Cologne, Weert, Calais, Dunkirk, Nurnberg, Dortmund, Ems, Kiel, Emden, Cuxhaven, Franco-Spanish border, Brest, Bordeaux, St Nazaire, Ploumanac, Le Croisic, Ushant, St Lannion, Lorient, St Nazaire, Douarnez Bay, Pt Duraz, Morlaix, Toulouse, St Malo, Poissy, Lubeck, Travemunde, North German ports, Dortmund, Cologne, Stuttgart, Heilbronn, Frankfurt, Mezieres, Essen, Amsterdam, Swinemunde, Hamburg, Brussels, Liege, Gironde ports, La Pallice, Martha, Saarbrucken, Mealte, Aachen, Rouen, Alten fiord. The log book also lists his post war flights.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike French
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LRobinsonFA33520v.1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Norway
Belgium--Antwerp
Belgium--Brussels
Belgium--Charleroi
Belgium--Ostend
Belgium--Zeebrugge
England--Cornwall (County)
England--Hampshire
England--Hertfordshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Middlesex
England--Oxfordshire
England--Surrey
England--Wiltshire
France--Abbeville
France--Béthune
France--Brest
France--Calais
France--Cherbourg
France--Le Croisic
France--Douai
France--Douarnenez
France--Dunkerque
France--Le Havre
France--Honfleur
France--Lannion
France--Lille
France--Lorient
France--Charleville-Mézières
France--Morlaix
France--La Pallice
France--Poissy
France--Rouen
France--Toulouse
France--Ouessant Island
Germany--Aachen
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Cuxhaven
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Lübeck
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Saarbrücken
Netherlands--Amsterdam
Netherlands--Den Helder
Netherlands--Groningen
Netherlands--Rotterdam
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Netherlands--Weert
Norway--Altafjord
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Saarbrücken
France--Saint-Malo
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
Belgium--Liège
France--Bordeaux (Nouvelle-Aquitaine)
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
France--Ouessant Island
France--Saint-Nazaire
France--Cap Gris Nez
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1940-05-13
1940-05-14
1940-07-10
1940-07-11
1940-07-12
1940-07-23
1940-07-24
1940-07-29
1940-07-30
1940-08-02
1940-08-03
1940-08-06
1940-08-07
1940-08-10
1940-08-11
1940-08-14
1940-08-15
1940-08-18
1940-08-19
1940-09-11
1940-09-13
1940-09-18
1941-08-10
1941-08-17
1941-08-18
1941-08-19
1941-08-21
1941-08-22
1941-08-26
1941-08-27
1941-08-31
1941-09-02
1941-09-04
1941-09-16
1941-09-21
1941-09-22
1941-09-23
1941-09-26
1941-09-28
1941-10-02
1941-10-06
1941-10-13
1941-10-20
1941-10-23
1941-11-01
1941-11-03
1941-11-06
1941-11-12
1941-11-14
1941-11-18
1941-11-20
1941-11-24
1941-11-25
1941-12-01
1941-12-05
1941-12-07
1941-12-11
1941-12-13
1941-12-15
1941-12-19
1942-01-02
1942-01-04
1942-01-06
1942-01-09
1942-01-11
1942-01-12
1942-01-15
1942-01-16
1942-01-24
1942-01-26
1942-01-28
1942-02-02
1942-02-03
1942-02-05
1942-02-07
1942-02-08
1942-02-10
1942-02-11
1942-02-18
1942-02-19
1942-02-27
1942-03-05
1942-03-09
1942-03-24
1942-03-26
1942-03-27
1942-03-29
1942-04-02
1942-04-06
1942-04-12
1942-04-14
1942-04-16
1942-04-25
1942-04-30
1942-05-03
1942-05-06
1942-05-16
1942-05-18
1942-05-24
1942-05-28
1942-06-06
1942-06-17
1942-06-21
1942-06-22
1942-07-08
1942-07-18
1942-07-30
1942-08-06
1942-08-17
1942-08-18
1942-08-19
1942-08-23
1942-08-28
1942-09-11
1942-09-18
1942-10-04
1942-11-09
1942-11-10
1943-01-18
1943-06-25
1943-09-03
1943-09-05
1943-09-09
1943-09-13
1943-09-14
1943-09-19
1943-09-24
1943-09-26
1943-09-29
1943-10-09
1943-10-16
543 Squadron
aircrew
Anson
Blenheim
bombing
Flying Training School
Gneisenau
gremlin
Harvard
Lysander
Magister
Meteor
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
Photographic Reconnaissance Unit
pilot
Proctor
RAF Benson
RAF Cranwell
RAF Hatfield
RAF Hendon
RAF Odiham
RAF St Eval
Scharnhorst
Spitfire
Tiger Moth
Tirpitz
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/939/25664/LMackieGA855966v1.2.pdf
fcf6fb7f9ed67b82fbba69f08697fa3d
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Mackie, George
George Alexander Mackie
G A Mackie
Description
An account of the resource
Nine items. An oral history interview with George Mackie (1920 - 2020, 855966 Royal Air Force) with his log books, diary extract, list of operations, battle order and photographs. He flew operations as a pilot with 15 and 214 Squadrons.
The collection was catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-12-22
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Mackie, GA
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
George Alexander Mackie’s pilots flying log book. One
Description
An account of the resource
Pilots flying log book one, for George Alexander Mackie, covering the period from 17 September 1940 to 30 September 1942. Detailing his flying training, operations flown and instructor duties. He was stationed at RAF Meir, RAF Cranfield, RAF Bassingbourne, RAF Wyton, RAF Waterbeach and RAF Castle Combe. Aircraft flown were Magister, Master, Oxford, Wellington, Anson, Stirling, Tiger Moth, Heinkel 111 and Lancaster. He flew a total of 22 operations, 2 daylight and 15 night operations with 15 Squadron and 5 night operations with 1651 Conversion Unit. Targets were Lille, Frankfurt, Arques, La Rochelle, Berlin, Mannheim, Stettin, Nuremberg, Brest, Pilsen, Kiel, Dusseldorf, Emdem, Hamburg, Cologne, Cape de Antifer and Bremen. He flew as a second pilot on operations with Pilot Officer Jones. The log book also contains photos of aircraft, crews and sketches.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LMackieGA855966v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Great Britain
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Czech Republic--Plzeň
England--Bedfordshire
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Staffordshire
England--Wiltshire
France--Arques (Pas-de-Calais)
France--Brest
France--La Rochelle
France--Lille
France--Normandy
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Nuremberg
Poland--Szczecin
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1940
1941-07-06
1941-07-07
1941-07-08
1941-07-12
1941-07-23
1941-07-25
1941-07-26
1941-08-25
1941-08-26
1941-09-19
1941-09-20
1941-10-12
1941-10-13
1941-10-24
1941-10-25
1941-10-28
1941-10-29
1941-10-30
1941-10-31
1941-11-01
1941-11-02
1941-11-15
1941-11-16
1941-11-25
1941-11-26
1941-11-27
1941-11-28
1942-01-10
1942-01-11
1942-01-14
1942-01-15
1942-05-30
1942-05-31
1942-06-01
1942-06-02
1942-06-22
1942-06-23
1942-07-28
1942-07-29
1942-09-14
1942-09-15
1942-09-16
1942-09-17
11 OTU
15 Squadron
1651 HCU
aircrew
Anson
arts and crafts
bombing
bombing of Cologne (30/31 May 1942)
crash
Flying Training School
He 111
Heavy Conversion Unit
Initial Training Wing
Lancaster
love and romance
Magister
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
pilot
RAF Bassingbourn
RAF Castle Combe
RAF Cranfield
RAF Waterbeach
RAF Wyton
Stirling
Tiger Moth
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/455/24507/LLaneRJJ5795v10001.2.pdf
c6aa909ea3a27fba7908ba1635d89d84
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cothliff, Ken
Ken Cothliff
K Cothliff
Description
An account of the resource
486 items in 12 sub-collections. The collection concerns Ken Cothliff's research on 6 Group Bomber Command and contains an interview with Adolf Galland, documents and photographs. Sub-collections include information on 427 Squadron, 429 Squadrons, Gerry Philbin, Jim Moffat, Reg Lane, Robert Mitchell, Steve Puskas and logs from RAF Tholthorpe.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Ken Cothliff and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-10-20
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Cothliff, K
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Reg Lane’s Royal Canadian Air Force pilot’s flying log book
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
R J Lane’s RCAF Pilot’s Flying Log Book from 10th February 1941 to 2nd September 1956, detailing his training, operations and post war duties as a pilot. No flying is recorded in 1945, 1946, 1947, 1953, 1954 or 1955.
He was stationed at RCAF Station Sea Island (No. 8 Elementary Flying Training School), RCAF Station Dauphin (No. 10 Service Flying Training School), RAF Abingdon (No. 10 OTU), RAF Linton on Ouse (35 Squadron), RAF Driffield (1502 Beam Approach Training Flight), RAF Gransden Lodge (Path Finder Force Navigation Training Unit, 405 Squadron), RCAF Station Rockliffe (Air Force HQ) and RCAF Station Edmonton.
Aircraft in which flown: Tiger Moth, Harvard, Whitley III, Whitley IV, Halifax I, Halifax II, Oxford, Lancaster I, Lancaster III, Lancaster VI, Mosquito IV, Liberator I. Expeditor, Beechcraft, B-29, Goose, North Star, Dakota III, Dakota IV and Mitchell.
Records a total of 64 operations (63 night, one day). Targets in Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy and Norway were: Berlin, Bonn, Bremen, Brest, Caen, Cologne, Duisburg, Dusseldorf, Emden, Essen, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Kiel, Magdeburg, Mannheim, Milan, Munich, Nuremberg, Nurnberg, Osnabruck, Paris, Pilsen, Saarbruck, Schweinfurt, Stuttgart, Trondheim, Turin, Vegesack and Warnemunde. His first or second pilots on operations were Sergeant Williams, Sergeant Hammond, Pilot Officer Field, Pilot Officer Dobson, Sergeant Murray and Sergeant John. Records four flights with Flight Lieutenant G. L. Cheshire in October 1941. Post war flights include “FIRST RCAF ROUND - THE - WORLD FLIGHT” January and February 1950.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
David Leitch
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LLaneRJJ5795v10001
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Canadian Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Canada
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Norway
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Italy--Po River Valley
Alberta--Edmonton
British Columbia--Vancouver
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Oxfordshire
England--Yorkshire
Manitoba--Dauphin
Ontario--Ottawa
Czech Republic--Plzeň
France--Brest
France--Caen
France--Paris
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Bonn
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Magdeburg
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Osnabrück
Germany--Saarbrücken
Germany--Schweinfurt
Germany--Stuttgart
Italy--Milan
Italy--Turin
Norway--Trondheim
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Rostock
Ontario
Alberta
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Manitoba
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1941
1942
1943
1944
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1956
1941-11-07
1941-11-08
1941-11-09
1941-11-10
1941-12-11
1941-12-12
1941-12-18
1941-12-30
1942-03-03
1942-03-04
1942-03-08
1942-03-09
1942-03-13
1942-03-14
1942-03-30
1942-03-31
1942-04-27
1942-04-28
1942-05-04
1942-05-05
1942-05-08
1942-05-09
1942-05-19
1942-05-20
1942-05-30
1942-05-31
1942-06-01
1942-06-02
1942-06-03
1942-06-16
1942-06-17
1942-06-19
1942-06-20
1942-06-21
1942-06-22
1942-06-23
1942-06-25
1942-06-26
1942-06-29
1942-06-30
1942-07-02
1942-07-03
1942-07-19
1942-07-20
1942-07-21
1942-07-22
1942-07-23
1942-07-24
1942-07-25
1942-07-26
1942-07-27
1942-07-30
1942-07-31
1942-08-01
1942-10-13
1942-10-14
1942-10-15
1942-10-16
1942-10-24
1942-10-25
1942-11-09
1942-11-10
1942-11-22
1942-11-23
1942-12-31
1943-01-01
1943-02-03
1943-02-04
1943-02-05
1943-02-14
1943-02-15
1943-02-25
1943-02-26
1943-02-27
1943-03-01
1943-03-02
1943-03-03
1943-03-04
1943-03-08
1943-03-09
1943-03-10
1943-03-11
1943-03-12
1943-03-27
1943-03-28
1943-03-29
1943-03-30
1943-04-04
1943-04-05
1943-04-14
1943-04-15
1943-04-16
1943-04-17
1943-11-17
1943-11-18
1943-12-16
1943-12-17
1943-12-20
1943-12-21
1944-01-21
1944-01-22
1944-02-15
1944-02-16
1944-02-24
1944-02-25
1944-03-24
1944-03-15
1944-04-18
1944-04-19
1944-04-20
1944-04-21
1944-04-26
1944-04-27
1944-07-18
10 OTU
35 Squadron
405 Squadron
aircrew
B-24
B-25
B-29
bombing
bombing of Cologne (30/31 May 1942)
bombing of the Juvisy, Noisy-le-Sec and Le Bourget railways (18/19 April 1944)
C-47
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
Flying Training School
Halifax
Halifax Mk 1
Halifax Mk 2
Harvard
Lancaster
Lancaster Mk 1
Lancaster Mk 3
Master Bomber
Mosquito
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
Pathfinders
pilot
RAF Abingdon
RAF Driffield
RAF Gransden Lodge
RAF Linton on Ouse
tactical support for Normandy troops
Tiger Moth
training
Whitley
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/520/24264/LLucasWE122826v1.1.pdf
f8b8a2ebb89d539b28a771b379da14f0
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Lucas, Bill
William Ernest Lucas
W E Lucas
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Lucas, WE
Description
An account of the resource
15 items. Two oral history interviews with Squadron Leader Bill Lucas DFC (1917 - 2018, 1255396 Royal Air Force), his log book, brief memoir and photographs. He served as a pilot with 9, 15, 139 and 162 Squadrons. After the war he ran in the 1948 Olympics.
The collection was catalogued by Trevor Hardcastle.
Requires
A related resource that is required by the described resource to support its function, delivery, or coherence.
William (Bill) Ernest Lucas was born in Tooting Bec, London on the 16th January 1917, 3 years deep into World War One. Luckily for Bill he was not of age to endure with the fighting in the trenches. However, when Europe was engulfed into another worldwide conflict in 1939, this set way for Bill to become involved with the RAF and IBCC.
Growing up, Bill was an only child and left his school (Bec Grammar School) at the age of 15. He managed to get a job with a printers, which led to his second and only other job at an insurance company called the London and Lancashire. The company’s sports club enabled Bill to find his passion for athletics (especially running) and he was expected to participate in the 1940 Olympics until the war interfered. (https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/30884)
A photo of Bill in his running gear is shown in https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/30865 where he is running down 55 Graham Road in Surrey.
Bill instead competed in the 1948 Olympic Games as the games were also cancelled in 1944 due to World War Two. Luckily the games were hosted in London (https://olympics.com/en/olympic-games/london-1948) and Bill had retired from IBCC meaning that he had time to participate.
As seen in ‘Bill Lucas and the 1948 London Olympics’ (1948) https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/30866 Bill managed to come 6th in the Second Heat meaning he was one position off of being in the final on the 2nd August 1948! This collection also includes Bill in his older prime wearing his 1948 Olympic Games jacket and the official Olympic Games programme from 1948.
When Hitler invaded Poland on September 1st 1939, Bill was 22 years old meaning that he was eligible to be part of Great Britain’s Army. Combining Bill’s hatred of the sea and his fathers recent experiences in the trenches, the RAF seemed to be the most compatible choice with Bill. (https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/520/30884/B[Author]LucasWEv10001.jpg)
Bill was not involved in Britain’s mightiest air conflict against Hitler’s Luftwaffe however, instead watching ‘The Few’ defeat the Nazi aircrafts and succeed. Being considered to be Nazi Germany’s first ‘major military defeat’, this allowed for Britain to continue fighting in the war (https://www.raf.mod.uk/our-organisation/our-history/anniversaries/battle-of-britain/ and to an extent, allowed Bill to continue his path of becoming an Squadron Leader.
It was November 1940 when Bill started his pilot training, but due to a bomber offensive being the only way to properly counter the Nazis, this was huge not just for Bill but Britain as a whole. There had never been a bomber offensive before in warfare. https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/520/30884/B[Author]LucasWEv10001.jpg
As seen in Bill’s official Pilot’s Log Book: (https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/520/24264/LLucasWE122826v1.1.pdf) his training consisted of being part of 16 Elementary Flying School at RAF Derby from 1940 to 41 , 8 School of Flying Training at RAF Montrose in 1941 and 20 Operational Training Units at RAF Lossiemouth in 1941 . He flew three different types of aircraft during his training, Miles Magister, Miles Master and Wellington I’s.
Bill’s training finally finished in August 1941 and he was posted to his first official squadron, IX Squadron at Honington. Here he flew the Wellington Bomber.
Will Cragg
Record of Service:
4 November 1940- 4 January 1941: 16 Elementary Flying Training School at RAF Derby flying Miles Magisters
9 January- 4 May 1941: 8 School of Flying Training at RAF Montrose flying Miles Masters
31 May 1941- 13 August 1941: 20 Operational Training Units at RAF Lossiemouth flying Wellington I’s
14 August 1941- 4 November 1941: 9 Squadron at RAF Honington flying Wellington III’s
4 November 1941- 30 December 1941: 26 Conversion Fleet at RAF Waterbeach flying Stirling’s
30 December 1941- 1 August 1942: 15 Squadron at RAF Wyton flying Whitley V’s
1 August 1942- 3 August 1942: 218 Conversion Fleet at RAF Marham flying Airspeed Oxfords
4 August 1942- 18 August 1942: 19 Operational Training Units at RAF Kinloss flying Whitley IV’s
19 August 1942- 13 August 1942: 3 Fighter Instructor Schools at RAF Hullavington flying Ansons
17 September 1942- 18 September 1942: 19 Operational Training Units at RAF Kinloss flying Halifax II’s
18 September 1942- 24 October 1944: 19 Operational Training Units at RAF Forres flying Mosquito III’s
30 October 1942- 19 December 1944: 1655 Mosquito Training Unit at RAF Warboys flying Mosquito IV’s
30 October 1944- 19 December 1944: 1655 Squadron at RAF Bourn flying Mosquito XX’s
7 June 1945- 28 June 1945: 162 Squadron at RAF Blackbushe flying Mosquito XXV’S
28 June 1945- 29 January 1946: 139 Squadron at RAF Upwood flying Lancaster III’s
29 January 1946: Station Head Quarters at RAF Upwood flying Mosquito XVI’s
William Cragg
William (Bill) Lucas was born on January 16th, 1917 in Tooting Bec, London. He was educated at Bec Grammar School, and left at the age of 15 to work at a printing company before moving to the insurers London and Lancashire to work as an assessor. While working there, he developed his talent for athletics with the Belgrave Harriers, with his best discipline being the 5000 metres. His goal was to compete at the 1940 Olympic games. However, in 1940, Bill was called up to help the war effort and mindful of his father’s advice to avoid the army and his own dislike of the sea, he chose to join the RAF.
Initially he trained as a fighter pilot on Miles Magisters and Miles Masters, but by the time he had finished training, the Battle of Britain had been won and the need for bomber pilots was more urgent. So, he was reallocated to bombers and trained to fly the Wellington at RAF Lossiemouth. Bill Lucas · IBCC Digital Archive (lincoln.ac.uk)
Following completion of pilot training in August 1941, he was posted to RAF Honington and joined 9 Squadron flying Wellingtons. He flew 14 operational sorties – notably Cologne and Hamburg – before converting to Stirlings at RAF Waterbeach. He then joined 15 (Bomber) Squadron at RAF Wyton, flying the Short Stirling and, by August 1942, Bill had completed a full tour of 30 operational sorties (over 40 operations in total). Bill experienced tense encounters with German defences, having to take evasive action and also getting caught in a cone of five or six searchlights. To get out of the searchlight glare he had to do things with the aircraft which it was never meant to do. Returning from one mission they flew too close to Kiel and the airframe amassed a lot of bullet holes and an alarming loss of fuel. Crossing the North Sea, the tank indicators showed practically nothing and they had to divert into Woodbridge in Suffolk. The groundcrew estimated there was less than twenty-five gallons of fuel left (probably less than 6 minutes of flying time).
He was released from operational duties and was posted to RAF Lossiemouth as a flying instructor. Then in December 1944, he returned to operational flying and was posted to 162 Squadron, part of the Pathfinder force, to fly the Mosquito, an aircraft he described as “a bit quicker and more responsive; a nice aeroplane”. He completed a further 34 operational sorites with 162 Squadron, including missions over Kiel, Berlin, Hannover and Magdeburg. In recognition of his war services, Bill was awarded the DFC and was Mentioned in Despatches.
Squadron Leader Bill Lucas was released from the Service in January 1946 and returned to the insurance job he had left to join the RAF. Eventually, he left the company to become an insurance broker. He also returned to athletics and the Belgrave Harriers; he ran in various internationals and competed for Great Britain in the 5000m at the 1948 London Olympics. Athletics remained with him for the rest of his life and he gave his spare time freely, working in prominent roles in the administration of athletics. He remained a Belgrave Harrier committee member well into his 90s. He became known as “the golden voice of British Athletics” for his many years as stadium announcer at the White City .
In his later years, Bill remained prominent in RAF and Aircrew Associations. He, along with a small Band of Sussex veterans, was instrumental in helping to raise funds for the construction of the Bomber Command Memorial in London’s Green Park and the International Bomber Command Centre.
Chris Cann
1940: Volunteered for the RAF
4 November 1940 – 4 January 1941: RAF Burnaston, No. 16 EFTS, flying Magister aircraft
9 January 1941 – 4 May 1941: RAF Montrose, No. 8 SFTS, flying Master aircraft
31 May 1941 – 13 August 1941: RAF Lossiemouth, No. 20 OTU, flying Wellington aircraft
14 August 1941 – 4 November 1941: RAF Honington, No. 9 Squadron, flying Wellington aircraft
1941: Commissioned into the officer ranks
4 November 1941 – 30 December 1941: RAF Waterbeach, No. 26 Conversion Flight, flying Stirling aircraft
30 December 1941 – 1 August 1942: RAF Wyton, No. 15 Squadron, flying Stirling aircraft
1 August 1942 – 3 August 1942: RAF Marham, 218 Conversion Flight
4 August 1942 – 18 August 1942: RAF Kinloss, No. 19 OTU, flying Whitley aircraft
19 August 1942 – 13 September 1942: RAF Hullavington, No. 3 FTS, flying Oxford aircraft
17 September 1942 – 18 September 1942: RAF Kinloss, No. 19 OTU, flying Whitley and Anson aircraft
18 September 1942 – 24 October 1944: RAF Foress, No. 19 OTU, flying Whitley and Anson aircraft
30 October 1944 – 19 December 1944: RAF Warboys, 1655 MTU, flying Mosquito and Oxford aircraft
19 December 1944 – 7 June 1945: RAF Bourn, 162 Squadron, flying Mosquito aircraft
7 June 1945 – 28 June 1945: RAF Blackbushe, 162 Squadron, flying Mosquito aircraft
28 June 1945 – 29 January 1946: RAF Upwood, 139 Squadron, flying Mosquito and Oxford aircraft
29 January 1946: Released from Service having attained the rank of Squadron Leader.
Chris Cann
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
W E Lucas’ pilots flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
Pilots flying log book for W E Lucas, covering the period from 7 November 1940 to 18 February 1946. Detailing his flying training, operations flown and instructor duties. He was stationed at RAF Derby, RAF Montrose, RAF Lossiemouth, RAF Honington, RAF Waterbeach, RAF Wyton, RAF Alconbury, RAF Kinloss, RAF Hullavington, RAF Forres, RAF Warboys, RAF Bourn, RAF Blackbushe (Hartford Bridge) and RAF Upwood. Aircraft flown in were Magister, Master, Wellington, Stirling, Whitley, Oxford, Anson, Halifax, Mosquito and Lancaster. He flew a total of 67 night operations. 10 with 9 Squadron, 23 with 15 Squadron and 34 with 162 Squadron. Targets were Cologne, Mannheim, Brest, Boulogne, Turin, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Genoa, Stettin, Lorient, Lubeck, Stuttgart, Warnemunde, Blaavands Point, Norderney, Essen, Emden, Bremen, Wilhelmshaven, Lemburg, Hanau, Nurnberg, Hannover, Berlin, Magdeburg, Erfurt, Kiel, Dessau and Osnabruck. <span>His first or second pilots on operations were </span>Sergeant Baker, Sergeant Bulford, Pilot Officer Saunders, Sergeant Cross, Sergeant Melville, Sergeant Bond, Sergeant Russell-Colins, Group Captain Kirkpatrick and Squadron Leader Walsh. He also lists his post war flying duties with 139 Squadron.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LLucasWE122826v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Denmark
France
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Netherlands
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Denmark--Ribe
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Derbyshire
England--Hampshire
England--Suffolk
England--Wiltshire
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Brest
France--Lorient
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Dessau (Dessau)
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Erfurt
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Hanau
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Lübeck
Germany--Magdeburg
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Norderney
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Osnabrück
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Italy--Genoa
Italy--Turin
Netherlands--Limburg
Poland--Szczecin
Scotland--Angus
Scotland--Moray
Germany--Rostock
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1940
1941-08-26
1941-08-27
1941-08-29
1941-08-30
1941-09-07
1941-09-08
1941-09-10
1941-09-11
1941-09-12
1941-09-13
1941-09-15
1941-09-16
1941-09-26
1941-09-28
1941-09-29
1941-09-30
1941-10-01
1941-10-20
1941-10-26
1942-03-25
1942-03-26
1942-03-28
1942-03-29
1942-04-28
1942-05-06
1942-05-07
1942-05-08
1942-05-09
1942-05-17
1942-05-18
1942-05-29
1942-05-30
1942-05-31
1942-06-01
1942-06-02
1942-06-03
1942-06-06
1942-06-07
1942-06-19
1942-06-20
1942-06-22
1942-06-23
1942-06-25
1942-06-26
1942-06-29
1942-06-30
1942-07-02
1942-07-03
1942-07-07
1942-07-08
1942-07-09
1944-12-21
1944-12-22
1944-12-23
1944-12-24
1944-12-28
1944-12-29
1945-01-01
1945-01-02
1945-01-03
1945-01-05
1945-01-06
1945-01-07
1945-01-08
1945-01-10
1945-01-11
1945-02-01
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-04
1945-02-05
1945-02-06
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-10
1945-02-11
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-19
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-02-22
1945-03-03
1945-03-04
1945-03-05
1945-03-06
1945-03-07
1945-03-08
1945-03-09
1945-03-10
1945-03-13
1945-03-14
1945-03-15
1945-03-16
1945-03-20
1945-03-21
1945-03-22
1945-03-23
1945-03-27
1945-03-28
1945-04-03
1945-04-04
1945-04-05
1945-04-09
1945-04-10
1945-04-11
1945-04-12
1945-04-20
1945-04-21
1945-04-23
1945-04-24
1945-04-25
1945-04-26
1945-06-04
1945-07-16
1945-09-17
1945-09-21
1946
139 Squadron
15 Squadron
162 Squadron
19 OTU
20 OTU
9 Squadron
aircrew
Anson
bombing
bombing of Cologne (30/31 May 1942)
Cook’s tour
Flying Training School
H2S
Halifax
Lancaster
Magister
mine laying
Mosquito
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
pilot
RAF Alconbury
RAF Bourn
RAF Hartford Bridge
RAF Honington
RAF Hullavington
RAF Kinloss
RAF Lossiemouth
RAF Upwood
RAF Warboys
RAF Waterbeach
RAF Wyton
Stirling
training
Wellington
Whitley
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/551/23213/LLancasterJO103509v1.2.pdf
56bf3c9cc310d03cf9f44312ba2ba698
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Lancaster, Jo
John Oliver Lancaster
J O Lancaster
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Lancaster, JO
Description
An account of the resource
17 items. Two oral history interviews with John Oliver 'Jo' Lancaster DFC (1919 - 2019, 948392, 103509 Royal Air Force), photographs and six of his log books. Jo Lancaster completed 54 operations as a pilot with in Wellingtons with 40 Squadron, and after a period of instructing, in Lancasters with 12 Squadron from RAF Wickenby. He became test pilot after the war and was the first person to use a Martin-Baker ejection seat in an emergency.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Jo Lancaster and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-08-18
2017-03-08
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Jo Lancaster’s pilots flying log book. One
Description
An account of the resource
Pilots flying log book for J O Lancaster covering the period from 6 July 1937 to 15 September 1943. Detailing his flying training, operations flown and instructor duties. He was stationed at RAF Sywell, RAF Ansty, RAF Desford, RAF Sealand, RAF Ternhill, RAF Lossiemouth, RAF Wyton, RAF Wellesbourne Mountford, RAF Upavon, RAF Wymeswold, RAF Kirmington, RAF Wickenby and RAF Binbrook. Aircraft flown were Tiger Moth, Cadet, Hart, Audax, Master, Wellington, Bombay, Oxford, Stirling, Magister, Lancaster, Whitley, Halifax, Martinet, Skua and Spitfire. He flew a total of 54 operations, 31 with 40 squadron 1 daylight and 30 night, 2 night operations with 22 Operational Training Unit and 21 night operations with 12 Squadron. Targets were Calais, Hamburg, Hannover, Atlantic, Dusseldorf, Cologne, Cherbourg, Brest, Munster, Osnabruck, Mannheim, Duisburg, Frankfurt, Berlin, Turin, Stettin, Rotterdam, Emden, Nurnberg, Essen, St Nazaire, Terschelling, Haugesund Fijord, Lorient, Wilhelmshaven, Bremen, Munich and Spezia. His pilot for his first 'second dickie' operations was Sergeant Taylor.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LLancasterJO103509v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Leicestershire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Northamptonshire
England--Shropshire
England--Warwickshire
England--Wiltshire
England--Worcestershire
France--Brest
France--Calais
France--Cherbourg
France--Lorient
France--Saint-Nazaire
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Osnabrück
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Italy--La Spezia
Italy--Turin
Netherlands--Rotterdam
Netherlands--Terschelling
Norway--Haugesund
Poland--Szczecin
Scotland--Moray
Wales--Flintshire
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Poland
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1941-05-09
1941-05-10
1941-05-11
1941-05-12
1941-05-15
1941-05-16
1941-05-27
1941-06-02
1941-06-03
1941-06-11
1941-06-12
1941-06-23
1941-06-24
1941-06-26
1941-06-27
1941-07-02
1941-07-03
1941-07-04
1941-07-05
1941-07-06
1941-07-07
1941-07-09
1941-07-10
1941-07-22
1941-07-23
1941-07-24
1941-07-30
1941-07-31
1941-08-12
1941-08-13
1941-08-16
1941-08-17
1941-08-18
1941-08-19
1941-08-25
1941-08-28
1941-08-29
1941-08-31
1941-09-01
1941-09-02
1941-09-03
1941-09-07
1941-09-08
1941-09-10
1941-09-11
1941-09-12
1941-09-13
1941-09-15
1941-09-16
1941-09-29
1941-09-30
1941-10-03
1941-10-04
1941-10-11
1941-10-12
1941-10-14
1941-10-15
1941-10-16
1941-10-17
1942-06-01
1942-06-02
1942-11-03
1942-11-04
1942-11-07
1942-11-08
1942-11-09
1942-11-10
1943-01-04
1943-01-05
1943-01-08
1943-01-09
1943-01-23
1943-01-24
1943-01-30
1943-01-31
1943-02-02
1943-02-03
1943-02-07
1943-02-08
1943-02-11
1943-02-12
1943-02-13
1943-02-14
1943-02-15
1943-02-16
1943-02-17
1943-02-18
1943-02-19
1943-02-21
1943-02-22
1943-03-03
1943-03-04
1943-03-05
1943-03-06
1943-03-08
1943-03-09
1943-03-10
1943-03-12
1943-03-13
1943-03-22
1943-03-23
1943-03-27
1943-03-28
1943-04-03
1943-04-04
1943-04-05
1943-04-18
1943-04-19
12 Squadron
20 OTU
22 OTU
28 OTU
40 Squadron
aircrew
bombing
bombing of Cologne (30/31 May 1942)
Flying Training School
Halifax
Lancaster
Magister
Martinet
mine laying
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
pilot
RAF Ansty
RAF Binbrook
RAF Desford
RAF Kirmington
RAF Lossiemouth
RAF Sealand
RAF Sywell
RAF Ternhill
RAF Upavon
RAF Wellesbourne Mountford
RAF Wickenby
RAF Wymeswold
RAF Wyton
Spitfire
Stirling
Tiger Moth
training
Wellington
Whitley
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1334/20640/PSearleROJ17060007.1.jpg
706ac3a430dd32ac3025c4d810b48d19
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Searle, Rex. Album 2
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-07-25
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Searle, ROJ
Description
An account of the resource
24 items. The album contains photographs and papers relating to Rex Searle's wartime and postwar service.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[35 bombing raids over enemy territory 3.9.44 to 1.3.45]
1. DAYLIGHT ‘W’ D.C.O. DIV.
VOLKEL 3.9.44.
2. DAYLIGHT ‘V’ D.C.O. FORGOT CHUTE!
EMDEN 6.9.44.
3. DAYLIGHT ‘N’ D.C.O.
LE HAVRE 9.9.44.
4. DAYLIGHT ‘W’ D.C.O.
LE HAVRE 10.9.44.
5. DAYLIGHT ‘W’ D.C.O.
CASTROP RAUXEL 11.9.44.
6. DAYLIGHT ‘W’ D.C.O.
WANNE EIKAEL 12.9.44.
7. DAYLIGHT ‘O’ D.C.O.
OSNABRUCK 13.9.44.
8. NIGHT ‘W’ D.C.O. HYDRAULICS U/S
DORTMUND 6.10.44.
9. NIGHT ‘T’ D.C.O. 3 ENGINES
BOCUM 9.10.44.
10. DAYLIGHT ‘W’ D.C.O.
WANNE EIKAEL 12.10.44.
11. DAYLIGHT ‘W’ D.C.O.
DUISBURG 14.10.44.
12. NIGHT ‘J’ D.C.O.
WILHELMSHAVEN 15.10.44.
13. NIGHT ‘W’ RECALLED
HANOVER 21.10.44.
14. NIGHT ‘Y’ D.C.O. DIV. SHORT OF FUEL
ESSEN 23.10.44.
15. DAYLIGHT ‘W’ D.C.O.
HOMBERG 25.10.44.
16. DAYLIGHT ‘W’ D.C.O.
COLOGNE 25.10.44.
17. NIGHT ‘W’ D.C.O.
OBERHAUSEN 1.11.44.
18. NIGHT ‘W’ D.C.O.
DUSSELDORF 2.11.44.
19. NIGHT ‘W’ D.C.O.
BOCHUM 4.11.44.
20. DAYLIGHT ‘W’ D.C.O.
GELSENKIRCHEN 6.11.44.
21. NIGHT ‘W’ D.C.O.
CASTROP RAUXEL 22.11.44.
22. DAYLIGHT ‘J’ D.C.O. RETURNED S.I. U/S
DUISBURG 30.11.44.
23. NIGHT ‘W’ D.C.O.
TROIS DORF 29.12.44.
24. NIGHT ‘W’ D.C.O.
SAARBRUCKEN 13.1.45.
25. NIGHT ‘J’ D.C.O.
GREVENBROICH 14.1.45.
26. NIGHT ‘I’ D.C.O.
MAGDEBURG 16.1.45.
27. NIGHT ‘W’ D.C.O. HYD U/S
STUTTGART 28.1.45.
28. NIGHT ‘W’ D.C.O.
MEINZ 1.2.45.
29. NIGHT ‘W’ D.C.O.
WANNE EICKEL 2.2.45.
30. NIGHT ‘W’ D.C.O.
BONN 4.2.45.
31. NIGHT ‘Y’ D.C.O.
BOHLEN 13.2.45.
32. NIGHT ‘K’ D.C.O.
CHEMNITZ 14.2.45.
33. DAYLIGHT ‘W’ D.C.O. RETURNED WITH BOMBS INST OF M.B.
WESSEL 17.2.45.
34. DAYLIGHT ‘W’ D.C.O.
MEINZ 27.2.45.
35. DAYLIGHT ‘W’ D.C.O.
MANNHEIM 1.3.45.
1ST TOUR COMPLETED 1.3.45. [signature]
Dublin Core
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Title
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List of Operations
Description
An account of the resource
A list of 35 operations completed, with target, aircraft and date.
Date
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1945-03-01
Format
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One handwritten sheet
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Identifier
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PSearleROJ17060007
Spatial Coverage
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Netherlands--Eindhoven
France--Le Havre
Germany--Castrop-Rauxel
Germany--Wanne-Eickel
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Essen
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Troisdorf
Germany--Grevenbroich
Germany--Magdeburg
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Mainz (Rhineland-Palatinate)
Germany--Bonn
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Chemnitz
Germany--Wesseling
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Osnabrück
Germany--Saarbrücken
Germany--Oberhausen (Düsseldorf)
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Homburg (Saarland)
France
Germany
Netherlands
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
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1944
1945
Contributor
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David Bloomfield
bombing
Halifax
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1334/20639/PSearleROJ17060006.1.jpg
49e4d96e01286c7ad65c0e0f70fa78b8
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Searle, Rex. Album 2
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-07-25
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
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Searle, ROJ
Description
An account of the resource
24 items. The album contains photographs and papers relating to Rex Searle's wartime and postwar service.
Dublin Core
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Title
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Target Token Emden
Aiming point certificate
Description
An account of the resource
A card with an aerial photograph taken during an operation. The target was Emden and the crew members are listed.
‘F/O Potter
F/O Rutherford
F/O Mjolsness
F/O Reid
Sgt Taylor
Sgt Tuer
Sgt Searle’
Date
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1944-09-06
Format
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One printed card
Language
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eng
Type
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Physical object
Identifier
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PSearleROJ17060006
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Canadian Air Force
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Spatial Coverage
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Germany
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Temporal Coverage
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1944-09-06
Creator
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Canada. Royal Canadian Air Force
6 Group
aerial photograph
aircrew
bombing
Halifax
target photograph
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/743/20634/BCleggPVWilsonDv1.1.pdf
52fe453884f3b8aa4fb3ff000cb8677a
Dublin Core
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Title
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Clegg, Peter Vernon
P V Clegg
Description
An account of the resource
Eight items and five sub-collections. Main collection contains a log of Pathfinder operations from RAF Wyton 1943 -1944, histories of the Avro repair facility at Bracebridge Heath, and Langar, a biography of Squadron Leader David James Baikie Wilson, biography of Squadron Leader Lighton Verdon-Roe, a book - Test Pilots of A.V. Roe & Co Ltd - S.A. 'Bill' Thorn, and two volumes of book - Roy Chadwick - no finer aircraft designer, Sub-collections contain a total of 29 items concerning the Aldborough Dairy and Cafe as well as biographical material, including log books for Alan Gibson, Peter Isaacson, Alistair Lang and Charles Martin. <br /><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1772">Aldborough Dairy and Cafe</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1768">Gibson, Alan</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1769">Isaacson, Peter</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1770">Lang, Alastair</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1771">Martin, Charles</a><br /><br /><br />The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Peter Clegg and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2015-07-02
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
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Clegg, PV
Transcribed document
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Transcription
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[underlined] A bomber pilot’s journey through WWII. [/underlined] Page 1.
(A Veteran from 617 Squadron – David Wilson).
Sqd. Ldr. David James Baikie Wilson, DSO, DFC and Bar – Head of Aerodynamic Development and Testing, and Test-Pilot, A.V. Roe & Co Ltd.
April 8th 1946 to August 23rd 1947 (killed in Tudor crash)
David James Baikie Wilson was born on January 16th 1917, in Highgate, London, to his Scottish mother and Norfolk-born father. His mother came from a tough sea-faring family called Baikie living in [inserted] Brisbane Street, [/inserted] Greenock, on the River Clyde, to the west of Glasgow. From her, David inherited a great resolution of character, and from his father he acquired a brilliant academic brain – a combination that does not often lead to its owner becoming a test-pilot.
David was the only child in the family, and his mother inserted the name of her Sea-Captain father, James Baikie, between “David” and “Wilson” to perpetuate the family name – as is the wont of many Scottish families.
David’s father and mother had moved down to North London prior to the birth, and remained in that area while he grew up. Attending the local Kingsbury County School, and later Berkbeck College in Fetter Lane, David soon proved himself extremely bright, academically, obtaining [inserted] School Certificate [/inserted] “Distinctions” in Pure Maths, General Physics and Chemistry and “Credits” in Advanced Maths, French, History and English. He left the College with Higher School Certificate in Pure and Applied Maths, Chemistry and Physics, and then went straight to London University, to try to gain a degree in some of these subjects. True to his academic form, he gained a B.Sc. (General) in Chemistry, Physics and Pure Maths in July 1937 and then studied Chemistry for a further two years, gaining a “First” in the “Special” B.Sc. category and [inserted] starting work at the British Oxygen Company in November 1938. [/inserted]
Combining a taste for something more exciting, with his studying, David was already very keen
[Page break]
3/2
on aircraft and flying, and as the inevitable War loomed up he joined the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve (RAFVR), and was called up for deferred service in January 1940, training at Hendon (his nearest RAF base) for six months until June that year. Then he was called up properly to attend initial RAF training and selection, and spent the next two months being drilled and graded – as David had hoped – for pilot training in the Commonwealth. September 1940 saw him arrive in Southern Rhodesia at No 25 Elementary Flying Training School at Salisbury, and his pilot training started on September 18th with his first flight there in a Tiger Moth flown by his instructor, Flt/Sgt Marsden.
[Underlined] Pilot Training in Rhodesia [/underlined]
Flying in the [inserted] dry, [/inserted] sunny climate of Southern Rhodesia, David was able to [inserted] thoroughly [/inserted] enjoy his airborne experiences, and progress rapidly with the training routine. He went solo after 18 hrs 25 mins dual flying – indicative not so much of his own ability but the steady and rigorously adhered to procedures followed at the EFTS there, to cut down the early accident rate. It was not a spectacular time in which to go solo – rather the opposite – but David learned slowly but surely, and once learned, he never forgot, becoming a very sure-handed pilot.
Training progressed rapidly – David making three or four flights a day at times, and a lot of attention was paid to aerobatics, spinning, forced landing practice, and even night flying on the Tiger Moth! Some instrument flying was also done on the Tiger, and – a curious exercise – “abandoning an aircraft in flight”. His qualifying Cross-Country on October 31st was from Salisbury to Gatooma and back, and then he was posted out the same day, categorised a “Average” as a pilot, and recommended for “twin-engined types” in furthur training. He had gained his “Wings” on the Tiger Moth.
After a weeks’ leave, David now attended the No 21 S.F.T.S. at [inserted] Kumalo, [/inserted] Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia, to start training on Oxford aircraft. He had by now clocked up 65 hrs flying, 28 hrs 30 min of which
[Page break]
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was solo. His first flight in an Oxford was now made on November 11th 1940, with his [inserted] new [/inserted] instructor, Flying Officer Wood. David actually failed his first solo test on the Oxford, but managed all right on the second occasion, on November 14th, and from there on never looked back. As the training progressed, he passed a “Height-Test”, “Navigation”, “Navigator Test”, “Cross-Country”, “Low-flying”, “triangular cross-country on instruments”, “Formation”, “Progress”, and finally his passing-out test by the Chief Flying Instructor, Sqd. Ldr Hendrikz. With a total of 115 hrs now (55 hr 55 mins solo), David passed the first stage of the twin-engined Oxford Course on Dec 18th 1940, again classified as “Average” as a pilot.
The second stage started on December 30th now concentrating on tactical flying – making reconnaissance sorties, low-level bombing practice, and a lot of instrument and cross-country flying. There were night landings by floodlight, and many more low-level bombing runs at 1,000 ft, during which David’s mean bomb-dropping error crept down from 126 yds to 88 yds, and finally to 42 yds on average. Then they indulged in a bit of aerial gunnery from the Oxford, firing 90 rounds off from the Oxford’s single target gun. Near the end of the course, there were “ZZ” approaches, photography – “stereo pairs”, and “line-overlap”, and finally, formation flying. David passed out of No 21 S.F.T.S on February 12th 1941, with an “Average” grading again, having now flown 163 hrs 35 mins, of which 99 hrs 15 mins was solo. He was now posted to No 11 Operational Training Unit on Wellington bombers, at Bassingbourn, back in England.
[Underlined] Operations with 214 Squadron [/underlined]
At Bassingbourne [sic] David rapidly completed a further 75 hrs 40 mins flying on Wellington IO and IA aircraft, starting on May 21st 1941. He solo-ed on the Wellington after some 21 hrs 10 mins “dual” and “2nd pilot” flying, and then started to do a lot of night flying ranging from “circuits and bumps” to cross-country flying, mock bombing raids, air-to-air firing [inserted] and [/inserted] a North Sea Sweep. [Deleted] and [/deleted] Cross-country instrument flying was invariably from Bassingbourne [sic] to Wittering and Andover
[Page break]
4.
to Upper Heyford and return. At the end of all this, on June 26th 1941, David passed out of the O.T.U. and was posted to No 214 [inserted] (Federated Malay States) [/inserted] Squadron based at RAF Stradishall in Suffolk. This Squadron – as its name implies – was supported by the Malay Federation in WWII and several aircraft were paid for by funds raised in the States, including a Wellington II, W5442* coded BU-V, which David Wilson flew the first evening he arrived at the Squadron. After having an “Air Test” with one of the Flight Commanders, Sqd. Ldr. Field, in the morning of July 9th, David flew as Second Pilot to the Squadron Leader that same evening on his first operation – carrying a 4,000 lb “dookie” to drop on Osnabruk.** The raid was carried out by a total of 57 Wellingtons from No 3 Group, and, as discovered after the War, not many bombs fell on the target area. Two Wellingtons were lost that night, but David returned safely.
Only five days later, David was off on his next operation – this time to Bremen, to drop three 500 lb bombs and clusters of incendiaries. After this, raids followed in quick succession every two or three nights; Cologne, Rotterdam, Mannheim, Hamburg, Hanover, Duisburg, Keil, etc. Each time David was flying as Second Pilot to the Squadron Leader, or to a Sgt. Foxlee. On the night of July 25/26th, after raiding Hamburg with Sgt. Foxlee, they had to divert to Debden on the return, as their own base had poor weather and low visibility. The same thing happened on August 12th, on their return from Hanover, but this time David and Sqd. Ldr. Field diverted to Newmarket instead.
At this time, these attacks were mostly being directed at German ports, shipping and naval bases, or railway yards, but [inserted] their [/inserted] accuracy – or [inserted] the [/inserted] damage [inserted] caused [/inserted] - at this stage in the war, in hindsight, did not reach any great measure of success.
David recorded his longest operational flight so far on September 7th 1941, when he acted as Second pilot again for a Pilot Officer Barnard, and they bombed Berlin, taking 8 hrs 15 mins for the entire flight. Two sorties later – and on his own 6th operation – David was
* This Wellington was named “Sri Guroh” and had already completed some 25 successful raids before David flew it.
** See appendix 4 for details.
[Page break]
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the Captain of the aircraft for the first time, and this particular trip was a short one across the Channel to Le Havre. He flew a Wellington IC, N2850, but there was ten tenths cloud over the target, and they eventually dropped their bombs in the sea before returning to base
After this, David was the Captain on all his future operations, which included an attack on Hamburg on the night of September 29th carrying a 4,000 lb High Capacity blast bomb – and flying W5442, the old aircraft of the O.C. “B” flight, Sqd Ldr Field.
David was now allocated Wellington IC X9979 for his own crew to use, and this “Wimpy” stayed with him from October 2nd 1941 right up to the end of David’s tour of operations on January 31st 1942.
Many of his raids in October over the German sea ports were plagued by solid cloud cover, or bad weather, and they often bombed “blind” over the top of the targets. On November 7th David set out for Berlin again with six 500 lb bombs, but there was extremely bad cloud and icing over Germany, and Berlin, and so he unloaded his bombs over Osnabruck instead, on the return journey. This was one of Bomber Command’s biggest raids on Berlin to date, and there would be no more large raids on the capital until January 1943. The weather was equally bad over England on the return, and David [inserted] had to [/inserted] divert to another airfield.
Back [inserted] on [/inserted] September 1st, David and others in 214 Squadron began a series of low-level bombing practices, flying over their ranges at [inserted] Foxcote at [/inserted] 200 ft and dropping six bombs at a time. By December 9th they were dropping up to eight practice bombs a time, and on the 11th David, again flying at only 200 ft, dropped a massive 4,000 lb bomb from this low altitude! The end of the year 1941 arrived with David bombing Brest on December 23rd and 27th, trying to hit the Port area.
In January 1942, David was sent to Brest on four more occasions, having to divert to land at Harwell on one of these raids because of bad weather on the return. On January 21st he flew to Bremen to drop a 4,000 lb HC bomb, and then on the 28th came the final “Op” of the Tour – a raid on Münster. The cloud cover was again so bad that they returned home without dropping the bombload, and diverted to Waterbeach to land. David had safely completed his first Operational Tour, having flown
[Page break]
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289 hrs 50 mins in all with 214 Squadron, of which 199 hrs 35 mins were on actual operations. * He was now graded as “Above Average” as a pilot by 214’s C.O., Sqd. Ldr. Carr.
[Underlined] Becoming a Flying Instructor [/underlined]
For his traditional rest from operations, David was now posted to No1 Flying Instructors School at Church Lawford, near Rugby. He arrived there on February 24th 1942,[inserted] to start on the No22 War Course, and [/inserted] to be trained to teach others how to fly multi-engined aircraft. This course here lasted to April 21st, and during this time he was given intensive instruction on Oxford I’s and II’s, and (surprisingly enough) on some single-engined pre-war Avro Tutors!
David underwent day and night instruction, his mentor being a Flt. Lt. Mann, and sessions of any of the half dozen Avro Tutors were interspersed with the twin-engined flights on Oxford trainers. Between March 27th and April 2nd, he was sent down to Upavon to pass the 24th “Beam Approach” Course with flying honours (being graded “Above Average” again, and “Fit to Instruct”). This Course, in fact, was run as part of the Central Flying Scool [sic] of the RAF.
Then it was back to Church Lawford on the Oxford and Tutor, until he was finally passed out as a qualified instructor on April 20th 1942, rated as “Average” on both single and twin-engined aircraft.
[Inserted] David had been commissioned as a Pilot Officer out in Rhodesia, and on completion of this Course was made up to a Flying Officer, preparatory to commencing duties as an Instructor at RAF College Cranwell. [/inserted]
He arrived at Cranwell on May 1st [inserted] as a “B” Category Flying Instructor [/inserted] to start to instruct pupils at the College [inserted] Flying Training School [/inserted] how to fly the Oxford. Most of these were ordinary Leading Aircraftsmen (LAC’s) or Corporals, or Lieutenants (presumably the College Officer Cadets). By late June, a few Miles Master II single-engined trainers had been acquired, and David instructed on these as well. And at the
* See appendix 4 for details.
[Page break]
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end of July he was posted to No 7 Flying Instructors School at Upavon. This time to train others how to become “Instructors”!
David was becoming restless to be back on operations again, but had to put up with the daily round of flying Oxfords, Magisters and Masters again at Upavon, until the beginning of November 1942, when the CFI, Wing Cmdr GFR Donaldson, graded him out as “Above Average” again on David’s posting to 196 Squadron – a brand new night-bomber squadron formed on November 7th at Driffield in Yorkshire.
[Underlined] Second Tour, with 196 Squadron [/underlined]
David reported to 196 Squadron at Driffield on November 7th, and then was immediately sent off on a new Course called the “Captains of Aircraft” at Cranage [inserted] near Holmes Chapel [/inserted] in South Cheshire. It was the 12th intake at this Course, and David was lectured there on Navigation, and had to undertake six long cross-country exercises on Ansons, flown by a Course pilot, with David and two others on board having to act as Navigators in turn. The Course was an adjunct of the RAF’s Central Navigation School, and was intended to refine operational Captain’s navigating skills, for posting them to Coastal Command, or to Bomber stations where new 4-engined bombers with only one pilot were the norm.
While he was posted to Cheshire over the Christmas period of 1942/43 [inserted] Dec 21st to January 3rd [/inserted], David had some chance to attend some local functions and festivities, as he did not have time to return to his parents in Hendon. It was while the Station was giving a Dance for local people that David met a Cheshire girl called Elsie, who worked at a nearby I.C.I. Works connected with the Salt industry Elsie was a very personable girl, with a number of boyfriends, and David was a shy and quiet person, but the two became immediate friends, and kept up correspondence with each other when David re-joined 196 Squadron (now moved to Leconfield) after Christmas. One other course David had to attend for a few days, was at Westcott in Buckinghamshire, at No 1 Engine Control Demonstration Unit (E.C.D.U), to learn “Engine Handling”
[Page break]
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and “Petrol Consumption” there on the Wellington Mk III. (No flying was involved). Finally, on January 14th 1943, he took to the air at Leconfield on Wellington X HE179, to try some “circuits and bumps” on this new Mark of the bomber He then had a few “working-up” flights to get his [inserted] brand- [/inserted] new crew shaken down, trying out air-to-air firing with his gunners, and practice bombing using [inserted] new [/inserted] infra-red photography to record the results.
David’s first sortie with 196 Squadron [inserted] and the Squadron’s second operation [/inserted] was on the night of February 7th 1943, when he dropped seven 500 lb bombs on a new type of “area-bombing” raid on French ports with German U-Boat pens. This directive had been issued by the War Cabinet on January 14th, and because the new U-boat pens of solid concrete were too thick to penetrate, the towns themselves were obliterated instead (the French civilians had been warned to evacuate them).
Some 323 aircraft bombed Lorient that night, with the [inserted] new [/inserted] Pathfinders marking the target well. Seven aircraft were lost, two being Wellingtons. David’s crew obtained a good infra-red photograph of the bomb bursts.
It was back again to Lorient on February 13th, this time forming part of a raid of 466 aircraft in all, and dropping over 1,000 tons of bombs for the first time on a Bomber Command target. The French town of Lorient received more devastation, but the U-boat pens survived. Then it was Cologne on the 14th, and Emden on the 17th, but the latter raid was abandoned by David’s aircraft, due to heavy cloud cover. Just six Wellingtons had been sent to Emden that night to test the infra-red bomb sights, but only three found the target, and bombed it. David brought all his bomb load back.
Before February finished, David had been to Cologne again on the 26th (where two of his three 500 lb bombs “hung up” and he had to return to base with them) and St Nazaire on the 28th (again dropping a “mix” of 500 lb bombs and incendiaries).
In March David went to Hamburg, Essen (twice) Duisberg and Bochum, dropping a 4,000 lb “Cookie” on one of the Essen raids. This was the beginning of the “Battle of the Ruhr”, devised now by Bomber Command to paralyse German Industry. There was an increasing flow of new four-engined bombers to the Squadrons, and a build-up of the Pathfinder
[Page break]
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Force and their new marking techniques using Mosquitos guided by Oboe equipment, * and Lancasters etc, to continue illuminating the markers dropped by the “Mossies”. All this now led to ever more accurate raids on the German Ruhr industrial zone.
The first Essen raid, on March 5th, was well marked by the Pathfinder Force (PFF), and David’s Wellington was in the second of three waves over the target – the Krupps industrial complex. This night marked Bomber Command’s 100,000th sortie of the war, and it is likely that David’s 4,000 lb bomb was one of the many that helped destroy an area of the Krupps works that night. A week later he was over the same target again, with the more usual mixture of 500 lb bombs (many fuzed for a long delay action) and incendiaries. Even more of Krupps was reduced to rubble that night.
David normally flew with a crew of four in his aircraft, and his regular crew consisted of Pilot Officer Parkin, Sgt. Wakeley, Flt. Sgt, Allen and Sgt. Lund. Occasionally he would take another Sgt. Pilot on board to give him operational experience for the odd flight or two (before he went off to captain his own aircraft). His O.C. in “A” Flight was Sqd Ldr Ian R.C. Mack, and the 196 Squadron C.O. at this time was Wing Cmdr. A.E. Duguid.
David only had one “Op” in April, to Kiel on the 4th, but May was another intensive month, with successful visits to Dortmund, Duisburg, Bochum and Düsseldorf. Most of the aircraft sent on these raids were now four-engines types, and of 110 Wellingtons sent to Dortmund, six were lost. The equivalent numbers [inserted] of Wellingtons [/inserted] sent to the other three points were: Duisburg 112 (10); Bochum 104 (6); and Düsseldorf 142 (6). The last two raids did not have the desired effects as the Germans were now starting decoy markers and fires outside the cities, to lure the PFF and bombing aircraft away. But the Duisburg raid had been highly successful, the Port and August Thyssen steel factories being badly hit.
[Inserted] On May15th [inserted] 1943 [/inserted] the [deleted] Press [/deleted] [inserted] London Gazette [/inserted] released the news that David had been awarded a Distinguished Flying Cross (D.F.C.), for (as the citation stated) “completing numerous [inserted] operational [/inserted] missions, flying on many occasions to targets such as Cologne, Berlin, Kiel and Hamburg, where the fiercest opposition is encountered.
“Since the beginning of his operational career, his single aim has been to press home his attacks as accurately and efficiently as possible, and in this he has had many successes. His courage, skill and determination against all hazards have been an inspiration to the Squadron”. [/inserted]
In June 1943, David flew sorties to Düsseldorf, Krefeld and Wuppertal, using his normal Wellington X HE901 on most flights (he
* “Oboe” was a system in which radio beams were sent out from English points, to cross over a specific target, and the RAF aircraft fitted with the receiving equipment could tell exactly when to drop their markers.
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had previously used HE170 and MS488 for long spells at a time, all with 196 Squadron’s code letters ZO-. Two of his crew had been commissioned by now – Wakeley and Allen had been made Pilot Officers. (David himself was now a Flight Lieutenant). The Düsseldorf raid was very successful, and that on Krefeld equally so, devastating the city centres. Just prior to the Krefeld raid on June 21st, some “Monica” sets had been fitted to some of 196 Squadron’s Wellingtons, HE901 being one of them. David and his crew had conducted air teats with the new equipment on June 16th and 17th, and aerial exercises with fighters, to try out the operational aspects. “Monica” was the code name given to equipment which, installed in RAF bombers, would give warning of the approach of German night-fighters from the rear. This radar equipment gave out its own transmissions however, and later in the war, when a German Ju88 night fighter landed by mistake at Woodbridge on July 15th 1944, it was discovered that its “Flensburg” radar transmission detector set could “home in” from 50 miles away onto an RAF aircraft using Monica. The increasing losses of Allied bombers was being blamed on Monica, [inserted] “H2S” radar, [/inserted] and “I.F.F.” (Identification Friend or Foe) signals emanating from their aircraft, and instructions were immediately given to remove all “Monica” sets, use “H2S” only sparingly, and switch off “IFF” altogether over German territory.
The raid on Wuppertal on June 24th 1943, in which David dropped an entire load of incendiaries, devastated the Elberfeld half of the town (the other half had already been hit). Some 94% of the town was destroyed that night. 630 aircraft having taken part, and 6 Wellingtons out of 101 being lost (together with 28 Lancasters, Halifaxes or Stirlings).
David now made the last operational sortie of his second Tour, to Cologne again on July 3rd 1943. He was flying Wellington X HE901 [deleted] again [/deleted], with a new member of crew, Flt. Lt. Reaks (who had replaced P/O Allen), and the PFF successfully marked the industrial area of the town, on the East bank of the Rhine. Again, David’s load consisted entirely of incendiaries, and they bombed the target accurately, but on returning to England after a flight lasting 5 hrs 5 mins, had to divert to Westcott, Bucks, because
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of ground fog and bad weather in the North. This raid was noted for something else – the beginning of mass night-time attacks by German night-fighters over the target area – something not met before by the RAF – where the Luftwaffe units attacked from above, using the mass of fires, target indicators (T.I.’s) and searchlights below as illumination for the bombers. On this raid 30 aircraft were lost out of 653 despatched – 12 being claimed by the Luftwaffe night fighters. In hindsight David was lucky to finish his second Tour at this point, as the RAF raids over Germany began to meet increasing fighter opposition, leading to many losses.
[Underlined] Lancaster Conversion Unit [/underlined]
Again classed as “Above Average” [inserted] in his recent capacity as “Master Bomber” of 196 Squadron [/inserted], David Wilson was now posted to a Lancaster Conversion Unit [inserted] No 1660 [/inserted] at RAF Swinderby, to convert to flying four-engined heavy bombers. The reason he had had a shorter Tour than usual at 196 Squadron was because the Squadron was moving [inserted] its [/inserted] base down South now, and re-equipping with Stirling bombers. David neither liked the Stirling, nor the future role of the Squadron, which was to be on glider-tug and troop dropping rôles, and so he had quickly opted to go for a Lancaster Squadron posting. [Inserted] He had in fact volunteered to join 617 Squadron (now known as the “Dambusters”), who were now looking for a few more seasoned and “Above Average” graded pilots to replace the eight lost on their famous raid of May 16th/17th. Only men of exceptional experience and calibre would be accepted, and all crews had to show a very high accuracy in their bombing experience. David’s name had gone forward for consideration by 617’s C.O., Wing Cmdr. Guy Penrose Gibson, V.C., DSO and Bar, DFC and Bar, who was still in charge but about to be posted onto a temporary staff duty as a rest (against his wishes!). Provided he converted to the Lancaster successfully, he would be accepted. [/inserted]
And so Flt. Lt. David Wilson started at Swinderby on July 23rd 1943, learning the tricks of flying the mighty Lancaster – an aircraft that would endear itself to him for life. The Course was not long, only five weeks, and finished on August 30th, when David had completed his multi-engine transition to the big Avro machine designed by Roy Chadwick. The Lancasters at the Unit were old Mk I’s from early production runs by A.V. Roe & Co Ltd at Manchester, or Metropolitan-Vickers at Trafford Park, and some had originally been laid down as Manchesters, and converted on the line.
David firstly had “circuits and landings” practice, then “stalling”, “three and two engine flying”, “fire action”, and “three-engine overshoots”. Then came cross-country exercises, “time and distance”
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runs (practicing dropping bombs after a measured run-in from a known geographical position) “corkscrewing” (to avoid fighters at night), and “fighter affiliation” (practice in being “attacked” by fighters). Finally David made some bombing runs, dropping four bombs on Wainfleet Sands, then eight (getting a mean error of only 71 yds from the target), and finally a round-the-UK cross-country flight at night, from Swinderby to Ely, Bicester, Sidmouth, St. Tudwells (where he dropped two bombs, and hit the target), Strangford [inserted] Lough [/inserted] in N. Ireland Dumfries in Scotland, Aberdeen and back home! A large part of the return trip was flown on three-engines, the whole flight taking 5 hrs 35 mins – just like a typical raid over Germany.
Wing Cmdr. Everitt, the CO. of 1660 Conversion Unit, passed David out [inserted] on August 30th [/inserted] as “Above Average” once again on the Lancaster this time, and David thus had his posting to 617 Squadron confirmed, and joined them the same day at Coningsby, Lincolnshire. [Deleted] – the already famous 617 Squadron, otherwise known now as the “Dambusters”. [/deleted]
[Underlined] Joining the “Dambusters” [/underlined]
David Wilson joined 617 Squadron on August 30th 1944, the date the Squadron moved its home from Scampton to Coningsby, in Lincolnshire. Since its famous [inserted] first [/inserted] raid on the German dams on the night of May 16th/17th 1944, [sic] the Squadron had [inserted] briefly [/inserted] returned to [deleted] a rest period, and started [/deleted] operations again on July 15, raiding power stations in Northern Italy and landing [inserted] at Blida [/inserted] in N. Africa afterwards. [Inserted] (Blida was a [inserted] captured [/inserted] Allied aerodrome a few miles south-west of Algiers, in French North Africa). The Squadron’s third raid had been on the Italian port of Leghorn on the way back from Blida. And its fourth was a mass leaflet raid on major Italian cities on July 29th 1943, after which the aircraft landed at Blida again. (This time they positioned back to England without raiding any target on the way). [/inserted] With its high level of training [deleted] and accuracy [/deleted] in bomb dropping especially [inserted] at low level [/inserted] the Squadron was now being used for attacks on major targets which required a great deal of accuracy in placing their weapons. These targets by definition, were also likely to be very heavily defended.
