1
25
41
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/89/876/LCalvertRA1488619v1.1.pdf
a4d74b59eb8d89a89607ee6b934e1006
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Calvert, Roger
R A Calvert
Description
An account of the resource
Seven items. The collection consists of an oral history interview with Flight Lieutenant Roger Alfred Calvert (b. 1923, 1488619; 152814), his logbook, navigators training course class book and 3 photographs. Roger Calvert was a navigator with 141 Squadron at RAF West Raynham flying Mosquitos on night intruder operations. For most of his operational career his pilot was Flight Lieutenant John Thatcher.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Roger Calvert and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-04-24
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Calvert, R
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Roger Calvert's Royal Canadian Air Force flying log book for aircrew other than pilot
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LCalvertRA1488619v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Canadian Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Canada
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Ontario--London
England--Bedfordshire
England--Herefordshire
England--Norfolk
England--Northumberland
France--Dieppe
France--Paris
France--Pas-de-Calais
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Mainz (Rhineland-Palatinate)
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Oberhausen (Düsseldorf)
Germany--Osnabrück
Germany--Rüsselsheim
Germany--Schleswig-Holstein
Poland--Szczecin
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Wiesbaden
Netherlands--IJssel Lake
Netherlands--Zeist
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Poland
Ontario
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Description
An account of the resource
Royal Canadian Air Force flying log book for aircrew other than pilot of Flight Lieutenant Roger Calvert from 25 March 1943 to 6 July 1945. Detailing training and operations flown. Served at RAF Cranfield, RAF Great Massingham, RAF Ouston, RAF Twinwood Farm and RAF West Raynham. Aircraft flown were Anson, Beaufighter, Mosquito, Oxford, Tiger Moth and Wellington. He carried out a total of 32 intruder operations as a navigator with 141 Squadron from RAF West Raynham on the following targets in France, Germany, Poland and the Netherlands: Bochum, Bremen, Darmstadt, Dieppe, Dortmund, Dresden, Emden, Frankfurt, Gelsenkirchen, Hamburg, Kiel, Mainz, Merseberg (Leipzig), Nuremberg, Oberhausen, Osnabruck, Pante-Lunne airfield, Paris, Pas de Calais, Politz, the Ruhr, Russelhelm, Schlesvig, Steenwjik aerodrome, Stettin, Stuttgart, Wiesbaden, Zeist and Zuider Zee. His pilots on operations were Squadron Leader Thatcher and Flying Officer Rimer. The log book is well annotated and contains a green endorsement and several photographs of aircraft flown and attacked. Notes include an air sea rescue sortie, the sighting of a V-2 and one Me-110 claimed.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944-07-18
1944-07-19
1944-07-20
1944-07-21
1944-08-07
1944-08-08
1944-08-09
1944-08-10
1944-08-11
1944-08-12
1944-08-12
1944-08-13
1944-08-16
1944-08-17
1944-08-18
1944-08-19
1944-08-25
1944-08-26
1944-08-26
1944-08-27
1944-08-30
1944-09-11
1944-09-12
1944-09-12
1944-09-13
1944-09-15
1944-09-16
1944-09-17
1944-10-04
1944-10-06
1944-10-09
1944-10-19
1944-10-26
1944-10-29
1944-11-01
1944-11-04
1944-11-06
1944-11-10
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1945-01-16
1945-01-17
1945-01-28
1945-01-29
1945-02-01
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-04
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-04-22
1945-04-23
1945
141 Squadron
21 Squadron
Air Gunnery School
Air Observers School
air sea rescue
aircrew
Anson
Beaufighter
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
Initial Training Wing
Me 110
Mosquito
navigator
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
RAF Cranfield
RAF Great Massingham
RAF Ouston
RAF Padgate
RAF Torquay
RAF Twinwood Farm
RAF West Raynham
Tiger Moth
training
V-2
V-weapon
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/407/6865/LAnsellHT1893553v1.1.pdf
edfc366bd5e7a30081d45f021fab8420
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Ansell, Henry
Henry Ansell
H T Ansell
Description
An account of the resource
28 items. The collection concerns Sergeant Henry Thomas Ansell, DFM (b. 1925, 1893553 Royal Air Force) and contains his logbook, his release book, a school report, two German language documents and several photographs, his medals and other items. Henry Ansell served as a flight engineer with 61 Squadron and 83 Squadron Pathfinders.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Vicki Ansell and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-07-30
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Ansell, HT
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Harry Thomas Ansell's flying log book for flight engineers
Description
An account of the resource
The log book covers the training and operational duties of Flight Engineer Sergeant Harry Thomas Ansell, from 14 April 1944 to 24 May 1945. He trained at RAF Torquay, RAF St Athan, RAF Stockport and was stationed at RAF Wigsley, RAF Syerston, RAF Skellingthorpe and RAF Coningsby. Aircraft flown in were Stirling and Lancaster. He flew 34 operations with 61 Squadron, 15 daylight and 19 night, and 18 night operations with 83 Squadron. Targets in Belgium, France, Germany and Norway were Limoges, Prouville, Vitry, Doullens, Chalindrey, Villeneuve-St-Georges, Caen, Revigny, Courtrai, Kiel, Donges, Saint-Cyr, Lyons, Stuttgart, Cahienes, Joigny-Laroche, Pas de Calais, Bois de Cassan, Saint-Leu-d'Esserent, Secqueville, Châtellerault, Bordeaux, Rüsselsheim, Königsberg, Rollencourt, Brest, Le Havre, Darmstadt, Boulogne, Bremerhaven, Rheydt, Munich, Heilbronn, Glessen, Politz, Merseberg, Brux, Karlsruhe, Ladbergen, Dresden, Rositz, Gravenhorst, Bohlen, Horten Fiord, Molbis and Lutskendorf. His pilot on operations was Flight Lieutenant Inness.
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Norway
Great Britain
England--Buckinghamshire
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Devon
England--Greater Manchester
England--Lancashire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Yorkshire
Wales--Vale of Glamorgan
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Belgium--Kortrijk
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Brest
France--Caen
France--Calais
France--Chalindrey
France--Châtellerault
France--Creil
France--Doullens
France--Joigny
France--Le Havre
France--Limoges
France--L'Isle-Adam
France--Paris
France--Saint-Nazaire
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Hörstel
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Munich
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Rüsselsheim
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Wettin
Norway--Horten
Russia (Federation)--Kaliningrad (Kaliningradskai︠a︡ oblastʹ)
Germany--Böhlen
France--Lyon
Russia (Federation)
France--Bordeaux (Nouvelle-Aquitaine)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LAnsellHT1893553v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1945
1944-06-19
1944-06-20
1944-06-23
1944-06-24
1944-06-25
1944-06-27
1944-06-28
1944-06-29
1944-07-12
1944-07-13
1944-07-14
1944-07-15
1944-07-18
1944-07-19
1944-07-20
1944-07-21
1944-07-23
1944-07-24
1944-07-25
1944-07-26
1944-07-27
1944-07-28
1944-07-29
1944-07-30
1944-07-31
1944-08-01
1944-08-02
1944-08-05
1944-08-07
1944-08-08
1944-08-09
1944-08-10
1944-08-11
1944-08-12
1944-08-13
1944-08-14
1944-08-26
1944-08-27
1944-08-31
1944-09-05
1944-09-10
1944-09-11
1944-09-12
1944-09-13
1944-09-14
1944-09-18
1944-09-19
1944-09-20
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-04
1944-12-06
1944-12-10
1944-12-21
1944-12-22
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1945-01-16
1945-01-17
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-06
1945-02-07
1945-02-08
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-15
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-02-23
1945-02-24
1945-03-20
1945-03-21
1945-04-07
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944
1945
1654 HCU
61 Squadron
83 Squadron
aircrew
Bennett, Donald Clifford Tyndall (1910-1986)
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
bombing of the Pas de Calais V-1 sites (24/25 June 1944)
Distinguished Flying Medal
flight engineer
George VI, King of Great Britain (1895-1952)
Heavy Conversion Unit
Initial Training Wing
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Pathfinders
RAF Coningsby
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF St Athan
RAF Stockport
RAF Syerston
RAF Torquay
RAF Wigsley
Stirling
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/407/7070/MAnsellHT1893553-160730-01.1.pdf
bc52255c5b798cbee3f035a21d2b59d6
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Ansell, Henry
Henry Ansell
H T Ansell
Description
An account of the resource
28 items. The collection concerns Sergeant Henry Thomas Ansell, DFM (b. 1925, 1893553 Royal Air Force) and contains his logbook, his release book, a school report, two German language documents and several photographs, his medals and other items. Henry Ansell served as a flight engineer with 61 Squadron and 83 Squadron Pathfinders.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Vicki Ansell and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-07-30
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Ansell, HT
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
LEBENSGEFAHR!
W.G.2.F.
[page break]
[underlined] Gibt es wirklich keine Brücken mehr …. [/underlined]
zwischen dem deutschen Volk und der freien Welt?
Die Antwort auf diese Frage bestimmt in diesen Stunden das Handeln oder Nichthandeln aller deutschen Menschen. Von dieser Antwort hängt DEINE Zukunft ab!
Goebbels sagt: [italics]„ Das Deutsche Volk hat alle Brücken hinter sich abgebrochen ...“ [/italics]
Für Goebbels, Hitler, Himmler und Co. ist das kein Problem. Für die besessenen Fanatiker und zum Untergang verurteilten Führer der deutschen Tragödie gibt es in der Tat keine Brücke. Weder eine Brücke zur europäischen Zivilastion – noch zu einer besseren deutschen Zukunft.
Für die Partei und SS-Fanatiker gibt es nur den UNTERGANG.
[page break]
Aber Hitler ist nicht Deutschland und der Deutschland ist nicht Hitler
[italics] Deutschland muss sich in dieser Stunde entscheiden[ /italics]
[illustration]
WEITERKÄMPFEN MIT HITLER BIS ZUM VERRECKEN UND NATIONALEN UNTERGANG
oder
[/underlined] SOFORTFRIEDE UND WIEDERAUFBAU? [underlined]
[page break]
Sie handelten, weil sie die wirkliche Lage Deutschlands besser kannten als irgend jemand. Sie wussten, dass der militärische Zusammenbruch des Hitlerregimes zum Untergang Deutschlands wird. Sie entschieden sich gegen Hitler und für Sofortfrieden, weil sie wollten, dass Deutschland lebt.
Jedoch: sie scheiterten und versagten im entscheidenden Augenblick, weil sie auf eigene Faust, ohne Verbindung mit der Masse des Volkes handelten.
Generalsrevolten allein können die Entscheidung nicht erzwingen. Die zum Sofortfrieden und zum Abbruch des verlorenen Krieges bereiten Führer den deutschen Wehrmacht brauchen die aktive Unterstützung der gesamten Nation – dass heisst: DEINE HILFE!
DIE AKTIONSBEREITSCHAFT JEDES EINZELNEN !
[underlined] Die Entscheidung des Einzelnen [/underlined]
Mit diabolischer Beredtheit sucht der Reichspropagandaminister Joseph Goebbels dem deutschen Menschen einzureden, dass jeder deutsche Arbeiter, Bauer und Bürger auf Gedeih und Verderb, auf Leben und Tod mit dem Schicksal der wahnsinnigen kriegsschuldigen Führung verkettet ist. Fieberhaft sucht er Dich zu überzeugen, dass nicht die nationalsozialistische Führung, sondern das ganze deutsche Volk die Brücken hinter sich abgebrochen hat.
[page break]
Das ist nicht wahr !
Nur eine Brücke ist unwiderruflich niedergerissen: Die Brücke zum deutschen Sieg.
Ob es Brücken geben wird aus der unsagbar grauenvollen Gegenwart des Hitlerkrieges in eine bessere deutsche Zukunft, das hängt nicht von Hitler, Himmler und Goebbels ab -
das hängt ab, einzig und allein, von der Entscheidung jedes Einzelnen – von der Entscheidung, durch persönlichen oder organisierten Widerstand gegen die Kriegsverlängerung das Schlimmste zu vermeiden.
[underlined]Das Schlimmste![/underlined]
DAS SCHLIMMSTE ist nicht die militärische Niederlage. Es ist auch nicht die geordnete Besetzung Deutschlands durch alliierte Garnisonen. Das kommt auf jeden Fall.
DAS SCHLIMMSTE IST KRIEG AUF DEUTSCHEM BODEN, Krieg in jedem deutschen Dorf und jeder deutschen Stadt, bis am Ende ausgebranntes, ausgeblutetes Deutschland in Chaos zusammenbricht.
[underlined] DAS [/underlined] IST DAS SCHLIMMSTE !
[underlined] Den Krieg überleben…. [/underlined]
Aber ist es nicht sinnlos, von einer deutschen Zukunft und einem deutschen Wiederaufbau zu reden, wenn noch
[page break]
mehr Millionen fünf Minuten vor Zwölf Gesundheit, Gut und Leben opfern müssen, und wenn die Nation physisch zusammenbricht, ehe die Zukunft beginnen kann?
Für jeden Deutschen, dem das eigene Leben – und das ÜBERLEBEN DES KRIEGES – das Leben seiner Familie und Kinder und die menschenwürdige Zukunft seiner Heimat einen Pfennig wert ist, kann es in diesem Augenblick keinen Zweifel und kein Wanken geben:
ER MUSS SICH DURCH DIE TAT FÜR DIE SCHNELLSTE BEENDIGUNG DES KRIEGES EINSETZEN, - DENN DIE ALLIIERTE INVASION DEUTSCHLAND HAT BEGONNEN!!
[underlined] „Ein Mann gegen die Macht des N.S.-Staats ...“ [/underlined]
[italics] „Was kann der Einzelne schon tun? Der Einzelne ist doch machtlos...“ [/italics]
Millionen Deutsche haben seit Jahren so gesprochen. Sagen es nicht immer noch Millionen?
Solange die Macht des Hitlerschen Diktaturstaates ungeschwächt war, solange deutsche Soldaten von Sieg zu Sieg marschierten, solange die Führung geeint und der Polizeiapparat mächtig war – solange konnte die Welt wenig vom Widerstand des Einzelnen gegen diesen verbrecherischen Krieg erhoffen.
[page break]
Heute aber ist das Hitlerregime tödlich verwundet. An allen Fronten sind deutsche Heere in Auflösung. Zu Zehntausenden haben deutsche Offiziere und Soldaten die Konsequenz gezogen und sich ergeben. Die Führung ist in sich gespalten. Gestapo und Polizei erweisen sich als machtlos gegenüber dem „unbekannten kleinen Mann“ des besetzten Europas. So wie die Bürgerarmee der französischen Maquis den deutschen Besatzungstruppen den deutschen Besatzungstruppen erfolgreich Widerstand leistet, so wie Millionen von einfachen Arbeitern, Bauern und Bürgen sich in allen Ländern Europas den nationalsozialistischen Machthabern erfolgreich widersetzen – so kann heute auch der „unbekannte kleine Mann Deutschlands“ wirksamem Widerstand leisten und dabei helfen, sein eigenes Leben, seine Zukunft und die Zukunft seiner Heimat durch schnellste Beendigung des Krieges zu retten.
FÜRCHTEST DU DEN N.S.-STAASTAPPARAT?
HAST DUE HEUTE NOCH ANGST VOR IHM?
Vergiss nicht: ER UND SEINE HANDLANGER HABEN VIEL MEHR ANGST VOR DIR!!
[underlined] „Unmöglich …?“ [/underlined]
Das Gebot ist nicht Revolution, Bürgerkrieg und Barrikaden. Das erste Gebot ist: HERAUS AUS DEN STÄDTEN! HERAUS AUS DEN FABRIKEN! Bringe DICH und die DEINIGEN in Sicherheit! Die
[page break]
letzte kommende Phase des Krieges bedeutet akute Lebensgefahr für die Bevölkerung der Städte und die Belegschaften der R-Betriebe.
Das zweite Gebot ist: ORGANISIERTER WIDERSTAND ALLER! PASSIVER WIDERSTAND ALLER ARBEITER IN DER KRIEGSINDUSTRIE!
Widerstand der Bauern, die Hundearttausenden von „untergetauchten“ Fremdarbeiten Unterschlupf gewähren können und so gleichzeitig, durch die zusätzliche Arbeitskraft, ihre letzte Kriegsernte voll einbringen können! Widerstand der Beamten, Angestellten und Spezialisten!
Jeder Einzelne kann an seinem Platz dazu beitragen, die Weiterführung eines verlorenen, sinnlos gewordenen Krieges auf deutsche Boden zu verhindern.
Die entscheidende Aufgabe fällt dabei auf die deutsche Arbeiterschaft!
[underlined] Deutsche Arbeiter! [/underlined]
Ihr wisst, das bereits heute Zehntausende von ausländischen Zwangsarbeiten in deutschen Betrieben in Aktions-Zellen und Widerstands-Gruppen organisiert sind. Morgen werden Hunderttausende – vielleicht Millionen - bisher passiver Fremdarbeiter in die Reihen der grossen Widerstandsbewegung strömen.
Deutsche Arbeiter! Übt Solidarität! Verbrüdert Euch mit Euren ausländischen Kollegen unter der Losung:
SCHLUSS MIT DEM KRIEGE!
STÜRZT DIE KRIEGSVERLÄNGERE!!
[page break]
BRÜCKEN BAUEN ZU EINER BESSEREN ZUKUNFT NACH DEM KRIEGE HEISST HEUTE ZUSAMMENARBEIT DER DEUTSCHEN ARBEITER MIT DEN WIDERSTANDGRUPPPEN EURER AUSLÄNDISCHEN KOLLEGEN.
[illustration]
[underlined] GEMEINSAME AKTION GEGEN DEN GEMEINSAMEN FEIND, GEGEN DIE KRIEGSVERLÄNGERER HITLER, HIMMLER, GOEBELLS & CO.[/underlined]
[page break]
PRENEZ CONTACT AVEC LUI
et par lui, avec ses camarades qui pensent comme lui.
Les ouvriers allemands anti-nazi seront des alliés de valeur.
Quant au Nazis, les vrais de vrais, les brutes et les bandits, les quislings et les corrompus – qu'Ils soient Allemands ou vos compatriotes – faites-leur savoir dès MAINTENANT que le moment des brutalités est passé.
Faites-leur savoir que les ouvriers français et belges en Allemagne n'entendent pas prolonger l'agonie de la lutte dans une guerre perdue.
Faites-leur savoir que VOUS n'entendent pas vous faire tuer cinq minutes avant la fin et que vous avez l'intention de survivre à la guerre et de rentrer chez vous sain et sauf.. Ceci est donc
VOTRE LIGNE GENERALE DE CONDUITE SI VOUS NE POUVEZ PAS ALLER A LA CAMPAGNE: ORGANISEZ DES CELLULES D'ACTION! RALENTISSEZ LA PRODUCTION! RESISTEZ A TOUTE EXPLOITATION PAR UNE RESISTANCE PASSIVE ORGANISEE! COLLABOREZ AVEC LES ALLEMANDS ANTI-NAZIS! OUVREZ UNE LISTE DES NAZIS ET DES QUISLINGS !
[page break]
REPANDEZ LA VERITE SUR LES DEFAITES ALLEMANDES SUR TOUS LES FRONTS ! ECOUTEZ LES NOUVELLES DIFFUSEES PAR LES POSTES ALLIES! OBEISSEZ AUX INSTRUCTIONS DU COMMANDEMENT SUPREME ALLIE !
[box surrounding text]
SURVIVEZ A LA GUERRE!
[/box]
[page break]
la tâche immédiate dan se dernier stade de la guerre. Ne l'oubliez pas: Les Nazis ont besoin de vous! Partout où ils soupçonneront, où ils sauront que les travailleurs français et belges d'une usine sont en contact organisé, ils accéderont à la majeure partie de vos revendications car ils craindront que dans la négative il se produira des troubles.
Le réseau des cellules d'ouvriers français et belges doit s’étendre à travers toute l'Allemagne. Tous les trous doivent être bouchés; les travailleurs français et belges qui sont rendus volontairement en Allemagne au cours des années de 1940 à 1942 – et même plus tard - doivent maintenant être recrutés pour joindre le grand mouvement de la résistance passive et de la défense organisée. Faites bon accueil dans vos rangs à ceux qui désirent réellement coopérer. Mais fermez vos rangs à ceux qui sympathisent ouvertement avec les Nazis. Avertissez le Gau et les Kreisverbindungsmaenner et leurs petits collaborateurs quislings au moyen de messages directs ou anonymes que toutes dénonciation ou que tout mesure prise contre les ouvriers français ou belges sera notée et vengée.
[underlined] DEENDEZ-VOUS MAINTENANT![/underlined]
Les ouvriers français et belges déjà organisés en cellules ou en groupes doivent dès maintenant inaugurer une vaste campagne d'agitation et de propagande parmi leurs compatriotes. Ils doivent leur expliquer que la résistance et la défense DES MAINTENANT et la protection et le rapatriement après la défaite de Hitler ne peuvent être
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efficaces qu'au moyen de l'organisation massive des cellules d'ouvriers français et belges dans tous les établissements industriels du Reich.
Mais quoi que vous tentiez de faire – LE CONTACT ORGANISE avec vos camarades, la confiance mutuelle, l' information mutuelle et L'ACTION ORGANISEE ET COLLECTIVE SONT LES SEULES GARANTIES DU SUCCESS. LE TRAVAILLEURS ISOLE EST IMPUISSANT.
[underlined] VOUS ET L'ÁLLEMAND A VOS COTES [/underlined]
Un problème est soulevé. Comment tout ce qui précède affectera vos relations avec les ouvriers allemands ordinaires qui travaillent à côté de vous? Il n'y a pas de règle générale. Peut-être est-il bon gars … qui en a tout autant marre que vous. Peut-être même est-il un anti-nazi endurci. (Comme vous le savez il existe de nombreux anti-nazis parmi les hommes plus âgés). Mais peut-être es marre-il simplement un salopard, un lâche, qui s'est servi de tous ses privilèges aux dépens de ses camarades étrangers. En conséquence il n'est pas possible de donner de règles générales sur la façon de traiter vos co-équipiers allemands.
IL Y A CEPENDANT,
[underlined] UNE REGLE: [/underlined]
Où que vous trouviez un ouvrier allemand qui a clairement démontré son attitude anti-nazie et son honnêteté personnelle par sa conduite et ses actes
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[underlined] COMMENT S'Y PRENDRE? [/underlined]
Une condition du succès C'EST L'ORGANISATION.
Dans la défense de ses DROITS, ou dans la résistance passive contre la continuation d'une guerre perdue … tout homme agissant seul sans le soutien de ses camarades ne peut obtenir que le maigres résultats.
Vous serez d'accord avec nous: l'action individuelle est, la moins efficace des formes de la résistance; et la défense individuelle offre le moins de protection.
[underlined] VOUS N'ETES PAS SEULS! [/underlined]
Un homme qui combat une puissance supérieure comme celle de la police d'état des Nazis a besoin d'alliés. Chaque ouvrier étranger – sont vos alliés naturels et VOUS êtes un allié des forces combattantes de la Grande-Bretagne, de l'Amérique et de la Russie, ainsi que toutes les Nations Unies.
[underlined]TOUS POUR UN ET UN POUR TOUS [/underlined]
Une alliance ne tombe pas du ciel. Elle doit être négociée et conclue. Elle comporte l'action. Elle comporte surtout le contact mutuel, la confiance mutuelle et l'information mutuelle avant que les millions d'hommes isolés, qui ont tous le même but, puissent agir ensemble en une grande fraternité.
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[underlined] VOUS SOUFFRIREZ [/upnderlined]
Si vous ne reconnaissez pas ce fait au dernier moment possible.
[underlined] QUEL GENRE D'ORGANISATION? [/underlined]
Ne vous effrayez PAS du mot ORGANISATION. Il ne signifie pas la création d'une organisation vaste et compliquée de tous les ouvriers étrangers; ni la création d'un mouvement syndicaliste illicite. Le temps nécessaire manque pour cela. La fin de guerre est trop proche. Le devoir de passer à l'action immédiate et à la protection d'heure en heure, est trop pressant. A l'état actuel des choses l'organisation et l'action organisée signifient l'action d'accord et en combinaison avec des collègues sur lesquelles vous pouvez compter. Elles signifient que vous devriez discuter de ce que vous entendez faire avec de trois à cinq camarades en qui vous pouvez avoir confiance. Il est possible qu’ils pourront vous aider, il est possible qu’il pourront participer et agir comme vous. Il est possible que l'un d'entre eux aura un meilleur plan.
[underlined] CELLULES D'ACTION [/underlined]
Il existe déjà de milliers de cellules d'action d'ouvriers français et belges mal organisées dont on ne sait rien. Au cours des semaines qui vont suivre tous les ouvriers français et belges doivent soit former, soit se joindre à des cellules de résistance passive de protection. Voilà
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prendre " les instructions qui vous sont données, ou bien veiller à ce qu'un article presque achevé soit abîmé "accidentellement", - peu importe pourvu que vous parveniez à abaisser la production. "QUE PEUT FAIRE UN SEUL HOMME CONTRE LA PUISSANCE ARMÉE DU RÉGIME NAZI?"
UN SEUL HOMME PEUT FAIRE BEACOUP.
Cela peut sembler de faible envergure et insignifiant mais l'action de dix, de onze, ou de douze millions d'hommes et de femme peut briser les reins à Hitler.
IL N'EXISTE AU MONDE AUCUNE PUISSANCE QUI PUISSE AVOIR RAISON DE VOTRE FORCE COMBINEE.
[underlined] ROMPEZ ISOLEMENT! [/underlined]
Le "Betriebsleitung", le D.A.F., l'ensemble du régime nazi entendent vous maintenir dans l’isolement. Ils peuvent avoir raison de vous tant que vous êtes SEULS. Tant que vous êtes seuls ils savent qu'ils peuvent vous bousculer. Mais ils ont la frousse dès qu'ils sont confrontés par votre force combinée.
LA RESISTANCE PASSIVE DOIT ETRE UNRE RESISTANCE ORGANISEE. Pour votre propre protection il faut combiner, dès aujourd'hui et partout, la résistance passive avec la DEFENSE COLLECTIVE DE VOS DROITS EN TANT QU'OUVRIERS FRANÇAIS ET BELGES.
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[underlined] RECLAMEZ VOS DROITS [/underlined]
Le slogan PROTECTION PAR L'ORGANISATION veut dire que vous devez défendre vos DROITS dans toutes les usines, les camps, les ateliers, et où que vous vous trouviez. VOS DROITS concernant.
LA NOURRITURE DANS LES CANTINES: LES RATIONS: L'HEURE DES REPAS: LES AMENAGEMENTS DES CAMPS ET DES CANTONNEMENT: LES HEURES DE TRAVAIL: LES CONDITIONS SANITAIRE: LES SOINS HYGENIQUES: LES MESURES PREVENTIVES CONTRE LES ACCIDENTS: LES PERMISSIONS: LES CONGES DU DIMANCHE: LES ABRIS CONVENABLES CONTRE LES ATTAQUES AERIENNES: VOTRE DROIT DE VOUS RENDRE AUX ABRIS, NON PAS SEULEMENT QUAND IL Y A DANGER AU-DESSUS DE VOUS, MAIS AUSSITOT QUE L'ALERTE A ETE DONNEE DANS VOTRE REGION.
Tous ces DROITS doivent être vigoureusement défendus car en raison du manque désespéré de main-d'oeuvre les Nazis tenteront le liquider TOUS ces droits aux dépens de VOTRE SANTE ET DE VOTRE SECURITE.
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ET POUR CEUX QUI POUR UNE RAISON OU UNE AUTRE NE PEUVENT PAS S'EN ALLER? VOUS AUSSI, VOUS POUVEZ VOUS PROTEGER !!
[underlined] COMMENT? [/underlined]
Parlons tout d'abord de sabotage actif industriel et militaire. Toutes les formes de sabotage sont un moyen de faire la guerre. Le saboteur doit agir avec le même courage et la même discipline qu’un troupier de choc.
Dans cette brochure nous ne donnons pas d'instructions de sabotage. Elle ne s'adresse pas aux cadres clandestins des mouvements actifs de résistance et de sabotage. Cette brochure s'adresse à tout travailleur français ou belge en Allemagne.
[underlined] QUELLE ACTION PRENDE ? LA RESISTANCE PASSIVE !
Chaque ouvrier français ou belge en Allemagne quels que soient son âge, son sexe ou on [sic] métier, peut pratiquer la résistance passive – qu'il soit membre d'une cellule dans dans [sic] une usine, d'une organisation secrète, ou qu'il soit indépendant.
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Chacun d'entre vous peut contribuer à réduire la puissance et l'efficacité de la machine de guerre de Hitler de mille façons en pratiquant la RESISTANCE PASSIVE. Dans l’intérêt de votre propre protection et de votre survie; LA RESISTANCE PASSIVE EN MASSE est l'ordre donné a tout ouvrier français ou belge en Allemagne à partir de maintenant et jusqu'à la fin de la guerre. Mais nous n'entendons pas vous donner des instructions précises concernant ce que vous avez à faire – comment vous devez le faire et où. Tous ce que nous vous demandons c'est de vous servir de votre intelligence et de votre bon sens, d’étudier les conditions et les possibilités de résistance passive dans votre usine, dans votre bureau ou là où vous travaillez.
Nous allons vous donner une définition très simple de résistance passive. La voici :
TOUT CE QUI PEUT ABAISSER LA QUALITE OU LA QUANTITE DE LA PRODUCTION
[underlined] LA FAIBLESSE DE HITLER [/underlined]
La puissance combattive [sic] de Hitler peut être décisivement affaiblie par les tactiques de le résistance passive. Dans toutes les catégories d'usines ou dans toutes les branches de l'industrie il y a toujours mille et un moyens d'abaisser et la quantité et la qualité de la production. Vous pouvez faire ''la grève perlée'' ou ''mal com-
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phase cruciale de la guerre qui pourrait amener le combat au coeur du territoire du Reich.
SOUVENEZ -VOUS: Que de nombreux fermiers allemands et qu des paysannes allemandes isolés seront prêts à vous donner asile et nourriture en échange de quelques semaines de travail sain en plein air. Des milliers de FERMIERS ET DE PAYSANS ont tellement besoin de votre travail qu'ils ne parleront pas et qu'ils ne vous dénonceront pas.
Mais souvenez-vous aussi de ces principes généraux.
1. Préparez un ALIBI avant de quitter la ville. Dites par exemple, que vous avez entendu parler d'un vieil ami à vous qui travaille comme ouvrier agricole dans une certaine région. Dites que vous avez passé votre journée de repos à essayer de le retrouver. Tout ALIBI est bon – mais vous devez avoir une histoire convaincante à raconter. Servez-vous de votre bon sens.
2. Quand vous croisez un Allemand, soit dans une ferme ou dans un village, ne manquer pas, de faire ''votre récit''. PRETENDEZ TOUJOURS avoir perdu votre chemin, - avoir manqué votre train, etc., etc. Demandez asile et nourriture et offrez de payer en travaillant pendant quelques jours sur la terre. Si votre offre est acceptée demandez le jour suivant à rester encore quelques temps.
3. Soyez très prudent et tâchez d'être courtois quand vous rencontrez des femmes seules. Elles s’effraient
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facilement car on leur a dit que tous les ouvriers étrangers sont des meurtriers, des voleurs, et qu'ils violent des femmes. Essayez de prendre contact en premier lieu avec des vieillards.
4. D'une façon générale évitez les grandes propriétés ou les grandes fermes. Elles sont susceptibles de renfermer trop de témoins et d'espions.
5. N'oubliez pas que vous devez rester à même d'entrer en contact avec vos camardes de la libération.
Bref : La terre allemande a besoin de bras. Elle a besoin de vous ! Il y a de la place et la SECURITE pour des centaines de milliers d'ouvriers français et belges dans les villages de l'Allemagne. ALLEZ-Y POUR VOTRE PROTECTION ET POUR RACCOURCIR LA GUERRE. DES USINES DE GUERRE ET DE MINES VIDES HATENT LA FIN ET SAUVGARDE DES VIES
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[underlined] QUITTEZ LES VILLES !! [/underlined]
'' Il est souvent arrivé... ''
… (écrivait en juillet un journal allemand – le NDZI 21.7)
…'' [italics] que des ouvriers étrangers qui ne parlent l'allemand se sont perdus accidentellement et sont arrivées là où ils n’avaient rien à faire. Des gens – des gens allemands – ont profité de cette occasion et ont tout simplement permis aux ouvriers isolés de travailler dans leurs entreprises ou dans leurs fermes. Nombreux sont ceux qui croient qu'il y a là un moyen facile d'obtenir de la main-d’œuvre supplémentaire. [/italics]''
Eh bien, voilà un moyen facile à adopter ! Camarade, vous pouvez '' vous perdre accidentellement '' tout aussi facilement que des dizaines de milliers d'ouvriers étrangers qui, suivant des déclarations allemandes officielles, '' ont tous simplement disparu ''. Beaucoup d'entre vous se souviennent de camarades qui un jour travaillaient avec vous et le lendemain – pour ne jamais revenir. Betriebsleitung, Betriebsverbindungsmaenner, Werkscharführer et les S.D. locaux s'agitèrent, maugréèrent, posèrent de nombreuses questions qui ne reçurent aucune réponse … et le tour était joué. Un autre ouvrier étranger avait rejoint les '' UNTERGETAUCHTEN ''. Les déclarations officielles ou semi-officielles allemandes ne concordent pas quant au nombre de cette population flottante d'ouvriers étrangers '' UNTERGETAUCHTE ''. Elles
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parlent de 60.000, de 80.000, de 100.000. En vérité leur nombre a été beaucoup plus important au cours des dix-huit derniers mois.
[underlined] UNE GRANDE OCCASION SE PRESENTE A VOUS ! [/underlined]
Peu importe les statistiques . Ce qui importe c'est que l'occasion ''de se perdre accidentellement '' est mille fois plus favorable aujourd'hui. La dernière mesure désespérée '' de mobilisation totale '' a eu pour résultat, entre autres, de diminuer les effectifs de la police, des S.D., de la Gestapo, du personnel du D.A.F., et, par la même occasion, ce dernier appel d'urgence a encore augmenté la disette incurable de main-d’œuvre dans les régions agricoles.
'' Disette de main-d’œuvre '' est devenue aujourd'hui une expression sans signification. La vérité c'est qu'il existe à peine un seul village à travers l'Allemagne qui dispose d'assez de bras pour faire la récolte cet été et pour faire les préparatifs les plus élémentaires en vue de l'ensemencement de l'automne. Les vieillards, les femmes et les enfants triment jusqu'à ce qu'ils tombent de fatigue. Les paysans allemands ordinaires et les grands propriétés clament pour avoir de la main-d’œuvre - ET NE PARVIENNENT PAS A L'OBTENIR.
Telle est la position. En ce moment il se présente une occasion in espérée à des dizaine de milliers d'ouvriers français et belges de '' se perdre ''.
DONC – PERDEZ-VOUS ! ! Quittez les villes ! Cachez-vous et mettez-vous en sûreté pendant la dernière
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Ils vous craignent …
Les Nazis le savent bien. Ils CRAIGNENT les travailleurs français et belges, sachant parfaitement que chaque heure de la continuation de la guerre dépend autant de votre obéissance du peuple allemand.
… et ils vous menacent
Du fait que le régime de Hitler vous craint, les dirigeants allemand feront tout, et toute méthode leur sera bonne vous effrayer, pour vous terroriser, pour empêcher que vous vous protégiez en vous organisant.
Les dirigeants nazis sont au désespoir et ils agissent tel un rat pris au piège. Pour eux, la paix équivaut à la mort. Des êtres tels que Hitler, Goebbels, Himmler et ses bandes meurtrières de S.S. n'ont que faire de votre vie.
[underlined] NOUS VOUS DISONS DONC : [/underlined]
SI VOUS VOULEZ SURVIVRE A LA DERNIERE PHASE DE LA GUERRE, LA PHASE LA PLUS DANGEREUSE ET LA PLUS VIOLENT, AGISSEZ DES MAINTENANT ET ASSUREZ VOUR VOTRE PROTECTION.
Nous savons fort bien qu'il n'existe pas de protection complète contre le danger des bombes ou contre la terreur nazie, MAIS NOUS SAVONS AUSSI QU'IL EST POSSIBLE D'ASSURER UN DEGRE ELEVE DE PROTECTION - PROTECTION PAR L'ORGANISATION.
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[underlined] QU'ALLEZ-VOUS FAIRE ?
QUE POUVEZ-VOUS FAIRE ? [/underlined]
Si vous voulez survivre à la guerre, eh bien c'est maintenant qu'il faut vous en sortir! Nous savons parfaitement que 99% d'entre vous n'ont que peu de chances de s’évader de l'Allemagne actuellement . L'invasion alliée de l'Allemagne a commencé. Mais nombre de vous on cependant l'occasion de
SORTIR DE LA GUERRE
ce qui revient à dire QUITTES LES CENTRES INDUSTRIELS – mettez-vous HORS DE PORTEE des bombardiers alliées EN VOUS RENDANT A LA CAMPAGNE.
Si vous ne pouvez pas effectivement vous esquiver, le moment est venu pour faire tous les efforts possibles pour vous protéger, vous et vos camarades dans les camps et dans les usines, contre la violence croissante de la guerre et contre la furie croissante des gangsters nazis battus.
Dans les deux cas vous prendrez certains risques, mais ces risques seront insignifiants comparés aux dangers que vous serez appelés à confronter au cours des jours et des semaines à venir si vous vous contenter au cours des jours et des semaines à venir si vous vous contentez de rester passifs sous les ordres des bureaucrates du D.A.F., sous la corruption les Verbindungsmaenner ou sous les espions couards et les brutes de la Werkscharen.
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pour combler les rangs ravagés de la Wehrmacht vaincue. Des milliers d'hommes, qui ne sont pas ressortissants allemands, ont déjà été précipités sous la mitraille des canons et des escadrilles de bombardiers britanniques et américains. Beaucoup d’entre eux n'eurent même pas l'occasion de se rendre.
Comme du bétail vous pourrez être contraints à construire à la dernière minute des fortifications le longs des frontières menacées de l'Allemagne où les S.S tenteront de ''maintenir l'ordre et la discipline'' en fusillant des otages et en passant à tabac et à la torture les ouvriers français et belges dans des camps spéciaux de concentration.
HEURE PAR HEURE ET JOUR PAR JPOUR CES DEUX DANGERS QUI MENACENT CHACUN DE VOUS GRANDISSENT. Et ces dangers grandissent au moment même où la FIN de la guerre et de toutes vos souffrances approche.
Mais [italics] vous-même [/italics vou pouvez contribuer [italics] à hâter la fin [/italics] de la guerre.
[underlined] VOTRE FORCE EST IMMENSE ![/underlined]
L'action organisée de millions de travailleurs français et belges pourrait mettre fin à la guerre demain. Des grèves en masse et une résistance organisée ont fait crouler la régime de Mussolini avant que les armées alliées n’envahissent l'Italie en 1943.
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Une grève générale des ouvriers de Copenhague déclenchée en juillet 1944 a forcé les Nazis et les armées d'occupation allemandes à s'avouer vaincus et à donner satisfaction à toutes les revendications de travailleurs.
[underlined] COMMENT VOUS POURRIEZ AGIR ! [/underlined]
Vous êtres environ douze millions de travailleurs étrangers en Allemagne aujourd'hui. Si seulement la moitié d'entre vous prenaient la décision demain de faire la grève et de refuser, à tout prix, de continuer la guerre de Hitler.
VOUS POURRIEZ TOTALEMENT L'EFFORT DE GUERRE ALLEMAND, VOUS POURRIEZ IMMOBILISER TOTALEMENT TOUTE LA PRODUCTION ET LES TRANSPORTS ALLEMANDS, VOUS POURRIEZ EN QUELQUES JOUR METTRE FIN A LA GUERRE DE HITLER – BIEN AVANT QUE LES RAVAGES DE LA BATAILLE NE DEFERLENT CHEZ VOUS.
L'ACTION ORGANISEE POURRAIT ATTEINDRE TOUS CES BUTS EN QUELQUES JOURS
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[underlined] Aux Travailleurs Alliés en Allemagne ! [/underlined]
La guerre tire à sa fin inévitable.
L'Allemagne sur le territoire de laquelle vous avez été déportés doit bientôt devenir un champ de bataille.
Ceci implique des dangers encore plus grands pour vous si vous continuez à obéir aux ordres de vos négriers et si vous leur permettez de vous envoyer là où bon leur semble.
Mais ceci vous fournit des occasions plus grandes que que jamais pour la fin de votre captivité.
Le travail de vos compatriotes dans les mouvements de résistances à l’intérieur a apporté une contribution de grande valeur au succès de nos armes.
Vous, également, avez une contribution à apporter si vous suives leur exemple.
Gardez présents à l'esprit les trois points suivants :-
1) Il est de votre devoir de dérégler la machine de guerre allemande.
2) Il est de votre devoir d'aider à la libération de votre propre patrie.
3) Il est de votre devoir de veiller à ce que vous soyez sauvegardés pour rentrer chez vous le plus rapidement possible et ainsi aider au travail de reconstruction qui nous attend tous quand la victoire sera gagnée.
Dans cette brochure vous trouverez des directives qui vous indiqueront comment vous pouvez atteindre ces trois objectifs.
Vous recevrez de nouvelles instructions par voie de la T.S.F. et par tracts.
LE HAUT COMMANDEMENT INTERALLIE
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[underlined] UN APPEL AUX TRAVAILLEURS FRANCAIS ET BELGES EN ALLEMAGNE [/underlined]
L'Allemagne a perdu la guerre !
La fin de la plus grande guerre de l'histoire approche – mais ….
[underlined] VOUS ETES EN DANGER ! [/underlined]
A mesure que la guerre tire à sa fin le régime nazi deviendra de plus en plus impitoyable. Chacun de vous dorénavant est sous le coup d'UN DOUBLE DANGER. Le DANGER émanant des terroristes nazis qui, pour obtenir le maximum de rendement de votre part, useront contre contre vous de tous les moyens. Et le DANGER – chaque jour plus grand – des ATTAQUES AERIENNES.
Vous serez contraints à vivre et à travailler dans les régions qui renferment les plus dangereux des objectifs choisis par les Force Aériennes Alliées – tandis que les adolescents allemands de seize ans et les vieillards de soixante ans et de plus seront dirigés vers le front pour servir de dernières réserves de chair à canon dans les batailles de Hitler acculé. Ne dites pas: Nous savons ce que sont les bombardements.
[underlined] VOUS N'AVEZ ENCORE RIEN VU À MOINS D'AVOIR CONNU L'EXPÉRIENCE DES NOUVELLES BOMBES INCENDIARES QUI ONT ÉTÉ LANCÉES DNAS LES RÉCENTES ATTAQUES SUR DARMSTADT, FRANCFORT ET D'AUTRES CENTRE ALLEMANDS. [/underlined]
Vous serez versés de force dans l'armée allemande
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DANGER de MORT!
[underlined] et comment l'éviter [/underlined]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Lebensgefahr
Danger de Mort
Description
An account of the resource
The first part is targeted at the German population and argues, with illustrations, for passive and active resistance against the regime. It uses the image of Germany’s many broken bridges to argue that the only bridge open to the German people is that leading to peace and reconstruction.
The second, much longer, part warns foreign workers in Germany (particularly French and Belgian) that they are in grave danger as the final conflagration of the war is inevitable. Urges them to take action to lessen the danger and hasten the end of their captivity, and gives guidance and instruction as to how they should proceed.
It says that workers are in danger from Germans and from air attack from Allied Forces, the like of which they have never seen before. They will be forced to live and work in areas where Allied attacks will be at their fiercest (such as Darmstadt and Frankfurt), sent to the front, or forced to work on the fortifications. Hostages are likely to be shot or beaten and tortured in special concentration camps.
Claims that workers are in a powerful position, and should consider the successes of the Resistance organized against the regime of Mussolini before the Allies invaded in 1943. A workers’ general strike in Copenhagen in July 1944 had similar success and the workers triumphed in their demands. The 12 million foreign workers in Germany could paralyse the production of goods as well as all transport links and all this could be done in a few days.
Workers should get out the industrial centres - which are likely to be bombed by the Allies - and go to the countryside. They can hide there taking advantage of widespread labour shortage. Workers should have alibis ready, pretend to have lost their way, avoiding to rouse suspects, and steering clear from big farms as these may have spies.
Stresses the importance of sabotage and passive forms of resistance which will reduce the quality and quantity of production, either by deliberately misunderstanding instructions or damaging an almost finished article. The combined effect of these actions may be massive.
Workers should band together to ensure that their rights in the camps, workshops, or wherever their work is, are meticulously protected. Rights include food in the canteens, rations, mealtimes, facilities in the camps and cantonments, working hours, sanitary conditions, hygiene, accident prevention, permissions, Sunday leave arrangements, protection from aerial attack, and the right to get to a shelter.
Stresses the importance of acting together forming or joining cells of passive resistance or protection rights; also claims that some anti-Nazi Germans can be valuable allies provided their intentions are sincere. Concludes urging foreign workers who cannot go to the countryside to organize resistance cells, slow production, resist exploitation by passive resistance, collaborate with anti-Nazi Germans, set up a list of Nazis and their minions and spread the truth about German defeats in battle on the different fronts. They should also listen to the news broadcasts from Allied sources and obey instructions from the Allied High Command.
Format
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One printed booklet
Language
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deu
fra
Type
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Text
Artwork
Identifier
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MAnsellHT1893553-160730-01
Coverage
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Civilian
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
France
Belgium
Denmark
Denmark--Copenhagen
Italy
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Darmstadt
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1945
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Gilvray Williams
Frances Grundy
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
bombing
Goebbels, Joseph (1897-1945)
Hitler, Adolf (1889-1945)
propaganda
Resistance
shelter
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/408/7542/SChattertonJ159568v10438.2.jpg
467cb4b29bdb71e0357ad57720312b0b
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/408/7542/SChattertonJ159568v10439.2.jpg
ba09b90f8c464897342bbb573cae7605
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Chatterton, John. 44 Squadron operations order book
Description
An account of the resource
Collection consists of 521 items which are mostly Operations orders, aircraft load and weight tables and bomb aimers briefings for 44 Squadron operations between January 1944 and April 1945. <br /><br />The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by M J Chatterton and catalogued by Nigel Huckins. <br /><br />This collection also contains items concerning Dewhurst Graaf and his crew, and Donald Neil McKechnie and his crew. Additional information on <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/109020/">Dewhurst Graaf</a> and <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/115642/">Donald Neil McKechnie</a> is available via the IBCC Losses Database.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-03-14
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Chatterton, J
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[Underlined] DARMSTADT. [/underlined]
DATE 11-9-44
[Table of bomb loads]
PETROL 1800
DISTRIBUTOR 15YDS.
T.V. 1000
BOMB WEIGHT 10,564
ALL UP. WEIGHT. 64,724+
[Table of Preselect]
[Table of aircraft heights]
TIME OFF 2030 E.T.R. 0230 ZERO. [deleted] 0000 [/deleted] 2359.
EFFORT. 100 seen
TIME TO TARGET. 3 1/2 TARGET HEIGHT. 400’
BOMBING HEIGHTS. 15-16000’ BOMBING [deleted] HEADING [/deleted] TRACK. 020 - 060
[Table of aircraft waves]
COLOUR FILM: X.T.J.Q.M.H.F.K.B.
Marking PT. 1300yds 265°
[Underlined] Orbit [deleted] Right [/deleted] Left [/underlined]
[Page break]
4 Waves Flares H-[deleted] 15 [/deleted] Controller & Deputy arrive at Δ
H-10 – 6 Flares A/C illuminate Δ blind
1st a/c will drop 1 green TI. } on centre of town.
GTI will be assed. visually by Mosq. }
H-8 2nd Flare wave to back up GTI visually }
H-6 3rd wave drop flares blind }
6 Mosq. markers search for A.PTS. using Red TI’s. marking offset marking point.
By H-2 if Mosq. cannot mark Controller will back up the original GTI’s.
[Table of aircraft and heights]
[Underlined] 18 [deleted] 40 [/deleted] 20. Main [/underlined]
1st wave 20 secs.
2nd wave 10 secs.
[Deleted] Black [/deleted] Main Force. BLACKTIE
Abandon CASTIRON
Stop Bombing. TOUCHSTONE.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Bomb aimers briefing 11 September 1944 - Darmstadt
Description
An account of the resource
Shows a single bomb load for operation. Includes preselection and other weapon settings, times, weights and other details. On the reverse timings and marking including by Mosquito and bombing instructions. List of aircraft in table with wave, heights and headings for each. At the bottom, code words.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-09-11
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Two sides front form document partially filled in on the reverse handwritten.
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Service material
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
SChattertonJ159568v10438, SChattertonJ159568v10439
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Germany--Darmstadt
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-09-11
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Anne-Marie Watson
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
briefing
Master Bomber
Mosquito
target indicator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/408/7554/SChattertonJ159568v10458.1.jpg
9e815180f2bba0789492383f64e8e0fe
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/408/7554/SChattertonJ159568v10459.1.jpg
c45681c5e8af2b49b8cd4030293a109a
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Chatterton, John. 44 Squadron operations order book
Description
An account of the resource
Collection consists of 521 items which are mostly Operations orders, aircraft load and weight tables and bomb aimers briefings for 44 Squadron operations between January 1944 and April 1945. <br /><br />The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by M J Chatterton and catalogued by Nigel Huckins. <br /><br />This collection also contains items concerning Dewhurst Graaf and his crew, and Donald Neil McKechnie and his crew. Additional information on <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/109020/">Dewhurst Graaf</a> and <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/115642/">Donald Neil McKechnie</a> is available via the IBCC Losses Database.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-03-14
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Chatterton, J
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
DARMSTADT.
DATE 25-8-44
MLJABHGK – [deleted] New [/deleted] old. Window. 65,534.
[Table of bomb loads]
PETROL 2000
DISTIRBUTOR 12 yds. .13
T.V. 1000
BOMB WEIGHT 9584
ALL UP. WEIGHT. 65,184 Plus window.
[Table of Preselect]
[Table of aircraft heights]
[Circled] ZERO. 0115 [/circled] H- H+6.
NICKELS. NIL. EFFORT. 177 V GP. 300 A/C MAINZ.
TIME TO TARGET. 4.20. TARGET HEIGHT. 400’
BOMBING HEIGHTS. 8-10,000’ BOMBING HEADING. [circled] TRACK 336° [/circled]
[Table of aircraft waves]
COLOUR FILM: FLJBKORPX.
[Calculations]
[Underlined] ORBIT PORT [/underlined]
[Page break]
Controllers in Mosquito.
[Underlined] No bombing before H. hour [/underlined]
[Underlined] Callsigns. [/underlined] Main Force – R/T Blacktie.
54 Base mark with flares & 1 [circled] proximity Green TI. [/circled] [inserted] will not be dropped unless at H hour because of attack at North [/inserted] at H-8 approx H-6
15 A/C in 3 waves.
[Underlined] Marking Point [/underlined] Mosq. dropping 1000lb TI Red 1 RTI. (1st marker) [deleted] 3 [/deleted] RTI back-up.
30 Red TI’s.
Backed up if necessary 3 SABS Lancs. – 1000lb Red TI.
TI Yellow to cancel.
Vectors issued by HQ to each base to cause bombs to straddle the various APTs.
[Underlined] Last Resort [/underlined] 12 Flare wave A/C carrying 250lb RTI.
If cloud base at Δ [underlined] above [/underlined] 6000’ bomb below cloud
If cloud base at Δ below 6000’ bomb above cloud at glow.
If unable to see glow bomb on H2S or as an alternative bomb any identified built up area east of 7°E.
Controller going ahead in mosq. to see weather & give orders to flare force either to drop on instruments or visually.
Special warning re attacking main concentration of TI’s.
Do not bomb any scattered incendiary fires etc. dropped by main force of 1st attack especially in defended area between
Piebald – Stop Bombing.
Ballyhoo – Abandon mission.
[Table of aircraft waves and heights] X?
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Bomb aimers briefing 25 August 1944 - Darmstadt
Description
An account of the resource
Shows a single bomb load for the operation with distributor, preselection and false height settings as well as other details. Includes information on waves and times. On the reverse bombing instructions and marking plan. Alternative attach plans for cloud and controller role. Code words and list of aircraft with wave and heights.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-08-25
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Two sides front form document partially filled in on the reverse handwritten
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Service material
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
SChattertonJ159568v10458, SChattertonJ159568v10459
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Germany--Darmstadt
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-08-25
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Anne-Marie Watson
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
briefing
target indicator
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany--Darmstadt
Title
A name given to the resource
Darmstadt [place]
Description
An account of the resource
This page is an entry point for a place. Please use the links below to see all relevant documents available in the Archive.
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/275/10063/LHughesAM417845v1.2.pdf
b342f70b6f3bea68f97cea8b2c7ffee6
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Hughes, Angas
Angas Hughes
Angas M Hughes
A M Hughes
A Hughes
Description
An account of the resource
29 items. An oral history interview with Flight Sergeant Angas Murray Hughes (b. 1923, 417845 Royal Australian Air Force), his logbook, prisoner of war identity cards and dog tags, two memoirs and 21 photographs. Angas Hughes flew 32 operations as a bomb aimer with 467 Squadron from RAF Waddington. One of the aircraft he flew in was Lancaster R5868, S-Sugar, now at RAF Hendon. He was shot down in September 1944 and became a prisoner of war.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Angas Hughes and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-10-01
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Hughes, AM
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Angas M Hughes’ Royal Australian Air Force observer’s air gunner’s and wireless operator’s flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
Royal Australian Air Force observer’s air gunner’s and wireless operators flying log book for Angus Murray Hughes, covering the period from 24 October 1942 to 26 September 1944. He was stationed at RAAF Mount Gambier, RAAF Port Pirie, RAAF Nhill, RAF West Freugh, RAF Lichfield, RAF Swinderby, RAF Syerston and RAF Waddington. Aircraft flown were, Anson, Battle, Wellington, Stirling and Lancaster. He flew a total of 31 operations with 467 (RAAF) squadron, before being reported missing on operation number 32 to Karlsruhe. He flew 13 Daylight and 18 night operations. Targets were, Poitiers, Aunay-sur-Odon, Chatellerault, Gelsenkirchen, Limoges, Prouville, St. Leu D’Esserent, Thiverny, Courtrai, Stuttgart, St Cyr, Caen, Laroche, Siracourt, Troissy. Givors, Gilze-Rijen, Stettin, L’isle Adam, Darmstadt, Brest, Le Havre, Boulogne, Bremerhaven, Rheydt, Dortmund-Ems Canal and Karlsruhe. His pilot on operations was Flying Officer Millar.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text. Log book and record book
Text
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1942
1943
1944
1944-06-12
1944-06-13
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
1944-06-16
1944-06-19
1944-06-20
1944-06-21
1944-06-22
1944-06-23
1944-06-24
1944-06-25
1944-07-04
1944-07-05
1944-07-07
1944-07-08
1944-07-09
1944-07-20
1944-07-21
1944-07-24
1944-07-25
1944-07-30
1944-07-31
1944-08-01
1944-08-03
1944-08-05
1944-08-07
1944-08-08
1944-08-11
1944-08-12
1944-08-15
1944-08-16
1944-08-17
1944-08-18
1944-08-25
1944-08-26
1944-09-05
1944-09-10
1944-09-11
1944-09-12
1944-09-17
1944-09-18
1944-09-19
1944-09-20
1944-09-23
1944-09-24
1944-09-26
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Australia
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
South Australia
Victoria
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Staffordshire
Belgium--Kortrijk
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Brest
France--Caen
France--Châtellerault
France--Givors
France--Le Havre
France--Limoges
France--L'Isle-Adam
France--Marne
France--Normandy
France--Oise
France--Pas-de-Calais
France--Poitiers
France--Saint-Cyr-sur-Mer
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Stuttgart
Scotland--Dumfries and Galloway
Poland--Szczecin
Poland
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
France--Aunay-sur-Odon
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LHughesAM417845v1
1660 HCU
27 OTU
467 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
Air Observers School
aircrew
Anson
Battle
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of Luftwaffe night-fighter airfields (15 August 1944)
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
bombing of the Pas de Calais V-1 sites (24/25 June 1944)
Bombing of Trossy St Maximin (3 August 1944)
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Lancaster Mk 1
Lancaster Mk 3
missing in action
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
RAF Lichfield
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
RAF Waddington
RAF West Freugh
Stirling
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
V-1
V-weapon
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/817/10800/PFawcettK1701.2.jpg
687b0968eb23c82bd9e8d7d593d8a53b
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/817/10800/AFawcettK170926.2.mp3
0e974eecf09d6a19823e3903c4fcb309
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Fawcett, Ken
K Fawcett
Description
An account of the resource
An oral history interview with Ken Fawcett. He flew operations as an air gunner with 617 and 227 Squadrons.
The collection was catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-09-26
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Fawcett, K
Transcribed audio recording
A resource consisting primarily of recorded human voice.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
DK: This is David Kavanagh for the International Bomber Command Centre interviewing Mr Kenneth Fawcett at his home on the 26th of September 2017. I’ll just put that there. What I’ll do is if I —
KF: Switch it on and off.
DK: Yeah. I can switch it on and off.
KF: Yeah.
DK: And if I’m looking down I’m just making sure it’s still working. Ok. Ok, what [pause] just having a look at the, at your bits here I’m just wondering if we could go back a bit and just ask you what were you doing immediately before the war?
KF: I was working with the Post Office.
DK: Right. So what made you then want to join the RAF?
KF: Because I didn’t want to be called up to the Army or the Navy. Is this on?
DK: Yes. Yeah.
KF: Sorry.
DK: No. That’s ok. That’s ok.
KF: During the wartime you were called up at eighteen. If you didn’t make any preference beforehand you were posted to either, you could go in the Bevan boys which were the miners.
DK: The miners. Yeah.
KF: You could go in the Army, the Navy or the Air Force. If you volunteered for any particular job then you could take that as, in your choice. So a number of us, six of us went off to the Recruiting Centre and made our choices. Three of us joined the RAF as aircrew. Two joined the Navy. And one joined the Army.
DK: And were these six, were they your friends then were they?
KF: They were all my working colleagues.
DK: Working colleagues from, from the Post Office.
KF: From the Post Office.
DK: Right.
KF: And we were then, having made our choices we were left to be called up eventually as we got nearer to eighteen.
DK: And then what happened then? Did you have to go off for your initial training somewhere? Or —
KF: Well, you were called up eventually.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And then you were posted to, I joined up at the Lords Cricket Ground in London.
DK: Yes. Yeah. I know it well.
KF: Do you?
DK: Yeah.
KF: That was an ACRC Recruiting Centre.
DK: Alright.
KF: And you went down there and you were billeted in the empty luxury flats in the area.
DK: Right.
KF: And we dined at the zoo restaurant.
DK: Right. Yes. Yeah.
KF: In Regent’s Park.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And then from there you went on through the courses.
DK: So what was it like then? Was this, would this have been the first time you’d left home or —
KF: Yes. Yeah.
DK: So after your initial at Lords Cricket Ground where did you go on to after that?
KF: You were then sent to 17 ITW at Bridlington.
DK: Right.
KF: Which was like a, an introduction to the, you did the square bashing.
DK: Square bashing.
KF: And kitting out and one thing and another.
DK: What did you think of the square bashing?
KF: Came naturally because I’d already done two and a half years in the Home Guard.
DK: Oh right. Ok.
KF: So that was, I joined the Home Guard when I was sixteen. And at seventeen, eighteen and, seventeen, eighteen and a half you were called up.
DK: Right. And what year would that have been?
KF: ’43.
DK: ’43. Yeah.
KF: September ’43.
DK: So, after Bridlington where did you go on to then?
KF: After Bridlington went to Northern Ireland.
DK: Oh right.
KF: Which was the Air Gunnery School.
DK: Right.
KF: And —
DK: So, by this time they’d already decided what trade you were going to be in.
KF: No. That was decided for you at, at the Doncaster Recruiting Centre.
DK: Right.
KF: I had to go for PNB. Pilot, navigator, bomb aimer.
DK: Right.
KF: And then while I was waiting for call up I realised or I found out that to become a pilot was a two year course and being ’43 and being eighteen and naive I wrote to them and asked them for to reassign me to the shortest course which was air gunnery.
DK: Right.
KF: Because at that time I had ambition to get in the war.
DK: Yeah.
KF: Stupidly. But so they did and of course I got called up to go to a Gunnery School.
DK: Right.
KF: So Northern Ireland. Bishop’s Court —
DK: Right.
KF: Was an Air Gunnery School with Ansons.
DK: Right. So, when you got to the Ansons then would that have been the first time you’d actually —
KF: Flown.
DK: Actually flown.
KF: Fascinating really. Because what they did was they took seven pupils up in an Anson and I was fortunate to get the co-pilot’s seat.
DK: Right.
KF: And in the Anson the pilot said, ‘There’s a handle down by the side of your seat.’ You know it do you? And he said, ‘You wind it up and you watch the lights and when they turn green we’ve got them locked.’
DK: Can you remember how many times you had to turn the —
KF: About a hundred. And of course I’m down here winding this and looking at the lights and by the time we I looked up we were about a thousand feet up in the air. So I never saw my first —
DK: Take-off.
KF: Take-off.
DK: Oh no.
KF: But it was interesting.
DK: So, what did you think of the Anson then? Was that [unclear]
KF: It was, it was interesting because it was my first flying and funnily enough I, we used to get kitted out with a flying suit and parachute and I said to the instructor one day, ‘You never bring a parachute. Why is that?’ He said, ‘I’ll tell you, son,’ he said, ‘If you jumped out at this height you’d never survive.’ So we were always down time taking parachutes. But that was only an aside, you know.
DK: So what would you, at the Gunnery School then were you introduced to the gun? The guns you were going to be using before the first flight.
KF: Yeah. You had to learn all the parts of the gun.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And you had to be able to strip a gun down and reassemble it.
DK: So, can you remember what type of weapons they were?
KF: It was a Browning 303.
DK: Yeah.
KF: Air cooled. And the Anson had a gun turret on.
DK: Right.
KF: And you took your turn in the gun turret and the ammunition belt had been tipped. The bullets had been tipped with paint of different colours.
DK: Right.
KF: So that you may be designated the blue tips. And when you fired at a drogue that was being flown by another aircraft, when the drogue was taken to the ground and counting the holes in the drogue the blue paints would show up and you’d be credited with those hits.
DK: Yeah. Was it something that came naturally to you?
KF: Well, being in the Home Guard for two years I’d been firing Bren guns and Thompson sub-machine guns and throwing grenades and, and anti-tank mortars. So, you know at sixteen and seventeen we were playing soldiers anyway.
DK: Yeah.
KF: So with ammunition and firing it became second nature.
DK: So, after the Gunnery School then where did you go on to next?
KF: That’s what I got this for.
DK: Ah. Say for the tape that’s your force’s logbook —
KF: Sorry.
DK: That’s ok.
KF: Bridlington. Oh yes. Bridgnorth. 1650 Conversion. No. Number 1, Elementary Air Gunnery School at Bridgnorth in Shropshire.
DK: Right. So that was more advanced.
KF: That was more advanced training. More square bashing. More fatigues and what have you.
DK: Right. And what aircraft were based there? Was that —
KF: No. There was no flying there.
DK: Oh right. Ok. So it was purely just gunnery training.
KF: In fact, I think I’ve got these the wrong way around. It was London, Bridlington, Bridgnorth and then [pause] yeah. I haven’t got them in order. 12 Air Gunnery School. 17 OTU. That was at Silverstone. So, yeah. We did Bridgnorth and then [pause] That’s right. Bridgnorth and then Silverstone.
DK: Right.
KF: 17 OTU.
DK: Right. So, Bridgnorth first. Then Silverstone.
KF: Yeah.
DK: And that was 17 Operational Training Unit.
KF: Right.
DK: Right. And, and is that where you would have met your crew then? All the rest of your crew.
KF: We were taken to a station in the Midlands. I forget the name of the one. And you were taken into an assembly room and there were twenty pilots, twenty navigators, forty gunners because there are two gunners to a crew.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And twenty wireless operators. And the pilots were told to wander around and go to each trade and select a member of a crew. If a pilot approached you and asked you and you didn’t like the look of him you could say no. If you liked him you’d say yes and then he would go on to find a wireless operator or the, whatever crew he hadn’t yet selected.
DK: And this was all mixed together regardless of rank.
KF: Yeah. Completely.
DK: And just by trade.
KF: And you were entirely free to say yes or no to the guy.
DK: How did you think that worked? Because it’s quite unusual in the military. It seems a very relaxed way of —
KF: Oh, it was. It was unique to the military. Instead of being told you would do this or that you were given the choice because I think in the sense that if your life was on the line and you didn’t like the guy you were going to have to live with you were given the option of declining. Although face to face it’s a first instinct. If you sort of, it’s an attitude when you first meet somebody.
DK: Yes.
KF: You have a feeling.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And this fella came along in dark blue because the Australians were, were in dark blue uniform whereas we were in light blue. And he came along and asked if I cared to join his crew. I looked at him and he had his Australian colleague with him who was the wireless operator and I just thought oh it’s different. ‘Yeah. Ok.’
DK: Ok. Just for the tape can you remember their names?
KF: Yeah. Ken Allen.
DK: Ken Allen was the pilot.
KF: Was the pilot.
DK: Yeah. And —
KF: And he was from Melbourne in Australia.
DK: And the wireless operator?
KF: And the wireless operator was a Bill Eudey.
DK: Right.
KF: He was Australian. He was from Melbourne.
DK: Right.
KF: And the pilot at that time was a flight sergeant.
DK: Right.
KF: He subsequently got promoted to commissioned rank.
DK: Right. And can you remember the name of the second gunner that joined your crew?
KF: Yeah. Mike Clegg. Mike Clegg from [pause] Rotherham.
DK: Right.
KF: In Yorkshire.
DK: We’re missing one. Is the other one the navigator?
KF: The navigator was a guy from London. But subsequently we lost him because he couldn’t keep up with the training.
DK: Oh. Ok.
KF: So we had a different navigator when we eventually went on to ops.
DK: And can you remember his name?
KF: His name was —
DK: We can come back to it. It’s alright.
KF: Yeah. I’m looking. Where’s the photograph?
DK: Is he there?
KF: No. That’s, that’s have you got this to switch off or not?
DK: Yeah. I can pause it. It’s ok.
[recording paused]
DK: Right. So looking at the photograph here from right to left.
KF: Mike Clegg.
DK: Mike Clegg. Yeah.
KF: That was the navigator.
DK: Yeah.
KF: He was from Preston. That was the flight engineer. Ken Mepham from Manchester.
DK: Ken.
KF: Mepham.
DK: Mepham. Yeah.
KF: That was the second bomb aimer because that first bomb aimer Kirk Kent.
DK: Right.
KF: Had a nervous breakdown during the course of the ops.
DK: Oh. Ok.
KF: So he came back with the photograph.
DK: Right.
KF: But he was on our twenty seventh op.
DK: Right.
KF: So he did twenty six and then he did twenty seven to thirty six. That was Bill Eudey, the Australian wireless operator.
DK: Right.
KF: Ground crew. Ground crew. Ground crew. And myself.
DK: And who’s that down there?
KF: That’s the pilot.
DK: That’s the pilot. And the pilot’s name?
KF: Ken Allen.
DK: Ken Allen. So these are two bomb aimers then. That one and that one
KF: Yeah. Yeah.
DK: And he had a nervous breakdown.
KF: That’s right.
DK: Right.
KF: He was on the train going home on leave. He was on the train and had a collapse on the train. So he was off then for several weeks.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And then we finished our tour while he was having hospital treatment.
DK: Right. With, with the replacement bomb aimer.
KF: With, yeah.
DK: Right. Ok. So if I could just take you back to the Operational Training Unit then. Number 17.
KF: 17 OTU.
DK: 17 OTU.
KF: Silverstone.
DK: So what type of aircraft were you training on then?
KF: Wellingtons. Twin engine Wellingtons.
DK: And what did you think of the Wellington as a, as an aircraft?
KF: We went from Silverstone. We were there for a week and then we were sent to Turweston, which was the satellite airfield where there were also Wellingtons. On the morning we arrived, about 11 o’clock we went to the mess. We had lunch. We came out and we were going up to the flights and it was in a lane and we heard a Wellington landing. So we went to a gap in the hedge, watched the Wellington land and take off again on circuits and bumps.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And sadly the pilot pulled the plane up too steeply, stalled and crashed. So our first sight of a Wellington was one coming down on its tail and all eleven onboard were killed.
DK: That was —
KF: So we, we looked at the pilot and thought how clever is he?
DK: That must have made you all a bit nervous about what was to come.
KF: Well, you didn’t get nervous really. You just simply thought well, but that was the first we’d saw of the Wellington. You know.
DK: Yeah.
KF: Anyway, we, we eventually did some of the training there. Then we were sent back to Silverstone to complete the training.
DK: Right.
KF: So each trade was working with the pilot as a student pilot.
DK: Right.
KF: With a trainee, with a instructor alongside.
DK: So you’d have the instructor pilot, your pilot as trainee and the rest of the crew there.
KF: That’s right.
DK: So had you decided which gun position you were going to take?
KF: Well, on the, on the Wellington there was only a rear turret.
DK: Right.
KF: There was no mid-upper turret. And we weren’t particularly designated to any particular one. So throughout the tour we used to switch.
DK: Right.
KF: Sometimes I’d go in the mid upper turret. Sometimes I’d go in the rear turret.
DK: So this training then at the OTU that was mostly circuit and bumps.
KF: That’s right.
DK: Cross country.
KF: Yeah. Yeah. It was mostly really for bomb aiming when the Wellington would fly over the predetermined bombing range on the, on the coast. Used to fly out to the coast at Lincoln.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And near the Wash somewhere. And the bomb aimer would then drop the practice bombs and he would get a qualification depending how good he was.
DK: And at this point can you remember were you beginning to feel confident with your crew? Or were you beginning to gel and —
KF: Oh yes. You got on very well. If you hadn’t got on well you would apply for a move.
DK: Right.
KF: But no. We all got on fine and eventually you did everything as a crew. When you went to the pub you all went together. And when you went for a meal you all went together. Basically.
DK: Yeah.
KF: But your crew because your lives depended on each other you became quite associated with one another.
DK: So after the OTU then where did you go on to then?
KF: Lanc Finishing School.
DK: Right.
KF: Where the pilot was particularly trained to switch from twin engine to four engine.
DK: And would that be the point when your flight engineer joined you?
KF: That’s right.
DK: Yeah.
KF: No. Sorry. There was, before the Lanc Finishing School there was an OT.
DK: It was at the Heavy Conversion Unit.
KF: That’s right. Yeah. Convert. Conversion Unit.
DK: Can you remember which Heavy Conversion Unit it was?
KF: Wigsley, Wigsley.
DK: Wigsley. Yeah.
KF: Yeah. And —
DK: And was that —
KF: That was the conversion from twin engine to four engine.
DK: Right.
KF: And then from there we went to the Lanc Finishing School to give the pilot training from radial engine to Lancaster.
DK: So, at the Heavy Conversion Unit what four engine bombers —
KF: Stirling.
DK: Stirlings. Right. Ok. And what did you think of the Stirling?
KF: Well, not being the pilot particularly, we were passengers.
DK: Yeah.
KF: So each aircraft didn’t matter to us particularly.
DK: Yeah.
KF: As gunners.
DK: And on the Stirling did you train in the mid-upper and the rear turret?
KF: Yeah. There was the mid upper and rear.
DK: Yeah. So after the Heavy Conversion Unit on Stirlings you then went to the Lancaster Finishing School.
KF: The Lanc Finishing School.
DK: For the pilot. For the Lancaster.
KF: That’s right. For the pilot to convert.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And I’m not sure what stage, before Lanc Finishing School or after you were posted to a particular group.
DK: Right.
KF: And we were fortunate in the sense that we were posted 5 Group which was considered the elite group of the Bomber Command.
DK: Yeah. Yeah.
KF: Because 5 Group was at Grantham.
DK: Yeah.
KF: With —
DK: Ralph Cochrane.
KF: That’s right. Yeah.
DK: Yeah
KF: Yeah.
DK: So you were quite pleased about that then, were you? Did they —
KF: Oh yes. Yeah.
KF: Yeah.
DK: Because to be sent on the Lancaster as opposed to the Halifax.
DK: Yeah.
KF: Because you know the Halifax was slower and it was more vulnerable. So to get on to Lancasters we were quite happy.
DK: And then your first squadron was?
KF: First?
DK: Your first squadron.
KF: 619 Squadron.
DK: Yeah.
KF: At Dunholme Lodge.
DK: Dunholme Lodge.
KF: Just outside Lincoln.
DK: Yeah.
KF: It’s now a school. I think.
DK: Yeah. I actually drove through there quite recently.
KF: Did you?
DK: it’s all farms now.
KF: Is it?
DK: The airfield’s long gone. Right. So this was your first operational squadron then?
KF: 619 was. Yes.
DK: 619, at Dunholme Lodge. And did you like the squadron as you joined? Was it —
KF: It was very basic.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And you were in Nissen huts, and there was sufficient beds in one Nissen hut for two crews. And one crew would have one end of the room.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And the other crew would have the other end of the room and you just simply got on with each other. But sadly, very often the crew in the other end of the hut would go missing so another crew would come in. And that was the [pause] you just shrugged and —
DK: Yeah.
KF: Tough. Sort of thing.
DK: So on your first operational squadron then can you remember much about your first operation?
KF: My first operation I was called to operate with another crew.
DK: Right.
KF: Yeah. One of their gunners had gone sick so I was called up to make up their crew.
DK: Yeah. Would you mind if I close the door? There’s a bit of drilling going on outside.
KF: Is there? Yeah.
DK: Yeah. It’s picking up on the [unclear] is that alright?
[pause]
DK: That’s it. Somebody had a, somebody had a drill going.
KF: Did they?
DK: Yeah. Sorry. So your first operation then you flew with another crew.
KF: Yeah.
DK: Yeah.
KF: It was a daylight op to Le Havre submarine pens.
DK: Right. And at, so as an extra gunner then where did you actually sit because you couldn’t obviously both get in the turret. Did you just sort of swap places with him?
KF: At what stage?
DK: Well, you’re with another crew at this point.
KF: Yeah, but their gunner had gone sick so I was sitting in his turret.
DK: Oh, sorry. Oh, sorry. I thought you meant —
KF: He wasn’t flying. He wasn’t flying so I took his place.
DK: You were a replacement gunner.
KF: I was a replacement gunner.
DK: So how did that make you feel then? Flying out with a different crew then on your first operation?
KF: You just got on with them. You just simply fitted in and they accepted you and you accepted them. There was no, no embarrassment at all.
DK: Yeah. So when was your first operation then with your actual crew? Was that the next one?
KF: The next one was a daylight to Brest. That was a, so throughout the whole tour I had always done one more than they had —
DK: Right.
KF: You know, I was one ahead of them. It was interesting because when I came back, ‘What was it like? What was it like?’ And of course when you flew from Lincoln to Le Havre this was in September and of course D-Day was in June.
DK: Yeah.
KF: So you flew over the Channel and saw the battleships shelling the French coast.
DK: Right.
KF: It was quite spectacular because it was daylight.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And of course Le Havre was a short hop over France so you weren’t in too much of a, you got the odd ack ack but nothing special.
DK: So as your operations have progressed then can you remember the different targets you were sent too?
KF: Oh yeah. Yeah. I remember them all really.
DK: Yeah.
KF: Not necessarily in order but the first, the third operation was a night one to Munchen Gladbach.
DK: Right. So that would have been your first time over Germany then.
KF: This was the first time over Germany and of course it was spectacular because it was night time and you saw all the fires and the explosions and it was all like a bit of a firework display. In fact, I called the navigator and I said, ‘Terry,’ Terry Fellowes, that was the navigator —
DK: Terry Fellowes. Right.
KF: Terry Fellowes.
DK: Terry Fellowes. The navigator, yeah.
KF: And he was always in, the navigator worked in a curtained off area.
DK: Yeah.
KF: With lights on.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And the lights had to be shielded from outside to save giving your position away. So he looked out and he blamed me after that. He said, ‘I wish I’d never looked out,’ he said. And he said throughout the rest of the tour he never did look out.
DK: Look out.
KF: But of course as gunners we were seeing everything, you see.
DK: Yeah. So, as a, as a gunner then this might sound a silly question but what was your actual role as part of that crew? What was your job?
KF: Your main basic job was a lookout. Particularly in the dark because you’d have seven or eight hundred aircraft all flying along in the dark with no lights on and you particularly had to have good night vision.
DK: Yeah.
KF: Because you could see, you might be flying along for a while and suddenly see some sparks and when you looked up you discerned another aircraft only fifty, sixty feet away. So you’d then call the pilot up. Warn him that there was another aircraft to the port or starboard. Wherever. And he would veer away slightly and you would sit, then you would tell him yes ok you were out of range. And of course you were looking out for enemy aircraft. The difference in the dark sky is very minimal between seeing something and not seeing something.
DK: Yeah.
KF: So you had to have good night vision to see a black shadow against a slightly less black background. And then you had to recognise the shape. And if the shape was an enemy aircraft you’d got to decide whether to move away or attack or whatever. If he was doing no harm you left him alone because he had a bigger gun than you did.
DK: Right. So the intention would be you wouldn’t want to draw attention to yourself if you saw an enemy aircraft and he wasn’t behind you.
KF: If he wasn’t, if he wasn’t aware of your presence you kept schtum because if you fired your gun every fifth round of the belt was an incendiary. And it was an incendiary to aid you to know why you were firing. But at the same time it gave your position away.
DK: Yeah.
KF: So that if you fired when you didn’t need to and then the enemy aircraft could say, ‘Hello. I didn’t know you were there. I’ll go for you.’ So you kept quiet. If he saw you and you attacked, he attacked then you’d call the pilot up and call him to veer and corkscrew port or starboard. If the aircraft was coming in from the starboard you dived in to him.
DK: Right.
KF: If he was diving from the port you dived in to him. And the pilot, you’d call the pilot up and just simply shout quickly, ‘Corkscrew. Starboard. Go.’ And the pilot never stopped to ask. He just went.
DK: Right.
KF: And then he did a corkscrew. You know what a corkscrew is?
DK: Yeah. I do.
KF: And he’d do the corkscrew until you felt you’d got rid of him and then he would get back on to course. And the navigator then would curse and swear at you because everything had gone up in the air. His plan, maps and pencils and everything else shot up in the air.
DK: Yeah. So, you were actually attacked by German aircraft.
KF: Oh, you could. Yeah. On several occasions.
DK: Yeah. Yeah.
KF: So you, you simply got out of the way because they had cannons which had a six hundred yard range.
DK: Yeah.
KF: We had 303s which had a three hundred yard range. So if you fired at him he could stay further away and hit you and you couldn’t reach him.
DK: Did any of these German attacks ever damage the aircraft or did you always always manage to —
KF: Not, not to, well I say not to our knowledge. We sometimes came back and there was holes in the aircraft. Whether they were shrapnel or bullet holes you never really discerned.
DK: Yeah.
KF: The ground staff would have known because they were having to repair them. But when you got out of after coming back from a raid there were very often holes in the aircraft from either bullets or shrapnel.
DK: Right. But you never came back severely damaged though.
KF: Not severely damaged.
DK: No.
KF: But the amazing thing to me was that seven of us in an aircraft. We came back with holes in the aircraft but none of them ever hit anybody. Not one of the aircraft, not one of the crew was hit with any bit or injured.
DK: Right. So how many operations did you do with 619?
KF: We did nine with 619.
DK: Right.
KF: And then they wanted to form a new squadron so they took the best or the experienced crews from 619 and they also took the experienced half the crew, half the squadron and the other half was taken from a squadron at Bardney and they were sent to Strubby. And then from Strubby we went down to Balderton where we formed 227 Squadron. And then from ten ‘til thirty six we did at Balderton.
DK: Right. So you did thirty six operations altogether.
KF: Well, a tour was thirty.
DK: Right.
KF: And every four weeks of flying you were sent on ten days leave. So we thought right if we do twenty eight we’ll go on leave for ten days, come back, do two and we’ll get to our next leave. So we were being clever to get two lots of leave in quick succession.
DK: Yeah.
KF: When we came back from the twenty eight ops thinking we’d two to do and we arrived back on station and we were told that they had increased the tour from thirty to thirty five because of the bad weather down the training line was stopping new crews coming up the line. So we had seven to do.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And sadly when you went to the flight and looked at the casualty board while we’d been away somebody had done thirty one and shot down. Thirty two, shot down. If they had finished their tour at thirty they would have survived.
DK: They’d have survived.
KF: So there was a bit of an ironic situation.
DK: How did that, can you remember how that made you feel at the time?
KF: Well, you’re invincible at eighteen. Anybody else was going to.
DK: Yeah.
KF: When you saw an aircraft being shot down over target you just simply said, ‘Well not me. Tough mate.’ You know.
DK: So you did, so the rest of your crew did thirty five but you did the —
KF: I did the odd one.
DK: Extra one at thirty six, yeah.
KF: What I didn’t realise until much later was that I could have called off at thirty five but I carried on with my crew without question.
DK: So, could, could you talk through sort of what an operation would be like. A night time one. Presumably they got you up quite late during the day and then you’d, would you do a sort of training mission during the day with the aircraft? Or —
KF: Yes. You did what they called the pre-flight test.
DK: Right.
KF: You would, the morning would [pause] in the morning the pilot would go to the flights and look at the Battle Order. If he was on and the aircraft he was designated to then we would go out to that aircraft and make sure everything was in working order and then he would do a pre-flight test of about ten minutes, fifteen minutes. Check that it was, sounded all right. The radio operator would contact base and make sure —
DK: Yeah.
KF: The radio was working. And we would just make sure the guns were, were working. We didn’t actually fire them but you made sure that the mechanism was working. And then you landed. Then you went to a meal. Then you would come back and get briefed. And then you would go to the aircraft and wait for take-off and then when the green light went up you took off.
DK: What was it like at the briefings though when you saw what your target was going to be? Was it —
KF: Well, you went in to, all the buildings were Nissen huts.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And this was the biggest style of Nissen hut. And you went in and it was seated. Benches and chairs. And you were looking at the stage and the whole of the back of the stage was covered with a big curtain. And when the CO and the briefing crew came along you stood up to attention. The guy, the CO told you, ‘Sit down.’ And then the curtains were drawn back. And then you would see the whole map of Europe and a tape would be from base to the target.
DK: Right.
KF: During the course of the day you established from the ground crew how much petrol they were putting in. If it was a little, a small amount they could put more bombs. If it was a long target, a long range target it reduced the amount of bombs you could take because there was more petrol.
DK: Petrol.
KF: So if the petrol load was high you knew it was a long way.
DK: Yeah.
KF: If the petrol load was low you knew it was a shorter one.
DK: Yeah.
KF: So when you looked at the map you have a preconceived idea that it was going to be a long one or a short one.
DK: Yeah.
KF: If it was long one it was obviously going to be in to, in to Germany. One particular one was Gdynia. Which was in Poland.
DK: And that was your longest.
KF: Ten and a half hours that one.
DK: Ten and a half hours.
KF: Five hours out and five hours back. And but if it was a short one it would be something like Le Havre or Brest or —
DK: Yeah.
KF: Any of the occupied countries. You know.
DK: So before, you had a pre-flight meal presumably before you went.
KF: Well, you just had a normal meal.
DK: Yeah.
KF: But as aircrew you were privileged in that you could have as much milk as you liked.
DK: Right.
KF: Where, I’m talking, that’s surprising but milk was in short supply at the time. So being privileged you could drink as much milk as you liked. You could eat, you could ask for anything you wanted from catering.
DK: Yeah.
KF: That was available.
DK: So basically you get the green light and off you go. For take-off then where were you? Were you in the turret or were you in the —
KF: You were in the turret.
DK: Right.
KF: But you had to centralise them and, and not swivel them because that would unbalance the aircraft.
DK: Yeah.
KF: When you were taking off. The pilot could feel you if you were swinging the guns about. So you sat with your guns centralised.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And you just took off down the runway and got airborne. Once you were airborne then you could swivel your turrets.
DK: Yeah. And what was that like though? Being sort of dragged backwards as it were.
KF: Didn’t really, didn’t I don’t think there was anything. It’s just like sitting on the train backwards.
DK: So you would be in the turret for the entire time.
KF: Oh yeah. You never. It wasn’t wise to leave the turret.
DK: Yeah.
KF: So you stayed in it. But if you were over friendly territory there was in the aircraft there was what they called an elsan which was a chemical toilet. And if needed to go to the loo you could go.
DK: Yeah.
KF: But being in a flying suit as the gunner you had four layers of clothing on.
DK: Yeah.
KF: So you would, you made sure you didn’t need to go to the loo.
DK: Yeah.
KF: You made sure before you put your suit on.
DK: Yeah.
KF: That you’d drained yourself.
DK: Did you have electrical heated suits?
KF: Yeah.
DK: You did. Yeah. And were they any good because I’ve heard different stories.
KF: Oh yes. They were good. No. They were good.
DK: Yeah.
KF: In fact, sometimes they would, I remember once getting my foot slipper was getting too hot and there were studs at the back of the heel fitting on to the suit, and I just disconnected it.
DK: Yeah. What was it like being in the rear turret then? Was it, because you are cut off from the rest of the crew. Was it a little, a little lonely there? Or were you —
KF: Well, you could always call up on, on the intercom. You never felt. I mean the rear turret was behind the tail so you were hanging over the back and you could see the tail struts were out here somewhere.
DK: Yeah.
KF: You’re out in space really. You’re in a, in a Perspex dome.
DK: And do you remember much about as you reached the target and the bombs dropping and what happened to the aircraft then?
KF: Oh yeah. I mean the pilot, the navigator in particular, to get seven hundred aircraft over the target they were all give a different direction to come in so that they weren’t all falling over one another. So every aircraft would come in at a certain time at a certain angle to make sure that they all dropped over the target but they were all zigzagging about. So you would be [pause] the navigator would tell the pilot what course to fly. He would fly the course. Then eventually he would see the target because it had already been marked by the Pathfinders.
DK: Yeah.
KF: Or it was already in flames anyway. So as you approached the target on the heading that you had already been given, no, the navigator had been given. At the height the bomb aimer would be laying on the front nose looking through the bombsight and as he got closer to the target he would direct the pilot. The navigator would fall out of the equation and the bomb aimer would take over and tell the pilot, ‘Left. Left. Steady. Right. Steady.’ Got him on. And then when the pilot, when the bomb aimer was over the target he would press the tit, shout, ‘Bombs gone,’ and the aircraft would lift up. You could feel it. But what you had to do as gunners you had to make sure that the guy above you wasn’t directly above you dropping on — several aircraft got lost on targets by other aircrew dropping their bombs on the aircraft below.
DK: So, as, as the bomb run was happening you were looking up there and there and there right up to —
KF: Well, you were looking left, right and centre. And if you, two aircraft on the route from base to the target some aircraft would be two minutes later than they should have been or two minutes earlier. So there would always be a little bit of congestion over the target.
DK: Yeah.
KF: The worst thing that could happen when you were over the target was not being able to drop the bombs and then you were shouted, ‘Bomb bays closed. Go around again.’ So you had to go around again whilst everybody is shooting at you. Because the guy above you was going to drop his bombs on you.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And so you would tell the pilot and he would drop back a bit and then the guy above you would drop his bombs past you. But sometimes because the guy above didn’t want to go around again he wouldn’t care that you were underneath him.
DK: Yeah.
KF: He would drop them and hope they didn’t hit you. But that was one of the hard facts of life.
DK: So you dropped your bombs on target. You were heading for home now.
KF: After you’ve dropped your bombs the bomb aimer and the pilot had to continue for another thirty seconds on a straight and level course to allow the flash, photo flash to trigger over the target and it took a photograph of where the bomb aimer had dropped his bombs.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And then after thirty seconds of level you could fall off and then the navigator would give the pilot a course to set for home.
DK: Yeah. So you’re setting back for home then. How, how are you feeling as you approached the airfield? Was it a sense of — ?
KF: Well, you left the target but you still had to be alert.
DK: Yeah.
KF: Because when if an enemy aircraft was above you he could see you silhouetted against the flames below.
DK: Right.
KF: So he could come down on you when he, and what he would often do was go under you. There was a bit of a fallacy that the rear gunner is in the most endangered position.
DK: Right.
KF: Not necessarily so because an enemy aircraft depending on which angle he’s coming at you isn’t necessarily going to kill the rear gunner first.
DK: Right.
KF: He could come in from the side and as you possibly well know there was what they called schrage musik. And the enemy aircraft had a gun —
DK: Yeah.
KF: At an angle. And he would come underneath you and fire into the wing.
DK: Yeah.
KF: Where the petrol tanks were. And the first you knew of it was where the wing took off. You know. And so periodically you would get the pilot to tilt over so you could look underneath and then look underneath again.
DK: You never saw anybody coming up to shoot you from below then when you [unclear]
KF: No. No. No
DK: No. I guess, yeah, so when you got back home then what was the feeling as you got back off an operation?
KF: You were only relieved when the wheels touched down. You were always looking out for, at one time, particularly during the end of the war a lot of the German aircraft used to follow the bomber crews in when their airfield was lit up and they were landing on the runway. When they were wheels down and flaps down.
DK: Yeah.
KF: They were at their most vulnerable because they couldn’t manoeuvre and the enemy pilot who’d followed him in would then shoot him down and several aircraft sadly were lost —
DK: Right.
KF: On the approach to the runway. So you never gave up until you actually wheeled down.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And hit the runway.
DK: Yeah. Is it ok if I have a look at the old logbook? [pause] I just wondered if I have a look at the various operations there.
KF: Red were night ops.
DK: Red for night ops. Yeah.
KF: Green were daylights.
DK: So that —
KF: And black was flying.
DK: This is just for the recording. So that’s the Lancaster Finishing School.
KF: That’s right.
DK: Syerston. So then 619 squadron. So that’s Allen. Your —
KF: Flight Sergeant Allen.
DK: Your pilot. So, that’s the first operation was to Brest. Wasn’t it?
KF: Yeah
DK: So with a different pilot. Franks.
KF: That’s right.
DK: Yeah. [unclear]
KF: And then the next one was Le Havre. Was it Le Havre?
[pause]
DK: I’ve got Darmstadt.
KF: Sorry?
DK: Darmstadt.
KF: No, that’s, there’s another one.
DK: Oh, here we go. Le Havre.
KF: Later on. That’s it.
DK: Gun positions.
KF: That’s right.
DK: Yeah. So the Brest operation was on the 2nd of September.
KF: That’s right.
DK: Then Le Havre.
KF: That was the first one with my crew.
DK: The first one with your crew. 10th of September. And then the 11th of September your first night operation to Darmstadt.
KF: Darmstadt. That’s right.
DK: So there’s Darmstadt. Munchen Gladbach.
KF: And then Munchen Gladbach.
DK: So most, most of the German cities here aren’t there? Ops to Bergen. Was that —
KF: Norway.
DK: Norway. Right.
KF: Norway.
DK: So that’s with, that was Balderton. So you joined Balderton with 227 Squadron in October ’44. [pause] So there’s a Dortmund Ems canal.
KF: Yeah.
DK: So that was two operations there then.
KF: Oh, we went there several times.
DK: Several times. Right.
KF: The idea was you, there was a high point between Dortmund and Ems.
DK: Right.
KF: And the idea was to break the banks, drain the canal and none of the barges could travel from Dortmund to Ems.
DK: Right.
KF: With material for the war production. So they kept going back and of course when they built the, when they repaired the dam and the water went back in again you went back again and burst it again.
DK: Right.
KF: So that’s why we kept going back to the Dortmund Ems Canal.
DK: You went there on the 4th of November. Then again the 6th of November.
KF: Went back three or four times I think.
DK: Yeah. Then Munich, 27th of November.
KF: Three times to Munich.
DK: Three times Munich. There’s a recall there I see. The Urft Dam.
KF: Urft Dam. Yeah.
DK: U R F T Dam. Yeah.
KF: Gdynia.
DK: Gdynia.
KF: That was Poland.
DK: Yeah. So Gdynia was on the 18th of December. Oh. So you did Munich on the 17th of December. And then Gdynia the next day. The 18th of December.
KF: Yeah. Two long ones. Because Munich was right down in the far end of Germany.
DK: Then the 30th of December there’s ops to I’ll spell this out for the recording H O U F F.
KF: Houffalize.
DK: ALIZE. Houffalize. The Dortmund Ems Canal again on January the 1st.
KF: Yeah.
DK: So, Houffalize again.
KF: You see, Royan. That one is a coastal town in France.
DK: Right.
KF: And when the D-Day landing took place they went down. The Americans went down the peninsula and Royan was in a German garrison but because the Americans went down so fast they were —
DK: Cut off.
KF: Cut off.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And the French were complaining that the Germans were going out in to the countryside and rustling for food and one thing and another so they asked for, and the garrison was too big for the French Resistance to take on so they asked us to go down and —
DK: Bomb them.
KF: Bomb them. But the point I’m getting around to is that the briefing by the meteorological officer was completely wrong, and when. Because it was only a pocket in France and the country around about was already occupied by us —
DK: Yeah.
KF: We didn’t do a deviation. We went straight to the target. The wind speed given by the meteorological officer was wrong and there was a huge tailwind which got us there early. And we flew over Royan about six or seven minutes early for the bomb aiming, for the bombing and there were no markers down so we didn’t know where we were. So when we’d over shot the target we had to turn around and come back because it was fatal because every other aircraft was still coming.
DK: Yeah.
KF: So there was and we lost several aircraft in crashes.
DK: Collisions.
KF: Albeit there was very little anti- aircraft.
DK: So that was Royan. R O Y A N. And that’s January the 4th.
KF: Yeah.
DK: Yeah. In France.
KF: Well, if we’re going back one if you look back at December [pause] December we were out on New Year’s Eve. December 31st. 30th.
DK: No. That’s the 18th there.
KF: Sorry?
DK: 30th. Yeah.
KF: That was the, that was—
DK: Houffalize.
KF: The [pause] when the Germans broke through. You know the Battle of the Bulge.
DK: Oh, the Battle of the Bulge. Oh right. Ok.
KF: That was the Battle of the Bulge.
DK: Right. So that’s —
KF: And what date was that?
DK: 30th of December.
KF: That’s right.
DK: Houffalize.
KF: The night before the New Year. Night before New Year.
DK: Yeah. Yeah. So Politz.
KF: Politz.
DK: Politz on —
KF: That was in Czechoslovakia.
DK: Yeah. So Politz again there. Dresden on the 13th of February.
KF: Yeah.
DK: Do you remember, do you remember much about that?
KF: The famous Dresden raid.
DK: Do you remember much about that operation?
KF: Nothing special. Just another one. It was only afterwards that we, I mean that was this is what really appalled me. If you remember Harris. Bomber Harris, you know.
DK: Yeah. Yeah.
KF: You know. He got no credit for doing what he did because after the war everybody was saying, ‘Look at the damage you’ve done. Oh terrible.’ So even right up until when was the Battle of Britain, not the Battle — the Bomber Command Memorial.
DK: Yeah.
KF: Seventy odd years later.
DK: Yeah. 2012 that was. Yeah.
KF: And what I’m saying is really nobody gave you credit for what you did.
DK: No.
KF: And in fact, I’ve an opinion. I’ve a theory that we did Germany a favour in a, in a odd way. When we knocked everything out of Germany I mean we flew over Germany after the war to look at the damage and it was, you might have seen photographs yourself.
DK: Yeah. Yeah.
KF: They had nothing. So they had to renew everything with new equipment to get back on their feet. And we gave them thousands. And America did. To save them going over to the Russian sphere.
DK: Yeah. Yeah.
KF: We pumped millions of pounds into Germany. They got all completely new equipment.
DK: Yeah.
KF: New factories. New houses. New, new buildings.
DK: That’s it.
KF: We’re coming back to all our old clapped out aeroplanes and trains.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And infrastructure. And Germany then went to be a very renowned engineering country.
DK: Yeah. It was the West German economic miracle wasn’t it?
KF: That’s right.
DK: But of course it was financed by the Americans and Volkswagen. Yeah.
KF: Volkswagen. Volkswagen was saved by the British Army.
DK: That’s right. Yeah.
KF: They ran it for several years after the war.
DK: Yeah. True. So then —
KF: But people forget that.
DK: Yeah.
KF: I mean Germany today in my opinion is ruling Europe.
DK: Yeah.
KF: By economic means. Whereas it tried to do it —
DK: Militarily.
KF: By military means.
DK: Yeah. So just going on then into March ’45. So you’d then got, I see the Dortmund Ems again. March the 3rd. Harburg on the 7th of March. And a place near Leipzig on the 20th of March. So, would that have been your last operation then?
KF: What was that one.
DK: Leipzig, Poland.
KF: No. That was —
DK: Bohlen.
KF: What date was that?
DK: March the 20th.
KF: No. Bohlen was the last one.
DK: Yeah. Bohlen. Yeah.
KF: Oh. Near Leipzig.
DK: Yeah.
KF: Bohlen. That was the last one.
DK: So your last operation then March the 20th.
KF: Yeah.
DK: Bohlen near Leipzig.
KF: That was their thirty fifth. My thirty sixth.
DK: Right. So that’s B O H L E N.
KF: That’s right.
DK: Yeah. So the war’s come to the end then and did, did you [pause] what happened to your crew then? Did they all split up?
KF: When we finished operations. The two gunners. Myself and my other mate we were sent back to Silverstone as instructors. What you [pause] if the war had lasted longer if you did thirty ops then you did six months rest. And at that six months you were sent to a training base to train up the crews coming up the line. And then you went back for another thirty. And then you could opt out altogether or volunteer for more.
DK: Yeah.
KF: But being, being the end of the war we were at Silverstone as instructors when VE day came up.
DK: Was there any plans that you might go out to the Pacific afterwards?
KF: We were then sent to Cranwell with a view to training for Tiger Force.
DK: Yeah.
KF: But fortunately while we were at Cranwell VJ day came up.
DK: Were the atomic bombs a bit of a relief?
KF: So, oh yeah. Funnily enough there was always a fear that dropping in, dropping over Europe if you were shot down.
DK: Yes.
KF: And you could get out if you could out. Dropping out over Germany and either trying to get back through the escape channels or getting captured didn’t bear the same risks or fears that if you dropped over Borneo.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And going, thinking of going out to Japan.
DK: Get caught by the Japanese.
KF: Or the Japanese theatre you kept thinking of the bloody jungles and dropping in the trees and God knows what, you know.
DK: So did you manage to keep in touch with your crew after the war?
KF: Sadly no. It’s always with hindsight.
DK: Yeah.
KF: I suppose some crews did keep in touch but life was so quick and so you moved so quickly that we, we dispersed.
DK: Right.
KF: And didn’t keep in touch. But years later I got in on my computer and I found what they were called in Australia the Odd Bods Organisation. Have you heard of it?
DK: No. I haven’t. No. No.
KF: The odd bods. There was a lot of Australian crews, members and they flew from RAF stations. Some of them went to an Australian, purely Australian squadron.
DK: Yeah.
KF: So when they went back to Australia after the war those who weren’t in the Australian squadron formed a group called the Odd Bods.
DK: Right. Right.
KF: They were the odd crew members —
DK: Yeah.
KF: In the British. And I got through to them and I found in their website a Roll of Honour and saw Flying Officer Allen.
DK: Oh right.
KF: Who had died. As a civilian of course.
DK: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.
KF: Years after this is. So I got in touch with the secretary on the computer and asked him if I could get in touch with his widow.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And I said I also knew Bill Eudey who was the wireless operator.
DK: Yeah. Yeah.
KF: So he said, ‘Oh, he’s also died.’ So he said, ‘Yes, I’ll get in touch with the widows to see whether they’re happy for you to communicate with you. And they came back and said yes.
DK: Oh good.
KF: So I got in touch with them both. One was on the computer.
DK: Yeah.
KF: One wasn’t.
DK: Yeah.
KF: The pilot’s wife wasn’t computer literate so I kept in touch with her by correspondence.
DK: Yeah.
KF: But sadly since she’s died.
DK: Right.
KF: The wireless operator’s widow I speak to every morning on, every Saturday morning on Skype.
DK: Oh excellent. That’s —
KF: We have a chat you know.
DK: Yeah. There’s some good aspects to new technology isn’t there?
KF: That’s right. Yeah. The flight engineer when you got to the OC, OC [pause] whatever. Conversion Unit.
DK: Yeah.
KF: That’s when you picked up the engineer.
DK: Right.
KF: So we picked up an engineer. A flight engineer from Manchester.
DK: At the Heavy Conversion Unit.
KF: At the Heavy Conversion Unit.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And he eventually moved to Australia.
DK: Right.
KF: So I tried to get in touch with him. But he had died.
DK: Right.
KF: And these are all about ten years ago.
DK: Yeah. Oh, that’s a shame.
KF: So I’ve got in touch with his widow. But then she’s since died. You know.
DK: Yeah.
KF: This is what time does. We all go off the end at the end.
DK: Eventually. So all these years later looking back at your time in RAF Bomber Command how do you feel about that period of your life now? Looking back on it.
KF: How do I feel?
DK: [unclear]
KF: I suppose really being one of the fifty percent that lived you know you feel relieved that you, as I said earlier none of us got wounded at all.
DK: Yeah.
KF: So we were lucky in that sense and to survive as well was also another bonus, you know. But you see people began to get this attitude of we were cruel. We were [pause] so they didn’t want to know you. They don’t say directly but there was that undercurrent.
DK: Yeah.
KF: That you did. I mean the RAF Bomber Command was the only arm of the services that fought throughout the whole of the war.
DK: Yeah.
KF: The Navy never went out of bay, err out of port unless they had to.
DK: Yeah.
KF: The Army got defeated at Dunkirk and had two years where they were completely reforming.
DK: Yeah.
KF: So the RAF Bomber Command were the only group that kept the war going.
DK: Yeah.
KF: When everybody else was marking time.
DK: Yeah. That’s very true. Ok. I’ve just got one final question. I know I asked you this before but for the recording could we, could we just go through the crew again. Is that alright?
KF: Sorry. There’s one.
DK: Have you got one with the names?
KF: I’ve got one with all the names on. Let me go upstairs again.
DK: Are you ok doing? Are you sure? Is that alright?
KF: I’m trying to think where I put it.
DK: It might still be on the table. Put that on there again. So left, so left to right that’s Charlie Clegg.
KF: Yeah.
DK: Terry.
KF: Terry.
DK: Fellowes.
KF: Fellowes.
DK: Then it’s the rigger there presumably.
KF: That’s right.
DK: Harry Reeves. The rigger.
KF: Yeah. Harry Reeves.
DK: Then Charlie Tudor, flight mechanic.
KF: That’s right.
DK: Then Sergeant Ken —
KF: Mepham.
DK: Mepham. That’s M E P H A M.
KF: That’s right.
DK: He was the flight engineer.
KF: Yeah.
DK: Then Jack Barton.
KF: Yeah.
DK: The second bomb aimer.
KF: That’s right.
DK: Yeah. Then Pilot Officer Bill —
KF: Eudey.
DK: Eudey.
KF: E U D E Y.
DK: E U D E Y. Then Corporal Scotty Scott.
KF: Yeah.
DK: Who was a fitter. Flight Sergeant Ken Fawcett.
KF: Yeah.
DK: Which is your good self.
KF: That’s right.
DK: You’re listed there as the mid-upper gunner. Yeah.
KF: That’s right. Well, the gunner. We used to do both.
DK: Yeah. And then Flight Sergeant Kirk Kent.
KF: That’s right.
DK: And then kneeling is —
KF: Flying Officer Allen.
DK: Flying Officer Ken Allen.
KF: Ken Allen.
DK: The pilot. So just going back to Kirk Kent did you ever find out anything more about him as his, when he was ill or —
KF: No. No. Things are [pause] wartime you didn’t take the same personal interest in, you simply they were there or they weren’t there.
DK: Yeah.
KF: Whilst he was in hospital we were flying operationally so we didn’t have time to bother.
DK: Right.
KF: How he was or who he was or where he was.
DK: Right. Ok. And —
KF: Movements were so fleeting.
DK: Yeah.
KF: You just came and went. People. You didn’t, you didn’t get —
DK: On that point, just one final thing as a crew did you all used to socialise outside?
KF: Oh yeah.
DK: What did you do then? Do you go to the pubs and —
KF: Yeah. You go down the pub together.
DK: Yeah.
KF: You wouldn’t necessarily all go together.
DK: No.
KF: At Balderton the air, the air [pause] the station.
DK: Yeah.
KF: The runways and all that were over the A1.
DK: Right.
KF: The living quarters were about a half a mile away down a country lane. What they used to do was to disperse everything so that if there was an attack on it everything wouldn’t go together.
DK: Yeah.
KF: So that if the living quarters was always away and the mess and everything else was away.
DK: Yeah.
KF: So you would get from the, you would simply walk or sometimes you could get a station bicycle.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And you’d cycle from one place to another. The living quarters were down a country lane which if you went down about a mile down the road was in to Balderton village.
DK: Right.
KF: Where the pub was.
DK: Right.
KF: And that was either you went to the mess or you went to the pub.
[recording paused]
DK: Well, thanks very much for that. That’s been absolutely marvellous. It’s been just over an hour.
KF: I don’t know whether it’s me or what but when I did the Duxford one they said it would only take about a quarter of an hour.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And when we ended up it was about an hour and a bit.
DK: An hour and a bit, yeah. Well, this one’s an hour and a bit so that sounds about right. Ok. Well, thanks very much for that. I’ll switch off now.
[recording paused]
KF: Flying fortresses were coming back from the daylight.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And the air was full of Maydays. They didn’t have separate navigators on every aircraft. They had a lead navigator and a back-up navigator and when they turned everybody turned.
DK: Yeah.
KF: But when they came back in dusk and it was getting dark they were panicking because they couldn’t, they didn’t have navigators to get them home.
DK: They hadn’t navigated in the dark.
KF: That’s right.
DK: What did you feel about the Americans then? Were you sort of in awe of them? Of what they were doing. Or think they were daft.
KF: Only in awe in the sense that going out one night when they were coming back they were flying a slightly, you could see them in the dark and dusk you know.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And there was holes, and the tails were flying off, wings were hanging off, engines were hanging off. And I mean they took an awful lot of hammering but that was partly their own fault because they simply wouldn’t. They didn’t. You see we were individual and we could fly. We could turn off target. Off course.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And get back on course because the navigator knew what he was doing.
DK: Yeah.
KF: But when they came off course very often they were isolated and they were picked off.
DK: Yeah. Yeah. So you preferred the way the British did it then. At, at night.
KF: And when you see most of the documentaries they were always showing daylight raids by American Fortresses.
DK: Yeah.
KF: As if the Bomber Command didn’t exist.
DK: Yeah.
KF: Because everything that the bombers, the did the Americans did was in daylight.
DK: And they could film it.
KF: So the cameras could film it.
DK: Yeah.
KF: But at night time there wasn’t a lot of material.
DK: No. Did you, did you ever meet any of the American aircrew at all?
KF: No. But mind you I will admit that when some of our aircrew parachuted over an American airfield or crash landed on an American airfield in an emergency —
DK: Yeah.
KF: They usually come back loaded with, they were taken to the PX store.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And they were give free hand to take what they wanted.
DK: Oh right.
KF: So the guys used to come back with a load of goodies that we’d never seen for years.
DK: They were very generous then, were they?
KF: Oh yeah. Yeah.
[recording paused]
KF: But they were funny because they couldn’t discern very often when an aircrew crashed anywhere near the American field. They were apprehended.
DK: Oh right.
KF: And treated as if they were Germans.
DK: Right.
KF: Because the Americans didn’t always recognise an RAF. They had to convince them. And then they would allow them to ring the squadron.
DK: Yeah.
KF: And call for the transport to come and bring them. Once they realised they were British then they treated them.
DK: Yeah.
KF: With generosity. But they very often used to because the German Air Force blue was similar to ours.
DK: Right. Right. So they had to be wary to start with.
KF: But the Americans were quite naive you know.
DK: Well, you’d think they wouldn’t make that mistake wouldn’t you?
Dublin Core
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Title
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Interview with Ken Fawcett
Creator
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David Kavanagh
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2017-09-26
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Type
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Sound
Identifier
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AFawcettK170926, PFawcettK1701
Format
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01:06:22 audio recording
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eng
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Civilian
Description
An account of the resource
Ken Fawcett worked for the Post Office and served in the Home Guard for two and a half years having signed up at sixteen. He joined the Royal Air Force at Lords Cricket Ground in September 1943. He initially requested pilot training but realising the duration of training Ken transferred to air gunner which enabled him to join a squadron much sooner. Ken trained at No1 Elementary Air Gunnery School at RAF Bridgenorth and No 12 Air Gunnery School at RAF Bishops Court in Northern Ireland. He recalled gun turret training in Anson aircraft using ammunition tipped with coloured paint so that his accuracy firing at towed target drogues could be assessed. Following gunnery training Ken transferred to No 17 Operational Training Unit at RAF Syerston flying Wellingtons, he recalled his first sight of a Wellington was a training flight stalling on takeoff and crashing with the loss of all crew members. No 1654 Heavy Conversion Unit at RAF Wigsley brought four engine training in Stirling and Lancaster aircraft in preparation to joining 619 Squadron in 5 Group. Ken’s Crew included: Pilot Ken Alan and Wireless Operator Bill Eudey from Australia, Bomb Aimers Kirk Kent and Jack Barton, Gunner Charlie Clegg, Flight Engineer Ken Mepham and Navigator Terry Fellows. On completion of nine operations with 619 Squadron at RAF Dunholme Lodge his crew were transferred to 227 Squadron at RAF Balderton, they completed both daylight and night operations and Ken recalled seeing capital ships shelling the French coast during the D Day invasion. He described a typical operation from pre-flight test to returning to base and how they would quiz the ground crew as to how much fuel was loaded, this gave an indication of the duration of the operation that evening before the official crew briefing. Ken gives a vivid insight into the role of the rear gunner as a lookout scanning the darkness for both friendly and enemy aircraft, trying to discern dark shadows against a dark sky or sparks from an aircraft’s exhaust. The danger from collisions or another aircraft dropping its bombs from above was ever present. Opening fire he described as a last resort given the range of the enemy fighter’s cannons were twice that of his .303 machine guns, so stealth he stated was the best policy. On completion of 36 operations Ken was transferred to No 17 Operational Training Unit at RAF Syerston as an instructor and then to RAF Cranwell in preparation to join Tiger Force in the Far East. VJ Day led to the cancellation of Tiger Force before he completed his training.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Jim Sheach
Julie Williams
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
Germany
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Shropshire
France--Le Havre
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Northern Ireland--Down (County)
Great Britain
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943-09
1944
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending revision of OH transcription
1654 HCU
17 OTU
227 Squadron
619 Squadron
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
bomb struck
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
civil defence
Cook’s tour
crash
ground personnel
Heavy Conversion Unit
Home Guard
Lancaster
military service conditions
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
RAF Balderton
RAF Bishops Court
RAF Bridgnorth
RAF Cranwell
RAF Dunholme Lodge
RAF Silverstone
RAF Syerston
RAF Wigsley
Stirling
take-off crash
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/286/17755/LKirbyH1637087v1.1.pdf
f5d1d4f26477231c35ba4d430b6f4fd0
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Kirby, Harold
Harold V A Kirby
H V A Kirby
Harold Kirby
H Kirby
Description
An account of the resource
Nine items. Two oral history interviews with Warrant Officer Harold Kirby (1923 - 2022, 1637087 Royal Air Force), his log book, photographs and documents. He flew operations as a flight engineer with 467, 97 and 156 Squadrons.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-07-10
2015-09-21
2016-06-11
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
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Kirby, H
Requires
A related resource that is required by the described resource to support its function, delivery, or coherence.
Warrant Officer Harold Kirby 1637087 was born in Kilbourne, Loncon in 1923, his job after leaving school was in the accounting department at London Electric Supplies. He initially tried to volunteer for the RAF but failed the medical, at that time. He was subsequently drafted in 1942. Skill training started with training as a Flight Mechanic, but during this was asked to volunteer to rain as a Flight Engineer. His first posting was as an Aircraft Fitter at No.460 Squadron, RAF Binbrook, although only for 6 months.
After Flight Engineer training at St Athan and then training on the Short Stirling and then the Lancaster with 1661 Heavy Conversion Unit at RAF Winthorpe, the first solo flight for the crew, the port landing gear would not lock, during the landing the gear collapsed, although there were no injuries.
First operational unit was No.467 Squadron at RAF Waddington a mainly Australian Squadron, the crew were here for July and August 1944, One operation 3/4th August 1944, to the V1 storage site at Trossy Saint Maximin had another bomber flying above their aircraft and dropping their bombs, one going through the wing, narrowly missing vital structures, this resulted in a gear up landing, due to hydraulic loss, but again there were no injuries resulting.
He was then posted along with the crew to No 97 Squadron, based at RAF Coningsby a pathfinder squadron, tasked to mark the targets for other aircraft,
In total two tours were completed before the end of the European war, after finishing as a Flight Engineer, Harold trained as a RADAR mechanic, before leaving the RAF.