David was airborne on September 1st, the second day after he arrived at Coningsby, and was promptly sent off on a low-level cross country. (With the “Dambusters”, low level meant just that – at 200 to 330 ft altitude! [inserted] all the way [/inserted]). Wing Cmdr Guy Gibson, VC, DSO and Bar, DFC and Bar had just relinquished command of the Squadron [inserted] on August 3rd) [/inserted] to [inserted] Acting [/inserted] Wing Cmdr George Holden, DSO, DFC [inserted] and Bar? [/inserted]
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and there were 10 [deleted] complete [/deleted] Lancaster [deleted] crews [/deleted] pilots left at that moment out of the original 21 that had been in the Squadron when the raid on the Dams was mounted. * Apart from David, the other new pilots [inserted] ① who had joined 617 since the Dams raid were F.O. W.H. Kellaway, DSO; at the end of June; P.O. B. [deleted] (“Bunny”) [/deleted] W. Clayton, DFC, CGM, early in July; [deleted] and [/deleted] Flt. Lt. R.A. Allsebrook, DSO, DFC, also early in July; [inserted] and Flt. Lt. E.E.G. [inserted] (“Ted”) [/inserted] Youseman, DFC, at the end of July. (Ted came from David Wilson’s old 214 Squadron). [/inserted]. All these pilots – like David – brought their old crews along with them as well, and so all eight men in each Lancaster found themselves suddenly flying with the famous “Dambusters”. One of these new arrivals had also crashed on August 5th on Ashley Walk Bombing Ranges, when it hit the slipstream of another Lancaster, but luckily the crew survived, but with the exception of one gunner did not fly with 617 again. [/inserted]
The [inserted] surviving [/inserted] Lancasters which had been used for the Dams raid were in the process of being returned to A.V. Roe & Co to have the special fittings removed and the enlarged (bulged) bomb doors put in their place. For the purpose of keeping the crews in training, however, other Lancasters had to be borrowed or drafted in, and the Lancaster which David flew on September 1st was one such – ED735 (KC-R) from 44 Squadron (where it had been called KM-K). This Lancaster had just [inserted] ② been fitted with new “deep-section bomb doors by Avros, to take the new 12,000 lb High Capacity Blast bombs, and was sent to the A&AEE at Boscombe Down this month, to measure the Position Errors. [/inserted]
The Dambusters had moved from a grass airfield at Scampton, to one with hard runways at Coningsby and were sharing the latter airfield now with other Lancaster Squadrons. [Deleted] No 619 [/deleted] (Another Lancaster Squadron that would henceforth [deleted] to [/deleted] work closely with 617 was No 619 [inserted] - based nearby at Woodhall Spa - [/inserted] ) David flew Lancaster EE144 (KC-S) on September 14th – this aircraft was normally used by Sqn Ldr. Holden.
David was [inserted] then [/inserted] engaged in intensive low-level cross-country flying for the first two weeks of September, working himself and his crew up to the required accuracy of bombing, air firing, and low-level navigating as befitted the high standards expected of the specialist squadron. Two of these flights were on aircraft that had originally been on the Dams raid – ED886 (AJ-O flown then by P.O. Bill Townsend) and ED921 (AJ-W of Flt. Lt. Les Munro). These had been altered back to carry normal bombs, and in common with 617’s other permanent Lancasters were now fitted with new radio altimeters which could be set to give the pilot warning of dropping below, say, 75 ft above the ground (where a “hiccuph” could mean flying into the deck”).
All this preparation was for 617’s next scheduled raid on one of the War’s earliest, and by now most heavily defended targets – the Dortmund-Ems Canal. It had been decided to try to breach this by moonlight, and at low level. The canal was of vital importance to the German War industry, as it joined the steel plants of the Ruhr
*(for Note see over →③
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[Underlined] footnote ③ FOOTNOTE [/underlined]
* The original [inserted] 21 [/inserted] pilots of 617 Squadron at the time of their first operation – the Dams raid – consisted of Wing Cmdr. Guy Gibson, VC, DSO and Bar, DFC and Bar; Flt. Lt. J.V. Hopgood, DFC; Flt. Lt. H.B. Martin, DSO and Bar, DFC and two Bars, AFC; Sqd Ldr. H.M. Young, DFC; Flt. Lt. W. Astell, DFC; Flt. Lt. D.J.H. Maltby, DSO, DFC; Sqd. Ldr. Henry Maudslay, DFC; P.O. L.G. Knight, DSO; Flt.Lt. D.J. Shannon, DSO and Bar, DFC and Bar; Sqd. Ldr. J.C. McCarthy, DSO, DFC; Sgt. [inserted] V.W. [/inserted] Byers; Flt Lt R.N.G. Barlow; P.O. Geoff Rice, DFC; Flt. Lt. J.L. Munro, DSO, DFC; F.O. W.C. Townsend, CGM, DFM; Flt Sgt. K.W. Brown, CGM; Flt. Sgt. Cyril [inserted] T [/inserted] Anderson; P.O. [inserted] Warner [/inserted] Ottley; P.O. [inserted] L.J. [/inserted] Burpee (all of whom had flown on the raid); and P.O. W. [inserted] G. [/inserted] Divall and Flt. Lt. Harold [inserted] S. [/inserted] Wilson (both of whom had not been included on the Dams raid).
The [inserted] eight [/inserted] killed on the raid were Hopgood, Young, Astell, Maudsley, Byers, Barlow, Ottley [inserted[ and [/inserted] Burpee; Guy Gibson, of course, had now been rested from “Ops”; Cyril Anderson had decided to return to his original Squadron, and Bill Townsend had been posted away to 1668 Conversion Unit. All this left just 10 of the original pilots.
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with the Baltic, enabling iron ore from Sweden to be barged to the steelworks, and finished parts (Eg of U-boats) to be sent North to the German ports.
It was lucky for David that he was still getting into training at that moment. On a cross-country on September 13th, he practiced low-level bombing from 300ft and 500 ft, and gained a mean error of 73 yds from the target centre; and on September 14th he dropped bombs on the ranges from 200, 300, [inserted] and [/inserted] 400 ft high, and got his average error down to 36 yds.
David was assigned to “B” Flight, under the leadership of Flt. Lt. J.L. (“Les”) Munro (a survivor of the Dams raid who had been hit by flak en route to the Sorpe Dam and had had to turn back because the radio/intercom had been destroyed). But due to his “working-up” period, he was not selected for the raid on the Dortmund-Ems Canal on September 14th/15th. This was meticulously planned – as usual – and eight of 617’s Lancasters would take part, dropping new 12,000 lb High Capacity thin-cased, bombs from low level (fuzed for an adequate delay). The crews selected were the new C.O., George Holden, Dave Maltby, Les Knight, Dave Shannon, Harold Wilson [inserted] (no relation to David) [/inserted], Athelsie Allsebrook, Geoff Rice and Bill Divall. All but Holden, and Allsebrook [deleted] and Divall [/deleted] were survivors of the original 617 Squadron, and they set off on the evening of the 14th, but en route to the target received news back from a “recce” Mosquito in front, that the weather was too bad over the target area for low-level bombing. Regretfully they turned for home, but as they did so at low level over the North Sea, Maltby’s Lancaster hit someone else’s slipstream, dipped a wing into the sea, cartwheeled – and that was that. Maltby and his crew all perished.
Back home at Coningsby, they re-planned the raid for the next evening, the 15th, and Mick [deleted] y [/deleted] Martin just back from leave, filled Maltby’s place. [Inserted] David Wilson flew two more cross-country flights on this day, using one of the original Dams raid Lancasters, ED886 (AJ-O) [deleted] glued back again [/deleted] They were his last practices, and he was not called up for the raid that night. [/inserted] As the [inserted] others [/inserted] flew low over darkened Holland, Holden, flying with [inserted] Guy Gibson’s old crew [/inserted] and leading the two flights, was hit by flak and he climbed to avoid a church steeple in a small town while the others behind swung low around the outside of the built-up area. Holden’s Lancaster, trailing flames, went down and his 12,000 lb bomb exploded with a blinding flash of light.
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It was his 30th birthday.
Over the target area, a ground mist obscured the markers they dropped, there was a lot of light flak about, and the escorting Mosquitos found it difficult to silence the flak, and the 617 pilots found it very difficult to see the canal. Allsebrook, who now acted as leader, dropped his bomb and helped to direct others onto the target, but then disappeared. He had been shot down leaving the area. Knight, flying low, hit some trees which damaged his two port engines, and asked Mick Martin’s permission to jettison the bomb. He tried desperately to get home, but after allowing his crew to bale out over Holland, was killed trying to crash land the Lancaster alone.
Rice tried in vain for an hour to find the target, was holed by flak, jettisoned his bomb and managed to return home to Coningsby. Harold Wilson was hit by flak too, and had to crash-land his Lancaster with the bomb on board. It went up soon after, killing all on board before they could escape. Divall was [inserted] also hit and crashed. [/inserted]
// Dave Shannon flew around for 70 minutes, before he managed to spot the Canal and drop his bomb. It hit the towpath and did not seem to breach the canal banks. And Mick Martin flew around for a long 90 minutes, repeatedly getting hit by flak, and finally dropping his bomb on his 13th run in. He was two hours overdue when he landed back at Coningsby, to find only Shannon and Rice there before him. There were just the three Lancasters back, out of the eight that had set off. And nothing to show for the losses.
Next day Mick Martin was made a Squadron Leader by the A.O.C. No 5 Group, Air Vice-Marshal the Honourable Ralph Cochrane, and temporarily given command of 617 Squadron. Martin immediately volunteered to go back to the Canal the next night, and said there were six of them left who could try it (Martin himself, Shannon, Rice, Les Munro, Joe McCarthy and Ken Brown). In addition to these Martin could now call on the newly posted Captains - David Wilson, Ted Youseman and Bunny Clayton.
Fortunately Sir Ralph insisted on the three latest survivors being rested for 617’s next raid, on the Antheor Viaduct near Cannes in the South of France, on September 16th. And because
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this operation followed on without a break, the three “new boys”, and [inserted] the three veterans, [/inserted] Munro, McCarthy and Brown [deleted] (all had taken part on the original Dams raid) [/deleted] were supported by six Lancasters from 619 Squadron as well, and all placed under 619’s C.O., Wing. Cmdr. Abercromby.
[Underlined] The Anthéor Viaduct [deleted] preparing for the Tirpitz [/deleted] [/underlined]
It was against this backdrop of tragedy that David Wilson now flew his first “Op” for 617 Squadron. The atmosphere couldn’t have been worse, but morale was still high. Other Squadrons were [inserted] now [/inserted] beginning to call 617 the “Suicide Squadron”, and there were [inserted] noticeably [/inserted] fewer requests from other pilots to transfer to it [deleted] now [/deleted]! However, the intensive training, and the work involved in the briefing to the raids, kept David’s mind off all that (and the fact that his namesake, Harold Wilson, had died the night before).
This was 617’s seventh operation (including the first abortive Dortmund-Ems sortie), and the target was difficult to find, not counting hard to bomb accurately when they reached it. The main railway link between Central and Southern France and Italy, ran along the coast from Fréjus/St. Raphael to Cannes, and a typical curving viaduct lifted it across a ravine at a point just east of Cap du Dramont, a few miles on the Cannes side of St. Raphael. This little place was called Anthéor, and was 617’s next headache.
David flew in [inserted] company with the other 617 veterans, [/inserted] his “B” Flight Commander, Flt. Lt. John Leslie Munro, DFC, [inserted] RNZAF [/inserted], Pilot Officer Kenneth Charles McCarthy, DSO, DFC, [inserted] RCAF [/inserted], Pilot Officer Kenneth William Brown, CGM, RCAF, and two other “new boys”, Flt. Lt. “Ted” Youseman DFC, and Pilot Officer “Bunny” Clayton, DFC, CGM. Although the target was on France’s South coast, they were expected to return to England on this raid – not land in N. Africa.
David took Lancaster JB 139 on this raid, (coded KC-X and recently transferred from 49 Squadron). His bomb load included one 4,000 lb “Blockbuster” and three 1,000 lb bombs, and his crew consisted of Flt Sgt Hurrel, F.O. Parkin, Flt. Sgt. Barrow, P.O. Allen, Sgt Lowe and Sgt Mortlock. When they found their target, they jockeyed for position down the
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ravine to the sea, and David [inserted] and the others [/inserted] released their bombs from 300 ft. [Inserted] The idea was to lob the bombs onto or between the arches of the bridge, but all seemed to go through the arches instead. [/inserted] The viaduct seem [sic] unscathed, however, - although it and the rail tracks were peppered with holes – and they flew back in the knowledge it would probably need further attempt.
After a flight of 10 hrs 20 mins, David Wilson put his Lanc down at Predannack in Cornwall, to refuel, before flying back to Coningsby later.
[Underlined] Preparing for another Dams raid [/underlined]
Mick Martin was firmly in charge of the Squadron now, interviewing new would-be 617 pilots, thinking about a method of them taking flares with them on future raids to mark the target and make it easier for all to bomb, and liaising with the A.O.C. 5 Group with regard to future targets for 617.
In fact Cochrane was scheming up another attack on a dam, this time the big installation at Modane in Northern Italy, which lay deep in the hills. But Cochrane duped even Mick Martin for a time – he pretended it was to be a raid on the German battleship Tirpitz in a Norwegian fjord, and this required flying over the hills, down the steep slope, across a short stretch of water and then over the ship (in reality, the dam in Italy)!
So Martin went looking for a suitable site to practice on, and found a hillside near Bangor in N. Wales, near the coast, where he could get 617 to try flying down the face of the slope to level out over the sea. He experimented with putting down his landing flaps, to 40° or so, but found although the Lanc would sink down the hillside better, he had to exceed the max speed with flaps down by some 60 mph, and thus risk [inserted] their [/inserted] collapse – with undoubted fatal results to aircraft and crew.
David flew in [inserted] Mick Martin’s [/inserted] Lancaster (EE150 [inserted] coded KC-Z [/inserted]) to the scene on September 18, with Dave Shannon, (one of the three Flight Commanders, with Munro and McCarthy) in the cockpit beside him, and the two of them took it in turns to try flying up and over the hills that Mick Martin had found. Next day David was up in the Midlands [inserted] in the same aircraft [/inserted], this time with his
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own Flight Commander, Les Munro, the two of them doing practice runs across the Derwent reservoir at very low level, and then they tried the hill near Bangor again, Les trying it out and handing over to David. It was all intensely demanding work, and the adrenalin flowed very freely!
Between September 19th and 23rd, the “dams” type training intensified, David flying dummy attacks over Derwent reservoir in ED735 (KC-R) [inserted] on the 19th, [/inserted], then on September 20th he used Guy Gibson’s old aircraft ED932 (AJ-G) of Dams raid fame to take up one of the special “Upkeep” weapons that they still held in store and he dropped this on a dummy low-level attack in the Wash. (Guy Gibson’s old aircraft, unlike the majority that had survived the Dams raid, had [inserted] not yet [/inserted] been converted to have the bulged bomb-doors, and the old cylindrical “Upkeep” canister was used on the original Barnes Wallis-designed release mechanism). Then, in the next three days came low-level cross-country formation flying, dropping bombs on the Wainfleet ranges. David dropped the first lot (of four bombs), getting a mean error of 64 yds, and on the second occasion dropped eight bombs from 800 ft high. Then came a night time cross country at low level on astro fixes only, and finally a trip to Castle Kennedy, and Turnberry in Ayrshire, carrying 14 [inserted] staff [/inserted] passengers in connection with these trials.
However, the very next day, September 24th, came a complete change of policy, and training. The reason was the development of a new, more accurate bomb-sight, and its ability to deliver two large new weapons that Dr Barnes Wallis had been developing recently – the 12,000 lb streamlined “Tallboy” bomb, and its big brother, the 22,000 lb “Grand Slam”. The Chief of Bomber Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, had been agonising over the future rôle of 617 Squadron with Sir Ralph Cochrane, and had concluded that it should stay in the latter’s 5 Group, and now become a “Special Duties” Squadron. Cochrane, on his part, decided to press ahead with Wallis’ new weapons, and get 617 equipped as fast as possible with the new bob-sight, to start dropping these expensive weapons.
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[Underlined] The Stabilising Automatic Bomb-Sight. [/underlined]
This SABS sight had been developed at the RAE at Farnborough back in 1941 by a man called Richards, and used the gyro principle in its stabilising system. It had been held up in its development by the fact that although it was a great deal more accurate than its predecessors, it did require a very careful straight and level approach at high altitude, on the run in to the target. Consequently the likelihood of Bomber Command taking heavier casualties from flak and fighters because of this, had resulted in its being “shelved” for the time being. But now, the development of these special weapons merited another look at it. A certain Sqd. Ldr. Richardson was now despatched post haste from the RAE to 617 Squadron at Coningsby, to see the SABS fitted, and perfected, in their Lancasters.
From September 24th, therefore, everything changed in David’s training. No longer was it low-level dams-type exercises, but he flew in EE150 [inserted] (KC-Z) [/inserted] this day, with Joe McCarthy acting as Captain for some of the time, making [inserted] the first [/inserted] high level dummy runs with the new SABS fitted. The next day, David took Bunny Clayton up with him, and Sqd Ldr. Richardson (by now dubbed “Talking Bomb” by the Squadron, for his propensity to talk bomb-sights from the moment he woke, until the moment he went to sleep), to check out the SABS in EE150 again.
Sqd Ldr Richardson was busy fitting the new SABS into all the aircraft, and then checking the installation by flying with it. He also knew that it took two to be accurate – the pilot on the one hand (to fly at a given height, and airspeed, on the final run in), and the bomb aimer on the other (who had to feed the correct data into the sight, and advise the pilot when he strayed off the necessary heading/approach speed). With the Squadron C.O. (Mick Martin), Richardson then evolved a system of each pilot being checked out, by someone senior, and each bomb-aimer being paired with different pilots – cross-checking the results against each other.
Thus David [sic] third flight (on September 26th) was with Mick Martin (now elevated to Sqd. Ldr. status),
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and they did high level bombing (HLB) from 6,000 ft gaining an average bombing error of 60 yds (this altitude was not “high” in the view of most other squadrons – but where 617 was normally flying below tree-tops and between haystacks, 6,000 ft really was “high” to them!
Next day (the 27th) David had two training sorties – one taking up Ken Brown to show him the ropes, dropping bombs at Wainfleet from 10,000 ft this time, and recording a mean error of 61 yds; the next sortie being with Bunny Clayton and flying at 5,000 ft and 7,000 ft, recording an error of 50 yds. (It was getting better!)
Next day David took Geoff Rice up, and also made a sortie by himself. On the latter he dropped three bombs from 10,000 ft, but an error in the altimeter setting led to a mean drop error of 143 yds this time. All this showed how essential it was to get all the readings correct, and here they ran into the problem of calculating the exact [inserted] ground level [/inserted] barometric pressure reading over the target so as to be able to correct the altimeters to give their exact height. Another problem was to obtain absolutely accurate outside air temperatures, and the exact speed of the Lancaster (determined by a combination of airflow and Static Pressure vents in the instrumentation, and known errors (Position Errors) in the Static Pressure System (caused by the location of the vents in the fuselage airflow). All this was essential but complicated and the RAE and A&AEE had to make tests on the Lancasters to give 617 the most effective results, and to increase the accuracy of information fed into the SABS.
For a few days the weather held up training, but it resumed in October with a vengeance. David was flying different Lancasters on each sortie, a new [inserted] Mark III [/inserted] DV246 (KC-U) that had just been delivered, ED932 (Gibson’s old aircraft now recoded AJ-V) [inserted] for low-level sorties [/inserted], JB139 (KC-X), ED915 (AJ-Q), or EE146 (KC-K). He [inserted] sometimes [/inserted] went up three times a day, usually it was twice each day, and his bombing errors read consecutively: 74 yds from 10,000 ft, 182 yds (10,000 ft) then only 21 yds from a 200 ft high low-level sortie, 26 yds (200 ft), 96 yds (10,000 ft), 88 yds (10,000 ft), 101 yds [deleted] (10,000 ft) [/deleted], 86 yds [deleted] 10,000 ft) [/deleted], 57 yds (all at 10,000ft)
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60 yds (from 12,000 ft), 47 yds (1,000 ft), and so on. They had great difficulty getting the accuracy to any greater limits – which really was going to be essential if Barnes Wallis’ big, expensive bombs were to be dropped (These had streamlined aerodynamic fins, and would spin at an increased speed as they dropped, giving different trajectories to the normal, unstreamlined weapons).
Slowly the results of the RAE and A&AEE testing were incorporated on the Lancasters, and Sqd Ldr Richardson’s observations, and things at last began to come together.
Mick Martin went up with David and acted as the bomb-aimer himself on October 16th, flying in ED932 on a low-level sortie. He managed a mean error of 105 yds from 250 ft altitude – not very good! (He obviously then appreciated the level of accuracy David’s normal bomb-aimer could achieve – of 21 to 26 yds!)
David tried a run at 15,000 ft on October 17th – getting an error of 70 yds. But next day doing exactly the same, he only registered a mean error of 128 yds. (On both occasions he was flying ED932, now fitted up with the SABS system).
In the meantime, Mick Martin had been told by Cochrane to get the Squadron up to strength again in pilots and crews, and a good deal of interviewing had been carried out. Martin knew now that an extremely high degree of training and ultimate accuracy in dropping the new bombs was going to be needed, but the crews were going to have to be well blooded already with records to show that they could unflinchingly carry out day after day, the steady, straight run in to the target, whatever flak or defending fighter status. He sought only the very best and bravest of men, therefore, and rejected many applications on instinct. By the first week or so in October, however, he had selected a few more, including Pilot Officer F.E. Willsher – a young fair-haired boy of 19, only a year out of the school classroom; Flt. Lt Thomas Vincent O’Shaughnessy; Flying Officer Gordon Herbert Weeden; [deleted] and [/deleted] Warrant Officer “Chuffy” Bull; Flying Officer
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Geoffrey Stevenson Stout, DFC, [inserted] Flt Lt. R.S.D. Kearns, DFC, DFM; [/inserted] Pilot Officer Nicholas R Ross; [inserted] Sqd. Ldr William [inserted] R [/inserted] Suggett (to take over “A” Flight) [/inserted]; and Flying Officer J. (“Paddy”) Gingles. They all soon settled into the training routine, although both Ross and Bull hit trees on low-flying exercises, narrowly avoiding disaster each time.
David Wilson took up young Willsher on October 9th, to show him how the SABS worked on a 10,000 ft high-level bombing run, and in the afternoon of the same day, he flew ED932 at low level all through the Lake District and the Scottish Glens, taking 5 hrs 30 mins for the cross country. On the 11th he tried the SABS at 12 000 ft and got his error down to 60 yds, and then over the next few days he used it at 1,000 ft (Error=47 yds), 250 ft (with Mick Martin acting as bomb aimer again (Error=105 yds), then at 15,000 ft (Error=70 yds, with Sqd Ldr Richardson on board), then 15,000 ft again (128 yds). And so it went on with David flying his new Lancaster DV 246 [inserted]KC-U) [/inserted], or the two originals from the Dams raid, ED932 (AJ-V), or ED 924 [inserted] (AJ-Y) [/inserted], which had been flown by Cyril Anderson.
David took “Talking Bomb” down to the RAE at Farnborough on October 18th to have some modifications made to the SABS, then he flew the Sqd. Ldr. (who had been a Great War pilot in the RFC) up to the bombing range at West Freugh (near Stranraer) where they checked the bombsight out again at 14,000 ft and 8,000 ft.
As October drew to a close, the bugs seemed to be getting ironed out of the SABS system, as the various modifications were made to it, and after the sight went U/S two days running on practice bombing on 22nd and 23rd, at long last, on the afternoon of the 23rd, David flew over West Freugh again at 14,000 ft and dropped one 4,000 lb “Cookie” this time. It hit the 3-storey target building [inserted] at Braid Fell [/inserted] fair and square in the middle, demolishing it! (Average error = Zero!). On his next run, on the 25th, he dropped six 1,000 lb bombs from 14,000 ft, hit the target with one, gained a very near miss with a second, and put the other four close by ([inserted] Mean [/inserted] Error = 79 yds). Things were getting better!
[Underlined] Restarting Operations [/underlined]
November started off the same way – with more
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high and low level exercises. David had been allocated Guy Gibson’s old aircraft (ED932, AJ-V) on a permanent basis now, and he flew it on most of the practices. He did a run at 12,000 ft and dropped four [inserted] bombs (with [/inserted] an average error of 146 yds), then three bombs from 2,000 ft (53 yds), and then switched to one of Mick Martin’s latest ideas – bombing a PFF red Target Indicator from 15,000 ft. He scored a “bullseye” on it on November 5th (appropriately for Guy Fawkes night!), and with things now obviously getting to the stage where 617 Squadron was ready for operations with the SABS, David showed a VIP around his aircraft on November 6th (believed to be Roy Chadwick, Avro’s Chief Designer) and flew him back to Ringway in the afternoon.
Cochrane at Group had meanwhile decided it was time to test the SABS in action, and so Mick Martin was informed [inserted] that [/inserted] they were to raid the Anthéor Viaduct in Southern France again on November 11th – this time from 8,000 ft to avoid the flak from recently installed German defences.
On the morning of November 11th, David made one more practice flight in ED932, dropping 6 bombs from 15,000 ft and getting his mean error down to 89 yds. It was the best they could do, and he [inserted] then [/inserted] prepared for the evening’s operation. The Squadron despatched 11 aircraft, starting at 18.15, with Ted Youseman first off, and each being bombed-up with one 12,000 [inserted] lb [/inserted] H.C. Blast bomb. Mick Martin himself was leading the raid, and Dave Shannon and Les Munro were also flying, but Shannon had engine failure on take-off and had to abort. The others all got off safely – O’Shaughnessy, Rice, Bull, Clayton, Brown, Kearns, and David Wilson – and set course for Anthéor (David had two new members of his → [inserted] crew on this “op” – Flying officer Chandler and Warrant officer Holland, who were to stay with him ‘for some time (“Chan” Chandler had already survived 8 days in a dinghy in the N-Sea, after ditching in a 49 Sqd Hampden, returning from Düsseldorf in the early hours of July 1st, 1941). [/inserted]
They found the viaduct in half moonlight this time, but there were guns and searchlights to avoid, and there was another similar viaduct just to the West, in the bay by Agay, and this confused some crews sufficiently enough to aim at that. There were no direct hits, but Mick Martin’s bomb hit the railway line to one side of the viaduct, and several more got near misses, David’s bomb [inserted] being 30 yds out. [/inserted] But the viaduct survived, and the 10 Lancasters flew on to Blida again,
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in Algeria. There had been some ships just off the shore at Anthéor which had opened fire on some of the Lancasters, but none had been hit, and they all landed safely in N. Africa. They had a four day break there (taking full advantage of it as they had done before, to sample the local wines and unrationed food and fruit. [sic] They left on November 15th for Rabat in Morocco, and on the 17th flew home from Morocco to Coningsby, via the Bay of Biscay, loaded with Forces Christmas mail for home and fruit and wine. But one Lancaster never made it back – Ted Youseman and his crew were probably picked off by a German fighter, and were believed to have ditched in the sea south-west of Brest, perishing in the process.
{Underlined] New C.O.; new ideas. [/underlined]
While they had been away in N. Africa, a new C.O. had arrived to take command from Mick Martin (who had only been in charge on a temporary basis). His name – Wing Commander Geoffrey Leonard Cheshire, DSO and Bar, DFC – and he had dropped a rank from Group Captain, in order to take over 617. Mick Martin had some burning ideas now about marking targets first with flares, so the rest could bomb with the SABS system, and so did Cheshire too. He was to change 617’s role quite dramatically with his ideas – how dramatically, and how successfully none of them would have guessed in their wildest dreams!
After they were once more back at Coningsby, David tried out his SABS from 18,000 ft now, gaining an error of 137 yds for [inserted] dropping [/inserted] six bombs, and made a few routine air tests of his Lancaster (ED932) early in December. Cheshire also loaned out from 617 crews with McCarthy Clayton, Bull and Weeden, for a few days to the Special Duties Squadrons at Tempsford. They were needed to make pinpoint drops of guns and ammunition to the French Resistance [inserted] near Doullens (on the River Outhie in Northern France) [/inserted] on December 10th. The raid went badly, flak bringing down both Bull and Weeden’s aircraft with two of Bull’s crew, and all in Weeden’s being killed. McCarthy couldn’t find the target, and so he and Clayton went back on December 11th, and were successful this time. Cheshire and 617
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had lost two more valuable crews.
Almost immediately after this, 617 was detailed to bomb a [inserted] V1 [/inserted] Flying Bomb [inserted] launch [/inserted] site in the Pas de Calais, and Group decided to try out the SABS again at night, but this time, working on Martin and Cheshire’s ideas, arranged for the P.F.F to mark the wood concerned with incendiaries. [Inserted] → Mick Martin [inserted] – as Cheshire’s Deputy - [/inserted] had now taken over as O.C. “B” flight from Les Munro, and David Wilson was now flying as Mick’s right hand man. [/inserted] Nine Lancasters were [inserted] therefore [/inserted] sent off from 617 Squadron on December 16th, [inserted] led by Cheshire with Martin as his Deputy [/inserted] to bomb the “Ski-site” ** at Flixecourt on the Somme between Abbeville and Amiens. A single PFF Mosquito used the “Oboe” beam system of marking the target [inserted] with incendiaries [/inserted], and all nine 617 Lancasters dropped their single 12,000 ln H.C. Blast bombs as close to the burning wood as possible. David dropped his, and his bomb-aimer took a photograph of the aiming point to check on their return. [Inserted] His sortie lasted for 3 hrs 40 mins in all. [/inserted] Subsequent “recce” pictures showed the Squadron had collectively achieved a mean error of 94 yds – but the “Oboe” Mosquito had marked 350 yds from the target – and so all the bombs were wide! Cheshire was not amused.
David was up again on December 18th, doing a practice drop from 2,500 ft (Error-70 yds), and on the [inserted] morning of the [/inserted] 20th from 15,000 ft (Error=60 yds). This was a good, consistent result from differing altitudes and in different aircraft (ED932 and ME557). In fact ME557 [inserted] (KC-O) [/inserted] was a brand new Lanc, and David took a Ministry of Aircraft Production official up on the practice to check the [inserted] Napier [/inserted] compressors [inserted] supplying air to the SABS system [/inserted]. * It was also one of the first Lancasters fitted out to carry Barnes Wallis’ new 12,000 ln Tallboy streamlined bomb to be delivered to 617.
The next operation was on [inserted] the evening of [/inserted] December 20th to [inserted] the Cockerill steelworks [/inserted] [deleted] an armaments factory [/deleted] in a residential area of Liege, in Belgium. The bombing had to be accurate to avoid civilian casualties, so eight PFF Mosquitos preceded eight 617 Lancasters. The Mosquitos marked the target, but [deleted] as [/deleted] low cloud prevented the markers being seen, [inserted] Cheshire dived low to see for himself, and found the markers were well off the target. He therefore ordered [/inserted] the force [inserted] to [/inserted] return without bombing. David (and the [inserted] others [/inserted]) brought their 12,000 lb H.C. bombs back, and Geoff Rice was shot down by a night fighter, miraculously surviving alone out of his crew, to be taken prisoner. One more of the original 617 founders had gone.
* Recoded later as KC-S, this was the aircraft in which Flt. Lt. “Bill” Reid, VC, was shot down on July 31st 1944 (he survived).
** So-called because of the shape of the curved ramp V1 launch site.
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Two days later, on December 22nd, David was off again [inserted] (in AJ-V) [/inserted] to attack a [inserted] V1 [/inserted] Flying Bomb [inserted] launch [/inserted] site near Bellencombre, south-east of Dieppe, this time taking Flying Officer Len Sumpter, DFC, DFM as his [inserted] bomb-aimer [/inserted] [deleted] crew [/deleted] instead of F.O. Parkin. Sumpter had flown on the original Dams raid, been rested, and had just come back for a second tour with 617, [inserted] normally flying with Dave Shannon [/inserted]. But the PFF Mosquitos failed again, and David brought all 11 x 1,000 lb bombs back. There were no casualties, fortunately, but Cheshire was not impressed by these PFF failures
David had a few days leave, and resumed flying on the 31st, after Christmas. He missed the new attempt by 617 on December 30th to bomb Flixecourt again, with 10 Lancasters helped by six PFF Mosquitos. Once more the markers were 200 yds off target, 617 accurately straddled them, but because [inserted] of their accuracy [/inserted] missed the main target.
[Underlined] Sorting out the marking problem; a new base [/underlined]
At the beginning of January 1944, David was up on bombing practices again – high level from 15,000 ft (with an average error of 127 yds – and one bomb that toppled); then another of the same height with a better error (98 yds). That was on the morning of the 4th, and in the evening David was one of 11 Lancasters put up for attacking another Flying Bomb [inserted] launch [/inserted] site in the Pas de Calais area [inserted] – this time at Fréval. [/inserted] With the others, he bombed a PFF Target Indicator that they had dropped at very low level this time – but the T.I. was four miles from the target, however, and David brought a photo back to prove it. He blamed the PFF once more! This was obviously not good enough, and whereas 617 Squadron was now trained up to be the RAF’s most accurate bombing squadron, it was the Pathfinders who were now plainly not up to scratch! It was no good having accurate bombing on inaccurate target markers, and so Cheshire, Martin and Bob Hay (Flt. Lt. Robert Claude Hay, DFC and Bar, RAAF – 617’s bombing leader, and Mick Martin’s own bomb-aimer from the first raid on the Dams) put their heads together to work out their own in-house method of marking a target, and then bombing it with the rest of the Squadron. But they first had to prove that the System worked, and to do this they needed Cochrane’s
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permission from Group to discontinue using PFF assistance Cheshire, with his innocently youthful and matter-of-fact ways, soon got this.
Meanwhile, determined to get everyone’s accuracy up even further, David and the rest of 617 went on practicing, day after day, over the next 17 days of January. They made high-level bombing runs, low-level cross country flights, and usually pin-pointed targets all the way round in woodland areas – just like the V1 Flying Bomb sites. David flew these separate and original 617 Lancasters during this period – ED915, ED924 and his own ED932
On January 9th, after a practice over the Wainfleet Sands at low level, he and the others landed at Woodhall Spa – to be their new base from now onwards. Cochrane had decided that 617, with its special techniques, top priority targets – and more importantly, the forthcoming new Tallboy and 10-ton Grand Slam bombs they were to use – deserved a special one-squadron base secluded away from other camps. Woodhall Spa was a one-squadron aerodrome, and so 619 Squadron there moved to Coningsby (which could hold several squadrons), and 617 transferred in the reverse direction on January 9th 1944. → [Inserted] A few more pilots joined 617 at this time, including Lt. Nick Knilans, DSO, DFC (USAF), Flying Officer Geoffrey Stevenson Stout, DFC, and Flying Officer J.L. Cooper. [/inserted]
Over the next few days, operations now from Woodhall Spa and billeted in the delightful Petwood House Hotel (which served as the Officer’s Mess) David flew on low-level cross country sorties, but this time in formation. He flew his (and Guy Gibson’s old aircraft) ED932 for the last time on January 18th [inserted] across to Coningsby, [/inserted] and this veteran Lancaster was left there to be used by 61 Squadron in future (it survived the war intact, only to be eventually scrapped). On the 20th, David started some new tactics that Cheshire was devising – low flying over the Wash at only 60 ft high, and then flying across, and down, the aerodrome’s flarepath at 60 ft, practicing the tactics of dropping more Target Indicators onto a cluster dropped already by the leader (using the runway lights as imaginary markers). It was during this practicing on → [inserted] the 20th that O’Shaughnessy misjudged his height and hit a sea wall at Snettisham, crashing on the beach. He and one of his crew were killed, but the rest (one badly injured) survived to fight again. The Squadron had lost another [inserted] good [/inserted] pilot. [/inserted]
Next day, January 21st, Cheshire announced he had got permission to strike at a V1 [inserted] launch [/inserted] site again – but this time without using the PFF at all. That evening, they set out with even greater excitement than usual, for they knew they had to get a good result
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this time, to substantiate all their training.
David took another of his old mounts, JB139 [inserted] (KC-X) [/inserted], on this raid, and 617 put up 12 aircraft in all. The target was at Hallencourt, a few miles South of Abbeville, and Cheshire and Martin carried out their own new “Pathfinder” technique. First of all the leading pair dropped [inserted] Red Spot [/inserted] flares from 7,000 ft, then dived down [inserted] to about 400 ft, [/inserted] using their illumination of the target area to drop long-burning Target Indicators right on top of the Ski-site.* The rest of 617 then flew over, dropping their bombs on the T.I’s. David, in fact, carried 2 x 1,000 lb, 13 x 500 lb bombs and 6 flares in his Lancaster, and, in common with others, would have used the flares if necessary to help Cheshire and Martin to go on marking the target if their first T.I’s had gone out. But David didn’t need to use the flares on this occasion, nor did he drop all his bombs – only 7 x 500 lb and 1 x 1,000 were let go, and he brought the rest back. He got a good photograph of the aiming point [inserted] from his bombing level of 13,000ft, [/inserted] and when the crews got back to Woodhall Spa, they were jubilant. It had worked, and later “recce” pictures confirmed they had blasted the main target area – for a change!
Once again, in the next few days, David was hard at Cheshire’s new tactics again, doing low-level [inserted] (60 ft high) [/inserted] runs over Uppingham Reservoir, and practicing aiming at the flarepath at their base – or carrying out “Tomato” exercises (as they now referred to them). Then on January 25th came their second “Op” using their own marking [inserted] techniques [/inserted] on a V1 [inserted] launch [/inserted] site. Now it was Fréval [inserted] again [/inserted], and David was one of 12 617 Lancasters to head for the target, flying a Mk I (DV385, KC-A). [deleted] from 50 Squadron for a few days [/deleted] He carried 13 x 500 lb and 2 x 1,000 lb bombs and Cheshire and Martin dived in low again aided by a green Target Indicator dropped [inserted] in the general target area by the PFF, [/inserted] marked the target [inserted] with Red Spot flares [/inserted] in very gusty wind conditions, and David and the rest dropped their bombs exactly on target. It was a case of two out of two “bullseyes” for 617, and there were no losses from either raid.
[Underlined] Picking off the targets [/underlined]
Cochrane now realised that Cheshire and 617
* Cochrane had insisted that the marking had to be done from above 2,500 ft, but Cheshire and Martin had worked out the dive-bombing technique down to 400 ft!
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were now thoroughly capable of using their low-marking techniques on any number of specialised targets – and Cheshire had eventually told him of their habit of dive-bombing their Lancasters right down to 400 ft over the target. So Cochrane now picked a beauty for them – the new engine works at Limoges, in mid-western France. This was to be on February 8th, and so in the days leading up to this, David found himself practicing once again, this time dropping bombs on the ranges from 1,500 ft, 2,000 ft, then at 8,000 ft, 10,000 ft and finally 14,500 ft (at West Freugh). At low-level his mean error was 222 yds, but at 10,000 ft he got it down to 39 yds, and at West Freugh to 65 yds.
Finally, the 8th dawned, and in the evening 12 Lancasters took off for the Gnome et Rhône aero engine works at Limoges. Cheshire and Martin left 15 minutes before the rest – led by Dave Shannon and consisting of David, Ken Brown, Bob Knights (a new pilot), Knilans, Ross, Kearns, Willsher Clayton and Suggitt.
Para // Cheshire had worked out a special technique for this raid , as most of the workers were French, and the factory was close to a built-up area where many of them lived. There was cloud right along their route, but it broke just before they reached Limoges, on the River Vienne. Cheshire then flew over the factory roof three times, down to about 100 ft to warn all the night shift workers to leave, and take shelter. His aircraft, DV380 (Coded KC-N) had had some modifications to accommodate an RAF Film Unit crew, led by Sqd Ldr. Pat Moyna. Half its fuselage door was cut away to instal [sic] two 35mm movie cameras, and two large mirrors were fitted underneath to reflect as much light as possible (had Roy Chadwick, the Lancaster’s designer known, he would doubtless have considered it as sacrilege)!
After Cheshire’s third run, his crew could see the French workers streaming out of the factory, to their air raid shelters, and after waiting a few minutes, Cheshire went in to drop his cascading incendiary markers and Red Spot fires directly on top of the centre of the factory roofs. The Film crew had a beanfeast, obtaining some of the most remarkable shots of the War, as the cascades of light lit up the factory, river and railway yards nearby.
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Mick Martin then followed Cheshire in, flying his Lancaster DV402 (coded KC-P), and dropped his markers on top of Cheshires – After that Cheshire told the main force overhead to bomb, and he cruised around the area at 5,000 ft, to let the film crew record the event. They had a grandstand view, as the other 10 Lancasters (David was flying ME559, KC-Q) unloaded their weapons on the factory. Five of them carried 12,000 lb H.C. Blast bombs, the other seven – like David – [inserted] each [/inserted] dropped 12 x 1,000 lb bombs, and most of them were within the factory perimeter. David reckoned his stick fell slightly off target, and straddled the railway lines away from the factory.
Cheshire then ordered all crews home, but he flew around the burning, smoking factory in the moonlight at 100ft (or less) for half an hour, letting the Film crew complete a unique task. Even Cheshire’s crew got fidgety, trying to egg him on gently to start for home. As Moyna said afterwards: “Cheshire seemed as unconcerned as an assistant arranging a group photograph in a studio”! Finally, they turned out to the Bay of Biscay, and flew back over the sea. They all arrived back safely – Cheshire about an hour behind the rest. And the main achievement (for Cheshire) was a perfect record on film to show the AOC and all the others at Bomber Command HQ, illustrating how effective low-level marking could be.
[Underlined] Third attempt at Anthéor. [/underlined]
After the attack on Limoges, David’s next flight with 617 was another operation on February 12th – back to the Anthéor viaduct again. The Squadron had already attacked it twice, and the USAF once, but it was still intact and carrying almost 100,000 tons of German supplies down to the Italian Front each week. All these attacks had, however, served only to get the Germans to defend it more heavily each time, and the defences were formidable this time.
Once again 617 fielded 10 Lancasters for the “Op”. but Cheshire was concerned about the range at their disposal, for Cochrane refused permission for them to carry on to Sardinia this time, saying he needed 617 back in the UK after the raid. In order to squeeze every gallon of petrol into their tanks, they flew
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their Lancasters down to Ford aerodrome, between Bognor Regis and Littlehampton on the South Coast, using it as an advance base to refuel. Then Cheshire and Martin took off ahead of the others, climbing through bad icing conditions, and arrived some five minutes ahead of the main force.
It was a pitch black night and the narrow valley was full of all types of ack ack guns, which opened up in an absolute hail of flak. Cheshire tried three times to dive down the valet over the viaduct, and drop his load of markers and flares, but each time he was blinded by the flak and forced off course and out to sea. Martin then had a go, and Cheshire tried to get back inland to draw off the fire as he ran in, but was out of position as Mick slid down the dark ravine. As Mick levelled out over the viaduct, a 20mm cannon shell exploded through the bomb-aimers’s cupola, and Bob Hay was killed instantly, and the Flight Engineer, Ivan Whittaker injured in his legs.
Cheshire ordered Martin to fly on to Sardinia, and land there (where he had wanted the entire Squadron to go), and then he went in again himself, this time at 5,000 ft, above the ravine and out of range of the cannon fire. There was still a mass of heavy flak bursts, and David [inserted] in Lancaster ED763 (KC-D), [/inserted] and the others flying overhead thought it looked impossible for anyone to survive in that holocaust. Cheshire managed to drop some of his Red Spot markers, but they drifted to the beach side of the viaduct. With time over the target limited by having to return to the UK, Shannon up above now commenced the high-level bombing, and David and the others followed. David dropped his single 12,000 H.C. Blast bomb [inserted] from 9,500 ft [/inserted] and turned for home. Only one of these weapons dropped close to the viaduct, the rest falling closer to the beach, and once again the bridge remained intact! Finally, after a flight lasting seven hours exactly *, David touched down at Ford again, to refuel and rest, before flying back to Woodhall Spa that morning. [Deleted] The Lancaster he had used this time was ED763 (KC-D). [/deleted]
But fate had not finished with the Squadron yet, for next morning, as the 617 crews left Ford to fly up to Woodhall Spa, Sqd. Ldr. Bill
* David’s previous sortie to Limoges lasted 7 hrs 25 mins altogether but this was from Woodhall Spa. It took about an hour each way from there down to Ford.
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Suggitt climbed out to the West, and turned to starboard in DV382 (KC-J) to set course to the North-east. He had to climb up through the clouds shrouding [inserted] the [/inserted] South Downs, and just after 08.30 a tractor driver at Duncton Hill Farm saw the Lancaster impact on Littleton Down, above him. Wreckage spread everywhere, and all Suggitt’s crew died instantaneously, although Suggitt himself died two days later, still in a coma. Flight Sgt. John Pulford, DFM, the last but one survivor of Guy Gibson’s original raid crew, died in the crash. (The last survivor, Flt. Lt. Richard Trevor-Roper DFC, DFM, was killed on a 97 Squadron operation just 20 days later).
[Underlined] Improving the techniques. [/underlined]
After Mick Martin returned from Sardinia later, his Lancaster temporarily patched up, Cochrane sent him off for a rest period – much against his will. But Cochrane preferred living Flight Commanders to dead ones, and he had few survivors left now, of the original 617 founding pilots.
Then came some top-level Group and Command meetings – at one of which Cheshire appeared on the one hand, proposing greater use of his and Martin’s low-level marking techniques (preferably using Mosquitos in future), and on the other hand Air Vice Marshal Don Bennett [inserted] of 8 Group [/inserted] was strongly defending his PFF high-level marking (and being generally dismissive of 617 Squadron’s techniques).
Cochrane, however, gave Cheshire some leeway in his 5 Group, and set a string of targets now for 617 to attack where Cheshire could devise the necessary low-level marking himself. With Martin gone now, Cheshire took Les Munro as his Deputy, and Les became “B” Flight Commander, with David Wilson as his right hand man. Cheshire did not yet put in a bid for two Mosquitos (but he was busy making the necessary high-level contact in the RAF in order to obtain them quickly and painlessly when he needed them). He knew that the light, fast and manoeuvrable Mosquito would help to make diving onto the target so much easier, and also assist in avoiding the defensive flak.
The last half of February 1944 passed for David with no more than four training flights or air tests
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being flown, due to bad weather. The last of these, on February 29th, was a bomb-dropping exercise from 15,000 ft, where David’s crew scored a 100 yd average error. Then came another practice from 10,000 ft on the morning of March 2nd, followed by 617’s next operation the same evening – this time to the aero-engine works at Albert in the Pas de Calais, between Amiens and Bapaume. Because this was believed to be heavily defended (repairing as it did, vital BMW engines for Focke Wulf FW 190 fighters) Cochrane ordered Cheshire not to mark below 5,000 ft this time. This was Leonard Cheshire’s 75th operation, and David Wilson’s 67th, yet 617’s three Flight Commanders – Dave Shannon, Joe McCarthy and Les Munro were some way behind these totals themselves. Both McCarthy and Munro were now promoted to Squadron Leaders.
David’s aircraft, DV246 (KC-U) was loaded up completely this time with [inserted] 248 x 30 lb [/inserted] incendiaries, and Cheshire and Munro (as deputy) went ahead to position themselves down to 5,000 ft so as to identify the target when the flares were dropped by the leading 617 Lancasters [inserted] of the 13 flying [/inserted] overhead. Cheshire went in under the flares to drop his markers, but his aircraft’s SABS bombsight went U/S on the approach, and while he stood off [inserted] for his bomb-aimer [/inserted] to try to get it working, he called in Munro to drop markers [inserted] just [/inserted] as the flares burnt out. Munro’s markers were spot on, and 617 bombed the factory from higher up, practically all their bombs and certainly David’s load of incendiaries [/inserted] (dropped from 9,200 ft) [/inserted] hitting the factory dead-centre. It was a text book operation, and Cheshire’s diary entry was almost right when he wrote: “This factory will produce no more engines for the Hun!”
Two nights later, on March 4th, 617’s target was the small, but important [inserted] La Ricamerie [/inserted] needle-bearing factory at St. Etienne (to the South-west of Lyon). It was a very small target, in a narrow valley with 4,000 ft hills on either flank, and once again in a built-up area, meaning it had to be picked out surgically, without harming the French citizens if possible.
Again, 15 Lancasters were put up that night, Cheshire and Munro leading (the latter on three engines, as one had packed up after take off). But there was ten-tenths cloud over the target, as David Wilson recorded. He was carrying a Sqd Ldr. Doubleday that night in his usual mount, JB139 (KC-X), and 1,000 lb
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bombs. But Cheshire couldn’t mark the target because of the bad weather, and so they all brought their bombs back that night. David’s flight there and back lasted exactly four hours.
Six days later, with better weather forecast, 617 tried to hit St. Etienne again. This time 16 Lancasters set off for La Ricamerie factory – on the same night that 5 Group bombed the Michelin works at Clermont-Ferrand. This time Cheshire made six attempts to mark at very low level in the blackness, dropping them accurately on the last run, but they bounced beyond the factory. Munro followed, and dropped short, Shannon tried and his markers bounced beyond, and finally Arthur Kell (a new Australian pilot) made a low-level dive and planted incendiaries in the factory. The rest of 617 then bombed the incendiaries (to Cheshire’s commands), and David unleashed his 11 x 1,000 lb bombs [inserted] from X “X-Ray” on the second run in [/inserted] in two sticks, [inserted] dropping them from 8000 ft. [/inserted] When they returned safely, David’s bob-aimer believed they had missed the target, but when “Recce” photographs were obtained, 617 was delighted to see the target had been completely destroyed, and there was no damage to the built-up area outside!
There was no more training at the moment, and the next “Op” was on March 15th, to an aero-engine works at Woippy, on the Northern outskirts of Metz (on the R. Moselle, East of Paris). It was freezing cold weather and 617 and 619 Squadrons sent a combined 22 Lancasters up this night, but the target was hidden by cloud [deleted] again [/deleted]. David was carrying a single 12,000 H.C. Blast bomb in his [inserted] JB139 [/inserted] X “X-Ray” again, but there was no hope of bombing, and so they all brought their bombs back. This was a longer sortie – 5 hrs 30 mins – and one [inserted] 617 [/inserted] crew, flying with Flying Officer Duffy, were attacked by three night fighters on their return leg, and claimed all three shot down!
Next day, March 16th, 617 was off again, this time to bomb the Michelin tyre factory at Cataroux, Clermont-Ferrand. The 15 Lancasters they put up were joined by six from 106 Squadron that were fitted with [inserted] the [/inserted] new [inserted] H2S [/inserted] radar bombing equipment. These latter aircraft dropped the flares this time, and Cheshire
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Made his usual low-level dives over the Cataroux Michelin factory to warn the [inserted] French [/inserted] workers to take cover, dropping his markers on the third run – but a little short. He was being extremely careful once more, because the factory had these major sheds in its complex, but a fourth large building – the French workers canteen – had “on no account to be damaged, if possible”, (Group’s instructions). Cheshire then called in his three Flight Commanders, Munro, Shannon and McCarthy, and they all managed to drop their markers directly on the factory sheds. To do this, they had to have a constant rain of flares to illuminate the target, and David Wilson in JB139 released his six, to help their aim. Then Cheshire called up the others to bomb the newly laid markers and David released his [inserted] single [/inserted] 12,000 Blast bomb *, right on target, and turned for home. This trip lasted 6 hrs 40 mins in all, with the separate run-ins to drop flares, and then the weapon, and with poor weather conditions back at Woodhall Spa, David landed at Coningsby on the return, positioning back to base [inserted] later [/inserted] in the morning.
The “recce” pictures next morning showed the works entirely in flames – and yet the canteen was intact! In fact Cheshire had once again carried Sqd Ldr Pat Moyna and his Film Unit in his Lancaster, and filmed the progress of the bombing from low-level.
Off again on March 18th, David was one of 13 Lancasters this time from 617 Squadron, to bomb the French [inserted] “Poudrerie Nationale” [/inserted] explosives factory at Bergerac, on the R. Dordogne east of Bordeaux. Cochrane had meanwhile told Cheshire that he would try to obtain two Mosquitos, to carry on the low-level marking in greater safety, and therefore until they came, Cheshire must not do any more low-level marking below 5,000 ft. On this raid therefore, six other 5 Group Lancasters, using H2S, joined 617 Squadron, and Cheshire marked from 5,000 ft – spot on – followed by an equally accurate Munro. Shannon and McCarthy both marked an ammunition dump close by. Then the others started to bomb, and before David [inserted] (in JB139 again) [/inserted] dropped his 12,000 lb weapon on the factory [inserted] from 10,000 ft [/inserted], Bunny Clayton dropped his on the nearby
* Six crews carried this weapon on the raid (those with the most accurate bombing averages). This weapon was now referred to as “The Factory Buster”.
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ammunition dump, which exploded in a 15-second long, gigantic flash that blinded everybody. Cheshire, down below, looked up and saw the rest of 617’s Lancasters silhouetted above him against the sky. Then David’s bomb slammed into the powder works, and it disappeared in turn beneath a series of vast explosions. “The powder works”, Cheshire noted, “would appear to have outlived their usefulness!”
This route also took 6 hrs 40 mins from take-off to touch-down, and two days later (as usual now) on [inserted] March [/inserted] 20th, David was off again [inserted] in JB139 [/inserted] to another explosives works – this one at Angoulême, [inserted] North-east of Bordeaux [/inserted]. The pattern was repeated, six 5 Group Lancasters using H2S to drop flares, Cheshire leading 617’s total force of 14 Lancasters and marking from 5,000 ft again. This explosives factory, on a bend on the R. Charente there, performed in the same manner as the one at Bergerac. David dropped 1 x 8,000 lb and 1 x 1,000 lb bomb from 8,300 ft on top of this works, and the factory was completely – and spectacularly – destroyed. Some 6 hrs 5 mins later, David was safely back at Woodhall Spa, as were all 617 crews, and the Film Unit in Cheshire’s aircraft again.
[Underlined] Lyon – third time lucky [/underlined]
The fact that 617 would never leave a “demolition job” half-finished was becoming equally well known to Germans and British alike. The Germans were, in fact, beginning to draft in more defences to the vital plants in France that were supplying their War Effort. But nowhere was this reputation more tested than with their attack on the SIGMA aero-engine works near Lyon on the night of March 23rd 1944. Again six Lancasters of 106 Squadron were to act as the Flare droppers, and 617 put up 14 aircraft.
Cheshire told the 106 crews when to drop their flares, but the first lot were too far North, the second try fell short to the South, and final corrections failed to illuminate the actual target. Cheshire now had to send in his own 617 flare droppers, at altitude, and he just managed one dive over the target at 5,000 ft before they went out. He was not sure his markers had hit, but ordered the rest of 617 to bomb them. David was carrying 11 x 1,000 lb bombs [inserted] in JB139 [/inserted] this time, all fitted with long delay fuses (for the safety of the French
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civilians), so Cheshire had to fly around on his own afterwards to assess the results. They exploded eventually, and certainly something had been hit fair and square.
On the return, all but one 617 aircraft diverted to Tangmere – a fighter station near Chichester – only Nick Ross getting back to Woodhall Spa [inserted] (David’s sortie had lasted 6 hrs 45 mins by this time). [/inserted] There was very limited accommodation, and Cheshire and his Flight Commanders slept with some of the 617 crews in their billets, and on the floor – being last in that morning! When they returned to Woodhall Spa after resting, it was to discover that their target was untouched – they had bombed the wrong factory!
So, next day, March 25th, they went back again to finish the job. This time there were 22 Lancasters in all, including the half dozen from 106 Squadron, but Cheshire had re-organized the Flare-dropping force this time, putting 617’s Kearns in charge of all such flare usage – be it by 106 or 617 Squadron. Cochrane had allowed Cheshire to mark at low-level this time, if required, and as the flares went down Cheshire once again realised they were off target. Eventually he and Kearns got them back on the right target, and Cheshire and McCarthy simultaneously marked underneath. Cheshire then realised they had dropped their spot markers on the wrong buildings, and went in again, his second lot of red spot incendiaries again overshooting. Finally he called in McCarthy again, who hit the target with his last markers, and Cheshire ordered these to be bombed by the rest. Due to problems of communication, however, all the 617 crews orbiting overhead then bombed the early markers – missing the target once again! David’s load this time consisted entirely of 500 lb incendiary clusters and they obtained a good aiming point photograph – proving once back home again 7 hrs 20 mins later, that they had missed the right aero engine works for the second time!
Once more, therefore, 617 set out again on March 29th to try and complete the demolition job. This time 106 and 617 put up 19 Lancasters, and Cheshire was ordered to mark from 5,000 ft again. The flares
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dropped by 106 this time failed to ignite, and Kearns therefore ordered 617 crews to drop their flares. These were accurate, and Cheshire then marked carefully, getting his spot fires just a few yards out of the target centre. When David and the rest above bombed these, their average error put their bombs within the target area this time. David was carrying 1 x 8,000 lb and 1 x 1,000 lb bomb [inserted] in JB139 [/inserted] this occasion, [deleted] flying his usual X “X-ray” [/deleted], and his crew knew immediately that they had at last scored a “bulls-eye”. It took just 7 hrs this time, before they were back at base, third time lucky!
[Underlined] Mosquito marking; and marshalling yards. [/underlined]
Two days before this operation – the last that Cheshire flew and marked in a Lancaster – Cochrane said he had obtained the use of two Mosquitos for marking in future. Cheshire went to see them at Coleby Grange on the 27th, and then later on the day he returned from Lyon (the 30th) he had an hour’s dual instruction on it before flying it to Woodhall Spa. He decided that [inserted] McCarthy [/inserted], Shannon, Kearns and Fawke should join him on the Mosquitos as pilots, and they did some rapid dual instruction and test flights. And within two weeks Cochrane had given them two more Mosquitos.
David Wilson was on a few days leave at the beginning of April, and missed the next operation to the aircraft repair plant at Toulouse-Blagnac aerodrome on April 5th. This was the first time Cheshire used his Mosquito to do the target marking, and this time he was marking not just for 617 Squadron – in the lead – but for the whole of 5 Group which joined in the raid for the first full scale rest of operations to come. In addition to Cheshire’s Mosquito, 617 Squadron fielded 17 Lancasters, and 5 Group put up another 127 altogether. Cheshire found the target clear of cloud, and dived three times, dropping his markers right on target, despite considerable flak of all types. But the Mosquito was fast and agile, and the flak was inaccurate because of this. Munro and McCarthy had marked with Lancasters, and then 617 and other 5 Group Lancasters unloaded their bomb
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loads on the aircraft factory, and on other nearby targets too. All were destroyed, but Cheshire had to leave the scene early, as he was not sure of the range of the Mosquito at low altitude, without extra wing tanks.
When David returned from leave, he was immediately scheduled on the next raid on April 10th, this time to the Luftwaffe’s Signals Equipment Depôt at St. Cyr, by Versailles. He was given the new Lancaster, LM485 (KC-N), which Les Munro had flown in the Toulouse raid on the 5th, and bombed-up with 1 x 8,000 lb and 6 x 500 lb bombs. This raid was just carried out by 617, using Cheshire’s Mosquito and 17 Lancasters, and Cheshire eventually dive-bombed the target [inserted] down to 700 ft [/inserted] with his markers, after having trouble finding it in the dark. But he was spot on again, and David and the rest bombed the target [inserted] from 13,600 ft, [/inserted] destroying most of it.
Discussions at Bomber Command HQ now led to the C-in-C, Harris, agreeing now to let Cochrane have his own Pathfinder Force, within 5 Group, built around the special marking techniques developed by 617 Squadron. Thus Cochrane now received back two Lancaster Squadrons – 83 and 97 – which had originally been seconded to 8 PFF Group, and one Mosquito Squadron – 627 – [inserted] also [/inserted] from 8 Group, (much against the wishes of their A.O.C., Don Bennett).
The object now was to use the Mosquito squadron, and 617’s Mosquitos, for marking large targets, have the Lancasters of 83 and 97 Squadrons dropping the flares and acting as back-ups, and use 617 as the lead bombing squadron, and the others to bomb from a higher level. The next target was just such a place – the marshalling yards at Juvisy, 10 miles South of Paris.
David, meanwhile, had been back over the ranges again with 617, honing their skills all the time. He had “Talking Bomb” up with him on one high level from 15,000 ft, did some low-level flying, and then, on April 18th, was off to Juvisy with 201 other Lancasters in the Group, plus 617’s four Mosquitos [inserted] flown by Cheshire, Fawke, Shannon and Kearns.) [/inserted] Flying LM 485 [inserted] (KC-N) [/inserted] again, David was designated (as was the whole of 617 Sqd) to mark the target for the [inserted] Group’s Lancasters. [/inserted], and carried 6 x Red Spots,
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[inserted] 6 x 1,000 lb, and [/inserted] 4 x 500 lb bombs. The railway yards were on the West bank of the R. Seine, just on the south-east corner of Orly aerodrome, and [deleted] they covered such a large aera that the raid was split into two waves – one to attack the Southern half, the next (one hour later) to attack the Northern section. [/deleted] Cheshire found the Southern aiming point under flares dropped by 83 and 97 Squadrons above (although he had suffered a compass [inserted] failure [/inserted] in the Mosquito). He marked the yards successfully, and was backed up by the other [deleted] of the [/deleted] 617 Mosquitos, and David and the 617 Lancasters then unloaded their markers and bombs from 6,500ft fairly accurately on the target, [deleted] David and his 617 colleagues being the most [/deleted] with the rest of 5 Group – being trained in area (rather than spot) bombing – then carpeting the whole area. [Deleted] soon marked for the second wave, in Northern half of the yards, and again the results were accurate. [/deleted] The combined 5 Group method was becoming one of Bomber Command’s [inserted] most [/inserted] successful weapons!
On [inserted] the morning [/inserted] April 20th, David made his highest practice bombing run yet on Wainfleet Ranges – from 20,000 ft this time. He did not know it, but Cochrane was anticipating the arrival shortly of Barnes Wallis’ new Tallboy Bomb, and the higher it would be accurately dropped, the deeper it would penetrate in the ground before exploding, and creating an “earthquake” effect – bringing any building crashing (even if made of solid concrete).
The same evening (April 20th) David took part in another massed 5 Group attack – this time on the marshalling yards on the North side of Paris, at Porte de la Chapelle, just up the line from the Gare du Nord. He was flying LM485 (KC-N) this evening, and because these yards were very close to the residential tenement blocks surrounding them, extreme care was needed in dropping both markers and bombs. This raid was also even bigger than the one in Juvisy, because 5 Group also borrowed the services of some 8 Group PFF Mosquitos to drop markers by their Oboe equipment (using converging radio beams from UK stations), before 617’s Mosquitos, and Lancasters [inserted] of [/inserted] all three 5 Group marking Squadrons (617, 83 and 97) did their marker and bomb dropping, and then the 5 Group’s Lancasters bombed the target. There was a total of
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247 Lancasters, and 22 Mosquitos in all involved this night, and the raid was split into two waves, each about an hour apart, which attacked the Southern and Northern halves of the yards separately.
The Oboe markers were a little late over the target and there were inevitably some communication problems with all the aerial units involved, and Cheshire trying to control the different facets of the operation. But these were overcome, and another accurate blitzing of the target was achieved. David dropped [inserted] 6 x Red Spots, 6 x 1,000 lb and 4 x 500 lb [/inserted] bombs this time [inserted] from 6500 ft [/inserted], and achieved a direct hit on the aiming point. His sortie lasted 4 hrs 10 mins this time, and once again, all 617 aircraft – Mosquitos and Lancasters, returned safely, although 6 Lancasters from the other squadrons were lost. On the subject of Squadron losses, 617 itself was now very much below the average of most squadrons in this respect, helped no doubt by its training, and the fact that it had concentrated recently on French targets, rather than those in the most heavily defended parts of Germany. There were other reasons too – such as Cheshire’s acquaintance with an RAF officer who was [inserted] the [/inserted] Senior Controller of Beachy Head radar station, near Eastbourne. This had some new American equipment that gave long range cover for Fighter Command deep into France and the Low Countries, and the officer suggested that it could be used at night to warn 617’s Lancasters if they were being stalked by German nightfighters. Cheshire then had 617’s Lancasters fitted with special crystal pick-ups and the latest VHF sets (all with Cochrane’s approval) and from there on, they had valuable radar protection on their missions into the Continent.