Andy St.Denis
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Title
A name given to the resource
Harold Kirby’s flight engineers log book
Creator
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Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Format
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One colour photocopy of a booklet
Language
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eng
Identifier
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LKirbyH1637087v1
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1944-07
1944-08
1945
1944-07-12
1944-07-13
1944-07-17
1944-07-20
1944-07-21
1944-07-22
1944-07-23
1944-07-24
1944-07-25
1944-07-26
1944-07-27
1944-07-28
1944-07-29
1944-07-30
1944-08-01
1944-08-02
1944-08-03
1944-08-19
1944-08-24
1944-08-25
1944-08-26
1944-08-27
1944-08-29
1944-08-30
1944-08-31
1944-09-18
1944-09-19
1944-09-23
1944-09-24
1944-10-14
1944-10-15
1944-10-28
1944-10-29
1944-11-06
1944-11-07
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-11-23
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-04
1944-12-05
1944-12-06
1944-12-07
1944-12-09
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1944-12-19
1945-01-07
1945-01-08
1945-01-13
1945-01-14
1945-02-07
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-02-22
1945-03-03
1945-03-04
1945-03-05
1945-03-06
1945-03-07
1945-03-20
1945-03-21
1945-03-22
1945-04-08
1945-04-09
1945-04-16
1945-04-17
1945-04-18
1945-04-19
1945-04-25
1945-04-26
Contributor
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Mike Connock
Type
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Text
Text. Log book and record book
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Great Britain
Norway
Poland
Russia (Federation)
Belgium--Kortrijk
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Czech Republic--Chomutov
Czech Republic--Plzeň
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
France--Caen
France--Calmont
France--Creil Region
France--Givors
France--Hesdin
France--La Pallice
France--Lens
France--L'Isle-Adam
France--Villers-Bocage (Calvados)
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Giessen (Hesse)
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Leipzig Region
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Munich
Germany--Sassnitz
Germany--Stuttgart
Norway--Bergen
Norway--Tønsberg
Norway--Trondheim
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Russia (Federation)--Kaliningrad (Kaliningradskai︠a︡ oblastʹ)
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Description
An account of the resource
Flight engineers log book (Copy) for H Kirby covering the period from 26 April 1944 to 24 May 1945. Detailing his flying training and operations flown. He was stationed at RAF Winthorpe, RAF Syerston, RAF Waddington and RAF Coningsby. Aircraft flown in were Stirling and Lancaster. He flew a total of 44 operations. 6 daylight and 10 night operations with 467 squadron and 28 night operations with 97 squadron pathfinder force. Targets were Culmont Chalindrey, Caen, Courtrai, Kiel, Stuttgart, Givors, Cahagny, Siracourt, Cassan, Trossy St Maxim, La Pallice, Darmstadt, Konigsberg, Rollencourt, Mönchengladbach, Munster, Brunswick, Bergen, Dortmund-Ems Canal, Trondheim, Munich, Heilbronn, Giessen, Gdynia, Politz, Ladbergen, Dresden, Gravenhorst, Bohlen, Sassnitz, Hamburg, Lutzkendorf, Pilsen, Komatau and Tonsberg. His pilot on operations was Flying Officer Ryan.
1661 HCU
467 Squadron
8 Group
97 Squadron
aircrew
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
Bombing of Trossy St Maximin (3 August 1944)
crash
flight engineer
forced landing
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Lancaster Mk 3
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Pathfinders
pilot
RAF Coningsby
RAF Syerston
RAF Waddington
RAF Winthorpe
Stirling
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
V GROUP NEWS V
AUGUST 1944 * [deleted] SECRET [/deleted] * NO * 25
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
In August the Group set up several new records for operations and training, and Squadrons got more hours flying out of their aircraft than ever before. Top of the list is No. 61 Squadron with a total of 105 hours per aircraft on charge, and close behind are Nos. 50 and 44 Squadrons with 103 and 101 hours respectively. These are splendid figures which reflect great credit on the maintenance staffs. The total flying for the month was 34,000 hours with 3,600 operational sorties.
A high proportion of the attacks was directed against naval targets, more especially the six ships in Brest Harbour, including the battleship Clemenceau and the cruiser Gueydon, all of which were sunk, thus preventing the enemy from carrying out his intention of blocking the harbour.
Two highly successful mining attacks were also undertaken against the ship canals at Stettin and Konigsberg. At Stettin a dredged channel crosses a six mile wide lake between the coast and the docks, and it was decided that a complete hold up of enemy shipping could best be caused by laying a considerable number of mines in this Channel. The sides of the channel were marked at the two ends and in the middle by small towers intended for lights, and between these by a double row of buoys. For the attack the area was first lit with flares and in their light, three marker aircraft laid flame floats down two sides of the canal, using the buoys as their guide, so that the aircraft carrying the mines had a well marked line in which to put them. The marking was magnificently undertaken in the face of considerable searchlight and light flak opposition and the whole operation proved an outstanding success. The average height of laying was 300 feet. The operations against the Konigsberg canal a few nights later was on a smaller scale, but two aircraft succeeded in placing all their mines in the channel again from a very low height and in the light of flares. It was after these two attacks that all Swedish shipping was withdrawn from Baltic trade.
During the month valuable support was also given to the Army in the Falaise area, and many sorties were directed against the flying bomb sites. This commitment has now happily come to an end with the capture of the flying bomb country, but the following message from the Air Ministry to Bomber Command will show the considerable part which the Command played in reducing the scale of this menace.
“The continuous and heavy bombing of the experimental stations, production plants, launching sites, storage depots and installations, which has been carried out by your Command, not only imposed on the enemy a prolonged and unwelcome delay in the launching of his campaign, but effectively limited the scale of effort which he was able to make. This notable achievement has added one more to the long list of successful operations carried out by Bomber Command.”
The month ended with two attacks by the Group on Konigsberg, capital city of East Prussia. The first attack had all the elements necessary for a decisive success but the misunderstanding by a few crews of their briefed instructions, led to the attack, which was the most concentrated ever undertaken by the Group, being centred 2000 yards from the aiming point and doing relatively little damage. As a result a further attack had to be carried out in much less favourable weather. Happily this attack was successful and resulted in the almost complete destruction of the chief port supplying the German armies in East Prussia.
The success which has, in general, attended the attacks delivered by the Group over the past six months has been largely due to the system of low level marking by Mosquito aircraft which was first tried out by Wing Commander Cheshire with No. 617 Squadron. I am sure that all in the Group will join me in congratulating him on the award of the Victoria Cross in recognition of his great gallantry over 4 years of War and 100 operational sorties.
[Page break]
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoon]
[Underlined] CRICKET [/underlined]
The end of the season weather proved most unkind, and most teams found their last month’s activities very limited. Scampton completed three games, beating Rustons and A.A. Command but losing to R.A.F. Cranwell. Dunholme lost to Ruston Bucyrus away, beat Hartsholme away, and the local Cadets at home. Metheringham managed to complete only one inter-station game, and then operations caused them to field a weak side and they were well beaten by R.C.A.F. Digby. Metheringham have now completed eleven games in the season, won five, lost five and drawn one. The outstanding teams of the season were Woodhall and Syerston, both of whom were blessed with “stars”. It was fitting for them to meet in the final of the Group Trophy, and although Syerston were unlucky in having lost S/Ldr MacKenzie, Woodhall put up a splendid effort to add the cricket Trophy to 54 Base collection.
[Underlined] SWIMMING [/underlined]
Coningsby Squadrons took advantage of the last day of summer, and held the Inter-Squadron Swimming Trophy in the Open Air Pool at Woodhall Spa in the 13th August. Events were held in Free Style, Breast and Back Stroke over the usual distances, together with plunging and diving. No.83 Squadron emerged as winners, with 26 points, the next best being Metheringham with 22.
[Underlined] BADMINTON [/underlined]
Several Stations find the Badminton Court in great demand. Dunholme have just concluded a Doubles Tournament in which Cpls Pigott and Hurst beat ACs King and Wright by 21 – 19, 18 – 21, 21 – 17. Scampton have a Badminton Club. Here is a big field for inter-station friendlies, and it is hoped Stations will not miss the opportunity of taking Badminton teams to play away matches during the coming winter. Inter-station games do much to improve the standard of play, by giving players an opportunity of comparing themselves with entirely new opposition. Mixed Doubles is a successful Badminton event, giving the W.A.A.F. another opportunity of a vigorous winter sport. A combined Badminton cum Darts cum Billiards Inter-station tourney cannot fail to be successful.
[Underlined] WINTER SPORTS [/underlined]
On September 4th a Conference of Group P.F.O’s met at this Headquarters to discuss the winter programme. The starting dates for the three knock-outs were agreed as follows:-
MATZ CUP (SOCCER) – Early November
WINES TROPHY (RUGGER) – Early December
MIXED HOCKEY – Mid October.
In the near future invitation letters for the above tournaments will be issued, and a busy season is anticipated. It is hoped that as many Stations as possible will support the Mixed Hockey Trophy; mixed hockey is an enjoyable sport and provides, together with Netball, an excellent opportunity for the W.A.A.F.
[Underlined] VARIETIES [/underlined]
Winthorpe sport an enthusiastic W.A.A.F. Soccer Eleven. Any other Station that can produce eleven Amazons is invited to roll up and meet the Winthorpians in battle.
[Underlined] TRAVELLING [/underlined]
It is hoped to obtain an early decision from Command on the 5 Group suggestion that the limit for which a station can provide sports transport be increased from 5 to 20 miles (single journey). This measure will give an immediate fillip to all inter-station sport and alleviate the task of P.F.O’s in endeavouring to get variety into the programmes.
ENGINEERING
Another record number of sorties has been carried out, which entailed in turn a record number of flying hours.
The flying hours for aircraft on charge in the Squadrons has exceeded anything which has yet been achieved, and is proof of what can be done by good technical organisation and co-operation and the will to keep aircraft serviceable on the part of Officers, N.C.O’s and men.
It has been rumoured that the establishment of tradesmen was based on the assumption that a Lancaster should produce 40 hours flying a month. The hours actually flown per Lancaster on charge has varied between 80 hours and 105 hours in Squadrons for August. This means of course that the Maintenance Personnel have worked twice as hard as the Establishment Committee calculated they would. Many problems present themselves as a result of this high pressure flying, but one point is predominant: the flying has been done, and at the month end serviceability was still 90% of the U.E. aircraft.
Quite a number of aircraft are still operating although their flying hours are in excess of 1,000. The condition and work required on the 3rd major should be watched, and full advantage must be taken of 43 Group facilities for those aircraft which will require too many man hours to overhaul locally.
The increased periodicity between inspections has been approved at 75 hours for Minor and 600 hours for Major Inspection for Lancaster aircraft. This amendment will be issued within the next few days by Bomber Command.
Of the 3,600 sorties detailed 1.66% were unsuccessful due to engineering faults. This constitutes a slight increase over the July total.
No Squadron was entirely free from unsuccessful sorties, and No.52 Base are to be congratulated on having the lowest percentage.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of Aircraft Serviceability by Training Unit]
WAR EFFORT
[Table of Aircraft Serviceability and Sorties, including Star Awards by Squadron]
Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “Successful sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties Nos. 9, 49, 83, 97, 617, and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another Squadron the [missing] is divided between the two Squadrons.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO. 25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 2
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
Compared with July, this month’s total of combats shows a big reduction. There have been a total of 70 combats for day and night operations; the claims being:-
7 destroyed
- probably destroyed, and
4 damaged.
During the daylight operation on Bois de Cassan on 6th August, 13 combats were reported, 2 enemy aircraft being claimed destroyed and 3 enemy aircraft damaged. In this operation the enemy fighters exploited the old tactics of attacking out of the sun, and all gunners should take note of this and ensure that in future daylight operations they are equipped with anti-glare glasses. In one instance a Lancaster was attacked from below and seriously damaged, two members of the crew being killed and another seriously wounded. The first intimation of the attack was when hits were registered on the Lancaster, the first burst from the enemy aircraft neutralising both rear turrets. Search must be carried out assiduously to cover all sections of the sky, above and below, by day as well as by night.
As a trial, tracer has been removed from the first 300 rounds in each belt, and gunners’ views are required after having used this sequence in combat, as to whether sighting is easier without the trace or vice versa. Gunners must appreciate that success, the destruction of the enemy fighter, will only be achieved by the correct application of the sight.
[Underlined] NIGHT AFFILIATION WITH HURRICANES [/underlined]
Night affiliation with Hurricanes of 1690 B.D.T. Flight has been available to Squadrons since the beginning of August. Full information and details have been sent out to Bases and Units under reference 293/Trg. dated 3rd August, 1944, and it is encouraging to note that some Squadrons have already availed themselves of these facilities. In view of the advent of longer hours of darkness which means operations of longer duration, it is most essential that gunners’ night vision and practical experience of night interception be brought to the highest standard of proficiency by constant practice. From results of recent exercises, the fighter has not been observed until a range of 150 – 200 yards. The remedies lie in the more skilful use of Early Warning Devices and better night vision.
[Underlined] ODD JOTTINGS [/underlined]
A 400 yards range will shortly be available to the Group and Dunham Cliff. Instructions will be issued shortly. It is hoped that another 400 yards range will be sited at Wainfleet which will be more accessible to those Stations in the Eastern half of the Group.
An Air Staff Instruction has been issued for Skeet Range Shooting. This is to be adhered to closely to obtain the maximum benefit from this form of training.
Details have now been issued regarding Night Vision Training Exercises in blacked-out gymnasiums. The maximum use should be made of this training which will combine fitness with night vision training.
THIS MONTH’S BAG
[Drawings]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
Sqdn A/C Letter Date Type of E/A
44 “A” 6.8.44. FW. 190
630 “L” 12/13.8.44. JU. 88
50 “L” 16/17.8.44. ME. 410
44 “F” 25/26.8.44. ME. 410
106 “B” 25/26.8.44. JU. 88
207 “K” 25/26.8.44. ME. 110
619 “G” 29/30.8.44. ME. 109
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
Sqdn A/C Letter Date Type of E/A
57 “U” 6.8.44. ME. 109F
57 “B” 6.8.44. ME. 109F
57 “D” 6.8.44. ME. 107F
9 “B” 12.8.44. JU. 88
All the above claims have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
[Underlined] AIR TRAINING CARRIED OUT IN CONVERSION UNITS AND SQUADRONS DURING AUGUST. [/underlined]
[Table of Training Exercises by Squadron and Conversion Units]
X 49 Squadron employed on special training.
GRAND TOTAL OF FIGHTER AFFILIATION EXERCISES FOR AUGUST:- 2136
[Underlined] No. 1690 B.D.T. FLIGHT [/underlined] Grand total 760 hours and 712 details.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 3
[Page break]
TRAINING
During August 51 Base produced 151 crews and topped the previous month’s record by one crew. This was achieved despite several days unseasonable weather. The Base is confident that it can improve on this total for September. No. 5 L.F.S. continued to take Lancaster Conversion in its stride and completed its third month with over 2,000 hours flying.
Final training in Squadrons was abreast of the time throughout, and the Base Training Pilots and Flight Engineers did a good job in getting the crews fit for operations without any hold up despite the increased number of crews passing through their hands. 10 and 20 sortie checks were also carried out. Gunnery categorisation is now forging ahead, and towards the end of the month categorisation of Navigators was introduced. This will be followed shortly by categorisation of pilots and Flight Engineers.
The detached elements of 1690 B.D.T. Flight, comprising Martinets and Spitfires, were withdrawn from 51 Base airfields and centralised with the Hurricanes at Syerston. This did not interfere with fighter affiliation training and 1690 B.D.T. Flight as a single Unit are now providing both day and night affiliation for the Group from one Station, and in addition are affiliating with No.49 Squadron for special training. The number of details flown and gunners exercised are dealt with elsewhere in the News.
The formation of 1668 Lancaster Conversion Unit and 1669 Halifax Conversion Unit also took place during the month, and 5 Group is responsible for the training up to the present.
No.1668 Conversion Unit is due to open on the 1st September, and 1669 later in the month.
EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] ECONOMY IN THE USE OF EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
The war has now entered its sixth year and although things are going better for us, Equipment Officers should still strive after perfection in economy of equipment. This is an old and well known subject, but owing to its importance, it cannot be rammed home often enough.
Only by frequent review of establishments can correct provisioning be maintained. If provisioning is good, then the Station will not want and Station Sections will cease to hoard.
Therefore, all Equipment Officers can, by good provisioning, plus foresight, and good liaison with the other Sections on the Station, make every item of equipment do its correct job and prevent waste.
[Underlined] A.M.O’s OF INTEREST [/underlined]
A.738/44 (Parts III, IV and V) Civilian Repair Organisation – Repair of R.A.F. Equipment.
A.759/44 Contract Washing, Procedure for. Articles of Service clothing and equipment in the U.K.
A.774/44 Introduction of new small F.600.
A.775/44 Preparation of Carriers’ Notes.
A.806/44 Removal of components from aircraft in Category AC.
N.828/44 Revision of Scale of Watch, Clock and Instrument repair tools.
N.846/44 Revised scale of issue of Testers Insulation resistance, types A, B, C and D.
N.873/44 Introduction of Lubricator sets for Type B Mechanical Sweeper.
PHOTOGRAPHY
Condensation has again been the cause of a number of failures, and it is now considered that the majority of instances are the result of conditions at Base rather than conditions at or en route to the target. Experiments are being conducted to determine whether it is practicable to remove the register glass in the camera. So far success has attended our efforts and results are being watched carefully. If this can be done, then one of the surfaces on which condensation can form will have been eliminated.
Composite film join failures are still occurring and it has been decided to use French chalk on the linen side of the tape in order to prevent this sticking to the register glass of the camera. Photographic N.C.O’s are to select the tape used for this purpose with great care, as the quality of different rolls varies considerably.
The titling of photographs often leaves much to be desired. Operational air photographs without adequate and readable titling are useless. N.C.O’s are therefore to watch this point carefully. The printing of films could be much improved in many cases. Whilst speed is essential in the production of results, do not let the result be marred by bad workmanship. A green, badly titled print is an offence to the photographer’s eye.
The use of Standard Day Panchromatic Film on Day Operations should make for better quality results with much finer grain, but will, however, necessitate more frequent magazine loading in the changes from Day to Night Operations. Very great care must be exercised in handling the film during these changes.
Standard Day Film is to be used whenever possible for day operations.
ANALYSIS OF PHOTOGRAPHY
[Table of Photographic Results by Squadron]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 4
[Page break]
GARDENING
Business has been brisk this month In all departments of the offensive, but the Gardeners have certainly had their share of the task, and excellent results have been achieved, in High and Low Planting. The Command Gardening, totalling 1587 vegetables has been divided as follows:-
(a) A constant stream of planters directed at the U-Boat Bases on the West Coast of France.
(b) Large scale operations in the Baltic area with the object of dislocating the enemy’s sea-borne supplies for the Russian Front, and of severing all trade with Scandinavia.
[Underlined] The U-Boat Offensive. [/underlined] 5 Group, represented by 44, 97, 619 and 57 Squadrons carried out 6 operations in these areas, laying accurately by H.2.S. with slight to moderate interference from Flak.
[Underlined] Results. [/underlined] At the time of going to press, it is believed that all West Coast bases have been closed to U-Boat traffic for some time. This is more than embarrassing to a frantic enemy endeavouring to check our advances. The U-boat command must now be at pains to form any systematic plan of control for their U-boats already on patrol in the Atlantic. Individual Commanders are certain to be confused, dissatisfied and hampered by the continuous stream of contradictory instructions issuing from their superiors, on the best methods and routes for their return. Offensive patrols – already minimised to a large extent – will now have to be reduced to even shorter periods through lack of fuel, food and water; in short, lack to the North Sea Bases they will have to go, and the days of the U-boats are numbered. In co-operation with out Gardening efforts in this sector, the most striking results have been achieved by the brilliant bombing of 617 and 9 Squadrons on the Pens and Berths in these Bases. Naval Patrols have also been most successful along this stretch of water, and the future reading in Weekly Intelligence Reports should contain some interesting home truths of our enemy’s state of mind.
[Underlined] The Baltic Offensive. [/underlined] Among the many and varied targets on hand during this past month, not the least were our long and hazardous trips far into the Baltic. The nature of these operations involved dangerous low flying through heavy and light flak, concentrations of searchlights, and surprise flak ships placed in the most awkward positions. On the 16/17th August, the first strike at Stettin took place, and a special Gardening operation was co-ordinated in the main attack. 23 Lancasters were detailed from 44, 106, 57 and 97 Squadrons to pounce on the Kaiser Fahrt Channel, 97 Squadron performing marking duties ad carrying two choice vegetables apiece.
Little was known of the garden to be attacked, the only guide being the Light houses positioned in pairs, every 3 1/2 miles along the channel 157 yards wide, by about 10 miles in length. Careful timing, concise intercommunication, and cool heads were the Orders of the Day. When the force arrived the Light houses were lit, and remained so for sufficient time to reveal the line of the channel. Down went 97 Squadron to mark at mast head height with lines of flame floats. The Controller was first to mark, and laid most accurately, which was quickly confirmed by his Deputy flying between the Lighthouses at the time. The Gardeners were then called in to lay at 200 feet, meanwhile the main bomber force went for the town of Stettin, and other Groups were planting furiously to seaward. Two Gardeners were unfortunately shot down in the area – including the controller after performing an excellent task – two more were forced to jettison through flak damage, three were forced to jettison and return early with engine trouble, and two were unhappily non-starters. Out of 81 vegetables carried, 61 were successfully planted. It is estimated that a very high percentage of these now lie gracefully in the narrow waterway, including two discreetly dropped 3 1/2 miles inside the canal itself by Z/106 Squadron – a very fine piece of work. It can therefore, be said that this enterprising evolution was carried out with highly commendable skill and determination on the part of all crews in the face of intense opposition, and their combined team-work has added a further page in the history, already outstanding, of the Group’s Gardening efforts.
On the 26/27th, a similar operation took place, but this time in the Konigsberg area. Extensive planting took place to seaward in the approaches to important Baltic harbours, in which 44, 106 and 630 Squadrons took part, while four selected crews from 44, 57, 106 and 207 Squadrons made for the Konigsberg inland canal.
Illumination was provided by the main force as they retired from their target area, enabling the Gardeners clearly to identify their target. Unfortunately two aircraft were seen to be hit by flak and did not return, but R/106 and E/207 pressed home their attack with great zeal, and skilfully planted 10 of the best in the waterway. A fine example of courage and airmanship.
The main force returned to this target again on 29/30th and this time opportunity was seized to back up the previous lays in the outer gardens. 10 Lancasters representing 44, 49, 106 and 630 Squadrons completed a 100% planting of forty Mark IV vegetables with little opposition using H 2 S from high altitude. Very good records have already been received from P.P.I. photographs.
[Underlined] All is not well in the Baltic [/underlined] – The Swedish Home Service stated on the 22nd August that the State War Insurance Board had decided to stop granting war risk insurance to German Baltic Harbours for the time being, on account of the prevailing conditions.
The following tribute to the efficiency of British mining operations was paid by Rear Admiral Gadow, the Naval correspondent of the Deutsche Alhgemeine Zeitung. He wrote that the mining of the shipping routes of the North Sea had reached such a pitch of intensity that it was putting the heaviest strain on the German minesweeping flotillas.
[Underlined] General Summary [/underlined]
Sorties – 65
Successful – 53
% Successful – 81 1/2
Aircraft Missing – 4
Nights operated – 8
Mileage Flown – 96,312
Total Planted successfully – [underlined] 260 [/underlined]
[Underlined] NAVAL SUPPORT [/underlined]
In close connection with the general plan of denying the U-Boat Bases to the enemy is also the all important object of preventing the enemy from totally destroying or blocking these bases before they can be used by the Allies. With such enormous forces having to be maintained in Europe it is essential that we should have every available harbour working at full pressure for the off loading of stores and equipment from suitable big ship berths, rail and roadway centres. The enemy has been quick to realise this point, and has taken every step to bring about total destruction where he can, by the use of expert demolition squads, and the subsidiary use of Block ships in harbours.
Immediate steps were necessary, and taken, in the case of Brest, by allocating Block ship targets to 5 Group Squadrons. Great care and attention to detail wrought havoc to the enemy’s intentions, as one by one, the ships at anchor in the harbour were singled out for devastating attack, and successfully sent to the bottom by pin point bombing. The 11,000 ton tanker capable of completely filling the main entrance was the first to ‘settle’ safely in her berth, quickly followed by the aged French Cruiser “Gueydon”, a Sperbrecher berthed alongside the quay, and the half completed battleship “Clemenceau”. This stripped the saboteurs of any immediate facilities, but as they had previously disclosed their intentions by sinking one tanker and two small coasters near the entrance, the job was completed by satisfactorily destroying one large Merchant Ship and a large Sperbrecher undergoing repairs in the dry docks.
Such accuracy in bombing ships, for the sorties carried out, has seldom been reached before; the Squadrons involved are to be congratulated on their work, and helping hand given to the Royal Navy, which will greatly assist the common task of feeding our armies in the future.
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Approximate savings in pence per head.
(b) Approximate percentage of personnel saving.
(c) Total savings for the month.
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTAL SAVED [underlined] £6,625.15.5. [/underlined]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 5
[Page break]
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
Longer nights and longer sorties make accurate flying more important than ever. Here are three occasions when accurate flying is essential if you are to keep “ON TRACK AND ON TIME”.
(i) On the short leg out of the target. An incorrect airspeed can make you overshoot and put you several miles off track.
(ii) During the banking search. If poorly flown, or done more to one side than another, you will also wander off track.
(iii) During the corkscrew. If carelessly executed you might get on a reciprocal. It’s been done before.
[Underlined] FLYING INTO CLOUD [/underlined]
It takes all pilots 5 to 10 seconds to “settle down” on instruments after changing over from visual flying. Always go over the instruments well BEFORE entering cloud, and avoid adding that unsettled feeling to other difficulties that you may encounter. Check pitot head “ON”, Suction on both pesco pumps, all instruments O.K., and note outside air temperatures.
[Underlined] NOTES ON PURE FLYING [/underlined]
(i) Look round before starting a turn.
(ii) In turns, correct slip or skid with rudder and keep the nose in the correct position on the horizon with the elevators, not rudder.
(iii) Aileron drag produces yaw, and it is most notable when a large amount of aileron is applied. The solution is in the rudder. Use it.
[Underlined] USE OF BOMB DOOR SELECTOR LEVER [/underlined]
If the bomb door selector lever is half-up or half-down, you will get a runaway film on the camera. So make sure the lever comes right down when selecting bomb doors OPEN. Avoid selecting bomb doors open until on the bombing run, as each time they are selected open an exposure is turned over in the camera. If you have to test the bomb doors ensure that the bombsight is switched off first.
[Underlined] FIRE IN THE AIR – DON’T DIVE [/underlined]
Diving an aircraft in an attempt to put out a fire is forbidden. It invariably leads to disaster because:-
(i) The increased air flow in a dive feeds and spreads the fire.
(ii) The risk of structural failure, if the airframe is weakened by fire, is increased.
(iii) Baling out is difficult, and in a violent dive almost impossible.
[Underlined] CREW AIRMANSHIP [/underlined]
Most new captains have at least 2 – 300 hours flying experience. The crews may not have more than 100 hours. Take practical steps to ensure your crew’s airmanship is as good as your own. Remember the old adage “A chain is as strong as its weakest link”.
(Continued at foot of col. 2)
[Underlined] OVERSHOOTING [/underlined]
The length of landing run depends on many variables, including airspeed at touchdown, strength of wind, all up weight, amount of flap used and strength of brakes. The bar of white lights 800 yds from the upwind end of the runway, therefore, can only be used as a measure of distance and not as a safety limit before landing.
[Underlined] Motto for the Month:- [/underlined]
“IF IN DOUBT – GO ROUND AGAIN”
HONOURS & AWARDS [Drawing]
The following IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/Ldr F.W. THOMPSON, D.F.C. D.S.O.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/Lt B.H. BOTHA, D.F.C. D.S.O.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O W.H. GOLDING D.F.C.
W/Cdr H.Y. HUMPHREYS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/Ldr L.C. DEANE, D.F.C. D.S.O.
A/W/C G.F. GEORGESON, D.F.C. D.S.O.
W/Cdr J.R. JEUDWINE, O.B.E., D.F.C. D.S.O.
A/W/C J. WOODROFFE. D.F.C.
P/O R.R. ORMISTON D.F.C.
F/O N.O. JOHNSON D.F.C.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.L. ETHERIDGE D.F.C.
F/S D. BRYDEN D.F.M.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
Sgt R.O. NORFOLK D.F.M.
[Underlined} 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L B.W. CLAYTON, D.F.C. C.G.M. D.S.O.
A/S/L D.J. SHANNON, D.S.O. D.F.C. &BAR BAR TO D.S.O.
W/Cdr J.B. TAIT, D.S.O., & BAR, D.F.C. 2ND BAR TO D.S.O.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/W/C W.A. DEAS, D.F.C. & BAR D.S.O.
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O H.F. ROBINSON D.F.C.
F/Sgt J. MICHAEL D.F.M.
F/Sgt C.R. BOLT D.F.M.
P/O A.W.M. BIRCHENOUGH D.F.C.
F/Sgt BOWER D.F.M.
Sgt H.O. SMITH D.F.M.
F/Sgt W.E. MILLER D.F.M.
F/Sgt. C.E. BOWYER D.F.M.
P/O F.S. COLMAN D.F.C.
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O O.J. REYLAND D.F.C.
Sgt J.B. COWAN D.F.M.
P/O J. WOULD D.F.C.
Sgt K. WOOLARD D.F.M.
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON (CONTD) [/underlined]
P/O R.L. DAVISON D.F.C.
Sgt R. WOODWARDS D.F.M.
F/Sgt D.M. MURRAY D.F.M.
P/O V.G. WILLIAMS D.F.C.
Sgt E.C. WREN D.F.M.
Sgt H.L. ROBERTS D.F.M.
Sgt J.H. DAVIDSON D.F.M.
F/Sgt K.F. LETTS D.F.M.
Sgt J. MICHIE D.F.M.
Sgt W.H.R. CHAMPION D.F.M.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J.J. LETT D.F.C.
P/O J.C. MC.KAY D.F.C.
Sgt G.J.W. PARKINSON D.F.M.
P/O J.A. JONES D.F.C.
F/O J.H. SIMPSON D.F.C.
P/O R.H. EWENS D.F.C.
F/O K.S. STOKOE D.F.C.
F/Sgt J.R. PEAKER D.F.M.
F/O L.P. MAPP D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O L. CREED D.F.C.
F/Sgt S. BROWN D.F.M.
F/Lt F.W. CHADWICK D.F.C.
F/Lt A. HAWORTH D.F.C.
P/O J. WATT D.F.C.
F/O W.F. SWINYARD D.F.C.
F/Sgt F.E. BURTON D.F.M.
F/O A.H. CRAWFORD D.F.C.
Sgt D. GROSCOP D.F.M.
P/O D.S. RICHARDSON D.F.C.
F/O H.A. HUGHES D.F.C.
F/O A.R. VERRIER D.F.C.
F/Sgt L.C. HOGBEN D.F.M.
Sgt C.A. HORN D.F.M.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/Sgt K. VOWE D.F.M.
W/O J. GRAHAM D.F.C.
P/O A.E. STONE D.F.C.
Sgt S. BILLINGTON D.F.M.
P/O R.A. GRIFFIN D.F.C.
F/O S.A. JENNINGS D.F.C.
P/O C.W.J. FRANKLIN D.F.C.
F/O J.C. HODGKINS D.F.C.
Sgt W. DACRE D.F.M.
F/Sgt O.H. MILLAR D.F.M.
A/F/O J.E. GIBBERD D.F.C.
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.A.C. HELLIER, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
W/O C.W. GRAY, D.F.M. D.F.C.
P/O M.A. ROONEY D.F.C.
P/O C.E. HAYNES D.F.C.
P/O C.E. ERICKSON D.F.C.
P/O F.A. MARDEN D.F.C.
P/O C.W. EARNSHAW D.F.C.
F/O R.E.H. FOOTE D.F.C.
F/O W.E. SIDDLE D.F.C.
P/O N.J. CORNELL D.F.C.
F/O C. BRUDETT D.F.C.
F/O R.E. FOSTER D.F.C.
W/O J.C. PARKER D.F.C.
W/O A.C. STRICKLAND D.F.C.
W/O E. PLUNKETT D.F.C.
F/O H.A. DICKINSON D.F.C.
F/O C.J. PURSEY D.F.C.
F/Sgt C. CASSIE D.F.M.
F/Sgt D.A. LAWES D.F.M.
F/Sgt M.J. BLOWER D.F.M.
Sgt F. WILDMAN D.F.M.
Sgt A.N. JONES D.F.M.
F/Sgt F. JOHNSON [sic]
P/O C.J. DUGGIN D.F.C.
(Contd. On Page 17 Col 2)
5 GROUP NEWS, NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 6
[Page break]
SIGNALS
[Underlined] SIGNALS TRAINING [/underlined]
The month of August saw the start of controlled daylight formation flying, and again the Wireless Operator (Air) came in for a fair share of the work. The Master Bomber and Base Leader’s Wireless Operator had the task of transmitting instructions to the force, and reception of their transmission was very good.
From the W/T point of view, the control of operations during August was very good. The standard of operating by Controller’s Wireless Operators was good throughout, and the work of these operators is appreciated. It was unfortunate that, on the night on which both Link 1 and Link 2 failed to reach the target area, the primary W/T frequency was heavily jammed. We are now all well aware of the tremendous effect of “Jostle” – it really does amount to complete wipe out over a large band.
The initiative shown by the Link 3 Wireless Operator in taking over control, assessing the impracticability of the primary frequency for W/T control, issuing instructions to change to the alternative, and using this channel for W/T control, was very commendable. Also, in this respect, our congratulations go to the 97 Squadron Wireless Operator who, although not detailed as a deputy link, assumed the duties of one, and acknowledged all instructions sent by the Link3. A very good show by both Wireless Operators (Air).
[Underlined] CONTROLLERS’ OPERATORS [/underlined]
No. 54 Base again led the field in the number of Wireless Operators who carried out successful tests as laid down in No. 5 Group Signals Instruction No.13. No.55 Base have now taken up the challenge, and very soon we hope to see a healthy competition between all Bases in carrying out these tests.
[Underlined] GROUP W/T EXERCISE [/underlined]
Daylight operations during the month interfered a little with the Group W/T Exercise though some Squadrons made a good attempt to carry out every exercise. This is, perhaps, the best W/T Operating practice afforded to Wireless Operators while on the Squadrons, and every effort must be made to ensure that every Wireless Operator does take part. Some good exercises were carried out, but we still have a few offenders who will not listen out before transmitting; some still send VE before callsigns, and the proper use of QVU is not made. Signals Leaders please note.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The use of Early Warning Devices during the month was curtailed quite a bit by daylight operations, but, when required on night operations, they again proved their worth, judging by the number of contacts reported. Now that Squadron Signals Leaders are being given a three days course at the Bomber Command Tactics School, some very valuable information on the tactical use of Early Warning Devices and Radio Countermeasures should be gained, and passed on to the Squadrons, thus showing W/Op (Air) the value of his efforts.
[Underlined] GOOD SHOWS [/underlined]
An outstanding example and inspiration to all Wireless Operators (Air) was given by F/Lt Bean, Station Signals Officer, Coningsby, on the night of 16/17th August. The Controller detailed for the operation that night was without a complete crew, and F/Lt Bean, who had been primarily responsible for the high standard of W/T operating carried out by the Controllers’ Wireless Operators on 54 Base, and who had himself passed the test laid down in 5 Group S.I. No. 13, was detailed to carry out the duties of Controller’s Wireless Operator (Air).
Whilst over the target, the aircraft was hit and set on fire. F/Lt Bean, who was already transmitting his Captain’s instructions for the attack, sent out in plain language to the force the message “Hit and on fire”. Immediately after this transmission, he transmitted further instructions to the force to carry on the attack.
F/Lt Bean set a very fine example of coolness and devotion to duty, and it is hoped that he and all members of his crew were able to make a safe landing.
Further good shows were the commendable efforts of the two 97 Squadron Wireless Operators already mentioned, and a Wireless Operator of 44 Squadron, who, while sending an immediate sighting report of a dinghy, switched his I.F.F. to distress while over the dinghy, informed the M/F section of his action, and when leaving the area again informed the M/F Section of time of switching off. This action enabled a good fix to be taken on his aircraft. It is to be noted that an aircraft crew were rescued in this area the following day.
[Underlined] SIGNALS FAILURES [/underlined]
The percentage of Signals failures against the 3,600 sorties flown in August was 1.722. This is an increase of 0.32 per cent over the figure for July. There were no failures which prevented aircraft from taking off on account of Signals defects. Two early returns were attributed to Signals “equipment failures”. The remainder of the failures reported had no adverse effect on any of the operations.
Over 80% of the total defects were due to component failures, the others being under the category “Miscellaneous”. There were no “manipulation” or “servicing” failures. The result of five of the Signals defect investigations was “No Fault Found”. This is a most unsatisfactory type of report and every effort must be made to get at the roots of such reported defects.
[Underlined] V.H.F. [/underlined]
During the past month, replacement TR.1143 equipment has been in very short supply. It appears that the production of this equipment is decreasing whilst the requirements of A.D.G.B. are steadily increasing. As a result is has been decided to withdraw TR.1143’s and TR.1143A’s from all 5 Group aircraft, and refit the Group with the American version of this equipment, which is known as SCR.522. The problem presenting itself with this changeover is that a complete change of frequencies is also taking place. This means that a normal, steady re-equipping of, say, six aircraft per Squadron each day cannot be done, because all aircraft must be on the same V.H.F. frequencies, and TR.1143 crystals for the new frequencies are not available.
Full quotas of SCR.522 equipment have already been received by 53 and 54 Bases, and now 52 Base have received 75% of their quota. As the equipment arrives at the Squadrons, it is being set up to the new frequencies, modified and bench tested. This will ensure that, when sufficient equipment has been received to fit all Squadrons, a 100 per cent changeover throughout the Group can be effected upon receipt of the executive from this Headquarters.
[Underlined] RADAR [/underlined]
During August the disposition of Radar personnel underwent several changes. Radar Officers have been deleted from Squadron strength and placed on Stations as Station Radar Officers. A Radar Officer has also been allocated to R. & I. at Base Stations. Where two Squadrons are based on a Station, the Station Radar Officer controls the Radar servicing of both. The Radar mechanics are divided between the Daily Servicing Section and the R. & I. Section, and thus a division is made in the two maintenance aspects. This should improve the organisation very considerably. The decision to use Wireless Operators (Ground) to assist in Radar Servicing is now being implemented, and the advantage to be derived from this new arrangement will be self-evident.
[Underlined] LORAN [/underlined]
Although the policy on the use of Loran has not yet been decided upon, the intervening period between now and its installation should be utilised to train the greatest number of Radar Mechanics possible on its maintenance. The six mechanics who attended the course at Headquarter, Bomber Command, were selected as evenly as possible from Bases, and now they, with the aid of those who have had previous experience with the equipment in America, will instruct personnel within their respective Bases. Sets of equipment have been distributed to all Bases for instructional purposes. All relevant technical literature available in the form of the Bomber Command Radar Servicing Manual, Section XIII and C.D. O.526-A, has been issued.
[Underlined] REPEATER INDICATORS [/underlined]
Numerous unexpected delays have occurred in the production of these indicators, due to the great difficulty in procuring certain components. In some cases diversion orders had to be placed, and consequently temporary bottlenecks developed. Metal screens for the C.R.T. are extremely difficult to obtain, and in an effort to complete a sufficient number of indicators to equip the two Squadrons at Skellingthorpe, all redundant screens have been collected from Stations within the Group. It is hoped that by the time this summary comes off the press, this fitting will have been accomplished as well as that of the remaining Monica IIIA and V Squadrons. We take this opportunity of commending those concerned in 53 Base for their very fine work in constructing these units.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
The serviceability of Gee maintained its usual high standard, during the past month, although we did not succeed in boosting it much above July’s figure (.02% to be exact). When it is remembered that at times less Gee sets were held than aircraft, all sue credit should be given to the maintenance personnel for keeping the serviceability at this high level. There were a total of 3207 sorties completed, and out pf these 88 difficulties arose, giving an overall percentage of 97.26. The difficulty in the supply position appears to be due to the shortage of crystals, and so,
(Continued on page 8, col. 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 7
[Page break]
SIGNALS (CONT.)
bearing this in mind, all crystals should be returned to Group Headquarters for repair and re-issue immediately they become unserviceable.
[Underlined] H 2 S MARK II AND MARK III [/underlined]
Despite the new switching procedure used on two operations during August, the serviceability of H 2 S Mark II was slightly improved. For an increase in sorties of approximately 30% (1635 sorties), 90.52% were completely serviceable. Headquarters, Bomber Command, are analysing the effect of delayed switching of the modulator at high altitudes, and will, if found necessary, take adequate steps to counteract any adverse effect it may have. It would appear, judging from the last operation on which this procedure was used, that provided this switching is done at altitudes of 2000 – 4000 feet, there would be no decrease in serviceability.
Unfortunately Mark III serviceability dropped below July’s figure by 4.73%. Of the 172 sorties completed, 19 developed defects. The percentage free from defects was therefore 88.96. Two of the faults were due to enemy action, and amongst the remaining 17 there were no outstanding component failures. Nos. 83 and 97 Squadrons are almost completely fitted to Mark III now, and all replacements are of this same type. Several stabilised scanners have been received but at this stage it is difficult to assess their value and efficiency.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
Last month saw a slight improvement over July in the serviceability of Fishpond. 1424 sorties were completed, and of these 90.52% gave very satisfactory results. The minimum range of this device is one of the major problems and is one which requires continual attention. Where any evidence exists that the minimum range is abnormally high, immediate steps must be taken to bring it down to the shortest range possible by replacing the defective units.
[Underlined] MONICA [/underlined]
Monica IIIA resumed its normal position in serviceability during August. There were 36 defects out of 941 sorties completed, giving a percentage of 96.18 serviceable, or an increase of 2.36% over July. The end of the Monica IIIA supply has now been reached, but our first issue of Monica IIIC is being made from Headquarters Bomber Command early in September, to Waddington. Future replacements will be Mark IIIC, and should be in good supply at a very early date.
Monica V, by relinquishing second place, which it held in July, did not by any means experience a decrease in serviceability. Rather, an increase was obtained, and out of 649 sorties completed, 96.0% functioned in the most efficient manner. This fact adds further evidence that, regardless of the odds which may exist, no problem is insurmountable when the proper thought and energy is applied.
ARMAMENT
[Underlined] BOMBING [/underlined]
Headquarters, Bomber Command Armament Bulletin, Issue No. 6, dated September 1st, covers many of the points which would otherwise have been raised in this News.
Special attention is drawn to the responsibilities of Armament Officers in connection with bomb aiming problems. There are two courses now running. The first is the Mark XIV Bombsight Course, at present conducted in No. 4 Group. F/Lt Rogers, the Armament Officer from Winthorpe attended the first course. It is hoped that the Group will have further vacancies on subsequent courses, and it will be possible in time to give all Armament Officers the benefit of such a course. The second course is the Mark XIV Bombsight Analysis Course now being run at Bruntingthorpe. The first few vacancies on the technical courses are being allocated to Base Electrical Officers, and subsequent vacancies will be allocated to Armament Officers.
[Underlined] CIRCULATION OF INFORMATION [/underlined]
Do you circulate your copies of the Armament Bulletin to other Sections who may be interested in the various items? This is particularly applicable to Issue No.6.
[Underlined] DE-BELTING AMMUNITION [/underlined]
It looks as though we have at last found a solution to that vexing problem of de-belting and cleaning ammunition. The machines referred to on Page 29 of the Armament Bulletin are now improved and working at R.A.F. Station, Swinderby, where the Base Armament Officer will be pleased to demonstrate this equipment. Owing to the pressure of operations it is difficult to lay down a time for a visit, but Base Armament Officers should contact S/Ldr Rowed, and make arrangements to see and copy this equipment.
[Underlined] BOMB CARRIERS [/underlined]
Credit is due to R.A.F. Station, Bardney, for producing a prototype Triple Adaptor for the Lancaster centre Stations, to take 3 x 500 lb H.E. bombs.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT QUIZ [/underlined]
Do you know what the letter “G” on a bomb trolley means? If not refer to A.M.O. N.1236/43.
[Underlined] GUNS AND GUNNERY [/underlined]
With the approach of winter, gunnery problems will become more acute. In your keenness to obtain gun serviceability, do not forget that gun aiming problems as well as bomb aiming problems are Armament problems.
[Underlined] CO-OPERATION [/underlined]
Co-operation should extend beyond one’s own Unit, and when stores are required urgently for operational use by other Stations, any delay in delivery means inconvenience to other Units. If this Headquarters asks you to send stores immediately by road, make certain that any delay in sending them is reduced to a minimum, and if such a delay is unavoidable, let us know – in other words keep us in the picture.
[Underlined] WAR EFFORT [/underlined]
August has been a busy month, and all previous records have been easily surpassed by the totals of 3,600 sorties and 14,952 tons of bombs dropped.
Credit is due to all Armament personnel in having the goods ready for delivery to the place where it hurts the Hun most.
[Underlined] BOMB DUMPS [/underlined]
In order to keep up the tonnage of bombs dropped on the Hun, Bomb Dump organisation must be still further improved, and every yard of storage space used to the best advantage.
ARMAMENT FAILURES TABLE
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A = MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING
D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 8
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
Fifteen months ago our chief concern was whether the Navigational standard was sufficiently high to ensure that all aircraft would reach the target. With the increase in the number of aids available, this problem has solved itself, and our main worries these days are the finer points of navigation, i.e. rigid adherence to track and timing, and the finding, and the finding of accurate winds for bombing. The standard achieved in track keeping during the last two or three months does not leave much to be desired. We must now concentrate on the two remaining difficulties, i.e. Timing and bombing wind velocities.
If we are to achieve the concentration in timing necessitated by current tactics then all aircraft must arrive at each turning point en route and at the target within ± 1 minute. It is very hard to do this, but on the other hand it must be done. Constant checking of ground speeds and revision of E.T.A’s plus a change of air speed where necessary is the only way that really accurate timing can be achieved. Every Navigator must check and re-check his E.T.A’s as often as possible and must revise the air speed as soon as it becomes evident that revision is essential.
The finding of an accurate bombing wind in the target area is equally important. Here again this is only possible if those Navigators detailed as windfinders realise their responsibility, and work to the utmost limits of accuracy, e.g. do all the plotting necessary to find the target area wind on a large scale chart, plot air positions and fixes by use of dividers and finally check all computations and plotting again and again.
Station Navigation Officers are to concentrate on these two points during the next two months and are to make sure that all Navigators realise the necessity for accurate time keeping, and the finding of accurate wind velocities in the target area.
[Underlined] BROADCAST WIND VELOCITIES [/underlined]
The broadcast wind velocity procedure has been used on five occasions this month. In each instance the results have been very good. It is good to note that the majority of Navigators are transmitting every wind they find. This is of course essential if the Met. Staff are to note any sudden change in the wind velocity.
It would be wise to recall the Berlin raid of March this year, when the winds experienced were 50 miles an hour stronger than forecast. This change took place very suddenly and a vast majority of Navigators suspected their instruments and refused to believe the wind velocity could have increased by such a large amount. The result was that almost all of them “watered down” their wind velocities before transmitting. The Met. Staff, having no other data to work on, had to assume that the ”watered down” wind velocities were correct. At this time not many Squadrons in the Group were equipped with H 2 S, and also aircraft were flying over a continuous sheet of cloud. Consequently the majority of aircraft had to fly on D.R. using broadcast wind velocities for a period of 4 hours. At least 50% of the aircraft were 70 miles south on the return journey, and eventually passed over the Northern fringe of the Ruhr defences, without of course, realising where they were. The results were not as disastrous as they may well have been.
This must not happen again. Once again we repeat “[sic] If you obtain a wind velocity differing from the previous found wind velocities, then provided you are confident about the fix obtained and have checked the A.P.I. you must transmit that found wind velocity. If it is wrong it will be very apparent to the Met. Staff and no harm will be done. If, however, it is right and you do not transmit it, then a great deal of harm may well be done. Read this paragraph over again very carefully and digest it well.
Now to come back to a more cheery and less threatening note. The results obtained this last month have, as was said earlier, been very good. There are still, however, one or two points which are not entirely satisfactory. The chief one is coding and transmission of wind messages. A number of instances occur where the message is coded incorrectly and sometimes this is not very apparent to the receiver of the message. Also Wireless Operators make mistakes in transmission. In each instance the message is of no use. It is very annoying to think that you have worked so hard finding an accurate wind velocity, and then nullified its value by a small slip like wrong coding or transmission. Another point is that wind finders tend to slacken off on the return journey. It is realised that fatigue is partly responsible for this, but nevertheless the wind still blows and will still play tricks on you. So [underlined] DON’T [/underlined] slacken on the return journey no matter how great the temptation.
The best wind finders on each operation were as follows:-
1. BRUNSWICK (12/13.8) – F/O REID (106 Sqdn)
2. STETTIN (16/17.8) – F/O BAILEY (630 Sqdn)
3. DARMSTADT (25/26.8) – F/S KNIGHT ( 44 Sqdn)
4. KONIGSBERG (26/27.8) – F/O YOUDALE (619 Sqdn)
5. KONIGSBERG (29/30.8) – F/O McCAMM (630 Sqdn)
Good work – keep it up!
[Underlined] GENERAL HINTS IN NAVIGATIONAL PROCEDURE [/underlined]
(i) Don’t “flap” – ever!
(ii) Always work to a system, but see that the system is good. The cycle of operations, i.e. fix, air position, alter course if necessary, wind velocity, ground speed check, new E.T.A., should not be repeated oftener than once every 10 minutes nor less than once every 20 minutes.
(iii) Check every calculation at least once. If you are a slow worker, then to ensure you have sufficient time to check all your calculations, use a 15 or 20 minutes system.
(iv) When orbiting or dog legging, before setting course, keep the pilot informed of the number of minutes in hand, e.g. “5 minutes to go” – “3 minutes to go”, etc.
(v) Remember that an aircraft requires time to alter course. The heavier the load, the longer the time required. Make allowances for this, and so avoid overshooting any of the turning points, and subsequent displacement off track.
[Underlined] LOG AND CHART WORK [/underlined]
Four months ago we began a drive on more work on the chart and less in the log. The initial trials were a success, and the method was adopted throughout the Group. It was decided, however, not to force it on to the more experienced Navigators who had been used to keeping a very full log.
The reason for reducing the log work was to have more time available for the checking and re-checking of all calculations, and to enable Navigators to obtain that extra fix or ground speed check which is so often vital. A few Navigators can do all this and still keep a full log. If they wish to waste their time by recording unnecessary details, then providing their Navigation suffers in no way, there is no objection. It has been noted, however, that a few Navigators are keeping a detailed log at the expense of accurate Navigation, and constant checking. This must stop immediately. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers are to watch carefully for this, and must ensure that no Navigator is wasting valuable time writing a detailed log at the expense of accurate navigation.
[Underlined] A.P.I. ATTACHMENT FOR WINDFINDING [/underlined]
It was stated in last month’s News that 5 A. P. I. attachments were installed in aircraft in this Group and trials were to be carried out. The trials have now been completed, and the results achieved have come well up to expectations. More than 20 windfinding exercises were completed, and the winds found were compared with the Balloon Sonde Winds issued by the Met. Office. In every single instance the difference between the two sets of w/v’s was negligible. Practice bombing was completed after 10 of these exercises, and the average vector error obtained was 3 1/4 m.p.h.
The attachments have also been used on operations with equally good results. It is not possible to state the vector error obtained on these sorties, but the winds found by all A. P. I. attachment windfinders were very consistent.
One or two instances of completely “phoney” winds found by the attachments have occurred, however. Investigation has proved that in each case the error was attributable to incorrect tracking over the datum point on the second run up. A displacement of the datum point from the graticule of 500 yards, or a tracking error of 15 °, would give a wind error of 6 miles per hour. Errors of such proportions cannot obviously be tolerated, otherwise the attachment loses all its value.
It is obvious, therefore, that very great care is to be taken on the second run over the target to ensure that the aircraft approaches on the correct heading and the datum point is on the graticule. Such accuracy as is required can only be obtained by constant crew practice, and in view of the fact that these attachments will shortly be distributed to all Squadrons, crews are urged to practice constantly until they can achieve the required accuracy on each run up to the datum point. Windfinding is the responsibility of the Navigators, therefore, it is up to you Navigators to ensure that your pilot and Bomb Aimer practice constantly.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING WINDS [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by all Squadrons and Conversion Units this month is as shown below:-
Average error of Squadrons – 6.5
Average error of Con. Units – 6.6
(Continues on page 10, col. 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 9
[Page break]
NAVIGATION (CONTINUED)
These figures show an improvement for the Squadrons of 1 m.p.h. and for the Conversion Units of 1.4 m.p.h. This is very good. We must now endeavour to reach the ideal overall average of 5 m.p.h.
[Table of Average Vector Errors ranked by Squadron and Conversion Units]
It will be noted that 9 and 50 Squadrons are holding two of the first three places for the third month is succession. Also 207 Squadron have jumped from 16th place last month to first place this month. A very creditable performance on the part of these three Squadrons.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr Creeth Base Nav. Officer, Swinderby to be Squadron Nav. Officer 83 Squadron.
F/Lt Patchett 49 Squadron Nav. Officer to be Base Navigation Officer, Swinderby.
F/Lt Catty, DFC. No. 54 Base to be Squadron Nav. Officer, No.49 Sqdn.
S/Ldr. Mason, DFC. Base Navigation Officer, Coningsby, to be Flight Commander, 97 Squadron.
F/Lt Warwick, DFC. Radar/Nav. Officer, No.1661 Conversion Unit, to be Base Navigation Officer, Coningsby.
F/O Bennet, DFM. No.617 Squadron, to be Sqdn. Navigation Officer.
RADAR/NAV
H2S Operators were presented with numerous opportunities of using H2S to full advantage this month in view of the long range targets that were attacked. It is gratifying to note that after the slackening off in the use of H2S which was noticed last month, operators have at last realised they were neglecting excellent opportunities for obtaining valuable experience of the set under operational conditions. That H2S has been used to advantage has been shown in the number and accuracy of winds received back from windfinding aircraft particularly on this Group’s attacks on Konigsberg. Opportunity was taken to examine some of the Navigators’ and Air Bombers’ charts on these attacks, and they indicated that excellent use had been made of H2S pinpoints en route, and in addition, track keeping, timing and concentration were extremely good. It is therefore up to Navigators, Air Bombers and H2S Instructors to see that this standard is maintained on all future operations.
With the winter months coming along, and the possible increase in the number of stand-downs due to bad weather, more and more time will be available for practice on the H2S synthetic trainers. It is realised that certain inaccuracies inherent in the trainer mechanism, make exact D.R. navigation difficult, but providing the potentiometers on the control panel are matched daily, and the trainer is run for 20 – 30 minutes before each exercise, wind vectors can be found to an accuracy of ± 10° and ± 8 m.p.h.
Standardised routes have been issued as navigational exercises for the Zuider Zee, Hamburg – Bremen and Frankfurt – Saarbrucken trainer maps, and Operators should endeavour to carry them out at frequent intervals, as if they were real flights. Fixes should be made as frequently as possible, and winds found every 15 – 20 minutes. H2S Instructors should check each exercise for accuracy of winds found, ground speed checks, adherence to planned track, E.T.A’s and reliability of fixes. Whilst it is appreciated that both the Navigators’ and set operators’ reactions to H2S may be entirely different in the air, these exercises may help to iron out a lot of difficulties, and assist in forming an accurate assessment of the capabilities of the navigational team.
A system of categorisation of H2S crews has been issued for Nos.83 and 97 Squadrons. This system depends on complete analysis of all operational and training flights, and is being done to ensure the best set operators are matched with the best equipment. It will also ensure that the best navigational teams are chosen as blind markers.
If this system is successful at 54 Base it may be possible to extend it to other H2S Squadrons and assist in ensuring that only the best crews are chosen for the two marker Squadrons.
This month we had the first opportunity of attacking a target entirely blind on H2S equipment. Unfortunately, due to numerous factors, the attack developed over a large area, but many lessons were learnt by this experience and should serve to make another such attack successful. Whilst it may not be possible to carry out this type of attack again, crews are reminded that they must take every opportunity to practice blind bombing, both on the trainer and in the air. Why not make it a habit to carry out at least one practice blind bombing run on H2S every N.F.T? Even if photographs cannot be taken you are at least developing the technique.
H2S mining has been carried out on numerous occasions during the month, and from P.P.I. photographs it is evident that the vegetables were laid in the correct gardens. A considerable collection of excellent photographs of different H2S Coastal landmarks has now been built up, and it has been suggested to Command that slides be issued of these landmarks for use at briefing. Incidentally if your garden is situated at a position which is covered by your H2S trainer maps, why not carry out your H2S briefing in the trainer room with an actual demonstration incorporating the method to be used? Crews will obtain ideal indications of the picture they can expect, and the difficulties they may experience. If you haven’t the map coverage try making your own training maps of the garden areas likely to be visited.
P.P.I. photography still continues to give a few headaches, both to Navigation and Photographic Sections. However, an improvement has been noted during the latter half of the month, and Squadrons are to be congratulated on the quality of the mining photographs taken. 97 Squadron obtained an excellent photograph of the French Coast near CAEN, the details of which have been confirmed by Command.
When using P.P.I. Cameras, a good photograph depends upon the complete absence of light except that from the cathode ray tube. Watch your cabin lights and the blackouts, and above all see that you give the correct exposure for the type of camera you are carrying.
PPI Photographic Interrogation Reports are being loosely filled in. If you want to be plotted in the position you actually were at the time the photograph was taken, please see you enter correct details on this form. You are probably saving yourself from an investigation at a later date.
By examination of P.P.I. photographs, several manipulation errors have come to light, particularly:
(i) Operators are still having too large a 10 mile zero in the centre of the P.P.I. on the 10/10 scan. By manipulation of the 10 mile zero control this hole should be more of the size of a sixpence, not a half crown.
(ii) Operators are not paying sufficient attention to the correct tuning of the set. They are content with the initial tuning, completely ignoring any retuning at half-hourly intervals, and before carrying out blind bombing runs.
(iii) Too much or too little gain is being employed, and consequently the responses are completely swamped by ground returns or the responses appear too faintly to be recognised or photographed.
(iv) The Contrast control is not being used to advantage. Whilst it is not the usual policy to allow untrained operators to use the contrast control, experienced operators may obtain considerable benefit by slight manipulation of the contract control, particularly when land/water definition is essential.
GEE
During the month, navigators have taken full advantage of the extended ranges now being experienced on Gee with a resultant improvement in navigation.
(Contd. At foot of Col.1)
(Contd. From Col.3)
Excellent use is being made of the frequencies on the RF27 Unit, and many operators report that fading signals are the only restrictions on range.
The new Channel Chain has come into operation this month, and so far the only indications of its range have been obtained on one operation when the average was 0530E at 4900N. No jamming was experienced.
Gee Operators are warned that the practice of calling charts be Series Numbers has been abolished. Sheets which have been re-printed are identified by the name of the chain only. A block has now been inserted to the right of the top margin for operators to insert the number of identification blinks for each chain.
A reshuffle of Gee frequencies is likely in the near future, and Gee operators should take every precaution of checking studs and frequencies before every flight in case sudden change has been made.
Once again it is necessary to warn Navigators that XF frequencies not allocated for their particular targets are not to be used by them. Fixes taken from such transmissions are likely to be in error up to 15 miles. Always ensure that when an XF transmission is given to you that it is for [underlined] your [/underlined] target.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 10
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
In spite of very heavy operational commitments during August, twelve Squadrons qualified for the competition.
52 Base are to be congratulated on winning the competition for the fourth successive month (in June the Conversion Units were included and 619 Squadron were second to 1654 Conversion Unit).
49 Squadron have won the competition for the second successive month, and 44 and 619 Squadrons tie for second place. Next month all THREE Squadrons are fighting for 1st place. Any other opposition will be welcomed.
52 Base has also provided the three entries for the “Big Chief” Competition. Group Captain Weir improved his previous month’s result and won the competition.
Next month all crews must guard against larger errors, because we are now measuring all bombs from T.2. and [underlined] not [/underlined] from the C.M.P.I. If you are careless the errors will inevitably be larger. Air Bombers must take care to set on the bombsight the wind the Navigator gives him, and the Navigator must plot his A.P.I. wind correctly to avoid getting a reciprocal wind.
Are all Bombing Leaders aware that for competition purposes, only 5 bombs need be counted, but all 6 must be included in the weekly return?
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st – 49 Squadron – 71 yards
2nd – 619 Squadron – 78 yards
44 Squadron – 78 yards
4th – 9 Squadron - 84 yards
5th – 97 Squadron - 88 yards
6th – 83 Squadron – 90 yards
7th – 630 Squadron – 91 yards
8th – 106 Squadron – 104 yards
9th – 57 Squadron – 105 yards
10th – 207 Squadron – 106 yards
11th – 50 Squadron – 116 yards
12th – 61 Squadron – 117 yards
13th – 463 Squadron, completed only 5 exercises with 121 yards error
14th – 467 Squadron, completed only 2 exercises with 89 yards error
[Underlined] “BIG CHIEF” COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st G/Capt. Weir (Fiskerton) – 69 yards
2nd W/Cdr. Millward (619 Squadron) – 76 yards
3rd G/Capt. Jeudwine (Dunholme Lodge) – 125 yards
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st – 1661 C.U. – 60 yards
2nd – 1654 C.U. – 66 yards
1660 C.U. – 66 yards
3rd – 5 L.F.S. – 92 yards
Congratulations to 1661 Conversion Unit on winning the competition for the second successive month.
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Results by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
AUGUST’S OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS
Once again, owing to the number of crew errors below 100 yards, only those below 80 yards can be recorded.
Sqdn. or Con. Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Error at 20,000 (in yards)
617 F/L Iveson Sgt Chance F/O Harrison 75 and 79
F/L Orum P/O Cole P/O Brand 79
S/L Cockshott P/O Booth F/S Gosling 80
F/O Joplin F/S Hebbard Sgt Fish 74 and 49
F/O Hamilton F/O Atkinson P/O Jackson 71
97 F/L Parker W/O Carvell F/S Fripp 46-48-54
61 F/O Gibberd P/O Roberts F/S Michael 70
1660 C.U. F/S Atkinson F/O Coyne Sgt Kingston 73
F/S Eakins Sgt Wente Sgt Moulds 80
F/S Croscombe Sgt Devine F/O Reeves 66
1661 C.U. F/S Barratt Sgt Berry Sgt Towle 35
F/O Dow F/O Muddle F/O Orrell 55
F/O Findlay Sgt Hemmingway F/S Larkin 76 and 67
F/O Symes Sgt Bayliss F/O Smith 70
W/O Harrison Sgt Barnett Sgt Smart 69
1654 C.U. W/O Ross Sgt Finch W/O Hayes 66 and 76
F/O Jory F/O Pooley Sgt Craig 61
5 L.F.S. P/O Arndell F/O Porter ? 60
F/S Wiley Sgt Evans Sgt Verry 72
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 11
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONT.)
[Diagram] Fig. 1
[Diagram] Fig. 2
This article is addressed to ALL pilots, veterans and freshmen. At the top of this page will be found a plot of 15 bombs dropped by two pilots acting as Air Bombers. For reference purposes we will call the pilot who flew the aircraft for the first 9 bombs – No. 1 Pilot, and No. 2 Pilot flew the aircraft when 9 – 16 were dropped.
Now all fifteen bombs were dropped from the same aircraft, using the same bombsight, and wind velocity which was from 230°. The time taken to drop the bombs was seventy minutes. In other words, the aircraft did not land between the two exercises, not were any settings on the bombsight altered.
If we study the two groups of bombs for a few minutes, we see that there are two very definite groups. No. 1 Pilot (as Air Bomber) has obtained a much smaller group than has No.2 Pilot. [Underlined] WHY? [/underlined] – Can [underlined] YOU, [/underlined] as a pilot give an explanation? Don’t read any further for the moment; have another look at the plot (Fig.1). Now look at the bombs plotted on the same heading (Fig.2).
From these plots we see that there is a tendency for the Air Bomber to overshoot, but also present is a large pilot error. In short, the pilot who flew the aircraft for bombs 9 – 16 was steadier and flew more accurately, more relaxed if you prefer it. This was because No.2 pilot is an experienced Lancaster pilot, whereas No.1 Pilot has not yet mastered “The flying for bombing technique”.
Can [underlined] YOU [/underlined] as a pilot, see just how important you are in the bombing team? Grudgingly as Air Bombers, we have to admit that [underlined] you [/underlined] are definitely responsible for about 75% of the success of a successful exercise or operational sortie.
Remember that “flying for bombing” is an art, and only constant practice will ensure you becoming a good bombing pilot.
Remember, also that, as a pilot, flying for bombing with the Mark XIV, your worst crimes are flat turning, skidding, side-slipping and crabbing. The bombsight is fully stabilised. That means that if you bomb in a turn, you [underlined] must [/underlined] apply bank and rudder. In other words, do a PROPER TURN.
If you fly your aircraft in the correct manner on every run-up, you can be sure that [underlined] you, [/underlined] as the pilot, are contributing a great amount to cutting out errors in line.
In short, if you, as a pilot, fly your aircraft correctly, and your Air Bomber aims correctly, you automatically look after “line”. Your stick length looks after “range”.
There is another error present in [underlined] both [/underlined] exercises, and the main clue to finding it is in the above article. Bombing Leaders, Bombing Analysis Officers and Air Bombers – DO YOU KNOW WHAT THAT ERROR IS??? The answer is in another column!!!
RESULTS OF COURSES
F/O Baker (207) was 10th on No.89 Course with “B” Category.
F/O Arkieson (630) was 6th on No. 89 Course with “B” Category.
F/O Wilkie (1661) was 6th on No. 90 Course with “B” Category.
F/O Thomas (617) was 7th on No.90 Course with “B” Category.
F/O Points (61) failed to qualify as a Bombing Leader, obtaining a “C” Category.
Congratulations to F/O Soaper (5 L.F.S.) and P/O Alley (1654 C.U.) on obtaining 1st and 2nd places respectively on No.37 A.B.I. Course.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 12
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONT.)
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORISATION [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categorisation by Base]
A+ = 85 yards or less. A = 140 yards or less
B = 210 yards or less. C = 280 yards or less
D = Over 280 yards.
Congratulations to 50 Squadron on obtaining the 2 A+ categories!
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/L Campbell, D.F.C. (9 Sqdn) [/underlined] reports that No. 9 Squadron is now fully equipped with Mk. XIVA bombsights, and intend to win the Competition in September. At present they are having “teething” troubles.
[Underlined] F/O Clegg (619 Sqdn) [/underlined] is commencing a photographic album, 18” x 18”, in which is to be inserted the best photograph on any operation obtained by any one crew. Alongside the photograph is written such “gen” as bearing and distance from A.P., bearing and distance of markers from A.P. and marking technique etc.
Apologies are due to A/Cdre Sharpe, 54 Base, who carried out a dive bombing exercise in a Lightning during last month, averaging 9 yards for 6 bombs. This information was inadvertently missed last month.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE RANGES [/underlined]
[Underlined] Wainfleet [/underlined] plotted 4123 bombs dropped by 841 aircraft.
[Underlined] Epperstone [/underlined] plotted 1397 bombs dropped by 242 aircraft.
[Underlined] Owthorpe [/underlined] plotted 1901 bombs dropped by 317 aircraft.
BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER
S/Ldr Brewer leaves 1660 C.U. to take up duties as Bombing Leader at 83 Squadron.
F/Lt McRobbie takes over 1660 Base Bombing Leader duties.
F/O Kennedy (ex 100 Group) has joined No.49 Squadron’s Bombing Section.
F/Lt McCarthy (467 Squadron) tour expired, has moved to 1654 C.U.
F/Lt Woods has succeeded F/Lt Astbury as Bombing Leader to No.617 Squadron.
[Underlined] BOMBING “LADDER” [/underlined]
617 and 627 Squadrons maintain a Bombing “Ladder”. Top positions this month are as follows:-
617 Squadron 627 Squadron
1st F/O JOPLIN & CREW F/LT BARTLEY & CREW
2nd F/LT ORAN & CREW F/O WHITEHEAD & CREW
3rd F/LT IVESON & CREW W/CDR CURRY & CREW
[Underlined] ?? BOMBING QUIZ ?? [/underlined]
1. Your Computor [sic] Box Compass over-reads by 30 ° on all headings. What type of error would result?
2. A certain type of P.F.F. technique uses sticks of flares. Is it Musical Paramatta, Paramatta, Newhaven or Wanganui?
3. If you land away with your bombs fused with ?? you must inform the Armament Officer immediately. What fuses would be used to necessitate this procedure?
4. Some Squadrons have panels modified so that they have a 32 way distributor and [underlined] two [/underlined] pre-selector boxes. Your first pre-selector box reads:-
[Underlined] PRESELECTOR [/underlined] 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16.
[Underlined] STATIONS [/underlined] 7,8,9,2,11,12.
You wish to drop 2 separate sticks of 3 flares; what selector switches would you use for each stick?
[Underlined] WARNING: [/underlined] This is not as easy as it first appears. It is vitally important that crews who have to carry out more than one bombing run, know the answer. SEE THAT YOU DO!!
[Underlined] WERE YOU RIGHT??? [/underlined]
The other error present in the two exercises plotted on the opposite page is a “Linear” error common to both exercises. This was caused by a sluggish D.R. compass.
LINK TRAINER
[Table of Link Trainer Exercises by Conversion Unit and Base/Squadron]
There was a slight increase in Pilot’s Link Times for the month but Flight Engineers dropped a little and the overall total was 20 hours less than July. Nos. 9 and 617 Squadrons were engaged on other special practices throughout the month and only Flight Engineers of 617 did any Link. It’s a point to note, however, that the Link flies well on a rainy day – there were several during August.
AIR SEA RESCUE
Two ditchings occurred in the Group during August. Both crews were saved. Neither ditching was “copy book”, nor were the drills up to the required standard, but in each instance, good use was made of the time available.
[Underlined] “G” of 1654 Conversion Unit. 14th August. [/underlined]
This aircraft was engaged on Air to Sea firing on the afternoon of the 14th, when the pilot found he was unable to maintain height at t low altitude because two engines gave trouble on account of fuel shortage.
There was no time to send out distress messages, but the pilot, seeing a trawler, ditched nearby. The ditching was very well carried out and no-one was hurt, though the Flight Engineer and the two Gunners had not reached their ditching stations and therefore were not braced for the impact.
No crew member inflated his Mae West before the impact and no emergency equipment was taken out of the aircraft. The crew was not aware of the existence of a locking pin in the Dinghy Manual Release and as a result of this and the failure of the immersion switch, the dinghy had to be forced out of its stowage.
The crew were picked up by the trawler within 20 minutes and after being transferred to an H.S.L. were taken to Grimsby.
[Underlined] “J” of 97 Squadron. 15th August. [/underlined]
This aircraft was returning from a daylight operation with the two port engines u/s due to enemy action. The Port inner engine failed to feather and its windmilling action together with other damage caused the aircraft to lose height until it ditched just off the Dutch coast.
W/T distress messages were sent out and the aircraft was in V.H.F. contact with the rest of the formation. It was also escorted by the Controller in a Mosquito.
The aircraft ditched successfully and no-one was hurt though the Wireless Operator stayed too long at his set and on impact was caught in the bulkhead doorway. Again in this ditching no crew member inflated his Mae West until after impact, and no emergency equipment was taken out of the aircraft.
Within two hours of ditching A.S.R. aircraft were on the scene and a Lindholme dinghy as well as an airborne lifeboat was dropped. The crew got the airborne lifeboat under way but because of the proximity of the coast, an H.S.L. was sent out an picked up the crew before they had gone very far.
[Underlined] POINTS TO WATCH [/underlined]
(i) Inflate your Mae Wests before impact.
(ii) Get to your ditching stations smartly on the Captain’s order.
(iii) Know where your emergency equipment is and take it with you.
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] Due to the fact that no emergency equipment was got out of the aircraft and that the crews concerned did not inflate their Mae Wests until after impact (some members were stunned in each case) both these ditchings might have had sadder endings had not weather and light conditions been so favourable.
For the sake of your own lives don’t be half-hearted about your Safety Drills.
PRACTICE IN SAFETY DRILLS IS MORE EFFICIENT AND LESS EXPENSIVE THAN LIFE INSURANCE.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 13
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
August started with three abortive attacks on Siracourt, La Beteque and Mont Candon. Unfortunately all three areas were cloud covered and aircraft brought their bombs home.
[Underlined] BOIS DE CASSAN – DAY, 2ND AUGUST. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/L. Owen
PLAN 100 Lancasters were to attack this target visually using Oboe Markers as a guide on their bombing run. The majority of crews bombed visually and only a few reported seeing the Oboe markers.
RESULTS Partial P.R.U. cover obtained shows that the Northern half of the target was obliterated.
[Underlined] TROSSY ST. MAXIMIN – DAY, 2ND AUGUST. [/underlined]
Master Bomber :- W/C. Simpson
PLAN The target was marked by P.F.F. Oboe Mosquitoes. The 94 Lancasters and 2 Mosquitoes attacked in conditions of 3-7/10ths patchy cloud.
RESULTS P.R.U. and strike photographs reveal fresh damage in the target area, a large rectangular building partially wrecked, and a number of craters to the South and South East of the target area.
[Underlined] TROSSY ST. MAXIMIN – DAY, 3RD AUGUST. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/C. Porter (Lanc.)
PLAN The aiming point was marked by Oboe Mosquitoes and crews were to bomb visually using these as a guide.
RESULTS 1 Group attacked this target 15 minutes before 5 Group, and consequently the aiming point was difficult to identify, owing to thick smoke in the target area. P.R.U. cover showed the area to have been well plastered, and certainly one and possibly three of the tunnel entrances were blocked.
[Underlined] ST. LEU – DAY, 5TH AUGUST. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/C. Woodroffe
PLAN The aiming point was to be marked by both Oboe and 54 Base Mosquitoes and 189 Lancasters were detailed to bomb visually using the markers as a guide.
RESULTS 6/10th cloud at the target made bombing difficult. The majority of crews made runs from land marks in the target area, and consequently bombing was scattered. P.R.U. cover shows further subsidence round the Southern entrance to the caves, and road and rail communications leading to the entrance were blocked.
[Underlined] BOIS DE CASSAN – DAY, 6TH AUGUST [/underlined]
PLAN This Flying Bomb Storage target was to be marked by Oboe Mosquitoes and 101 aircraft were to attack the aiming point visually.
RESULTS This attack was unsuccessful due to the force running into heavy Cu.b. cloud on track about 20 miles from the target. The force became disorganised, and many aircraft returned to Base because they heard an order from the Master Bomber over R/T to do so. Considerable interference was present and the Master Bomber is missing so that it is impossible to check this order. 39 aircraft carried on and bombed the target which was clear. Fighter escort found their task extremely difficult with the result that more than 12 of our aircraft were attacked by enemy fighters in the target area. Two enemy aircraft were claimed destroyed and three damaged, while the fighter escort without loss, destroyed two and damaged two.
P.R.U. cover showed that what bombing took place was good and the storage units and buildings immediately South of the aiming point were hit.
[Underlined] SECQUEVILLE BATTLE AREA – 7/8TH AUGUST. [/underlined]
PLAN This target was planned to assist land forces. In all, five aiming points were marked by Oboe Mosquitoes. The first phase of the bombing went according to plan, but after five minutes the Master Bomber ordered crews back to Base as smoke was making bombing impossible.
RESULTS The attack, though generally concentrated around the aiming point spread to the North/North East for a distance of approximately 1500 yards.
[Underlined] CHATTELERAULT – 9/10TH AUGUST. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/C. Woodroffe (W.A/P) W/C. Simpson (E.A/P)
PLAN On this attack two aiming points were allotted and a common marking point was selected. One force was to use an over-shoot and the second force a vector. Marking to be carried out by 54 Base.
RESULTS Marking was difficult and was delayed due to hazy conditions. The marking point however, was eventually marked with reasonable accuracy and both Master Bombers ordered their forces to attack as planned. After five minutes bombing the markers became obscured by smoke and further T.I’s were dropped; these undershot by some 20 yards, and fresh bombing instructions were given to each force, who completed their bombing.
P.R.U. cover shows storage areas around both aiming points to be heavily cratered. The effect of blast and fire is seen over a considerable area. This attack shows that although a minimum quantity of marking is necessary for a good concentration, initial marking should be adequate to ensure that it will stand the smoke caused by subsequent bombing.
[Underlined] BORDEAUX – 10/11TH AUGUST. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/L. Owen
PLAN The aiming point was marked direct by Green T.I’s. Again there was some trouble from smoke and further backing up was ordered. Owing to crew manipulation error, incorrect switches were selected and the markers fell in a long stick, approximately 1,00 yards wither side of the aiming point. Bombing however, continued on the concentration of markers.
RESULTS P.R.U. photographs show the Eastern bank of the river to be heavily cratered and severe damage caused to an oil and petrol storage park and also to corn silos and warehouses. This is an occasion when bad drill on the part of a member of a crew can cause scatter to what might have been an extremely concentrated attack.
[Underlined] BORDEAUX – DAY, 11TH AUGUST [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/C. Woodroffe
PLAN The Master Bomber dropped yellow T.I. cascading on the aiming point. This was to serve as a guide for crews in the run-up. A visual vector point was selected and a vector wind broadcast by the Master Bomber.
RESULTS The attack went according to plan and a good concentration was reported, although P.R.U. cover showed little damage to the submarine pens.
[Underlined] GIVORS – 11/12TH AUGUST [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- (Northern Aiming Point) W/Cdr Simpson (Southern Aiming Point) S/Ldr Owen
PLAN Two aiming points were detailed for this target.
(i) Marshalling Yard to the South (Red Aiming Point).
(ii) Junction to the South (Green Aiming Point).
On the Northern aiming point vector bombing was employed and on the Southern direct bombing of the aiming point.
RESULTS On the Northern Aiming Point some uncertainty existed about the accuracy of marking. The force was instructed to stand off for five minutes and instructions were passed to backers up. Backing up was not accurate and a large concentration of markers resulted. Master Bombers ordered the crews to bomb the M.P.I. of the markers, which formed a triangle with sides about 500 yards, with zero wind. The correct wind vector, however, should have been 214/13 m.p.h. on the Southern Aiming Point, but bombing was completed before the Deputy Master Bomber realised his error. The direct marking went according to plan and accurate bombing followed. P.R.U. cover shows that the attack was fairly successful and that damage was inflicted around both aiming points.
[Underlined] BRUNSWICK – 12/13TH AUGUST. [/underlined]
PLAN This attack was of an experimental nature to determine the accuracy of blind bombing on H2S.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows some fresh incidents in the town but these are mostly scattered. There is one small concentration in the Northern part of the city.
[Underlined] RUSSELSHEIM – 12/13TH AUGUST [/underlined]
PLAN Approximately 200 aircraft of this and other Groups were to attack the Opel Works at Russelsheim. A Master Bomber was provided by P.F.F. and the aiming point marked by controlled Paramatta.
RESULTS The markers were rather scattered and although results were difficult to assess it would appear that bombing was not
5 GROUP NEWS. NO. 25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 14
[Page break]
OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
particularly concentrated. P.R.U. cover shows that new damage was caused to the South West area of the target although fires spread to woods some three miles away and to residential property to the South East.
[Underlined] FALAISE – 12/13TH AUGUST [/underlined]
PLAN 25 aircraft from this Group were called for at short notice, together with 85 aircraft of other Groups to attack land positions in support of our land forces. Musical marking was carried out by P.F.F.
RESULTS P.R.U. shows very heavy cratering around the aiming point, with very few loose sticks.
[Underlined] BORDEAUX – 13TH AUGUST [/underlined]
PLAN 20 aircraft of 53 Base were detailed to attack oil storage. There was no marking and all crews identified the aiming point and bombed visually.
RESULTS Although several sticks were reported to have straddled the aiming point and strike photographs show bomb bursts in close proximity, P.R.U. cover showed only minor damage to the aiming point.
[Underlined] QUESNEY – 14TH AUGUST [/underlined]
PLAN This was a large scale attack in which Bomber Command gave support to our land forces. Aiming points were marked by Oboe Mosquitoes and as our troops were only approximately 2000 tards from the aiming point, accurate bombing was essential.
RESULTS Crews bombed either markers or the upwind edge of the area of smoke. Apart from one stick which appeared to fall about 600 yards North of the markers, bombing was concentrated. P.R.U. photographs taken show that the area was saturated and severe destruction inflicted.
[Underlined] BREST – EVENING, 14TH AUGUST [/underlined]
Shipping in Brest Harbour was the target for 130 aircraft of this Group. Targets were assigned as follows:-
No.52 Base – a hulk
No.53 Base - a tanker
Nos. 54 and 55 Bases – a cruiser
PLAN All crews were to bomb visually, no markers being dropped. The Master Bomber was to precede the force to the target and broadcast the direction and lie of the ships.
RESULTS Weather at the target was clear and all Bases claimed a proportion of hits on their aiming points. P.R.U. photographs taken on the 15th August at almost half tide showed that:-
(i) The hulk was still afloat.
(ii) The tanker was awash.
(iii) The cruiser had disappeared.
Photographs taken the following day show an object in the former position of the cruiser, which may be its wreck.
GILZE RIJEN AND DEELEN AIRFIELDS – 15TH AUGUST
These airfields were allotted to this Group with approximately 100 aircraft on each.
PLAN 54 Base Mosquitoes were to drop cascading yellow T.I’s on each aiming point and these were to be used as a guide to visual bombing. The aircraft were to fly in company, led by 54 Base.
RESULTS All crews were able to identify and bomb the target visually and heavy damage was inflicted on both targets.
[Underlined] STETTIN – 16/17TH AUGUST. [/underlined]
PLAN Approximately 450 Bomber Command aircraft were to attack Stettin with full P.F.F. Marking. The marking in the early stages was reported as accurate but as the attack progressed, the marking became more scattered. The Master Bomber controlled the operation as the situation demanded although bombing spread back on track and to some woods to the North West of the target.
RESULTS From P.R.U. photographs taken, devastation could be seen through a gap in the cloud, but the extent of this has not as yet been ascertained.
[Underlined] BORDEAUX – 18TH AUGUST [/underlined]
PLAN 25 Lancasters were to attack oil storage – all bombing to be carried out visually.
RESULTS The weather was clear but hazy. The attack was scattered due to accurate heavy flak, making a steady bombing run almost impossible.
[Underlined] L’ISLE D’ADAM – 18TH AUGUST. [/underlined]
PLAN 160 aircraft were despatched to attack a supply depot in the forest of the L’Isle D’Adam. Oboe Mosquitoes were to mark a point three miles from the target to assist crews on their run-up. Two aiming points were allotted which were marked by 54 Base Mosquitos dropping smoke bombs.
RESULTS All crews were able to bomb visually and P. R. U. photographs show the target area to be heavily cratered.
[Underlined] LA PALLICE – 19TH AUGUST [/underlined]
PLAN 51 aircraft of 53 Base were to attack oil storage installations. All bombing to be carried out visually.
RESULTS Cloud made target observation difficult and the attack was somewhat scattered, although some bursts were observed near the oil storage depot.
[Underlined] DARMSTADT – 24/25TH AUGUST [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/L. Owen
PLAN This town was to be attacked by the Group in strength. A point in the centre of the town was to be marked and each Base to use a separate false vector so that bombing would be well distributed over the town centre, around the aiming point.
RESULTS Weather conditions were perfect, and flares, although doubtful at the time, were proved by photographs to have been dropped accurately. Difficulty was experienced by the visual markers in identifying the aiming point. This was eventually recognised but before the Mosquitos could manoeuvre into position and carry out marking, the last of the flares had died out. The Master Bomber had to return early due to failure of VHF and Deputy 1 and Deputy 2 were shot down before reaching the target area. The main force therefore arrived at the target without a Master Bomber. In the absence of any marking and control, W/T Link 3 took charge and ordered the force to bomb on instruments.
P.R.U. photographs show some incidents scattered throughout the built up area. Although there was no control at the target, and the main reason for failure of the attack was due to no marking being down; the weather was favourable and the flares were accurate, and this case proves that it is impossible to spend too much time on careful study of target photographs. The visual marker, has only at the best a fleeting glance of the aiming point and he must arrive at the target with a complete and real picture in his mind of the aiming point and land marks in relation thereto.
[Underlined] KONIGSBERG – 26/27TH AUGUST [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/C. Woodroofe
Konigsberg was singled out for attention by 5 Group, 174 aircraft from all Bases being detailed. Weather at the target was clear, visibility good.
PLAN The normal 5 Group technique of illumination was employed, the aiming point to be marked visually and backed up if accurate. Crews were to bomb T.I’s direct.
RESULTS Illumination was punctual, three markers identifying the target simultaneously, and dropping their markers together. The first was 350 yards North West of the aiming Point, the second 1200 yards to the North East. The Master Bomber dropped his own markers about 500 yards East of the aiming
[Underlined] O.R.S. ANALYSIS OF RAIDS [/underlined]
(a) Percentage of loose bombs.
(b) Radius of 50% circle (i.e. half the bombs dropped fell more than this distance from the centre of concentration).
(c) Distance of M. P. I. from Aiming Point.
[Table of Analysis of Raids]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 15
[Page break]
OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
point and midway between the two previous markers. He then ordered the backers up to back these up, but the first backer up disobeyed these instructions and backed up those which had fallen 1,200 yards to the North East, which he believed to be accurate. The Master Bomber was not aware of this misplacement of the concentration and once the bombing started he found assessment difficult due to glare. As a result the concentration of bombing fell to the North East of the aiming point. This failure proves two points, firstly that the technique of one aircraft marking and this marking being assessed is the only way to achieve success. The fact that three markers dropped their load together was the primary cause for the great spread in bombing. Secondly, had the backer up obeyed the Master Bomber’s instructions implicitly, then the attack would have been misplaced by some 500 yards instead of 1500yards. There must be one Controller only at the target, and his orders must be obeyed rigidly.
[Underlined] KONIGSBERG – 29/30TH AUGUST [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/C Woodroffe.
Another heavy attack was despatched against this target the following night, and it was hoped on this raid to make up for the failure of the previous raid. 8-10/10ths strato cu, base 11,000 feet was encountered at the target.
PLAN The marking force was allowed 12 minutes to illuminate and mark the target. On this attack a marking point was chosen, and was to be marked visually with Red and Green T.I’s. Each Base was allotted a separate heading of attack and release of bombs was delayed for varying time intervals, in order to get a good distribution of bombs around the aiming point.
RESULTS The attack went according to plan and P.R.U. photographs show that almost the entire built up area of the city has been devastated, except for two small areas. This area of devastation, almost entirely by fire, stretches nearly 3,000 yards from East to West, and 2,000 yards from North to South. This area is confined to the main built up area of the city and does not extend West of the railway bridge across the river.
[Underlined] ROLLENCOURT, AUCHY LES HESDINS, BERGENEUSE – 31ST AUGUST [/underlined]
Three forces of aircraft were despatched from the Group to attack the above three flying bomb targets.
PLAN In each case 54 Base Mosquitos were to drop smoke markers as a guide for visual bombing. Weather was uncertain and aircraft were instructed to orbit if the targets were temporarily obscured by cloud.
RESULTS Some orbiting was necessary, but all three attacks were carried out according to plan. Bombing on each target was fairly concentrated and P.R.U. cover gives evidence of very extensive damage.
The most successful attack of these three was on Rollencourt.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
[Underlined] ETAPLES – 4TH AND 5TH AUGUST [/underlined]
617 and 9 Squadrons attacked the railway bridge at Etaples in daylight on August 4th. The weather over the target was clear although some patches of cloud were encountered on the run-up.
RESULTS Photographic cover shows that four direct hits were scored on the double track bridge, whilst the single track bridge also sustained damage.
This bridge was attacked by 9 Squadron on the following day, but although conditions were good the attack was generally disappointing. Due to a miscalculation on the part of the formation leader the actual bombing heading carried out was almost parallel to the bridge itself, and consequently 75% of the sticks burst to the West of the bridge. Although there are two possible fresh hits on the Southern end of the target, the attack must be considered a failure due to the wrong heading of approach.
[Underlined] BREST – 5TH AUGUST [/underlined]
On the 5th August 617 Squadron attacked the submarine pens at Brest with 12,000 lb. bombs. Aiming was visual and weather at the target was good.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover confirms at least five direct hits on the pens, of which three were definite penetrations.
[Underlined] LORIENT – 6TH AND 7TH AUGUST [/underlined]
On this attack 617 Squadron were supported by No. 106 Squadron and had submarine pens for their target in daylight. The 617 Squadron leader was to drop two red T.I’s as areas markers to assist visual bombing.
RESULTS It is believed that at least two direct hits were scored on the submarine pens with a number of near misses. P.R.U. photographs show four hits on the wet pens and further damage caused by 12,000 pounders between the wet and the dry pens.
617 and 9 Squadrons were detailed to attack this target the following day, but weather prevented visual bombing and bombs were brought back to base.
[Underlined] LA PALLICE – 9TH AUGUST [/underlined]
In this attack 617 Squadron were allotted the submarine pens whilst 9 Squadron were given adjacent oil installations. A 9 Squadron aircraft was to precede the main force by 20 minutes to find a bombing wind by means of the API attachment. All bombing was to be carried out visually.
RESULTS [Underlined] 617 Squadron. [/underlined] 12 x 12,000 lb. bombs were dropped and P.R.U. cover confirms that a direct hit or hits on the S.E. corner of the pens caused a collapse of the roof over an area of 240 feet x 120 feet. There were also three further direct hits with possible penetration.
[Underlined] 9 Squadron [/underlined] reported the attack to have been fairly successful although many under-shoots and over-shoots were reported. The storage tanks are not therefore thought to have received the full weight of the attack.
[Underlined] LA PALLICE – 11TH AUGUST [/underlined]
The submarine pens were again the target for 617 Squadron who were carrying 2,000 lb. A.P. bombs. Bombing was to be carried out visually from beneath 16 and 18,000 feet.
RESULTS The bombing was accurate although smoke tended to become troublesome towards the end of the attack. P.R.U. cover shows at least four hits although none of these appear to have penetrated the roofs of the pens.
[Underlined] BREST – 12TH, 13TH AND 14TH AUGUST [/underlined]
Continuing the attacks against submarine pens, 617 Squadron visited Brest in a daylight attack in which 8 x 12,000 lb bombs were to be aimed visually at the aiming point.
RESULTS Weather at the target was clear and only one bomb reported to be wide of the target. P.R.U. cover shows that two bombs penetrated the roof, one in the centre making an opening of almost 50 feet across, whilst a third has taken off part of a corner of the roof at the Western side. There are two other possible hits which have not penetrated the roof.
[Underlined] 13TH AUGUST [/underlined]
On the following day 9 Squadron supported 617 Squadron in a second attack on the pens and shipping in the harbour. 5 x 12,000 lb. bombs were carried, the remaining loads being made up of 1,000 lb. A.P. bombs.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover reveals one direct hit which may have penetrated the pens, with two other very near misses close to the Northern wall.
9 Squadron were allotted a tanker in the harbour whilst aircraft of 617 Squadron were to attack the cruiser. P.R.U. cover showed that the cruiser was still intact, but that the tanker was awash at the stern and was resting on the bottom.
[Underlined] 14TH AUGUST [/underlined]
The cruiser was the target for 617 Squadron whilst 14 Lancaster of 9 Squadron were to attack a hulk which had been towed into the harbour. Weather was clear at the target. Bombing was not as good as had been experienced in previous attacks and P.R.U. cover showed that both vessels were still intact and undamaged after the attack.
[Underlined] LA PALLICE, 16TH AND 18TH AUGUST [/underlined]
617 and 9 Squadrons were detailed to attack the submarine pens but 9/10ths cloud was encountered at the target and the attack was abortive. On the 18th August, however, the Squadrons paid a second visit in good weather conditions. 6 x 12,000 lb. bombs were carried, the remaining aircraft carrying 2,000 lb. and 1,000 lb. A.P. bombs.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows at least one hit and possibly two on the roof of the pens by the 12,000 lb. bombs, but no bombs
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 16.
[Page break]
OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
appear to have penetrated.
[Underlined] IJMUIDEN – 24 TH AUGUST [/underlined]
Enemy E and R Boat pens were the target for 617 and 9 Squadrons in a daylight attack when 12,000 lb. bombs and 1,000 lb. bombs were carried. The attack was carried out in clear weather.
RESULTS All crews were able to identify the aiming point and bombing appeared concentrated. P.R.U. cover shows one hit in the Western half of the pen which has penetrated into the pen and blown out a large portion of the rear.
[Underlined] BREST – 27TH AUGUST [/underlined]
A hulk and Sperrbrecher were detailed for 617 and 9 Squadrons respectively for a daylight attack. Weather at the target was clear with slight haze. All crews to bomb visually.
RESULTS Hits were claimed by both squadrons on their aiming points, and these are confirmed by P.R.U. cover, which was taken on the same day. This revealed that the hulk has disappeared and that there are signs of mud displacement around the position of this vessel. The Sperrbrecher is still afloat with much debris on the decks.
Wishful Thinking
I saw a Service switchboard,
A most amazing sight,
It filled me with deep wonderment,
And thrilled me with delight.
For dainty creatures fingered
Their cords with grace and charm,
And [underlined] rarely [/underlined] gave wrong numbers,
And [underlined] never [/underlined] lost their calm.
They all had silvery voices,
Melodious and untarnished,
And each had lovely finger-nails,
Not one of which was varnished.
Their speed was quite phenomenal,
Their tact a perfect joy;
Their supervisor sat at ease,
With nothing to annoy.
They never cut subscribers off,
They always saw calls through,
And never, never argued
With their clients as others do.
Their calm serene detachment,
No traffic could abate.
They scarcely ever faltered
Or were known to hesitate.
A vision so astounding
Pure phantasy did seem.
The shock it gave awoke me
And dispersed my precious dream.
Anon. (Circa 1944)
HONOURS & AWARDS (CONTINUED)
NON IMMEDIATE AWARDS (Continued)
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/Lt E.F. CAWDERRY, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
P/O J.K. BELL D.F.C.
F/O W.H. BENTON D.F.C.
P/O J.P. DOWN, D.F.M. D.F.C.
F/O R.M. NELSON, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/Lt C.B. OWEN D.F.C.
F/O W.G. WISHART, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/Sgt SMITH D.F.C.
A/F/O B.J. LINDSAY D.F.C.
F/O P.J. CRANE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O A. ROMANO D.F.C.
F/O J.R. GLAZEBROOK D.F.C.
F/O W.G. SEYMOUR D.F.C.
F/Sgt J.V. BEVAN D.F.M.
F/Sgt A.M. McKIE D.F.M.
F/Sgt G. HOYLAND D.F.M.
F/Sgt R.A. SNOWDEN D.F.M.
Sgt J.S. WILLIAMS D.F.M.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O G.G. FURNISS D.F.C.
F/O G.R. ANDREWS D.F.C.
P/O F. COLLIS D.F.C.
P/O F.J.A. REDMAN D.F.C.
P/O V.J. GLANN D.F.C.
P/O A.G.R. UDSON D.F.C.
F/Sgt E.J. DAWISON D.F.M.
F/Sgt C. ALLSOP D.F.M.
F/Sgt R. EDWARDS D.F.M.
F/Sgt R.S.J. CAPON D.F.M.
F/Sgt G.J. SCUFFINS D.F.M.
F/Sgt F.W. LOGAN D.F.M.
Sgt C. GIDMAN D.F.M.
Sgt A.H. ALLISON D.F.M.
Sgt W.H.A. YOUNGS D.F.M.
Sgt H.G. HALL D.F.M.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/Sgt D.A. BROOM D.F.M.
P/O A.R.S. BOWMAN D.F.C.
F/Sgt M.C.J. BARBER D.F.M.
F/O F.L. MERRILL D.F.C.
P/O J.F. FREEMAN D.F.C.
W/O K.F. FLUTE D.F.C.
Sgt E.F. MARTIN D.F.M.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O H.W. COULSON D.F.C.
P/O W. MACKAY D.F.C.
P/O W.L. GIBBS D.F.C.
P/O G.B. QUARTERMAINE D.F.C.
P/O J.W. McMANUS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O P. BUTLAN D.F.C.
P/O L.J. WARNER D.F.C.
P/O J.C. DOUGHTERY D.F.C.
F/O F.C. SECKER D.F.C.
P/O F.L. CHIPPERFIELD D.F.C.
P/O R.W. OLSON D.F.C.
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J.A. SAINT-SMITH, D.F.M. D.F.C.
F/O G.B. HEATH, D.F.M. D.F.C.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O N.W. HILL D.F.C.
P/O H.C. RODGERS D.F.C.
F/O F.D. SPENCER D.F.C.
F/Sgt A.W. JEFFREY D.F.M.
F/Sgt G.A. DAVIES D.F.M.
FLYING CONTROL
Successful trials at Dunholme Lodge of an addition to the present landing scheme have resulted in its introduction throughout the Group. The addition has been effected by bringing back the call-up point to the funnel and renaming the existing call-up point “CHECK” where the pilot does actually check his Stud ‘B’. This has entailed an amendment to the Plus 1/2 and Plus 1 position which are now defined as QDM of runway plus 90 degrees. The additional position gained by moving the call-up point has minimised stacking and given the pilots further time in which to adjust their positions. The major gain made by the move is, however, that at all airfields the call-up point is very definitely marked by the first lead-in light.
Experiments are being conducted at Waddington with “American High Lights”, located in the centre of the airfield to define the various positions on the circuit. These lights give a beam of 15°and are of the type now being installed at Winthorpe for runway lighting in conditions of poor visibility.
Following the success of Spilsby’s experiment of utilising the second Duty F.C.O. to “shepherd” the aircraft on the circuit, the practice is to be made general throughout Group. “Shepherding” has resulted in regular spacing with consequent greater safety margin and improved landing times. In effect, the F.C.O. “talks down” the aircraft. For weather protection, Spilsby have given the F.C.O. a m/u turret on the roof. Their lay-out and the method of control used are worth seeing and will well repay a visit.
Landing times can still be much improved. Aircraft are still arriving at irregular intervals. S.F.C.O’s must continue to impress on crews at briefing the essential point of a regular flow of aircraft on return. Spasmodic “bunching” and unnecessary delay break down the whole principle upon which the landing scheme is based. Crew drill can give the same regular flow to one squadron airfields as to two squadron airfields, and crew drill is solely dependent on discipline of the highest order.
One final point about overshoots. The airfield controller has a large responsibility in that final instructions to overshoot if necessary will emanate from him. Although the airfield controller will always err on the safe side, there are still far too many instances of aircraft being instructed to overshoot, when in actual fact they could land with safety. This is proved time again by the fact that the overshooting aircraft rarely overhauls the aircraft on the runway until is clearing the runway.
It is also realised that the airfield controller finds difficult to access the range of approaching aircraft solely by means of
(Contd. In Col.1)
(Contd. From Col.3)
navigation lights. To assist them therefore simple range finders will be provided.
S.F.C.O’s should point out to airfield controllers that an overshoot is not without a certain amount of risk, and that whenever possible aircraft should be allowed to land, and not just be given instructions to overshoot in order to be on the safe side.
[Underlined] AUGUST LANDING TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of Landing Times by Station]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.25. AUGUST, 1944. PAGE 17
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V Group News, August 1944
5 Group News, August 1944
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Five Group Newsletter, number 25, August 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about sports, engineering , war effort, gunnery, training, equipment, photography, gardening, war savings, second thoughts for pilots, honours and awards, signals, armament, navigation, radar navigation, air bombing, air sea rescue, link trainer, operations, special operations, flying control, wishful thinking, tactics, accidents, and the Stirling.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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1944-08
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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18 printed sheets
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eng
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-29
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
England--Lincolnshire
France--Brest
France--Creil
France--Etaples
France--Falaise
France--Hesdin
France--La Pallice
France--L'Isle-Adam
France--Lorient
France--Pas-de-Calais
France--Siracourt
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Königsberg in Bayern
Germany--Rüsselsheim
Netherlands--Arnhem
Netherlands--IJmuiden
Netherlands--Tilburg
Poland--Szczecin
France--Bordeaux (Nouvelle-Aquitaine)
Poland
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1944-08
1944-08-03
1944-08-07
1944-08-08
1944-08-14
1944-08-15
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of Luftwaffe night-fighter airfields (15 August 1944)
Bombing of Trossy St Maximin (3 August 1944)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Oboe
pilot
radar
rivalry
sport
Stirling
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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[Picture]
V
GROUP
NEWS
No 26 SEPTEMBER 1944
Copies sent to Stns.
[Stamp] Base Copy.
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[Blank Page]
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FOREWORD BY A.O.C.
September was a most successful month and a reward for the hard work which all ranks have put in throughout the Summer. The Group secured two prizes for which many have striven since the early days of the War, the Tirpitz and the Dortmund-Ems Canal. The attack on the Tirpitz was splendidly undertaken by Nos. 9 and 617 Squadrons and appears to have been highly successful in spite of a most efficient smoke screen. The attack on the Dortmund-Ems Canal has earned the following message from the Secretary of State for Air.
“The War Cabinet have instructed me to convey to you and to all concerned their congratulations on the outstanding success achieved in the recent attack on the Dortmund-Ems Canal. Pressed home with great determination against strong opposition and in difficult weather it constituted yet another major blow against German War economy.”
These two attacks have once more shown the remarkable efficiency of the 12,000 lb. “Tallboy” bomb when it hits the target.
The Group has achieved an equally high measure of success in attacks against German cities. During September alone, an area of nearly 3,000 acres has been burnt out. Such results can only be achieved if the marking is accurately placed and if the incendiaries are spread evenly over the whole area to be burnt. With a small force of Group strength there are no loads to be spared and if incendiaries go wide or are over-concentrated on certain sectors, it must be at the expense of the total area destroyed. Examples are Stuttgart where too high a percentage of loads fell wide of their sectors and Kaiserslautern where crews allowed themselves to be deflected inwards by the fires raging in the central sector, thus allowing the equally important areas on either side to escape.
I want to impress on crews that area bombing calls for every bit as much accuracy as attacks on the smallest factory or railway targets. In attacks on these targets during the Summer crews achieved remarkably small errors, and similar accuracy is needed on these large targets if they are to be burnt out from end to end leaving no gaps calling for an uneconomical return visit. Each crew in fact is given a small area of his own to burn and if his load falls on his neighbour’s patch, his own area may well escape destruction, and this has happened on some of our recent attacks.
The problems of lining up the aircraft on the correct heading after allowing for drift and of carrying out the overshoot procedure, are not easy to solve but instructions have recently been issued which should help crews in this matter. If an even spread of incendiaries can be achieved we should be able, with our normal effort, to burn out nearly 1,000 acres on each attack. This will represent a tremendous achievement, and one which will bring nearer the end of the War.
No.51 Base has also put out a great effort in training 161 crews during the month. This has enabled all squadrons to be kept up to establishment and had provided a margin from which new squadrons are already starting to be formed. I congratulate all concerned.
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[Drawing] OPERATIONS
[Underlined] BREST – 2ND SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber – Wing Commander Humphreys.
Operations in September opened with an attack on the dry docks and shipping in Brest Harbour by 67 Lancasters of Nos. 52 and 55 Bases, in daylight on September 2nd. There was no marking for this attack, which was carried out visually and according to plan. Officers who have since visited Brest say that the concentration of bomb craters around the two docks in such that it is almost impossible to get across this area on foot. Both ships are shattered by many bombs.
[Underlined] DEELEN AIRFIELD – 3RD SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
103 Lancasters from Nos. 52 and 55 Bases, plus No. 106 Squadron, took off to attack Deelen airfield in daylight. Two Mosquitoes from No.54 Base went ahead of the main force to mark the target with smoke. One Mosquito fitted with an A.P.I. was detailed to find a bombing wind and pass it to the Master Bomber Two smoke bombs were assessed as being on the aiming point but no trace of markers was seen on strike photographs. No. 106 Squadron bombs were fused T.D. 0.025 while both 52 and 55 Bases carried a load of 1,000 lb. and 500 ln bombs all fused half an hour delay, with the object of avoiding smoke and thereby allowing each crew to have a clear run up to the target. This was the first occasion on which we have used the half hour delay fuse against an airfield target. Unfortunately there was much cloud so that the experiment was not conclusive.
RESULTS Only partial cover was obtained, but concentrations of bombs were seen to have fallen on the S.W. and Eastern intersections of the runways, and at least 60 craters are seen in the partial cover of the runways.
[Underlined] BREST – 5TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:– Wing Commander Simpson.
The United Stated Forces investing Brest were meeting stiff opposition from the defences around Brest. These enemy batteries were the target for 60 aircraft of No. 53 Base in daylight on September 5th. There were four aiming points, A.B.C. and D, to be marked by 7 Mosquitoes of No.627 Squadron. Crews were to bomb visually.
RESULTS All aiming points were attacked, a fair concentration being achieved, with the exception of some loose bombing on A. and B., several bombs falling as much as 400 – 500 yards to the West. A full interpretation from photographic cover was unobtainable owing to the difficulty of distinguishing between the Lancaster and previous attacks.
[Underlined] MUNCHEN GLADBACH – 9/10TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Squadron Leader Owen.
Nos. 52 and 55 Bases provided 113 Lancasters to attack this target on the Western fringe of the Ruhr; in conditions of cloudless weather and good visibility.
PLAN For this attack, as area of the town was selected and a suitable marking point chosen, upwind from it. The marking point was to be marked with T.I’s dropped by Mosquitoes in the light of flares, after which the
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main force, tracking over the T.I’s on pre-determined headings through a sector of 90° were to aim their bombs at the T.I., but delay release for a certain number of seconds. The aircraft were divided throughout the sector and each division given its own band. In this way the incendiary load would be spread evenly over the selected target area.
Should the 54 Base Mosquitoes find it impossible to locate their marking point then they were to back up yellow Oboe T.I’s dropped in the centre of the target area by P.F.F. Mosquitoes, and the main force were to bomb the yellow and red direct, without delaying release. The Oboe T.I’s were dropped on time, but visual marking was delayed owing to the first and second flare waves dropping their flares too far to the South and South East over open country. The Master Bomber, therefore, ordered the third flare wave to drop their flares on the Oboe T.I’s, and by their aid, Marker II was able to identify and mark the marking point. The main force were then called in to attack.
RESULTS Photographs show enormous volumes of smoke coming from a very large number of fires scattered throughout the centre of the built up area of the town. Large new areas of complete devastation, mostly by fires, are seen all around the main railway station. This was a successful attack, but the Mosquito markers would have been aided had a more conspicuous marker point been chosen.
[Underlined] LE HAVRE – 10TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by P.F.F.
Defences at Le Havre which were holding up the besieging Allied Forces were attacked by 108 Lancasters from Nos. 52 and 55 Bases in cloudless weather in daylight on September 10th. Aiming points were marked by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. and the attack went according to plan.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows that all areas have been heavily cratered in a widespread fashion. It was noticeable that there were no craters North of the Northern limits of the target area.
[Underlined] LE HAVRE – 11TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by P.F.F.
A force of 101 aircraft from Nos. 53 and 55 Bases, plus 106 Squadron, again attacked the defences at Le Havre in good weather in daylight on 11th September. Here again the marking was carried out by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. and P.R.U. cover confirms the success of the attack, showing that all aiming points were well covered. Once again no bombs were seen outside the Northern limits of the target area.
[Underlined] DARMSTADT – 11/12TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Simpson.
The weather in the target area was clear with some ground haze.
PLAN The “fanning out” method employed against Munchen Gladbach was again planned for this attack, each Base being allotted a separate sector. On this occasion, leading aircraft of the flare force assumed the additional role of blind markers and, in addition to illuminating the target for the Mosquitoes, were to drop T.I. green in the centre of the target area. Mosquitoes were then to mark the marking point with T.I. Red, and the main force in their allotted height bands were again to aim their bombs at the Red, delaying release. To ensure the distribution of the incendiary load over the whole of the required area the first wave was to delay 20 seconds, the second wave 10 seconds, and the third wave 8 seconds. As on a previous occasion the green T.I’s from the Lancaster markers were to be backed up by the Mosquitoes, if the latter were unable to locate their own marking point, and the centre of
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these two sets of T.I’s was to be bombed direct by the main force. Flares were dropped accurately and on time, and the markers successfully dropped their red T.I’s on the marking point. The attack then proceeded according to the primary plan.
RESULTS Photographs show the main area of the city to be completely gutted. On the whole a highly successful attack but something went wrong with the Northern edge which has escaped devastation. Investigation into the reason is not yet complete.
[Underlined] STUTTGART – 12/13TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Squadron Leader Owen.
The target was heavily attacked by a force of 195 Lancasters from all Bases, in good weather on 12/13th September.
PLAN The target had suffered severe and wide spread damage from previous R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. attacks, and so a plan of attack was required to cover the remaining comparatively undamaged areas.
A marking point was therefore chosen, and sectors allotted to each Base in which bombing headings were to be evenly distributed, in order to cover the whole of the undamaged area.
No.54 Base Mosquitoes were to mark the big railway yards with T.I. Red and Red Spot fires, with the help of illumination from the flare force.
Appropriate delays were ordered, and blind markers were again dropped by 54 Base Lancasters as an initial guide to the Mosquitoes, and as an insurance if the latter failed to locate their marking point.
Flares were dropped accurately and punctually. Marking was completed successfully and the attack was carried out in accordance with the primary plan.
RESULTS Photographic cover shows new areas of damage round the aiming point, in the Bad Constadt district, and at Fueurbach to the North of Stuttgart, in addition to several important industrial works.
Plots show that, although a fair concentration of incendiaries was obtained within the sectors planned, the main weight in the later part of the attack tended to spread to the East and North. The reasons for this are being investigated.
[Underlined] BOULOGNE – 17TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:– Provided by P.F.F.
The garrison at Boulogne was putting up a heavy resistance against the Canadians attacking the town and harbour, and two forces comprising 199 aircraft from all Bases were detailed to attack the specific aiming points.
PLAN All aiming points were marked by full P.F.F. Oboe marking. The first two forces were timed to attack in two separate waves, the first at 0830 hours and the second at 0940 hours. In view of the proximity of our own troops, crews were carefully briefed to make their run up from a well defined pin-point on the coast and use was made of the Navigator’s Master Bomber switch.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows well bombing concentrated around the aiming points.
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[Underlined] BREMERHAVEN – 18/19TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Woodroffe.
207 Lancasters from all Bases and 7 Mosquitoes took part in a heavy and devastating attack on the town and harbour installations at Bremerhaven, in cloudless weather conditions, with good visibility.
PLAN There were five aiming points, lying in a rough direction from N.N.W. to S.E.E. on the Eastern bank of the river. Marking procedure for this target was to be similar to that for the preceding targets, but its shape restricted the use of sectors and it was therefore planned that part of the force would attack on defined tracks over the Mosquitoes’ T.I’s, with the appropriate delay in the release of the bombs, whilst others would aim direct at these T.I’s with a false wind vector applied to the bombsight. Illumination and marking was carried out without any hitches, and the attack was completed according to plan.
RESULTS The two most closely built up areas North and South of the harbour entrances have been completely devastated. Most of the warehouses and dockside buildings have been gutted. This was a model for an incendiary attack.
[Underlined] MUNCHEN GLADBACH AND RHEYDT – 19/20TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Gibson.
A further heavy attack was carried out on this target by 227 aircraft from all Bases in the Group, the intention being to complete the destruction of this enemy industrial centre.
PLAN There were three forces – Red (53 Base plus 106 Squadron), Green (52 Base), and Yellow (55 Base), each force being allotted separate height bands and its own Marking Point, each of which was to be illuminated by flares and marked with Red, Green and Yellow T.I’s respectively. The aiming point of the Red force was the primary target and was to be fully controlled. If the green or yellow targets could not be successfully attacked aircraft were to be ordered to attack the red target.
There was a hitch with the marking for the Red Force. In the light of accurately placed flares, the Master Bomber went in to drop his T.I’s on the Red Marking Point, but his markers hung up. He then called the markers to come in. Number one marker had trouble with exhaust studs and Markers 2 and 3 could not identify. As no Red markers were down, the Master Bomber ordered the Red Force to bomb the green T.I’s which were dropped on time. Later, however, Marker number one identified and marked his target. The order to bomb the green T.I’s was cancelled and the force were then ordered to bomb the red T.I’s. The yellow marking point was punctually and accurately marked, and the Yellow force completed their attack as planned.
RESULTS Considerable additional damage over the whole N.W. perimeter of the town is revealed adding to the already severe and widespread damage. This almost completes the destruction of the town. There is little additional damage in Rheydt.
Plots of night photographs and the incendiary plot show that although the incendiary sticks dropped early in the attack fell near the aiming point, a spread rapidly developed both to the South and W.S.W. and at the end of the attack, an area from S.E. to West was covered. No markers were plotted in these areas. No explanation for this wide spread beyond and outside the planned sectors has yet been arrived at.
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[Underlined] DORTMUND-EMS CANAL, HANDORF AIRFIELD AND MUNSTER – 23/24TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Red Target: Wing Commander Woodroffe.
Green Target: Squadron Leader Owen.
A large force comprising 254 aircraft from all Bases in the Group was detailed to attack these targets, the first two being the primaries and the last, Munster, an alternative, should the weather present difficulties for marking and attack. Unfortunately 10/10ths cloud was encountered in the target area with base 8,000 ft.
PLAN No.53 Base plus 106 Squadron and 617 Squadron were ordered to attack the red target (Dortmund-Ems Canal) and Nos. 52 and 55 Bases the green target (Handorf Airfield). If the red target were not marked, the red force, excluding the Tallboy aircraft, were to attack the green target, or if the green target was not marked, the yellow target. Similarly, the green force were to attack the yellow target as an alternative.
RESULTS [Underlined] Dortmund-Ems Canal [/underlined] – Although the portion of the canal marked and attacked was some 7 miles North of the planned aiming point, a very successful attack ensued, and both branches of the embanked portion of the canal were breached. A stretch of 18 miles of the canal is now dry, and over 100 barges are stranded. A splendid result. Of the red force, 82 Lancasters attacked the primary, and 12 the alternative.