[Underlined] Tallboys, and “Taxable”. [/underlined]
The next operation Cochrane planned for 617 was an attack on a German railway centre, and the first he chose was Braunschweig (Brunswick), to the east of Hannover, on the evening of April 22nd. This was historically important, as it was the first time that 617 and 5 Group employed their low-level marking activities over German soil. David, however, missed this operation, and the next ones on Munich [inserted] on April 24th [/inserted] (marshalling yards again) and the German
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tank and troop park at Mailly-le-Camp (May 3rd) – because he was busily engaged in working [inserted] up [/inserted] himself and a few [inserted] other [/inserted] specially selected 617 crews on the Barnes Wallis Tallboy bomb technique. For the most accurate bombing crews on the squadron had been selected to drop these new 12,000 lb weapons (and later, the 22,000 lb Grand Slam bombs too).
It is worth recording, however, that the Braunschweig raid saw 238 Lancasters and 17 Mosquitos of 5 Group, and 10 Lancasters of 1 Group take part, The result was not good, chiefly because there was low cloud and although 617 marked the yards successfully (in the light of flares dropped by 83 and 97 Squadron Lancasters above), other H2S aimed markers were inadvertently dropped farther South, and much of the main force bombed these. One Lancaster of 5 Group had left its radio transmitter on, and it jammed every direction Cheshire tried to give to the other crews. Four Lancasters were lost, but none from 617.
The Munich raid, on April 24, was by contrast an immense tactical success. A mixed force of 260 aircraft once more struck the railway yards there (as well as spreading out over other areas of the town) after Cheshire and 617 Mosquitos had marked the target, [inserted] and Cheshire flew around at low level through a considerable curtain of flak and searchlights. Diversionary raids were flown to Karlsrühr (by the main force), and on Milan (a spoof “Window” dropping exercise by six 617 crews), and the only casualty 617 suffered this time was Flt. Lt. J.L. Cooper (a recent joiner from 106 Squadron). His Lancaster was shot down en route to Munich as Aichstetten, just North-east of Lake Constance, and although his bomb-aimer was killed, the rest of the crew survived to be taken prisoner. [Inserted] Eight other Lancasters of 5 Group were also lost this night. [/inserted] They were lucky to be in Bavaria – for there was now a large price on the heads of 617 crews caught in France!
[Inserted] After this raid on Munich, Cochrane ordered 617 crews to have a weeks complete leave, and most used the rest to good effect. But one or two stayed behind, David Wilson being one.
One factor worth noting about this raid was that Cheshire could not obtain extra fuel tanks for 617’s four Mosquitos. They had to fly these to Manston, refuel on the runway and take off without warming up the engines, to be sure of getting to Munich. None of them believed they could get back to Manston, and yet all just made it – despite a German night fighter in the circuit when they landed! [/inserted]
The Mailly raid upset 617’s and 5 Groups recent success patterns with a vengeance – but it was [inserted] just [/inserted] one of these things (C’est la Guerre”). Mailly was a large French military training area South of Chalons-sur-
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Marne (itself just a few miles [inserted] South-east [/inserted] of Rhiems). Here, it was known the Germans had a Panzer division and their equipment in transit.
Cheshire and 617’s other three Mosquito pilots, Shannon, Fawke and Kearns, were ordered to mark at Mailly, but 617’s Lancasters were not detailed for this raid – which was just as well. Cheshire marked the target perfectly, and ordered the 5 Group Controller to order the first wave of Lancasters to bomb. But things started to go wrong then, as the [inserted] latter’s [/inserted] radio was subsequently found to be seriously off frequency, and his VHF set was being drowned by an American Forces broadcast. After some delay they started to bomb, but because the second wave was held back, Shannon and Kearns had to remark the target in the face of considerable flak. The second wave also bombed accurately, but in the delays caused by the lack of communication, and while Cheshire had to get the Deputy Controller to take over, German night fighters began to arrive in large numbers, and harried the Lancasters all the way back to Northern France. All the 617 crews returned safely, but 42 Lancasters were lost out of the 340 Lancasters and 16 Mosquitos sent on the raid by 5, 1 and 8(PFF) Groups. (This was an 11.6% loss rate – some three times the normal)!
David missed Braunschweig and Munich, because on April 22nd (the day after his return from La Chappelle) he took his old JB139 (originally KC-X, but now changed to KC-V) down to Boscombe Down to carry out trials with Barnes Wallis’ 12,000 ln Tallboy bomb. Sqd Ldr Richardson (“Talking Bomb”) was also there and over the next four days, David took him up several times daily, making high-level trials dropping prototype Tallboys from 18,000 ft each time. On the 26th he returned to Woodhall Spa, carrying seven of the scientists concerned with these tests. He had to break off the special Tallboy dropping exercises in May, however, as all 617’s crews were now engaged on one of their most boring exercises – yet [deleted] as [/deleted] it turned out, it was to be perhaps their most successful and decisive of all – Operation “Taxable”.
The [deleted word] squadron was being trained up to conduct a major “spoof” exercise on the day before D-Day.
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This would entail [inserted] two waves, each of 8 [/inserted] [deleted] 16 [/deleted] Lancasters, flying on instruments in short overlapping circuits, and dropping “Window” to try to indicate to the German shore defences that an invasion fleet was heading their way. (And of course it would be in a very different direction to that taken by the real fleet). The whole operation, once started, would have to be kept up [deleted] continuously [/deleted] for some four hours or more. [Deleted] to seem on the German radar as if a vast number of ships was slowly advancing in their direction. [/deleted] The continuous orbiting by the Lancasters had to be at low level [inserted] 3,000 ft [/inserted], start at a pre-arranged time near Dover, and advance gradually over a group of 18 surface vessels flying barrage balloons, as the vessels sailed beneath them towards the coast below Calais. Bundles of “Window” would have [inserted] to be dropped out every 12 seconds during the four hours. [/inserted]
The month of May, 1944 was probably the most boring in the Squadron’s history, as they practised, day after day, and usually for an hour or so at a time, the intricate navigational exercises that would enable them to fly these continuous orbits. David flew a total of 26hrs 20 mins altogether on these exercises, between May 6th and June 4th, in his Lancaster I, LM485 (KC-N). As the continuous orbiting was going to be a taxing operation, each Lancaster would have to have two crews on board, one relieving the other at the halfway point. David had as his relief pilot a Pilot Officer Sanders and his crew, and after May 13th they always flew together.
On May 18th, David tested out a new “automatic pilot” (or “George”) that Avro’s had fitted to his aircraft, to alleviate the strain of the exercise. These were fitted to all the other Lancasters. At the end of May the Squadron flew up to Yorkshire to practice over the North Sea, and dovetail the second wave of 8 Lancasters into the tricky take-over from the first wave – to keep dropping the “Window” without any gaps (lest the German radar show some strange interruptions in the “fleet’s” progress).
Finally, all was ready on the night of June 5th, and the first wave of 617’s Lancasters set off at about 23.00, the first wave finishing their intricate movements halfway across the Channel
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between Dover and the Pas de Calais coast at around 02.30, and being relieved by the second wave, who finished at around 05.00, after daybreak and by which time they were in sight of the French coast. Another Squadron, No 218, used six Stirling bombers fitted with G-H blind bombing radar units, working in the same fashion but a little more to the East of 617.
In the event, as David noted in his log book, the exercise was “believed very successful”. His total sortie lasted for 4 hrs 40 mins, and the entire Squadron was heartily glad when it was over!
[Underlined] Effect of the Tallboy raids [/underlined]
Two days later, 617 Squadron was back on its normal type of bombing operations again, but this time the raid was laid on suddenly, at short notice, to try to prevent a German Panzer Division reaching the D-Day bridgehead. They were moving up from Bordeaux, and Cochrane ordered 617 to take the newly arrived Tallboy bombs, and try to block a rail tunnel on their route. This was at Saumur, on the R. Loire West of Tours, on the South side of the river just before the railway crossed the Loire on a long, low bridge.
The Squadron was hurriedly bombed up with the 12,000 lb streamlined Tallboy, which had a casing of hardened chrome molybdenum steel and a filling of some 5,000 lbs of Torpex D1 explosive. It was some 21 feet long, and 3ft 2 ins in diameter, with four aerodynamically shaped fins, offset slightly to the airflow in order to spin the bomb as it dropped.
David flew his usual Lancaster (KC-N), which accommodated the Tallboy in its bombay, and had the latest deep-section bomb-doors which closed around the bomb and were also flush with the fuselage – except at the rear end, where they left a [inserted] small semi-circular [/inserted] gap around the bombs tail-fin. The rest of 617’s earlier Lancasters [inserted] in the “DV” or “JB” serial range [/inserted] had been similarly modified, or exchanged for newer aircraft with “ME” or “LM” serials. David’s crew – which had changed slightly over the last few months with postings, etc – consisted of → [inserted] Flying Officer G.A. Phillips (Flight Engineer), F/O J.K. Stott (Navigator), F/O D.W. Finlay (Bomb Aimer/Front Gunner) Warrant Officer H.G. Allen (Radio Operator), Flt. Sgt. H.D. Vaughan (Mid-upper gunner), and Flt. Lt. E.B. Chandler (Rear-gunner), [/inserted] [deleted] F.O. [inserted] D.W. [/inserted] Finlay, W.O. [inserted] H.G. [/inserted] Allen, Flt Sgt. [inserted] H.D. [/inserted] Vaughan, and Flt. Lt. E.B. Chandler, [/deleted] and everyone was looking forward to seeing what these new “Earthquake” bombs could accomplish.
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Cheshire marked the target in his Mosquito, as usual, dropping his markers by the light of the flares from four Lancasters of 83 Squadron above, and placing his Red Spots by the tunnel mouth at the Southern end. He was followed in by his other two Mosquitos (Shannon had had to return home with engine trouble, soon after take-off), and then he called up the 25 Lancasters of 617 that were circling above (this raid was a “maximum strength” affair)!
David’s bomb-aimer released their Tallboy at the → [inserted] end of his seventh run-in over the tunnel. On all the earlier 6 runs his bomb-aimer was unable to see the markers clearly at the tunnel’s South end. He waited for the North end to be marked – the secondary aiming point – and then bombed on the seventh run-in. His Tallboy fell away at the [/inserted] end of a careful, steady run-in, and – like the others – they were disappointed to see only a small red splash [inserted] of light [/inserted] below, as it buried itself deep in the ground – not the blinding, white flash that their 12,000 lb Blast bombs always made, lighting up the countryside. Because of this the 617 crews were a little doubtful whether the tunnel, or railway cutting had been hit properly, until “Recce” pictures [inserted] arrived] [/inserted] next day. These were remarkable. David had written in his log: “Operations – Railway Tunnel at Saumur. 12,000 lb Special. Poor shot, but tunnel badly damaged” [inserted] and his sortie had lasted exactly 6 hrs 20 mins [/inserted]. Which crater applied to which 617 crew was impossible to verify, but the aerial reconnaissance pictures showed all the huge round craters clustered around the Southern end to the tunnel. Two Tallboys had hit the railway lines fairly and squarely in the middle, on the tunnel approach (wrecking an overhead road bridge too), three had landed on the top edges of the cutting by the tunnel mouth, cascading earth onto the lines, but one (and to this day, nobody knows who dropped this) hit the hill above the tunnel some 50 [deleted] hundred [/deleted] yards from the tunnel mouth, and did just what Barnes Wallis had predicted – [deleted] buried itself in [/deleted] penetrated the ground right down by the tunnel roof, and blew an enormous crater in the hillside, exposing the tracks at the bottom and dumping thousands of tons of rubble on them. The 617 crews were greatly heartened by the result, and there had been no casualties.
The next Tallboy raid was on June 14th, and this time Cochrane had sought Barnes Wallis’ advice about using the weapon on German E-boat pens at coastal ports like Le Havre. These torpedo boats were proving a pest at night amongst the convoys of ships off the Normandy beach-head, and so the idea [inserted] was both [/inserted] of dropping the Tallboys to create “tidal waves” to swamp the E-boats
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in harbour.
The raid was Bomber Command’s first daylight raid since June 1943, and was to be a big one on the Port area of Le Havre. Two waves of Lancasters, from 1 and 3 Groups, were to attack in the evening, and at dusk (it was almost Midsummer’s day), but 617 were to go in first with Cheshire and two other marker Mosquitos, followed by 22 Lancasters each carrying the Tallboy bombs.
The 617 aircraft took off, with a fighter escort of Spitfires accompanying them, as it was still broad daylight over the target area. There was heavy flak over Le Havre, but Cheshire [deleted] Shannon and Fawke [/deleted] dived his Mosquitos right down into the thick of it, getting down to 7,000ft over the Pens, and dropped his Red Spot markers by the E-boar quayside Shannon, Fawke and the leading Lancasters who were watching, marvelled at the way Cheshire flew through a dense curtain of all types of A.A. fire, and survived.
Cheshire then told his other Mosquito pilots not to bother marking (as the first Spots he had laid were very visible), and told 617 to start to bomb on these. David’s Flight Commander, Les Munro, then led the Lancasters in at around 17,700 ft (several had already been hit in the engines and wings by flak, and turned back), and David and his crew [inserted] in LM 485 [/inserted] recorded a “Direct-Hit” with their Tallboy on the E-boat [deleted] Pens and [/deleted] wharves. All the 15 Tallboys dropped by 617 hit the target area (one went right through the roof of a large concrete E-Boat Pen), and the E-boats were literally blasted out of the water onto dry land, or blown apart. The post-raid photos showed 617 had wreaked immense damage in the Port area, and the subsequent two waves of 199 Lancasters in all, blitzed the rest of Le Havre, rendering the German Naval presence completely ineffective after that. Again, 617 had no losses.
With this success behind them, Cochrane sent them up again next day (June 15th 1944) to do the same at Boulogne. For these Tallboy operations, David always had a seven-man crew (rather than the old six-man complement), and he had now added a Sgt. King to his regulars. Still using [inserted] LM485 [/inserted] (KC-N), David was up with 21 other 617 Lancasters that evening. There was thick cloud over
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Boulogne this time, and Cheshire (his Mosquito heavily patched up from its ordeal by flak the previous day) dived down below the cloud to drop his markers from around 6,000 ft, once more in a hail of anti-aircraft gunfire. Although his Mosquito was hit several times he survived again, and his markers hit the E-Boat Pen area. He ordered the 617 Lancasters in, but as it was now dark and the cloud had thickened up at 13,000 ft, 10 of the crews could not see Cheshire’s markers below the overcast, and regretfully turned for home taking their precious Tallboys back (they had strict instructions never to waste them!). The remaining 12, however, (mostly more experienced, and leading crews) dived below the clouds, enduring the same barrage of flak that Cheshire had, and lined up over the Pens to drop their bombs. David was one of these, following Les Munro in, and himself followed by McCarthy, Kearns, Clayton, Howard, Poove, Knights, Stout, Hamilton and two others. Most of their aircraft were hit by flak, but David dropped his Tallboy from 8,000 ft, and recorded “Believed Good Shot”. His aircraft was hit by flak, and holed as well.
All the 617 crews got back to base (David was only airborne for 2 hrs 35 mins altogether – against 3 hrs 40 mins for the previous Le Havre raid), but several crew members of other aircraft were injured. Following 617 in to attack had been 133 other Lancasters and 130 Halifaxes, aided by 11 Mosquitos of 8 (PFF) Group, and these had bombed the rest of Boulogne. Only one Halifax [inserted] had been lost [/inserted], out of all the aircraft taking part, and in the two raids taken together, 617 had been largely responsible for the wrecking of some 133 German boats (mostly E-boats).
[Underlined] V2 sites. [/underlined]
The moment they had returned from the Boulogne raid, there was a lot of patching up of the aircraft to do. David’s KC-N was too badly holed to be quickly back in service, and so he was allocated another – DV 380, Wing. Cmdr. Cheshire’s original Lancaster (KC-N), but now re-coded KC-X.
The very morning they had returned from Boulogne, Cochrane had alerted Cheshire to get ready for a
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very important operation that evening (the 16th). Cheshire had only just got to bed but was told to get up again and attend an intelligence briefing right away. The V1 Flying Bombs had started dropping on London, and Intelligence sources had warned the War Cabinet of the imminent firing of two other secret weapons at London – the V2 rockets, and in the V3’s case, huge shells fired through incredibly long [inserted] “Super” [/inserted] gun barrels being built across the Channel in France (a forerunner of the Iraqi “Super”-guns of 1991). The concrete blockhouses hiding these weapons had to be attacked with Tallboys immediately, as the War Cabinet thought on the one hand they might have to order the evacuation of London, and on the other – if aimed at Portsmouth and Southampton, etc, they might interfere [inserted] with [/inserted] the invasion of France, and put it in jeopardy.
The result of all this was that [inserted] David and the other [/inserted] [deleted] the [/deleted] Squadron crews were aroused, and after briefing, stood by all day at their aircraft dispersals, waiting for the signal that the cloud cover over the target had cleared. The Lancasters were bombed-up, but then had to be unloaded, one by one on a rota, to avoid straining their undercarriages. Food was brought out to dispersals, but late in the evening the raid was cancelled – the cloud was still unbroken over the target. Not long after, they were stood-to again, and then stood-down, and so it went on over three days!. Eventually the crews were living in a detached state of limbo, with too little sleep and their metabolic clocks thoroughly upset.
Finally, on June 19th, the cloud cleared and they were off at last. The first target for 617 was a large concrete structure to the [inserted] West of [/inserted] Watten (North-west of St. Omer), on the edge of the Forêt d’Eperlecques. [Inserted] This was one of two large “Bunker” sites for launching V2’s, consisting of huge [inserted] semi- [/inserted] underground concrete bunkers, with large armoured doors. Both these sites were constructed to initially fire the vertical-standing V2 rockets at London, but they were intended later to launch V2’s with nuclear or chemical war-heads, directly as the USA. [/inserted] David took off from Woodhall Spa [inserted] in DV380 (KC-X) [/inserted], with 18 other Lancasters, and Cheshire and Shannon in their Mosquitos. As it was a daylight raid, they were escorted again by Spitfires, and Cheshire went down to 8,000ft over Calais, to find the target beyond the town. He was engaged by a terrific flak barrage, so dived flat out down to 2,000 ft, and released smoke markers (for daylight use) on the target.
* The remains of this structure, called “Blockhaus”, are kept today as a tourist museum.
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Having come through the barrage miraculously unscathed, Cheshire’s markers then failed to ignite, so Shannon then went in through a haze that was developing as the day wore on. He dropped the last of the smoke markers, and as Cheshire believed they were close enough to the blockhouse, ordered 617 to bomb it. David dropped his [inserted] Tallboy [/inserted] like the others, from 18,000 ft, but it “hung-up” momentarily, and recorded a near-miss on his aiming point – the smoke indicators. The rest dropped their weapons close to or on top of the markers, but when the raid was over and “Recce” pictures obtained, it was established that the markers had been some 70 yds wide of the target. Some Tallboys had dropped far enough away from the markers to fall beside (and one on top of) the concrete structure, and this proved sufficient to encourage the Germans not to use the site afterwards. * For some reason (perhaps connected with the repeated bombing-up and down over the three day wait) several Tallboys besides those on David’s Lancaster also “hung-up” – including those of Knilans, Ross and Howard (two of these were “freed”, but one had to be brought back).
Next day, the 20th, the second of these large “Bunker” sites, at Wizernes (just to the South-West of St. Omer) was given to 617, and this time 17 Lancasters set off, with Cheshire and two more Mosquitos in the lead David was still flying DV380, but he had only flown as far as Orfordness, near Woodbridge when Cheshire, in front of them, received information the cloud cover was too thick over the target, and recalled the Squadron (complete with Tallboys).
Two days later, they tried again, and reached the target area this time, but there was ten-tenths cloud over the area, and once more they brought [deleted] back [/deleted] the Tallboys back. Not to be outdone, 617 made a third attempt [inserted] the morning of [/inserted] June 24th, and this time the clouds had cleared. [Inserted] Again they had a fighter escort, [/inserted] and two Mosquitos led 16 Lancasters to the quarry in the North-facing hill near Wizernes station and Cheshire dived in to mark. His markers hung up, however, and he called Fawke in behind him. The flak was intense, and Fawke’s Mosquito and several 617 Lancasters above were hit, but David dropped his Tallboy from 17,400ft, recording a “Good Shot”. On the run in, John Edwards’ Lancaster DV413 (KC-G) was hit, and went
* After Allied troops had captured this site in Autumn 1944 → Barnes Wallis persuaded Bomber Command to let several Lancasters drop the new 22,000 lb Grand Slam bombs on this structure in mid November, to test their destructive force. [/inserted]
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down out of control, [inserted] some crew baling out on the way. [/inserted] The Lancaster exploded as it levelled out, [inserted] its pilot fighting [/inserted] desperately to effect a crash-landing, [deleted] in a field [/deleted], and the rest of the crew were trapped [deleted] out [/deleted] amongst the debris, or flung out onto the field where it pancaked. Only the Navigator, Wireless Operator and Bomb-aimer survived, to become POWs. The rest of the Squadron returned safely, albeit many of the aircraft had flak damage.
As David’s aircraft was also damaged, he promptly air-tested his old aircraft, LN485 (now itself repaired), the same afternoon (June 24th), and next day he was off [inserted] in it [/inserted] with 617 to attack a huge underground storage area for V1 Flying Bombs – at Siracourt, just South of the main road from St. Pol-sur-Ternoise to Hesdin (and East of Le Touquet). The Squadron put up 17 Lancasters, 2 Mosquitos – and a North American Mustang fighter flown by Cheshire.
Para // There was quite a story behind the acquisition of the Mustang, but suffice to say that the Station Commander at Woodhall Spa, together with Cheshire’s friendship with the American Air Force Generals Spaatz and Doolittle, resulted in their sending a Mustang over [inserted] on the morning of the 25th [/inserted] for Cheshire to try out. The 617 ground crews had to work hard to modify the under wing bomb attachments, to fit the necessary smoke markers and the Squadron navigator had to plot Cheshire’s courses for him, and help him jot down the information on his knee pad – for the Mustang was a single-seater. Cheshire had never flown one before, nor a single-engined aircraft for some time, and by the time it had been prepared he was adamant that he would use it on that evening’s raid. He also knew that he had no time to do “circuits and bumps” in it, to get to know its landing techniques – his first take-off would have to be on the operation, and his landing back would have to be in the dark!
As the Mustang was a fast aircraft, David and the other 16 Lancasters and two Mosquitos took off ahead of Cheshire, and by the time they arrived at Siracourt, their C.O. was there, diving in to mark the concrete roof of the underground site with smoke indicators, and followed in by Shannon and Fawke. Then the 617 “gaggle” was called in to drop their Tallboys on the smoke, and David recorded a “Direct Hit” [inserted] from 18,800ft [/inserted], together with some of the others, while other Tallboys fell close by. Someone’s bomb pierced the
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16 ft thick concrete roof of the structure, [inserted] resulting in a spectacular collapse of the walls and ceiling, and others undermined the sides. [/inserted]
Three hours and five minutes after take-off, David was back on the ground at his base, and all had returned safely, including Cheshire in the Mustang.
There were still more sites to attack, but bad weather and thick clouds prevented 617 Squadron from further attacks for some days. [Deleted] In the days [/deleted] During this period, David only managed to get in one practice “Formation flight” and an “Air Test” (involving air-to-sea firing practice). Several times they stood by from dawn [inserted] onwards [/inserted], but raids were cancelled by the late afternoon. The urgency was in everyone’s minds, as the V1’s were now landing in London and the South-East in increasing numbers.
Finally the weather cleared again for the morning of July 4th, and they were briefed to attack a new V1 launch site located in underground caves in the limestone hill overlooking the River Oise, at St. Leu-d’Esserent, a little village North-west of Chantilly. These caves had been used before the war by French mushroom-farmers, but were now reinforced with concrete to store the V1’s, and their launching rails. [Deleted] and the gigantic barrels of the V3 guns [/deleted]
David’s Squadron put up 17 Lancasters, Cheshire in the Mustang, and his back-up in a single Mosquito for this daylight raid. Fawke in the Mosquito went ahead to get weather information, and then Cheshire arrived, dived very low over the caves and dropped his smoke markers accurately on top. Les Munro led in the Lancasters above, through fairly heavy, [deleted] and [/deleted] accurate, flak which caught several aircraft, but the Tallboys started to rain down on the site. One hit the main building, others dropped in the cave mouths and around the entrances to the site, all destroying a great deal of machinery. Many Germans [deleted] workers [/deleted] were trapped underground and some were entombed forever. David [inserted] flying in LM484 again, [/inserted] described his Tallboy hit [inserted] from 18,700ft [/inserted] as a “Fair Shot”, obtaining a good photograph of this exploding near the cave mouth. Once the limestone dust and debris had started to hide the target, some Lancasters had difficulty finding the aiming point, one was hit in all four engines and had to jettison the [inserted] Tallboy [/inserted] over the Channel on the run home [inserted] and [/inserted] one had its bombsight go u/s. Thus only 11 out of the 17 dropped Tallboys on the target,
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but the results were once again spectacular – although in many of these Tallboy raids, these were only seen at first hand after the Allies had captured the area, later in 1944.
All 617 crews returned safely [inserted] David’s own sortie lasting 4hrs 05 mins this time [/inserted], although some had been injured by shrapnel from Flakbursts. [Deleted] but [/deleted] Bomber Command sent in another force of [inserted] 5 Group [/inserted] Lancasters later that same evening – totalling some 231, with 15 Mosquitos for marking. German night-fighters were very active, and shot down 13 of the Lancasters around the target area – a high price to pay.
[Underlined] Last “Op” with 617 – V3 Site. [/underlined]
Two days later, [inserted] on July 6th 1944 [/inserted], David took off on his last operation with 617 Squadron, this time another daylight raid on a V3 site at Mimoyecques, where several “super-guns” were being set up. Cheshire flew his Mustang again, with a Mosquito to back him up, and the usual “gaggle” of 17 617 Lancasters followed higher up (usually around the 18,00 ft level). The “gaggle” was so named by Cheshire, but referred to the pattern 617 was now adopting in its bombing formations – normally four parallel rows of Lancasters (four or five to a row), each of the leaders flying at carefully planned 200 ft or 300 ft vertical separation from each other, and behind each of them, every subsequent Lancaster flying [inserted] in turn [/inserted] at 400 ft lower than the one in front. Thus the “gaggle” had the best chance of avoiding each others bombs in the run-up to the targets, and had a better sighting of the target as it began to become obscured from the markers and first hits. Generally speaking, if the Lancasters adhered closely to this box formation (which was not always possible), the last aircraft’s Tallboys should have released before the first started to explode (they were frequently given delayed-action fuzes).
The V3 site at Mimoyecques was in the chalk hills behind Calais, and Cheshire once again went in very low and dropped his markers on top of the tunnels. The rest then dropped their Tallboys, and David’s went down on target [inserted] from 19,000 ft [/inserted], but the burst wasn’t seen by his crew. Then he flew LM 485 (KC-N) back to
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Woodhall Spa, joining the others who all arrived safely. “Recce” photos later showed the V3 site to have been hit and straddled by the Tallboys and completely wrecked, once more entombing some Germans.
[Inserted] Sub heading [underlined] Leaving 617 Squadron [/underlined] [/inserted]
After landing from this short flight (David had been airborne only 2 hrs 45 mins on this last occasion), [deleted] their C.O. [/deleted] Cheshire was summoned to Cochrane’s Group HQ. Cochrane looked at Cheshire, and said quietly to him: “I’ve been looking at the records, and see you’ve sone 100 trips now. That’s enough, it’s time you had a rest!” And he told Cheshire it was no use arguing! He also added that his three Flight Commanders, [inserted] Dave [/inserted] Shannon, [inserted] Joe [/inserted] McCarthy and [inserted] Les [/inserted] Munro had to come off as well, with David Wilson too. Mimoyecques had been David’s own 90th Operation [/deleted] as well [/deleted], and although the Flight Commanders had done fewer trips, they had [inserted] all [/inserted] been flying on “Ops” continuously for some two years.
So David was rested simultaneously with his CO and Flight Commanders. He had joined 617 in time for its seventh operation (and its first visit to the Anthéor viaduct) on September 16th 1943, and had been with the Squadron for over two months before Cheshire had arrived to take over from [inserted] Mick Martin [/inserted] the temporary C.O. When he joined there had been 10 of the original Dams raid pilots still flying in 617, but when he left, the last three – the Flight Commanders – left with him. It was the end of an era in 617, and David was very proud to have fought and lived alongside those famous names. As for himself, he has never really had the recognition that he deserved for his part in the 40 Operations mounted by 617 between September 16th 1943 and July 6th 1944, but this is no doubt because he was an inherently shy man – though a very tough one in his quiet [inserted] Scottish [/inserted] way.
With all of them being suddenly rested from 617, the 5 Group A.O.C. began to confer some long deserved awards on them. Cheshire had been given a second Bar to his DSO on April 18th 1944 (while with 617) and now, two months after leaving, he was awarded the Victoria Cross, for four years of continuous bravery (unique because it was not for one specific act of gallantry). Shannon was awarded a Bar to his DSO, and Munro was awarded a DSO (McCarthy had just been awarded a Bar [inserted] to his DFC. [/inserted] David was justly awarded a Bar to his DFC (gazetted on June 29th
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1944. This was [inserted] then [/inserted] followed up on November 26th 1944 by his second decoration with 617 – a DSO. (The delay in the award of the DSO was probably occasioned by the departure of Wing Cmdr Geoffrey Leonard Cheshire, VC, DSO and two Bars, DFC, M.I.D., and the arrival and settling-in of his successor at 617, Wing Cmdr J.B. (“Willie”) Tait, DSO and Bar, DFC, MID).
The citation for David Wilson’s Bar to his DFC read: “Since the award of his first DFC in May 943, this officer has completed a third tour of operational duty, during which his experience, determination and devotion to duty have been displayed in the course of many sorties As a captain of aircraft, he can always be relied upon to complete his tasks in the face of the heaviest enemy opposition. He has a long and distinguished record of operational flying.”
And when the DSO was gazetted on November 26th this citation said: “This officer has taken part in numerous missions over enemy territory, including attacks on Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen, Cologne and Mannheim. He is now in his 3rd Tour, and has completed many sorties demanding a high standard of skill and accuracy. He has proved himself to be an ideal leader and his example has been most inspiring.”
“. [sic]
It is interesting to look back on David’s three tours of operations to see the difference in training required by any pilot flying with 617, and the other squadrons. In his time with 214 Squadron (his first tour) David flew a total of 289 hrs 50 mins, of which 199 hrs 35 mins was on operations, and just 90 hrs 15 mins doing Squadron training and exercises, etc. In this case the training hours amounted to 31% of the total. With 196 Squadron, training hours (34hr 35mins out of a total of 135 hrs 40 mins) amounted to 25%. But in 617 Squadron, David’s training accounted for 239 hrs 45 mins out of 420 hrs 55 mins – or a massive 57% of his total time! For each operational hour flown, he had flown over an hour’s worth of practice – nearly all bomb-aiming. This just illustrates the degree to which Guy Gibson (who started it), followed by Mick Martin and Geoffrey Cheshire, had insisted on the very highest level of low and high-level bombing accuracy.
At the end of his third tour, David had flown 90 missions, lasting for a total of 481 hrs 50 mins, and trained for a further 364 hrs 35 mins in these squadrons.
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[Inserted] As for David’s Lancaster [deleted] that [/deleted] [inserted] in which [/inserted] he finished his days [deleted] in [/deleted] at 617 (LM485, KC-N), this aircraft survived a further V1 site attacks, two attacks on the German battleship Tirpitz in Norway (as KC-U), and further raids on Norway, etc, [deleted] in 1945, [/deleted] surviving the War to be scrapped in October, 1945. His other favourite, JB139 (KC-X, and later -V) was shot down over Brest on August 5th 1944, piloted by Don Cheney, R.C.A.F., who survived, with three of his crew (four were killed). The remains of the Lancaster can still be seen in the shallow water of St. Anne-la-Palud Bay, nearby. [/inserted]
[Underlined] Marriage, No5 L.F.S, and the E.T.P.S. [/underlined]
Now that David had obtained a welcome break from operations, he and Elsie were married on July 22nd 1944, and he snatched a quick two weeks leave before finally saying goodbye to 617 Squadron [inserted] at a mammoth farewell party [/inserted] on August 7th, and reporting to his new posting, No5 Lancaster Finishing School at Syerston, Notts, the next day.
David was now made [inserted] up to [/inserted] a Squadron Leader, and [deleted] at first [/deleted] put in charge of “B” Flight at 5 LFS. He was later [deleted] at Syerston until March 13th 1945, becoming [/deleted] appointed the Chief Flying Instructor of the whole School on October 4th, and remained its CFI until he ended his posting there on March 13th 1945. During this time he put many other budding Lancaster pilots through their paces on the School’s well worn (and operationally expired) Lancasters. They were mostly Flying Officers, but there were a few Warrant Officers, Pilot Officers and Flight Lieutenants, and the odd Squadron Leader converting onto the four-engined bombers.
David put all his pupils through the full training steps, which included “stalling practice”, “steep turns”, “three and two engine flying”, “three engine overshoots and landings”, apart from routine circuits and bumps, and night flying.
On several occasions he managed a trip in a Lancaster, or the unit’s Oxford “hack”, to visit 617 at Woodhall Spa, usually taking Sqd Ldr. Poore over as well (both of them had served with the Dambusters). And a number of the Lancasters David taught on at the LFS had once flown in 617 Squadron.
In March 1945, having come to the end of his
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Posting to the LFS, David applied to go on one of the Engine Test Pilot’s Courses at Boscombe Down. He was accepted on the No 3 Course there, and started the Course on March 15th 1945.
This was the third and last of the early Courses to be held at Boscombe Down, due mainly to the construction of hard runways on the aerodrome, leading to a veritable log-jam of aircraft taking off or landing on the restricted grass areas.
David’s Course lasted until October 2nd that year – a period of 6 1/2 months – and David was one of 31 test-pilots to complete it successfully. Amongst other subsequently famous names on the course with him were [inserted] Lt. [/inserted] Peter Twiss RN (to become Chief Test-Pilot for Fairey Aviation), [inserted] Sqd. Ldr. [/inserted] Charles McClure, who then took over from “Roly” Falk as Wing Cmdr. And Chief Test-Pilot at the R.A.E. at Farnborough, Flt. Lt. J.O. Lancaster who went to Boulton Paul, Saunders Roe, and finally Armstrong Whitworth; Ron Clear, from Airspeeds; and Lt. Cmdr. J.B.V. Burgerhorst, who went to Fokkers.
Five of the 31 on the Course were to lose their lives testing aircraft (the corresponding losses on the 1st Course were 5 out of 13, [deleted] and [/deleted] on the 2nd 7 out of 28, and the 4th, 7 out of 33). This eventual “loss” rate from the early courses was on average almost 23% , illustrating the high price paid in the lives of exceptionally brave and talented young men, by the advancement of Britain’s and other countries’, aviation industries.
As described in the chapters in these Volumes about Jimmy Owell, Ricky Esler and Jimmy Nelson, etc, the ETPS Course proceeded for David along the normal lines. The previous Commandant, Gp. Capt. J.F. McKenna [inserted] AFC [/inserted], had just been killed in a Mustang at the beginning of David’s Course, and his place was taken by Gp Capt. H.J. Wilson, AFC, who had been a senior test-pilot at the RAE. The Assistant Commandant was Wing Cmdr H.P. “Sandy” Powell, AFC, who also acted as the Chief Test-flying Instructor.
David flew the [inserted] range of [/inserted] ETPS aircraft, which at that time included an Oxford, Harvards, Lancaster
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Swordfish, Mosquitos, Tempest [inserted] I and II and V, [/inserted] Spitfire IX and XXI Boston, [deleted] Sptifire IX [/deleted], [inserted] and the [/inserted] Meteor I. The last machine was the first jet aircraft that David had flown, but it provided no undue problems for him.
By the beginning of October, David had passed the difficult classroom studies, and the flying examinations, with ease, and after qualification, he accepted a post as test-pilot in “B” Squadron ( [deleted] the [/deleted] multi-engine aircraft) at the A & AEE at Boscombe Down, to last until his demob on March 15th 1946.
At the A & AEE, he started flying there on January 10th 1946, and undertook some firing trials on a new Avro Lincoln, flew a Lancaster to measure “speed/power curves”, practiced bombing runs in a Mosquito VI, and carried out other tests on a Halifax III, Dakota, Warwick, etc. Then his Service career was over, and David was demobbed.
[Underlined] A Career at A.V. Roe & Co. [/underlined]
With his brilliant academic qualifications, his war-time record, and qualifications now as a test-pilot, David Wilson [inserted] now [/inserted] had a great deal to offer the world. He was immediately offered a job at RAF Cranwell, and in fact the College was very keen to employ him, but David had written to Sir Roy Dobson, Managing Director now of A.V. Roe & Co. Ltd. at Manchester, to seek a post there – not necessarily in the Flight Test Dept., but perhaps connected with the Design side.
Sir Roy offered David the post of “Manager – Aerodynamic Development and Testing”, and David promptly accepted, starting work at Woodford [inserted] on April 8th 1946 [/inserted] at a salary of £800 per annum, with the promise of an early rise to £900 p.a. He was now 29 years of age, and had a total of 1807 flying hours to his credit.
David’s new job was immediately very tied up with examination of the Tudor airliner designs – both the Mark I and Mark II that were on order for BOAC and BSAA. A considerable amount of aero-dynamic research was going on into the problems affecting these designs, and several establishments
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Apart form Avro’s were engaged in a dramatic race to find the answers. The description of these problems can be found in the stories of Bill Thorn and Jimmy Orrell in these Volumes, but suffice to say that David and his Dept. were soon very busy liaising with Roy Chadwick, [deleted] the [/deleted] Avro’s Chief Designer (and from February 1947, their Technical Director), and the Test-pilots at Woodford to try to overcome the Tudor’s bad stalling characteristics, and excessive drag problems.
Once settled in at Woodford, David decided he had better keep his hand in at flying, and so [inserted] he had a medical on January 1st 1947, and [/inserted] took out a Civilian Flying Licence (No 24644) on March 26th 1947, not valid for flying Public Transport aircraft, but enough to cover him for test-flying at Woodford.
[Inserted] It was also early in 1947 before David and his wife were called to Buckingham Palace to receive the DSO he had won in 617 Squadron – so great had been the queue of people at the end of the War. As he was now a civilian, David had to receive the decoration in civilian clothes. [/inserted]
David was by now living at 3, Leith Rd, Sale, Cheshire, some miles from Woodford and closer to the Southern side of Manchester, and he and his wife Elsie now had a baby daughter, Carol. He was very satisfied with his work at Woodford, and he was starting to fly as Second pilot to Ken Cook and others, and rapidly getting the taste of flying back again. → [Inserted] For instance he went up with Ken on November 25th 1946 [inserted] and Reg Knight on November 27th [/inserted] in the Anson C.Mk XIX Series 2 VL 310, to conduct “Trailing Static Tests”[inserted] “Asymmetric and P.E.” tests. On December 1st he was flying with Reg Knight in Tudor I G-AGPF, doing tests at 25,000’. [/inserted] On December 30th and 31st he was up again with Ken in the Anson XII NL172 doing “Trimmer Setting” tests with the C of G fully forward and full aft, and “Single-engine” tests loaded up to 10,000 lbs weight.
In January 1947, David was flying with Ken again, doing “Trim” tests and “Loop swinging” on York MW322, checking “Stalling speeds” [inserted] and “P.E’s” [/inserted] on Avro XIX G-AGNI, and conducting “Pressurization and Heating” trials on the Tudor I G-AGRJ. And in May 1947 he was flying with Reg Knight in the Tudor I G-AGRI, Anson VM172 and Tudor IV G-AHNI, carrying out “stalls”, “stabilities”, “levels” and other aero-dynamic tests. [/inserted] And it was because of his flying ability, coupled with his interest in sampling the stalling characteristics of the new Tudor II, and observing the reaction of the [inserted] newly-shaped [/inserted] wool-tufted wing fillets fitted to it that he flew as Second-pilot with Bill Thorn on [inserted] that fateful [/inserted] August 23rd 1947. He was not originally → [inserted] scheduled to be the No 2 pilot on this flight as Bill had intended to take Reg Knight up with him. But Reg (see the next Chapter) had to go down to see his mother at Nuneaton, at very short notice, due to a dispute she was having over a new house. And Fate thus decreed that David would take his place. [/inserted]
So Bill Thorn and David Wilson taxied out in G-AGSU that sunny Saturday morning at a little after 10.50 (GMT), carrying Roy Chadwick (Avro’s Technical Director) and Stuart Davies (now the Chief Designer), with their Flight Engineer Eddie Talbot, and radio operator J. Webster. And soon after lift off on the main runway, Bill Thorn got into difficulties with Britain’s largest passenger aircraft (at that time), because of the aileron circuits being mistakenly reversed during work in the factory. The Tudor tilted right over onto
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59a
[Insertions to previous page]
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3/60
Its starboard wing, the tip touched the ground and the Tudor II sideslipped slowly into a field, crumpling the wing, sliding along the stubble on its belly, and then decelerating into a group of oak trees surrounding a deep pond. The trees broke up the fuselage and wings, and the long nose of the Tudor fractured, and dropped the cockpit end into the pond, drowning the two pilots. But for the presence of water, they would undoubtedly have survived.
Thus, David’s career with Avro’s came to a sudden halt, along with the great Chief Test-pilot sitting beside him, and the man in the back who had designed all these magnificent machines, - and the Lancaster bomber in which David had spent so much of an eventful wartime career, and survived because of its strength and performance. Certainly, if he had to die, he could not have died in the company of any greater men than these.
Roy Dobson, who should have been on the test flight himself, but had skipped it because he was called to his office for an urgent ‘phone call, tried to cope with the tragedy that afternoon from his office at Woodford. The relatives of the other occupants, dead or injured, were contacted by various means, but David’s wife Elsie was mistakenly overlooked for a time. With a young daughter to bring up, and a home to try to keep together, things looked bleak. But when Sir Roy realised how difficult things were, he went out of his way to do all he could for Elsie. He had Avro’s arrange to pay off the mortgage, [inserted] and [/inserted] and give her a monthly sum for quite some time. He sent presents for Carol from time to time, and used to bring them back for the little girl from his overseas trips.
Sir Roy was greatly affected by the accident, and genuinely grief-stricken over the deaths of his life-long friend and colleague, Roy Chadwick, and Bill Thorn and David Wilson. He advised Elsie Wilson to brief a good solicitor and sue A.V. Roe & Coe for damages, so that she could be awarded compensation, and although Elsie found this difficult, and at times could hardly understand what was going on, eventually she was awarded damages and these were held by the Court in 2 1/2 % War Loan on trust for her daughter, with the income being paid regularly.
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3/61
In fact David’s daughter Carol was eventually offered a Dr. Barnes Wallis Scholarship, had her mother wanted to accept this (out of the two per year that the great aircraft and bombs designer had set up out of his own money). This could have entitled Carol to attend Christ’s Hospital (Girls School,) in Hertfordshire, but Elsie declined, in order to keep the family close together.
David was buried in Woodford Church, near Roy Chadwick and Bill Thorn, and where Sir Roy and Lady Dobson now also lie. The funeral was a very grand affair, attended by hundreds of colleagues of the crew from all walks of life, the Ministries, RAF and 617 Squadron, and other Aviation companies. Afterwards, Sir Roy said of David:
“He was a brilliant young man, and a technician of extraordinary aptitude and ability, who would soon have made his mark on the company. His loss is going to be most severely felt”.
And it was, no less than by his daughter Carol, who to this day remains devoted to the war hero father she scarcely remembers, and her mother Elsie, who has remarried, but still lives in Cheshire not many miles from Woodford, and under the flight path to Ringway Airport.
[Page break]
[Underlined] Appendix [/underlined] P1
[Underlined] Sqd. Ldr. David James Baikie Wilson, DSO, DFC & Bar [/underlined]
[Underlined] List of Operations (3 Tours) [/underlined]
[Underlined] With No 214 Sqd: [inserted] (Wellington IC). [/inserted] Target Bomb load make-up Total Bombs dropped [/underlined]
1941 July 9* Osnabrück. 1 x 4000 4,000
July 14* Bremen 3 x 500 + Incendiaries. 1,500 +
July 17* Cologne 1 x 4000 4,000
July 20* Rotterdam 1 x 1,000, 3 x 500, + Incendiaries 2,500 +
July 23* Mannheim 1 x 4000 4,000
July 25* Hamburg ? ?
Aug 12* Hanover ? ?
Aug 16* Duisburg ? ?
Aug 19* Kiel 6 x 500 3,000
Aug 22* Mannheim ? ?
Aug 27* Mannheim ? ?
Aug 31* Cologne 1 x 1000, 5 x 500 3,500
Sep 2* Frankfurt 1 x 4000. (Retd, engine trouble) –
Sep 7* Berlin ? ?
Sep 8* Kassel ? ?
Sep 11 Le Havre ? ?
Sep 15 Brest 1 x 1,000, 4 x 500, 1 x 250 3,250
Sep 17 Karlsruhe 1 x 1,000, 4 x 500 3,000
Sep 29 Hamburg 1 x 4,000 HCMI 4,000
Oct 3 Antwerp 1 x 1,000, 6 x 500, 1 x 250 4,250
Oct 10 Cologne 1 x 1,000, 5 x 500, 1 x 250 3,750
Oct 12 Bremen ? ?
Oct 13 Dusseldorf 1 x 1,000, 5 x 500, 1 x 250 3,750
Oct 21 Bremen 1 x 1,000, 5 x 500 3,500
Oct 23 Kiel 1 x 1,000, 3 x 500, 1 x 250 2,750
Oct 31 Bremen Bad Wx, retd with bombs. –
Nov 7 Berlin 6 x 500 (Bad Wx, Osnabruck bombed) 3,000
Nov 9 Hamburg 6 x 500, 1 x 250 3,250
Dec 23 Brest 6 x 500 3,000
Dec 27 Brest 6 x 500 3,000
1942 Jan 2 Brest ? ?
Jan 8 Brest ? (Bad Wx, bombs returned) –
Jan 11 Brest 6 x 500, 3,000
Jan 21 Bremen 1 x 4,000 4,000
Jan 26 Brest 6 x 500 3,000
Jan 28 Munster ? (Bad Wx, bombs returned) –
[Underlined] TOTAL = 36 MISSIONS Total hours with Squadron = 289:50 [/underlined]
[Underlined] Total hours on “Ops” = 199:35 [/underlined]
* Flying as Second-pilot on these raids (Rest as Captain).
[Page break]
[Underlined] Appendix [/underlined] P2
[Underlined] With No 196 Squadron. (Wellington X) [/underlined]
1943 Feb 7 Lorient 7 x 500 3,500
Feb 13 Lorient 3 x 500, 6 Containers 1,500 +
Feb 14 Cologne 3 x 500 6 Containers
Feb 17 x Emden ? Bad Wx. Bombs returned. –
Feb 26 Cologne 3 x 500, +Incendiaries (2 x 500 bombs hung up, returned) 500 +
Feb 28 St. Nazaire 3 x 500 + Incendiaries 1,500 +
Mar 3 Hamburg 3 x 500 + Incendiaries 1,500 +
Mar 5 Essen 1 x 4,000 4,000
Mar 12 Essen 3 x 500 + Incendiaries 1,500 +
Mar 26 Duisburg 3 x 500 + Incendiaries 1,500 +
Mar 29 Bochum 3 x 500 + Incendiaries 1,500 +
Apr 4 Kiel 1 x 4,000 4,000
May 4 Dortmund 2 x 500, 6 x SBC 1,000 +
May 12 Duisburg 1 x 4,000 4,000
May 13 Bochum 1 x 4,000 4,000
May 25 Düsseldorf 2 x 500, 7 x SBC 1,000 +
June 11 Düsseldorf ? ?
Jun 21 Krefeld ? ?
Jun 24 Wuppertal (Elberfeld) Incendiaries only. ?
Jul 3 Cologne Incendiaries only ?
[Underlined] Total = 20 Missions Total hours with Squadron = 135:40 [/underlined]
[Underlined] Total hours on “Ops” = 101:05 [/underlined]
[Underlined] With 617 Squadron. (Lancaster I and III) [/underlined]
1943 Sep 16 Antheor Viaduct. 1 x 4,000, 3 x 1,000 7,000
Nov 11 Antheor Viaduct. 1 x 12,000, HC 12,000
Dec 16 Flixecourt xx 1 x 12,000 HC 12,000
Dec 20 Liege 1 x 12,000 HC Bomb returned, raid abortive (due PFF) –
Dec 22 Abbeville-Amiens. xx 11 x 1,000. Bombs brought back (due PFF failure) –
1944 Jan 4 Pas de Calais (Flying Bomb Site) ? Bombs dropped 4 miles from target due PFF error ?
Jan 21 Hallencourt. xx 2 x 1,000, 13 x 500, 6 Flares. Only 1 x 1,000 and 7 x 500 dropped 4,500
Jan 25 Fréval (Pas de Calais) xx 2 x 1,000, 13 x 500 8,500
Feb 8 Limoges 12 x 1,000 12,000
Feb 12 Antheor Viaduct 1 x 12,000 12,000
x Daylight raid.
xx Flying bomb site. (V1 weapon).
[Page break]
[Underlined] Appendix [/underlined] P3
[Underlined] With 617 Sqd cont’d [/underlined]
1944 March 2 Albert All Incendiaries ?
March 4 St. Etienne. ? Bad Wx. Returned –
March 10 St. Etienne 11 x 1,000 11,000
March 15 Woippy (near Metz). 1 x 12,000. Bad Wx. Returned. –
March 16. Clermont Ferrand 1 x 12,000, 6 Flares 12,000
March 18 Bergerac 1 x 12,000 12,000
March 20 Angouleme 1 x 8,000, 1 x 1,000 9,000
March 23 Lyons 11 x 1,000 11,000
March 25 Lyons ? x 500, Incendiaries ?
March 29 Lyons 1 x 8,000. 1 x 1,000 9,000
Apr 10 St. Cyr. 1 x 8,000, 6 x 500 11,000
Apr 18 Juvisy 4 x 1,000, 4 x Red Spots 4,000
Apr 20 La Chapelle 12 x 1,000 12,000
Jun 5 D-Day decoy mission
Jun 8 Saumur Tunnel 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
Jun 14 Le Havre Pens 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
Jun 15 Boulogne Pens 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
Jun 19 Watten xx 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
Jun 20 Wizernes xx – Tallboy Raid recalled over Channel –
Jun 22 Wizernes xx Tallboy Bad Wx. Bomb brought back. –
Jun 24 Wizernes xx 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
Jun 25 Siracourt xx 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
July 4 St. Leu d’Esserent. Xx 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
July 6 Mimoyecques xx 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
[Underlined] Total – 34 Missions Total hours with Squadron = 420:55 [/underlined]
[Underlined Total hours on “Ops” = 181:10 [/underlined]
[Underlined] Grand total (3 tours) = 90 Operational Flights. [/underlined]
[Underlined] Grand total of flying hours with Squadrons = 846:25 [/underlined]
[Underlined] Grand total of flying hours on Operations = 481:50 [/underlined]
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Title
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A bomber pilot’s journey through WWII
Description
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Biography of Squadron Leader David James Baikie Wilson, DSO, DFC and Bar (1917 - 1947). He flew operations as a pilot with 214, 196 and 617 Squadrons before becoming Head of Aerodynamic Development and Testing, and Test-Pilot at A V Roe & Co Ltd. He was killed 23 August 1947 in the Avro Tudor crash.
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Peter V Clegg
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IBCC Digital Archive
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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handwritten sheets
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eng
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Text
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BCleggPVWilsonDv1
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
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1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1944-04-05
1944-04-06
1944-06-05
1944-06-06
1944-06-08
1944-06-09
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
1944-06-16
1944-06-19
1944-06-20
1944-06-22
1944-06-24
1944-06-25
1944-07-04
1944-07-05
1944-07-06
1945
1946
1947-08-23
1944-04-18
1944-04-19
Conforms To
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Pending review
Spatial Coverage
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Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Belgium--Antwerp
Belgium--Liège
England--Cheshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Suffolk
France--Albert
France--Angoulême
France--Bergerac
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Brest
France--Clermont-Ferrand
France--Creil
France--Le Havre
France--Limoges
France--Lorient
France--Lyon
France--Mimoyecques
France--Pas-de-Calais
France--Saint-Cyr-sur-Mer
France--Saint-Étienne (Loire)
France--Saint-Nazaire
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
France--Saumur
France--Siracourt
France--Watten
France--Woippy
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kassel
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Krefeld
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Wuppertal
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Osnabrück
France--Watten
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
11 OTU
1660 HCU
1668 HCU
196 Squadron
214 Squadron
5 Group
617 Squadron
8 Group
aircrew
Bennett, Donald Clifford Tyndall (1910-1986)
bombing
bombing of the Boulogne E-boats (15/16 June 1944)
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
bombing of the Juvisy, Noisy-le-Sec and Le Bourget railways (18/19 April 1944)
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
bombing of the Mimoyecques V-3 site (6 July 1944)
Bombing of the Saumur tunnel (8/9 June 1944)
bombing of the Siracourt V-weapon site (25 June 1944)
bombing of the Watten V-2 site (19 June 1944)
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
bombing of Toulouse (5/6 April 1944)
Boston
C-47
Chadwick, Roy (1893-1947)
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
crash
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Service Order
final resting place
Flying Training School
Gibson, Guy Penrose (1918-1944)
Grand Slam
grief
H2S
Halifax
Halifax Mk 3
Harvard
Heavy Conversion Unit
incendiary device
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Lincoln
Meteor
Mosquito
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Normandy deception operations (5/6 June 1944)
Oboe
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
P-51
Pathfinders
pilot
promotion
RAF Bassingbourn
RAF Boscombe Down
RAF Church Lawford
RAF Coningsby
RAF Cranage
RAF Cranwell
RAF Driffield
RAF Leconfield
RAF Stradishall
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
RAF Upavon
RAF Wainfleet
RAF Woodhall Spa
Spitfire
Stirling
Tallboy
Tiger Moth
training
V-1
V-2
V-3
V-weapon
Wallis, Barnes Neville (1887-1979)
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/743/19703/MCleggPV[DoB]-150710-010001.pdf
e92546a0df93cd6e5c1d97fe9cd36a63
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Clegg, Peter Vernon
P V Clegg
Description
An account of the resource
Eight items and five sub-collections. Main collection contains a log of Pathfinder operations from RAF Wyton 1943 -1944, histories of the Avro repair facility at Bracebridge Heath, and Langar, a biography of Squadron Leader David James Baikie Wilson, biography of Squadron Leader Lighton Verdon-Roe, a book - Test Pilots of A.V. Roe & Co Ltd - S.A. 'Bill' Thorn, and two volumes of book - Roy Chadwick - no finer aircraft designer, Sub-collections contain a total of 29 items concerning the Aldborough Dairy and Cafe as well as biographical material, including log books for Alan Gibson, Peter Isaacson, Alistair Lang and Charles Martin. <br /><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1772">Aldborough Dairy and Cafe</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1768">Gibson, Alan</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1769">Isaacson, Peter</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1770">Lang, Alastair</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1771">Martin, Charles</a><br /><br /><br />The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Peter Clegg and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2015-07-02
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
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Clegg, PV
Transcribed document
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Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[Photograph] – Joan Gardiner [indecipherable word] WAAF Pat Dey of 156 PFF Sqn.
[page break]
* While at School near Berchtesgarten, [sic] Hitler & his entourage used to pass the gates frequently. The School would line the road and salute ‘Heil Hitler’ when his car passed. One day he slowed and stopped, noticing Pat Dey did not salute. He asked her ‘why’? She said: “Because I am English!”
She worked for an Australian boss before the War began. One day she said she wanted a few minutes to go and sign on for the RAF. He said: “don’t be silly – War is a man’s job – you’ll never be able to stomach it.” How wrong he was!
She worked at Bomber Command HQ at High Wycombe before 156 Sqn, on bombing raid plotting. She was fluent in German.
At 156 Sqn she got to know A V-M Don Bennett – C-in-C of the Pathfinder Group at Wyton, and became a family friend, doing baby-sitting for them.
Page 1
Example of ‘Met’ chit used in Ops briefings.
Form 2324.
METEOROLOGICAL OFFICE, [indecipherable word]
LOCAL FORECAST from [indecipherable word] hours 2/3/44 date.
ROUTE FORECAST [indecipherable word] TO [indecipherable word] till [indecipherable word] hours [indecipherable word] date.
Time of Origin: [indecipherable word] hours [indecipherable words]
[underlined] SURFACE WIND: [/underlined] NW to WNW, 10-15 knots. Gusting locally to 20 knots.
{underlined] UPPER WIND: [/underlined] 2000 feet 310 degs 35 knots. 5000 feet 300 degs 40 knots.
[underlined] WEATHER: [/underlined] Wintry showers, isolated this morning but more widespread this afternoon.
[underlined] VISIBILITY: [/underlined] Mainly 4 to 8 miles but 1 to 3 miles in showers.
[underlined] CLOUD: [/underlined] Small amounts of Sc (Stratocumulus) at 2/3000ft top 4/5000ft this morning apart from local increase in showers to 6/10
[page break]
Page 2
[underlined] 26TH APRIL 1943 [/underlined]
DUISBURG.
Paramatta. 133M & 356H. & 72 P.F.F. [missing] will be dropped at Position ‘A’ 5145N 0642E. by [missing] Mosquitos Squadron.
[missing] exact A/P with Ground markers T.I Red [missing] as backers up will keep the A/P marked with T.I Green throughout
[missing] their bombs with maximum precision at the T.I red if these are [missing] centre of cluster of T.I Green. ZERO = 0215
[list T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPHS. REMARKS.]
[missing] with small amounts of cloud 10/10ths to E. of target. At the beginning [missing] selected crews were attacking good concentration was [missing] of main force attacked fires spread until finally area [missing] mainly ENE of red T.I’s. 14 photographs attempted.
[page break]
Page 3
[underlined] 27TH APRIL 1943 [/underlined]
DORTMUND.
Paramatta. Zero Hour. 0200 hrs.
Flares to be dropped short of target by Mosquitos 4 mls. E of [missing]
[missing] Red & Green T.I’s.
[missing] of special a/c will attack Soest as first running [missing] target. T.I. Yellow to be dropped at position C to [missing].
[list T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPHS. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 28th APRIL 1943 [/underlined]
Stand down.
[missing] of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Group laid mines. 23 a/c are missing.
[page break]
4
[underlined] 29th APRIL 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 09.35HRS. [/underlined] STAND DOWN.
[underlined] 30TH APRIL 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940HRS. [/underlined] Target received – ESSEN.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical (meaning Oboe-guided) Wanganui. 290 Heavies to 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups. & 35 P.F.F/ (8 Mosquitos.) Tracking flares red steady will be dropped on track 5 mins short of the release point at position A as telephoned. (51’45’N 06’56’E). Tracking flares green steady will be dropped on track 2 1/2 mins short of release point at 5137N 0657E.
Release point flares will be red with green stars with one white for longer burning.
Main force a/c to [indecipherable word] tracking flares as guide for bombing run up should aim bombs at release point flares on exact heading 200M & 165mph indicated.
All flares will ignite at 16000ft.
Zero hour. 2359. Changed to 0230.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Owing to height of cloud both navigational & release point flares went into cloud very quickly & all a/c bombed on white flares on approximate position. White flares seen. Glow of fires seen below cloud, large white explosion lit up underside of cloud at 0305 hrs.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 12 a/c missing over ESSEN. 1 from 1 Group, 5 from 4 Group, 5 from 5 Group, 1 from 405. late of 7 squadron over BOCHOLT.
Photographic Cover shows further damage to KRUPPS. Attack gave rise to serious annoyance among the authorities. Described as “terror raid by Jewish and Bolshevic [sic] air pirates.”!
[page break]
5
[underlined] 1ST MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1100HRS. [/underlined] Target. DUISBURG. ‘D’
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Same as for ESSEN 30th April/1st May. Zero hour. 0005.
[deleted] Route – Base – 53’17N 02’12E. – EGMOND – 5200N [/deleted]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 1300HRS. [/underlined] OPS CANCELLED
[underlined] 2nd MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0931HRS. [/underlined] Target – Area 1. DUISBURG. Area 2. BREMEN.
[underlined] METHOD. Area I. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta - Ground Marking. Zero hour 0030hrs. Landmark T.I’s Yellow will be dropped at 5141N 0645E. Mosquitoes will mark exact A/P with T.I. red. Other P.F.F. a/c acting as backers up will keep A/P marked with T.I. Green.
Main Force to aim bombs at T.I. red if visible otherwise at centre of area covered by T.I Green.
[underlined] Area II. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground marking. Landmark flares red steady will be dropped by early a/c only at 5405N 0750E. Landmark T.I. Yellow will be dropped at 5400N 0855E. by all P.F.F. a/c. target will be marked with ground markers T.I. Green.
Main Force a/c to aim their bombast centre of area covered by all T.I. Green. No attempt at visual identification to be made. Flares white & Ground markers T.I. [deleted] Green [/deleted] Red will also be dropped in target area for use of PFF a/c only. Landmark T.I. Yellow to be dropped at 5345N 0835E.
[underlined] 1800HRS. [/underlined] Briefed.
[underlined] 2026 HRS. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta on Area I confirmed.
[underlined] 2110 HRS. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[page break]
6
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 3RD MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940 HRS. [/underlined] Target. Area I DUISBURG. Area II BREMEN
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Area I. Musical Paramatta unless further met. Information makes sky-marking necessary. Zero hour 0030 hrs. Method as for yesterday. Mosquitoes, - Z-3, Z, Z+7, Z+13, Z+19, Z+25, Z+31, Z+37, Z+43. Area II. Newhaven Ground marking. As for yesterday.
[underlined] 1800HRS. [/underlined] Briefing
[underlined] 1801 HRS. [/underlined] OPS. CANCELLED.
[page break]
7
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 4TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0932HRS. [/underlined] Target – DORTMUND. A/P 160° 350yds from ‘A’
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta. 0100HRS. Zero. 116 Mediums + 388 heavies + 71 PFF Mosquitoes will drop landmark ground markers T.I. Yellow at 5152N 0726E. Mosquitoes will then accurately mark exact A/P with ground marker T.I. Green at Z-3, Zero, Z+7, Z+13, Z+19, Z+25, Z+31, Z+37. Other P.F.F. a/c acting as backers up will keep A/P marked throughout attack with T.I. red.
Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at T.I. Green if visible, if not at centre of pattern of T.I. red. A small attack for training purposes will be carried out on Rheine at Z+20.
[underlined] 1800HRS. [/underlined] Briefed. A.O.C’s message to crews read. Photographs of line up taken.
F/L LANG AND SGT. CLARK SINCE REPORTED SAFE.
[page break]
8
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
‘T’ first a/c to return to base made three unsuccessful attempts to land after which owing to the aerodrome being ‘red’ all a/c were either diverted to Honiley or went of their own accord. Visibility there was found to be even worse than Warboys and a/c which had not already been instructed to land elsewhere were told to return and land at Marham. Finally landing at Marham, Chedworth, Sleap, Honeybourne, Stanton Harcourt, Whitchurch, High Ercall, Pershore and one ‘J’ baled out successfully. Interrogations then proceeded during the following day until 1900 hrs!
[underlined] SUMMARY [/underlined] 4 a/c missing P.F.F. 1 from 83, 1 of 156, 2 of 35. 30 a/c missing from Command. Owing to the misconduct of W/C Donaldson who, according to the Main Force, apparently dropped his Red T.I.s on the Dutch coast, he said as far as night photographs show succeeded in developing up to 6 mls. North of the target.
[page break]
9.
[underlined] 5TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations – 156 Squadron returned to base at various times during the day.
[underlined] 6TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1012 HRS. [/underlined] Stand down for P.F.F. with the exception of 109 Squadron.
[underlined] 7TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1008 HRS. [/underlined] Target – DUISBURG Backers-up not required – 6 Main Force only.
[underlined] 1040 HRS. METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta or Musical Wanganui depending on later met: information. If [underlined] Musical Paramatta [/underlined] Mosquitoes will drop preliminary warning groundmarkers T.I. yellow at 5145N 0644E. Mosquitoes will then mark exact A/P with groundmarkers T.I. red which will be dropped at Z-5, Z, Z+5, Z+10, Z+15, Z+20. These groundmarkers will each burn for 7 minutes. No backers up. Main Force to aim bombs with max. precision at T.I. red. If [underlined] Musical Wanganui. [/underlined] Mosquitoes will drop tracking flares red steady at 5145N 0644E. 2nd tracking flares green steady will be dropped on track at 5136N 0645E.
Release point flares red with green stars and white stars for longer burning will be dropped at Z, Z+5, Z+10, Z+15, Z+20. All flares igniting at 16000ft. Main Force a/c will aim their bombs with max. precision at centre of release point flares on exact heading of 200°M IAS 143kts with bomb sights set for height, air speed & zero wind.
195 heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 Group + 17 (L) P.F.F. + 7 Mosquitoes.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 1745 HRS. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[page break]
10.
[underlined] 8TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0930HRS. [/underlined} MAKE & MEND. Tunis and Bizerta [sic] fallen.
[underlined] 9TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000HRS. [/underlined} Target – DUISBURG. [underlined] METHOD [/underlined] Musical Wanganui. 87 mediums + 355 heavies + 8 Mos. + 31 PFF = 482 a/c. Zero. 0200hrs. Tracking flares red steady will be dropped on track at 5150N 0644E. Tracking flares green steady will be dropped on track at 5138N 0644E. Release point flares will be red with green stars with flares white for longer burning. Main Force a/c should aim bombs at centre of release point flares on heading 200°M at IAS 165mph (143kts) with bombsight set for true height, airspeed & zero wind. All flares igniting at 16,000ft.
Mosquitoes will drop release point flares at Z, Z+5, Z+10, Z+15, +20, +25, +30, +35.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
A/C sent to Wyton for take off as Warboys runway was u/s.
[underlined] 1800HRS. [/underlined] Briefing.
[underlined] 1805HRS. [/underlined] Probability of change of method to Musical Paramatta.
[underlined] 2220 HRS. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[page break]
11.
[underlined] 10TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0937HRS. [/underlined] No operations in Command tonight.
[underlined] 11TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0941HRS. [/underlined] Target – BOCHUM. [underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta. 115 Mediums + 431 Heavies + 100 PFF. Zero hour 0015HRS.
[underlined] WORLD’S RECORD WEIGHT CARRYING ATTACK. [/underlined]
Mosquitoes with ground mark A/P with T.I. red at Z-3, Z+1, Z+7, Z+12, Z+17, Z+22, Z+27, Z+32, Z+37.
These will be backed up by other P.F.F aircraft dropping groundmarkers T.I. Green.
Main Force a/c should drop their bombs on the T.I. red if these are seen, otherwise at the estimated centre of the area covered by T.I. Greens. Length of attack Z – Z+45.
Preliminary warning Ground markers T.I. Yellow will be dropped by Mosquitoes at 5146N 0712E.
[underlined] 1726HRS. [/underlined] Area 2. DUISBURG. Main Force crews only will be required if Area 2.
[underlined] 1810HRS. [/underlined] Backers-up scrubbed.
[underlined] 1820HRS. [/underlined] P.F.F. cancelled except for 109 Squadron.
[underlined] 1726HRS. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] for DUISBURG. To be Musical Wanganui. As for method 9th May 1943. Sortie information as for 12th May 1943.
[underlined] 12TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1017HRS. [/underlined] Target – DUISBURG. 8 backers up with their best bomb aimers & 10 Main Force.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta. 120M + 437H. – 89 PFF + 9 Mos: Zero. 0200hrs. Landmarkers T.I. Yellow will be dropped by all Mosquitos [sic] at 5140N 0645E. Exact aiming point will be marked by Mosquitoes with T.I. red at Z-3, Z+1, Z+7, Z+12, Z+22, Z+27, Z+32, Z+37. to be backed up by other PFF dropping T.I. Green. Main Force should aim bombs at T.I. red if visible otherwise at the centre of the pattern of all T.I. Green.
[page break]
12.
[underlined] 12TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET: DUISBURG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 35 a/c missing – 4 P.F.F. Very good concentration on A/P shown by photographs. 1560 tons of bombs dropped – greatest weight achieved against any city in a single attack.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] All crews reported good concentration of markers & fires. One large explosion with big orange glow lasting 6 to 7 sec: at about 0216hrs. Glow of fires seen from Dutch Coast on homeward journey.
[underlined] DAYLIGHT COVER. [/underlined] This shows that the central area of DUISBURG itself is wrecked. Main railway station almost completely destroyed. Centre of DUISBURG-RUHRORT burned out. [indecipherable words]
[page break]
13.
[underlined] 0950HRS. [/underlined] Target – Bochum a/c ‘Q’. PLZEN.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Area I. Musical Paramatta. 104 M + 300 Heavies + 35 PFF + 8 Mos: Area II. Newhaven Groundmarking.
‘Y’ a/c will drop T.I. Yellow at 51°29N 0940E to be backed up by 156 Squadron. ‘Y’ a/c will drop T.I. White at 51°00N 11°02E to be backed up by all P.F.F. Target to be marked blindly by T.I. Green and sticks of White flares. 3L/83, 1L/97, 5L/156, will act as visual markers & will, if A/P is positively identified mark A/P with Red T.Is. If further illumination is necessary a further stick of flares may be used.
Backers up will aim T.I. reds at the exact centre of T.I. red visible. Main Force may for training purpose identify the A/P for themselves in the light of flares, otherwise at the centre of all T.I. red visible. T.I. White and T.I. Yellow will be dropped as navigational aids at the same positions on the route home.
[underlined] 1800HRS. [/underlined] Briefing
[underlined] PLZEN – RESULTS. [/underlined] Main concentration was North of the SKODA WORKS – eleven photographs plotted on the works. Although therefore some damage must have been done, no very important results are expected.
[underlined] BOCHUM. [/underlined] Heavy and well concentrated attack. Smoke from fires on the following day prevented good photographs from being taken, but the industrial area on the N.W. of the city centre has been badly hit and the central area largely devastated.
[page break]
14.
[underlined] TARGETS: PLZEN AND BOCHUM [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY PLZEN. [/underlined] Early arrivals pinpointed works & early T.I. reds dropped on western edge of works & some to N.W. Attack later spread until area 8 x 10mls was covered. Smoke screen which came into operation prevented later pinpointing.
[underlined] BOCHUM. [/underlined] Ground haze prevented identification of ground detail. This a/c was early on the target & no final assessment of success of the raid can be given, but glow of fires could be seen from the Dutch Coast.
[page break]
15.
[underlined] 14TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations – Training. “Interrogation of Prisoners of War” shown to R.A.F. & WAAF personnel. Berlin attacked by 12 Mosquitoes.
[underlined] 15TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations in P.F.F. Command: gardening (mine laying). 2 Group 3 Mosquitoes attack on Berlin and 19 Lancasters attack the Ruhr with 6 Mosquitoes of 2 Group. 1 a/c of 4 Group missing on gardening.
[underlined] 16TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations. Attack on the Moehne, [sic] Sorper, [sic] & Eder dams by 19 Lancasters.
[underlined] 17TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations.
[underlined] 18TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations. Dinghy drill at “The Pike and Eel”.
[underlined] 19TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations. T.I. demonstration at Lakenheath and Rushford Ranges by P.F.F. for benefit of new crews in Bomber Command. S/L Grant in ‘P.’ and W/O Busby in ‘X’ from 156.
[underlined] 20TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations.
[underlined] 21ST MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations.
[page break]
16.
[underlined] 22ND MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations. M.I.9 Lecture by F/O Grainger.
[underlined] 23RD MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940HRS. [/underlined] MAXIMUM effort on DORTMUND.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta.
Mosquitoes will drop groundmarkers T.I. Yellow at 5145N 0728E as an aid to Navigation.
Mosquitoes will mark the exact A/P with T.I. red at Z-2, Z+1, Z+8, Z+14, Z+20, Z+26, Z+32, Z+38, Z+44, Z+50, Z+56. These will be backed up by P.F.F. a/c with T.I. Green.
Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at the T.I. red if these are visible otherwise at the estimated centre of the area covered by all T.I. Green.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 163 Mediums + 535 Heavies + 119 P.F.F. = 817 a/c.
[underlined] list by Squadron of aircraft numbers, roles and losses involved [/underlined]
[underlined] BRIEFING. [/underlined] 1800HRS. – New briefing room.
[page break]
17
[underlined] TARGET: DORTMUND [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Markers confined to an area with a diameter of about 1 mile. Main Force covered Red T.I. area tailing off to the N & NE 4-5mls. in pear-shaped pattern. The intense glow & smoke from fires in the later stages prevented red T.Is from being seen.
Heavy flak. Moderate “predicted” at first – tailed off in quality & quantity. Negligible L/F. Moderate S/Ls (searchlights) sometimes in cones – mostly singly.
[page break]
18.
[underlined] 24TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1940HRS. [/underlined] MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 25TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000HRS. [/underlined] Target – DÜSSELDORF.
underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta. Groundmarkers T.I. Yellow will be dropped at 5100N 0634E throughout period of attack as an aid to navigation, & backed up by LANCASTER backers up. Mosquitoes will mark the exact A/P with groundmarkers T.I. red at:- Z-2, Z+1, Z+8, Z+14, Z+20, Z+26, Z+32, Z+38, Z+44, Z+50. Other P.F.F. a/c acting as backers up will keep the A/P marked with Green T.Is. Main Force a/c should aim their bombs exactly at the T.I red if visible otherwise at the estimated centre of the pattern of T.I. Green. Groundmarkers T.I. Yellow will be dropped at 5117N 0630E by practice ‘Y’ a/c as an aid to navigation.
[underlined] EFFORTS. [/underlined] 155 Mediums + 513 Heavies + 117 P.F.F. = 785 a/c. Zero hour – 0130HRS.
[underlined] BRIEFING. [/underlined] 1800HRS.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 759 a/c attacked:
[underlined] list by Group, of aircraft numbers involved and missing [/underlined]
[page break]
19.
[underlined] TARGET: DÜSSELDORF [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY {/underlined] Very conflicting reports received from crews. Early crews unable to see any markers below cloud layer at 8/10,000ft. Apparent gap in T.I. reds in early part of attack seemed to result in scattering of Green T.Is into red T.is reported dropped at 0207hrs and 0210 1/2 hrs. about 1 1/2mls apart resulted in two Green T.I. areas. If these do not agree with Mosquito then enemy is using decoys. Fires reported by last a/c to cover area about 1 1/2mls in diameter.
[page break]
20
[underlined] 26TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000 HRS. [/underlined] Target – COLOGNE. Area 2. DUISBERG.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] MUSICAL PARAMATTA. Ground marking with red T.I. by Mosquitoes and Green T.I.s by backers up. Preliminary warning Yellow T.I. will be dropped by fire raisers of 7 Squadron using ‘Y’ only at 5105N 0025E. These will be maintained by backers up of 7, 35, 83 and 156 Squadron who will aim their Yellow T.I. at those previously dropped. Mosquitoes will then act as precision ground markers and will drop their red T.I. in salvo on the A/P.
Then PFF a/c will act as Backers up aiming their Green T.I. at the Red T.I. if seen otherwise at the estimated centre of the pattern of Green T.I. visible overshooting by 2 seconds in either case.
Fire-raisers and main force will aim their bombs at the Red T.I. if visible otherwise at the centre of all the Green T.I.s visible otherwise at the centre of all the Green T.I.s visible using ‘Y’ as an aid if fitted. ‘Y’ a/c may, if no T.I.s are seen, drop their bombs blind on ‘Y’.
[underlined] AFTERNOON. [/underlined] KING GEORGE and QUEEN ELIZABETH visit Wyton to meet Air Crews. Representatives of each PFF squadron present. F/L COOK and Crew from 156 Squadron.
[underlined] 1800 HRS. [/underlined] Briefing. ‘Y’ F/L COOK to carry Dictaphone.
[underlined] 2153 HRS. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED
[page break]
21.
[underlined] TARGET: COLOGNE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 27TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1010 HRS. [/underlined] Target – ESSEN.
[underlined] Method [/underlined] Musical Wanganui or Musical Paramatta according to weather conditions. No Backers-up on ‘Y’ type a/c required from 150.
[underlined] 1800 HRS. [/underlined] Briefing
[underlined] 2045 HRS. [/underlined] Method to be Musical Wanganui.
[page break]
22.
[underlined] TARGET: ESSEN [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Good concentration achieved with incendiaries inclined to fall short. Good fires seen through breaks in cloud. Flak reports vary – generally considered moderate barrage. 3 a/c hit – ‘B’ F/O PRICHARD – both by flak and another Lancaster over the target. S/L’s few, occasionally small cones through breaks in cloud. ‘B’ F/O PRICHARD carried the dictaphone, but it was broken on return.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing [/underlined]
14 Mosquitoes of 2 Group attacked JENA (ZEISS works) in daylight – 3 missing.
[underlined] 28TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations for P.F.F. Bombing, fighter affiliation and other training. 12 a/c of 2 Group on Zeebrugge missing. [missing sentence]
[page break]
23.
[underlined] 29TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] METHOD [/underlined] MUSICAL PARAMATTA. Preliminary warning Yellow T.I will be dropped by 2S/7 + 2H/35 special a/c at 5059N 5626E This will be maintained by ‘Y’ type backers up. Mosquitoes will then act as precision groundmarkers dropping Red T.I. in salvo on the A/P.
Other P.F.F. a/c will act as Backers up aiming their Green T.I. at the Red T.I. if seen, otherwise at the estimated centre of all green T.I. visible and overshooting by 1 second in either case.
Landmarkers Yellow T.I. will be dropped by ‘Y’ a/c at 5033N 0723E on the route home as an aid to navigation and to help the main force avoid defended areas on leaving the target.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK [/underlined] 113 Mediums + 479 Heavies + 117 P.F.F. Zero hour = 0045 hrs. Dictaphone carried by ‘Y’ F/L COOK, but failed to work.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] The most concentrated raid of the war.
[underlined] list by Group, aircraft numbers involved and missing [/underlined]
[page break]
24.
[underlined] TARGET: WUPPERTAL [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] It is considered by all crews that this attack achieved a good concentration of T.I. marking & consequently good fires were started around this concentration. The fire raising technique appears to have been very successful in the early part of [words missing]
[page break]
25.
[underlined] 30TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0947 HRS. [/underlined] Stand down for all P.F.F. Squadrons.
[underlined] 31ST MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0948 HRS. [/underlined] All Squadrons stood down.
[underlined] 1ST JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0952 HRS. [/underlined] No operations in P.F.F. Training only. Sgt. Wedd lecture on “New Guinea”
[underlined] 2ND JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
No operations in P.F.F.
[underlined] 3RD JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
No operations for 156 Squadron.
[underlined] 4TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940 HRS. [/underlined] Target BOCHUM. Secondary Target MUNSTER. GOODWOOD effort.
[underlined] METHOD for BOCHUM. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta. Mosquitoes will drop Groundmarkers T.I. Yellow at Position A 5148N 0713E. as an aid to navigation. Backers up will keep Position A marked also with T.I. Yellow. Mosquitoes will mark the exact A/P with Groundmarkers T.I. Red at Z-3, Z, Z+7, Z+12, Z+17, Z+22, Z+27, Z+32, Z+37, Z+42. Backers up will keep A/P marked with Groundmarkers T.I. Green. Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at the T.I. red if visible otherwise at the centre of the pattern of T.I. Green.
For information P.F.F. are carrying out a separate attack on MUNSTER from Z+25 to Z+35 using red and green T.I.s
[missing words]
[page break]
26.
[underlined] 5TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1002 HRS. [/underlined] Target OBERHAUSEN. 15 main force only.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Wanganui. Tracking flares red steady will be dropped by all Mosquitoes at Position A 5142N 0615E.
Tracking flares green steady will be dropped by all Mosquitoes at Position B. 5136N 0652E.
Release point flares red with green stars & white for longer burning will be dropped by all Mosquitoes to ignite at 18,000ft in such a position that all main force a/c aiming their bombs at them on a heading of 199M. at 143kts I.A.S. will hit the A/P.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 272 heavies + 43 P.F.F. Zero hour: 0100hrs.
[underlined] 1538 hrs. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[underlined] 6TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1030 HRS. [/underlined] Targets OBERHAUSEN & MUNSTER.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and targets [/underlined]
[underlined] METHODS. Munster. [/underlined] ‘Y’ a/c only will attack at Z+10 & Z+12. by special equipment. [underlined] Oberhausen. [/underlined] Tracking flares red steady will be dropped by all Mosquitoes on Track 8.5 N. Mls. short of the release point.
Release point flares red with green stars & white for longer burning will be dropped by all Mosquitoes to ignite at 18,000ft so that all main force a/c aiming [missing words]
[page break]
27
[underlined] 6TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined] (CONT:)
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 274 heavies + 38 P.F.F. Zero hour: 0100hrs.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 1800 HRS. [/underlined] Briefing.
[underlined] 1803 HRS. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[page break}
28
[underlined] 7TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 12.15 HRS. [/underlined] Target MÜNSTER: 1 ‘Y’ + 3 visual marker. + 6 main force. Target MÜLHEIM: 11 Backers-up.
[underlined] METHOD MULHEIM. [/underlined] Yellow T.I. will be dropped by special a/c of 7 & 35 squadron on their way to Munster at Position A. 5150N 0637E. This will be maintained by Backers-up of 35 and 405 Squadron who will aim their Yellow T.I. at those previously dropped.
Mosquitoes will then act as precision groundmarkers and will drop their red T.I. in salvo on the A/P.
Other P.F.F. a/c will act as backers up aiming their Green T.I. at the red T.I. if seen otherwise at the estimated centre of all the Green T.I. visible overshooting by 3 seconds in either case.
Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at the red T.I.s if visible otherwise at the estimated centre of all Green T.I.s visible.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 120 Mediums + 576 Heavies + 49 P.F.F. Zero hour: 0100 HRS. Z - Z+50.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers and type involved [/underlined]
[underlined] MÜNSTER. [/underlined] All blind marker illuminators of 7 & 35 squadron will drop T.I. Yellow blindly at Position A. 5150N 0637E as a navigational aid to a/c attacking Mülheim.
‘Y’ a/c will act as finders and will mark the target area blindly with Green T.I. proceeding on the same heading for 10 seconds before releasing a stick of flares at 4 seconds interval. The Visual Markers will then mark the A/P with red T.I.
Main Force a/c are permitted to identify the A/P visually in the light of flares for [missing words] release their bombs at the estimated centre
[page break]
29.
[underlined] 7TH June 1943 [/underlined] (CONT.)
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 69 heavies of P.F.F. Zero hour: 0100 HRS.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
P.F.F. a/c are to fly strictly between the height limits of 15,800ft and 16,200ft between meridians 0600E and 0700E on the route to & from the target.
[underlined] 1900 HRS. [/underlined] Zero hour now 0115 hrs.
[underlined] 2200 HRS. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
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[underlined] TARGETS: MÜNSTER AND MÜLHEIM [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
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[underlined] 8TH June 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1040 HRS. [/underlined] Target – MÜNSTER. PFF only.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Blind bombing by P.F.F. ‘Y’ a/c.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined]
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
G/Capt. Collings assumed Command 156 Squadron.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Fighter Command intruders over Dutch aerodromes from midnight – 0300 HRS.
[underlined] 1900 HRS. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 9TH June 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1115 HRS. [/underlined] Targets for 156 Squadron – MÜNSTER 1 [indecipherable number] + 10 main force. ESSEN 10 Backers Up.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] ESSEN. Mixed Musical Paramatta.
Preliminary warning flares Green steady will be dropped by Mosquitoes at Position 5137N 0730E. 4 nautical miles to S/B of main force track. Mosquitoes will then drop release point flares red with green stars & white for [missing words] by all Mosquitoes with red T.Is.
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[underlined] 9TH June 1943 [/underlined] (CONT:)
Other P.F.F. backers-up will drop their Green T.I on the red T.I visible. If groundmarkers are invisible backers-up will revert to main force aiming their bombs at the centre of the release point flares on a heading of [missing] at 143kts. and bringing their Green T.I. back.
[underlined] MÜNSTER. [/underlined] Skymarking and groundmarking by special a/c for non ‘Y’ a/c. Special ‘Y’ a/c will drop flares green with red stars then T.I red. If cloud conditions are suitable for groundmarking no flares will be dropped. Other ‘Y’ a/c will bomb by aid of their special equipment.
[underlined] 2155 HRS. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[underlined] 10TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1940 HRS. [/underlined] MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 11TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1055 HRS. [/underlined] TARGETS RECEIVED. Area I. DUSSELDORF. MUNSTER (Y a/c.) Area II. BREMEN. Area III EMDEN.
[underlined] METHODS. MUSICAL PARAMATTA. [/underlined] DUSSELDORF.
Preliminary warning Yellow T.I will be dropped at 5101N 0633E. by Mosquitoes, and backed up by other P.F.F. a/c.
Mosquitoes will act as precision groundmarkers dropping Red T.I on the exact A/P. They will also drop sky markers red with green stars & white igniting at 14000ft.
Other P.F.F. a/c will act as backers-up aiming their Green T.I at the Red T.I seen otherwise at the centre of all Green T.I overshooting by 3 seconds in either case. If groundmarkers are not visible backers-up will revert to main force bringing their T.Is back.
Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at the Red T.Is seen otherwise at the centre of all Green T.Is visible. If release point flares are used a/c should bomb on a heading of 042M at 143kts.
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33
[underlined] 11TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined] (CONT:)
[underlined] MUNSTER. [/underlined]
‘Y’ a/c will act as finders marking the target area with Yellow T.I proceeding on the same heading for 10 seconds before releasing a stick of flares at 5 secs. interval.
Visual markers will mark the A/P with red T.I after positive visual identification in the light of flares.
Main Force a/c are permitted to identify visually for practice purposes, otherwise they will aim their bombs at the estimated centre of all T.I reds visible or at the centre of all Yellow T.I seen with with an overshoot of 3 seconds. All ‘Y’ a/c should bomb blindly on ‘Y’
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined]
DUSSELDORF. 148 mediums + 612 heavies + 44 P.F.F. Zero hour 0120 hrs.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[underlined] MÜNSTER. [/underlined] 69 heavies of P.F.F. Zero hour 0120 hrs.
[underlined] list of aircraft roles, aircraft numbers and Squadron [/underlined]
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[underlined] TARGETS: MÜNSTER AND DÜSSELDORF [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
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[underlined] 12TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1040 HRS. [/underlined] Target – BOCHUM.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta.
Yellow T.I will be dropped by the first 2 Mosquitoes only at 5142N 0712E. Mosquitoes then act as precision groundmarkers dropping Red T.I in salvo on the A/P.
Other P.F.F. a/c will act as Backers-up, aiming Green T.I at the Red T.I if seen, otherwise at the centre of all Green T.I visible overshooting by 3 seconds in either case.
Main Force a/c will aim their bombs at the T.I Red if seen, otherwise at the estimated centre of all T.I Green visible.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 429 Heavies + 64 P.F.F.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
Thin layer of 7/10ths cloud at about 10/12,000ft over the target did not prevent Ground-markers from being seen. T.Is do not appear to have been dropped with the usual accuracy. 25 a/c missing. P.F.F. 1-97 F/S Thomas. 1-83 F/O Tilbury.
[underlined] Photographs. 18th June. [/underlined]
Damage is widespread and severe. In the central city area. 130 acres of business and residential property have been devastated, some 700 buildings having been destroyed or damaged.
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[underlined] TARGET: BOCHUM. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 13TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 10.10 HRS. [/underlined] STAND DOWN. Marham only operating and small amount of gardening.
[underlined] 14TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000 HRS. [/underlined] Target – OBERHAUSEN. All Squadrons stood down except for 109 – figures 6 + 2.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 17 a/c on Oberhausen. 1 a/c on gardening.
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[underlined] 15TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940 HRS. [/underlined] All P.F.F. stood down. “BULLSEYE” exercise with T.I demonstration. 5 a/c. Q G/C COLLINGS. D F/S RYAN. F/O LUTZ. F/S WINTERBON. F/L MANDENO.
[underlined] 1740 HRS. [/underlined] BULLSEYE Scrubbed.
[underlined] 16TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1025 HRS. [/underlined] Target – KREFELD-UERDINGEN. Derby Effort.
[underlined] 1355 HRS. [/underlined] Target changed to COLOGNE.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined]
Green flares steady will be dropped by ‘Y’ a/c at Position 5105N 0620E. All ‘Y’ a/c will drop flares Red/Green stars and white to ignite at 18,000ft in such a position that other a/c aiming their bombs on a heading of 117M at 143kts I.A.S. should hit the A/P.
‘Y’ a/c will also drop groundmarkers T.I. Green.
Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at the estimated centre of the skymarkers, but if T.I Green can be seen through cloud at the centre of all T.I Greens visible in preference to the skymarkers.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
All crews bombed on sky markers, but no results seen. 3 a/c attacked Last Resorts.
[underlined] GERMAN COMMUNIQUE. [/underlined] 17TH JUNE 1943.
During last night British Bombers attacked Western Germany & bombs were dropped on residential areas particularly in COLOGNE causing casualties among the population and damage to buildings including 4 hospitals & 3 churches.
[page break]
38.
[underlined] TARGET: COLOGNE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
39
[underlined] 17TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
BULLSEYE exercise and T.I demonstration.
Q. G/C COLLINGS. D. F/S RYAN. L. F/S WINTERBON. E. F/O LUTZ. H. F/S ROSE.
S/Ls ineffective owing to cloud. T.I demonstration at Rushford Range with Red T.Is backed up by Green T.Is and White T.Is to simulate incendiaries. T.I Yellow dropped at Lakenheath as preliminary warning groundmarkers. T.Is very well placed at both ranges.
[underlined] 18TH June 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
[underlined] 19TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET [/underlined] LE CREUSOT.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
MONTCHANIN
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined]
Special a/c [deleted] will /[deleted] of 7 & 35 Squadrons will drop the following on route:-
A) Flares green steady at 4920N 0045W. B) T.I Yellow at 4730N 0110E. C) T.I red at 4705N 0310E. On the way home D) T.I red at 4800N 0202E.
[underlined]LE CRUESOT. [/underlined]
1. [indecipherable digit] S/7 + 2H/35 will blindly illuminate the target with long sticks of flares white
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40
2. Remaining illuminators [sic] will continue to illuminate the target with long sticks of flares white dropped after definite visual identification and will release their HE. on the A/P.
3. All above illuminator a/c (in 1 & 2) will carry on to MONTCHANIN and will illuminate it with sticks of flares white at 6 second intervals whilst in a rate 1 turn to the left around the Southern edge of the [symbol]. (triangle symbol meaning target)
4. Main Force Stirlings and Halifaxes [sic] will drop their bombs with maximum accuracy on the A/Ps detailed only after definite visual identification in the light of flares marking 2 or more bombing runs as necessary. Bombs to be brought back if A/Ps are not definitely identified.
[underlined] MONTCHANIN. [/underlined]
1. Illuminator a/c will illuminate the A/P as detailed above (Para. 2.)
2. 3L/83 + 3L/156 will after definite visual identification drop T.I Green on the exact A/P.
3. Blind illuminators, visual markers, & main force Lancasters will aim bombs at the A/P using T.I Green as a guide.
4. All a/c are to leave the target by 0215 hrs.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] LE CREUSOT 244 Heavies of 3, 4 and 6 Groups. MONTCHANIN 26 Heavies of P.F.F.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
Some crews report seeing blue flashes from the target area and are sure that a proportion of the effort fell on the target. Smoke from the Le Creusot attack floated across the target towards the end of the attack. Markers were not necessary in existing conditions. W/O BROWN ‘M’ took a photograph of the A/P.
23rd June 1943. Cover received to date shows no hits on MONTCHANIN.
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41
[underlined] TARGET: MONTCHANIN [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 20TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
156 stood down.
56 Lancasters of 5 Group & 4 Lancasters of P.F.F attacked the old Zeppelin works at Friedrichshaven [sic] now used as an R.D.F. equipment factory. Many buildings were seen to be hit. Subsequent photographs showed severe damage to parts of the works. The Lancasters continued from Friedrichshaven [sic] and landed in North Africa.
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[underlined] 21ST JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET. [/underlined] KREFELD.
[underlined] METHOD. MUSICAL PARAMATTA. [/underlined]
I. Mosquitoes will act as precision ground-markers dropping Red T.I in salvo on the A/P. To guard against the possibility of technical failure of Mosquitoes, selected ‘Y’ a/c in 2 waves will mark the A/P with Yellow T.I with the aid of special equipment only if, on arrival, no red T.Is are seen.
II. Backers-Up aim Green T.I at Red T.I, if seen, otherwise at the estimated centre of the concentration of Yellow T.I. If Backers-Up can see neither Red nor Yellow T.Is they should aim Green T.Is at the centre of the pattern of Green T.Is.
III. Main Force a/c are to aim their bombs at the T.I red if seen, otherwise at the centre of the concentration of T.I Green. T.I Yellow should be ignored.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] Zero hour: 0130 hrs. 108 mediums + 474 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 114 P.F.F. = 696 a/c.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
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[underlined] NIGHT FIGHTER ACTIVITY. [/underlined]
8 Mosquito Night Fighters operating in the Bomber Stream. 8 Intruder Mosquitoes operating at GILZE RIJEN, VENLO, DEELEN, TWENTE ENTSCHEDE, [sic] BERGEN ALKMAAR, ST. TROND, FLORENNES. Free lance Mosquitoes will be operating at LAON and DIZIER.
[underlined] 0240HRS. [/underlined] Wellington from Upper Heyford crashed on No.I runway. Operational a/c to land on No.3.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
All crews report an excellent attack with markers well concentrated, no strays. Bombing effort confined to an area 1 1/2 mls. square. A few Yellow T.Is were dropped unnecessarily were by 156 Squadron!
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
Photographs. 24th June. Damage is extremely heavy & concentrated in the centre of the city, particularly round the Adolf Hitler Platz. Out of 1,100 acres of fully built-up town area it is estimated that about 900 acres have been devastated. There is also severe damage to the industries on the N.E. side of the town & to barracks on the N.W.
Reinforcements both for fire and police services are said to have been requested as far afield as Dortmund and Munster. The number of people killed is thought to have been around 2,000.
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44
[underlined] TARGET: KREFELD [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
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45
[underlined] 22ND JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000HRS. [/underlined] Target: [deleted] OBERHAUSEN. [/deleted] GELSENKIRCHEN.
[underlined] 1320HRS. [/underlined] Target: MULHEIM.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] MUSICAL PARAMATTA.
I. Preliminary warning T.I Yellows will be dropped by Mosquitoes at 5143N 0652E 7 statute miles to port of main force track.
II. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] will mark the exact A/P with T.I Red at Z-3, Z+1. 7, 13, 19, 25, 31, 36.
III. [underlined] Backers Up [/underlined] will keep the A/P marked with T.I. Green.
IV. [underlined] Main Force a/c [/underlined] aim there bombs at T.I Red if visible otherwise at the estimated centre of the pattern of T.I Green.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 54 mediums + 437 heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 63 P.F.F. = 554 a/c. Zero hour 0120 hrs.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined]
6 to 8 Beaufighters will be operating on the Bomber Command route. Mosquitoes and Bostons will be operating over Dutch airfields from 2359 – 0330hrs
[page break]
46.
[underlined] TARGET: MULHEIM [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Marker concentration was good, the Greens spread over an area radius 1 mile. The main attack was also concentrated, with incendiaries tending to fall short at the beginning. The last a/c over the target reports a fire area about 2 mls, square in which 3 large fires were burning. Large explosions reported in the [symbol] area at 0122, 0134 and 0147 hrs.
[underlined] 23RD JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0955 hrs. [/underlined] Make and Mend.
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47
[underlined] 24TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000 HRS. [/underlined] Target – ELBERFELD. A/P ‘A’
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta.
I. T.I Yellow will be dropped by [underlined] special a/c [/underlined] at 5059N 0626E by special equipment if serviceable, otherwise aiming their T.I at those already dropped. 4 special a/c attacking at Z+2 will arrive at Pos: A 2 mins early – drop their markers, do a rate 1 orbit before proceeding to the target.
II. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] then drop T.I red in salvo on the A/P.
III. [underlined] Backers-Up [/underlined] aim Green T.I at red if seen otherwise the estimated centre of Green T.I.
IV. [underlined] Main Force [/underlined] aim bombs at T.I red if seen otherwise at centre of all T.I Green visible.
V. T.I Yellow will be dropped by [underlined] special a/c [/underlined] on return at 5033N 0723E by means of their special equipment.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 102 Mediums + 441 Heavies + 76 P.F.F. = 619 a/c. 630 a/c. took off. 517 a/c attacked primary. 25 a/c attacked last resort.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[underlined] INTRUDERS & FIGHTERS. [/underlined]
Intruders will be operating in the Bomber Command stream. A wing of Spitfires will meet bombers on return covering the route for a/c returning late.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
33 a/c are missing.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined] [incomplete]
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48
[underlined] TARGET: ELBERFELD. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY [/underlined]
In the early stages both markers and main force were well concentrated although incendiaries again tended to undershoot. Later smoke up to 9000ft made it difficult to see markers except when cascading, & therefore concentration of main force tended to fall off incendiaries stretching [missing words]
[page break]
49
[underlined] 25TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
P.F.F. stood down except for 109 Squadron.
Target GELSENKIRCHEN.
[list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, missing]
[underlined] 26TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0943HRS. [/underlined] 156 Squadron stood down. Mosquitoes of P.F.F attacked DUISBURG AND HAMBURG.
[underlined] 27TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down. Lecture on ‘ESCAPE’ by F/L Yelland given to Air Crew.
[underlined] 28TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET: [/underlined] COLOGNE.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Mixed Musical Paramatta and Wanganui.
I. Preliminary warning flares Green steady will be dropped by Mosquitoes on track at 5041N 0647E 18.7 statute mls. short of release point.
II. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] mark release point with flares red with green stars and white at Z-4, Z, Z+5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35. They will also mark the A?P with T.I red at the same times.
III. [underlined] Backers-Up [/underlined] A/P marked with T.I Green only if red are visible. Otherwise they will revert to Main Force. [missing sentence]
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[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 85 Mediums + 437 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 73 P.F.F. Zero hour 0140 hrs. T.O.T. Z to Z + 40.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined]
9 Mosquitoes + 2 Bostons 0030-0315. 6-8 Beaufighters operating in Main Bomber stream.
[underlined] TARGET: COLOGNE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY [/underlined] 10/10ths cloud over the [symbol] with tops 7/8,000ft. Competent a/c crews to bomb on either markers or cascading T.I reds before they disappeared through cloud. Early a/c on [symbol] report that opening markers were late. All T.I Green brought back. No accurate estimate of attack can be given. Explosions reported 0158, 0211 & 0244.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 12/97 & 24/35 missing. 25 a/c in Command [missing]
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51
[underlined] 29TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
[underlined] 30TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
[underlined] 1ST JULY 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 2ND JULY 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
[underlined] 3RD JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1005 hrs. [/underlined] Target – COLOGNE.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Musical Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] 1. Mosquitoes [/underlined] will drop preliminary warning flares Green steady on track at 5045N 0648 1/2E. 14 1/2 nautical mls short
[underlined] 2. Mosquitoes [/underlined] will drop sky-markers red with green stars and white at Z-4, Z, Z+5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40. They will also drop T.I red on the exact A/P at the same times.
[underlined] 3. [/underlined] If these T.I Red are visible through cloud, [underlined] Backers-Up [/underlined] will keep the A/P marked with T.I Green. If none are visible Backers-Up revert to main force and bring T.Is back.
[underlined] 4. [/underlined] Main Force aim bombs at :- 1. T.I Red if visible. 2. Centre of T.I Green. 3. Release Point flares heading [indecipherable digits] M I.A.S. 143 kts.
[underlined] 5. [/underlined] All flares to ignite at 12,000ft.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 94 Mediums + 525 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 72 P.F.F. Zero hour 0130hrs.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
52
[underlined] TARGET: COLOGNE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] There appeared to be a time lag of 2 minutes between the sky-markers dropped at 0114 hrs and ground-markers at 0116 hrs. Marker concentration good. Main attack reasonable, but again tending to undershoot as much as 2-3 mls. but in built up area. Smoke seen rising at 0116 hrs made early crews suspect a smoke screen. Smoke at end of attack up to 15,000ft. Fires seen from 40 mls away. One a/c ‘Y’ F/L Cook bombed last resort BONN/HANGELAR A/D. (aerodrome) Bombs hung up over the target and as they were near the end of the attack Captain decided not to run in again. Fires were started on the A/D where a/c beaming nav lights were seen circling.
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined]
3 Mosquitoes on Venlo, 3 on Gilze Rijen, 3 on St. Trond, 3 on Florennes, 2 on [indecipherable word], 2 on [indecipherable word], 6 Beaufighters operating in B. Command stream.
[underlined] RESULTS.] 30 a/c missing. P.F.F. 1 of 97, 1 0f 405, 1 0f 35. 4 group. 4H + 4W [missing words]
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[underlined] 4TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
Target: HAGEN.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta.
1. T.I Yellow will be dropped by [underlined] ‘Y’ a/c [/underlined] on route to the target at 5153N 0724E (to keep clear of MÜNSTER).
2. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] will drop T.I red in salvo on the exact A/P at Z-3, Z+1, 7, 12, 17, 22.
3. [underlined] Backers-Up [/underlined] aim T.Is and bombs at the T.I red if visible, otherwise at the centre of the concentration of T.I Green overshooting by 2 seconds in either case.
4. [underlined] Main Force [/underlined] a/c aim their bombs at the T.I red if visible, otherwise at the estimated centre of the pattern of T.I Green.
[underlined] 5. Y a/c [/underlined] drop T.I Yellow on the return route at 5048N 0716E (to keep clear of COLOGNE)
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined]
39 Mediums + 309 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 44 P.F.F.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] BRIEFING [/underlined] 1800 hrs.
[underlined] 1810 hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 5TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1025 hrs. [/underlined] Target: ESSEN. 139 squadron. 4 a/c HAMBURG. 4 a/c COLOGNE.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Sky-marking.
1. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] will drop tracking flares red steady on track at Pos: 5047N 0658E [missing words] release point.
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54
[underlined] 2. Mosquitoes [/underlined] drop tracking flares GREEN steady at 5138N 0659E 10 nautical miles short of release point.
3. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] drop release point flares red with green stars & flares white at 0126, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55.
[underlined] 4. Main Force [/underlined] aim bombs at centre of release point flares on heading 197M at 143 kts I.A.S.
If this method is used BACKERS-UP bring green T.Is back.
[underlined] 5. [/underlined] All flares will ignite at 16,000ft.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 398 Heavies & 41 P.F.F. = 439 a/c.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
Zero hour = 0130 hrs. T.O.T. Z to Z+30.
BRIEFING. 1800 hes.
1805 hrs. OPERATIONS CANCELLED
[underlined] 6TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
Target:- ESSEN. Main Force only. ‘A’ S/L MANSFIELD 156 squadron.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Wanganui.
[underlined] 1315 hrs. Operations cancelled. 139 Squadron 4 a/c on COLOGNE 4 a/c DUSSELDORF.
[underlined] 7TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down except for 139 Squadron. 4 a/c DUISBERG. 4 a/c COLOGNE
[page break]
55
[underlined] 8TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1030 HRS. [/underlined] Target COLOGNE.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Musical Wanganui and Paramatta.
[underlined] 1. [/underlined] Preliminary warning flares Green steady will be dropped by all Mosquitoes on track at 5041N 0640E 18.2 nautical mls. short of release point.
[underlined] 2. [/underlined] Release point flare red with green stars and flares white will be dropped by Mosquitoes at:- 0110, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40. They will also mark the A/P with red T.Is at the same time.
[underlined] 3. [/underlined] If the latter are visible Backers-Up will keep the A/P marked with T.I Green.
[underlined] 4. [/underlined] Main Force a/c bomb in the following order of preference:- 1) T.I Red. 2) Centre of T.I Green. 3) Centre of release point flares on exact heading of 023M at a speed of 143 kts.
All flares ignite at 17,000ft. red T.Is cascade from 10,000ft. green T.Is cascade from 3,000ft until Z+15, then one T.I Green from each Backer-Up will cascade from 10,000ft.
[underlined] 5. [/underlined] T.I Yellow will be dropped by 2L/7 at 5040N 0715E. These will be backed up by all Lancasters of 97 Squadron & 1 B/U of 83 Squadron.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 435 Heavies + 55 P.F.F.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
Zero hour = 0110 hrs. T.O.T. Z to Z+35.
[underlined] 1800 hrs. [/underlined] Effort reduced. Z to Z+20 T.O.T.
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56
[underlined] TARGET: COLOGNE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Sky-markers were late, the first one being seen at 0115 hrs. owing to 10/10ths cloud very little was seen of the attack, but large explosions were observed at 0115, 0117 and 0122 hrs. One crew bombed on Green T.Is seen to cascade at 0109 hrs. and one bombed on E.T.A. Glow of fires seen to be starting beneath cloud.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[list by group, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
3 Mosquitoes of P.F.F. attacked DUISBURG. Nil missing
[underlined] Gardening. [/underlined]
[words missing]
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57
[underlined] 9TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] GELSENKIRCHEN.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] To sky-mark the Release Point.
[underlined] 1 [/underlined] Tracking flares red steady will be dropped by Mosquitoes 20 1/2 m. short of Release point at 5153N 0708E.
[underlined] 2 [/underlined] Tracking flares Green steady will be dropped by Mosquitoes 11.4 n.m. short of release point at 5144N 0705E.
[underlined] 3 [/underlined] Release point flares red/green and flares white will be dropped by Mosquitoes, so that main force a/c on a heading of 196M at 143 kts I.A.S. will hit the A/P.
[underlined] 4 [/underlined] All flares to ignite at 17,000ft.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 426 Heavies + 32 P.F.F. Zero hour 0110 hrs.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Target identified by sky-markers. Glow of fires seen through cloud indicated reasonably concentrated attack.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[list by group, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
58
[underlined] 10TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down. Invasion of Sicily announced.
[underlined] 11TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] TURIN.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] 1. [/underlined] Route markers Green steady will be dropped by ‘Y’ a/c at 4544N 0553E. These will be backed up by Backers-Up only if they are able to identify the lake visually.
[underlined] 2. ‘Y’ a/c [/underlined] will act as Finders and mark the [symbol] area with Yellow T.I proceeding on the same heading & releasing stick of flares at 6 seconds interval. 1st bundle to be dropped in salvo with Yellow T.I.
[underlined] Visual Markers [/underlined] then mark A/P with Red T.I when they have definitely identified it, using Yellow T.I as guide only. They will [underlined] not [/underlined] drop Red T.I unless absolutely certain of the A/P.
[underlined] Backers-Up [/underlined] aim Green T.I at centre of all Red T.I visible or centre of Green overshooting by 2 seconds in either case. Last resort – aim Green T.Is at the centre of all Yellow T.Is if visible.
[underlined] Non-marker a/c. [/underlined] aim bombs at Red T.I if seen, otherwise at the centre of all Green T.Is. [deleted] If [/deleted]
If on arrival at the [symbol] area cloud conditions make it impossible to see T.Is all ‘Y’ a/c will mark the release point with flares red/green stars. In these circumstances squadrons to detail 1/2 their special a/c to mark after Zero & the other 1/2 to orbit & mark after Z+9. Backers-Up then revert to non-markers & along with other main force aim bombs on heading 126M at 143 kts.
[underlined] 3. [/underlined] Route markers flares Green steady as in Para 1. Zero hour 0120 hrs.
[underlined] 1725 hrs. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled
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59
[underlined] 12TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target. [/underlined] TURIN.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground marking. As for 11th July 1943.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 422 Heavies + 57 P.F.F.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0040 hrs. T.O.T. Z to Z+30.
[underlined] BRIEFING. [/underlined] 1815 hrs.
[underlined] 1600 HRS. [/underlined] Figures changed. F. R. M. Z. N to go as Main Force. 224 Lancs of 1 & 5 Groups + 57 P.F.F.
[underlined] Alteration to Method. [/underlined] Zero hour. 1045 hrs T.O.T. Z to Z+15.
[underlined] 1. [/underlined] Route marker flares Green steady will be dropped on Lake Annecy backed up by Backers-Up.
[underlined] 2. [/underlined] Route markers Yellow T.I will be dropped by ‘Y’ a/c of 156 squadron backed up by Backers-Up of 156 squadron at 4544N 0305E.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Yellow T.Is from blind markers all fell in town area. Red T.Is reported very accurate. The first 2 bundles of Reds fell about 1 ml. apart one either side of the river – the 3rd fell close to the Red on the A/P. All Red markers & subsequently Green markers reported excellent concentration. Main Force attack well concentrated, practically no run back except for a few incendiaries. Route marking also reported very good, both Lake Annecy and Lake Bourget marked on run to target.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 295 a/c detailed. 1 Group 108 Lancs. [missing words]
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60
[underlined] TARGET: - TURIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base. Bradwell Bay – Dungeness – Cayeux – Lake Annecy – TURIN – 4544N 0305E – 4630N 0110W – 4630N 0250W – 4700N 0600W – 4830N 0630W – ST. EVAL – Base.
[page break]
61 [inserted] No pages for July 13th – 22nd (On leave?) [/inserted]
[underlined] 23RD JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] HAMBURG or MUNCHEN GLADBACH. A/C required 3 B/M, 13 B/Up, 5 Non-markers.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta or Wanganui.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 55 Mediums + 610 Heavies + 110 P.F.F.
[underlined] 1800 hrs. [/underlined] Briefing
[underlined] 1830 hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 24TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target. [/underlined] HAMBURG. 139 Squadron. 4 a/c DUISBERG. 3 a/c KIEL. 2 a/c LÜBECK. 2 a/c BREMEN. 2 a/c Target to be advised.
[underlined] Requirements. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles] Our figures increased to 24 a/c.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
1. Route markers T.I. Yellow will be dropped by special a/c at 5411N 0850E.
2. Target will be marked by visual markers with T.I. Red, backed up by T.I. Green. Long sticks of flares white and T.I. yellow may be seen in the target area, for the exclusive benefit of P.F.F. only.
3. Main Force attack T.I. Red visible or centre of T.I. Green.
4. [missing words] T.I. Yellow will be dropped by special a/c at 5343N 0836E.
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62
[underlined] TARGET: HAMBURG [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base. 5400N 0300E – 5445N 0700E – 5355N 0945E – Hamburg – 5315N 1000E – 5435N 0600E – 5400N 0300E – Base.
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63
[underlined] MESSAGE TO CREWS FROM THE C-in-C. [/underlined]
Hamburg is the 2nd largest city in Germany, the most important port and a vital war industrial area. It was the place whence the rot started which spread throughout Germany in 1918. It was the last part of Germany to adhere to Germany and may well be the first to come unstuck. It has been bombed before but not as you, and still more the Germans, understand bombing. To-night, you start the real battle of Hamburg, and you are going to write it off. This is no ordinary or routine operation and each one of you will, I know, do your utmost.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 76 Mediums + 604 Heavies + 116 P.F.F.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Weather over the target was nil cloud with fair visibility. This enabled, although a smoke screen was in operation, our visual markers to pinpoint tributaries and built up area and to put 3 x T.I. Red which were already down on the target. These were positioned one to the West, one Central and one well to the East. His own T.I. Red was placed along with the centre one. Later a/c report that a good concentration was achieved for a target of this description, but that the attack was diverted roughly by the Alsten, 75% falling on the West and 25% to the east. Exceedingly good fires were seen and a large explosion was observed at 0108 hrs. Smoke was rising over the target in a large column up to 18/20,000ft.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
No a/c missing from P.F.F. 12 a/c missing in Command. ‘Windows’ carried for the first time proved presumably to be a success. “Zephyr” also used for the first time.
6 Beaufighters operated S. of line 5300N and W. of 0700E from 0200-0230 hrs. 13 Mosquitoe [sic] intruders operating from 2330-0330 over A/Fs. [missing words]
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64
[underlined] German Broadcast. [/underlined]
A strong formation of British bombers a terror raid against Hamburg last night. The population suffered heavy losses and considerable damage was caused to residential quarters and cultural monuments and public buildings. According to reports so far available 17 of the attacking bombers were shot down by the Air Defences of N.W. German Coastal areas and in the Norwegian area.
[underlined] 25TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] U.S.A.A.F. [/underlined] Fortresses attacked HAMBURG in daylight and North German Coastal areas including ROSTOCK, KIEL and LÜBECK.
[underlined] 0958 hrs. [/underlined] Target: HAMBURG – Alternative ESSEN.
[underlined] 1150 hrs. [/underlined] A/C required of 156 Squadron. 3 B/Markers. 1 V/Marker. 11 B/Up. 5 N/Markers.
[underlined] Methods. [/underlined] HAMBURG. Newhaven Ground-marking. ESSEN. Musical Paramatta.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] HAMBURG. 71 Mediums + 538 Heavies + 97 P.F.F. = 706 a/c. ESSEN. 71 Mediums + 538 Heavies + 85 P.F.F. = 694 a/c.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
Zero hour. 0030 hrs.
[underlined] 1800 hrs. [/underlined] Briefing. Area I Cancelled.
[missing words]
[page break]
65
[underlined] TARGET: ESSEN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base – 5313N 0253E – 5153N 0638E – Essen – Nordwijk [sic] – 5300N 0210E – Base.
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined] Mosquitoes. 4 a/c DEELEN. 4 a/c TWENTE. 4 a/c GILZE RIJEN. 4 a/c VENLO. 3 a/c BERGEN. 3 a/c LIPPSTADT. 3 a/c ST. TROND.
[missing words] Bomber Command track.
[page break]
66
[underlined] 2330 hrs. BOMBER COMMAND BROADCAST. [/underlined] Mussolini has resigned and Bagdolio [sic] has taken his place.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Large patch of alto. cum: and industrial haze prevented a clear view of the main attack. Route markers (T.I. Yellow) appear to have been dropped accurately with good concentration. All crews reported good concentration of T.I. Reds and Greens around target area. Several large fires seen, and 2 huge explosions at approx. 0036 hrs & 0105 hrs. Moderate, erratic heavy flak over the target and slight amount of light flak. Results: P.F.F. 3 missing. 25 a/c in Command.
[underlined] 26TH JULY 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] 1015 hrs. [/underlined] MAKE & MEND for P.F.F. except for 139 Squadron. 6 Mosquitoes on HAMBURG.
[underlined] U.S.A.A.C. [/underlined]
[underlined] HAMBURG. [/underlined] 127 Fortresses took off to attack the ship yards and aero engine factory.
[underlined] HANNOVER. [/underlined] 122 Fortresses took off to attack the Tyre & Rubber Factory & Synthetic Rubber works.
P.F.F. 6 Mosquitoes on HAMBURG.
[underlined] 27TH JULY 1943. [/underlined]
[deleted] [underlined] 0948 hrs. Target: HAMBURG. [/underlined] [/deleted] [underlined] P. I. [indecipherable letter] [/underlined]
[deleted] [underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] [/deleted]
[underlined[ ESSEN. [/underlined] Considerable fresh damage on KRUPPS. Many fires burning throughout town.
[underlined] HAMBURG. [/underlined] Considerable damage seen outside smoke area – including BLOHM & VOSS works.
[underlined] ELBERFELD. [/underlined] Almost complete destruction throughout the town.
[underlined] GELSENKIRCHEN. {/underlined] A [missing words]
[page break]
67
[underlined] 27TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0948 hrs. [/underlined] Target: HAMBURG.
[underlined] A/C Requirements. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK [/underlined] 76 Mediums + 591 Heavies + 112 P.F.F. Zero hour 0100 hrs.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
Route markers T.I. Yellow will be dropped at 5418N 0840E by 7 & 405 Squadrons. Route markers T.I. Yellow will also be dropped at 5352N 1025E by 35 Squadron. Blind markers mark target with T.I. Yellow by ‘Y’ equipment. Visual markers cancelled, become Backers-Up. Backers-Up aim Green T.I at Yellow T.I on Green T.I. Re-centrers – qualified ‘Y’ Backers-Up spread evenly throughout the attack to drop Green T.I by means of special equipment if it is functioning properly.
[underlined] MESSAGE FROM C-IN-C. [/underlined] The Battle of HAMBURG continues – your opening blow was first rate – it may take 1/2 a dozen for the knock out, but knock out it will be, final & complete. Photo’s of ESSEN yesterday – mostly smoke covered but sufficient to show your devastation in & around KRUPPS and to the housing areas around the A/P. In the last 5 months you have inflicted upon Germany the greatest continuous series of military disasters in history. At present that fact is only just beginning to dawn upon the exponents of the more archaic forms of warfare, but it has dawned on Germany and resonates throughout Germany. From inflicting military disasters you are now proceeding to administer catastrophies. [sic] If you keep it up, and I know you will, you will be saving the lives of millions in the other forces of the United Nations & in the Occupied Countries and you will have Germany on her knees before the leaves have fallen. I will not ask you to do your best. I know you always [missing words]
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68
[underlined] TAREGET: - HAMBURG [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – 5448 0430E – 5407N 1025E – 5342N 1025E – [symbol] – 5320N 0930E – 5435N 0620E – 5448N 0430E – Base.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] The Yellow T.Is dropped by blind-markers were generally well placed & concentrated. Backers-Up seem to have had little difficulty in placing their Greens amongst the Yellows, although in later stages Green T.Is fell into smoke. Early crews report that on arrival flares were still
[page break]
69
[underlined] 28TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
P.F.F. No operations for 156 Squadron. 4 Mos: of P.F.F. attacked HAMBURG. Fires still burning.
[underlined] 29TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
Target: Area I. HAMBURG. 4’Y’. B/M 2‘Y’ Re-C. 13 B/Up. 2 N/M. II. [underlined] SOLINGEN [/underlined] & REMSCHEID. 9 B/Up. 2 N/M.
Area I. Paramatta Zero. 0045 hrs. Area II. Musical Paramatta. z 0115 hrs.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] Area I. 92 M + 590 Heavies + 116 P.F.F.
Area I. Confirmed.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta.
i. Route markers T.I. Red with flares Red will be dropped at 5413N 0850E
ii. Special a/c will ground mark the A/P with T.I. Yellow.
iii. Backers-Up back up the initial ground marking with T.I. Green.
iv. Main Force a/c aim bombs at the centre of all Green & Yellow T.I visible.
v. Route markers T.I. Red & flare Red will be dropped at 5340N 0848E
vi. Spoof markers T.I. Yellow to attract night fighters will be dropped at 5332N 0733E
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Weather – Nil cloud, ground vis: impaired by much smoke haze. Early crews found many fires still burning on arrival. Yellow T.Is were dropped slightly early at approx.: 0037 hrs. Concentration fair – some dropped S. of river about 1 1/2 [indecipherable word] from main concentration. Green T.Is good. Tendency to undershoot later. Main Effort good with large fires left burning, but observation of results hampered by smoke.
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70
[underlined] TARGET: HAMBURG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base 5430N 0500E – 5430N 0700E – 5403N 0944E – Hamburg – 5323N 0938E – 5430N 0630E – 5430N 0500E – Base.
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71
[underlined] 30TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1005 hrs. [/underlined] MILAN. 2’Y’ 5 B/Up. GENOA 3 ‘Y’ 5 B/Up. TURIN 3’Y’ 5 B/Up.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] TURIN and Milan – Newhaven Ground-marking. GENOA. Illumination.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 100 Lancasters of 1 & 5 Groups + P.F.F. Zero hour. 0135 hrs TURIN. 0155 hrs. MILAN & GENOA.
[underlined] 1745 hrs. [/underlined] 156 squadron – Operations cancelled.
[list by Group of aircraft numbers and types] attacked REMSCHEID. Markers became concentrated as attack developed and smoke rose to 10000ft. 15 a/c are missing.
[underlined] 31ST JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940 hrs. [/underlined] Target: HAMBURG.
[underlined] A/C Requirements. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
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72
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 70 Mediums + 437 Heavies + 73 P.F.F = 580 a/c. Zero hour 0200. T.O.T. Z-3 to Z+44.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
Route markers T.I. Red will be dropped off track at 5250N 0840E by 156 Squadron.
Spoof markers T.I. Yellow will be dropped at 5342N 0835E on the homeward journey by Mosquitoes of 139 squadron.
[underlined] ROUTE. [/underlined] Base – 5430N 0515E – 5245N 0725E – 5245N 1000E – HAMBURG – 5400N 1000E – 5430N 0700E – 5430N 0500E – Base.
[underlined] INTRUDER ACTIVITY. [/underlined] 2 Mos: Leeuwarden. 2 Mos: Twente Entschede.[sic] 4 Mos: Vetchta. 3 Mos: Vetchta 3 Mos: Schleswig-Jagel. 3 Mos: Ardorf. 3 Mos: Westland/Sylt. [sic]
[underlined] 2050 hrs. [/underlined] Squalls & Thunderstorm warning.
[underlined] 2250 hrs. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[underlined] 1ST AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down. 15 Stirlings. 3 Group. 14 Wellingtons. 4 Group. Minelaying.
[page break]
73
[underlined] 2ND AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: HAMBURG. & HARBURG. Alternative KIEL.
[underlined] A/C Requirements. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking. Zero hour 0200 hrs.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 74 Mediums + 575 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups. + 100 P.F.F. on [deleted] DA [/deleted] HAMBURG and HARBURG.
[underlined] 1755 hrs. [/underlined] Area I confirmed.
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined] 26 Mosquitoes and 6 Beaufighters operating in the Bomber stream.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
10 Lancasters out of 21 attacked the primary. A bank of Cu.Nim. covered the coast at Pos: A up to 17,000’ – breaks occurred between this point and the last turning point before the target (5300N 1000E) where a large area of Cu. Nim. Cloud, base about 10,000’, tops above 25,000’ was encountered giving severe icing, electrical and thunder storms. 10 a/c managed to penetrate to the target area where some bombed on Special Equipment. One a/c bombed below cloud and reported some fires still burning. 9 a/c attacked last resorts or jettisoned and 2 a/c returned early.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] [list by Group, Squadrons, aircraft numbers, roles and missing]
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74
[underlined] TARGET: HAMBURG [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: - CROMER – 5422N 0400E – 5420N 0700E – 5345N 0832E – 5300N 1000E – HAMBURG – 5400N 1000E – 5430N 0700E – 5422N 0400E – CROMER.
[page break]
75
[underlined] 3RD AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Make and Mend.
[underlined] 4TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Targets: TURIN, GENOA & MILAN.
A/C Required: 8 Y + 9 B/Up.
Method: Newhaven Groundmarking. Zero hours. TURIN = 0120 hrs. GENOA & MILAN: 0145 hrs.
150 Heavies of 1 & 5 Groups (50 a/c each [symbol])
[underlined] 1755 hrs. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[underlined] 5TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: MILAN. 7 & 156 squadrons only required. [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
Route. Base – Reading – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – N. end of Lake Bourget – [symbol] – return same route.
[underlined] 1756 hrs. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[page break]
76
[underlined] 6TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: MILAN. 83 squadron will provide a Raid Commentator. 156 squadron will provide a reserve Raid Commentator.
BULLSEYE. Z. F/S Slade.
Route: Wrexham – Sevenake (I.R.A) – 5020N 0050W – N. Foreland – Westminster Bridge (I.R.A) – Odstone Down – Otmoor – (T.I. Demonstration.)
[underlined] 1755 hrs. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[underlined] 7TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: TURIN, GENOA, MILAN.
A/C Required. TURIN/GENOA [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles] MILAN. [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
Route markers flares Green steady will be dropped at 4547N0550E out & back.
[underlined] MILAN. [/underlined]
Blind markers Mark A/P with T.I Red flares White. Backers-Up mark visually with T.I. Green or aim Green at T.I. Red or T.I Green already down.
[underlined] TURIN & GENOA. [/underlined] Method the same.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 50 a/c of 1 & 5 Groups on each [symbol]. Zero: TURIN: 0100 hrs. [missing words]
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77
[underlined] TARGETS: MILAN – GENOA – TURIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route. Base – Reading – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – N. end of Lake Bourget – [symbol] – return same route.
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78
[underlined] SUMMARIES. [/underlined]
Primary: GENOA.
Nil cloud – good visibility. All crews report a good concentration, docks and harbours clearly seen in the light of flares. Smoke screen was in operation, but blowing out to sea. Fires started and glow was seen quite a distance from the target.
[underlined] Primary: MILAN. [/underlined]
Nil cloud – good visibility. Attack was reported well concentrated with one load of Red T.Is about 5 mls. to the N.W. One large explosion believed Gas Works seen at 0124 hrs.
[underlined] Primary: TURIN. [/underlined]
Few patches of cloud, but great visibility. Attack was considered the worst concentration of the three. One large and about five small fires seen by a/c on homeward route from GENOA.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 2 a/c of 5 Group missing.
[underlined] 8TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down. 35 & 405 Squadrons on Italy. later cancelled.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0040 hrs. T.O.T. Z to Z+30.
[underlined] BRIEFING. [/underlined] 1815 hrs.
[underlined] 1600 HRS. [/underlined] Figures changed. F. R. M. Z. N to go as Main Force. 224 Lancs of 1 & 5 Groups + 57 P.F.F.
[underlined] Alteration to Method. [/underlined] Zero hour. 1045 hrs T.O.T. Z to Z+15.
[underlined] 1. [/underlined] Route marker flares Green steady will be dropped on Lake Annecy backed up by Backers-Up.
[underlined] 2. [/underlined] Route markers Yellow T.I will be dropped by ‘Y’ a/c of 156 squadron backed up by Backers-Up of 156 squadron at 4544N 0305E.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Yellow T.Is from blind markers all fell in town area. Red T.Is reported very accurate. The first 2 bundles of Reds fell about 1 ml. apart one either side of the river – the 3rd fell close to the Red on the A/P. All Red markers & subsequently Green markers reported excellent concentration. Main Force attack well concentrated, practically no run back except for a few incendiaries. Route marking also reported very good, both Lake Annecy and Lake Bourget marked on run to target.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 295 a/c detailed. 1 Group 108 Lancs. [missing words]
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79
[underlined] 9TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: MANNHEIM.
[underlined] A/C required. [/underlined] ] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] NEWHAVEN GROUNDMARKING.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 400 Heavies of 1, 4, 5, & 6 Groups + 53 P.F.F. Zero hour. 0130 hours.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Area I. Leverkusen. Area II. Ludwigshaven [sic]. Changed to MANNHEIM. Early arrivals found a thin layer of cloud at about 8,000ft. This began to break up and late arrivals reported as little as 3/10ths. Attack started reasonably concentrated with T.I. Reds covering an area approx: 2mls. across – later the raid tended to scatter with a [indecipherable word] of markers in the centre and the main attack again tending to undershoot. One large explosion at 0137 hrs lasting well over a minute. Defences slight to moderate H/F. Not more than 50 S/Ls. Crews report that on the way out to the target on the leg Bradwell Bay & Dungeness, they were illuminated and in the case covered for 5 mins: by our own S/Ls in spite of the fact that the appropriate letter of the period was repeatedly flashed. It is requested that strong protests be made.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] P.F.F. 2 missing. 5 Group: 2 missing. 1 Group: 2 missing. 6 Group: 1 missing.
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80
[underlined] TARGET: MANNHEIM. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route. Base – Bradwell Bay – Dungeness – Le Touquet – Mannheim – 4920 0820E – Le Touquet – Dungeness – Bradwell Bay – Base.
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81
[underlined] 10TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: NÜRBURG.
[underlined] A/C required. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 573 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5, & 6 Groups + 106 P.F.F. Zero hour. 0100 hrs.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] NEWHAVEN GROUNDMARKING.
[underlined] 1. [/underlined] Spoof-markers T.I. Red and T.I. Green will be dropped by 139 Squadron on MANNHEIM.
[underlined] 2. [/underlined] Blindmarkers mark the A/P with T.I. Red & flares White. Visual Markers identify and drop T.I. Yellow. Backers-Up use T.I. Green. Non-markers aim at centre of T.I. Green.
[underlined] 3. [/underlined] On route home B/Markers of 83 drop 1 x 250 lb. Incen: at 4919N 0826E backed up by Backers-Up of 156 squadron also with 1 x 250 lb I.B.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Red markers scattered over target on track principally in two batches. Greens attempted to concentrate, doing so principally on the Eastern loads of Reds, but still covered an area 5 x 3mls. Cloud prevented any accurate observation and little was observed except some glow of fires on cloud when crews were in the Karlsruhe area.