[Underlined] Handorf Airfield [/underlined] – The marker force experienced difficulty in identifying the target area, and after an unsuccessful attempt, the main force was ordered to bomb the alternative. 20 Lancasters and 2 Mosquitoes claim to have attacked the primary, and 61 Lancasters attacked the alternative. There was no new damage to the alternative.
[Underlined] CALAIS – 24TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by P.F.F.
30 Lancasters of 53 Base were ordered to attack defence positions at Calais in daylight on 24th September. Marking was to be carried out throughout the attack by Oboe Mosquitoes of P.F.F.
RESULTS Weather conditions were unfavourable, there being 10/10ths cloud, base between 2/3,000 feet. In view of this the Master Bomber cancelled the attack. This order was not received by 8 aircraft of the force, who carried out the attack visually having identified their respective aiming points.
[Underlined] KARLSRUHE – 26/27TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Simpson.
Force employed – 216 Lancasters, 11 Mosquitoes. Weather conditions experienced over the target were 8 – 10/10ths cloud 6 – 8,000 feet.
PLAN In order that the whole weight of the attack should fall on previously undamaged areas of the town, a marking point was selected, to be marked with red T.I’s and each Base was allotted a sector or track, radiating from the marking point. Main force crews were to aim their bombs at the red T.I’s and delay for the detailed number of seconds. The usual blind marking technique was ordered to ensure against the failure of the Mosquitoes to locate and mark the aiming point visually.
Cloud conditions and poor visibility prevented the visual markers from identifying the marking point and consequently the secondary plan was resorted to.
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RESULTS P.R.U. photographs reveal a large area of gutted buildings extending over many blocks. This devastation spreads on both sides of the main East to West road through the city around the closely built up area, for a distance of 1,500 yards by 500 yards to 1,000 yards. There are many scattered incidents of destruction beyond this central area, and a large number of commercial and administrative buildings have been destroyed. This is a great triumph for the blind markers.
[Underlined] KAISERLAUTERN – 27/28TH SEPTEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Squadron Leader Owen.
207 Lancasters and 10 Mosquitoes from all Bases in the Group were to attack the industrial centre and railway workshops. The attack was carried out in weather conditions of 2 – 8/10ths thin stratus at 3,000 feet and 10/10ths cloud at 7,000 feet.
PLAN The railway workshops were to be attacked with ‘J’ bombs using a false wind vector on the bombsight, and the town by the normal method of overshooting.
RESULTS The illumination and marking on both areas were accurate and punctual.
The damage inflicted on the town, confined chiefly to a narrow belt across the centre of the area id disappointing in relation to the number of aircraft used. Investigation shows that over 70% of the aircraft bombed on headings within a small sector, and were not evenly spread over the whole sector as planned, thus little damage was sustained by the Northern and Southern outskirts. Greater attention should be paid at briefing to explaining the details of the plan of attack, and the importance of aircraft adhering to their briefed bombing headings must be strongly emphasised. The attack on the railway workshops achieved a greater measure of success.
[Underlined] SPECIAL ATTACK BY NO. 617 AND NO. 9 SQUADRONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] ATTACK ON THE GERMAN BATTLESHIP TIRPITZ – SEPTEMBER 15TH. [/underlined]
Previous attempts made by aircraft of the Fleet Air Arm and midget submarines to sink the Tirpitz had proved unsuccessful. It was considered that a force of Lancasters carrying Tallboy bombs and other special bombs would have a good chance of inflicting severe damage to the battleship, if not sinking her, provided the element of surprise could be achieved, so that aircraft could carry out their bombing run before the smoke screen, which was known to be capable of covering the ship and fiord in which she lay within 10 minutes, could be brought into operation.
On September 11th, 38 Lancasters and 2 Liberators took off and with the exception of one aircraft of No. 9 Squadron, which had to return to base, all arrived at Archangel or in that area. Weather conditions were appalling, with rain and low cloud, and some crews were unable to locate the advanced base and had to land on other airfields and even in open country. But for a very high standard of airmanship many more aircraft might have been damaged or lost.
It was hoped that by approaching the target from the South, the necessary element of surprise would be achieved. Tallboy aircraft were to attack first, as it was essential that they should see and aim at the Tirpitz visually. The aircraft carrying the special bombs did not depend on visual sighting of the target. A separate plan and aiming data were provided for them. The plan consisted of the selection of two clearly identifiable landmarks close to the target, at which the bomb aimers could aim, using false settings on their bombsights. Two lakes, one on either side of the fiord were chosen for this purpose. Each aircraft was given a separate track, with the intention of covering an area of 750 yards X 750 yards with the target at its centre.
The flight plan proceeded as detailed until the approach to the target area, when the Tallboy force had to make a last minute alteration of course, as they were west of track.
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The leading Tallboy aircraft saw the Tirpitz clearly when 8 minutes flying time away from it, but by the time the first bombing run was made, the smoke screen was already in operation, and later aircraft found the target area completely obscured. Some aircraft were able to aim their bombs before the last traces of the Tirpitz disappeared under the smoke screen, but others had to aim at the gun flashes and light flak seen through the smoke screen. Others, unable to identify the target, took their bombs back to the advanced base.
The six aircraft carrying the special load aimed their bombs at the planned aiming points, but were unable to observe any results.
The majority of bombing frame photographs are unplottable due to smoke but the release point frames of thirteen of the Tallboy aircraft have been plotted, and the calculated strike position of the bombs indicate that at least one direct hit, and three near misses are probable. Neither the bombing nor release point frames of the aircraft carrying the special load are plottable, as they are obscured by smoke.
Subsequent P.R.U. photographs show a large rent in the starboard side of the ship forward, covering much of the forecastle. Apart from this hit the explosion of some 6,000 lbs of Torpex at a depth of 60 feet within a few yards of the ship’s side cannot fail to have given her a severe shaking, and at least one of the near misses was very close.
This was a highly successful operation carried through in spite of considerable difficulties.
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[Drawing] GARDENING
The Group Gardening effort this month has been on a small scale, and has only called for two operations in which a total of 77 vegetables were successfully planted, although crews stood by for other operations which were cancelled owing to adverse weather conditions.
It is interesting to note that in our first operation this month, the Gardeners from 44 Squadron were co-ordinated into the main force attack on an important German Port, and planted visually by the light of the Flare Force, close to the docks in a channel 800 yards wide, from 12,000 feet.
The second operation, performed by 57 and 630 Squadrons, was a normal H 2 S high lay off the entrance to important German shipping channels where 53 selected vegetables were successfully planted. Unfortunately H/57 had trouble with H 2 S equipment after trying local repairs to within 20 minutes of the target, and then correctly returned with a complete load.
The Command effort totalled 748 vegetables, mostly planted in the Baltic and Kattegat area, with the object of continuing the present dislocation of enemy shipping routes, and preventing troop movements from Scandinavia to the mainlands of the European offensive.
It can be estimated that at present the figures for vegetables planted per ships sunk, stand at 47 to 1. This is an encouraging figure when taking into account the number of Gardening sortied made, and bearing in mind that this does not include the loss to war effort while sweeping measures are put in hand and completed in each area, or the number of ships that are severely damaged and can only be repaired under difficult conditions, or the all-important morale effect on those who “go down to the sea in ships”.
The following extract from the “News Digest” of 28th September reveals the present state of our enemy’s imagination:
“Norway – German fear of Paratroops. British bombers have recently flown over Oslofjord dropping mines.”
“…The Germans are nervous because they think that paratroops were dropped at the same time as the mines. After the first attack some weeks ago, Oslo harbour was closed to all traffic for two days. Since then many attacks have been made, and the harbour has been closed every time. Even the Bygde ferries have, at times, had to stop their traffic. Large-scale raids have been carried out in Cjelleras, and even as far away as Lillestrom there have been raids for paratroops”.
It is also reported that all ships entering narrow channels in the Kiel area have to place two strong cables round their bottoms, and so sail until they are out of the area. This is done in order to facilitate the salvaging of a ship by cranes or other salvage devices in case she is bombed or mined.
In other words, our enemy has developed the minephobic complaint to a very high degree, and with our present increase in stocks he will receive further innoculations [sic] as, and where, we may decide in the future.
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WAR EFFORT
[Table of Sorties, Tonnage and Hours by Squadron]
Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “Successful sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties Nos. 9, 49, 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another Squadron the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons.
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[Drawing] TACTICS
The main tactical development of this month has been the withdrawal of early warning devices, i.e. MONICA and BOOZER, and the limitation in the use of H.2.S. It is now known that Hun night fighters can home upon these devices. In the circumstances, therefore, there was no alternative but to withdraw them. MONICA is in the process of modification and may be reissued eventually, but in its absence, crews must exert the utmost vigilance in their search.
It must be appreciated that, although German C.G.I. is getting very much shorter warning of an approaching raid, the number of targets to which a bomber force may be going is also decreasing, making the night fighter controller’s job easier. He also has his night fighter squadrons concentrated into a smaller area and their transfer from one area to another is consequently easier. Bearing these factors in mind, there can be no doubt that the German night fighter will constitute our main problem during the coming months. The following steps should be taken to ensure utmost efficiency in combatting the enemy’s defensive measures.
(i) [Underlined] Night Vision Training. [/underlined]
No opportunity should be lost of training crews in night vision. Night vision efficiency is something which can be improved with practice. Remember, with the withdrawal of the early warning devices, it is now your eyes and night vision versus the night vision aided by A.I. of the enemy night fighter. On the other hand, you have seven pairs of eyes where he has one. This advantage must be exploited to the utmost.
(ii) [Underlined] Increased Banking Search. [/underlined]
Surprise remains the night fighter’s most important weapon. The only effective counter to surprise from behind and below is a constant banking search, and captains must increase the frequency with which they carry out this banking search.
(iii) [Underlined] Corkscrew. [/underlined]
The 5 Group Corkscrew continues to be a very effective fighting manoeuvre. A scrutiny of recent combat reports, however, reveals that there is little doubt that the Hun night fighters now expect the corkscrew and anticipate it. Out of 94 combats reported the enemy fighter opened fire only 37 times, and in many cases was seen to make a feint attack, sufficient to persuade the Lancaster’s captain to corkscrew, and then to hold off and wait until the manoeuvre was completed. The existence of a combat report proves that the corkscrew was successful, but it is considered that where no combat report exists, i.e. where the bomber has been shot down, the fighter’s tactics have been successful. In other words, he waited until the corkscrew has been completed and the aircraft has resumed course, and has then closed in and opened fire.
You are no longer safe in assuming, therefore, that one cycle of a corkscrew will throw off the fighter. Should the gunners lose the fighter in a corkscrew, a banking search should be carried out as soon as course is resumed, to ensure that he is not directly under the
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aircraft.
A new German night fighter, the H.E.219, is now known to carry two fixed astral guns, oblique upwards firing. It is believed that these fire at an angle of 65° upwards and forwards and are fired by the pilot. This adds further weight to the necessity for constant banking search.
To summarise:-
1. Learn how to use your eyes at night!
2. Carry out the correct search to find the enemy.
3. When you have found him – don’t lose him!
[Cartoon]
THE MAN WHO EMNTIONED THE TARGET AT FLIGHT PLANNING!
[Underlined] WITH APOLOGIES TO H.M. BATEMAN [/underlined]
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[Drawing] SIGNALS
[Underlined] W/T DISCIPLINE. [/underlined]
On the night 27/28th. September, 217 aircraft of this Group attacked Kaiserslautern. In accordance with recent practice, very strict W/T, R/T and Radar silence was ordered en route to and from the target. Wireless Operators should have been well aware of the vital need for strict W/T silence on this occasion, in view of the unusual measures taken. In spite of this, however, five Wireless Operators of this Group broke W/T silence during the period 0114 to 0325. Their transmissions took the form of such senseless remarks as “INT WOP – HOW ARE YOU – BANG ON – IMI – GOOD SHOW – INT CUP OF TEA.”
What satisfaction these inane natterbugs got out of their efforts it is hard to see. The enemy, deprived of his usual means of detecting the stream, might easily have obtained bearings on these continuous transmissions, with the result that five brainless Operators would have been the direct cause of the loss of several Group aircraft and many of their comrades.
Despite energetic enquiry and investigation, it has not been possible – so far – to track down the culprits; they are obviously not the type who would own up. If they are found, however, they may rest assured that never again will they have the opportunity to jeopardise their comrades. That such incidents must never occur again has been made perfectly plain.
The Wireless Operators of 5 Group have had the privilege, since the attack on the Dams, of a fair amount of interesting W/T operating. This makes it all the more incomprehensible, therefore, that a few of them should adopt this culpable form of keybashing. It is known, however, that the vast majority of Wireless Operators are responsible men, who feel just as strongly about this “black” as does the C.S.O. It is hard that their good name should have been sullied by the action of so few, and all must now combine to ensure that such flagrant breaches of W/T discipline never occur again.
[Underlined] CONTROLLERS’ OPERATORS. [/underlined]
The hope expressed in last month’s summary that a healthy competition between Bases would develop, has now materialised. In fact, it is almost a full time job for one man at Group Headquarters to book and supervise these exercises. Signals Leader should note that many a good exercise is spoilt by failure of the Operators to pay attention to detail. Before an operator takes part in any of these exercises, he should know 5 G.S.I. No. 12 backwards. In this connection, the main points to watch are:-
(1) The number of times call signs should be sent.
(2) How often the text of a message should be repeated.
In next month’s issue, it is intended to publish a table showing the number of exercises completed by Bases.
[Underlined] REGRADING. [/underlined]
The Group Signals Leader examined a large number of wireless Operators during the month, and claimed he was more or less up to date on regrading before proceeding on leave. Perhaps it is not generally known that the main purpose of this leave was to see for the first time Gilmour Junior – of the ‘transmitter’ variety we believe. It is known, however, that during the past fortnight quite a formidable queue of W/Ops Grade II has been forming, and every endeavour will be made to deal with these as soon as possible.
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[Underlined] GROUP EXERCISES. [/underlined]
These have taken place regularly throughout the month, and the high standard of operating maintained. They still reveal, however, that morse practice and more morse practice is essential. It is hoped that the recent quiet spell has been taken advantage of in this connection.
[Underlined] SIGNALS FAILURES. [/underlined]
The Signals failure percentage continues to increase, the figure for September being 2.459. Over the past 3 months the percentage has risen steadily. On reading through the defects summary however, it can be seen that over 90% of the trouble is still attributable to component failures. The long spell of no maintenance faults has broken, one Squadron having no less than three such failures. There are still quite a number under the heading miscellaneous – the “remarks” column being “No fault found”. This type of alleged failure must stop. There were two manipulation failures which could easily have been avoided, in one case an incorrect VHF channel was selected, in the other, the type 51 Junction box switch was in the wrong position.
It is most gratifying to see that not one failure of VR.101, i.e. output valve V8, was reported throughout the month. It appears that the recent glut of V8 failures can be attributed either to faulty manufacture or wartime materials.
[Underlined] V.H.F. [/underlined]
There have been many essential changes in the V.H.F. policy during the past month, the reason being, an operation on HANDORF airfield, night 23/24th September, when very heavy FREYA interference was experienced on the TR.1143 equipment. This setback made it quite clear that the series noise limiting diode modification had to be carried out on all the new SCR.522 equipments prior to their debut into 5 Group Lancasters and Mosquitoes. The modification is quite simple, the only difficulty being the realigning of the four I.F. stages and all Squadrons not possessing a suitable 12 m/c oscillator. It was decided, therefore, that the Americans be asked to incorporate the modifications for us, and this they most willingly agreed to. The result is, at the time of going to press, only 35 of the 435 SCR.522’s held, now require to be modified.
For 100% suppression of all noise, it has also been found necessary to filter the 150 volt Dynamotor output with a 5 uf electrolytic 200 volts D.C.W. Capacitor. If this equipment is readily available through R.A.F. sources, in such a large quantity the modification will be carried out locally. Failing this the U.S. Air Force has again expressed willingness to assist.
[Underlined] NOISE SUPPRESSION MODIFICATION. SCR.522. [/underlined]
Briefly the Noise Limiting modification functions as follows:- A double diode is inserted in series with the output from the 2nd Detector, one section of the valve is biassed by a portion of the average D.C. voltage developed by this detector. When normal speech is being received, the bias is such as to allow the diode to conduct, i.e. the diode becomes a low impedance. When any pulse waveform is impressed on the incoming required signal the diode anode is biassed more negative and cuts off; hence it offers a high impedance to the interfering pulse. The other half of the valve holds the A.V.C. to zero until the average D.C. voltage developed by the A.V.C. diode exceeds the delay voltage. The A.V.C. voltage, after the modification, is derived from the primary of the last I.F. transformer. Changes are also made in the I.F. Grid circuits, to reduce cross modulation effects caused by the grid current as the result of high noise voltage pulses.
[Underlined] BLIND MARKING – CONINGSBY’S SPECIAL RADAR EFFORT. [/underlined]
The story may now be told of the work done at Coningsby to improve the performance of MK.III H2S. During the latter half of July, it was decided that efforts should be made to improve the efficiency of our offensive Radar devices. Hs” MK.III was selected for particular attention, the main requirement was for an accurate Blind Bombing Instrument, and immediate steps were taken to improve MK.III H2S to enable it to perform this function. T.R.E. aided us in every way possible, to enable this commitment to be undertaken without impairing operational serviceability.
The greatest difficulty which had to be overcome was the tendency of the presentation on the screen to disintegrate or disappear at the shorter ranges. It was felt by T.R.E. that this was due to the inefficiency of the scanners, and therefore, scanners received the first attention. Those which had previously
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given the best results were carefully selected, and thorough checks made against specifications, at the same time the best Units of the equipment were subjected to a detailed and exacting overhaul for power output, tuning, and accurate calibration of height and range markers. When one complete installation had been fully tested in this manner, it was placed in an aircraft, and one of the most experienced crews commenced bombing trials on Wainfleet, and on several inland towns. The results obtained on these trials are compared here with results which were obtained previous to these experiments. The average error obtained at Wainfleet for 5 bombs was 316 yards as compared to a previous error of 1,193 yards. A second crew dropped 6 bombs with an average error of 1.6 miles with the ordinary Mk. III H 2 S equipment, and on using the improved equipment reduced this error to 800 yards. On inland towns the bombing results were similar to those on Wainfleet, an average error of 700 and 500 yards being obtained with the special equipment, whilst errors of 1,600 and 2,000 yards were obtained with the standard equipment.
It was decided from these figures that the experiments and improvements were making more accurate bombing possible, and a further 6 aircraft were similarly equipped, and the best Operators assigned to these aircraft. Further training and trials were carried out, and the results gave additional proof that the experiments were on the right road. The final assurance that all this concentration on improvements and selection of all Units and Operators was improving the bombing was soon forthcoming. The operations were conducted against Konigsberg, Darmstadt, Stuttgart, and Karlsruhe were most successful, the average error of the proximity markers being 550 yards.
These results do not by any means mark the successful conclusion of the experiments, but rather indicate that we are just beginning, and the coming few months will see an ever increasing improvement in both equipment and crews.
It is desired at this point to express our appreciation for the assistance which has been rendered by T.R.E. and H.Q.B.C. and for the close co-operation by all concerned at Coningsby without whose help none of this work would have been possible.
[Underlined] GEE. [/underlined]
Gee maintained its usual high standard of serviceability through September. Of the 2386 sorties reported for the month, 62 difficulties were experienced for a percentage serviceable of 97.4 as compared with 97.26 for August.
The supply of Gee remains a very critical problem, although the position has eased up slightly. The new aerial loading unit is apparently becoming available shortly, and a few have already been received in new aircraft. The supply of R.F. Units Type 27 has also improved and an effort is being made to fit all Squadrons completely in the near future.
A modification which enables the simultaneous presentation of signals and calibration pips on the screen has been submitted by 617 Squadron, and forwarded to Headquarters Bomber Command for approval.
[Underlined] H 2 S. [/underlined]
Although for obvious reasons the use of H 2 S Mark II was restricted this month, a total of 819 sorties was completed and out of these 90.7 per cent were free of technical difficulty. A switch unit which allows the equipment to be switched on and off at altitude has been developed by T.R.E. This should soon be in production.
H.2.S. Mark III is not so badly affected by this restriction, and during September, a total of 135 sorties was reported. Twelve difficulties were experienced, which brings serviceability back to 91.2 per cent, an increase of 2.3 above last month. The work which has been undertaken on the H.2.S. Mark III at Coningsby has served to familiarise the Radar Mechanics even more with the equipment, and the benefits thus derived should bring the serviceability to a much higher standard from day to day.
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[Underlined] MONICA. [/underlined]
Unfortunately Monica has had to be removed from all aircraft, but it is hoped only temporarily, pending the introduction of a modification developed by 53 Base and T.R.E. This modification is being pursued at T.R.E. with the assistance of a Radar Officer from this Group.
Before it was restricted, Monica IIIA reached its highest serviceability. Of the 139 sorties completed, only one defect was experienced, giving a percentage serviceable of 99.3. This provides a record which will require a great deal of effort if it is to be bettered on the re-installation of the equipment.
Monica V was, however, not far behind, for out of 99 sorties only one difficulty occurred, giving a serviceability of 99 per cent – another record which we will endeavour to equal.
[Underlined] FISHPOND. [/underlined]
Fishpond, due to the restriction on H 2 S, was also used to a lesser extent during September. Despite this, it rendered a very satisfactory service for 722 sorties out of 796 reported, a percentage of 90.7. Training of operators has increased the usefulness of the equipment, and every effort should be made to aid those operators in quickly interpreting the picture on the screen.
[Underlined] A. G. L. (T) [/underlined]
During the second week of September, A.G.L. (T) became operational and up to the end of the month 70 sorties had been completed. Of these, 20 developed difficulty which gives a percentage serviceable of 71.5. Nine of these defects were due to components in the A.G.L. (T) installation itself, whilst H 2 S, Fishpond and the power supply were responsible for the remaining eleven.
Although this standard of serviceability leaves a great deal to be desired, October should bring about an encouraging improvement, in view of the experience which has now been gained by servicing personnel. It is very gratifying to note the enthusiasm with which this new device has been received, on the part of both the air and ground crews. As it becomes increasingly familiar and serviceability steadily climbs, this enthusiasm will grow and the full benefit will be derived from it.
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[Drawing] AIR BOMBING
The month of September has provided some excellent results from the attacks on German towns, and despite adverse weather conditions on one or two occasions the determination of crews provided better results than were, at first anticipated.
Incendiaries formed the greater part of the bomb loads, and the previous difficulties experienced in aiming the 4 lb I.B. have been largely overcome by the use of the new wind conversion factors for bombs of low T.V. However, it is still very necessary for Air Bombers to adhere strictly to the “delay release” times supplied at briefing, and Bombing Leaders must ensure that the importance of this is stressed.
Another point which cannot be stressed too often is the necessity for not dropping any bombs until either the Controller has given the order to bomb, or ‘H’ hour has arrived and no instructions have been received from the Controller. You will be briefed to adopt the latter alternative is it has been decided that there will be no orbiting in the target area. The reasons for these instructions should be apparent; the difficulties of the Mosquito markers are greatly increased if a few stray ‘cookies’ are dropping while they are searching for the marking point, and a load of 4 lb. I.B’s can be very dazzling to the low-flying markers.
The destruction of towns and cities behind the actual battle-front will have a direct effect upon the results of the hard battles which the ground forces will have to undertake soon. The enemy will be denied the use of his most essential means of transport, shelter for his reserves, and what remains of his armament production in the previously attacked areas. To achieve this, all Air Bomber must make sure that their bombs hit the areas they are intended for, and that means constant practice, a thorough knowledge of all equipment, and the ability to conform strictly to the plan of attack.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING. [/underlined]
Although the amount of practice bombing has increased considerably during the past six months, there is still a large number of details being cancelled because of snags which could have been avoided.
Now that the winter months are approaching, and opportunities for bombing will decrease, it is essential that the best advantage be taken of every chance to complete an exercise.
Quite a large number of faults which cause an abandonment of an exercise could have been prevented if the air bomber had thoroughly checked his equipment before take-off.
First of all make certain that the auto-selector box on the Light series carrier has been reset to No.1. The ground crew will usually attend to that, but there are occasions when it has been missed.
Examine the bombs and change any that have damaged tail fins. At the same time see that the safety pins have been withdrawn.
Test your bombsight on the ground and make sure that you have an emergency computor [sic]. In the event of a bombsight failure you can still derive some benefit from the exercise.
[Underlined] BOMBING ANALYSIS. [/underlined]
The provision of Bombing Analysis Officers on Squadrons and Conversion Units has proved of great value during the past few months, ensuring speedy
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assessment of exercises and the abolition of inevitable errors which occurred when Bombing Leaders were unable to devote sufficient time to this very important duty.
However, there are still one or two points not receiving the attention required:-
(i) Crews must be given a detailed analysis of their exercises. It is not always possible to have the Pilot, Navigator and Air Bomber present during the actual analysis, but they should see the plot as soon as possible.
(ii) Form 3073 must be completed, and the details supplied must be accurate. It will then afford the Analysis Officer, and the Bombsight Maintenance Staff, the maximum amount of assistance. It should be possible for the Squadron Commander to pick up a Form 3073 relating to an analysed exercise and thereby obtain a complete account of the bombing and any relevant comments from the Bombing Leader.
(iii) Do not forget that new crews have had very little experience in bombing from a Lancaster, and an accurate analysis will be of the greatest assistance to them.
(iv) When a bombsight fault has been discovered, inform the Instrument Section [underlined] immediately, [/underlined] and give them all the information you can. If necessary, produce the bomb plot and explain the errors. The Bombsight maintenance staff will appreciate all the assistance you can give them.
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ [/underlined]
1. What action would you take if you obtained maximum starboard drift on the sighting head with zero wind set on the computor [sic]?
2. What is the procedure on landing at a strange airfield with 500 lb bombs (37 pistol) still on the aircraft?
3. Why is it essential to conform to the briefed air speed when making a “Wanganui” attack?
4. How does the Flight Engineer check the suction and what readings would you require to ensure that the bombsight was serviceable?
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER [/underlined]
[Underlined] S/Ldr Mansbridge [/underlined] has left Group Headquarters and is now on a Staff Officers’ Course.
[Underlined] F/Lt Abbott [/underlined] (49 Squadron) is carrying out Group Bombing Leader’s duties.
[Underlined] S/Ldr Murtough [/underlined] (53 Base) has gone to Manby to take charge of the Bombing Leaders’ Courses.
[Underlined] F/Lt McCarthy [/underlined] (1654 C.U.) has gone to 53 Base and has been replaced by [underlined] F/Lt Kennedy [/underlined] (463 Squadron)
[Underlined] F/O Grime [/underlined] is doing Bombing Leader’s duties at 463 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/Lt Harris [/underlined] (5 L.F.S.) has met with an unfortunate accident, and [underlined] F/O Wilkie [/underlined] (1661 C.U.) has taken over the Bombing Section at Syerston.
[Underlined] COURSES [/underlined]
The Group had three Air Bombers on No.91 Bombing Leaders’ Course, F/O Moreton (106 Squadron) was 6th, P/O Muhl (207 Squadron) 8th, and F/O Pyle (1661 C.U.) 10th, all obtaining “B” categories.
The bombing analysis courses are proceeding satisfactorily, and our
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candidates have all received excellent assessments. If any Squadron or Conversion Unit has not appointed a Bombing Analysis Officer who has completed the course, please apply for an early vacancy.
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
[Underlined] Squadron Average Error [/underlined]
1st 97 61 yards
2nd 630 64 yards
3rd 619 71 yards
4th 83 74 yards
5th 467 77 yards
6th 207 81 yards
7th 9 89 yards
8th 49 90 yards
9th 463 93 yards
10th 61 113 yards
11th 44 114 yards
12th 50 117 yards
13th 57 118 yards
14th 122 yards
September has produced a 100% entry in the Squadron Bombing Competition and 97 Squadron are at the top with an average error, for 8 exercises, of 61 yards.
This is an excellent result and 97 are to be congratulated, more especially as quite a lot of their bombing was carried out by Flight Engineers.
With the exception of 619 Squadron, 52 Base have slipped down the ladder, but assurances have been received from 44 and 49 Squadrons that this is only a temporary lapse, and every effort will be made to return to their former positions.
106 Squadron are handicapped by having many unexperienced crews on their strength and consequently are at the bottom of the list. However, the keenness which is apparent on the station is sure to produce better results.
Competition should be very keen during October; 97 Squadron will be ‘all out’ to keep on top, and it will need a very special effort from the “Main Force” to depose them. Given suitable weather, all records should be broken.
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
[Underlined] Con. Unit Average Error [/underlined]
1st 1654 56 yards
2nd 1660 65 yards
3rd 1661 72 yards
4th 5 L.F.S. 85 yards
1661 Conversion Unit, after leading for two successive months, have gone down to third place, and 1654 Conversion Unit have taken over the top position with an average error of 56 yards.
[Underlined] “BIGCHIEF” COMPETITION [/underlined]
The only entry this month comes from 51 Base:-
G/Capt Coats (Swinderby) – 103 yards
[Underlined] “LEADER” COMPETITION [/underlined]
This competition has only produced one entrant also:-
F/Lt Foulkes (630 Squadron) – 158 yards
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[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Errors by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
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[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE RANGES [/underlined]
Wainfleet plotted 4945 bombs and 111 T.I’s dropped from 921 aircraft.
It is obvious that the Range staff have had a busy time, and to ensure accurate plotting, crews must conform to range procedure.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
[Underlined] S/Ldr Wonham [/underlined] (55 Base) extends a hearty welcome to 44 and 619 Squadrons. The rivalry between the Squadrons, on Practice Bombing matters, is very keen and errors have shown a steady decrease during the past few months.
[Underlined] F/Lt Foulkes [/underlined] (630 Squadron) has equipped an excellent Bombing Analysis room. Points concerning Bombing, which need stressing, are emphasised by humorous cartoons, and the room itself is kept very clean and tidy.
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORIES [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
* Excluding 617 and 627 Squadrons.
A+ 85 yards or less.
A 140 yards or less.
B 210 yards or less.
C 280 yards or less.
D Over 280 yards.
The number of “D” category crews has decreased from 41 in August, to 15 for this month. This is a considerable improvement, but it is not good enough – there should be no “D” crews on an Operational Squadron, and Bombing Leaders must give careful attention to these errors.
[Underlined] SEPTEMBER’S OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS [/underlined]
SQDN OR CON UNIT PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR ERROR AT 20,000’ IN YARDS
9 F/O Marsh F/O Carr - 78
44 P/O Evans Sgt Harper F/S Hunter 73
49 F/O Furber F/S Gentleman F/O Hassell 75
50 F/S Wonders F/S Earle F/S Minchin 79
97 F/O Woolnough W/O Shearwood F/O Haggerston 57
F/L Shorter F/S Betts P/O Aveline 57 – 79
467 F/O Jones F/S Burns F/S Michelmore 74
617 F/L Knights F/O Rogers F/O Playford 74
F/O Levy F/S Peck F/O Fox 78
F/O Stout F/O Rupert F/O Graham 59
F/O Joplin F/S Hebbard F/S Fish 70
F/L Hamilton F/O Rogers P/O Jackson 72
F/O Leavitt Sgt Oldham F/O Withams 73
619 F/O Cottman F/S Coster F/S Murray 71
1654 F/O Gray F/O Aitken Sgt Adams 62
F/O Denton F/O Goebel Sgt Kneebone 77
F/O Brammer Sgt White W/O Davies 69
P/O Dockworth F/S Quealy F/S Kenward 43
F/O Langridge F/O Cavanagh F/S Diggins 65
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OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS (continued)
SQDN OR CON UNIT PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR ERROR AT 20,000’ IN YARDS
1660 P/O Le Marquand Sgt Bowen Sgt Ransom 56
Sgt Sargent Sgt Walters F/S Symes 67
Sgt Keen Sgt Hurst Sgt Fidler 62
Lt Evenson Sgt BJorcy P/O Carling 61
P/O Penman F/S Dash P/O Pointon 78
F/S Cox F/S Smitherwaite Sgt Taylor 68
F/O Downing F/O Harrison P/O Semark 64
Lt Howes Sgt Johnston F/O Butterfield 78
1661 F/S Wonders F/S Earle F/S Minchin 78
F/O James Sgt Longhurst P/O Jeffreys 70
F/O Gillegin Sgt Jenden Sgt Elliott 58
P/O Smith F/S Scott F/O Sweeney 77
F/O Caryer F/O Arnett P/O Grassie 71
5 L.F.S. P/O Aryton Sgt Herkes F/S Bardsley 65
P/O Le Marquand Sgt Bowers Sgt Ransom 78
Owing to the large number of crew errors below 100 yards, it is only possible to publish those below 80 yards. Congratulations are due to F/L Shorter and crew (97 Squadron), F/S Wonders and crew (50 Squadron) and P/O Le Marquand and crew (now of 49 Squadron) for their consistently good bombing during the month.
[Underlined] THE “LORD CAMROSE” BOMBING TROPHY [/underlined]
The “Lord Camrose” trophy remains at Skellingthorpe for another three months.
50 Squadron’s average crew error for the months of July, August and September is 148 yards at 20,000 feet. Well done 50 Squadron!
463 Squadron are the runners up with an average error of 153 yards at 20,000 feet.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING. [/underlined]
The complete summary of practice bombing results for the month of September provides some very interesting facts and comparisons.
The number of bombs dropped is the best ever, and 9 Squadron are to be congratulated on their magnificent effort in dropping 789. However, it will be noted that 61 Squadron dropped only 96 and assuming the Squadron strength to be 25 crews, that gives an average of 4 bombs per crew for one month. This compares unfavourably with the other Squadrons in the same Base, and it is essential that crews have the maximum amount of bombing training permitted by operational commitments and weather conditions.
Crew errors have declined slightly this month, the average being 9 yards less than that of August. This is a step in the right direction and it is hoped that there will be a steady reduction in errors until we can get our average error down to less than 150 yards. It can be done, 50 Squadron have proved it by obtaining an average crew error of 148 yards for the last three months.
The number of bombsight errors has increased from 42 in August to 90 in September, but the proportion of bombsight errors to exercises completed remains the same. Close co-operation between the Bombing Analysis Officer and the Instrument Section will help to bring bombsight serviceability up to a satisfactory level.
Our practice bombing has improved considerably during the past six months, from 275 to 183 yards at 20,000 feet and this improvement is apparent in the results of the attacks on German targets. However, it is possible to reach an even higher standard of accuracy but it means constant practice on the part of every member of the bombing team.
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[Drawing] NAVIGATION
Almost all attacks this month have been on German objectives and navigators have done a good job on these longer range targets. Radar restrictions have necessitated flying considerable distances outside Gee range, and with winter approaching we must be prepared to fly even greater distances on D.R. alone. To achieve the high standard of navigation necessary for correct timing at the target, your D.R. navigation must be as sound and as complete as possible.
Mathematical accuracy, constant checking of D.R. positions and constant w/v checks, are the keynote of efficient D.R. navigation. Unfortunately very few navigators comply with all these points, and cases still occur of navigators not obtaining one D.R. position between their last Gee fix and the target.
Timing has been stressed frequently but on the coming long range operations it will be of paramount importance. By comparing forecast winds with winds found it is nearly always possible after the first hour’s flying to tell whether the aircraft will arrive at the target on time or not. If no moveable zero hour is being employed, then the earlier you can adjust your air speed, the easier it will be for you to arrive at the target at your scheduled time. During the winter months of last year it was not unusual to experience a spread of 15 – 20 minutes in the time over the target or along the route. With the concentration of enemy defences YOU CANNOT afford to fly in a bomber stream some 60 miles in length.
[Underlined] WIND FINDING. [/underlined]
The broadcast wind velocity scheme has not been used this month. Crews detailed to find correct bombing winds have put in some very good work, however, particular mention being due to 49 Squadron on the night 26/27th (Karlsruhe).
[Underlined] EXAMPLE OF GOOD “PILOT” NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
On the night of 27/28th September, 1944 (Kaiserlauten) F/O Nunns, Pilot of 630 Squadron gave an excellent example of “Pilot” Navigation. His aircraft was hit by flak on the return journey when some 150 miles inside France. He ordered the crew to abandon aircraft and was about to bale out himself when he managed to regain control. He decided to bring the aircraft back to base himself. Levelling out the aircraft and putting in “George” he went back to the navigator’s compartment and studied the log and chart carefully. From the information on the chart he was able to ascertain the aircraft’s present approximate position, and from the flight plan the courses to steer to reach base and the times on each leg. He flew the courses stated for the requisite amount of time and (strangely enough!) reached the base area. He was able to identify the beacons en route from the navigator’s flimsy and was thus able to “map read” the last few miles to base by this method.
This was a great effort and praise is due to both the pilot and also to his navigator who must have kept a complete and tidy chart to enable F/O Nunns to reach base the way he did.
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF NAVIGATORS. [/underlined]
During the month of August it was decided to categorise navigators. Navigation does not lend itself easily to categorisation, mainly because it is impossible to lay down a procedure which will cater for every eventuality. It therefore will depend upon common sense and judgement of navigation officers.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION ANALYSIS OFFICERS. [/underlined]
It is essential that all navigator’s operational logs and charts are thoroughly analysed immediately after each raid, and the results of that analysis made known to the navigation team as soon as possible, so that mistakes made will not be repeated. The analysis of logs and charts has always been the responsibility of Station and Squadron Navigation Officers; the present frequency of operations makes this an impossible task. It has therefore been decided to appoint one Navigation Analysis Officer to each Squadron, whose whole time duty it will be to analyse very thoroughly each log and chart.
By these appointments it is hoped to bring to light the errors and omissions of each navigator within 24 hours of completing a sortie. The Station Navigation Officer will thus be able to point out to each Navigator the “error of his ways” immediately, and will thus ensure that the mistake is not repeated.
Navigation Officers have a very big job in front of them and much hard work will be required.
[Underlined] APPROACH OF WINTER – WHAT IT MEANS! [/underlined]
Apart from all the well-known discomforts, the approach of winter means that OLD MAN WIND – the Navigator’s greatest enemy – will start hitting out again in force and will do all he can to land you in mischief. Low pressure systems are more prevalent in winter time, and therefore stronger winds have to be combated. Longer range targets means passing over territory which cannot at the moment, be too well explored by the Met. man, therefore you may pass over a front with a consequent wind change or run into a low pressure system which has not been forecast by the Met. Section. All this means that every individual Navigator must have a very thorough understanding of wind system. He must be able to interpolate for wind changes and must anticipate any sudden change of wind velocity. In last month’s summary attention was drawn to the Berlin raid of last Winter. We do not want this to happen again.
Get to know the wind system; visit the Met. man regularly and discuss the subject with him. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers should arrange constant lectures on this subject for the benefit of their Navigators. Wind is your biggest enemy.
[Underlined] O.R.S. INFORMATION. [/underlined]
A word about the O.R.S. information which is taken from you at interrogation. Numerous instances are occurring of incorrect information being forwarded to Group Headquarters. For example, an aircraft’s position is given as 4720N when it should be 4920N. These inaccuracies are obvious but other smaller inaccuracies are not so obvious. The concentration diagrams prepared from this information do not present a true picture of the situation, also many statistics prepared by O.R.S. are equally inaccurate and are therefore of no value.
All this O.R.S. information is collected and collated for your benefit and ultimate safety so do make sure that you give the CORRECT information and SEE that the Interrogator logs it correctly.
[Underlined] ATTACK ON TIRPITZ. [/underlined]
Navigators of 9 and 617 Squadrons had an opportunity during the month of showing their skill as “real” Navigators. The occasion was the attack on Tirpitz in Northern Waters and the landing at advanced bases in Russia. This operation, undertaken under difficult weather conditions and in total darkness, called for a very high standard of Navigation. It was anticipated that Gee would be received as far as 63° or 64°N; this was in fact correct. The remaining 1,000 miles over enemy occupied territory and enemy waters had to be tackled without the aid of Radar fixing facilities. Map reading was of course the most accurate method of fixing available, but this was very difficult over mountainous country studded with lakes and rivers. Nevertheless Air Bombers did some excellent work. Good use was also made of drifts
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and astro shots. Unfortunately the low pressure system which could not be accurately positioned by Met., was encountered over the most difficult part of the route. This meant that winds became much stronger than forecast and also a considerable lowering of cloud base. Nevertheless, practically all the Navigators noted this sudden strengthening and varying of the wind velocity and were able to combat it successfully.
It was anticipated that a little trouble might be experienced with the P4 Compasses in these Northern latitudes. Every precaution was therefore taken before the aircraft left this country, compasses were swung and as much deviation was removed before take-off for this operation. It was gratifying to note, however, that not one single instance of compass failure or excessive deviation occurred.
The Air Bombers and Navigators of 9 and 617 Squadrons did an excellent job on this operation, under the most difficult conditions. They brought back with them much valuable information on the performance of compasses, Northern chain Gee range at varying heights etc. – information which will be of considerable importance in the planning of future operations.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING W/VS [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by all Squadrons and Conversion Units this month is shown below.
Average Error of Squadrons – 4.7
Average Error of C. Units – 5.0
These figures show an improvement for the Squadrons of 1.8 m.p.h. and for the Conversion Units of 1.6 m.p.h. This is excellent and the ideal overall average of 5 m.p.h. has been reached. Let us now try and reduce this ideal over-all to 4 m.p.h.
[Table of Vector Error by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
It will be noted that 9 and 50 Squadrons are holding two of the first three places for the fourth month is succession. A very creditable performance. There still appears to be little improvement in the errors obtained by the three Squadrons from 54 Base. Come along now, let us see them at the top of the list next month.
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[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr. Mould, DFC – Base Nav. Officer, Scampton to be Base Nav. Officer, Syerston.
S/Ldr. Bray, DFC – Station Nav. Officer, Dunholme to be Station Nav. Officer, Strubby.
S/Ldr. Warwick, DFC – Base Navigation Officer, Coningsby missing on operations.
[Cartoon] “HERE IS THE BOMBING WIND – AND THIS IS P/O VECTOR READING IT!”
N.M.
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[Drawing] RADAR NAV.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
The most outstanding feature regarding 2 S this month has been the severe restrictions placed upon its use for operations.
It is realised that with these restrictions of H 2 S, navigation is bound to suffer slightly, particularly during the autumn months as no one can be too certain of the ranges on Gee. Operators must therefore make the best of the limited use of H 2 S on each operation. This Headquarters will welcome any ideas on how to obtain maximum efficiency from H 2 S during the limited periods it is available.
There are one or two points regarding the restrictions which must be stressed at the present time. Firstly, operators, if they are allowed to use H 2 S on any part of the flight, must make sure that it is switched on below 6,000 feet or else circuit breakdowns may occur. Secondly, close watch must be maintained on the scanner position when turned off, as wander is likely particularly during tactical manoeuvres.
It must be pointed out that despite restrictions on H 2 S on operations, no relaxation in training can be allowed and every effort must be made to see that operators remain proficient in its use. Experiments are being carried out to develop some kind of sector scan and if successful, operators may be able to make use of H 2 S throughout the whole flight. Sector scan requires a high standard of proficiency in H 2 S particularly in the interpretation of the P.P.I., and although training in sector can cannot be given at the moment, operators may do well to bear the problem in mind.
Experiments are also going ahead with the Mark II H 2 S scanner to try and improve the bombing picture on the P.P.I. This is being done by altering the pitch of the scanner to concentrate the beam and alter the polar diagram. If successful it may be possible to modify other Mark II equipment gradually. This will only be done if the range is not seriously restricted and its navigational use is not affected.
Blind bombing technique in the Group has developed further in the past few weeks and considerable success has been obtained by 83 and 97 Squadrons on the last few operations. To indicate the high standard which these two Squadrons have attained, a resume’ of their flare and blind marking errors on operations is given.
[Underlined] KOENIGSBERG. 26/27 AUGUST, 1944. [/underlined]
This was the first operation on which the specially selected H 2 S Mark III equipment was used and F/Lt. Baker, Blind Marker crew of 97 Squadron dropped his marker 400 yds. south of the Aiming Point. Had the whole attack been based on this marker it might have been slightly more successful.
[Underlined] KOENIGSBERG. 29/30th AUGUST, 1944. [/underlined]
An extremely successful operation with the centre of the blind illuminating flares being plotted extremely close to the centre of the town. The blind proximity marker released by a crew of 97 Squadron was reported 600 yds. south of the aiming point although no photograph was obtained.
[Underlined] DARMSTADT. 11/12th SEPTEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
An excellent operation with highly successful blind illumination
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provided by 83 and 97 Squadrons. The direct release method of marking and blind bombing was used and photographs gave the following results:-
F/O TAYLOR 97 SQUADRON AIMING POINT.
F/LT. HIGGS 97 SQUADRON 1,300 yds.
F/O EATON 97 SQUADRON 1,300 yds.
F/O SIMPSON 97 SQUADRON 1,300 yds.
F/LT. BAKER 97 SQUADRON 1.75 n.m.
[Underlined] STUTTGART. 12/13th SEPTEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Blind marking was carried out by the direct release method with a G.P.I. check from PFORZHEIM. The following successful results were obtained:-
F/LT. AMES 97 SQUADRON 600 yds. From Town Centre.
F/LT. HIGGS 97 SQUADRON 1,000yds. From Town Centre.
F/LT. SHORTER 97 SQUADRON 2,500 yds From Town Centre.
F/O. SIMPSON 97 SQUADRON 2,500 yds. From Town Centre.
F/LT. LAING 97 SQUADRON 2,500 yds. From Town Centre.
[Underlined] BREMERHAVEN 18/19th SEPTEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
A most successful sortie. Of the Primary Blind Markers F/Lt. Kelly of 83 Squadron dropped his T.Is. 500 yds. from the Aiming Point whilst F/Lt. Laing and F/Lt. Lines of 97 Squadron both had errors of less than 1 nautical mile. The Flare Force too was remarkably accurate, illuminating the target area to such effect that the Mosquito aircraft had no difficulty in marking the Aiming Point. The Flare Force photographs showed that F/O Gamble, 83 Squadron, F/O Price, 83 Squadron and F/O Canever of 97 Squadron had Aiming Points, whilst S/Ldr. Hatcher had an error of 1,400 yds.
[Underlined] MUNCHEN GLADBACH 19/20th SEPTEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Technical failures prevented the plotting of many flare force photographs, but P.R.U. cover shows considerable damage in the target area, proving that the flare force illumination was of its usual high order.
[Underlined] KARLSRUHE. [/underlined]
Cloud prevented the plotting of photographs, but P.R.U. cover shows very extensive damage in the most closely built up area of the town. P.P.I. photographs indicate that the accuracy of the blind markers was to the order of 1,000 yds. and 400 yds. respectively.
[Underlined] KAIDERSLAUTERN. [/underlined]
Using the direct release method with a G.P.I. check on SAABRUCKEN, W/C. Ingham of 83 Squadron dropped his flares 1,500 yards, F/Lt. Edwards, 83 Squadron 1.3 miles and F/O Simpson 1.25 miles respectively from the flare aiming point. By this illumination, the low level Mosquitos were able to mark the target accurately.
Great credit is due to the two marking Squadrons for the success obtained on these operations. The majority of the results were obtained on the specially selected and tuned up sets thus proving that not only have crews to be selected, but also the equipment. In addition, the results have been obtained only through particularly extensive training, and the enthusiasm of the crews carrying it out.
If we are to maintain these excellent results, the two squadrons must be provided with crews of a suitable type; Crews selected are carrying on high tradition and are directly responsible for the success of all future operations.
[Underlined] P.P.I. PHOTOGRAPHY. [/underlined]
The standard of P.P.I. photography has been raised slightly during the month and several good photographs have been received at this Headquarters. F/Lt. Dobbie of 97 Squadron obtained an excellent photograph
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of KAISERLAUTERN when on the operation to KARLSRUHE. This was of considerable assistance to set operators in their identification of this target on a later raid.
Very little gardening has been carried out this month. But so far the results received are up to the usual 5 Group standard. A paper on the plotting od H 2 S mining photographs has been received and copies are being sent to the gardening squadrons for their attention. This report supplements the report S.121 on the plotting of “Y” photographs and is based on data from No. 4 and 6 Groups who have carried out the majority of H 2 S gardening sorties.
[Underlined] GEE. [/underlined]
Increased importance has been placed on the use of Gee this month due to the restrictions placed on the use of H 2 S. Thus the necessity for that very last fix is again well to the forefront. Operators must make every effort to read through the jamming and make maximum use of position lines where fixes cannot be obtained.
On the majority of operations during the month a considerable increase in ranges have been noticed due to the swift advance of the allied armies, capturing large areas of country in which Gee jamming equipment was sited. This at once extended the ranges obtainable over France and Belgium to the limits of the territory held, but no marked improvement was shown further north where enemy interference in Holland and N. West Germany, though varying in intensity from day to day, was nearly always at maximum intensity when heavy bombers were operating.
On the Eastern Chain it has been noted that the enemy has transferred a considerable amount of his jamming to the 27 unit and that greater range is being obtained on the Unit 25. Weakness of pulses only restricts range on the Unit 25.
The average range on the North Eastern Chain has been stabilised at about 6°E with the limiting factor being the weakness of the “A” pulse.
The Southern Chain appears to be giving the best results now that German jamming has ceased with fixes as far as 7°E. These ranges may drop during the Autumn due to meteorological conditions. The limiting factor on this chain appears to be the weakness of the “C” pulse.
There have been few reports on the Channel chain, but it would appear that the limits of its coverage are between 5 and 6° with little jamming. The general complaint on the use of this chain are that the topographical lattice maps suppled are unsuited for heavy bomber navigation.
Two Squadrons had the opportunity of using the Northern Chain at its extreme limits this month. The flight was carried out at low level and signals were received as far as 64 °N, but the small cut of the lattice lines did not enable fixes to be plotted accurately at that range. These results were as much as expected, and confirm the reports of Costal [sic] Command who do the most flying in that area.
The low level at which we are now flying over France may restrict Gee range somewhat but it is thought that the short ranges obtained by navigators on the operation on KAISERLAUTERN was due to the poor propagation properties of the atmosphere. These properties are most noticeable during the months of October and November, and it may well be that our Gee range on the present chains may be restricted to 5°E throughout these months.
However, to counteract this we have news of further chains which are being provided on the Continent and as soon as information is received at this Headquarters it will be passed to Squadrons.
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
Tests are still being carried out by Bomber Command as to the suitability of the use of the Homing and S.S. Chains for Bomber Command Navigation.
Until the results of these tests are known no action is being taken regarding the training of navigators.
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[Drawing] ENGINEERING
Large number of movements have taken place or about to take place which are liable to upset calculations, but it is apparent that the operational effort has not suffered as a result. 52 Base is about to leave the Group complete with R.A.F. Stations, Scampton, Fiskerton and Dunholme. The good work which we associate with such stations will now be associate with other stations within the Group. 55 Base now comprises as many squadrons as 53 Base, i.e. five full squadrons each, and No. 5 L.F.S., Syerston, comes within a Base Organisation.
[Underlined] OPERATIONAL DEFECTS. [/underlined]
The operational effort was not quite so high as the previous month, but the aircraft were available had the weather given us a fair chance. The percentage of operational failures due to Engineer faults was 0.94 which is an improvement on the previous months. Out of this total, 0.24% were abortive sorties and 0.7% were early returns. Special mention must be made to No. 54 Base as a whole and they are given the ‘Big Hand’ for producing the record of having no operational failures due to matters concerning the Engineers during September. 49 Squadron also are to be congratulated for similar reasons.
[Underlined] MAINTENANCE – 5 GROUP SERVICING SECTION [/underlined]
Appreciation of the efforts of No. 5 Group Servicing Section is recorded and the good work which is carried out by them under very often difficult conditions. C.T.O’s should realise the personal problems and difficulties of these mobile parties which are moved about at a moment’s notice to wherever the ‘shoe pinches’ within the Group. The sum total of the work carried out by these few men during the last four months comprises eight Major Inspections, thirty initial checks and 120 rebuilt power plants. During September two gangs were in operation as Major Inspection gangs solely for the first time, and their activities within the Group are apparent. Apart from the above work, four base hydraulic bays have been completed, two during the last four months. The instrument personnel have built and installed 110 second pilot’s instrument panels in Stirling aircraft of Conversion Units during the last three months.
[Underlined] FORMS 765C. [/underlined]
The remarks by the Specialist Officer concerned at para. 11 of the 765C are still far too brief and in many cases incomplete, and invariably give no indication whether relevant modifications are embodied or not. It is pointed out once more that care and thought in rendering Forms 765C will prove of assistance in attempting to establish the cause of failures and recommending action for preventing recurrences of such failures.
[Underlined] INSTRUMENTS AND ELECTRICAL. [/underlined]
Bombsight maintenance continues at a high standard throughout the Group, and accuracy of a high order is being achieved, mainly due to the effective liaison existing between Electrical Officers and Bombing Leaders. Bombing Analysis courses are now open to Base Electrical Officers, and two have, up to the time of writing, completed the course. The course has proved very valuable in assisting Electrical Officers in diagnosing the causes of bombing errors, particularly instrument errors, and we can now look forward to an even higher standard of accuracy. As it will be a long time before all Electrical Officers will be able to attend the course Base Electrical Officers should instruct their junior officers in the art of analysing a bombing plot.
Mk.XIVA bombsights are now arriving in large numbers and the Group Instrument Servicing Van is having a busy time in instructing personnel in
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the differences between the XIV and the XIVA. The new computor [sic] is not all that could be desired, the great majority of them (about 95%) needing retuning or the replacing of defective parts, and are generally requiring about twice the number of man hours to rectify. The matter has been taken up with higher authority and it is hoped that results of our ‘moans’ will soon be evident. In the meantime a thorough check must be given to every computor [sic] and 1022 action taken in every case of faulty design, or workmanship.
A word or two regarding defect action would not come amiss. Far too many defective items of equipment are being returned to stores without 1022 or 1023 action being taken. It must be impressed again on all officers that it is only by taking the correct official procedure that rectification action can be taken. It is of no earthly use just to tell the Group Specialist Officer that such and such is giving trouble if there is no 1022 backing. The Group Specialist Officer of course wants to know what is giving trouble but any report that he may make will be shot down if it is not supported by a 1022. A case in point concerns the low insulation of gun heaters. Only two cases have been reported to Command out of the hundred or so which have occurred. So let us have some more 1022’s.
After putting in a considerable amount of work in their respective sections the Electrical and Instrument personnel of 52 Base have had to evacuate their quarters and move to Syerston and start again from scratch. No doubt their experience will serve them well in producing even better sections.
Command Modification No. 74 is now completed throughout the Group and a word of praise must be given to those men who formed the Group pool to produce the modified bomb aimer’s panels. They worked long hours and did an excellent job of work. All Bases were represented so they will each have a good man to start their own modification gang cracking.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of Training Unit Serviceability]
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Many applications have been made in the past by Flight Engineers to change over to Transport Command; This Command is now prepared to accept Flight Engineers for flying duties provided they have completed two operational tours and one tour of instructional duties. Flight Engineers who are eligible should make application through the usual channels at their unit.
Log keeping has improved throughout this Group, but it is noticed that many engineers do not record atmospheric temperatures and airframe serial letter and numbers; this has been pointed out before. Flight Engineer Leaders must insist that this omission is remedied.
Defect reports still come through showing the cause as manipulation trouble on the part of the Flight Engineer, in many cases these result in a cancellation or early return. Points for the Flight Engineer Leader to instruct on are as follows:-
[Underlined] Starter Motor burnt out: [/underlined] if correct drill had been used this would have been avoided.
[Underlined] Overheating of Engines: [/underlined] early returns are made because of supposed overheating; on examination, these temperatures prove to be within the engine limitations.
[Underlined] Misbehaviour of Engines: [/underlined] black smoke from exhaust; on this trip other crews reported same conditions but attributed this to atmospheric conditions on flying through cloud. Had this Flight Engineer checked all his gauges he would have been able to inform his Captain that engines were quite normal and this early return would have been avoided.
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[Drawing] AIR SEA RESCUE
With the liberation of countries in Western Europe, the flow back to England of aircrew who have been shot down is increasing – not only in numbers, but in speed. It is strongly rumoured that one, who was shot down on the outward trip, managed, with the assistance of a jeep and a flip from Paris, to arrive back before the Main Force!
These evaders tell amazing stories – some are good and reveal level-headedness, fine crew discipline and a sound knowledge of Safety Drills. Others are the reverse, and the following extracts from reports by 5 Group aircrew tell their own story.
[Underlined] Crew shot down on 6th June, 1944. [/underlined]
“The executive order was “We’ve been hit kids, get out”.
“My parachute was only fixed by the right buckle”.
“Informant had known for some time that the left clip was loose, but had neglected to have it repaired”.
[Underlined] Crew shot down on 24/25th July, 1944. [/underlined]
“The executive order was “Get to Hell out of this as quickly as possible”.
“The informant did not leave his turret (Mid-Upper) very speedily as he experienced some difficulty in locating the footbar”.
[Underlined] Crew shot down on 3/4th May, 1944. [/underlined]
“The W/Op noticed as he passed, that the Navigator’s altimeter was reading 1,000 feet. He therefore pulled his rip cord while still in the aircraft. He gathered the canopy in his arms and went out head first, receiving a kick on the behind from the pilot”.
[Cartoon] DO YOU KNOW YOUR DRILLS? – OR DO [underlined] YOU [/underlined] HAVE TO BE KICKED OUT?? N.M.
[Underlined] Crew shot down on 7/8th August, 1944. [/underlined]
“The Mid Upper Gunner was moving so quickly that he overshot the exit and fell against the rear turret. He returned with some difficulty to the exit, which he opened. He then took his parachute from his stowage and fastened it on”.
“The pilot had to go back from his seat for his parachute which the Navigator had failed to give him”.
[Underlined] CHECK YOUR ESCAPE HATCH! [/underlined]
There have been too many incidents where the front hatch has
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jammed or taken a long time to open. The Air Bomber’s pre-flight drill calls for a check on this hatch. A check does not mean that the Air Bomber looks to see that the hatch is there, but means that he is to check its ease of release and that it is correctly fastened afterwards.
The parachute drill (5 Group Aircraft Drills) states that the hatch is to be JETTISONED, not pulled up inside the aircraft where it is liable to obstruct the exit.
[Underlined] CHECK YOUR PARACHUTE! [/UNDERLINED]
An unfortunate incident occurred during the month when a Hurricane Pilot, not wearing his own parachute, collided with a Martinet and was forced to abandon his aircraft.
The pilot did not get clear until he was at about 3,000 ft. and, although he pulled the rip cord immediately, he was killed on impact with the ground.
An examination of the parachute harness also showed that it was far too loose for the wearer.
Each member of air-crew flying fighters or bombers, must check his parachute for serviceability and fitting before every flight.
[Underlined] EVASION [/underlined]
No less than 25 aircrew of No. 50 Squadron, missing since the beginning of May, are reported to have evaded capture and returned safely to this country.
Successful evasion depends upon:
(i) Your will to evade.
(ii) Your physical fitness.
(iii) An up to date knowledge of the military situation.
(iv) the latest advice which your Intelligence Officer will give you.
Consider these things beforehand and avoid Dulag Luft.
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[Drawing] PHOTOGRAPHY
The total number of failures on Night Photography has decreased to 5.93%. Failures on Day Photography amount to 4.07%. The decrease over the previous month in respect of Night Photography has occurred chiefly on the Armament side. The prevailing target conditions, when smoke from incendiary loads obscured the target, has made it impossible in many cases to determine whether a flash has or has not exploded correctly. This is a recurrence of conditions which existed during last winter. Manipulation failures have shown an increase in the last two months, in 83 and 97 Squadrons. In the past this type of failure has been very low in this Group, and it is to be hoped that the steps now being taken by the Bombing Leaders will eliminate them in these two Squadrons.
The supply of High Speed Night Film has now materially increased and Squadrons are to use this film on all operations. In view of the fact that we are now entering a period of the year when light conditions will often be poor, the use of this film will help to ensure sufficient exposure. It will, of course, save a lot of magazine reloading.
The supply of H 2 S cameras has grown considerably during the past month and promises to continue doing so. These cameras are not constructed for service work or to be handled by service personnel; great care will therefore have to be exercised in the handling and operating of them. A number of H 2 S photographs received have been unsharp and sometimes of poor quality. This poor workmanship will have to be remedied and a special effort by Photographic N.C.O’s in this direction is required.
No. 5 Group Headquarters now hold a K.20 camera for use on hand held obliques. Any station requiring the use of this camera is to inform the Group Photographic Officer who will make arrangements for the camera to be forwarded. Two days’ notice will be required.
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[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF PHOTOGRAPHY [/underlined]
[Table of Photographic Analysis by Squadron]
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[Drawing] ARMAMENT
[Underlined] WINTER [/underlined]
Once more the annual reminder which you are no doubt tired of hearing, but a warning which must be even more carefully heeded this year than ever before.
Listed below are a few points which will require your personal attention during the coming months if an increase in failures is to be avoided.
[Underlined] Gun Heaters. [/underlined] Are all your aircraft fitted with gun heaters? The Electrical Officers are giving this matter their personal attention and the fitting of heaters is going ahead. Take a personal interest in this matter yourself, see that the Electrical Branch are given every assistance.
[Underlined] Duct Heaters. [/underlined] New aircraft are now arriving with ducted heating to both rear and mid-upper turrets. Have you any of these aircraft? If so, go and have a look at one and get the “gen” on how it works.
[Underlined] Browning Guns. [/underlined] Has your gun maintenance been allowed to slip during the summer months? If so, now is the time to tighten up. All new guns must be very carefully checked; all grease must be removed, particularly from the breach block, firing pin and spring, etc. and guns must be lubricated in accordance with B.C.A.S.I. Pt.2, Section 14, Leaflet No.6, Issue No. 1.
[Underlined] Gun Covers. [/underlined] Have you an adequate supply of gun and turret covers? All Units should now have manufactured the cover for the Direct Vision Aperture in the F.N. 120. This Headquarters’ letter 634/4/Armt. dated 12th May, 1944 refers.
[Underlined] Cluster Projectiles. [/underlined] Wet Cluster Projectiles may cause functioning failures due to ice accretion on the mechanism or from rust. See that full use is made of all available tarpaulins. Recommendations have been made to Headquarters, Bomber Command for an increase in establishment of Covers, Water proof, Large and Small.
[Underlined] Bomb Trollies. [/underlined] Are all your trollies fitted with mud guards to prevent S.B.C. release slips from becoming splashed with mud and water during transportation?
[Underlined] Welfare. [/underlined] During Winter months Armourers will be working long hours in bad weather conditions. See that they are properly equipped with warm clothing, gloves, oil skins, and gum boots etc. A warm and contented man will work better than one half frozen.
[Underlined] SMALL BOMB CONTAINERS. [/underlined]
The month of September saw the return, after a long absence, of the Small Bomb Container. With the introduction of the Cluster Projectile, relief was felt by all Armament Officers as it was thought we had seen the last of the “very difficult to handle” Small Bomb Container. Unfortunately the shortage of Cluster Projectiles has necessitated our return to this item of equipment, consequently a large number of headaches have resulted.
With the introduction of the new Twin Adaptors the Incendiary load has been considerable [sic] increased and it is now possible to carry 20 S.B.C’s on the Lancaster. This increase in bomb load means that far more work is entailed in the preparation of the required number of S.B.C’s for an
[Page break]
operation and it has been found necessary to seek outside labour to assist in the filling. Unfortunately it is still necessary to fill the Mk. VA. S.B.C. by hand, but small numbers of 50 pack Incendiaries are now being received and it is hoped that in the near future the boxes of 30 x 4lb. Incendiaries will entirely disappear. This step will be welcomed by all.
[Cartoon] THIS – OR THIS?? N.M.
[Underlined]
[Underlined] CLUSTER PROJECTILES – HANDLING. [/underlined]
The organisation for the handling of Cluster Projectiles still requires a lot of attention on some Stations. Quantities of Roller Conveyors are now held on all Stations and this equipment, suitably raised from the ground on tail unit boxes or cluster projectile cases, provides an excellent method for the handling and fusing of cluster projectiles.
This equipment, suitably laid out, can provide multi unloading, fusing and loading points, and can cut down the man handling required to the barest minimum, and the saving in time will be considerable.
[Underlined] SALVAGE. [/underlined]
The problem of returning salvage has now become a major one, and when one considers that approximately, 4,000 boxes of 4lb. Incendiaries are thrown up from one operation on a 2 Squadron Station, it is obvious that careful attention must be given to the organisation for the return of this salvage. All 2 Squadron Station have now been supplied with additional labour kindly loaned to us by the Army. This additional labour, if correctly employed, should prevent the accumulation of any large quantity of salvage. When lorries deliver explosives to you let your motto be “They shall not return empty.”
All smaller salvage, i.e. nose plugs, transit caps from tail pistols etc., should be placed in bins and not left lying around to form a permanent menace to bomb trolley tyres. Bins are easily obtainable and sufficient should be placed in the bomb store to enable an ample supply to be available at all fusing and handling points.
[Underlined] HEAVY TYPE TRANSPORTERS. [/underlined]
There is at present a deficiency of approximately 2,500 transporters in this Group, including those sent away under Bomber Command’s instructions, for modification. Bomber Command have promised that every effort is being made to expedite the manufacture of new type heavy transporters and early issues are expected. In the meantime, continual care must be exercised in the loading of cluster projectiles on to bomb trolleys to ensure that no tail units are damaged.
[Underlined] THIS MONTH’S BOOBS – BOMBING LEADERS PLEASE NOTE. [/underlined]
Two boobs by Air Bombers this month were responsible for complete bomb loads being returned to Base.
1. Bomb Aimer failed to fully rotate the Distributor Drum Switch with the result that no contact was made – FULL
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BOMB LOAD RETURNED.
2. Bomb Aimer set drum switch half way between “Distributor” and “Single and Salvo” – FULL BOMB LOAD RETURNED.
Eight other manipulation failures resulted in 8 photoflashes being returned due to the Isolation switch not being made.
[Underlined] QUIZ. [/underlined]
Is your A.P. 2264A fully amended? If so where would you find the information on the Bomb, Smoke, Aircraft, 100 lb. Mk.1?
[Drawing] WAR SAVINGS
(a) Approximate savings in pence per head.
(b) Approximate percentage of personnel saving.
(c) Total savings for the month.
[Table of War Savings by Base and Station]
TOTAL: £5,722.14s. 3d.
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[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES TABLE [/underlined]
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A – Manipulation. B – Maintenance. C – Icing. D. – Technical. E – Electrical. F. – Obscure.
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[Drawing] GUNNERY
[Underlined] THIS MONTH’S BAG [/underlined]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
[Underlined] A/C Letter Sqdn Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
“E” 630 11/12 Sept. T/E
“B” 57 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
“T” 57 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
“O” 83 23rd Sept. S/E
“R” 630 23rd Sept. T/E
“U” 207 26/27 Sept. ME410
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
[Underlined] A/C Letter Sqdn Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
“H” 50 11/12 Sept. ME110
“D” 207 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
“X” 467 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
[Underlined] A/C Letter Sqdn Date Type of E/A [/underlined]
“J” 106 11/12 Sept. JU. 88
“J” 61 11/12 Sept. ME.109
“Y” 9 26/27 Sept. ME.410
Confirmation of these claims, by Headquarters Bomber Command, is awaited.
There was a total of 119 combats during the month’s operations which shows a slight increase on last month’s figure. Of these 8 are claimed as destroyed 3 as probably destroyed and 4 as damaged. The largest number of combats occurred on the night 11/12th September, when Darmstadt was the target. Out of 39 combats the Group claimed 3 destroyed, 3 probably destroyed and 2 damaged – an excellent return. During the month, tracer was removed from the first 300 rounds, with a view to assisting the gunner in his sighting. Reports have since been submitted by Bases, and these are now under consideration. If the test has convinced gunners that accurate shooting can only be applied through the sight, it has certainly been worth while.
Early Warning Devices, with the exception of Fishpond, have been temporarily suspended, so once again the gunner has got to rely on his ability to see under night conditions and on his mental alertness. Even with the E.W.D. several instances occurred of enemy aircraft approaching and attacking unobserved, and without the E.W.D’s we must expect more instances of this. To arm ourselves against this, we must make use of every opportunity of training under night conditions, either at night with night affiliation, or simple exercises on the ground, or by day in the Night Vision rooms. Whilst on the subject of night vision, it is painful to have to record that two instances of Lancaster firing on Lancaster were reported during the month. In each instance the aggressor was identified as a Lancaster by the gunners. It was fortunate that no serious casualties resulted from these attacks, but it does stress the fact that more aircraft recognition under night conditions is called for.
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[Underlined] ODD JOTTINGS [/underlined]
Instances have occurred of guns being fired in dispersals and seriously damaging other aircraft. Gunners must make certain that all guns are on “SAFE” before unloading or testing.
Instructions are to be issued shortly regarding the wearing of Pilot type parachutes by rear gunners. This will come into force when sufficient quantities of this type of parachute are available.
Fighter affiliation exercises with Gyro Camera have shown a big increase on last month’s figures, and Squadrons are to be congratulated. It is hoped that it will be possible in the near future, to issue an extra Gyro Camera assembly to each Squadron.
[Underlined] SQUADRON GUNNERY LEADERS [/underlined]
9 Squadron F/Lt Gabriel
50 Squadron F/Lt Mills
61 Squadron F/Lt Glover
463 Squadron F/Lt Winston
467 Squadron F/O Ellis
44 Squadron F/Lt Clarke
619 Squadron F/Lt Waterhouse
83 Squadron S/Ldr Poole
97 Squadron S/Ldr Sherring
106 Squadron F/Lt Sullivan
617 Squadron F/Lt Armstrong
57 Squadron F/Lt Taylor
630 Squadron F/Lt Cass
207 Squadron F/Lt Wardle
49 Squadron F/Lt Wynyard
[Underlined] AIR TRAINING [/underlined]
[Table of Air Training by Squadron]
GRAND TOTAL OF FIGHTER AFFILIATION EXERCISES FOR SEPTEMBER:- [underlined] 2535 [/underlined]
* 49 Squadron employed on special training.
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[Drawing] TRAINING
[Underlined] RECORD OUTPUT [/underlined]
This was the last month of the full Summer Training Programme, and the number of crews produced was the highest on record. A total of 162 pilots (161 full crews) was posted to Squadrons and provided ample surplus for the forthcoming expansion.
Weather was patchy towards the end of the month, but despite this and some difficulties with power plants and tyres, the Stirling Conversion Units flew an average of 2,000 hours each. No. 5 L.F.S. did a total of just over 2,000 hours. The accident rate improved for the third successive month.
No.1668 Lancaster Conversion Unit is getting into its stride and flew 700 hours. The first course is due to pass out early next month. No. 1669 Halifax Conversion Unit which also formed under the control of 5 Group, made rapid progress once the Staff had the airfield to themselves. The first course enters on 7th October.
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION [/underlined]
Fighter Affiliation continued to increase and 1690 B.D.T. Flight gave day and night affiliation on over 1,000 details, exercising 2450 gunners compared with 2100 for August.
Night affiliation with Hurricanes is growing from infancy into a robust child. 1690 B.D.T. Flight affiliated with 60 Squadron crews at night, exercising 120 gunners, double the total last month. The Hurricanes averaged 41 hours per aircraft.
The monthly target for night affiliation from now on is 600 details. If 300 crews do two night details each, and 9 of the 12 Hurricanes average 3 details each on approximately 21 fit nights in a month, the results will be 600 details, 1200 gunners exercised, and a figure ten-fold greater than this month!
Incidentally, 1690 B.D.T. Flight packed its bags once again, and is now located at R.A.F. Station, Metheringham.
[Underlined] SQUADRON TRAINING [/underlined]
The provision of an instructor for each Squadron, instead of instructors allocated to Bases, will give Squadrons a greater opportunity of supervising closely all new crews, and picking up any deficiencies which arise because of the shortness of the course at the L.F.S.
It is essential that Squadron Training Pilots forward their reports on new crews through the usual channels to Base Headquarters so that the Base Air Staff Officer can submit to this Headquarters at the end of each month a summary of opinion on the standard of training and points requiring attention. 10 and 20 sortie checks are essential for all crews in Squadrons throughout the Group, and Squadron Training Pilots are to give them special attention.
No.106 Squadron now has a new function as the “Nursery” for the two P.F.F. Squadrons in 54 Base. Outstanding crews under training in 51 Base and L.F.S. are being selected for P.F.F. duties in 5 Group, and are posted to 106 Squadron for experience and training, after which they proceed to either 83 or 97 Squadron to provide the necessary experience and for supervising the new crews.
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[Underlined] LINK TRAINER TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of Link Trainer Times by Base, Squadron and Conversion Unit]
GRAND TOTAL:- Pilots: 1463 hours
F/Engineers: 965 hours
There was again an increase in Link Trainer Times for the month by both Pilots and Flight Engineers. The Pilots went up by about 100 hours and the Flight Engineers by about 40 hours.
Every little helps, but 140 hours among 21 Units represents an average increase of about 7 hours per Unit.
It should be possible to increase this four-fold now that the more doubtful weather is approaching. Each Squadron in particular should get its Pilots’ Link times up to the 50/60 hour mark.
[Underlined] SPECIAL NOTE [/underlined]
Pilots and Link Trainer Instructors should take special note of the modification to topple the Artificial Horizon and spin the Directional Gyro, and make sure it is used on every exercise.
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[Drawing] ACCIDENTS
The 26 aircraft damaged during August gave us a rate of 7.3 per 10,000 flying hours, one of the best rates the Group has ever attained, and good enough to put us in second place in the Command Accident ladder.
September’s total is 23, made up as follows:- 6 Cat. AC; 5 Cat. B; 12 Cat. E. Quite a number of aircraft were damaged to a lesser extent and repaired more or less “on the spot”. They, happily, do not count against us, and the “rate” should be close to August’s good figures. Flying hours will decide.
11 of the month’s accidents were avoidable.
[Underlined] SQUADRONS: [/underlined] Overshoots landing – 2; Heavy Landings – 1; Miscellaneous – 2.
[Underlined] 51 BASE: [/underlined] Swings Landing – 2; overshoots landing – 2; Taxying – 1.
[Underlined] 1690 Flight: [/underlined] Miscellaneous – 1.
None of these accidents have any special features except perhaps the collision between a Hurricane engaged on affiliation with a Lancaster, and a Master of another Group. From details at present available the Hurricane pilot appears to have been “shooting away” the Master who was taking close an interest in the exercise. Both single aircraft engined aircraft crashed, but the Master pilot escaped by parachute. 1690 pilots take note. Extreme care is required when dealing with these other aircraft which very often have pupil pilots aboard, and do not always do what you would expect.
In addition to the accidents above, there have been 7 minor taxying accidents in the Group this month. In each instance the damage was soon repaired, but that is not the point. Each one was completely avoidable, and required a certain amount of valuable time and labour to put right. With the coming of the darker nights and poorer weather it is most important, yes, essential, that this tendency to careless taxying is stamped out. Last winter’s taxying story was a sorry tale. It must not be duplicated this year.
The period for the second award of the Silver Lancaster has just ended. As soon as all accident reports are forward the result will be published. It looks like another close race.
[Table of Avoidable Accidents and Star Awards by Squadron]
The above table includes minor avoidable accidents which are not listed in the review above. The damage was Cat. A in each instance. 51 Base Units are not given STAR awards.
[Page break]
SECOND THOUGHTS for PILOTS
[Underlined] INSTRUMENT FLYING. [/underlined]
(i) Take your place in the drive on instrument flying. Nights grow longer and you’ll be getting both dark take-offs and dark returns.
(ii) Give yourself 5 – 10 minutes on your primary instruments – Turn and Bank, A.S.I. and Altimeter – on every N.F.T. Cover up the artificial horizon and cage the gyro.
(iii) Practice the corkscrew on instruments. Its [sic] easy to “mock up” a hood for instrument flying in day-light. Fold a map, fit it on your helmet and draw goggles on to your forehead. The goggles and strap will hold the map in place. Don’t forget to have a member of the crew keeping a look out for other aircraft.
(iv) Get your quota of Link hours in. The new device to topple the artificial horizon and spin the gyro will put you on your mettle.
[Underlined] TAXYING. [/underlined]
(i) Take things steadily on the ground. The autumn and winter in the past have always produced a sorry tale of bogged aircraft and taxying accidents.
(ii) Look up Air Staff Instruction F.C. 24 for the duties and responsibilities of all aircrew when taxying.
(iii) Use the landing light on the Lancaster and man the Aldis light. Modifications to the landing light are under consideration in an attempt to further increase its usefulness as an aid to taxying.
(iv) Remember you get the illusion at night that you are taxying slowly when you are in fact going fast. CO-OPERATION – CAUTION – CONTROL are the three principles to apply to taxying.
[Underlined] THE LAST 100 FEET. [/underlined]
(i) Wind velocity decreases proportionately from 1,500 feet to ground level because of the friction of the ground. This is most pronounced at night.
(ii) Its [sic] possible to have a wind of gale force at 1,500 feet and dead calm at ground level at night. Its [sic] also possible for the wind direction to be 50° different between 1,500 feet and the ground.
(iii) So watch your approaches. In a very strong wind, increase your air speed by 5/10 m.p.h. and check for drift. The last 100 feet can be difficult if you don’t appreciate the circumstances.
(iv) A word on landings. Your Check Landing Card is a valuable record for [underlined] YOU. [/underlined] Don’t wait until your crew complains your landings are not too good. Inspect your Check Landing Card once a fortnight and see that it is up to date.
[Page break]
[Drawing] FLYING CONTROL
This month has seen the introduction of a Bomber Command Standard Landing Procedure which aims to provide a simple and standard landing drill, and which will give reasonably good landing times. It is hoped that this procedure will be adopted by other Commands, and that it will eventually be used at every airfield in the British Isles. This Group, however, has been permitted to retain its two R/T channels of communication, and the landing procedure, previously employed by 5 Group, has been substantially modified to bring it in to line with the new Standard Procedure.
In the near future, it is hoped that a directif will be issued to all Flying Control Officers laying down a standard technique of handling aircraft. At present there are two schools of thought. One in which one officer in the Watch Office controls aircraft on both Studs ‘A’ and ‘B’. Secondly where one officer in the Watch office feeds aircraft into the circuit on Stud ‘A’ and a second officer controls aircraft on Stud ‘B’, and gives instructions where necessary should aircraft be too closely or too loosely spaced. Trials are at present being carried out on both these schemes and the details will be issued on which scheme proves itself to be the safest and most efficient.
One word here about flying discipline. At some stations in the Group, breaches of flying discipline in the circuit are reports to Squadron Commanders, who take immediate action with the aircrew concerned. No matter how good or how safe a landing procedure might be, if crews don’t play fair and obey instructions to the letter then one might just as well give up the idea of trying to speed up the rate of landing, and at the same time maintain an adequate safety margin. If every crew takes its turn, plays fair and used its common-sense it will be landed within the minimum time and with perfect safety.
[Underlined] Marking Circuit Points. [/underlined]
It is appreciated that in the past there has been some difficulty in determining when an aircraft exactly reaches the various points of call around the circuit. The problem of marking these points to suit all runways is not an easy one, and several experiments have been carried out as yet with little success. It is hoped, however, that the end is now in sight and that very soon “call-up” and “check” points for use with every runway will be marked around the circuit.
[Underlined] SEPTEMBER LANDING TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of Landing Times by Station]
[Page break]
[Drawing] EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] UNIT RETURNS. [/underlined]
Cases have occurred where serviceable equipment returned to the U.E.D. has arrived in an unserviceable state. In most cases the cause has been careless packing. Equipment Officers should realise that this almost amounts to sabotage as not only is time and labour wasted at the receiving end, but equipment, which has taken the manufacturers valuable man-hours to make, is useless to the service until more man-hours are spent in repair.
Therefore watch this and thus save labour.
[Underlined] Q. FORM. [/underlined]
The Q Form has been amended and the old “U” has been broken down into “U.1” (awaiting spares, work held up) and “U.2” (awaiting spares but work proceeding). Up to now this Group has had a good record, so Equipment Officers should continue to keep both “U.1” and “U.2” out of the Q Form.
[Underlined] MECHANICAL SWEEPERS. [/underlined]
Instances are still occurring where Mechanical Sweepers are unserviceable for some considerable time owing to the delay in obtaining spares. Owing to the very acute rubber shortage it is essential that runways be swept regularly. All Bases should ensure that at least one set of brushes and other frequently required spares are held, and Equipment Officers should give the subject their personal attention.
[Underlined] SURPLUS FIRE CRASH TENDER. [/underlined]
Several Bases are holding one surplus Crash Tender for use within the Group in an emergency. When this is required it is frequently found that the vehicle is unserviceable and in consequence a Station is left with only one Crash Tender standing by, which is totally inadequate. It is essential that these vehicles are kept serviceable, and all demands for spares required to render vehicles serviceable are to be sent by I.O.R. signal and hastened where any undue delay occurs.
[Page break]
[Drawing] DECORATIONS
The following IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/S. R. HARTLEY CGM
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.E.P. OXBORROW DFC
F/O. B.J. DOBSON DFC
F/O. J.E. WHITE DFC
F/O. W.C. FREESTONE DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/L. D.R. STUBBS DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
P/O. P. AINLEY DFC
P/O. A.C. MCKELLAR DFC
SGT. L.J. CHAMPION DFM
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
P/O. M. MCNEILL DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
S/L. H.B. LOCKE, DFC DSO
S/L. S.M.P. PARKES DSO
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. C.W. KIPFER DFC
F/O. H.E. SAYEAU DFC
F/O. W.N. REDMAN DFC
F/L. M.H. PARRY AFC DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O. R.C. DAVIE DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O. P.N. HERBERT DFC
F/O. F.N. CHANDLER DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/S. C.H. STEWART DFM
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/W/C G.W. CURRY, DFC DSO
The following NON_IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.R. HANCOCK DFC
SGT. T.W. POWELL DFM
SGT. J.H. MCCREERY DFM
F/O. R.W. MATTHEWS DFC
P/O. P.E. PLOWRIGHT DFC
W/O. R. LAWSON DFC
F/O. S.C. MATTHEWS DFC
F/O. S.J. MANCEKIVELL, DFM DFC
F/O. J.S. MIDDLETON DFC
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/L. N.H. STEPHENSON DFC
P/O. E.P. BURDEN DFC
P/O. J. HALL DFC
P/O. J.S. DEAN DFC
P/O. W. FARADAY DFC
P/O. R.B. FARREN DFC
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
1st Lt. J.F. STEVENS DFC
F/O. A.V. PATCHETT DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
P/O. E. BERRY
F/O. J.C.D. GUTHRIE DFC
F/S. L. HOWARTH DFM
F/O. D.T. WATKINS DFC
P/O. G. EARNSHAW DFC
P/O. J.L. BENDIX DFC
W/O. G.W. MORREY DFC
P/O. J.H. COLE DFC
F/S. R. VICKERSTAFFE DFM
F/S. N.F. BACON DFM
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON. [/Underlined]
P/O. A.E. NICKLIN DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.R. ANDERSON, DFM DFC
F/L. J. BREAKLEY DFC
W/O. J.A. LEWIS DFC
W/O. T. DOWYER DFC
P/O. A.G. WILLIAMS DFC
F/S. E.A. DAVIDSON DFM
SGT. A. KANE DFM
[Page break]
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/S. J. HARRISON DFM
P/O. J.H. WILKINSON DFC
F/S. H.D.K. LEWIS DFM
P/O. J.W. SCOTT DFC
S/L. W.A.G. GALLIENNE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/L. C.A.S. DREW, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/S. B.A. MANNING DFM
F/S. F. COOPER DFM
S/L. J.F. MITCHELL D.F.C. BAR TO DFC
F/L. D.H. PIDDING, D.F.C. BAR TO DFC
W/O. C.A. RUSSELL DFC
F/L. R.W. WESTON DFC
F/S. N. MACHIN DFM
F/O. O. HALLIKAS DFC
F/O. A. DRINKALL DFC
F/L. J.N.C. WRIGHT, DRF. BAR TO DFC
P/O. G.K. CHAPMAN DFC
F/S. R.C.T. LODGE DFM
P/O. M. MACDONALD DFC
P/O. W WARBURTON DFC
F/O. G.J. LINDSAY DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O. W.M. REID DFC
F/S. R.C. WOOLLFORD DFM
F/S. D. BOLLAND DFM
F/S. H. TOWNSLEY DFM
P/O. G.D. HOOTON DFC
F/S. K.S. RANDLE DFM
P/O. C.W. LACY DFC
F/O. J.J. ROGERSON DFC
F/L. C.W. SHIRES DFC
W/O. J.T. STANTON, DFM DFC
F/O. R.L.C. LASHAM DFC
F/S. D.P. GANNINGS DFM
F/L. T.H. MACKEPEACE DFC
F/S. R.J. BOWEN DFM
F/O. B.J. LINDSAY DFC
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
W/O. E.K. PIERCY DFC
P/O. B.F. DURRANT DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.T.H. GIDDENS DFC
F/O. R.Y. KENYON DFC
F/S. D.A. DEAR DFM
F/S. W. CHARLESWORTH DFM
F/S. K.E. BOONE DFM
P/O. F.W. BLAKE DFC
P/O. C.A. SKINNER DFC
P/O. A.W. HALLAM DFC
P/O. S. JOHNSON DFC
F/O. R.K. ESSERY DFC
P/O. S.W. CARTER DFC
P/O. J.M. DENTON DFC
F/O. R.W. JEW
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON. [/underlined] (Contd.)
P/O. G.V. MALON DFC
P/O. D.G.J. GRIFFITHS DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. J.W. MUDDLE DFC
F/O. K. SCHULTZ DFC
F/O. E.T. PICKERD DFC
SGT. A.V. WING DFM
P/O. G.F. FLANAGAN DFC
F/O. J.D.H. BILLAM DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. H.C.J. BENTLEY DFC
F/O. B. HAWES DFC
F/O. A.T. YOUDAN DFC
P/O. J. WESLEY DFC
P/O. L.S. AINSWORTH DFC
F/O. D.L. HARRIS DFC
F/O. J.S.A. MARSHALL DFC
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/L. D. RODGER DFC
W/O. A. RUSHTON DFC
W/O. R. SMITH DFC
W/O. J.W. HUTTON DFC
F/O. S.R. CLARKE DFC
F/S. W. HUME DFM
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/O. N.D. KENNEDY DFC
F/O. K.R. MAKIN DFC
F/L. S.E.J. JONES, DFM DFC
F/S. T. FLEETWOOD DFM
F/S. P.V.J. LOWEN DFM
P/O. J.G. NOBLE DFC
F/S. T. AITKEN DFM
F/O. R.W. WOOD DFC
SGT. H. WATERSON DFM
SGT. A. MCINULTY DFM
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/L. L.C.E. De VIGNE DFC
F/O. A.E. RICHARDS DFC
S/L. R.F. ELLIOTT, DSO, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O. S.F. PARLATO DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
F/L. R.O. CULVERT, DFC & BAR BAR TO DFC
F/L. E.R. BUTLER, DFC & BAR BAR TO DFC
F/O, A. KUZMA DFC
P/O. D.W. ALLEN DFC
P/O. A.J. PAYNE DFC
P/O. A.J. LUCAS DFC
[Page break]
A TRIP TO RUSSIA
On the 11th September, 1944, Lancasters of 9 and 617 Squadrons together with two Liberators attached from Transport Command, took off for YAGODNIK, an airfield near Archangel. The Liberators re-fuelled at Lossiemouth before leaving, and the hospitality extended by this Station was very much appreciated by the ground staff who were passengers in these aircraft.
The weather at first was good, but when about 150 miles from Archangel considerable low cloud and rain were encountered. Aircraft flew just above tree tops over the most desolate country imaginable – lakes, forests and swamps. Map reading was impossible; weather conditions alone made this too difficult, and in addition it was found that maps of the area were inaccurate – many villages and even railway lines being omitted.
The Archangel area was reached after about 10 hours flying, and with endurance becoming low and with no radio aids available, it was necessary for aircraft to land quickly. Some were fortunate enough to locate airfields quickly, whilst others searched through cloud and heavy rain.
Several aircraft landed at a small airfield named KEG ISLAND. Some of the crews of these aircraft originally thought they had landed at YAGODNIK and were unable to find out the whereabouts of the other aircraft. For some time they thought they were the sole survivors of the force. Later, however, all aircraft were located, though in all six had crash landed. In spite of this nobody was hurt and in the weather conditions it must be considered miraculous that no lives were lost. It was a great tribute to the skill of the pilots and navigators that so many masterly landings were made.
The Russians had originally expected some 250 guests but last minute alterations had increased this to 325. In addition, the crews of the crashed aircraft had to be located and collected from outlying districts.
In the circumstances the Russians performed wonders in giving all available help. A major diversion in this country often causes somewhat of an upheaval, but the Russians placed transport aircraft at the disposal of the Commanding Officer and even dropped a parachutist to direct the crew of one aircraft which had crash landed in a morass. In this particular case the “blind led the blind” for a while as the guide lost his way!
Eventually all crews and serviceable aircraft collected at Yagodnik where accommodation and re-fuelling facilities existed. Yagodnik is an island and is in the middle of the river Dvina, about 20 miles from Archangel It can only be reached from that city by air or river. The accommodation consisted of a paddle steamer which was moored to the river bank, and several underground huts. These huts provide warmth in winter but the absence of any kind of ventilation and the fact that a large brick fireplace forms a major part of the accommodation leads to a degree of stuffiness difficult to bear, and appears to form a breeding ground for various forms of life. The first few nights produced a large number of bug eaten victims until a form of insert [sic] killer, generously given by some American friends in the this country, was used.
Entertainment was provided by the Russians in the form of cinema shows, dances, etc., and on one occasion a lecture on a Russian composer which started 55 minutes late, lasted for 75 minutes, and was a complete mystery from start to finish to the British members of the audience.
The mush publicised football match also took place and proved a huge success. A football match in Russia produces much ceremony including the exchange of bouquets by the opposing captains before the start of game, and a tune somewhat similar to “See the conquering hero comes” has to be played each time the home team scores a goal. Apparently it is also possible for
[Page break]
the weary player to be replaced by a reserve – or was it the fear of possible repercussions that caused two members to retire from the game and be replaced by the Commanding Officer and the local Station Commander? The latter was so fed with passes by his triumphant tam that a glancing blow off his knee which scored a goal must have caused him considerable relief as it enabled the game to be continued under normal conditions! In spite of all this our Allies showed that they thoroughly understood the game and were indeed very capable players.
The major job of servicing and re-fuelling the aircraft for the operation was tackled by the maintenance crews in a whole hearted manner – they worked for 48 hours almost without a break and their keeness and cheerfulness was what one would expect of such a grand team. It was refreshing to see all trades helping where help was most needed. The following instances will give some idea of what difficulties were overcome. With bowsers available it took exactly 18 hours to re-fuel the aircraft alone. A spare engine was carried in the Liberators and as no crane was available to remove this from the aircraft, a ramp of trees with blankets on top had to be built so that the engine could be slid down.
Meantime a Mosquito had arrived in Yagodnik for P.R.U. duties and after a favourable report from the pilot the operation took place on the 15th September.
Both take off and landing were in accordance with the usual 5 Group high traditions, 28 aircraft taking off in 23 minutes and 27 landing in 30 minutes – one aircraft having flown direct to U.K.
The details of the operation are given elsewhere. As aircraft became re-fuelled and serviceable they returned to the U.K., until finally the two Liberators remained and they were held up for about a week.
While waiting for their aircraft to be re-fuelled some of the crews went into Archangel by minesweeper and were entertained by the R.A.F. Mission there. This measure of hospitality extended to them can be gained by the fact that one member on his return decided to jump in the river fully clothed, in an endeavour to return to the city. The sobering influence of the Dvina soon dissuaded him.
The final return to the U.K. was made under variable but much better conditions than the outward journey.
Finally a few impressions of this Northern outpost of the U.S.S.R. as seen in a fleeting visit may be interesting. It is of course, quite impossible to form balanced judgements, or to provide a real comparison between social and economic conditions seen in Archangel and those to which we are accustomed in Great Britain. After all, Archangel is far to the North of the vast land mass which constitutes the U.S.S.R., and was for some period cut off from the rest of Russia by the Finnish-German advances. Bearing all this in mind, it can hardly be described as a health resort. There was not a great deal of food, the clothing of the civilians was poor, and the roads, houses, sanitation and drainage, the latter where they existed, were far below anything generally to be seen in this country. However, we found that the organisation to provide the essentials of war was good, and all the technical teams we encountered were capable and willing workers. The system of privilege is apparent; extra food and clothing are the reward of rank in the armed forces and of position in civil works. But even in the inferior living conditions at Archangel we found among the Russians an intense patriotism, and a belief in the future of Russia after the war. All Russians’ energies seem directed towards the future.
Our hosts, with the limited facilities at their disposal, did all they could for our comfort, and for this we were all very grateful.
[Page break]
[Boxed] [Underlined] “V” GROUP NEWS” [/underlined]
The cover of this month’s News was designed by S/Ldr. N Floyd Wilson of Headquarters No. 5 Group. Each month the cover will be changed, and all artists in the Group are invited to submit specimen designs. The best design will be selected each month and will be adopted for the cover of the current issue. [/boxed]
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[Blank page]
Dublin Core
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V Group News, September 1944
5 Group News, September 1944
Description
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Five Group Newsletter, number 26, September 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about operations, gardening, war effort, tactics, signals, air bombing, navigation, radar navigation, engineering, air sea rescue, photography, armament, war savings, gunnery, training, accidents, second thoughts for pilots, flying control, equipment, decorations and a trip to Russia.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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1944-09
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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56 printed sheets
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eng
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Text
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-17
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
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France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Norway
Russia (Federation)
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Brest
France--Calais
France--Le Havre
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Stuttgart
Netherlands--Arnhem
Norway--Kåfjord (Troms fylke)
Russia (Federation)--Arkhangelʹskai︠a︡ oblastʹ
Temporal Coverage
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1944-09
5 Group
617 Squadron
9 Squadron
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Conspicuous Gallantry Medal
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
flight engineer
fuelling
Gee
Gibson, Guy Penrose (1918-1944)
H2S
Lancaster
Master Bomber
mine laying
Mosquito
navigator
Oboe
Pathfinders
petrol bowser
pilot
radar
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
service vehicle
Tallboy
Tirpitz
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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IBCC Digital Archive
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Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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October 1944 No. 27
V
Group
News
[Drawing]
[Stamp] Base Copy
101. 9
Copies dist Stn.
[Underlined] 1315 hrs. [/underlined]
Dortmund Ems
Bremerhaven
M. Gladbach
Darmstadt
Karlsruhe
Brunswick
Konigsberg
Kembs
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
Foreword by A O C
October has seen a fine month’s work with many important operations successfully concluded. Several of these took place in difficult conditions, reflecting the improved standard of training which crews have reached before they go on operations.
As this month marks the departure of No.51 Base on its incorporation into the newly formed 7 Group, I would like to congratulate all in the Base on the fine results which they have achieved over the past 20 months. Although they now move to 7 Group they will continue to provide crews for this Group, and since the Stirlings with which they are now equipped, are shortly to be replaced by Lancasters, it will soon be possible to relieve squadrons of much of their training commitments.
While there has been a steady improvement in the efficiency of all members of aircrew there is one matter in which the standards are still deplorably and dangerously low. I refer to the problem of security.
I am certain that if I asked any member of an aircrew whether he would, of his own free will, give information to the enemy he would hotly deny the suggestion. Yet the names of no less than 17 members of 5 Group who are now Prisoners of War, appear on a list lately captured from an enemy Headquarters, which was over-run during the Army’s advance.
The list contains the names of individuals who had passed through the normal interrogation centre, and gives a precis of the information which the interrogating officer gleaned from each; some of it is of considerable value to the enemy. I do not suggest that the information was given with any treasonable intent, but the orders state that nothing may be said at interrogation except NUMBER, RANK AND NAME, and the individuals whose names appear on this list have flagrantly disobeyed these orders.
In the aggregate very great harm has been occasioned to the Allied cause by disclosures which have been made by Prisoners of War. Some were no doubt doing no more than airing their ideas, or repeating what they had heard, hoping, by appearing to give information, to appease the interrogating officer. Unfortunately, when faced with a skilled interrogator there is no “half way house”, either you say nothing and get away with it, or you start to talk and everything you know will be dragged out of you.
There is ample evidence to show that the German Interrogation centre is conducted along the lines specified in the Geneva Convention, and that no undue pressure is brought to bear on any individual who will not talk. If, however, a Prisoner appears to be of the talkative type he will certainly be interrogated at considerable length. Anyone who gives only the details of Number, Rank and Name and thereafter keeps his mouth firmly shut, will not only be respected by the enemy, but is unlikely to be further interrogated.
I suggest that members of aircrew who may have the misfortune to find themselves Prisoners of War, should bear in mind that the Allied
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] A. O. C’S FOREWORD [/underlined]
Armies are still advancing and that in their progress towards Berlin, they will no doubt capture other lists containing the names of Prisoners and what they have said. They should ponder on the sharp retribution which will overtake those individuals when they again set foot on British soil. But this retribution will not bring to life those of their comrades who have been killed because of their failure to carry out their orders.
Unfortunately, this unworthy giving of information to the enemy has its counterpart in dangerous talk in this country. Before the first attack on the Tirpitz on the 15th September, 1944, all crews taking part had to be briefed some days in advance. They were told that on no account must a word be breathed outside, and there were very good reasons for this special warning.
Yet, within 48 hours loose talk by members of certain crews in front of individuals in no way concerned with the operation, had spread the news to other Units in the Group where it was being freely debated. A number of individuals are about to face the consequences of their folly and I cannot, at present, refer in more detail to this episode. But it shows that there are still those who fail to realise their responsibilities.
A further form of laxity is the carriage of documents in aircraft. We know that diaries containing valuable and secret information have been taken by the Germans off Bomber crews; while the other night an aircraft of this Group which had been detailed to attack Bergen, landed at a diversion airfield where the captain dropped his copy of the complete briefing instructions which he had been given before take-off and which is expressly forbidden to take into the air.
Great harm is being done by this slackness in matters of security. It reflects on the standard of discipline of aircrew, and shows the lack of a proper sense of responsibility. We cannot afford to give information to the enemy, even on matters which may appear trivial; for we are up against a powerful and experienced defence which knows well how to turn information to good account.
I ask aircrew to give this matter of security the serious thought that it deserves, and ensure that they thoroughly understand the orders on the subject and obey them.
[Underlined] PONDER ON THIS. [/underlined]
A crew of No. 61 Squadron interrogated in April, 1944, gave the enemy details of the 5 Group method of attack including our technique of marking, the part played by the Master Bomber, and even such matters as the frequencies used in the control of the operation.
[Underlined] ALSO THIS. [/underlined]
Sgt. D. was extremely well drilled in security. For this reason he would say nothing, especially as the crew had been repeatedly warned against talking by the Intelligence Officer.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27 OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] operations
[Underlined] WILHELMSHAVEN – 5TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Simpson.
Operations in October started with a daylight attack by a force of 221 aircraft on the Great Naval base at Wilhelmshaven.
PLAN Although previously attacked by both the R.A.F. and the U.S.A.A.F., no great or widespread damage had been done, and on this occasion, the intention was to devastate the built-up area and suburbs of the town, rather than the dock area. The bomb load was 10 x 1,000 lb H.E. with only a small proportion of incendiaries, a change from our usual 80% incendiary load.
Two aiming lines some 4,000 yards long and running roughly east to west through the town, were allotted to Nos. 53 and 55 Bases, whose aircraft were to be evenly distributed over the whole length of both aiming lines. Nos. 49, 9 and 106 Squadrons were given individual aiming points in the north east sector of the town. No. 54 Base were to place proximity markers on the coast line to the north east, to aid crews in their run-up. Bombing to be direct and visual. Failing visual identification, crews were ordered to bomb on H.2.S., or (for non-H.2.S. aircraft) on bombs dropped by H.2.S. aircraft; or as a last resort, any built up area in Germany.
RESULTS 10/10ths cloud was encountered over the target area, and the Master Bomber ordered crews to bomb on H.2.S. 198 aircraft attacked the primary target area, the remainder bombed last resort targets. Bombing was consequently very scattered, and only minor points of fresh damage are reported.
An H hour of 09.00 hours involved a dark take-off, and forming up was not easy. In spite of this, and of the unfavourable weather conditions, the fighter escort reported that this was one of the easiest operations they have yet had to cover.
[Underlined] BREMEN – 6/7TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Woodroffe.
Bremen, frequently the target for both the R.A.F. and the U.S.A.A.F. had suffered wide-spread damage both to harbour installations and industrial premises, but a large built-up area in the town itself, remained undamaged. A force of 237 aircraft of the Group was despatched on the night of October 6/7th to devastate this area, which was probably the largest the Group has yet had to tackle since it has operated as a separate force. Two aircraft from each Squadron carried H.E. bombs and the remainder a 100% load of 4 lb incendiaries.
PLAN Four areas were selected: two of them heavily built up, on opposite banks of the river, in the centre of the town, and the other two, rather larger but not quite so heavily built up, to the S.E. and S.W. respectively of the two areas lining the river bank.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
The large marshalling yard, some 1,500 yards to the north, was chosen as a convenient marking point. Three Squadrons were allotted to each of the four areas, three of which were divided into sectors, while the fourth was covered by a single track. All crews were ordered to aim at the marking point, delaying release for a detailed number of seconds.
RESULTS The attack took place in clear weather, with slight haze, and the illumination and marking went according to plan. The markers fell in a sector roughly NW – SW some 200 – 300 yards from the selected point. Photographs show that considerable damage has been inflicted in the areas selected for attack, and the devastation of the old town has been extended south eastwards, and is now almost complete. The part of the town on the West bank of the river is also heavily damaged. Nevertheless, an examination of the photographic and incendiary plots show that the concentration aimed at was not achieved, and that a large proportion of the bomb loads fell in areas previously devastated. Moreover, it is obvious that many incendiary loads were dropped short of the aiming point and although a certain amount of damage was caused in the housing estate to the north of it, this area was not included in the sectors selected for attack. Many loads have also fallen to the west, outside the planned sectors. The weather conditions for the attack were most favourable, and the marking was punctual and accurate, and no satisfactory explanation for the wide bombing spread has yet been arrived at. Two obvious possibilities are that:-
(a) the plan of attack is still not being explained to crews in sufficient detail and with sufficient emphasis.
(b) crews are not adhering rigidly to the tracks allotted to them nor carrying out the required delay when dropping their bombs.
Provided we can be satisfied that these conditions are being fulfilled, we can then begin to look elsewhere for causes which result in these incendiary attacks failing to achieve the saturation aimed at.
[Underlined] FLUSHING – OCTOBER 7TH. [/underlined]
The port of Antwerp had been in Allied hands for some time, but the facilities could not yet be used for unloading supplies for the invading armies, since Walcheren Island at the mouth of the Scheldt esturary [sic] was still held by the Germans, and the approaches to the port were under fire from enemy gun batteries.
120 aircraft from Nos. 53 and 55 Bases were therefore detailed to attack two point either side of Flushing, the sea wall on the east and the Dyke to the West, with the intention of flooding the island and forcing the enemy to abandon his gun positions.
PLAN Each Base was allotted an aiming point, and each Squadron within the Base was to attack separately at 10 minute intervals, making individual attacks and bombing in line astern at right angles to the dyke. The bomb load consisted of 14 x 1,000 lb bombs fused half an hour or one hour delay. Two runs were to be made, half the load to be dropped on each run. Crews were to bomb visually, using a Red T.I. dropped near the base of the dyke, as a guide to the run-up. Particular stress was laid on the necessity for reducing line error to a minimum, in view of the nature of the target.
RESULTS The attack was successful. The sea wall on the east side
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
of Flushing was broken in several places. The dyke on the west side was breached at one point only, but there were many craters along its crest. A few days later the water had penetrated as far as two miles inland in both areas.
[Underlined] WALCHEREN ISLAND – 11TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Breaches were made in the dyke and sea wall during our attack on Flushing, but the process of flooding is slow. A further force was therefore detailed to help the process, this time by attacking the dyke at Veere, on the North East side of the island. No. 55 Base provided 60 aircraft for this attack, while a second force of 113 aircraft of Nos. 53 and 55 Bases was sent to deal with four gun positions in the dock area of Flushing.
PLAN Aircraft were ordered to make individual bombing runs in line astern against the dyke, and once again emphasis was laid on the importance of reducing line error to a minimum. A red T.I. was to be dropped as a guide to visual bombing. On this occasion too, the bomb load consisted of 1,000 lb. bombs with half an hour or one hour delay. No marking was used on the gun positions, and all crews bombed visually. The bombs for this target were fused T.D. 0.025.
RESULTS [Underlined] Veere Dyke. [/underlined] This attack was also successful, and on the following day an area approximately 800 X 250 yards was seen to be flooded. Several breaches were made, one of 200 yards, a second of 100 to 150 yards, three more small breaks and in addition, four more places where the wall was cratered which would probably erode into breaks.
[Underlined] Gun Positions. [/underlined] Although good concentrations were achieved round all four aiming points, many units being destroyed by direct hits and others affected by near misses, some of the casemated positions escaped damage. These guns are almost entirely screened from blast by thick mounds and only direct hits, or very near misses near the gun apertures, are likely to put them out of action.
REMARKS The plan of flooding the Germans out of their positions on Walcheren Island started with the breaching off the sea wall at Westkapelle by other Groups early in the month. This was followed by the successful breaching of the sea wall and dyke at Flushing, and later the Veere Dyke, on the N.E. of the island, by No.5 Group, which completed the flooding of substantially the whole of the low lying areas of the island.
The importance of eliminating line error was stressed on these attacks. Their success shows that this was, in the main, achieved, though too few bomb craters are visible on the photographic cover for an accurate analysis to be made.
[Underlined] BRUNSWICK – 14/15TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Woodroffe.
Brunswick has proved an elusive target for the R.A.F. in the past although it has been attacked on numerous occasions both by the R.A.F. and by the U.S.A.A.F. It was last attacked some two months ago, and on that occasion was the guinea pig for an experiment in blind bombing, entirely on H.2.S. The results were inconclusive, and only scattered incidents of damage were caused, and the guinea pig survived. On the night of the 14/15th October a strong force of 241 aircraft took off to complete the destruction of this important industrial centre.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
PLAN The plan for this attack followed what has now become our normal procedure on targets of this nature, i.e. a suitable marking point was selected (the main railway terminus) and sectors between 345°T and 080°T measured from the marking point. Bases and Squadrons were to spread their aircraft evenly along tracks in these sectors and appropriate delays for bomb release were ordered. Separate height bands were given to each Base. Illumination and marking in the normal sequence.
RESULTS The attack took place in clear weather and was well controlled by the Master Bomber. Flares were accurately dropped, and the marking went according to plan. Bombing was somewhat scattered early in the attack, with a tendency to creep back towards the markers. This was later corrected, and a good concentration was achieved. A large area in the centre of the town, previously undamaged and containing the majority of administrative buildings and business premises, was devastated. On this occasion, the bomb load included a proportion of H.E., 4,000 lb, 2,000 lb and 1,000 lb H.C. and M.C. bombs, and in addition to the incendiary damage, large areas have been levelled by blast. On the whole, this was a very successful attack. A proportion of the bombing has fallen outside the westerly sector, and although considerable roof damage is visible in the easternmost sector, the destruction is not so concentrated as in the central portion. It appears probable that the displacement may have been caused by the difficulty in assessing the true position of the markers. It has not been possible to plot these on night photographs on account of smoke and fires.
REMARKS (i) Many crews reported having received instructions on R/T to delay H hour by 5 minutes, and giving a different wind. Fortunately, the attack was well under way and no-one was misled. This was at first attributed to attempts by the enemy to disrupt the attack, but was later found to be due to an 8 Group force operating on the same frequency. Action has been taken to prevent a recurrence.
(ii) Many crews reported a number of incendiaries jettisoned on track on the was back from the target. This shows gross thoughtlessness and lack of regard for other aircraft in the stream, particularly having regard to the low level return. This action is absolutely inexcusable, except in an emergency.
[Underlined] WALCHEREN ISLAND – 17TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
A force of 50 aircraft was detailed to attack the sea wall of Westkapelle, with the intention of extending the existing breach southwards, and inundating German strong points.
PLAN Mosquitoes were to drop Red T.I’s on a given point on the wall south of the existing breach, and crews were to aim their bombs at a position midway between the markers and the edge of the breach. Planned bombing height 5,000 to 6,000 feet. Each aircraft carried a load of 14 x 1,000 lb MC/GP bombs fused half or one hour delay. Two aircraft were detailed to find a bombing wind by means of flame floats and the A.P.I. attachment.
RESULTS Although many sticks straddled the target, most of the bombing appeared to overshoot the narrow strip of land, and fell into the flood water near the village of Westkapelle. One of the A.P.I. attachments was partially unserviceable, resulting in an incorrect bombing wind being used. This resulted in a slight overshoot, and no appreciable extension of the breach was made.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] NUREMBURG – 19/20TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Woodroffe.
A force of 270 aircraft took off to attack Nuremburg, a target which has escaped lightly in previous raids.
PLAN There were three areas to be attacked, two large and one small. A convenient marking point was selected, and the bombs were to cover the two large areas by means of the delayed release, while the smaller area was to be attacked direct, with a false wind vector set on the bombsight. Sectors were distributed between Bases and Squadrons in the normal way. The marking plan followed the normal sequence and provided for one additional alternative, i.e. Wanganui flares were to be dropped if cloud conditions rendered other methods Impracticable. There were therefore four alternative methods for bombing, the Master Bomber to decide upon the one to be used. Crews were ordered to bomb:-
(i) The red T.I. with delayed release as planned.
(ii) The green T.I. backed up by reds, without the delay.
(iii) The red T.I. direct (in the event of the greens dropped by blind markers being incorrect and the Mosquitoes being able to mark the centre of the town with red T.I’s).
(iv) The Wanganui flares.
RESULTS There was 8 – 10/10ths cloud over the target, but the Master Bomber decided that the red and green T.I’s would be visible through the cloud, and did not order Wanganui. The Mosquitoes were therefore ordered to back up with their red T.I’s, the greens dropped by the blind markers, and the main force ordered to bomb them direct. It was impossible to assess the markers accurately, and night photographs show no ground detail. Although there were reports of the glow of fires through the clouds, it is probable that the attack was scattered. Unfortunately, Nuremburg appears to have escaped once more.
[Underlined] FLUSHING – 23RD OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Three gun positions in the harbour at Flushing, not previously attacked by this Group, were the targets for 112 aircraft of 53 and 55 Bases.
PLAN Each aircraft carried a bomb load of 14 X 1,000 lb bombs, fused .025 secs, planned bombing height 6/7,000 feet, minimum 4,000 feet. Aircraft to identify targets and aim visually.
RESULTS Visibility in the target area was poor with 10/10ths cloud, base 4,000 – 5,000 feet, with rain. Most crews had to make several orbits before they could identify the targets and obtain a good run up. Many crews reported being practically over the top of their targets before being able to identify their aiming point. Although many sticks straddled the targets, many more are reported to have overshot. Photographs show at least 70 craters in the area of the gun positions.
[Underlined] BERGEN – 28/29th OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Wing Commander Woodroffe.
With the loss of France, the Germans also lost their U-boat bases on the Atlantic coast, and since then, they are known to have been
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS [/underlined]
operating from Norway. Reconnaissance showed that strenuous efforts were being made to complete U-boat pens at Bergen, and these were the target for 244 aircraft on October 28/29th.
PLAN Green T.I’s and flares were to be dropped in the target area, and by the aid of these the Mosquito markers were to mark the marking point with T.I. red. The Master Bomber was then to assess the accuracy of the markers, and to broadcast to the main force a false bombing vector to bring the bombs onto the aiming point. Six aircraft of the Flare Force acted as wind-finders. In view of the small size of the target, all crews were warned against loose bombing, to avoid endangering the lives and property of the Norwegians, and were ordered on no account to bomb unless they had a steady run-up on to the red T.I’s.
RESULTS 10/10ths cloud in layers from 5,000 feet to 10,000 feet was encountered over the target, with haze and poor visibility below. Flares were dropped punctually in the target area, but markers found it difficult to locate the marking point. Eventually marker No.4 dropped his red T.I’s and assessed them as within 50 yards of the marking point. The Master Bomber called the force down to bomb from between 5,000 and 8,000 feet with the wind vector as planned, provided they could get a clear run. Only 45 aircraft attacked the red T.I’s. The remainder were unable to see them or were unable to make an accurate bombing run, and did not attack, according to briefed instructions.
The attack inflicted considerable damage on the pens.
[Underlined] WALCHEREN ISLAND – 30TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Master Bombers:- S/Ldr. Oakley and F/Lt. de Vigne.
[Underlined] Target [/underlined] – Four gun positions in the vicinity of Flushing and Westkapelle.
PLAN No.54 Base Mosquitoes were to mark the exact aiming points with low bursting red T.I’s, the attacks to be controlled by a Master Bomber, also provided by No.54 Base. Six aircraft of No.55 Base were to find winds for each force. These were sent back to Group, and a bombing wind corrected for the bombsight, transmitted to both forces.
RESULTS {underlined] Flushing [/underlined] - Weather 7-10/10ths strato cu. base 4,000 feet.
[Underlined] Western Aiming Point [/underlined] – Bombing was carried out according to Master Bomber’s instructions. Believed that a fair concentration was achieved.
[Underlined] Northern Aiming Point [/underlined] – Crews had difficulty in identifying the target as it was almost entirely submerged, and markers extinguished as they fell. Those who attacked bombed visually aiming at the tops of the casements, which were above the water, with unobserved results.
[Underlined] Westkapelle [/underlined] – Weather 4/10ths – 7/10ths strato cu. Clear below.