F/S STEPHENS. ‘Z’. On his first flight from this squadron had two combats, first with an Me 110. M/U/G & T/G both opened fire – captain reports accurate fire by Gunners. E/A (enemy aircraft) did not return fire. 2 minutes later an Me 109 [deleted] attacked [/deleted] approached. T/G got in a burst – E/A did not attack.
F/O SHANAHAN. ‘R’. Gee ‘Y’ and W/T all failed & on the return route the Navigator F/O Stafford used D/R (direct reckoning) to return to base.
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82
[underlined] TARGET: NÜRNBURG [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route – Beachy Head – Le Treport – 4935N 1040E – NÜRNBURG – 4917N 0826E – Le Treport – Beachy Head.
[page break]
83
[underlined] 11TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
[underlined] 12TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Targets: MILAN and TURIN. [underlined] 139 Squadron – 8 Mos: BERLIN [/underlined] 156 squadron required for MILAN only.
[underlined] A/C Required – MILAN. [/underlined] [underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 439 Heavies + 66 P.F.F.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] TURIN. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking. Zero hour. 0115 hrs.
W/C WHITE ‘S’ to act as Raid Commentator.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
One or two crews reported a small amount of thin patchy cloud. The majority report nil cloud & good vis: with slight ground haze. In the initial stages of the attack T.I Reds dropped by B/Markers were somewhat scattered, but the general opinion is that this was put right by the T.I. Y. & the excellent instructions of the Master of Ceremonies, which resulted in the T.I.G. falling in a good concentration. The main force achieved a fair concentration with perhaps a tendency to fall a bit short, but summarising up the results the blame can be placed on the R.A.F if the Italians in MILAN don’t pack in to-morrow & use the excellent fires started for their peace celebrations.
[page break]
84
[underlined] TARGET: MILAN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route. Base – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – N. end of Lake Bourget – MILAN – 4520N 0905E - S. end of Lake Bourget – Cabourg – Selsey Bill.
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85
[underlined] 13TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
156 squadron stood down: MAKE & MEND for Command.
[underlined] 14TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
156 squadron stood down. 7, 83 and 156 squadron attacked MILAN. 139 squadron attacked BERLIN.
[underlined] 15TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: MILAN.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking. Zero hour 0015 hrs.
[underlined] A/C REQUIRED. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 150 Heavies + 49 P.F.F. Note: No a/c to cross the French Coast before 2140 hrs.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Green T.Is well concentrated in area about 2mls. across at worst. Crews report T.I. Yellow very accurately dropped on actual A/P. Main attack reasonably concentrated with some incendiaries tending to fall short as usual. Large fires reported by later a/c.
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86
[underlined] TARGET: MILAN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
10 Lancasters – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – N. end Lake Bourget – 4540N 0912E – MILAN – 4520N 0905E – S. end of Lake Bourget – Carbourg – Selsey Bill.
3 Lancasters – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – N. end Lake Bourget – MILAN – 4520N 0905E – S. end of [missing words]
[page break]
87
[underlined] 16TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Stand down for 156 squadron.
[underlined] 17TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: PEENEMUNDE. [/underlined] R.D.F. Experimental Establishment.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Shifters [/underlined] are A/P movers.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] 0015 hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+40.
[underlined] Phase I. [/underlined] A/P. ‘F’
Blind markers mark A/P with T.I. Red & flares White. Make 2nd run to drop bombs. Visual markers mark exact A/P with T.I. Yellow. Backers-Up aim Green T.I. at T.I. Yellow or T.I. Red. Non-marker a/c go in with the Blind-markers using their anti-personnel bombs against defences – then make a second run & aim H.E. at the Centre of T.I. Green.
[underlined] Phase II. [/underlined] A/P ‘B’.
At Z+24 Shifters move the A/P.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 430 heavies + 94 P.F.F.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] T.I. Reds rather scattered up the length of the target, with a lot about 2mls. [missing word] the W. of A/P ‘B’ of the T.I. Yellows one load overshot slightly & fell in woods S. of A/P ‘F’ and load of T.I. Green also fell in woods to the S. of A/P ‘F’. One load of Green T.Is also fell [missing words] along lay-out. Main attack
[page break]
88
[underlined] TARGET: PEENEMUNDE. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route. – Cromer – 5520N 0829E – 5441N 1320E – RUDEN ISLAND – PEENEMUNDE – MANDO ISLAND – 5500N 0500E – CROMER.
First shifter reported attack at that time concentrated on A/Ps ‘B’ & ‘F’ and subsequently attacked
[page break]
89
[underlined] 17TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined] (Cont:)
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
41 a/c missing – A large number of combats were seen and the majority of losses may probably be attributed to this cause, as defences over the target were negligible.
[underlined] 18TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
P.I.U. report on PEENUMUNDE.
75% damage to works. A/P ‘F’ practically wiped out – living quarters. A/P ‘B’ Southern hanger hit. workshops hit. A/P ‘E’ Damaged. A/P ‘A’ Not hit.
[underlined] 19TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] TURIN. All Lancasters. ALESSANDRIA. U/T ‘Y’ a/c. BERLIN Mosquitoes.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground marking.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 511 heavies + 90 P.F.F on TURIN. 18 P.F.F on Alessandria.
[underlined] 1655 hrs: [/underlined] Ops cancelled.
[underlined] 20TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
Command Combined ‘BULLSEYE’ 3 a/c T.I. dropping. 2 a/c full sortie.
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90
[underlined] 21ST AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
[underlined] 22ND AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
underlined] Target: [/underlined] LEVERKUSEN.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 419 Heavies + 50 P.F.F.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hour [/underlined] 2300 hrs. T.O.T. Z-4 to Z+36.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
Owing to weather over the target being from 8/10ths to 10/10ths cloud with tops 16/17000ft (most crews reporting 10/10ths), no T.I. Red were seen on bombing. Crews were compelled to bomb on E.T.A. and Special Equipment. Fires, which seemed to be mainly incendiaries, were scattered over a very wide area. No T.I. Green were dropped by this squadron.
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Only 4 Mosquitoes worked, the remainder having technical troubles. Only 2 heavy crews (both non-markers) claim to have bombed on T.Is. All backers-up claim to have brought back their T.I but one a/c J/7 F/L Amekstein returned with only [indecipherable word] T.I. So the other fellow presumably went with the bombs. All crews except the two mentioned above dropped on E.T.A on fires
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91
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Southwold – Knocke [sic] – 5025N 0705E – 5042N 0730E – Leverkusen – 5103N 0620E – Nordwijk [sic] – 5235N 0330E – Hainsboro’ – Base.
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92
[underlined] 23RD AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required.[/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 516 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups led by 127 a/c P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2345 hrs. T.O.T. Z-3 to Z+40.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta.
1. Mosquitoes drop T.I. Red at 5250N 0652E & Green T.I at 5235N 0702E as route markers. Blind markers of 83 squadron drop Red spot fires at 5217N 1232E – backed up by 97 squadron.
2. Blind markers mark A/P with T.I. Red.
3. Backers-Up aim Greens at the centre of T.I. Reds overshooting by 2 seconds, or if no reds seen at the centre of T.I. Green.
4. Re-centres use special equipment.
5. Non-markers aim bombs at centre of T.I. Reds or T.I. Greens.
Master of Ceremonies will be in operation from Z-1 to Z+10. 1L/405.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
T.I. dropping on the whole was good with no cloud and only a slight haze over the target. The first Reds appeared to form two points of attack east & West. The first Greens dropped midway between, around which the attack developed. Later re-centrers are of the opinion that the attack drifted slightly South as [indecipherable word] by their Special Equipment. Later fires, however, covered the whole area and the attack is considered a success. The Hun appeared to defend the target by the employment of a large concentration of S/L’s to operating with night fighters as flak was only moderate.
[page break]
93
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base – Hainsboro’ – 5305N 0220E – EGMOND – 5250N 1347E – BERLIN – 5250N 1340E – 5420N 1225E – MANDO – 5420N 0300E – HULKHAM BAY – Base.
[page break]
94
[underlined] ‘F’ F/S STEVENS. [/underlined]
On approaching the target at 19,000ft our a/c was covered by a large number of S/Ls. Bombs were dropped in the centre of Red T.Is and almost at once our a/c was badly hit by flak. The inter-comm was rendered u/s and the S/B outer caught fire. The navigator and M/U/G were badly and the port wing severely damaged. The S/B outer was at once feathered. Almost immediately an enemy fighter attacked ‘F’ killing the Rear-Gunner Sgt. Atkee. Evasive action was taken & the fighter lost. As the navigator was u/s. and there was no inter-comm. The pilot steered more or less due North. About 5 minutes later the port outer engine caught fire and was feathered. Pilot carried on for about 1 1/2 hrs. losing height down to 7,000ft. The W/Op. hence succeeded in repairing the morse key and got a fix. The pilot turned on to 280 and the navigator who had been bandaged up by the W/Op. managed to plot the fix and give a course for home. During passage through the Baltic the crew had been warned to prepare for ditching. Order was cancelled when Captain discovered rear gunner trapped in his turret. The W/Op continued to get fixes until the English Coast was reached when the pilot made a safe landing at ATTLEBRIDGE aerodrome.
Captain. F.S Stevens. Bomb Aimer. [missing] Navigator. Sgt. Clegg. M/U/Gunner. [missing] W/Operator. Sgt. Stocks. Rear Gunner. Sgt. Atkee. F/Engineer. [missing]
F/S Stevens, Sgt Clegg and Sgt. Stocks have received an immediate award of the D.F.M.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 726 detailed – 58 missing.
[list by Group, aircraft type and numbers involved, roles and numbers missing]
[page break]
95
[underlined] 24TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All P.F.F. squadrons stood down except 139 Squadron. Command – Gardening. P.R.U. pilot who was over Berlin to broadcast in the 9 o’clock news.
[underlined] 25th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Make and Mend for all Squadrons.
[underlined] 26th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MANNHEIM. All squadrons except 105 & 109 required.
[underlined] A/C Requirements. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] 1128 hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 27th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined]NÜRNBERG.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] method. [/underlined] {deleted] Paramatta. [/deleted] Newhaven.
[words missing] bomb (500 or 1000 MC) on HEILBRONN
[page break]
96
[underlined] TARGET: NÜRNBERG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Beachy Head – 5005N 0125E – 4856N 1100E – NURNBERG – 4938N 1108E – 5005N 0126E – Beachy Head – Base.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
In the early stages of the attack the Red T.Is were rather scattered, but one or two reports give the impression that the majority fell slightly to the S & SE of the A/P. later Backers-Up and Recentrers appear to have somewhat corrected this, as later [words missing]
[page break]
97
there is every probability that a wide area of the town was covered. Fires are reported to be widely spread, but on built-up area. One Visual marker ‘Y’ F/L Cook did not drop his T.I yellow owing to interference by a cone of S/Ls which held & dazzled him on the bombing run. His second attempt was spoilt by smoke & fire.
Defences – Flak very mild – S/Ls active co-operating with fighters. Large amount of fighter activity.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[list by Group, aircraft type and numbers involved, roles and numbers missing]
Photographs show main Concentration – P.F.F. E & SE – Main Force very scattered SE & E.
[underlined] 28th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
[underlined] 29th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
[underlined] 30th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down. Other squadrons MUNCHEN GLADBACH. SPECIAL TARGET IN FRANCE. [words missing]
[page break]
98
[list by Group, aircraft type and numbers involved, roles and numbers missing]
[underlined] SPECIAL TARGET IN FRANCE. [/underlined]
[list by Group, aircraft type, numbers involved and numbers missing]
[underlined] 31ST AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Ordinary Paramatta.
Routemarkers T.I.G. at 5152N 1143E by blind markers of 83 squadron backed up by backers up of 156 squadron. Blind markers mark A/P with T.I. Red. Backers-Up aim T.I. Green at T.I. Red on centre of T.I. Green. Re-centres use special equipment to re-centre. Non-markers aim HE at centre of T.I. Red. Route markers T.I. Green at 5152N 1143E by blind markers of 83 squadron backed up by 156 squadron.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 534c heavies + 102 P.F.F. Zero hour. 2330 hrs.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles] [words missing]
[page break]
99
[underlined] BERLIN. 31ST AUGUST 1943 [/underlined] (Cont:)
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: HAPPISBURGH – 5322N 0323E – 5147N 1108E – 5217N 1405N [sic] – BERLIN – 5100N 0930E – 5030N 0720E – CAYCUX – BEACHY HEAD.
[page break]
100
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
7 – 10/10ths thin strato-cum: tops about 5,000ft. While some Red T.Is were dropped on time, owing to late arrivals, blind markers were active for about 20 minutes. Red T.Is scattered, but generally at the beginning in two sections about 4 mls. apart. As the raid progressed the markers became still more scattered. Some of the backers-up finding no T.Is to guide them.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
German broadcast. “Re-organised Berlin Ack-Ack defences inflicted extremely heavy losses on the attackers. British bomber formations were dispersed & mostly had to jettison their bombs. Effective defences prevented the Bomber a/c from making a concentrated attack”.
[list by Group, aircraft type and numbers involved, roles and numbers missing]
F/S FRY. ‘P’ Combat with unidentified T/E E/A. M/U/G opened fire. No results observed.
F/O WRIGHT ‘T’ M/U/G opened fire on unidentified T/E E/A at 400yds range & T/G opened fire immediately afterwards. No return fire experienced from E/A which dived steeply to starboard & disappeared. An explosion was seen on the deck behind 30/60 seconds afterwards.[deleted] During [/deleted] E/A claimed as probably destroyed.
[underlined] SPECIAL TARGET IN N.W. FRANCE. [/underlined]
41 a/c detailed – Nil missing.
[underlined] BRAUWEILER. [/underlined]
8 Group. 5 Mosquitoes [missing word] Missing.
[page break]
101
[underlined] 2ND SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] 5028N 0354E. Special target in France.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 30 Mediums + 11 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2200 hours.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
10 a/c attacked dropping 10 x T.I. Green. 60 x 1000 G.P. Weather was 9/10ths thin strato-cum tops 8,000ft. Good concentration of markers with one load of Green T.Is at the most 1/2 ml. off.
One large explosion at about 2203 hrs lit up cloud for about 3 seconds. No other large explosions seen.
One heavy flak gun about every 2 minutes.
[underlined] 3RD SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
102
[underlined] Method [/underlined] Paramatta.
Routemarkers red spot fires at Pos: 5238N 0820E.
Preliminary warning markers. T.I. Yellow at Brandenburg.
Blind-markers drop T.I. red.
Backers-Up keep A/P marked with T.I. Green.
Non-markers aim bombs at the centre of T.I. Red.
Y Backers-Up act as normal backers-up unless cloud conditions make it necessary to revert to Wanganui.
Routemarkers T.I. Red L/B. at 5432N 1334E.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2315 hrs.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 244 heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 81 P.F.F.
‘U’ F/O Foderingham and 5 of crew crashed at Snetterton Heath.
[underlined] 1630 hrs. [/underlined] Briefing. SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, secretary of State for Air, attended briefing and gave a talk on the progress of the war.
[underlined] SUMMARY [/underlined]
Weather over the target was chiefly nil cloud, but with occasional whisps [sic] of very thin cloud at varying heights, with moderate to good visibility.
At the start of the attack, T.I. Reds covered an area of approx. 3 sq. m. but as later good concentration of Reds was achieved, which was backed up admirably by T.I. Greens to form a light cluster. Ground fires and many explosions were seen around the T.I. Concentration, with smoke rising up to approx: 19,000ft. The general impression is that the attack was a success & far exceeds the previous raids. Flak was only moderate, but the S/Ls were as active as usual, working in cones, track indicating & for illumination for fighters.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
‘R’. F/O SHANAHAN. Missing from 156. F/L Stafford. W/O Collins. Sgt. Hoyle. F/S Denyer. F/S Wilson. W/O Dodds, 3/L of 7 Squadron.
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[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Great Yarmouth – 5245N 0330E – EGMOND – 5240N 0900E – Brandenburg – Berlin – 5233N 13422E – 5555N 1325E – 5800N 1100E -5700N 0600E – Brancaster.
[page break]
104
[underlined] 4TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
156 Stood down.
[underlined] 5TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MANNHEIM. Area II. MUNICH. Area I.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] I & II. Newhaven.
Area II.
Routemarkers T.I. Reds L/B at 4933N 0608E.
Blind-markers mark A/P with T.I. Red after a timed check from KAISERSLAUTERN.
Visual markers mark A/P with T.I. Green & Yellow if seen. no overshoot. Later Backers-up aim T.I. Green at the centre of all T.I. Green overshooting by 2 seconds.
Re-centrers after Z+12 drop T.I. Green by means of special equipment.
Non-markers may identify visually or aim at centre of T.I. Reds.
Routemarkers T.I. Red Spot at 4928N 0608E.
[underlined] A/C Required [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
491 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 107 P.F.F. T.O.T. Z-4 to Z+36.
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base – Reading – Beachy Head – 4952N 0040E – 4937N 0300E – Kaiserslautern – Mannheim – 4919E [sic] 0830E – 4937N 0300E – 4952N 0040E – Beachy Head – Reading Base. Backers-Up & Re-centrers from 4937N 0300E – Mannheim.
[page break]
105
[underlined] TARGET: MANNHEIM. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Beachy Head – 4952N 0040E – 4937N 0300E – (KAISERSLAUTERN V/M. B/M & N/M) – MANNEHEIM – 4919N 0830E – 4937 0300E – 4952N 0040E – Beachy Head – Base.
[page break]
106
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
The blind-markers achieved a good concentration and were mainly on time although some were still visible at 2313 hrs. The yellows were in the centre of a very good concentration of greens. Later a/c report a large number of good fires and it is estimated that this is the best attack made on this target. A number of explosions were reported principally from 2259/2303hrs. One N/F claimed destroyed.
“X” F/S HEWITT.
KAISERSLAUTERN. 2312 hrs. 19000ft. S/E a/c was sighted by T/G doing a diving attack from Port quarters up, & opened fire at range of 150 yds firing orange tracer which passed underneath the Lancaster: T/G & M/U/G fired 4 & 2 second bursts respectively. Strikes observed on E/A’s port wing & fuselage & E/A was seen in flames in a shallow dive which became steeper & subsequently E/A burst into flames on the ground. E/A DESTROYED.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
3 a/c missing from P.F.F.
E/156. F/O PRICHARD. 2 of 7 squadron.
P.F.F.
This was undoubtedly one of the best “Y” attack the P.F.F. have ever achieved. The timing throughout was good. The ‘Y’ a/c were reasonably concentrated – probably due largely to the fact that only 10 dropped T.I’s and all those a/c who were doubtful about their ‘Y’ bombing brought their T.I back. The town was thus successfully illuminated for the Visual markers who all appear to have identified the A/P and bombed it accurately. The backing up and recentring was well maintained and accurate throughout the raid.
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107
[underlined] 6TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET: [/underlined] MUNICH.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined]
362 Heavies + 74 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
[underlined] ZERO HOUR. [/underlined] 2330 hrs.
[underlined] BRIEFING: [/underlined] 1530 hrs.
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined] 6 Beaus operating in the Bomber stream. 2 Mosquitoes over the main target.
[underlined] 2155 hrs. [/underlined] Warning from Group. German Intruder a/c are definitely expected to be very active tonight at time of return, especially between 0300 – dawn. All stations are warned to have defences ready to meet these intruders who are expected to be over here in force. It is stressed that this is no ordinary warning.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
7/10 – 9/10ths thin stratus 8/10000ft moderate to good visibility. Cloud interfered with technique. Reds seemed quite concentrated. Greens in early stages were well concentrated were considered by later crews to be more scattered although cloud prevented adequate observation. The glow of fires were seen from 160/200 mls. away. One large explosion at 2335 hrs. ONE N/FIGHTER CLAIMED AS DESTROYED.
[underlined] H/156. S/L COATES. [/underlined]
Detailed as a BACKER-UP. At the beginning of the bombing run tracer was observed coming from port quarters down passing under the wing of the Lancaster. Captain was weaving slightly to S/B & increased his turn to a steep diving turn to S/B . 2 bursts of approx. 3-8 seconds duration were fired by E/A, hits being scored
[page break]
108
[underlined] TARGET: MUNICH. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Beachy Head – 5000N 0115E – Freiburg – 4740N 1006E – MUNICH – 4758N 1145E – 4806N 0735E – 4806N 0235E – Cabourg – Belsey Bill – Reading - Base
on port inner engine, S/B tail plane, & port side of fuselage & bomb bays. Gunners were blinded by the brightness of E/A’s tracer & no member of the crew sighted the E/A. T/G opened fire simultaneously with the E/A’s second burst giving a 2-second burst towards the judged apparent notion of where the E/A would be. E/A was not observed to break away. Both [missing words]
[page break]
109
[underlined] Z/156. F/L MANIFOLD [/underlined]
Detailed as Backer-Up. 18mls. S.W. of the target when doing gentle weaving action S/E (Single-Engined) E/A (Enemy Aircraft) sighted by T/G on the S/B quarter 20 down, making a quarter attack, range 800yds. T/G gave directions to Captain “Down port, up S/B” T/G opened fire at 400yds range with 2-3 second burst, all guns being in operation. Flash was observed on E/A who immediately broke his attack, climbing to port quarter and smoke & sparks were seen trailing backwards. This was confirmed by the M/U/G & the W/Op. who was standing in the astrodome. When positioned on the port beam above, flames enveloped the E/A which dived vertically down through the clouds & an explosion was seen through cloud by members of the crew as fighter hit ground. THIS A/C DEFINITELY CLAIMED AS DESTROYED.
T./G. F/O CURRIE. M/U/G Sgt. ROSIE.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
404 a/c despatched.
[list by Group, aircraft numbers & types involved and aircraft missing]
[underlined] 7TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
35 squadron. PONGO.
[page break]
110
[underlined] 8TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] 156 squadron. 4 B/M. 8 B/U. 5 N/M.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 335 Heavies + 82 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta..
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0010hrs.
[underlined] 1745hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED
[underlined] 1745hrs. ITALIANS SIGN ARMISTICE – UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER. [/underlined]
[underlined] 9TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN. Alternative FRANKFURT
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 356 Heavies + 97 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] BERLIN. Paramatta. FRANKFURT. Newhaven.
[underlined] Zero hour.. [/underlined] Berlin. 0115hrs. Frankfurt 0200hrs.
[underlined] 1645hrs. [/underlined] Berlin Confirmed.
[underlined] 1800hrs. [/underlined] Zero hour changed to 0130hrs.
[underlined] 2107hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[page break]
111
[underlined] 10TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 11TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
No operations.
[underlined] 12TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
No operations.
[underlined] 13TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
156 stood down. 5 Mosquitoes 139 Squadron on DUISBERG. 5 Mosquitoes 139 Squadron on COLOGNE.
[underlined] 14TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
8 Mosquitoes 139 squadron on BERLIN. 1 Mosquito missing
T.I. Demonstration at RUSHFORD. F/S PALMER 156. observing a/c.
[underlined] 15TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target:- [/underlined] MONTLUÇON
156 & 83 Squadrons stood down except for F/S Fry from N.T.U. (Navigation Training Unit)
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 314 Heavies + 64 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2330hrs.
[page break]
112
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
[underlined] Target: MONTLUÇON. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
Attack a great success. P.I.U. photographs show a large amount of damage to the DUNLOP RUBBER TYRE FACTORY.
[list by Group, aircraft numbers & types involved]
5 U.S.A. Fortresses took part under the control of 3 Group. 3 a/c missing.
[underlined] DORTMUND-EMS CANAL. [/underlined] [underlined] words missing? [/underlined]
8 Lancasters of 5 Group carried out an attack on the embanked stretch of the canal, 4mls. E. of GREVEN using 12,000lb. Thick ground haze made identification extremely difficult. Of the 3 a/c which returned only 2 succeeded in identifying the target. 6 Mosquitoes of Fighter Command escorted the Lancasters (617 Squadron.)
7 Mosquitoes of 139 Squadron on BERLIN.
[underlined] 16TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MODANE. (French Alps.)
[underlined] A/C Required [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
113
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 304 Heavies + 66 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Visual Groundmarking.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0001hrs.
[underlined] TARGET: MODANE. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Selsey Bill – Carbourg – 4735N 0045E – 4512N 0535E – MODANE – 4735N 0120E – Carbourg – Selsey Bill.
[page break]
114
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Weather over the target varied from nil to 3/10ths patchy cloud at about 10,000ft with good vis: in the early stages of the attack, but smoke, presumably from T.Is interfered in the later stages. Our 3 visual markers identified the A/P visually by the river and marshalling yards clearly in the moonlight. T.I. Reds were extremely well concentrated with the exception of one which was dropped approx.: 2m. S.W. on a hillside. The main concentration of T.I. Reds was backed up by the Backers-Up dropping T.I. Green. Some fires were seen burning around the A/P & many bomb explosions were seen around the marshalling yard & river. A large proportion of the main force appeared to drop their bombs wide on the hillside. The general opinion is, however, that the attack was a success.
A. F/S FRY.
T/E (Twin Engined) Single tail aircraft reported by T/G flying parallel on port quarter 15 up range 700yds. As aircraft was not definitely identified our Lanc:: turned S/B. Then a/c turned in making a beam attack & T/G gave instructions to turn port. M/U opened fire. No strikes observed.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
From photographs plotted a cluster of P.F.F. are on the A/P and one or two main force. The rest are scattered to the E & NE, towards the town.
[underlined] 17TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
156 squadron stood down.
N.T.U. on “BULLSEYE” 7 a/c.
[page break]
115
[underlined] 18TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
STAND DOWN.
[underlined] 19TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 20TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
STAND DOWN.
[underlined] 21ST SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
ALL HEAVY SQUADRONS STOOD DOWN.
Bullseye & T.I. Demonstration.
[list aircraft letters and ranks and names of pilots]
[underlined] 22ND SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Targets: [/underlined] AREA I. HANNOVER. – SPOOF: OLDENBURG. AREA II BOCHUM.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] HANNOVER.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] BOCHUM. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles] [information missing]
[page break]
116
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
615 Heavies + 29 Mediums + 82 P.F.F on HANNOVER. 31 P.F.F. on OLDENBURG.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
[deleted] Route marke [/deleted]
[underlined] 1630hrs.. [/underlined] Area I Confirmed.
[underlined] Intruder Activity. [/underlined]
[list of aircraft numbers, aircraft type and targets]
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2130hrs
[underlined] T.O.T.. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+25.
[underlined] SUMMARY. HANNOVER. [/underlined]
Judged by the position of the Yellow T.Is blind markers tended to overshoot. Green T.Is generally well concentrated. Fires in an area about 3mls x 1 mile. on track across target – could be seen from Enemy Coast on return. Red T.Is dropped over STEINHUDER LAKE 2117h
[underlined] OLDENBURG. [/underlined]
Nil cloud – good visibility.
Reds well concentrated, greens scattered. Some fires reported in target area.
[underlined] ‘Y’ S/L COOK. [/underlined]
After second run over target and bombs had been dropped a load of incendiaries fell on the Lancaster dropped by a Halifax. Port outer engine set on fire & hydraulic gear for both turrets severed – gear u/s – ‘Y’ smashed. Incendiaries burning in the a/c which W/Op threw out of the flare Shute. Shortly after leaving the target attacked by [words missing] u/s & the inter-comm. Evasive action taken.
[page break]
117
[underlined] TARGET: HANNOVER. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] ROUTE. [/underlined] 12 Lancasters: Cromer – 5350N 0400E – (5240N 0920E B/Ms, U/Ms, N/Ms) – HANNOVER – 5210N 0945E – 5350N 0400E – Cromer.
4 Lancasters: Cromer – 5350N 0400E – 5309N 0645E – OLDENBURG – 5420N 0620E 5420N 0 [indecipherable digit] 00E – Wells.
[page break]
118
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] HANNOVER - OLDENBURG. [/underlined] The spoof raid was successful – bombing not very concentrated. A few Mosquitoes strayed out towards Bremen defences, but the correct town was hit & the raid undoubtedly attracted some fighters & this assisted the main operation. Preliminary reports of the main attack were most encouraging, but this optimism was not justified by the photo plot or daylight recco. Three crews who aimed visually were very near the A/P but the majority of blind markers overshot the aiming point by 3-4mls. & unfortunately it was their markers which the backers-up maintained. For once the main force did not undershoot the markers to any great extent, with the result that most of the bombing took place to the SE of the town & a PRU a/c reported that no fires were burning in Hannover town centre. Photographs however prove that there were some fires burning [deleted] round [/deleted] around the A/P & it is probable that considerable damage was done. Although probably only a small proportion of the total bomb load fell on the town, it seems unlikely that there was any large scale devastation as was first expected.
P.F.F. 1 missing.
[underlined] 23RD SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGETS. [/underlined] MANNHEIM & DARMSTADT.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] HANNOVER.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 541 heavies & mediums of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 78 PFF on Mannheim. 29 a/c of PFF on Darmstadt.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2130hrs.
[page break]
119
[underlined] TARGETS: MANNHEIM & DARMSTADT. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE:- BASE – CLACTON – 5058N 0254E – 4955N 0750E – Target – (4920N 0843E DARMSTADT) – 49 [indecipherable digits] 0820E – 4800N 0400E – 4830 0030W – 4920N 0040W – SELSEY BILL – READING – BASE.
[page break]
120
[underlined] SUMMARY. MANNHEIM. [/underlined]
Nil cloud, good visibility. Blind markers well concentrated and accurate. Visual markers claimed to have identified A.P. without any doubt. Green markers well concentrated apart from occasional strays. Main force effort caused good fires with incendiaries undershooting considerably. Large explosion seen at 2156hrs in North end of target. 1 a/c attacked last resort DARMSTADT as nothing seen at MANNHEIM on arrival.
[underlined] DARMSTADT. [/underlined]
Red marker concentration reasonably good although some fell well away. Green T.Is generally good. Ground fires seen starting as a/c left. One large explosion seen at 2135hrs – believed gas holder, also seen by Mannheim crews.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
2 a/c of P.F.F. missing, both of 97 Squadron. Photographic plot shows a very bad scatter to the N.W. back along track, and although a high proportion of photographs are unplottable because of fire-tracks, it seems that the main force bombing spread back badly. A P.R.U. sortie the following afternoon reported fires still burning in the town.
[list by Groups, of aircraft missing]
[underlined] 24TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
156 squadron stood down. Mine-laying by 1, 3 and 6 Groups. 8 Group. 4 Mosquitoes on DUISBERG.
[underlined] 25TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] KIEL.
[underlined] A/C required: [/underlined] 8 B/M. 6 Supporters.
Zero hour [missing words] later changed to 0230hrs.
[page break]
121
[underlined] 26TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Area I. HANNOVER. AREA II. BOCHUM.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
Area I. 5 B/M. 2 V/M. 4 B/U. 7 Supporters. [underlined] Spoof [/underlined] 1 B/M. 2 Supporters. Area II. 2 B/U. 90 Supporters.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
Area I. 578 Heavies + 23 Mediums + 89 P.F.F. Area II. 354 Heavies + 42 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0030hrs.
[underlined]1730hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 27TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Area I. HANNOVER. AREA II. KIEL.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] HANNOVER.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
590 Heavies + 24 Mediums + 89 P.F.F. 28 on BRUNSWICK.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2330hrs.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] HANNOVER.
Nil cloud – good vis: T.I. Yellows fairly concentrated, estimated about 3 loads of Red T.Is dropped and Greens backed up well. Incendiaries were reported as falling short about 30% of the effort being short of [missing words]
[page break]
122
[underlined] TARGETS: HANNOVER & BRUNSWICK. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE. Base – Southwold – 5237N 0330E – Egmond – 5235N 0800E – 5234N 0900E – [symbol] – 5210N 0945E – 5238N 0800E – Egmond – Southwold – Base.
Brunswick [missing words]
[page break]
123
and could be seen from the Dutch Coast on the homeward run
[underlined] Brunswick. [/underlined]
Reds seemed rather scattered. Green T.Is away from the Reds. Some fires seen as a/c left. Many night fighters flames were seen over CELLE and the target & the attack is therefore considered to have been successful as a “Spoof”.
[underlined] German Intruders. [/underlined] Operated over this country. Bombs dropped on warboys aerodrome.
[underlined] RESULTS: [/underlined]
38 a/c missing [list by Group of aircraft missing]
From preliminary reports attack appeared to fall to the NE. N & NW.
[underlined] 28TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
[underlined] 29TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET: [/underlined] BOCHUM.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Musical Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] 2045HRS.
[underlined] A/C required: [/underlined] [list by squadron of aircraft numbers & roles] [words missing]
[page break]
124
[underlined] TARGET: BOCHUM.[/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 372 Heavies + 24 Mediums + 45 P.F.F.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
1 a/c ‘2’ Sgt Maclean landed at Newmarket short of petrol. ‘C’ F/S Ray [deleted] landed [/deleted] attempted to land at Downham Market but overshot and crashed at Wimbotsham.
Weather over the target was clear & enabled Paramatta to be used. 1st T.I. Red dropped on time. All crews bombed on ground markers except one who bombed skymarker at 2054hrs. The T.I. concentration was good, with the exception of 2 x T.I. Green which were reported dropped at 2053 4/5mls. NE. Many fires were started but had a scatter of several miles and undershooting.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
High standard of accuracy was achieved by markers. From photographic cover since received it is seen that a large amount of damage was done and the raid proved to be very successful.
[page break]
125
[underlined] 30TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET.[/underlined] STETTIN.
156 squadron required.
[underlined] 1255HRS. [/underlined] OPERATIONS cancelled.
[underlined] 1ST OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] STUTTGART.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 6 B/M. 2 V/M. 1 B/U. 3 Supporters. Spoof. 2 B/M. 2 Supporters.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 523 Heavies + 81 P.F.F. 32 P.F.F. on Spoof.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2235hrs. T.O.T. Z-4 to Z+25.
[underlined] 1340hrs. [/underlined] Area I. Scrubbed. Area II. Hagen. [underlined] Zero hour [/underlined] 2100hrs. [underlined] A/C required: [/underlined] 4 Supporters. [underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 209 Heavies + 37 P.F.F. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-3 to Z+12.
[underlined] 1450hrs. [/underlined] Area I still on.
[underlined] 1615hrs. [/underlined] Area I scrubbed.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
9 – 10/10ths cloud tops 5/6,000ft. Despite cloud conditions T.Is clearly discernible on ground. Three out of four crews report first Red T.Is dropped on time, followed 1/2 a minute later by first greens. Early T.I.G well placed with slight tendency to overshoot. Fires starting & 2 crews report a large explosion at 2103hrs.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
There was a gap in the mosquito marking early in the attack, but this was covered by the Backers-Up who kept the A/P marked throughout the attack. Accuracy of mosquitoes & B/Up alike was of a high standard.
[page break]
126
[underlined] TARGET: HAGEN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – 5310N 0150E – Egmond – 5145N 0800E – HAGEN – 5030N 0730E – 5020N 0132E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
[underlined] 2ND OCTOBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MUNICH.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 203 Heavies of 1 & 5 Groups + 86 P.F.F
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2230 hours. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+14.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
Weather nil cloud – good vis: B/markers more concentrated than previously. Visual markers seemed rather scattered. Green T.Is were well concentrated in centre of yellows. Good fires were reported well concentrated in target area with incendiaries undershooting as usual. Large explosions at 2231 & 2239hrs. Main force a/c arrived in [symbol] area as much as 20 mins early doubling the time of the attack & allowing night fighters to get organised.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[list by Groups, of aircraft missing]
[page break]
127
[underlined] TARGET: MUNICH. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Harwich – 5125N 0230E – 4950N 0310E – 4826N 0745E – 4128N 1052E – 4800N 1120E – MUNICH – 4810N 1151E – 4945N 1280E – 4808N 0733E – Cayeux – Beachy Head – Base.
[page break]
128
[underlined] 3RD OCTOBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] KASSEL.
139 Squadron. HANNOVER.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 467 Heavies + 87 P.F.F. Spoof. HANNOVER. 10 Mosquitoes.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2115hrs. [underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] Z-25.h.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+23.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
Nil cloud. Ground visibility. Although flares illuminated town, many of the Yellow T.Is seemed to fall to the E. No red T.Is were seen dropped. Green T.Is seemed reasonably well concentrated. Ground fires were started with much of the effort falling short as usual and as a consequence it is anticipated that the Henschel works will have been well attacked. One very large explosion seen by some crews when about 100mls. from the target at about 2200hrs. The spoof attack on Hannover very successful as lanes of N/F flares laid across town & S/Ls in Ruhr area seemed to [indecipherable word] a/c in Hannover direction.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Timing of all marker crews were good the attack opening shortly before the scheduled time & the A/P marking was maintained. General tendency of B/Markers was to undershoot & the spread of PFF was roughly from the A/P to 2 1/2m ESE. Main force do not appear to have followed P.F.F. & although great destruction was caused in the town there was a bad scatter N. P.I.U. showed fires burning the next day.
[list by Groups, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
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129
[underlined] TARGET: KASSEL [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE:- Base – Cromer – 5320N 0400E – N. tip of TEXEL – 5228N 0910E – 5147N 0340E – KASSEL – 5112N 0938E – 5030N 0720E – 5018N 0132E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
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130
[underlined] 4TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target:[/underlined] FRANKFURT A/MAIN. [underlined] SPOOF [/underlined] LUDWIGSHAVEN: Area II. STUTTGART.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C required: [/underlined] Area I.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 361 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5, & 6 Groups + 67 P.F.F. Spoof: 50 Heavies of 1 Group + 12 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2130hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+18. Spoof. Z-9 to Z-7.
[underlined] Summary. FRANKFURT. [/underlined]
Nil cloud, good visibility. T.I. Yellow seemed reasonably well concentrated. 3 red T.I’s fell in target area well concentrated – covered area about 1ml. square. 1 Red T.I. dropped about 3-4 mls. South – Did not attract attack – did not seem to be decoy. Green T.I’s backed up well. Many fires burning some good. Generally not very concentrated. Incendiaries a little more concentrated than usual. One large red explosion at 2137hrs.
[underlined] LUDWIGSHAVEN. [/underlined]
Nil cloud – slight haze. Reds occupied triangular area about 2ml. sides: greens about same area – fires starting up – results seem good for general number detailed.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] The results of the Spoof [symbol] were very bad due mainly to bad manipulation. There is however evidence of some marking on the A/P, although most of the attack probably missed the mark. A considerable amount of bombing
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131
[underlined] TARGET: FRANKFURT & LUDWIGSHAVEN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Reading – Beachy Head – 5020N 0135E – 4934N 0752E – Frankfurt – 5016N 0845E -5020N 0135E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
Spoof: As above – 4934N 0752E – LUDWIGSHAVEN – 5010N 0900E – 5 [indecipherable digits] N 0845E – [indecipherable word]
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132
[underlined] 5TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] GELSENKIRCHEN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Parraamatta. [sic]
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] 156 squadron Supporters only. Stand down requested.
[underlined] 6TH OCTOBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRANKFURT-AM-MAIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 156 squadron. 6 B/M. 2 V/M. 9 B/Up. 4 Supporters.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2130hrs.
[underlined] 1650hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 7TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] STUTTGART.
[underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] FRIEDRICHSHAVEN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0005hrs.
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133
Mosquitoes will also carry out attacks on MUNICH & AACHEN.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
262 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 and 6 Groups + 66 P.F.F. 16 P.F.F. on Friedrichshaven.
[underlined] Route. STUTTGART. [/underlined]
Base – Reading – Beachy Head – 5004N 0122E – 4822N 0542E – 4800N 0750E – STUTTGART – 4852N 0920E – 4840N 0500E – 5004N 0122E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
[underlined] FRIERICHSHAVEN. [/underlined]
Base – Reading – Beachy Head – 5004N 0122E – 4822N 0542E – 4800N 0750E – 4800N 0900E – [symbol] – 4851N 0828E – 4840N 0500E – 5004N 0122E – B. Head – Reading – Base.
[underlined] SUMMARY. STUTTGART [/underlined]
10/10ths cloud. T.I’s visible through cloud. The first Yellows fell on time followed by a further batch some 6-10mls. to the N.E. These followed the marker for 2 separate attacks, both concentrations being backed up by T.I.G. There are no reports of T.Is being dropped outside either of these concentrations. Some a/c dropped sky-markers in preference to T.I’s but generally these were so scattered that they could not be aimed at. Two crews report seeing Red T.Is but in view of cloud conditions it was impossible to identify them with certainty. Glow of good fires was seen above both concentrations & from one particularly large fire in the Northern area smoke was rising above cloud level.
[underlined] FRIERICHSHAVEN. [/underlined] 10/10ths cloud. 1st red T.I’s dropped on time & were seen as a glow above cloud. Only one captain (Q.) was able to make any definite report as to concentration, which he described as good by both Greens & Reds. Two crews report greenish-blue explosion at 0001hrs.
[underlined] RESULTS. PFF [/underlined] The weather was not very suitable for ground-marking and this resulted resulted [sic] in a certain amount of confusion amongst the B/Markers, some of whom dropped their T.I.Y. while others correctly resorted to emergency Wanganui & dropped release point lanes. The result seems to have been 2 separate concentrations about 5-6ms apart on track. No PRU results are so far to hand.
[list by Groups, of aircraft missing]
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134
[underlined] TARGETS: STUTTGART + FRIEDRICHSAVEN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.] [missing information]
[page break]
135
[underlined] 8TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] HANNOVER. 139. BERLIN & MANNEHEIM & AACHEN. 105 & 109. KÖLN.
[underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] BREMEN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
391 Heavies + 25 mediums of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 79 PFF. on HANNOVER. 100 Stirlings + 25 PFF on Bremen. 8 Mosquitoes of 139 on Berlin.
[underlined] Zero hours. [/underlined] HANNOVER. 0130hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+ 20. BREMEN. 0115hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+ BERLIN. 0120hrs.
[underlined] Summary: [/underlined] HANNOVER.
Nil cloud – good vis: Markers of all types were put down well and are reported by all crews as being accurate. Early arrivals reported a few reds backed up by one load of Greens about 3m. N. of [symbol], but these were fortunately ignored. At 0140hrs a few reds were also reported well to the W. of the concentrations but by this time fires were burning very well over the entire area of the centre of the town. One large explosion reported at 0142hrs.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined] HANNOVER. [underlined] BREMEN. [/underlined]
[list by Groups, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
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136
[underlined] TARGETS: HANNOVER & BREMEN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Routes: Base – 5320N 0350E – N. tip of Texel – 5225N 0800 – 5240N 0948E – HANNOVER – 5156N 0918E – [missing information]
[page break]
137
[underlined] 9TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
No operations for heavies. 6 Mosquitoes on BERLIN. [deleted] 4 Mosquitoes on COLOGNE. 4 Mosquitoes on DUISBERG. [/deleted]
[underlined] 10TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 11TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 12TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 13TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
8 Group: 4 Mosquitoes COLOGNE. 4 Mosquitoes DUISBERG. MAKE AND MEND ALL OTHER SQUADRONS.
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138
[underlined] 14TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 15TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 16TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
8 Group. 9 Mosquitoes on DORTMUND. 91 Group. 4 Whitleys – Leaflets. 92 Group. 4 Wellingtons – Leaflets. MAKE AND MEND ALL OTHER SQUADRONS.
[underlined] 17TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
8 Group. 6 Mosquitoes on BERLIN. 3 Mosquitoes on AACHEN. 1 Group. 12 Wellingtons mine-laying. 3 Group. 32 Stirlings mine-laying. 6 Group. 5 Wellingtons mine-laying. 91 Group. 2 Whitleys – Leaflets. 93 Group. 7 Wellingtons – Leaflets. 1 Whitley – Leaflets.
[page break]
139
[underlined] 18TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Area I HANNOVER. Area II. GELSENKIRCHEN. 139. BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: Area I. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
293 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 64 P.F.F. 8 Mosquitoes of 139 squadron on BERLIN.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2015hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+14.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
9/10ths cloud, tops 15/17000ft. 4 crews reported Red T.I’s dropped at 2011hrs & 2016hrs, but the majority of crews bombed either the glow of Green T.I’s on the glow on cloud in the area where T.I Yellow & Green had been seen cascading. One visual marker (‘X’ S/L Manifold) came below cloud and bombed the centre of two cluster of greens approx: 2mls apart. Only one crew reported seeing a sky-marker at 2014hrs. Incendiaries scattered over a wide area. One very large explosion at approx.: 2015hrs.
[underlined] results. [/underlined]
[list by Groups, of aircraft numbers involved and missing]
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140
[underlined] TARGET: HANNOVER. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route: [/underlined] Base – Cromer – 5320N 0350E – N. end of Texel – 5240N 0948E – HANNOVER – 5155N 0920E – 5233N 0436E – 5245N 0330E – Southwold – Base.
[underlined] V/M. [/underlined] After N. end of Texel – 5225N 0820E – 5255N 0835E – 5246N 0849E – 5240N 0948E for route-marking to aid Mosquitoes on Berlin.
[underlined] 19TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] AUGSBURG. [underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] MUNICH
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 3 B/M. 2 V/M. 6 B/Up. 8 Supporters. MUNICH 2 B/M.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 497 Heavies + 83 P.F.F. on Augsburg. 15 Heavies of 1 group + 26 PFF on Munich.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2200hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+18. MUNICH. Z-13. [missing information]
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141
[underlined] 20TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Area I. LEIPZIG. Area II STETTIN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
83 squadron to operate from Warboys.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 281 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 72 P.F.F. on LEIPZIG. 10 Mosquitoes of 139 squadron on BERLIN.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2100hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+11.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 8/10 – 10/10ths cloud. Yellow & Green T.I’s were seen by most crews generally very scattered. The attack seems to have concentrated over an area of at least 100 square miles. Some fires were seen – unable to say in what part of HUNLAND!
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] The attack was completely spoiled by bad weather especially that encountered en-route. Many a/c were iced up & lost their A.S.I.s & other instruments. Also owing to external ice the special equipment went u/s on several a/c & only 3 a/c (R. P/O Slaper & X. S/L Manifold/156) dropped emergency Wanganui flares. A few a/c dropped Yellow T.I & these were widely scattered. Like P.F.F the main force found the weather too much for them with the result that no concentration at all was achieved. The Germans have admitted some damage in Leipzig but there is no reason to suppose that this was anything but the incidental damage which is inevitable in a big raid.
[underlined] Losses. [/underlined] [deleted] KASSEL. [/deleted]
[list by Group, of aircraft losses]
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142
[underlined] TARGET: LEIPZIG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Cromer – 5320N 0350E – N. end of TEXEL – 5253N 0740E – 5236N 1152E – 5202N 1242E – LEIPZIG – 5106N 1211E – 5253N 0740E – N. end of TEXEL – 5320N 0350E – Cromer – Base.
[underlined] 21ST OCTOBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND for all Heavy Squadrons.
8 Group. 1 Mosquito DORTMUND. 3 Mosquitoes BUDERICH (NW. Dusseldorf.) 1 Mosquito AACHEN. 3 Mosquitoes EMDEN
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143
[underlined] 22ND OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] KASSEL..
[underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] FRANKFURT AM MAIN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 474 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 79 P.F.F. on KASSEL. 36 P.F.F. on FRANKFURT.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2055hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+16. Z-25 to Z-16 on FRANKFURT.
[underlined] Summary. KASSEL. [/underlined]
Nil cloud. Good vis: apart from one load of Yellow T.I’s which fell at 2044hrs 5 mins early – the Yellows were accurate and well placed. At least 3 loads of T.I. Red were dropped accurately placed & well concentrated. Green T.I’s backing up very well. Crews on Frankfurt attack on passing Kassel reported very good fires burning. Large explosion seen about 2100hrs. Crews consider a good raid.
[underlined] FRANKFURT. [/underlined] Nil cloud. First Red T.I. fell about 2 mins: early. Red T.I’s intended to scatter over town area. Green T.I’s generally West not good concentration.
[underlined] Results. P.F.F. [/underlined] Technically this was probably the best attack P.F.F. has ever carried out, certainly the best Newhaven against a defended German target. The illuminating and blind-marking was excellently done with a slight tendency to overshoot. All nine visual markers identified the A/P – of the 8 who dropped T.I’s 6 [indecipherable word] so far plotted all within 1ml. of the A/P. The B/Up were nearly as accurate, & there was a good crop of supporter photographs on and around the A/P.
[list by Groups, aircraft types, numbers involved, roles and aircraft missing] [missing information]
[page break]
144
[underlined] TARGET: KASSEL & FRANKFURT. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
145
[underlined] 23RD OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
All heavy squadrons MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 24TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
All heavy squadrons stood down.
2 a/c required for BULLSEYE. ‘P’ F/L Stannard. ‘F’ Sgt. Turner.
[underlined] 1620hrs. [/underlined] Bullseye cancelled.
[underlined] 25TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND for all heavies.
[underlined] 26TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND for all heavy squadrons.
FIDO Demonstration at Graveley.
[underlined] 27TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
35 Squadron on LEVERKUSEN – Scrubbed later.
All other heavies stood down.
[page break]
146
[underlined] 28TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavy squadrons.
[underlined] 29TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavy squadrons.
[underlined] 30TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target.: [/underlined] LUDWIGSHAVEN. 35 on Leverkusen.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 8 B/M – 2 V/M. 6 B/U. 4 Supporters.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2015hrs.
[underlined] 1613hrs. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[underlined] 31ST OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
All heavies stood down.
[underlined] 1ST NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavy squadrons.
[underlined] 2ND NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all squadrons.
[page break]
147
[underlined] 3RD NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] DUSSELDORF.
[underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] COLOGNE.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
DUSSELDORF. [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
COLOGNE. [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Musical Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] Paramatta.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 1945hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-3 to Z+20. [underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] Z-10 to Z-1.
Serrate will be on – Mosquitoes and Beaufighters.
[underlined] SUMMARY. DUSSELDORF. [/underlined]
Nil cloud – good vis: apart from slight haze. The first reds T.I’s & sky markers fell about one minute late. After the first red T.I. had fallen at 1944hrs there was a lapse of about 10 minutes before further reds were dropped. Subsequently concentration of markers appeared to be good and fires in compact area were taking a good hold as the later crews left the target.
[underlined] KÖLN [/underlined] Nil cloud. Considerable haze. Red T.I’s were dropped five minutes early while N/156 was covered by S/Ls. Subsequent Reds fell in line N to S. about 8/10mls in length. Greens were well concentrated around the S. concentration which it is feared may have been BONN.
[underlined] Last Resort. OVERHIT area. [/underlined] T/156. Primary not attacked as first Red T.I’s were dropped early & were ignored by a/c which continued on track for 8 minutes before turning back. After [deleted] about [/deleted] 2 minutes it was decided to drop bombs as otherwise a/c would have
[page break]
148
[underlined] TARGET: DUSSELDORF & COLOGNE. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
1 a/c BONN area – L/156 – Last resort.
Primary not attacked for similar reasons to T/156.
[page break]
149
[underlined] RESULTS: [/underlined]
[underlined] DUSSELDORF. [/underlined]
P.F.F. 8 Group. [list of aircraft type, numbers involved and missing]
[list by Groups, of aircraft type, numbers involved and missing]
[underlined] KÖLN [/underlined]
P.F.F. 8 Group. [list of aircraft type, numbers involved and missing]
[underlined] 4TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
Make & Mend.
[underlined] 5TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] 6TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
Mosquitoes on BOCHUM, DUISBERG, DUSSELDORF.
‘K’ W/C WHITE ‘X’ S/L MANIFOLD Hooded flare demonstration at RUSHFORD.
[page break]
150
[underlined] 7TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] AUGSBURG.
[underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] MUNICH.
[underlined] A/C required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 524 heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 70 PFF. on AUGSBURG. 15 Heavies of 1 Group + 41 PFF.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] AUGSBURG – Newhaven. MUNICH – Parramatta.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0300hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+16.
Serrate will be on – Mosquitoes & Beaufighters. Mosquitoes also operating North & South of Augsburg against Night fighters.
[underlined] Briefing [/underlined] 1700hrs.
[underlined] 2120hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED. 10/10ths cloud over the target.
‘BULLSEYE’ ‘N’ F/O DOCHERTY.
[page break]
151
[underlined] 8TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] AUGSBURG.
[underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] MUNICH.
[underlined] A/C required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 339 Heavies + 72 P.F.F on AUGSBURG. 15 Heavies + 42 P.F.F on MUNICH.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] AUGSBURG – Newhaven. MUNICH – Paramatta.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 03015hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] AUGSBURG. Z-6 to Z+!2. MUNICH. Z-12 to Z.
12 Beaufighters operating in the Bomber stream. 12 Mosquitoes intruding.
[underlined] 2205hrs. [/underlined] OPERATION CANCELLED.
[underlined] 9TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRIEDRICHSHAVEN.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
152
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 312 Lancasters + 90 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0400hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+12.
[underlined] A/P [/underlined] The main shed of the old Zeppelin works. Possibility of diversions.
[underlined] 1700hrs. [/underlined] MAIN OPERATION cancelled.
[underlined] 10TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] KÖNIGSBERG.
[underlined] Alternative: [/underlined] DANZIG.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 8 B/M. 2 V/M. 3 B/Up. 8 Supporters.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2100hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+10.
[underlined] Briefing [/underlined] 1330hrs.
[underlined] 1345hrs [/underlined] Area I & II both cancelled. [underlined] Target: [/underlined] MODANE.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 240 Heavies of 1 & 5 Groups + 75 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0300hrs. . [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-7 to Z+12.
[underlined] 1645hrs. [/underlined] Zero hour changed to 0100hrs.
[underlined] 1730hrs. [/underlined] Briefing.
[page break]
153
[underlined] TARGET: - MODANE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Base – Reading – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – 4735N 0045E – 4512N 0542E – MODANE – 4735N 0120E – Cabourg – Selsey Bill – Reading – Base.
[page break]
154
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Nil cloud – slight haze in the valley. First red T.I dropped at approx.: 0057hrs. on or near the A/P. Further reds slightly overshot & a few fell on the mountain side, one very early in the attack – main concentration then formed near bend in river by eastern marshalling yard, greens falling mostly in this area with the exception of one which fell 1-2mls. South. Our visual markers arrived late over the target having been misled by river in valley S. of MODANE. One arrived in time to identify visually, later smoke filled the valley. Some incendiaries overshot to the North.
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] The marking of the target was excellent – timing however was bad & most a/c arrived late. It was intended that the first visual markers should endeavour to visually mark the A/P by moonlight only & if necessary the 2nd lot of visuals should identify by the light of flares dropped by B/Markers.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
The raid was no doubt a great success from every point of view. A large number of plotted photographs show that the largest part of the attack fell exactly where it was intended. Crews reported fires and a number of explosions of varying sizes & some crews are of the opinion that an ammunition train blew up. There is no doubt that full photographic cover of the area will show extensive damage to the marshalling yards & tunnel entrance. The far reaching results of this excellent raid will be felt & much appreciated by the allied armies fighting in Italy.
No a/c were missing from Command.
[underlined] 11TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRIEDRICHSHAVEN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 7 B/M. 3 V/M. 4 B/Up. 7 Supporters.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2230hrs.
[underlined] 1825hrs. [/underlined] MAIN OPERATION CANCELLED.
[underlined] CANNES. [/underlined] attacked by 4 & 6 Group + 35 & 97 squadrons. 4 a/c missing ANTWERP viaduct attacked by 10 Lancs. of 617 squadron.
[page break]
155
[underlined] 12TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[underlined] 13TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[underlined] 14TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[underlined] 15TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[underlined] 16TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target:[/underlined] AREA I. LUDWIGSHAVEN. AREA II. LEVERKUSEN. SPOOF FRANKFURT.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] Area I. Now Leverkusen. 2 B/Up. 6 supporters. Area II. Ludwigshaven. 7 B/M. 1 V/M. 5 B/Up. 6 Supporters. Frankfurt. 3 B/M.
[underlined] Zero hours. [/underlined] Area I. 2000hrs. Area II. 2020hrs. Spoof 2010-12hrs
[underlined] Methods. [/underlined] Area I. Paramatta, Area II. Newhaven.
[missing timing] OPERATIONS cancelled.
[page break]
156
[underlined] 17TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940hrs. [/underlined] All heavies MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 1210hrs.[/underlined] 156 required for target MANNHEIM ‘B’.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list of 156 squadron ‘Y’ aircraft numbers involved]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 70 + P.F.F.
[underlined] Method.. [/underlined] Blind-bombing by means of ‘Y’.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs.
[underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] Mosquitoes of 139 squadron will carry out a spoof attack on BONN. at 1935hrs.
[underlined] TARGET: MANNHEIM. ‘B’ [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: base – reading – Beachy Head – 5010N [missing information]
[page break]
157
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Varying amounts of cloud 7/10ths to nil. The majority of the attack covered an area about 2-2mls. across but some reports show a wide scatter by a few a/c. At about 2007hrs a large explosion resulted in a large fire. Some other fires reported at 2005hrs approximately one red T.I seen dropped about NNW of the target. This was seen by nearly all crews but there are conflicting opinions as to whether dummy or not. Bombing was much hampered by moisture freezing on inside of Perspex. One a/c attacked SCHIFFERSTADT mistaking it for MANNHEIM.
[underlined] 18TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGETS: [/underlined] BERLIN. MANNHEIM.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] BERLIN. Lancasters.
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
Halifaxes [sic] & some Lancasters on MANNHEIM.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] PARAMATTA.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2100hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+12.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 379 Heavies of 1, 3, 5, & 6 Groups + 70 P.F.F.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] A number of crews experienced difficulty with special equipment in identifying Brandenburg, and therefore the Red T.I’s were scattered, and were dropped over a rather longer period of time than briefed. Green T.I’s were difficult to see owing to cloud but were more concentrated than the Red. While thick cloud made observation of results difficult later crews reported seeing glows of fires on cloud. At approximately 2112hrs a large explosion. Spoof fighter flares were considered inaccurate – some crews reporting them having been dropped on the route out of the [symbol]. Apparently only 2 or 3 skymarkers were released.
[page break]
158
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Naisboro’ – 5310N 0400E – 5240N 0900E – 5225N 1235E – BERLIN – 5233N 1350E – 5212N 1350E – 5100N 0930E – 5030N 0720E – CAYEUX – Beachy Head – Base.
Two Cuckoos landed Warboys. W/C Adams. 49 squadron 5 Group. Sgt Shearer. 101 squadron 1 Group.
[underlined] Results. BERLIN. [/underlined] 450 a/c detailed [underlined] MANNHEIM. [/underlined] 401 a/c detailed. [missing information]
[page break]
159
[underlined] 19TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
156 squadron stood down.
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] LEVERKUSEN. 3, 4 & 6 Groups. 10 Mosquitoes + 6 Halifaxes from P.F.F.
[underlined] Results: [/underlined] 5 a/c missing of 267 a/c.
[underlined] 20TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 21ST NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND
[underlined] 22ND NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Sky-marking & Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required [/underlined] [list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 612 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 121 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+20.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 10/10ths cloud tops 10/12,000ft – layers to 20,000ft. First skymarkers were dropped punctually & thereafter fell in unbroken succession throughout attack forming two clusters about 4mls. apart N & S. Some Red & Green T.I’s were seen cascading but quickly disappeared into cloud. A few crews reported seeing Red & Yellows dropped together. Good fires were started which were visible for at least 100mls. many crews reported an unusually large explosion at 2022hrs.
[page break]
160
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base. Cromer. – 5310N 0400E – 5240N 0900E – 5236N 1221E – BERLIN – 5225N 1350E -5200N 1350E – 5223N 1200E – 5240N 0900E – 5310N 0400E – CROMER. BASE.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] [list by Groups of aircraft types and numbers missing]
P.F.F. – “The squeals of the enemy point to a most highly successful attack”.
[page break]
161
[underlined] 23RD NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Paramatta.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 329 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 90 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+15.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 9/10ths cloud. All crews report good concentration with skymarkers in a line approx.: N & S. about 1 ml. in length – one isolated about 4m. N.E. Glow of fires over whole area & smoke seen coming through cloud.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined] German Communiqué – 1300hrs. 24.11.43. On the evening of 23 November the Reich capital was again attacked by strong British formations. This terror raid caused more damage in several districts. In addition to residential districts, numerous public buildings, including churches, welfare institutions & cultural monuments were destroyed. Fighter formations & A.A of the Luftwaffe in spite of difficult conditions for defence shot down 19 E/A.
[list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
P.F.F. [list of aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
[page break]
162
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Cromer – 5310N 0400E – 5240N 0900E – 5236N 1221E – BERLIN – 5225N 1350E – 5200N 1350E – 5223N 1200E – 5240N 0900E – 5310N 0400E – Cromer – Base.
[page break]
163
[underlined] 24TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[deleted] Target: [/deleted] MAKE & MEND ALL HEAVIES
[underlined] 25TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] LANCASTERS – BERLIN. HALIFAXES – FRANKFURT.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 2 Primary B/Markers. 4 Sec: B/Markers. 6 Supporters.
[underlined] FRANKFURT. [/underlined] [list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] BERLIN. 2115hrs. FRANKFURT 2000hrs.
[underlined] Z1340hrs. [/underlined] Zero hours changed Berlin – 1345hrs Frankfurt – 0230hrs.
[underlined] 1450hrs. [/underlined] Zero hours changed again BERLIN – 0400hrs. FRANKFURT – 0245hrs. T.O.T. Z-5 to Z+10.
[underlined] 2230hrs. [/underlined] BERLIN cancelled – Supporters transferred to Frankfurt.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] NEWHAVEN
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] [deleted] 426 [/deleted] [inserted] 215 [/inserted] Heavies + 33 P.F.F.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] Apparently winds were much stronger than given in Met. Forecast. This combined with conditions of 9-10/10ths cloud varying from 19/15,000ft has obviously resulted in a scattered attack. Most crews report seeing Red T.I’s going quickly into cloud, but it is thought that these are just as likely to have been sky-markers in their initial stages as any attempt on the part of the Hun to simulate T.I. Red. One crew reports being able to see below cloud on return and to have seen fairly good fires burning. Many crews report a large fire burning in France – believed to be Lille.
[page break]
164
[underlined] TARGET: FRANKFURT. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: BASE – Reading – Beachy Head – 5020N 0130E 5015N 0800E – FRANKFURT – 5000N 0100E – 4945N 0900E – 5020N 0130E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
[underlined] RESULTS & SUCCESS.. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. Analysis. [/underlined] It is inevitable that an attack carried out under unexpected cloud conditions such as those over Frankfurt must spread very badly. Many main force were reduced to bombing on what markers they could see before they disappeared into cloud.
P.F.F. [list of aircraft type, numbers involved and missing] [list by Groups, of aircraft type, numbers involved and missing]
[page break]
165
[underlined] 26TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Targets: [/underlined] BERLIN. STUTTGART.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] STUTTGART. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] BERLIN – Paramatta. STUTTGART – Newhaven.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] BERLIN – 384 Heavies + 74 P.F.F. STUTTGART – 170 Heavies + 31 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hours: [/underlined] BERLIN. 2115hrs [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+12. STUTTGART. 2030hrs [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+8.
[underlined] SUMMARIES. BERLIN. [/underlined]
Large break occurred in cloud over [symbol]. One salvo of Red & Yellow T.I’s seen at 2113hrs and although small clusters of T.I. Red fell to the N.W. & to the S.E. the main backing up appears to have concentrated [indecipherable word] the T.I. Red & yellow. Later in the attack incendiaries seemed to be undershooting but fires were burning in the centre of the city.
[underlined] STUTTGART. [/underlined]
8-9/10ths thin cloud tops 8,000ft. Sky-markers & T.I. Yellow were dropped on time and also some T.I. Red were seen cascading. There was a concentration of T.I. Yellow & T.I. Green covering a fairly wide area. Good fires were seen burning through cloud. Few signs of night fighters over the [symbol] but great activity of all sorts – flak, S/Ls & many fighter flares around Frankfurt.
[underlined] ROUTE – BERLIN.[/underlined]
BASE – READING – BEACHY HEAD – 5020N 0130E – 5020N 0910E – 5215N 1210E – BERLIN – 5240N 1350E – [missing information]
[page break]
166
[underlined] TARGETS: BERLIN AND STUTTGART. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.] [missing information]
[page break]
167
[underlined] 26TH NOVEMBER 1943 (cont:) [/underlined]
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. Analysis. [/underlined] The only Special B/Markers to bomb dropped his T.I’s 8mls. N.W. of the A/P. These T.I’s attracted a considerable proportion of backing up and bombing, but luckily the attack appeared to have spread mostly to the SE of this position under the influence of normal ‘Y’ a/c. The centre of the area marked by B/Markers appears to have been about 5mls. W. of the A/P. Considerable damage has clearly been caused in the area to the North & West of the Tiergarten.