[Underlined] Northern Aiming Point [/underlined] – Marking and bombing reported as accurate – No results observed.
[Underlined] Southern Aiming Point [/underlined] – Marking assessed as accurate, but the main force had difficulty in seeing the T.I’s, which were partly buried in the sand dunes. As a result, there was a tendency to overshoot.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] SPECIAL OPERATIONS BY NOS. 617 AND 9 SQUADRONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] KEMBS BARRAGE – 7TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
The Kembs Barrage, which lies 6 1/2 miles below Basle, governs the flow of the Rhine between the Swiss town and Strasbourg. Apart from its navigational importance to barge traffic between Strasbourg and the upper reaches of the river, the Barrage was a weapon in the hands of the enemy which they could have used to impede the operations of our land forces in the south eastern sector of France. The sudden release of a large volume of water from the barrage and the breaching of the river banks below it would result in the flooding of large areas. The Barrage is 180 metres wide, and consists of five bays, each of 30 m. span separated by piers 5 m. thick. Each bay is closed by metal sluices, operated electrically, on a principle similar to that of sash windows.
PLAN 7 aircraft, carrying Tallboys, fused T.D. 0.025 were to bomb from high level (8,000 feet or below cloud base, minimum 5,000 feet), and six aircraft with Tallboys fused 1/2 hour delay, from low level (500 to 800 feet, 500 feet minimum). The force was to be covered by three squadrons of Mustangs, one of which was detailed to deal with light gun positions near the target. The high force was to bomb first and the low force was timed to go in after the smoke from the high force bombs had cleared.
RESULTS Weather was clear at the target, with good visibility, and the attack was carried out as planned. The defences proved to be more formidable than had been shown on recent photographs, and intense light flak was experienced, mainly coming from the eastern bank of the river. Of the high force, several aircraft experienced bomb release trouble, and as a result there were several overshoots. Two bombs were dropped as much as 600 yards west owing to hang-ups. Of the low force bombs, one fell immediately beyond the barrage, and there were two overshoots of 40/50 yards. One bomb fell close to the westernmost sluice gate, and demolished it. Visual reconnaissance later the same day, reported that the water level 2 1/2 miles up stream from the target had fallen 11 feet 4 inches and that many barges were stranded. Later, photographs showed that the iron superstructure above the first and second pillars on the west side had been completely destroyed, together with the sluice gate.
[Underlined] THE SORPE DAM – 15TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Railway communications between northern and central Germany and the Ruhr have become increasingly important to the enemy since the successful attack by 5 Group on the Dortmund Ems canal. These lines not only supply the Ruhr industrial area itself, but are also the life-lines to the enemy’s main front facing our forces advancing on the Ruhr. The destruction of the Sorpe dam would result in the flooding of a considerable area, including the Neheim-Schwerte railway, one of the three main lines serving the Ruhr from the east, and would thus add to the enemy’s communications and supply problems. It was therefore decided that the Dam should be attacked by 18 aircraft of No.9 Squadron, all carrying Tallboy bombs. No immediate results were expected, owing to the peculiar nature of the Dam’s construction, but it was hoped that direct hits from Tallboys would unbalance the retaining wall of the dam, resulting in gradual erosion, finally enabling the water to break through.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
PLAN 18 aircraft, carrying Tallboys, six fused 1/2 hour delay and 12 fused 11 seconds delay, were to attack the Dam from 14/15,000 feet. The attack was to be made at right angles to the face of the Dam, to obtain maximum penetration. Winds were to be found by six aircraft, using visual pinpoint and A.P.I. These were then to be averaged and a bombing wind transmitted by the force leader. Fighter cover was provided by seven squadrons of Mustangs. When 20 miles short of the target, the force was to divide into two formations, the first composed of the 12 aircraft carrying 11 second delay bombs and the second formation, of the 6 aircraft carrying the half hour delay bombs. Aircraft were to bomb in line astern, each aircraft to position itself 100 feet below and 200 yards astern of the aircraft in front. Bombs were to be aimed at the shore of the compensating lake below the dam face, and a false height setting applied to the bombsight, so that the bombs should strike a point 50 yards short of the crest of the dam. It was appreciated that the water level in the lake was somewhat low to be certain of success, but it was nevertheless considered that there was a reasonable chance of destroying the dam.
RESULTS 16 aircraft dropped their Tallboys. Two were unfortunate enough to be “jostled” during their run up, and were unable to bomb. The force flew over 10/10ths cloud to within a short distance of the target, but were lucky to find a clear gap over the target itself. Navigation winds had to be used, as visual pinpointing was impossible. Several direct hits were registered on the crest of the dam, one fair and square on the road running about 50 yards below the crest, and several on the dam face at its western extremity. In addition to these, several bombs slightly overshot the crest and fell in the water, and should have done their fair share of damage. There appears to have been a slight vector error, which resulted in the M.P.I. of the bombs (those visible on P.R.U. cover), being displaced some 200 yards 330 degrees from the aiming point. Although the dam was not breached, the enemy has been forced to lower the level of the dam to reduce the pressure on the water side. If the water had been a little higher the dam would undoubtedly have gone.
[Underlined] TIRPITZ – 29/30TH OCTOBER. [/underlined]
Since the last attack on September 15th the Tirpitz had been moved from Alten Fiord, to an anchorage off the small island of Haak, 4 miles West of Tromso, and some 200 miles nearer to the British Isles than her previous berth.
Possibly this move was prompted by the Germans’ fear of the ship falling into the hands of the Russians, who were rapidly over-running the Petsamo area, or possibly because they wished to get her back by stages to a German base, where major repairs and a refit could be carried out.
It was decided that, by increasing the all-up weight for take-off, and with the addition of an extra fuel load, an attack from bases in the British Isles was practicable. To achieve this, Merlin 24 engines, giving + 18 boost for take off, were installed in all Nos. 617 and 9 Squadrons’ aircraft. This involved the changing of 120 engines, and was a magnificent feat carried out in a few days. One Wellington long range tank and one Mosquito drop tank were added, giving a total fuel load of 2406 gallons. The round trip totalled 2,252 track miles.
All aircraft carried Tallboy bombs. The take off presented no difficulties, and aircraft flew at 2,000 feet to within a short distance
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
of the Norwegian coast, where a rapid climb was made to negotiate the high ground. A rendezvous point was chosen within a convenient distance of the target, and here both squadrons formed up, to attack the target in two separate forces, having made a rapid climb to bombing height. All went well as far as this point.
During the approach to the target, which lay along a fiord, all bomb-aimers obtained a good view of the battleship, which was lying in the briefed position. Unfortunately, at the crucial stage of the bombing run, cloud was encountered, caused doubtless by a wind coming in off the sea and striking the high ground surrounding the Tirpitz’s anchorage. The majority of crews were able to release their bombs, some after several runs, but four aircraft were unable to obtain a satisfactory run, and returned with their bombs.
There was without doubt, one very near miss, but up to the present there is no evidence, photographic or otherwise, to show that the battleship was hit.
Once again, these two squadrons were cheated of their prey, and this time by a trick of the weather which was wholly unexpected, and certainly undeserved.
With the exception of one 617 Squadron aircraft, which was hit over the target, and forced to land in Sweden, all aircraft returned safely with a reasonable safety margin of petrol, to advanced bases.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] gardening
All Group Gardeners returned to battle in excellent strength this month, and successfully planted 316 vegetables in 60 sorties, bringing our share to 39% of the Command total of 808.
The plantings were all made by H.2.S. and mostly confined to the Kattegat area, and continued the good work of dislocating the enemy’s shipping routes, by dropping over carefully chosen pinpoints and channel intersections through which the shipping is known to pass. Despite the long distances involved, with frequent icing conditions over target areas, and Bases often unfit for return, it is very satisfying to note that the high standard of efficiency and determination is being maintained by the Captains and their crews, and that the average load per aircraft has been kept to the maximum of six vegetables.
One of our largest operations for some months occurred on the 24th October, when twenty-five Gardeners set course to the Eastward and planted 149 vegetables. 10 loads were supplied by No.106 Squadron and 4, 4, 4, and 3 by Nos. 57, 630, 44 and 207 Squadrons respectively. The results of this lay were very promising, and as the crews sighted some twenty ships on this occasion within the vicinity, it is earnestly hoped that they did not all reach port safely.
To round off the month’s activities Nos.619 and 106 Squadrons had the honour to add to the ‘History of Mining’ by planting in a new and important Garden on the 28th October. It is early to anticipate results but as the enemy is bound to use this hitherto virgin piece of water, it will be interesting to see how he fares.
In the light of past experience, all Gardeners must now remain on their toes for the coming winter months are bound to offer excellent opportunities to strike hard at the enemy’s shipping organisation in every possible position, and to rapidly assist in his ultimate downfall.
A total summary of the value of this mode of warfare is unfortunately on the Top Secret list at this stage of the war, and is therefore unable to be disclosed. But when it is realised that the total sorties this year have already reached 14,457, as against 5,313 in 1943, some estimation can immediately be made on its degree of vital importance and effect. The area in which this offensive can be conducted has now diminished to a corner of Europe. But inside the limits of this area is contained an enemy who is feverishly pressing hard to retain his command of that sea, and so move his troops, stores, equipment and trade from Scandinavia to Germany. By the terms of the Russian-Finnish Armistice Germany has been denied the use of enormous tonnage in shipping. This means that their Merchant Fleet, Minesweepers and other craft already busily employed, will be forced to double their work to make good the
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944
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[Underlined] GARDENING. [/underlined]
requirements of a nation at war. Added to this distressing state of affairs, the enemy is now hurriedly building prefabricated U-Boats, and fitting them with every device possible in order to risk another strike at our forces. But each U-Boat is useless if she has not been ‘worked up’ by a highly trained crew for weeks, in a [underlined] safe [/underlined] area for practicing her ‘Torpedo Attacks’ and ‘Diving Trials’, or is unable to be completed at her building yard for the lack of some equipment that was to have arrived by sea transport and has been [underlined] sunk en route. [/underlined]
Whoever shall be so bold as to venture forth from this area for attack on our trade, will undoubtedly meet a hot reception from the Allied Navies and Coastal Command, but in the meantime let us delay, and if possible, prevent this, by the strong and penetrating effects of our Gardening effort.
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF SORTIES. [/underlined]
[Table of Sorties Carried Out by Squadron]
[Underlined] GROUP VISITORS. [/underlined]
On the 2nd October, Rear Admiral J.H. Edelsten, C.B.E., Royal Navy, The Assistant Chief to the Naval Staff (U-Boats and Trade), paid a short visit to R.A.F. Station, Woodhall, to thank the Bombing and Gardening Squadrons for their excellent work and co-operation with the Royal Navy during the past months.
Rear Admiral Edelsten gave a short address stating the vital importance of this work, and strongly congratulated the Captains and crews who had taken part. He said that the results of the precision bombing had been most effective and successful towards the war effort as a whole, in assisting to force the U-Boats to retire to more distant bases, and that minelayers were performing a vitally important task in a thoroughly efficient and successful manner. Aerial mining is denying the safe passage of enemy shipping in their own waters, which for the time being were out of reach of His Majesty’s Ships.
Accompanying Rear Admiral Edelsten, were Rear Admiral E.D.B. McCarthy, D.S.O., Royal Navy, The Assistant Chief to the Naval Staff (Home Station), and Captain F.A. Slocum, O.B.E., Royal Navy, Deputy Director Operations Division (Intelligence).
“v” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] signals
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR). [/underlined]
[Underlined] W/T CONTROLLERS’ TEST. [/underlined]
One of the outstanding features in the Wireless Operators (Air) domain last month was the enthusiasm shown by squadrons in carrying out the W/T Controllers’ test. During the month 67 operators carried out the tests laid down in 5G. S.I. No.13, and out of that number 65 passed as suitable for W/T Link duties. It is hoped that this enthusiasm will continue, and all Wireless Operators (Air) will eventually pass this test of their ability in accurate tuning and operating of their W/T equipment under “target-area” conditions. The operators who passed the test during October were drawn from the squadrons shown in the following table:-
[Table of Numbers of W/Ops. (Air) Passing Test by Base and Squadron]
Now that the names of all W/T Link Wireless Operators are forwarded to Group Headquarters prior to each operation, it is possible to know exactly who are our first class men, and note how they perform in the crucial test of operating over the target area.
Next month it is hoped to publish the names of all Wireless Operators who have carried out Link duties during the month.
[Underlined] GROUP W/T EXERCISE. [/underlined]
During the month, this part of the Wireless Operators (Air) training was curtailed to some extent by daylight operations, but some good exercises were carried out. The introduction of an 18 and 20 w.p.m. test was well received, and still further changes in this training are impending. It is proposed that squadrons be divided
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
into four sections, and each section participate once per week. An alteration to the time of the exercise is also proposed.
[Underlined] TRAINING ROOMS. [/underlined]
With the coming winter months, and the possible decrease in the number of operational and training flights, Signals Leaders must ensure that their training rooms are properly equipped and in good preparation for the extra ground training which will be necessary. All morse keys, headsets and equipment, should be checked over to ensure that full benefit can be derived from their use. Liaison between Signals Leaders and visits to neighbouring squadron training rooms should be encouraged.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES. [/underlined]
The curtailment in the use of early warning devices did leave the Wireless Operator (Air) with more time on his hands during an operational flight, and on many occasions the W/Op. did his watching from the astrodome when not required on the W/T equipment. It is hoped that in the near future these early warning devices will again become available, and with this in view training has continued at Conversion Units. Operators on the squadrons who may have let this training lapse should take steps to bring themselves up to the highest state of efficiency in manipulation and interpretation of these devices.
[Underlined] STOP PRESS. [/underlined]
We extend a hearty welcome to four new Signals Leaders – F/O Cheshire, who has taken over Signals Leaders duties on 227 Squadron, F/O Chapman, 463 Squadron, F/O Tyler, 50 Squadron, and F/O Smith, 189 Squadron. We also take this opportunity of saying au revoir to F/Lt. Howarth, 50 Squadron and F/O Bulmer, 463 Squadron, who have now taken up other duties. We wish them every success in their new sphere.
[Underlined] SIGNALS’ WORKSHOPS. [/underlined]
The aim of all Base and Station Signals Officers must be to make their workshops into well laid out, comfortable, well lighted and warm laboratories. It is appreciated, that, with the type of accommodation available, this will not be an easy task, but it is certainly not an insurmountable one. Furthermore, this “pepping up” of workshops must take place before the full rigour of winter is upon us.
Every one must agree that mechanics will be far happier and therefore produce far more efficient work if their workshops are comfortable. In addition, workshops in which such delicate equipment as the T.R.5043 is being serviced, must be clean, tidy and warm, if the highest standard of serviceability is to be achieved.
[Underlined] SIGNALS FAILURES. [/underlined]
It is pleasing to record that throughout the past month not one operational sortie was cancelled, and only one aircraft returned early, as the result of a signals defect. The reason for this one early return is attributed to a flight engineer, who, in an attempt to repair a mid upper hydraulic leak, disconnected the intercom. wiring, allowing it to short circuit, thus rendering the whole intercommunication system unserviceable. Under classification ‘C’ (aircraft completing
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
mission) the failures were as follows:- W/T – 6; H/F. R/T – 9; V.H.F. R/T – 21; and intercom. – 9.
Of the V.H.F. defects, 50% were attributable to broken whip aerials. We are doing all in our power to overcome this breakage of aerials. The official view is that 20° backward rate could cure the trouble, but unfortunately to obtain this necessitates lowering part of the aerial beneath the aircraft skin, with the result that very severe interference is then caused to V.H.F. by the aircraft’s own H.2.S. equipment. We are endeavouring to obtain fighter type V.H.F. aerials – at least for the flare force and marking aircraft. Meanwhile, the application of de-icing paste and ensuring that the aerial is screwed right home, with no part of the aerial thread showing above the Rubber Lord mounting are the best palliatives. The necessity for units to report these defects in accordance with A.M.O. A.869/43 is again emphasised.
There were two servicing failures during the month. In both cases the T.R. 5043 receivers were off tune. Signals Officers must do all in their power to eliminate this criminal type of defect.
[Underlined] V.H.F. CHANGEOVER. [/underlined]
The month of October saw the quick and successful changeover from T.R.1143’s to T.R.5043’s in all operational aircraft of the Group. Apart from one dynamotor overheating and one selector mechanism being jammed, there have been no serious defects. This state of affairs is very promising. It is stressed, however, that G.P.O. keystops No.2 must be fitted on all controllers’ electric type 5003, and that when fitted there must be no “play” whatsoever in the T/R/REM switch – the tolerance of a few thousandths of an inch may result in the equipment going over to transmit. In this connection, all concerned are reminded that the type 170 switch in the transmitter H.T. lead is sealed in the “off” position prior to operational take-off.
Pilots are talking enthusiastically about the wonderfully clear, but sometimes too loud R/T now obtained. The audio pre-set control in the T.R.5043 should be set back to give comfortable volume, but it is appreciated that that will not cater for every taste. Rest assured, however, we are still trying hard to get a pilot’s manual volume control.
The efficiency of our new V.H.F. R/T equipment was well described recently by a main force flight commander who said how comforting it was when still miles away from the target to hear and recognise the calm voice of W/Cdr. Woodroffe talking to his markers and flare force, and to realise several minutes before the attack that the target had already been correctly located and marked.
[Underlined] SIGNALS HITS THE HEADLINES. [/underlined]
On the 1 o’clock news on Sunday, 29th October, the B.B.C. announced that the Tirpitz had been hit by a 12,000 lb bomb. This announcement was made approximately 3 hours before the aircraft which made the attack were due to return, and was based solely on two short W/T messages transmitted soon after the attack by a 9 Squadron aircraft, while that aircraft was still well over 1000 miles away from base.
These W/T messages were two of quite a number transmitted at ranges of up to and over 1000 miles, on this target.
This is an outstanding example of the ability of the present day Wireless Operator in long range daylight W/T communication. It is
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
all the more remarkable considering that the frequency in use was in the 8 mc/s band, and required spot on tuning to ensure any measure of success.
[Underlined] SIGNALS SECURITY. [/underlined]
There is a custom, now hoary with age, of prefixing ALL Bomber Code messages with the month and day of the code used in encyphering. This means that all Bomber Code messages are prefaced by a four-figure group, and the figures are NOT part of the encyphered text. This system has been explained slowly and laboriously to all users of the code, but for all that, a simple two group message, such as “2329 XY” was recently pronounced “unbreakable” by an officer who should have known better. Had the message been transmitted simply as “XY” he would have known it at once, and robbed himself of his present glory of the “Highly Derogatory Order of the Irremovable Digit”.
[Underlined] FLIGHT PLANNING. [/underlined]
The F.P.C. has now been in use for well over twelve months, and has proved to be a very reliable and efficient arrangement, which has contributed largely to the Group’s success. Despite its obvious efficiency, there are certain faults which cannot be eradicated without the complete isolation of all the circuits involved – a formidable task (involving 169 miles of cable for main circuits, and 185 miles for reserve circuits between Group and Bases alone), which cannot be contemplated. These faults mainly comprise overhearing teleprinter chatter and induced “ringing” tones, all of which are familiar to listeners.
There is another type of fault, which is not due to equipment, but which is traceable to users of the network. This can be stated briefly as a tendency to forget that the loudspeaker was designed to cater for an audience of two or three in a small room, and to speak too fast as though taking part in an ordinary telephone conversation. This speed, allied with the extraneous noises explained above, tends to mystify rather than enlighten the listener in a large room. Slower and more carefully enunciated speech, pitched somewhat higher than normal, but without shouting, will be found to produce more satisfactory results.
One last word. The conference is not secret for the reason, already given, that the conference circuits run in multi-pair G.P.O. cables, where mutual overhearing was always liable to occur. For this reason mention of the target by name, or of turning points with reference to altitude and longitude should always be avoided. Lest this warning should result in too obscure future plannings, it should be added that civilian conversations which are frequently overheard on conferences are amplified at this Headquarters, whereas civilians who overhear part of the conference do not receive an amplified version.
[Underlined] RADAR. [/underlined]
Although operations completed by the Group during October were considerably fewer than in the preceding few months, there was no let up in the work being done by the Radar Sections.
With the opening of two stations at Fulbeck and Balderton, the transfer of the Base to Syerston and 49 Squadron to Fulbeck, there was plenty of work to be done. In addition to all this, two new squadrons have now been formed and moved to the new stations. The most critical problem arising out of the formation of these squadrons has
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1933 [sic].
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
been the furnishing of Radar Mechanics, and up to this date is still causing considerable inconvenience. In order to lighten the burden on those few already there, several mechanics were withdrawn from other Bases and posted to 56 Base. In the past few days, however, a number of mechanics have been posted into 56 Base from Radio Schools, and this should alleviate the situation somewhat. It is hoped that the remaining deficiency will gradually improve and will eventually be eliminated.
[Underlined] H.2.S. MARK III. [/underlined]
The success of the trials and experiments on H.2S. [sic] Mark III is proceeding with a vengeance at Coningsby. To relieve the strain on those mechanics doing the valuable work, action has been taken to attach temporarily a number of H.2.S. II mechanics from 53 Base Stations.
In pursuance of this experiment, a new type of scanner was procured from T.R.E. Air Tests were made immediately, and results, to say the least, were encouraging. Arrangements have now been made to have several of these scanners produced, and the first should be available about the second week of November. In the meantime, further tests are being made with the existing scanners in an endeavour to raise their efficiency. Several different ideas have been investigated, the latest of which shows considerable promise.
[Underlined] H.2.S. MARK II. [/underlined]
The restrictions on the use of H.2.S. remained in force during October, and this was the prime reason for the decision to remove the equipment from 53 Base Squadrons. It was felt that the time being spent by personnel in servicing the equipment there would be more valuably spent if they were transferred to 54 and 56 Bases, where acute shortages in strength existed. Simultaneously it was decided to halt the fitting of H.2.S. in 227 Squadron, and to remove what had already been installed.
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
Right on the heels of the decision to withdraw H.2.S. from 53 Base, came the policy to equip 53 Base and some of the 54 Base Squadrons with Loran. This policy has since been altered to include all 5 Group Squadrons. Fitting is now going ahead, and it is hoped to see the whole Group equipped by the 1st December, and also to have a large number of radar and navigation personnel trained on the equipment. It is stressed, however, that the Bomber Command school cannot hope to train more than a nucleus of mechanics between now and December, and for this reason Radar Officers should ensure that the knowledge of those attending the course at Bomber Command is imparted to the remainder of their respective sections. To facilitate easier servicing of Loran, photostatic copies of circuit diagrams, which can be placed on the walls above benches will be made in the near future.
[Underlined] GEE MARK II. [/underlined]
Much to our regret, although it was forecast in September’s Summary, the supply position of Gee had gradually deteriorated, and even now there is no indication of it improving in the near future. Every possible effort is being made to obtain components which will enable sets, which at present cannot be used, to be made serviceable. This number has fortunately been greatly reduced during the last month. In view of this acute shortage of equipment, it becomes increasingly essential that all cases of component breakdowns are brought to the notice of Sigs.7 at Air Ministry, vide A.M.O. A.869/43. A reminder
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
is also given that if no reply has been received from Air Ministry within a month dating from the originating of the report, there is no need to hold the unit or component for investigation. Secondly, if operational requirements demand that the unit be used before the month has elapsed, a record to this effect should be kept.
[Underlined] GEE SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
As mentioned at the outset of the Summary of October’s activities, the number of sorties undertaken by 5 Group were fewer than for the preceding months. Gee was reported ‘bang on’ for 96.8% of the sorties, despite the most unsatisfactory supply position, and accordingly all due credit must be given to the radar mechanics who made this possible.
[Underlined] H.2.S. SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
For the very limited number of occasions on which H2S II was used an increased serviceability of .7% over September was obtained, to bring it up to 91.4%. The time is fast approaching when scanners will require careful attention with regard to lubrication and heating. Radar Officers should ensure that the modification has been completed in all aircraft, to eliminate the danger of freezing up, which gave us so much bother last winter. It is again stressed that A.M.O. A. 869/43 action is to be taken on all occasions when components break down.
H.2.S. III suffered a slight set-back in serviceability for October, and out of the 85 sorties completed, 10 developed difficulties, giving a percentage of 88.2 serviceable.
[Underlined] FISHPOND. [/underlined]
Fishpond maintained approximately the same degree of serviceability for September and October, being 90.7 and 90.8 per cent respectively.
[Underlined] SALVETE ET VALETE. [/underlined]
The 1st of November marked the loss to the Group of our old Radar I, S/Ldr. Tom Branson. He had been with the Group for over two years, and all will agree that it was to a large degree due to his guidance and whole-hearted support that Radar is playing such a successful part in the operations conducted by the Group. We wish him the greatest success in his new work, and at the same time, extend to S/Ldr. Perrin a most hearty welcome.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] tactics
This month has produced the unusual phenomena of heavy raids well into Germany with negligible losses from fighters. This has been due to the very short warning that the German defences now get of the approach of a raid, and a skilful combination of Window spoofs, the Mandrel screen and other countermeasures.
We have won the first round, but the Hun is bound to stage a come-back. With the lengthening nights and deeper penetrations his job will become easier. He has a highly developed Radar system, and it is now known that, in addition to the H.E.219, considerable numbers of the M.E.110 and J.U.88 are fitted with two upward firing 20 m.m. cannon.
[Cartoon] WHERE’S THAT FLAK COMING FROM?
I WOULDN’T KNOW – I’M ONLY THE REAR GUNNER
These fighters attempt to formate some distance below the bomber’s tail, and rake it. With the loss of early warning devices, the only answer to this form of attack is a regular banking search and an ability to see the fighter during the search. The first is useless without the second. Gunners must realise that to see a fighter underneath on a dark winter’s night is a very different proposition from d=seeing a fighter coming in level astern on a clear starlit night. The importance of efficient night vision and, therefore, night-vision training, cannot be over emphasised.
With regard to combat manoeuvres, the corkscrew is still the most effective provided the fighter is seen in time. On a dark night, however, crews must be prepared for sudden unseen attacks, to which the only answer is the diving turn. Captains must ensure that they have some form of emergency signal from their gunners and that they can act on it immediately. This does not mean violent mishandling of the controls. On pilot of this Group put up an ‘black’ this month by returning to base with a large number of rivets missing from the wings of his aircraft. He was lucky to get back at all. Two doses of such handling and even a Lancaster would have succumbed.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER,1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TACTICS. [/underlined]
Two last points:-
(i) The Hun has started to use jet-propelled aircraft at night. They are very easily seen, and can only be considered a threat on bright nights. Gunners should remember, however, that due to the very high speed of these aircraft, combat manoeuvres should be started at increased range.
(ii) “Stepping Down” out of a target does not mean 20°of flap and everything closed. It is a series of dives at high speed with normal boost and revs, the idea being to get down quickly and also to leave the target quickly. Some figures for the guidance of crews are being produced for distribution.
[Cartoon] KEEP OFF THE GRASS
“Detailed – 15 Took off – 9:
E.R’s – Nil: Missing – Nil”
[Underlined] Cancelled – 6 [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] air bombing
The night attacks on German targets undertaken by the Group were again planned to destroy sectors of towns and cities that had to a large extent, escaped major damage during previous attacks. However, incendiary plots show that quite a large proportion of the bomb loads did not fall on the section of the target area they were intended for. There were quite a number of early releases causing the “creep-back” it is so important to avoid, and aircraft not adhering to the briefed [underlined] TRACKS, [/underlined] scattered thousands of incendiaries on areas which had been burned out during previous raids. Cross-trail has been practically eliminated by the use of the wind conversion factors for various T.V’s, and additional time delay.
Now that the chances of a cloud-covered target are greater than during the summer months, the Air Bomber must be prepared for a sudden change of tactics a matter of minutes before the commencement of the bombing run. If he is not sure of the “Wanganui” procedure, and cannot make the necessary alterations to the bombsight in a short space of time, the opportunity for an accurate attack will be lost.
The Group has reached a very high standard of practice bombing and if German targets are attacked with this same degree of accuracy, every bomb will fall where it hurts the Hun most.
[Underlined] THE LORD CAMROSE TROPHY. [/underlined]
The Air Officer Commanding visited R.A.F. Station, Skellingthorpe, to present the Lord Camrose Trophy to No.50 Squadron who have won the competition for the second consecutive period of three months, with an average crew error of 148 yards at 20,000 feet, for all high level practice bombing during that period.
The A.O.C. congratulated the Squadron upon their success which had only been achieved by the close co-operation between all members of the bombing team and the high standard of bombsight serviceability provided by the Instrument Section.
The fact that practice bombing results provide an indication of a Squadron’s efficiency and accuracy on operations was also stressed.
In conclusion, No.50 Squadron were warned that other squadrons in the Group were making a great effort to defeat them during the next three months and it will need an even greater effort on their part to retain the trophy.
W/Cdr. Frogley, O.C., No.50 Squadron, thanked the A.O.C. and assured him that the Squadron were determined not the lose the trophy, despite increasing opposition.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] OCTOBER’S OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS. [/underlined]
The qualification for inclusion on this list is now 75 yards at 20,000 ft. instead of 80 yards.
SQDN. OR CON. UNIT PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR ERROR AT 20,000 FT. IN YARDS
9 F/O Davis Sgt. Harrison Sgt. Ward 55 yards
F/O Tweddle P/O Singer P/O Shields 73 yards
44 F/O Lewis F/Sgt. King F/Sgt. Shearman 70 yards
49 F/Lt. Le Marquand Sgt. Boyce F/O Ransome 44 yards
F/O Rowley F/O Barlow P/O Deutscher 62 yards
50 F/Lt. Enoch F/Sgt. Hugh F/O George 73 yards
61 F/O Swales Sgt. Taylor F/O Saunders 56 yards
106 F/O Bowell F/Sgt. Plumb Sgt. Peterson 74 yards
207 F/O Dougal F/Sgt. Scowen Sgt. Stewart 70 yards
617 F/O Martin F/Sgt. Day P/O Jackson 58 & 58 yards
F/O Flatman F/O Kelly P/O McKie 62 yards
630 F/O Waterfall Sgt. Dixon Sgt. Kindler 68 yards
1654 C.U. F/Lt. Dagnon Sgt. Watson F/O Mayer 72 yards
F/Sgt. Eggins Sgt. Grady F/Sgt. Cahill 51 yards
F/O Gilmour F/O Burrington Sgt. Steadman 56 yards
No.617 Squadron report the following outstanding Mk.III Low Level exercise.
F/O Ross P/O Tilby F/O O’Brien
8 bombs – 400 feet – Average Error 9 yards.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING. [/underlined]
This month’s figures show a decrease in the number of bombs dropped within the Group, due to the limitations imposed by unfavourable weather conditions. The errors however, have decreased considerably and much of the credit must go to the navigators, the majority of whom now realise that the prime factor in an exercise is the obtaining of an accurate wind velocity.
The outstanding result of the month is that achieved by No. 61 Squadron. After a temporary fall from grace last month, they have, during October, dropped 522 bombs for an average crew error of 131 yards. An excellent start in the first round of the Lord Camrose Trophy competition.
Nos.9 and 50 Squadrons can also be congratulated on obtaining crew errors of 135 yards and 138 yards respectively.
The Conversion Units appear in this Summary for the last time, but it is hoped that we shall be able to publish their figures as a matter of interest to the Squadrons who will eventually receive crews trained in No.75 Base.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING. [/underlined]
The following article has been contributed by S/Ldr. Wonham, D.F.M., Bombing Leader, 55 Base, and outlines a practical method of obtaining maximum benefit from the limited opportunities for practice bombing available during the winter months.
[Underlined] BOMBING TRAINING. [/underlined]
With the coming of the winter weather, practice bombing on operational squadrons will be more and more difficult to organise, and the somewhat haphazard method of laying on the maximum number of exercises which has served during the summer months is going to prove very inadequate now that early take-offs and low cloud will limit the opportunities for high level practice bombing. It is felt that a definite system should be aimed at by Flight and Squadron Commanders.
The advantage of a regular and systematic method had amply proved itself in all manner of training from the creating of a rugby team to the organisation of the crew of a battleship. On first thought it would appear that the many difficulties entailed by practice bombing training in a squadron make it impossible to use one system, but a method is necessary, and if squadrons try to adhere to a form of training on the lines of that suggested, it would be found that in a few months errors would be reduced to an even lower level than at present believed possible with the Mk.XIV Bombsight.
Firstly let us consider as average squadron with 30 crews as a permanent strength, and an intake of about 10 crews per month. On the first of any given month the categories of the crews will probably be:-
CAT. A+ Nil
CAT. A 5
CAT. B 18
CAT. C 6
CAT. D 1
The 10 new arrivals would have a bombing standard on Stirlings of:-
CAT. A+ Nil
CAT. A 2
CAT. B 6
CAT. C 1
CAT. D1
In actual fact when bombing from Lancaster aircraft at first, these categories fall considerably, and it is usual that a crew on its first exercise on the squadron gets an error of about 240 yards. Experience has shown that on an average, with careful analysis and instruction, this error improves to 200x on the second exercise, and 160x on the third. Consider, therefore, the average new crew as in Cat. C on arrival and a potential B after the first three exercises.
In the same way we may consider the Squadron Crews (as apart from the new arrivals) who are Category C., as potential A’s and B’s after 2 exercises, and the Category D crews as potential B’s after 3 exercises.
The target, therefore, for a Squadron Commander should be to give during the month:-
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
10 New Crews 3 exercises each – 30
6 Cat. C. Crews 2 exercises each – 12
1 Cat.D. Crew 3 exercises – 3
[Underlined] TOTAL – 45 [/underlined]
This appears to be quite a large programme to complete during a winter month, and as the Category A and B crews already on the squadron also need some bombing practice, the total number of exercises completed by the squadron would be in the region of 60 to 70.
If this is to be accomplished it means taking advantage of every opportunity provided by the weather and operational needs. Base Bombing Leaders must endeavour to avoid over-crowding on the range at their disposal, and crews can assist by being on the range at the times detailed.
[Underlined] DO YOU KNOW YOUR SWITCH DRILL? [/underlined]
An aircraft returned from an abortive sortie with a full bomb-load of H.E., and it was decided that a few of the bombs would have to be jettisoned in order to get down to the safe all-up weight for landing. On reaching the jettison area, the Air Bomber put the fusing switches to “SAFE”, turned the drum-switch to “SINGLE AND SALVO”, selected the appropriate bomb stations, then pushed the jettison bars over.
[Underlined] ITEMS OF INTEREST. [/underlined]
[Underlined] 1661 Conversion Unit (F/Lt. Price) [/underlined] now have an excellent ‘mock-up’ of the Lancaster bombing panel including the camera. Several unusual and effective ideas are incorporated and thanks are due to F/Lt. Buckley, Station Electrical Officer, for providing this excellent aid to instruction.
[Underlined] 1654 Conversion Unit (F/Lt. Kennedy) [/underlined] report that No.95 Course completed 30 High Level practice bombing exercises with an average crew error 138 yards at 20,000 feet. This is an excellent result and as nine of the Captains are Australians, Waddington should produce some A+ category crews very shortly.
F/O Mason (Pilot) and F/O Barker (Air Bomber) completed a very good exercise despite the absence of wind finding aids. Their aircraft had no A.P.I. and Gee was found to be u/s, so a three-drift wind of 286 degrees 24 m.p.h. was found, and six bombs were dropped using this wind. The resulting errors were:-
Crew 111 yards
Vector 85 yards
Basic 82 yards at 20,000 feet.
Another three-drift wind, 280 degrees 30 m.p.h. was found, and a further six bombs were dropped with even better results.
Crew error 61 yards
Vector error 42 yards
Basic error 46 yards
Both winds were checked by the 90° method and the results of the exercise are a tribute to the accuracy of both the Pilot and the Air Bomber.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] 1660 Conversion Unit (F/Lt. Wake) [/underlined] report an example of perseverance on the part of F/O Howard and crew who were detailed to drop 12 practice bombs in indifferent weather conditions. The exercise took four hours to complete and two ‘A’ category results were obtained.
[Underlined] 207 Squadron (F/Lt. Linnett) [/underlined] issue all Air Bombers with a height correction card to allow for the difference between the T.V. of the practice bomb, and the minimum it is possible to set on the bombsight. This has helped to bring the average crew error down from 238 yards to 160 yards.
[Underlined] East Kirkby (F/Lt. Hanniball & F/Lt. Foulkes) [/underlined] are endeavouring to equip a Station Training Room where Air Bombers will have all the available training equipment concentrated in one place.
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] Squadron Average Error [/underlined]
1st 207 53 yards
2nd 83 54 yards
3rd 630 63 yards
4th 57 65 yards
5th 97 69 yards
6th 44 72 yards
7th 9 73 yards
8th 49 79 yards
9th 463 88 yards
10th 61 92 yards
11th 619 93 yards
12th 106 98 yards
13th 50 103 yards
14th 467 118 yards
No. 227 Squadron completed 5 exercises with an average error of 162 yards.
No.207 Squadron are the winners of the Inter-Squadron Competition with an exceptionally good average for eight exercises, only just beating 83 Squadron. The results obtained by both these Squadrons are highly commendable.
No.55 Base have staged a revival during the past few months and four of their squadrons are included in the first six, a careful study of these pages will provide a few of the reasons for their success.
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
[Underlined] Con. Unit Average Error [/underlined]
1st 1660 C.U. 60 yards
2nd 1654 C.U. 65 yards
3rd 1661 C.U. 75 yards
4th 5 L.F.S. 145 yards
No.1660 Conversion Unit have done well during the month, and competition between the three Conversion Units remains very keen, but No.5 L.F.S. cannot do enough bombing to compete with them and consequently are once again at the bottom of the list.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] “BIGCHIEF” COMPETITION. [/underlined]
The only entry for this month comes from 55 Base:-
G/Capt. Harris (Spilsby) – 136 yards.
[Underlined] “LEADER” COMPETITION. [/underlined]
F/Lt. Campbell (9 Sqdn) – 92 yards.
F/Lt. Foulkes (630 Sqdn) – 120 yards.
There should be more than two entries for the Leader’s competition, and a 100% entry is expected for November.
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORIES [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
ӿ Excluding Nos.617 and 627 Squadrons.
X Plus 14 not categorised.
A+ 85 yards or less
A 140 yards or less
B 210 yards or less
C 280 yards or less
D Over 280 yards
The number of A+ category crews is a record for the Group. All crews in this category demonstrate their ability to maintain a consistently high standard of bombing and it should be given the widest publicity within the squadron.
The crew bombing category is not applied to an individual, but to the combination of Pilot, Navigator and Air Bomber and it should be every Captain’s duty to discover [underlined] WHY [/underlined] his team is in C or D category.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER. [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/Lt. Price (1661 C.U.) [/underlined] has returned to operational duties as Bombing Leader with No.50 Squadron, and has been replaced at Winthorpe by F/Lt. Falgate (50 Sqdn.).
[Underlined] F/O Kennedy (49 Sqdn.) [/underlined] is Bombing Leader with No.227 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/Lt. Lewis (92 Group) [/underlined] has been appointed Bombing Leader at No.189 Squadron for a second tour of operations.
[Underlined] F/Lt. Woods (617 Sqdn.) [/underlined has completed his tour and been replaced by F/O Rumgay.
[underlined] F/Lt. Gibson (A.C.S.) [/underlined] returns to No.49 Squadron for a second tour of operations.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING [/underlined]
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE [/underlined]
[Table of Bombing Practice Results by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
No.617 Squadron also dropped 209 T.I’s with an average error of 58 yards.
No.627 Squadron dropped 308 bombs and 280 T.I’s with average errors of 60 yards and 151 yards respectively.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING [/underlined]
[Underlined] RESULTS OF COURSES. [/underlined]
F/O Manos 50 Sqdn ‘B’
F/O Palmer 57 Sqdn ‘B’
F/O Krinke 619 Sqdn ‘B’
F/O Woollam 44 Sqdn ‘B’
F/O Goodwin 467 Sqdn ‘D’
F/O ALEY, 1654 Conversion Unit, obtained 1st place and an ‘A’ category on No. 94 Course.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE RANGES [/underlined]
The following are the figures from the Bombing Ranges for the month of October, 1944.
[Table of Bombs and T.I’s Dropped by Range]
[Underlined] TOTAL 7626 [/underlined]
“v” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] navigation
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
Less than half the attacks this month have been on Germany, the majority being on short range targets at the battlefront. An interesting operation was carried out on Bergen at the end of the month, which gave some navigators their first experience of navigation on the Northern Gee Chain, undisturbed by the enemy’s defences jamming. Nos. 9 and 617 Squadrons attacked the “Tirpitz” again in Northern Waters, making a round flight of 2400 miles. (This operation will be dealt with in another paragraph).
The standard of navigation achieved throughout the month has been good – BUT NOT EXCEPTIONAL. It has been said that one must either progress or retrogress, but never stand still. At the moment the Navigation Union of this Group is standing still, inasmuch that our standard is not improving. We have reached a standard of concentration which is good but not yet good enough. It must be our aim to improve this standard to guarantee a concentration, at any time, covering an area of not more than 50 miles in length and 10 miles in width – and we are a long way from this as yet.
Take the raid on Nuremburg, 19/20th October, 1944, as an example. The concentration plot for this raid one hour after bombing showed that the spread, in length, was 100 miles, and in width, 42 miles. No less than 43 aircraft were out of the “tram lines”, and this only 80 minutes after bombing! What are the causes of such a spread? The following are suggested:-
(i) [Underlined] Track Keeping. [/underlined]
(a) Navigators do not find an accurate w/v at the target on which they can set course on the return journey.
(b) Navigators do not obtain D.R. check positions, by use of A.P.I. and target w/v, every 10 or 15 minutes on the return journey when out of Gee range.
(c) In consequence of (b) G/S and E.T.A. checks are not obtained regularly when out of Gee range, consequently turning points are under and over-shot.
(ii) [Underlined] Timing. [/underlined]
(a) Corner are cut to make up or gain a little time.
(b) Captains [underlined] do not [/underlined] fly at the agreed speeds and [underlined] do not [/underlined] take any notice of navigators’ warnings of being early at turning points.
(c) Navigators “sit back” and do not inform the pilot that they are running ahead of time. (It has been noted that very few aircraft are behind concentration times on the return journey).
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
Of all the above suggested cases, it is known (ii) (b) is the most important and is the chief cause of the spread. Pilots are entirely at fault here, but navigation is primarily YOUR responsibility, so make sure that YOUR pilot sees this paragraph. If he doesn’t believe it, tell him to go and see your Station Navigation Officer and he will put him right. Also see that your pilot is shown every concentration diagram sent from Group, or better still, show it to him yourself. Get him navigation conscious, he is the captain of the aircraft and as such must realise his responsibilities.
Station Navigation Officers have already discussed this matter and have given their suggestions for combatting these failings. These are being attended to but meantime it is requested that all Station Navigation Officers, working in conjunction with Analysis Officers, give this problem their undivided attention. Discussions, with not only navigators but also pilots, should be arranged frequently until we have achieved our aim.
[Underlined] A.P.I. WINDFINDING ATTACHMENT. [/underlined]
We still have only five of these attachments in the Group – all there are in the Command! No.9 Squadron have two of these and have put them to good use on operation and training flights. In some instances they have obtained amazingly low vector errors. It is doubtful whether the large vector errors, which have been occasionally obtained, are attributable to the crews concerned, because it is known that one of the instruments does not always function correctly.
The remaining three attachments are installed in Mosquito aircraft of No.627 Squadron for trial purposes. To date 24 exercises have been completed and the results fully justify our demand for a large supply of these instruments. Approximately 100 w/v’s were obtained on these trials and were compared with smoke puffs and Balloon Sonde winds. This comparison showed that an A.P.I. attachment w/v had an average vector error of only 2.64 m.p.h. These results are excellent, and there is no reason why they cannot be repeated on operations. As soon as we have more of these instruments available, and are able to equip the Mosquito Squadron completely, we shall have solved our target windfinding problems. Everything is being done to obtain these extra attachments.
It is interesting to compare the above results with those achieved by (i) Lancasters fitted with A.P.I. attachment, (ii) Lancaster fitted only with A.P.I. To date 25 practice and operational flights have been undertaken by Lancaster attachment aircraft and their average vector error, computed as for Mosquitoes, was 1.75 m.p.h. The average practice bombing vector error for main force squadrons, using only the A.P.I. was 4.75 m.p.h. for the month of September, and 4.3 m.p.h. for the month of October.
The difference between the Mosquito and Lancaster attachment errors is probably explained by the fact that in a Lancaster aircraft the job is done by two men as against the Mosquito’s one, also the Lancaster navigator can work in comfort, bright light and in a spacious compartment. All these lead to greater accuracy in work.
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION AND NAVIGATION ANALYSIS OFFICERS. [/underlined]
All analysis officers are now installed and have settled down to their arduous task. Already they are achieving some good results. There has been a noticeable improvement in the general standard of wind finding, log and chart work and computations. An improvement on the
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
general standard so soon after appointing these officers was unexpected and augers well for the future.
The number of ‘A’ and ‘A+’ Navigators in the Group has increased from 101 in September to 142 in October; and the number of ‘C’ and ‘D’ Navigators has decreased from 61 in September to 33 in October. This is good, but the number of ‘C’ and ‘D’ Category Navigators is still far too high. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers must do everything in their power to reduce this figure of 33 to nil.
The standard of navigation set by this Headquarters in the Categorisation Test, which is the basis of all analyses, is high. Analysis Officers must maintain this standard and must be strict in their marking. Only by adopting this attitude will you ensure that your analyses reflect a true picture of the general standard of navigation in your particular squadron. The predominating weaknesses of each navigator, so obvious from the analysis of his log and chart, must be passed on to the Station Navigation Officer immediately and definitely within 36 hours of completing an operation. He will do the rest. The information must be passed [underlined] quickly [/underlined] however, to ensure that the navigator in question can have his faults pointed out to him before he operates again.
One final word to Analysis Officers. You have much work to do which will keep you well occupied, but even so you should make a special point of liaising with your opposite numbers in other squadrons, preferably in another Base. Much can be learnt from the liaison visit, and you are bound to pick up one or two ideas better than your own.
[Underlined] SECOND ATTACK ON THE “TIRPITZ”. [/underlined]
The battleship “Tirpitz” was attacked a second time by aircraft of No.9 and 617 Squadrons. Navigators of the two squadrons were therefore given another chance to show their skill – and once again they came up to expectations.
The operation was carried out as a “night gaggle”, all aircraft burning lights until within 50 miles of enemy territory. Weather was poor over the first part of the trip, which was carried out at a height of 1,000 feet. This low altitude combined with the very heavy static in the cloud, restricted the Gee range to 62N 01E in most cases, although some fixes were obtained as far as 63N. After Gee coverage, cloud made the use of Astro very difficult, and the remainder of the route over the sea was mainly on DR. Due to a change of wind landfall was made some 15 miles south of track, but the moonlight made it possible to pinpoint very accurately, and no further navigational troubles were experienced from then until the target was reached.
The return trip was uneventful, accurate navigation was made almost impossible because of the lack of aids. From the target aircraft had to fly for a total of 3 1/2 hours on D.R. Navigation before they came into Gee range once again. Loop homing facilities were made available and good use was made of them. Gee re-appeared at approximately 62° north, and from then on it was all plain sailing.
The average duration of this trip was 13 hours, and the navigators have every reason to feel satisfied with their contribution to this operation.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1844.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
[Drawing] THIS MONTH’S Bouquets [Drawing]
It has been decided that the names of the eight navigators who submit the best work for the month shall appear in this Summary. The following navigators have been picked out for their consistent accurate and methodical work. This includes good track keeping and timing, constant wind velocity checks, and checking of E.T.A’s, and log and chart work of a very high order.
F/Sgt. Ward – 467 Squadron.
F/O. Markham – 463 Squadron.
Sgt. Berry – 106 Squadron.
Sgt. Burns – 106 Squadron.
F/Lt. Lengston – 630 Squadron.
F/Sgt. Latus – 619 Squadron.
F/O. Bailey – 49 Squadron.
F/Sgt. Searle – 227 Squadron.
[Underlined] NAVIGATION TRAINING IN THE CONVERSION UNITS. [/underlined]
This month has seen little change in the training programme, with the exception that still greater stress has been laid on the importance of timing. Its importance is being stressed at every “verse end”; no doubt squadrons will appreciate this when the present lot of trainees are posted to them.
Every effort has been made to get crews up to standard in their Radar training. This has been most difficult because of the weather and a sudden “torrent” of aircraft unserviceability. However, crews are receiving plenty of valuable ground training and manipulation exercises on the trainers. It is hoped that this extra ground training will partially compensate the loss of a little air training.
The Conversion Units are carrying out experiments on practice bombing wind finding, using Gee co-ordinated as a datum point. The vector errors will be compared with those obtained using a visual datum point and a Mk.XIV Sighting Head. If these experiments prove successful, then, with the introduction of the new Continental Gee chains, it may be possible to use such a method on operations when cloud prevents the using of a visual datum point. The results are eagerly awaited.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING VECTOR ERRORS. [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by all squadrons and conversion units this month is as shown below:-
Average error of Squadrons – 4.3 m.p.h.
Average error of Conversion Units – 5.5 m.p.h.
These figures show an improvement for the squadrons of .4 m.p.h., but
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
a deterioration for the conversion units of .5 m.p.h. The over-all average is still below 5 m.p.h., let us now go all out for reducing it below the 4 m.p.h. mark.
[Ranked Table of Average Vector Errors by Squadrons and Conversion Units]
For the fifth month in succession Nos. 9 and 50 Squadrons hold the first two places. There is no doubt that this excellent performance on the part of these two squadrons is due entirely to their hard work and great keenness. There is a noticeable improvement in the errors obtained by the three squadrons of No.54 Base. This is good, but we are confident that they can do much better. We hope to see them at the top of the list next month.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS. [/underlined]
F/Lt. Williams, DFC, DFM – No.463 Squadron Navigation Leader – posted to No.1661 Con. Unit as Navigation Leader.
S/Ldr. Walker, DFC & Bar – Station Navigation Officer, Woodhall repatriated to Canada.
S/Ldr. Crowe, DFC – Station Navigation Officer, Metheringham to be Base Navigation Officer, Coningsby.
F/Lt. Martin – No.630 Squadron Navigation Officer to be Station Navigation Officer, Metheringham.
F/Lt. Hewitt – No.630 Squadron, to be Squadron Navigation Officer.
F/Lt. Ayles, DFC, DFM – Navigation Leader, Aircrew School, to be Station Navigation Officer, Balderton.
F/O. Swinyard, DFC – Aircrew School, to be Navigation Leader.
F/Lt. Kilbey, DFM – No.1660 Con. Unit Navigation Leader, to be Squadron Navigation Officer, No.227 Squadron.
F/Lt. Ingram, DFC – No.1660 Con. Unit to be Navigation Leader.
F/O. Booth, DFC – No.1660 Con. Unit to be No.189 Squadron Navigation Officer.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] radar nav:
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Once again much greater use has been made of this efficient little aid than of its bigger brother H.2.S.
Ranges on the primary Gee chains have been much similar to those experienced during September, but areas of intensive jamming noted in Northern Holland, along the Frisians and in the Ruhr and Frankfurt areas.
Opportunity has again been afforded for operators to use the north-eastern and northern chains. Both chains gave excellent cover, with the northern chain giving target fixes. The only “moan” being that the chart coverage of the north-eastern chain is insufficient, leaving a blank area at its northern limits before the northern chain comes in.
After much trouble with the siting of Stations, preparation of lattice charts and their distribution, the Ruhr and Rheims chains have at last come into being. So far the Rheims chain has proved quite satisfactory with little or no interference. However teething troubles are still being experienced with the Ruhr chain, mainly due to the fact that two of the stations are light mobiles. When these have been changed far better reception and coverage should be obtained, and charts are to be produced covering the North Sea, and Straits of Dover, thus cutting out the changeover of the R.F. Units over the Continent. Until this is done the eastern chain transmission on the R.F.27 is to continue.
Although little or no jamming has yet been experienced on the two new chains, it does not mean to say that the Hun will not devote his time to them. Operators are therefore reminded that much time can usefully be spent reading through jamming on the trainer. You may need this experience some day.
With the positioning of Gee stations nearer and nearer the Reich and probably on Reich territory, the possibility of Gee bombing again comes to the forefront. Every opportunity must therefore be made of practicing your Gee bombing. Homing to your airfield control tower is quite satisfactory, why not do it after every flight? (Don’t forget to keep above circuit height however).
A word about Gee homing with the advent of winter and possibilities of low cloud or drissle [sic] on return. The facilities afforded by Gee in order to reach your airfield are too numerous to outline here. You have your homing lattice lines and instructions regarding losing height. These have been provided for your safety – use them intelligently and avoid the repetition of many unfortunate accidents which occurred last winter.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAV. [/underlined]
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
Yet another navigational aid has made its debut this month in the form of Loran (Long Range Navigation). Whilst not so simple to operate as its older brother Gee it has one distinct advantage – its range. As Loran does not afford adequate homing facilities it has been fitted to aircraft in addition to and not in place of Gee, giving the navigator one more “baby” to care for. Let us see that we bring it through the teething stages without much trouble and use it as intelligently as Gee has been used in the past.
To help to counteract the teething trouble it might be as well to enumerate here the main difficulties which will be experienced with Loran by most operators during training.
(i) Difficulty in identifying the pulses, particularly the sky waves.
Ground waves are steady in amplitude.
Sky waves frequently vary in amplitude and are constantly changing their general shape. This is known as SPLITTING and usually the trailing or right edge only is affected. This is not particularly serious in the taking of readings.
(ii) DANGEROUS SPLITTING of the sky waves, causing the leading or left edge of the pulses to collapse and appear ragged. This does not persist for more than two or three minutes and operators should therefore wait until the normal pulse shape reappears before attempting to take any readings.
(iii) Interference from outside sources. Navigators are warned that Loran may be affected by many wireless transmissions, but patience must be exercised when this occurs. Wait until the interferences stop before attempting to take a reading. This interference is in no way to be confused with jamming, which is hardly likely to occur at the present time.
(iv) Blinking of the pulses, i.e. signals moving from side to side at regular intervals of about 1 second. This denoted the slave station is experiencing trouble in receiving the Master Station’s transmissions. Readings are not to be taken when blinking is on.
Training in Loran is to be undertaken by operational navigators trained by B.D.U. These instructors will be withdrawn from squadrons, trained at B.D.U. and returned on completion of the course. Each squadron should have at least one per flight in the very near future.
With the present operational commitments it is hardly possible that much time will be allowed for air training and the majority of training will have to be carried out on the ground.
Unfortunately air training over this country does not allow operators much chance to use the S.S. Loran chain and training flights over the Continent have therefore been organised. It is hardly likely that time will allow many of these flights to be made. Many navigators may therefore have to train whilst on operational sorties. With the
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAV. [/underlined]
difficulties that are experienced with Loran, this method of training may not appear too satisfactory, but every navigator can, by devoting a proportion of his time in the operation of Loran on each sortie, attain a good standard of efficiency.
Air Bombers too are to acquaint themselves with this new aid and give as much help to the navigators as they possibly can.
Very little is known about the reception of Loran over the Continent, and we are relying on every individual operator using this equipment to bring back as much information as possible. From this information better facilities may be provided in the future. It is up to each and every one of you to see that this duty is carried out.
[Underlined] H.2.S. [/underlined]
Very little can be said of the performance of H2S Mark II on operations during the month due to the severe restrictions which have been placed upon its use.
However several gardening sorties have been undertaken with the use of H2S Mark II and results have shown no decrease in the efficiency of its operators.
It must necessarily follow that under present restrictions, the training of operators will take much longer than before. In addition, little opportunity is given to operators to study the appearance of European territory on the P.P.I.
To make up for this time lost, it is all the more necessary for even greater use to be made of flying time over this country and of synthetic training.
No N.F.T. or bombing exercises should be carried out without using the equipment either for practice blind bombing or navigational purposes. Every minute spent over this country making yourself familiar with the equipment may mean the saving of valuable time over the Continent, particularly if you have the full manipulation drill at your finger tips.
It has been noted that since the restrictions have been placed on the use of H2S Mark II, considerable lack of faith in the equipment has been expressed by many operators. This it is believed has been due to the various tales which have invariably spread amongst aircrew.
To counteract this lack of faith a report has been issued to all squadrons detailing the reasons for the restrictions and if operators spend a little time in reading the report it will do a lot to dispel these rumours. In addition they will feel more determined to obtain the maximum out of H2S on the various occasions it can be used.
The performance of H2S Mark II has been of its usual high order, 83 and 97 Squadrons again having carried out several successful attacks during the month.
Experiments have been going ahead to design a perfect scanner to eliminate the serious gap which has been occurring in the picture at 6 miles. This has been achieved and with equipment fitted with the new scanner it should be possible to bomb direct on the response with greater accuracy and less difficulty than with the present indicator. Good work 54 Base!
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAV. [/underlined]
P.P.I. Photography has been carried out on all operations during the month and several good photographs have been obtained by Nos. 83 and 97 Squadrons. Whilst the present camera leaves much to be desired, operators must remember that it is the only check on the target area if cloud conditions prevail; every effort must be made therefore to obtain successful photographs.
If the photograph is not taken at bomb release, enter on your Interrogation form the number of seconds it was taken before or after release and you will be plotted correctly.
The excuse that both set operator and plotter are busy when in the target areas cannot be accepted. This is an operational photograph and it must be taken.
Experiments are being made by this Headquarters and at Headquarters, Bomber Command, to simplify the manipulation of the present camera and also to improve the quality of photographs obtained. It is realised that if sufficiently good photographs can be obtained, navigational and target approach strip maps can be produced for the benefit of all concerned. It is therefore up to every individual operator to see that these photographs are forthcoming.
106 Squadron are progressing favourably in the training of crews for the P.F.F. Squadrons. It is realised that H2S Mark II, whilst it gives a good idea of the basic principles of H2S, does not provide the facilities of the 184 Indicator and Mark III H2S. Despite this, every effort is being made by 106 Squadron to see that crews are fully aware of the basic principles of all H2S equipment before they arrive at 83 and 97 Squadrons, leaving only the finer points and intensive blind bombing training to be carried out by those squadrons.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] training
[Underlined] 51 BASE’S LAST MONTH. [/underlined]
This month was the last in which 51 Base was part and parcel of No.5 Group. On the 3rd November the three Heavy Conversion Units became No.75 Base under the administration of the newly formed No. 7 Heavy Conversion Unit Group. No.75 Base will, however, retain a direct affiliation with No.5 Group, and except in special circumstances will provide crews for No. 5 L.F.S. and No.5 Group Squadrons in the usual way. No.5 L.F.S. will remain within No.5 Group until Heavy Conversion Units are re-armed with Lancasters instead of Stirlings.
During their period in No.5 Group, 51 Base has produced 2,000 crews for Squadrons and has used Manchester-Lancaster, Halifax-Lancaster and Stirling-Lancaster combinations for four-engined conversion. The training organisation not only covered all the basic features of operational training but also embraced latest instruction in the rapidly developing Radar devices. Despite its many problems caused by using such a variety of aircraft types, the Base met all its Squadron commitments and, this last summer during the months July – September, produced 70 crews in excess of Bomber Command’s estimate. The formation of the two new Squadrons, Nos. 189 and 227, therefore presented no crew difficulties. The accident rate during this peak period of training also continued to improve steadily.
The pinch of the approaching winter was reflected in the hours flown during October and the Base logged just over 7,000 hours compared with 8,000 hours the previous month. The average hours per crew, however, were according to the syllabi and a total of 133 crews were posted from No.5 L.F.S. to Squadrons – one in excess of the estimate for the month. No.5 L.F.S. from now on is training on the winter rate, and investments have been made to produce 115 crews in November and 100 crews in December.
[Underlined] SQUADRON TRAINING. [/underlined]
Squadrons completed 4,500 hours day operational training and 1,500 hours night operational training during the month – 1,000 hours more than in September. The organisation for training new crews and for 10/20 sortie checks has been summarised in the Headquarters Air Staff Instructional Training/24 dated 26th October. This instruction includes a revised syllabus for initial crew training and a list of the duties and responsibilities of the Squadron Training Instructors. The last of the Squadron Training Instructors took up their duties during the month and particular attention to the details contained in the Instruction is essential to ensure the smooth operation of the squadron training scheme.
Of 133 new crews posted to squadrons, 113 completed initial crew training and were passed fit to operate. The average flying time for initial training by new crews in main force squadrons was 16 hours, which excludes No.49 Squadron on A.G.L.T. training. The syllabus in Air Staff Instruction Trg/24, Appendix ‘A’ lays down 11 hours 15 minutes,
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING. [/underlined]
and every effort is to be made to keep close to this figure unless individual crews reveal deficiencies which require more flying. All Bases reported that the standard of crews from 5 L.F.S. was satisfactory.
The 10/20 sortie checks are not being regularly carried out. During recent weeks a total of 76 outstanding checks have been accumulated. A total of 32 were completed during the month – 30% - a sorry figure. 53 Base has 27 checks outstanding, 55 Base 38, and 56 Base 10. This aspect of squadron training requires immediate attention and Squadron and Flight Commanders are to assist the squadron instructors in clearing the 76 checks without delay. [Underlined] These checks are COMPULSORY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION – 1690 B.D.T. FLIGHT. [/underlined]
No. 1690 B.D.T. Flight exercised 2116 gunners during 929 details. The Flight did 785 hours flying which included day and night affiliation, A.G.L.T. training and a small amount of drogue towing for the R.A.F. Regiment. Pilots average 33 hours flying, the Hurricanes 38 hours, Spitfires 27 hours, and the Martinets 14 hours. These figures were slightly less than last month, but taking into account the weather, the Flight operated more intensively during fit periods.
October 17th was a record day for the Flight. It carried out affiliations with 103 crews including 17 night details, thereby exercising 240 gunners in 24 hours. Night affiliation again showed an increase for the third successive month and a total of 94 details, in which 200 gunners were exercised, was carried out. In addition to this squadron crews had other sources for night affiliation.
The opportunity still exists for more and more night affiliation as nights grow darker and longer as the Group is nowhere near the ideal of giving all crews two affiliation exercises in a month. The Flight also assisted 51 Base by providing 10 night details.
[Underlined] LINK TRAINER TIMES [/underlined]
There was another increase in Squadron times this month by pilots (49 hours) and Flight Engineers (150 hours). This is largely due to the good work put in by 54 and 55 Bases in increasing their total hours to 316 and 377 hours respectively.
56 Base has not been able to get off the mark properly owing to the shortage of Link trainers. However, congratulations are due to 49 Squadron whose pilots reached the 50/60 mark set in last month’s summary.
53 Base with a total of only 240 hours will have to put in some time this month to catch up with the leaders. Their pilots’ times in particular are very low at 61 hours.
All pilots should now have had some experience of the Artificial Horizon toppling device. This should help to improve their appreciation of the turn and bank indicator.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING [/underlined]
[Table of Training by Base and Squadron]
GRAND TOTALS: Pilots…1367 hours. Flight Engineers…1127
[Drawing] SWINDERBY, WIGSLEY & WINTHORPE LTD
FINISHED CREWS A SPECIALITY 51
SUCCESSFUL TOURS GUARANTEED
UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT
Good Luck and Many Thanks!
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
second thoughts for pilots
[Underlined] “WINTER’S TALE”. [/underlined]
The best place for “Second Thoughts” is in the Flight Office before you go near your aircraft. It is not much good having them when you are bogged off the perimeter track in a foot of Lincolnshire mud with six other aircraft from your own Flight queuing up behind – five minutes to go to “last time of take-off” on a raw winter night and the tractor has broken down. It is warmer by the Flight Officer fire anyway, and you have three good books to read – 5 Group Aircraft Drills, 5 Group Air Staff Instructions and Pilots and Flight Engineers Notes, (that little blue book which looks brand new because it has been in the cupboard for the last six months).
You’ve never some winter operations before; but thousands have and there is nothing new to learn. It is a matter of remembering what you’ve been told. Check your personal clothing (you get cold in the feet and finger tips first so pay plenty of attention to your boots and your gloves). See that your crew are kitted according to scale, especially the Rear Gunner, and see that your oxygen masks and helmets are tested on the rigs in the cloakroom before you go to dispersal.
[Underlined] “BEFORE YOU LEAP”. [/underlined]
That hour before take off which you spend with your aircraft in dispersal is not a dreary one because you have got plenty to do. During the winter it is not always possible to do an N.F.T. and therefore a thorough check is more essential than ever. All the points to note are covered in the Check Lists provided at the Crew Stations in every aircraft. Take a special note of the condition of the dispersal surface when you tumble out of the crew bus. Don’t allow a dispersal to accumulate dirty oil, its [sic] slippery enough at the best of times and worse still in winter. Inspect the chocks closely to make sure there is no danger of them slipping during the run up, especially if there has been “freeze” beforehand and there is frost or ice about.
Don’t roar out of dispersal in a hurry with the Flight Engineer still busily stowing “Window”. Switch on the landing light, have the Flight Engineer manning the Aldis light, and follow the marshalling airman. Check your brakes as you move out of dispersal. Taxy slowly and take the corners easily. As you taxy round check your Gyro and Artificial Horizon to ensure that they are operating (you’ve already checked the suction on both Pesco pumps before you left dispersal), and see your Pitot head heater is ON.
[Underlined] “THE TEMPEST”. [/underlined]
You have got all the Met. information you need, and it is not much good having “Second Thoughts” about something you have forgotten if you are off the ground. If you have been warned of isolated Cu.Nims. up to 24,000 feet, keep clear of them. You know the icing level, and you know your critical temperatures for icing – between 0°Cent. and -8°
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS. [/underlined]
Cent. for airframe icing, and between 0° Cent. and -30° Cent. for carburettor icing. There are of course extremes to both temperatures at which you can get icing, but it is not serious if you stick to the Flight Plan and know the symptoms.
Airframe icing is obvious. You can see it and sometimes hear it cracking off the airscrews and beating against the fuselage. If this occurs, climb out of the temperature layer, keep your flying controls free by moving them slightly all the time, and if you get the perspex icing up, use the de-icing spray to clear it. Carburettor icing makes the boost drop or surge. Fly in hot air for ten minutes and then return to cold air. Repeat this procedure whenever icing occurs and remember that hot air increases tour petrol consumption by 16%.
[Underlined] “THROUGH THE OVERCAST”. [/underlined]
Home strictly to your lattice lines and observe any special instructions you have received about where you break cloud on the return from the target. Do a proper controlled descent through cloud, 20° of flap, 400 feet a minute, and don’t be over anxious for sight of the ground. Check Q.F.E. and Q.F.F. When you clear the cloud base stay on your instruments until you are in level flight. Order your crew to keep a lookout, otherwise you may, at a low altitude, forget your lateral level because you are pre-occupied in trying to read beacons or see the ground. If you break cloud at the right point on your lattice line, there will be no danger of striking high ground. Incidentally, [underlined] never [/underlined] break cloud until you have fixed your position. You should know by now the instructions contained in 5 Group Air Staff Instruction, Trg./14, Safety Measures to Prevent Aircraft Flying into High Ground.
On the circuit give the precise order “Circuit lookout” to your crew as you prepare for the Quick Landing Scheme. This is most important in winter when cloud base might well be below 1,000 feet. Do not amble in with the intention of “Getting down this time” if conditions are difficult for landing. There is no shame in an overshoot and do not be satisfied until you are sitting comfortably in the Green of the Glide Path Indicator with your approach speed right and all your drills completed. Keep your speed down to 120 on the initial approach and get it down to 105 – 110 across the boundary. It is pointless to throw away valuable distance on the runway, especially as the brakes may be less effective than normal, because the runway is wet or freezing. “Second Thoughts” in the overshoot area are usually pretty cheerless.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] gunnery
[Underlined] “DECLINE AND FALL OF THE G.A.F.” [/underlined]
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
6.10.44 “V” – 630 Sqdn. – JU.88 c.
15.10.44 “X” – 630 Sqdn. – JU.88
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
6.10.44 “G” – 207 Sqdn. – FW.190 c.
11.10.44 “Y” – 9 Sqdn. – FW.190
Claims annotated ‘c’ have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
The number of combats during the month’s operations shows a big decrease on last month’s figures. The total stands at 44 combats and of these two enemy aircraft are claimed as probably destroyed and two as damaged.
The majority of the attacks emanated from astern and above, due, no doubt, to the good conditions of visibility prevailing at the time. Now that it has been confirmed from P. of W. interrogation that upward firing guns are being fitted to the majority of the long range night fighter, attacks from astern and below must again be reckoned with, and good all-round search organised, with particular attention to the dark part of the sky.
With a night fighter breaking away below the bomber, make doubly sure that the Hun is not lying in wait below you, before giving orders to the pilot to resume course. One or two people have had very unpleasant surprises, by resuming course too soon and receiving a raking attack from below.
[Underlined] “Beware the Jetties” [/underlined] At the time of going to press no sightings of the jet propelled aircraft have been reported at night, but no doubt that has yet to come. Be prepared for their excessive closing speed when giving the order to corkscrew. The jet should be distinguishable on dark nights and the con-trail on light nights.
An account of the interesting exploits of 619/”W” on the night 4/5th is given below.
“Aircraft “W” of 619 Squadron was returning at 10,000 ft. heading 273T returning from Gardening on the night 4/5th October, and had reached position 5605N 0807E when the Rear Gunner sighted a JU.88 on the starboard quarter level silhouetted against the lighter part of the sky. At that time the bomber was flying in clear visibility with 10/10ths cloud below, tops 2000 ft. and thin stratus above 15,000 ft. The JU.88 attacked from the starboard quarter on a curve of pursuit and the bomber commenced a corkscrew when the fighter
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GUNNERY. [/underlined]
reached 600 yards. The corkscrew took the bomber into cloud and the fighter was lost to view. On reappearing from cloud the F/E sighted a JU.88 below camouflaged white and Rear Gunner ordered banking search, the fighter imitated all the bomber’s manoeuvres, preventing the guns from being brought to bear. As the bomber resumed course another JU.88 attacked from Port beam with heavy calibre armament. The attack came from the dark part of the sky and was not seen by the Mid Upper Gunner. The first indication of the attack was when the bomber was hit. The strikes caused a fire amidships which exploded the ammunition in the rear turret tanks in the fuselage and disabled all the hydraulic and intercommunication system. The Mid Upper immediately vacated his turret and attacked the fire with extinguishers. The Rear Gunner saw the attacking JU.88 break away starboard quarter up and fired a long burst using manual rotation and operating one gun manually by the rear sear.
By this time the aircraft was on fire from cockpit to Elsan and the Mid Upper gunner was unable to control it on his own. The Rear Gunner, seeing the Mid Upper Gunner’s flying kit ablaze came to his assistance and with the aid of the Air Bomber, stripped him of his burning harness and placed it in the Elsan. The flames were spreading through the bomb bay and had burnt a hole in the bottom of the fuselage.
By using fire extinguishers, personal clothing and various other means, the fire was extinguished, but approximately 5 minutes later it flared up again at the rear of the ammunition tanks on the starboard side. This was extinguished by the Rear and Mid Upper Gunners.
The Rear Gunner then went into the Mid Upper turret and the Mid Upper Gunner went forward owing to lack of flying clothing which had been burnt.
The aircraft was crash-landed and on landing it was found that the Mid Upper Gunner had received extensive burns on hands and face and was suffering from shock, and the Navigator was burnet on his right hand.
It is considered that both gunners put up an exceptionally fine show in extraordinary circumstances as the hole burnt in the aircraft made any movement extremely hazardous.”
[Underlined] “ODD GOINGS ON”. [/underlined]
A Rear Gunner got repeated number one stoppages on all four guns. This continued through much “cocking and firing” until he suddenly remembered he hadn’t put the “Fire and Safe” units to “Fire”. Having completed this small operation the guns functioned perfectly.
A Gunnery Leader took a crew on drogue firing. He put the Air Bomber into the mid upper and told him to fire one gun only. During the exercise the Gunnery Leader got the impression that both mid upper guns were firing and on mentioning this to the Air Bomber, received the reply “Well, I’m only pressing one trigger!”.
[Underlined] RESULTS OF C.G.S. COURSES. [/underlined]
F/O Roberts 5 L.F.S. Cat. ‘B’.
P/O Danahar 44 Sqdn. Cat. ‘C’.
“v” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GUNNERY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] AIR TRAINING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] ORDER OF MERIT [/underlined]
[Table of Fighter Affiliation Exercises by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
[Underlined] TOTAL OF AFFILIATION EXERCISES FOR OCTOBER:- 2190. [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GUNNERY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] TABLES. [/underlined]
Though the total of affiliation exercises is below that of last month, the Squadrons’ totals are better, which is a very good sign. The night affiliation exercises with Hurricanes and Mosquitoes show an increase on last month, but whilst credit is due in this respect, it is hoped that next month’s total will be the equivalent to one night affiliation exercises per crew throughout the Group. Successful trials have been carried out by No.54 Base using infra-red film and instructions are being issued by this Headquarters in the near future.
Bomber Command have now approved the modifications to incorporate the hydraulically operated winch for self-towed drogue in the Lancaster, and this Headquarters’ letter 5G/3204/2/1/Eng. dated 25th October, 1944, refers. It is anticipated therefore, that next month that very barren column headed “AIR TO AIR” will blossom forth with digits.
Base Gunnery Leaders are warned that in all probability two extra Mark 1C Gyros will be allotted to each Squadron in the near future. It is suggested therefore, that they take immediate steps to have the necessary parts for the rig made in workshops and wired in a similar manner to their existing assemblies, so that there will be the minimum amount of delay when these Gyros arrive.
Up to date there have been two cases of frostbite in the Group due chiefly to the metal parts of the mask and helmet not being covered. This covering is very liable to have been torn and neglected during the summer months, so that now the cold weather is upon us, Gunnery Leaders would do well to check all helmets and masks immediately to see that they are in 100% fit condition.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] oiling up [Drawing]
The perfect Air Gunner climbed out of his aircraft, and turned to the Armourer. “Those guns are good enough” he said, and his Captain and his crew heard and felt happy as they knew by “good enough” the perfect Gunner meant “very good indeed”. Two other Gunners, who were by no means perfect, also heard and remarked to themselves “Old Smithy must have been born with a gun in his hand, think of all the trouble you and I have had with that turret, yet Smithy goes up a couple of times, and everything is bang on. Either he’s just plumb lucky, or he’s got a gift that way. Yes, I think he takes to it naturally”. So saying, the speaker and his friend cautiously made their way towards the Mess, cautiously, in case their Gunnery Leader or Captain should catch sight of them, and acting on experience promptly put them on some sort of training. “After all” they used to argue “Why should we have to bind at aircraft Recce etc., just like any sprogs – we are almost the original operational types, we know the answers”.
“Hope the old skipper is in a better mood this evening, Bill, he seemed to be quite shirty with me after that Daylight yesterday. Called me a bloody fool and told me to pull my finger out. Me of all people. Me! Why I told him he was lucky to have two Gunners like us in his aircraft, but even that didn’t seem to cheer him up. After all, as I said, anyone might have mistaken those Thunderbolts for 190’s, and after all, he only did two corkscrews. I suppose he’ll be binding next about that turret, just because old Smithy gets airborne and it happens to work. Things always seem to work with Smithy”. The speaker pulled his chair a little nearer to the fire.
In the meantime, the perfect Air Gunner and the Armourer had finished cleaning the guns and were packing up. “It always seems to be the same when you take over someone else’s aircraft, doesn’t it”, said the perfect Gunner. “However, they begin to look a bit more like guns now, don’t they, and I don’t think we’ve much more to worry about, goodnight, and many thanks”.
The not-so-perfect Gunners, were still sitting by the fire in the Mess. “Hulloo, here comes old Smithy – Hi Smithy, how did you manage to make those ropey guns go this afternoon?”
“Well, as a matter of fact, we only gave the turret a good D.I., and all the guns a thorough cleaning, and everything went like clockwork. There’s nothing much wrong with those guns”.
As one not-so-perfect Gunner said to the other “Old Smithy may be lucky, but he’s a secretive sort of bloke, keeps things to himself you know – just cleaned the guns and they worked my foot – why they’ll be saying we don’t know our job next – you and me!”
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] accidents
Throughout the year this Group has steadily climbed the Bomber Command accident ladder until in September we reached the top with a rate of 7.9 aircraft damaged for every 10,000 hours flown. This goal was achieved with 23 aircraft damaged and was largely due to a drop in the number of crashes during non-operational flying. 51 Base therefore, can feel they have pulled their weight in the struggle for accident reduction, especially as October figures again stand comparison with the squadrons.
Unfortunately it is unlikely that we will remain in that exalted position at the top of the ladder. There is every indication that the rate for October will have increased, particularly as the total number of aircraft damaged rose to 31: 10 were totally destroyed, 7 were Cat.B., and 14 were Cat.AC; in addition there were 6 Cat.A(R), but these will not count against us. The [underlined] avoidable [/underlined] accidents against which every drive is concentrated, rose in proportion. October’s figures read:-
[List of Avoidable Accidents by Squadrons, Conversion Units and Other Flights]
[Underlined] GRAND TOTAL – 25 Avoidable Accidents. [/underlined]
It may be argued that the number of avoidable accidents during October is merely an indication of the seasonal rise in accidents as a whole. This is probably true, but the danger lies in passing this rise off as inevitable. It is up to pilots to combat the additional difficulties of winter flying by such means as more concentration on instrument flying, increased care when taxying, and a demand for full support and co-operation from their crews. With regard to taxying, you will note that accidents in this class continue to hold a notorious position in the Summary. Read and digest the notes on taxying given under another heading in this News. A typical example from the month’s records will emphasise
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ACCIDENTS. [/underlined]
the inexcusability of such accidents. Can you find any mitigating circumstances in this one:-
(i) In broad daylight a pilot was following another aircraft round the perimeter to take off point. The leading pilot stopped, naturally, at the taxy post to do his pre-flight checks. He was immediately struck from behind by the following aircraft, the pilot of which simply states that “he did not know the other aircraft had stopped until too late”.
[Underlined] EMERGENCY AIR. [/underlined]
A “new” accident occurred in October, and details are given here so that a pitfall may be avoided. Briefly, a Lancaster pilot had to use the “emergency air” to lower his undercarriage on landing. He left the lever in the [underlined] “up” [/underlined] position, made a perfect landing and taxied to dispersal. A few hours later the undercarriage collapsed. Now, wheels can be lowered by emergency air with the lever in [underlined] any [/underlined] position, but take another look at Pilot’s Notes (Latest) and there read that the lever should be fully [underlined] down. [/underlined] Now you know!
The other accidents do not provide any special features.
51 Base now passes from 5 Group to 7 Group. The accident rate on Stirlings has been steadily reduced since January, and reflects creditably on the way Stirling problems have been tackled. At the risk of repetition, this is best shown by October’s “avoidable” figures. For the first time 51 Base total is less than the total for the squadrons. In 1654 Conversion Unit only one aircraft was damaged during the whole of the month, and even this was only damaged to a slight extent, namely Cat.A(R). A commendable effort.
[Table of Avoidable Accidents by Squadron with Star Award]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] aircrew safety
There was only one known ditching throughout the Group during October – “R” of No.467 Squadron ditched 50 miles North of Terschelling on 5th October. First the port outer engine failed at 1500 ft. followed by the port inner at 900 ft. on the outward flight to the target. The Pilot incorrectly thought that he could not jettison his particular load below 2,000 ft. and turned for home, at the same time firing a red Verey cartridge to let the concentration know that he was in trouble. The port inner engine failed at 900 ft. and not until this happened was the Wireless Operator ordered to institute W/T S.O.S. procedure. These signals were transmitted at 200 ft. and naturally were not received.
Fuel jettisoning action was taken, but the jettison cocks were not closed again the the [sic] aircraft ditched with a full bomb load and little or no buoyancy from the fuel tanks. It ditched successfully but sank in 1 1/2 minutes. The Flight Engineer did not brace his back on the rest bed and the shock threw him upwards and forwards. His head splintered the bulkhead door but he was not injured, and the inrush of cold water brought him round from his temporary stunning. (Hard heads are necessary for an awkward situation!).
All members of the crew reached the dinghy without difficulty and although the mast was broken it was repaired and erected. A sail was made from silk escape maps and with a North Easterly wind the dinghy sailed about 27 miles towards the English Coast before it was located by air.
An airborne lifeboat was dropped and the crew, transferred successfully, started the engines and set course for home. The mast was slipped without releasing the whip aerial and before this was noticed, the sea had freshened, making it impossible to rectify the mistake. As the covering aircraft lost contact with them on three occasions this mistake might easily have had more serious consequences.
The crew was finally rescued by a Naval launch after 36 hours in their dinghy and almost as long in the lifeboat.
This ditching should prove a lesson to those disbelievers in transmitting “Emergency” messaged on the failure of one engine.
Though the Rear Gunner of another aircraft saw the distress cartridge being fired, no sighting report was transmitted, nor, due to a misunderstanding, was any notice taken of the report at Interrogation. W/T silence does [underlined] not [/underlined] apply to aircraft in distress or sightings of aircraft in distress unless specifically ordered at briefing.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] AIRCREW SAFETY. [/underlined]
What have now become common errors were again made by this crew:-
(i) The dinghy radio was released from its stowage prior to ditching and was lost on impact.
(ii) Mae Wests were not inflated until after impact.
Two interesting new Air Diagrams have been issued:-
Flying Control and A.S.R. Services – A.D. 3970, Issued June, 1944.
Air Sea Rescue Services – A.D.3971, Issued June, 1944.
The Lancaster Static line parachute drill has been amended. The new diagram is numbered 3011A issued May, 1944. Note those helping the wounded man should wear their parachutes – just in case.
[Drawing] THIS
OR
THIS?
PILOTS & REAR GUNNERS –
Have YOU drawn YOUR seat type parachute?
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] flying control
[Underlined] Flying Control Competition [/underlined] – The second quarterly Flying Control Competition has now ended and the award goes to METHERINGHAM. It is only fair to Skellingthorpe to say that they have not fallen behind but have been surpassed. Sections have, in many cases, taken serious steps to bring up to scratch the surrounds of Watch Offices. The tidiness of the grass surrounds, the layout of the car park, all raise or lower the value of Control in the eyes of visitors.
The heavy winter months ahead with their problems of snow, ice and water, will demand from every Flying Control Section the maximum serviceability of portable equipment. Night Flying Equipment should be thoroughly examined to bring it up to 100% efficiency. All lamps and accs. should be tested and necessary replacements made. Never let the responsibility for a “bogging” or a taxying accident be laid on your shoulders because equipment was unserviceable or inadequate for emergencies.
[Underlined] V.H.F. Landing Trials [/underlined] – Waddington are carrying out VHF/RT trials for Command, more particularly on the control side. The policy is a “long term” one, attempting to meet future requirements of all Commands, and future layouts of Watch Offices. Preliminary trials will probably occupy a month, after which “visitors will be admitted”.
[Underlined] Rangefinder Attachment [/underlined] – Details of a ranging instrument for the Airfield Controller have been issued to stations, to ensure that at night the A.F.C. knows whether an aircraft is inside or outside the 2000 yards safety line. The adaption consists of the insertion in the inner ring sight of a metal “thimble” in which is cut an aperture of .1225 inches, equivalent to the wing span of a four-engined bomber at 200 yards.
[Underlined] Circuit Marking [/underlined] – Trials are to be carried out at Metheringham to mark the “upwind” and “downwind” positions on the circuit. It has not been possible to instal [sic] permanent lighting which will cater for marking the circuit points when each runway is in use. A compromise has been effected, however, to concentrate on the main runway. The “ball-up” point and the “cross-wind” position are at present marked with the identification letters of the airfield, and it is proposed to mark the “upwind” and “downwind” positions by means of a bar of three lights across the outer circuit.
Bases will be informed when this installation is complete at Metheringham, and Flying Control Officers should fly over there at night to inspect and report on the efficiency of this system of marking.
In saying goodbye to 51 Base on their translation to 7 Group, one must express our best wishes for their continued good work in their new “orbit”. All three stations have recently made vast improvements in their airfield conditions. Control work at Conversion Units is much heavier than on operational units and the zeal of Control Officers at those stations to bring control conditions into line with operational stations, is to be commended.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] FLYING CONTROL. [/underlined]
Landing times for October refer in the main to daylight times and an improvement has again been shown over the previous month’s average. The new form of monthly return of landings to meet the requirements of Headquarters, Bomber Command, will be used to compile future returns for these records. The return should be compiled day by day and not left to the end of the month.
[Table of Landing Times by Station]
[Underlined] AVERAGE FOR THE GROUP 1.59 MINUTES PER AIRCRAFT. [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] equipment
[Underlined] COAL AND COKE. [/underlined]
The fuel situation this winter is going to be very difficult [sic] This is due, of course, to the fact that we will be supplying most of the liberated countries, until they can produce their own fuel.
Equipment Officers should therefore make their stations more fuel conscious, and try to save every pound of coal and coke they can.
[Underlined] RETURN OF EQUIPMENT TO U.E.D. AND R.E.D. (A.M.O. A.736/43). [/underlined]
Many letters have been written upon the necessity of following the instructions laid down in A,M.O. A.736/43.
Headquarters, Bomber Command, have now dealt us a bitter blow. A list has been sent to this Headquarters, showing all stations who have not carried out the instructions, and practically every station in the Group is named.
This is a bad state of affairs, and we hope in future stations in this Group will do much better and make certain equipment is returned to the right place.
[Underlined] RADIATORS. [/underlined]
The radiator pool at Coningsby is working satisfactorily, and since it has been going, the flow of radiators to the squadrons has been better, though, of course, we could do with a lot more.
We now hear from Command that this system may be stopped, and the normal demand procedure put in its place. This matter is being dealt with between Command and Air Ministry, and we can only hope that the present system is retained.
[Underlined] DEMANDS. [/underlined]
Units should take more care making out their equipment demands; cases have been reported where, either the unit serial number or the nearest railway station has been omitted. A further point is that stations are not using the rubber stamp in the Consignee’s Block.
Equipment Officers must scrutinise their demands, before signing them, and see that the demand is made out correctly. If the section has not got the rubber stamp then it should be demanded from the Orderly Room at once.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] engineering
[Underlined] GENERAL. [/underlined]
During October, 56 Base formed, and two new squadrons were built up. With the formation of 56 Base much hard work has been entailed in the organising of Base sections once more, but these are coming along very nicely and will soon be up to the desired standard. Balderton and Fulbeck, which are sub-stations to 56 Base, provide a heavy task in themselves to bring them up to the standard of airfields which were vacated by 5 Group. It is “self-help” with a vengeance. However, even in the short time that the airfields have been occupied by 5 Group units, the improvement is most noticeable.
An interesting feature of the month is the manner in which Bases have helped each other with acceptance chekes [sic] modifications and engine changes where necessary. Acceptance checks for the new squadrons were split evenly through the Bases.
Good reports are being received as a result of pilots and flight engineers of the Test Crews at Bases attending the Test Pilots’ Course at A.V. Roe’s. All Base Major Servicing Sections are enthusiastic about the testing of their aircraft and consider that greatly improved handling is given to aircraft passing out of B.M.S.S. as a result of the excellent reports submitted after these test flights.
[Underlined] GROUND EQUIPMENT. [/underlined]
Since starting the drive on improving the condition and maintenance of ground equipment and the general cleanliness of hangars and dispersals, a big improvement has been noticed throughout the Group. The cleanliness of hangars is far more important than some C.T.O’s realise. However busy a servicing section is, it can always find time to keep the hangar and its surrounds clean and tidy if the will to do so is present. The mechanical sweepers which have been issued throughout the Group have proved an asset in keeping the hangar floors swept, but we still have the odd C.T.O. who allows his maintenance hangar to get into a filthy, oily state, and complains that pressure of work is the cause. Pressure of work is never the cause of this state of affairs as it is usually due to lack of interest in this aspect of maintenance over a long period. Once a hangar and its surrounds have been made to look clean, neat and tidy, this state can be maintained by just a small amount of work daily. It is again repeated that if a Servicing Wing looks neat, well organised and tidy, it invariably is also efficient.
[Underlined] OPERATIONAL FAILURES. [/underlined]
Engineer faults which prevented the successful completion of operational sorties totalled 1%. This is a slight increase over the previous month, but is still a general improvement. Only one of these defects could be attributed to faulty maintenance; unfortunately
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] ENGINEERING. [/underlined]
this maintenance defect occurred in a squadron which would otherwise have had a clear sheet. 54 Base gets the “Big Hand” this month, with only two engineer operational failures. The following squadrons are to be congratulated on having no engineer operational failures during October:- 9, 50, 83, 227, 617 and 627 Squadrons. This is a very good start indeed for the first month 227 Squadron appeared as an operational squadron.
[Underlined] 51 BASE. [/underlined]
With the passing of 51 Base, complete with Wigsley, Swinderby and Winthorpe and maintenance staffs, go many engineer officers and maintenance personnel who have worked hard for 5 Group for a very long period. The type of work which they have been carrying out has been arduous and we are very reluctant to see them pass to another Group; to the newly formed No.7 Group such officers and maintenance personnel who have worked so loyally for 5 Group will be a great asset.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
[Table of Aircraft Serviceability for Conversion Units]
[Underlined] FLIGHT ENGINEERS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] ENGINE HANDLING. [/underlined]
Much controversy has taken place since Air Ministry has cleared Merlin 22’s, 24’s, 28’s and 38’s at +7 lbs. boost for cruising. It is thought by so many pilots that this extra 3 lbs. boost is something for nothing, that petrol consumption at 2650 r.p.m. and + 7 lbs. boost will be the same as 2650 r.p.m. and 4 lbs. boost; this is not the case. This is what has taken place – before the modification was incorporated, the S.U. Carburettor richened when the boost was increased above + 4 lbs. and the Stromberg Carburettors richened with boost above + 3 1/2 lbs. With Mod.582 both these carburettors will now be progressively weak throughout their range up to + 7 lbs. boost.
In all cases for economical flying it is necessary to fly at a given optimum R.A.S. This optimum R.A.S. is governed by the all-up weight of the aircraft, so crews should always attempt to obtain the I.A.S. for which they are briefed.
Boost of + 7 lbs will only be obtained up to rated altitude, this will be approximately 9,000 ft. in ‘M’ gear and 17,000 ft. in ‘S’ gear. Therefore if an I.A.S. of 170 m.p.h. is required at 8,000 ft.,
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27 OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] FLIGHT ENGINEERS. [/underlined]
to fly economically the boost would be increased to + 5 or 6 lbs, but the revs must be reduced below 2650; the only advantage in this case is, the throttles would be fully open. If, however, the revs were left at 2650 using + 5 or 6 lbs. boost petrol consumption would increase. A case in point – a Lancaster in this Group was fitted with flowmeters; at 10,000 ft. using 2650 + 4 the R.A.S. obtained was 200 m.p.h. and petrol consumption 228 galls/hr. The same aircraft when using 2650 + 6 at the same altitude obtained an R.A.S. of 215 m.p.h., but the petrol consumption increased to 271.2 galls/Hr. As can be seen, for the extra 15 m.p.h. the consumption was out of all proportion.
The advantage of + 7 lbs. boost will be found in the climb. When climbing at 2650 + 4 with a fully laden aircraft, the R.A.S. should be 157 m.p.h.; if this speed cannot be maintained or the aircraft becomes “heavy” to handle, the boost can be increased over the + 4 lbs. setting to obtain the optimum R.A.S. of 157 m.p.h.
If the general rule of high boost and low revs together with the optimum R.A.S. is carried out on all flights, the petrol consumption will always be good.
[Underlined] WINTER FLYING. [/underlined]
To overcome many of the “snags” of winter flying due to the inexperience of crews, a list of the most important points are set out for the guidance of Flight Engineer Leaders who must instruct and advise all Flight Engineers in their section.
1. Special care and instruction on the use of oxygen, care and maintenance of masks, and the use of the extra 12 ft. oxygen tube carried in all aircraft.
2. Have each Flight Engineer work the Dead Man’s release of the rear turret.
3. Make certain each Flight Engineer knows how to use the hot and cold air valve, and under what conditions this should be used.
4. Use of de-icing fluid for windscreens – how to operate the pump. Advise each Flight Engineer to have a can of de-icing fluid in his aircraft for use inside the cabin. [Underlined] Danger [/underlined] – this fluid is inflammable.
5. Check clothing. Warm but not bulky, electrically heated waistcoat and socks are a great advantage.
6. Care to be taken when running up – see that chocks cannot slip.
7. Check “storm window” for freedom.
8. Pulsometer pumps must be switched “ON” at 17,000 ft.
9. All Flight Engineers to know 5 Group Drill No.12 “Oxygen and Anti-Frostbite Drill”.
10. Flight Engineers to inspect the de-icing paste on the leading edge of the control surfaces; care must be taken that this is evenly applied.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] armament
On the 25th October a meeting of Base Armament Officers was held at Headquarters, No.5 Group, when a very lengthy discussion took place covering almost all the points affecting armament work and organisation. Every effort is being made to provide more man power, more supervision and more equipment, but all armament personnel should bear in mind the vital need for careful planning and organisation of work to eliminate unnecessary handling of stores. In this connection, a tidy and well planned bomb store will always be able to handle a greater tonnage of bombs for less man hours of work (i.e. a reasonable number of days off for everybody), than a bomb store which is allowed to become disorganised and congested, thus entailing handling stores two or three times.
To run a bomb store in this ideal way calls for clear thinking and planning by the Officer i/c and an appreciation of the work and handling schemes in use by N.C.O’s.
The new heavy transporter referred to in our last issue has at last made its appearance but unfortunately only in very small quantities. Reports from the station fortunate enough to receive the first issue show that this piece of equipment is a great time and labour saver, and in addition, ensures that the tail units of 4 lb. incendiaries carried in S.B.C’s are not damaged when loaded on to bomb trolleys.
One station, not content to sit back and wait for the arrival of these items, has produced its own transporter. The transporter has been constructed from a portion of the M.7 cluster mechanism suitably modified with two small angle brackets to slip under the drop bar of the S.B.C. This transporter has been in issue for some time and has proved entirely satisfactory and easy to handle. Details of this modification are being forwarded to Units, and Armament Officers should take the opportunity of constructing as many of these transporters as possible for use prior to the introduction of the improved type heavy transporter.
No doubt many of you can think of more and possibly better methods of simplifying the handling and transportation of clusters and S.B.C’s, so get your heads together and see what you can produce. To a great extent this problem will have to be solved by ourselves, so don’t be content to sit back and wait for someone else to find the answer. You are the people who know what is required and are in the best position for finding the solution.
[Underlined] REPORTING OF DEFECTS. [/underlined]
Many instances have occurred during the past months of Armament Officers failing to carry out the correct procedure for the reporting of defects of ammunition, explosives and their components or ancilliary equipments.
The correct procedure is laid down fully in A.P. 2608A, Appendix 12, and it is suggested that a few minutes spent with this very valuable publication would benefit the majority of Armament Officers.
[Underlined] THIS MONTH’S “BOOBS”! [/underlined]
On two occasions this month Bomb Aimers omitted to select the isolation switch with the result that the photoflash was not released and no photographs obtained.
Two full bomb loads were returned to base, one due to the Bomb Aimer setting the distributor drum switch half way between “Distributor” and “Single and Salvo”, and the other due to the failure of the Bomb Aimer to ensure that his Master switch was wired in the “ON” position.
“v” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES TABLE. [/underlined]
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A – MANIPULATION. B – MAINTENANCE. C – ICING. D – TECHNICAL. E – ELECTRICAL. F – OBSCURE
[Page break]
[Drawing] photography
The total number of operational sorties for the month of October was below previous months’ figures and details of the photographic results are shown in the analysis.
[Underlined] Technical Failures [/underlined] were not high, but it is an undeniable fact that many of those which did occur could have been avoided – Photographers, Instrument Repairers and Electricians responsible for the maintenance and testing, and Photographers who process the films should make a special effort to reduce the number of failures which occur through insufficient maintenance testing and processing.
A percentage of failures also occurs because the Bomb Release Key Switch sometimes releases the bombs but does not make a positive contact to operate the camera. Headquarters, Bomber Command, have stated that a new type of key has been designed and will be issued in due course; until the new key is fitted bomb aimers must remember to depress the key fully.
[Underlined] American K.24 Camera [/underlined] is now rapidly taking the place of the F.24; despite certain criticisms there can be no doubt that the camera will give good results, provided that a few minor details are attended to. Owing to the unbalanced weight, mainly due to the motor position, this camera is not to be stood upright on the lens cone, but is to be laid on its side; furthermore, the camera should not be lifted by the motor, otherwise there is every possibility that the motor gear will become mis-aligned. Air Ministry have been asked to provide muffs which will fit the K.24, but it is not known when these muffs will become available. However, owing to the rubber film roller, brittle film should not prove very troublesome since the main cause of torn film in the F.24 camera is the measuring roller needles.
[Underlined] Composite colour [/underlined] is now in standard use, and it is hoped to increase its use but, before doing so, Photographic N.C.O’s should ensure that all photographers are trained in making up and processing the film. It is necessary to stress once again the importance of temperature and time; failure to bear this in mind will produce out of colour balance results, A different type of colour film, called the “Ansco” has been tested by No.56 Base , but the results were inferior to those produced by Kodacolour.
[Underlined] H.2.S. Photography. [/underlined] The number of cameras now available for this type of photography has materially increased, but there is much to be done before it can be claimed that the results produced are as good as they should be. The best H.2.S. Photographic results can only be obtained by correct set operation and good quality processing and printing. It has been reported that Photographers are not sufficiently informed on the working of H.2.S. to get the best out of the results. Therefore, it is hoped that the Radar/Nav. officer will arrange demonstrations in due course.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF PHOTOGRAPHY. [/underlined]
[Table of Photographic Analysis by Squadron]
[Page break]
Education [Drawing]
During October, many airmen began study, which it is hoped will be continued during the winter months. The suggested programmes and facilities drawn up by Station Education Officers were widely circulated on most stations and the response on the whole has been satisfactory. The most popular demand has been for classes at the local Technical Institutes – indeed, the Lincoln Technical College was quite unable to cope for a time with the numbers of students who wished to attend. Most of the requirements appear to have been catered for now, however. It should be stressed that the college authorities have taken considerable trouble to accommodate R.A.F. personnel and we in our turn must attend as regularly as possible to make the work they have put in worth while.
Organised study is difficult in view of the uncertain hours of duty. One solution to this problem is the correspondence course method, which does give the chance of doing the work at the student’s own convenience. A full list of courses cannot be enumerated here, but there are roughly 500, and they cater for almost all the professions as well as individual subjects. The cost is only 10/-. Your Education Officer will show you what is available.
About 700 people have enrolled for correspondence courses in this Group during the past few months, and some stations have over 100 airmen attending local evening institutes each week. These are the people who are looking to the future, and there must be many hundreds more in the Group who would benefit from something of this kind. After all, its [sic] your future, so it is up to you to prepare for your return to civilian life.
Do you ever visit your Station News Room? If you do you will realise the tremendous amount of work put in to keep it fresh and up to date, and usually the Education Officer is doing the job himself. He would welcome any suggestions and ideas for improving the room, and any practical help towards putting the ideas into practice. About half a dozen airmen who are interested, can make a great difference to the freshness and appeal of the News Room.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
AN ENGLISHMAN’S HOME
[Drawings] IS HIS NISSEN
Due to the long hours of blackout, bad weather and general deterioration of living and working conditions, all of which affect the health of personnel, operational efficiency may be reduced during the winter unless strenuous efforts are made by all concerned to offset its effects.
If initiative is used NOW to plan essential precautions, this Group can be fully prepared to operate during the winter months at an even higher pressure and even more efficiently than during the last few months.
Instructions to all Base and Station Commanders have already been issued by the Air Officer Commanding, summarising instructions which have already been issued. Indication will only be given in this article of those additional jobs we may be called upon to do which are not of a routine nature, and which merely involve the use of average common-sense.
There is an old saying that “An Englishman’s Home is his Castle”. However, the true sense of this saying is, unfortunately, not fully established during war-time, as the majority of our lives is being spent in Nissen huts or, for the more fortunate (?), in rooms shared with many others, who have various ideas of conditions in which one should eat and sleep.
A balance, therefore, has to be made and the foundation for our “War Castles” should be waterproof rooms, clean approaches to living quarters, well-prepared food, hot water supply, good entertainment and ample warm clothing, together with the sensible use of camp amenities which are provided for all and not for any one individual.
In the first years of war, ample labour and material were available for ensuring that the above conditions were met, but due to the withdrawal of labour and material to priority work in the South of England, each and every one of us will be called upon to perform duties which, hitherto, have been implemented by “Specialists”. Take, for instance, that leaking roof. It’s all very well saying that it’s about time Works and Buildings repaired it; the fact is that Works and Buildings have not the labour to meet all the requirements of daily maintenance on a present-day Bomber Station. Therefore, instead of sitting back and waiting for somebody else to do the work, we shall have to do it ourselves. Material, and technical supervision will be provided and we shall have to initiate our own repairs in our “spare time”.
If we were back in our own homes, we wouldn’t need to be told to implement maintenance or to redecorate rooms which have become shabby. We would take off our coats after our day’s work and do all within our power to make it as comfortable as possible.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] “AN ENGLISHMAN’S HOME IS HIS NISSEN”. [/underlined]
Similarly, in peace-time, when we called at the local for “one for the road” and, due to bad navigation we encroached on the muddy part of the front garden, we wouldn’t dream of entering the house without wiping our feet or scraping the mud off. This should be kept well in mind when returning from the N.A.A.F.I., or the Mess back to our quarters, or to the places where we work.
In this respect, mud can be one of the chief factors of lowering the morale during the winter. Mud is usually introduced on to the concrete roads on stations, primarily by mechanical transport being driven off perimeter tracks and from concrete roads on to the airfield, and by certain types who will insist on taking “short cuts”. This practice must be stopped; by so doing, we shall also improve the appearance of our airfields.
In regard to clothing, facilities exist for the exchange of worn clothing which would not provide proper warmth during the winter months and would, therefore, result in health conditions which seriously affect the manpower question during this particular time of the year.
Personnel working in exposed conditions are entitled to draw protective clothing consisting of a variety of items which may be obtained on request. In Civvy Street the wise man ensures that his clothing is in a constant state of good repair and although the responsibility is usually shelved on to our mothers or wives, in war-time it is up to each individual to fend for himself.
With a little bit of research “someone” can always be found to do the necessary darning, and to execute the necessary repairs if the individual has not the maternal instinct.
To deal with all the troubles would involve writing at some length and it is again repeated that average commonsense [sic] must be used. If the powers-that-be are to be believed, this is going to be the last winter of the European War. Everyone should make a supreme effort to ensure that our living and working conditions are such that our operational efficiency is not affected, and that all precautions are introduced in time to meet the trouble which they are intended to cure.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] decorations
The following IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J.J. DUNNE DFC
P/O R.F. ADAMS DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.E. AMEY DFC
SGT G.W. LANE DFM
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O J.F. GRAY, DFC DSO
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O F.T. GRIFFIN DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O G.H. STEWART DFC
F/SGT R. CALOV DFM
F/SGT D.J. MORLAND DFM
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/LT D.J.B. WILSON, DFC DSO
F/O P.H. MARTIN DFC
F/O W.A. DANIEL DFC
F/O J.A. SANDERS, DFC BAR TO DFC
W/CDR J.B. TAIT, DSO, 2 BARS, DFC BAR TO DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT F. WEBSTER DFM
P/O D.H. STRACHAN DFC
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/LT R.E.W. OAKLEY, DFM DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT D.S. MORGAN BEM
[Underlined] 54 BASE [/underlined]
A/Cdr. A.C.H. SHARP, ADC. DSO
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O N.H.B. LUCAS DFC
F/O J.E. LOGAN DFC
F/O J. CHADDERTON DFC
F/O D.A. KEEBLE DFC
W/O R.P. ALLEN DFC
F/O C.H. CALTON DFC
P/O D.D. McLEAN DFC
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L G.A. MILDRED DFC
P/O N.H. LLOYD DFC
P/O A. AIREY DFC
SGT W.J. ROBINSON DFM
F/SGT A. WILSON DFM
P/O A. DICKEN DFC
F/SGT M.J. STANCER DFM
F/O K.A. MATHIESON DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O D.J. ORAM DFC
P/O H.M. MILNE DFC
F/SGT W.J. BEESLEY DFM
F/SGT D.P. PIERSON DFM
SGT A. DARBY DFM
F/SGT J. SHORT DFM
W/O G.F. GRAHAM DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O P.V. HAZELDENE DFC
F/O H.B. MacKINNON DFC
P/O H. WELLAND DFC
F/O J.C. LUMSDEN DFC
F/SGT P.S. BAKER DFM
F/O C.S. PATON DFC
F/O G. POW DFC
F/SGT R.A. HAMMERSLEY DFM
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O B.S. TURNER DFC
P/O E.W. HALLETT DFC
S/LDR J. WOODROFFE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O R.T. REID DFC
F/SGT J. MORAN DFM
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON (CONTD) [/underlined]
F/O J.A. MacDONALD DFC
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L T.W. BLAIR, DSO, DFC.BAR TO DFC
W/O R.G. GOODWIN, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O D.J. HEGARTY DFC
F/O J.A. KELLY DFC
A/S/L G.A. WATSON, DFM DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT C. BAUMBER DFM
A/F/LT J.L. COMANS, DFC BAR TO DFC
A/F/LT W.T. GEE DFC
F/SGT G.H. WIDDIS DFM
P/O M.J. BRIDGMAN DFC
F/O D.H. SHORTER DFC
P/O T.W.L. LEAK DFC
P/O J.A. PEARSON DFC
F/O J.F. THOMSON DFC
F/O J.W. NEDWICH DFC
P/O J.W. MULLER DFC
F/O R.D.H. PACKER DFC
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/LT J.E. TAYLOR, DFM DFC
P/O C.E. THOMPSON DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT E.G.S. SCOTT DFM
P/O N. OWEN DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O A.J.C. CASSELL DFC
P/O C. JAMES DFC
F/O J.H. DECHASTEL DFC
F/O A. WILLIAMS, DFM DFC
F/O P.R. PETTIT DFC
P/O E.A. MUSTARD DFC
P/O B.W. WEBB DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/LT P.E. McCARTHY, DFM DFC
F/O R.O. FULLER, DFM DFC
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/LT E.N. CHANDLER, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O T.R. DAVIES, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O G.A. CHALMERS, DFM DFC
F/LT F.G. RUMBLES, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O E. TWELLS DFC
F/O D.A. BELL DFC
F/O H.B.R. RHUDE DFC
P/O J.R. BELL DFC
F/O R.E. WOODS DFC
F/SGT P.W. DERHAM DFM
F/O H.V. CORNISH-UNDERWOOD DFC
P/O J.R. GURNEY DFC
F/O J.K. STOTT, DFM DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT L. HOPE DFM
P/O A. WHITELEY DFC
P/O G.F. WILSON DFC
P/O F.S. GARSIDE DFC
SGT A.J. GRIFFEE DFM
SGT H.D. CAMPBELL DFM
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/LT N.W. MacKENZIE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/LT J.G. GREY, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/LT N. LEWIS, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O J. MARSHALLSAY DFC
F/LT E.F. NELLES, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/LT J.R. GOODMAN, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/SGT N.A. RANSHAW DFM
F/LT A.J.L. HICKOX, DFC BAR TO DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O A.W.Q. CONNOR, DFM DFC
F/O K.G. CHAMBERLAIN DFC
F/O L.N. RACKLEY DFC
P/O W. MOONEY DFC
F/SGT W.E.J. COX DFM
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO, 27. OCTOBER 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] war savings
(a) Approximate savings in pence per head.
(b) Approximate percentage of personnel saving.
(c) Total savings for the month.
[Table of Savings by Station]
TOTAL:- [Underlined] £3,635. 7. 6. [/underlined]
[Boxed] [Underlined] “V” GROUP CREST [/underlined]
Many designs for a Group Crest have been received at this Headquarters and have had continued close scrutiny and study. Due to the high standard of work produced it has not, as yet, been possible to select the winning crest, but it is hoped to do so in the near future. [/boxed]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 27. OCTOBER, 1944.
[Page break]
war effort
[Table of Aircraft, Sorties and Flying Hours by Squadron]
ӿ New Squadron – formed 7th October, 1944.
Squadrons are place in the above table in order of “Successful sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties Nos. 9, 49, 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another Squadron the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons.
All Lancaster Squadrons are above establishment and therefore flying hours are calculated on an establishment of 20.
[Page break]
[Boxed] The cover of this month’s News has been designed by S/Ldr. N. Mould, D.F.C., of Headquarters, No. 56 Base. All personnel with artistic tendencies are requested to submit designs for covers of future issues. So far only very few have been received, and it is hoped that during the coming month the editor will receive an increasing flow of specimen designs. [/boxed]
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
October 1944 Secret No. 27
V
Group
News
[Drawing]
Dortmund Ems
Bremerhaven
M. Gladbach
Darmstadt
Karlsruhe
Brunswick
Konigsberg
Kembs
[Page break]
October 1944 No. 27
V
Group
News
[Drawing]
[Stamp] Base Copy
101. 9
Copies dist Stn.
[Underlined] 1325 hrs. [/underlined]
Dortmund Ems
Bremerhaven
M. Gladbach
Darmstadt
Karlsruhe
Brunswick
Konigsberg
Kembs
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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V Group News, October 1944
5 Group News, October 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 27, October 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about operations, gardening, signals, tactics, air bombing, navigation, this month's bouquets, radar navigation, training, second thoughts for pilots, gunnery, oiling up, accidents, aircrew safety, flying control, equipment, engineering, armament, photography, education, an Englishman's home is his Nissen, decorations, war savings and war effort.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-10
Contributor
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Anne-Marie Watson
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
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75 printed sheets
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Identifier
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-19
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Great Britain
Norway
Netherlands
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
England--Lincolnshire
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Königsberg in Bayern
Germany--Konstanz
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Sorpe Dam
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Netherlands--Walcheren
Norway--Bergen
Temporal Coverage
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1944-10
5 Group
617 Squadron
9 Squadron
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
gremlin
H2S
Master Bomber
military living conditions
military service conditions
mine laying
navigator
Nissen hut
pilot
radar
rivalry
Tallboy
Tirpitz
training
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/743/19703/MCleggPV[DoB]-150710-010001.pdf
e92546a0df93cd6e5c1d97fe9cd36a63
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Clegg, Peter Vernon
P V Clegg
Description
An account of the resource
Eight items and five sub-collections. Main collection contains a log of Pathfinder operations from RAF Wyton 1943 -1944, histories of the Avro repair facility at Bracebridge Heath, and Langar, a biography of Squadron Leader David James Baikie Wilson, biography of Squadron Leader Lighton Verdon-Roe, a book - Test Pilots of A.V. Roe & Co Ltd - S.A. 'Bill' Thorn, and two volumes of book - Roy Chadwick - no finer aircraft designer, Sub-collections contain a total of 29 items concerning the Aldborough Dairy and Cafe as well as biographical material, including log books for Alan Gibson, Peter Isaacson, Alistair Lang and Charles Martin. <br /><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1772">Aldborough Dairy and Cafe</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1768">Gibson, Alan</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1769">Isaacson, Peter</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1770">Lang, Alastair</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1771">Martin, Charles</a><br /><br /><br />The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Peter Clegg and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-07-02
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
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Clegg, PV
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[Photograph] – Joan Gardiner [indecipherable word] WAAF Pat Dey of 156 PFF Sqn.
[page break]
* While at School near Berchtesgarten, [sic] Hitler & his entourage used to pass the gates frequently. The School would line the road and salute ‘Heil Hitler’ when his car passed. One day he slowed and stopped, noticing Pat Dey did not salute. He asked her ‘why’? She said: “Because I am English!”
She worked for an Australian boss before the War began. One day she said she wanted a few minutes to go and sign on for the RAF. He said: “don’t be silly – War is a man’s job – you’ll never be able to stomach it.” How wrong he was!
She worked at Bomber Command HQ at High Wycombe before 156 Sqn, on bombing raid plotting. She was fluent in German.
At 156 Sqn she got to know A V-M Don Bennett – C-in-C of the Pathfinder Group at Wyton, and became a family friend, doing baby-sitting for them.
Page 1
Example of ‘Met’ chit used in Ops briefings.
Form 2324.
METEOROLOGICAL OFFICE, [indecipherable word]
LOCAL FORECAST from [indecipherable word] hours 2/3/44 date.
ROUTE FORECAST [indecipherable word] TO [indecipherable word] till [indecipherable word] hours [indecipherable word] date.
Time of Origin: [indecipherable word] hours [indecipherable words]
[underlined] SURFACE WIND: [/underlined] NW to WNW, 10-15 knots. Gusting locally to 20 knots.
{underlined] UPPER WIND: [/underlined] 2000 feet 310 degs 35 knots. 5000 feet 300 degs 40 knots.
[underlined] WEATHER: [/underlined] Wintry showers, isolated this morning but more widespread this afternoon.
[underlined] VISIBILITY: [/underlined] Mainly 4 to 8 miles but 1 to 3 miles in showers.
[underlined] CLOUD: [/underlined] Small amounts of Sc (Stratocumulus) at 2/3000ft top 4/5000ft this morning apart from local increase in showers to 6/10
[page break]
Page 2
[underlined] 26TH APRIL 1943 [/underlined]
DUISBURG.
Paramatta. 133M & 356H. & 72 P.F.F. [missing] will be dropped at Position ‘A’ 5145N 0642E. by [missing] Mosquitos Squadron.
[missing] exact A/P with Ground markers T.I Red [missing] as backers up will keep the A/P marked with T.I Green throughout
[missing] their bombs with maximum precision at the T.I red if these are [missing] centre of cluster of T.I Green. ZERO = 0215
[list T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPHS. REMARKS.]
[missing] with small amounts of cloud 10/10ths to E. of target. At the beginning [missing] selected crews were attacking good concentration was [missing] of main force attacked fires spread until finally area [missing] mainly ENE of red T.I’s. 14 photographs attempted.
[page break]
Page 3
[underlined] 27TH APRIL 1943 [/underlined]
DORTMUND.
Paramatta. Zero Hour. 0200 hrs.
Flares to be dropped short of target by Mosquitos 4 mls. E of [missing]
[missing] Red & Green T.I’s.
[missing] of special a/c will attack Soest as first running [missing] target. T.I. Yellow to be dropped at position C to [missing].
[list T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPHS. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 28th APRIL 1943 [/underlined]
Stand down.
[missing] of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Group laid mines. 23 a/c are missing.
[page break]
4
[underlined] 29th APRIL 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 09.35HRS. [/underlined] STAND DOWN.
[underlined] 30TH APRIL 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940HRS. [/underlined] Target received – ESSEN.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical (meaning Oboe-guided) Wanganui. 290 Heavies to 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups. & 35 P.F.F/ (8 Mosquitos.) Tracking flares red steady will be dropped on track 5 mins short of the release point at position A as telephoned. (51’45’N 06’56’E). Tracking flares green steady will be dropped on track 2 1/2 mins short of release point at 5137N 0657E.
Release point flares will be red with green stars with one white for longer burning.
Main force a/c to [indecipherable word] tracking flares as guide for bombing run up should aim bombs at release point flares on exact heading 200M & 165mph indicated.
All flares will ignite at 16000ft.
Zero hour. 2359. Changed to 0230.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Owing to height of cloud both navigational & release point flares went into cloud very quickly & all a/c bombed on white flares on approximate position. White flares seen. Glow of fires seen below cloud, large white explosion lit up underside of cloud at 0305 hrs.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 12 a/c missing over ESSEN. 1 from 1 Group, 5 from 4 Group, 5 from 5 Group, 1 from 405. late of 7 squadron over BOCHOLT.
Photographic Cover shows further damage to KRUPPS. Attack gave rise to serious annoyance among the authorities. Described as “terror raid by Jewish and Bolshevic [sic] air pirates.”!
[page break]
5
[underlined] 1ST MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1100HRS. [/underlined] Target. DUISBURG. ‘D’
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Same as for ESSEN 30th April/1st May. Zero hour. 0005.
[deleted] Route – Base – 53’17N 02’12E. – EGMOND – 5200N [/deleted]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 1300HRS. [/underlined] OPS CANCELLED
[underlined] 2nd MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0931HRS. [/underlined] Target – Area 1. DUISBURG. Area 2. BREMEN.
[underlined] METHOD. Area I. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta - Ground Marking. Zero hour 0030hrs. Landmark T.I’s Yellow will be dropped at 5141N 0645E. Mosquitoes will mark exact A/P with T.I. red. Other P.F.F. a/c acting as backers up will keep A/P marked with T.I. Green.
Main Force to aim bombs at T.I. red if visible otherwise at centre of area covered by T.I Green.
[underlined] Area II. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground marking. Landmark flares red steady will be dropped by early a/c only at 5405N 0750E. Landmark T.I. Yellow will be dropped at 5400N 0855E. by all P.F.F. a/c. target will be marked with ground markers T.I. Green.
Main Force a/c to aim their bombast centre of area covered by all T.I. Green. No attempt at visual identification to be made. Flares white & Ground markers T.I. [deleted] Green [/deleted] Red will also be dropped in target area for use of PFF a/c only. Landmark T.I. Yellow to be dropped at 5345N 0835E.
[underlined] 1800HRS. [/underlined] Briefed.
[underlined] 2026 HRS. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta on Area I confirmed.
[underlined] 2110 HRS. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[page break]
6
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 3RD MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940 HRS. [/underlined] Target. Area I DUISBURG. Area II BREMEN
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Area I. Musical Paramatta unless further met. Information makes sky-marking necessary. Zero hour 0030 hrs. Method as for yesterday. Mosquitoes, - Z-3, Z, Z+7, Z+13, Z+19, Z+25, Z+31, Z+37, Z+43. Area II. Newhaven Ground marking. As for yesterday.
[underlined] 1800HRS. [/underlined] Briefing
[underlined] 1801 HRS. [/underlined] OPS. CANCELLED.
[page break]
7
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 4TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0932HRS. [/underlined] Target – DORTMUND. A/P 160° 350yds from ‘A’
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta. 0100HRS. Zero. 116 Mediums + 388 heavies + 71 PFF Mosquitoes will drop landmark ground markers T.I. Yellow at 5152N 0726E. Mosquitoes will then accurately mark exact A/P with ground marker T.I. Green at Z-3, Zero, Z+7, Z+13, Z+19, Z+25, Z+31, Z+37. Other P.F.F. a/c acting as backers up will keep A/P marked throughout attack with T.I. red.
Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at T.I. Green if visible, if not at centre of pattern of T.I. red. A small attack for training purposes will be carried out on Rheine at Z+20.
[underlined] 1800HRS. [/underlined] Briefed. A.O.C’s message to crews read. Photographs of line up taken.
F/L LANG AND SGT. CLARK SINCE REPORTED SAFE.
[page break]
8
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
‘T’ first a/c to return to base made three unsuccessful attempts to land after which owing to the aerodrome being ‘red’ all a/c were either diverted to Honiley or went of their own accord. Visibility there was found to be even worse than Warboys and a/c which had not already been instructed to land elsewhere were told to return and land at Marham. Finally landing at Marham, Chedworth, Sleap, Honeybourne, Stanton Harcourt, Whitchurch, High Ercall, Pershore and one ‘J’ baled out successfully. Interrogations then proceeded during the following day until 1900 hrs!
[underlined] SUMMARY [/underlined] 4 a/c missing P.F.F. 1 from 83, 1 of 156, 2 of 35. 30 a/c missing from Command. Owing to the misconduct of W/C Donaldson who, according to the Main Force, apparently dropped his Red T.I.s on the Dutch coast, he said as far as night photographs show succeeded in developing up to 6 mls. North of the target.
[page break]
9.
[underlined] 5TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations – 156 Squadron returned to base at various times during the day.
[underlined] 6TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1012 HRS. [/underlined] Stand down for P.F.F. with the exception of 109 Squadron.
[underlined] 7TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1008 HRS. [/underlined] Target – DUISBURG Backers-up not required – 6 Main Force only.
[underlined] 1040 HRS. METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta or Musical Wanganui depending on later met: information. If [underlined] Musical Paramatta [/underlined] Mosquitoes will drop preliminary warning groundmarkers T.I. yellow at 5145N 0644E. Mosquitoes will then mark exact A/P with groundmarkers T.I. red which will be dropped at Z-5, Z, Z+5, Z+10, Z+15, Z+20. These groundmarkers will each burn for 7 minutes. No backers up. Main Force to aim bombs with max. precision at T.I. red. If [underlined] Musical Wanganui. [/underlined] Mosquitoes will drop tracking flares red steady at 5145N 0644E. 2nd tracking flares green steady will be dropped on track at 5136N 0645E.
Release point flares red with green stars and white stars for longer burning will be dropped at Z, Z+5, Z+10, Z+15, Z+20. All flares igniting at 16000ft. Main Force a/c will aim their bombs with max. precision at centre of release point flares on exact heading of 200°M IAS 143kts with bomb sights set for height, air speed & zero wind.
195 heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 Group + 17 (L) P.F.F. + 7 Mosquitoes.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 1745 HRS. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[page break]
10.
[underlined] 8TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0930HRS. [/underlined} MAKE & MEND. Tunis and Bizerta [sic] fallen.
[underlined] 9TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000HRS. [/underlined} Target – DUISBURG. [underlined] METHOD [/underlined] Musical Wanganui. 87 mediums + 355 heavies + 8 Mos. + 31 PFF = 482 a/c. Zero. 0200hrs. Tracking flares red steady will be dropped on track at 5150N 0644E. Tracking flares green steady will be dropped on track at 5138N 0644E. Release point flares will be red with green stars with flares white for longer burning. Main Force a/c should aim bombs at centre of release point flares on heading 200°M at IAS 165mph (143kts) with bombsight set for true height, airspeed & zero wind. All flares igniting at 16,000ft.
Mosquitoes will drop release point flares at Z, Z+5, Z+10, Z+15, +20, +25, +30, +35.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
A/C sent to Wyton for take off as Warboys runway was u/s.
[underlined] 1800HRS. [/underlined] Briefing.
[underlined] 1805HRS. [/underlined] Probability of change of method to Musical Paramatta.
[underlined] 2220 HRS. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[page break]
11.
[underlined] 10TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0937HRS. [/underlined] No operations in Command tonight.
[underlined] 11TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0941HRS. [/underlined] Target – BOCHUM. [underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta. 115 Mediums + 431 Heavies + 100 PFF. Zero hour 0015HRS.
[underlined] WORLD’S RECORD WEIGHT CARRYING ATTACK. [/underlined]
Mosquitoes with ground mark A/P with T.I. red at Z-3, Z+1, Z+7, Z+12, Z+17, Z+22, Z+27, Z+32, Z+37.
These will be backed up by other P.F.F aircraft dropping groundmarkers T.I. Green.
Main Force a/c should drop their bombs on the T.I. red if these are seen, otherwise at the estimated centre of the area covered by T.I. Greens. Length of attack Z – Z+45.
Preliminary warning Ground markers T.I. Yellow will be dropped by Mosquitoes at 5146N 0712E.
[underlined] 1726HRS. [/underlined] Area 2. DUISBURG. Main Force crews only will be required if Area 2.
[underlined] 1810HRS. [/underlined] Backers-up scrubbed.
[underlined] 1820HRS. [/underlined] P.F.F. cancelled except for 109 Squadron.
[underlined] 1726HRS. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] for DUISBURG. To be Musical Wanganui. As for method 9th May 1943. Sortie information as for 12th May 1943.
[underlined] 12TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1017HRS. [/underlined] Target – DUISBURG. 8 backers up with their best bomb aimers & 10 Main Force.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta. 120M + 437H. – 89 PFF + 9 Mos: Zero. 0200hrs. Landmarkers T.I. Yellow will be dropped by all Mosquitos [sic] at 5140N 0645E. Exact aiming point will be marked by Mosquitoes with T.I. red at Z-3, Z+1, Z+7, Z+12, Z+22, Z+27, Z+32, Z+37. to be backed up by other PFF dropping T.I. Green. Main Force should aim bombs at T.I. red if visible otherwise at the centre of the pattern of all T.I. Green.
[page break]
12.
[underlined] 12TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET: DUISBURG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 35 a/c missing – 4 P.F.F. Very good concentration on A/P shown by photographs. 1560 tons of bombs dropped – greatest weight achieved against any city in a single attack.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] All crews reported good concentration of markers & fires. One large explosion with big orange glow lasting 6 to 7 sec: at about 0216hrs. Glow of fires seen from Dutch Coast on homeward journey.
[underlined] DAYLIGHT COVER. [/underlined] This shows that the central area of DUISBURG itself is wrecked. Main railway station almost completely destroyed. Centre of DUISBURG-RUHRORT burned out. [indecipherable words]
[page break]
13.
[underlined] 0950HRS. [/underlined] Target – Bochum a/c ‘Q’. PLZEN.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Area I. Musical Paramatta. 104 M + 300 Heavies + 35 PFF + 8 Mos: Area II. Newhaven Groundmarking.
‘Y’ a/c will drop T.I. Yellow at 51°29N 0940E to be backed up by 156 Squadron. ‘Y’ a/c will drop T.I. White at 51°00N 11°02E to be backed up by all P.F.F. Target to be marked blindly by T.I. Green and sticks of White flares. 3L/83, 1L/97, 5L/156, will act as visual markers & will, if A/P is positively identified mark A/P with Red T.Is. If further illumination is necessary a further stick of flares may be used.
Backers up will aim T.I. reds at the exact centre of T.I. red visible. Main Force may for training purpose identify the A/P for themselves in the light of flares, otherwise at the centre of all T.I. red visible. T.I. White and T.I. Yellow will be dropped as navigational aids at the same positions on the route home.
[underlined] 1800HRS. [/underlined] Briefing
[underlined] PLZEN – RESULTS. [/underlined] Main concentration was North of the SKODA WORKS – eleven photographs plotted on the works. Although therefore some damage must have been done, no very important results are expected.
[underlined] BOCHUM. [/underlined] Heavy and well concentrated attack. Smoke from fires on the following day prevented good photographs from being taken, but the industrial area on the N.W. of the city centre has been badly hit and the central area largely devastated.
[page break]
14.
[underlined] TARGETS: PLZEN AND BOCHUM [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY PLZEN. [/underlined] Early arrivals pinpointed works & early T.I. reds dropped on western edge of works & some to N.W. Attack later spread until area 8 x 10mls was covered. Smoke screen which came into operation prevented later pinpointing.
[underlined] BOCHUM. [/underlined] Ground haze prevented identification of ground detail. This a/c was early on the target & no final assessment of success of the raid can be given, but glow of fires could be seen from the Dutch Coast.
[page break]
15.
[underlined] 14TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations – Training. “Interrogation of Prisoners of War” shown to R.A.F. & WAAF personnel. Berlin attacked by 12 Mosquitoes.
[underlined] 15TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations in P.F.F. Command: gardening (mine laying). 2 Group 3 Mosquitoes attack on Berlin and 19 Lancasters attack the Ruhr with 6 Mosquitoes of 2 Group. 1 a/c of 4 Group missing on gardening.
[underlined] 16TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations. Attack on the Moehne, [sic] Sorper, [sic] & Eder dams by 19 Lancasters.
[underlined] 17TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations.
[underlined] 18TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations. Dinghy drill at “The Pike and Eel”.
[underlined] 19TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations. T.I. demonstration at Lakenheath and Rushford Ranges by P.F.F. for benefit of new crews in Bomber Command. S/L Grant in ‘P.’ and W/O Busby in ‘X’ from 156.
[underlined] 20TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations.
[underlined] 21ST MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations.
[page break]
16.
[underlined] 22ND MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations. M.I.9 Lecture by F/O Grainger.
[underlined] 23RD MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940HRS. [/underlined] MAXIMUM effort on DORTMUND.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta.
Mosquitoes will drop groundmarkers T.I. Yellow at 5145N 0728E as an aid to Navigation.
Mosquitoes will mark the exact A/P with T.I. red at Z-2, Z+1, Z+8, Z+14, Z+20, Z+26, Z+32, Z+38, Z+44, Z+50, Z+56. These will be backed up by P.F.F. a/c with T.I. Green.
Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at the T.I. red if these are visible otherwise at the estimated centre of the area covered by all T.I. Green.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 163 Mediums + 535 Heavies + 119 P.F.F. = 817 a/c.
[underlined] list by Squadron of aircraft numbers, roles and losses involved [/underlined]
[underlined] BRIEFING. [/underlined] 1800HRS. – New briefing room.
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17
[underlined] TARGET: DORTMUND [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Markers confined to an area with a diameter of about 1 mile. Main Force covered Red T.I. area tailing off to the N & NE 4-5mls. in pear-shaped pattern. The intense glow & smoke from fires in the later stages prevented red T.Is from being seen.
Heavy flak. Moderate “predicted” at first – tailed off in quality & quantity. Negligible L/F. Moderate S/Ls (searchlights) sometimes in cones – mostly singly.
[page break]
18.
[underlined] 24TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1940HRS. [/underlined] MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 25TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000HRS. [/underlined] Target – DÜSSELDORF.
underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta. Groundmarkers T.I. Yellow will be dropped at 5100N 0634E throughout period of attack as an aid to navigation, & backed up by LANCASTER backers up. Mosquitoes will mark the exact A/P with groundmarkers T.I. red at:- Z-2, Z+1, Z+8, Z+14, Z+20, Z+26, Z+32, Z+38, Z+44, Z+50. Other P.F.F. a/c acting as backers up will keep the A/P marked with Green T.Is. Main Force a/c should aim their bombs exactly at the T.I red if visible otherwise at the estimated centre of the pattern of T.I. Green. Groundmarkers T.I. Yellow will be dropped at 5117N 0630E by practice ‘Y’ a/c as an aid to navigation.
[underlined] EFFORTS. [/underlined] 155 Mediums + 513 Heavies + 117 P.F.F. = 785 a/c. Zero hour – 0130HRS.
[underlined] BRIEFING. [/underlined] 1800HRS.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 759 a/c attacked:
[underlined] list by Group, of aircraft numbers involved and missing [/underlined]
[page break]
19.
[underlined] TARGET: DÜSSELDORF [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY {/underlined] Very conflicting reports received from crews. Early crews unable to see any markers below cloud layer at 8/10,000ft. Apparent gap in T.I. reds in early part of attack seemed to result in scattering of Green T.Is into red T.is reported dropped at 0207hrs and 0210 1/2 hrs. about 1 1/2mls apart resulted in two Green T.I. areas. If these do not agree with Mosquito then enemy is using decoys. Fires reported by last a/c to cover area about 1 1/2mls in diameter.
[page break]
20
[underlined] 26TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000 HRS. [/underlined] Target – COLOGNE. Area 2. DUISBERG.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] MUSICAL PARAMATTA. Ground marking with red T.I. by Mosquitoes and Green T.I.s by backers up. Preliminary warning Yellow T.I. will be dropped by fire raisers of 7 Squadron using ‘Y’ only at 5105N 0025E. These will be maintained by backers up of 7, 35, 83 and 156 Squadron who will aim their Yellow T.I. at those previously dropped. Mosquitoes will then act as precision ground markers and will drop their red T.I. in salvo on the A/P.
Then PFF a/c will act as Backers up aiming their Green T.I. at the Red T.I. if seen otherwise at the estimated centre of the pattern of Green T.I. visible overshooting by 2 seconds in either case.
Fire-raisers and main force will aim their bombs at the Red T.I. if visible otherwise at the centre of all the Green T.I.s visible otherwise at the centre of all the Green T.I.s visible using ‘Y’ as an aid if fitted. ‘Y’ a/c may, if no T.I.s are seen, drop their bombs blind on ‘Y’.
[underlined] AFTERNOON. [/underlined] KING GEORGE and QUEEN ELIZABETH visit Wyton to meet Air Crews. Representatives of each PFF squadron present. F/L COOK and Crew from 156 Squadron.
[underlined] 1800 HRS. [/underlined] Briefing. ‘Y’ F/L COOK to carry Dictaphone.
[underlined] 2153 HRS. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED
[page break]
21.
[underlined] TARGET: COLOGNE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 27TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1010 HRS. [/underlined] Target – ESSEN.
[underlined] Method [/underlined] Musical Wanganui or Musical Paramatta according to weather conditions. No Backers-up on ‘Y’ type a/c required from 150.
[underlined] 1800 HRS. [/underlined] Briefing
[underlined] 2045 HRS. [/underlined] Method to be Musical Wanganui.
[page break]
22.
[underlined] TARGET: ESSEN [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Good concentration achieved with incendiaries inclined to fall short. Good fires seen through breaks in cloud. Flak reports vary – generally considered moderate barrage. 3 a/c hit – ‘B’ F/O PRICHARD – both by flak and another Lancaster over the target. S/L’s few, occasionally small cones through breaks in cloud. ‘B’ F/O PRICHARD carried the dictaphone, but it was broken on return.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing [/underlined]
14 Mosquitoes of 2 Group attacked JENA (ZEISS works) in daylight – 3 missing.
[underlined] 28TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations for P.F.F. Bombing, fighter affiliation and other training. 12 a/c of 2 Group on Zeebrugge missing. [missing sentence]
[page break]
23.
[underlined] 29TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] METHOD [/underlined] MUSICAL PARAMATTA. Preliminary warning Yellow T.I will be dropped by 2S/7 + 2H/35 special a/c at 5059N 5626E This will be maintained by ‘Y’ type backers up. Mosquitoes will then act as precision groundmarkers dropping Red T.I. in salvo on the A/P.
Other P.F.F. a/c will act as Backers up aiming their Green T.I. at the Red T.I. if seen, otherwise at the estimated centre of all green T.I. visible and overshooting by 1 second in either case.
Landmarkers Yellow T.I. will be dropped by ‘Y’ a/c at 5033N 0723E on the route home as an aid to navigation and to help the main force avoid defended areas on leaving the target.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK [/underlined] 113 Mediums + 479 Heavies + 117 P.F.F. Zero hour = 0045 hrs. Dictaphone carried by ‘Y’ F/L COOK, but failed to work.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] The most concentrated raid of the war.
[underlined] list by Group, aircraft numbers involved and missing [/underlined]
[page break]
24.
[underlined] TARGET: WUPPERTAL [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] It is considered by all crews that this attack achieved a good concentration of T.I. marking & consequently good fires were started around this concentration. The fire raising technique appears to have been very successful in the early part of [words missing]
[page break]
25.
[underlined] 30TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0947 HRS. [/underlined] Stand down for all P.F.F. Squadrons.
[underlined] 31ST MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0948 HRS. [/underlined] All Squadrons stood down.
[underlined] 1ST JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0952 HRS. [/underlined] No operations in P.F.F. Training only. Sgt. Wedd lecture on “New Guinea”
[underlined] 2ND JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
No operations in P.F.F.
[underlined] 3RD JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
No operations for 156 Squadron.
[underlined] 4TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940 HRS. [/underlined] Target BOCHUM. Secondary Target MUNSTER. GOODWOOD effort.
[underlined] METHOD for BOCHUM. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta. Mosquitoes will drop Groundmarkers T.I. Yellow at Position A 5148N 0713E. as an aid to navigation. Backers up will keep Position A marked also with T.I. Yellow. Mosquitoes will mark the exact A/P with Groundmarkers T.I. Red at Z-3, Z, Z+7, Z+12, Z+17, Z+22, Z+27, Z+32, Z+37, Z+42. Backers up will keep A/P marked with Groundmarkers T.I. Green. Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at the T.I. red if visible otherwise at the centre of the pattern of T.I. Green.
For information P.F.F. are carrying out a separate attack on MUNSTER from Z+25 to Z+35 using red and green T.I.s
[missing words]
[page break]
26.
[underlined] 5TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1002 HRS. [/underlined] Target OBERHAUSEN. 15 main force only.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Wanganui. Tracking flares red steady will be dropped by all Mosquitoes at Position A 5142N 0615E.
Tracking flares green steady will be dropped by all Mosquitoes at Position B. 5136N 0652E.
Release point flares red with green stars & white for longer burning will be dropped by all Mosquitoes to ignite at 18,000ft in such a position that all main force a/c aiming their bombs at them on a heading of 199M. at 143kts I.A.S. will hit the A/P.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 272 heavies + 43 P.F.F. Zero hour: 0100hrs.
[underlined] 1538 hrs. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[underlined] 6TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1030 HRS. [/underlined] Targets OBERHAUSEN & MUNSTER.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and targets [/underlined]
[underlined] METHODS. Munster. [/underlined] ‘Y’ a/c only will attack at Z+10 & Z+12. by special equipment. [underlined] Oberhausen. [/underlined] Tracking flares red steady will be dropped by all Mosquitoes on Track 8.5 N. Mls. short of the release point.
Release point flares red with green stars & white for longer burning will be dropped by all Mosquitoes to ignite at 18,000ft so that all main force a/c aiming [missing words]
[page break]
27
[underlined] 6TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined] (CONT:)
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 274 heavies + 38 P.F.F. Zero hour: 0100hrs.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 1800 HRS. [/underlined] Briefing.
[underlined] 1803 HRS. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[page break}
28
[underlined] 7TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 12.15 HRS. [/underlined] Target MÜNSTER: 1 ‘Y’ + 3 visual marker. + 6 main force. Target MÜLHEIM: 11 Backers-up.
[underlined] METHOD MULHEIM. [/underlined] Yellow T.I. will be dropped by special a/c of 7 & 35 squadron on their way to Munster at Position A. 5150N 0637E. This will be maintained by Backers-up of 35 and 405 Squadron who will aim their Yellow T.I. at those previously dropped.
Mosquitoes will then act as precision groundmarkers and will drop their red T.I. in salvo on the A/P.
Other P.F.F. a/c will act as backers up aiming their Green T.I. at the red T.I. if seen otherwise at the estimated centre of all the Green T.I. visible overshooting by 3 seconds in either case.
Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at the red T.I.s if visible otherwise at the estimated centre of all Green T.I.s visible.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 120 Mediums + 576 Heavies + 49 P.F.F. Zero hour: 0100 HRS. Z - Z+50.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers and type involved [/underlined]
[underlined] MÜNSTER. [/underlined] All blind marker illuminators of 7 & 35 squadron will drop T.I. Yellow blindly at Position A. 5150N 0637E as a navigational aid to a/c attacking Mülheim.
‘Y’ a/c will act as finders and will mark the target area blindly with Green T.I. proceeding on the same heading for 10 seconds before releasing a stick of flares at 4 seconds interval. The Visual Markers will then mark the A/P with red T.I.
Main Force a/c are permitted to identify the A/P visually in the light of flares for [missing words] release their bombs at the estimated centre
[page break]
29.
[underlined] 7TH June 1943 [/underlined] (CONT.)
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 69 heavies of P.F.F. Zero hour: 0100 HRS.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
P.F.F. a/c are to fly strictly between the height limits of 15,800ft and 16,200ft between meridians 0600E and 0700E on the route to & from the target.
[underlined] 1900 HRS. [/underlined] Zero hour now 0115 hrs.
[underlined] 2200 HRS. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[page break]
30
[underlined] TARGETS: MÜNSTER AND MÜLHEIM [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
31
[underlined] 8TH June 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1040 HRS. [/underlined] Target – MÜNSTER. PFF only.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Blind bombing by P.F.F. ‘Y’ a/c.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined]
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
G/Capt. Collings assumed Command 156 Squadron.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Fighter Command intruders over Dutch aerodromes from midnight – 0300 HRS.
[underlined] 1900 HRS. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 9TH June 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1115 HRS. [/underlined] Targets for 156 Squadron – MÜNSTER 1 [indecipherable number] + 10 main force. ESSEN 10 Backers Up.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] ESSEN. Mixed Musical Paramatta.
Preliminary warning flares Green steady will be dropped by Mosquitoes at Position 5137N 0730E. 4 nautical miles to S/B of main force track. Mosquitoes will then drop release point flares red with green stars & white for [missing words] by all Mosquitoes with red T.Is.
[page break]
32
[underlined] 9TH June 1943 [/underlined] (CONT:)
Other P.F.F. backers-up will drop their Green T.I on the red T.I visible. If groundmarkers are invisible backers-up will revert to main force aiming their bombs at the centre of the release point flares on a heading of [missing] at 143kts. and bringing their Green T.I. back.
[underlined] MÜNSTER. [/underlined] Skymarking and groundmarking by special a/c for non ‘Y’ a/c. Special ‘Y’ a/c will drop flares green with red stars then T.I red. If cloud conditions are suitable for groundmarking no flares will be dropped. Other ‘Y’ a/c will bomb by aid of their special equipment.
[underlined] 2155 HRS. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[underlined] 10TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1940 HRS. [/underlined] MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 11TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1055 HRS. [/underlined] TARGETS RECEIVED. Area I. DUSSELDORF. MUNSTER (Y a/c.) Area II. BREMEN. Area III EMDEN.
[underlined] METHODS. MUSICAL PARAMATTA. [/underlined] DUSSELDORF.
Preliminary warning Yellow T.I will be dropped at 5101N 0633E. by Mosquitoes, and backed up by other P.F.F. a/c.
Mosquitoes will act as precision groundmarkers dropping Red T.I on the exact A/P. They will also drop sky markers red with green stars & white igniting at 14000ft.
Other P.F.F. a/c will act as backers-up aiming their Green T.I at the Red T.I seen otherwise at the centre of all Green T.I overshooting by 3 seconds in either case. If groundmarkers are not visible backers-up will revert to main force bringing their T.Is back.
Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at the Red T.Is seen otherwise at the centre of all Green T.Is visible. If release point flares are used a/c should bomb on a heading of 042M at 143kts.
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[underlined] 11TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined] (CONT:)
[underlined] MUNSTER. [/underlined]
‘Y’ a/c will act as finders marking the target area with Yellow T.I proceeding on the same heading for 10 seconds before releasing a stick of flares at 5 secs. interval.
Visual markers will mark the A/P with red T.I after positive visual identification in the light of flares.
Main Force a/c are permitted to identify visually for practice purposes, otherwise they will aim their bombs at the estimated centre of all T.I reds visible or at the centre of all Yellow T.I seen with with an overshoot of 3 seconds. All ‘Y’ a/c should bomb blindly on ‘Y’
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined]
DUSSELDORF. 148 mediums + 612 heavies + 44 P.F.F. Zero hour 0120 hrs.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[underlined] MÜNSTER. [/underlined] 69 heavies of P.F.F. Zero hour 0120 hrs.
[underlined] list of aircraft roles, aircraft numbers and Squadron [/underlined]
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[underlined] TARGETS: MÜNSTER AND DÜSSELDORF [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
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[underlined] 12TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1040 HRS. [/underlined] Target – BOCHUM.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta.
Yellow T.I will be dropped by the first 2 Mosquitoes only at 5142N 0712E. Mosquitoes then act as precision groundmarkers dropping Red T.I in salvo on the A/P.
Other P.F.F. a/c will act as Backers-up, aiming Green T.I at the Red T.I if seen, otherwise at the centre of all Green T.I visible overshooting by 3 seconds in either case.
Main Force a/c will aim their bombs at the T.I Red if seen, otherwise at the estimated centre of all T.I Green visible.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 429 Heavies + 64 P.F.F.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
Thin layer of 7/10ths cloud at about 10/12,000ft over the target did not prevent Ground-markers from being seen. T.Is do not appear to have been dropped with the usual accuracy. 25 a/c missing. P.F.F. 1-97 F/S Thomas. 1-83 F/O Tilbury.
[underlined] Photographs. 18th June. [/underlined]
Damage is widespread and severe. In the central city area. 130 acres of business and residential property have been devastated, some 700 buildings having been destroyed or damaged.
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[underlined] TARGET: BOCHUM. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 13TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 10.10 HRS. [/underlined] STAND DOWN. Marham only operating and small amount of gardening.
[underlined] 14TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000 HRS. [/underlined] Target – OBERHAUSEN. All Squadrons stood down except for 109 – figures 6 + 2.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 17 a/c on Oberhausen. 1 a/c on gardening.
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[underlined] 15TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940 HRS. [/underlined] All P.F.F. stood down. “BULLSEYE” exercise with T.I demonstration. 5 a/c. Q G/C COLLINGS. D F/S RYAN. F/O LUTZ. F/S WINTERBON. F/L MANDENO.
[underlined] 1740 HRS. [/underlined] BULLSEYE Scrubbed.
[underlined] 16TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1025 HRS. [/underlined] Target – KREFELD-UERDINGEN. Derby Effort.
[underlined] 1355 HRS. [/underlined] Target changed to COLOGNE.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined]
Green flares steady will be dropped by ‘Y’ a/c at Position 5105N 0620E. All ‘Y’ a/c will drop flares Red/Green stars and white to ignite at 18,000ft in such a position that other a/c aiming their bombs on a heading of 117M at 143kts I.A.S. should hit the A/P.
‘Y’ a/c will also drop groundmarkers T.I. Green.
Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at the estimated centre of the skymarkers, but if T.I Green can be seen through cloud at the centre of all T.I Greens visible in preference to the skymarkers.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
All crews bombed on sky markers, but no results seen. 3 a/c attacked Last Resorts.
[underlined] GERMAN COMMUNIQUE. [/underlined] 17TH JUNE 1943.
During last night British Bombers attacked Western Germany & bombs were dropped on residential areas particularly in COLOGNE causing casualties among the population and damage to buildings including 4 hospitals & 3 churches.
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38.
[underlined] TARGET: COLOGNE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
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39
[underlined] 17TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
BULLSEYE exercise and T.I demonstration.
Q. G/C COLLINGS. D. F/S RYAN. L. F/S WINTERBON. E. F/O LUTZ. H. F/S ROSE.
S/Ls ineffective owing to cloud. T.I demonstration at Rushford Range with Red T.Is backed up by Green T.Is and White T.Is to simulate incendiaries. T.I Yellow dropped at Lakenheath as preliminary warning groundmarkers. T.Is very well placed at both ranges.
[underlined] 18TH June 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
[underlined] 19TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET [/underlined] LE CREUSOT.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
MONTCHANIN
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined]
Special a/c [deleted] will /[deleted] of 7 & 35 Squadrons will drop the following on route:-
A) Flares green steady at 4920N 0045W. B) T.I Yellow at 4730N 0110E. C) T.I red at 4705N 0310E. On the way home D) T.I red at 4800N 0202E.
[underlined]LE CRUESOT. [/underlined]
1. [indecipherable digit] S/7 + 2H/35 will blindly illuminate the target with long sticks of flares white
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40
2. Remaining illuminators [sic] will continue to illuminate the target with long sticks of flares white dropped after definite visual identification and will release their HE. on the A/P.
3. All above illuminator a/c (in 1 & 2) will carry on to MONTCHANIN and will illuminate it with sticks of flares white at 6 second intervals whilst in a rate 1 turn to the left around the Southern edge of the [symbol]. (triangle symbol meaning target)
4. Main Force Stirlings and Halifaxes [sic] will drop their bombs with maximum accuracy on the A/Ps detailed only after definite visual identification in the light of flares marking 2 or more bombing runs as necessary. Bombs to be brought back if A/Ps are not definitely identified.
[underlined] MONTCHANIN. [/underlined]
1. Illuminator a/c will illuminate the A/P as detailed above (Para. 2.)
2. 3L/83 + 3L/156 will after definite visual identification drop T.I Green on the exact A/P.
3. Blind illuminators, visual markers, & main force Lancasters will aim bombs at the A/P using T.I Green as a guide.
4. All a/c are to leave the target by 0215 hrs.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] LE CREUSOT 244 Heavies of 3, 4 and 6 Groups. MONTCHANIN 26 Heavies of P.F.F.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
Some crews report seeing blue flashes from the target area and are sure that a proportion of the effort fell on the target. Smoke from the Le Creusot attack floated across the target towards the end of the attack. Markers were not necessary in existing conditions. W/O BROWN ‘M’ took a photograph of the A/P.
23rd June 1943. Cover received to date shows no hits on MONTCHANIN.
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41
[underlined] TARGET: MONTCHANIN [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 20TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
156 stood down.
56 Lancasters of 5 Group & 4 Lancasters of P.F.F attacked the old Zeppelin works at Friedrichshaven [sic] now used as an R.D.F. equipment factory. Many buildings were seen to be hit. Subsequent photographs showed severe damage to parts of the works. The Lancasters continued from Friedrichshaven [sic] and landed in North Africa.
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[underlined] 21ST JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET. [/underlined] KREFELD.
[underlined] METHOD. MUSICAL PARAMATTA. [/underlined]
I. Mosquitoes will act as precision ground-markers dropping Red T.I in salvo on the A/P. To guard against the possibility of technical failure of Mosquitoes, selected ‘Y’ a/c in 2 waves will mark the A/P with Yellow T.I with the aid of special equipment only if, on arrival, no red T.Is are seen.
II. Backers-Up aim Green T.I at Red T.I, if seen, otherwise at the estimated centre of the concentration of Yellow T.I. If Backers-Up can see neither Red nor Yellow T.Is they should aim Green T.Is at the centre of the pattern of Green T.Is.
III. Main Force a/c are to aim their bombs at the T.I red if seen, otherwise at the centre of the concentration of T.I Green. T.I Yellow should be ignored.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] Zero hour: 0130 hrs. 108 mediums + 474 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 114 P.F.F. = 696 a/c.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
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[underlined] NIGHT FIGHTER ACTIVITY. [/underlined]
8 Mosquito Night Fighters operating in the Bomber Stream. 8 Intruder Mosquitoes operating at GILZE RIJEN, VENLO, DEELEN, TWENTE ENTSCHEDE, [sic] BERGEN ALKMAAR, ST. TROND, FLORENNES. Free lance Mosquitoes will be operating at LAON and DIZIER.
[underlined] 0240HRS. [/underlined] Wellington from Upper Heyford crashed on No.I runway. Operational a/c to land on No.3.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
All crews report an excellent attack with markers well concentrated, no strays. Bombing effort confined to an area 1 1/2 mls. square. A few Yellow T.Is were dropped unnecessarily were by 156 Squadron!
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
Photographs. 24th June. Damage is extremely heavy & concentrated in the centre of the city, particularly round the Adolf Hitler Platz. Out of 1,100 acres of fully built-up town area it is estimated that about 900 acres have been devastated. There is also severe damage to the industries on the N.E. side of the town & to barracks on the N.W.
Reinforcements both for fire and police services are said to have been requested as far afield as Dortmund and Munster. The number of people killed is thought to have been around 2,000.
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[underlined] TARGET: KREFELD [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
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45
[underlined] 22ND JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000HRS. [/underlined] Target: [deleted] OBERHAUSEN. [/deleted] GELSENKIRCHEN.
[underlined] 1320HRS. [/underlined] Target: MULHEIM.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] MUSICAL PARAMATTA.
I. Preliminary warning T.I Yellows will be dropped by Mosquitoes at 5143N 0652E 7 statute miles to port of main force track.
II. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] will mark the exact A/P with T.I Red at Z-3, Z+1. 7, 13, 19, 25, 31, 36.
III. [underlined] Backers Up [/underlined] will keep the A/P marked with T.I. Green.
IV. [underlined] Main Force a/c [/underlined] aim there bombs at T.I Red if visible otherwise at the estimated centre of the pattern of T.I Green.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 54 mediums + 437 heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 63 P.F.F. = 554 a/c. Zero hour 0120 hrs.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined]
6 to 8 Beaufighters will be operating on the Bomber Command route. Mosquitoes and Bostons will be operating over Dutch airfields from 2359 – 0330hrs
[page break]
46.
[underlined] TARGET: MULHEIM [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Marker concentration was good, the Greens spread over an area radius 1 mile. The main attack was also concentrated, with incendiaries tending to fall short at the beginning. The last a/c over the target reports a fire area about 2 mls, square in which 3 large fires were burning. Large explosions reported in the [symbol] area at 0122, 0134 and 0147 hrs.
[underlined] 23RD JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0955 hrs. [/underlined] Make and Mend.
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47
[underlined] 24TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000 HRS. [/underlined] Target – ELBERFELD. A/P ‘A’
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta.
I. T.I Yellow will be dropped by [underlined] special a/c [/underlined] at 5059N 0626E by special equipment if serviceable, otherwise aiming their T.I at those already dropped. 4 special a/c attacking at Z+2 will arrive at Pos: A 2 mins early – drop their markers, do a rate 1 orbit before proceeding to the target.
II. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] then drop T.I red in salvo on the A/P.
III. [underlined] Backers-Up [/underlined] aim Green T.I at red if seen otherwise the estimated centre of Green T.I.
IV. [underlined] Main Force [/underlined] aim bombs at T.I red if seen otherwise at centre of all T.I Green visible.
V. T.I Yellow will be dropped by [underlined] special a/c [/underlined] on return at 5033N 0723E by means of their special equipment.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 102 Mediums + 441 Heavies + 76 P.F.F. = 619 a/c. 630 a/c. took off. 517 a/c attacked primary. 25 a/c attacked last resort.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[underlined] INTRUDERS & FIGHTERS. [/underlined]
Intruders will be operating in the Bomber Command stream. A wing of Spitfires will meet bombers on return covering the route for a/c returning late.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
33 a/c are missing.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined] [incomplete]
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[underlined] TARGET: ELBERFELD. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY [/underlined]
In the early stages both markers and main force were well concentrated although incendiaries again tended to undershoot. Later smoke up to 9000ft made it difficult to see markers except when cascading, & therefore concentration of main force tended to fall off incendiaries stretching [missing words]
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[underlined] 25TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
P.F.F. stood down except for 109 Squadron.
Target GELSENKIRCHEN.
[list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, missing]
[underlined] 26TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0943HRS. [/underlined] 156 Squadron stood down. Mosquitoes of P.F.F attacked DUISBURG AND HAMBURG.
[underlined] 27TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down. Lecture on ‘ESCAPE’ by F/L Yelland given to Air Crew.
[underlined] 28TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET: [/underlined] COLOGNE.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Mixed Musical Paramatta and Wanganui.
I. Preliminary warning flares Green steady will be dropped by Mosquitoes on track at 5041N 0647E 18.7 statute mls. short of release point.
II. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] mark release point with flares red with green stars and white at Z-4, Z, Z+5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35. They will also mark the A?P with T.I red at the same times.
III. [underlined] Backers-Up [/underlined] A/P marked with T.I Green only if red are visible. Otherwise they will revert to Main Force. [missing sentence]
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[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 85 Mediums + 437 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 73 P.F.F. Zero hour 0140 hrs. T.O.T. Z to Z + 40.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined]
9 Mosquitoes + 2 Bostons 0030-0315. 6-8 Beaufighters operating in Main Bomber stream.
[underlined] TARGET: COLOGNE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY [/underlined] 10/10ths cloud over the [symbol] with tops 7/8,000ft. Competent a/c crews to bomb on either markers or cascading T.I reds before they disappeared through cloud. Early a/c on [symbol] report that opening markers were late. All T.I Green brought back. No accurate estimate of attack can be given. Explosions reported 0158, 0211 & 0244.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 12/97 & 24/35 missing. 25 a/c in Command [missing]
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51
[underlined] 29TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
[underlined] 30TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
[underlined] 1ST JULY 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 2ND JULY 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
[underlined] 3RD JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1005 hrs. [/underlined] Target – COLOGNE.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Musical Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] 1. Mosquitoes [/underlined] will drop preliminary warning flares Green steady on track at 5045N 0648 1/2E. 14 1/2 nautical mls short
[underlined] 2. Mosquitoes [/underlined] will drop sky-markers red with green stars and white at Z-4, Z, Z+5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40. They will also drop T.I red on the exact A/P at the same times.
[underlined] 3. [/underlined] If these T.I Red are visible through cloud, [underlined] Backers-Up [/underlined] will keep the A/P marked with T.I Green. If none are visible Backers-Up revert to main force and bring T.Is back.
[underlined] 4. [/underlined] Main Force aim bombs at :- 1. T.I Red if visible. 2. Centre of T.I Green. 3. Release Point flares heading [indecipherable digits] M I.A.S. 143 kts.
[underlined] 5. [/underlined] All flares to ignite at 12,000ft.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 94 Mediums + 525 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 72 P.F.F. Zero hour 0130hrs.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
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52
[underlined] TARGET: COLOGNE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] There appeared to be a time lag of 2 minutes between the sky-markers dropped at 0114 hrs and ground-markers at 0116 hrs. Marker concentration good. Main attack reasonable, but again tending to undershoot as much as 2-3 mls. but in built up area. Smoke seen rising at 0116 hrs made early crews suspect a smoke screen. Smoke at end of attack up to 15,000ft. Fires seen from 40 mls away. One a/c ‘Y’ F/L Cook bombed last resort BONN/HANGELAR A/D. (aerodrome) Bombs hung up over the target and as they were near the end of the attack Captain decided not to run in again. Fires were started on the A/D where a/c beaming nav lights were seen circling.
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined]
3 Mosquitoes on Venlo, 3 on Gilze Rijen, 3 on St. Trond, 3 on Florennes, 2 on [indecipherable word], 2 on [indecipherable word], 6 Beaufighters operating in B. Command stream.
[underlined] RESULTS.] 30 a/c missing. P.F.F. 1 of 97, 1 0f 405, 1 0f 35. 4 group. 4H + 4W [missing words]
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[underlined] 4TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
Target: HAGEN.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta.
1. T.I Yellow will be dropped by [underlined] ‘Y’ a/c [/underlined] on route to the target at 5153N 0724E (to keep clear of MÜNSTER).
2. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] will drop T.I red in salvo on the exact A/P at Z-3, Z+1, 7, 12, 17, 22.
3. [underlined] Backers-Up [/underlined] aim T.Is and bombs at the T.I red if visible, otherwise at the centre of the concentration of T.I Green overshooting by 2 seconds in either case.
4. [underlined] Main Force [/underlined] a/c aim their bombs at the T.I red if visible, otherwise at the estimated centre of the pattern of T.I Green.
[underlined] 5. Y a/c [/underlined] drop T.I Yellow on the return route at 5048N 0716E (to keep clear of COLOGNE)
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined]
39 Mediums + 309 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 44 P.F.F.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] BRIEFING [/underlined] 1800 hrs.
[underlined] 1810 hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 5TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1025 hrs. [/underlined] Target: ESSEN. 139 squadron. 4 a/c HAMBURG. 4 a/c COLOGNE.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Sky-marking.
1. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] will drop tracking flares red steady on track at Pos: 5047N 0658E [missing words] release point.
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54
[underlined] 2. Mosquitoes [/underlined] drop tracking flares GREEN steady at 5138N 0659E 10 nautical miles short of release point.
3. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] drop release point flares red with green stars & flares white at 0126, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55.
[underlined] 4. Main Force [/underlined] aim bombs at centre of release point flares on heading 197M at 143 kts I.A.S.
If this method is used BACKERS-UP bring green T.Is back.
[underlined] 5. [/underlined] All flares will ignite at 16,000ft.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 398 Heavies & 41 P.F.F. = 439 a/c.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
Zero hour = 0130 hrs. T.O.T. Z to Z+30.
BRIEFING. 1800 hes.
1805 hrs. OPERATIONS CANCELLED
[underlined] 6TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
Target:- ESSEN. Main Force only. ‘A’ S/L MANSFIELD 156 squadron.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Wanganui.
[underlined] 1315 hrs. Operations cancelled. 139 Squadron 4 a/c on COLOGNE 4 a/c DUSSELDORF.
[underlined] 7TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down except for 139 Squadron. 4 a/c DUISBERG. 4 a/c COLOGNE
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55
[underlined] 8TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1030 HRS. [/underlined] Target COLOGNE.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Musical Wanganui and Paramatta.
[underlined] 1. [/underlined] Preliminary warning flares Green steady will be dropped by all Mosquitoes on track at 5041N 0640E 18.2 nautical mls. short of release point.
[underlined] 2. [/underlined] Release point flare red with green stars and flares white will be dropped by Mosquitoes at:- 0110, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40. They will also mark the A/P with red T.Is at the same time.
[underlined] 3. [/underlined] If the latter are visible Backers-Up will keep the A/P marked with T.I Green.
[underlined] 4. [/underlined] Main Force a/c bomb in the following order of preference:- 1) T.I Red. 2) Centre of T.I Green. 3) Centre of release point flares on exact heading of 023M at a speed of 143 kts.
All flares ignite at 17,000ft. red T.Is cascade from 10,000ft. green T.Is cascade from 3,000ft until Z+15, then one T.I Green from each Backer-Up will cascade from 10,000ft.
[underlined] 5. [/underlined] T.I Yellow will be dropped by 2L/7 at 5040N 0715E. These will be backed up by all Lancasters of 97 Squadron & 1 B/U of 83 Squadron.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 435 Heavies + 55 P.F.F.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
Zero hour = 0110 hrs. T.O.T. Z to Z+35.
[underlined] 1800 hrs. [/underlined] Effort reduced. Z to Z+20 T.O.T.
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[underlined] TARGET: COLOGNE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Sky-markers were late, the first one being seen at 0115 hrs. owing to 10/10ths cloud very little was seen of the attack, but large explosions were observed at 0115, 0117 and 0122 hrs. One crew bombed on Green T.Is seen to cascade at 0109 hrs. and one bombed on E.T.A. Glow of fires seen to be starting beneath cloud.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[list by group, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
3 Mosquitoes of P.F.F. attacked DUISBURG. Nil missing
[underlined] Gardening. [/underlined]
[words missing]
[page break]
57
[underlined] 9TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] GELSENKIRCHEN.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] To sky-mark the Release Point.
[underlined] 1 [/underlined] Tracking flares red steady will be dropped by Mosquitoes 20 1/2 m. short of Release point at 5153N 0708E.
[underlined] 2 [/underlined] Tracking flares Green steady will be dropped by Mosquitoes 11.4 n.m. short of release point at 5144N 0705E.
[underlined] 3 [/underlined] Release point flares red/green and flares white will be dropped by Mosquitoes, so that main force a/c on a heading of 196M at 143 kts I.A.S. will hit the A/P.
[underlined] 4 [/underlined] All flares to ignite at 17,000ft.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 426 Heavies + 32 P.F.F. Zero hour 0110 hrs.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Target identified by sky-markers. Glow of fires seen through cloud indicated reasonably concentrated attack.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[list by group, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
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58
[underlined] 10TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down. Invasion of Sicily announced.
[underlined] 11TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] TURIN.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] 1. [/underlined] Route markers Green steady will be dropped by ‘Y’ a/c at 4544N 0553E. These will be backed up by Backers-Up only if they are able to identify the lake visually.
[underlined] 2. ‘Y’ a/c [/underlined] will act as Finders and mark the [symbol] area with Yellow T.I proceeding on the same heading & releasing stick of flares at 6 seconds interval. 1st bundle to be dropped in salvo with Yellow T.I.
[underlined] Visual Markers [/underlined] then mark A/P with Red T.I when they have definitely identified it, using Yellow T.I as guide only. They will [underlined] not [/underlined] drop Red T.I unless absolutely certain of the A/P.
[underlined] Backers-Up [/underlined] aim Green T.I at centre of all Red T.I visible or centre of Green overshooting by 2 seconds in either case. Last resort – aim Green T.Is at the centre of all Yellow T.Is if visible.
[underlined] Non-marker a/c. [/underlined] aim bombs at Red T.I if seen, otherwise at the centre of all Green T.Is. [deleted] If [/deleted]
If on arrival at the [symbol] area cloud conditions make it impossible to see T.Is all ‘Y’ a/c will mark the release point with flares red/green stars. In these circumstances squadrons to detail 1/2 their special a/c to mark after Zero & the other 1/2 to orbit & mark after Z+9. Backers-Up then revert to non-markers & along with other main force aim bombs on heading 126M at 143 kts.
[underlined] 3. [/underlined] Route markers flares Green steady as in Para 1. Zero hour 0120 hrs.
[underlined] 1725 hrs. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled
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59
[underlined] 12TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target. [/underlined] TURIN.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground marking. As for 11th July 1943.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 422 Heavies + 57 P.F.F.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0040 hrs. T.O.T. Z to Z+30.
[underlined] BRIEFING. [/underlined] 1815 hrs.
[underlined] 1600 HRS. [/underlined] Figures changed. F. R. M. Z. N to go as Main Force. 224 Lancs of 1 & 5 Groups + 57 P.F.F.
[underlined] Alteration to Method. [/underlined] Zero hour. 1045 hrs T.O.T. Z to Z+15.
[underlined] 1. [/underlined] Route marker flares Green steady will be dropped on Lake Annecy backed up by Backers-Up.
[underlined] 2. [/underlined] Route markers Yellow T.I will be dropped by ‘Y’ a/c of 156 squadron backed up by Backers-Up of 156 squadron at 4544N 0305E.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Yellow T.Is from blind markers all fell in town area. Red T.Is reported very accurate. The first 2 bundles of Reds fell about 1 ml. apart one either side of the river – the 3rd fell close to the Red on the A/P. All Red markers & subsequently Green markers reported excellent concentration. Main Force attack well concentrated, practically no run back except for a few incendiaries. Route marking also reported very good, both Lake Annecy and Lake Bourget marked on run to target.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 295 a/c detailed. 1 Group 108 Lancs. [missing words]
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60
[underlined] TARGET: - TURIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base. Bradwell Bay – Dungeness – Cayeux – Lake Annecy – TURIN – 4544N 0305E – 4630N 0110W – 4630N 0250W – 4700N 0600W – 4830N 0630W – ST. EVAL – Base.
[page break]
61 [inserted] No pages for July 13th – 22nd (On leave?) [/inserted]
[underlined] 23RD JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] HAMBURG or MUNCHEN GLADBACH. A/C required 3 B/M, 13 B/Up, 5 Non-markers.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta or Wanganui.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 55 Mediums + 610 Heavies + 110 P.F.F.
[underlined] 1800 hrs. [/underlined] Briefing
[underlined] 1830 hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 24TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target. [/underlined] HAMBURG. 139 Squadron. 4 a/c DUISBERG. 3 a/c KIEL. 2 a/c LÜBECK. 2 a/c BREMEN. 2 a/c Target to be advised.
[underlined] Requirements. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles] Our figures increased to 24 a/c.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
1. Route markers T.I. Yellow will be dropped by special a/c at 5411N 0850E.
2. Target will be marked by visual markers with T.I. Red, backed up by T.I. Green. Long sticks of flares white and T.I. yellow may be seen in the target area, for the exclusive benefit of P.F.F. only.
3. Main Force attack T.I. Red visible or centre of T.I. Green.
4. [missing words] T.I. Yellow will be dropped by special a/c at 5343N 0836E.
[page break]
62
[underlined] TARGET: HAMBURG [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base. 5400N 0300E – 5445N 0700E – 5355N 0945E – Hamburg – 5315N 1000E – 5435N 0600E – 5400N 0300E – Base.
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63
[underlined] MESSAGE TO CREWS FROM THE C-in-C. [/underlined]
Hamburg is the 2nd largest city in Germany, the most important port and a vital war industrial area. It was the place whence the rot started which spread throughout Germany in 1918. It was the last part of Germany to adhere to Germany and may well be the first to come unstuck. It has been bombed before but not as you, and still more the Germans, understand bombing. To-night, you start the real battle of Hamburg, and you are going to write it off. This is no ordinary or routine operation and each one of you will, I know, do your utmost.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 76 Mediums + 604 Heavies + 116 P.F.F.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Weather over the target was nil cloud with fair visibility. This enabled, although a smoke screen was in operation, our visual markers to pinpoint tributaries and built up area and to put 3 x T.I. Red which were already down on the target. These were positioned one to the West, one Central and one well to the East. His own T.I. Red was placed along with the centre one. Later a/c report that a good concentration was achieved for a target of this description, but that the attack was diverted roughly by the Alsten, 75% falling on the West and 25% to the east. Exceedingly good fires were seen and a large explosion was observed at 0108 hrs. Smoke was rising over the target in a large column up to 18/20,000ft.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
No a/c missing from P.F.F. 12 a/c missing in Command. ‘Windows’ carried for the first time proved presumably to be a success. “Zephyr” also used for the first time.
6 Beaufighters operated S. of line 5300N and W. of 0700E from 0200-0230 hrs. 13 Mosquitoe [sic] intruders operating from 2330-0330 over A/Fs. [missing words]
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64
[underlined] German Broadcast. [/underlined]
A strong formation of British bombers a terror raid against Hamburg last night. The population suffered heavy losses and considerable damage was caused to residential quarters and cultural monuments and public buildings. According to reports so far available 17 of the attacking bombers were shot down by the Air Defences of N.W. German Coastal areas and in the Norwegian area.
[underlined] 25TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] U.S.A.A.F. [/underlined] Fortresses attacked HAMBURG in daylight and North German Coastal areas including ROSTOCK, KIEL and LÜBECK.
[underlined] 0958 hrs. [/underlined] Target: HAMBURG – Alternative ESSEN.
[underlined] 1150 hrs. [/underlined] A/C required of 156 Squadron. 3 B/Markers. 1 V/Marker. 11 B/Up. 5 N/Markers.
[underlined] Methods. [/underlined] HAMBURG. Newhaven Ground-marking. ESSEN. Musical Paramatta.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] HAMBURG. 71 Mediums + 538 Heavies + 97 P.F.F. = 706 a/c. ESSEN. 71 Mediums + 538 Heavies + 85 P.F.F. = 694 a/c.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
Zero hour. 0030 hrs.
[underlined] 1800 hrs. [/underlined] Briefing. Area I Cancelled.
[missing words]
[page break]
65
[underlined] TARGET: ESSEN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base – 5313N 0253E – 5153N 0638E – Essen – Nordwijk [sic] – 5300N 0210E – Base.
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined] Mosquitoes. 4 a/c DEELEN. 4 a/c TWENTE. 4 a/c GILZE RIJEN. 4 a/c VENLO. 3 a/c BERGEN. 3 a/c LIPPSTADT. 3 a/c ST. TROND.
[missing words] Bomber Command track.
[page break]
66
[underlined] 2330 hrs. BOMBER COMMAND BROADCAST. [/underlined] Mussolini has resigned and Bagdolio [sic] has taken his place.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Large patch of alto. cum: and industrial haze prevented a clear view of the main attack. Route markers (T.I. Yellow) appear to have been dropped accurately with good concentration. All crews reported good concentration of T.I. Reds and Greens around target area. Several large fires seen, and 2 huge explosions at approx. 0036 hrs & 0105 hrs. Moderate, erratic heavy flak over the target and slight amount of light flak. Results: P.F.F. 3 missing. 25 a/c in Command.
[underlined] 26TH JULY 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] 1015 hrs. [/underlined] MAKE & MEND for P.F.F. except for 139 Squadron. 6 Mosquitoes on HAMBURG.
[underlined] U.S.A.A.C. [/underlined]
[underlined] HAMBURG. [/underlined] 127 Fortresses took off to attack the ship yards and aero engine factory.
[underlined] HANNOVER. [/underlined] 122 Fortresses took off to attack the Tyre & Rubber Factory & Synthetic Rubber works.
P.F.F. 6 Mosquitoes on HAMBURG.
[underlined] 27TH JULY 1943. [/underlined]
[deleted] [underlined] 0948 hrs. Target: HAMBURG. [/underlined] [/deleted] [underlined] P. I. [indecipherable letter] [/underlined]
[deleted] [underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] [/deleted]
[underlined[ ESSEN. [/underlined] Considerable fresh damage on KRUPPS. Many fires burning throughout town.
[underlined] HAMBURG. [/underlined] Considerable damage seen outside smoke area – including BLOHM & VOSS works.
[underlined] ELBERFELD. [/underlined] Almost complete destruction throughout the town.
[underlined] GELSENKIRCHEN. {/underlined] A [missing words]
[page break]
67
[underlined] 27TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0948 hrs. [/underlined] Target: HAMBURG.
[underlined] A/C Requirements. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK [/underlined] 76 Mediums + 591 Heavies + 112 P.F.F. Zero hour 0100 hrs.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
Route markers T.I. Yellow will be dropped at 5418N 0840E by 7 & 405 Squadrons. Route markers T.I. Yellow will also be dropped at 5352N 1025E by 35 Squadron. Blind markers mark target with T.I. Yellow by ‘Y’ equipment. Visual markers cancelled, become Backers-Up. Backers-Up aim Green T.I at Yellow T.I on Green T.I. Re-centrers – qualified ‘Y’ Backers-Up spread evenly throughout the attack to drop Green T.I by means of special equipment if it is functioning properly.
[underlined] MESSAGE FROM C-IN-C. [/underlined] The Battle of HAMBURG continues – your opening blow was first rate – it may take 1/2 a dozen for the knock out, but knock out it will be, final & complete. Photo’s of ESSEN yesterday – mostly smoke covered but sufficient to show your devastation in & around KRUPPS and to the housing areas around the A/P. In the last 5 months you have inflicted upon Germany the greatest continuous series of military disasters in history. At present that fact is only just beginning to dawn upon the exponents of the more archaic forms of warfare, but it has dawned on Germany and resonates throughout Germany. From inflicting military disasters you are now proceeding to administer catastrophies. [sic] If you keep it up, and I know you will, you will be saving the lives of millions in the other forces of the United Nations & in the Occupied Countries and you will have Germany on her knees before the leaves have fallen. I will not ask you to do your best. I know you always [missing words]
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68
[underlined] TAREGET: - HAMBURG [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – 5448 0430E – 5407N 1025E – 5342N 1025E – [symbol] – 5320N 0930E – 5435N 0620E – 5448N 0430E – Base.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] The Yellow T.Is dropped by blind-markers were generally well placed & concentrated. Backers-Up seem to have had little difficulty in placing their Greens amongst the Yellows, although in later stages Green T.Is fell into smoke. Early crews report that on arrival flares were still
[page break]
69
[underlined] 28TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
P.F.F. No operations for 156 Squadron. 4 Mos: of P.F.F. attacked HAMBURG. Fires still burning.
[underlined] 29TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
Target: Area I. HAMBURG. 4’Y’. B/M 2‘Y’ Re-C. 13 B/Up. 2 N/M. II. [underlined] SOLINGEN [/underlined] & REMSCHEID. 9 B/Up. 2 N/M.
Area I. Paramatta Zero. 0045 hrs. Area II. Musical Paramatta. z 0115 hrs.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] Area I. 92 M + 590 Heavies + 116 P.F.F.
Area I. Confirmed.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta.
i. Route markers T.I. Red with flares Red will be dropped at 5413N 0850E
ii. Special a/c will ground mark the A/P with T.I. Yellow.
iii. Backers-Up back up the initial ground marking with T.I. Green.
iv. Main Force a/c aim bombs at the centre of all Green & Yellow T.I visible.
v. Route markers T.I. Red & flare Red will be dropped at 5340N 0848E
vi. Spoof markers T.I. Yellow to attract night fighters will be dropped at 5332N 0733E
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Weather – Nil cloud, ground vis: impaired by much smoke haze. Early crews found many fires still burning on arrival. Yellow T.Is were dropped slightly early at approx.: 0037 hrs. Concentration fair – some dropped S. of river about 1 1/2 [indecipherable word] from main concentration. Green T.Is good. Tendency to undershoot later. Main Effort good with large fires left burning, but observation of results hampered by smoke.
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70
[underlined] TARGET: HAMBURG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base 5430N 0500E – 5430N 0700E – 5403N 0944E – Hamburg – 5323N 0938E – 5430N 0630E – 5430N 0500E – Base.
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71
[underlined] 30TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1005 hrs. [/underlined] MILAN. 2’Y’ 5 B/Up. GENOA 3 ‘Y’ 5 B/Up. TURIN 3’Y’ 5 B/Up.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] TURIN and Milan – Newhaven Ground-marking. GENOA. Illumination.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 100 Lancasters of 1 & 5 Groups + P.F.F. Zero hour. 0135 hrs TURIN. 0155 hrs. MILAN & GENOA.
[underlined] 1745 hrs. [/underlined] 156 squadron – Operations cancelled.
[list by Group of aircraft numbers and types] attacked REMSCHEID. Markers became concentrated as attack developed and smoke rose to 10000ft. 15 a/c are missing.
[underlined] 31ST JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940 hrs. [/underlined] Target: HAMBURG.
[underlined] A/C Requirements. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
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72
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 70 Mediums + 437 Heavies + 73 P.F.F = 580 a/c. Zero hour 0200. T.O.T. Z-3 to Z+44.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
Route markers T.I. Red will be dropped off track at 5250N 0840E by 156 Squadron.
Spoof markers T.I. Yellow will be dropped at 5342N 0835E on the homeward journey by Mosquitoes of 139 squadron.
[underlined] ROUTE. [/underlined] Base – 5430N 0515E – 5245N 0725E – 5245N 1000E – HAMBURG – 5400N 1000E – 5430N 0700E – 5430N 0500E – Base.
[underlined] INTRUDER ACTIVITY. [/underlined] 2 Mos: Leeuwarden. 2 Mos: Twente Entschede.[sic] 4 Mos: Vetchta. 3 Mos: Vetchta 3 Mos: Schleswig-Jagel. 3 Mos: Ardorf. 3 Mos: Westland/Sylt. [sic]
[underlined] 2050 hrs. [/underlined] Squalls & Thunderstorm warning.
[underlined] 2250 hrs. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[underlined] 1ST AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down. 15 Stirlings. 3 Group. 14 Wellingtons. 4 Group. Minelaying.
[page break]
73
[underlined] 2ND AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: HAMBURG. & HARBURG. Alternative KIEL.
[underlined] A/C Requirements. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking. Zero hour 0200 hrs.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 74 Mediums + 575 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups. + 100 P.F.F. on [deleted] DA [/deleted] HAMBURG and HARBURG.
[underlined] 1755 hrs. [/underlined] Area I confirmed.
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined] 26 Mosquitoes and 6 Beaufighters operating in the Bomber stream.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
10 Lancasters out of 21 attacked the primary. A bank of Cu.Nim. covered the coast at Pos: A up to 17,000’ – breaks occurred between this point and the last turning point before the target (5300N 1000E) where a large area of Cu. Nim. Cloud, base about 10,000’, tops above 25,000’ was encountered giving severe icing, electrical and thunder storms. 10 a/c managed to penetrate to the target area where some bombed on Special Equipment. One a/c bombed below cloud and reported some fires still burning. 9 a/c attacked last resorts or jettisoned and 2 a/c returned early.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] [list by Group, Squadrons, aircraft numbers, roles and missing]
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74
[underlined] TARGET: HAMBURG [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: - CROMER – 5422N 0400E – 5420N 0700E – 5345N 0832E – 5300N 1000E – HAMBURG – 5400N 1000E – 5430N 0700E – 5422N 0400E – CROMER.
[page break]
75
[underlined] 3RD AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Make and Mend.
[underlined] 4TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Targets: TURIN, GENOA & MILAN.
A/C Required: 8 Y + 9 B/Up.
Method: Newhaven Groundmarking. Zero hours. TURIN = 0120 hrs. GENOA & MILAN: 0145 hrs.
150 Heavies of 1 & 5 Groups (50 a/c each [symbol])
[underlined] 1755 hrs. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[underlined] 5TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: MILAN. 7 & 156 squadrons only required. [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
Route. Base – Reading – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – N. end of Lake Bourget – [symbol] – return same route.
[underlined] 1756 hrs. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
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76
[underlined] 6TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: MILAN. 83 squadron will provide a Raid Commentator. 156 squadron will provide a reserve Raid Commentator.
BULLSEYE. Z. F/S Slade.
Route: Wrexham – Sevenake (I.R.A) – 5020N 0050W – N. Foreland – Westminster Bridge (I.R.A) – Odstone Down – Otmoor – (T.I. Demonstration.)
[underlined] 1755 hrs. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[underlined] 7TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: TURIN, GENOA, MILAN.
A/C Required. TURIN/GENOA [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles] MILAN. [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
Route markers flares Green steady will be dropped at 4547N0550E out & back.
[underlined] MILAN. [/underlined]
Blind markers Mark A/P with T.I Red flares White. Backers-Up mark visually with T.I. Green or aim Green at T.I. Red or T.I Green already down.
[underlined] TURIN & GENOA. [/underlined] Method the same.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 50 a/c of 1 & 5 Groups on each [symbol]. Zero: TURIN: 0100 hrs. [missing words]
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77
[underlined] TARGETS: MILAN – GENOA – TURIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route. Base – Reading – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – N. end of Lake Bourget – [symbol] – return same route.
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78
[underlined] SUMMARIES. [/underlined]
Primary: GENOA.
Nil cloud – good visibility. All crews report a good concentration, docks and harbours clearly seen in the light of flares. Smoke screen was in operation, but blowing out to sea. Fires started and glow was seen quite a distance from the target.
[underlined] Primary: MILAN. [/underlined]
Nil cloud – good visibility. Attack was reported well concentrated with one load of Red T.Is about 5 mls. to the N.W. One large explosion believed Gas Works seen at 0124 hrs.
[underlined] Primary: TURIN. [/underlined]
Few patches of cloud, but great visibility. Attack was considered the worst concentration of the three. One large and about five small fires seen by a/c on homeward route from GENOA.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 2 a/c of 5 Group missing.
[underlined] 8TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down. 35 & 405 Squadrons on Italy. later cancelled.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0040 hrs. T.O.T. Z to Z+30.
[underlined] BRIEFING. [/underlined] 1815 hrs.
[underlined] 1600 HRS. [/underlined] Figures changed. F. R. M. Z. N to go as Main Force. 224 Lancs of 1 & 5 Groups + 57 P.F.F.
[underlined] Alteration to Method. [/underlined] Zero hour. 1045 hrs T.O.T. Z to Z+15.
[underlined] 1. [/underlined] Route marker flares Green steady will be dropped on Lake Annecy backed up by Backers-Up.
[underlined] 2. [/underlined] Route markers Yellow T.I will be dropped by ‘Y’ a/c of 156 squadron backed up by Backers-Up of 156 squadron at 4544N 0305E.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Yellow T.Is from blind markers all fell in town area. Red T.Is reported very accurate. The first 2 bundles of Reds fell about 1 ml. apart one either side of the river – the 3rd fell close to the Red on the A/P. All Red markers & subsequently Green markers reported excellent concentration. Main Force attack well concentrated, practically no run back except for a few incendiaries. Route marking also reported very good, both Lake Annecy and Lake Bourget marked on run to target.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 295 a/c detailed. 1 Group 108 Lancs. [missing words]
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79
[underlined] 9TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: MANNHEIM.
[underlined] A/C required. [/underlined] ] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] NEWHAVEN GROUNDMARKING.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 400 Heavies of 1, 4, 5, & 6 Groups + 53 P.F.F. Zero hour. 0130 hours.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Area I. Leverkusen. Area II. Ludwigshaven [sic]. Changed to MANNHEIM. Early arrivals found a thin layer of cloud at about 8,000ft. This began to break up and late arrivals reported as little as 3/10ths. Attack started reasonably concentrated with T.I. Reds covering an area approx: 2mls. across – later the raid tended to scatter with a [indecipherable word] of markers in the centre and the main attack again tending to undershoot. One large explosion at 0137 hrs lasting well over a minute. Defences slight to moderate H/F. Not more than 50 S/Ls. Crews report that on the way out to the target on the leg Bradwell Bay & Dungeness, they were illuminated and in the case covered for 5 mins: by our own S/Ls in spite of the fact that the appropriate letter of the period was repeatedly flashed. It is requested that strong protests be made.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] P.F.F. 2 missing. 5 Group: 2 missing. 1 Group: 2 missing. 6 Group: 1 missing.
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[underlined] TARGET: MANNHEIM. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route. Base – Bradwell Bay – Dungeness – Le Touquet – Mannheim – 4920 0820E – Le Touquet – Dungeness – Bradwell Bay – Base.
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81
[underlined] 10TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: NÜRBURG.
[underlined] A/C required. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 573 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5, & 6 Groups + 106 P.F.F. Zero hour. 0100 hrs.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] NEWHAVEN GROUNDMARKING.
[underlined] 1. [/underlined] Spoof-markers T.I. Red and T.I. Green will be dropped by 139 Squadron on MANNHEIM.
[underlined] 2. [/underlined] Blindmarkers mark the A/P with T.I. Red & flares White. Visual Markers identify and drop T.I. Yellow. Backers-Up use T.I. Green. Non-markers aim at centre of T.I. Green.
[underlined] 3. [/underlined] On route home B/Markers of 83 drop 1 x 250 lb. Incen: at 4919N 0826E backed up by Backers-Up of 156 squadron also with 1 x 250 lb I.B.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Red markers scattered over target on track principally in two batches. Greens attempted to concentrate, doing so principally on the Eastern loads of Reds, but still covered an area 5 x 3mls. Cloud prevented any accurate observation and little was observed except some glow of fires on cloud when crews were in the Karlsruhe area.
F/S STEPHENS. ‘Z’. On his first flight from this squadron had two combats, first with an Me 110. M/U/G & T/G both opened fire – captain reports accurate fire by Gunners. E/A (enemy aircraft) did not return fire. 2 minutes later an Me 109 [deleted] attacked [/deleted] approached. T/G got in a burst – E/A did not attack.
F/O SHANAHAN. ‘R’. Gee ‘Y’ and W/T all failed & on the return route the Navigator F/O Stafford used D/R (direct reckoning) to return to base.
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[underlined] TARGET: NÜRNBURG [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route – Beachy Head – Le Treport – 4935N 1040E – NÜRNBURG – 4917N 0826E – Le Treport – Beachy Head.
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83
[underlined] 11TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
[underlined] 12TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Targets: MILAN and TURIN. [underlined] 139 Squadron – 8 Mos: BERLIN [/underlined] 156 squadron required for MILAN only.
[underlined] A/C Required – MILAN. [/underlined] [underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 439 Heavies + 66 P.F.F.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] TURIN. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking. Zero hour. 0115 hrs.
W/C WHITE ‘S’ to act as Raid Commentator.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
One or two crews reported a small amount of thin patchy cloud. The majority report nil cloud & good vis: with slight ground haze. In the initial stages of the attack T.I Reds dropped by B/Markers were somewhat scattered, but the general opinion is that this was put right by the T.I. Y. & the excellent instructions of the Master of Ceremonies, which resulted in the T.I.G. falling in a good concentration. The main force achieved a fair concentration with perhaps a tendency to fall a bit short, but summarising up the results the blame can be placed on the R.A.F if the Italians in MILAN don’t pack in to-morrow & use the excellent fires started for their peace celebrations.
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[underlined] TARGET: MILAN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route. Base – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – N. end of Lake Bourget – MILAN – 4520N 0905E - S. end of Lake Bourget – Cabourg – Selsey Bill.
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85
[underlined] 13TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
156 squadron stood down: MAKE & MEND for Command.
[underlined] 14TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
156 squadron stood down. 7, 83 and 156 squadron attacked MILAN. 139 squadron attacked BERLIN.
[underlined] 15TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: MILAN.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking. Zero hour 0015 hrs.
[underlined] A/C REQUIRED. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 150 Heavies + 49 P.F.F. Note: No a/c to cross the French Coast before 2140 hrs.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Green T.Is well concentrated in area about 2mls. across at worst. Crews report T.I. Yellow very accurately dropped on actual A/P. Main attack reasonably concentrated with some incendiaries tending to fall short as usual. Large fires reported by later a/c.
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86
[underlined] TARGET: MILAN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
10 Lancasters – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – N. end Lake Bourget – 4540N 0912E – MILAN – 4520N 0905E – S. end of Lake Bourget – Carbourg – Selsey Bill.
3 Lancasters – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – N. end Lake Bourget – MILAN – 4520N 0905E – S. end of [missing words]
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87
[underlined] 16TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Stand down for 156 squadron.
[underlined] 17TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: PEENEMUNDE. [/underlined] R.D.F. Experimental Establishment.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Shifters [/underlined] are A/P movers.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] 0015 hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+40.
[underlined] Phase I. [/underlined] A/P. ‘F’
Blind markers mark A/P with T.I. Red & flares White. Make 2nd run to drop bombs. Visual markers mark exact A/P with T.I. Yellow. Backers-Up aim Green T.I. at T.I. Yellow or T.I. Red. Non-marker a/c go in with the Blind-markers using their anti-personnel bombs against defences – then make a second run & aim H.E. at the Centre of T.I. Green.
[underlined] Phase II. [/underlined] A/P ‘B’.
At Z+24 Shifters move the A/P.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 430 heavies + 94 P.F.F.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] T.I. Reds rather scattered up the length of the target, with a lot about 2mls. [missing word] the W. of A/P ‘B’ of the T.I. Yellows one load overshot slightly & fell in woods S. of A/P ‘F’ and load of T.I. Green also fell in woods to the S. of A/P ‘F’. One load of Green T.Is also fell [missing words] along lay-out. Main attack
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88
[underlined] TARGET: PEENEMUNDE. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route. – Cromer – 5520N 0829E – 5441N 1320E – RUDEN ISLAND – PEENEMUNDE – MANDO ISLAND – 5500N 0500E – CROMER.
First shifter reported attack at that time concentrated on A/Ps ‘B’ & ‘F’ and subsequently attacked
[page break]
89
[underlined] 17TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined] (Cont:)
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
41 a/c missing – A large number of combats were seen and the majority of losses may probably be attributed to this cause, as defences over the target were negligible.
[underlined] 18TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
P.I.U. report on PEENUMUNDE.
75% damage to works. A/P ‘F’ practically wiped out – living quarters. A/P ‘B’ Southern hanger hit. workshops hit. A/P ‘E’ Damaged. A/P ‘A’ Not hit.
[underlined] 19TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] TURIN. All Lancasters. ALESSANDRIA. U/T ‘Y’ a/c. BERLIN Mosquitoes.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground marking.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 511 heavies + 90 P.F.F on TURIN. 18 P.F.F on Alessandria.
[underlined] 1655 hrs: [/underlined] Ops cancelled.
[underlined] 20TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
Command Combined ‘BULLSEYE’ 3 a/c T.I. dropping. 2 a/c full sortie.
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90
[underlined] 21ST AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
[underlined] 22ND AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
underlined] Target: [/underlined] LEVERKUSEN.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 419 Heavies + 50 P.F.F.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hour [/underlined] 2300 hrs. T.O.T. Z-4 to Z+36.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
Owing to weather over the target being from 8/10ths to 10/10ths cloud with tops 16/17000ft (most crews reporting 10/10ths), no T.I. Red were seen on bombing. Crews were compelled to bomb on E.T.A. and Special Equipment. Fires, which seemed to be mainly incendiaries, were scattered over a very wide area. No T.I. Green were dropped by this squadron.
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Only 4 Mosquitoes worked, the remainder having technical troubles. Only 2 heavy crews (both non-markers) claim to have bombed on T.Is. All backers-up claim to have brought back their T.I but one a/c J/7 F/L Amekstein returned with only [indecipherable word] T.I. So the other fellow presumably went with the bombs. All crews except the two mentioned above dropped on E.T.A on fires
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91
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Southwold – Knocke [sic] – 5025N 0705E – 5042N 0730E – Leverkusen – 5103N 0620E – Nordwijk [sic] – 5235N 0330E – Hainsboro’ – Base.
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92
[underlined] 23RD AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required.[/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 516 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups led by 127 a/c P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2345 hrs. T.O.T. Z-3 to Z+40.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta.
1. Mosquitoes drop T.I. Red at 5250N 0652E & Green T.I at 5235N 0702E as route markers. Blind markers of 83 squadron drop Red spot fires at 5217N 1232E – backed up by 97 squadron.
2. Blind markers mark A/P with T.I. Red.
3. Backers-Up aim Greens at the centre of T.I. Reds overshooting by 2 seconds, or if no reds seen at the centre of T.I. Green.
4. Re-centres use special equipment.
5. Non-markers aim bombs at centre of T.I. Reds or T.I. Greens.
Master of Ceremonies will be in operation from Z-1 to Z+10. 1L/405.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
T.I. dropping on the whole was good with no cloud and only a slight haze over the target. The first Reds appeared to form two points of attack east & West. The first Greens dropped midway between, around which the attack developed. Later re-centrers are of the opinion that the attack drifted slightly South as [indecipherable word] by their Special Equipment. Later fires, however, covered the whole area and the attack is considered a success. The Hun appeared to defend the target by the employment of a large concentration of S/L’s to operating with night fighters as flak was only moderate.
[page break]
93
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base – Hainsboro’ – 5305N 0220E – EGMOND – 5250N 1347E – BERLIN – 5250N 1340E – 5420N 1225E – MANDO – 5420N 0300E – HULKHAM BAY – Base.
[page break]
94
[underlined] ‘F’ F/S STEVENS. [/underlined]
On approaching the target at 19,000ft our a/c was covered by a large number of S/Ls. Bombs were dropped in the centre of Red T.Is and almost at once our a/c was badly hit by flak. The inter-comm was rendered u/s and the S/B outer caught fire. The navigator and M/U/G were badly and the port wing severely damaged. The S/B outer was at once feathered. Almost immediately an enemy fighter attacked ‘F’ killing the Rear-Gunner Sgt. Atkee. Evasive action was taken & the fighter lost. As the navigator was u/s. and there was no inter-comm. The pilot steered more or less due North. About 5 minutes later the port outer engine caught fire and was feathered. Pilot carried on for about 1 1/2 hrs. losing height down to 7,000ft. The W/Op. hence succeeded in repairing the morse key and got a fix. The pilot turned on to 280 and the navigator who had been bandaged up by the W/Op. managed to plot the fix and give a course for home. During passage through the Baltic the crew had been warned to prepare for ditching. Order was cancelled when Captain discovered rear gunner trapped in his turret. The W/Op continued to get fixes until the English Coast was reached when the pilot made a safe landing at ATTLEBRIDGE aerodrome.
Captain. F.S Stevens. Bomb Aimer. [missing] Navigator. Sgt. Clegg. M/U/Gunner. [missing] W/Operator. Sgt. Stocks. Rear Gunner. Sgt. Atkee. F/Engineer. [missing]
F/S Stevens, Sgt Clegg and Sgt. Stocks have received an immediate award of the D.F.M.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 726 detailed – 58 missing.
[list by Group, aircraft type and numbers involved, roles and numbers missing]
[page break]
95
[underlined] 24TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All P.F.F. squadrons stood down except 139 Squadron. Command – Gardening. P.R.U. pilot who was over Berlin to broadcast in the 9 o’clock news.
[underlined] 25th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Make and Mend for all Squadrons.
[underlined] 26th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MANNHEIM. All squadrons except 105 & 109 required.
[underlined] A/C Requirements. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] 1128 hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 27th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined]NÜRNBERG.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] method. [/underlined] {deleted] Paramatta. [/deleted] Newhaven.
[words missing] bomb (500 or 1000 MC) on HEILBRONN
[page break]
96
[underlined] TARGET: NÜRNBERG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Beachy Head – 5005N 0125E – 4856N 1100E – NURNBERG – 4938N 1108E – 5005N 0126E – Beachy Head – Base.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
In the early stages of the attack the Red T.Is were rather scattered, but one or two reports give the impression that the majority fell slightly to the S & SE of the A/P. later Backers-Up and Recentrers appear to have somewhat corrected this, as later [words missing]
[page break]
97
there is every probability that a wide area of the town was covered. Fires are reported to be widely spread, but on built-up area. One Visual marker ‘Y’ F/L Cook did not drop his T.I yellow owing to interference by a cone of S/Ls which held & dazzled him on the bombing run. His second attempt was spoilt by smoke & fire.
Defences – Flak very mild – S/Ls active co-operating with fighters. Large amount of fighter activity.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[list by Group, aircraft type and numbers involved, roles and numbers missing]
Photographs show main Concentration – P.F.F. E & SE – Main Force very scattered SE & E.
[underlined] 28th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
[underlined] 29th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
[underlined] 30th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down. Other squadrons MUNCHEN GLADBACH. SPECIAL TARGET IN FRANCE. [words missing]
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98
[list by Group, aircraft type and numbers involved, roles and numbers missing]
[underlined] SPECIAL TARGET IN FRANCE. [/underlined]
[list by Group, aircraft type, numbers involved and numbers missing]
[underlined] 31ST AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Ordinary Paramatta.
Routemarkers T.I.G. at 5152N 1143E by blind markers of 83 squadron backed up by backers up of 156 squadron. Blind markers mark A/P with T.I. Red. Backers-Up aim T.I. Green at T.I. Red on centre of T.I. Green. Re-centres use special equipment to re-centre. Non-markers aim HE at centre of T.I. Red. Route markers T.I. Green at 5152N 1143E by blind markers of 83 squadron backed up by 156 squadron.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 534c heavies + 102 P.F.F. Zero hour. 2330 hrs.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles] [words missing]
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99
[underlined] BERLIN. 31ST AUGUST 1943 [/underlined] (Cont:)
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: HAPPISBURGH – 5322N 0323E – 5147N 1108E – 5217N 1405N [sic] – BERLIN – 5100N 0930E – 5030N 0720E – CAYCUX – BEACHY HEAD.
[page break]
100
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
7 – 10/10ths thin strato-cum: tops about 5,000ft. While some Red T.Is were dropped on time, owing to late arrivals, blind markers were active for about 20 minutes. Red T.Is scattered, but generally at the beginning in two sections about 4 mls. apart. As the raid progressed the markers became still more scattered. Some of the backers-up finding no T.Is to guide them.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
German broadcast. “Re-organised Berlin Ack-Ack defences inflicted extremely heavy losses on the attackers. British bomber formations were dispersed & mostly had to jettison their bombs. Effective defences prevented the Bomber a/c from making a concentrated attack”.
[list by Group, aircraft type and numbers involved, roles and numbers missing]
F/S FRY. ‘P’ Combat with unidentified T/E E/A. M/U/G opened fire. No results observed.
F/O WRIGHT ‘T’ M/U/G opened fire on unidentified T/E E/A at 400yds range & T/G opened fire immediately afterwards. No return fire experienced from E/A which dived steeply to starboard & disappeared. An explosion was seen on the deck behind 30/60 seconds afterwards.[deleted] During [/deleted] E/A claimed as probably destroyed.
[underlined] SPECIAL TARGET IN N.W. FRANCE. [/underlined]
41 a/c detailed – Nil missing.
[underlined] BRAUWEILER. [/underlined]
8 Group. 5 Mosquitoes [missing word] Missing.
[page break]
101
[underlined] 2ND SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] 5028N 0354E. Special target in France.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 30 Mediums + 11 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2200 hours.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
10 a/c attacked dropping 10 x T.I. Green. 60 x 1000 G.P. Weather was 9/10ths thin strato-cum tops 8,000ft. Good concentration of markers with one load of Green T.Is at the most 1/2 ml. off.
One large explosion at about 2203 hrs lit up cloud for about 3 seconds. No other large explosions seen.
One heavy flak gun about every 2 minutes.
[underlined] 3RD SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
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102
[underlined] Method [/underlined] Paramatta.
Routemarkers red spot fires at Pos: 5238N 0820E.
Preliminary warning markers. T.I. Yellow at Brandenburg.
Blind-markers drop T.I. red.
Backers-Up keep A/P marked with T.I. Green.
Non-markers aim bombs at the centre of T.I. Red.
Y Backers-Up act as normal backers-up unless cloud conditions make it necessary to revert to Wanganui.
Routemarkers T.I. Red L/B. at 5432N 1334E.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2315 hrs.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 244 heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 81 P.F.F.
‘U’ F/O Foderingham and 5 of crew crashed at Snetterton Heath.
[underlined] 1630 hrs. [/underlined] Briefing. SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, secretary of State for Air, attended briefing and gave a talk on the progress of the war.
[underlined] SUMMARY [/underlined]
Weather over the target was chiefly nil cloud, but with occasional whisps [sic] of very thin cloud at varying heights, with moderate to good visibility.
At the start of the attack, T.I. Reds covered an area of approx. 3 sq. m. but as later good concentration of Reds was achieved, which was backed up admirably by T.I. Greens to form a light cluster. Ground fires and many explosions were seen around the T.I. Concentration, with smoke rising up to approx: 19,000ft. The general impression is that the attack was a success & far exceeds the previous raids. Flak was only moderate, but the S/Ls were as active as usual, working in cones, track indicating & for illumination for fighters.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
‘R’. F/O SHANAHAN. Missing from 156. F/L Stafford. W/O Collins. Sgt. Hoyle. F/S Denyer. F/S Wilson. W/O Dodds, 3/L of 7 Squadron.
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[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Great Yarmouth – 5245N 0330E – EGMOND – 5240N 0900E – Brandenburg – Berlin – 5233N 13422E – 5555N 1325E – 5800N 1100E -5700N 0600E – Brancaster.
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104
[underlined] 4TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
156 Stood down.
[underlined] 5TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MANNHEIM. Area II. MUNICH. Area I.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] I & II. Newhaven.
Area II.
Routemarkers T.I. Reds L/B at 4933N 0608E.
Blind-markers mark A/P with T.I. Red after a timed check from KAISERSLAUTERN.
Visual markers mark A/P with T.I. Green & Yellow if seen. no overshoot. Later Backers-up aim T.I. Green at the centre of all T.I. Green overshooting by 2 seconds.
Re-centrers after Z+12 drop T.I. Green by means of special equipment.
Non-markers may identify visually or aim at centre of T.I. Reds.
Routemarkers T.I. Red Spot at 4928N 0608E.
[underlined] A/C Required [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
491 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 107 P.F.F. T.O.T. Z-4 to Z+36.
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base – Reading – Beachy Head – 4952N 0040E – 4937N 0300E – Kaiserslautern – Mannheim – 4919E [sic] 0830E – 4937N 0300E – 4952N 0040E – Beachy Head – Reading Base. Backers-Up & Re-centrers from 4937N 0300E – Mannheim.
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105
[underlined] TARGET: MANNHEIM. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Beachy Head – 4952N 0040E – 4937N 0300E – (KAISERSLAUTERN V/M. B/M & N/M) – MANNEHEIM – 4919N 0830E – 4937 0300E – 4952N 0040E – Beachy Head – Base.
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106
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
The blind-markers achieved a good concentration and were mainly on time although some were still visible at 2313 hrs. The yellows were in the centre of a very good concentration of greens. Later a/c report a large number of good fires and it is estimated that this is the best attack made on this target. A number of explosions were reported principally from 2259/2303hrs. One N/F claimed destroyed.
“X” F/S HEWITT.
KAISERSLAUTERN. 2312 hrs. 19000ft. S/E a/c was sighted by T/G doing a diving attack from Port quarters up, & opened fire at range of 150 yds firing orange tracer which passed underneath the Lancaster: T/G & M/U/G fired 4 & 2 second bursts respectively. Strikes observed on E/A’s port wing & fuselage & E/A was seen in flames in a shallow dive which became steeper & subsequently E/A burst into flames on the ground. E/A DESTROYED.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
3 a/c missing from P.F.F.
E/156. F/O PRICHARD. 2 of 7 squadron.
P.F.F.
This was undoubtedly one of the best “Y” attack the P.F.F. have ever achieved. The timing throughout was good. The ‘Y’ a/c were reasonably concentrated – probably due largely to the fact that only 10 dropped T.I’s and all those a/c who were doubtful about their ‘Y’ bombing brought their T.I back. The town was thus successfully illuminated for the Visual markers who all appear to have identified the A/P and bombed it accurately. The backing up and recentring was well maintained and accurate throughout the raid.
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107
[underlined] 6TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET: [/underlined] MUNICH.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined]
362 Heavies + 74 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
[underlined] ZERO HOUR. [/underlined] 2330 hrs.
[underlined] BRIEFING: [/underlined] 1530 hrs.
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined] 6 Beaus operating in the Bomber stream. 2 Mosquitoes over the main target.
[underlined] 2155 hrs. [/underlined] Warning from Group. German Intruder a/c are definitely expected to be very active tonight at time of return, especially between 0300 – dawn. All stations are warned to have defences ready to meet these intruders who are expected to be over here in force. It is stressed that this is no ordinary warning.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
7/10 – 9/10ths thin stratus 8/10000ft moderate to good visibility. Cloud interfered with technique. Reds seemed quite concentrated. Greens in early stages were well concentrated were considered by later crews to be more scattered although cloud prevented adequate observation. The glow of fires were seen from 160/200 mls. away. One large explosion at 2335 hrs. ONE N/FIGHTER CLAIMED AS DESTROYED.
[underlined] H/156. S/L COATES. [/underlined]
Detailed as a BACKER-UP. At the beginning of the bombing run tracer was observed coming from port quarters down passing under the wing of the Lancaster. Captain was weaving slightly to S/B & increased his turn to a steep diving turn to S/B . 2 bursts of approx. 3-8 seconds duration were fired by E/A, hits being scored
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108
[underlined] TARGET: MUNICH. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Beachy Head – 5000N 0115E – Freiburg – 4740N 1006E – MUNICH – 4758N 1145E – 4806N 0735E – 4806N 0235E – Cabourg – Belsey Bill – Reading - Base
on port inner engine, S/B tail plane, & port side of fuselage & bomb bays. Gunners were blinded by the brightness of E/A’s tracer & no member of the crew sighted the E/A. T/G opened fire simultaneously with the E/A’s second burst giving a 2-second burst towards the judged apparent notion of where the E/A would be. E/A was not observed to break away. Both [missing words]
[page break]
109
[underlined] Z/156. F/L MANIFOLD [/underlined]
Detailed as Backer-Up. 18mls. S.W. of the target when doing gentle weaving action S/E (Single-Engined) E/A (Enemy Aircraft) sighted by T/G on the S/B quarter 20 down, making a quarter attack, range 800yds. T/G gave directions to Captain “Down port, up S/B” T/G opened fire at 400yds range with 2-3 second burst, all guns being in operation. Flash was observed on E/A who immediately broke his attack, climbing to port quarter and smoke & sparks were seen trailing backwards. This was confirmed by the M/U/G & the W/Op. who was standing in the astrodome. When positioned on the port beam above, flames enveloped the E/A which dived vertically down through the clouds & an explosion was seen through cloud by members of the crew as fighter hit ground. THIS A/C DEFINITELY CLAIMED AS DESTROYED.
T./G. F/O CURRIE. M/U/G Sgt. ROSIE.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
404 a/c despatched.
[list by Group, aircraft numbers & types involved and aircraft missing]
[underlined] 7TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
35 squadron. PONGO.
[page break]
110
[underlined] 8TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] 156 squadron. 4 B/M. 8 B/U. 5 N/M.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 335 Heavies + 82 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta..
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0010hrs.
[underlined] 1745hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED
[underlined] 1745hrs. ITALIANS SIGN ARMISTICE – UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER. [/underlined]
[underlined] 9TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN. Alternative FRANKFURT
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 356 Heavies + 97 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] BERLIN. Paramatta. FRANKFURT. Newhaven.
[underlined] Zero hour.. [/underlined] Berlin. 0115hrs. Frankfurt 0200hrs.
[underlined] 1645hrs. [/underlined] Berlin Confirmed.
[underlined] 1800hrs. [/underlined] Zero hour changed to 0130hrs.
[underlined] 2107hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[page break]
111
[underlined] 10TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 11TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
No operations.
[underlined] 12TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
No operations.
[underlined] 13TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
156 stood down. 5 Mosquitoes 139 Squadron on DUISBERG. 5 Mosquitoes 139 Squadron on COLOGNE.
[underlined] 14TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
8 Mosquitoes 139 squadron on BERLIN. 1 Mosquito missing
T.I. Demonstration at RUSHFORD. F/S PALMER 156. observing a/c.
[underlined] 15TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target:- [/underlined] MONTLUÇON
156 & 83 Squadrons stood down except for F/S Fry from N.T.U. (Navigation Training Unit)
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 314 Heavies + 64 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2330hrs.
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112
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
[underlined] Target: MONTLUÇON. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
Attack a great success. P.I.U. photographs show a large amount of damage to the DUNLOP RUBBER TYRE FACTORY.
[list by Group, aircraft numbers & types involved]
5 U.S.A. Fortresses took part under the control of 3 Group. 3 a/c missing.
[underlined] DORTMUND-EMS CANAL. [/underlined] [underlined] words missing? [/underlined]
8 Lancasters of 5 Group carried out an attack on the embanked stretch of the canal, 4mls. E. of GREVEN using 12,000lb. Thick ground haze made identification extremely difficult. Of the 3 a/c which returned only 2 succeeded in identifying the target. 6 Mosquitoes of Fighter Command escorted the Lancasters (617 Squadron.)
7 Mosquitoes of 139 Squadron on BERLIN.
[underlined] 16TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MODANE. (French Alps.)
[underlined] A/C Required [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
113
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 304 Heavies + 66 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Visual Groundmarking.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0001hrs.
[underlined] TARGET: MODANE. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Selsey Bill – Carbourg – 4735N 0045E – 4512N 0535E – MODANE – 4735N 0120E – Carbourg – Selsey Bill.
[page break]
114
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Weather over the target varied from nil to 3/10ths patchy cloud at about 10,000ft with good vis: in the early stages of the attack, but smoke, presumably from T.Is interfered in the later stages. Our 3 visual markers identified the A/P visually by the river and marshalling yards clearly in the moonlight. T.I. Reds were extremely well concentrated with the exception of one which was dropped approx.: 2m. S.W. on a hillside. The main concentration of T.I. Reds was backed up by the Backers-Up dropping T.I. Green. Some fires were seen burning around the A/P & many bomb explosions were seen around the marshalling yard & river. A large proportion of the main force appeared to drop their bombs wide on the hillside. The general opinion is, however, that the attack was a success.
A. F/S FRY.
T/E (Twin Engined) Single tail aircraft reported by T/G flying parallel on port quarter 15 up range 700yds. As aircraft was not definitely identified our Lanc:: turned S/B. Then a/c turned in making a beam attack & T/G gave instructions to turn port. M/U opened fire. No strikes observed.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
From photographs plotted a cluster of P.F.F. are on the A/P and one or two main force. The rest are scattered to the E & NE, towards the town.
[underlined] 17TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
156 squadron stood down.
N.T.U. on “BULLSEYE” 7 a/c.
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115
[underlined] 18TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
STAND DOWN.
[underlined] 19TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 20TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
STAND DOWN.
[underlined] 21ST SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
ALL HEAVY SQUADRONS STOOD DOWN.
Bullseye & T.I. Demonstration.
[list aircraft letters and ranks and names of pilots]
[underlined] 22ND SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Targets: [/underlined] AREA I. HANNOVER. – SPOOF: OLDENBURG. AREA II BOCHUM.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] HANNOVER.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] BOCHUM. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles] [information missing]
[page break]
116
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
615 Heavies + 29 Mediums + 82 P.F.F on HANNOVER. 31 P.F.F. on OLDENBURG.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
[deleted] Route marke [/deleted]
[underlined] 1630hrs.. [/underlined] Area I Confirmed.
[underlined] Intruder Activity. [/underlined]
[list of aircraft numbers, aircraft type and targets]
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2130hrs
[underlined] T.O.T.. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+25.
[underlined] SUMMARY. HANNOVER. [/underlined]
Judged by the position of the Yellow T.Is blind markers tended to overshoot. Green T.Is generally well concentrated. Fires in an area about 3mls x 1 mile. on track across target – could be seen from Enemy Coast on return. Red T.Is dropped over STEINHUDER LAKE 2117h
[underlined] OLDENBURG. [/underlined]
Nil cloud – good visibility.
Reds well concentrated, greens scattered. Some fires reported in target area.
[underlined] ‘Y’ S/L COOK. [/underlined]
After second run over target and bombs had been dropped a load of incendiaries fell on the Lancaster dropped by a Halifax. Port outer engine set on fire & hydraulic gear for both turrets severed – gear u/s – ‘Y’ smashed. Incendiaries burning in the a/c which W/Op threw out of the flare Shute. Shortly after leaving the target attacked by [words missing] u/s & the inter-comm. Evasive action taken.
[page break]
117
[underlined] TARGET: HANNOVER. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] ROUTE. [/underlined] 12 Lancasters: Cromer – 5350N 0400E – (5240N 0920E B/Ms, U/Ms, N/Ms) – HANNOVER – 5210N 0945E – 5350N 0400E – Cromer.
4 Lancasters: Cromer – 5350N 0400E – 5309N 0645E – OLDENBURG – 5420N 0620E 5420N 0 [indecipherable digit] 00E – Wells.
[page break]
118
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] HANNOVER - OLDENBURG. [/underlined] The spoof raid was successful – bombing not very concentrated. A few Mosquitoes strayed out towards Bremen defences, but the correct town was hit & the raid undoubtedly attracted some fighters & this assisted the main operation. Preliminary reports of the main attack were most encouraging, but this optimism was not justified by the photo plot or daylight recco. Three crews who aimed visually were very near the A/P but the majority of blind markers overshot the aiming point by 3-4mls. & unfortunately it was their markers which the backers-up maintained. For once the main force did not undershoot the markers to any great extent, with the result that most of the bombing took place to the SE of the town & a PRU a/c reported that no fires were burning in Hannover town centre. Photographs however prove that there were some fires burning [deleted] round [/deleted] around the A/P & it is probable that considerable damage was done. Although probably only a small proportion of the total bomb load fell on the town, it seems unlikely that there was any large scale devastation as was first expected.
P.F.F. 1 missing.
[underlined] 23RD SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGETS. [/underlined] MANNHEIM & DARMSTADT.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] HANNOVER.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 541 heavies & mediums of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 78 PFF on Mannheim. 29 a/c of PFF on Darmstadt.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2130hrs.
[page break]
119
[underlined] TARGETS: MANNHEIM & DARMSTADT. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE:- BASE – CLACTON – 5058N 0254E – 4955N 0750E – Target – (4920N 0843E DARMSTADT) – 49 [indecipherable digits] 0820E – 4800N 0400E – 4830 0030W – 4920N 0040W – SELSEY BILL – READING – BASE.
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120
[underlined] SUMMARY. MANNHEIM. [/underlined]
Nil cloud, good visibility. Blind markers well concentrated and accurate. Visual markers claimed to have identified A.P. without any doubt. Green markers well concentrated apart from occasional strays. Main force effort caused good fires with incendiaries undershooting considerably. Large explosion seen at 2156hrs in North end of target. 1 a/c attacked last resort DARMSTADT as nothing seen at MANNHEIM on arrival.
[underlined] DARMSTADT. [/underlined]
Red marker concentration reasonably good although some fell well away. Green T.Is generally good. Ground fires seen starting as a/c left. One large explosion seen at 2135hrs – believed gas holder, also seen by Mannheim crews.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
2 a/c of P.F.F. missing, both of 97 Squadron. Photographic plot shows a very bad scatter to the N.W. back along track, and although a high proportion of photographs are unplottable because of fire-tracks, it seems that the main force bombing spread back badly. A P.R.U. sortie the following afternoon reported fires still burning in the town.
[list by Groups, of aircraft missing]
[underlined] 24TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
156 squadron stood down. Mine-laying by 1, 3 and 6 Groups. 8 Group. 4 Mosquitoes on DUISBERG.
[underlined] 25TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] KIEL.
[underlined] A/C required: [/underlined] 8 B/M. 6 Supporters.
Zero hour [missing words] later changed to 0230hrs.
[page break]
121
[underlined] 26TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Area I. HANNOVER. AREA II. BOCHUM.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
Area I. 5 B/M. 2 V/M. 4 B/U. 7 Supporters. [underlined] Spoof [/underlined] 1 B/M. 2 Supporters. Area II. 2 B/U. 90 Supporters.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
Area I. 578 Heavies + 23 Mediums + 89 P.F.F. Area II. 354 Heavies + 42 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0030hrs.
[underlined]1730hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 27TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Area I. HANNOVER. AREA II. KIEL.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] HANNOVER.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
590 Heavies + 24 Mediums + 89 P.F.F. 28 on BRUNSWICK.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2330hrs.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] HANNOVER.
Nil cloud – good vis: T.I. Yellows fairly concentrated, estimated about 3 loads of Red T.Is dropped and Greens backed up well. Incendiaries were reported as falling short about 30% of the effort being short of [missing words]
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122
[underlined] TARGETS: HANNOVER & BRUNSWICK. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE. Base – Southwold – 5237N 0330E – Egmond – 5235N 0800E – 5234N 0900E – [symbol] – 5210N 0945E – 5238N 0800E – Egmond – Southwold – Base.
Brunswick [missing words]
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123
and could be seen from the Dutch Coast on the homeward run
[underlined] Brunswick. [/underlined]
Reds seemed rather scattered. Green T.Is away from the Reds. Some fires seen as a/c left. Many night fighters flames were seen over CELLE and the target & the attack is therefore considered to have been successful as a “Spoof”.
[underlined] German Intruders. [/underlined] Operated over this country. Bombs dropped on warboys aerodrome.
[underlined] RESULTS: [/underlined]
38 a/c missing [list by Group of aircraft missing]
From preliminary reports attack appeared to fall to the NE. N & NW.
[underlined] 28TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
[underlined] 29TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET: [/underlined] BOCHUM.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Musical Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] 2045HRS.
[underlined] A/C required: [/underlined] [list by squadron of aircraft numbers & roles] [words missing]
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124
[underlined] TARGET: BOCHUM.[/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 372 Heavies + 24 Mediums + 45 P.F.F.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
1 a/c ‘2’ Sgt Maclean landed at Newmarket short of petrol. ‘C’ F/S Ray [deleted] landed [/deleted] attempted to land at Downham Market but overshot and crashed at Wimbotsham.
Weather over the target was clear & enabled Paramatta to be used. 1st T.I. Red dropped on time. All crews bombed on ground markers except one who bombed skymarker at 2054hrs. The T.I. concentration was good, with the exception of 2 x T.I. Green which were reported dropped at 2053 4/5mls. NE. Many fires were started but had a scatter of several miles and undershooting.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
High standard of accuracy was achieved by markers. From photographic cover since received it is seen that a large amount of damage was done and the raid proved to be very successful.
[page break]
125
[underlined] 30TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET.[/underlined] STETTIN.
156 squadron required.
[underlined] 1255HRS. [/underlined] OPERATIONS cancelled.
[underlined] 1ST OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] STUTTGART.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 6 B/M. 2 V/M. 1 B/U. 3 Supporters. Spoof. 2 B/M. 2 Supporters.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 523 Heavies + 81 P.F.F. 32 P.F.F. on Spoof.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2235hrs. T.O.T. Z-4 to Z+25.
[underlined] 1340hrs. [/underlined] Area I. Scrubbed. Area II. Hagen. [underlined] Zero hour [/underlined] 2100hrs. [underlined] A/C required: [/underlined] 4 Supporters. [underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 209 Heavies + 37 P.F.F. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-3 to Z+12.
[underlined] 1450hrs. [/underlined] Area I still on.
[underlined] 1615hrs. [/underlined] Area I scrubbed.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
9 – 10/10ths cloud tops 5/6,000ft. Despite cloud conditions T.Is clearly discernible on ground. Three out of four crews report first Red T.Is dropped on time, followed 1/2 a minute later by first greens. Early T.I.G well placed with slight tendency to overshoot. Fires starting & 2 crews report a large explosion at 2103hrs.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
There was a gap in the mosquito marking early in the attack, but this was covered by the Backers-Up who kept the A/P marked throughout the attack. Accuracy of mosquitoes & B/Up alike was of a high standard.
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126
[underlined] TARGET: HAGEN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – 5310N 0150E – Egmond – 5145N 0800E – HAGEN – 5030N 0730E – 5020N 0132E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
[underlined] 2ND OCTOBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MUNICH.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 203 Heavies of 1 & 5 Groups + 86 P.F.F
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2230 hours. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+14.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
Weather nil cloud – good vis: B/markers more concentrated than previously. Visual markers seemed rather scattered. Green T.Is were well concentrated in centre of yellows. Good fires were reported well concentrated in target area with incendiaries undershooting as usual. Large explosions at 2231 & 2239hrs. Main force a/c arrived in [symbol] area as much as 20 mins early doubling the time of the attack & allowing night fighters to get organised.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[list by Groups, of aircraft missing]
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127
[underlined] TARGET: MUNICH. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Harwich – 5125N 0230E – 4950N 0310E – 4826N 0745E – 4128N 1052E – 4800N 1120E – MUNICH – 4810N 1151E – 4945N 1280E – 4808N 0733E – Cayeux – Beachy Head – Base.
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128
[underlined] 3RD OCTOBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] KASSEL.
139 Squadron. HANNOVER.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 467 Heavies + 87 P.F.F. Spoof. HANNOVER. 10 Mosquitoes.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2115hrs. [underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] Z-25.h.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+23.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
Nil cloud. Ground visibility. Although flares illuminated town, many of the Yellow T.Is seemed to fall to the E. No red T.Is were seen dropped. Green T.Is seemed reasonably well concentrated. Ground fires were started with much of the effort falling short as usual and as a consequence it is anticipated that the Henschel works will have been well attacked. One very large explosion seen by some crews when about 100mls. from the target at about 2200hrs. The spoof attack on Hannover very successful as lanes of N/F flares laid across town & S/Ls in Ruhr area seemed to [indecipherable word] a/c in Hannover direction.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Timing of all marker crews were good the attack opening shortly before the scheduled time & the A/P marking was maintained. General tendency of B/Markers was to undershoot & the spread of PFF was roughly from the A/P to 2 1/2m ESE. Main force do not appear to have followed P.F.F. & although great destruction was caused in the town there was a bad scatter N. P.I.U. showed fires burning the next day.
[list by Groups, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
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129
[underlined] TARGET: KASSEL [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE:- Base – Cromer – 5320N 0400E – N. tip of TEXEL – 5228N 0910E – 5147N 0340E – KASSEL – 5112N 0938E – 5030N 0720E – 5018N 0132E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
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130
[underlined] 4TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target:[/underlined] FRANKFURT A/MAIN. [underlined] SPOOF [/underlined] LUDWIGSHAVEN: Area II. STUTTGART.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C required: [/underlined] Area I.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 361 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5, & 6 Groups + 67 P.F.F. Spoof: 50 Heavies of 1 Group + 12 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2130hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+18. Spoof. Z-9 to Z-7.
[underlined] Summary. FRANKFURT. [/underlined]
Nil cloud, good visibility. T.I. Yellow seemed reasonably well concentrated. 3 red T.I’s fell in target area well concentrated – covered area about 1ml. square. 1 Red T.I. dropped about 3-4 mls. South – Did not attract attack – did not seem to be decoy. Green T.I’s backed up well. Many fires burning some good. Generally not very concentrated. Incendiaries a little more concentrated than usual. One large red explosion at 2137hrs.
[underlined] LUDWIGSHAVEN. [/underlined]
Nil cloud – slight haze. Reds occupied triangular area about 2ml. sides: greens about same area – fires starting up – results seem good for general number detailed.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] The results of the Spoof [symbol] were very bad due mainly to bad manipulation. There is however evidence of some marking on the A/P, although most of the attack probably missed the mark. A considerable amount of bombing
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131
[underlined] TARGET: FRANKFURT & LUDWIGSHAVEN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Reading – Beachy Head – 5020N 0135E – 4934N 0752E – Frankfurt – 5016N 0845E -5020N 0135E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
Spoof: As above – 4934N 0752E – LUDWIGSHAVEN – 5010N 0900E – 5 [indecipherable digits] N 0845E – [indecipherable word]
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132
[underlined] 5TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] GELSENKIRCHEN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Parraamatta. [sic]
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] 156 squadron Supporters only. Stand down requested.
[underlined] 6TH OCTOBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRANKFURT-AM-MAIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 156 squadron. 6 B/M. 2 V/M. 9 B/Up. 4 Supporters.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2130hrs.
[underlined] 1650hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 7TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] STUTTGART.
[underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] FRIEDRICHSHAVEN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0005hrs.
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133
Mosquitoes will also carry out attacks on MUNICH & AACHEN.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
262 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 and 6 Groups + 66 P.F.F. 16 P.F.F. on Friedrichshaven.
[underlined] Route. STUTTGART. [/underlined]
Base – Reading – Beachy Head – 5004N 0122E – 4822N 0542E – 4800N 0750E – STUTTGART – 4852N 0920E – 4840N 0500E – 5004N 0122E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
[underlined] FRIERICHSHAVEN. [/underlined]
Base – Reading – Beachy Head – 5004N 0122E – 4822N 0542E – 4800N 0750E – 4800N 0900E – [symbol] – 4851N 0828E – 4840N 0500E – 5004N 0122E – B. Head – Reading – Base.
[underlined] SUMMARY. STUTTGART [/underlined]
10/10ths cloud. T.I’s visible through cloud. The first Yellows fell on time followed by a further batch some 6-10mls. to the N.E. These followed the marker for 2 separate attacks, both concentrations being backed up by T.I.G. There are no reports of T.Is being dropped outside either of these concentrations. Some a/c dropped sky-markers in preference to T.I’s but generally these were so scattered that they could not be aimed at. Two crews report seeing Red T.Is but in view of cloud conditions it was impossible to identify them with certainty. Glow of good fires was seen above both concentrations & from one particularly large fire in the Northern area smoke was rising above cloud level.
[underlined] FRIERICHSHAVEN. [/underlined] 10/10ths cloud. 1st red T.I’s dropped on time & were seen as a glow above cloud. Only one captain (Q.) was able to make any definite report as to concentration, which he described as good by both Greens & Reds. Two crews report greenish-blue explosion at 0001hrs.
[underlined] RESULTS. PFF [/underlined] The weather was not very suitable for ground-marking and this resulted resulted [sic] in a certain amount of confusion amongst the B/Markers, some of whom dropped their T.I.Y. while others correctly resorted to emergency Wanganui & dropped release point lanes. The result seems to have been 2 separate concentrations about 5-6ms apart on track. No PRU results are so far to hand.
[list by Groups, of aircraft missing]
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134
[underlined] TARGETS: STUTTGART + FRIEDRICHSAVEN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.] [missing information]
[page break]
135
[underlined] 8TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] HANNOVER. 139. BERLIN & MANNEHEIM & AACHEN. 105 & 109. KÖLN.
[underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] BREMEN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
391 Heavies + 25 mediums of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 79 PFF. on HANNOVER. 100 Stirlings + 25 PFF on Bremen. 8 Mosquitoes of 139 on Berlin.
[underlined] Zero hours. [/underlined] HANNOVER. 0130hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+ 20. BREMEN. 0115hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+ BERLIN. 0120hrs.
[underlined] Summary: [/underlined] HANNOVER.
Nil cloud – good vis: Markers of all types were put down well and are reported by all crews as being accurate. Early arrivals reported a few reds backed up by one load of Greens about 3m. N. of [symbol], but these were fortunately ignored. At 0140hrs a few reds were also reported well to the W. of the concentrations but by this time fires were burning very well over the entire area of the centre of the town. One large explosion reported at 0142hrs.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined] HANNOVER. [underlined] BREMEN. [/underlined]
[list by Groups, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
[page break]
136
[underlined] TARGETS: HANNOVER & BREMEN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Routes: Base – 5320N 0350E – N. tip of Texel – 5225N 0800 – 5240N 0948E – HANNOVER – 5156N 0918E – [missing information]
[page break]
137
[underlined] 9TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
No operations for heavies. 6 Mosquitoes on BERLIN. [deleted] 4 Mosquitoes on COLOGNE. 4 Mosquitoes on DUISBERG. [/deleted]
[underlined] 10TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 11TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 12TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 13TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
8 Group: 4 Mosquitoes COLOGNE. 4 Mosquitoes DUISBERG. MAKE AND MEND ALL OTHER SQUADRONS.
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138
[underlined] 14TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 15TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 16TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
8 Group. 9 Mosquitoes on DORTMUND. 91 Group. 4 Whitleys – Leaflets. 92 Group. 4 Wellingtons – Leaflets. MAKE AND MEND ALL OTHER SQUADRONS.