[underlined] BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
[underlined] STUTTGART. [/underlined]
[list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
[underlined] 27TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
ALL HEAVIES MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
168
[underlined] 28TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
All Heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 29TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
All Heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 30TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MUNICH
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] BERLIN.
[list of 156 squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2015hrs.
[underlined] 1551hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 1ST DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] LEIPZIG.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 6 Primary B/M. 5 Sec: B/M. 2 V/M. 3 B/U. 5 Supporters.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs.
[underlined] 2233hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[page break]
169
[underlined] 2ND DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 543 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 107 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs. altered later to 2006hrs.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Paramatta.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
5/10ths cloud tops 5,000ft. First Red T.I’s were apparently dropped at 2004hrs. and owing to different cloud cover conditions varying reports have been submitted by crews some not seeing T.I’s. Opinions generally seems to be that Markers were scattered along a line running approximately 3m. N-S with concentrations at extremities. From Special equipment observations it seems that the Southern concentration was probably in the centre of the city. Last [deleted] er [/deleted] B/Up on confirm that the fires confirmed with there [sic] impressions. Several crews reported dense clouds of smoke rising.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Plotted photographs cannot show a complete picture due to the cloud cover but it is probable that the greatest part of the raid was dropped in the S.E outskirts of Berlin.
[list by Groups, of aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing] [missing information]
[page break]
170
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: - BASE – HAISBORO’ – 5250N 0330E – 5235N 0440E – 5238N 1004E – 5236N 1220E – BERLIN – 5230N 1350E – 5255N 1350E – 5238N 1004E – 5235N 0440E – 5250N 0330E – HAISBORO’ – BASE.
[page break]
171
[underlined] 3RD DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Area I. LEIPZIG. Area II. BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 465 Heavies + 106 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0400hrs.
Mosquitoes of 627 and 139 squadrons will carry on from 5225N 1225E to BERLIN following a Spoof attack.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
10/10ths thin cloud – tops above 6,000ft. First T.I’s and sky-markers fell about 3 minutes early. A good concentration of T.I. Red developed and, according to experienced crews the best concentration of sky markers yet achieved. There was a slight overshoot of one T.I. Red to the South. T.I. Green backed up well though a few followed the overshoot. However in its later stages the concentration seemed to tighten up. Several explosions were seen, one large one at 0403hrs approximately – glow of many fires was seen & black smoke rising through cloud. Fighter flares seen on the way in. Out from the target route markers S. of Koblenz were very scattered some being dropped N. of Frankfurt. It seems that the HUN is becoming familiar with this route into the target and that night fighters wait near Hannover for routemarkers then follow the Bomber stream.
[underlined] Success. & Results. [/underlined]
Daylight cover confirms the success of the attack. The W. area of the city was covered by smoke rising to a great height & in the E. half of the target area upwards of 20 good fires were still burning furiously.
[page break]
172
[underlined] TARGET: LEIPZIG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: BASE – HAISBORO’ – 5250N 0330E – 5235N 0435E – 5240N 0810E – 5225N 1222E – LEIPZIG – 5105N 1205E – 5015N 0740E – 5010N 0130E – BEACHY HEAD – READING – BASE.
[list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing] [missing information]
[page break]
173
[underlined] 4TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
All heavies MAKE & MEND.
8 Group, 9 Mos: FLAMBURG. 5 Primary. 1, 3, & 4 Groups mine-laying.
[underlined] 5TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 6TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 7TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND. SECURITY FILMS SHOWN.
[underlined] 8TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 9TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
174
[underlined] 10TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 11TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 12TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 13TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 14TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 15TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
175
[underlined] 16TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 400 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 91 P.F.F. + 15 Mosquitoes.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Wanganui & Paramatta.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 10/10ths thick cloud about 7,000ft. First red T.I’s & Sky-markers dropped early at 1956hrs. Early in the attack concentration of sky markers appeared to be fairly good, but in the later stages more ragged, stretching across the [symbol] from E – W. From H2S observations it would appear that the main weight of the attack fell on the centre of the city. Thick cloud prevented observation of T.I’s on the ground except as a vague glow. Many crews reported dummy Red T.I’s several miles to the N & NE of the target. Numerous fighter flares were seen from the Dutch coast to beyond the [symbol]. ‘Spoof’ fighter flares were seen being dropped & 2 crews report seeing fighters heading for them. Fighters were also reported as crossing the Dutch coast to the first turning point at sea to meet the a/c.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[list by Groups, of aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing
Visibility on return was extremely bad and a number of a/c crashed on landing.
[deleted] 19.12.43 [/deleted]
[page break]
176
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – 5250N 0330E – 5235N 0440E – 5238N 1005E – 5238N 1220E – BERLIN – 5243N 1400E – 5455N 1143E – 5525N 0938E – 5523N 0825E – 5510N 0700E – Base.
[page break]
177
[underlined] 17TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 18TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 19TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
One crew of 5 Group – mission 16/17-12-43 reported picked up by launches looking for ‘W’ F/L Aubert.
[underlined] 20TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRANKFURT.[underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] MANNHEIM.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[underlined] FRANKFURT. [/underlined] [list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 600 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5, & 6 Groups + 93 P.F.F. on Frankfurt. 27 Heavies P.F.F. + 30 Heavies of 1 Group on Mannheim.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] FRANKFURT 1935 MANNHEIM 1925.
Intruders operating.
[page break]
178
[underlined] TARGETS: FRANKFURT AND MANNHEIM. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE. Base – Southwold – 5130N 0440E – 5032N 0510E – 5015N 0730E – FRANKFURT/MANNHEIM – (5005N 0905E 4930N 0902E) 5030N 0900E – 5032N 0510E – 5130N 0440E 5215N 0300E – Southwold – Base.
[page break]
179
[underlined] 20TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined] (CONT:)
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] FRANKFURT.
6-9/10ths strato cm. with large breaks. First T.I. Yellows dropped on time. Some crews report they dropped early and one fell short over Wiesbaden. One of our supporters bombed these. T.I. Yellows then formed a rather scattered line E – W across the target. Backers up on later in the attack reported a circular concentration of T.I. Yellow with T.I. Red falling NW at approx: 1932hrs & others up to 10m. NE. T.I. Green were dropped approx: in the centre of the Yellows. Fires were very scattered following 2 concentrations but burning well. Large explosion 1947hrs.
[underlined] MANNHEIM. [/underlined]
2-3/10ths cloud. Red T.I’s dropped very accurately & well backed up by Greens. From visual identification crews report that Reds fell between marshalling yards & Rhine. Good fires started.
[underlined] P.F.F. RESULTS. [/underlined] FRANKFURT.
The timing of the B/Markers was very good. Owing to cloud conditions no visual markers were able to identify the A/P. backers up had great difficulty in selecting the centre of T.I. Yellow as these were confused with the flames. The flares drifted rapidly Eastwards & tended to produce an overshoot & considerable scatter. Plotted photographs stretch from the A/P up to 5m. E & SE.
[underlined] MANNHEIM. [/underlined] Little of the attack can have fallen in Ludwigshaven but it is probable that some damage was caused to parts of MANNHEIM. Photographs show 3-8mls. overshoot .
P.F.F. 3 missing. Command 42 a/c.
[underlined] 21ST DECEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
180
[underlined] 22ND DECEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 23RD DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 353 Heavies 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 90 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Paramatta.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2045hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+12.
Mosquitoes Spoof on Leipzig – Fighter flares on Berlin & Routemarking.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] put back to 0400hrs.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] Attack opened on time the first reds being seen at 0357.5hrs. Red T.I’s visible as a glow on cloud well concentrated. At 0407hrs 11 skymarkers seen over [symbol]. One Green fell to E of main concentration. Dummy reds seen to N.W. From H2S observations it would appear that the attack began well on the A/P with a tendency to spread slightly to the E & SE. Several large explosions reported – one at 0410hrs.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
16 a/c missing.
[page break]
181
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – 5220N 0300E – 5030N 0608E – 5033N 0940E – 5050N 1227E – 5205N 1310E – [symbol] – 5302N 1327E – 5235N 0943E – 5240N 0300E – Southwold – Base.
[page break]
182
[underlined] 24TH DECEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE and MEND all Heavies.
CHRISTMAS EVE.
[hand drawing of holly] [underlined] 25TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET.[/underlined] BERLIN. Present from BUTCH.
[underlined] 1000hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED!!
[underlined] 26TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND
[underlined] 27TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[underlined] Message from A.O.C. [/underlined] All crews to fly today to blow the alchohol [sic] out of their lungs.
BATTLE CRUISER ‘SCHARNHORST’ sunk off NORWAY.
[underlined] 28TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[page break]
183
[underlined] 29TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 604 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 106 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+18.
[underlined] Spoof Attacks. [/underlined] Leipzig & Magdeburg. By Mosquitoes.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Wanganui and Paramatta.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 10/10ths cloud – tops 6/10,000ft. The first T.I’s & skymarkers were dropped punctually at 1958hrs or slightly before T.I’s disappeared quickly into cloud, but a good concentration of skymarkers was achieved in a line E to W. H2S observations appear to indicate that the concentration was slightly to the SE of the centre of the city. Two crews report seeing T.I. Red & skymarkers 20m. S. of Berlin at 1949hrs. There are few definite reports of fires burning as glow was difficult to distinguish from that of Red T.I’s. Fighter flares mostly seen between Dummer See [sic] & Leipzig.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Reports are consistent in reporting a reasonable concentration. The enemy has become remarkably reticent on the results of the recent raids on Berlin. All the evidence however seems to point to this raid being successful.
19 a/c missing.
[page break]
184
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Cromer – 5320N 0400E – 5230N 0820E – 5137N 1220E – [symbol] – 5302N 1327E – 5300N 1145E – 5245N 0830E – 5320N 0400E – Cromer – Base.
[page break]
185
[underlined] 30H DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 31ST DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRANKFURT.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 156 Squadron. 8 P.B/M. 2 V/M. 3 B.B/U. 2 V.B/U. 6 Supporters.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 508 a/c of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups. 110 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 1945hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+15.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed.
[underlined] 1459hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 1ST JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] WHITEBAIT.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 369 a/c of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 87 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0300hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+12.
[page break]
186
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: Base – Southwold – 5240N 0330E – 5238N 0438E – 5250N 0912E – 5236N 1220E – BERLIN – 5210N 1338N [sic] – 5050N 1210E – 5030N 0720E – 5030N 0135E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] First sky-markers dropped on time, T.I’s were invisible owing to cloud. Skymarkers fairly concentrated at the beginning, tending to scatter over a line about 4mls. N – S. No fires seen. Large explosion at 0306hrs.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[missing information] P.F.F. Success. Impossible to assess results [missing information]
[page break]
187
[underlined] 2ND JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 320 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 85 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0315hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+14.
Changed to 0245hrs owing to change of route.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
[blank]
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Practically impossible to assess success of raid but crews were more optimistic than on the previous nights raid in their reports. Main force groups report the concentration of release point flares as good.
8 Group 10 missing Command 18 missing
[page break]
188
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: Base – Southwold – 5245N 0330E – 5250N 0850E – 5325N 1240E – BERLIN – 5210N 1310E – 5150N 1030E – 5230N 0820E – 5245N 0330E – Southwold Base.
[page break]
189
[underlined] 3RD JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 4TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 5TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] STETTIN. [underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 325 Heavies 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 92 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven or Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0345hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+12.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Nil cloud, vis: good, haze nil, snow on ground, cloud bank crossed target. Short duration. Apart from one or two reports of Red & Green T.I’s being dropped early, particularly T.I. Green, the markers achieved a good concentration. White flares were considered unnecessary due to very good visibility & snow. The visual marker definitely identified the A/P. Red T.I’s were considered a little scattered with some falling on the islands on the E. side of the River Oder in the Freihafen area. Attack generally considered very concentrated & successful. One large explosion seen about 0409hrs.
[page break]
190
[underlined] TARGET: STETTIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE. BASE – 5600N 0600E – 5600N 1300E – 5405N 1323E – STETTIN – 5325N 1450E – 5500N 1505E – 5600N 1300E – 5600E [sic] 0600E – Base.
[underlined] RESULTS & SUCCESS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Doubtless a good attack – plotted night photographs & crews reports are most optimistic. Judging by plotted photographs from this group there seems to have been a slight spread to the west [missing words]
[page break]
191
[underlined] 6TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 7TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 8TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Z633.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 156 Squadron. 3 B.M.I. 1 V/M. 3 Supporters.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2030hrs.
[underlined] 1605hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 9TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 10TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
192
[underlined] 11TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 12TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 13TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 14TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BRUNSWICK.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 416 of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 93 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven. or Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 1915hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+12.
[page break]
193
[underlined] TARGET: BRUMSWICK. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: Base – Haisboro’ – 5305N 0400E – 5250N 0930E – BRUNSWICK – 5200N 1030E – 5230E [sic] 0820E – 5305N 0400E – Haisboro’ – Base.
[page break]
194
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
First markers. Green T.I’s & skymarkers R/Green stars were reported dropped at 1907.5hrs. The concentration was considered good at the commencement, stringing out in a line of attack 5/7 miles long subsequently. There appears to have been a gap of about 7 mins from approx: 1912 – 1919hrs in the skymarkers, with but an occasional Green T.I after 1912hrs. There is a suspicion that dummy T.I. Reds were dropped. One marker dropped T.I. Yellow over the target, together with T.I. Green & sky-markers at 1907hrs. No concrete results to report due to cloud & only small glow seen by crews on return journey, although last backer up reports good glow on cloud. Magdeburg ‘spoof’ considered too near. Many N/F flares over target in line of track in & particularly out. Concentration of N/F N & NE of Hannover.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
38 a/c missing.
[underlined] 15TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 16TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 17TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
195
[underlined] 18TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 19TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 20TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 659 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 112 P.F.F. & Mosquitoes.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 1935hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+18.
[underlined] SUMMARY [/underlined]
10/10ths cloud tops 8,000ft with small breaks. First skymarkers & T.I. Red were dropped on time. T.I.’s disappeared very quickly into cloud, & sky markers formed two concentrations, one big & one small, which were soon joined in a line about 2 – 3 miles long running approx.: parallel to track NW – SE. According to H2S checking the larger concentration was over the centre of the city, possibly a little to the E. There was a gap in the sky-marking of about 3 mins – 1944 – 1947hrs. Large explosion seen in S. part of [symbol]. 1942hrs.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Difficult to assess results owing to cloud.
[page break]
196
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: base – 5425N 0400E – 5245N 0800E – 5337N 1055E – 5328N 1240E – BERLIN – 5220N 1330E – 5138N 1220E – 5207N 0750E – 5338N 0532E – 5340N 0400E – Cromer – Base.
[page break]
197
[underlined] 21ST JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MAGDEBURG.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 560 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 117 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven or Wanganui if necessary.
[underlined] Zero. [/underlined] 2300hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+18. [underlined] Berlin [/underlined] 2253hrs.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
Thin layer cloud 8-8/10ths – clear to SE. Some crews report T.I. Red dropped with T.I. Green in fairly good concentration. The T.I. Red is reported short of target. Skymarkers were well concentrated and in general bombing good, although incendiaries reported well to S. of [symbol]. Fires burning well with smoke well up to 12,000ft. Glow of fires seen at coast on return. Large explosion at 2309hrs.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] 9 a/c missing. It is feared that the main weight of the raid fell to the East and S.E of the town, and little damage is likely in the town centre.
[underlined] Command. [/underlined] 54 a/c missing.
[page break]
198
[underlined] TARGET: MAGDEBURG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
199
[underlined] 22ND JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 23RD JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 24TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies make & mend.
[underlined] 25TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRANKFURT
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
156 Squadron. 3 B.M.I. I V/M. 4 B.B.U. 2 Vis: B/U. 9 Supporters.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 638 Heavies + 107 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method [/underlined] Newhaven – Emergency Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2050hrs.
Mosquitoes precede Main attack dropping Window. Other Mosquitoes to act as spoof markers on Stuttgart & Karlsruhe.
[underlined] 1635hrs. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[underlined] 2125hrs. [/underlined] N.T.U. a/c F/L [indecipherable word] crashed at Ramsey.
[page break}
200
[underlined] 26TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 27TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 422 Lancasters of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 84 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2030hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+12.
Mosquitoes drop Window from Dummer See to Berlin. Mosquitoes drop route-markers. Mosquitoes drop spoof fighter flares. 12 Mosquitoes attach AACHEN with T.I. Green & bombs.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] The attack opened on time & two of the early crews reported a good initial concentration of R/P flares. Later there was a spread in a line or crescent formation, variously reported at different times in the attack as being E – W and N – S and from 1/2 ml to as much as 8mls. in length. T.Is quickly disappeared in cloud. Glows of good fires was seen and some crews reported this as being visible for 100mls. after leaving the target. One crew reported a large fire 30m. S.W. of Berlin. Routemarker flares red steady were reported as accurately placed except at Pos: Q which was thought to be about 10mls. S. of track. Crews [missing information]
[page break]
201
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Cromer – 5345N 0430E – 5155N 1010E – 5237N 1158E – 5235N 1150E – BERLIN – 5215N 1350E – 5050N 1210E – 5030N 0735E – 5020N 0132E – Dungeness – Bradwell Bay – Base.
[page break]
202
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 1 a/c P.F.F. missing.
[underlined] P.F.F. Analysis. [/underlined] There is no evidence of the concentration achieved and crews’ reports vary considerably. It appears however that there was a considerable spread up and down wind as would be expected, and that the initial marking was rather spread but tended to become more concentrated later. Owing to complete lack of photographic evidence of all kinds it is impossible to give any accurate estimate of the success achieved. There is every reason to expect however that this raid has added further considerable damage to the already extensive devastation.
[underlined] 28TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 566 Heavies + 113 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0315hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+15.
Mosquitoes drop window & drop T.I. Red on Hannover.
[page break]
203
[underlined] Target: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Cromer – 5510N 0700E – 5510N 1035E – Berlin – 5223N 1345E – 5235N 1405E – 5510N 1010E – 5510N 0700E – Cromer – Base.
4 Halifaxes P.F.F. Sylt. 63 Stirlings of 3 Group Mine-laying Sylt area.
[page break]
204
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
First R/P flares fell at 0309/0310hrs. The attack then opened on time. Crews report that a good concentration of R/P flares was achieved and well maintained throughout although there were a few to the South of the main concentration. Most crews reported that the glow of T.I’s could be seen below cloud but attack was apparently Wanganui. One very big explosion was seen at 0314hrs, second at 0325hrs, third at 0349hrs and one a/c saw one at 0400hrs when well away from the target. The 0325hrs. explosion reported to be vivid green. Spoof flares & Yellow T.Is seen.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
P.F.F. 6 a/c missing. Command. 43 missing
[underlined] P.F.F. Summary. [/underlined] Again very difficult to assess owing to lack of observation of results and night photographs, but crews who have been to Berlin a number of times during the series of attacks were unanimous in considering it the best attack on Berlin so far. A very impressive fire area was seen by later crews & the glow on the clouds could be seen for a distance of 165mls. on the homeward journey. Many impressive explosions were reported in the target area & one at Z-1 was unanimously reported as being the largest & most violent explosion a lot of the crews taking part in the attack had seen. [deleted] When [/deleted]
[page break]
205
[underlined] 29TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 30TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Goodwood on BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 392 heavies + 94 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2015hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+12.
Mosquitoes to drop window & spoof fighter flares on target, also spoof red flares. Mosquitoes to act as fire watchers after attack. Mosquitoes also drop T.I. Red & Green on Brunswick.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 10/10ths st.cm. tops 12,000ft. Skymarker concentration from the beginning was very good with a few strays, & this concentration appears to have been maintained throughout the attack. Little was seen of results while a/c were over the target but on the way home later crews report a large glow from the target. One crew reported a dummy T.I. Red at least 10mls. N. of the target, darker in colour than our own – fell very slowly before going into cloud. Our own T.Is were only visible for approx.: 30 before disappearing in cloud.
[page break]
206
[underlined] Target: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: Base – 5435N 0500E – 5438N 1100E – BERLIN – 5200N 1325E -5200N 0920E – 5240N 0800E – 5250N 0400E – Southwold – Base.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] P.F.F. 8 a/c missing
Thick cloud over the target made results exceptionally difficult to judge, but main force crews were enthusiastic as to the concentration of R/P flares. The glow of large fires was seen in the later half of [missing words]
[page break]
207
[underlined] 31ST JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 1ST FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 2ND FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 3RD FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
Newish crews required for Cross Country and T.I. Demonstration at Whittlesey and Rushford Ranges. ’W’ W/O Trotter. Marker. ‘H’ F/O Cameron. ‘S’ Sgt. Cuthilll. ‘L’ F/S Doyle. ‘F’ P/O Samson.
2105hrs. Exercise abandoned owing to enemy activity.
[underlined] 4TH FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[page break]
208
[underlined] 5TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend. Mosquitoes on BERLIN.
[underlined] 6TH FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavy a/c of P.F.F. to take part in Navigational exercise.
1245hrs. Exercise postponed on account of weather.
“SOMEBODY TALKED” security film shown in Officers’ Mess.
[underlined] 7TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
Navigation exercise postponed.
“SOMEBODY TALKED” shown in Sergeants’ Mess.
[underlined] 8TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
Navigational exercise to take place.
[list of navigational exercise aircraft identifier letter and pilots]
[missing information]
[page break]
209
[underlined] 9TH FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend. T.I. trials scrubbed.
[underlined] 10TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
VISIT OF KING & QUEEN.
1245. King & Queen visited Ops Room.
G/Capt. Collins posted to R.A.F. Bourne. G/Capt. Searby to R.A.F. Warboys.
[underlined] 11TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 12TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
All heavies P.F.F. Navigational Exercise.
1613hrs. Exercise cancelled.
[underlined] 13TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN. Spoof: FRANKFURT-ON-ODER.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] BERLIN: 2 P.B.M. 4 B.B.U. 3 V.B.U. 5 Supporters. FRANKFURT: 2Y. BB/U.
[page break]
210
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 594 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 91 P.F.F.
[underlined] 1555hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 14TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 15TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN. [underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] FRANKFURT-ON-ODER.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
BERLIN. 2 P.B.M. 3 B.B.U. 6 V.B.U. 4 Supporters. FRANKFURT. 3 B.M. 3 B.U. Kiel Fjord: - 4 a/c of 35 Squadron.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 703 heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 96 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2115hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+20.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta & Wanganui mixed.
[underlined] Route: [/underlined] Base – 5450N 1100E – 5525N 0700E – 5510N 1000E – 5430N 1230E – [symbol] – 5210N 1250E – 5240N 1100E – 5240N 0855E – 5340N 0400E – Haisboro’ – Base.
Mosquitoes dropping spoof route-markers – fighter flares – window. 6 [deleted] / [/deleted] M/139 act as firewatchers after main attack is over.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] The attack appeared to have opened early, some crews reported seeing first Wanganui flares & Red T.Is as early as 2110hrs. Reports on concentration of Wanganui flares vary considerably, some stating they fell in tight cluster while others say they were very scattered. The general impression, however, is that they spread but in a line or arc SW/NE. Owing to thick 10/10ths cloud T.Is were not visible for long & possibly for the same reason no glow of good fires could
[page break]
211
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN & FRANKFURT-ON-ODER. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
212
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
P.F.F. Missing 7 a/c
[underlined] P.F.F. Analysis. [/underlined]
Results difficult to assess although a glow of fires was reported crews did not think they were as plentiful as on previous attacks. Mosquitoes over the target after the attack finished however report large areas of effective fires burning in the city, and the column of smoke which rose to 20,000ft was particularly impressive. T.I. is practically impossible to say for certain which area of Berlin received the main weight of the attack, but crews who checked the position on navigational aids were of the opinion that the attack opened slightly to the West of the city area & spread in later stages towards the centre.
[underlined] 16TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required 1st Wave. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] 2nd Wave. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hours: [/underlined] 1st Wave. 2125hrs. 2nd Wave 2330hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+8.
[underlined] Strength of Attack: [/underlined] 57 P.F.F. + 280 Main Force. 55 P.F.F. + 270 main Force.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] 1503hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[page break]
213
[underlined] 17TH FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN. [underlined] Alternative: [/underlined] LEIPZIG.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
156. 1st Wave: 3 P.B.M. 3 B.B.U. 2 V.B.U. 4 supporters. 2nd Wave: 3 P.B.M. 3 B.B.U. 1. V.B.U. 2 Supporters.
[underlined] Strength of Attack: [/underlined] 615 Heavies + 110 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hours: [/underlined] 1st Wave: 2135hrs. LEIPZIG. 2150hrs. 2nd Wave: 0055hrs. LEIPZIG. 0005hrs.
[underlined] 1600hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 18TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 156: 8 P.B.M. 4 B.B.U. 4 V.B.U. 5 Supporters.
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] 0330hrs.
[underlined] Routes: [/underlined] Alternative route home for a/c on [symbol] after Z+8.
[underlined] 1215hrs [/underlined] Snow Warning.
[underlined] 1639hrs. [/underlined] ALL OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 19TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] LEIPZIG.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
214
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 736 Heavies 0f 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 108 P.F.F. 4H/35 + 50 Stirlings gardening Kiel Fjord.
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] 0400hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+19.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Wanganui & paramatta.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
First Wanganui flares and red T.Is dropped about 4” early. A good concentration of Wanganui flares quickly formed in oval formation NE/SW. One load of skymarkers fell 5 to 10mls South of main concentration but was not backed up. Skymarking was well maintained until 0405hrs when there was a gap of about 4 minutes after which marking was resumed but more sparsely than before. Another gap of a few minutes occurred at about 0400hrs. Only a vague glow of T.I’s was visible through cloud.
Glow of good fires could be seen through cloud in later stages with dense clouds of black smoke rising above 10,000ft. large explosions reported at 0358, 0435 & 0438hrs.
[page break]
215
[underlined] Target: LEIPZIG [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
216
[underlined] 20TH FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] STUTTGART.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method [/underlined] Mixed Wanganui & Paramatta.
[underlined] Strength of Attack: [/underlined] 597 Heavies + 103 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] 0400hrs.
[page break]
217 (last page)
Feb 20th, 1944.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
[photograph] F/S WINTERSON. [photograph] P/O GROVE. [photograph] SGT. SMITH. [photograph] SGT. DUCHENÉ [photograph] SGT. BEMBRIDGE. F/O. RYAN. [photograph] F/O. GENTLE. [photograph] SGT. WALEMBY. [photograph] SGT. HEDGE. [photograph] F/L AUBERT. [photograph] F/L SAMUEL. [photograph] F/S FISHER. [photograph] F/L MACKAY. [photograph] F/O PETRIDES. [photograph] P/O HALPERIN. [photograph] F/S HOOPER.
[page break]
Names of the 5 photographs from BOTTOM LINE OF PREVIOUS PAGE.
F/L LITTLE, F/O FLYNN, SGT .JONES, SGT. MACLACHLAN, SGT. TRUMAM
[photograph] F/O SMITH. [photograph] P/O SMITH. [photograph] F/O PHILPS. [photograph] SGT. CORDRAY. [photograph] F/O GOODWIN. [photograph] SGT. MARSHALL. [photograph] F/L VINCENT. [photograph] SGT. CLARKE. [photograph] SGT. HATWELL. [photograph] SGT. SWINNEY. [photograph] SGT. HODGES. [photograph] S/L SAMMY HALL. [photograph] F/L YOUNG. [photograph] SGT. [indecipherable name]. [photograph] P/O [indecipherable name]. [photograph] SGT. [indecipherable name] [missing photograph] SGT. HODGES. [photograph] SGT. [indecipherable name]. [photograph] W/C DUIGAN. [photograph] SGT. KING. [photograph] S/L MANDENO. [photograph] Sgt. Forbes. [photograph] [indecipherable name]. [photograph] SGT. CURTIS. [5 indecipherable names]
[page break]
[photograph] SGT. MARSON. [photograph] SGT. WILLETT. [photograph] SGT. OTTEY. [photograph] SGT. EDWARDS. [photograph] SGT. SHACKLADY. [photograph] SGT. BOWMAN. [photograph] SGT. BROWN. [photograph] F/S STEWART. [photograph] SGT. HAVARD. [photograph] SGT. HANDLEY. [photograph] SGT. THORINGTON. [photograph] P/O KERRY. [photograph] P/O CARTER. [photograph] SGT. DURAT. [photograph] SGT. DALTON. [photograph] SGT. CHAPMAN. P/O ROBERTS [photograph] P/O THOMPSON. [photograph] SGT. WILKINSON. [photograph] F/L CRAMPTON. [photograph] SGT. SCOTT. [photograph] F/O WOODSEND. [photograph] P/O BAGG. [photograph] SGT. LEADER.
[page break]
[photograph] W/C DONALDSON. [photograph] S/L LAWSON. [photograph] F/O DRAKE. [photograph] SGT. LAWRENCE. [photograph] F/L VERDON ROE. [photograph] F/S BANKS. [photograph] F/O TOWNSEND. [photograph] P/O JOLLY. [photograph] S/L GRIMSTON. [photograph] F/S VOLANTE. [photograph] F/L MACPHERSON. [photograph] F/L KEARS. [photograph] P/O MOLLER. [photograph] F/S PRICE. [photograph] SGT. BARNHAM. [photograph] P/O BARCLAY. [photograph] W/C WOMERSLEY. [photograph] F/S GILES. [photograph] SGT. YOUNG. [photograph] F/S ELCORTE. [photograph] W/O GREAVES.
[page break]
[photograph] SGT. WALLIS. [photograph] SGT. WALDER. [photograph] F/S CASE. [photograph] F/S McLENNAN. [photograph] F/S TREMBLAY. [photograph] S/L MOIR. [photograph] F/O INNES. [photograph] SGT. BRAMLEY. [photograph] SGT. MACPINLAY. [photograph] SGT. HAZELGRAVE. [photograph] SGT. WEBB. [photograph] SGT. FOLLAND. [photograph] S/L GRANT. [photograph] P/O WALKER. [photograph] SGT. SALTER. [photograph] SGT. DOBSON. [photograph] SGT. IRWIN. [photograph] F/S WHITE. [photograph] SGT. [indecipherable name] [photograph] [missing name]
[page break]
[photograph] F/O GOODLEY. P/W. [photograph] S/L BALL. [photograph] P/O GINGER JONES. P/W. [photograph] F/SGT. PERCY. [photograph] SGT. THOMPSON. [photograph] W/C HOOLWAY. [photograph] F/S HART. [photograph missing] P/O TURK. [photograph] F/O LUFF. [photograph] F/S HEAP. [photograph] P/O HORAN. [photograph] F/S ATKIN. [photograph] W/O SAUNDERS. [photograph] F/O McKENNA. [photograph] SGT. CHAPMAN. [photograph] P/O DAVIES. [photograph] F/S HOLDERNESS. [photograph] F/S McHUGH. [photograph] SGT. MURRAY. [photograph] F/L LANG. [photograph] F/L GREY. [photograph] F/S RIDINGS. [photograph] Sgt. LEE. [photograph] F/S VENN. [photograph] Sgt WOOD.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Description
An account of the resource
Operational Record ledger created by Pat Falkinder (nee Day). Running log book which includes briefing, targeting, crews and methods of prosecution for various bombing operations. It includes a photographs of Pat Day in uniform and several aircrew.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Robin Christian
David Bloomfield
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
224 photocopied sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCleggPV[DoB]-150710-01
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
Title
A name given to the resource
Operational Record ledger
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
Czech Republic
Denmark
France
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Belgium--Antwerp
Belgium--Florennes
Belgium--Sint-Truiden
Belgium--Zeebrugge
Czech Republic--Plzeň
Denmark--Manø Island
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Southwold
France--Bourget Lake
France--Cannes
France--Cayeux-sur-Mer
France--Laon
France--Modane
France--Montchanin
France--Montluçon
France--Saint-Dizier (Haute-Marne)
Germany--Augsburg
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Bocholt
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Bonn
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Elberfeld
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Freiburg im Breisgau
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Jena
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kassel
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Koblenz
Germany--Krefeld
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Lübeck
Germany--Ludwigshafen am Rhein
Germany--Magdeburg
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Mülheim an der Ruhr
Germany--Munich
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Oberhausen (Düsseldorf)
Germany--Oldenburg
Germany--Peenemünde
Germany--Rostock
Germany--Schifferstadt
Germany--Soest
Germany--Stuttgart
Italy--Genoa
Italy--Milan
Italy--Turin
Netherlands--Breda
Netherlands--Leeuwarden
Netherlands--Texel
Netherlands--Venlo
Poland--Gdańsk
Poland--Szczecin
Russia (Federation)--Kaliningrad (Kaliningradskai︠a︡ oblastʹ)
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Hamburg
Russia (Federation)
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Germany--Frankfurt (Oder)
Netherlands--Twente
England--Suffolk
156 Squadron
anti-Semitism
B-17
bombing
bombing of Hamburg (24-31 July 1943)
Bombing of Peenemünde (17/18 August 1943)
briefing
ground personnel
Halifax
incendiary device
Lancaster
mine laying
Mosquito
Pathfinders
RAF Wyton
Scharnhorst
target indicator
Women’s Auxiliary Air Force
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1313/19074/PStachiewiczM17010043.1.jpg
2cf46d704aa8a1ff698664791f303421
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Stachiewicz, Mieczysław. Album
Description
An account of the resource
58 items. An album of photographs, newspaper clippings and papers relating to Mieczysław Stachiewicz's escape from Poland through Romania, Greece, and France to Great Britain, and his tour of operations as a pilot with 301 Squadron from RAF Hemswell. The album also contains photographs of his friends and family.
These items were digitised by a third-party using technical specifications and operational protocols that may differ from those used by the IBCC Digital Archive.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-01-19
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Stachiewicz, M
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1942-11-03
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One typewritten and one printed sheet
Language
A language of the resource
pol
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Service material
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PStachiewiczM17010043
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Polskie Siły Powietrzne
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Poland
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Cologne
France--Dieppe
Germany--Essen
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Osnabrück
Germany--Saarbrücken
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
France
Germany
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1942-06-27
Description
An account of the resource
The Polish language proposal is for Mieczysław Stachiewicz to receive Poland's highest military award, the Virtuti Militari. It details his 25 operations, including the first 1000 bomber operation, on Cologne. There is also a list of medals awarded by the UK government.
Title
A name given to the resource
Proposal for Mieczysław Stachiewicz to receive Virtuti Militari
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Mieczysław Stachiewicz
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending text-based transcription. Other languages than English
301 Squadron
aircrew
bombing
bombing of Cologne (30/31 May 1942)
mine laying
pilot
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/531/18978/LStachiewiczM170522v1.1.pdf
fc5a6831b747d08e20e5f1a3b8f0716a
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Stachiewicz, Mieczysław
Mieczysław Stachiewicz VM KW**
M Stachiewicz
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Stachiewicz, M
Description
An account of the resource
Two items. An oral history interview with Flying Officer Mieczysław Stachiewicz, Virtuti Militari (b. 1917, 1625, Polskie Siły Powietrzne), and his log book. He came to the UK after the Nazi invasion of Poland and flew operations as a pilot with 301 Squadron from RAF Hemswell.
The collection also contains an album of photographs, newspaper clippings and papers relating to his escape from Poland and his tour of operations.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Mieczysław Jusef Stachiewicz and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-01-19
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LStachiewiczM170522v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Polskie Siły Powietrzne
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
Title
A name given to the resource
Mieczysław Stachiewicz's RAF Pilot’s Flying Log Book
Description
An account of the resource
Pilot Officer Mieczysław Stachiewicz's RAF Pilot’s Flying Log Book from 11 June 1941 to 21 November 1942 detailing his training and operations as a pilot. He was stationed at RAF Peterborough (No. 25 (Polish) Elementary Flying Training School), RAF Newton (No. 16 (Polish) Service Flying Training School), RAF Bramcote (No. 18 (Polish) Operational Training Unit) and RAF Hemswell (No. 301 Polish Squadron). Aircraft in which flown: Tiger Moth, Oxford, Wellington IC and Wellington IV.
Records a total of 31 night operations (2 noted as “Duties Not Carried Out” and 4 noted as ‘return to base’ for various reasons). Targets in France, Germany and Italy were: Bremen, Cologne, Dieppe, Duisberg, Emden, Essen, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Kassel, Kiel, Osnabruck, Saarbrucken, St Nazaire, Stuttgart, Turin and Wilhelmshaven. His first or second pilots on operations were Sergeant Hur, Squadron Leader Pazyczka and Flying Officer Krasinski. Several operations are described as ‘mine laying’ or ‘gardening’ without a specific target noted.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
David Leitch
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Warwickshire
Italy--Po River Valley
France--Dieppe
France--Saint-Nazaire
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Kassel
Germany--Osnabrück
Germany--Saarbrücken
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Italy--Turin
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1941
1942
1942-05-04
1942-05-05
1942-05-19
1942-05-20
1942-05-30
1942-05-31
1942-06-04
1942-06-05
1942-06-06
1942-06-08
1942-06-09
1942-06-10
1942-06-19
1942-06-20
1942-06-21
1942-06-22
1942-06-23
1942-06-25
1942-06-26
1942-07-02
1942-07-03
1942-07-05
1942-07-06
1942-07-08
1942-07-09
1942-07-26
1942-07-27
1942-07-29
1942-07-30
1942-08-16
1942-08-17
1942-08-18
1942-08-20
1942-08-21
1942-08-24
1942-08-25
1942-08-28
1942-10-11
1942-10-12
1942-10-13
1942-10-14
1942-10-15
1942-10-16
1942-10-31
1942-11-03
1942-11-08
1942-11-09
1942-11-20
18 OTU
301 Squadron
aircrew
bombing
bombing of Cologne (30/31 May 1942)
Flying Training School
mine laying
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
pilot
RAF Bramcote
RAF Hemswell
RAF Newton
RAF Peterborough
Tiger Moth
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1272/17684/BBrookerWHBrookerWHv1.2.Pdf
24729bb5b19388c22accd4ab9136516e
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Brooker, William Harry
W H Brooker
Miller James
J Miller
Description
An account of the resource
11 items. The collection concerns brothers in law James Miller (b. 1919) and
William Harry Brooker (b.1920). It contains propaganda leaflets, two photographs, a NSDAP Car flag, documents and a memoir.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Ann Brookfield and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018-04-02
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Brooker, WH-Miller, J
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[underlined] INTRODUCTION [/underlined]
This is the World War II service history of RAAF Flight Lieutenant W H Brooker, who was decorated with the Distinguished Flying Cross, and also mentioned in Despatches.
After the War Service he was awarded a Diploma of Accountancy and was admitted to the status of AASA and is Certified Practising Accountant. [inserted] AUDITOR 3335 [/inserted]
He was born at Lameroo South Australia on 3rd April 1920. He completed his education in 1934 and was awarded the Dux of the Lameroo Higher Primary School.
Typed for Mr Brooker by Mrs Rhonda Copper
[page break]
[underlined] MY HISTORY WITH BOMBER COMMAND OF THE RAF [/underlined]
I will commence at the beginning of my time on the RAAF, and my World War II service in Bomber Command.
I volunteered for aircrew in the RAAF about June or July 1940, and was called up for the service about 27th February 1941. The entry at that time was called 12 Course: this means the Empire Training Scheme commenced about Jan/Feb 1940, representing an in-take each month. Training took place in Australia, Canada, Rhodesia, Kenya and South Africa. I believe some training did occur in England; but most English trainees were sent overseas, mainly to Canada. I do not think any came to Australia.
The trainees were allotted to specific courses – Pilot, Observer/Navigator, and Wireless Operator/Air Gunner. Certain numbers of Australian trainees were sent to Canada, but after some initial training of about 6 weeks in Australia. The courses for pilots were held at Initial Flying Training Schools. Observers/Navigators went to other places, and Wireless Operators, Gunners went to other places also. The whole course took each category about 6 months. I went to Pearce, WA for initial training – then Ballarat for wireless training, then to Pt Pirie for gunnery, and flew in Fairey Battle aircraft. Observers also went there for bombing training.
I believe that flying training was not undertaken in England, due to the airfields being required for offence, and defensive purposes, and probable to give the rest of the Empire something to do, and of course, the space available.
Of course another reason is the terrible weather in England, especially in the winter months, and the industrial haze. Visibility was very much impaired. In fact, flying training at Operational Training Units (OTUS) could not be undertaken for several days at a time.
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The training in Australia to passing out stage, and the awarding of wings and promotion, took about 6 months. Some were promoted to the Commissioned rank of Pilot Officer, while the remainder became Sergeants.
I believe most of the newly qualified personnel were sent overseas to the United Kingdom, while a lesser number were retained in Australia, to become instructors, or go on to Squadrons, where they would have had to undergo further training on the aircraft, with which each Squadron was equipped, and of course the duties and tactics of the Squadron.
Those who graduated as in gunnery without wireless qualifications, had to go to England, due to Australia not having a need for them. Our gunnery duties were performed by the wireless/air gunner, but only in Beauforts.
Those who went to England were drafted to the Royal Air Force operational training units, for a course of instruction on the aircraft that they would be flying, on operations. These courses lasted several months due to the poor weather. In Australia it would have been about two months or less.
The main OTU for Australians was No 27, located at Lichfield in the Trent Valley. There was also a satellite airfield located at Church Broughton – near Derby.
Bomber Command had about 5 or 6 of these stations. There are located towards the midland, or centre of England, and in Scotland. In fact due to bad weather, several courses were transferred to Lossiemouth, Scotland. I should have said that on arrival in England, we were sent to holding units to live, until vacancies became available and the various OTU. Australians went to Bournemouth on the Channel coast; later this holding unit was transferred to Brighton. I spent about 2 1/2 months at Bournemouth.
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I and several others arrived at 27 OTU Lichfield, in the Trent Valley, on 13th January 1942, but were immediately transferred to a satellite holding camp about 20 miles away. It was a farm called ‘Kings Standing’, supposedly owned by the Prince of Wales. It was very poor, cold, wet and snowed; however we were only there for about 3 or 4 weeks. You can now see that there was a terrific lot of waiting and wasting of time. It would seem that the flow of personnel was quicker, than the absorption rate and getting personnel into operations.
Eventually my group got into real training at Lichfield with classroom subjects on the aircraft, being Wellington Mark IC, being taught the various parts and stations in the aircraft, and of course gunnery. We had a ground rear turret with two Browning 303 machine guns, with belt feed at the rate of about 1150 rounds per minute. The turret could be rotated and the guns elevated, and depressed. We did go to a firing range with turret mounted on a trailer, and being of hydraulic operation, it was powered by a Ford 10HP engine. The ammunition was stored or packed in four containers within the turret. The turrets could be used to measure the wind shift. The guns were sighted on an object on the full beam, and there was a scale on the fixed part of the turret ring, that gave a reading for the Navigator. These engines were widely used for powering searchlights, and as hauling winches for barrage balloons and anti aircraft guns.
Besides being taught gunnery, we had subjects on parachute drill, harness and handling of parachutes, and stowage; entry and exit from aircraft; aircraft identification and recognition; ditching procedure and dinghy drill; how to speak to; and answer the other members of the crew, and the correct patter, or other matters.
Ground subjects would have been aircraft recognition during day and nights. It was necessary to identify between a Messerschmidt 109, Hurricane, Spitfire, Beaufighter Mosquito, V Junkers 88, and later a US Thunderbolt and Focke Wulf 190. We were told of tactics, when caught in searchlights and anti aircraft fire, barrage balloons, and icing of wings (it changes the shape of the aero-foil). Also exits for parachuting and ditching, and getting into the dinghies.
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Also getting into the aircraft on the ground and out, while the engines are running; persons were known to walk into a spinning propeller.
At the end of training at an OUT [sic], the crews were sent on a cross-country exercise. One of the final was at St Tugwell. They flew to St Tugwell, an uninhabited small island in the Irish Sea.
The bomb aimers were able to drop several live bombs, and after that the height was reduced, so that the gunners could fire at the rocks and seagulls.
Reporting to the pilot and crew on what was observed, such as flash, searchlights and attacking fighter aircraft. Of course other categories were undergoing their specialist training, on ground subjects.
After a few weeks, pilots were told to get a crew together. This was done by approaching people they knew. First selection was probably Navigator, and then Wireless operators. At this state [sic] I must say that some navigators became bomb aimers, and had to get used to gunnery at short notice, as they occupied the front turret; and last, the rear gunner, unless he had become known to others. This made up a crew of 5.
Pilots would have had a mixture of ground subject and actual flying, as the latter would have taken longer, especially in the poor weather. The crew of the Wellington would have been made up of instructor pilot, trainee pilot, instructor wireless operator, and instructor rear gunner. The training was what was called circuits and bumps; ie take off circuits and landing taxiing, about 6 times in a lesson.
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[underlined] HISTORY OF BOMBING OR DROPPING BOMBS FROM AIRCRAFT [/underlined]
This had its beginning during the First World War. At the end of the War the British had to decide what direction the Armed Service should go, and in view of the post war reconstruction for the civil population, made it necessary to cut back in finances from the armed forces.
For example, the army commands decided that tanks were only a passing phase; similarly machine guns, and that money would not be spent on those two branches.
Aircraft had been under the command of the Navy and Army, and these two arms would like to continue that way. The Navy and Army were much against aircraft becoming a separate arm of attack or defense, even after WW1, although on 1st April 1918, the Royal Air Force was established as a separate arm. The Army and Navy were against it, probably due to the great expense that was necessary to provide aircraft and all the support activities.
It was after the war that many countries were put under the control of France and Britain. Several of these came to Britain, Palestine, Trans Jordan, Mesopotamia (Iraq) etc. The French got Syria and Lebanon, and we (Australia) got New Guinea. The three armed service were permitted to express their desire and cost. The RAF won, due to the personnel, costs and efforts. This is when aerial bombing both by day and night was developed. It created great opportunities for flying, training, development of aircraft, bombs, and of course the accuracy and development of release mechanism, and the bombsights.
The pilots who took part in these operations [inserted] w[/inserted]ere the same personnel who, on their return and in the 1930’s became the senior officers to command the RAF during World War II. Such names come to mind as, Charles Portal, Arthur Harris, and the Hon. Peter Cochcrane, Lord Trenchard.
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After passing out of the OTU the crew reverted [inserted] were posted [/inserted] to the various squadrons equipped with
2-engined aircraft. This was before the 4-engined machines became available in greater numbers. The type we had were Mark 111 Wellingtons with Bristol Hercules radial engines, with sleeve valves 14 cylinders in two rows. They were faster than we had trained on, and had 4 gunned rear turrets; and ammunition was stored in bins about mid way along the fuselage, and came along in chutes to the turret, up through the floor. These aircraft were also equipped with GEE, a radar navigation aid. This meant that the navigators had to be trained.
On arrival at the squadron at Snaith, Yorkshire, the new crew were sent on short training flights to become accustomed to the new surroundings, and the later aircraft and engines.
At OTU our crew consisted of four Australians, Sergeants and English Pilot Officer. The first operation was for the new pilot to do a second dickie trip with an experienced crew.
It was on this trip that our pilot became very sick, and had to be taken off operations. He later was discharged, but was accepted by ATA (Air Transport Auxiliary). These pilots ferried aircraft from maintenance depots to squadrons etc. Two well-known pilots were Amy Johnson and Jim Mollinson.
These pilots became very expert and versatile and could fly many various makes and types of aircraft.
I was on the tarmac when two ATA pilots came to take two Beaufighters away – one was a woman. But the two aircraft were different; one had Bristol Hercules 14 cylinder radial engines in two rows; the other had Rolls Royce V12 engines. I heard them say, “I have never flown one of those”. So they decided the woman would take the conventional one, with the radial engines. So the man got the manual out and started perusing it; then said “Well, if I get into trouble I will read it then”.
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This resulted in us being a headless crew; however it did not last for long, and we got an English Sergeant, who proved to be very good. He was a spare who had lost his crew when he was off; be he had about ten trips to he credit, so we had him until he clocked up his 30 trips for the tour. He was the pilot who took our next pilot on his second dickie. We were matched with an Australian, he was a Flight Lieutenant who remustered from ground duties and kept his rank.
We have better wireless equipment. All aircraft of the RAF were equipped with an automatic signaling device, known as Identification Friend or Foe (IFF). This was uses over England, and after crossing the North Sea or English Channel, was switched off to prevent the Germans homing on to it. On the return it was switched on when nearing the English coast. Failure resulted in the anti aircraft batteries starting to shoot.
Our first sortie was to Emden on the night of 22nd June 1942 from 23.25 hours, for 6 hours 15 minutes uneventful.
The second sortie: 25th June 1942 from 23.30 hours for 6 hours 40 minutes to Bremen. On the way back we were caught in a cone of searchlight; at about 14,000 ft we twisted etc and lost height and I could fire at searchlights. We were hit by light tracer flak, and sustained a hole in a petrol tank at the top.
The next operation was termed “Gardening”, and consisted of dropping mines in the Kiel Canal, from about 700 feet, on parachutes so as not to damage them and keep them live, until a ship passed over them. We carried two at about 2000 Ibs each. This type of attack was fairly frequent and rendered substantial results. The time was 3 hours 50 minutes after take off at 0145 on 8th July 1942.
All my operations were at night.
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The next trip was on the same day, and with take off at 23.35 hours to Wilhelmshaven for 5 hours 35 minutes. We were chased by a Mersserschmidt 109 but were able to take evasive action.
Still during July we went to Duisberg three times. On one occasion we sighted a Junkers 88 twin-engine night fighter, but we took evasive action. It was the tactic not to allow an attack before the range closed. Of courses we do not fire; the tracer bullets would have shown our position. It was said that the Germans, on identification of the bombers, did not want to take on the four guns.
On another mission on 11th August 1942, we went to bomb Mainz from 2215 hours for a flight of 6 hours 30 minutes. We saw several aircraft go down. One was on fire and we saw 3 parachutes appear. The rest of this story had a sequel. I was sent on a gunnery course, and we were asked to tell of our experiences; so I mentioned the parachutes, and sitting next to me the person said, “I was one of them”.
To continue, he landed safely in France and was rescued by the French, and he was passed on to various locations, and was back in England within 19 days. This resulted in him not being used, to fly over France and Germany again.
Other sorties were to Frankfurt; during the trip I saw a Focke Wulf 190, a single radial engine German fighter. It was the first sighting of this type of aircraft at night. All crews were interrogated on their return. My story resulted in me being called by the Intelligence Officer the next afternoon.
We went to Kassal, Saarbrucken twice, Karlsruhe, Bremen (sustained holes from flak, anti aircraft fire), Duisberg and Bremen again.
Mine laying among the Friesian Isles twice, and St Nazaire (Bay of Biscay)) twice, Saarbrucken again.
Lorient mine laying.
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On 8/11/42 at 1740 hours we went to Hamburg for a flight of 6 hours and 30 minutes. You will notice that take off was quite early and this could be achieved due to the less hours of daylight. This was my thirtieth operation and resulted in me being ‘screened’, the term used for term expired aircrew.
The crews were quite often broken up and sent to operational trainings as instructors for a rest period. I went back to Lichfield, Staffordshire. I was sent on a specialist course at a training unit to do an air gunnery instruction course, which lasted about 2 months. On completion of the course I returned to Lichfield, but after a few days I was sent to the Satellite Church Broughton airfield, as an instructor. The station was not very large, only about ten aircraft, being Wellingtons. It was not very far from Derby. There was one activity of interest there being the testing of Gloster Meteors Mark 1 and Mark 11, being pure jet aircraft. As an aside, there was a Wellington fitted with a jet engine in the tail of the fuselage as test aircraft. Part of the test was to feather the two piston engines, and fly just of the jet, I believe it was quite fast.
The Commanding Officer was an Australian Wing Commander, Ken Baird from Ballarat, an early appointment of an Australian.
On 3/10/1943 I was sent on a short gunnery course of 3 weeks, mainly flying against attacking aircraft.
At the end of October, I was sent to a heavy conversion unit, to meet a new crew of Australian and one Englishman, to be trained for Lancasters. The five Aussies had just passed out of 27 OUT on Wellingtons at Lichfield. The Englishman was our Flight engineer who had remustered from a fitter. This course took about two months; part of familiarization on the ground and flying take off circuits, landing, and later cross-country, mainly at night.
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In fact, our first 4-engined flight was in a Halifax for about 3 trips. It can be mentioned that the instructor pilots were, of course, screened from operations and could fly either Halifax or Lancasters. We were at two stations in Lincolnshire at Skellingthorpe and Swinderby. Our conversions finished on 23/12/1943 and we were posted to 463 RAAF Squadron at Waddington, Lincolnshire about 3 miles south of the city of Lincoln.
We were one of the foundation crews of 463, which was formed by taking several crews from 467 RAAF, and then building up to about 20 crews each. 467 had been stationed at Bottesford, which is a bit further inland, and was a new war-time airfield. Waddington was and still is, a permanent station being built up during the First World War. In fact it was an airfield before WW1. The citizens of Lincoln are very proud of Waddington airfield, and the staff have in more recent times been granted the freedom of the city.
As an aside, Lincoln has been classed as a City for several hundred years. The lord Mayor carries the title of Right Worship; even the lord Mayor of London only has the title of Worshipful. The Australian Sister City of Lincoln is Port Lincoln.
Our operations with 463 Squadron commenced on 2/1/1944; but we did not complete the mission due to icing, and could not gain the height of 20,000 feet, so we returned, as we could only reach about 12,000. So we jettisoned the load safe over Holland. The next trips were to Brunswick, Magdebur, then 4 to Berlin. On the second to Berlin we shot down a Focke Wulf 190 single engine fighter from a range of about 40 yards. The trips took about 8 to 9 hours.
Other targets were Liepzig, Stuttgart twice, Schweinfurt, Augsburg.
After these I went to the Central Gunnery School to partake in a specialist course for gunnery leaders for three weeks during the month of April.
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On my return to 463 Squadron my crew was still there, they had survived about 10 operations; this put us about level in the count. They had to do 30 sorties and I only 20.
The targets now switched from Germany to France.
8th April 1944, we bombed an airfield near Brest. Other targets were Lille (railway yards), Boug Leopold, St Martins camp, gun emplacements at Cherbourg. These were coastal batteries and you can now see we were preparing for the “D” Day landing on the 6th June 1944.
It might be mentioned that larger bombs were capable of splitting the gun barrels, and more accurate.
The strategy was to put coastal batteries out of action and to hamper transport to the French coast. Also to put the Luftwaffe out of action, which was virtually achieved by D Day – done by attacking airfields and destroying the aircraft on the ground, and the facilities.
Another target was the railway marshalling yards at Saumur. We did not drop our bombs, but were ordered to return with the load, probably due to an earlier wave about to destroy the target.
3rd June we bombed a wireless station at Cherbourg. The bomb loads would be increased for those close targets, and be varied to high explosive 500 pound. The load would have probably been 16,000 pounds – 8 tons. The petrol would have been reduced from 2154 gallons to perhaps 1000 gallons.
The weather was very poor in early June; and landing barges etc were loaded, and took refuge from the high seas around Isle of Wight. The weather cleared toward the 5th June and improved further to permit the landings and flights to be made.
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Our target was gun emplacements at Pierre du Mont. Our take off was at 0243 on 6th June and took 4 hours 29 minutes. After bombing we headed southwest to be clear of other operations. On the return, an American Thunderbolt fighter followed for about 10 minutes, probably a bit lost, to access the course home.
Again on 6th June at 2319 yours [sic] we went to a road junction at Argentan, this was to delay the German reinforcements coming to counter the allied armies in Normandy.
Other sorties were to Rennes railway yards and Orleans railways. The latter on 10th June was my last of 52 missions.
Then on leave when returning to Lichfield.
Here I can mention that once aircrew personnel had commenced operations, they were granted leave of 1 week every 6 weeks, and this continued until the end of the war.
Aircrew was given a special flying meal before an operation, and a similar one on return. The menu was always bacon and eggs. Some crew members were given coffee to drink and biscuits to consume during the flight. However this was a bit difficult to handle – take off gloves, pour out into top of thermos flask in total darkness, and minus 40 degrees Celsius. Of course there was always the danger of an attack. The crew had to be on the watch and alert at all times. The gunners rotated their turrets from side to side all the time, and the mid upper could do a complete circle. The only crew member not watching the sky was the navigator, he was the only one in a lighted cubicle. The pilot would also need to watch the instruments, and the Engineer to keep checking the fuel levels, for the amount and transfer and for cross feeding. He had to complete the log.
The wireless-operator stood looking out the astrodome, if he was not required to listen out.
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After take off, the strategy was to climb to our operating height of about 20,000 feet to be above the range of light anti-aircraft fire, and increase the inaccuracy of the fire from larger caliber guns, also perhaps to make it more difficult for fighter aircraft.
Depending on the route to the target, we could still be climbing over the North Sea, but if the route were over Northern France, Belgium, Holland the climbing would have been over England.
The heavy anti-aircraft gun fire was close, when the puffs of black smoke from the shell bursts were at around our level; and closer if you could hear the shell bursts about the noise of the aircraft; and a real close one when the smell of the burst could be smelt even when an oxygen mask was worn.
Oxygen masks were worn all the time, because of the microphone for the intercommunication, within the aircraft. Oxygen was put on at about 5000 feet, although no real effects would be felt until about 10,000 were reached. It was usual for the pilot to call up each crew member about every 15 minutes. If no answer was received it was usually the wireless operator who would go to the position. The mid upper gunner was able to see whether the front and rear turrets were moving.
There were small portable oxygen bottles for use when crew members had to move about.
Searchlights, which I must mention briefly, were used to locate flying aircraft and could illuminate up to 20,000 feet, to aid night fighters and anti-aircraft fire. If searchlights had locked onto an aircraft and then went off, it was sign that a fighter attack may occur. In some instances a large number of lights may lock on; this was disconcerting, as they had a blinding effect and upset the pilots view of the instruments. The most frightening was if the aircraft was under cloud, as each light threw a shadow of the aircraft on the clouds.
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Up to now you may have been wondering how it was decided as to where the targets for Bomber Command would be aimed.
There were Committees of the Chiefs of Staff of the three services, and strategists, as to what would retard the enemy and aid other forces-army-navy. Such targets would be listed. Some that can be mentioned were shipping ports, u-boat facilities, transport, war factories, oil and mining, army, navy and Luftwaffe installations.
There were some targets that may be hard to hit, out of range; others the amount of damage that could be caused and the effort to be incurred to repair it. Bombing an airfield may not be of great result unless aircraft and buildings were destroyed. Bomb craters on the airfield could be reinstated within a few hours.
Alternatively factories could put out of action, or output was substantially reduced for several weeks, or remain as production reduced, for a considerable time.
Oil refineries would have to suffer direct hits and are reasonably small in unpopulated areas.
Populated areas did suffer damage and civilian deaths. This put a strain on other civilian activities, and caused the workers to miss out on work attendance while they attended to home type duties.
Having damaged a highly productive war production area such as the Ruhr Valley. After a series of raids such damage would take some time to repair, and bomber efforts would be directed elsewhere for some time, before it was seen to be useful to revisit those targets.
You will see that the targets that I’ve attacked were an attempt to retard the German war effort, and to take the war to the German people. There were some targets that were attacked that were an urgent nuisance. Like attacking the pocket battle ships as they progressed through the English Channel, and the battleship Bismark as it proceeded in the Atlantic.
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The Chief of Air Staff would have a short list of targets that should be visited provided the conditions were favourable.
The Squadrons would be notified by about 10am that operations were to be prepared for; this would include petrol load, bomb load and types of bombs. Other personnel would be advised of the target and route to be taken. The routes were planned to miss the heavily defended areas, and also to avoid night fighter airfields in close proximity.
The battle order was prepared and posted, so crews knew who were involved. After lunch the pilots and navigators were called to the briefing room for a pre briefing as to target and route. The pilots left early, while the navigators took an hour or so to prepare their charts.
Depending on the time of take off, the timing of the full briefing was fixed when all crew members attended. The Wing Commander named the target and showed the route; the Navigation Officer expanded on the route.
The Intelligence Officer told of the defences etc. The Meteorology Officer (not necessarily an RAF officer) told of the weather for take off etc, along the route, at the target area, the return route and landing.
The wireless operators were given the details of call signs and wave lengths etc on flimsy rice paper so that it could be eaten to destroy it.
During the afternoon an air test of an aircraft could be undertaken, especially if an aircraft had had some special work performed on it. This was limited to some degree due to the petrol being topped up, and the bombs had still to be loaded. The aircraft should be loaded if possible in daylight to observe the blackout.
Security – as soon as the operation was announced some telephone services around the airfield were cut. Public telephones in the base and in the streets and messes were cut.
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All aircraft were dispersed around the airfield to isolate them from an attack and to minimize any damage. It was therefore necessary to have buses or covered trucks with seating, to take the aircrews from the hangars or briefing rooms etc to the aircrafts.
On the return the transport picked up the crews to take them back to the briefing room for interrogation as to their efforts. Every aircraft carried a camera to photograph the result of their bombs. Flares were released to light the target as the bombs dropped, and the camera would run with shutter open until the falling time had elapsed. These photographs were assessed and the crews were told of the result.
In addition photography reconnaissance aircraft were dispatched to be over the target in daylight and take more photographs. Various aircraft were used such as Spitfire, Mosquitoes etc. A Murray Bridge pilot was on one of these units, David Rice. I believe he flew a Spitfire.
Spitfires were specifically prepared, no guns, no armor plate, to reduce weight. The rivets on the fuselage were rubbed down flush to reduce drag and the fuselage polished, no paint.
We were issued with special flying underwear and heated flying suits. The pilot, flight engineer and navigator were in a heated section of the plane, did not need anything special. We were also given an escaping kit to be used in the event of coming down in Europe. The kit contained a compass kit, buttons, war rations etc, money appropriate to the area over which the route took us.
Lectures were also given as to what to say when under enemy interrogations upon capture. The usual period of interrogation was only a day or two before transfer to prisoner-of-war camps.
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If you were able to evade capture, information was given as to how to behave and of course to obey the French Resistance, as to the route to be taken and how to travel. Of course Switzerland was a haven and arrangements were made to repatriate personnel. Another place to head was Spain, but it was further and the mountain range a barrier.
Information was also given to be wary of allied persons who become friendly and quizzed of secrets etc of operations. There were several known RAF personnel who had become stool pigeons, and were given favours by the Germans for information gleaned.
One of these was an RAF man called Flying Officer Metcalf-Freeman. The story of his end was that upon his arrival back in England he was arrested and put into prison for trial. Of course the pictorial media had a field day over this. Fancy a hero, after being in a POW camp for several years, not being allowed to return home to see his wife and family etc. Who saw the film – “The Great Escape” there was an informer in that.
During 1944 Waddington had two crews who become the newsreel photographers. These were both Australian crew. The 35mm camera was mounted in the front turret and the plane carried an extra person who probably gave some instruction to the front gunner. The film was a record of the bombing, and was shown in the London cinemas the next afternoon. One of the pilots was Keith Schutz from Kapunda or Eudunda, and now resides in the Modbury area.
The bomb carrying capacity of the several bombers was:
Wellingtons 4000 Ib crew of 5
Halifax 8000 Ib crew of 7
Mosquito 4000 Ib crew of 2
US Flying Fortress 4000 Ib crew of 10
Lancaster 16000 Ib crew of 7
Stirling 8000 Ib crew of 7 or 8
Now you which aircraft was the most effective for crew number involved.
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[underlined] Aids to Bombers [/underlined]
I mentioned GEE earlier. This was a radar device which had three transmitters in England separated by 100 miles or so. They each sent a signal that was picked up by the set in the aircraft, and the signals inspected on the screen, showed a position that could be plotted on a specifically prepared chart, to give the position over the earth. It was very accurate but its range was only 400-450 miles. The Germans devised a method to partially jam it. We were able to bomb on the position given by GEE.
Later a radar device came into being known as H2S. It was self-contained radar fitted to the underside of the fuselage and it scanned the earth like map reading. It would distinguish between water, land, and gave a picture. It could pick up ploughed fields against trees, forest or meadow. Not every Lancaster was fitted with it, and only squadrons used for making targets.
Talking of special squadrons. There was the pathfinder force made up of well-trained and experienced crews. They went off a few minutes before the main force with the purpose of locating the target, marking it with coloured flares or bomb blasted. They then flew around to assess the marking and report to the main force by RT as the aiming point.
Later developments were for the location and marking to be done by a Mosquito and even by Leonard Cheshire in a Mustang. These were done at lover level.
Another development was to use Mosquito night fighters to accompany the Lancasters, with the aim of getting the German night fighters. This operation was referred to as Intruders, and was quite successful.
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Some Mosquito bombers were fitted with a radar device known as Oboc. This was a navigation signaling system to correct the pilot’s course over the target-bombing run. It had a system of lights in the cockpit to indicate bombing run, and bomb bay doors open, and dropped the bombs, After that the pilot closed the bomb bay doors and turned for home.
A few Lancasters in 1943 and onwards were fitted out with extra wireless and media receivers and transmitters.
They carried extra crewmembers that could speak German, and listened out to hear the German ground controllers and night fighters. They were to give countermanding messages or false messages to confound the night fighters and send them off in the wrong direction. They would have known the target and route. This was called A.B.C. airborne cigar.
Another devise was called Tindal and this was a method of transmitting a noise over the German wavelengths so that the WT & RT (Wireless Telegraphy & Radar Transmission) could not be used. The noise was generated by a microphone fitted to one of the engines. Later it was fitted to the wireless operations gene motor, which was just as effective.
One of the most successful devices was called Window. This was a large number of tin foil strips cut to a certain length and about 1/16” wide. The length of the strip was cut so as to jam to enemy radar, to such an extent that the screens were a total blur of colour and could not show a target, and put the ground, night fighter and anti-aircraft radar, out of action. I think the first target was Hamburg and resulted in great destruction. Even the bitumen streets were alight. The wireless operator fed those bundles out through the flair chute when the target was being reached.
The aim was to cause the conflagration caused by the incendiary bombs. The bomb load consisted of blockbusters, incendiaries and high explosive.
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Incendiaries were packed into containers about 50-60 per container.
Just a short portion on the Commander in Chief, Air Chief Marshall, Sir Arthur Traver Harris. Some people did not like him because of his manner in some instances. However, these people in high places had to be very careful what they said about him and to whom.
We must not forget that Churchill and quite a number of others recognized he was a champion. This was even agreed and echoed by Roosevelt, General Arnold etc and later by Eisenhower when he was supreme Commander European theatre.
Bomber Command was divided into five main groups and all the Commanders were well-known and proven officers and had served with Harris for many years overseas and at home.
With the defeat of the Dutch, Belgians, and French etc and after the evacuation of the British Army from Dunkirk in 1940; only one force carried the war to the German people. This was Bomber Command, especially from 1942 to D Day, commanded by Harris.
METRIC CONVERSION
Feet to Metres x 0.3048
Miles to Kilometres x 1.609
Gallons to Litres x 4.544
Pounds to Kilograms x 0.4536
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
World War II service History of Flight Lieutenant WH Brooker DFC
Description
An account of the resource
WH Brooker volunteered in June or July 1940. He was called up on 27 February 1941 and trained in Pearce, Western Australia. On transfer to UK there were delays in further training.
Initially he served on Wellingtons at Snaith. He describes individual operations starting with Emden. After 30 operations he was transferred to an Operational Training Unit as an instructor, firstly to Lichfield then to Church Broughton. He then transferred to a Heavy Conversion Unit, training on Halifaxes and Lancasters, based at Skellingthorpe and Swinderby. He was then posted to Waddington with 463 Squadron, RAAF. After several operations he transferred to a specialist gunnery course before returning to 463. Bombing operations were switched to France to assist in hampering German reinforcements after D-day. He describes the various roles of the crew during a flight and how targets were decided by the High Command. He concludes with aids to bombers -GEE, H2S, Oboe and Pathfinders. Also he describes counter measures such as ABC, Tidal and Window.
This item was provided, in digital form, by a third-party organisation which used technical specifications and operational protocols that may differ from those used by the IBCC Digital Archive.
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WH Brooker
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20 typed sheets
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Text. Memoir
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BBrookerWHBrookerWHv1
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
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Australia
Western Australia
Victoria--Ballarat
Great Britain
England--Bournemouth
England--Brighton
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Kiel Canal
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Germany--Kassel
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Friesland
Germany--Hamburg
England--Lincoln
Germany--Magdeburg
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Schweinfurt
Germany--Augsburg
France--Brest
France--Lille
Belgium--Leopoldsburg
France--Cherbourg
France--Saumur
France--Orléans
France--Rennes
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Mainz (Rhineland-Palatinate)
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Saarbrücken
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Victoria
France
Germany
Belgium
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
England--Hampshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Sussex
France--Saint-Nazaire
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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Georgie Donaldson
27 OTU
463 Squadron
467 Squadron
Air Transport Auxiliary
aircrew
anti-aircraft fire
Beaufighter
bombing
Fw 190
Gee
H2S
Halifax
Harris, Arthur Travers (1892-1984)
Heavy Conversion Unit
Hurricane
incendiary device
Ju 88
Lancaster
Me 109
Meteor
mine laying
Mosquito
Oboe
Operational Training Unit
Portal, Charles (1893-1971)
RAF Bottesford
RAF Church Broughton
RAF Lichfield
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF Snaith
RAF Swinderby
RAF Waddington
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano (1882-1945)
searchlight
Spitfire
training
Wellington
Window
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1213/15106/LDonaldsonDW70185v1.1.pdf
1a7c7740b88e474aee2629a899eb7201
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Title
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Donaldson, David
David Donaldson
D Donaldson
Description
An account of the resource
309 Items and a sub-collection of 51 items. Concerns Royal Air Force career of Wing Commander David Donaldson DSO and bar, DFC. A pilot, he joined the Royal Air Force Reserve in 1934. Mobilized in 1939. he undertook tours on 149, 57 and 156 and 192 Squadrons. He was photographed by Cecil Beaton at RAF Mildenhall in 1941. Collection contains a large number of letters to and from family members, friends as well as Royal Air Force personnel. Also included are personal and service documents, and his logbooks. In addition, there are photographs of family, service personnel and aircraft. After the war he became a solicitor. The collection also contains an oral history interview with Frances Grundy, his daughter.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Anna Frances Grundy and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2015-06-02
2022-10-17
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
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Donaldson, D
Grundy, AF
Transcribed document
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Transcription
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Cutting from the Times that was attached to the page with the entry for October 23rd 1940
THE TIMES WEDENESDAY DECEMBER 30 1953
[Photograph of a stone archway] The gatehouse entrance to St. Osyth’s Priory.
SALE OF ST. OSYTH’S PRIORY ESTATE
NEW OWNER’S PLANS
St. Osyth’s Priory estate, on the Colne estuary, near Colchester, Essex, has been bought by Mr Somerset de Chair. He intends to preserve the priory, which is in excellent architectural condition and includes a flint and ashlar gatehouse erected in 1475.
This historic place was bought in 1949 by the Loyal Order of Ancient Shepherds Friendly Society from Brigadier-General K. J. Kincaid-Smith for £30,000. It was then planned to build a war memorial in the grounds and to restore the thirteenth-century chapel.
St. Osyth’s Priory derives its name from Osyth, granddaughter of Penda, King of Mercia. When the Danes sacked the property, they killed the nuns and beheaded the Prioress Osyth. The priory was founded by Richard de Balmeis, Bishop of London, in 1118, on the site of a nunnery, but the earliest surviving building is the small chapel, with its fine groined arches supported on slender pillars.
Mr. de Chair informed The Times yesterday that he hoped to work the priory farm, and might convert the gatehouse into a pied-à-terre.
Lofts and Warner. Of London, and Percival and Co., of Sudbury, have acted as agents for the vendors in the sale of the estate.
[Page break]
Newspaper cutting that was attached to the summary page for April 1943
THE COURSE OF NATURE
THE “MIRACLE OF SPRING”
FROM A CORRESPONDENT
The fine weather since Easter has brought things on. There is again the miracle of Spring. It is perhaps a minor miracle compared with April 1943, when by St. George’s Day the trees were leafy as in June, and the hedges heavy with the scent of hawthorn, so that many, seeing and smelling the billowing masses of white blossom, were content that this was out, and, not waiting for the following month’s exit to give permission, too hurriedly cast their clouts.
If in the woods there is as yet no density of green above, nor bridal white of wild cherry blossom, there is no lack of green and white below, for the bluebells, soon to bloom, have raised a thousand gleaming dark green spears, in contrast to which there are the dainty pale green shamrock leaves of wood sorrel, graced by pendant silver bells, most delicately veined. Pendant, too, on a dull or cloudy day, but raise and opening wide to the sun, are the white wood anemones, which now make a starry heaven underneath the trees. There are other stars, the glossy bright gold stars of the celandines, and, in ever-widening constellations, the “milky way” of primroses. In woodland, too, as well as in meadows, one finds the “lady-smocks all silver white” (though more usually the palest shade of mauve) as well as “violets blue,” which may be pale wood violets if the spur is darker than the petals or dark wood violets if the spur is paler, and it is often a creamy white. Such is the absurdity of some English names. Add to these the quaintly attractive green flowers of the moschatel, the small white flowers of the barren strawberry, and, where the ground drops to the merest trickle of a woodland stream, the pale gold of the golden saxifrage, and one has, indeed, a few short weeks from ice and snow, “the miracle of Spring.”
[Page break]
THE TIMES
THE REGISTER [Crest]
DEBATE: THE HUTTON REPORT page 80 ▪ COURT & SOCIAL: MANOR OF DULWICH page 82
OBITUARIES
WING COMMANDER DAVID DONALDSON
Pilot who bombed Hitler’s invasion barges in Calais harbour and flew with the Pathfinders
[Photograph of a pilot leaning against the wing of an aircraft] Donaldson with a Wellington of 149 Squadron: the type was the mainstay of Bomber Command earlier in the war
IN WHAT was, given the cruel statistics of wartime flying, a remarkably long career on bombing operations, David Donaldson flew his first raids during the Battle of Britain in September 1940, when Bomber Command’s techniques were in their infancy, and he was still there at the end. He participated in Pathfinder ops in 1941, by which time the whole strategic air offensive had taken on a much more scientific cast and was beginning to achieve results. And he was still airborne over enemy territory on electronic countermeasures missions in the last months of the war, by which time the RAF, and the US Army Air Forces were masters of the skies over Western Europe.
In four tours of operations, Donaldson flew 86 sorties, a figure which put him well above the average survival chances. During Bomber Command’s worst days in 1941 and 1942 (if one discounts the virtual suicide missions against heavily defended German naval bases in December 1939), the average life in the command was as low as eight sorties.
David William Donaldson was born in 1915 at Southampton, a son of the managing director of the Thorneycroft shipyard. He was educated at Charterhouse and Trinity College, Cambridge, where he was a keen rower. Taking a boat over to Germany with the First Trinity Boat Club in the mid-1930s, he enjoyed the hospitality of boat clubs in the Rhineland – and at the same time became sharply aware of the culture of aggression that was taking over the German psyche with the advent of Hitler.
In 1934 he joined the RAF Volunteer Reserve as a weekend pilot, and did much of his flying training at Hamble. After graduating at Cambridge he had joined a firm of solicitors in London. But his articles were interrupted in September 1939 when he was called up.
After basic training he did operational training on Wellington bombers and on September 20 was sent to 149 (Wellington) Squadron at Mildenhall, Suffolk. No 149 had already been involved in some desperate missions: the forlorn-hope attack on German shipping at Wilhelmshaven on December 18, 1939; the equally hopeless attempt to stem the German advance in the Low Countries in May 1940; and a brave but futile transalpine lunge at Genoa in June after Italy had opportunistically entered the war on the German side. Now it was ordered to attack invasion barges which had been collected in Channel ports, and Donaldson’s first sortie was a daytime raid on Calais harbours.
With the end of the Battle of Britain, No 149 was redirected to strategic bombing. This was soon to be revealed as far too dangerous against flak and fighter defences by day, and was therefore conducted by night, which (frequent) bad weather made locating targets extremely difficult in the state of development of navigational aids at the time.
During the winter of 1940-41 the main effort was against targets in the relatively close Ruhr, but there was a much longer sortie, to Berlin, in vile weather, in October. This ended with Donaldson’s Wellington becoming completely lost on the return trip. At length, with fuel running perilously low, he achieved a casualty free forced manding at St. Osyth, near Clacton.
There were further attacks on northern Italian industrial cities, one of which, an attack on the Fiat works at Turin, Donaldson was asked by the BBC to describe a radio broadcast in December 1940. Instead of dwelling on the difficulties of such a mission, he eloquently described the majesty of the snow covered Alps for his audience.
Donaldson won his DFC for a highly successful raid on Merignac aerodrome, near Bordeaux, which he bombed from a height of 1,500ft, destroying its large hangars. Further publicity for these early efforts by Bomber Command came from his featuring in a series of propaganda photographs taken by Cecil Beaton, entitled A Day in the Life of a Bomber Pilot. Once of these, which features the aircrew of a 149 Squadron Wellington at Mildenhall, adorns the cover of a recently published video of the 1941 propaganda film Target for Tonight.
Donaldson was “rested” after completion of his tour in March 1941. But there was still plenty of flying to be done. He was seconded to the Air Ministry to help buy aircraft in the US. This turned out to involve hazardous ferry flying across the Atlantic of American aircraft that had been purchased, notably the invaluable Hudson long-range patrol bomber for Coastal Command.
In September Donaldson returned to operations with 57 Squadron, another Wellington unit. Bomber Command was faring no better than it had been earlier in terms of results, and an improvement in German air defences was increasing the rate of losses among aircrew, with corresponding effects on RAF morale. No 57 was roughly handled. In a raid over Düsseldorf in October, Donaldson’s aircraft was badly shot up and limped home without hydraulics. The undercarriage could not be lowered and the sortie ended with a crash landing at Marham. After several more raids Donaldson succumbed to the strain and at the end of the year was admitted to hospital.
After a period of sick leave he was posted as group tactical officer to 3 Group, but in July 1942 the air beckoned again when he was posted to No 15 Operational Training Unit for six months as a flight commander. Though this was not supposed to be a frontline unit, he did get in one operational trip, to Düsseldorf, during this period.
Then, in January 1943, he was appointed a flight commander to 156 Squadron, one of the original units of the Pathfinder Force, which had been making strides in the improvement of bombing through its marking techniques since its formation under the Australian Don Bennett six months previously. The four-engined Lancaster was now the mainstay of Bomber Command and both the weight and accuracy of the air offensive began to assume a different dimension. With No 156 Donaldson carried out 23 raids, and was awarded the DSO and promoted to wing commander at the end of his tour. Bennett himself said of Donaldson, “He has provided an example of determination and devotion to duty which it would be difficult to equal.”
Rested again in June 1943, Donaldson commanded a conversion unit and then went as a staff officer to No 100 (Special Duties) Group. The air war had changed out of all recognition and the need to be able to jam and confuse the enemy’s radars and radio direction beacons was well recognised.
In June 1944, just after D-Day, Donaldson was back in the air again in command of 192 (SD) Squadron. Flying a mixture of Wellingtons, Halifaxes and Mosquitoes, over the remaining months of the war No 192 sought out and jammed the enemy’s radio and communication systems using methods ranging from the well-tried “window” – dropping steel foil strips – to more sophisticated electronic deception techniques.
Leading the Squadron in a Halifax III, Donaldson flew 25 more sorties, some of them in daytime. On one daylight operation he was attacked by two Bf109s. Rather than trying to shoot it out against the cannon armed fighters with the Halifax’s 303in machineguns, Donaldson chose to evade the foe by violent and skilful evasive action, and brought his aircraft and crew safely home. He was awarded his second DSO in July 1945.
Donaldson had no ambition to further a career in the RAF and on demobilisation he resumed his law articles and qualified as a solicitor. After four years in the City firm Parker Garrett he joined National Employers Mutual Insurance, where he was at first company secretary and later a director. He left NEM to become chairman of an industrial tribunal, which he greatly enjoyed, presiding over some notable cases. He finally retired in 1987.
His wife Joyce, whom he married when she was a WAAF officer during the war, died in 1996. He is survived by a daughter and two sons.
Wing Commander David Donaldson, DSO and Bar, DFC, wartime bomber pilot and solicitor, was born on January 31, 1915. He died on January 15, 2004, aged 88.
[Page break]
DAVID AND THE RAF
My brother David’s very distinguished wartime career with the RAF – two DSOs and a DFC, and promotion to Wing Commander at 28 – warrants a separate appendix to these family notes. He has kindly helped me to compile it by giving me the run of his log books, and I have supplemented them from a number of other sources.
He became interested in flying in he early 1930s. I recall him taking his small brother of 9 or 10 to an air show at Eastleigh and abandoning him while he went up as a passenger in a Tiger Moth doing aerobatics. That may well have given him the incentive to join the RAF Volunteer Reserve in 1934 as a weekend pilot. He did much of his training at Hamble on the Solent. When war broke out in September 1939 he was called up immediately and had to abandon his legal training. He spent the “phoney war” towing target drogues at a bombing and gunnery school at Evanton in Scotland. His log books show him rated as an “average” pilot.
At the end of April 1940, just before the Germans attacked in the West, he went to Brize Norton for immediate training (earning an “above-average” rating) and then to Harwell for operational training on Wellingtons, the main twin-engined heavy bomber of the early war years. On 20th September, just as the Battle of Britain was ending, he was posted to his first operational squadron, No 149, part of No 3 Group, at the big pre-war station at Mildenhall. His first operational sortie was over Calais towards the end of September, no doubt to attack the invasion barges.
Over the following five months he took part in some 31 night raids. The German defence at this time was relatively feeble by comparison with what was to follow, and so the tour was correspondingly tolerable; however bitter experience had shown that day bombing was much too costly, and the night bombing techniques were very inaccurate. His first raid on Berlin, at the end of October, was particularly eventful; they got hopelessly lost on their return, came in over Bristol, and ended up over Clacton as dawn was breaking with very little fuel left. There both the Army and the Navy opened up on them, and even the Home Guard succeeded in putting a bullet through the wing. They eventually made a forced crash landing at St. Osyth. The Home Guard commander, a retired general, entertained him generously and he finally got back to Mildenhall where his Group Captain forgave him for the damaged aircraft and advised him to go out and get drunk. He took the advice, and in the pub he met a WAAF whom he married eight months later (maybe that is why he remembers that particular day so well.)
The gauntlet of Friendly Fire seems to have been a not uncommon hazard to be faced. On another occasion, when he had to make three circuits returning to Mildenhall, the airfield machine gunners opened fire on him from ground level; he thought they were higher up and judged his height accordingly, and narrowly missed the radio masts which were not, as he thought, below him.
The longest raids on this tour were trips of over ten hours to Italy: to Venice, which they overflew at low level, and to the Fiat works at Turin. He described the latter raid, and the spectacular views of the Alps it afforded, in a BBC broadcast in December 1940. The commonest targets were the Ruhr and other German cities, and some raids were made at lower level on shipping in French ports. The raid which won him the DFC was on 22nd November, on Merignac aerodrome near Bordeaux, which “difficult target he attacked from a height of 1,500 feet and successfully bombed hangars, causing large fires and explosions. As a result of his efforts the task of following aircraft was made easier … He has at all times displayed conspicuous determination and devotion to duty.”
It was at Mildenhall that he featured in a series of propaganda photos by Cecil Beaton,
[Page break]
= 2 =
“A Day in the Life of a Bomber Pilot”; they were given a good deal of publicity and in fact David appears in one of them on the cover of a recently published video of the 1941 propaganda film “Target for Tonight”, also made with the help of 149 Squadron – though he did not take part in the film. Beaton describes the occasion at some length in his published diaries, though he has thoroughly scrambled the names and personalities, and he “demoted David from captain to co-pilot in his scenario.
On completion of this tour, early in March 1941, David was detached on secondment to the Air Ministry to assist with buying aircraft in North America, and later to ferry aircraft within North America and across the Atlantic – he flew the Atlantic at least twice in Hudsons, taking 12 hours or more.
The “chop rate” 1 in Bomber Command increased substantially during the first half of 1941. This coupled with increasing doubts about the value of the results obtained led to a serious decline in aircrew morale. During the summer of 1941 the Germans had considerable success with intruders – fighter aircraft attacking the bombers as they took off or landed at their own bases. At the end of September David returned to No 3 Group and joined No 57 Squadron at Feltwell, still with Wellingtons. His third raid, over Dusseldorf on October 13th, was particularly difficult; they were badly shot up and with their hydraulics out of action they crash landed at Marham on their return. After two more raids the strain finally proved too much and he was admitted to hospital just before Christmas 1941; for the next two months he was there or on sick leave. From then until mid-July he was Group Tactical Officer at HQ No 3 Group, and not directly involved in operations. In July 1942 he was posted to No 15 Operational Training Unit, at Harwell and Hampstead Norris, where he spent six months as a flight commander flying Ansons and Wellingtons, though he did participate in one raid on Dusseldorf while he was there.
In spite of the appointment of Harris in early 1942 and the introduction of the Gee radio navigational aid, results were still considered disappointing, particularly over the Ruhr, and serious questions were raised about the future of Bomber Command. To improve matters, in August 1942 the elite Pathfinder Force was set up under Don Bennett, albeit in the face of considerable opposition from most of the group commanders who were reluctant to lose their best crews to it. At least initially, all the crews joining it had to be volunteers, and to be ready to undertake extended tours. Their task was to fly ahead of the Main Force in four waves; the Supporters, mainly less experienced crew carrying HE bombs, who were to saturate the defences and draw the flak; the Illuminators, who lit up the aiming point with flares; and the Primary Markers and Backer Up who marked the aiming point with indicators. Their methods became more and more refined as the war went on. The increased accuracy required of them, and their position at the head of the bomber stream, inevitably exposed them to greater danger and a higher casualty rate than those of the Main Force.
No 156 Squadron was one of the original units in the Force; it operated from the wartime airfield of Warboys with Wellingtons until the end of 1942 and thereafter with 4-engined Lancasters, the very successful heavy bomber which was the mainstay of Bomber Command in the later years. The squadron flew a total of 4,584 sorties with the loss of 143 aircraft – a ratio of 3.12%. David joined it in January 1943, again as a flight commander. In the following four months he carried out a further 23 raids (all but one as a pathfinder) in Lancasters. The log books note occasional problems – “coned 2”, “shot up on way
1 The average sortie life of aircrew in the Command was never higher than 9.2 and at one time was as low as eight, and during the dark days of 1941-1943 the average survival chances of anyone starting a 30-sortie tour was consistently under 40% and sometimes under 30%. In one disastrous raid, on Nuremburg in March 1944, 795 planes set out, 94 were shot down and another 12 crashed in Britain. During the war as a whole, out of some 125,000 aircrew who served with Bomber Command, 55,000 died.
2 “Coned” – caught in a cone of converging searchlights, as experience which says put him off hunting for life.
[Page break]
= 3 =
in”, “slight flak damage”, and so on. Much of the period became known as the Battle of the Ruhr, though other targets were also being attacked. He told me once that the raid he was really proud to have been on was the one where instead of marking the targeted town (I think Dortmund) they marked in error a nearby wood, which the main force behind them duly obliterated; only after the war did the Germans express their admiration for the British Intelligence which had identified the highly secret installation hidden in the wood …
One of the pages in his log book has a cutting from the Times inserted, evidently dated some years later, recalling how in April 1943 the spring came very early and the hedges were billowing with white hawthorn blossom. This puzzled me until I read in a book on 156 Squadron how that blossom had come to have the same significance for them as the Flanders poppies of the 1914-1918 war.
David was promoted to Wing Commander half way through the tour (pathfinders rated one rank above the comparable level elsewhere), and awarded the DSO towards the end of it. The recommendation for this said that he had “at all times pressed home his attacks with the utmost determination and courage in the face of heavy ground defences and fighters. As a pilot he shows powers of leadership and airmanship which have set an outstanding example to the rest of the squadron” – and Bennett himself added, noting that David had just flown four operational sorties in the last five days, “he has provided an example of determination and devotions to duty which it would be difficult to equal.”
On the end of this tour in June 1943, he was sent to command No 1667 Conversion Unit at Lindholme and later Faldingworth. In December 1943 he transferred to a staff appointment at the headquarters of the newly formed 100 (SD) Group at West Raynham and later Bylaugh Hall. At this stage in the war the methods of attack and defence were growing increasingly complex, and this group was formed as a Bomber Support Group, including nightfighters, deceptive measures, and radio countermeasures (RCM). In June 1944, just after D-Day, he was given command of No 192 (SD) Squadron based at Foulsham, another wartime airfield. This squadron had been formed in January 1943 as a specialist RCM unit, and it pioneered this type of operation in Bomber Command; it flew more sorties and suffered more losses (19 aircraft) than any other RCM squadron. While RCM and electronic intelligence were its primary purpose, its aircraft often carried bombs and dropped them on the Main Force targets. RCM took a number of forms – swamping enemy radar and jamming it with “window” tinfoil, looking for new radar types and gaps in its coverage, deceptive R/T transmissions to nightfighters and so on – and one of the attractions of the work was the considerable measure of autonomy, and the freedom to plan their own operations. These extended to tasks such as searching for V2 launch sites (recorded as “whizzers” in David’s log book) and trying to identify the radio signals associated with them, and supporting the invasion of Walcheren in September. The squadron was equipped with Wellingtons (phased out at the end of 1944), Halifaxes and Mosquitoes, plus a detachment of USAAF Lightnings.
This role was the climax of his career, and lasted until the end of the war and after. It involved him in 25 operational sorties, all in Halifax IIIs, the much improved version of this initially disappointing 4-engined heavy bomber. They carried special electronic equipment and an extra crew member known as the Special Operator. The record of these sorties in the log books, for the most part so formal and statistical up to this point, becomes a little more anecdotal: “rubber-necking on beach “ (when he took two senior officers to see the breaching of the dykes at Walcheren), “Munster shambles”, “Lanc blew up and made small hole in aircraft [but only] 4 lost out of 1200!” The furthest east he went was to Gdynia in Poland; on returning from there he had the privilege of becoming the first heavy aircraft to land at Foulsham using the FIDO fog dispersal system. “Finger Finger Fido” was the cryptic comment in the log book.
[Page break]
= 4 =
A number of these sorties were daytime; on one of them, on September 13th, he was chased home by two ME109s which made six attacks on him. One of them opened fire but thanks to violent evasive action his aircraft was undamaged: his own gunners never got a chance to fire. No doubt it was skill of this sort, as well as his survival record, which gave his crew great faith in David’s ability to get them home safely. An encounter on December 29th 1944, on a Window patrol over the Ruhr, was not quite so satisfying; they claimed to have damaged a Ju88 which subsequently proved to be an unhurt Mosquito X from Swannington – and the Mosquito had identified them as a Lancaster. The log book entry concludes “Oh dear. FIDO landing, flew into ground. What a day.”
He was awarded a bar to his DSO in July 1945. The recommendation, made in March, recorded that “since being posted to his present squadron he has carried out every one of his sorties in the same exemplary fashion and has set his crews an extremely high standard of devotion to duty and bravery. This standard has had a direct influence on the whole specialist work of the squadron.
“He has been personally responsible for the planning of all the sorties carried out by his special duty unit and by his brilliant understanding and quick appreciation of the everchanging nature of the investigational role of his squadron, much of the success of the investigations performed by his aircraft can be attributed to him. He has shown himself to be fearless and cool in the face of danger, and towards the end of his tour made a point of putting himself on the most arduous and difficult operations.
“Both on the ground and in the air he has been untiring and has not spared himself in his efforts to get his squadron up to the high standard which it has now reached.”
The squadron was disbanded in September, by which time David had completed 501 hours of operations against the enemy in 86 sorties, the great majority of them as captain of his aircraft, He had no ambition to make a permanent career in the RAF; he has commented to Richard that this fact gave him a degree of independence in his dealing with his superiors that he thinks they appreciated and valued. He was demobilised in November and returned to his interrupted law studies.
…….
I showed these notes to David, who thought them well written but suggested that they gave a twisted view of the reality – a reaction that I can understand. Since then, however, I have managed to contact one man who flew with David: HB (Hank) Cooper DSO DFC, who first met David in 149 Squadron which he joined in January 1941 as a wireless operator / air gunner for his first tour, and later did two tours as a Special Operator in 192 Squadron, the second of them under David’s command. On two occasions he flew as a member of David’s crew.
He has written of David that “he was always completely fearless and outstandingly brave and pressed home his attacks to the uttermost. As the Squadron’s CO he generated loyalty and warmth, he was an outstanding model to follow. He spent much trouble and time encouraging his junior air crews as well as helping and seeing to the needs of the ground technicians who serviced the aircraft, generally in cold and difficult conditions. He was completely non-boastful, in fact he belittled his own actions (which were always of the highest order) when discussing air operations. (That rings very true!) He was an outstanding squadron commander in all respects, much liked and completely respected by all his air crews and ground crews.”
GND
March 2002
[Page break]
Temple Bar 1217
TEL. Extn. 2631
Correspondence on the subject of this letter should be addressed to:-
PS. THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE,
AIR MINISTRY S. 7. E.
and should quote the reference:-
S.7.e/79693.
[Crest] AIR MINISTRY,
LONDON, W.C.2.
26 March, 1949.
Sir,
I am directed to refer to your letter dated 21st March, 1949, regarding those awards due to you in respect of your service in the 1939/45 World War, and to inform you that your entitlement to the 1939/45 Star, Air Crew Europe Star with the France and Germany Clasp, and the War Medal has been established. These awards will be despatched to you shortly.
2. It is regretted that as you did not complete three years wartime non-operational service in the United Kingdom, the Defence Medal cannot be authorised. The Air Efficiency Award will not be ready for issue for some time. Application will not be necessary, but I am to request that you will notify this Department of any change in your permanent address, so that the award may be sent to you as soon as it becomes available.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
[Signature]
Wing Commander D.W. Donaldson, D.S.O., D.F.C.,
1a, Crescent Place,
London, S.W.3.
[Crest] Rep’d 29/3/49 & pointed out total of No of service in UK was 3 yrs 4 mth 120 day
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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David Donaldson's pilot's flying log book. One
Identifier
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LDonaldsonDW70185v1
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Description
An account of the resource
Pilots flying log book for David W Donaldson. This is a newly bound compilation of 3 log books covering the period from 12 March 1938 to 19 September 1945. Detailing his flying training, operations flown, Instructor duties and special duties flying. He was stationed at RAF Hamble, RAF Hanworth, RAF Evanton, RAF Brize Norton, RAF Harwell, RAF Mildenhall, RAF Feltwell, RAF Wyton, RAF Exning, RAF Hampstead Norris, RAF Warboys, RAF Lindholme, RAF West Raynham, RAF Bylaugh Hall and RAF Foulsham. Aircraft flown were, Cadet, B2, Hart, Hind, Magister, Henley, Oxford, Wellington, Hudson, Mentor, Anson, Lancaster, Tiger Moth, Halifax, Proctor and Moth Minor. He flew a total of 86 Night operations, 31 with 149 squadron, 5 with 57 squadron, 1 with 15 OTU, 23 With 156 squadron and 26 with 192 squadron. Targets were, Calais, Le Havre, Flushing, Essen, Gelsenkirchen, Cologne, Berlin, Munich, Hamburg, Duisburg, Merignac, Mannheim, Turin, Bordeaux, Lorient, Bremen, Venice, Wilhelmshaven, Hannover, Brest, Cherbourg, Dunkirk, Dusseldorf, Emden, Milan, Nurnberg, Stuttgart, St Nazaire, Kiel, Frankfurt, Spezia, Dortmund, Pilsen, Munster, North Sea, Walcheren, Bochum, Hagen, Merseburg, Gdynia, Wiesbaden, Politz, Chemnitz, Ladbergen, Dessau, Stade, Moblis and Berchtesgarten. His first or second pilots on operations were Pilot Officer Woollatt, Pilot Officer Morrison, Flying Officer Henderson, Sergeant Horn, Pilot Officer Garton, Pilot Officer Pelletier, Sergeant Wilson, Flight Lieutenant Meir, Major Leboutte, Flying Officer Parr, Wing Commander Chisholm and Wing Commander Willis. The log book contains newspaper clippings and a summary of his exploits written by his brother.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1940-09-25
1940-10-01
1940-10-02
1940-10-09
1940-10-10
1940-10-13
1940-10-14
1940-10-15
1940-10-16
1940-10-21
1940-10-22
1940-10-23
1940-10-24
1940-11-06
1940-11-07
1940-11-08
1940-11-09
1940-11-13
1940-11-14
1940-11-15
1940-11-16
1940-11-17
1940-11-18
1940-11-19
1940-11-20
1940-11-22
1940-11-23
1940-11-28
1940-11-29
1940-12-04
1940-12-05
1940-12-08
1940-12-09
1940-12-20
1940-12-21
1940-12-23
1940-12-24
1940-12-28
1940-12-29
1941-01-02
1941-01-03
1941-01-09
1941-01-10
1941-01-12
1941-01-13
1941-01-29
1941-01-30
1941-02-10
1941-02-11
1941-02-12
1941-02-14
1941-02-15
1941-02-21
1941-02-22
1941-02-24
1941-02-25
1941-02-26
1941-02-27
1941-03-01
1941-03-02
1941-09-30
1941-10-01
1941-10-03
1941-10-13
1941-10-14
1941-10-22
1941-10-23
1941-11-26
1941-11-27
1942-09-10
1942-09-11
1943-02-13
1943-02-14
1943-02-15
1943-02-19
1943-02-20
1943-02-24
1943-02-25
1943-02-26
1943-03-08
1943-03-09
1943-03-10
1943-03-11
1943-03-12
1943-03-13
1943-03-22
1943-03-23
1943-03-27
1943-03-28
1943-03-29
1943-03-30
1943-04-04
1943-04-05
1943-04-10
1943-04-11
1943-04-13
1943-04-14
1943-04-26
1943-04-27
1943-05-04
1943-05-05
1943-05-12
1943-05-13
1943-05-14
1943-05-23
1943-05-24
1943-05-25
1943-05-26
1943-06-12
1943-06-13
1943-12-21
1943-12-22
1944-09-03
1944-09-13
1944-10-03
1944-10-25
1944-11-04
1944-11-05
1944-11-18
1944-12-04
1944-12-05
1944-12-06
1944-12-07
1944-12-18
1944-12-19
1944-12-29
1944-12-30
1945-01-05
1945-01-06
1945-01-28
1945-01-29
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-14
1945-02-15
1945-03-03
1945-03-04
1945-03-07
1945-03-08
1945-04-02
1945-04-03
1945-04-07
1945-04-08
1945-04-25
1945-04-26
1945-05-12
1945-06-23
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Anne-Marie Watson
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Netherlands
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Czech Republic--Plzeň
England--Berkshire
England--Cambridgeshire
England--London
England--Hampshire
England--Norfolk
England--Oxfordshire
England--Suffolk
England--Yorkshire
France--Brest
France--Calais
France--Cherbourg
France--Dunkerque
France--Le Havre
France--Lorient
France--Saint-Nazaire
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Berchtesgaden
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Chemnitz
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Dessau (Dessau)
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Hagen (Arnsberg)
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Leipzig Region
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Stade (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Steinfurt Region (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Wiesbaden
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Italy--Milan
Italy--La Spezia
Italy--Turin
Italy--Venice
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Netherlands--Walcheren
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Scotland--Ross and Cromarty
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
France--Bordeaux (Nouvelle-Aquitaine)
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
France--Mérignac (Gironde)
100 Group
149 Squadron
15 OTU
156 Squadron
1667 HCU
192 Squadron
57 Squadron
Air Observers School
aircrew
Anson
bombing
Bombing and Gunnery School
Cook’s tour
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Service Order
Flying Training School
Gee
Halifax
Heavy Conversion Unit
Hudson
Lancaster
Magister
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
Pathfinders
pilot
Proctor
RAF Brize Norton
RAF Evanton
RAF Feltwell
RAF Foulsham
RAF Hampstead Norris
RAF Harwell
RAF Lindholme
RAF Mildenhall
RAF Warboys
RAF West Raynham
RAF Wyton
Tiger Moth
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/614/8883/PMusgroveJ1501.1.jpg
b7eca1ecabb2abfcc21142f7d37a6759
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/614/8883/AMusgroveJ150812.2.mp3
772053bb4cd364dadff721dd7f83f840
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Musgrove, Joseph
J Musgrove
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Musgrove
Description
An account of the resource
Two items. An oral history interview with Warrant Officer Joseph Musgrove (1922 - 2017, 1450082, Royal Air Force). He flew operations as an air gunner with 214 Squadron.
The collection was catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-08-12
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed audio recording
A resource consisting primarily of recorded human voice.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
AM: This interview is being conducted for the International Bomber Command Centre, the interviewer is Annie Moodie, and the interviewee is Joe Musgrove, and the interview is taking place at Mr. Musgrove’s home in Whatton, on 12th August, 2015. So Joe just to start off will you tell me a little bit about your, where you were born and your family background and school, stuff like that?
JM: Well I was born in York in 1922, my parents were Soldney [?] people, my father unfortunately had an accident when he was sixteen and lost half an arm so I was brought to appreciate the problems of people who had lost limbs. I went to school, I was at school until I was fourteen at the Loddon School in York which is very good quality school, er, did not do very well. When I went to work I decided that my education ought to be extended a bit more and spend two days a week at night school to bring myself up to a reasonable standard.
AM: What job were you doing Joe, what job were you doing then?
JM: I was working at Rowntrees which is a factory, and just ordinary work producing what is today a Kit-Kats.
AM: What did you do at night school then, what sort of things were you doing at?
JM: Well I concentrated on English and mathematics as I thought they were two basic things in life and that did stand me in good stead when I applied to join the Air Force when I was seventeen.
AM: What made you apply to join the Air Force?
JM: The main reason I think was I didn’t want to join the Army, I didn’t want to join the Navy, obvious reasons [laughs] and the Air Force appealed. The reason why in 1936 a single engined twin wing fighter landed not very far from where I was living and that got my interest in flying which I had ever since.
AM: Right. So you joined the RAF?
JM: Yes.
AM: How old were you eighteen?
JM: I joined in 19 well I went to join in 1940, had all me exams and one thing and another, but I hadn’t realised when I first applied to join that it would be such a complicated business and that, because I spent three days at [unclear] at Cardington where the airships were, going through various tests and exams and things like that, and fortunately I did quite well so they eventually accepted me as a wireless operator/air gunner and I went and trained me on that.
AM: So what was the training like where did you do it?
JM: Well.
AM: Describe the training to me?
JM: I did a bit of everything, I went to Cardington to get kitted out and I went from there to Scar to Blackpool, for initial training, which I enjoyed, because bearing in mind at the time I was just coming up to eighteen in 19. I never been away on me own before it was quite exciting to be in Blackpool in those days, and that was the doing Morse Code and things like that. I did I think reasonably well, a very kindly flight sergeant patted me on the head and said, ‘I think you’ve passed.’ I was pleased about that, and then I went on leave. And then from there I went to a place called Madley in Herefordshire for initial flying on, can’t remember the name of the aircraft now, anyhow it was a twin engine twin plane, it was my first experience of flying which I think I enjoyed at the time you went up and down it’s a little bit rough, and I found out what air sickness was all about and that particular thing, but did quite well pass there and then I went on flying with a single engine aircraft a Percival IV [?] which was quite good. And then from there on leave, Madley by the way was the place where Rudolph Hess when he came was moved to Madley first of all from Glasgow. From there I went on leave, sounds if life’s one great leave for me isn’t it, and enjoyed it. From there I went, can you just let me have a little think. I got posted to a place called Staverton, I went to the, er, railway transport office, and he said, ‘Oh I know where it is it’s not very far from blah, blah, blah.’ So off I went down to the South Coast and on to Staverton, got off train there, empty platform, I found one of the officials there, I said, ‘How do I get to Staverton aerodrome?’ He said, ‘With a great deal of difficulty from here ‘cos you’re in the wrong county the one you want is between in Gloucestershire, between Gloucester and Cheltenham.’ So they put me up overnight and the following day to Staverton which was an aerodrome just opposite Rotols Airscrews Factory. Spent some time there, I’m not quite certain what the objective at Staverton was, did a fair bit of flying. Staverton went on leave and got posted to 102 Squadron on Halifaxes at Topcliffe. Hadn’t been there very long and then moved just the other side of York, can’t remember the name of the aerodrome now, anyhow, but wasn’t on operations I was there as part of my training.
AM: Was this the Heavy Conversion Training, Heavy Conversion Training?
JM: Yes, thoroughly enjoyed it. Went on leave from there yet again, I think my parents begin to think life is one great leave for Joseph David. And from there, oh I got posted to a place called Edgehill near Banbury, which was No. 12 Operational Training Unit. From there of course I joined the usual thing there’s twenty of us of each kind, so the cup of coffee on the lawn and get crewed up which we did.
AM: How did, how did you crew up? How did that work?
JM: Well, it’s I stood there, mostly among people of my own breed if you like [unclear] and a chappie came up to me and said, ‘Are you crewed up yet?’ I said, ‘No.’ He said, ‘Well my pilot’s, a chap called Ces Brown, and I’m his navigator.’ And his name was dead fancy. ‘It would be very nice if you joined us and if you do of course we’ll have an idea we’ll just pop in the mess and have a cup of coffee and a beer later on in the day.’ And I thought, sounds good, so I joined them. And we did our OTU at Edgehill which was an aerodrome sit on like a little plateau which was a bit different but the beauty of it is, it was a farm that abutted the aerodrome that used to have a really good system whereby they give egg and bacon if you wanted it from the farm, which we did regularly. And from there on leave again, goodness, now this time it’s on my record in’t it this man goes on leave quite a lot. And got posted from there to 214 Squadron which was based at Chedburgh. Unfortunately on the way there I got robbed of my case with all my RAF papers in that I was studying nothing secret or anything like that but it was a bit of a loss to me, and joined 214 Squadron at Chedburgh not very far from Bury St. Edmonds. Stirlings Mark 3 Stirlings, I was quite pleased because I thought Mark 3’s, one or two were joining Mark 1’s and Mark 1’s were a little bit of a [intake of breath] I always thought a bit of a difficult thing they used to have a lot of swing on take-off, whereas a Mark 3 had one but not quite as serious as the other ones. So that was it I’m now operational.
AM: So what was your first operation like?
JM: Well it was gardening they always are aren’t they, cinnamon [?] which was just off the Baltic. I don’t know it’s when you’re sitting in the radio operator’s little compartment almost isolated from everybody else you don’t really know what’s going on outside, so what I used to approaching the target area stand in the astrodome and look out for people who were a little bit sort of not all that nice to us and that was the first one, it was uneventful insofar as we weren’t damaged anyway usual [unclear] shells and flak and that was my if you like introduction to operations. I didn’t find it very difficult at all.
AM: What were you doing as the radio operator, what did you do for your main things?
JM: Well it’s communications I suppose was the main thing about radio operators, [coughs] they it was an air gunner, the training for air gunnery and I missed that out ‘cos I did my air gunnery training on Walney Island which was nice.
AM: Near Barrow-in-Furness.
JM: It had a nice pub, and they had Boulton Paul Defiants which was nice, and enjoyed that, and of course at the end of it we did we went on leave. [laughs]
AM: So back to being a radio operator?
JM: Well the Boulton Paul Defiant one was [unclear] two seater fighter with a pilot and the turret just behind, quite fast aircraft. The only thing was with Boulton Paul Defiant’s, oh yes and the pilot that I had was a Pole who didn’t speak English and on the thing there’s a set of coloured lights which combination of each it meant something to him and to me but not necessary the same so on that we had a bit of a problem on there. And on them the undercarriage the hydraulics were a little bit dubious, if I can use that word [whispers], so the problem was if you wouldn’t come down sometimes you’d get one leg down and the other one not, so I used to take it up, oh he used to take it up to about seven or eight thousand feet put his nose down and pull it up and centrifugal force would force the other one down. Well I was a [unclear] and when I flew on it it always worked, and from there as I said before I went on leave and on to [?] squadron.
AM: So actually being the radio operator on the operation what sort of things did you have to do?
JM: Well the thing is [coughs], excuse me, when approaching the target when presumably no, no stuff was going to come off the radio, my skipper asked me if I’d go in the front turret which I did, interesting ‘cos when you sit on the front of an aircraft, with nobody in front of you and nobody at the side of you to me it was a little bit isolated and there’s only two guns in the front turret rather than four in the back, but it was not too bad and it is interesting ‘cos you get a good view of the target when you went over it. One or two times we had a difference of opinion with night fighters, which meant me spraying or hosing the guns.
AM: So you did actually use the guns then?
JM: But I never ever shot anybody down unfortunately so I can’t claim any credit for anything like that, and that was it. And of course we had leave from time to time. [coughs]
AM: How many operations did you do Joe?
JM: Well it was listed as eight, so I wasn’t all that lucky.
AM: And what sort, what areas did you target, where did you actually go on the operations, can you remember?
JM: I remember two gardening, one was cinnamon and the other one was off the isl, Ile du Ré on the Durant which was the entrance to a U-Boat base somewhere.
AM: Why did they call them gardening, why did they call them gardening?
JM: Well they codes we all was vegetables, like cinnamon and rose and things like that, so it was just a code gardening. It was supposed to be our introduction to operations more often than not on the second one we did which was Ile du Ré off the Durant, we got you’ve got to drop them at a certain height, certain speed, and we had two large ones and then going down along the powers that be that gave us the route didn’t take into consideration the facts, there was some anti-aircraft ships they used to have based there, um, which unfortunately for us were just a, if I can put it that way, just a little bit unfriendly.
AM: Describe unfriendly?
JM: And um, the I think it was port [unclear] and that destroyed the power supply to a lot of the instruments the navigator was using [coughs] so we used the, I can’t use his name, but it was “D”. The code you phoned when you were in trouble on the nights and the thing indicated it was night time and we asked for searchlight assistance to get us to our which couldn’t do, so they got us into Andrew’s Field which is an American station which mitchers [?] and marauders and of course we put this Stirling down there and of course we put the Stirling down there and of course the quite high the nose on a Stirling, and the following morning we got up there’s all the, a lot of American [unclear] looking up at us, with some right rude remarks being made about it. But the beauty of it was, was the er, one of my commanders’ said, [coughs] excuse me, ‘You can go into the PX’, I think it was called. A large building where you could buy all sorts of things, so we stocked up on, I think it was Lucky Strike Cigarettes, handkerchiefs and things like that. And I must say when we landed there we went for debriefing for these, they got the station education officer etcetera up who debriefed us and he said, ‘Well non-commission officers in the Air Force the American Air Force don’t have a mess separate, but nevertheless we can get you something that you’ll will enjoy.’ And we had steak and one thing and another for breakfast, and they said, ‘Did we mind.’ And I thought no I don’t mind but if they want to hang on to me for a month or two I don’t mind at all. Eventually we went back to Chedburgh.
AM: How did you get back? How did you get back did somebody come and fly you back?
JM: They sent a lorry for us.
AM: Oh right.
JM: Not a crew bus a lorry and we sat in the back of that, flying kit and everything. And when we went along people recognised what we were and waved to us and we waved back, which was like being on holiday, and we got back and we went on leave, which was nice. And at that time I’d been introduced to a young lady who eventually became my wife, and I went to London to, she was a Londoner, I went to London to see her.
AM: Where did you meet her?
JM: I met her in Banbury when I was at HEO, and there was no bus service from HEO that I remember into Banbury so I used to walk, it wasn’t very far six or seven miles something like that. And I used to walk in spend the day with Elsie, walk back, and we was on night flying, circuit, bumps and things like that, and after seven days I said to Elsie, ‘I wish you’d go back to London ‘cos I’m worn out with you here going backwards and forwards.’ But it was nice. So back to Chedburgh, on the 27th which is the Monday of September 1943, we was briefed to go to Hanover which we’d been before so we knew the way, at least I thought we knew the way to Hanover. I remember it quite well because the final turning point was at the far end of the Steinhoven [?] and I was illuminated by a white flare cascading at three thousand feet, and I thought great that’s exactly where we go on the last leg, unfortunately rather unpleasant German night fighters I think it was, they used to have two sets of night fighters who would [unclear] there’s the tamer soar which was the tame boar and the wilder soar which was the wild boar, and the wild boar it roamed with radar a little bit feared by the way came from nowhere and one of them took a fancy to having a closer look at aircraft and the rear gunner fought him off. The rear gunner, Tommy Brennan, thought he’d shot him down but I don’t think he did, the trouble with rear gunners they always think they’re are shooting people down and there not. But by that time by the time we’d been chased all over the sky we was down to about five thousand feet and we took a consensus of the crew whether should go on or turn back so we decided after come that far we’d keep going although five thousand feet was a little bit low for operating.
AM: Had you been actually shot up at by that time?
JM: Yes the port engine had caught fire which we put out with the Gravenor, the Gravenor is the fire extinguisher in the engine which you can only use once, got that out, got down say to five thousand feet and then got shot at by anti-aircraft fire which set the port outer one on fire, so we [laughs] the bomb aimer disposed of his little things and off we went back but it was pretty obvious we was losing fuel and the aircraft kept getting lower and lower and lower, and Ces Brown the pilot said, ‘We better bale out now otherwise I think it’ll blow up.’ So that’s what we did and I landed near Emden in the middle of a field, and the funny thing was I remember about it, it was a soft landing, so I thought get rid of the parachute and me flying jacket etcetera, but I couldn’t find a way out of the field because there was a ditch all the way round and there seemed to be no way above it to get out, so I went round again and the moon was shining on the water but just underneath the water was this black bridge that was covered by water. So I got across there and I thought right go to the village which was in the distance with a church, go to the last cottage then if it’s unpleasant I’m out in the continent. Well that was the principle but when I got to the village I’m walking along very carefully keeping well into the hedge and things, when a little thing was in me, me back, and a voice said something or other, I could never remember what he actually said but I knew what it meant and that was it, and he was, he was I think he was a Hageman [?] in the Luftwaffe on leave, serves me right for getting involved in [unclear], and he was saying goodnight to his girlfriend when I happened to walk past so I thought his eyes lit up and he thought, ooh I’ve got it, I’ve got it, and I was, and he actually took me to the end cottage anyhow. Got in there and there was my navigator, Ted Bounty, sitting there looking quite miserable but he did perk up when he saw me and that was it.
AM: What happened to the others, what happened to the rest of the crew do you know?
JM: Well see when you are baling out you’ve got to remember the aircraft is still moving, and I been bale out the next man might be half a mile further on, so I don’t know until we’d been to Interrogation Centre, Dulag Luft, and we met that was the first prisoner of war camp I went to which was Stalag VI in Heydekrug in Lithuania.
AM: Right. Tell me about Dulag, tell me about the interrogation part of it?
JM: So they sent him that picked us up to Emden and Emden which was a police marine barracks, him that picked us up, and of course on the films you see these motorbikes with Germans on with a sidecar, they sent one of those, well they sent two, one for Ted Bounty, and one for me, and off we went to Emden. And at that time [coughs] I had, every now and again aircrew a thing we used to do, one of them’s got money and I was the one that had money, currency, so I thought I’ve got to be careful here what I do with it, so I said to the interrogator and they all, interrogators they all look nice, very polite, but there are not. I said, ‘I’m awfully sorry but I must use the toilet.’ So they got a guard took me along and I went inside the little cubicle and he waited outside, and I thought I know what I’ll do I’ll put the money, it was one of the old fashioned toilets up there, lift the lid up put it inside and get it later on. That was a, so went back into interrogation and they in retrospect it was not any particular worry on that, they shout at you, they threatened you, [coughs] excuse me, they offer you cigarettes, in fact I was offered a drink, um, but I’ve always made a promise I would never drink if I was captured, at least I think I did. So I then was taken into a room and given some soup to keep me going and said to that person, ‘I must use the toilet.’ [unclear] fine I’ve got it back again, climbed up lifted it up it had gone, dereliction of duty I suppose you would if the commander found out but I tried hard to keep it. And then went from there after about two or three days by train to Frankfurt am Main which is near to Oberursal which is where Dulag Luft was, stopped at Cologne and there’s I’m in this compartment with two guards, and I thought oh gosh I don’t feel very safe here on the station at Cologne, but fortunately a Luftwaffe officer came in and what he demanded I don’t know but he came to sit in here with us so his presence kept everybody out.
AM: So it was the civilians that were —
JM: Yes.
AM: Was the worrying factor.
JM: So we got on to Frankfurt am Main and then on to Dulag Luft. Dulag Luft I’ve read many many accounts of people’s grief there but I didn’t find it particularly harrowing if that’s the best word for it, unpleasant yes but not harrowing. So again I was offered cigarettes and drink which I didn’t take, regretted it afterwards. And then after about a fortnight something like that, may be six or seven of us that was there, I mean you was in isolation by the way, they took us by tram to a park where there was a wooden hut and it was opposite the IG Farbernwerks [?], I always remember that and we’d got to spend the night there and there’s an air raid, and next to the hut was a German anti-aircraft gun unit, which pooped ‘em up all night, not particularly pleasant, but in retrospect not too bad anyhow. I think when you say in retrospect it means that as the years have gone by you’ve mellowed to the situation, and then from there we were transported by train, luxury train, well cattle trucks really, but they were clean. All the way and I think we spent, and I can’t be hundred per cent certain, but I think we spent two days and two nights going to across Germany to Lithuania to Luft VI Heydekrug, and then that was it. And then when the Russians moved and in July 1944 when the Russians were not all that far away they decided they’d move the camp, most of the camp went by train to Thorn in Poland, the rest of us about eight hundred British airmen and the Americans went by train to Memell just up the coast from Lithuania and boarded a little ship called “The Insterburg” there was nine hundred I think from Klage[?] in the hold that we were in. It was a, it was an old coal ship, a Russian coal ship the Germans had taken over, and I had got volunteered to help the medics at Heydekrug there, one of my problems in life is that I keep going and putting me hand at the back of me head to scratch it and every time I’ve done that I’ve volunteered for something and I apparently volunteered to help the medics. Particularly on aircrew that had had injuries to the joints and the joints become sort of locked with adhesions of the joints, and my job was sort of try to break them down, which was interesting on that. So I had a Red Cross Armband and when I got on “The Insterburg” I said, pointed to it and the just tore it off and backed me down [laughs], and it was a twenty foot ladder, steel ladder into the, and we was on “The Insterburg” I think can’t remember exactly three or two days and nights on that, and then we landed at Swinemünde the German Naval Base at Swinemünde. When the what appeared to be an air raid but it was an individual American aircraft, [unclear], and went from there to Kiefheide, Kiefheide Station where we was going to go onto Gross Tychow which was Luft IV, and when they eventually the following morning got us out they had Police Marine [?] men or mainly boys in running shorts and vests with fixed bayonets and some of the Luftwaffe with dogs and a chap whose name was Hauptman Pickard, I always remember, and he was stood on the back seat of a Kugelwagen which was like a German little vehicle, and shouting all sorts of things [unclear] move you to Gross Tychow Camp at a reasonably fast pace with jabbing and one thing and another and dogs biting, and a thought that occurred to me was that I’d rather be on leave right now than doing this. And it was not all that far about four kilometres from Kiefheide Station to Gross Tychow but we had lots of casualties.
AM: On the way or you had casualties that you were taking with you?
JM: Well the instructions apparently mean to the police moving people, you can do what you like but you must not kill anybody, but that gave them carte blanche to knock hell out of us. Luckily I wasn’t too bad. So when we got there we found that the camp wasn’t even finished, we slept the first night in the open. The toilet arrangement in those days were a little bit suspect and it comprised, I shouldn’t really say this, a big trench with a [unclear] over it. And then the following day we was like in we call them dog kennels, small wooden huts, we slept in there for a few nights until they got the permanent ones done and that was Gross Tychow. It was of all the camps I was in the worst of the whole lot.
AM: Worse because of the conditions or the —
JM: Well, Prisoner of War Camps are governed mainly by the people running them, they can be nice or they can be nasty, at Heydekrug there were some about average they weren’t too bad at all, Gross Tychow they were awful to any of us.
AM: Awful in what way?
JM: Well bullying and things like that, but the food wasn’t very good, didn’t have much of it. There was a man there who was six foot three, or six foot four something like that, we used to call him the big stoop, largely because I think he was a little bit embarrassed by his height and he used to walk in a stoop. He was the one that took by wristwatch, he was the one that used to knock people over and things like that. But for every villain there’s always a day of comeuppance isn’t there and when we moved out on the march towards the end of the war the Americans found him and they’d taken his head off and that was that he’d got his comeuppance didn’t he. The end of the war.
AM: Tell me about the march then?
JM: Well in February, I think it was February 2nd, they made out we had been pre-warned we hadn’t been pre-warned they told us at midnight they was moving out the following day. So you’d got to prepare everything take everything with you that you can take, and most of the people got a spare shirt, sometimes you had a spare shirt, tie the up, the arms up and button it up and it made a nice little receptacle put your things in there, and the following morning we went on the march, it was I think it was eleven o’clock if I remember rightly. And we went from Gross Tychow on the northern run to the Oder to cross the Oder, the Russians were the other side of Statin further down the Oder, and we had to take, we had to get across and what they did for the ones I was with you went into barges, there was two barges tied together and you was towed across the Oder to the other side. Unfortunately the night before when we got there the Germans said, ‘We’ve got nowhere for you to stay for the night.’ It had been snowing so we had to sleep in the open, but being aircrew boasting to the, we worked out what to do, so there’s some like a cloudy fern at the side, got those down tried to sweep away a bit of snow off, we had overcoats on.
AM: Did you have boots, did you have boots on?
JM: Oh yeah, oh shoes, in those days we’d been, well [coughs] usually when you get shot down you lose your flying boots. So the following morning I say they moved us across by barge and then we had to, we found out afterwards of course that the reason for the panic they was frightened the Russians would catch up with us, whether they was ever in a position to do that I don’t know, but the Germans obviously thought that they did. So then we went on the march across Northern Germany, various places, enjoying it, looking at Germany through the eyes of a hitchhiker. [laughs]
AM: You don’t really mean enjoying it?
JM: Well yes, but it, um, there was too many incidents happened there.
AM: What was it like, what was, ‘cos it’s cold?
JM: Well it had been snowing, remember we set out in February.
AM: Yes.
JM: And it was a cold winter. By the time we got to Fallingbostel the weather was getting better.
AM: What did you eat, what did you eat and drink?
JM: Well that’s a problem, I’ve got the world’s worst memory, so I don’t remember a lot. The two things you must do is you must get sleep and you must have liquids, liquids was a very difficult thing, some of the times the Germans got us liquids a lot of the times they didn’t. When there was snow about if you were lucky enough to get a snow that was still clean it would melt in your mouth, but that causes dysentery anyhow, I know [whispers] that’s the other problem. But, to be honest a lot of the time they found us barns and things like that to sleep in. What you had to remember at that time, March and April of 1945 it was mostly British fighter planes in the air which were having a good time, and one of the barns I was in got shot at and set on fire.
AM: How did you all get out?
JM: One or two people got killed.
AM: Did they?
JM: But to be honest the Germans tried to find us somewhere, but I’m afraid Royal Air Force fighter pilots were seeing something that’s a good target they went for it. [coughs] Fortunately we got to Fallingbostel eventually sometime in April if I remember rightly.
AM: So two months.
JM: We was then there for a couple of days on the station, the man in charge of Fallingbostel decided it was overcrowded so our little lot was moved out again on the road to Lubeck, which we went to, was one or two incidents on the way. But the man I was with, if you in the thing you’ve got to have a friend who you are with and Danny was one of mine, and Danny said to me, ‘Why don’t we just nip out sometime when we stop if there’s a time when we can do it safely.’ And there came one of those times and we just, Danny and I nipped out across the field into the woods and that was it, spent a little bit of the time keeping had to get through the German lines and through the British lines which we did when we got to the Elbe, across the Elbe.
AM: Just the two of you?
JM: Yeah, on a boat there was no oars but the hands work for oars don’t they.
AM: And did you know what you were making for that, did you know that you would find the British lines?
JM: Well not really we know the direction roughly and we’d got ears that tell you a lot, we got, there was only one time where we was in a little bit of trouble, we spent the night in a barn that didn’t have a roof but it was a barn so Dan and I spent the night in there and the village further down about two kilometres further down it was a village where there were German half-tracks and things and logic would say that they should be moving east which meant they wouldn’t come our way they’d go east and we were north of them, so we decided, we saw them moving to go so we decided we would go to the village. Unfortunately they decided to go our way north instead of going east, and it was not a lot of them I remember a Mark IV type of tank was pulling two lorries and there’s half-tracks with Germans at the back and we’re going along and they’re coming and there’s no point in running away doing anything like that, and our jackets were already prepared, chevrons everything was pulled off so there’s nothing, so we just kept on walking and we had a like a French conversation, and if they knew it was French they would have wondered what language we were talking it certainly wasn’t French but it sounded like it, and luckily they were so keen to get away they just ignored us and we just kept on going, and we just kept on going, and going, and going, eating what we could and we eventually came across an aerodrome that had some Dakotas, we went on an RAF pilot we collared him.
AM: What did you think when you finally saw it?
JM: Eh?
AM: What did you think when you finally saw it there?
JM: Well, well, contrary to what other people have said it didn’t make a lot of difference to me. It was just something was happening at the time, the fact that it was the if you like the starting point of going out didn’t occur to us, the RAF pilot he said he was on some sort of exercise for evacuation of prisoners of war, and he was, he did say he that they was taking people like to me somewhere in Belgium for transit, but he said I’m not going that way I’m going direct to Great Britain. And we talked him into taking us and he flew from there to Wing near Aylesbury, I think as part of an exercise sort of, and we got to Wing and that was the nice part. When we was coming towards, they all take you over the white cliffs of Dover don’t they you see that, and he couldn’t head them ‘cos you can’t see much so he said ‘I’ll bank to port and you can all go that side and have a look, anyway he said for goodness sake go back again the balance of the aircraft is all over.’ We got to Wing and unloaded us, Danny and I, I remember [coughs] there was WAAFS and all sorts of things, there was two rather large Salvation Army ladies I remember quite clearly came across and lifted us both up and swung us round said a lot I think then we went inside the hangar where all sorts of people came and cuddled you and things like that, yeah that was a nice thing. And one lady said to me I can send a telegram to your parents if you like, give me all the details which I did and they sent a telegram off to my mum and dad saying I was here. So we had something to eat, I always like this because you see they have all this food out and when you get a plate full suddenly a doctor comes along and takes half of it back you know, saying, ‘You mustn’t eat too much.’ And we went from there to Cosford which was set up as a reception centre, had medicals and things like that, and the station commander apparently if I believe what I’m told, given me concerning reception a chat on how to treat ex-prisoners of war and one of the things what he apparently said if I’m to believe what I’m told, ‘For goodness sake don’t leave anything lying about you’ll find it disappears you know.’ Whether that was true or not I don’t know could well have been ‘cos I was the only judge of a lot of people you live on your wits don’t you. And then after I’d been there for some time there was one little amusing incident you had to see a doctor before you could do anything you had to see a doctor, and that’s after you had been deloused that’s one of the things you get done, deloused straight up. And there was five cubicles and the word got around there’s four male doctors and one female doctor, everybody’s trying to work out where the female doctor was to avoid that one, and we, I can’t remember, say cubicle four, and this cubicle four came up you were next you used to say, ‘You go before me I’m not in a rush.’ And I got pushed into cubicle four and it was a lady doctor, mind you she was getting on a bit she was a nice lady, but it was funny the way people were avoiding her simply because they’d been away all that time. And then we were carted off [coughs] to the station, I remember it quite well it was just an ordinary little local train that went from Cosford to Birmingham, two stations at Birmingham, Snow Hill, and I can’t remember the other one.
AM: New Street, New Street, its New Street now in’t it?
JM: So we did that and when we got on the train that was going north there was just one carriage, there was an RAF policeman at either end of it and that was reserved for people like me, the train was absolutely crowded but our coach wasn’t and nice young ladies served refreshment all the time. And I got to York Station, I’d already notified Elsie my future wife and she was at York Station, and all the time I was in Germany I imagined meeting Elsie it’s a step bridge across the rails at York Station, [unclear] slow motion on that like if you’re on the films, looking forward to this, so I’m going slowly towards Elsie and she went straight past me, I remember that I thought oh dear all that time she doesn’t recognise me, it’s something you remember isn’t it, and that and at the other side there’s my sister and her husband so that was it. And I had instructions to go to the RAF York aerodrome there to see the medical officer which I did and he gave me a form to go to the food office in York, and the following day I went. A man said, ‘Join that queue.’ So I joined the queue, it was in the Assembly Rooms in York which is a lovely place, and I’m in this queue and it occurred to me there’s all pregnant women, there’s all pregnant women getting extra rations, people patting me on the back and one thing and another and I always remember that, and that was it I was back in York.