[underlined] 17TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
8 Group. 6 Mosquitoes on BERLIN. 3 Mosquitoes on AACHEN. 1 Group. 12 Wellingtons mine-laying. 3 Group. 32 Stirlings mine-laying. 6 Group. 5 Wellingtons mine-laying. 91 Group. 2 Whitleys – Leaflets. 93 Group. 7 Wellingtons – Leaflets. 1 Whitley – Leaflets.
[page break]
139
[underlined] 18TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Area I HANNOVER. Area II. GELSENKIRCHEN. 139. BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: Area I. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
293 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 64 P.F.F. 8 Mosquitoes of 139 squadron on BERLIN.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2015hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+14.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
9/10ths cloud, tops 15/17000ft. 4 crews reported Red T.I’s dropped at 2011hrs & 2016hrs, but the majority of crews bombed either the glow of Green T.I’s on the glow on cloud in the area where T.I Yellow & Green had been seen cascading. One visual marker (‘X’ S/L Manifold) came below cloud and bombed the centre of two cluster of greens approx: 2mls apart. Only one crew reported seeing a sky-marker at 2014hrs. Incendiaries scattered over a wide area. One very large explosion at approx.: 2015hrs.
[underlined] results. [/underlined]
[list by Groups, of aircraft numbers involved and missing]
[page break]
140
[underlined] TARGET: HANNOVER. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route: [/underlined] Base – Cromer – 5320N 0350E – N. end of Texel – 5240N 0948E – HANNOVER – 5155N 0920E – 5233N 0436E – 5245N 0330E – Southwold – Base.
[underlined] V/M. [/underlined] After N. end of Texel – 5225N 0820E – 5255N 0835E – 5246N 0849E – 5240N 0948E for route-marking to aid Mosquitoes on Berlin.
[underlined] 19TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] AUGSBURG. [underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] MUNICH
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 3 B/M. 2 V/M. 6 B/Up. 8 Supporters. MUNICH 2 B/M.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 497 Heavies + 83 P.F.F. on Augsburg. 15 Heavies of 1 group + 26 PFF on Munich.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2200hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+18. MUNICH. Z-13. [missing information]
[page break]
141
[underlined] 20TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Area I. LEIPZIG. Area II STETTIN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
83 squadron to operate from Warboys.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 281 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 72 P.F.F. on LEIPZIG. 10 Mosquitoes of 139 squadron on BERLIN.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2100hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+11.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 8/10 – 10/10ths cloud. Yellow & Green T.I’s were seen by most crews generally very scattered. The attack seems to have concentrated over an area of at least 100 square miles. Some fires were seen – unable to say in what part of HUNLAND!
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] The attack was completely spoiled by bad weather especially that encountered en-route. Many a/c were iced up & lost their A.S.I.s & other instruments. Also owing to external ice the special equipment went u/s on several a/c & only 3 a/c (R. P/O Slaper & X. S/L Manifold/156) dropped emergency Wanganui flares. A few a/c dropped Yellow T.I & these were widely scattered. Like P.F.F the main force found the weather too much for them with the result that no concentration at all was achieved. The Germans have admitted some damage in Leipzig but there is no reason to suppose that this was anything but the incidental damage which is inevitable in a big raid.
[underlined] Losses. [/underlined] [deleted] KASSEL. [/deleted]
[list by Group, of aircraft losses]
[page break
142
[underlined] TARGET: LEIPZIG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Cromer – 5320N 0350E – N. end of TEXEL – 5253N 0740E – 5236N 1152E – 5202N 1242E – LEIPZIG – 5106N 1211E – 5253N 0740E – N. end of TEXEL – 5320N 0350E – Cromer – Base.
[underlined] 21ST OCTOBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND for all Heavy Squadrons.
8 Group. 1 Mosquito DORTMUND. 3 Mosquitoes BUDERICH (NW. Dusseldorf.) 1 Mosquito AACHEN. 3 Mosquitoes EMDEN
[page break]
143
[underlined] 22ND OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] KASSEL..
[underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] FRANKFURT AM MAIN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 474 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 79 P.F.F. on KASSEL. 36 P.F.F. on FRANKFURT.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2055hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+16. Z-25 to Z-16 on FRANKFURT.
[underlined] Summary. KASSEL. [/underlined]
Nil cloud. Good vis: apart from one load of Yellow T.I’s which fell at 2044hrs 5 mins early – the Yellows were accurate and well placed. At least 3 loads of T.I. Red were dropped accurately placed & well concentrated. Green T.I’s backing up very well. Crews on Frankfurt attack on passing Kassel reported very good fires burning. Large explosion seen about 2100hrs. Crews consider a good raid.
[underlined] FRANKFURT. [/underlined] Nil cloud. First Red T.I. fell about 2 mins: early. Red T.I’s intended to scatter over town area. Green T.I’s generally West not good concentration.
[underlined] Results. P.F.F. [/underlined] Technically this was probably the best attack P.F.F. has ever carried out, certainly the best Newhaven against a defended German target. The illuminating and blind-marking was excellently done with a slight tendency to overshoot. All nine visual markers identified the A/P – of the 8 who dropped T.I’s 6 [indecipherable word] so far plotted all within 1ml. of the A/P. The B/Up were nearly as accurate, & there was a good crop of supporter photographs on and around the A/P.
[list by Groups, aircraft types, numbers involved, roles and aircraft missing] [missing information]
[page break]
144
[underlined] TARGET: KASSEL & FRANKFURT. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
145
[underlined] 23RD OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
All heavy squadrons MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 24TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
All heavy squadrons stood down.
2 a/c required for BULLSEYE. ‘P’ F/L Stannard. ‘F’ Sgt. Turner.
[underlined] 1620hrs. [/underlined] Bullseye cancelled.
[underlined] 25TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND for all heavies.
[underlined] 26TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND for all heavy squadrons.
FIDO Demonstration at Graveley.
[underlined] 27TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
35 Squadron on LEVERKUSEN – Scrubbed later.
All other heavies stood down.
[page break]
146
[underlined] 28TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavy squadrons.
[underlined] 29TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavy squadrons.
[underlined] 30TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target.: [/underlined] LUDWIGSHAVEN. 35 on Leverkusen.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 8 B/M – 2 V/M. 6 B/U. 4 Supporters.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2015hrs.
[underlined] 1613hrs. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[underlined] 31ST OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
All heavies stood down.
[underlined] 1ST NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavy squadrons.
[underlined] 2ND NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all squadrons.
[page break]
147
[underlined] 3RD NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] DUSSELDORF.
[underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] COLOGNE.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
DUSSELDORF. [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
COLOGNE. [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Musical Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] Paramatta.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 1945hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-3 to Z+20. [underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] Z-10 to Z-1.
Serrate will be on – Mosquitoes and Beaufighters.
[underlined] SUMMARY. DUSSELDORF. [/underlined]
Nil cloud – good vis: apart from slight haze. The first reds T.I’s & sky markers fell about one minute late. After the first red T.I. had fallen at 1944hrs there was a lapse of about 10 minutes before further reds were dropped. Subsequently concentration of markers appeared to be good and fires in compact area were taking a good hold as the later crews left the target.
[underlined] KÖLN [/underlined] Nil cloud. Considerable haze. Red T.I’s were dropped five minutes early while N/156 was covered by S/Ls. Subsequent Reds fell in line N to S. about 8/10mls in length. Greens were well concentrated around the S. concentration which it is feared may have been BONN.
[underlined] Last Resort. OVERHIT area. [/underlined] T/156. Primary not attacked as first Red T.I’s were dropped early & were ignored by a/c which continued on track for 8 minutes before turning back. After [deleted] about [/deleted] 2 minutes it was decided to drop bombs as otherwise a/c would have
[page break]
148
[underlined] TARGET: DUSSELDORF & COLOGNE. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
1 a/c BONN area – L/156 – Last resort.
Primary not attacked for similar reasons to T/156.
[page break]
149
[underlined] RESULTS: [/underlined]
[underlined] DUSSELDORF. [/underlined]
P.F.F. 8 Group. [list of aircraft type, numbers involved and missing]
[list by Groups, of aircraft type, numbers involved and missing]
[underlined] KÖLN [/underlined]
P.F.F. 8 Group. [list of aircraft type, numbers involved and missing]
[underlined] 4TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
Make & Mend.
[underlined] 5TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] 6TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
Mosquitoes on BOCHUM, DUISBERG, DUSSELDORF.
‘K’ W/C WHITE ‘X’ S/L MANIFOLD Hooded flare demonstration at RUSHFORD.
[page break]
150
[underlined] 7TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] AUGSBURG.
[underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] MUNICH.
[underlined] A/C required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 524 heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 70 PFF. on AUGSBURG. 15 Heavies of 1 Group + 41 PFF.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] AUGSBURG – Newhaven. MUNICH – Parramatta.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0300hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+16.
Serrate will be on – Mosquitoes & Beaufighters. Mosquitoes also operating North & South of Augsburg against Night fighters.
[underlined] Briefing [/underlined] 1700hrs.
[underlined] 2120hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED. 10/10ths cloud over the target.
‘BULLSEYE’ ‘N’ F/O DOCHERTY.
[page break]
151
[underlined] 8TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] AUGSBURG.
[underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] MUNICH.
[underlined] A/C required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 339 Heavies + 72 P.F.F on AUGSBURG. 15 Heavies + 42 P.F.F on MUNICH.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] AUGSBURG – Newhaven. MUNICH – Paramatta.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 03015hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] AUGSBURG. Z-6 to Z+!2. MUNICH. Z-12 to Z.
12 Beaufighters operating in the Bomber stream. 12 Mosquitoes intruding.
[underlined] 2205hrs. [/underlined] OPERATION CANCELLED.
[underlined] 9TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRIEDRICHSHAVEN.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
152
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 312 Lancasters + 90 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0400hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+12.
[underlined] A/P [/underlined] The main shed of the old Zeppelin works. Possibility of diversions.
[underlined] 1700hrs. [/underlined] MAIN OPERATION cancelled.
[underlined] 10TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] KÖNIGSBERG.
[underlined] Alternative: [/underlined] DANZIG.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 8 B/M. 2 V/M. 3 B/Up. 8 Supporters.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2100hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+10.
[underlined] Briefing [/underlined] 1330hrs.
[underlined] 1345hrs [/underlined] Area I & II both cancelled. [underlined] Target: [/underlined] MODANE.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 240 Heavies of 1 & 5 Groups + 75 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0300hrs. . [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-7 to Z+12.
[underlined] 1645hrs. [/underlined] Zero hour changed to 0100hrs.
[underlined] 1730hrs. [/underlined] Briefing.
[page break]
153
[underlined] TARGET: - MODANE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Base – Reading – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – 4735N 0045E – 4512N 0542E – MODANE – 4735N 0120E – Cabourg – Selsey Bill – Reading – Base.
[page break]
154
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Nil cloud – slight haze in the valley. First red T.I dropped at approx.: 0057hrs. on or near the A/P. Further reds slightly overshot & a few fell on the mountain side, one very early in the attack – main concentration then formed near bend in river by eastern marshalling yard, greens falling mostly in this area with the exception of one which fell 1-2mls. South. Our visual markers arrived late over the target having been misled by river in valley S. of MODANE. One arrived in time to identify visually, later smoke filled the valley. Some incendiaries overshot to the North.
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] The marking of the target was excellent – timing however was bad & most a/c arrived late. It was intended that the first visual markers should endeavour to visually mark the A/P by moonlight only & if necessary the 2nd lot of visuals should identify by the light of flares dropped by B/Markers.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
The raid was no doubt a great success from every point of view. A large number of plotted photographs show that the largest part of the attack fell exactly where it was intended. Crews reported fires and a number of explosions of varying sizes & some crews are of the opinion that an ammunition train blew up. There is no doubt that full photographic cover of the area will show extensive damage to the marshalling yards & tunnel entrance. The far reaching results of this excellent raid will be felt & much appreciated by the allied armies fighting in Italy.
No a/c were missing from Command.
[underlined] 11TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRIEDRICHSHAVEN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 7 B/M. 3 V/M. 4 B/Up. 7 Supporters.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2230hrs.
[underlined] 1825hrs. [/underlined] MAIN OPERATION CANCELLED.
[underlined] CANNES. [/underlined] attacked by 4 & 6 Group + 35 & 97 squadrons. 4 a/c missing ANTWERP viaduct attacked by 10 Lancs. of 617 squadron.
[page break]
155
[underlined] 12TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[underlined] 13TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[underlined] 14TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[underlined] 15TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[underlined] 16TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target:[/underlined] AREA I. LUDWIGSHAVEN. AREA II. LEVERKUSEN. SPOOF FRANKFURT.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] Area I. Now Leverkusen. 2 B/Up. 6 supporters. Area II. Ludwigshaven. 7 B/M. 1 V/M. 5 B/Up. 6 Supporters. Frankfurt. 3 B/M.
[underlined] Zero hours. [/underlined] Area I. 2000hrs. Area II. 2020hrs. Spoof 2010-12hrs
[underlined] Methods. [/underlined] Area I. Paramatta, Area II. Newhaven.
[missing timing] OPERATIONS cancelled.
[page break]
156
[underlined] 17TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940hrs. [/underlined] All heavies MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 1210hrs.[/underlined] 156 required for target MANNHEIM ‘B’.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list of 156 squadron ‘Y’ aircraft numbers involved]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 70 + P.F.F.
[underlined] Method.. [/underlined] Blind-bombing by means of ‘Y’.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs.
[underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] Mosquitoes of 139 squadron will carry out a spoof attack on BONN. at 1935hrs.
[underlined] TARGET: MANNHEIM. ‘B’ [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: base – reading – Beachy Head – 5010N [missing information]
[page break]
157
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Varying amounts of cloud 7/10ths to nil. The majority of the attack covered an area about 2-2mls. across but some reports show a wide scatter by a few a/c. At about 2007hrs a large explosion resulted in a large fire. Some other fires reported at 2005hrs approximately one red T.I seen dropped about NNW of the target. This was seen by nearly all crews but there are conflicting opinions as to whether dummy or not. Bombing was much hampered by moisture freezing on inside of Perspex. One a/c attacked SCHIFFERSTADT mistaking it for MANNHEIM.
[underlined] 18TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGETS: [/underlined] BERLIN. MANNHEIM.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] BERLIN. Lancasters.
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
Halifaxes [sic] & some Lancasters on MANNHEIM.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] PARAMATTA.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2100hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+12.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 379 Heavies of 1, 3, 5, & 6 Groups + 70 P.F.F.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] A number of crews experienced difficulty with special equipment in identifying Brandenburg, and therefore the Red T.I’s were scattered, and were dropped over a rather longer period of time than briefed. Green T.I’s were difficult to see owing to cloud but were more concentrated than the Red. While thick cloud made observation of results difficult later crews reported seeing glows of fires on cloud. At approximately 2112hrs a large explosion. Spoof fighter flares were considered inaccurate – some crews reporting them having been dropped on the route out of the [symbol]. Apparently only 2 or 3 skymarkers were released.
[page break]
158
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Naisboro’ – 5310N 0400E – 5240N 0900E – 5225N 1235E – BERLIN – 5233N 1350E – 5212N 1350E – 5100N 0930E – 5030N 0720E – CAYEUX – Beachy Head – Base.
Two Cuckoos landed Warboys. W/C Adams. 49 squadron 5 Group. Sgt Shearer. 101 squadron 1 Group.
[underlined] Results. BERLIN. [/underlined] 450 a/c detailed [underlined] MANNHEIM. [/underlined] 401 a/c detailed. [missing information]
[page break]
159
[underlined] 19TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
156 squadron stood down.
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] LEVERKUSEN. 3, 4 & 6 Groups. 10 Mosquitoes + 6 Halifaxes from P.F.F.
[underlined] Results: [/underlined] 5 a/c missing of 267 a/c.
[underlined] 20TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 21ST NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND
[underlined] 22ND NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Sky-marking & Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required [/underlined] [list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 612 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 121 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+20.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 10/10ths cloud tops 10/12,000ft – layers to 20,000ft. First skymarkers were dropped punctually & thereafter fell in unbroken succession throughout attack forming two clusters about 4mls. apart N & S. Some Red & Green T.I’s were seen cascading but quickly disappeared into cloud. A few crews reported seeing Red & Yellows dropped together. Good fires were started which were visible for at least 100mls. many crews reported an unusually large explosion at 2022hrs.
[page break]
160
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base. Cromer. – 5310N 0400E – 5240N 0900E – 5236N 1221E – BERLIN – 5225N 1350E -5200N 1350E – 5223N 1200E – 5240N 0900E – 5310N 0400E – CROMER. BASE.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] [list by Groups of aircraft types and numbers missing]
P.F.F. – “The squeals of the enemy point to a most highly successful attack”.
[page break]
161
[underlined] 23RD NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Paramatta.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 329 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 90 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+15.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 9/10ths cloud. All crews report good concentration with skymarkers in a line approx.: N & S. about 1 ml. in length – one isolated about 4m. N.E. Glow of fires over whole area & smoke seen coming through cloud.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined] German Communiqué – 1300hrs. 24.11.43. On the evening of 23 November the Reich capital was again attacked by strong British formations. This terror raid caused more damage in several districts. In addition to residential districts, numerous public buildings, including churches, welfare institutions & cultural monuments were destroyed. Fighter formations & A.A of the Luftwaffe in spite of difficult conditions for defence shot down 19 E/A.
[list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
P.F.F. [list of aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
[page break]
162
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Cromer – 5310N 0400E – 5240N 0900E – 5236N 1221E – BERLIN – 5225N 1350E – 5200N 1350E – 5223N 1200E – 5240N 0900E – 5310N 0400E – Cromer – Base.
[page break]
163
[underlined] 24TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[deleted] Target: [/deleted] MAKE & MEND ALL HEAVIES
[underlined] 25TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] LANCASTERS – BERLIN. HALIFAXES – FRANKFURT.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 2 Primary B/Markers. 4 Sec: B/Markers. 6 Supporters.
[underlined] FRANKFURT. [/underlined] [list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] BERLIN. 2115hrs. FRANKFURT 2000hrs.
[underlined] Z1340hrs. [/underlined] Zero hours changed Berlin – 1345hrs Frankfurt – 0230hrs.
[underlined] 1450hrs. [/underlined] Zero hours changed again BERLIN – 0400hrs. FRANKFURT – 0245hrs. T.O.T. Z-5 to Z+10.
[underlined] 2230hrs. [/underlined] BERLIN cancelled – Supporters transferred to Frankfurt.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] NEWHAVEN
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] [deleted] 426 [/deleted] [inserted] 215 [/inserted] Heavies + 33 P.F.F.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] Apparently winds were much stronger than given in Met. Forecast. This combined with conditions of 9-10/10ths cloud varying from 19/15,000ft has obviously resulted in a scattered attack. Most crews report seeing Red T.I’s going quickly into cloud, but it is thought that these are just as likely to have been sky-markers in their initial stages as any attempt on the part of the Hun to simulate T.I. Red. One crew reports being able to see below cloud on return and to have seen fairly good fires burning. Many crews report a large fire burning in France – believed to be Lille.
[page break]
164
[underlined] TARGET: FRANKFURT. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: BASE – Reading – Beachy Head – 5020N 0130E 5015N 0800E – FRANKFURT – 5000N 0100E – 4945N 0900E – 5020N 0130E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
[underlined] RESULTS & SUCCESS.. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. Analysis. [/underlined] It is inevitable that an attack carried out under unexpected cloud conditions such as those over Frankfurt must spread very badly. Many main force were reduced to bombing on what markers they could see before they disappeared into cloud.
P.F.F. [list of aircraft type, numbers involved and missing] [list by Groups, of aircraft type, numbers involved and missing]
[page break]
165
[underlined] 26TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Targets: [/underlined] BERLIN. STUTTGART.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] STUTTGART. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] BERLIN – Paramatta. STUTTGART – Newhaven.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] BERLIN – 384 Heavies + 74 P.F.F. STUTTGART – 170 Heavies + 31 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hours: [/underlined] BERLIN. 2115hrs [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+12. STUTTGART. 2030hrs [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+8.
[underlined] SUMMARIES. BERLIN. [/underlined]
Large break occurred in cloud over [symbol]. One salvo of Red & Yellow T.I’s seen at 2113hrs and although small clusters of T.I. Red fell to the N.W. & to the S.E. the main backing up appears to have concentrated [indecipherable word] the T.I. Red & yellow. Later in the attack incendiaries seemed to be undershooting but fires were burning in the centre of the city.
[underlined] STUTTGART. [/underlined]
8-9/10ths thin cloud tops 8,000ft. Sky-markers & T.I. Yellow were dropped on time and also some T.I. Red were seen cascading. There was a concentration of T.I. Yellow & T.I. Green covering a fairly wide area. Good fires were seen burning through cloud. Few signs of night fighters over the [symbol] but great activity of all sorts – flak, S/Ls & many fighter flares around Frankfurt.
[underlined] ROUTE – BERLIN.[/underlined]
BASE – READING – BEACHY HEAD – 5020N 0130E – 5020N 0910E – 5215N 1210E – BERLIN – 5240N 1350E – [missing information]
[page break]
166
[underlined] TARGETS: BERLIN AND STUTTGART. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.] [missing information]
[page break]
167
[underlined] 26TH NOVEMBER 1943 (cont:) [/underlined]
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. Analysis. [/underlined] The only Special B/Markers to bomb dropped his T.I’s 8mls. N.W. of the A/P. These T.I’s attracted a considerable proportion of backing up and bombing, but luckily the attack appeared to have spread mostly to the SE of this position under the influence of normal ‘Y’ a/c. The centre of the area marked by B/Markers appears to have been about 5mls. W. of the A/P. Considerable damage has clearly been caused in the area to the North & West of the Tiergarten.
[underlined] BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
[underlined] STUTTGART. [/underlined]
[list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
[underlined] 27TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
ALL HEAVIES MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
168
[underlined] 28TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
All Heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 29TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
All Heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 30TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MUNICH
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] BERLIN.
[list of 156 squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2015hrs.
[underlined] 1551hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 1ST DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] LEIPZIG.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 6 Primary B/M. 5 Sec: B/M. 2 V/M. 3 B/U. 5 Supporters.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs.
[underlined] 2233hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[page break]
169
[underlined] 2ND DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 543 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 107 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs. altered later to 2006hrs.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Paramatta.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
5/10ths cloud tops 5,000ft. First Red T.I’s were apparently dropped at 2004hrs. and owing to different cloud cover conditions varying reports have been submitted by crews some not seeing T.I’s. Opinions generally seems to be that Markers were scattered along a line running approximately 3m. N-S with concentrations at extremities. From Special equipment observations it seems that the Southern concentration was probably in the centre of the city. Last [deleted] er [/deleted] B/Up on confirm that the fires confirmed with there [sic] impressions. Several crews reported dense clouds of smoke rising.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Plotted photographs cannot show a complete picture due to the cloud cover but it is probable that the greatest part of the raid was dropped in the S.E outskirts of Berlin.
[list by Groups, of aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing] [missing information]
[page break]
170
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: - BASE – HAISBORO’ – 5250N 0330E – 5235N 0440E – 5238N 1004E – 5236N 1220E – BERLIN – 5230N 1350E – 5255N 1350E – 5238N 1004E – 5235N 0440E – 5250N 0330E – HAISBORO’ – BASE.
[page break]
171
[underlined] 3RD DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Area I. LEIPZIG. Area II. BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 465 Heavies + 106 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0400hrs.
Mosquitoes of 627 and 139 squadrons will carry on from 5225N 1225E to BERLIN following a Spoof attack.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
10/10ths thin cloud – tops above 6,000ft. First T.I’s and sky-markers fell about 3 minutes early. A good concentration of T.I. Red developed and, according to experienced crews the best concentration of sky markers yet achieved. There was a slight overshoot of one T.I. Red to the South. T.I. Green backed up well though a few followed the overshoot. However in its later stages the concentration seemed to tighten up. Several explosions were seen, one large one at 0403hrs approximately – glow of many fires was seen & black smoke rising through cloud. Fighter flares seen on the way in. Out from the target route markers S. of Koblenz were very scattered some being dropped N. of Frankfurt. It seems that the HUN is becoming familiar with this route into the target and that night fighters wait near Hannover for routemarkers then follow the Bomber stream.
[underlined] Success. & Results. [/underlined]
Daylight cover confirms the success of the attack. The W. area of the city was covered by smoke rising to a great height & in the E. half of the target area upwards of 20 good fires were still burning furiously.
[page break]
172
[underlined] TARGET: LEIPZIG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: BASE – HAISBORO’ – 5250N 0330E – 5235N 0435E – 5240N 0810E – 5225N 1222E – LEIPZIG – 5105N 1205E – 5015N 0740E – 5010N 0130E – BEACHY HEAD – READING – BASE.
[list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing] [missing information]
[page break]
173
[underlined] 4TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
All heavies MAKE & MEND.
8 Group, 9 Mos: FLAMBURG. 5 Primary. 1, 3, & 4 Groups mine-laying.
[underlined] 5TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 6TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 7TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND. SECURITY FILMS SHOWN.
[underlined] 8TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 9TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
174
[underlined] 10TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 11TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 12TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 13TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 14TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 15TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
175
[underlined] 16TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 400 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 91 P.F.F. + 15 Mosquitoes.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Wanganui & Paramatta.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 10/10ths thick cloud about 7,000ft. First red T.I’s & Sky-markers dropped early at 1956hrs. Early in the attack concentration of sky markers appeared to be fairly good, but in the later stages more ragged, stretching across the [symbol] from E – W. From H2S observations it would appear that the main weight of the attack fell on the centre of the city. Thick cloud prevented observation of T.I’s on the ground except as a vague glow. Many crews reported dummy Red T.I’s several miles to the N & NE of the target. Numerous fighter flares were seen from the Dutch coast to beyond the [symbol]. ‘Spoof’ fighter flares were seen being dropped & 2 crews report seeing fighters heading for them. Fighters were also reported as crossing the Dutch coast to the first turning point at sea to meet the a/c.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[list by Groups, of aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing
Visibility on return was extremely bad and a number of a/c crashed on landing.
[deleted] 19.12.43 [/deleted]
[page break]
176
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – 5250N 0330E – 5235N 0440E – 5238N 1005E – 5238N 1220E – BERLIN – 5243N 1400E – 5455N 1143E – 5525N 0938E – 5523N 0825E – 5510N 0700E – Base.
[page break]
177
[underlined] 17TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 18TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 19TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
One crew of 5 Group – mission 16/17-12-43 reported picked up by launches looking for ‘W’ F/L Aubert.
[underlined] 20TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRANKFURT.[underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] MANNHEIM.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[underlined] FRANKFURT. [/underlined] [list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 600 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5, & 6 Groups + 93 P.F.F. on Frankfurt. 27 Heavies P.F.F. + 30 Heavies of 1 Group on Mannheim.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] FRANKFURT 1935 MANNHEIM 1925.
Intruders operating.
[page break]
178
[underlined] TARGETS: FRANKFURT AND MANNHEIM. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE. Base – Southwold – 5130N 0440E – 5032N 0510E – 5015N 0730E – FRANKFURT/MANNHEIM – (5005N 0905E 4930N 0902E) 5030N 0900E – 5032N 0510E – 5130N 0440E 5215N 0300E – Southwold – Base.
[page break]
179
[underlined] 20TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined] (CONT:)
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] FRANKFURT.
6-9/10ths strato cm. with large breaks. First T.I. Yellows dropped on time. Some crews report they dropped early and one fell short over Wiesbaden. One of our supporters bombed these. T.I. Yellows then formed a rather scattered line E – W across the target. Backers up on later in the attack reported a circular concentration of T.I. Yellow with T.I. Red falling NW at approx: 1932hrs & others up to 10m. NE. T.I. Green were dropped approx: in the centre of the Yellows. Fires were very scattered following 2 concentrations but burning well. Large explosion 1947hrs.
[underlined] MANNHEIM. [/underlined]
2-3/10ths cloud. Red T.I’s dropped very accurately & well backed up by Greens. From visual identification crews report that Reds fell between marshalling yards & Rhine. Good fires started.
[underlined] P.F.F. RESULTS. [/underlined] FRANKFURT.
The timing of the B/Markers was very good. Owing to cloud conditions no visual markers were able to identify the A/P. backers up had great difficulty in selecting the centre of T.I. Yellow as these were confused with the flames. The flares drifted rapidly Eastwards & tended to produce an overshoot & considerable scatter. Plotted photographs stretch from the A/P up to 5m. E & SE.
[underlined] MANNHEIM. [/underlined] Little of the attack can have fallen in Ludwigshaven but it is probable that some damage was caused to parts of MANNHEIM. Photographs show 3-8mls. overshoot .
P.F.F. 3 missing. Command 42 a/c.
[underlined] 21ST DECEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
180
[underlined] 22ND DECEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 23RD DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 353 Heavies 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 90 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Paramatta.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2045hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+12.
Mosquitoes Spoof on Leipzig – Fighter flares on Berlin & Routemarking.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] put back to 0400hrs.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] Attack opened on time the first reds being seen at 0357.5hrs. Red T.I’s visible as a glow on cloud well concentrated. At 0407hrs 11 skymarkers seen over [symbol]. One Green fell to E of main concentration. Dummy reds seen to N.W. From H2S observations it would appear that the attack began well on the A/P with a tendency to spread slightly to the E & SE. Several large explosions reported – one at 0410hrs.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
16 a/c missing.
[page break]
181
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – 5220N 0300E – 5030N 0608E – 5033N 0940E – 5050N 1227E – 5205N 1310E – [symbol] – 5302N 1327E – 5235N 0943E – 5240N 0300E – Southwold – Base.
[page break]
182
[underlined] 24TH DECEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE and MEND all Heavies.
CHRISTMAS EVE.
[hand drawing of holly] [underlined] 25TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET.[/underlined] BERLIN. Present from BUTCH.
[underlined] 1000hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED!!
[underlined] 26TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND
[underlined] 27TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[underlined] Message from A.O.C. [/underlined] All crews to fly today to blow the alchohol [sic] out of their lungs.
BATTLE CRUISER ‘SCHARNHORST’ sunk off NORWAY.
[underlined] 28TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[page break]
183
[underlined] 29TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 604 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 106 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+18.
[underlined] Spoof Attacks. [/underlined] Leipzig & Magdeburg. By Mosquitoes.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Wanganui and Paramatta.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 10/10ths cloud – tops 6/10,000ft. The first T.I’s & skymarkers were dropped punctually at 1958hrs or slightly before T.I’s disappeared quickly into cloud, but a good concentration of skymarkers was achieved in a line E to W. H2S observations appear to indicate that the concentration was slightly to the SE of the centre of the city. Two crews report seeing T.I. Red & skymarkers 20m. S. of Berlin at 1949hrs. There are few definite reports of fires burning as glow was difficult to distinguish from that of Red T.I’s. Fighter flares mostly seen between Dummer See [sic] & Leipzig.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Reports are consistent in reporting a reasonable concentration. The enemy has become remarkably reticent on the results of the recent raids on Berlin. All the evidence however seems to point to this raid being successful.
19 a/c missing.
[page break]
184
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Cromer – 5320N 0400E – 5230N 0820E – 5137N 1220E – [symbol] – 5302N 1327E – 5300N 1145E – 5245N 0830E – 5320N 0400E – Cromer – Base.
[page break]
185
[underlined] 30H DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 31ST DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRANKFURT.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 156 Squadron. 8 P.B/M. 2 V/M. 3 B.B/U. 2 V.B/U. 6 Supporters.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 508 a/c of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups. 110 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 1945hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+15.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed.
[underlined] 1459hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 1ST JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] WHITEBAIT.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 369 a/c of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 87 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0300hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+12.
[page break]
186
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: Base – Southwold – 5240N 0330E – 5238N 0438E – 5250N 0912E – 5236N 1220E – BERLIN – 5210N 1338N [sic] – 5050N 1210E – 5030N 0720E – 5030N 0135E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] First sky-markers dropped on time, T.I’s were invisible owing to cloud. Skymarkers fairly concentrated at the beginning, tending to scatter over a line about 4mls. N – S. No fires seen. Large explosion at 0306hrs.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[missing information] P.F.F. Success. Impossible to assess results [missing information]
[page break]
187
[underlined] 2ND JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 320 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 85 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0315hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+14.
Changed to 0245hrs owing to change of route.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
[blank]
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Practically impossible to assess success of raid but crews were more optimistic than on the previous nights raid in their reports. Main force groups report the concentration of release point flares as good.
8 Group 10 missing Command 18 missing
[page break]
188
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: Base – Southwold – 5245N 0330E – 5250N 0850E – 5325N 1240E – BERLIN – 5210N 1310E – 5150N 1030E – 5230N 0820E – 5245N 0330E – Southwold Base.
[page break]
189
[underlined] 3RD JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 4TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 5TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] STETTIN. [underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 325 Heavies 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 92 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven or Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0345hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+12.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Nil cloud, vis: good, haze nil, snow on ground, cloud bank crossed target. Short duration. Apart from one or two reports of Red & Green T.I’s being dropped early, particularly T.I. Green, the markers achieved a good concentration. White flares were considered unnecessary due to very good visibility & snow. The visual marker definitely identified the A/P. Red T.I’s were considered a little scattered with some falling on the islands on the E. side of the River Oder in the Freihafen area. Attack generally considered very concentrated & successful. One large explosion seen about 0409hrs.
[page break]
190
[underlined] TARGET: STETTIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE. BASE – 5600N 0600E – 5600N 1300E – 5405N 1323E – STETTIN – 5325N 1450E – 5500N 1505E – 5600N 1300E – 5600E [sic] 0600E – Base.
[underlined] RESULTS & SUCCESS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Doubtless a good attack – plotted night photographs & crews reports are most optimistic. Judging by plotted photographs from this group there seems to have been a slight spread to the west [missing words]
[page break]
191
[underlined] 6TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 7TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 8TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Z633.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 156 Squadron. 3 B.M.I. 1 V/M. 3 Supporters.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2030hrs.
[underlined] 1605hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 9TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 10TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
192
[underlined] 11TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 12TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 13TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 14TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BRUNSWICK.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 416 of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 93 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven. or Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 1915hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+12.
[page break]
193
[underlined] TARGET: BRUMSWICK. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: Base – Haisboro’ – 5305N 0400E – 5250N 0930E – BRUNSWICK – 5200N 1030E – 5230E [sic] 0820E – 5305N 0400E – Haisboro’ – Base.
[page break]
194
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
First markers. Green T.I’s & skymarkers R/Green stars were reported dropped at 1907.5hrs. The concentration was considered good at the commencement, stringing out in a line of attack 5/7 miles long subsequently. There appears to have been a gap of about 7 mins from approx: 1912 – 1919hrs in the skymarkers, with but an occasional Green T.I after 1912hrs. There is a suspicion that dummy T.I. Reds were dropped. One marker dropped T.I. Yellow over the target, together with T.I. Green & sky-markers at 1907hrs. No concrete results to report due to cloud & only small glow seen by crews on return journey, although last backer up reports good glow on cloud. Magdeburg ‘spoof’ considered too near. Many N/F flares over target in line of track in & particularly out. Concentration of N/F N & NE of Hannover.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
38 a/c missing.
[underlined] 15TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 16TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 17TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
195
[underlined] 18TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 19TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 20TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 659 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 112 P.F.F. & Mosquitoes.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 1935hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+18.
[underlined] SUMMARY [/underlined]
10/10ths cloud tops 8,000ft with small breaks. First skymarkers & T.I. Red were dropped on time. T.I.’s disappeared very quickly into cloud, & sky markers formed two concentrations, one big & one small, which were soon joined in a line about 2 – 3 miles long running approx.: parallel to track NW – SE. According to H2S checking the larger concentration was over the centre of the city, possibly a little to the E. There was a gap in the sky-marking of about 3 mins – 1944 – 1947hrs. Large explosion seen in S. part of [symbol]. 1942hrs.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Difficult to assess results owing to cloud.
[page break]
196
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: base – 5425N 0400E – 5245N 0800E – 5337N 1055E – 5328N 1240E – BERLIN – 5220N 1330E – 5138N 1220E – 5207N 0750E – 5338N 0532E – 5340N 0400E – Cromer – Base.
[page break]
197
[underlined] 21ST JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MAGDEBURG.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 560 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 117 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven or Wanganui if necessary.
[underlined] Zero. [/underlined] 2300hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+18. [underlined] Berlin [/underlined] 2253hrs.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
Thin layer cloud 8-8/10ths – clear to SE. Some crews report T.I. Red dropped with T.I. Green in fairly good concentration. The T.I. Red is reported short of target. Skymarkers were well concentrated and in general bombing good, although incendiaries reported well to S. of [symbol]. Fires burning well with smoke well up to 12,000ft. Glow of fires seen at coast on return. Large explosion at 2309hrs.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] 9 a/c missing. It is feared that the main weight of the raid fell to the East and S.E of the town, and little damage is likely in the town centre.
[underlined] Command. [/underlined] 54 a/c missing.
[page break]
198
[underlined] TARGET: MAGDEBURG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
199
[underlined] 22ND JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 23RD JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 24TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies make & mend.
[underlined] 25TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRANKFURT
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
156 Squadron. 3 B.M.I. I V/M. 4 B.B.U. 2 Vis: B/U. 9 Supporters.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 638 Heavies + 107 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method [/underlined] Newhaven – Emergency Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2050hrs.
Mosquitoes precede Main attack dropping Window. Other Mosquitoes to act as spoof markers on Stuttgart & Karlsruhe.
[underlined] 1635hrs. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[underlined] 2125hrs. [/underlined] N.T.U. a/c F/L [indecipherable word] crashed at Ramsey.
[page break}
200
[underlined] 26TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 27TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 422 Lancasters of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 84 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2030hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+12.
Mosquitoes drop Window from Dummer See to Berlin. Mosquitoes drop route-markers. Mosquitoes drop spoof fighter flares. 12 Mosquitoes attach AACHEN with T.I. Green & bombs.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] The attack opened on time & two of the early crews reported a good initial concentration of R/P flares. Later there was a spread in a line or crescent formation, variously reported at different times in the attack as being E – W and N – S and from 1/2 ml to as much as 8mls. in length. T.Is quickly disappeared in cloud. Glows of good fires was seen and some crews reported this as being visible for 100mls. after leaving the target. One crew reported a large fire 30m. S.W. of Berlin. Routemarker flares red steady were reported as accurately placed except at Pos: Q which was thought to be about 10mls. S. of track. Crews [missing information]
[page break]
201
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Cromer – 5345N 0430E – 5155N 1010E – 5237N 1158E – 5235N 1150E – BERLIN – 5215N 1350E – 5050N 1210E – 5030N 0735E – 5020N 0132E – Dungeness – Bradwell Bay – Base.
[page break]
202
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 1 a/c P.F.F. missing.
[underlined] P.F.F. Analysis. [/underlined] There is no evidence of the concentration achieved and crews’ reports vary considerably. It appears however that there was a considerable spread up and down wind as would be expected, and that the initial marking was rather spread but tended to become more concentrated later. Owing to complete lack of photographic evidence of all kinds it is impossible to give any accurate estimate of the success achieved. There is every reason to expect however that this raid has added further considerable damage to the already extensive devastation.
[underlined] 28TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 566 Heavies + 113 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0315hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+15.
Mosquitoes drop window & drop T.I. Red on Hannover.
[page break]
203
[underlined] Target: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Cromer – 5510N 0700E – 5510N 1035E – Berlin – 5223N 1345E – 5235N 1405E – 5510N 1010E – 5510N 0700E – Cromer – Base.
4 Halifaxes P.F.F. Sylt. 63 Stirlings of 3 Group Mine-laying Sylt area.
[page break]
204
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
First R/P flares fell at 0309/0310hrs. The attack then opened on time. Crews report that a good concentration of R/P flares was achieved and well maintained throughout although there were a few to the South of the main concentration. Most crews reported that the glow of T.I’s could be seen below cloud but attack was apparently Wanganui. One very big explosion was seen at 0314hrs, second at 0325hrs, third at 0349hrs and one a/c saw one at 0400hrs when well away from the target. The 0325hrs. explosion reported to be vivid green. Spoof flares & Yellow T.Is seen.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
P.F.F. 6 a/c missing. Command. 43 missing
[underlined] P.F.F. Summary. [/underlined] Again very difficult to assess owing to lack of observation of results and night photographs, but crews who have been to Berlin a number of times during the series of attacks were unanimous in considering it the best attack on Berlin so far. A very impressive fire area was seen by later crews & the glow on the clouds could be seen for a distance of 165mls. on the homeward journey. Many impressive explosions were reported in the target area & one at Z-1 was unanimously reported as being the largest & most violent explosion a lot of the crews taking part in the attack had seen. [deleted] When [/deleted]
[page break]
205
[underlined] 29TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 30TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Goodwood on BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 392 heavies + 94 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2015hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+12.
Mosquitoes to drop window & spoof fighter flares on target, also spoof red flares. Mosquitoes to act as fire watchers after attack. Mosquitoes also drop T.I. Red & Green on Brunswick.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 10/10ths st.cm. tops 12,000ft. Skymarker concentration from the beginning was very good with a few strays, & this concentration appears to have been maintained throughout the attack. Little was seen of results while a/c were over the target but on the way home later crews report a large glow from the target. One crew reported a dummy T.I. Red at least 10mls. N. of the target, darker in colour than our own – fell very slowly before going into cloud. Our own T.Is were only visible for approx.: 30 before disappearing in cloud.
[page break]
206
[underlined] Target: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: Base – 5435N 0500E – 5438N 1100E – BERLIN – 5200N 1325E -5200N 0920E – 5240N 0800E – 5250N 0400E – Southwold – Base.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] P.F.F. 8 a/c missing
Thick cloud over the target made results exceptionally difficult to judge, but main force crews were enthusiastic as to the concentration of R/P flares. The glow of large fires was seen in the later half of [missing words]
[page break]
207
[underlined] 31ST JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 1ST FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 2ND FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 3RD FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
Newish crews required for Cross Country and T.I. Demonstration at Whittlesey and Rushford Ranges. ’W’ W/O Trotter. Marker. ‘H’ F/O Cameron. ‘S’ Sgt. Cuthilll. ‘L’ F/S Doyle. ‘F’ P/O Samson.
2105hrs. Exercise abandoned owing to enemy activity.
[underlined] 4TH FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[page break]
208
[underlined] 5TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend. Mosquitoes on BERLIN.
[underlined] 6TH FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavy a/c of P.F.F. to take part in Navigational exercise.
1245hrs. Exercise postponed on account of weather.
“SOMEBODY TALKED” security film shown in Officers’ Mess.
[underlined] 7TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
Navigation exercise postponed.
“SOMEBODY TALKED” shown in Sergeants’ Mess.
[underlined] 8TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
Navigational exercise to take place.
[list of navigational exercise aircraft identifier letter and pilots]
[missing information]
[page break]
209
[underlined] 9TH FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend. T.I. trials scrubbed.
[underlined] 10TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
VISIT OF KING & QUEEN.
1245. King & Queen visited Ops Room.
G/Capt. Collins posted to R.A.F. Bourne. G/Capt. Searby to R.A.F. Warboys.
[underlined] 11TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 12TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
All heavies P.F.F. Navigational Exercise.
1613hrs. Exercise cancelled.
[underlined] 13TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN. Spoof: FRANKFURT-ON-ODER.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] BERLIN: 2 P.B.M. 4 B.B.U. 3 V.B.U. 5 Supporters. FRANKFURT: 2Y. BB/U.
[page break]
210
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 594 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 91 P.F.F.
[underlined] 1555hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 14TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 15TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN. [underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] FRANKFURT-ON-ODER.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
BERLIN. 2 P.B.M. 3 B.B.U. 6 V.B.U. 4 Supporters. FRANKFURT. 3 B.M. 3 B.U. Kiel Fjord: - 4 a/c of 35 Squadron.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 703 heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 96 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2115hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+20.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta & Wanganui mixed.
[underlined] Route: [/underlined] Base – 5450N 1100E – 5525N 0700E – 5510N 1000E – 5430N 1230E – [symbol] – 5210N 1250E – 5240N 1100E – 5240N 0855E – 5340N 0400E – Haisboro’ – Base.
Mosquitoes dropping spoof route-markers – fighter flares – window. 6 [deleted] / [/deleted] M/139 act as firewatchers after main attack is over.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] The attack appeared to have opened early, some crews reported seeing first Wanganui flares & Red T.Is as early as 2110hrs. Reports on concentration of Wanganui flares vary considerably, some stating they fell in tight cluster while others say they were very scattered. The general impression, however, is that they spread but in a line or arc SW/NE. Owing to thick 10/10ths cloud T.Is were not visible for long & possibly for the same reason no glow of good fires could
[page break]
211
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN & FRANKFURT-ON-ODER. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
212
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
P.F.F. Missing 7 a/c
[underlined] P.F.F. Analysis. [/underlined]
Results difficult to assess although a glow of fires was reported crews did not think they were as plentiful as on previous attacks. Mosquitoes over the target after the attack finished however report large areas of effective fires burning in the city, and the column of smoke which rose to 20,000ft was particularly impressive. T.I. is practically impossible to say for certain which area of Berlin received the main weight of the attack, but crews who checked the position on navigational aids were of the opinion that the attack opened slightly to the West of the city area & spread in later stages towards the centre.
[underlined] 16TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required 1st Wave. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] 2nd Wave. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hours: [/underlined] 1st Wave. 2125hrs. 2nd Wave 2330hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+8.
[underlined] Strength of Attack: [/underlined] 57 P.F.F. + 280 Main Force. 55 P.F.F. + 270 main Force.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] 1503hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[page break]
213
[underlined] 17TH FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN. [underlined] Alternative: [/underlined] LEIPZIG.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
156. 1st Wave: 3 P.B.M. 3 B.B.U. 2 V.B.U. 4 supporters. 2nd Wave: 3 P.B.M. 3 B.B.U. 1. V.B.U. 2 Supporters.
[underlined] Strength of Attack: [/underlined] 615 Heavies + 110 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hours: [/underlined] 1st Wave: 2135hrs. LEIPZIG. 2150hrs. 2nd Wave: 0055hrs. LEIPZIG. 0005hrs.
[underlined] 1600hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 18TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 156: 8 P.B.M. 4 B.B.U. 4 V.B.U. 5 Supporters.
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] 0330hrs.
[underlined] Routes: [/underlined] Alternative route home for a/c on [symbol] after Z+8.
[underlined] 1215hrs [/underlined] Snow Warning.
[underlined] 1639hrs. [/underlined] ALL OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 19TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] LEIPZIG.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
214
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 736 Heavies 0f 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 108 P.F.F. 4H/35 + 50 Stirlings gardening Kiel Fjord.
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] 0400hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+19.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Wanganui & paramatta.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
First Wanganui flares and red T.Is dropped about 4” early. A good concentration of Wanganui flares quickly formed in oval formation NE/SW. One load of skymarkers fell 5 to 10mls South of main concentration but was not backed up. Skymarking was well maintained until 0405hrs when there was a gap of about 4 minutes after which marking was resumed but more sparsely than before. Another gap of a few minutes occurred at about 0400hrs. Only a vague glow of T.I’s was visible through cloud.
Glow of good fires could be seen through cloud in later stages with dense clouds of black smoke rising above 10,000ft. large explosions reported at 0358, 0435 & 0438hrs.
[page break]
215
[underlined] Target: LEIPZIG [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
216
[underlined] 20TH FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] STUTTGART.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method [/underlined] Mixed Wanganui & Paramatta.
[underlined] Strength of Attack: [/underlined] 597 Heavies + 103 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] 0400hrs.
[page break]
217 (last page)
Feb 20th, 1944.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
[photograph] F/S WINTERSON. [photograph] P/O GROVE. [photograph] SGT. SMITH. [photograph] SGT. DUCHENÉ [photograph] SGT. BEMBRIDGE. F/O. RYAN. [photograph] F/O. GENTLE. [photograph] SGT. WALEMBY. [photograph] SGT. HEDGE. [photograph] F/L AUBERT. [photograph] F/L SAMUEL. [photograph] F/S FISHER. [photograph] F/L MACKAY. [photograph] F/O PETRIDES. [photograph] P/O HALPERIN. [photograph] F/S HOOPER.
[page break]
Names of the 5 photographs from BOTTOM LINE OF PREVIOUS PAGE.
F/L LITTLE, F/O FLYNN, SGT .JONES, SGT. MACLACHLAN, SGT. TRUMAM
[photograph] F/O SMITH. [photograph] P/O SMITH. [photograph] F/O PHILPS. [photograph] SGT. CORDRAY. [photograph] F/O GOODWIN. [photograph] SGT. MARSHALL. [photograph] F/L VINCENT. [photograph] SGT. CLARKE. [photograph] SGT. HATWELL. [photograph] SGT. SWINNEY. [photograph] SGT. HODGES. [photograph] S/L SAMMY HALL. [photograph] F/L YOUNG. [photograph] SGT. [indecipherable name]. [photograph] P/O [indecipherable name]. [photograph] SGT. [indecipherable name] [missing photograph] SGT. HODGES. [photograph] SGT. [indecipherable name]. [photograph] W/C DUIGAN. [photograph] SGT. KING. [photograph] S/L MANDENO. [photograph] Sgt. Forbes. [photograph] [indecipherable name]. [photograph] SGT. CURTIS. [5 indecipherable names]
[page break]
[photograph] SGT. MARSON. [photograph] SGT. WILLETT. [photograph] SGT. OTTEY. [photograph] SGT. EDWARDS. [photograph] SGT. SHACKLADY. [photograph] SGT. BOWMAN. [photograph] SGT. BROWN. [photograph] F/S STEWART. [photograph] SGT. HAVARD. [photograph] SGT. HANDLEY. [photograph] SGT. THORINGTON. [photograph] P/O KERRY. [photograph] P/O CARTER. [photograph] SGT. DURAT. [photograph] SGT. DALTON. [photograph] SGT. CHAPMAN. P/O ROBERTS [photograph] P/O THOMPSON. [photograph] SGT. WILKINSON. [photograph] F/L CRAMPTON. [photograph] SGT. SCOTT. [photograph] F/O WOODSEND. [photograph] P/O BAGG. [photograph] SGT. LEADER.
[page break]
[photograph] W/C DONALDSON. [photograph] S/L LAWSON. [photograph] F/O DRAKE. [photograph] SGT. LAWRENCE. [photograph] F/L VERDON ROE. [photograph] F/S BANKS. [photograph] F/O TOWNSEND. [photograph] P/O JOLLY. [photograph] S/L GRIMSTON. [photograph] F/S VOLANTE. [photograph] F/L MACPHERSON. [photograph] F/L KEARS. [photograph] P/O MOLLER. [photograph] F/S PRICE. [photograph] SGT. BARNHAM. [photograph] P/O BARCLAY. [photograph] W/C WOMERSLEY. [photograph] F/S GILES. [photograph] SGT. YOUNG. [photograph] F/S ELCORTE. [photograph] W/O GREAVES.
[page break]
[photograph] SGT. WALLIS. [photograph] SGT. WALDER. [photograph] F/S CASE. [photograph] F/S McLENNAN. [photograph] F/S TREMBLAY. [photograph] S/L MOIR. [photograph] F/O INNES. [photograph] SGT. BRAMLEY. [photograph] SGT. MACPINLAY. [photograph] SGT. HAZELGRAVE. [photograph] SGT. WEBB. [photograph] SGT. FOLLAND. [photograph] S/L GRANT. [photograph] P/O WALKER. [photograph] SGT. SALTER. [photograph] SGT. DOBSON. [photograph] SGT. IRWIN. [photograph] F/S WHITE. [photograph] SGT. [indecipherable name] [photograph] [missing name]
[page break]
[photograph] F/O GOODLEY. P/W. [photograph] S/L BALL. [photograph] P/O GINGER JONES. P/W. [photograph] F/SGT. PERCY. [photograph] SGT. THOMPSON. [photograph] W/C HOOLWAY. [photograph] F/S HART. [photograph missing] P/O TURK. [photograph] F/O LUFF. [photograph] F/S HEAP. [photograph] P/O HORAN. [photograph] F/S ATKIN. [photograph] W/O SAUNDERS. [photograph] F/O McKENNA. [photograph] SGT. CHAPMAN. [photograph] P/O DAVIES. [photograph] F/S HOLDERNESS. [photograph] F/S McHUGH. [photograph] SGT. MURRAY. [photograph] F/L LANG. [photograph] F/L GREY. [photograph] F/S RIDINGS. [photograph] Sgt. LEE. [photograph] F/S VENN. [photograph] Sgt WOOD.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Description
An account of the resource
Operational Record ledger created by Pat Falkinder (nee Day). Running log book which includes briefing, targeting, crews and methods of prosecution for various bombing operations. It includes a photographs of Pat Day in uniform and several aircrew.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Robin Christian
David Bloomfield
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
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224 photocopied sheets
Language
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eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
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MCleggPV[DoB]-150710-01
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
Title
A name given to the resource
Operational Record ledger
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
Czech Republic
Denmark
France
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Belgium--Antwerp
Belgium--Florennes
Belgium--Sint-Truiden
Belgium--Zeebrugge
Czech Republic--Plzeň
Denmark--Manø Island
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Southwold
France--Bourget Lake
France--Cannes
France--Cayeux-sur-Mer
France--Laon
France--Modane
France--Montchanin
France--Montluçon
France--Saint-Dizier (Haute-Marne)
Germany--Augsburg
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Bocholt
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Bonn
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Elberfeld
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Freiburg im Breisgau
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Jena
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kassel
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Koblenz
Germany--Krefeld
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Lübeck
Germany--Ludwigshafen am Rhein
Germany--Magdeburg
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Mülheim an der Ruhr
Germany--Munich
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Oberhausen (Düsseldorf)
Germany--Oldenburg
Germany--Peenemünde
Germany--Rostock
Germany--Schifferstadt
Germany--Soest
Germany--Stuttgart
Italy--Genoa
Italy--Milan
Italy--Turin
Netherlands--Breda
Netherlands--Leeuwarden
Netherlands--Texel
Netherlands--Venlo
Poland--Gdańsk
Poland--Szczecin
Russia (Federation)--Kaliningrad (Kaliningradskai︠a︡ oblastʹ)
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Hamburg
Russia (Federation)
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Germany--Frankfurt (Oder)
Netherlands--Twente
England--Suffolk
156 Squadron
anti-Semitism
B-17
bombing
bombing of Hamburg (24-31 July 1943)
Bombing of Peenemünde (17/18 August 1943)
briefing
ground personnel
Halifax
incendiary device
Lancaster
mine laying
Mosquito
Pathfinders
RAF Wyton
Scharnhorst
target indicator
Women’s Auxiliary Air Force
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/496/19743/LCookeWH2220169v1.1.pdf
a7bbedefc460e05481466090e4aaa801
Dublin Core
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Title
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Cooke, William
William H Cooke
W H Cooke
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Cooke, WH
Description
An account of the resource
15 items. An oral history interview with William Cooke (2220169 Royal Air Force), log book and other service material, medals, photographs and memorabilia. He flew operations with 49 Squadron as an air gunner.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by and catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
William H Cooke’s navigators, air bombers and air gunners flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
Navigators, air bombers and air gunners flying log book for W H Cooke, air gunner, covering the period from 3 November 1943 to 15 June 1945. Detailing his flying training and operations flown. He was stationed at RAF Bishops Court, RAF Upper Heyford, RAF Winthorpe, RAF Syerston, RAF Fiskerton, RAF Fulbeck, RAF Kolar and RAF Dhubalia. Aircraft flown in were, Anson, Wellington, Stirling, Lancaster and Liberator. He flew a total of 29 operations with 49 squadron, 8 daylight and 21 night. He also flew 2 operations with 99 squadron. Targets were, Givors, Trossey-St-Maxim, St Leu D’Esserent, Coquesville, Chattelerault, Brunswick, Ouilly, Deelan, Le Havre, Darmstadt, Stuttgart, Boulogne, Bremerhaven, Munchen-Gladbach, Munster, Karlsruhe, Kaiserslautern, Nurnburg, Bergen, Homberg, Dusseldorf, Ladbergen, Gravenhorst, Heilbronn, Geissen, Heinbach, Munich and Bilin. His pilot on operations was Flying Officer Parkin.
Creator
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Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1943-08-06
1945-06-15
Format
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One booklet
Language
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eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
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LCookeWH2220169v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Oxfordshire
Germany
France
Norway
Burma
Great Britain
India
Netherlands
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Burma--Mon State
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Caen
France--Châtellerault
France--Givors
France--Le Havre
France--Normandy
France--Oise
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Giessen (Hesse)
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Homberg (Kassel)
Germany--Hörstel
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Steinfurt (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Germany--Stuttgart
India--Bengal
India--Kolar (District)
Netherlands--Gelderland
Northern Ireland--Down (County)
Norway--Bergen
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
France--Creil
Great Britain
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1945
1944-07-26
1944-07-27
1944-08-07
1944-08-08
1944-08-09
1944-08-10
1944-08-11
1944-08-12
1944-08-13
1944-08-14
1944-08-15
1944-09-10
1944-09-11
1944-09-12
1944-09-13
1944-09-17
1944-09-18
1944-09-19
1944-09-20
1944-09-23
1944-09-24
1944-09-27
1944-09-28
1944-10-19
1944-10-20
1944-10-28
1944-10-29
1944-11-01
1944-11-02
1944-11-03
1944-11-04
1944-11-05
1944-11-06
1944-11-07
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-12-04
1944-12-06
1944-12-10
1944-12-11
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1945-06-12
1945-06-15
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
16 OTU
1661 HCU
49 Squadron
99 Squadron
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
B-24
bombing of Luftwaffe night-fighter airfields (15 August 1944)
Bombing of Trossy St Maximin (3 August 1944)
crash
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
radar
RAF Bishops Court
RAF Fiskerton
RAF Fulbeck
RAF Syerston
RAF Upper Heyford
RAF Winthorpe
Stirling
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/501/22419/BCurnockRMCurnockRMv1.2.pdf
dd6c1f8bb85b78fcd0c5a2ab7464a67a
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Curnock, Richard
Richard Murdock Curnock
R M Curnock
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Curnock, RM
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-04-18
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
92 items. An oral history interview with Warrant Officer Richard Curnock (1924, 1915605 Royal Air Force), his log book, letters, photographs and prisoner of war magazines. He flew operations with 425 Squadron before being shot down and becoming a prisoner of war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by Richard Curnock and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[photograph]
Richard Montague Curnock
My War Story
[page break]
[underlined] CONTENTS [/underlined]
Page Number
Foreword 4
World War II begins 5
Samuel William Curnock 7
Dick's War Begins 10
Dalcross 10
Wellesbourne- Warwickshire 11
Heavy Conversion Unit - Dishforth (York's) the crew is completed 13
Tolthorpe - Squadron station 14
Our First Mission 15
The Second and Final Mission 16
Prisoner of War-number 2108 17
Stalag Luft VI - Heydekrug 18
Kriegies 10 commandments 20
Torun Stalag Luft 357 25
Oerbke near Fallingsbostel 27
The Long March 27
19th April 1945 28
The end of the War nears 31
Military Transport Training 33
Horsham 34
Egypt??? 35
To Italy 36
On the Road to Bari 39
Mercy Mission to Egypt 43
Dakota back to Italy - Treviso 46
2
[page break]
Reunions 49
Appendix 1- RAF flying log book 52
i) Gunnery course results 52
ii) Gunnery training 53
iii) - vi) 22 O.T.U 54-57
vii) - viii) 1664 Conversion Unit 58 - 59
ix) 425 Squadron 60
x) Flights to visit Bob in Egypt 61
Appendix 2 - Berlin cemetery plan 62
Appendix 3 - The March 63
Appendix 4 Red Cross map of prisoner of war camps
i) Long march route and map correction information 65
ii) Long march route 66
iii) Blue cross in circle marks where Dick was shot down. Red
cross near Frankfurt where he was moved to 67
iv) Red line shows route taken by Dick. Torun (Thorn camp) 68
v) Poznan - Stalag Luft XXI D 69
vi) Stalag Luft VI - Lithuania 70
3
[page break]
Foreword
The following writings are a combination of Dick's recollections as he remembers them in 2013/14. Also within are additions (in blue) from earlier recordings by Barbara, and information taken from his Wartime log (given to him by the Red Cross when in his first POW camp). And from his RAF navigator's; air bomber's and air gunner's flying log book.
Richard Montague Curnock (in his own words January 2014)
I was speaking just recently to Shirley and Steph about the anniversary of the shooting of the 50 POW's that attempted the escape from Stalag Luft 3, as I was at that time also a prisoner in another camp and was recounting how we took the news of this wholesale murder of our fellow airmen, also what the Germans retaliated with was an excuse for their prisoners over in North Africa having to sleep in tents (which anybody knows most troops lived that way in the desert) they took all our mattresses off the bunk beds, which left us with about five or six bed boards only and one blanket too sleep on, also we had two tables and a few chairs to each room, these they also removed.
All this happened whilst we were herded out of huts on to the parade ground where we were surrounded by hundreds of the German army in lorries with mounted machine guns, also the troops were on the ground with machine guns also lying on the roofs of the huts were virtually surrounded and all you could see guns pointing your way.
4
[page break]
[underlined] World War II begins [/underlined]
Guess it is time for me to start this saga of my war time story, which started when it was announced that Hitler had not replied to our letter stating of no reply had been heard from them by 11am on 3rd September 1939 then we would be at war with them, no reply so we were at war again.
I was a fifteen year old and had been working for a year and half, the first twelve months in a piano shop on Belgrave Road, was sacked for not dusting the violins and bows that hung on the walls "enough times".
My day started at 8.45 washing the front of the shop which was on a corner, so had two large windows and tiles along under the window, then dust all the pianos and they needed polishing regularly, sweeping regularly, attending to customers who wanted to pay for the their [sic] pianos which they paid for weekly. Pianos were priced at the lower being 12 pounds for an upright and 15 pound for an over strung, we had a special made for a customer a baby grand, the wood used was walnut and cost 35 pounds was on show for a week.
[photograph]
Dick, Sam, Bob and Mary, Minehead Street. 1940-1
Next job was making boot polish and paint that was used in the boot and shoe industry. My job was delivering the product to a lot of factories in Leicester and as far as Wigston and Oadby on a bike with a large basket over the front wheel, which held quite a lot of cans, they weighed nearly as much as I did that's another story.
5
[page break]
[photograph] [photograph]
Dick in ATC uniform 1941 Bob, Dick, Sam and Mary (1941)
6
[page break]
[underlined] Samuel William Curnock [/underlined]
[photograph]
Samuel William Curnock RAFVR: newly qualified sergeant pilot 1942
Brother Sam was already in the RAF and over in Canada training to be a pilot and I had then joined the Air Training Corps on third September 1941 as an aircrew cadet, brother Bob I believe was waiting to go into the RAF as a trainee pilot, I believe that during his tour over there Sam was killed in a flying accident at Gibraltar in 1942 (26th September 1942).
7
[page break]
[photograph]
Our flying crews have their recreation room at the United Kingdom landplane base
Sam (second from left) in a recreation room
There was nothing to how the accident happened but that the aircraft crashed into the sea at Gibraltar with no survivors. The pilot was a senior captain, Sam was a second pilot officer and they had an officer wireless operator. We were led to believe it could have been sabotage but no one knew.
It was then I decided I would get in the RAF quicker if I re-mustered as an air gunner instead of waiting for my pilot navigator course to come through.
In 2009 Peter and Jayne received a phone call from Jonathan Falconer who was researching Sam Curnock, the extract below gives more information on the circumstances of Sam's death than the family had ever known before.
Extract from "Names in Stone"-Jonathan Falconer.
Sam had volunteered to join the RAF in October 1940 on his eighteenth birthday, just as the fortunes of the RAF seemed to be swinging in its favour after the desperate air battles of the Battle of Britain in the summer months. He learnt to fly on Tiger Moths at 7 Elementary Flying Training School, Desford; Leicestershire. Before sailing to Canada; for further flying training at 73 Service Flying Training School; north Battleford, Saskatcheqan [sic] .
Sam qualified as a pilot and returned to England. With a shortage of flight crews for civil aircraft he was transferred in May 1942 to fly transport aircraft with Britain's national airline; BOAC.
in September 1942, Sam was Second Officer in the four-man crew of Whitley MK V, G-AGCI, which was operated by BOAC on its route between the UK and Gibraltar. Thirty-three year old Capt Charles Browne was in command of "Charlie-India".
8
[page break]
Charlie-India had flown into Gibraltar from England on 10th September 1942 and the aircraft's Master had stated in his Voyage Report that the aircraft was tail-heavy for the landing. The aircraft left again for England on 13th September, but her Master decided to turn back after only 25 minutes, reporting that Charlie India was now flying nose heavy.
Not long before his death, Sam was second pilot in a BOAC Whitley that crashed in England on take-off due to engine failure. He was uninjured and managed to walk away from the wreckage. In the fortnight that remained before her fatal crash, Charlie-India was the subject of several engineering inspections and three test flights after report by several pilots of nose and tail heaviness during flight. These problems appeared cured, but on 19th September the Master reported that Charlie-India was underpowered during take off and the initial climb, and unstable in flight. A further detailed inspection was carried out and another test flight was arranged.
To add to Charlie-India's woes, on 24th September the twin Bristol Hercules engines of an RAF Beaufighter was run up on Gibraltar's tarmac, tail on to the BOAC Whitley. The powerful propeller wash from the two radial engines caused damage to the trailing edge of the Whitley's elevators and the rudder trim tabs. Engineers made temporary repairs to the elevators, the damaged trim tab mechanisms were replaced, and a test flight was arranged for 3.56pm on 26th September.
With Charles Browne in command and Sam and the rest of the crew, Charlie-India took off normally from Gibraltar's east-west runway at 3.56pm and climbed out over the Bay of Gibraltar to about 300 feet, whereupon Browne eased the Whitley into a left-hand turn. Then something went badly wrong because the aircraft assumed a power glide attitude and continued in a shallow dive until it struck the sea at 3.59pm, sinking almost immediately in more than 900 feet of water.
Naval vessels were on the scene within minutes. Apart from a few small items of wreckage floating on the surface, the aircraft was not recovered. There were no survivors from her crew of four, and no bodies were ever recovered.
BOAC's technical investigators launched an immediate inquiry into the crash and on 29th October 1942 they made their report. Its conclusion was based more on informed speculation than hard fact, but in the absence of any wreckage or survivors this was the best that could be hoped for: "The precise cause of the accident cannot be determined, but a possible cause was an uncontrollable elevator trimmer tab due to a fracture in some part of the actuating mechanism .... There exists a possibility that subsequent to the take off one or both of the elevator trimmer tab mechanisms fractured, with the result that the Master was unable to maintain longitudinal control of the aircraft."
9
[page break]
[underlined] Dick's war begins [/underlined]
22nd March 1943; When l was 18 and 11 months I was called up (RAF (V.R) volunteer Reserve) and was sent a rail warrant for travel to London and Lord's cricket ground which was the Aircrew Receiving Centre (A.C.R.C) for al! aircrew candidates were we were kitted out and billeted in hotels all around the St Johns Wood area, loads of marching around going from one lecture to another with lots of marching exercises around the hotels, and in between times you were taken to a medical centre for inoculation, stand in line both arms bared, left arm two injections one inoculation right arm then out to the street, where there were bodies al! over the place, some bodies flat out other holding their arms and moaning. When they managed to get all of us in some semblance of order, we marched back to our hotels, but swinging of arms was painful and was not done with any energy.
After our initiation into RAF life we were on a train to Bridlington to learn navigation, armaments mathematics- aircraft recognition plus as always plenty of marching from one lecture to another, one other pastime was Morse code and the Aldis lamp, this was done with someone being sent to the end of the breakwater with an instructor with an Aldis lamp and they sent signals to the rest of us on the beach in twos, one reading the signal being sent and your friend writing it down, we used got some very weird messages at end of a session.
My next stage of training after Bridlington was Bridgnorth where unfortunately there was an outbreak of scarlet fever and German measles and unfortunately I happened to catch German measles and was put into an isolation hut, one of many for the recruits who had caught one of the diseases. I was put into a room of my own and had two weeks being looked after very well by a WAAF nurse during the day, and my night nurse who looked after me exceptionally well and was a lovely young lady. And as my condition improved she brought a radio into my room and we managed to have a dance and then she would tuck me up for the night with a cuddle and kiss goodnight.
After two weeks it was back to work where we did have a lot of lectures about armaments - aircraft recognition - Morse code with mathematics also but mainly armaments, how to dismantle a machine gun and also put it back and hope it worked alright.
Aircraft recognition was a priority knowing which the enemy was and which ours. My time spent with aircraft recognition at home kept me getting top marks in every exam we did, we had night vision exams where pictures were shown on a screen as if you were in a turret and had to identify the aircraft shown, my trouble was the fellows around me were always asking me what the aircraft was, the instructor stopped me helping them, he said that they would not be any use unless they got to know themselves. From then on I was removed from my seat and had to sit by the light switches turning them on and off as required. After finishing this course my instructors gave me a very good report and should get on well.
[underlined] Dalcross [/underlined]
Dick RAF flying log book information can be seen in appendix 1
My section was then sent on leave for a week after which we had to board a train to Scotland, destination was a place called Dalcross (near Inverness, Moray Firth) which turned out to be our Initial Flying Training course on Avro Ansons.
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Pilots converting on to twin engine Airspeed Oxford after training in Canada. This was now 17.7.43 and my course here lasted until 28.8.43 (appendix i) and ii)). The training consisted of being taken up in Avro Ansons six training gunners and an instructor we took it in turns to sit in the turret which had one gun in it attached was a camera which we had to train on a fighter aircraft which made a dummy attack on you, all exciting stuff, except when the fighter was late arriving and you had to fly round and round a church steeple, that was when my last coffee and biscuit decided to reappear, this happened three times, each time I was sent to the sick bay and gave an explanation of what was happening, I was given a glass of horrible liquid and told to report back for more flying. This occurred twice more by that time my stomach stopped playing around and settled down to the rigours of flying.
We also had firing with the one gun at a drone towed behind another aircraft and our bullets had colours on the tips so that they could record the number of hits. Our results were pathetic as the guns would only fire two bullets at a time and then jam so you then had to rearm it; we also used camera guns with which we had more success.
It also happened to be a training camp for pilots on night flying on airspeed oxfords.
Bob had by this time gained his pilots wings in Canada and was back in England and was posted to Dalcross near Inverness. I think this was during July 1943 and August 1943 to train on twin engine Airspeed Oxfords. Neither of us knew we were there until one evening we were going into Inverness and just happened to be walking down the road to catch the bus into town when I spotted Bob who was as surprised as I was; from then on we spent a bit of time together until he was posted elsewhere.
I continued at Dalcross to become a Sergeant air gunner had quite a good report from all the training staff and was given above average report from most of the tutors, not that it helped much as the ammunition we were using had a wide flange on the bullet casing as it was American and caused it to stick, you could only fire a couple of rounds and then you had to re-cock it again, life was hard on us.
[underlined] Wellesbourne- Warwickshire - meet the crew [/underlined]
18.9.1943. (Appendix iii) t [sic] vi)) My next posting was to Wellesbourne (Warwickshire) the Operational Training Unit to start being crewed up with members of a crew. The procedure was for the pilots to have a chat with the navigators, wireless operators, bomb aimers and air gunners and then ask the ones he wished to be his crew if they would join him Charlie (Chuck) Stowell, the pilot picked Bob Friskey as navigator then Eugene Fullum our wireless operator, the next was our bomb aimer Gordon Dinsmore, which left the rear gunner, which I believe was unanimous decision by them all that was me. We then spent our time getting to know each other; that is we went out at night doing a spot of drinking and rather a lot of talking or the other way round.
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[photograph]
Bob Friskey, Eugene Fullom and Chuck Stowell
[photograph]
A copy of the only photo of the crew: Back row: Bob Friskey, Gordon Dinsmore
Front row: Eugene Fullom, Dick Curnock, Chuck Stowell
This was at Gaydon the satellite airfield to Wellsbourne, here we started flying as a crew in the Wellington bomber, doing practice bombing at targets on the coast and various places also we had
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fighter aircraft doing dummy attacks during which I had a camera gun and it recorded my success against these attacks we also did firing at a draught [sic] towed behind another aircraft, with our bullets being painted different colours so they could count the number of hits we scored. This proved to be very hap hazard as the ammunition we were using was American and every second round got stuck in the breech and had to be manually ejected so our scores were very low. We did quite a lot of cross country flying for the navigators to gain experience a lot of it at night time.
We also did a lot of circuit flying at night so that the pilot could manage to get us back to the airfield safely. Some nights were a bit bumpy as he misjudged his height, my head used to get a lot of knocks on these occasions and the skippers name was anything but "Chuck".
[drawing]
Picture drawn by Dick whilst a prisoner of war
[underlined] Heavy Conversion Unit - Dishforth (Yorks) - the crew is completed [/underlined]
14.1.1944. ( appendix vii and viii) We moved on next to a conversion unit which meant going onto four engine aircraft this was at Dishforth (near Ripon, Yorks) 1664 Heavy conversion unit. The aircraft was a four engine Halifax bomber for which we needed two extra crew; a mid upper gunner and a flight engineer. These we met and we all moved into a hut so that we would could get know each other. The mid upper gunner was a Canadian from a farming background a rather slow on the uptake but we got on well together. The engineer was from Salford a tall lad and red haired. The mid upper gunner was Wesley (Wes) Skerick and the engineer was Ginger Wheadon.
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[photograph] [photograph]
Ginger Wheadon Wes Skerick
At this stage we were beginning to get to know each other and in the evenings we were usually down in mess having some light refreshments, Bob Friskey didn't very often come, as he had not been married very long and took to writing to his wife almost every evening, so the rest of us went into Burroughbridge [sic] the nearest town to have a few beers, this we managed quite well with a another couple of Canadians from another crew who Chuck knew, and we each bought a round of drinks which lasted us most of the evening.
[underlined] Tolthorpe - Squadron station [/underlined]
7.2.1944. (Appendix ix) We then moved from Dishforth on to our squadron station which was at Tolthorpe near Easingwold still up in Yorkshire. It was the only French Canadian squadron from Canada, although all spoke English there was a lot of French spoken between most of the other crews, also most of the senior officers were from French ancestors. They could get very aggressive to each other as happened one evening later on.
Here there were four squadrons of Halifax bombers with around 60 planes. The squadrons with mainly Canadian or French/Canadian crews were:
[picture of 425 Squadron crest]
420 Snowy Owl
425 Alouette (the Lark- Dick's squadron)
431 Iroquois
434 Blue Nose
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We did lots of night cross country to various parts of the England to give the navigator, targets to find and which would be our target to bomb later on, also we had a bombing range which we had to find and drop practice smoke bombs on and from a certain height, some pilots tried to drop from a lower height so that they were getting better results and a higher percentage of hits. Not our pilot he said we would go as high as the aircraft could climb and then drop our bombs, which we did, only to be told on our return we were still too low, to which the skipper said that the Wellington couldn't climb any higher, and the rear gunner had a tin of drink in his flying suit pocket that was frozen no more was said on the subject.
We as a crew were sent to a camp which was to improve our fitness, which we didn't think was necessary as we all felt fit and well, we were allocated a hut and promptly forgot, we went for meals regularly and were not called on to do anything apart from eat and sleep, Eugene Gordon and myself walked around the fields and found where they were growing swedes, carrots, turnips, so we borrowed a few and cooked them on our stove in the hut and with other bits from the cookhouse and had some good meals in the evenings. Fortunately we were only there for about 10 days, and then were sent to squadron.
The squadron was from Canada and had only been in England a short while and we joined it at the end of January 1944 in which time we got to know the aircraft we to fly in, it was a Halifax MK3 K.W.U for Uncle. Unfortunately for us we only did about 14 hours training on our aircraft.
[photograph of Halifax bomber]
Halifax Bomber
[underlined] Our First Mission [/underlined]
February 24th/25th we were called for a briefing and found we were due to fly a bombing trip to a place called Swinefurt [sic] , a long trip to the south of Germany which would be an eight hour round trip but unfortunately the port outer engine decided to cause a problem and stopped altogether, we couldn't climb to our bombing height due to lack of power and could not carry on at this low height, so the skipper decided we had best abort and return to base dropping our bomb load at sea. Which we did, and landed back at air station about three hours after take off. Not a good start at all, but the fault was found to be a blockage in the fuel pipe to the engine.
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[underlined] The Second and Final Mission [/underlined]
February 25th/26th we were on our second trip which was a bombing raid on Augsburg (North West of Munich) to bomb a factory making ball bearings for tanks, from which we failed to return. Our aircraft was hit by anti aircraft fire and both the engines on our left side were put out of action and caught fire. The noise it made when the shell hit our left side was like a firework being let off inside a dustbin. Then the next thing was flames coming past my turret Chuck our skipper came over our intercom asking if we were all uninjured which he did by calling each one by name. Then he said that we were not going to keep going, so had to bale out, each one of us saying we understood, good luck and made ready to bale out. What to do first I thought, disconnect my intercom, then the oxygen tube, think we were flying at a height of around twenty four thousand feet so would I have enough oxygen to keep going to get my parachute which was in a rack in the fuselage and then get the panel open in the fuselage floor for myself and mid upper - which was Wes to jump out. We shook hands and shouted good luck and looked down through the hatch to see the flames from the engines flying by so put my leg out and flow of air pulled the rest of me out!!
Suddenly everywhere is quiet, you are supposed to count to ten before pulling the ripcord to your parachute by the time I counted up to four I didn't hear any noise so pulled my ripcord and was instantly jerked upright, with my flying suit collar up round my ears and it was very quiet.
My thoughts whilst drifting down were varied and very worrying to say the least, it had my thoughts in turmoil.
Below was a patchwork due to snow and could have been fields, but from a height of 20000 feet there was no telling what it was going to be. My thoughts of a church spire came to mind or there was an industrial town down there with factories with tall chimneys also electric power cables, or a town with tall house and me hanging from the roof. The later [sic] was near to it as I came down between two poplar trees and I landed in a town house garden in an apple tree. I had my parachute hanging up in the tree, which I decided to pull down but it must have snagged and a piece ripped off and was left hanging in the tree what I had pulled down and bundled up and slipped under some buses [sic] . I then decided to find a way out of the garden; so removed my flying kit as I would be very conspicuous walking around in it. At that time I was just in my battle dress getting very cold, I then found a road running alongside the garden, so jumped over the wall onto a road started walking past some large houses all about five stories high, I had landed in a large residential area of a town. Then the siren for what I presumed was an air raid starting, so I walked up another road to miss people around that area, then the siren started again and people started running around (I discovered later that they had two sirens at the start of a raid and also two all clears) by which time I was back to where I had landed in the garden. So I hopped back over the wall and decided to put my flying suit back on as I was feeling very cold.
What to do now I thought; sleep seemed the best option or wake someone up and tell them who I was and call the police. I ended up curling up and sleeping and was woken by a squirrel running around me and then two elderly ladies coming our of the house next door and saw a piece of my parachute stuck up the tree, they shouted and ran back indoors and about 10 minutes later a policeman came down the garden path with a little pistol pointing at me and said hands up or words to that effect. Which I obliged, he then told me to take off my flying suit and go in front of him where
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he had left his cycle, and for me to put my clothes on his bike and we walked into the town to a police station. There were lots of people in the police station a lot were ex army with battle scars but quite polite, except one old boy who should have been in a home for the elderly along time ago, saying we would never win the war by sending us over to spy on them.
[underlined] Prisoner of War -number 2108 [/underlined] (Appendix 4 - iii) -Red Cross Map of prisoner of war camps)
I was then escorted to the Gestapo headquarters in the town which I discovered was Darmstadt (South East of Frankfurt) (on this journey Dick cut up his parachute with his penknife so that it couldn't be used by the Germans), and there met up with Wes, Eugene and Gordon whilst waiting there a rather irate man came in and picked up a chair and was going to hit Eugene with it, but fortunately I was able to stop the blow hitting Eugene with my flying suit, we found out later that Eugene had fractured his spine, releasing himself from his parachute harness whilst still hanging along way from the ground, which meant he had to go to a hospital so we didn't have any further contact with him.
Wes, Gordon and self were then taken by two armed guards to a building being used by the Police and handed over to Dulagluft Interrogation HQ on a tramcar with civilians on board who looked at us rather hostile, good job we had a couple of Luftwaffe guards with us, on the way through the streets there were a number of bodies hanging from lampposts turned out to be American airmen shot down on an earlier raid, quite a jolt to the system.
At the Interrogation HQ all our belongings were taken from us and we were then put into a cell with only a bed and a chair in it, no windows and an electric light on all the time, so you didn't know what part of the day or night it was. Dick became prisoner of war number 2108.
Then every so often an officer came in and said he was from the Red Cross and he would make sure that my parents would be notified where I was and was alright, but was being held in Germany as a prisoner of war and would be able to write once we had been sent to a POW camp. This treatment went on for quite a time you didn't know what day it was or time of day, we were fed soup and black bread and had brown water which they said was coffee, two or three times I was taken out and interviewed by an officer who told me who our commanding officer was and he had a daughter, had I met her, and then proceeded to tell me about the Halifax bomber but it wasn't doing much damage and we were losing them at a fare [sic] rate every night. When after a few days we were taken into the camp and given an American plastic suitcase in which was all manner of toiletries and clothes -a pair of slip on slippers, a towel, a face flannel, soap, toothbrush, toothpaste, comb, pyjamas, packet of pipe tobacco and a pipe, packet of twenty cigarettes, some vest and pants, a bar of chocolate a meal can opener, also an American army shirt.
We stayed there for a short while until they had enough bodies to fill up a lot of cattle trucks to take us to our next camp. I was then issued with our name and prisoner of war number, mine being 2108 and made of metal, we still had only our battledress uniforms and it was February so felt the cold. (Appendix 4 - iv)
Then one morning we were paraded on the square with our cases and marched off to the railway yard where our train awaited, there was no difference between first and third class, you were just herded along and pushed up into a cattle truck 20 prisoners into each end of the wagon (The wagons had written on the side - 40 hommes or 8 cheveaux, this became part of the POW insignia after the war),
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with the centre section for the guards, so each wagon was divided into compartments by a wire netting wall. There were no toilets so you had to wait until we had been shunted off the mainline and were then allowed to do your do's sitting on a log which was alongside the railway line, at first it was very embarrassing but after three or four days you didn't bother just got on with it.
We had a stop each day for a bowl of soup and drink of so called coffee. Forgot to mention that each truck had a guard sitting on top of the wagon and must have been covered in smoke from the engines. Sleeping was almost impossible with twenty people in a small space, but you managed you might have had feet by your head or a bottom, because the only pillow you had was your plastic suitcase.
I didn't keep a record of how long the train trip was but was told it was ten to twelve days, we passed through a couple of large stations but could only see out through the gaps in the sides of the trucks as the guards closed the doors, were surprised at one station when we went slowly past a train of open trucks packed with people they were either Jews or displaced persons being taken to places of forced labour, we couldn't pass them anything so had to just let them pass without being able to speak to them.
[underlined] Stalag Luft VI - Heydekrug [/underlined] (Appendix 4 - vi)
We finally arrived at our destination Heydekrug (in Lithuania) and Stalaf Luft 6 which meant in German prison camp for airmen. This was in East Prussia on the Baltic coast and was built on sand, so that tunnels couldn't be dug in the sandy soil, that didn't stop some of the hot heads from trying. Only one was tried and the Germans had some idea this was happening and brought a motor roller in to run up and down between the huts, it found a tunnel starting out between two huts and it sank into the sand about six feet and was stuck for two days, when they finally tried to move it, they couldn't start it as a lot of the parts had somehow gone missing, the Germans never did the same trick again.
All the crew members met up again here, except for Eugene, who was in hospital. The camp was divided into 3 compounds, two of which contained 2,000 men, the third being smaller held 1,000 men. Dick was in one of the larger compounds, with 60 men to a room. Dick and Ginger were in the same hut, the other crew members elsewhere.
We had some good men who cold [sic] turn their hands to anything and make things out of bits and pieces, one being a clock which went backwards made from an old gramophone. Also we had radios I think there were two, both were built inside Dixie's which was an eating and cooking pot.
We had some well educated lads with as a lot of early aircrew were from college undergraduates who were in the call up age range, so they started up classes in the camp on a variety of subjects, and you could qualify for a degree as the Red Cross got permission from the Germans for this to happen. One of the POWs that made use of the books was Peter Thomas, who became a Welsh MP after the war and later Lord Thomas.
My only inroad into anything like this was to draw in our POW book, we were issued with, like a diary was the drawing of the aircraft they flew in and the air force inscription over the top; and I charged one cigarette for each drawing, not a lot but helped out. I believe a number of people at home sent me cigarettes through the Red Cross but only two tins of tobacco got through to me, these were St
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Bruno and they lasted me some time. They would have lasted longer but I used to roll some into cigarettes and fellows used to drop by for a couple of puffs.
[drawing of book]
One of Dick's drawings
Dick also found a talent for needlework. He unpicked the silk lining from his flying boots, and made a cravat, with the RAF crest embroidered on it.
Cigarettes were used as currency for buying food, if and when the Red Cross food parcels arrived, they were divided up and were allocated, as 1 parcel between seven or ten men, not a lot, but as some kriegies didn't want some of the item they sold them for cigarettes. (Kriegies was short for Kriegesgefangenen which is the German word for prisoner of war)
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[underlined] Kriegies 10 commandments [/underlined]
[drawing of scroll]
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We had radios which were hidden in various places. In our hut we had the men who looked after the radios. One evening after being shut in, lookouts kept watch whilst repairs were being done. Suddenly someone shouted Goons up. An officer with three men plus an Alsatian dog walked in, the tables were cleared very quickly, everything dropped into a carton and passed down the lower bunks, it arrived at my bunk and I had nowhere to pass it to so I hid it under my knees under a blanket and picked up a book to read. The dog came sniffing around but kept on going by, when I sort of came too I found my book which I was supposedly reading was upside down. Good job the dog didn't notice it.
[drawing of hut interior]
Inside one of the huts in a camp
Mornings started with the overnight latrine bucket having to be emptied, not a nice job we had a rota in the hut and two of us had to take a 30 to 40 litre container almost full and take it and empty it at the toilet block you invariably finished up rather damp and needed a good wash.
Next it was the guards shouting "RAUS!" get out the parade ground for morning head count and anything that the Germans thought we should know, like how well they were doing in the war but didn't say where.
After the head count which could take quite some time, they couldn't agree on the figures and had to do it again sometimes it was our own faults [sic] for moving around whilst they tried to count us.
Finally all was right so off for breakfast the German rations were not very plentiful. It started with what they said was coffee, first in the morning, but what it was made with didn't question, but it was hot and with adding powered milk you drank it, it had to be fetched from the cookhouse in metal jugs.
Dinner was usually a soup of some sort could just be potato or sauerkraut and on a good day you were given corned beef which was send to the camp from Argentina, another soup was swede with potatoes, we were also issued with a fish cheese which was not very palatable but you ate it.
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Bread, black was issued per day, it varied in the amount which was either 6 or 10 persons sharing a loaf which was about 8 or 9 inches long about 4 inches wide and could be 3 1/2 to 4 1/2 inches deep that is they were thicker one end than the other, so one can imagine trying to share it out to either a combination of three or twelve.
Then to the cookhouse for our very large cans of ertzats [sic] coffee I still don't know what it was made of but it was wet and warm and washed down your breakfast if you ever had any. You were dreaming about eggs and bacon and toast and marmalade but didn't make a habit of it.
The next part of the morning was spent washing and shaving or not then cleaning up your space and making it tidy, then any washing you had to do for which you had to boil water which meant finding some material to burn, bed boards were used but there was a limit to how many you could sleep without and still have a straight back. As I previously mentioned classes were being held in huts all around the camp during the day also we had the parade ground on which was played sports, football, rugby, rounder's and also they had physical exercises for those who wanted it, we had a stream running through a part of the camp which was used to see who could jump it in one go! If not you had a free foot wash and legs and shorts!!
During the evenings one of our newsreaders would come in the hut, with days news that had been listened to on one of the radios (Daily Express reporter Cyril Aynsley was one who took it down in shorthand), some of us would keep watch at the door and be ready to stop the reader if any Germans happened to be about.
Most nights it was a nightly ritual to have a walk, around your section of the camp and have a chat with anyone and everyone. Then back to your hut for a late evening drink of tea or coffee which entailed lighting up your blower to boil the water. When we then had to either get to bed or light a candle and try and read but not for long.
[cartoon drawing of brew up]
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[photograph of washing facilities]
Washing facilities of Stalag 357 Fallingbostel
Our washing and shaving facilities were very limited, with some of the camps having the washing troughs in the open, ours were inside, just a trough with cold water running along it with holes in it about 18 inches in between to allow the water to run out into another trough below. If you wanted hot water it meant you had to get the blower out find some paper - cardboard or wood to burn to get some hot water. Wood was hard to come by unless you used your bed boards, which left you with another bend in your back. So it was usually a cold water shave and not everyday.
There was a shower room but this was situated about half a mile from the camp and we were taken there under guard once in about six weeks, why it was so far from the camp no one knew.
We were searched on leaving the camp and again when we returned, what they thought we would steal from room which only had showers and all in one large room. The water was switched on for about 10 minutes so you had to be quick.
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[letter confirming POW status]
Letter received by Dick’s Father, from the Chaplain at Tolthorpe
We were allowed to write home one letter and two postcards each month, which I think most of us took the opportunity, although it took quite a long time for the first ones to come from home. My first on arrived on August 14th having been sent from home on May 28th in all I think my mail total for my stay in Germany was a total of 42. 34 from Mum and Dad and a further 8 from friends and the caterpillar club confirming I had become a member.
[photograph of family] [reverse of photograph]
Family photo Dick received, the reverse shows the German censor’s mark
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There was a lot of aircrew arriving in the camp that they had to get two large tents and add them on to the rows of huts, each one held a further hundred men which didn't help our food rations. Not long after this we were told that we were to be moved into Germany.
[underlined] Torun Stalag Luft 357 [/underlined] (Appendix 4 - iv)
The place was actually in a part of Poland which had been the Polish Corridor and was Thorn or Torun Stalag 357. So we had to get packed up and ready to go in two days as the Russians were headed our way, so it was take the essentials, our pots and pans and the blower which was used for heating water mostly; any food plus your blanket and toiletries any spare clothes, some of the Canadian families had sent things over which were ice skates and baseball bats, most of which were left behind.
A wind up gramophone was smashed up plus all the records, and on the walk to where we had to board our cattle trucks which was about two miles away the road or more like a country track for carts was littered with discarded equipment people decided they could do without.
Once we were at the train which was waiting us at the trackside, no station. We were herded into the cattle trucks, 40 persons per truck; 20 bodies in each end of the truck. The centre used for the guards. They also had a guard sitting on top of each wagon wearing goggles and had a machine gun.
This trip took us about five days and nights on a slow train to Torun (on the river Vistula), and one wasn't very clean and tidy upon arrival.
The others at Heydekrug that were being shipped by boat from the port of Memel had a very bad time on the boat as they were herded into the hold of a boat and spent between five and seven days on board in horrible conditions on the way to a camp in Germany.
Our trip by train took about five days of shake rattle and very uncomfortable and one stop a day for the toilet, and sad to say we had to use a corner of the truck to relieve ones self.
We arrived at Thorun, which was a large camp mainly army prisoners and we were crowded into huts about 120-140 per hut and the meals we had were very poor in quality and quantity. We were only there for 6 weeks and once again were on our cooks tour again, back into our 40 hommes or 6 cheveaux carriages with a small amount of straw spread across the floor which had large gaps between the floor boards and no central heating, and again another train journey of six days to our next camp which was Fallingshostel [sic] which was about 80 miles north of Hanover. This again was an army camp but now accommodated American air force as well as us British and was split into three separate camps which also included a Russian compound. (Appendix 4 - i) and ii)
Also around this time I wanted some shoes as mine were about paper thin and I managed to get a brown pair of American army boots which was just what was needed if we were going for a long walk.
The huts were the usual having two tier bunks down each side of the room and a further rows [sic] up the centre of the room, with a large stove in the centre which wasn't used as there was no fuel for it.
The cookhouse supplied us with what was called coffee and made from what we really never found out what, but we called it coffee because it was brown. The food from the cookhouse was mainly
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some sort of soup, mainly potatoes with some sauerkraut like cabbage added. Sometimes we would have a ration of corned beef which the Argentineans sent over in bulk for us and very good too. We did also had what the Germans called cheese, but it tasted very fishy but never quite found out what its origin was our supplies of Red Cross parcels were getting few and far between with so much disruption on the railway.
Where they originally intended to have one parcel person per week, we were now having to make do with one parcel for ten men and had to last them a week or longer until more arrived.
Being closer to some large towns we now had the sounds of bombers targeting them at nights, we also had some low flying Mosquitoes shooting up the railway not far from us.
We all stood outside the hut watching when one of the guards shouted at us to get inside; of course no one moved so he took his rifle off his shoulder and put a bullet in the chamber. But forgot there was one already in, so it sent a round flying out onto the ground. The old fellow looked at us shrugged his shoulders picked up the bullet and left us to watch.
[photograph of prisoners]
Prisoners of war watching allied aircraft - inside Fallingbostel
Life here was not very good as there were too many of us cramped into huts, we did have an unusual game some evenings - because as it got dusk we had some large flying insects around, about an inch to inch and half long with a hard shell body. We used to wait them and then hit them with a wooden stick, scoring two points for a certain hit and one point for a probable; you had to produce a body for the two points. But there wasn't any prizes for a high score only a mess of squashed bodies.
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[underlined] Oerbke near Fallingbostel [/underlined]
The news we had from the Germans was that during the next couple of weeks we would be leaving camp and would be marching north to a holding area somewhere near Hamburg.
Our last camp at Oerbke near Fallingbostel was very large and housed British soldiers - some Russians also American airmen, the war was drawing to a close and the Russians were approaching us from the East and the Allies from the South so the beginning of April 1945 we going to be made to leave the camp in sections and carrying all our possessions. (Appendix 4 – i) and ii)
[underlined] The Long March [/underlined]
There is more information on the Long March in appendix 3
Whatever a holding area was meant to be for and why they would want us there was never discovered. There was a lot of speculation that they were going to drive us into the Baltic and drown us or otherwise just put us in barbed wire enclosure and leave us, but they didn't.
Instead we were marched out of the camp early April to begin a long trek northwards. The first lot we were marched out of camp April 6th in parties of about 500, everybody loaded with bags and blankets a box of food, a water bottle and all your clothes which didn't amount to much. I was glad that I had been given a new pair of army boots, also an overcoat, French army blue but very thin and not very waterproof but better than nothing. We covered varying distances each day, the weather varied from wet and windy to very cold, and we were not sure where would be sleeping the next evening.
It turned out that first night which was rather wet with rain, our accommodation was a field, no trees or high hedges to shelter us so it was rather a nasty start to our walk, which was on rough tracks through farmland and we managed to collect some vegetables from fields we passed although the guards were told to shoot anyone found doing it, which meant just about everybody.
Our second night was under the stars in a field.
It was on our third day we arrived in a village and were taken in to the church for our nights lodging sleeping anywhere you could lay out on the pews and under them and in the aisles. We had to boil water outside for our tea, on our blowers.
As we progressed each day through the county we saw American aircraft by their vapour trails going on some bombing mission.
There were some days after marching or should say walking, or hobbling, that we would finish up in a farmyard, this was welcome as we soon found eggs about. Some lucky lads found barns that were not in use as the cattle were in the fields; this allowed chicken and sometimes a small pig to enter the barn which was quickly turned into a meal.
One occasion was a nice bit of garden behind a barn that was full of ripe rhubarb, must have been about 10 feet wide and 14 feet long, within a very short time it was clear, the farmer was furious, he got an officer who said he would punish any prisoner found with stewed rhubarb. He walked around
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with the farmer looking in every saucepan or a fire, in which lo and behold they were full of stewing rhubarb, he just shrugged his shoulders and that was it.
Later in the month we had to cross the river Elbe by a railway bridge, but as we approached it there was a column of tiger tanks coming over and their tracks were breaking up the road as they passed. Our guards suddenly vanished into air raid shelters and circling over the bridge was one Spitfire. With the Germans firing at him with machine guns mounted on the ends of the towers at the ends of the railway bridge, but they were nowhere near hitting him as they fired miles behind him. They were useless.
When it quietened down and the tanks had all gone our guards came out of their air raid shelter and herded us across the bridge.
We must have covered a fare [sic] distance as we have been walking every day from the 6th April and it is now midway through April and the weather is improving, but our lodgings don't improve, the villages we go through gave us drinks of water and now the guards turn a blind eye.
It must have been mid April that was about the 18th April that we stayed at a farm that was rather run down and neglected. Cow sheds were filthy and hadn't been cleared so no one could sleep in them so we were in the open up against walls. I was itching around my waist and found that it was lice, so I needed a good wash, but where so had a look around and discovered a duck pond covered in greed [sic] weed, there had to be water under the weed, so clothes off make a hole ain [sic] the weed and lower myself into about 8 inches of water and a foot of mud, it was wonderful and I got rid of a lot of the lice.
We stayed one night in a farm where the farmer had a stable for a couple of horse, on a walk round with another chap, I found this stable and it had a water tank on top, so we had a look and found a pipe leading down from the roof with a large tap at the base, we hurried back for our toiletries and towels. I said you sit in front of the tap which was about 4 inches across and I will turn it on, which I did, and oh dear the water came out with such force he shot backwards across the cobbled floor on his bottom. He said you wait until it is your turn. It was a wonderful feeling to get your self refreshed.
[underlined] 19th April 1945 [/underlined]
Still moving North on about the 19th April we were informed that at our next stopping place we were going to get a Red Cross food parcel, one parcel per man at a place named Gresse, this was very good news as it was about three weeks since we last had one.
We were walking through a rather large forest for quite some miles now and were informed that on the other side we would be issued with our parcels.
We had been living on soup some overnight stops and now and again ertzats [sic] coffee reputedly made from acorns.
So to be handed a parcel for your self was out of this world and very much needed. So we came out of the forest along a track which was about 18 feet wide and had about another 6 or 8 feet either side which was about a foot lower and then a few trees sort of along the edge after them were fields and quite a lot more trees.
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At this time we were having a rest on the track starting to open up our parcels, when we heard some aircraft flying parallel to us about half a mile away. They sounded like Hurricanes so could be ours so kept sorting our parcels, when we heard these load explosions coming down the road towards us. The aircraft turned out to be our own Typhoons equipped with rockets and cannons plus machine guns and anti personnel rockets.
I flung myself down and into the ditch which was only shallow and behind a plant which was about a foot high and about eight inches wide. it was just something to hang onto. The guard who had been sitting by a tree had been wounded and next to me an Aussie Sergeant wireless operator had been shot through his head and chest, my nearest bullet hit my boot heel, as I felt it but it just left a line across the heel.
The two others I shared everything with were Ginger Wheadon and Alec Laing, who were no where to be seen. So I decided to walk back and found Alec not far away but very shaky. So told him to stay put and I would look for Ginger, on my way back up the track, I was giving drinks of water to people who had been wounded and were waiting for treatment either shock or wounds, but couldn't find Ginger.
There were people calling out for their friends, I came across one fellow sitting by a tree with the lower part of his body a mess, although he asked me for a drink as if nothing was wrong. Just as I had given him a drink a couple of his pals came and took over whilst I carried on my search for Ginger.
At one hedge I passed there were legs sticking through so I hopefully looked on the other side, but hastily moved on as they were all there was.
There were quite a few bodies lying about on the track but not Ginger, someone suggested I looked in the fields near where we had been; a lot of men had run across them, so I did and found him but he had been hit in the chest whilst running and was dead.
He must have left his belongings in his haste as I never found them.
In Dick's Wartime log book he wrote on April 20th 1945 - "to our engineer Ginger Wheadon. Ging was killed by a bullet from a Typhoon whilst we were resting during a march on April 19th 1945, he was killed instantly. We are trying to get some of his personal kit to bring home for his Mother and Mary his girl. He was buried at a village of Heydekrug, 4km from Gresse where we had just drawn food parcels. He was buried by our Padre and a parson. The time of his death was about 12 noon.
Having looked after one or two other badly wounded lads, l went back to Ginger only to find that all his kit had been taken and his pockets empty. Some thieving B……. had pinched everything he had on him.
I only hope the food choked them and all the other things brought them the worst luck possible."
The count was 35 POW were killed also 6 of the German guards.
I searched around and found one of our seniors who I gave him Gingers name which apparently someone else had already done so after finding his name and number on his dog tags. So I returned to where I had left Alec and we moved on down the road to the next village where we stayed for the
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night in field with a couple of barns in it but some good thick hedges to bed down under and found a barn with some straw in which we used as bedding.
Dixie Deans our camp commandant spoke to the officer who was in command of the Germans guarding us to let him go through the German lines accompanied by a German officer with a safe conduct note, to then contact the Americans, and let them know that there were 20,000 allied prisoners on the line of their advance and to advise them to let their airbase know of this situation. This was done and Dixie Dean and his accompanying German officer cycled back through the lines and after sorting out the burial of our lads in the churchyard at Gresse.
They were buried in a mass grave and the German priest held a service for our lads and also the guards that were killed. (After the war the RAF personnel killed in this attack were reburied in a new Commonwealth War grave cemetery outside Berlin see appendix 2).
The injured where taken to a hospital at Boizenburg for treatment, and no doubt sent home for further treatment.
Our English Padre was to march on with the others as he would not attend the church service as it was not his parish.
That was April 19th 1945 which will always be remembered as it was just a few days before my 21st birthday which I very nearly could have missed, that was a dream that haunted me for quite some time.
We constantly saw American aircraft around but they were mainly bombers heading Hamburg way we did pass an airfield that had JU88's on it but it had been bombed and most of its aircraft destroyed.
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[War Graves Commission citation]
Ginger's burial place, to the right of the building in the distance (see Appendix 2 for cemetery map)
[underlined] The end of the War nears [/underlined]
We carried on Northwards and the farms that we stayed in were larger and did have some decent barns, but were rather a lot bodies and not everyone got in a barn. Alec and my self usually found a well and stayed out with the weather now being quite good. My birthday on the 26th April was nothing special I think maybe I had an extra piece of chocolate and maybe made a cigarette with my pipe tobacco and smoked it all myself, otherwise we usually passed them around.
It's now the beginning of May the weather is quite good and there are lots of American aircraft leaving vapour trails, we think Hamburg or ports in the North were their targets.
We settled down on the 2nd May in a small outhouse with no windows or doors just three walls and a roof that would have let in more rain than it kept out and wondering what tomorrow would bring.
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When we woke to a fine morning and made a drink someone said look all our guards have gone during the night, so we then went to find what our next move was.
We were told not to go out on the roads running North as there were German panzer troops still in that area, this information we got from an officer in jeep which came on ahead of the English and American troops who pushing the Germans back in this area.
We were then informed by Dixie Deans that we were to find some means of transport and make our own way South to Luneburg where our troops had built a pontoon bridge over the river Elbe and from there proceed to a German airfield situated near Luneburg, which had been turned into a reception area for POWs.
The area around the airfield became littered with vehicles we had acquired including a fire engine, a few tractors some civilian cars, horse and carts, motor cycles and a couple of buses.
My mode of transport was in one of the buses so had a comfortable ride to the reception centre.
May 8th 1945. The road we had to use to get the river crossing was littered on both sides with German and English military vehicles which had been bulldozed off the road so that others could get through to the pontoon bridge at Luneburg.
We spent a couple of days here being subject to a delousing period that incurred someone with a spray gun putting it down your back and front and also each trouser leg.
After which they took your particulars and you were given an identity card with your name, number, rank, and squadron number and told to find a bed in one of the huts and report back in the morning. If we had anything which we didn't need there was a bonfire on which we could get rid of old clothes not that we had much. But some of the prisoners had picked up guns and ammunition on the way which they decided to get rid of, there was a lot of exploding ammunition going off all night and the next day.
We had a breakfast of coffee and a slice of toast and then had to go on a parade ground and form up into groups of around 40 to await the arrival of aircraft for our homeward flight to England and a POW reception centre at RAF Cosford in a Dakota, used as transport and troop carrier the workhorse of the air force.
Here we were met by nurses and WAFs and again given the treatment of delousing, then a check over by doctors and lots of questions as to how you felt. Then it was a sit down meal, but our stomachs would only take a small amount, l can't remember what was on the menu but I know I could only manage a little, and a nice young WAAF sat with me and talked me into eating a little more. I really couldn't eat anymore, but had more tea so I could keep her talking with me.
We were then subject to being kitted out with new uniforms and glad to be out of the old stuff. The only [sic] I kept was my American army boots which had walked many miles or should say kilometres over German countryside, they lasted a good many years as my gardening boots. They still have the mark on the heel where a bullet from a typhoon clipped it when we were shot up.
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We only stayed at Cosford long enough to be kitted out and given some idea of how would carry on until our number for demob came up.
I had still about a year to do so was given a choice of ground trades which was, clerk in accounts, pigeon keeper or store keeper. What a choice is that it I asked and said that I didn't like any of these and wanted to be assigned to the transport division either as a driver or in admin. The Officer said he would put my choice forward but didn't think I would be lucky as so many had chosen transport as an option. So it was then we had to collect our travel warrants and any pay we had coming plus identity cards and ration book.
It was now late May and a start of long awaited leave which was for about four weeks to get me back into being fit again, I arrived from Cosford at London Road station and a neighbour who was a taxi driver happened to be at the stand and so he shouted over to me to get in his car. After putting my bags in and much hand shaking from other people I was on my way home. Mr Shuker talked all the way and got me up to date with what had been happening in Minehead Street, and upon arriving there he slowed down and hooted so people could know that he had arrived with a neighbour. There was quite a lot came out and gave me a cheer, and upon arrival at home I [sic] most of our neighbours were there with Mum, Dad and Mary. It was quite a homecoming with lots of hugs and kisses from all the close neighbours, it was something I’II never forget.
It took a while to get used to a normal bed and home routine but it was good to be home.
My two pals Ken and Derek who were both in the air force Ken was an engine maintenance engineer at fighter station, while Derek was a Corporal in the RAF police service. They managed a spot of leave whilst I was home so we spent a few days together.
The first evening they took me down to our local pub which was the Blue Moon. This was the first time for me to go out for pint.
Ken and Derek ordered pints, but I said that mine had better just be a half, which was just as well as when I got up to go the bar to order another round my legs gave way so I didn't have any more. So Ken and Derek took me home, I could manage to walk but not very steady, I guess that my system hadn't had any booze for quite some time but would get around that problem in time.
[underlined] Military Transport Training [/underlined]
My leave seemed to pass very quickly and very soon a travel warrant arrived to say that I was being posted to Melksham, and it turned out to be a course for Drivers-motor transport, I was told previously that there was no chance for this as so many had tried but were told they had no chance. Lucky me as my Aunts and Uncles all lived around this area at the village of Wingfield, so I would have some place to go at weekends.
So up one morning and off to catch the train for Melksham and becoming a driver for the air force in what sort of vehicles one wondered.
It turned out to be initial training was on vehicle maintenance as you had to be able to keep your vehicle in road worthy conditions at all times.
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We had a very rigorous course on engines and ensuring they were in good running order with oil and water checked daily, there were lectures every day on subjects such as Highway Code road traffic signs and use of hand signals and being courteous to other road users.
Our first driving lessons were with British School of Motoring civilian instructors driving mainly Austin cars, each car had three learners with tutor and took it in turns at the driving. I had some goes at driving but this was a trifle different as you had to double de clutch as if you were driving a vehicle without synchromesh gears. One instructor was very strict and if you didn't get it right he had a wooden mallet with which he used to clout your knee with, it worked well, my leg went up and down like a yoyo, after just one tap.
If you passed you then passed on to RAF instructors to learn the different types of vehicles you would encounter, these were classified as Hillman Minx used a lot by junior officers, then on to 15 cwt hundred weight [sic] for light loads, then three ton vehicles used for ration collection and general work. Progressing then to the lorries, eight ton and ten ton lorries and the five and seven ton cranes, last of all came the sixty foot long trailers for carrying aircraft when dismantled for repairs.
Having mustered [sic] this little lot you had to pass a driving test on a three ton vehicle and one of the other larger vehicles. After passing all this you had a written test on all subjects and if all was well you were given a driving certificate and were now an MT driver.
What was nice about this posting that every weekend I could spend on the farm with my Aunt and Uncle it was called Sparrow nest farm and they kept cattle for milking, and I was not at all good at milking but helped out fetching the animals in for milking and taking the milk churns on a tractor and trailer to a platform on the roadside ready for the lorry to collect which was twice a day.
Alternate weekends were spent in Wingfield village with Aunt Hilda and Uncle Bill and Granddad who was Aunt Hilda's Uncle, he and I used to play cards in the evenings and he used to beat me at cribbage quite often even though he was missing a lot of his fingers on both hands due to wounds in the First World War.
One morning I awoke and on looking out my bedroom window overlooking a field there was a white object there in a corner, so when l got up I said to my Aunt I'm just going to see what's in the field, and when I got there it was a mushroom the size of a dinner plate, yes I had it for breakfast.
Another time Granddad and I were walking down a lane when a rabbit ran out from the hedge, I had a walking stick which I threw towards it and it stopped running because I had killed it, broke its neck and so we took it home and Auntie skinned it and it made us a dinner.
I used to catch a bus from camp to Wingfield but Uncle Bill always took me back to camp on his motorbike and no crash helmet.
[underlined] Horsham [/underlined]
When I finished at Melksham I was posted to Faygate near to Horsham, it was a maintenance unit, where we were sent out to dismantle aircraft that were not required anymore.
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My vehicle that I was allocated turned out to be a six wheeled lorry a left over from the last war, a
1918 model it would not start on the starter motor so had to be towed.
I got up into the drivers seat to which there was no door only canvas panels which just hooked across also the whole cab was just canvas. The steering wheel was about 2 feet in diameter like a bus, the gear lever was about three foot tall and the handbrake was on the right side and about four feet tall, I wondered what I had let myself in for.
They towed me out of the gates with a three ton Bedford lorry on to a main road and I managed to get it started. They then left me and said over to you and don't forget that this vehicle has not got synchromesh gear so you have to double declutch on all gear changing.
After about two hours and 15 miles later I had mastered it all and found my way back to the unit.
There were no facilities for accommodation on the camp so we had to be billeted at Horsham and commute every day by train. But we were away quite often for three or four days, we spent two days at Monston [sic] airport dismantling an Avro Anson that had overshot the runway and went through a small plantation of trees, which left it a write off, so my band of lads reduced it down to a scrap heap. We had to stay there awaiting the vehicle to collect the parts so had an extra day there.
Over [sic] next trip was down to Boscombe near to Bournemouth and we were told we would be there for four or five days as we had to dismantle quite a lot of spitfires which had been made redundant at Christchurch airfield. So we had to look for accommodation in Boscombe, which we found in a Salvation Army hostel and had five days there.
I parked my lorry in the railway goods yard as there would be someone with a vehicle there to give you a tow in the morning. The old lady surprised me one morning and started first time on the starter motor but that was the only time.
That was my only trip with her as t was assigned to a brand new three ton Bedford lorry. It was the same that we trained on at Melksham and I was to use it to collect all the supplies for the officers mess also all the others so had quite a decent job, also whenever we had rations to collect I was
accompanied by a WAAF which was a nice change from a load of lads.
I was checking tyre pressures and as these vehicles were equipped with its own air pump driven by the motor it was quite simple, but as I was checking one of the front tyres the wind blew the drivers door open and I stood up and hit my head on a corner and finished up flat out, not very long though but decided I had better go to sick quarters and get patched up as it was bleeding a lot. I passed a few people who asked if I was okay but I just said yes and they carried on. At sick bay they patched me up and I went back to finish the job and the motor was still running. So switched off, locked up and retired to the mess prior to catching the train.
[underlined] Egypt??? [/underlined]
Next day I was back into camp and was informed that I was moving on. It was that I was being posted to Egypt, l made a request to see our commanding officer who was an ex aircrew Squadron Leader, saying that I wasn't happy being posted abroad and that I had done my bit for the country and thought it most unfair as there were lots of people who hadn't left England.
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He listened to me and yes, he saw my complaint but he didn't think he could alter the decision and if I gave it a bit of thought, look at it as a holiday paid for by the Government for what you went through. So, yes that sounds reasonable and I'll go along with that, and thanked him. He said he wished me well and try to enjoy your cruise. He would have liked to have joined me, he said.
Went home for a spot of leave and got ready for my next forage into the unknown.
I was then sent a travel warrant for an air force camp situated at Newhaven to be kitted out with my overseas uniform, two khaki shirts and shorts plus long trousers and socks, then some inoculations for tropical diseases then were claimed ready for travel.
We were then told we would be travelling by the Medlock route that is from Newhaven to Dieppe in France by boat and thence by train down to Marseilles where we would be shipped across the Mediterranean to Egypt.
After the trip across to France at night we then continued through Switzerland and snow, it was very cold, but the villages on the mountainsides looked like the one on postcards very romantic amongst the snow. The French trains were not the cleanest but must have moved a lot of British service men since the war had ended over here.
At Marseilles we left the trains at the docks and boarded an American Liberty boat for the next part of the journey. We were shown into the first deck which was fitted out with beds in tiers of three the whole width of the ship and about forty or fifty foot in length. I managed to get one of the lower ones. When we settled in I was told and shown to the bakery, and was put in charge of 6 airmen which was very good as we had very new bread at our meal times. The six airmen worked well and we got along very well with the American crew.
We set sail in the evening and had a quiet evening up on deck, the weather was calm so after supper decided to turn in but couldn't sleep, the motion of the ship wasn't helping me and it took ages for me to eventually nod off.