AM: Back in York, on leave.
JM: [laughs] On leave, yeah, yeah, ubiquitous leave.
AM: What happened after that then up to being demobbed how long?
JM: Well I got, er I don’t think you know that most aircrew, nearly all of them had a rehabilitation period and mine was at an aerodrome off the A1, can’t remember the name of it.
AM: No don’t matter.
JM: Doesn’t really matter, anyway I was there for a month and it just so happened the Royal Air Force band was based there so we had music, and for that four weeks what it consists of Friday morning we got up quite early and the station commander had arranged for a Queen Mary to be there on the grounds we had to go to London for some reason.
AM: Queen Mary, is that the big truck?
JM: Yes.
AM: The big open truck.
JM: And about twenty of us climbed on there and went all the way from the station about fifty miles into London on that, and we had to meet at a certain time to get back and coming back and we did that for four weeks until I got on leave yet again, to arrange the wedding with Elsie.
AM: So she’d recognised you by then?
JM: Oh yes I’d put a bit of weight on and that [laughs] yeah, and took a long time to live it down. So from there where did I go, oh I went to Compton Bassett. They decided to put me on a code and cipher course so I went and code and ciphered Compton Bassett. I was the only warrant officer there, there was all flight lieutenants and squadron leaders going to be code and cipher officers which apparently I was destined to be. So I did that and now I’m a code and cipher officer aren’t I, had to go before the board for a commission and they said, ‘The posting will be to the Middle East they’re looking for code and cipher officers.’ So next time, I got every weekend off, so I’m coming back to London to Elsie and I said I’d been offered a commission but it’s a posting to Middle East code and cipher officer, and Elsie said, ‘No way.’ So I had to turn it down. So then they thought well what do we do with him so they had to [coughs] we had a party for the people who passed the code and cipher officer, and I’m sitting next to a civilian and I said to him, ‘It’s a little bit of an impasse I’m not quite certain what to do.’ And explained the circumstances to him, so he said, ‘Write to the air officer commanding training command for this particular region and apply for a compassionate posting to where you want to go.’ Said, ‘That’s fine I don’t know who the air officer commanding is?’ And he said, ‘Oh it happens to be me.’ So he was, I got to meet him he was coming to Compton Bassett for some reason and I had an interview with him and I said, ‘Well my wife is living in Golders Green which is only two stations off Hendon, Hendon would be a nice place.’ So I got a posting to Hendon and they say what the hell do you do with him. It was nice posting, nine to five Monday to Friday living hours, most enjoyable, 24 Squadron which had the Curtiss every now and then unofficially I used to join one of them and go flying. And then I got I think July 1944 I went to Oxbridge and got demobbed.
AM: ‘45.
JM: ‘44, ’45, ’46.
AM: ’46 we’ve moved on one.
JM: Well you’re allowed a mistake now and then.
AM: Yeah go on then.
JM: And got demobbed and got involved in getting a suit. I think Burtons made a lot of them.
AM: Montague Burtons.
JM: Montague Burtons. Some of them were really quite nice, I think I wore it once, it’s the material was nice the cut not particular, but I’m demobbed anyhow. And the company I used to work for before I went in the Air Force wrote to me to say there’s a job waiting for you.
AM: Is this Rowntrees?
JM: Yeah. So I wrote back and I said, ‘I don’t mind working for you but I want to work in London ‘cos my future wife lives in London.’ They said they can’t do that. The problem is when you come out the Air Force you don’t take very kindly to being instructed and when they said we can give you a job but not especially where you want it, so I said ‘I don’t want it.’ So I went to find a job in London and I was offered a job, the people who make fridges, and they made big American ones, but the problem was the job was stores controller and the man was doing it already but he was not retiring until September October and this was early in the year. So I got a job with Express Dairy which was a place quite close to where Elsie lived and thought I’ll have that job until I get the other one, but enjoyed working at Express so much then I wouldn’t leave although the difference in salaries was quite high, and I worked for Express Dairy for all my working life, and they were taken over by various firms but I still worked for them. And one of the problems if you got taken over if it’s two people doing the same job one of them’s going.
AM: Yes.
JM: And the one that’s going is the one in the highest salary.
AM: Yes.
JM: And I kept on being retained, and I said to Elsie, ‘Must mean that my salary is too low.’ I got offered a job at the main site at Ruislip, the job was in charge of warehousing and things like that, and they said well, and then I had a heart attack everybody does if you’ve got a do you’ve got to have one if you’re in a fashion[?], and I had three months off and the chairman called me and said, ‘You mustn’t go back on this job and I’ll sort it and we’ve found a nice little job for you working as PA assistant for the director who was responsible for production.’ And that’s what I did.
AM: And that’s what you did.
JM: And Dennis Watson was my boss, well nothings been written yet so you’ve got to sit down and write your job description will go from there so that’s what I did. I spent the rest of my time on that job.
AM: As PA.
JM: And his responsibility was keeping an eye on [unclear] functions and things like that and decided on systems, his, and we had seven factories up and down the country. One of my jobs was to visit ‘em now and again, and now and again meant to me when you’re a little bit fed up you get in the car and off you go to a factory and that’s what I used to do. And then when I retired my boss Dennis made a big party at Ruislip and there was about a hundred of us there, and that was it.
AM: And that was it.
JM: Yeah.
AM: I’m going to switch off now Joe.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Interview with Joseph Musgrove
Creator
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Annie Moody
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-08-12
Type
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Sound
Identifier
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AMusgroveJ150812
Conforms To
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Pending revision of OH transcription
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Language
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eng
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
United States Army Air Force
Format
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01:11:32 audio recording
Description
An account of the resource
Born in York in 1922, Joseph left school at 14 and started work in a chocolate factory and attended two nights of further education per week. In 1936, a fighter aircraft had landed nearby which stimulated his interest in flying which he retained all his life. After joining the RAF he did well in the selection tests and was offered a position of wireless operator/air gunner. After initial training he went to RAF Madley to train on twin-engined aircraft and then RAF Staverton, RAF Topcliffe and was crewed up at the operational training unit at RAF Edgehill. Gunnery training was carried out on Defiant which were notorious for undercarriage issues. Finally he was posted to 214 squadron at RAF Chedburgh, flying Stirlings.
His first operation was minelaying in the Baltic and he recalls standing in the astrodome to warn of enemy fighters. On other operations he would sit in the front turret and occasionally fire at enemy fighters, without success. Further minelaying operations were carried out and on his eighth, his aircraft was hit by anti-aircraft fire and diverted to a US Army Air Force airfield where he stocked up on goodies, unavailable in England from the base exchange store.
On the 22 September 1943 he took part to an operation to Hanover and describes the night fighter tactics in detail. Following lengthy evasive action his aircraft was forced down to 5,000 feet where it was hit by by anti-aircraft fire and he was forced to bail out over Emden where he was caught by a member of the Luftwaffe who was visiting his girlfriend. After initial interrogation he was sent to the interrogation centre at Dalag Luft and after a two day train journey arrived at Stalag 5 prisoner of war camp.
On July 1944 the encroaching Russian army forced the evacuation of the camp and he was moved to the unfinished Luft 4 camp and remembers the bullying guards and poor conditions. Again in February 1945 the camp was evacuated and after crossing the River Oder in barges marched across northern Germany. After two months he arrived at Lübeck and escaped the column, narrowly missing being captured by German soldiers by conversing in French. Finding an allied airfield he was repatriated to England where he was treated as a hero.
After recuperation he attended a code and cipher course and was offered a commission if he would go to the middle-east. Wanting to get married he declined and wangled his way to 24 Squadron at RAF Hendon, were he was eventually demobbed in July 1946.
Contributor
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Terry Holmes
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Gloucestershire
England--Herefordshire
England--Oxfordshire
England--Suffolk
England--Yorkshire
England--London
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany
Europe--Oder River
Germany--Lübeck
Poland
Poland--Tychowo
Lithuania
Lithuania--Šilutė
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1936
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1943-09-22
1944-07
1945-02
1946-07
102 Squadron
214 Squadron
air gunner
aircrew
animal
bale out
bombing
crewing up
Defiant
demobilisation
Dulag Luft
Halifax
mine laying
Operational Training Unit
prisoner of war
RAF Chedburgh
RAF Compton Bassett
RAF Madley
RAF Shenington
RAF Staverton
RAF Topcliffe
shot down
Stalag Luft 4
Stalag Luft 6
Stirling
strafing
the long march
training
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/551/8814/PLancasterJ1501.1.jpg
794d475655253509adf90821a41de268
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/551/8814/ALancasterJO150406.2.mp3
5eafd09ebb3a1d2459a7b55f8591b8a7
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Lancaster, Jo
John Oliver Lancaster
J O Lancaster
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Lancaster, JO
Description
An account of the resource
17 items. Two oral history interviews with John Oliver 'Jo' Lancaster DFC (1919 - 2019, 948392, 103509 Royal Air Force), photographs and six of his log books. Jo Lancaster completed 54 operations as a pilot with in Wellingtons with 40 Squadron, and after a period of instructing, in Lancasters with 12 Squadron from RAF Wickenby. He became test pilot after the war and was the first person to use a Martin-Baker ejection seat in an emergency.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Jo Lancaster and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-08-18
2017-03-08
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed audio recording
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Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
AP: This interview is being conducted for the International Bomber Command Centre. The interviewer is Andrew Panton. The interviewee is Jo Lancaster. Mr Lancaster was a pilot in various aircraft during World War Two and the interview is taking place at xxxx on April the 6th 2015. Apologies for the poor sound quality during various sections of this interview due to static on a tie clip microphone. Talk a little bit about that raid July the 24th 1941.
JL: Well at the time the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen were in the harbour at Brest. On that day the Scharnhorst made a run for it down the coast to La Pallice but the Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen were still in Brest and a number of Wellingtons, I think of 3 Group were ordered to carry out a daylight bombing raid on the harbour there. We were at Alcon, operating from Alconbury at the time. Near Huntingdon. And we were routed right down to the Scilly Isles. Then doubled back towards Brest and you could see a black cloud of flak smoke from quite a distance away. It was a beautiful, a beautiful clear day and we just had to barge straight in. There was, we only saw two ME109s, one of which went right through the middle and got severely shot up by everybody and the pilots baled out. Everybody claimed it of course but nobody knows who did it. But, anyway, we were in two vics of three. We [weren’t in company?] but our trio sailed through without too much damage. A piece of flak came through the windscreen alongside me and dropped on the floor which I still have and we’d used up a lot of fuel trying to keep formation with constantly altering the engine settings. And so, having, as I say, got away again out over back over the channel we and several others headed for St Eval in Cornwall and quite a number landed there. Many of them in various stages of damage. We’d had our hydraulic system knocked out but apart from flak holes we were intact.
AP: Did the searchlights sort of —?
JL: Well when that happened you were singled out for particular attention by the flak which happened to me several times. On one occasion it was right over the middle of Essen and did some violent evasive action and lost a lot of height and gained a lot of speed and finally outflew the searchlights.
AP: What was the evasive action? Did you corkscrew or did you dive?
JL: Well just various. Mainly sort of spiral diving but keep trying to keep a heading away from the searchlights all the time.
AP: And flying through the flak and the anti-aircraft again.
JL: Well there was nothing we could about that. We heard it and smelled it and when you got back you found lots of holes.
AP: Right. One of the things she was asking about was what it was like when you’re coming in on the final approach to your bomb run. You as the pilot. What are you doing? What’s the crew doing?
JL: I think you made yourself as small as possible. I just used to [unclear] and went in.
AP: So you were just taking orders from the bomb aimer. He was in control. Not the pilot.
JL: Yes. He would take over and he’d say. ‘Steady. Left. Left’ or ‘Right,’ and we would keep laterally level and try and make these small adjustments in heading until he was satisfied and then eventually he would say, ‘Bombs gone.’
AP: And then what?
JL: You felt the thud as they left and usually we had a camera aboard so they had to hold, hold the heading for a few, well about thirty seconds or more. I forget now. Until a camera had, the camera had flashed, had gone off, and then we were free to leave. On the Lancaster we had, usually had cookies and incendiaries. With the Wellingtons the target was usually the Ruhr. That was standard nine, five hundred pounders.
AP: Right. And what was the age? How old were you when you were flying? Can you say a little bit about how old you were? And your crew?
JL: In 1941 I was twenty two.
AP: And your crew. Could you say?
JL: Well, all much the same. I had a Canadian navigator, a Welsh wireless operator, a Canadian front gunner and a New Zealand rear gunner. The navigator, in the Wellingtons the navigator went forward to do the bomb aiming. Later on of course we had the bomb aimers on this, on the way back from Berlin. In a Wellington. And we were rather taken by surprise because you come down with the change in the wind over ten tenths cloud and we adjusted north and we came, we were flying back over Wihelmshaven and Emden and were getting shot at all the way through the clouds and then eventually there was a gap in the clouds and I could see, see through the clouds, the clouds across the causeway across the mouth of the Zuiderzee. And I think we were probably all looking at that and then an ME110 shot overhead and circled around and went into them and I went into a deep spiral dive and he tried to collar us and showed us a bit of [unclear] and I think he should have [unclear] went into the cloud and we never saw each other again so we don’t know what happened to him. In 1941, on a Wellington squadron such as 40 Squadron, each Wellington had its own ground crew. There was a fitter for each engine. That was his engine. And then there were two airframe fitters. And they were more or less permanently with the aircraft so we became very friendly with them. And on operational days they would do what they called an NFT — Night Flying Test and some of the guys would always come with us on that. They were very industrious and proud of their aeroplane.
AP: And other? Other people that you had to rely on? Was there? Can you say, talk about, some other people?
JL: The only people I can think of were the [lovely ladies?] in the parachute section which, on 40 Squadron our parachutes went to [unclear] RAF Alconbury had virtually no buildings at all. A couple of wooden huts and that was about all so all the things like parachutes and things were at Wyton which was our base station. I never went to the parachute section there but at Wickenby on 12 Squadron we had a parachute section there and it was always WAAFs who looked after the parachutes.
AP: OK. Any, any —?
JL: And we had WAAF drivers of course.
AP: Yeah. Ok. Any thoughts about the aeroplanes that you flew like the Wellington or Lancaster? A favourite or, you used to fly? Or —
JL: The Wellington is a well-designed aeroplane but it is grossly underpowered. When they finally put in decent engines in her. The Hercules instead of the Pegasus. It was a very good operational aeroplane.
AP: Right.
JL: But I think everybody loved a Lancaster.
AP: What was so special about it?
JL: I don’t know. It was viceless. It was doing, carried a big load, doing a good job and with the Wellingtons I had two complete engine failures and by the grace of God we were within easy distance of an airfield. On one occasion we took off on operations and the port engine started — oil started pouring out of it and eventually it stopped and we were able to, it was still fairly light and we just lobbed down into nearby Wyton. And the other one I was on in the, actually in the circuit at Wymeswold when I was an instructor at OTU and we were just able to go straight in from there because on the —
[Recording paused]
JL: Oh well. Yes. Well. I was, before the war I’d served an apprenticeship in Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft at Coventry and after the war I went to join Saunders Roe at Cowes but they didn’t have very much going on and I got a bit fed up with that and re-joined Armstrong Whitworth as a test pilot. There were three of us there Eric Frenton was a test pilot and another one — Bill Else, and they had, there was a lot of work going on. Amongst other things we had the AW52G which was a glider, a tail-less glider. Two thirds scale of the bigger versions of the AW52. There was two of those. One with Nene engines. One with Derwent engines. The Nene were more powerful. And the Nene engine one, when I went there, was out of action having the structure stiffened. And then it came out and had the limited speed increased by quite an amount and I was only on my third flight with it and the job was to explore the higher ranges, speed ranges and it’s rather difficult to explain technically but the controls were called elevons. They were combined elevators and ailerons. And in order to get them light enough for the pilot to control them manually they had what they called spring tabs which meant that the connection from the pilot’s control was actually, to the flying control was actually through a spring. And what happened was that while I was doing something like three hundred and twenty miles an hour, we didn’t use knots in those days and a flutter, what they called flutter set in and it became very very violent. Very very noisy. I anxiously estimated the frequency as one and a half cycles per second. The amplitude we don’t know. You could only guess at. It was probably six or eight feet as I was going up and down at that rate and I was rapidly disorientated and I thought the thing was going to break up anyway. But if it didn’t break up I was going to be unconscious so I decided to eject. A thing I’d never even anticipated before and I wasn’t in a very good state by then so I didn’t do the drill properly. I managed to jettison the canopy and I pulled the overhead blind down over my face which fired the seat. I should have put my heels on the, on the rest on the front of the seat which I didn’t do. I just was very lucky I did that because the aircraft had sort of spectacle controls and I think, as an afterthought, they realised that wasn’t very good combined with an ejection seat so they put in another system which jettisoned the hood and fired some cutters which, which disconnected the controls from the stick and I think you was just supposed to push the stick forward too. It was a bit of Heath Robinson system but I couldn’t do that because it was wired off anyway. Anyway, I got away with it with a lot of bruises on my shoulders and on my knees. I landed very badly. I thought I was going to land in a canal and tried to remember the drill we’d been given in the RAF but I only succeeded in making the descent worse by swinging. And when I landed I broke a chip off my shoulder bone and they took me away and x-rayed me and they said that I’d sustained a compression fracture of the first and second along the vertebrae and they said, ‘Not only have you done that but it’s been done before.’ And I have to say that it was in, I don’t remember the date. The 1st of January 1947. We had the SRA1 — that was at Saunders Roe — which has an ejection seat and we went up to Martin-Baker’s and went up on the test rig and after that I had a rather sore tail for a while. That must have been what it was. 30th of May 1949. And after all the kafuffle had died down on it I wrote to Sir James Martin. He wasn’t Sir James then. He was just James Martin to thank him and got a very nice letter in reply and also a custom made little wooden box which came through the post marked, “Explosives — danger” [laughs] which was delivered to Armstrong Whitworth. To me at Armstrong Whitworth. It contained a very nicely inscribed Rolex gold watch and [pause] I’m sorry am I —?
AP: That’s alright. No. That’s alright. Got to watch the microphone. Yeah. The watch. Yes.
JL: [unclear] In 1975 when I was living in the South. In West Sussex. I had a little bungalow with casement windows and some, one of the local villains I think, got in and took that watch and another one and several other small valuables and I presume that both watches had gone straight down to The Lanes in Brighton and by now would probably be melted down but — and just two years ago I was invited to go up to Martin-Baker’s and they showed me around, gave me lunch and I wondered what it was all about. Then they started asking me about my ejection and finally got on to the watch and eventually Andrew Martin produced from his pocket my watch. And the story is that they’d had an email from somebody in New York who had read the — it had my name on it and James Martin and somehow or other they put it together and connected it with Martin-Baker. Whatever company, I don’t know who it was in New York who went over or whoever it was contacted this chap who they said was a very shifty character and they bought the watch back. I don’t know for how much and they gave it back to me.
AP: That’s an amazing story.
JL: What happened then was that I didn’t really want the watch so I asked them to auction it but then they said instead of auctioning it we’ll put it in our company museum and we’ll put five thousand pounds in to the Bomber Command Memorial Trust. It applies to almost everybody. We usually crewed up completely at random and almost always within twenty four hours we were as thick as thieves.
AP: You relied on each other didn’t you?
JL: Loyalty all down the way.
AP: Strong teamwork and trust.
JL: Yes. I was with these two Canadians and a New Zealander. Yes. The two Canadians. I’d never met a Canadian before and I was mildly surprised that they sounded like the Americans I’d seen on the films. And I hardly knew where New Zealand was. But —
AP: I think it’s good to mention that it was an international crew wasn’t it? That they were from all over the Commonwealth.
JL: Yes.
AP: You had Canadians, British.
JL: Yes. And later on on the Lancaster squadron I had an Australian navigator.
[Recording paused]
JL: In the Wellington was to Stettin. That was a nine hours something. And the longest in the Lancaster was to La Spezia which is about sixty miles south of Genoa. A sea port. And that was, that was about nine and a half hours I think.
AP: You were the only pilot. Right?
JL: Yes. We did, we did carry a second pilot but he was just supernumerary. Usually he just stayed back in the astrodome helping to keep the, keep a lookout.
AP: Can you talk a bit about what it was like to fly so long? I mean did you eat anything? Drink. How did you survive on those hours?
JL: I don’t think I ever ate or drank anything until back in, back in safe area. In a safe area. I think most of us were the same. In those days everybody smoked and we sometimes smoked when we were below oxygen level which was ten thousand feet but we probably weren’t supposed to. We didn’t on operations anyway. Once again that would be when we were safe and nearly home.
[Recording paused]
JL: One long drag over France. And we had a thing called Mandrel which was a microphone in one of the engines to the wireless operator and he had, the wireless operators were given a recording of German night fighter RT traffic and they didn’t understand it but they could recognise it and I had a Canadian wireless op, Jordan Fisher, at that time and he was listening out on Mandrel and he was highly excited. He was apparently getting very good results. He could, he could tune in to one of these frequencies where the night fighters were operating and he was doing his Mandrel trick and they get very annoyed [laughs] Shouting.
AP: How did he use it? Did he block their signal? Or reduce it.
JL: Yes. Yes having identified the frequency he transferred the engine noise on that frequency.
AP: I see. So he could block their frequency.
JL: He was having the time of his life apparently [laughs]. Mandrel was a microphone mounted in to, actually in the port inner engine, the [strength of it?] the wireless operator, the wireless operators had been given some training to identify but not necessarily understand German night fighter RT traffic and they would listen out, looking for this RT traffic and when they found it they would tune in the transmitters to that frequency and then transfer the engine noise which blotted out everything and frequently made the night fighter pilots very cross.
[Recording paused]
Having completed a tour you then became a screened aircrew and you went to an OTU where you became an instructor in your particular aircrew job. As a pilot I went to Wellesbourne Mountford OTU and my job was conversion on to Wellingtons which are just circuits and landings, circuits and landings and not only in daytime but at night. And in the winter when I was there the night flying programme was divided into four three hours stints 6-9, 9 to12, 12 to 3 and 3 to 6 and you can imagine what it was like having to get up or be prepared to go down and be ready to start doing circuits and bumps at 3 o’clock in the morning.
AP: Yeah.
JL: It was bad enough at 12 o’clock. So I hated it. I wasn’t a very good instructor anyway. And then they started with these two one thousand bomber raids I was on. They started doing quite regular operations with screened, so-called screened aircrew at OTUs and I thought it was far better to be on a squadron if I had to do all that.
AP: Were you on, did you say a two thousand bomber raid?
JL: I was on the first two.
AP: Two thousand bombers in one raid? Or one thousand bombers?
JL: There were two one thousand bomber raids.
AP: Two one thousand bomber raids.
JL: May the, May the 30th and June the, June the 2nd I think.
AP: Could you say a little bit about what happened? I mean, was that Cologne?
JL: The first one was Cologne. The second one was Essen.
AP: Essen. And so you were flying Wellingtons.
JL: Yes. Wellesbourne Mountford OTU put up about twenty aircraft that night and we lost four. My aircraft still had the dual control in which made it very very difficult to get in and out because the entry was via a hatch under the nose. So in a hurry it would have been very awkward. And the aircraft were generally fairly clapped out. And on the way back I had a screened navigator and a screened wireless operator. And on the way back, when we got back over England the wireless operator came. Came up front and sat beside me. I think together we saw the oil pressure on the port engine just drop off to nothing and fortunately the wireless operator, he was familiar with Wellingtons, knew what had happened. It had run out of oil. We had a reserve oil tank down in the fuselage with a hand pump and he knew what to do immediately. He went scuttling back down. Started hand-pumping oil back in to the engine.
AP: That’s before you got to it.
JL: No. This was on the way back.
AP: On the way back.
JL: What I didn’t say — over Cologne we were quite high and I had two Canadian gunners. You know, they were students and they got very excited and wanted to spray their guns around [laughs]. I told them to sit quiet and keep a good lookout.
AP: What was the weather like on that night?
JL: Clear.
AP: So you had a good shot at them.
JL: Oh yes we could. We were late. Late on target and we could see it from miles away.
AP: It was already lit up.
JL: We were, we were more or less unmolested I think.
AP: A thousand bombers. Did you see the other ones around you?
JL: Oh yes.
AP: Can you say a little bit about what it was like?
JL: Yes. I saw them. Quite a lot. Yes.
AP: There were Lancasters, Halifaxes. Stirlings.
JL: Everything. Most of the ones I saw were Wellingtons.
AP: But you’re not in formation.
JL: No. No.
AP: Loose formation.
JL: Completely random.
AP: But you’re on your course and you’ve got aeroplanes.
JL: Yes. Had to try and keep an eye open. Very occasionally you’d hit the slipstream of one of them [laughs]. There’s one not very far away in front.
AP: So you had to keep a constant picture of that.
JL: Oh yes. There must have been hundreds of collisions we never heard about. Fatal ones.
AP: So when you arrived it was well and truly lit up. .
JL: Yes.
AP: Yeah.
JL: I don’t, I don’t remember actually being shot at.
AP: No? And then the other one was Essen.
JL: Yes. And that was a complete disaster because there was thick haze over the whole area and we just couldn’t see anything so I think we just let them go and came home.
AP: Right. Yes.
JL: Stood down for six weeks to convert. We were operational again on Lancasters on the 1st of January 1943.
AP: The operations that you did then. Can you say a bit about what you did?
JL: I think I did three mining operations. My first operation on a Lancaster was to Norway, to Haugesundfjord, and dropped, I think it was four, fifteen hundred pound mines in the fjord there. When we got caught out by searchlights and the gunners were able to reply and they, they won. Off Emden and the islands. We put a stick of mines there. And another one was at the entrance to St Nazaire harbour.
AP: Oh yeah. That was in France.
JL: Yes. That’s where we did, there’s an island, I think it’s called Belle ile and we had to do a timed run from Belle Ile. Went right up the estuary and let them go. I think the load was four, fifteen hundred pound mines. Parachute mines.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Interview with Jo Lancaster. One
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Andrew Panton
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-04-06
Type
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Sound
Identifier
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ALancasterJO150406
PLancasterJO1501
Conforms To
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Pending review
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
After leaving school, Jo Lancaster was an aircraft apprentice with Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft Company in Coventry. After volunteering for the Air Force, he trained as a pilot and completed a tour on Wellingtons with 40 Squadron from RAF Alconbury. Following a period as an instructor at an operational training unit, he flew another tour of operations. After the war Jo became a test pilot and was the first man to eject from an aircraft in danger using a Martin-Baker ejection seat.
Contributor
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Julie Williams
Language
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eng
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Lincolnshire
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Essen
Italy--La Spezia
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1941
1943
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
00:30:15 audio recording
12 Squadron
3 Group
40 Squadron
aircrew
bombing
bombing of Cologne (30/31 May 1942)
fitter airframe
fitter engine
Gneisenau
ground crew
Lancaster
Me 109
Me 110
mine laying
Operational Training Unit
pilot
RAF Alconbury
RAF Wickenby
RAF Wyton
Scharnhorst
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/283/6693/LJonesTJ184141v1.2.pdf
5748d2448d5ea2cadc0c3e9a2aadc8de
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Jones, Thomas John
Tom Jones
T Jones
Description
An account of the resource
62 items. An oral history interview with Peter William Arthur Jones (b. 1954) about his father Thomas John Jones DFC (b. 1921, 1640434 and 184141 Royal Air Force), his log book, photographs, correspondence, service documents, aircraft recognition manuals, medals and a memoir. He flew operations as a flight engineer on 622 Squadron Stirling and 7 Squadron on Lancaster. <br /><br />The collection also contains an <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/2566">Album</a> of 129 types of aircraft. <br /><br />The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Peter Jones and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2014-12-04
2017-12-07
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Jones, PW
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Tom Jones’ navigator’s, air bomber’s and air gunner’s flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
Navigator’s, air bomber’s and air gunner’s flying log book for Sergeant Tom Jones from 17 August 1943 to 27 August 1945. Detailing training schedule, instructional duties and operations flown. Served at RAF Mildenhall, RAF Warboys, RAF Oakington, RAF Nutts Corner, RAF Riccall and RAF Dishforth. Aircraft flown were. Stirling, Lancaster, Oxford, C-47 and York. He flew a total of 11-night operations with 622 squadron and 51 operations with 7 squadron pathfinder force. 18 daylight and 33-night operations on the following targets in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Poland: Aachen, Amiens, Aulnoye, Berlin, Biennias [sic], Cabourg, Cagney [sic], Chalons sur Marne, Chambley, Dortmund, Duisburg, Emden, Essen, Falaise, Fougeres, Foret de l'Isle-Adam, Franceville, Hannover, Homburg, Karlsruhe, Kassel, Kattegat, Kiel, Le Havre, Lille, Liuzeux [sic], Ludwigshafen, Lumbres, Montrichard, Mt Couple [sic], Mantes, Normandy battle area, Oisemont, <span>Œuf-en-Ternois</span> [sic], Renescure, Rennes, Schweinfurt, Skagerrak, St Martin d’Hortiers, Stettin, Stuttgart, Tergnier, Thiverny, Tours, Valenciennes, Venlo aerodrome and V-1 sites. His pilots on operations were Flight Lieutenant Phillips DFC, Wing Commander Lockhart and Wing Commander Cox. The log book is well annotated with comments about events during operations.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LJonesTJ184141v1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Air Force. Transport Command
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Atlantic Ocean--Kattegat (Baltic Sea)
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Skagerrak
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Suffolk
England--Yorkshire
France--Amiens
France--Cabourg
France--Chambley Air Base
France--Falaise
France--La Pallice
France--Le Havre
France--Lille
France--L'Isle-Adam
France--Lumbres
France--Mantes-la-Jolie
France--Montrichard
France--Nord (Department)
France--Normandy
France--Nieppe Forest
France--Oise
France--Oisemont (Canton)
France--Pas-de-Calais
France--Rennes
France--Somme
France--Tergnier (Canton)
France--Tours
France--Valenciennes
Germany--Aachen
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Essen
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Homberg (Kassel)
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Kassel
Germany--Ludwigshafen am Rhein
Germany--Schweinfurt
Germany--Stuttgart
Netherlands--Venlo
Northern Ireland--Antrim (County)
Poland--Szczecin
France--Neufchâtel-en-Bray
France--Châlons-en-Champagne
Great Britain
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
France--Œuf-en-Ternois
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1945
1943-09-21
1943-09-22
1943-09-27
1943-09-28
1943-10-02
1943-10-03
1943-10-04
1943-11-18
1943-11-22
1943-11-23
1944-01-30
1944-01-31
1944-02-20
1944-02-21
1944-02-24
1944-02-25
1944-03-01
1944-03-02
1944-04-09
1944-04-10
1944-04-11
1944-04-12
1944-04-18
1944-04-19
1944-04-24
1944-04-25
1944-04-26
1944-04-27
1944-05-01
1944-05-02
1944-05-06
1944-05-07
1944-05-21
1944-05-22
1944-05-23
1944-05-24
1944-05-25
1944-05-27
1944-05-28
1944-05-31
1944-06-01
1944-06-06
1944-06-07
1944-06-08
1944-06-09
1944-06-11
1944-06-12
1944-06-13
1944-06-15
1944-06-16
1944-06-17
1944-06-27
1944-06-28
1944-07-01
1944-07-04
1944-07-06
1944-07-08
1944-07-12
1944-07-15
1944-07-16
1944-07-18
1944-07-19
1944-07-20
1944-07-21
1944-07-23
1944-07-24
1944-07-25
1944-07-26
1944-07-28
1944-07-29
1944-07-30
1944-08-01
1944-08-04
1944-08-06
1944-08-07
1944-08-08
1944-08-09
1944-08-10
1944-08-11
1944-08-12
1944-08-13
1944-08-28
1944-08-29
1944-08-30
1944-09-01
1944-09-03
1944-09-05
1944-09-06
1944-09-09
1944-09-10
1944-06-05
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
1657 HCU
622 Squadron
7 Squadron
aircrew
anti-aircraft fire
B-24
bombing
bombing of the Normandy coastal batteries (5/6 June 1944)
C-47
flight engineer
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Mk 1
Lancaster Mk 3
mine laying
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Oxford
Pathfinders
RAF Dishforth
RAF Mildenhall
RAF Nutts Corner
RAF Oakington
RAF Riccall
RAF Stradishall
RAF Warboys
Stirling
tactical support for Normandy troops
target indicator
training
V-1
V-weapon
York
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/283/6692/PJonesPW1606.1.jpg
2c6796117404e6f8a2b57367b5876a71
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/283/6692/PJonesPW1607.2.jpg
e905f613134873d98cadcb062ccca7c5
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Jones, Thomas John
Tom Jones
T Jones
Description
An account of the resource
62 items. An oral history interview with Peter William Arthur Jones (b. 1954) about his father Thomas John Jones DFC (b. 1921, 1640434 and 184141 Royal Air Force), his log book, photographs, correspondence, service documents, aircraft recognition manuals, medals and a memoir. He flew operations as a flight engineer on 622 Squadron Stirling and 7 Squadron on Lancaster. <br /><br />The collection also contains an <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/2566">Album</a> of 129 types of aircraft. <br /><br />The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Peter Jones and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2014-12-04
2017-12-07
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Jones, PW
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
No 7 SQUADRON P.F.F. 8 GRP
RAF OAKINGTON
CAMBS
SEPT 1944
AVRO LANCSTER BIII
PA964 MG-G
L – R
J NAYLOR REAR GUNNER RAF
S HARPER BOMB AIMER RAF
D GOODWIN NAVIGATOR RNZAF
F PHILLIPS PILOT RAAF
T JONES FLT ENGINEER RAF
S WILLIAMSON W/OP AG RAAF
C THURSTON H2S OPERATOR RNZAF
R WYNNE M/U GUNNER RAF
[red dot] GARDENING SKAGGERAK
[red dot] HANNOVER
[red dot] HANNOVER
[red dot] GARDENING KATTEGAT
[red dot] KASSEL
[red dot] LUDWIGSHAFEN
[red dot] BERLIN
[red dot] BERLIN
[red dot] STUTTGART
[red dot] SCHWEINFURT
[red dot] STUTTGART
[red dot] LILLE
[red dot] AACHEN
[red dot] TERGNIER
[red dot] KARLSRUNE
[red dot] ESSEN
[red dot] CHAMBLEY
[red dot] MANTES
[red dot] DUISBURG
[red dot] DORTMUND
[red dot] AACHEN
[red dot] RENNES
[red dot] Mt COUPLE
[red dot] FRAUGEVILLE
[red dot] FORET DE CERISY
[red dot] FOUGERES
[red dot] RENNES
[red dot] TOURS
[red dot] AMIENS
[red dot] VALENCIENNES
[red dot] RENESCURE
[red dot] OISEMONT
[green dot] BIENNAIS
[green dot] ST MARTIN D’ORTIERS
[green dot] FORET DE CACC
[green dot] LIUZEUX
[green dot] THIVERNY
[red dot] CHALONS SUR MARENE
[green dot] CAGHEY
[red dot] AULNOYE
[red dot] HAMBURG
[red dot] KIEL
[red dot] STUTTGART
[red dot] FERFAY
[red dot] STUTTGART
[green dot]NORMANDY BATTLE AREA
[green dot]NOYELLE EN CHAUSSE
[green dot]FORET DE NIEPPE
[green dot]FORET D’ADAM
[red dot] CABOURG
[red dot] NORMANDY BATTLE AREA
[green dot] FORET DE MORMAL
[red dot] LA PALLICE
[green dot] MONTRICHARD
[red dot] FALAISE
[green dot] OUF EN TERNOIS
[red dot] STETTIN
[green dot] LUMBRES
[green dot] VENLO
[green dot] LE HARVE
[green dot] EMDEN
[green dot] LE HAVRE
[green dot] LE HAVRE
[green dot] LE HAVRE
OPERATIONS
[red dot] NIGHT
[green dot] DAY
2 TOURS EXPIRED
10 SEPT. 1944.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Lancaster and Fred Phillips' crew
Description
An account of the resource
A starboard side view of a Lancaster, PA964, on the ground. There are eight aircrew standing at the nose. On the reverse is a list of the aircrew including Tom Jones and a list of his operations.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Royal New Zealand Air Force
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PJonesPW1606, PJonesPW1607
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Atlantic Ocean--Skagerrak
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Kassel
Germany--Stuttgart
France--Lille
Germany--Aachen
France--Tergnier (Canton)
Germany--Karlsruhe
France--Chambley Air Base
France--Mantes-la-Jolie
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Dortmund
France--Rennes
France--Cerisy-la-Salle
France--Fougères (Ille-et-Vilaine)
France--Tours
France--Amiens
France--Valenciennes
France--Oisemont (Canton)
France--Creil
France--Châlons-en-Champagne
France--Maubeuge
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Kiel
France--Béthune
France--Normandy
France--Abbeville Region
France--Pas-de-Calais
France--L'Isle-Adam
France--Cabourg
France--La Pallice
France--Montrichard
France--Falaise
France--Hesdin
Poland--Szczecin
France--Lumbres
Netherlands--Venlo
France--Le Havre
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
Poland
France
Germany
Netherlands
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Atlantic Ocean--Kattegat (Baltic Sea)
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Claire Monk
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-09
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-09
7 Squadron
8 Group
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
dispersal
flight engineer
H2S
Lancaster
Lancaster Mk 3
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Pathfinders
pilot
RAF Oakington
wireless operator
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Title
A name given to the resource
Emden (Lower Saxony) [place]
Description
An account of the resource
This page is an entry point for a place. Please use the links below to see all relevant documents available in the Archive.
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/357/5770/LGrimesS1271597v1.1.pdf
f78de867933d06f442ab2845bafcbb34
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Grimes, Syd
Syd Grimes
S V Grimes
Description
An account of the resource
Three items. An oral history interview with Pilot Officer Sydney Grimes (173865, 1271597 Royal Air Force) a photograph, and his logbook. After training as a wireless operator/ air gunner he completed a tour on 106 Squadron at RAF Syerston. After a period as an instructor he joined 617 Squadron for his second tour where he took part in the attacks on the Tirpitz.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Syd Grimes and catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-11-21
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Grimes, SV
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Sydney Grimes' observer's and air gunner's flying log book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LGrimesS1271597v1
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Description
An account of the resource
Royal Air Force observer's and air gunner's flying log book for Sydney Grimes, wireless operator, covering the period from 2 July 1942 to 22 August 1945. Detailing training, operations flown, instructional duties and post war flying. He was stationed at RAF Evanton, RAF Madley, RAF Cottesmore, RAF Wigsley, RAF Syerston, RAF Balderton, RAF Scampton, RAF Winthorpe, RAF Woodhall Spa, RAF Bardney and RAF Sturgate. Aircraft flown in were Dominie, Proctor, Botha, Wellington, Anson, Manchester, Halifax and Lancaster. He flew a total of 41 operations, 24 night operations with 106 squadron and 15 daylight and 2 night operations with 617 squadron. Targets were, Kiel, Frankfurt, Spezia, Pilsen, Stettin, Duisburg, Dortmund, Dusseldorf, Essen, Wuppertal, Bochum, Gelsenkirchen, Cologne, Turin, Hamburg, Berlin, Tromso, Urft Dam, Ijmuiden, Politz, Rotterdam, Oslo Fjord, Emden, Koln, Poortershaven, Viesleble [Bielefeld] viaduct and Ladbergen. His pilots on operations were Flight Lieutenant Stephens and Flight Lieutenant Gumbley.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Scotland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Czech Republic--Plzeň
England--Herefordshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Rutland
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Bielefeld
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Ladbergen
Germany--Wuppertal
Italy--La Spezia
Italy--Turin
Netherlands--Ijmuiden
Netherlands--Rotterdam
Norway--Tromsø
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Poland--Szczecin
Germany--Urft Dam
Atlantic Ocean--Oslofjorden
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1942
1943
1944
1945
1943-04-04
1943-04-05
1943-04-10
1943-04-11
1943-04-13
1943-04-14
1943-04-16
1943-04-17
1943-04-18
1943-04-19
1943-04-20
1943-04-21
1943-05-12
1943-05-13
1943-05-14
1943-05-23
1943-05-24
1943-05-25
1943-05-26
1943-05-27
1943-05-28
1943-05-29
1943-05-30
1943-06-11
1943-06-12
1943-06-13
1943-06-24
1943-06-25
1943-06-26
1943-06-28
1943-06-29
1943-07-03
1943-07-04
1943-07-08
1943-07-09
1943-07-12
1943-07-13
1943-07-24
1943-07-25
1943-07-26
1943-07-27
1943-07-28
1943-07-29
1943-07-30
1943-08-23
1943-08-24
1944-10-29
1944-11-12
1944-12-08
1944-12-11
1944-12-15
1944-12-21
1944-12-22
1944-12-29
1944-12-30
1944-12-31
1945-01-01
1945-02-03
1945-02-06
1945-02-08
1945-02-14
1945-02-22
1945-02-24
1945-03-13
1945-03-14
1945-05-12
1945-06-25
1945-07-09
1945-08-07
1945-08-11
1945-08-20
1945-08-22
106 Squadron
14 OTU
1654 HCU
1661 HCU
1668 HCU
50 Squadron
617 Squadron
9 Squadron
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
anti-aircraft fire
bombing
bombing of Hamburg (24-31 July 1943)
Botha
Cook’s tour
Dominie
Halifax
Halifax Mk 2
Halifax Mk 5
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Lancaster Mk 1
Lancaster Mk 3
Manchester
Operation Catechism (12 November 1944)
Operation Dodge (1945)
Operation Exodus (1945)
Operational Training Unit
Proctor
RAF Balderton
RAF Bardney
RAF Cottesmore
RAF Evanton
RAF Madley
RAF Scampton
RAF Sturgate
RAF Syerston
RAF Wigsley
RAF Winthorpe
RAF Woodhall Spa
Tallboy
Tirpitz
training
Wellington
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/87/2205/LWoolgarRLA139398v1.2.pdf
35b154fb1d680686ee063c2241368776
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Woolgar, Reg
Reg Woolgar
R L A Woolgar
Jimmy Woolgar
Subject
The topic of the resource
World War (1939-1945)
Bombing, Aerial
Description
An account of the resource
<a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/items/browse?collection=87">17 items</a>. The collection consists of an oral history <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/2148">interview</a> with air gunner Reginald Woolgar DFC (139398 Royal Air Force), correspondence to his father about him being missing in action and subsequently rescued from the sea, his <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/2205">log book</a>, <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/854">service and release book</a> and nine photographs.<br /><br /> He flew operations as an air gunner with 49 and 192 Squadrons.<br /><br />The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Reg Woolgar and catalogued by Trevor Hardcastle. <br /><br />This collection also contains items concerning John William Wilkinson. Additional information on John William Wilkinson is available via the <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/125319/">IBCC Losses Database</a>.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Woolgar, R
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-06-04
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Requires
A related resource that is required by the described resource to support its function, delivery, or coherence.
Please scroll down to see all X items in this collection.
Reg ‘Jimmy’ Woolgar was born and schooled in Hove. He began working life as a valuations assistant and was training to be a surveyor, which was interrupted when, in December 1939, he joined the RAF. Although he had aspirations to become a pilot, he trained as a wireless operator/air gunner instead. His wireless operator training was carried out at the wireless training school, RAF Yatesbury. https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/87/849/PWoolgarRLA1609.2.jpg His air gunnery training on Fairy Battle aircraft was conducted at RAF West Freugh. On 15 November 1940 he was promoted to sergeant and posted to No 10 OTU at RAF Upper Heyford. https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/87/845/PWoolgarRLA1601.2.jpg Initially flying Anson aircraft and then Hampdens with C Flight, he had his first ‘Lucky Jim’ moment, on 6 February 1941, when his Hampden aircraft was forced to crash land in a field near Cottesmore, in Lincolnshire. The aircraft was written off, but he and the pilot survived with minor injuries. At the end of operational training, instead of going directly onto operasations, he spent the next 5 months as a screen operator instructor. Eventually, on 1 September 1941, he was posted to 49 Squadron, Hampdens, at RAF Scampton https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/852 where his very first operational trip (described as a baptism of fire) was to Berlin. With headwinds going out and coming back, and nil visibility, it was likely the crew would have to bail out. Fortunately, the skipper found a break in the clouds and the aircraft landed wheels down in a field near Louth. The aircraft had to be recovered back to base, transported by road, on a low loader. On another occasion, on a mine laying operation to Oslo Fjord, his aircraft was peppered with anti-aircraft fire, it returned to base with 36 bullet holes in the fuselage and mainplane. A bullet had also passed through the upright of his gun sight while he was looking through it, whilst another tore through his flying suit. The nickname ‘Lucky Jim’ was beginning to stick.
In February 1942, on an operation to Manheim, the port engine, hit by flak, cut dead. Despite jettisoning all superfluous weight, which unfortunately included all the navigation equipment, the aircraft rapidly lost height, and the pilot ditched the aircraft in the English Channel. Whilst the crew had struggled to keep the aircraft airborne, (on a single engine), it had steered on a massive curve and unbeknown to them was headed down the English Channel, before it ditched. The crew scrambled out onto the wing and managed to inflate the dingy, then had to cut the cord attaching the dingy to the aircraft using a pair of nail scissors, moments before it sunk. In the water for hours, the crew thought they were drifting near the Yorkshire coast, but were rescued by a motor anti-submarine boat, much to their surprise, near the Isle of Wight.
Operational flying was intense, Reg would feel wound up before take-off and there was much apprehension on the way out to the target. Often, they flew through intense flak that was sometimes so close they could smell it. There was always a sense of sense of relief once they came away from the target. In between operations, each day was treated as it came along with many off-duty hours spent socialising in the local hostelries https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/853
After his first operational tour (he completed two) he was commissioned and became gunnery leader with 192 Squadron in 100 Group.
After the war ended, he signed on for an extra two years and was posted to Palestine as an air movements staff officer. Luck was again on his side when, one day, he was on his way to an Air Priorities Board Meeting at the King David Hotel when the hotel was bombed, resulting in many army and civilian casualties.
After a short tour in Kenya, as Senior Movements Staff Officer, he returned to Palestine flying with 38 Squadron until August 1947. In his flying career he amassed over 1000 flying hours. For services to his country Reg was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/858
He was released from the RAF in September 1947. Initially employed as an assistant valuations officer, he studied to become a Chartered Surveyor and secured a job as a senior valuer with the City of London. He later became the planning valuer of the city. After 14 years he was made a partner at the firm St Quintin Son and Stanley. Reg retired in 1971.
08 December 1939: Joined RAF as a wireless operator/air gunner
28 August 1940: 145, 3 Wing, RAF Yatesbury - Wireless Operator training
29 October 1940 - 15 November 1940: RAF West Freugh, No 4 Bombing and Gunnery School, flying Battle aircraft
November 1940: Promoted to Sergeant
15 November 1940 - 20 August 1941: RAF Upper Heyford, No 10 Operational Training Unit flying Anson and Hampden aircraft
02 September 1941 - 24 March 1942: RAF Scampton, 49 Squadron, flying Hampden aircraft
28 April 1942 - 24 June 1942: 1485 Target Towing and Gunnery Flight flying Whitley and Wellington aircraft
02 July 1942 – 3 July 1942: RAF Manby, Air Gunnery Instructor Course
4 July – 10 July 1942: RAF Scampton, Air Gunnery Instructor flying Manchester and Oxford aircraft
25 July 1942 – 10 August 1942: RAF Wigsley, Air Gunnery Instructor flying Lancaster aircraft
3 October – 27 October 1942: RAF Sutton Bridge flying Wellington and Hampden aircraft
28 October 1942: RAF Sutton Bridge, Gunnery Leader Course
End of 1942: Awarded RAF Commission
09 Nov 1942 – 18 March 1943: RAF Fulbeck flying Manchester aircraft
14 May 1943 – 11 June 1944: RAF Sutton Bridge flying Wellington aircraft
20 June 1944 – 27 July 1945 RAF Foulsham, 192 Squadron flying Halifax and Wellington aircraft
29 April 1946 – 30 August 1946: Palestine, Air Movements Staff Officer
01 September 1946 – 21 January 1947: Kenya, Senior Movements Staff Officer
30 January1947 – 10 June 1947: Ein Shemer, Palestine, 38 Squadron flying Lancaster aircraft
13 July 1947 139398 Flt Lt RLA Woolgar released from Service.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Reg Woolgar's observer's and air gunner's flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
Observer's and air gunner's flying log book for Flight Lieutenant Reg Woolgar from 29 November 1940 to 21 July 1947. Detailing training schedule, instructional duties and operations flown. Served at RAF Yatesbury, RAF West Freugh, RAF Upper Heyford, RAF Weston, RAF Peterborough, RAF Scampton, RAF Barrow, RAF Manby, RAF Wigsley, RAF Sutton Bridge, RAF Fulbeck, RAF Catfoss, RAF Foulsham, Levant AHQ, Nairobi AHQ and RAF Ein Shemer. Aircraft flown were Dominie I, Fairey Battle, Anson, Hampden, Hereford, Whitley, Wellington, Manchester, Lancaster Mk 1, Mk 3, Mk 7, Oxford, B17, Master, Martinet, Halifax Mk 3, Tiger Moth, York, Dakota, Lodestar, Hudson and Argus. He carried out a total of 43 operations on two tours with 49 and 192 Squadrons as a wireless operator / air gunner on the following targets in France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden: Aachen, battleships in Channel, Berlin, Bremen, Brest, Cologne, Emden, Essen, Frankfurt, Fresians, Halse, Hamburg, Kassel, Kiel Bay, Le Havre, Lorient, Mannheim, Helsingborg, Oslo Fjord, Rostock, Wilhelmshaven, Flensburg, Frankfurt, Gdynia, Mainz, Munster, S.D. operations, S.D. patrol, St Leu, Stade, Stuttgart, Walcheren and Wiesbaden. His pilots on operations were Pilot Officer Falconer, Pilot Officer Allsebrook, Sergeant Davis, Pilot Officer Ellis, Pilot Officer Hazelhurst, Pilot Officer Thomsett, Wing Commander David Donaldson, Flight Lieutenant Hayter-Preston, Flight Lieutenant Stephens, Flight Lieutenant Ford and Squadron Leader Fawkes. Includes notes on crash landings and forced landings, ditching off the Isle of Wight, infra-red trials and a Cook’s tour in the Ruhr Hamburg area. Reg was assessed as having exceptional night vision, had proficiency record above average and received air officer commanding commendation on second tour.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
Germany
Great Britain
Kenya
Norway
Poland
Scotland
Sweden
Middle East--Palestine
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Oslofjorden
England--Lincolnshire
England--Norfolk
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Oxfordshire
Europe--Frisian Islands
France--Brest
France--Creil
France--Le Havre
France--Lorient
Germany--Aachen
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Essen
Germany--Flensburg
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Kassel
Germany--Mainz (Rhineland-Palatinate)
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Rostock
Germany--Stade (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Wiesbaden
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Netherlands--Walcheren
Norway--Halse
Poland--Gdynia
Scotland--Wigtownshire
Sweden--Helsingborg
Netherlands
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Atlantic Ocean--Kiel Bay
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1941-09-02
1941-09-03
1941-09-06
1941-09-07
1941-09-08
1941-09-09
1941-09-12
1941-09-13
1941-09-16
1941-09-17
1941-09-28
1941-09-29
1941-09-30
1941-10-01
1941-01-13
1941-01-14
1941-11-07
1941-11-08
1941-11-09
1941-11-10
1941-11-23
1941-11-23
1941-11-26
1941-11-27
1941-11-30
1941-12-01
1941-12-07
1941-12-08
1941-12-16
1941-12-17
1942-01-14
1942-01-15
1942-01-17
1942-01-18
1942-01-25
1942-01-26
1942-02-07
1942-02-10
1942-02-11
1942-02-12
1942-02-14
1942-02-15
1942-03-10
1942-03-11
1944-06-30
1942-03-31
1944-07-04
1942-03-05
1944-08-07
1944-08-20
1944-09-13
1944-09-15
1944-09-17
1944-09-19
1944-10-03
1944-11-18
1944-12-12
1944-12-13
1944-12-15
1944-12-16
1944-12-18
1944-12-19
1945-01-16
1945-01-17
1945-01-22
1945-01-28
1945-01-29
1945-02-01
1945-02-02
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-03-30
1945-03-31
1945-05-02
1945-05-03
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LWoolgarRLA139398v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
16 OTU
192 Squadron
49 Squadron
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
B-17
Battle
bombing
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
C-47
Cook’s tour
crash
ditching
Dominie
Halifax
Halifax Mk 3
Hampden
Hudson
Lancaster
Lancaster Mk 1
Lancaster Mk 3
Manchester
Martinet
mine laying
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
RAF Barrow in Furness
RAF Foulsham
RAF Fulbeck
RAF Manby
RAF Peterborough
RAF Scampton
RAF Sutton Bridge
RAF Upper Heyford
RAF West Freugh
RAF Wigsley
RAF Yatesbury
Tiger Moth
training
Wellington
Whitley
wireless operator / air gunner
York
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/89/876/LCalvertRA1488619v1.1.pdf
a4d74b59eb8d89a89607ee6b934e1006
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Calvert, Roger
R A Calvert
Description
An account of the resource
Seven items. The collection consists of an oral history interview with Flight Lieutenant Roger Alfred Calvert (b. 1923, 1488619; 152814), his logbook, navigators training course class book and 3 photographs. Roger Calvert was a navigator with 141 Squadron at RAF West Raynham flying Mosquitos on night intruder operations. For most of his operational career his pilot was Flight Lieutenant John Thatcher.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Roger Calvert and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-04-24
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Calvert, R
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Roger Calvert's Royal Canadian Air Force flying log book for aircrew other than pilot
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LCalvertRA1488619v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Canadian Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Canada
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Ontario--London
England--Bedfordshire
England--Herefordshire
England--Norfolk
England--Northumberland
France--Dieppe
France--Paris
France--Pas-de-Calais
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Mainz (Rhineland-Palatinate)
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Oberhausen (Düsseldorf)
Germany--Osnabrück
Germany--Rüsselsheim
Germany--Schleswig-Holstein
Poland--Szczecin
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Wiesbaden
Netherlands--IJssel Lake
Netherlands--Zeist
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Poland
Ontario
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Description
An account of the resource
Royal Canadian Air Force flying log book for aircrew other than pilot of Flight Lieutenant Roger Calvert from 25 March 1943 to 6 July 1945. Detailing training and operations flown. Served at RAF Cranfield, RAF Great Massingham, RAF Ouston, RAF Twinwood Farm and RAF West Raynham. Aircraft flown were Anson, Beaufighter, Mosquito, Oxford, Tiger Moth and Wellington. He carried out a total of 32 intruder operations as a navigator with 141 Squadron from RAF West Raynham on the following targets in France, Germany, Poland and the Netherlands: Bochum, Bremen, Darmstadt, Dieppe, Dortmund, Dresden, Emden, Frankfurt, Gelsenkirchen, Hamburg, Kiel, Mainz, Merseberg (Leipzig), Nuremberg, Oberhausen, Osnabruck, Pante-Lunne airfield, Paris, Pas de Calais, Politz, the Ruhr, Russelhelm, Schlesvig, Steenwjik aerodrome, Stettin, Stuttgart, Wiesbaden, Zeist and Zuider Zee. His pilots on operations were Squadron Leader Thatcher and Flying Officer Rimer. The log book is well annotated and contains a green endorsement and several photographs of aircraft flown and attacked. Notes include an air sea rescue sortie, the sighting of a V-2 and one Me-110 claimed.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944-07-18
1944-07-19
1944-07-20
1944-07-21
1944-08-07
1944-08-08
1944-08-09
1944-08-10
1944-08-11
1944-08-12
1944-08-12
1944-08-13
1944-08-16
1944-08-17
1944-08-18
1944-08-19
1944-08-25
1944-08-26
1944-08-26
1944-08-27
1944-08-30
1944-09-11
1944-09-12
1944-09-12
1944-09-13
1944-09-15
1944-09-16
1944-09-17
1944-10-04
1944-10-06
1944-10-09
1944-10-19
1944-10-26
1944-10-29
1944-11-01
1944-11-04
1944-11-06
1944-11-10
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1945-01-16
1945-01-17
1945-01-28
1945-01-29
1945-02-01
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-04
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-04-22
1945-04-23
1945
141 Squadron
21 Squadron
Air Gunnery School
Air Observers School
air sea rescue
aircrew
Anson
Beaufighter
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
Initial Training Wing
Me 110
Mosquito
navigator
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
RAF Cranfield
RAF Great Massingham
RAF Ouston
RAF Padgate
RAF Torquay
RAF Twinwood Farm
RAF West Raynham
Tiger Moth
training
V-2
V-weapon
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/86/785/MBeltonSLS190305-151120-06.1.pdf
e7c71deb7538b8617ef5f2c4eef1a394
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Belton, Spencer Lewis
Spencer Lewis Belton
Spencer Lewis Smith Belton
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Belton, SLS
Description
An account of the resource
34 items. Photographs, correspondence and newspaper clippings concerning Sergeant Spencer Lewis Belton (1919 - 1940, 581261 Royal Air Force). Spencer Lewis Belton flew as an observer/ bomb aimer with 144 Squadron from RAF Hemswell. He was awarded the Distinguished Flying Medal after an operation to Wilhelmshaven in July 1940 and was interviewed about it by the British Broadcasting Corporation. He was killed 10/11 August 1940 when his Hampden P4368 crashed in the Netherlands, during an operation to Homberg. <br /><br />Additional information on Spencer Lewis Belton is available via the <a href="https://losses.internationalbcc.co.uk/loss/101634/">IBCC Losses Database.</a><br /><br />The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Denise Carr and catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-11-20
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[underlined] AIR LOG [/underlined]
[underlined] The Wing Commander introducing a Sergeant Observer[/underlined]
Forces Programme, Tuesday, 30th. July, 1940, 6.30-6.40 p.m.
W/Cdr Good evening Forces.
Now that the war in the air seems to be on in earnest it’s amazing – and pretty cheering – to see the amount of punishment our planes can take – and get away with. Time after time our aircraft have been getting home safely after being badly shot up over Germany. It speaks well for British workmanship and British material – and for America’s too for that matter.
Tonight you are to hear a story of a bomber which by all ordinary rules of the game should now be scattered in small pieces somewhere over Germany. This aircraft was nearly shot to bits long before it even reached its target; it was only the skill and determination of the pilot and the crew that made it possible for the job to be carried out successfully. When the bomber arrived home it was riddled with bullet holes and looked like a Gruyere cheese – tattered and torn almost beyond recognition
It’s the navigator of this aircraft – a Sergeant Observer from Essex – who is going to [inserted] tell [/inserted] you the story.
Here he is …
Serg. [sic] Ob: Yes, we left our base in an aircraft that was in perfect condition. When we returned the ground staff almost
[page break]
2.
Gasped when they saw the mess were [sic] were in.
Our target that night was Wilhelmshaven, which is the main North Sea base of the German fleet. You can easily imagine how well defended it is. We started our journey serenely enough. There was a moon and plenty of broken cloud which at times seemed to make patterns on the sea. We didn’t see anything out at sea – no. I’m wrong. We did. We saw a large British convoy. The night before I had read an enemy report which claimed they had successfully blockaded the East Coast. Seeing is believing. That convoy certainly gave the lie to the enemy propaganda.
Well, we passed over the convoy, across the enemy’s coast- line and for quite a while met no opposition at all, but when we were about half way between the coastline and Wilhelmshaven we got a slight foretaste of what was in store for us. A few shells began to come our way. They didn’t worry us unduly as we know how to avoid that sort of stuff.
We flew on quite serenely till we got to Emden – with 30 miles still to go. It was at Emden that the fun started. Shells came whizzing up at us from all directions. They began to get very close and made the aeroplane rock about all over the place. One shell went right through the starboard wing. It knocked us about a bit, the aircraft stood it well and we carried on to Wilhelmshaven.
[page break]
3.
I think perhaps, at this stage, I ought to explain that [underlined] I [/underlined] sit right in the nose of the aircraft and have quite the best view of any member of the crew. In front of me is what looks like a glass window, but is in reality something very much safer. A shell splinter is of course liable to break it, especially if the shell bursts almost on top of it. We call this navigator’s window the Perspex and the Perspex of this aircraft stood the strain exceptionally well.
As we neared Wilhelmshaven I could see the searchlights – there seemed to be hundreds of them – splitting the sky, trying to pick us out. I could see the barrage – one of the biggest I have ever met – through which we had to fly. We were ready for our first run over the target, which was to be a practice one, when the big barrage seemed to get heavier. My pilot called me on the inter-communication system and asked me if I was all set.
“Yes”, I replied. “All set, captain!”
Down we went – engines all out – with shells bursting all round us. They made a kind of dullish thud. It was all over in a matter of seconds. We had flown through the barrage and confirmed the exact position of our target. A shell had burst near the starboard engine and slightly damaged the starboard propeller; another had peppered the fuselage, while yet one more had burst very near the Perspex. Several bits of shrapnel found there way into my window and two of them hit me. One tiny bit came to rest
[page break]
[deleted] 3. [/deleted] [inserted] 4 [/inserted]
in my elbow, but I soon pulled it out. The other went into my life saving jacket, (which we call “Mae West), and hit the gas bottle which pumps the jacket up if necessary. The gas bottle burst, but the only damage it did was to bruise my rib.
While I was feeling thankful that my window was still all right, we were circling round getting ready to make our business attack. Once more we went down – again the same barrage, but this time we got through all right after dropping our bombs.
While we were making our attack, the two rear gunners had been spending a lot of ammunition putting out searchlights and worrying machine-gun crews. As our height was less than 100 feet when we came out of our dive they had plenty of opportunity to see what they were aiming at.
The pilot, who is a Canadian, had to control the bomber which by now was a good deal shot about. We all got back safely because he kept his head and knew what to do in an emergency.
W/Cdr. [sic] Well, tell us what did happen on the way home.
Serg. [sic] Ob: We left Wilhelmshaven behind us looking a bit worse for wear – climbed up again to about 6,000 feet and made for home. Over Emdem we were again shaken up by anti-aircraft fire which was just as heavy as before, but this time all of it missed us.
W/Cdr. [sic] And then the pilot had to nurse you back over the North Sea?
Serg.Ob: [sic] Yes he did – and it is the devil of a job controlling
[page break]
[deleted] 4. [/deleted] [inserted] 5 [/inserted]
a badly damaged machine, as you know Sir. I remember the pilot telling us we might have to bale out when we did get home as he didn’t know what had happened to the undercarriage.
W/Cdr. How did you get down in the end?
Serg.Ob: Well, the hydraulic system for lowering the undercarriage had been shot away, but fortunately our emergency device worked all right and we made a good landing after all.
W/Cdr. You seem to have put up a pretty good show all round.
Serg.Ob: I don’t know about that, but I do know this. One of the reasons why we returned on time is British workmanship. If the men in the aircraft factories could see that aeroplane as it was when we returned, with two big shell holes in both wings, hundreds of holes in the fuselage, its peppered propeller and its damaged nose, they would realise why we have such faith in our aircraft. But as they make them, I expect they know that already.
W/Cdr. Well I only hope that some of you who are listening to this story are aircraft workers, and that you are as proud of your work as we are.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Bringing a damaged bomber back from Wilhelmshaven
Air log
Forces programme
Subject
The topic of the resource
World War (1939-1945)
Great Britain. Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Description
An account of the resource
Sergeant Spencer Lewis Belton is interviewed by a wing commander about his aircraft flying over North Sea to bomb Wilhelmshaven. Mentions a British convoy and intense anti-aircraft fire over Emden. Describes the Wilhelmshaven bombing mentioning many searchlights and intense anti-aircraft fire: first run over target was practice and aircraft took some damage, on second run dropped bombs without further damage. Hydraulic system had been damaged but emergency system had allowed landing gear to be lowered.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Spencer Lewis Belton
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Five page typewritten transcript
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MBeltonSLS190305-151120-11, MBeltonSLS190305-151120-060001, MBeltonSLS190305-151120-060002,MBeltonSLS190305-151120-060003, MBeltonSLS190305-151120-060004
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Civilian
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Germany
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Great Britain
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
David Bloomfield
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1940-07-30
anti-aircraft fire
bombing
propaganda
searchlight