Our second day went well and my lads and I ate well, but this next night we had a storm and Liberty boats are welded together not riveted and creaks in every joint. I wasn't very happy but just kept lifting the bows up after it went down in a trough. Didn't get much sleep and was glad to reach Alexandria and then taken to a camp at Damunbur and it was very hot and our accommodation was in tents that were built over three foot deep dugouts which gave you a bit more head room than just a tent. We stayed here for about three weeks.
[underlined] To Italy [/underlined]
But apparently there was nothing for us in our line of work required here so we were shipped back across the Mediterranean to Naples in Italy, where we stayed for a couple of days. We made the most of it seeing a part of the world and some of the Roman era, also there were plenty of young and very beautiful senoritas.
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[photograph]
Stanco, Dick's dog
We stayed in Naples for two days and were then told that we would be moving on to any [sic] airfield a few miles outside of Udine in a northern village of Potsuolo, which was the desert air force headquarters known as D.A.F.H.Q. Here were 3 squadrons which flew Mustang fighters. We were attached to DAF headquarters transport section and did all the movement of materials and stuff. This was very good as it entailed collecting the rations from stores which was about twenty miles away, but the roads in places was awful and stony. One item was an open top tin of jam which an Italian was carrying in the back, unfortunately a back tyre exploded like a bomb going off, my poor Italian thought he had been shot as he was covered in jam. After changing the wheel we continued back to camp.
[photograph]
Potsuolo
Another job we had was taking personnel up to our leave hotel up in the mountains for a week at a time and the driver stayed with them and drove them to scenic places, one of which was a lake about thirty miles trip, but was well worth seeing. It was but the road was very rough running along the side of the mountains our wheels were on the very edge of a few thousand foot drop and were running on
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a log which had been built into the road where the edge had fallen away, very bad for the nerves. Other places were when crossing over the bridges from one side of the mountain to the other. These were just planks of wood about three inches thick and about ten or twelve inches wide about fourteen feet long spaced about six inches apart on wooden beams. There was just enough room to get the vehicle around the ends onto the bridge, I only bent the tool box that was on the chassis when we were going.
[photograph]
Dead Slow Ahead!
It was a wonderful place called Cortina quite scenic we stayed for lunch and then I decided to return knowing it was a long way back and I would be on the outside looking down into the valley.
I said to the chap sitting next to me when we get to the logs set into the road edge, tell me how much room I've got your side, his remark was that my side mirror was about two inches from the rock wall which meant when I looked out that my wheels were running on the top of the logs, my legs shook a bit but I thought we came through this way so should be okay going back hopefully.
[photograph]
Dick's leave hotel in Forni Avolti, to the left of the church with a cross marked on the roof
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The hotel was very good and there were quite a few locals and there was a lady there with her daughter, the mother worked in the hotel and her daughter who was about 10 or 12 decided that when a few of the locals and us went for walks she would come and hold my hand and look after me, her name was Tina. We walked across one field and the melting snow had made a three or four foot wide stream down the grass, there was about twelve in the group and it was decided to jump instead of finding a place to cross. We all decided it was no problem just a short jump should do it, but it didn't. I think we all had very wet legs far the rest of our walk, but we all enjoyed it.
[photograph]
Tina and Friends
Most evenings there were four musicians who would play for us, sometimes a good old sing song of tunes of the times, and that led into dance music which was very tiring, as the girls that worked there kept going most of the evening and made sure we kept up with them. Lana the Austrian girl if she got hold of you your feet hardly touched the ground. But they were all good fun. The week passed very quickly and it was drive them back to camp and back to work.
Every other week we were duty driver for a day, which meant servicing the commanding officers vehicles; that he wanted to use that day. You had to knock on his caravan door and go in and ask him which of his three vehicles he required that day. From a jumble of blankets a voice would say either Merc or Jep or Util, which interpreted was either Mercedes or Jeep or his Utility, so you checked all three to make sure you got it right. You were busy taking officers to meetings and also running them into town to various places sometimes just so they could do some shopping.
[underlined] On the Road to Bari [/underlined]
Some days I was office boy handing out jobs to the drivers, this I didn't like as I would rather be out driving, and I was very lucky, our M.T officer who was also ex aircrew said he had a job for three vehicles to go down to Bari, where they were closing down an airfield and we had to bring back the furniture from the officers mess. Would I like to be one of the drivers? Of course that would be very nice, he then said and I shall be going as well to make sure we bring back the right things. So my friend another ex aircrew now a driver and the third driver was a corporal who had spent quite some time in Italy and knew his way around. We also had three airmen armed with rifles as guards, on to each vehicle so we had all the bodies required for the trip.
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[photograph]
On the Road to Bari
So it was up early one morning, pack the essentials for the trip which we had no idea how long we would be, so we took a change of clothes for it [sic] we went out in the evening at some stage of the journey.
Out [sic] first stop was at Rimini which was a holiday resort on the coast and there was an air force station there where we could find a bed for the night.
We left Udine and passed by Venice into Padova then for Ferrari, the roads were quite good but the towns and villages had been taken quite a bit of damage. From here we headed for Ravenna on the Adriatic coast. It again was a holiday resort; like most places took a lot of damage, then on to Rimini and a well earned rest. Out [sic] mileage for this leg of our journey was approximately 432 kilometres.
Some of the vehicles we passed on the way were rather weary, the loads they carried were unreal some were the width of the lorry but finished up twice the width at the top. The tyres were smooth and the engines were held together with bits of wire. The Italians were noted for have good mechanics, we had one of them in our section who could just listen to an engine running and get to the cause of the trouble straight away.
Back to our trip, we left Rimini the next morning after checking our vehicles and filling up with petrol heading for our next stop which was to be Rome. Our next road was heading inland across Italy into the more agricultural part of Italy, the traffic was very mainly bullock carts with four of them in the shafts pulling very large loads which hung over the sides and took up a lot of road space. Also we kept passing a lot of women and children carrying canes on their heads and shoulders, l thought that if one turned to chat with another it would cause chaos down the line if we hit them.
One thing that we noticed was the lack of bridges crossing the roads, mostly the countryside was very flat and were either agricultural or cattle. The towns and villages we passed through were a bit showing the signs of war damage and were trying to get back to normal. In the villages there were always lots of children on the streets and all were begging for chocolate, no doubt remembering the times the Americans were there.
We reached Rome in the evening and found the army barracks were we to stay the night, we all decided we would have an early night as tomorrow was a shorter trip and we could spend a little more time in Naples which we did. The road from Rome was fairly good although there was plenty of damaged buildings everywhere and not much building taking place although it was mainly getting the
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places ready for residents to return to repair jobs mostly. Although in Naples we found that the night life was very much alive, and we spent a few hours around the night clubs, and the officer and we two warrant officers were quite happy after consuming numerous bottles of wine with some very good food. And so to bed quite happy, not looking forward the next day's trip which was going to be a long one.
Up early the next morning and had a good breakfast and refuelled our vehicles and away on the road to Bari which is situated on the North coast of Italy, known as the heel of Italy. The road out of Naples was very busy with most vehicles having enormous loads and engulfed in a fog which we were glad to leave behind and over to our right was Mount Vesuvius but only a trickle of smoke from it. We were then heading North East and the road was less busy, and was pretty rough, villages we passed through had been very heavily damaged. We stopped for a meal or I should say a sandwich, and a family in a nearby house were having their spaghetti, there was an old lady with a plate full which was devoured in a very few minutes, guess she was hungry.
[photograph]
Still on the Road to Bari
We pressed on as it was starting to look like we were going to head into some rather wet weather, we did, and finding the place we wanted was not easy. The leading lorry with our officer and corporal driving, found what they thought was the right track to the airfield which turned out to be a very narrow road just wide enough for one lorry. After about a mile the road finished and we were left with the prospect of reversing all the way back to the main road in the pouring rain. There was no where we could have turned round as the fields had been ploughed on both sides. So about half an hour later three very wet headed drivers, a very wet officer and a guard who had walked back along the track with torches to guide us. We found the right road and got to our destination, and a good hot meal was very welcome.
I seem to remember that we didn't need much rocking to sleep.
We found out the next morning after breakfast that what we were collecting was a lot of electrical equipment which was too valuable to leave and could be useful elsewhere along with quite a lot of furniture from the officers quarters some of which turned out to be large mirrors about 5 foot high by 3 foot wide with a very ornate surround, and I don't recollect whether they survived the journey, it would have been very lucky if they had. Our three young guards did alright and had an armchair for the ride back. After we had packed everything into the lorries it was dinner time, so we had a very
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good meal and washed down with some very nice wine, and decided to stay the night here and start at 8am the next morning, so we had a look round Bari which had a good port for ferries to Yugoslavia across the Adriatic. Retired to our beds ready for the start back.
The trip back to Naples was uneventful but in Naples our guards had their hands full keeping loads of youngsters from climbing up the sides of the Lorries and stealing anything. Most of what we had was furniture which was stacked on top of the wireless equipment so they left empty handled.
It was evening time when we finally arrived in Naples so didn't go very far around the town just had a drink or two and then retired to bed.
Next morning it is up and away on our next leg to Rome where we hoped to spend a little time looking around the place as there is plenty to see, and walked around the centre of the Coliseum where the gladiators did their acts, and I was glad that I wasn't acting in it, and I think the lions that did an act had already eaten that day.
[photograph]
Coliseum Rome
Later on we found a good restaurant where we had a good meal washed down with a very good Italian wine, and walked back to our billets in an army barracks and so to bed.
Not looking forward to our next trip as it is a long run and not very scenic from Rome up to Rimini, mainly farming country and only a couple of towns on the way, the one consolation was that it stayed fine all the way.
Rimini was an army controlled town so there were lots of tanks and all types of weaponry around and we stayed in army barracks that night and we were up early the next morning as it was a long trip back to Udine.
We took the road out of Rimini for Rarenna along the coast, hence our next town was Venice where we stopped for a short rest and found a restaurant for a meal which was steak mushrooms and tomatoes washed down with a red wine, very nice too.
We were then only a couple of hours from our destination and our own beds. The whole trip had taken us about ten days, but that said the items we brought back was it worth it.
Overall we had a good look at how the Italians lived and were good mechanics, as they managed to keep their Lorries on. the road tied together with lots of wire and a lot more faith.
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We had a football team made up of NCOs and we played against teams from other ranks and also from the squadron that was stationed here. I was given the position of right wing and was usually up against a six foot left back of the opposing team, I don't think we won many of our matches, but it was a bit of good fun.
[photograph]
Military Transport Football Team
It is now getting into September and we are still living in tents, and have had a lot of rain recently and the camp was rather badly flooded, my other occupant and I were lucky our tent survived the storm, we had a lot of tents blown down and the roads were flooded and it took quite a while for everywhere to dry out.
Our leave hotel in Grado on the coast was popular and we ran an evening bus most nights, and it was one of my jobs as a driver to take the bus down to the town at 5pm and collect them again at 10pm from the town square. Most made it in time and on my trips we seemed lucky and didn't have any missing bodies, most of them were quite happy. I had four days leave and stayed in our leave hotel, very nice food and comfortable beds also there were grapevines where we had breakfast, so grapes were on the menu every morning. First thing after breakfast I went down the road and at the store shop used to buy a melon and take back to the hotel and have a waiter cut a square hole in it and put in a good portion of wine then put it in the fridge and have it with our evening meal, very nice finished the meal with it.
[underlined] Mercy Mission to Egypt [/underlined]
it was around September 15th that I had a call from the office of the Adjutant to tell me that I had been given ten days leave to go to a hospital in Egypt where my brother Bob was ill, and it would help him return to good health if he had a relative to see him. I was staggered and amazed as I had no idea of his whereabouts and that he was ill.
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18.9.1946. So I had to sort my kit out what I would require and managed to pack it in my small side pack. I then had to collect the pass and papers needed and so to Udine airport, arrived there at an early hour as flight was at 9.00am in a Dakota aircraft next stop Rome. Had a hotel for my overnight stay and very nice too, good food and bed and a very good night sleep.
My flight next morning which was to be about nine hours leaving Rome at ten past seven in the morning and we landed in Malta at 9.45 to refuel the aircraft had a drink there then left for our next stop which was El Adam in North Africa. Only stayed fifty minutes again to refuel and left at 4pm for our next stop at Almaza which we arrived at 6.30pm which was my stopping off place for Cairo.
I was driven to the Heliopolis hotel and shown to my room and then taken to the dining room and had a good meal.
I was very hot after being quite cool in Italy so changed into my shorts, but it was still very sticky hot, so decided to have an early night see what tomorrow brings.
! was up early as the night was very hot and I didn't get much sleep. I had a good breakfast and had to sit around and await my transport to the hospital.
20th September a car arrived and I was driven to the Helmieh hospital, where I was taken to meet the colonel of the hospital, who welcomed me and hoped my presence would help in Bob's recovery. He then told me I was to be accommodated at the Sergeants mess of the main hospital. There were numerous sections to the hospital, a fracture unit, dental unit, isolation unit which Bob was in eye and ear unit, it was quite a large place.
I was issued with a pass the [sic] to the isolation ward in which Bob was in with note to say the above named warrant officer was permitted to visit his brother signalman Curnock in isolation ward 1 and full preventative measures should be taken.
The sister I gave the note to just laughed gave me back the note, took me by the arm and gave me a hug, and said how lovely it was that I was able to have leave to go there, and then she took me to see Bob. He was surprised as he had no idea where I was, but he was very thin, white, and I looked like an Indian next to him as in a photo of us together.
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[photograph] [photograph]
Dick and Bob at Helmieh hospital, Egypt
My time at the hospital was spent on visits to Bob every day, having a game of snooker with some of the other members of the mess, or at other times some of the nurses and sister would ask me to escort them into Cairo to do a spot of shopping which I did quite willingly.
My ten days leave passed rather quickly, but when I rang the air booking centre in Cairo, I wasn't on any of the flights so had to wait another week. In fact it was the 25th October before my flight for Italy was finally here, so I had about 6 weeks of a 10 day leave.
Each unit had its own Sergeants mess and most evenings there was entertainment in one of them. Once or twice a week there was horse racing in one of them, and in the dental mess one night they had a Derby meeting, the horses were bid for at the start and I bought number two for two pounds after bidding against the colonel. And it won the race and I was twenty two pounds richer for a while, but lost a bit on the following races, good fun though.
The other entertainment was a quiz night which was quite hilarious, with answers to some questions quite ridiculous but funny. Others had classes which were well attended by all, as we had lots of nurses and sisters to make a good evening of it.
At another sergeants mess they held a bingo night with some other entertainment as bingo wasn't very popular.
In the sergeants mess some of them had nicknames, one was known as bash he was a boxer in Civvy Street; we also had a slash as he was always cutting himself when shaving, so I had to have one and was known as the parachute kid.
We had a snooker table in the mess and I had plenty of practice on it as I had quite a lot of time to fill in.
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Time passed and I finally had my seat booked for my return to Italy. So then I had to say my farewells to all the friends that I had made during my stay and to Bob of course and also I went to see the colonel and thanks him for all they had done for Bob and also making my stay a pleasant one.
[underlined] Dakota back to Italy – Treviso [/underlined]
So on the 26th October my flight was at 6.30am so was up early for the return journey. One of the sergeants had said the night before that he would take me to the airport as he was duty driver for that day. So once again I joined up with a Dakota of the South African Air force at Almaja airport stopping at El Adam to refuel then on to Malta where we stayed the night. The next day we were away at seven am on the last leg to Rome.
At Rome airport I was informed that the personnel of the 239 Wing Desert Air Force; had been moved to a place called Treviso so that where I was being sent. They said my kit had been transferred already so I had to get to this place, but found out that I was booked on a flight to an aerodrome just outside of Treviso.
[photograph]
Sergeants Mess Treviso 1945, Dick and friend
There was transport at the aerodrome and I was taken to our sergeant mess which was a town villa in Treviso and was shown to my room and where I was reunited with my kit bag.
This was luxury after living in tents for a long period with wash basins and baths and there were ladies to do your laundry and any repairs to your clothes.
I certainly enjoyed having a nice hot bath and retiring to a good bed and hoped that I wasn't to be moved again, as I had had enough of travelling for a while.
At Treviso it was usual routine doing runs into town and around the airfield, towing petrol trailers around to the aircraft for refuelling. Also fetching blocks of ice for the bars of the officers and sergeants also messes of other ranks. By the time you got back to camp there was a lot of water in the back of the truck and you had to lift blocks of wet ice into the various messes, a cold job.
From Treviso it was only a few miles into Venice and we spent a few weekends there, and got to do a lot of walking, you could have a gondola ride but they charged the earth, so we usually walked.
St Marco's square was very popular with lots of shops and cafes around. There was an abundant supply of jewellery shops and also the square had hundreds of pigeons, making it quite messy.
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There was a bell tower in one corner which had a large bell on the top. Apparently an Italian gent decided to inspect it too close and his head flattened by the bell hammer, very nasty.
There were lots of bridges over the canals and as you went into the centre where they had warehouses it was a rather different place, the canals were not so dean, and people living alongside them just threw rubbish out of the windows, not a good healthy environment to live in.
We found a very good restaurant in Treviso down a back street a very smart little place, who did beef steaks, which you could pick from a large selection and then you could see them being cooked and you then selected what you wanted with it.
Time passed very quickly at Treviso and was January before we realised suddenly that our demob numbers would be coming up soon. And it was January when we were told that some of us were going home and that we could be going to Villach in Austria to catch a train for the trip across Austria, Switzerland and France and home.
The day arrived when we were notified that we had reached the final week in Italy and would travel by train to Villach, and thence start our journey home. We cleared with all the necessary forms as was needed, paid any mess bills and said our farewells to rest of the transport department and was then taken to the station.
It was an uneventful journey to Villach where we had to stay overnight and there was thick snow there and rather cold with long icicles from roves [sic] of our huts.
[photograph]
Villach - with icicles
I met up with some of the other lads who had travelled with me on our trip out earlier, when we were leaving; waiting on the road for transport to the station a whole lot of youngsters arrived with sledges, so all we had to carry was our small kit, the kit bags were loaded on the sledges and so on to the station.
Our train was in and so we went aboard with kit bags on the corridors and rest of our kit on the racks, it was then that we all got into the spirit of finally going home. The trains were French so the toilets had no seat, just two places for your feet and a hole in the middle, not very comfortable.
With it being January everywhere was very white with snow and I took some pictures of the mountains as we passed into Switzerland which was wonderful. Coming out of a tunnel on the
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mountainside and there was a village and it appeared to just be hanging on. It went on like this from many miles as we went through Switzerland and into France.
[photograph]
Switzerland from the train
We stopped in Paris station for a hot drink and a sandwich and managed to have a wash and brush up before our next stop which was to be Dieppe and a channel crossing to Newhaven.
The trip over was uneventful but the sea was rather rough and there were one or two heaving stomachs to prove it, and we arrived in the dock, and then when we had sorted out our kit bags from a very large heap, the train was waiting in the station to take us to the demob centre, which was at No 101 Dispersal centre at Kirkham in Lancashire.
This was the place where you returned to civilian life once again. It is now the 21st January 1947 about to sort out from a large selection of shirts, underwear and suits and find some that is a reasonable fit. After which you went and tried on the items you had selected and handed in your uniform, well most of it, l remember that there was a shirt, a pair of shorts and some desert socks along with the boots that I wore during our sight seeing tour of Germany. Then you had to see numerous sections who dealt with your pay due to you and the amount of leave which turned out to be eighty days from the 21st January 1947.
You then had to collect your travel warrant, your pay also was entered in the back of your service release book and you had to collect it from the post office when it was due, and they would date stamp it in the back of your pay book.
My return home was a wonderful feeling after all my travels. At the station the neighbour of ours who had a taxi cab saw me and had me in his cab very quickly.
Upon arriving at Minehead Street the first thing I saw was the street still decorated with flags and bunting after the end of the war in Japan and not for me.
Mr Shuker sounded his horn and slowed down and there were a lot of people came out to welcome me home and of course Mum, Dad and Mary and our close neighbours were all waiting and I was smothered with their welcome.
And so I looked forward to a nice long holiday and getting used to civilian life once more.
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[underlined] Reunions [/underlined]
Dick's mother (Arabella Curnock) had welcomed several of the Canadian crew members into her home, and had corresponded with members of their families back home in Canada during the war.
Bob Friskey's wife Isabella in Abbotsford also wrote to Dick and Barbara after their marriage, as well as continuing to correspond with Dick's mother. It was from them that the news came that "Chuck" committed suicide some time after returning home.
Rob died sometime after, but Isabella continued to write to Dick.
Wes and his (Scottish) wife Mae made contact again sometime in the 1970s, when Dick received a phone call at the Thurmaston plant of Thorpe and Porter where he worked. The call was from the railway station in Leicester where Wes and Mae were - accompanied by the youngest of their five sons!
Dick went to pick them up, and they stayed overnight with [sic] at Queniborough before carrying on their journey to Scotland. Wes and Mae paid a short visit to Dick's mother, as Wes had stayed with her during the war when on leave.
In 1984 a lady who lived on Upperton Road (Mrs Tobin) was clearing out a house on Minehead Street (no 59) which was formally the Curnock family home. Amongst the papers was an unopened letter from Eugene Fullum in Montreal. She looked in the phone book and found a R Curnock and rang and this got Dick and Eugene back in touch.
[photograph]
Eugene and Dick 1985 (Leicester Mercury photo)
Eugene came over the UK in 1985, and when Dick and he met it was the first time they had seen each other since the police station in Germany the day after they had been shot down.
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[photograph]
RAF Prisoner of War insignia
[photograph]
Gordon, Eugene, Dick, Wes, 1987 Reunion
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[photograph]
Dick in the rear gunner position of a Halifax bomber; at Elvington, Yorks. 2004
[photograph]
Dick exiting the Halifax, the last time he did this, the Halifax was on fire and he was about to parachute into enemy territory
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Appendix 1 – Dick’s RAF flying log book – 17.7.1943 to 25.8.1947
i) Gunnery course results
[document]
52
[page break]
Appendix 1 - ii) gunnery training
[flight log book document]
53
[page break]
Appendix 1 – iii) 22 O.T.U.
[flight log book document]
54
[page break]
Appendix 1 – iv) 22 O.T.U.
[flight log book document]
55
[page break]
Appendix 1 – v) 22 O.T.U.
[flight log book document]
56
[page break]
Appendix 1 – vi) 22 O.T.U.
[flight log book document]
57
[page break]
Appendix 1 – vii) 1664 Conversion Unit
[flight log book document]
58
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Appendix 1 – viii) 1664 Conversion Unit
[flight log book document]
59
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Appendix 1 – ix) 425 Squadron – shows the last mission Dick flew to Augsburg
[flight log book document]
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Appendix 1 – x) Flights to and from Egypt to visit Bob
[flight log book document]
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Appendix 2
[drawing of Berlin War Cemetery]
Ginger Wheadon is buried in 6.B.19
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Appendix 3 -The March - source Wikipedia
"The March" refers to a series of forced marches during the final stages of the Second World War in Europe. From a total of 257,000 western Allied prisoners of war held in German military prison camps, over 80,000 POWs were forced to march westward across Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Germany in extreme winter conditions, over about four months between January and April 1945. This series of events has been called various names: "The Great March West", "The Long March", "The Long Walk", "The Long Trek", "The Black March", "The Bread March", and "Death March Across Germany", but most survivors just called it "The March".
As the Soviet Army was advancing, German authorities decided to evacuate POW camps, to delay liberation of the prisoners. January and February 1945 were among the coldest winter months of the 20th century in Europe, with blizzards and temperatures as low as -25 O C and even until the middle of March, temperatures were well below 0 O C Most of the POWs were ill-prepared for the evacuation, having suffered years of poor rations and wearing clothing ill-suited to the appalling winter conditions.
In most camps, the POWs were broken up in groups of 250 to 300 men and because of the inadequate roads and the flow of battle, not all the prisoners followed the same route. The groups would march 20 to 40 kilometers a day - resting in factories, churches, barns and even in the open. Soon long columns of POWs were wandering over the northern part of Germany with little or nothing in the way of food, clothing, shelter or medical care.
Prisoners from different camps had different experiences: sometimes the Germans provided farm wagons for those unable to walk. There seldom were horses available, so teams of POWs pulled the wagons through the snow. Sometimes the guards and prisoners became dependent on each other, other times the guards became increasingly hostile. Those with intact boots had the dilemma of whether to remove them at night - if they left them on, trench foot could result; if they removed them, they may not get their swollen feet back into their boots in the morning or, worse, the boots may freeze or be stolen.
With so little food they were reduced to scavenging to survive. Some were reduced to eating dogs and cats and grass-anything they could lay their hands on. Already underweight from years of prison rations, some were at half their pre-war body weight by the end.
Because of the unsanitary conditions and a near starvation diet, hundreds of POWs died of disease along the way and many more were ill. Dysentery was common; sufferers had the indignity of soiling themselves whilst having to continue to march, and being further weakened by the debilitating effects of illness. This disease was easily spread from one group to another when they followed the same route and rested in the same places. Many POWs suffered from frostbite which could lead to gangrene. Typhus, spread by body lice, was a risk for all POWs, but was now increased by using overnight shelter previously occupied by infected groups. Some men simply froze to death in their sleep.
In addition to these conditions were the dangers from air attack by Allied forces mistaking the POWs for retreating columns of German troops. On April 19, 1945, at a village called Gresse, 30 Allied POWs died and 30 were seriously injured (possibly fatally) in a "friendly-fire" situation when strafed by a flight of RAF Typhoons.
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As winter drew to a close, suffering from the cold abated and some of the German guards became less harsh in their treatment of POWs. But the thaw rendered useless the sledges made by many POWs to carry spare clothing, carefully preserved food supplies and other items. So, the route became littered with items that could not be carried. Some even discarded their greatcoats, hoping that the weather did not turn cold again. As the columns reached the western side of Germany they ran into the advancing western Allied armies. For some, this brought liberation. Others were not so lucky. They were marched towards the Baltic Sea, where Nazis were said to be using POWs as human shields and hostages. It was later estimated that a large number of POWs had marched over five hundred miles by the time they were liberated, and some had walked nearly a thousand miles.
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Appendix 4 – i) Stalag Luft 357 – long march route, and camp numbering correction information
Red Cross map of prisoner of war camps
[map]
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Appendix 4 – ii) Stalag Luft 357 and long march route
[map]
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Appendix 4 – iii) Blue cross in circle marks where Dick was shot down. Red Cross near Frankfurt where he was moved to
[map]
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Appendix 4 – iv) Red line shows routes taken by Dick. Torun (Thorn) camp shown
[map]
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Appendix 4 – v) Poznan – Stalag XXI
[map]
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Appendix 4 – vi) Stalag Luft VI – Lithuania
[map]
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26th April 2014
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
My War Story
Description
An account of the resource
A memoir written by Dick Curnock. It covers his wartime service and also his service after the war for the RAF. It covers his brother Sam and his accident as a pilot. Dick started his training at Lords in London, Bridlington then Bridgnorth and Dalcross. Next move was to Wellesbourne where he crewed up and practised bombing from a Wellington, then Dishforth for conversion on to Halifaxes. His squadron was 425 at Tholthorpe and he undertook night flying training. On his second operation he was shot down near Augsburg. He was taken prisoner and interrogated before being transferred to Stalag Luft VI. He describes his life there. As the Russians got nearer they were transferred by cattle truck to Stalag Luft 357 at Torun. Next they were subjected to the Long March in April 1945. During this the flight engineer, Ginger Wheadon was shot by an RAF Typhoon. After being liberated and returning to the UK he served briefly in Egypt then Italy as an RAF transport driver. During this time he went to Egypt to visit his brother, Bob who was ill in Cairo. Eventually he was demobbed from Italy via Austria and Paris.
Creator
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Dick Curnock
Date
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2014-04-26
Format
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71 printed sheets
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Text. Memoir
Identifier
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BCurnockRMCurnockRMv1
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Austria
Austria--Villach
Canada
British Columbia--Abbotsford
Québec--Montréal
Egypt
Egypt--Cairo
France
France--Paris
Gibraltar
Germany
Germany--Augsburg
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Schweinfurt
Great Britain
England--Bridlington
England--Horsham
England--Leicester
England--London
England--Melksham
Italy
Italy--Bari
Italy--Cortina d'Ampezzo
Italy--Naples
Italy--Padua
Italy--Ravenna
Italy--Rimini
Italy--Rome
Italy--Udine
Italy--Venice
Malta
North Africa
Poland--Toruń
Germany--Lüneburg
Poland
Lithuania
Poland--Żagań
Lithuania--Šilutė
Germany--Bad Fallingbostel
England--Christchurch (Dorset)
Québec
England--Dorset
England--Leicestershire
England--Yorkshire
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1945
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Peter Bradbury
22 OTU
420 Squadron
425 Squadron
431 Squadron
434 Squadron
air gunner
aircrew
animal
Anson
anti-aircraft fire
arts and crafts
bale out
bomb aimer
C-47
Caterpillar Club
crash
crewing up
Dulag Luft
final resting place
flight engineer
ground personnel
Halifax
Halifax Mk 3
Heavy Conversion Unit
Hitler, Adolf (1889-1945)
Hurricane
Ju 88
lynching
mess
Morse-keyed wireless telegraphy
navigator
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
P-51
pilot
prisoner of war
RAF Boscombe Down
RAF Bridgnorth
RAF Bridlington
RAF Cosford
RAF Dishforth
RAF Elvington
RAF Gaydon
RAF Inverness
RAF Manston
RAF Tholthorpe
RAF Wellesbourne Mountford
Red Cross
sanitation
service vehicle
sport
Stalag Luft 3
Stalag Luft 6
strafing
the long march
training
Typhoon
Wellington
Whitley
Women’s Auxiliary Air Force
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1375/23785/MEdgarAG172180-180704-03.2.jpg
cc3b8e628a56594008ffbbbd72816ee3
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Edgar, Alfred George
Edgar, A G
Description
An account of the resource
83 items. The collection concerns Pilot Officer Alfred George 'Allan' Edgar DFC (b. 1922, 172180 Royal Air Force) He flew operations as a pilot with 49 Squadron.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by Pip Harrison and Sally Shawcross nee Edgar, and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018-07-04
2019-10-01
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Edgar, AG
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Alan Edgar's Operations
Description
An account of the resource
A list of 34 operations undertaken by Alan Edgar.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One typed list
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MEdgarAG172180-180704-03
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France--Tours
France--Paris
France--Mailly-le-Camp
France--Amiens
Germany--Kiel
France--Cherbourg Region
France--Caen
France--Beauvois
Germany--Stuttgart
France--Givors
France--Reims
France--Rouen
France--Creil
France--Givors
France--Brest
Netherlands--Tilburg
Germany--Darmstadt
Belgium--Leopoldsburg
France--Normandy
Germany--Braunschweig
Poland--Gdańsk
France--Bordeaux (Nouvelle-Aquitaine)
Poland
France
Germany
Belgium
Netherlands
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1944-04-18
1944-04-19
1944-05-03
1944-05-04
1944-06-05
1944-06-06
1944-06
1944-07
1944-08
1944-08-03
1944-08-15
49 Squadron
83 Squadron
bombing of Luftwaffe night-fighter airfields (15 August 1944)
Bombing of Mailly-le-Camp (3/4 May 1944)
bombing of the Juvisy, Noisy-le-Sec and Le Bourget railways (18/19 April 1944)
bombing of the Normandy coastal batteries (5/6 June 1944)
Bombing of Trossy St Maximin (3 August 1944)
mine laying
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Pathfinders
RAF Coningsby
RAF Fiskerton
RAF Tuddenham
RAF Waterbeach
RAF Woodbridge
V-1
V-weapon
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/939/25665/LMackieGA855966v2.1.pdf
373629f09a105028803c922e214a5645
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Mackie, George
George Alexander Mackie
G A Mackie
Description
An account of the resource
Nine items. An oral history interview with George Mackie (1920 - 2020, 855966 Royal Air Force) with his log books, diary extract, list of operations, battle order and photographs. He flew operations as a pilot with 15 and 214 Squadrons.
The collection was catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-12-22
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Mackie, GA
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[photograph]
[photograph]
Gm
[page break]
[assessment form]
([symbol]4690 – 117) Wt. 51983 – 5030 48,500 4/40 T.S. 700 FORM 414 (A)
[underlined] SUMMARY of FLYING and ASSESSMENTS FOR YEAR COMMENCING 1st [/underlined] August [symbol][underlined] 19 [/underlined] 43
([symbol] For Officer, Insert “JUNE” : For Airman Pilot, Insert “AUGUST.”)
S.E. AIRCRAFT Day Night M.E. AIRCRAFT Day Night TOTAL for year GRAND TOTAL All Service Flying
DUAL 81.00
PILOT 1070.00
PASSENGER – – – – 35.00
[underlined] ASSESSMENT of ABILITY [/underlined]
(To be assessed as:– Exceptional, Above the Average, Average, or Below the Average)
(i) AS A HB [symbol] PILOT Above the Average.
(ii) AS PILOT-NAVIGATOR/NAVIGATOR Above the Average.
(iii) IN BOMBING
(iv) IN AIR GUNNERY
[symbol] Insert :– “F.”, “L.B.”, “G.R.”, “F.B.”, etc.
[underlined] ANY POINTS IN FLYING OR AIRMANSHIP WHICH SHOULD BE WATCHED [/underlined]
– NIL –
Date 2nd Oct. 1943
Signature [signature] W/C
Officer Commanding 1651 Con Unit.
[page break]
[photograph]
[photograph]
[page break]
[photograph]
[page break]
[leave pass form]
SO.P. FLYING CONTROL
[underlined] R.A.F. Sub Form 295. [/underlined]
[stamp] Stamp of Station not Unit. [inserted] 35/89 [/inserted]
ROYAL AIR FORCE.
Monthly LEAVE PASS FORM 295
[deleted] This Pass is/is not valid for Northern Ireland and/or Eire [/deleted]
Station WITCHFORD Official No. 2016392
Rank Cpl Name DEAN
Form 1250 No. 1231123 has permission to be
absent from [deleted] his [/deleted][inserted] her [/inserted] quarters from 13.00 hrs on 18.11.43 to 13.00 hrs on 19.11.43 1943. for the purpose of proceeding on [deleted][underlined] leave [/underlined][/deleted] [inserted] SO.P. [/inserted] to NEWMARKET
[deleted] Pass [/deleted]
Date 16.11.43. J.A. Spring A/S/O. for Commanding Officer
[signature] Strike out the words inapplicable.
[continued on duplicate page]
[sick form]
[inserted] Pilot 214 Sqd. Chedburgh Bury St. Edmonds. [/inserted]
[underlined] CONFIDENTIAL [/underlined]
SICK REPORT
MEDICAL INSPECTION REPORT
R.A.F. Form 624.
Unit
Station [indecipherable word] Sands
Date 30/11/ 1943
Official No. G45866
Rank W/O
Name and Initials MACKIE. [inserted] (member of aircrew) [/inserted]
Whether a [missing letters]ulter or if [missing letters]or duty [symbol]
Disease Abrasion and bruising of [symbol] upper arm due to injury by shrapnel. E.A.
Medical Officer’s Remarks [indecipherable words]
Disposal [indecipherable word]
[symbol] Strike out whichever is not applicable.
[symbol] State nature of duty for which warned. In the case of [missing word] for medical inspection the reason, such as “joining the station,” etc. should be stated against their duties.
Orderly N.C.O.’s Signature
Medical Officer’s Signature Dr. Andrews HW
WI. 23194/1307. 205031. 6/42. V.B. 51-2700.
[page break]
[continued on duplicate page]
[newspaper cutting]
[missing letter]LANE KILLS FIVE CHILDREN
CRASHED ON SMALL FARM-HOUSE
Five children, aged from 1 to 9 years, were killed when an aircraft on Wednesday night crashed into Cliffe House, a small farmhouse near Amble, Northumberland. One of the crew was saved. The farmhouse is occupied by Mr. William Robson.
The children were Sylvia Robson (9), Ethel (7), Marjorie (5), William Matthew (3), and Sheila (1). They were in bed at the time following a party, and the father and mother and two friends, Mr. and Mrs. J. Rowall, of Pilston, Amble, were injured but not seriously.
The survivor of the crew said that the plane had been experiencing trouble, but the pilot managed to keep it in the air until he was safely over [missing word] town, but after that was unable to maintain control and crashed into the farmhouse.
The airman saved owed his life to the courage and promptitude of Mr. Rowall, who rushed out and pulled him from the ‘plane though the man’s clothes were on fire. He rolled him on the ground and put the fire out.
With the children’s deaths Mr. and Mrs. Robson have lost the whole of their family.
Mr. James Rowell told a Press Association reporter last night: “We heard a ‘plane flying very low. I shouted, “Look out!” and we all threw ourselves on the floor. The house collapsed above our heads, and, looking upwards we saw the sky. Mrs. Robson shouted “Oh my poor bairns!” and tried to make her way towards the stairs, which had been blown away.” The children’s partly-charred bodies were later recovered.
Mr. and Mrs. Robson would have been in bed when the ‘plane crashed if they had not been visited by the Rowells. Mr. Rowell said: “We are the luckiest people in the world to be alive to-day. The chairs we were sitting on were smashed, and the walls in that part of the house are not more than 3ft. high now.
[page break]
[sketch]
[inserted][missing word] Pontoon [missing word] Marked Dec 1943 [/inserted]
[inserted] Pedro (Honeyman) Downham Mkt December 1943 [/inserted]
[inserted] my Flight engineer South American [/inserted]
[page break]
[photograph]
[photograph]
Dick Gunton
Flight engineer
(died. Atkinson’s disease c. 1995)
[photograph]
? / MG owned by Gm
[page break]
[photograph]
[photograph]
[photograph]
[page break]
F/LT Vern L Scantleton DFC War Experience 2
On the 11th March 1944, I was called to the Wing Commanders office and told that I was to take Flight Lieutenant Cam Lye, a pilot in the Royal New Zealand Air Force and Roy Forbes, my navigator and a skeleton crew and go to Langford Lodge R.A.F. Station in Northern Ireland and fly back a B-17 aircraft. This on the surface looked to be a simple and routine exercise. Pilot Officer George Mackie and crew were to fly us over and wait until we had taken off which was to be the following morning. At this stage it is worth giving a few comments on George Mackie. George was one of the great characters of the Royal Air Force. In 1940, he was studying architecture at Edinburgh University when he joined the R.A.F. and gained his wings as a pilot. George was well read, witty, highly intelligent and one of the few to have had his log book endorsed as an exceptional pilot.
--
On the debit side, he was very bad tempered, argumentative, sarcastic, “red-ragger” and a true Scot in that he had an intense dislike for the British. He did little to conceal his various dislikes and thus paid a high price as he was only commissioned in 1944. With his ability, he should have won a commission in 1940 and with the passing of time and the loss of pilots, he could have reasonably have expected to have risen to the rank of at least Wing Commander by the end of the war. George apparently has not changed and fifty years later I was to read a humorous letter that he had written to Roy Forbes in New Zealand in which in part, he refers to the fact that his unmarried daughter lives in Spain and collects cats, dogs and men in that order. I well remember the trip across the Irish Sea as it was a beautiful day and as we approached the Isle of Man, George took the aircraft down to zero feet and skimmed across the waves. This is a very dangerous stunt as water is very deceptive and a moment’s inattention can put the aircraft into the drink. As we approached the Isle of Man, George raised the nose of the aircraft and we slid across the Island at tree top height, no doubt frightening the hell out of animals and humans alike.
[page break]
[photograph]
[page break]
[photograph]
[page break]
[underlined] No. 214 (F.M.S.) Squadron. [/underlined]
[underlined] BATTLE ORDER. [/underlined]
[underlined] 21st May, 1944 [/underlined].
Pilot – “N”(386) P/O Mackie & F/S. Hill. – “B”(382) W/O Morrison
Nav. – F/O O’Leary – F/Sgt. Mitchell
Wo/Air – P/O Campbell – F/Sgt. Thompson
A.B. – F/Sgt. Morris – Sgt. Finch
M.U.G. – F/Sgt. Flack – Sgt. Mael
A.G. – Sgt. Foll – Sgt. Wing
F/Eng. – Sgt. Honeyman – Sgt. Carr
Ball Gnr. – W/O Taylor
Spec. Op. – Sgt. Hoffman – Sgt. Lloyd
Pilot – “A”(384) F/O Corke – “H”(388) P/O Gilbert & F/Sgt. Archibald
Nav. – Sgt. Podger – F/O Knight
Wo/Air – Sgt. Bonner – F/O Crossman
A.B. – F/O Foskett – P/O McGilchrist
M.U.G. – Sgt. Roose – Sgt. Boyle
A.G. – F/Sgt. Boanas – F/Lt. Sharpe, AFC.
F/Eng. – Sgt. Barber – Sgt. Pugh
Ball Gnr. – Sgt. Delisle – F/Sgt. West
Sped. [sic] Op. – Sgt. Stelling – Sgt. Haveland
[underlined] CERTIFIED FLIGHT OVER FOUR HOURS DURATION [/underlined].
Briefing . . . . . . . . . . 18.00 hrs.
Meals . . . to be notified.
Officer i/c Operations: W/Cmdr. McGlinn.
[signature] F/Lt.
for Wing Commander, Commanding
No. 214 (F.M.S.) Squadron.
[page break]
From : 169724, P/O G.A. Mackie.
To : Wing Commander, Commanding No. 214 (F.M.S./B.S.) Squadron.
Date : 27th June, 1944.
Sir,
I have the honour to forward this [deleted] my [/deleted] application for your consideration.
My crew, undermentioned, and myself, wish to complete our tour of operations with a 3 Group Lancaster Squadron. The reason for the application is that the crew have been with 214 Squadron for 12 months now, and have done on an average only 16 operations each. I myself have been with 214 Squadron since 2nd October, 1943, and have done only 11 operations. (Second tour.) The navigator has been trained on H2S.
Nav. F/O O’Leary [inserted] .156452. [/inserted]
B/A. F/S. Morris [inserted] 1338960. [/inserted]
F/Eng. F/S. Honeyman [inserted] 1394447. [/inserted]
W/Op. P/O Campbell [inserted] 169395. [/inserted]
R/G. W/O Taylor [inserted] A.410278. [/inserted]
M.U.G. F/S. Fell [inserted] 141058595. [/inserted]
I have the honour to be, Sir, you obedient servant,
P/O
[page break]
[photograph]
SR386
[page break]
[photograph]
[photograph]
? Gunton
[photograph]
[page break]
To : O.C., No. 214 (F.M.S.) (B.S.) Squadron.
From : 169724 F/O G.A. Mackie.
Date : 19th August, 1944.
[underlined] Aerobatics over Moreton-on-Marsh [/underlined].
Sir,
I have the honour to report that on the night of 6/7 August I was diverted to Moreton-on-March while returning from an operational flight in Fortress aircraft Mk.11, HB.763.
I took off for base at mid-day on the 7th. After doing a normal circuit I lost height over the airfield, where the only activity was one Stirling aircraft taxying on the perimeter track. I then pulled up into a climbing turn to port, followed by a climbing turn to starboard. I then continued climbing on course.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
[page break]
[photograph]
? – Moorby – Fell – Taylor? – F/O Wells
W/O Taylor? NZ – ‘Pedro’ Honeyman Engineer – Gm – O’Leary Navigator – W/O Hoffman?
[photograph]
[page break]
[underlined] No. 214 (F.M[missing letter]) (B.S.) Squadron [/underlined].
[underlined] BATTLE ORDER 22nd AUGUST, 1944 [underlined].
[underlined] “G” (HB.774) [/underlined]
Pilot F/O Wright
Nav F/S Mulligger
WO/Air F/S Bates
A.B. W/O Sherbourne
M.U.G. W/O Robson
A/G F/S Southgate
F/Eng. Sgt. Williams
Wst. G. F/S Williams
Wst. G. Sgt. Barrett
Sp. Op. Sgt. Bayliss.
[underlined] “T” (HB.763) [/underlined]
Pilot W/O Lee
Nav W/O Gibbons
WO/Air Sgt. Smith
A.B. Sgt. Pitchford
M.U.G. Sgt. Barkess
A/G Sgt. Williamson
F/Eng. Sgt. Curtis
Wst. G. F/S Boag, DFM.
Wst. G. Sgt. Caulfield
Sp. Op. Sgt. McNamara.
[underlined] “B” (HB.788) [/underlined]
Pilot F/Lt. Bray
Nav F/O Blyth
WO/Air F/S Roberts
A.B. F/O Murphy
M.U.G. P/O McGarvis
A/G P/O Lyall
F/Eng. P/O Sainsbury
Wst. G. W/O Moore
Wst. G. F/O Bryant
Sp. Op. F/O Lang.
[underlined] “C” (HB.780) [/underlined]
Pilot F/O Bettles
Nav. F/O Evans
WO/Air F/O Kinzett
A.B. F/O McGilchrist
M.U.G. P/O Connolly
A/G F/S Smyth
F/Eng. F/O Cann
Wst. G. Sgt. Chalk
Wst. G. --
Sp. Op. Sgt. Peters.
[underlined] “Q” (HB.772) [/underlined]
Pilot F/O Rix
Nav. F/S Sargeant
WO/Air F/S Irvine
A.B. F/O Lovel-Smith
M.U.G. Sgt. Cuttance
A/G Sgt. Douglas
F/Eng. Sgt. Pond
Wst. G. Sgt. Gamble
Wst. G. Sgt. Burgess
Sp. Op. F/O Darracott.
[underlined] “R” (HB.765) [/underlined]
Pilot F/Lt. Lye
Nav. F/S Stemp
WO/Air F/S Ord-Hume
A.B. F/S Braithwaite
M.U.G. F/S Stokes
A/G Sgt. Knowlton
F/Eng. F/S Currie
Wst. G. F/O Ufton
Wst. G. F/S Lumley
Sp. Op. Sgt. Mackintosh.
[underlined] “D” (SR.378) [/underlined]
Pilot. F/O Mackie
Nav. F/O O’Leary
WO/Air. W/O Mooreby
A.B. F/S Morris
M.U.G. W/O Flack
A.G. F/O Wells, DFM.
F/Eng. F/S Honeyman
Wst. G. W/O Taylor
Wst. G. F/S Fell
Sp. Op. P/O Hoffman.
[underlined] “F” (SR.383) [/underlined]
Pilot. W/O Archibald
Nav. Sgt. Cottrell
WO/Air. F/S Shepherd
A.B. W/O Harriott
M.U.G. F/S Hodgson
A.G. Sgt. Larcombe
F/Eng. F/S Richardson
Wst. G. F/S Phillips
Wst. G. F/S Earle, DFM.
Sp. Op. Sgt. Herbert.
[underlined] CERTIFIED FLIGHT OVER FOUR HOURS DURATION. [/underlined]
Meals 17.45
Transport 18.15
Briefing 18.30
Officer i/c Operations – W/Cdr. D.J. McGlinn.
[underlined] NOTE. [/underlined]
THERE WILL BE NO ALTERATION TO THE BATTLE ORDER WITHOUT AUTHORISATION BY THE SQUADRON [underlined] COMMANDER OR HIS DEPUTY. [/underlined]
Keith EW Evans F/O
For Wing Commander, Commanding,
[underlined] No. 214 (F.M.S.) (B.S.) Squadron [/underlined].
[page break]
[underlined] Return of Operational Aircrew as at 16.00 hrs. on 31st August, 1944 [/underlined].
[underlined] “A” FLIGHT [/underlined].
Pilot F/Lt. Bray 22.
Nav. F/O Blyth 20.
WO/Air F/S. Roberts 19.
A.B. F/O Murphy 20.
M.U.G. P/O McGarvie 20.
R/Gnr. P/O Lyall 19.
F/Eng. P/O Sainsbury 19.
W/Gnr. P/O Moore (30)13.
W/Gnr. F/O Bryant (31) 8.
Pilot F/Lt. [inserted]£[/inserted] Peden 25 1/2.
Nav. Sgt. Mather 23 1/2.
WO/Air F/S. Stanley, DFM. 19 1/2.
A.B. F/O Waters 25 1/2.
M.U.G. F/S. Lester 21 .
R/Gnr. W/O Phillips 22 1/2.
F/Eng. F/S. Bailey 22 1/2.
W/Gnr. F/S. Walker 14 1/2.
W/Gnr. F/S. Hepton 12 1/2.
Pilot F/Lt. Scantleton 19 .
Nav. F/O Forbes 20 .
WO/Air W/O McDonald 20 .
A.B. Sgt. Scott 19 .
M.U.G. F/S Hewitt 14 1/2.
R/Gnr. W/O Connolly (30)12 1/2.
F/Eng. Sgt. Nuttall 18 1/2.
W/Gnr. F/S. Taylor 17 1/2.
W/Gnr. P/O Milton (18)10 1/2.
Pilot F/O Corke 12 .
Nav. F/S. Podger 10 .
WO/Air F/S Bonner 9 .
A.B. F/O Foskett 10 .
M.U.G. F/S. Roose 10 1/2.
R/Gnr. W/O Boanas (24)12 .
F/Eng. F/S. Barber 10 1/2.
W/Gnr. W/O Delisle 9 .
W/Gnr. Sgt. Gregory 5 1/2.
Pilot F/O Lawson 19 1/2.
Nav. P/O Chappell 19 1/2.
WO/Air F/S. Atkinson 17 1/2.
A.B. W/O Halldorson 18 1/2.
M.U.G. P/O Knight 17 .
R/Gnr. W/O McCann 17 .
F/Eng. Sgt. Anstee 16 1/2.
W/Gnr. F/O Hawkins (21)15 .
W/Gnr. W/O Gill (34) 8 1/2.
Pilot F/Lt Gilbert 19 .
Nav. F/O Knight 22 .
WO/Air F/O Crossman 19 1/2.
A.B. P/O Watts (29) 8 1/2.
M.U.G. W/O Boyle 23 .
R/Gnr. F/O Claxton 17 .
F/Eng. F/S. Pugh 20 .
W/Gnr. W/O West 19 1/2.
W/Gnr. P/O Mardell (27)10 .
Pilot F/O [inserted]£[/inserted] Jackson 14 .
Nav. F/S. Harding 14 .
WO/Air F/S. Pollard 14 .
A.B. W/O Picciano 14 .
M.U.G. F/S. Hardie 16 .
R/Gnr. F/S. Bright 14 .
F/Eng. F/S. Bartlett 14 .
W/Gnr. P/O Jones, DFM. (27)10 .
W/Gnr. Sgt. Fletcher 3 1/2.
Pilot F/O Wright 16 .
Nav. F/S. Mullenger 16 .
WO/Air F/S. Bates 16 .
A.B. W/O Sherbourne 15 1/2.
M.U.G. W/O Robson (28) 10
R/Gnr. F/S. Southgate 17 .
F/Eng. Sgt. Williams 17 .
W/Gnr. F/S. Williams 17 .
W/Gnr. Sgt. Barrett 5 1/2.
Pilot W/O [inserted]£[/inserted] Archibald 10 1/2.
Nav F/S. Cottrell 10 1/2.
WO/Air F/S. Shepherd 10 1/2.
A.B. W/O Harriott 12 1/2.
M.U.G. F/S. Hodgson 10 .
R/Gnr. F/S. Larcombe 10 1/2.
F/Eng. F/S. Richardson 4 1/2.
W/Gnr. F/S. Phillips (26) 7 1/2.
W/Gnr. W/O Earle, DFM. (28) 5 1/2.
Pilot F/O Bettles (21) 15 1/2.
Nav. F/O Evans 19 .
WO/Air F/O Kinsett 19 1/2.
A.B. F/O McGilchrist 25 1/2.
M.U.G. P/O Connolly 23 1/2.
R/Gnr. F/S. Smyth 24 1/2.
F/Eng. F/O Cann 19 1/2.
W/Gnr. Sgt. Chalk 5 1/2.
W/Gnr.
Pilot F/Lt. Savage 3 1/2.
Nav. F/S. Pike 1 1/2.
WO/Air Sgt. Rishworth 1 1/2.
A.B. F/O Craven 1 .
M.U.G. Sgt. Astbury 1 1/2.
R/Gnr. Sgt. Kenney 1 1/2.
F/Eng. Sgt. Lee 1 1/2.
W/Gnr. Sgt. Judge 1 1/2.
W/Gnr. Sgt. Hamblett 1 1/2.
[underlined] “B” FLIGHT [/underlined].
Pilot S/L. Miller, DFC. (36)7 .
Nav. F/Lt. Graham, DFC. (34)8 1/2.
WO/Air W/O Lancashire (34)6 1/2.
A.B. F/Lt. Taffs (35)7 .
M.U.G. W/O Burn (29)7 1/2.
R/Gnr.
F/Eng. F/S. Cox 7 .
W/Gnr. W/O Rogers (25)7 .
W/Gnr. Sgt. Finnigan 3 1/2.
Pilot F/Lt. Puterbough 21 .
Nav. F/Lt. Dickson 18 1/2.
WO/Air F/S. Wright 19 .
A.B. W/O Joyce 18 .
M.U.G.
R/Gnr. W/O Bowman 20 .
F/Eng. Sgt. Parkington 19 .
W/Gnr. Sgt. Logan 15 .
W/Gnr. F/S. Brown (25) 7 .
Pilot F/Lt. [inserted]£[/inserted] Lye 14 1/2.
Nav. F/S. Stemp 14 1/2.
WO/Air F/S. Ord-Hume 14 1/2.
A.B. F/S. Braithwaite 14 1/2.
M.U.G. F/S. Stokes 15 .
R/Gnr. F/S. Knowlton 14 1/2.
F/Eng. F/S. Currie 15 .
W/Gnr. F/O Ufton (31) 8 .
W/Gnr. F/S. Lumley (28) 8 .
Pilot F/O Bayliss 16 1/2.
Nav. F/S. Creech 15 1/2
WO/Air F/S. Charlton 15 1/2.
A.B. W/O Crerar 15 1/2.
M.U.G. F/S. Edmonds 15 1/2.
R/Gnr. Sgt. Bailey 14 1/2.
F/Eng. Sgt. Carter 14 1/2.
W/Gnr. F/S. Wilson (13) 7 .
W/Gnr. Sgt. Christie 10 1/2.
Pilot F/O Rawlin 24 1/2.
Nav F/O Owen 20 .
WO/Air F/S. Bonnet 22 1/2.
A.B. F/S. Andrew 21 1/2.
M.U.G. Sgt. Ward 22 1/2.
R/Gnr. F/S. Fothergill 22 1/2.
F/Eng. F/S. Pottle 22 .
W/Gnr. W/O Stewart, DFM (25) 6 .
W/Gnr. W/O Heath (26) 8 .
Pilot F/O Mackie (20)16 1/2.
Nav. F/O O’Leary 21 1/2.
WO/Air W/O Mooreby 14 1/2.
A.B. F/S. Morris 23 1/2.
M.U.G. W/O Flack 21 .
R/Gnr. F/O Wells, DFM. (27) 5 1/2.
F/Eng. F/S. Honeyman 23 1/2.
W/Gnr. W/O Taylor 25 1/2.
W/Gnr. F/S. Fell 22 1/2.
Pilot F/O Morrison 15 .
Nav. F/S. Mitchell 15 .
WO/Air W/O Thompson 15 .
A.B. Sgt. Finch 15 .
M.U.G. W/O Lyon (29) 10 1/2.
R/Gnr. F/S. Wing 16 .
F/Eng. F/Sgt. Carr 12 .
W/Gnr. F/S. Mael 15 .
W/Gnr. F/S. Dutton (25) 7 1/2.
Pilot F/O Hill 15 .
Nav. P/O Honsinger 15 .
WO/Air [inserted]F[/inserted] /Sgt. Goodwin 15 .
A.B. F/O Harrison 14 .
M.U.G. F/S. Ives 15 .
R/Gnr. F/S. Andrews 17 1/2.
F/Eng. F/S. Gregory 15 .
W/Gnr. W/O Clark (28) 7 1/2.
W/Gnr. Sgt. Brown 9 1/2.
Pilot F/O Rix 3.
Nav. F/S. Sargeant 1.
WO/Air W/O. Irvine 1.
A.B. F/O Lovell-Smith 1.
M.U.G. [inserted]F[/inserted] /Sgt. Cuttance 1.
R/Gnr. [inserted]F[/inserted] /Sgt. Douglas 1.
F/Eng. Sgt. Pound 1.
W/Gnr. Sgt. Gamble 1.
W/Gnr. Sgt. Burgess 1.
Pilot F/Lt. Filloul (30) 2.
Nav. P/O Dodds 2.
WO/Air Sgt. Birkby 2.
A.B. F/O Dack 2.
M.U.G. Sgt. Benson 2.
R/Gnr. Sgt. Billington 2.
F/Eng. Sgt. Wilson 2.
W/Gnr. Sgt. Dobson 2.
W/Gnr. Sgt. Cooper 2.
[underlined] SQUADRON H.Q. PERSONNEL [/underlined].
W/Cmdr. D.D. Rogers 9. [underlined] Squadron Commander [/underlined]. F/Lt. D.J. Furner, DFC. (24) 7 1/2. [underlined] Navigation Officer [/underlined]. F/Lt. V.V. Doy (30) 5 1/2. ([indecipherable word]) [underlined] Signals Leader [/underlined].
F/O E.J. Phillips, DFC. (18) 11. [underlined] Gunnery Leader [/underlined]. F/Lt. R. Gunton (28) 9. [underlined] F/Eng. Leader [/underlined].
([underlined] Continued over [/underlined].)
[page break]
[newspaper cutting]
D.F.C. FOR CUPAR OFFICER
Flying Officer George A. Mackie (24), son of Mr and Mrs D.G. Mackie, Monreith, Cupar, who has been awarded the D.F.C., was educated at Bell Baxter School.
Prior to joining up in 1940 he was a student at Dundee College of Art. His father was colonel and O.C. of 1st Fife Home Guard.
Flying Officer Mackie, who has taken part in many operations against the enemy, in the course of which he has displayed the utmost fortitude, courage and devotion to duty, was commissioned in 1943, after service in the ranks.
[page break]
[assessment form]
([symbol]4690 – 117) Wt. 51983 – 5030 48,500 4/40 T.S. 700 FORM 414 (A)
[underlined] SUMMARY of FLYING and ASSESSMENTS FOR [deleted] YEAR [/deleted][inserted] 214 Squadron [/inserted] COMMENCING 1st [/underlined] October 1943 [symbol] 15 Sept [symbol][underlined] 19 [/underlined] 44
([symbol] For Officer, Insert “JUNE” : For Airman Pilot, Insert “AUGUST”)
S.E. AIRCRAFT Day Night M.E. AIRCRAFT Day Night TOTAL for year GRAND TOTAL All Service Flying
DUAL – – 1.30 –
PILOT – – 139.30 111.00 252.30 1409.40
PASSENGER – – – –
[underlined] ASSESSMENT of ABILITY [/underlined]
(To be assessed as:– Exceptional, Above the Average, Average, or Below the Average)
(i) AS A H.B. [symbol] PILOT Above the Average.
(ii) AS PILOT-NAVIGATOR/NAVIGATOR Above the Average.
(iii) IN BOMBING N.A.
(iv) IN AIR GUNNERY N.A.
[symbol] Insert :– “F.”, “L.B.”, “G.R.”, “F.B.”, etc.
[underlined] ANY POINTS IN FLYING OR AIRMANSHIP WHICH SHOULD BE WATCHED [/underlined]
Date 15 September 1944
Signature DD Rogers W/Cmdr.
Officer Commanding No 214 Squadron.
[newspaper cutting]
R.A.F. Awards
The following R.A.F. awards are announced to Scottish officers and airmen who have displayed the utmost fortitude, courage, and devotion to duty.
DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS. – Flying Officer George Alexander Mackie (Cupar), Flying Officer Thomas Newlands [indecipherable word] (Edinburgh), Pilot Officer Thomas Bowley [indecipherable word] Pilot Officer George [indecipherable words], and Warrant Officer John Wright (Glasgow).
[page break]
[stamp] SECRET
[stamp] IMMEDIATE
[inserted] 3310/6/2 [/inserted]
[inserted] 33/510
550
oc214 [/inserted]
RAY – SNO –[inserted] Snoring [/inserted] – FLS [inserted] Foulsham [/inserted] – OUL [inserted] oulton [/inserted] – NCK – MSM – SNG
V EDR NR HBC 140/12 ‘OP’
[stamp]12 SEP 1944 R.A.F. OULTON
FROM HQ BOMBER COMMAND 121840B
TO AIR MINISTRY WHITEHALL NOS 1 3 4 5 6 8 19 92 93 100 GROUPS
AND ALL BOMBER COMMAND BASES AND STATIONS IN THESE GROUPS
1 2 3 BOMBARDMENT DIVISION
INFO ADMIRALTY
SECRET QQY BT
[underlined] BOMBER COMMAND INTELLIGENTCE NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS NO 901 SECRE[missing letter][/underlined]
[underlined] PART II. [/underlined]
[underlined] NIGHT 11/12TH SEPTEMBER [/underlined].
DARMSTADT. 5/5 LANCASTERS OF 1 GROUP, 204/221 LANCASTERS AND 14/14 MOSQUITOES OF 5 GROUP ATTACKED IN CLEAR WEATHER WITH SLIGHT HAZE. MARKING WAS PUNCTUAL AND WELL PLACED AND BOMBING IS REPORTED AS VERY CONCENTRATED. FIRES QUICKLY GAINING SUCH A HOLD THAT THE ENTIRE TARGET AREA BECAME ENVELOPED IN A MASS OF FLAME, THE GLOW OF WHICH WAS VISIBLE 100 MILES AWAY. SLIGHT TO MODERATE [deleted] HEAC [/deleted] HEAVY FLAK WAS ENCOUNTERED, BUT FIGHTER ACTIVITY WAS EXPERIENCED THROUGHOUT THE ROUTE EAST OF 5 DEGREES EAST. PARTICULARLY IN THE TARGET AREA.
12 LANCASTERS ARE MISSING.
BERLIN. 41/47 MOSQUITOES OF 8 (PF) GROUP BOMBER FOR 21,000 FT. TO 28,000 FT. IN GOOD WEATHER CONDITIONS. T.I’S WERE WELL CONCENTRATED AND BOMBING WAS CARRIED OUT WITHIN THE MARKED AREA. ONE LARGE EXPLOSION AND SEVERAL SMALL FIRES ARE REPORTED. DEFENCES WERE MODERATE TO INTENSE HEAVY FLAK.
1 MOSQUITO IF MISSING.
STEENWIJK/HAVELTE A/F. 3/7 MOSQUITOES OF 8 (PF) GROUP ATTACKED AND BOMBED FROM 30,000 FT IN CLEAR WEATHER. THERE WERE NO DEFENCES.
MINELAYING. 7/8 LANCASTERS OF 1 GROUP 27/30 LANCASTERS OF 3 GROUP 18/20 HALIFAXES OF 4 GROUP AND 17/18 HALIFAXES OF 6 GROUP LAID MINES IN THE ALLOTTED AREAS.
[underlined] BOMBER SUPPORT. 100 GROUP [/underlined]
13/13 A/C PROVIDEDMANDREL SCREEN.
[inserted] GM – [/inserted] 5/5 A/C CARRIED OUT H.F. JAMMING, ACCOMPANYING THE BOMBERS TO DARMSTADT.
17/18 MOSQUITOES COMPLETED SERRATE PATROLS TO THE EAST, NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE DARMSTADT AREA, AND CLAIM 1 ME 110 DESTROYED AND 1 CHASE.
14/14 MOSQUITOES CARRIED OUT INTRUDER PATROLS OVER ENEMY A/F’S AND CLAIM 2 UNIDENTIFIED E/A DAMAGED.
12/12 MOSQUITOES CARRIED OUT HIGH LEVEL INTRUDER PATROLS IN THE DARMSTADT AREA AND IN THE VICINITY OF ENEMY NIGHT FIGHTER BEACONS IN DENMARK. 3 JU188’S ARE CLAIMED AS DESTROYED AND 1 JU 188 DAMAGED.
9/11 A/: COMPLETED SIGNALS INVESTIGATION PATROLS, ESCORTED BY 2 MOSQUITOES WHO CLAIM 5 CHASES.
[underlined] A.D.G.B. [/underlined]
16/17 MOSQUITOES PATROLED A/F’S IN GERMANY AND HOLLAND CLAIM: 1 JU88 DESTROYED
BT 121840B
MP BB+ [inserted] R2030 KQ [/inserted]
[page break]
[vertical][posting notice]
[inserted] 10524 02 214 Sqa [/inserted]
[underlined] POSTGRAM POSTING NOTICE [/underlined] A.M. FORM 1693
COPY “A”
TO: DESPATCHING GROUP
NO. GROUP
100
[cross hatched] COPY “B”
TO: DESPATCHING COMMAND
Bomber
COPY “C”
TO: RECEIVING GROUP
NO. GROUP
44
COPY “D”
TO: RECEIVING COMMAND
Transport
COPY “E”
TO:
[indecipherable]
(ACCOUNTS 2’d)
[indecipherable]
COPY “F”
TO:
[indecipherable words]
COPY “G”
TO:
[indecipherable words]
[/cross hatched]
ORGINATOR’S ADDRESS.
AIR MINISTRY,
LONDON, W.C.2.
TAKE ACTION ON THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTION
NAME AND RANK OF POSTING OFFICER} H.D. Wardle S/L for D.G. of P.
SERIAL REF. DGP/BC/8926/44/17
DATE 25.9.44.
PERSONAL NO. 169724
BASIC RANK. F/O
ACTING RANK –
NAME AND INITIALS Mackie G.A. [symbol]
BRANCH OR AIRCREW CATEGORY Pilot
[symbol] NATIONALITY
[symbol][underlined] POSTING/[deleted][indecipherable][/deleted][/underlined]
FROM: UNIT [circled] 214 Sqdn. [/circled] GROUP 100 DUTIES Flying RANK OF POST – }
TO: UNIT 1332 C.U. Langtown GROUP 44 DUTIES F/I RANK OF POST – } DATE OF EFFECT 2.10.44.
[underlined] ACTING RANK [/underlined] (QUOTING RANK AND DATE OF EFFECT) GRANTED RETAINED RELINQUISHED
[underlined] REMARKS [/underlined]
[underlined] ACTION AND CIRCULATION [/underlined]
1
[underlined] DESPATCHING GROUP [/underlined][inserted] HD [/inserted]
TO NOTE AND PASS TO
[underlined] DESPATCHING UNIT [/underlined]
FOR ACTION
2
[underlined] TO AIR MINISTRY POSTING BRANCH [/underlined]
CERTIFIED INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED ACCORDINGLY AND P.O.R. ACTION TAKEN.
(UNIT) 214 Sqdn (SIGNED) GA Mackie F/Lt DATE 29/9
3
AIR MINISTRY ACTION:
TO [underlined] D.G. of P. (DUPLICATE RECORDS) [/underlined]
TO NOTE AND RETAIN
[symbol] DELETE AS APPROPRIATE. [symbol] PERSONNEL OF DOMINION AND ALLIED FORCES ONLY. [/vertical]
[page break]
[assessment form]
([symbol]6392 – 117) Wt 39210 – 2791 33,000 1/41 T.S. 700 FORM 414 (A)
[underlined] SUMMARY of FLYING and ASSESSMENTS FOR [deleted] YEAR [/deleted][inserted] Period [/inserted] COMMENCING [deleted] 1st [/deleted] 15/11/44 to 25/11/[/underlined]44[underlined]
([symbol] For Officer, Insert “JUNE” : For Airman Pilot, Insert “AUGUST.”)
S.E. AIRCRAFT Day Night M.E. AIRCRAFT Day Night TOTAL [deleted] for year [/deleted] GRAND TOTAL [deleted] All Service Flying [/deleted]
DUAL – – 8.20 – 8.20 8.20
PILOT – – – – LINK 6.00
PASSENGER – – – – – –
[underlined] ASSESSMENT of ABILITY [/underlined]
(To be assessed as:– Exceptional, Above the Average, Average, or Below the Average)
(i) AS A Range [symbol] PILOT PROFICIENT.
(ii) AS PILOT-NAVIGATOR/NAVIGATOR ) –
(iii) IN BOMBING –
(iv) IN AIR GUNNERY –
[symbol] Insert :– “F.”, “L.B.”, “G.R.”, “F.B.”, etc.
[underlined] ANY POINTS IN FLYING OR AIRMANSHIP WHICH SHOULD BE WATCHED [/underlined]
–
Date 25 th November, 1944
Signature [signature] F/Lt
Officer Commanding No.1527 B.A.T. Flight, Prestwick.
[page break]
[photograph]
[photograph]
[page break]
Canadian [symbol]
? name [photograph]
[photograph]
[page break]
[photograph]
[photograph]
[page break]
[sketch]
F/L Buckwell PI 8AM over the Med 10/5/45
[page break]
[sketch]
A boozer
Taff Price
Spring 45
Straight
[page break]
[photograph]
Sterling V
[page break]
[photograph]
[page break]
[photograph]
Peden Gm Gm’s car
Gunton
[page break]
[photograph]
[page break]
[photograph]
Gm with Turbo
[page break]
[photograph]
Feb, 1944 Sculthorpe
Lancashire (Seattle)
[photograph]
Escape photo
for forged papers if shot down
[page break]
[newspaper cutting]
SIR – Once again we get near Remembrance Day, which always brings back memories of one of the best friends I ever met in my life.
We met when serving on 57 Lancaster Sqdn during the last war.
We were friends because we had mutual interests, our love of poetry and cricket.
We were all very young in those days.
He was a ‘Lanc’ pilot who paid tribute to the 55,000 aircrew who were killed in bomber command flying on nightly ‘ops’ into Germany, many of who had also been our friends.
Only two weeks after writing his brief poem to lost friends he himself was shot down and killed flying over Cologne.
Sir, it would give me great pleasure if you would print the above poem he wrote.
I have never forgotten him.
ALF RIPPON,
Lincoln Road,
Stamford. [inserted] 1998 [/inserted]
Lines written by a wartime friend who died over Cologne
My brief sweet life is over
My eyes no longer see
No summer walks, no Christmas trees
No pretty girls for me
I’ve got the chop, I’ve had it
My nightly ‘ops’ are done
But in a hundred years and more
I’ll still be 21
[photograph]
Control-Tower staff Wychford nr Ely
1944
[photograph]
Elsie
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
George Alexander Mackie’s pilots flying log book. Two
Description
An account of the resource
Pilots flying log book two, for George Alexander Mackie, covering the period from 24 September 1943 to 17 February 1946. Detailing his instructor duties, operations flown and post war flying with 46 squadron. He was stationed at RAF Waterbeach, RAF Chedburgh, RAF Downham Market, RAF Tempsford, RAF Sculthorpe, RAF Oulton, RAF Longtown, RAF Nutts Corner, RAF Prestwick and RAF Stoney Cross. Aircraft flown were Stirling, Fortress, Oxford and Liberator. He flew a total of 22 operations with 214 squadron, 23 night and one daylight. Targets were Pertius D’Antioche, Leverkusen, Laeso, St Omer, Cherbourg, Otignies, Tours, Lanveoc-Poulmic, Kiel Bay, Saumer, Sterkrade, Saint Leu D’Esserent, Schouwen Island, Overflakee Island, Brunswick, Frisians, Bremen, Rotterdam, Darmstadt and Eindhoven. The log book also contains photos of himself, aircraft, crews and various sketches.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LMackieGA855966v2
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--Kiel Bay
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Belgium--Ottignies
Denmark--Læsø
England--Bedfordshire
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Hampshire
England--Norfolk
England--Suffolk
France--Cherbourg
France--Creil Region
France--Poulmic
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
France--Saumur
France--Tours
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Leverkusen
Netherlands--Eindhoven
Netherlands--Overflakkee
Netherlands--Rotterdam
Netherlands--Schouwen-Duiveland
Netherlands--West Frisian Islands
Northern Ireland--Antrim (County)
Germany--Oberhausen (Düsseldorf)
Great Britain
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1943-10-17
1943-10-18
1943-11-19
1943-11-20
1943-12-01
1943-12-02
1944-01-04
1944-01-05
1944-01-21
1944-01-22
1944-04-20
1944-04-21
1944-05-01
1944-05-02
1944-05-08
1944-05-09
1944-05-21
1944-05-22
1944-05-31
1944-06-01
1944-06-16
1944-06-17
1944-07-07
1944-07-08
1944-07-23
1944-07-24
1944-07-25
1944-08-06
1944-08-07
1944-08-10
1944-08-11
1944-08-12
1944-08-13
1944-08-17
1944-08-18
1944-08-19
1944-09-11
1944-09-12
1944-09-13
1945
1946
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Steve Baldwin
11 OTU
1651 HCU
214 Squadron
aircrew
animal
arts and crafts
B-17
B-24
bombing
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
C-47
Flying Training School
Heavy Conversion Unit
Initial Training Wing
military living conditions
mine laying
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
pilot
RAF Chedburgh
RAF Downham Market
RAF Nutts Corner
RAF Oulton
RAF Prestwick
RAF Sculthorpe
RAF Stoney Cross
RAF Tempsford
RAF Waterbeach
Stirling
training
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/258/26884/LVaseyJ179596v1.2.pdf
3ae4de7621904346299103153a2c4eb7
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Ganney, Keith
Keith Ganney
K Ganney
Description
An account of the resource
23 items. An oral history interview with Flying Officer Keith Ganney (b. 1922, 1324929 Royal Air Force), his log books, documents and photographs. He flew operations as a bomb aimer with 57 Squadron.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Keith Ganney and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-03-01
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Ganney, K
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
J Vasey’s pilot’s log book
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LVaseyJ179596v1
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Nine photocopied sheets
Description
An account of the resource
Pilot’s flying log book for J Vasey covering the period from 20 July 1942 to 28 April 1946. Detailing his flying training and operations flown as pilot. He was stationed at RAF Cambridge (22 EFTS) RCAF Neepawa (35 EFTS), RCAF Weyburn (41 SFTS), RAF Shellingford (3 EFTS), RAF Church Lawford (18 PAFU), RAF Fiskerton (1514 BAT Flight), RAF Silverstone (17 OTU), RAF Swinderby (1654 HCU), RAF East Kirkby (57 Squadron), RAF Syerston (5 LFS), RAF Finningley (BCIS), RAF Wigsley (1654 HCU), RAF Welford (1336 TSCU), RAF Palam (353 Squadron), RAF Meiktelia (10 Squadron). He had two Red Endorsements. Aircraft flown in were Tiger Moth, Anson, Oxford, Wellington, Halifax, Lancaster and Dakota.
He flew a total of 30 operations with 57 Squadron (24 by night and six by day), targets were Darmstadt, Koningsberg, Bergoneuse, Stuttgart, Bremerhaven, Rheydt, Munster, Karlsruhe, Kaiserlauten, Bremen, Brunswick, Nuremburg, Dusseldorf, Dortmund-Ems Canal, Hamburg, Gravenhorst, Trondheim, Munich, Heinbach dam, Oslo, Royan, Leuna, Siegen, Cologne, Wilhelmshaven, Veerk, Homburg, Duren and Ladbergen. His pilot for his first 'second dickie' operation was Squadron Leader Fairburn. After December 1944 he instructed and then flew transport operations in the Far East.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form: no better quality copies are available.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1944-08-25
1944-08-26
1944-08-27
1944-08-29
1944-08-30
1944-08-31
1944-09-12
1944-09-13
1944-09-17
1944-09-18
1944-09-19
1944-09-20
1944-09-23
1944-09-24
1944-09-26
1944-09-27
1944-09-28
1944-10-05
1944-10-06
1944-10-07
1944-10-11
1944-10-14
1944-10-15
1944-10-19
1944-10-20
1944-11-01
1944-11-02
1944-11-03
1944-11-06
1944-11-07
1944-11-11
1944-11-12
1944-11-16
1944-11-21
1944-11-22
1944-11-23
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-12-08
1944-12-10
1944-12-29
1944-12-30
1945-01-01
1945-01-04
1945-01-05
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1945-02-01
1945-02-02
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
Germany
Great Britain
Norway
France--Royan
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Homburg (Saarland)
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Hörstel
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Ladbergen
Germany--Leuna
Germany--Munich
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Siegen
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Norway--Oslo
Norway--Trondheim
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Terry Hancock
1654 HCU
17 OTU
57 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
aircrew
Anson
bombing
C-47
Distinguished Flying Cross
Flying Training School
Halifax
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
pilot
RAF Church Lawford
RAF East Kirkby
RAF Finningley
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RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
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Tiger Moth
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/194/27209/MAdamsHG424504-170215-01.2.pdf
1081940cd3d5fc25972f96a05b4902d4
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Adams, Herbert
Herbert Adams
H Adams
Herbert G Adams
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88 items. Collection concerns Herbert George Adams DFC, Legion d'Honour (b. 1924, 424509 Royal Australian Air Force). He flew operations as a navigator with 467 Squadron. Collection contains an oral history interview, photographs of people and places, several memoirs about his training and bombing operations, letters to his family, his flying logbook and notes on navigation.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Herbert Adams and catalogued by Nigel Huckins and Trevor Hardcastle.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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2017-02-15
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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Adams, HG
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[inserted] (There is some duplication of notes for Ops [symbol] 1 to [symbol] 14 as I wrote something at different times (years apart.)) [/inserted]
[inserted] [symbol] Soon after we feathered that engine over “A” Flight commander flew up on our wing top & feathered 3 engines & kept up with us! He was giving us some assurance that a lightly loaded Lancaster could fly level (for a while) on 1 engine … reassurance for a new crew [/inserted]
My navigation Logs & Charts of our operations with 467 (RAAF) Squadron at Waddington, near Lincoln, from 10.9.44 to 16.1.45, with extracts from a publication giving some details of every operation by 467 & 463 Squadrons from 10.9.44 to 25.4.45.
[circled 1] [underlined] LE HAVRE, 10.9.44 [/underlined] 21 from 467, 20 from 463 as part of 992 bombers on 8 different German strong points outside of Le Havre. The targets were accurately marked and bombed, with no losses from Waddington. We took off at 1522, flew to Syerston (nearby), then did a radius of action on a track of 260oT so as to be back at Syerston at 1604 at 8000’. The winds were about what was forecast, 025/15; we bombed at 1723 at 12100’, bomb load was 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500 lb H.E. Two minutes after we dropped our bombs our Port Outer motor stopped (stray AA – fire?), we feathered the prop & flew home OK on 3 engines, airborne for 3h 55 min.
[symbol] On 11.9.44, 218 bombers from 5 Group attacked the German positions still holding out at Le Havre, with no losses. 2 British divisions were attacking Le Havre & the German garrison surrendered a few hours after the raid. The British wished to capture the port intact, but the German garrison had laid mines, and blown up most of the docks, and so it was several weeks before the port could be used.
DAMSTADT, 11.9.44. 226 Lancasters from 5 Group bombed at night, losing 1 crew (all K.I.A.) from 463 Sqdn. Our pilot, Peter Gray-Buchanan, did his “Second Dickie” on this raid.
[circled 2] [underlined] STUTTGART, 12.9.44. [/underlined] 20 from 467, 14 from 463, of 204 from [underlined] 5 Group [/underlined]. (On the same night 378 Lancasters bombed Frankfurt with success.) Post-war, a German expert – Heinz Bardau – wrote that the northern & western parts of Stuttgart city were erased in this concentrated attack… a [underlined] fire-storm resulted [/underlined], with 1171 people killed, the city’s highest fatality figure for the war.
[page break]
STUTTGART (Con’t)
467 Sqdn lost 2 crews (F/L D. Brown, 5 KIA, 2 POW, F/O Bright. 5 KIA, 2 POW.)
We took off at 1916 & set course at 1919, staying at 2500’ until 2137 when we began climbing, to 16000’ by 2233. Our last GEE fix was at 2232 and the next (after bombing OK at 2316) at 0022… so nearly 2 hours of Dead Reckoning with some map reading. (The Germans jammed our GEE receiver so that the screen was filled with “Grass”). The actual winds were about as forecast 160/15 at the target. Our bomb load was 1 x 4000 lb “cookie” & 13 J clusters (of incendiaries). Two minutes after bombing our gunners saw a fighter (they think a Do217) at about 400 yards, so we began to “corkscrew”. We continued corkscrewing until 2329, seeing one plane (unidentified) at about 50 yards! and another with a light on (!). We were airborne for 6h 51 min.
[circled 3] [underlined] BOULOGNE. 17.9.44. [/underlined] We took off at 0806 & flew to Syerston, then did a Radius of Action (on track of 260oT) to return to Syerston at 0837 at 6000’, where we did a circuit to port to lose height & get into formation at 3000! We had an uneventual [sic] trip to the target where we bombed at 8100’, dropping 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500 lb. We were airborne for 3h 26 min. 19 Lancs from each of 467 & 463 joined 762 bombers dropping more than 3000 tons of H.E. bombs on German positions around Bologne in preparation for an attack by Allied troops. The German garrison surrendered soon after the raid.
[circled 4] [underlined] BREMERHAVEN 18.9.44. [/underlined] 19 Lancs from each of 467 & 463 were part of a total of [underlined] 206 from 5 Group [/underlined], with no losses from Waddington. The post-war assessors found that this 5-Group attack, with less than 900 tons of bombs, started a [underlined] fire-storm [/underlined] which destroyed 2750 buildings in the main port area, & that [underlined] 30000 [/underlined] people were made homeless & had to live in the open until evacuated several days later.
[page break]
Extracts from a publication giving some details of every wartime operation by 467 & 463 Squadrons (loaned by Sam Nelson) RED = Daylight. BLACK = Night BLUE = We weren’t on it.
[circled 1] 10-9-44 LE HAVRE 21 from 467, 20 from 463 as part of 992 bomber raid on 8 different German strongpoints outside Le Havre. The targets were accurately marked and bombed. No losses.
D. 3h 55m. 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500. 12000’ (We lost P.O. engine during bomb-run).
Day 11-9-44. LE HAVRE. 218 bombers from 5 Group attacked German positions still holding out at Le Havre. Two British divisions were now attacking Le Havre and the German garrison surrendered a few hours later. The British wished to capture the port intact as a supply port for the armies, but the German garrison had proved spiteful – they had mined and blown up most of the docks, and it was a number of weeks before the port could be used.
[inserted] Night [/inserted] 11-9-44 DAMSTADT. 226 Lancasters of 5 Group.
Our pilot (Peter Gray-Buchanan) did his “second dickie”. 1 A/C from 463 lost (7 KIA).
[circled 2] 12-9-44 STUTTGART. 20 of 467, 14 of 463, of 204 from 5 Group. (Same night 378 Lancasters on Frankfurt … with success.) Post war, a German expert, Heinz Bardau, wrote that the Northern + Western parts of the city were erased in this concentrated attack, & that a fire-storm resulted … 1171 people killed. Stuttgart’s highest fatality figure for the war. 467 lost 2 crews: F/L D. Brown .. 5 KIA, 2 POW; F/O Bright … 5 KIA, 2 POW.
F 6h 50m 1 x 4000 + 13 J clusters. 15750’
[circled 3] 17-9-44. BOULOGNE. 19 from 467, 19 from 463, of 762 bombers dropping more than 3000 tons of H.E. bombs on German positions around Boulogne in preparation for an attack by Allied troops. The German garrison
[page break]
surrendered soon afterwards.
D. 3h 25 m. 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500. 8100’
[circled 4] 18-9-44 BREMERHAVEN. 19 of 467, 19 of 463, of 206 from 5-Group. No losses from Waddington. The post-war assessors found that this 5-Group attack, with less than 900 tons of bombs, started a fire-storm which destroyed 2750 buildings in the main port area, & that 30000 people were made homeless & lived in the open until evacuated several days later.
D 4h 45m. 18 cans (incendiaries – 150 per can). 15250’
[circled 5] [inserted] 19-9-44 [/inserted] RHEYDT/MUNCHEN-GLADBACH. 19 of 467, 16 of 463, of 227 Lancasters of 5-Group bombing the twin towns. German reports state that only between 267 and 271 people were killed. 467 lost one Lanc, crashing on returning (4 KIA, 1 POW, 2 evaded, including pilot, F/O Findlay) Master Bomber was W/C Guy Gibson, VC, DSO, DFC (of Dambusters fame) flying a Mosquito … which crashed in flames near the Dutch coast. He and his navigator (S/L J.N. Warwick, DFC) were killed and buried at Steenbergen-en-Kriesland. (Orbited target for 17mm – marking delay). 11000’
D 5h 5m 1 x 2000 + 12 J clusters.
[circled 6] 23-9-44 DORTMUND-EMS CANAL (Aqueduct). 19 of 467, 17 of 463, of 136 Lancs. from 5-Group mounting a special attack on the aqueduct at Ladbergen on the Dortmund-Ems Canal. The canal was breached, but losses were heavy 10% of the force were lost. 467 lost F/O G.A. Brown and crew. (5 KIA. 2 POW). (Orbited target losing height for 15 min extra there. Meant to bomb 14000’ but 6400’ due to cloud)
C 5h 25m 14 x 1000
[page break]
[inserted] On the unused back of one of the logsheets are some sketches (rough) of GEE BOX & the kind of blips, scales etc, displayed [/inserted]
(BREMERHAVEN, Con’t).
We took off at 1832, orbited base until 1844, when we set course at 2000’. At 1915 we needed to alter course southwards to regain our track as the winds were from about 085oT rather than 060oT (forecast). Our last GEE fix (before jamming) was on track near turning point A, and we’d climbed to 15000’, from which height we bombed at 2103. Our bomb load was 18 cans of incendiaries. The Lancaster bomb-bay, (quite long & wide, under the floor) had 14 ‘hooks’, so to use 18 cans, 3 of the hooks had a framework added to hold 3 cans side by side. The bomb-aimer could select all 14 hooks to release independently, usually at fairly short time intervals to produce a “stick” of bombs usefully spread. Each can of incendiaries released 150 small bombs about 5 cm diameter & about 40 cm long, each capable of starting a fire.
It was an easy trip for navigation, with GEE only jammed for about 1/2 hr before & after the target. We were airborne for 4h 46 min.
[circled 5] [underlined] RHEYDT/MUNCHEN-GLADBACH. 19.9.44 [/underlined] 19 Lancs from 467, & 16 from 463 were part of a total of 227 from 5 Group bombing the twin-towns. German reports state that only between 267 & 271 people were killed. 467 Sqdn lost one Lanc. crashing on returning (4 KIA but pilot, F/O Findlay, & one other evaded, & the 7th was imprisoned). The Master-Bomber was W/C Guy Gibson VC, DSO, DFC, of Dambuster fame, flying a Mosquito which crashed in flames near the Dutch coast. He and his navigator (S/L J.N. Warwick, DFC) were killed and buried at Steenbergen-en-Kriesland. We took off at 1856 and did a Radius-of-Action (track 260oT) to arrive back at Base at 1913, at 2000’. The winds were about as predicted, we kept close to track & time, and arrived at target at 2139 at 11000’, but were told to [underlined] orbit [/underlined] (to port) due to marking problems. At 2148 we were told to [underlined] orbit again, [/underlined] until, at 2151 we we [sic] told to “attack Green spot fires direct”, which we did at 2155, at 11000’.
[page break]
[photograph] D-Dog at Waddington, 1944
[photograph] [symbol] Peter at pilots window
[photograph] Our gunners
Left: Ken Nicholls, Rear Gunner
Right: Ray Giles, Mid-Upper Gunner
[page break]
RHEYDT/MUNCHEN-GLADBACH (Con’t).
At 2159 1/2 I logged “a/c hit ground – explosion – flame & smoke”
At 2201 1/2 I logged “a/c on ground, bears 000o, 2 min (51o23’, 05o51’E).
At 2211 we saw an unidentified fighter so went into the corkscrew routine, at about 51o30’N 05o00’E.
At 2213 1/2 , while in starbord [sic] turn saw unidentified fighter above us, at about 51o31’N 04o53’E, so continued to corkscrew.
At 2221, I logged “possible a/c hit ground 3 mi on port beam, about 51o32 1/2’N 04o19’E. Our bomb-load was 1 x 2000 lb & 12 “J” clusters. We were airborne for 5h 5 min.
[circled 6] [underlined] DORTMUND-EMS CANAL [/underlined]. 23.9.44. 19 from 467 & 17 from 463 of total 136 Lancs from 5 Group mounted a special attack on the aquaduct at Ladbergen. The canal was breached, but losses were heavy … 10% of the force. 467 Sqdn lost F/O G.A. Brown & crew (5 KIA, 2 POW).
We took off at 1906, did the usual Radius-of-Action to be back at Base at 1931 at 2000’. We crossed the Channel at 4000’ then climbed to 6000’, keeping nicely to track until 2047. GEE was being jammed, and the next 2 fixes showed us 10 & 20 mi North of track … they may have been wrong. We continued by dead-reckoning through cloud climbing to 14000’ and arriving at the target on time at 2148. (We were told by Master-Bomber at 2146 “to bomb 150 ft N.W. of Red Target Indicator (flare)” J. But we were in thick cloud, so [underlined] orbited to port [/underlined] losing height … very dangerous in cloud. At 2155 the Master-Bomber said “cloud base is 8000’, come in and bomb”, but we were still in cloud & had to do [underlined] another orbit [/underlined], losing height to 6300’, so that finally we could see the target at bombed at 2203 from 6400’.
At 2205 I logged “a/c hit ground & exploded 8 mi S.E. of [symbol], (at about 51o59’N 07o53’E.”
At 2228 1/2 I logged “crossed river; a/c hit ground, port beam, 3 mi.”
At 2229 “a/c directly under us hit ground, 52o15’N 06o11’E.”
At 2231 1/2 I logged “a/c hit ground ahead about 10 mi” [brackets]
At 2236 1/2 I logged “a/c (same one?) on port beam, 5 mi [brackets] 52o10’N 06o00’E
[page break]
DORTMUND-EMS CANAL (Con’t).
After leaving the target area, the winds must have been stronger than predicted from the South.
At 2253 I logged “Strong searchlights ahead … Bomb-Aimer thinks its Rotterdam” (about 10 mi North of desired track). So we immediately turned 40o to port, but copped some flak.
At 2303 we saw searchlights over the OVER FLAKKEE area, and at 2304 got our first GEE fix since our last good one at 2047 putting us about 11 mi north of track.
Our bomb-load was 14 x 1000 lb. We were airborne for 5h 25 min.
[underlined] CALAIS. 24.9.44. [/underlined] 8 from 467, & 7 from 463 of a total 188 from 5 Group. 8 were shot down, including 1 from 467 Sqdn, F/O R.A. Jones (3 KIA & 4 POW).
[circled 7] [underlined] KARLSRUHE 26.9.44 [/underlined]. 17 from 467, 14 from 463 of a total 227 from 5 Group. A short German report states “that there was damage throughout the city & lists several important buildings destroyed”. 467 Sqdn lost F/O K. Miller (1 KIA, 6 POW).
We took off at 0055 & did the usual radius-of-action to be back at base at 0113 at 3000’. The winds were much as predicted and we kept close to track & timing, our last reliable GEE fix was at 0337; we arrived at target at 0408 and Master-Bomber told us to “bomb direct on mixed Red & Green T.1’s” But we had 10/10 cloud below us, so we “went round again” & managed to bomb at 0414 from 11500’. Our first reliable GEE fix on the way home was at 0444, only just over 1 hour of jamming.
Our bomb-load was 18 cans of incendiaries, and we were airborne for 6h 50 mins.
[circled 8] [underlined] KAISERLAUTERN 27.9.44 [/underlined] 16 from 467, 15 from 463 of a total of 217 from 5 Group, did the only major raid of the war by Bomber Command. 909 tons of bombs were dropped causing widespread damage to this medium-sized city. A local German report complained that the town was not a military objective, but went on to list a catalogue of small factories destroyed. We took off at 2205,
[page break]
24-9-44. CALAIS. 8 of 467, 7 of 463, of 188 from 5-Group. 8 were shot down. 467 lost F/O R. A. Jones & crew (3 KIA, 4 POW)
[circled 7] 26-9-44 KARLSRUHE. 17 of 467, 14 of 463, of 227 from 5-Group. A short German report states that there was damage throughout the city & lists several important buildings destroyed. 467 lost F/O K. Miller & crew (1 KIA, 6 POW).
J 6h 50m 18 cans incendiaries 11500’
[circled 8] 27-9-44 KAISERLAUTERN. 16 of 467, 15 of 463, of 217 from 5-Group on Kaiserlautern, a medium-sized city, in the only major raid on it by Bomber Command during the war. 909 tons of bombs were dropped a widespread damage was caused. A local German report complains that the town was not a military object, but goes on to list a catalogue of small factories destroyed.
H 6h 20m 18 cans incendiaries 4000’
(Sept. Summary: 467 flew 199 sorties; lost 6 crews (23 KIA, 17 POW, 2 Ev.) 4 tours completed.)
[circled 9] 5-10-44 WILHELMSHAVEN 17 of 467, 16 of 463, of 227 from 5-Group. 10/10 cloud, marking by H2S. The Wilhelmshaven Diary states that only 12 people died and one bomber was shot down. 467 lost 1 crew (they ditched … hadn’t got to the target … at about 11 am. They were finally rescued about 5pm next day. After short leave, they returned to ‘ops, and were all Killed-in-Action on the Harburg raid.
(This was the only ‘trip’ on which we were allowed to use H2S (they thought enemy fighters could use its transmission to find us). We couldn’t see the markers, so bombed by H2S.)
C. 5h 5m. 18 cans incendiaries. 15000’ (We flew to target in formation escorted by long-range Mustangs
[page break]
did a Radius of Action to be back at base at 2228 at 3000’. We stayed at 3000’ until 0010, then climbed to 4500’ and stayed at 4500’ until close to target, when told to bomb from 4000’, which we did (1 1/2 min early), dropping 18 cans of incendiaries. We kept close to track all the way and only lost GEE for an hour. We were airborne for 6h 20 min.
[circled 9] [underlined] WILHELMHAVEN. [/underlined] 17 of 467, 16 of 463, of 227 from 5-Group, a daylight raid flying in formation to the target, escorted by long-range Mustang fighters. The met. forcast [sic] was for considerable cloud at the target, and we were given the most unusual priorities for bombing:-
(i) drop them visually if target is clear;
(ii) use H2S if target is obscured; or (!)
(iii) drop when you see another bomber drop its load.
We took off at 0755, did a Radius of Action to be back at base at 0811 to join formation at 1500’. My GEE set was not working, but being in formation I didn’t have to navigate anyway. Ted Pickard, the new assistant Nav. Officer, criticised my lack of effort to have some practice. At 1010 we began to climb to 15000’ at the target where at 1106 there was 10/10 cloud below. Our Bomb Aimer & I operated the H2S and aimed at the NW corner of the town and dropped our bombs at 1110 and noticed two other Lancasters dropped theirs immediately after. We flew home independently, but other Lancs were visible so we followed the stream. At 1212 I took over flying a plane for the first & only time, keeping straight & level without much trouble for half an hour. We did a bit of map-reading for the last 1/2 hour, and landed at 1306, being airborne for 5h 5 min. Our bomb-load was 18 cans of incendiaries. The Wilhelmshaven Diary states that only 12 people died and that 1 bomber was shot down. 467 lost 1 crew … they ditched before the target at about 11 am & were (finally) rescued about 1700 the next day. After short leave they resumed ops., but were all K.I.A. on the HARBURG raid on 11.11.44. Our bomb-load was 15 cans of incendiaries
[page break]
[circled 10] [underlined] BREMEN [/underlined] 17 of 467 Sq., 18 of 463 Sq., of 246 from 5 Group, a night raid on 6.10.44, with bomb-load 18 cans of incendiaries dropped from 17250’. Air borne at 1736 & did Return of Action arriving back at base at 1753 at 5000’. A good navigation trip keeping close to desired track, but winds were lighter than expected, so, despite reducing air-speed twice (10 mph each time) we did a 60o – 120o triangle to lose 7 min. This was the last of 32 major Bomber Command raids on Bremen of the war. This raid, based on the 5 Group marking method, was an outstanding success. 1021 tons of bombs were dropped, of which 868 tons were incendiaries. A detailed report (local) is available which was compiled by an official who stated that: “the night was clear, with 3/4 full moon. A huge fire area was started. Classed as destroyed were 4859 houses, 42 factories, 2 shipyards, the Focke-Wulf works & the Siemens-Schubert electrical works. The transport network was seriously disrupted.” This raid, by no more than 1/4 of Bomber Command (& hardly mentioned in the British War History) had finished Bremen … it was not attacked again in the war.
We landed at 2233 after a trip of 4hr 55 min.
[circled 11] [underlined] FLUSHING [/underlined] (WEST DYKE on WALCHEREN ISLAND in the Scheldt Estuary.) 12 of 467, & 11 of 463 of a total of 121 of 5 Group, a daylight raid on 7.10.44. We each did 2 runs dropping a stick of 7 each run (all 1000 lb HE bombs). The sea-wall was breached and virtually all the island was flooded except the rest of the sea-wall, the central tour (Middleburgh) & the town of Flushing. English newspapers had a photo of the flooded island the next day. We had no losses despite plenty of A.A. [inserted] [two indecipherable words] [/inserted]. On the same day 846 of Bomber Command attacked Kleve-Emerich & Kembs Dams. 617 Sqn. used Tallboys (12000 lb bomb) on Kembs to destroy the floodgates to [underlined] prevent [/underlined] the Germans flooding the valley in the face of the American & French advance.
We were airborn for 3h 10 min.
[page break]
[circled 10] 6-10-44 BREMEN. 17 of 467, 18 of 463, of 246 from 5-Group. This was the last of 32 major Bomber Command raids on Bremen during the war. The raid, based on the 5-Group marking method, was an outstanding success. 1021 tons of bombs were dropped of which 868 tons were incendiaries. A detailed local report is available which was compiled by an official who stated that the night was clear with 3/4 full moon … A huge fire area was started. Classed as destroyed were 4859 houses, 42 factories, 2 shipyards, the Focke-Wulfe works and the Siemens Schubert electrical works. The transport network was seriously disrupted. This raid, by no more than 1/4 of Bomber Command (and hardly mentioned in British (War) History, had finished Bremen and the city was not attacked again by Bomber Command.
D 4h 55m 18 cans incendiaries 17250’
[circled 11] 17-10-44 FLUSHING (WALCHEREN ISLAND – WEST DYKE)
12 of 467, 11 of 463, of 121 from 5-Group to successfully breach the sea-wall near Flushing. No losses. (The same day 846 of Bomber Command attacked Kleve Emerich & Kembs Dams … 617 Squadron used ‘Tallboy’ bombs on Kembs. (The idea was to destroy the floodgates to [underlined] prevent [/underlined] the Germans flooding the Rhine valley in the face of French & American advances … this was done OK.)
D 3h 10m 2 sticks of 7 x 1000 6100’ Extra 6 min. orbit for 2nd stick.
[page break]
DAY 11-10-44 FLUSHING. 14 of 467, 20 of 463, of 115 from 5-Group attacked gun positions on N. bank of Scheldt Estuary near Flushing. No losses from Waddington.
[deleted] NIGHT [/deleted] [inserted] DAY [/inserted] 14-10-44 DUISBURG Bomber command sent 1013 heavy bombers, and 473 fighters, Americans sent 1251 heavy bombers and 749 fighters … the raid was carried out on a directive from Allied H.Q. to show the Germans the power of Bomber Commands.
NIGHT 14-10-44 BRUNSWICK 19 of 467, 20 of 463 to join 233 of 5 Group. The most effective of numerous raids on Brunswick. Using the 5-Group low-level marking method, Brunswick was finally destroyed. A German report simply lists the number of hectares burnt out. 23000 people were rescued from air-raid shelters and only 200 perished. A special train was sent from Bavaria to help feed the 80000 homeless.
DAY 17-10-44 WESTKAPELLE 2 of 467, 9 of 463 of 47 from 5-Group attacking sea-wall at Westkapelle. Bombing appeared to be accurate but no report is available. No losses.
[circled 12] 19-10-44 NUREMBERG (& DUISBURG) 20 of 467, 20 of 463, of 263 from 5-Group with 7 Mosquitoes in a special low-level-marked attack on Nuremberg. The target was completely cloud-covered and low-level marking could not be used. The raid was effective but not the ‘knockout’ as hoped. (There were 103 bombers from another Group on Stuttgart and other targets, losing only 0.9%). 467 lost F/O E. Rodwell & crew (7 KIA)
D 8h 10m 1 x 2000 + 12 J clusters. 17400’
[page break]
On 11-10-44, 16 of 467, 20 of 463 of total 115 (all 5 Group) attacked big gun positions on the bank of [underlined] Scheldt Estuary [/underlined], near Flushing. The big guns prevented a sea attack to open the Estuary for Allied supply shipping (a minefield had to be cleared too), and they menaced the Canadian Army who were attacking south of the Estuary, but couldn’t match these big guns for range. I think the weather was bad, poor visibility maybe no great harm done to the guns.
On 14-10-44 there was a big daylight raid on [underlined] Duisberg [/underlined], carried out as a directive from Allied H.Q. to show the Germans the power of Allied Air Power. Bomber Command sent 1013 heavies & 413 fighters, the Americans sent 1251 heavies & 749 fighters.
That night, (14-10-44) 5 Group sent 19 of 467 Sq & 20 of 463 Sq of a total of 233, to [underlined] Brunswick [/underlined], using the 5 Group low-level marking method, Brunswick was finally destroyed. A German report simply lists the number of hectares burnt out. 23000 people were rescued from air-raid shelters & only 200 perished. Special train sent from Bavaria to help feed the 80000 homeless.
On 17-10-44, 2 of 467, & 9 of 463 Sq. of total of 47 of 5 Group attacked the sea-wall again near Westkapelle on Walcheren Island. Bombing appeared to be accurate but no report was available.
[circled 12] [underlined] NUREMBERG [/underlined]. 5 Group sent 20 of 467 Sq. & 20 of 463 Sq of a total of 263 with 7 Mosquitos to do low-level marking. There was total cloud cover which prevented the low-level marking. The raid was effective but not the knock-out hoped for. The rest of Bomber Command raided Stuttgart & other nearby targets, only losing 0.9%. 467 Sq. lost F/O Rodwell & crew (7 KIA). We took off at 1713, did a Radius of Action coming back to base at 1718 at 2000’. We reduced speed to 150 mph but still had to lose 6 min doing 60oL, 120oR, then got to [symbol] OK but had to orbit as directed.
Bombed 15 min late at 17400’ on Red & Green Target [deleted] [indecipherable word] flares [/deleted]
[page break]
Our bomb-load was 1 x 2000 lb HE, and 12 ‘J’ clusters (incendiary). After leaving the target we descended to 6000’, & flew on dead-reckoning, south of Stuttgart & Strasbourg for 2 hours until I got the first GEE fix, nearly 20 miles north of our track, but safely over France. Sid discovered that we had one of the ‘J’ bombs “hung-up”. We went to the jettison area in the Channel & tried to release it manually … did 2 orbits as we kept trying, but without success. So we flew on home to base at 4000’, landing after 8hr 9 min airborne, by far our longest flight so far.
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[inserted] [symbol] Don Coults (Engineer went to Ireland to visit his parents there. [/inserted]
After our 11th Op at Flushing we went on the usual 6-day leave, after only about 4 weeks after we started our tour. The crews were put on a roster for leave, usually each 6 weeks, but you could go earlier if a few crews before you on the list went missing.
A few items from a diary I kept then … 7th Oct: On our return from the Flushing op, we “shot-up” the ‘drome (low level) for W/C. Brill who was going home to Australia. Wrote up log book. Went to a dance with Jackie from our Mess.
8th:- Applied for leave passes. Got paid. Packed.
9th:- Collected subsistence money, & petrol coupons for bike, [symbol] got leave passes. Caught train to London, missed by Ken. Booked in at A.C.F. Club for the night. Ken arrived at 10 pm. We booked in for the rest of the leave. Nice room.
10th. Had breakfast at the Boomerang Club. I looked around & spotted Kirk Beddie from Mendooran. I’ll just go back in time to our first couple of operations to relate a coincidence. When our 8 new crews arrived together, our Nav. Leader, F/Lt Arnold Eastman, was still doing Ops himself, yet was responsible for in-service training of the navigators (especially us new ones). So he delegated the checking of log & charts, and giving advice to some of his senior navigators (Who’d lasted, say 10 ops or more). The first one who helped me twice was called Scotty – I didn’t find out his surname, it was strictly teacher & pupil, especially as he looked elderly … moustache & bald patch … (actually he was about 26). I didn’t see him again at Waddington – we had about 300 air-crew Flight sergeants there.
Anyway, at the Boomerang club, I said good-day to Kirk, we told each other what we’d been doing … he was well into a tour as captain of Sunderland crew – doing Atlantic patrols.
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I remarked that it was a coincidence that the only two fliers [sic] from Mendooran should be on leave at the same place & time. He said ‘-“Oh no, there’s another Mendooranite over here, Vernon Gall, who was the teller at the Bank of NSW there.” I replied that I didn’t know him. Kirk said:- “Well you might not have met him as you were at High School at Mudgee when your parents came to Mendooran, then you worked in Sydney, went into the Army, then the Air Force – you rarely were in Mendooran. Well, what do you know – there he is, I’ll bring him over & introduce you.” Kirk came back with Scotty. We laughed about that coincidence! After the war, when I bought the sports depot in Mudgee & transferred my bank a/c to the Bank of NSW there, Scotty was the teller.
[symbol] At the Club I also met Joe Barber & Eric Gentle who’d been with me at Cootamundra. Ken saw 4 chaps he knew at Lichfield, and I met Rupe Brown the Australian ground-crew corporal who looked after the 3 Lancs & ground crews at our dispersal corner. We went to a play, but didn’t enjoy it - - too serious. Back at A.C.F. played table-tennis with Ken & darts with Sid.
11th: Got some free theatre tickets with Sid & the play was quite enjoyable. Cinema after lunch .. Red Skelton in “Bathing Beauty”, very funny. Game of darts at the Club. Met Jack Freer, who played the saxophone on the ship across the Pacific.
12th. Ken & I got tickets for a play … a good comedy. Darts at the club after supper.
13th Got tickets for a show on Monday. Bought a wireless for £12/3/4.
[symbol] After the war, I found that Ray Meers (Rear Gunner) & Lindsay Francis (Wireless-Operator-Gunner, of Mendooran had both done tours with B.C. about the same time as I.
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14th. Bought more Xmas cards. Had lunch with Peter Dunn from Mudgee at the Club. Saw a newsreel, went to the Windmill theatre, a few beers with Ken, Supper, then table-tennis.
15th. Rupe left to return to Waddington (he’d shared our room
Visited Mme Tussauds waxworks Museum .. very good.
Walked through the Zoo. Saw a newsreel.
16th. At Boomerang Club met Ken Vidler’s crew (I think they were killed a bit later.) Walked the Embankment, saw Cleopatra’s Needle, down Whitehall, got a glimpse of 10 Downing St (cordoned off by Police). Saw the show we’d booked “Happy & Glorious”, easily the best show we’d been to. Had a few drinks with 2 girls who sleep in the railway station at Gloucester Road to be safe from air raids – they’d been doing that for years!
17th: Rain all day. Went cinema that featured 3 films … 4 1/4 hours. Had a steak (!) for 5/- then another film; couldn’t find the ‘steak’ cafe again.
18th. Packed, Sid came back from Exeter & Bristol. Played crib on the train with Sid, all the way to Lincoln. Lunch at 3, collected bike & rode back to camp.
19th. Flew at once for high-level-bombing practice … too much low cloud, so we got a fighter & did some affiliation practice. Then lunch & briefing at 1.30 for a “trip” to Nuremberg, the scene of one of B.C.’s worst losses sometime earlier, when about 500 heavies were caught below high cloud, searchlights lit them up & (from memory) nightfighters, mainly, & flak brought down 49 for a loss rate of 9%. This time it was cloud below us and 467 only lost 1 crew, F/O Rodwell’s … all KIA.
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[circled 13] 23-10-44 FLUSHING. 21 of 467, 20 of 463 of 121 from 5-Group attacked gun positions near Flushing. Visibility was bad and the bombing scattered.
D 3h 20m. 14 x 1000. Briefed to bomb at 6500’ but forced to descend (bad visibility). Bombed at 4000’
[circled 14] BERGEN 28-10-44. 20 of 467, 15 of 463, of 237 from 5-Group, to attack U-boat pens at Bergen. Target was cloud-covered and master-bomber called off the attack after only 47 planes had bombed … from below 5000’ (Mountains within 10 miles of track nearly 4500’!)
D 7h 30m. 12 x 1000 Briefed to bomb at 9000’. Orbited once [inserted] extra 6 min there [/inserted] and lost height using GEE to avoid mountains … bombed at 3800’ Diverted to Marston Moor on return (fog over Waddington). Returned next day.
[inserted] (On our final run there was AA fire from [underlined] above [/underlined] us (mountains) as well as below!) [/inserted]
[circled 15] 30-10-44 WALCHEREN ISLAND. 13 of 467, 13 of 463, of 102 from 5-Group attacked gun positions near Walcheren. The attack was successful and the Allied ground forces commenced their attack on 31st. No losses
Briefed to bomb at 6000’. Cloud over target. Two orbits made – 20 min over target area – bombed at 3500’.
D 3h 20m. 14 x 1000.
OCT ’44 SUMMARY: 467 flew 157 sorties, lost 2 crews (7 KIA, 7 Ev): 5 tours completed, incl. (C.O.) W/C. Brill completing his 2nd tour. 1 crew ditched, rescued & returned.
DAY 1-11-44 HOMBERG. 19 of 467, 17 of 463, of 226 from 5-Group attacked the Meerbeck oil plant at Homberg. Marking was scattered + only 159 planes attempted to bomb. No losses from Waddington.
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After nearly 2 hours on the way home we tried to jettison a J-Cluster (incendiary) which had “hung-up”. We turned back to try to realease [sic] it manually, but failed. So we brought it home & it was safely removed. We landed 1/2 hour late, time airborn was 8hr 9 min. Our bomb-load was 1 x 2000 lb HE & 12 ‘J’ clusters dropped from 17400’.
[circled 13] [underlined] FLUSHING [/underlined] 5 Group sent 121 incl. 21 of 467 Sq & 20 of 463, to attack big gun positions near Flushing on Walcheren Island on 23.10.44. Visibility was bad & the bombing was “scattered”. We took off at 1429, did a Radius of Action & got back to base at 1434 at 2000’. Had a good navigation trip but had to descent from 6500’ to 4000’ to see the target. 1 1/2 min before we bombed our gunners reported a Lanc. hit the sea behind us (I plotted it at 56o33’N, 03o27’E). Quite a few planes were lost and a lot of A.A. damage – we had many holes. Our bomb load was 14 of 1000 lb HE, and 1 of them “hung-up”. We tried to jettison it but couldn’t. We were airborn [sic] for 3h. 19 min.
[circled 14] [underlined] BERGEN (NORWAY) [/underlined] 5-Group sent 237 of which 20 from 467 Sq + 15 from 463, on 28-10-44 to attack U-boat pens at night. We took off at 2221 & did a Radius of Action & got back to base at 2250 at 1500’ which we maintained until 0120 (up till then we were over the N. Sea) when we climbed to 9000’ & increased speed to 180 mph as we were 3 min behind time. When we got to the target we were in cloud. The master bomber told us to come down to 5000’ … we had to orbit carefully as there were mountains East of Bergen over 4000’. I used GEE position lines to descend safely away from mountains to 3800’ when we bombed … about 10 min after the planned time. It was nice to have GEE all the way (no jamming like over Germany) & we kept nicely to track all the way. Our bomb load was 12 x 1000 lb HE. There was plenty of flak around Bergen … some from mountain tops nearly level with us! There was a lot of cloud (& maybe smoke-screen) at the target … master bomber cancelled the raid after only 47 of us bombed
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30.10.44. [symbol] 15 WALCHEREN ISLAND (FLUSHING). 13 from 467 Sqdn & 13 from 463 of 102 total (all 5 Group), daylight raid on big gun emplacements on the Southern edge of Walcheren Island. The Germans also held the Southern banks of the Scheldt Estuary. The Allies had always wanted to capture Antwerp (50 miles inland, the biggest port for unloading tanks & other heavy equipment). While ever these big guns covered both sides of the Estuary, the Allies couldn’t go in to clear the minefields. In fact the Canadian army trying to take the South bank was held up by bad weather (flooded terrain), lack of petrol & ammunition (Patton was partly to blame along with Eisenhower) for so long that eventually, [inserted] our [/inserted] [deleted] Armies [/deleted] [inserted] Marines [/inserted] took Antwerp from the East & finally [inserted] 8 NOV [/inserted] captured Walcheren Island by “sailing” through gaps in the sea-wall from the East! It then took [inserted] nearly [/inserted] another month to clear the mines & winter had set in … too late to use Antwerp for the big offensive they may have been able to mount had they cleared Antwerp 3 months earlier.
We took off at 1340, did a R. of A. & got back to base at 1356 at 1500’. The navigation was easy & we stayed on-track & on-time to the target. We’d been told to bomb at 6000’, but found cloud below, so had to orbit [inserted] twice [/inserted] lose height to 3500’, finally bombing 22 min later than planned. Our bomb load was 14 x 1000 lb HE. We had no losses. The attack was successful, and the Canadian army began their attack along the S. bank the next day.
We dropped 14 x 1000 lb HE; the flight took 3h 20 min. For October, 467 Sq. flew 157 sorties, lost 2 crews (7 KIA, 7 Evaded); 5 tours were completed; 1 crew ditched, were rescued & returned.
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Nov 1st. 226 Lancs of 5 Group (19 from 467 & 17 from 463), in daylight, raided the Meerbeck oil plant near Homberg. Weather was bad, the marking was scattered and only 159 attempted to bomb. No losses from Waddington.
2.11.44 [symbol] 16. DUSSELDORF. 5 Group was part of a big raid (992) by Bomber Command, 15 from 467, 15 from 463. Detailed German reports listed 5000 buildings destroyed, many of them industrial & production works. There were other raids that night too … a total of 1131 sorties. We took off at 1651, 15 min. late. We climbed to 17000’ & increased speed to 170 mph to catch up. At 1920 (at 18000’) we were “coned” by searchlights … very dangerous as ‘flak’ then could be fired visually. We shook them off & bombed at 1925, & I noted that an aircraft was hit about 10 mi ahead, our heading 220o.T. On the way home in the next 26 min, I made 12 more log entries of aircraft crashing to the ground with estimates of their bearing & distance from us.
The RAF had set up 2 more GEE “chains” based in Europe. I tried the RUHR chain, but found the readings “wouldn’t plot”.
Our bomb-load was 11 x 1000 lb & 4 x 500 lb HE.
The trip took 5h 20 min.
467 Sqdn lost F/O Langridge & crew (3 KIA, 5 evaded).
Dusseldorf taken (on Cook’s tour 19.6.45
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[circled 16] 2-11-44. DUSSELDORF. 15 of 467, 15 of 463 as part of 992 of Bomber Command. Detailed German reports list 5000 buildings destroyed, many of them industrial & production works. (There were other raids that night too … a total of 1131 sorties.) 467 lost F/O L. Langridge & crew (3 KIA, 5 evaded).
C. 5h 20m. 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500. 18000’
NIGHT 4-11-44 DORTMUND-EMS CANAL. 12 of 467, 12 of 463, of 174 from 5-Group attacked the canal near Munster. The banks of the canal were breached again. A report from Albert Speer to Hitler dated 11.11.44 was captured at the end of the war. Speer stated that the raids on the Dortmund-Ems canal, with attacks on the rail system, produced more serious setbacks to the German war industry at this time than any other type of bombing.
[circled 17] 6-11-44. EMS-WESER CANAL. 19 of 467, 16 of 463, of 235 from 5-Group attacked near the junction of the Ems-Weser and Mittland canals, near Gravenhorst. Markers had considerable difficulty in finding the junction due to ground haze, until a low-flying Mosquito (pilot: F/L L.C. de Vigne, and Aust. navigator, S/L. F. Boyle of 627 Sqdn) found and marked the target with such accuracy that the marker fell into the water and was soon extinguished. Only 31 planes bombed before the Master-Bomber ordered the raid be abandoned. 10 planes lost in the raid, 3 crews from 463 (all KIA). Waddington was fog bound on return & most planes were diverted to Seething. We were perhaps the last to land (in v. poor visibility).
D 5h 25m. 14 x 1000 (but did not bomb). Orbited target once, for extra 10 min. over it.
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4.11.44. 174 Lancs of 5 Group, 12 each from 467 & 463 Sqdns, attacked the Dortmund-Ems Canal, near Munster. The banks of the canal were breached again. A report from Albert Speer to Hitler dated 11.11.44 was captured at the end of the war. Speer stated then:- “that the raids on the Dortmund-Ems Canal, with attacks on the rail system, produced more serious setbacks to the German war industry, at this time, than any other type of bombing.” (In early 1945, the raids on oil targets may have been even more damaging to their war effort.)
6.11.44 [symbol] 17. EMS-WESER CANAL. 235 of 5 Group, 19 from 467, 16 from 463 attacked the Ems-Weser junction with the Mittland Canal, near Gravenhorst. The markers had considerable difficulty finding the junction due to ground haze, until a low-flying Mosquito (pilot: F/Lt L.C. de Vigne, & Australian navigator, S/Ldr F. Boyle of 627 Sqdn) found & marked the target with such accuracy that the marker landed in the canal & was soon extinguished. Only 31 planes bombed before the Master-Bomber abandoned the raid. 10 planes were lost, 3 of them from 463 Sqdn (all KIA).
We were supposed to take off at 1633 but actually took off 28 min late, so once we climbed to 11000’ we boosted our I.A.S. to 180 mph & were on-time by 1915. I logged a Lanc. crashing at 1923 1/2; we had to orbit twice [inserted] (12 min) [/inserted], at the target (due to the marking problem) … very dangerous. Logged 4 more planes crashing [deleted] at [/deleted] in the target area, & another at 1943, after we’d left the target without bombing. I couldn’t get any “joy” on either of the 2 new GEE chains. The trip took 5h. 25 min. We brought back our 14 x 1000 lb H.E. bombs.
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The weather deteriorated on the way back … the bumps were so bad that I had to hold all my navigation gear down to stop them hitting the roof, & brace my knees under the nav. table to avoid joining them there. The visibility at Waddington was bad due to fog, and most of our planes were diverted to Strubby; however, Peter did an abbreviated circuit (so he could actually keep the runway in sight) & then came in as if in a Tiger Moth, almost clipping the caravan stationed near the “funnel” (where they might use a Verey to send-you-round-again), but he landed safely … and then they closed the airfield.
Besides getting the 2 new GEE chains (RHEIMS & RHUR) to help with navigation over Germany, we now had LORAN fitted. It was similar in some ways to GEE, but depened [sic] on the radio signals being reflected from the ionosphere (only at night). The stations were widely separated … I think England, Norway, Italy … and each single reading had to be made & timed, then another [deleted] one [/deleted] tuned-in, read & timed … probably 2 min or more later, & the running -fix method used. On 9.11.44 we did at [sic] Cross-Country, using Loran, over England, ending with some high-level bombing practice … 3 1/4 hrs trip. The trailing aerial had to be used to receive Loran signals.
11.11.44 [symbol] 18. HARBURG. A 5-Group raid of 237 planes, + 8 marker Mosquitos, 19 from 467, 14 from 463 … a night raid on the Rhenania-Ossag oil refinery, near Hamburg. This refinery had been raided several times by American daylight bombers. We took off at 1627, did a R. of A. to be back a [sic] base at 1634 at 3000’.
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(HARBURG)
We climbed to 15000’ & later to 16000’ to get out of cloud, & kept nicely to track all the way to the target, getting a bit behind time all the way (no worries we were over the sea nearly all the way). We bombed 8 min late from 16000’. Our WOP (Eric) told us the Master Bomber said to bomb the centre of the Red Target Indicators (there were 4), but to ignore outside Indicators which were dummies (set up by the Germans). Half an hour before the target I wanted to use LORAN, but Eric (our WOP) said he’d been ordered not to use the trailing aerial. I relied on Dead-Reckoning from the target and got my first GEE fix 50 min later about 15 mi. N. of track.
Our bomb-load was 1 x 4000 lb “cookie”, 6 x 1000 lb, & 6 x 500 lb H.E. We could still see the plant burning from 100 mi away on our way back. Our squadron lost F/O Fedderson’s crew (7 KIA) & F/O Eyre’s crew (6 KIA, 1 POW) … one of these killed was Geoff (“Bushie”) Goodfellow, their navigator, one of my best friends … we played a lot of cards together & we bunked opposite each other in our room. He came from Tooraweenah (father ran the “Mountain View” hotel there), & he said I was the only person he’d met that had even heard of the place, let alone been there, which I had.
F/L Kynoch’s plane was hit & badly damaged, but he crash-landed it at Manston (an emergency ‘drome on the coast) & he & the crew survived.
The flight lasted 5h. 35 min.
On 13.11.44 we did our “20 SORTIE CHECK”, on a flight of 55 min. We’d only done 18 ops plus the 2 BULLSEYES at Lichfield & Swinderby.
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[circled 18] 11-11-44 HARBURG. 19 of 467, 14 of 463, of 237 from 5-Group, plus 8 Marker Mosquitos attacked the Rhenania-Ossag oil refinery at Harburg (near Hamburg). This had been attacked several times by American (day) bombers. Brunwig’s ‘History of Hamburg & Harburg’ (air-raids), gives the raid a brief mention. (We could still see the plant burning 100 miles away on our way home.)
467 lost F/O. M. Fedderson & crew (7 POW), and F/O. T. Eyre & crew [inserted] (G Goodfellow was the Nav) [/inserted] (6 KIA, 1 POW). F/L Kynoch’s plane was hit and badly damaged – he crash-landed at Manston (an emergency ‘drome on the coast).
D 5h 35m. 1 x 4000 + 6 x 1000 + 6 x 500 16000’
[circled 19] 16-11-44 DUREN. 15 of 467, 15 of 463, as part of 1188 from Bomber Command, attacked Duren, Julich & Heinsburg in support of the American 1st & 9th armies which were about to advance on this area. Raids were made by 1239 American heavy bombers on targets in the same area. (this was the biggest raid we took part in … there were planes to the horizon all the way, heaps of fighter escorts.) 9400 tons of bombs dropped. The result was disappointing. Heavy rain and wet ground prevented much of the tank assault and slowed the supplies of artillery ammunition and the armies’ advance was slow and costly. (For our part, the centre of Duren was reduced to rubble.) G/C. Bonham-Carter, O/C of Waddington led our Group, as ‘second dickie’ to the crew who had bombed the wrong target on a daylight raid on Flushing (23-10-44?), killing some Canadians.
D 5h 25m. 12 x 1000. 10500’
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16.11.44 [symbol] 19. DUREN (daylight). 15 planes from 467, & 15 from 463, were part of a big effort by Bomber Command (1188 planes) attacking Duren, Julich & Heinsburg in support of the 1st & 9th American Armies which were about to advance in this area. Raids were made on other targets in this area by 1239 American heavy bombers. This was by far the biggest raid we took part in … there were planes to the horizon all the way with heaps of fighter escort … [deleted] B [/deleted] 9400 tons of bombs were dropped, but the result was disappointing. Heavy rain & boggy ground prevented most of the tank attack and slowed supplies of artillery ammunition with the result that the advance was slow & costly. For our part, the centre of Duren was reduced to rubble – it may have needed bulldozers to clear a path through it! The base commander at Waddington, Gp/Capt Bonham-Carter, led 5 Group as ‘second dickie’ to one of our crews who had bombed the wrong “target” (a smoke-generator) on an earlier daylight raid near Flushing on 23.10.44, killing some Canadian army men.
The navigation was easy. Our bomb-load was 12 x 1000 lb H.E. dropped from 10500’. Flight time: 5h 25 min.
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Snaps of Duren taken on the “Cook’s Tour” I did on 19.6.45.
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Extracts from Diary –
18.11.44 navigators briefing at 1.30 for a v. long trip. Not enough time for preparation. Our crew just got out to the “kite” when the trip was “scrubbed” …joy! After tea we went down to the local Horse & Jockey (Hotel). Saw a bloke about his car, & bought it for £3 … a little Morris 8 HP Sedan
19.11.44 To navigation section before lunch for another briefing, to the same place as yesterday, more time for preparation & less to do. No lunch … sandwiches at briefing … then it was scrubbed again. Collected car.
20.11.44. Went to briefing for another daylight raid on the Dortmund-Ems canal, but it was scrubbed. Went to town with Ken Nichols & Ken (of ground crew) … wanted to go to the theatre, but all seats were sold, so we went to the cinema & saw “White Cliffs of Dover.”
21.11.44. Briefed again for the same canal raid as yesterday, chart was already done. [symbol] It was scrubbed at the 11th hour & we missed lunch … again had sandwiches in the briefing room.
21.11.44 [symbol] 20 DORMUND-EMS CANAL
We took off at 1726, did a R. of A. & got back to base at 1754 at 2000’. The winds were light & fairly consistently Westerly at first, then N.W. It was easy to keep on track & close on-time. At 2020 I logged “Lanc, crashed & blew-up 15 mi. astern”. We’d been at 10250’ until 2058 when WOP told us to descent to 3-4000’ … we did so, fast, and bombed at 2103. At 2108 I logged: “Aircraft crashed below us 3 mi. past other target.” At 2232 we jettisoned a hang-up bomb in the sea. Landed at base at 2337, time airborne 6h 11 min. Our bomb-load was 13 x 1000 lb H.E.
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21.11.44. [symbol] 20. DORTMUND-EMS CANAL, near LADBERGEN.
15 from 467, 15 from 463 bombed Dortmund-Ems & Mittland Canals; as part of Bomber Command maximum effort of 1345 heavy bombers attacking 6 targets in this general area.
No losses for 5-Group.
We took off at 1726, did a R. of A. getting back to base at 1754 at 2000’. I had a good navigation trip, GEE from England lasted until 2020, then the RUHR chain worked to the target area. I logged a Lanc. blowing-up 15 mi astern at 2020. We were briefed to bomb at 10500’ but, 5 min before out T.O.T our W.O.P. (Eric) got word that we descend to 3 – 4000’ to get below cloud. We descended quickly & bombed 5 min later at 4500’; then began climbing again into the clouds. Tried Loran for fixing without success. We had a bomb hang-up, but jettisonned [sic] it in the sea at 2222.
Our bomb load was 13 x 1000 lb H.E.
The trip took 6h 10 min.
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This is an enlargement of the smaller print of the area bombed repeatedly … DORTMUND EMS CANAL.
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[photograph] Open bomb-bay of a Lanc. loaded with 1000 lb H.E. bombs. Bomb-aimer could select each one to drop separately at predetermined intervals (usually close together as a “stick”.)
[photograph] Our Mid-upper gunner Ray Giles, near his turret – 2 Browning .303 machine guns
[photograph] Lanc’s in formation on a daylight raid. Nearest is PO-J
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On a low-level “Cooks Tour” from Wigsley on 19th June, 1945 (after war’s end in Europe), I took some photos with the old box Kodak.
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The Dortmund Ems canal where it was built above a stream, shown clearly in the left photo. The embankments here were bombed repeatedly, 8 times I think. We did 3 of Ops there and one at the nearby Ems-Weser canal.
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Broken bridges over the Rhine at Duisberg – we didn’t bomb there, but 5 Group did.
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The Krupps works at Essen, which was regularly bombed by the RAF during most of the war. Including some 1000 – bomber raids.
[photograph] Wrecked bridges at Cologne, another regular RAF target; somehow the Cathedral survived.
[photograph] The railway marshalling yards at Hamm received plenty of “attention”
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Dusseldorf was regularly bombed … we did our 16th Op. there
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[circled 20] 21-11-44. DORTMUND-EMS CANAL, (near LADBERGEN). 15 of 467, 15 of 463 as part of 1345 Bomber Command heavies attacked 6 targets in this general area. 5-Group targets were the Mitteland and Dortmund-Ems canals … without loss.
D 6h 10m. 13 x 1000. Briefed to bomb at 10250’, got 5 min warning by radio to descend to cloud base … bombed at 4500’.
[circled 21] 23-11-44. TRONDHEIM. 16 of 467, 4 of 463 of 171 from 5-Group, incl. 7 Mosquito Markers, to attack U-boat pens at Trondheim. The target was covered b y a smokescreen and could not be marked. The Master Bomber ordered the raid abandoned. No losses. (The weather was bad; big wind changes. Many jettisoned bombs in North Sea or diverted to North Scotland due to fuel shortage … we were the only one to return to Waddington with bombs still aboard.)
D 10h 55m. 9 x 1000 (brought home).
26-11-44 MUNICH (Our rear gunner, K. Nickols, went on this trip as ‘spare bod’.) 270 Lancs from 5-Group, 467 lost F/O Findlay & crew (crashed – out of fuel … their Nav. vomited and blocked his oxygen supply, went unconscious and they got lost in cloud. But all survived the crash and were flown home by the Americans on 1.12.44.
NOVEMBER SUMMARY 467 did 148 sorties, lost 4 crews (9 KIA, 8 POW, 11 Ev) 8 tours expired. 2 were badly wounded.
NIGHT 4-12-44 HIELBRONN. 282 from 5-Group (Main force attacked Karlsruhe). 467 lost F/O J. Plumridge & crew (6 KIA. 1 POW). F/L Bill Kynock & crew attacked by fighter, rear gunner killed (F/S R. Steele), and plane badly damaged (we think it was ‘D’.), crash landed at Manston (emergency airfield).
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23.11.44 [symbol] 21. TRONDHEIM (Norway). 5-Group sent 171 planes (including 7 Mosquito markers) to attack the U-boat facilities there. This was a very long trip mostly over the North Sea at low-level (1000’) in bad weather, rain & severe wind-changes. Tankers topped us up with petrol at the end of the runway before we took off at 1609, 12 min late. GEE ran out at 1848 … over 2 hours before we’d reach the target. We were unable to identify where we crossed the coast, so we continued on northwards and at 2050 saw the target lit up by flares to our left. A wind velocity to use for bombing was received by radio, and at 2055 we saw yellow Target Indicators about 10 mi to Port. We turned to a Westerly course. At 2102 we were told to abandon the raid as a smoke-screen obscured the target. We continued by Dead Reckoning & B.A. (Sid) identified a pin-point at 2112. We descended from 9000’ to 1000’, and at about 2130 discovered that the earlier pin-point was wrong, giving a new one near Smolen Island. At 2248 I got my first GEE fix (after 1 1/2 hr since the target) … about 50 mi NW of where we thought we’d be … big wind change. Pilot (Peter) & I decided to aim to land at LEUCHARS (Nth Scotland) as we had a head-wind. Then, at 0024 I got a good fix & found the wind had eased & changed to NE, and by 2130 was from the NW & getting faster. Pilot & Engineer consulted with me & we decided to try for Waddington, cutting our speed back from 190 to 170 mph. The wind held about NW & increased to about 45 mph, so we reached base OK & landed at 0302, with only about 80 gallons left. Most of our planes jettisonned [sic] bombs in the North Sea, or landed at Leuchars. We were the sole plane to bring our bombs home to Waddington. Trip-time 10h 53 min.
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26.11.44. 5-Group sent 270 heavies to MUNICH. Our rear-gunner, Ken Nicholls went as a “spare-bod” in place of a sick crewman. One of the 467 crews crashed, out of fuel. Their navigator had vomited and blocked his oxygen supply, he went unconscious, and they were lost in cloud. They all survived the crash-landing and were flown back by the Americans on 1.12.44.
November summary for 467 Sqdn: 148 sorties, 4 crews lost (9 KIA, 8 POW, 11 Evaded); 8 tours expired. 2 men were badly wounded.
4.12.44 (night). HEILBRONN was attacked by 282 from 5 Group, while the main force of Bomber Command attacked Karlsruhe. 467 Sqdn lost F/O Plumridge & crew (6 KIA, 1 POW). F/Lt Bill Kynoch’s plane was attacked by a fighter, his rear-gunner killed (F/Sgt R. Steele) & the plane badly damaged … we think it was our favourite “D”. They crash landed at the emergency ‘drome, Manston, & we heard that “D” was a write-off.
6.12.44. GIESSEN (night) attacked by 255 of 5-Group (19 from each of 467 & 463 sqdns) while the rest of Bomber Command bombed Osnabruck & Leuna (oil plant).
8.12.44 URFT DAM [symbol] 1. 205 of 5-Group (10 of 467, 15 of 463). 9/10 cloud over target, no result observed. No loss.
10.12.44 URFT DAM [symbol] 2. 5-Group (15 [inserted] each [/inserted] of 467 & 463). All were recalled before the target due to bad weather & visibility.
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More extracts from Diary.
23.11.44. No operations on. Went to Lincoln with Peter & Don in my car to see about getting Peter’s car fixed. Went to the pictures.
Feeling very crook … terrible cough.
24.11.44. Went on sick parade. The Dr. reckoned I was OK for flying … I didn’t. had heard there was to be a long trip that night & saw the Dr. again .. he put me into Sick Quarters & I slept!!! about 20 hours a day. Our crew wasn’t listed for the operation that night, but our rear-gunner, Ken Nichols, opted to go with Bill Kynock’s crew … but the trip was scrubbed anyway. Ken visited me.
25.11.44. Still in sick-quarters. No ops. Ken, Don & Rupe came to see me, then they went to an ENSA concert on the base.
26.11.44. Out of sick-quarters. Ken went with Kynoch’s crew to MUNICH in crook weather. It was OK at the target, quiet & a good ‘prang’. Went over to [deleted] 3 Sqdn [/deleted] SICK QUARTERS to see Ted Pickerd who’d been our Navigation analysis ‘joker’ for some months. Played pontoon, won 10/- Kynoch’s crew were diverted to Langham.
27.11.44. Went to Swinderby & got 3 gal of petrol in the car. Ken & Kynocks crew came back from Langham.
28.11.44. No ops. Made up a list of comments on ops that had to be done … big job. Flew to Thornaby [deleted] to bring [/deleted] & back in ‘D’ [deleted] back [/deleted] with a ferry crew for their plane.
Navigators party on tonight … too bad Ted Pickerd is still in sickquarters. Des Sands (o i/c A flight … Sqn Ldr, DFM on 2nd or 3rd tour) Lionel Hart & I took others in cars, the rest used bikes. Wionderful show. Bags of beer & fun.
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NIGHT 6-12-44 GIESSEN 19 of 467, 19 of 463, of 255 from 5-Group. (Main force attacked Osnabruck & Leuna).
DAY 8-12-44. URFT DAM [symbol] 1. 10 of 467, 15 of 463 of 205 from 5-Group. 9/10 cloud over target and no result observed. No loss.
DAY 10-12-44 URFT DAM [symbol] 2. 15 of 467, 15 of 463 … 5-Group. All recalled before reaching target due to bad weather and visibility.
[circled 22] 11-12-44 URFT DAM [symbol] 3. 15 of 467, 15 of 463, of 233 from 5-Group, with Mosquito Markers. Hits observed but no breach seen. (We brought our bombs home, despite doing an orbit … (hoping for gap in clouds) … against orders … extra 7 min. in target area. Very accurate radar-directed flak; we lost P.O. motor.).
F 6h 5m. 14 x 1000 (brought home) (9750’)
[circled 23] 17-12-44 MUNICH. 22 of 467, 19 of 463 of 280 from 5-Group, with 8 Mosquito Markers. (Main force attacked Duisburg, Ulm and Munster … a total of 1310 heavies, 1.1% loss.) Reconnaissance showed severe damage. 467 lost F/O T. Evans & crew (all 7 Ev) … they collided after bombing with an engine on fire.
M 9h 45m 1 x 4000 + 9 cans + 1 MONROE 11750’
[circled 24] 18-12-44 GDYNIA. 19 of 467, 15 of 463 of 236 from 5-Group. 2 crews from each flight attacked 2 pocket Battleships anchored near the port (which was the main target) … we hit “Lutzow” with 3 of our bombs (& 1 v. close in water) nicely near funnel area. Considerable damage to port area.
M 9h 45m. 10 x 1000 S.A.P.
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29.11.44. No ops. Went into Lincoln to try to register car … no joy; had to go to Sleaford, but no time. Tore around garages [inserted] for [/inserted] a battery & brake adjusters, but no joy. Finished off the navigation comments from yesterday. Decided to sell my autocycle & got a buyer. Played pontoon, won 3/-.
30.11.44. No ops. Went to Sleaford, got car registered & oil changed. Got coupons for petrol to go on leave, packed up, got leave pass, laundry & shoes. Went into Lincoln with Ken & got petrol & a new battery. Saw about trains for Ray & Eric for tomorrow.
1.12.44. Went out to our dispersal where mechanics helped get new battery in & working after a lot of trouble … bludged a couple of gallons of petrol from Ken (ground crew). Left at 10.10, had lunch at Nottingham & then went on to Birmingham, getting to where Don was staying at 3.30. had tea there, played solo until 1.30 am, went down to “Old Farm” at [inserted] ? Wesley [/inserted] Westly Castle for the night.
2.12.44. Duck eggs for breakfast! Lunch at Police Station (don had been a policeman in Birmingham before he enlisted for air crew.) Then tea at Mrs Benlays (friend of Don). Met Ken & Mrs Smith & Margaret from next door. Played solo. Went to Police Club for drinks. More solo ‘till 2 am. Slept next door at Smiths.
3.12.44. Breakfasts on both at Smiths & Benlays. Called at jewellers for Ken’s watch, but no luck. Set off for Swindon. Lunch at Swan’s Nest in Stratford. Looked over Shakespeare’s birthplace, got postcards & saw Home Guard parade. Went on to “Stow-in-the-Wold” & stayed the night in a nice little pub. Played darts, crib & drank beer.
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[photograph] Engineer Don Coutts & Mid Upper Gunner Ray Giles, Birmingham
[photograph] Rear Gunner, Ken Nichols, & Ray Giles at Benlay’s place at Birmingham where we stayed on leave 1/2 Dec ’44.
[photograph] Ray Giles, at Benlays’ place, Birmingham
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More from the Diary.
4.12.44. Rachel Swindon for dinner. Found our way out to Clyffe-Pyhard & saw Bunty Duff & got back just before dark. Had tea at fish & chip shop & went to pictures – saw Jon Hall & Maria Montez in ‘Cobra Woman’.
5.12.44 After breakfast towed an Engineers car to get it started. Bought side-lamp for car. Reached Slough via Reading for lunch & called [deleted] on [/deleted] at Margaret Vyner’s place … she was in London meeting Hugh Marlowe, home from France on 72-hours leave. Saw Mrs Vyner & Hugo, had afternoon tea & went to Slough, booked in at Salthill Hotel & had tea. At pub, picked up 2 girls & took them home but got lost on the way back. Turned in at 12.30.
6.12.44. Looked around a lot of shops in Slough & finally got some bulbs for dash-lights. Met an old Aussie-Scot, Macintosh for yarn & drinks; he showed us his home at 26 Windsor Rd. Slough. Drove to Windsor & looked over Eton College on Founders Day, … going for 504 years. Saw Windsor Castle & had tea there. Played cards with Ken, before & after tea.
7.12.44. After breakfast caught train to London & booked in at A.C.F. Club. Met Scottie Gall & Kirk Beddie again; had steak (!) & mushrooms at Athens Cafe; went to pictures & saw “Casanova Brown”. More steak with onions then a variety show at the Empire in Finsbury Park. Went back tp pub at Gloucester Rd & saw girls we knew from last leave in London. Also ran into Syd & Peter.
8.12.44. Arranged to meet Peter on the way to Cambridge. Got car at Slough & was 1 hr late in meeting Peter. Had lunch at Cambridge Arms. Saw a good picture “Love Story”. Met a navigator I knew at Brighton … Cameron, who’d done 35 ops in Mosquitos. More steak & onions for supper.
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9.12.44. Looked at some of Cambridge University … not much to see. Had lunch at roadside pub and got to Lincoln about 4.30. collected photos, had drinks at the Saracens head & went to a show at the Royal Theatre. Peter’s car had a flat tyre. Got battle-dress from cleaners & put overcoat in. A good leave
10.12.44. Welcomed back to nav. section. No ‘war’ today. had an interview for commission with Group-Captain Bonham-Carter. W/Cdr Bill Brill had told us not to apply for a commission until we’d done about 20 “trips”. But after he left, in October, the new C.O. W/Cdr J.K. Douglas invited anyone interested in a commission to apply, regardless of the number of ops. I did, but didn’t impress him with my answers (especially when I said “probably not” to his question “would I be more use to the air force with a commission?”. He didn’t recommend me. But Bonham-Carter said something like this: “I have 2 W’ Cdrs here, at 467 & 463; one C.O. recommends virtually all applicants after they’ve done 20 trips; the other (Douglas) likes to interview them at depth & knocks a few back. I have to make the final decision. You seem to be doing well. I’ll look at you again next month.” (He saw me in Mid-January with only one Op (Brux) to go, and recommended me without any further questioning.)
11.12.44. Took laundry & boots down but didn’t have time to check them in … there’s “war” on. Went to briefing room & sorted out Gee charts. The briefing was hurried; the plane we got, (F), was slow, climbed poorly, and we were late getting to the target.
(con’t on next page)
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11.12.44 [symbol] 22. URFT DAM No 3. Daylight raid by 233 from 5-Group (15 each from 467 & 463 Sqdns), with Mosquitos doing the marking. Hits were observed but no breach seen. We brought our bombs back despite doing an orbit (against orders) hoping for a gap in the clouds … we spent 7 minutes extra over the target, and experienced very accurate radar-directed flak just after leaving. We lost our Port-Outer motor.
We took off at 1205, did a R. of A. returning to base at 1219, at 6000’. We climbed to 12000’ & “cruised” at 170 mph, but gradually got behind time (5 min late at 1350) but only 3 min. late at the target. This plane, F, would not go any faster with our bomb-load of 14 x 1000 lb. H.E. Pilot feathered our Port Outer motor at 1554 (maybe some flak damage). Jettisonned [sic] 2 bombs at 1645 which took extra time … ending up 47 min. late home. Flight time 6h 5 min.
17.12.44 [symbol] 23. Night-raid on MUNICH by 280 from 5-Group, (22 from 467, 19 from 463), with 8 Mosquito markers. The rest of Bomber Command attacked Duisberg, Ulm & Munster, a total of 1310 ‘heavies’, for a 1.1% loss rate. Reconnaissance showed severe damage. 467 lost F/O T. Evans & crew (all 7 Evaded) … they collided after bombing with an engine on fire; they baled out before the plane crashed.
We took off at 1636, 3 min late, and immediately began climbing on course, south for Reading, then into France near Le Havre, mostly at 4000’, very bumpy, tried 5000’ to get out of cloud, then down to 3000’ & back to 4000’. As we neared the SW corner of Switzerland we climbed to 15000’ & skirted its southern border, seeing lights on in some villages.
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We had a good navigation trip to the target, keeping close to track & timing OK. We used GEE until 2026, then some LORAN fixes (some inaccurate) but sighted target at 2152, descended to 12000’ to bomb at 2211.
At 2214 I logged “air-to-air firing up – qr. to beam”
At 2215 1/2 “ “ “aircraft went in 40 mi ahead”.
We began descending in steps to 5500’ & continued to use LORAN until 2350 when GEE came good.
I got very airsick about 2250 (first time since Cootamundra!), and at about 2310 saw flak coming up from Mulhouse, so we turned to Port to avoid it. At 0110, the GEE box went unserviceable (U/S), and we read PUNDITS back to base where we landed at 0220. Flight time was 9h 45 min, bomb load was 1 x 4000 lb “cookie” & 9 cans of incendiaries & 1 Monroe.
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18.11.44. [symbol] 24. GYDNIA (“A” Target: Pocket Battleship LUTZOW).
A 5-Group raid, 236 planes, 19 of 467 & 15 of 463 Sqdn, on the Naval base. Considerable damage to the port area was reported. Two crews from each flight of both squadrons were to arrive at their targets … two pocket battleships, 9 min before the rest of the Group were to start bombing; the markers & the accompanying flare-force (they dropped lots of long-burning flares to light up the area for the Markers) arrived then too. We were supposed to see the battleships in the light of the flares & do our bombing between 2151 & 2156. Our bomb-load was 10 x 1000 S.A.P (Semi-Armour Piercing) bombs … unlikely to be really damaging, although the decks of the pocket-battleships were much thinner than on “real” battleships (although they had 16” guns, the same.)
We took off at 1712, already 10 min later than planned, & flew at about 3 – 4000’ at 180 mph until 2000, when we climbed to 11500’. GEE had given out at 1850, but LORAN was OK & I got good signals at 1920, but we hadn’t been given Loran charts that covered beyond 56oN. So it was dead-reckoning & the hope of a pin-point later. Then, at 2055 1/2, I got a Loran fix, on track, just below the 56oN latitude, which could be plotted. I got another dubious fix at 2105 1/2, about 5 mi Sth of track, then another good one at 2122 1/2, on track again. I got another good Loran fix at 2133 which allowed me to estimate the wind velocity at 190/23. We turned on dead-reckoning 3 min late at point E, & arrived at point F, on dead-reckoning 2 min late, and steered visually for our target. At 2150, Syd, our Bomb-Aimer, reported a smoke screen starting over the battleships area. The flares went down at 2150 1/2, but didn’t penetrate the smokescreen. At 2153 our Pilot, Peter, decided to “go-round” again. As we turned Syd saw the Lutzow, [indecipherable word] behind us now. We flew North East
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for a while, did a timed run, using his stop-watch, to be back over our target at 2158. But again, the smoke-screen obscured our target. We turned Northwards & repeated the timed run. All this time we experienced a lot of radar-predicted flak, close enough to keep rocking our plane. While we were doing this 3rd orbit, Peter said: “If we can’t bomb this time, we’ll go round again and lose height to bomb at low-level.” Syd said: “Geez, that would be bloody dangerous.” At 2206, the target was clear & we bombed accurately. On the photograph which we saw back at base the next day, 3 of our bombs hit the deck amidships, one very close to the funnel, and a 4th bomb right alongside in the water. We’d actually bombed from 11750’ at 150 mph (I.A.S.), heading 260oT. At 2208 I logged: “Lanc. crashed Stb. Bow, 20 mi.” We crossed the coast at 2216 and got a Loran fix at 2222 1/2, only 3 mi. S. of track. The rest of the trip home was uneventful, we kept close to track and landed at 0303, flight-time 9h 51 min.
[drawing of area map]
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I did some research about the Lutzow & Admiral von Sheer. They were both damaged and the Lutzow was towed to Swinemunde, the Admiral von Sheer to Keil, where, on the night of 9/10 April ’45, a raid using 591 planes, sank the von Sheer, and so severely damaged the light cruised Emden & the heavy cruiser Hippo, that their crews then scuttled them … they were unable to put to sea. Then on the night of 16/17 April, 617 Squadron attacked Swinemunde, & effectively disposed of Germany’s last pocket battleship, Lutzow, although I read that its crew also finally scuttled it, as it was beyond repair
[symbol] [underlined] 25 [/underlined]. 27-12-44. 5-Group sent 200 planes (15 of 467 & 12 of 463) to bomb [underlined] RHEYT [/underlined] (our [symbol] 25 trip), the railway yards there, part of Munchen-Gladbach, where we’d done our 5th trip. We took off at 1204, did a R. of A. to be back at base at 1220 at 6000’. We were supposed to fly in formation but there was a lot of confusion … we finally flew individually until 1309 when we joined the formation. Near the target, the other planes began turning towards the target long before reaching the GEE lattice line we were told to follow. We did as we’d been told, and bombed at 1505 1/2 from 17200’. The trip home was uneventful, the navigation easy, as we had GEE all the way, using the RHUR chain over Germany. We had some flak going close just after the target at 1512 1/2. We landed at 1705, flight-time was 5h., bomb-load was 14 x 1000 lb. H.E.
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[deleted] [circled [indecipherable number]] [/deleted] NIGHT 21-12-44. POLITZ. 17 of 467, 17 of 463, of 207 from 5-Group attacked synthetic oil plant. 3 Lancs lost over Europe, but 5 crashed in England on return … 90% of airfields were fogbound … most were diverted to Scotland, but some were so short on fuel they had to try to land in fog. (F.L. Kynoch crashed ‘M’ at Waddington, but no injuries.)
[circled 25] 27-12-44 RHEYDT. 15 of 467, 12 of 463, of 200 from 5-Group, attacked railway yards at Rheydt. No loss
C 5h 0m. 14 x 1000. 17200’
DAY 28-12-44 MOSS SHIPPING (OSLO FIORD). 4 of 467, 6 of 463 of 67 from 5-Group attacked a large naval unit off Oslo Fiord. No direct hits claimed.
30-12-44 HOUFFALIZE. 12 of 467, 12 of 463 of 166 from 5-Group attacked the German supply bottleneck at Houffalize. Cloud obscured target. (Main force of 500 heavies attacked Kalh-Nord railway yards near Cologne … results obscured by cloud.)
DEC ’44 SUMMARY. December ended in a long spell of cold, fog & snow which restricted operations and serviceability. 467 flew 172 sorties, losing 2 crews + 1 gunner. (7 KIA, 1 POW, 7 Ev) 8 crews finished tours. 1 crew crashlanded [sic] and were rescued.
(The 2 Lanc. Squadrons (467 & 463) had learnt that the 5-Group method of marking was the most cost-effective way of striking heavy flows to the enemy. From 17.8.44 (when Bomber Command returned to attacks on Germany proper, after the many short trips for 2nd Front, a total of 72881 sorties from which 696 aircraft were lost (… about 1%). In this period of 137 days [deleted] 467 & 463 [/deleted] [inserted] Bomber Command [/inserted] made 530 sorties per day (av.) & lost 5.1 planes per day (av.) … 265708 tons of bombs were dropped.
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[circled 26] 1-1-45. DORTMUND-EMS CANAL 18 of 467, 5 of 463 of 102 from 5-Group, breached the canal near Ladbergen, (the Germans had repaired the canal again.) They were using an enormous number of slave labourers (‘Todt’ workers … 40000 we heard) to repair these vital links in their transport system. (And so when the barges began to run again they ‘knew’ the Lancs would soon come, and they were ready with AA & fighters … it was a hot spot.)
(On this trip F/O Merv Bache got an immediate DSO … their B/A. was Sam Nelson (WaggaWagga) … onfire, [sic] crashed just inside Allied lines … they’d all baled out in time. F/S Thompson of 9 Sqdn. got a posthumous VC also.)
B 6h 40m. 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500. 10900’
Landed at STRUBBY on return, due to fog.
NIGHT 1.1.45 MITTELLAND CANAL (GRAVENHORST). 4 of 467, 6 of 463, of 152 from 5-Group with 5 Mosquitos. No loss. During all this period, Waddington, and most of England, was deep in snow. Aircraft were buried in snow, and runways could not be kept open for them. Landing on icy runways was difficult. (On 1.1.45, Bomber Command flew 598 sorties day & night, and 5 planes crashed trying to land.)
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More about the DORTMUND-EMS on 1/1/45.
Many years after the war I got to know Sam Nelson, (also a golfer), who was the Bomb Aimer in Merv Bache’s crew. He told me that his navigator was in the process of writing a small book covering their ‘troubles’ that day. I mentioned that I still had my logs & charts, including for that day, so I posted them to him, with the result that parts of my log & chart were photocopied (reduced size) and included in his book … and I received a copy; later a few more pages were sent about what happened to their crew members thereafter. Several of their crew had a reunion in Canberra just at the time when they refurbished the Lancaster display in the War Museum. They told the staff of their “trouble” on 1/1/45, and were given the privilege of going inside the Lanc, even though it was not then open to the public.
I’ve made a “pocket” at the back of this folder for that book.
On pages 33/4 of that book is some details about a major German air attack on Allied aircraft & airfields on the same morning as our daylight raid on the Dortmund-Ems Canal. It may have been fortunate for us that most of their fighters were otherwise-occupied that morning.
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[circled 27] 4.1.45. ROYAN (S. France).
8 of 467, 16 of 463, of 344 Lancs & 7 Mosquitoes. F/O R. Eggins (467) had a mid-air collision with another Lanc., they baled out & were rescued.
Stubborn German garrison holding out at Royan prevented Allies from using Bordeaux as a port. (the Americans had kept a big force in that area, hoping to capture Bordeaux much earlier.) Bomber Command was ordered to bomb the town. It appears that the order was cancelled, but that order not received by the Squadrons concerned. But the French people there were told of the cancellation. As a result 700 French people were killed & soured relations with Britain.
We took off at [deleted] 0122 [/deleted] 0104, did the usual Radius of Action to be back at base at 0140 at 2000’. We flew southwards crossing the coast near Portsmouth. We had GEE all the way 7 so kept nicely on-track; the winds mainly from NNE varied between 35 & 60 mph.
When just short of the target we got a message at 0359 1/2 “do not bomb for 2 min.” We were due there in about 1 min. I wrote “Have to orbit I think.” Then at 0400 1/2 we were told “Come in & bomb”, which we did at 0401 without having to orbit, at 6250’.
We had an easy trip home, airborne for 6h. 30m. Our bomb load was 1 x 4000 (“Cookie”), & 16 x 500 lb HE.
On the back of my chart are several diagrams showing what the displays looked like on the GEE-BOX, and an indication of the curves on our GEE Charts.
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NIGHT. 5-1-45 HOUFFALIZE. 10 of 467, 8 of 463, of 131 from 5 Group, with 9 Mosquitos attacked supply bottleneck at Houffalize in the Ardennes. Target was hit with great accuracy. No loss. (Main force of 664 attacked Hannover, losing [underlined] 4.7%. [/underlined])
[circled 28] 7-1-45 MUNICH. 11 of 467, 16 of 463, of 645 Lancs. and 9 Mosquitos. This was the last major raid on Munich by Bomber Command; the industrial area was severely damaged. 467 lost F/O W. McNamee & crew (all KIA) … Severe icing caused high fuel consumption … they ran out of fuel and baled out over the sea 5 mi. from Eye, but were not found.
V 8h 45m. 1 x 4000 + 6 J clusters.
(The winds on this trip were forecast at about 80 mph from NW, so the route to the target was direct across Germany, then home south of Switzerland. (Usually, on Munich trips, we’d go out south of Switzerland, hiding from radar behind the mountains – maybe – then come home, faster across Germany.) The winds, in places, exceeded 100 mph. We were forced to ‘waste time’ on the way to the target (dangerous over Germany!). We took 3 hours to reach Munich loaded, then 6 hours to come home empty!)
[inserted] I haven’t got my log & chart for this trip – mislaid when I was teaching ATC cadets at Forest Hills [/inserted]
NIGHT 13-1-45 POLITZ. 17 of 467, 14 of 463, of 218 Lancs & 7 Mosquitos from 5-Group, attacked the oil plant near Stettin. Intended to be [inserted] a [/inserted] blind H2S attack, but the target was clear and the 5-Group low-level-marking was used in an accurate attack. Photo-reconnaissance stated that the oil plant was reduced to rubble. No loss from Waddington.
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NIGHT 14-1-45 MERSBERG-LEUNA. 14 of 467, 14 of 463 of 573 Lancs & 14 Mosquitos attacked the synthetic oil plant at Leuna. Albert Speer wrote … “this was the most damaging raid on the synthetic oil industry”. (The remainder of Bomber Command raided Grevenbroich & Dulmen … a total of 1214 sorties.)
[circled 29] 16-1-45 BRUX. 16 of 467, 12 of 463 of 231 Lancs & 6 Mosquitos of 5-Group, attacked the synthetic oil plant in western Czecho-slovakia [sic] (the plant had P.O.W. camps quite close by). The raid was a complete success. Speer also mentions this raid “as a particularly severe setback to oil production”. (Bomber Command attacked 4 other targets this night with a total of 1238 bombers. All were successful … the loss rate was 2.4% (about 30). No loss from Waddington.
D 10h. 0m. 1 x 4000 + 12 x 500 (Not dropped – bomb circuit U.S.) 14250’
(The bombing circuit was faulty – we made 3 orbits of the target, taking 20 mins, but could not remedy the trouble. We set out for home with bombs aboard and flew home at fairly low altitude – varying between 4500’ & 8500’, our airspeed 15 – 20 mph slower than the rest of the force. Then we had to make a diversion into the North Sea jettison area to manually release one bomb fitted with anti-handling fuse. The result was that we were last home, nearly an hour late. As this was our last trip we were ‘expected’ to come home faster than usual & be ‘first home’ … many thought we were unlucky enough to ‘get the chop’ on our last trip. The aircraft had severe problems (besides the bomb circuit and resulted in a tragic crash on 2.2.45, killing all but one of the crew … included were T. Paine & W. Robinson from Mudgee.)
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I met Chris Jarret at a University conference in the 60’s and heard from him what happened to them in ‘D’ on the night of 2-2-45.
He was lucky to survive, although it was easy for the Bomb-Aimer to be first out when told to “Bale-Out”. The next man out would have been Tom Paine, the Rear Gunner, & he told me that he was the only other one to get out & open his ‘chute in time to avoid death, but that Tom landed over the crest of a hill & was killed by the plane crashing & bombs exploding near him, while Chris had landed on the other side of the hill.
Tom Paine was in my classes at Mudgee High right from 1st year in 1936.
Bill Robinson must have started in 1935 as he was a year ahead of us; but I can remember him as the school was rather small (about 400) compared to the 1000+ when I taught there in the ‘60s.
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NIGHT 22-1-45. GELSENKIRCHEN. 0 from 467, 1 from 463. (photographic)
JANUARY SUMMARY. The month ended with heavy snow and bad visibility. 467 did 90 sorties losing 3 crews (7 KIA, 14 Ev.) 4 crews ‘tour-expired’.
NIGHT 1-2-45 SIEGEN (Railway Yards) 21 of 467, 19 of 463 of 271 from 5-Group. 467 lost one crew – the navigator was our A-flight commander, Des Sands DFM, an Australian in the RAF on his second tour … he survived, parachuted, captured.
NIGHT 2-2-45 KARLSRUHE. 19 of 467, 16 of 463, of 250 from 5-Group. 467 lost 2 crews (14 KIA (incl. a ‘second dickie’ pilot) 1 POW. ‘D’ was one of the two. F/O A. Robinson [inserted] (pilot) [/inserted] and Rear Gunner – Tom Paine – went to school with me at Mudgee High – Tom was in the same class. (See extract from ‘The Bulletin’ for story by Bomb-Aimer survivor, whom I met accindentally [sic] at an external studies school at UNE (Armidale) in the ‘60’s.)
NIGHT 7-2-45 DORTMUND-EMS CANAL (near LADBERGEN)
13 from 467. 467 lost c.o. W/C J. K. Douglas & crew (+ second dickie Bomb-aimer) … 3 KIA, 4 POW, 1 Ev.
NIGHT. 8-2-45 POLITZ. 15 of 467, 16 of 463 of 163 total (5-Group was 1st ‘Wave’, other groups followed and put this important oil plant out of action for the remainder of the war. 1020 bombers attacked other targets including Krefeld.
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13-2-45 DRESDEN. 17 of 467, 19 of 463 of 144 Lancs and 9 Mosquitos from 5-Group attacked Dresden as the 1st wave of a 2-part attack, dropping 800 tons. The second wave, 3 hours later, dropped 1800 tons, mostly incendiaries, causing a devastating fire-storm. German report says that more than 50000 people died.
14-2-45 ROSITZ. 16 of 467, 16 of 463 of 224 Lancs + 8 Mosquitos from 5-Group, attacked the oil refinery near Leipzig. The rest of Bomber Command attacked 4 other targets – a total of 1316 ‘heavies’, loss rate 1.7%.
19-2-45 BOHLEN. 19 of 467, 16 of 463 of 254 Lancs and 6 Mosquitos from 5-Group. Raid was unsuccessful. The Master Bomber, W/C E.A. Benjamin DFF + Bar, was shot down by flak & killed. Only superficial damage was caused.
20-2-45 MITTLELAND CANAL near GRAVENHORST. 10 of 467, 10 of 463, of 154 Lancs & 11 Mosquitos of 5-Group … raids on the canal by now were called “the milk run”. A comment (in the Waddington report) … “5-Group had bombed the canal so often that the Germans could leave their guns aimed ready for the next raid”. The Master Bomber abandoned this raid when it could not be marked properly due to heavy low cloud. (The Main Force – of B.C. – did 4 raids using H2S. Total of 1283 sorties, loss rate 1.7%)
21-2-45 MITTLELAND CANAL (again). 10 of 467, 10 of 463 of 165 Lancs & 12 Mosquitos from 5-Group. Weather was clear, and the canal was breached.
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The Main Force raided 4 other targets, 1110 sorties; losses 3.1%. 463 Sq. lost their C.O. W/C Forbes on his last trip of 2nd Tour … shot down by German nightfighter ace, Major H.W. Schnaufer.
NIGHT 23-2-45. PFORZHEIM. 1 of 463 (Photo) 367 Lancs of 1, 6 & 8 groups. 1825 tons of bombs dropped … “The 3rd most effective raid of the war … killed 17000, and 83% of the town destroyed by a fire-storm.
DAY 24-2-45 DORTMUND-EMS CANAL. 18 of 467, 11 of 463, of 166 Lancs & 4 Mosquitos from 5-Group … The target was obscured by cloud and the raid abandoned. No Loss.
FEBRUARY SUMMARY. The weather was often bad. 467 did 158 sorties, lost 5 crews + 3 who baled out + 3 “2nd dickies”. (25 KIA, 15 POW, 1 Ev.) 3 tours expired. 1 Crew crashed in training.
NIGHT 3-3-45. DORTMUND-EMS CANAL. 15 of 467, 15 of 463, of 212 Lancs + 10 Mosquitos of 5-Group breached the aqueduct near Ladbergen in 2 places, putting it out of action until after the war’s end. 467 lost F/O R.T. Ward and crew (7 KIA); F/O R.B. Eggins & crew (6 KIA, 1 POW), and the C.O. W/C E. Langlois & crew (5 KIA, 2 POW) … he had only become C.O. on 9th Feb. 8 Lancs lost over Ger. 20 over U.K.[inserted] loss [/inserted] 3.6%
(This night the Luftwaffe mounted “Operation Gisela” sending 200 night fighters to follow various bomber forces into England (& so not being detected). They took the British defences by surprise and they shot down 20 bombers over England (some were Lancaster training planes … a couple at Wigsley, where I was Duty Navigator in the control tower!) The bomb dump at Waddington was attacked but wasn’t blown up. 3 German fighters crashed flying too low.
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NIGHT 5-3-45 BOHLEN 15 of 467, 15 of 463 of 248 from 5-Group, attacked synthetic oil refinery. Target was cloudy but some damage. Bomber Command made 1223 sorties for 31 lost over Germany and 10 crashed in England … “visibility had detiorated [sic] for returning aircraft”. (Percy Jobson, of Wagga Wagga, a friend of hockey years, was shot down, parachuted, on this trip … a big write up given.)
NIGHT 6-3-45. SASSNITZ - - a port on the Baltic Sea.
NIGHT 7-3-45 HARBURG. oil refinery (5-Group). Bomber Command total (on various targets): 1276, loss 41 (3.2%)
DAY 11-3-45 ESSEN by 1079 bombers … the largest day raid by B.C. … “paralysed Essen until the Americans entered. 467 lost 1 crew (all KIA) on collision with a Hurricane near base in F.A. training.
DAY 12-3-45 Dortmund. 1108 planes, record tonnage 4851 tons … with fighter escorts, over 2000 planes … “put the city out of the war”.
NIGHT 14-3-45 LUTZKENDORF. 5-Group attack on oil refinery, losing 18 (7.4%). Main Force of 568 attacked Zweibrucken & Homburg & other minor targets … 2.8% loss
NIGHT 16-3-45 WURZBURG. 5-Group, 225 Lancs & 11 Mosquitos, dropped 1207 tons with great accuracy in 17 minutes … 89% of industrial part of city destroyed. 467 lost F/O Thomas & crew (6 KIA, 1 POW). Main force attacked NUREMBERG with 480 planes, losing 28 (4.2%), due to night-fighters joining the bomber stream before the target
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DAY 19-3-45 ARNSBERG RAILWAY VIADUCT. 37 Lancs of 617 and 9 Sqdns (and 1 photo Lanc. from 463) dropped 6 ‘Grand Slam’ 10-ton bombs … the ‘earthquake-effect’ collapsed the viaduct … the film was spectacular.
NIGHT. 20-3-45 BOHLEN. 5-Group. The main force was on Hemingstedt with 675 planes, loss rate 1.9%.
DAY 22-3-45 BREMEN. 5-Group. Rail bridge.
NIGHT. 23-3-45 WESEL. 5-Group. 1000 tons in 9 minutes from 9000’ … as close army support … “British Army crossed the river before the bombers had left the area”, and Wesel was in British hands before midnight (the bombing ended at 2239). Wesel claims it was the most heavily bombed town in Germany … 97% of buildings destroyed in main town area; population reduced from 250000 at outbreak of war, to 1900 in May ’45.
DAY 27-3-45 FARGE Oil Storage, 5-Group plus 2 of 617 attacking U-Boat shelters with 23’-thick concrete roof. 2 of the Grand-Slam bombs penetrated the roof and brought down thousands of tons of concrete and rubble, rendering the shelter ineffective.
MARCH SUMMARY 467 flew 185 sorties, lost 4 crews (24 KIA, 4 POW), 4 crews completed tours.
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DAY 4-4-45 NORDHAUSEN. 5-Group … Military barracks Many ‘forced labourers killed’.
DAY 6-4-45 IJMUIDEN … on ships … raid abandoned due to bad weather.
NIGHT 7-4-45 MOLBIS. Benzol plant … “all production ceased”.
NIGHT 8-4-45 LUTZKENDORF. 5-Group. Oil refinery. ‘Put out of action until end of war’. Main force was on Hamburg 440 planes, & other targets, total of 918 planes … 1.3% loss.
DAY 9-4-45 HAMBURG .. oil storage (5-Group) and 617 Sq attacked U-Boat shelters with Grand Slam bombs, and Tallboy bombs. Both raids successful. On this raid German ME 152 & 153 jet fighters attacked the Lancs for the first time.
NIGHT 16-4-45 PILSEN 5-Group. Rail Yards.
NIGHT 18-4-45 KOMOTAU 5-Group.
DAY 23-4-45 FLENSBURG Railway yards. (Abandoned – cloud)
NIGHT 25-4-45 TONSBERG Oil Refinery & U Boat pens (Norway)
463 Sq. lost the last Lancaster of the war (crew survived)
3300 Lancasters lost in the whole war.
467 Sq from Nov ’42 to 26 Apr ’45 – flew 4188 sorties, used 214 Lancs. lost 110 by enemy action, 4 damaged – crashlandings but recovered. 590 KIA. 117 POW. 8E Ev. 5 DSO, 146 DFC. 2 CGM. 36 DFM
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[underlined] 467 SQUADRON – R.A.A.F. [/underlined]
467 Squadron was formed at SCAMPTON, LINCOLNSHIRE 7-11-42.
Moved to BOTTESFORD by 30-11-1942. Moved to WADDINGTON 11-11-1943.
Bottesford Station Commanding Officers: G/C. SWAIN, F.R.O: OBE: DFC.
From 3.3.43. – G/C. McKECKNIE, W.N: DFC.
[underlined] 467 SQAUDRON moved to WADDINGTON 12.11.43 [/underlined]
Waddington Station Commanding Officers:
16.4.43. G/C. S.C. ELWORTHY, CCB, CBE, DSO, MVO, DFC, AFC, MA.
31.3.44. G/C. D.W. BONHAM-CARTER, CB, DFC.
14.4.45. G/C. E.D. McK. NELSON, CB.
1.8.45 G/C. D.D. CHRISTIE, AFC.
24.8.45. G/C. A.E. TAYLOR.
467 SQUADRON COMMANDERS:
7.11.42. W/C. C.L. COMM, DSO, DFC. _ _ _ KIA 16.8.43.
19.8.43. W/C. J.R. BALMER, DFC, OBE. _ _ _ KIA 11.5.44.
12.5.44. W/C. W.L. BRILL, DSO, DFC & Bar _ _ _ Died 1964.
12.10.44. W/C. J.K. DOUGLAS, DFC, AFC. _ _ KIA 8.2.45.
9.2.45. W/C. E. le P. LANGLOIS _ _ KIA 3.4.45.
4.3.45. W/C. I.H. HAY, DFC. _ _ To disbandment.
467 STATION ADJUTANTS: F/L. BURFIELD_CARPENTER.
F/L. A.D. McDONALD (A18121): F/L. J.M.W. LOVE.
467 SQUADRON moved to RAF METHERINGHAM 16.6.45 and were disbanded there October, 1945.
[underlined] 467 STATISTICS COMPILED FROM OPERATIONAL RECORD BOOKS [/underlined].
First Operational Sortie – 2/3.1.1943 – To FURZE _ Minelaying.
Last Operational Sortie – 26/26.4.45 – to TONSBURG.
[underlined] OPERATIONAL SORTIES ATTEMPTED [/underlined]:
No. of a/c actually took off on operations: 3977
No. of Operational sorties completed: 3795
No. of Operational sorties failed: 182
[underlined] REASON FOR FAILURE OF SORTIE [/underlined]:
a/c failed to return – listed missing 105
a/c early return due to Engine Failure: 28
a/c early return due to Electrical Failure: 10
a/c “ “ “ to Armament Failure: 9
a/c “ “ “ to Oxygen Failure: 9
a/c “ “ “ to Instruments, radio, intercom failure: 12
a/c “ “ “ to Ice in flight & ice damage: 6
a/c “ “ “ to Navigational Error: [underlined] 3 [/underlined]
[underlined] 182 [/underlined]
No. of Sorties completed in a/c damaged by Enemy Action: 230
No. of Aircrew listed in Operational Record Books as flown on ops from 467 Sqdn, RAAF: (inc. RAF, RNZAF, RCAF): 1814
No. of Aircrew listed in ORB’s as War Casualty from 467 Sq: (includes) RAAF, RAF, RNZAF, RCAF): 760
No. of whole crews posted to 467 Sq. for Ops: 258
No. of whole crews finished tour of ops – 30 or more: 74
No. of whole crews lost on Ops: 115
No. of whole crews still operating when hostilities ceased 8.5.45. and not tour expired: 31
No. of whole crews posted to other Squadrons during tour: 34
No. of whole crews with no Ops. before hostilities ceased: 4
No. of crews from 53 Base who flew on ops from 467 Sqdn and not listed as posted to 467 Sqdn. 6
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[inserted] Extract of “WAR” List for an Operation … late 1944. [/inserted]
F/S J.W. Singer (Can) – Sgt A. Carson – [missing name]
PB. 193 ‘W’ – F/O R.J. Harris – P/O J.T. Adair – Sgt T. Andrews – Sgt R. Walker
P/O H.F.C. Parsons – F/L R.W. Cook – Sgt S. Saunders
EE.136 – F/O A.L. Keely – F/S W. Chorny (Can) – Sgt A.E. Wotherspoon – Sgt C.H. Connwell
F/S L.W. Tanner – Sgt S.D. Chambers – Sgt J.E. Johnson
LM.713 – F/O C. Newton (Can) – Sgt P. Grant – Sgt W. Gregory – Sgt E.H. Cooper (Can)
Sgt R. Flynn (Can) – Sgt L.G. Kelly – Sgt R.S. Stevens (Can)
LM.715 ‘O’ – F/O R.W. Ayrton (Aus) – Sgt M.J. Herkes – Sgt H.K. Huddlestone – Sgt D.K. Chalcraft
F/S N. Bardsley – Sgt W. Scott – Sgt J.A.W. Davies
ME.809 – F/O R.C. Lake – P.O J.A. Peterson (Can) – Sgt R.W. Baird – Sgt R.A. Morton
W/O G.B. Watts (Can) – F/S G.E. Parkinson – P/O R.D. Kerr (Can)
No. 467 Squadron, Second Wave
NF.908 ‘C’ – F/L J.K. Livingstone – F/L D.O. Sands – F/O E.G. Parsons – F/O R.N. Browne
P/O W.D. McMahon (Aus) – F/O J. Pendergast – F/O T.C. Taylor
PB306 – F/O R.J. Mayes (Aus) – F/O L.J. Hart (Aus) – Sgt D.H. Hamilton – F/S J. Manning
F/S A.R. Edgar (Aus) – F/S J.G. Muir (Aus) – F/S K.W. Cary (Aus)
LM.100 ‘D’ – F/O P.R. Gray-Buchanan (Aus) – F.S. H.G. Adams (Aus) – Sgt D.M. Coutts – F/S J.R. Giles (Aus)
F/S B.J. Payne (Aus) – F/S E.J. Taylor (Aus) – F/S K. Nichols (Aus)
PD.215 ‘F’ – F/O L. Landridge (Aus) – F/S D.G. Beverley (Aus) – Sgt J. Halstead – Sgt D.J. Allen
F/S K.C. Woollam (Aus) – F/S W.C. Denny (Aus) – Sgt B.A. Davies
LM.542 ‘K’ – F/O T.A. Gummersall (Aus) – F/S L.C.C. Chalcraft (Aus) – Sgt J. Clemons – F/S E.R. Baldwin (Aus)
F/O F.A. York (Aus) – F/S S.J. Anders (Aus) – F/S W.H. Bradbury (Aus)
LM.233 ‘M’ – F/O J.J. Sheridan (Aus) – F.S G.W. Gould (Aus) – Sgt B.J. Ambrose – Sgt J. Hodgson
F/S A. Raymond (Aus) – F/S W. Branagh (Aus) – Sgt R. Ward
LM.677 – F/O J.J.J. Cross (Aus) – F/S D.F. Edwards (Aus) – Sgt K.M. Pope – F.S W.K. Perry (Aus)
F/O V.L. Drouyn (Aus) – F/S W.V. Maurer (Aus) – F/S M.D. Wilkie (Aus)
NF.910 – F/O G.H. Stewart (Aus) – F/O R. Faulks (Aus) – Sgt G. Hopwood – F/S D.J. Morland (Aus)
F/S R. Galov (Aus) – F/S M.J.H. West (Aus) – F/S F.H. Skuthorpe (Aus)
NF.917 ‘Q’ – F/O R.S. Forge (Aus) – F/O H.M. Bissell (Aus) – Sgt W.C. Bradley – Sgt H. R. Harvey
F/O R.H. Darwin (Aus) – F/S E.J. O’Kearney (Aus) – Sgt R. Haire
ND.473 – F/O R.H. Mellville (Aus) – F/S J.L. Klye (Aus) – Sgt R.J. Brady – F/S D.D. Suter (Aus)
F/S J.F. Tongue (Aus) – F/S B.T. Hoskin (Aus) – F/S R.C.M. Newling (Aus)
NF.908 – F/O L.R. Pedersen (Aus) – F/S J.S. Hodgson (Aus) – Sgt D.R. Ba.dry [sic] – Sgt E.W. Durrant
F/S P.K. Garvey (AUS) – F/S V.J.M. McCarthy (AUS) – Sgt A.E. Dearns
NN.714 – F/O E.B. Rowell (Aus – F/S R.L. Morris (Aus) – Sgt A.J. Halls – Sgt. A Thomson
F/S D.J. Taylor (Aus) – F/S A.S. Smith (Aus) – Sgt A. Thomson
F/S D.J. Taylor (Aus) – F/S A.S. Smith (Aus) – Sgt J. Hodge
No. 463 Squadron, Third Wave
ND.133 ‘X’ – W/C W.A. Forbes (Aus) – F/O J.A. Costello – P/O W.A. Martin – F/S A.J. Norman
F/O W.J. Grime – P/O W. McLeod – P/O K.L. Worden
PD.311 ‘O’ – F/O P.J. Bowell (Aus) – F/S E.A. Petersen (Aus) – Sgt W. Forster – F/S W.H.J. Butcher (Aus)
F/S W. Plumb (Aus) – W/O J.R. Williams (Aus) – F/S I.D. Dutfiield [sic] (Aus)
LM.130 ‘N’ – F/O A.G. Stutter (Aus) – F/S P.L. Wilkinson (Aus) – Sgt H. Walsh – F/S M.F. Woodgate (Aus)
F/S P. O’Loughlin (Aus) – F/S D.J. Browning (Aus) – F/S H.R. Holmes (Aus)
PD.337 ‘L’ – F/O F.H. Smith (Aus) – Sgt E. Moss – ?
F/S B.A. Donaghue (Aus) – F/S R.T. Simonson (Aus) – F/S E.R. Cameron (Aus)
ND.977 – F/O G.T. White (Aus) – F/S G.D. Smith (Aus) – Sgt C. Jackson – Sgt V.G. Dunn
F/S H. Robinson (Aus) – F/S J.J.B. Middleton (Aus) – Sgt W. S. Bayne
PD.330 ‘F’ – F/O K.P. Brady (Aus) – F/S E.D. Rees – Sgt C.R. Levy – F/S G. Berglund (Aus)
F/S G.W. Boyes – F/S J.D. Stevens (Aus) – F/S J.E. Cox (Aus)
MD.332 – F/O B. Ward-Smith (Aus) – F/O R.W. Markham (Aus) – Sgt E. Taylor – F/S A.J. Tyson (Aus)
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[underlined] 5 Group, [/underlined] the biggest of 6 in Bomber Command.
Our 467 squadron was one of 18 Lancaster squadrons the Group. They were:-
9 at Bardney
227 at Balderton
[missing number] 4 (Rhod.) “ Spilsby
[underlined] 463 & 467 “ Waddington [/underlined]
49 “ Fulbeck
619 at Strubby
50 & 61 “ Skellingthorpe
630 “ East Kirkby
57 “ East Kirkby
617, 627 “ Woodhall Spa [symbol] Mosquitos
83 & 97 (Pathfinders) Coningsby
106 Metheringham
189 Fulbeck
207 Spilsby
[underlined] Some notable raids [/underlined]:
1944 Sept. 12/13. First operational use of [underlined] Loran [/underlined].
“ 23/4. Dortmund-Ems canal breached by [underlined] Tallboy [/underlined] (12000 lb bomb, designed by Barnes Wallis).
Oct. 3 Sea wall at Westkapelle (Walcheren Is) breached.
“ 14/5 Biggest night ops by Bomber Command of the war.
“ 23/4. Part of 1055 plane raid on Essen.
“ 25 “ “ 771 “ “ “ “, finishes it.
Nov. 2/3 “ “ 992 “ “ “ Dusseldorf.
“ 4/5. 174 Lancs breach Dortmund-Ems canal again.
“ 12 Tirpitz sank at Tromso by 9 & 617 Sqdns.
1945 Jan 1/2. 157 Lancs breach Mittleand canal.
“ 4/5. raid on Royan kills many French civilians.
“ 7/8. Part of 654 a/c; last raid on Munich.
Mar 14. Bielefeld aquaduct [sic] broken using Barnes Wallis’s new 22000 lb Grand Slam bomb. by 617 Sqdn.
“ 27. U-boat shelter at Farge blown up using the Grand Slam bomb, by 617 Sqdn.
Feb. 20/21 First of 36 consecutive night raids on Berlin by Mosquitos of 627 Sqdn.
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[circled 8]
[underlined] 5 Group [/underlined] Sqdns. As at 22.3.45.
Lanc I, III
9 Bardney
44 (Rhod.) Spilsby
49 Fulbeck.
50 Skellingthorpe
57 East Kirkby
61 Skellingthorpe
106 Metheringham
189 Fulbeck.
207 Spilsby
227 Balderton
463 [brackets] RAAF Waddington
407 RAAF Waddington [/brackets]
619 Strubby
630 East Kirkby
[symbol] 617 Woodhall Spa.
[brackets] 83 PFF Coningsby
97 PFF Coningsby [/brackets]
627 Woodhall Spa. Mosquito IV, XX, 25.
(83, 97 & 627 on loan from 8 Group.)
[inserted] [underlined] 1944. [/underlined] [/inserted]
Sept 12/13 First operational use of LORAN.
“ 23/4. Dortmund Ems canal breached by Tallboy (12000 lb).
Oct 3. Sea wall at Westkapelle (Walcheren Is) breached.
14/15 BC. biggest night ops of war.
23/24. 1055 raid on Essen. 25th 771 on Essen finishes it.
Nov 2/3. 992 on Dusseldorf.
4/5. 174 breach Dortmund Ems canal again.
12. Tirpitz sank at Tromas by 9 & 617 Sq.
Jan 1/2. 157 breach Mittleand Canal.
[inserted] 1945
Jan 4/5 Royan – many French casualties.
7/8 Last raid on Munich 654 a/c
Mar 14. Bielefeld aqueduct broken … Grand Slam 22000 lb.
27 U boat shelter at Farge successful using “ “ “
Feb. 20/21 first of 36 consecutive night raids on Berlin by mosquitos. [/inserted]
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Extracts from “The Hardest Victory – RAF Bomber Command in WW II by Dennis Richards. (Hodder & Stoughton, 1944.)
1944. March to June. The Transportation Plan, preparatory to OVERLORD … the invasion in Normandy. As part of the plan to convince the Germans that the landing would be in the Pas de Calais, far more bridges and railway workshops and marshalling yards were attacked North of the Seine than South of it. In this phase Bomber Command dealt with 37 of the railway centres, 8th American Air Force heavies 26, & AEAF (fighters, fighter-bombers, light & medium bombers, & recon. aircraft, a mixture of RAF & USAAF squadrons) 20. Bomber command dropped nearly 45000 tons on these centres, twice the tonnage of the other 2 put together. Harris in “Bomber Command” wrote:- “Bomber Command’s night bombing proved to be rather more accurate, much heavier in weight & more concentrated than the American daylight attacks, a fact which was afterwards clearly recognised by SHAEF when the time came (later) for the bombing of German troop concentrations within a mile or so of our own troops.”
In this phase, Bomber Command made 69 attacks, 9000 sorties & lost 198 planes (1.8%). They did enormous damage. In the end about 2/3 of the 37 centres were classed as completely out of action for a month or more, and the remainder as needing only some further “attention” from fighter-bombers.
Unhappily, the toll of friendly civilian lives was sometimes more than the “prescribed” limit of 100 – 150 per raid … (Coutrai 252, Lille 456, Ghent 482), but overall the total was much less than the 10000 “limit”.
The attacks on rail centres by all 3 air forces proved catastrophic for the Germans. Only about 12% of rolling stock was fit for use. A division from Poland took 3 days to get to West Germany, then 4 weeks to the Normandy battlefront!
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[duplicate page]
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[circled 2]
A particularly important raid, both in technique & results, was that on 5/6 Apr. (’43) on the Gnome et Rhône aero-works at Toulouse. 144 Lancs from 5 Group, with Leonard Cheshire of 617 SQN doing the initial marking at low level from a Mosquito. 2 Lancs of 617 reinforced the marking with great accuracy & this led to a raid which completely destroyed the factory. Thenceforth, Harris normally entrusted 5 Group (the largest in the Command) with its own marking, independent of the Pathfinder Force.
Bomber Command’s biggest task just before the invasion was to help silence the enemy’s coastal batteries … most nights since 24/25 May, & for deception purposes many of them outside the intended invasion area. But as D-Day neared, so the assault stepped up. On 2/3 June, 271 bombers attacked 4 batteries in the Pas de Calais (where the Germans most expected the invasion). On 3/4 June, 135 bombers attacked batteries at Calais & Winereux. On 4/5 June, 257 a/c attacked … this time in the invasion area. On 5/6 June (when invasion fleet was under way) Bomber Command put on max. effort … 1136 a/c (1047 attacked) [inserted] 5000 + tons of bombs. [/inserted] against [deleted] the [/deleted] 10 of the main batteries on the invasion coast. Other air formations & naval bombardment also attacked there & between them 9 of the 10 batteries were made incapable of sustained fire against the invasion forces.
In the week after D-Day, B.C. flew 3500 sorties to prevent reinforcements getting to the front. In the most skilful attack, 8/9 June. Lancs of 83 Sqn lit up railway tunnel at Saumur, then marked by Mosquitos, then 25 Lancs of 617 Sqn. dropped new 12000 lb “Tallboys” [inserted] [symbol] designed by Barnes Wallis. [/inserted] blocked the tunnel & delayed the Panzers.
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[circled 3]
During the struggle in Normandy, B.C. operated in strength close to battlefield. 14/15 Jun, 337 vs troops & vehicles at Aunay & Evrecy (near Caen). 30 Jun first B.C. daylight there … 266 Lancs & Halis & a few Mosquitos & Spitfire escort bombed a road junction at Villers-Bocage from 4000’ & frustrated a panzer attack. Of B.C.’s 5 other attacks in close support the biggest was 18 Jul .. GOODWOOD (max effort) … 1056 from B.C., 863 of AEAF & 8th A.F. to help the push SE of Caen towards Falaise …. but had bad weather & unsubdued anti-tank guns stopped the offensive (only 6 miles max.). But it impressed the Germans … Von Kluge who’d just replaced Rommel, wrote to Hitler on 21 Jul:- “There is no way by which, in the face of the enemy air forces’ complete command of the air, we can discover a form of strategy which will counterbalance the annihilating effects [underlined] unless we withdraw [/underlined] from the battlefield. Whole armoured formations allotted to counter-attack were caught beneath bomb carpets of the greatest intensity so that they could be got out of the torn-up ground only by prolonged effort … The psychological effect of such a mass of bombs coming down with all the power of elemental nature on the fighting forces, especially the infantry, is a factor which has to be taken into very serious consideration. It is immaterial whether such a carpet catches good troops or bad. They are more or less annihilated, and above all their equipment is shattered ...”
(He suicided a month later when Hitler wouldn’t allow a withdrawal)
On 7/8 Aug. 1019 a/c of B.C. raided 5 points in advance of Allied troops … helping Canadian 1st Army to open the way to Falaise.
Allies had 14000 a/c against German 1000 in those weeks.
25 Aug. Paris was free. 3 Sept. Brit 2nd Army in Brussels.
Resumption of oil targets delayed by V-1 threat.
[page break]
[circled 4] Jan (1944)
Hitler had hoped to begin V-1s vs London as ‘New Year present’ but damage to ‘ski” sites, & Fiesler works at Kassel & their own trouble with getting the bomb to operate reasonably – caused set-backs. Allied bombing of railways held up delivery of launchers & bomb components.
12/13 Jun first V-1 attacks. 7 of 55 sites managed to fire total of 10 … of which 3 reached England. But they improved. Bet. 15/16 & 16/17 Jun. 144 crossed Kentish coast & 73 reached London.
Operation CROSSBOW … B.C. + AEAF + 8th A.F. attacked V-1 sites from mid June to mid-August … using 40% of B.C. strength Targets were the modified launch sites, supply depots, & ‘large sites’ (V-2 rockets [deleted] maybe [indecipherable word] [/deleted]. B.C. attacked these day & night. B.C. flew 16000 sorties, 59000 tons vs the V-1 targets only losing 131 a/c ([symbol] 1%).
By mid-Aug, less need [symbol] defences (AA & fighters redeployed & more effect … + proximity fuses [symbol] [symbol] 20% reaching target; + balloons + finally our armies overrunning the launching sites.
Every day but one from 5 to 11 Sept Harris sent out 300 or more a/c to bomb [deleted] h [/deleted] [underlined] Le Havre [/underlined] area. (We did our [underlined] first trip [/underlined] on 10 [deleted] 8 [/deleted] Sept. 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500 lb.) that day 992 sorties. Total for the week 2500 sorties, 9750 tons … the ground attack after the last air raid on 11 Sept. succeeded & only c. 50 fatalaties [sic]. [inserted] (our 3rd) [/inserted] [underlined] Boulogne [/underlined] [inserted] we dropped 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500 lb. [/inserted] had become the next objective. We were in big raid on 17 Sept. by 762 a/c, opening the way for attack by Canadian army, … garrison gave in on 22 Sept, in diary of captured German officer: “Sometimes one could despair of everything if one is at the mery [sic] of the RAF without any protection. It seems as if all fighting is useless & all sacrifices in vain.”
[page break]
[circled 5]
Germans still held Dunkirk & Ostend … it became clear that key to faster supply to our armies was Antwerp, 40 miles up R. Scheldt. Allies captured Antwerp on 4 Sept. but Germans still held river banks, South Beveland & [underlined] Walcheren Is. [/underlined] dominating its approach from the sea. Allies tried, MARKET GARDEN, airborne troops to capture bridges over Maas, Wasl & lower Rhine … a disaster, losing 1st Airborne Div’n. [symbol] Try to open the Sheldt Estuary. B.C. began attacks on Walcheren Is. in 3rd week of Sept. Hitting batteries proved difficult. Canadian army told to capture Is. … their C.O. suggested bombing might breach its sea-walls & flood some low-lying batteries. Oct 2nd .. leaflets & broadcast to locals. Oct 3. .. Pathfinder Mosquitos in waves of 30 created a big gap in wall 60’ thick at top & 204’ at base. (617 Sqn with Tallboys not needed … took ‘em home!)
Many parts of Is. now flooded, but no surrender. Further attacks on walls on Oct 7, 11 & 17. We did our [underlined] 11th op [/underlined] [inserted] on 7 OCT. [/inserted] on [underlined] Flushing dyke [/underlined] walls, 2 sticks of 7 x 1000 lb, 2 runs at fairly low alt. & achieved a good breach.
We also bombed gun batteries on [underlined] Walcheren [/underlined] Is again on Oct. 23 (14 x 1000 lb) and Oct 30 (14 x 1000 lb) … [underlined] our 13th op [/underlined].
The plan was to take Wal. Is by amphibious assault & to ‘soften it up’, B.C. raided c 277 on Oct 28; then on Oct 29 with 358 a/c, then on [underlined] Oct 30 with 110 a/c [/underlined]. [inserted] [underlined] our 15th [/underlined] [/inserted] (us). On 1 Nov. Canadian & Scottish troops began a week of hard fighting … Royal marines sailed landing craft through the gaps in the sea-walls. B.C. flew 2000+ sorties in 14 raids there, 9000 tons of bombs … only lost 11 a/c ([symbol] 0.4%).
Antwerp not used for another 19 days … time taken to clear the estuary of mines.
[page break]
[circled 6]
B.C. continued to attack towns in Germany & coastal targets in the autumn & winter of 1944.
On [inserted] 12th [/inserted] Sept. we did our [underlined] 2nd trip [/underlined] on [underlined] Stuttgart [/underlined] (1 x 4000 lb + 13 J clusters). (Our skipper had been [deleted] there [/deleted] [inserted] to [underlined] Danstadt [/underlined] [/inserted] the previous night as “2nd-dickie”). Then our [underlined] 4th [/underlined] on Bremerhaven on 18 Sept. (18 cans). & 5th on Munchen-Gladbach the next night 19 Sept (1 x 2000 lb + 12 J clusters) on which Guy Gibson as master bomber went missing (KIA). Our [underlined] 6th on [/underlined] 23 Sept. was our first of 4 raids on [underlined] Dortmund [/underlined] Ems canal “the vital link between the Ruhr & North Sea”. (14 x 1000 lb). B.C. did about 10 raids on the canal, “each time draining the canal for several miles & leaving scores of barges stranded. And this was not simply a one-off piece of temporary damage. As soon as, by the effort of 4000 (Todt) labourers, the canal was once more fully working, B.C. breached it again - & went on doing so as required until the end of the war.” (It was a fairly “dicey” target – they [underlined] knew [/underlined] we’d be coming & [underlined] where [/underlined] (where the aqueduct was above ground level.)
Sept 26. Op [symbol] 7 on Karlsruhe (18 cans)
“ 27 [symbol] 8 “ Kauserlauten (18 cans).
Oct 6 [symbol] 10. Bremen (18 cans)
Oct 5. Daylight formation (!) on Wilhelmshaven (18 cans). - - cloud obscured target & we (& others) bombed by H2S … the only time we used it on ops … mostly we were denied its use because they reckoned German fighter &/or flak could pick us up from its transmission.
Oct. 19. Op [symbol] 12. Nuremburg (1 x 2000 lb + 12 J clusters).
Oct 28 op 14 Bergen (Norway) U-boat pens … but brought bombs back due to smokescreen over target. Had to descend to near mountain tops to clear cloud – did so safely using GEE.
[page break]
[circled 7]
“In the last quarter of 1944, nearly half the tonnage dropped by B.C. was aimed at Urban areas in general rather than on more specific targets. … eg. Stuttgart, Nuremburg; [underlined] Dusseldorf (our 16th [/underlined] on Nov 2nd, 11 x 1000 + 4 x 500) Munich our [underlined] 23rd [/underlined] on Dec. 17 (1 x 4000 + 9 cans + 1 monroe). & [underlined] Munich [/underlined] again our 28th on Jan 7th (1 x 4000 + 6 J clusters).
Our [underlined] 18th [/underlined] on 11 Nov. on Harburg oil refinery (near Hamburg) caused huge fire visible 100 miles on way home (1 x 4000+ 6 x 1000 + 6 x 500 lb).
16 Nov, Our 19th a daylight on [underlined] Duren [/underlined], part of a huge effort to react to battle of bulge destroyed the town to rubble. (12 x 1000 lb).
Our 24th Gdynic .. Dec 18, on Pocket Battleship ‘Lutzow’ (also there the P.B. Admiral Von Sheer) … may have caused enough damage to have Latzow towed (?) to Swinemunde where 617 Sqn finished it off on 16/17 April ’45 (10 x 1000 SA.P.).
5 Group. HQ Grantham, then Moreton Hall, near Swinderby.
[underlined] AOC’s [/underlined] Harris 11.9.39. Bottomley 22.11.40.
Slessor 12-5-41. Coryton 25.5.42. Cochrane 28.2.43
Constantine 16.1.45.
A/C. Hampdens, Manchesters, Lancasters, Mosquitos.
[underlined] B.C. casualties, Aircrew [/underlined] Operational K. 47120
Died as POW 138
Missing now safe. 2868
POW “ “ 9784
Wounded. 4200
[underlined] Non-operational [/underlined]
K. 8090
Wounded 4200
[page break]
A brief summary of the Bache crew’s experiences after the Operation to the Dortmund-Ems Canal on 1st January 1945.
A number of entries in the 160 pages that I wrote during 1945 in the second of my three war diaries refer to events connected with, or as a result of, the Bache crew’s experiences on 1st January of that year. (The three diaries contain a total of some 420 pages which cover only some sections of my overseas service in the RAAF, mainly while travelling to and while in Canada doing my navigator training, the Operation on 1st January 1945, that period which is summarised below and my trip back home from England. Unfortunately they do not cover any of the crew’s other Operational Sorties in detail but an amount of information on these is available from other sources in my possession)
The following very short summary makes use of extracts from some of the entries in my second diary, (other than from the 17 pages which contributed to my chronicle of events directly associated with our 16th Operation on 1st January 1945). It then goes on to refer to information that I have received since from various members of our crew covering their individual moves after the crew broke up in May 1945, plus each one’s post war status.
However, for the sake of brevity, this summary does not include any detailed references to those of our Operational Sorties which we flew between 19th February and 18th April 1945 – and some other of the events in which the crew were involved between January and May of that year – but which were not as a direct consequence of the Operation on 1-1-45 These matters may (possibly?) be covered at some future date.
So, picking up this account from a point part way through January 1945 –
My additional navigational duties during 1945.
During the period early in 1945 when our crew was non-operational, while we waited for Ernie and Cec to recover from their injuries received on 1st January, I was employed in the squadron’s navigation section in various ways. Some of these duties continued after we returned to Ops – particularly on the occasions where our crew was not flying on that Op.
Amongst other things, I had been requested by the squadron navigation leader to assist him by looking after the navigation Order Book, which covered matters such as changes in navigational procedures as these came through from No 5 Group Headquarters, as well as setting up an improved system for bringing this information to the notice of the navigators on the squadron. I was also asked to devise ways of drawing attention to cases or areas in which we should take steps to improve navigational performance.
I “dreamed up” a cartoon type character of a navigator who I named “Ayling-Rouse” (who was something like a mixture of the infamous idiotic pilot character, P/O Prune and the well known ancient Chinese philosopher, Confucius) to assist with this and it seemed to be quite successful in getting the guys’ attention! – the style being recommended for use elsewhere in the Group.
I was also shown by the section’s navigation assessment officer how to assess the squadron navigator’s Operational flying log sheets and plotting charts – and learned how to get the navigators away on “cross-country” training flights etc.
I was then introduced by the squadron navigation leader to Operational navigation briefing procedures and other of his duties – and taken to some of the pre-Operation navigational planning conferences, which were held via a Group telephone hook up between
[page break]
the various squadrons just prior to our squadron Navigators Briefing for the Op. concerned.
As an upshot of all this, I was made deputy navigation leader and eventually stood in for the squadron navigation leader on occasions – including the conducting of the Navigators Briefing and the navigation specialist officer’s briefing contribution at the Main Briefing which followed, for those of No. 467 Squadron’s crews who were to participate in the daylight Bomber Command attack on “Hitler’s Hideout” at Berchtesgaden, in April 1945.
As it turned out – like so many other planned attacks – this Operation had to be “scrubbed” (ie cancelled) at the last minute because of bad weather in the target area – but was carried out a day or so later by 359 Lancasters – of which some were from other squadrons in No 5 Group and some from Nos. 1 and 8 Groups. However it so happened that Nos. 463 and 467 Squadrons were not available to go there with them on that day due to our station’s involvement in an attack on Tonsberg in Norway which required take-off later in the same afternoon.
(As a result of the additional navigation section work which I had carried out while our crew was “off Ops” waiting for the return of Cec and Ernie and also after we returned to Ops, the squadron navigation leader, when he was informed by the squadron commander early in May that the Bache crew had been selected as one of several crews for a voluntary posting from No. 467 Squadron to Transport Command, tried to convince me not to go with them. He indicated that I was being recommended for a navigation leader’s training course – and would then probably go with the squadron on its intended transfer to the Far East theatre of War.
However, because of the close crew bonds developed during our earlier Operations – and particularly as a result of the events on 1st January 1945, I decided to stick with Merv, Sam and Cec in their transfer to Transport Command.)
Ernie returns to the crew and we return to Operations.
As events turned out, Ernie was declared fit for flying after several weeks and we resumed Ops with him back with us on 19th February, as by this time we were starting to “champ upon the bit” again. However we had to make use of the substitute wireless operators – Cec still being out of action.
Merv’s promotion and his new role on the squadron.
By then Merv had been promoted to the rank of Flight Lieutenant and on occasions had acted as O/C of our “A” Flight, then as O/C “B” Flight, to which our crew was transferred some time in March.
Cec returns to the crew for our trip in “S Sugar”
According to my diary, Cec – who had been recovering from his ankle injury in the RAF hospital at Wroughton, near Crewe, (as was Ernie after they were both transferred from the hospital in Holland) – was flown back to the squadron by Merv and I when he has discharged from there on 22nd February.
However he did not stay, but went to a convalescence place near Liverpool and remained unfit for flying for the remainder of our Operational Sorties – rejoining the crew just in time for our flight to Jouvincourt in France in PO-S on 6th May to bring a planeload of ex-prisoners of war back to England.
Page 2
[page break]
End of the war in Europe and its effects on No. 467 Squadron.
Hostilities in Europe ceased on 7th May 1945 and No. 467 Squadron was one of the Bomber Command squadrons selected for transfer to the Far East theatre of War.
Part of the Bache crew transfer to Transport Command.
Cec then joined Merv, Sam (who had been commissioned in February) and I, in our transfer on 11th May from No 467 Squadron of Bomber Command to Transport Command – to which we were posted as one of five “part-crews” from Waddington.
(These crews were taken from those who were apparently classified as “nominally tour expired” – ie those who had carried out 28, but in our case 25, Operations).
We went to the recently transferred RAAF No. 466, ex No. 4 Group Bomber Command Halifax squadron at Driffield for Transport Command flying training.
Sam’s Departure from Driffield.
We thought that the bomb-aimers who were transferred with us to No. 466 Squadron would have been trained as load masters for Transport Command flying crew “cargo supervision etc”, but were informed shortly after arrival on No. 466 Squadron that it had been decided they were now not required.
So Sam was to leave us! However the blow was softened considerably when he received notification that, because of his long period of service in the RAAF (including time served as a medical orderly in ground staff in the New Guinea theatre of war), he was to be repatriated back to Australia where he would be eligible for discharge from the Service.
He was first of all transferred to the Australian Aircrew Holding Centre at Brighton, on the south coast of England – to await a draft back home aboard a troopship.
Merv, Cec and I continue Transport Command training on No. 466 Squadron.
Merv, Cec and I continued on with No. 466 Squadron at Driffield – where we picked up an Australian Second Pilot (Merv becoming Senior Pilot) – and then converted to and flew in their Halifax bombers.
We then went with the squadron when it relocated to RAF Bassingbourn in September.
From Halifaxes to Liberators.
At Bassingbourne the squadron converted from Halifaxes to 4 engine Liberator bomber type aircraft – American designed and built – and a somewhat different aircraft from the 4 engine British designed and built heavy bombers in which we had previously flown. (It was not long before I christened the Liberator “the Flying Brick” after comparing its flying characteristics with those of our beloved Lancasters).
After we had completed a number of familiarisation exercises in the UK we were scheduled to undertake training flights and later, service transport operations, between UK and India.
The end of World War II in the Far East and the disbanding of 466 Squadron.
We were about to carry out our first training flight to India when the war in the Pacific area suddenly ended – resulting in the squadron being disbanded on 26th October 1945.
Page 3
[page break]
So the four of us, including the Australian Second Pilot, were transferred to Brighton for repatriation back home and discharge from the RAAF.
Our return to Australia.
As things turned out, all the Australian members of our crew, except for Sam, who had left England much earlier – finished up finally going back to Australia together on the same ship – the Athlone Castle.
Our return by sea to Australia is another story – including us becoming involved in a Mutiny aboard the first ship, the Orion, on which we were embarked – and from which we were later disembarked again, back in England, after it broke down in the Bay of Biscay!
Return Home and Post War
Sam
Sam, who received his promotion to Flying Officer in August, returned to Sydney in NSW for discharge from the RAAF. He and his wife, Valda, now live in Wagga, N.S.W.
Merv
Merv returned to Adelaide in South Australia for discharge as a Flight Lieutenant. He and his wife, Ethel, continued to live there until he died in 1974.
Cec
Cec returned to Brisbane in Queensland, for discharge, by which time he had been promoted to the rank of Flying Officer. He married Dawn there and they continued to live in Brisbane, but later moved northwards to Caloundra, on the Sunshine Coast in Queensland – where he died from a war related complaint in 1997.
Les
Les, Jim and Ernie remained at Waddington – Les transferring to No 463 Squadron to join Jack Blair’s crew (also ex 467 Squadron, on which they had done 24 Ops prior to the end of the war in Europe). They subsequently moved with the squadron to RAF Skellingthorpe in July. Here he remained until the war in the Pacific concluded, after which No. 463 Squadron was disbanded on 25th September 1945 and all of its RAAF personnel were repatriated back to Australia. He had the rank of Pilot Officer when he was discharged.
Les married and he and his wife, Norma, now live at Seymour, Victoria.
Jim
Jim remained on No. 467 Squadron at Waddington after Merv, Sam, Cec and I left for Transport Command – and while there joined F/O C F Stewart’s crew (which had done 6 Ops on 467 Squadron prior to the end of hostilities in Europe) – as mid upper gunner.
They were posted to No. 463 Squadron, which was also located at Waddington, on 4th June – and went with this squadron when it was relocated to RAF Skellingthorpe on 3rd July.
They remained with No. 463 Squadron until it was disbanded on 25th September 1945 – after which Jim was transferred to Brighton along with all its other Australian members and then returned to Australia for discharge from the RAAF. He was promoted to the rank of Warrant Officer sometime during this period.
Jim married and he and his wife, June, live in Sydney, N.S.W.
Page 4
[page break]
Australian War Memorial
Page 1 of [missing number]
No. 467 Squadron
No. 467 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force was formed at Scampton in the United Kingdom on 7 November 1942. Although intended as an Australian squadron under Article XV of the Empire Air Training Scheme, the majority of its personnel were originally British. The replacement of these men with Australians was a gradual process and it was only towards the end of the war that the squadron gained a dominant Australian character.
The squadron relocated to Bottesford on 23 November 1942 and commenced operations on 2 January 1943. A year later it moved to Waddington, which remained the squadron’s home until the end of the war. Equipped with Avro Lancaster heavy bombers, and forming part of 5 Group, RAF Bomber Command, the squadron’s operational focus for much of the war was the strategic bombing offensive against Germany. Bombing almost entirely by night, it participated in all of the major campaigns of the offensive including the battles of the Ruhr, Berlin and Hamburg. In addition to Germany, the squadron also attacked targets in France, Italy, Norway and Czechoslovakia. On 20 June 1943, 467 was the first Bomber Command squadron to participate in the “shuttle service” where aircraft would leave the United Kingdom, bomb a European target, and then fly on to an airfield in North Africa. There they would refuel and rearm and then bomb another target on their return flight to Britain. The German port of Friederichshafen was the outbound target, and the Italian port of Spezia the inbound one.
In addition to the strategic bombing offensive, 467 Squadron was also employed in support of ground operations prior to, and during the D-Day landing, during the drive out of the Normandy beachhead in mid-1944, and during the crossing of the Rhine in March 1945. The squadron also participated in the offensive to remove the threat posed by Germany’s terror weapons and participated in raids on the weapons research facility at Peenemende, and on V1 flying bomb and V2 rocket assembly and launch sites in France.
467 Squadron’s last bombing raid of the war was an attack on the oil refinery and tankerage at Vallo in Norway. Even before the cessation of hostilities, the squadron was employed to ferry liberated Allied prisoners of war from Europe to Britain and it continued in this role after VE Day. The squadron was one of several identified to form “Tiger Force”, Bomber Command’s contribution to the strategic bombing campaign against Japan. It relocated to Metheringham to prepare for this role, but the war against Japan ended before “Tiger Force” was deployed. 467 Squadron disbanded on 30 September 1945.
Between January 1942 and April 1945, 467 Squadron flew 3,833 sorties and dropped 17,578 tons of bombs. It suffered heavily in the course of its operations – 760 personnel were killed, of whom 284 were Australian, and 11 [missing number] aircraft were lost.
References AWM 64, RAAF formation and unit rolls [2 symbols] ORMF 0118, Roll 95 [2 symbols] 1/426 December 1942 – December 1943 [2 symbols] 1/427 January – December 1944 [2 symbols] 1/428 January – October 1945 [2 symbols] 1/435A December 1942 – March 1945; Units of the Royal Australian Air Force; a concise history. Volume 3, bomber units, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1995).; H.M. Blundell, They flew from Waddington! 463 – 467 Lancaster Squadrons, Royal Australian Air Force, (Sydney: W. Homer, 1975).
Category Unit
http://www.awm.gov.au/unit/U59451/
4/10
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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463 & 467 Squadron Notes on Ops
Description
An account of the resource
Extracts from publications giving details of all operations by 467 and 463 Squadrons from 10 September 1944 to 25 April 1945. Details include number of aircraft, target, bombloads and losses. Interspersed are details of operations carried out by Herbert Adam's crew on 467 Squadron between 10 September 1944 and 16 January 1945 which include many extracts from his diary describing operations and daily activities. Included are photographs of aircraft, crew members, air to ground views, targets, cook's tour and a map diagram. Details of 5 Group Squadrons, Extracts from books and a summary of Bache crew's experiences after operation to Dortmund Ems canal.
Creator
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H G Adams
Format
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Seventy eight page handwritten book
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Text. Memoir
Text. Personal research
Identifier
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MAdamsHG424504-170215-01
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Conforms To
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Pending review
Spatial Coverage
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Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
France
France--Le Havre
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Pas-de-Calais
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Germany
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Braunschweig
Netherlands
Netherlands--Walcheren
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Germany--Nuremberg
Norway
Norway--Bergen
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Germany--Hamburg
Norway--Trondheim
Germany--Munich
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Harburg (Landkreis)
Germany--Giessen (Hesse)
Germany--Euskirchen (Kreis)
Poland
Poland--Gdynia
Belgium
Belgium--Houffalize
France--Royan
Germany--Merseburg
Czech Republic
Czech Republic--Most
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Siegen
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Pforzheim
Germany--Sassnitz
Germany--Essen
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Halle an der Saale
Germany--Würzburg
Germany--Wesel (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Germany--Nordhausen (Thuringia)
Netherlands--IJmuiden
Germany--Flensburg
Norway--Tønsberg
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Czech Republic--Plzeň
Germany--Herne (Arnsberg)
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
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1944-09
1944-10
1944-11
1944-12
1945-01
1945-02
1945-03
1945-04
1944-04-05
1944-04-06
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
1944-06-30
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
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Tricia Marshall
463 Squadron
467 Squadron
5 Group
air gunner
aircrew
bombing
bombing of Toulouse (5/6 April 1944)
Cook’s tour
Gibson, Guy Penrose (1918-1944)
Grand Slam
H2S
killed in action
Lancaster
Mosquito
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
nose art
RAF Waddington
searchlight
tactical support for Normandy troops
Tallboy
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/194/27222/BAdamsHGAdamsHGv1.1.pdf
b59dbbc61b0779c5dd48c6f39bec2786
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Adams, Herbert
Herbert Adams
H Adams
Herbert G Adams
Description
An account of the resource
88 items. Collection concerns Herbert George Adams DFC, Legion d'Honour (b. 1924, 424509 Royal Australian Air Force). He flew operations as a navigator with 467 Squadron. Collection contains an oral history interview, photographs of people and places, several memoirs about his training and bombing operations, letters to his family, his flying logbook and notes on navigation.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Herbert Adams and catalogued by Nigel Huckins and Trevor Hardcastle.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2017-02-15
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
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Adams, HG
Transcribed document
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Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
1.
At our Squadron (467) we continued “in-service” training, mainly fighter-affiliation, often with cine-camera “guns” against Hurricanes mainly, sometimes a Spitfire … with analysis following. We did 7 of these, plus further bombing practice. Loran was introduced in November (’44), so after simulator training we did 2 training flights using it. We also had (earlier) some simulator training with H2S which was fitted [inserted] & used [/inserted] as early as Jan ’43, but we were’nt [sic] allowed to use it on operations because of the danger of German fighters “homing-in” on it! An exception was a daylight raid on Wilhelmshaven (on 5.10.44) when we dropped our load of incendiaries through 10/10 cloud using H2S.
After we finished our “tour” I was posted to Training Command … one of several Heavy Conversion Units where we helped to prepare crews for operations against Japan … the “Tiger Force” of 400 Lancasters & Lincolns. The Americans were reluctant to let the RAF use any of their air bases until eventually, they agreed to share Okinawa. The first lot of Tiger Force, led by the “special” Lancasters of 617 & 9 Squadrons arrived in July ’45 … they didn’t get anywhere near their planned 400 planes out there before the Atom Bombs stopped the war.
We flew about 84 hours (20 flights) mainly where I was the only staff member … is instructor for the crew’s navigator. The bulk of our navigation instruction was in the classroom or on simulators. It was all rather dull routine, with 2 exceptions.
One night, when I was in the Control Tower as Duty Navigator, several German planes (likely Me 110’s) came across the English Coast with returning bombers & were undetected … until the [sic] began shooting down training
[page break]
[underlined] 2. [/underlined]
planes .. I think 2 at Wigsley, where we were, and several more at adjoining training bases, plus one of them attacked Waddington, machine-gunning the Officers Mess & having a go at the bomb-dump (without success). Caused a big panic, but I think it happened on a couple of other occasions. Brave Germans.
A fellow instructor, “Twitcher” Kennedy (F/Sgt) who had a medal from some S. American country for surviving (I think) 19 raids on Berlin in his tour, was flying as navigator instructor with a crew who’d done a “cross-country”, then went to do air-to-sea gunnery practice over the ocean, firing at a patch of aluminium powder they’d dropped. The pilot, silly boy, came well below the safety height to give his gunners [deleted] e [/deleted] easy shots, dipped his wing in the ocean, & killed most of the crew, including “Twitcher”, aged 21.
A bit about “Fire Storms”. There was a big, and continuing, “hoo-ha” about the bombing of Dresden so late in the war .. mid Feb. ’45 … mainly because of the fact that a fire-storm occurred, killing a lot of people & doing a lot of damage. However, there is no way that the RAF could deliberately cause a fire-storm … it was just luck. The first, of just a hand-ful [sic] of such storms was at Hamburg, way back in July ’43. It may well have been partly due to the fact that WINDOW was first used, “blotting-out” the German radar, leaving their heavy concentration of AA. & searchlights unguided … & so the bombers may have been a lot more accurate than usual (“usual” was not good in those days). Plus, it was hot.
[page break]
3.
Yet this was the first fire-storm in thousands of raids. The only other ones mentioned in the many books I’ve read were: Damstadt 11.9.44 (8000 killed); Magdeburg 16-17 Jan ’45 (460 killed); Pforzheim 23-4 Feb ’45 (17,000 killed); and Wurzburg 16-17 Mar ’45 (5000 killed). Besides those, we took part, just with 5 Group, on 3 raids which caused firestorms … on 12.9.44 Bremen (1171 killed); 18.9.44 Bremerhaven (30 000 homeless in the open for a few days); and Bremen on 6.10.44 … “much destruction … finished Bremen” … none of these got a mention … so only 9 firestorms in all the years of bombing … they were just “flukes” … but bad luck for those towns.
A bit about Weaving, Corkscewing [sic] & Banking Seaches. [sic] Prior to the use of WINDOW, the German A.A. & searchlights were guided by Radar; so the technique used by bombers was to WEAVE … perhaps 20o – 30o either side of the desired course when the pilot saw AA or searchlights ahead. There was not much else they could do … perhaps try lower altitude. But weaving was popular. Once WINDOW became established, the German resorted to Barrage Flak along the path to the target. It looked bad to fly through, but going straight & level through it was the safest … if you [deleted] go to [/deleted] got out of the “stream” the night-fighters could pick you up by radar. So we did not ever do weaving.
In August ’43, during an attack on Peenemunde, the research station for the development of V.1 & V.2’s, that the Germans first used “Schrage Musik” where fighters were equipped with upward-firing guns … often getting below a bomber undetected … often close enough to deliberately aim at main petrol tanks … a sure kill.
[page break]
[underlined] 4. [/underlined]
I think that the RAF deliberately kept quiet about this … it would be bad for morale. But pilots were told to do “banking searches” over enemy territory to allow gunners to pick-up approaching fighters before they could attack. Our pilot was conscientious about this … we would hear “down port, reply all-clear port, down starboard, all clear starbord [sic]” for hour after hour. We only saw enemy fighters well-astern 2 or 3 times, & each time began the corkscrew manoevre [sic] at once. It seemed to be well known that German night-fighters would abandon those bombers & look for “easy-pickings” from below someone who hadn’t seen them. And although the concentration of flak & searchlights continued to grow as the war wore on, I think the losses to night-fighters increased. Some figures suggest that our loss rate eased off in the latter part of the war, but it was mainly that Bomber Command gave up on the Battle of Berlin about March ’44 as the losses then (about 5 percent) were not sustainable. During our tour the loss rate was closer to 2 percent than 3 percent, yet many crews were lost before ending a tour … 5 of the 8 crews who began with us were shot down. I’ve read that some of the Schrage Musik pilots claimed over a hundred Lancasters downed in 1944-45. Our base lost 2 Wing Commanders & 2 Flight Commanders in Feb – Apr 1945.
I think we were lucky to have serviced in 5 Group. Bomber Command had 6 Groups, but to a large extent 5 Group operated alone on most of our targets, often when the rest of Bomber Command continued with the area-bombing of cities, which, in retrospect, seems to have been a faulty obsession of “Bomber” Harris.
[page break]
Bomber Command. 1944.
Up to March ’44, Bomber Command mainly attacked large targets at night … big manufacturing places, especially the Ruhr. American bombers mostly bombed in daylight, escorted by long-range fighters. These bombers (Fortresses & Liberators) carried a lot of ammunition, some armour-plating, and a much smaller bomb-load than the British Lancasters & Halifaxes. They often endured running battles with German fighters for hours on long trips like Berlin.
After March ’44, Bomber Command abandoned night attacks on Berlin due to unsustainable losses. The German night-fighters had developed tactics to down our heavies by shooting from below where we only had partial coverage from the rear turret. Instead, Mosquito bombers began almost nightly raids on Berlin. These planes carried nearly as much bomb-load as a Fortress & just a crew of 2, taking 4 hours instead of 8. But the number of planes used was not great, more of a nuisance perhaps … & their loss-rate was very low.
In preparation for D-Day, Bomber Command began using heavies on short daylight raids “softening-up” the eastern side of the Channel for the invasion, and trying to stop the V1 bombs at their source. The number of ‘ops’ to a ‘tour’ was [deleted] reduced fr [/deleted] increased from 30 to 36, as most of these ‘trips’ took only about 3 hours.
Just prior to D-Day the heavies concentrated on railway bridges, locomotive workshops,
Dublin Core
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Title
A name given to the resource
In Bomber Command
Description
An account of the resource
Writes of training and briefly about operations on 467 Squadron. Continues to describe events after finishing his tour when he was training crews destined for Tiger Force as well as other training tasks. Writes of a training crash of a Lancaster killing all crew. Provides comments on firestorms and goes on to mention weaving, corkscrewing and banking prior to window. Writes about the introduction of Schrage Musik and that the air force deliberately kept quite about it. Continues with accounts of his crews tactics when engaged by fighters and anti-aircraft. Concludes with comments about bombing strategies in 1944 including being taken off operations against Germany for D-Day preparation.
Creator
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H G Adams
Format
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Five page handwritten document
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Text. Memoir
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
BAdamsHGAdamsHGv1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Peenemünde
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Magdeburg
Germany--Pforzheim
Germany--Würzburg
Germany--Bremerhaven
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1945
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Tricia Marshall
467 Squadron
5 Group
617 Squadron
anti-aircraft fire
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
bombing of Hamburg (24-31 July 1943)
crash
H2S
Lancaster
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
perception of bombing war
searchlight
Tiger force
Window
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/194/27223/BAdamsHGAdamsHGv2.1.1.pdf
304ecdfc31f7787581d98e79fbbebdae
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Adams, Herbert
Herbert Adams
H Adams
Herbert G Adams
Description
An account of the resource
88 items. Collection concerns Herbert George Adams DFC, Legion d'Honour (b. 1924, 424509 Royal Australian Air Force). He flew operations as a navigator with 467 Squadron. Collection contains an oral history interview, photographs of people and places, several memoirs about his training and bombing operations, letters to his family, his flying logbook and notes on navigation.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Herbert Adams and catalogued by Nigel Huckins and Trevor Hardcastle.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-02-15
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Adams, HG
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
BERT ADAMS
Navigator 467 Squadron R.A.A.F.
From early September, 1944 until mid January, 1945 I was a navigator with 467 Squadron – one of two Australian squadrons based at Waddington, near Lincoln (no 463 was the other one). Our crew was typical – pilot and wireless operator from Queensland, mid upper gunner from W.A. bomb aimer and rear gunner from Sydney …. all of us aged 20 except for the mid-upper gunner, an old married man of 25. plus our scottish [sic] engineer, actually going grey, aged 44.
All 6 Aussies trained (up to wing stage) in Australia Our bomber, Syd (a scubbed [sic] pilot) and I were together all the way …. 3 months basic navigation at Cootamundra, flying Avro Ansons; 2 months bombing and gunnery at Evans Head, on Fairey Battles; 1 month Astro-navigation at Parkes, On Ansons again. There we became Sargents [sic] and got our Observer’s Wings – qualified for navigation, bomb-aiming and gunnery.
We travelled to America on the same ship, expecting to go on to Canada for reconnaissance training, then on to Britain for Coastal Command …. a fairly safe part of the war. How ever, at San Francisco, plans were changed – we were off to Britain at once into Bomber Command. I did a 5 week Advanced Flying course in North Wales, ON Ansons again. Syd did a similar course (for Bomb Aimers) on the Isle of Anglesey, just across the Menai Straight. Thence we went to Lichfield for 3 months Operational training on Vickers Wellingtons. There we had the first two days (and nights in the mess) for voluntary crewing up. Syd and I found our Queensland pair (pilot and wireless operator) mutually impressed,
[page break]
…….. 2
Then the two gunners, who’d come 1st and 2nd in their advanced course, looking for a good crew picked us!
Next we did about 6 weeks conversion (to 4-engined Short Stirlings) where we were allocated our Engineer completing the crew of 7. Then we did a 4 week Lancaster Finishing School before joining our squadron. The Empire Air Training Scheme worked well, providing a good supply of thoroughly-trained aircrew.
Seven other crews, besides ours, arrived the same day. Five of these were destined not to complete a tour of 30 operations. We were welcomed, En Masse, by the C.O. next day, and he kept our crew back for a private chat, after dismissing the others. The reason: our pilot’s elder brother had been his rear gunner on [inserted] one of [/inserted] his two tours! Then he went up with us, checked us out, and 2 days later sent us on our first raid, a short daylight “trip’ to Le Havre, without our pilot doing the customary “second-dickie” trip with an experienced crew. Our pilot remedied that the next night. on Damstadt. Then we had our first night ‘trip’ the following night on Stuttgart.
At that time our Navigation Officer endevoured [sic] to check each navigator’s log and chart after each trip, but as he was still going on some trips himself, he co-opted some of his experienced navigators to help the new chums with the more detailed check of their log and chart and advice on the harder decisions to be faced.
Our basic System of navigation consisted of getting accurate winds from good GEE fixes until the enemy Jammed our reception soon after crossing enemy territory. Then we compared our winds with those forecast, considered the overall “Met’ picture. and
[page break]
Pr
……. 3
Predicted what winds to use from there to the target for “dead reckoning” This was the critical area for judgement. My helper’s name was Scotty (I did’t [sic] know his surname). He was nearly 30, and had done about 15 trips. He helped me for a couple of weeks, by which time an assistant navigation officer was appointed and the helper system abandoned. We had by then done 6 trips successfully and were no longer regarded as new chums.
Waddington was peace-time aerodrome. Our barracks were two-storey brick, H shaped, having four dormitories on each floor. Each dormitory had 12 bunks; our crew (except the pilot who was now an officer) down one side, another crew down the other. The navigator of the other crew was Geoff Goodfellow, from Tooraweenah (his father ran the Mountain View Hotel). Geoff reckoned I was the only bloke he’d met in the Airforce who’d even heard of Tooraweenah, let alone been there, as I had. We were good friends, Often playing crib or 500, or sampling a few beers together. Unfortunately they were shot down after two months – it was our 18th trip – about the same for them.
It was customary to give bomber crews 6 days leave after 6 weeks of operations (less if those above them on the leave-list went missing). This happened and we went to London after 11 trips in 5 weeks. While in London, I looked in at the BOOMERANG CLUB just out of curiosity – I had never been inside it. One of the first fellows I saw was Kirk Beddie ….. I knew he was with Coastal Command
[page break]
………… 4
“Hello Kirk”
“Hello Bert; what are you up to?”
“I’m on Lancs, on 467 squadron, at Waddington. This is our first leave. Done 11 trips. Where are you?”
“At [deleted] Pembroke Dock (S Wales) [/deleted] [inserted] PLYMOUTH (NO 10 SQDN) [/inserted], on Sunderlands. My first leave too, but we have to fly a lot of hours for it (500 I think it was) – takes about 6 months”
“It’s a bit of a coincidence, the only two airmen from Mendooran and we’re both on leave together and both come in here”, I said
Kirk replied.: “Yes, but we’re not the only two, Vernon Gall is over here in the Airforce too.”
I said,: “I don’t know him.”
“Oh, I forgot,” said Kirk. “You may never have seen him. He was in the Bank of NSW, but you were boarding in Mudgee while at High School, then working in Sydney until you got into uniform. So you were only in Mendooran on holidays or on leave. Your family would know him. Hey, there he is now! I will go and bring him over and introduce you.”
Kirk walked about 20 yards through the crowd of airmen and sailors, and came walking back with ……..
Scotty! …………
Neither of us had mentioned Mendooran, when he was helping me. Some coincidence now!
Scotty was on his second leave and went on to complete his “tour’. After the war, when I bought the Sports Depot in Mudgee, he turned up there as a teller at the Bank of NSW. His wife was MLC agent and sold us life insurance on each of our children.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Bert Adams 467 Squadron
Description
An account of the resource
Account of his time as a navigator on the squadron from September 1944 to January 1945. Describes his crew and training in Australia travel via the United States to England to join Bomber Command. Writes of training for multi-engine bombers and early operation on 467 squadron and how he navigated as well as describing RAF Waddington and various activities and leave.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Creator
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H G Adams
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Four page typewritten document
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Memoir
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
BAdamsHGAdamsHGv2
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
England--Staffordshire
Wales--Anglesey
Germany
Germany--Darmstadt
Australia
New South Wales--Cootamundra
New South Wales--Mudgee
New South Wales
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-09
1945-01
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Tricia Marshall
467 Squadron
aircrew
Anson
Battle
Lancaster
navigator
RAF Lichfield
RAF Waddington
Stirling
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/194/27306/MAdamsHG424504-170215-11.2.pdf
56856597013d8bd2a52dafda33e2087b
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Adams, Herbert
Herbert Adams
H Adams
Herbert G Adams
Description
An account of the resource
88 items. Collection concerns Herbert George Adams DFC, Legion d'Honour (b. 1924, 424509 Royal Australian Air Force). He flew operations as a navigator with 467 Squadron. Collection contains an oral history interview, photographs of people and places, several memoirs about his training and bombing operations, letters to his family, his flying logbook and notes on navigation.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Herbert Adams and catalogued by Nigel Huckins and Trevor Hardcastle.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-02-15
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Adams, HG
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[underlined] Firestorms [/underlined]
Germany’s second largest city, Hamburg had 4 RAF and 2 U.S. raids from 24th to 29th July ’43. All the Bomber Command raids were of over 700 planes. The 3rd raid, on 26th caused a huge firestorm with heavy casuaties [sic] & damage. Despite hundreds of raids on cities this was the first firestorm. Some of the reasons may have been: a more dense raid (in area & time) from the NW; use of WINDOW nullifying their radar; a compact city with few open spaces; prior air raid damage. However, it was a ‘fluke’ .. no one could predict such a fire. Despite all the raids on cities, before & after that, the next big one was at Damstaat [sic] on Sept 11th, ’44, and no more until 1945 … Magdeburg 16 Jan; Dresden 13th Feb; Pforzheim 23rd Feb. & Wurzburg 16th Mar. There was a great “hoo-ha” after the war about Dresden, but it was, along with Berlin, Leipzig & Chemnitz all threatened by Russians … and raids on them [inserted] were [/inserted] asked for at the Yalta Conference.
Our crew took part in 3 raids, just by 5 Group, with about 200 Lancs, causing firestorms on the cities Stuttgart (12.9.44), Bremerhaven (18.9.44) & Bremen ([deleted] 18.9 [/deleted] 6.10.44) … perhaps because of 5 Group’s good marking, with bombing much condensed in time & space compared to “earlier times”. I have seen no record of these 3 fires in the several books I’ve read about Bomber Command.
“Lutzow.” On 17.12.44 our crew was one of just a few picked to attack the Lutzow & another pocket battleship at Gdynia (Poland) Over the years I’ve tried to find out what happened to the Lutzow … & recently found, on p. 183 of a book “Lancaster, The Biography by 617 Pilot Iveson, when they attacked it with Tallboys & 1000 pounders … “tore a hole in the bottom of Lutzow & she settled to the bottom in shallow water.”
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Firestorms
Description
An account of the resource
Describes operations by Bomber Command and USAAF aircraft to Hamburg from 24 to 28 July 1943. Mentions it was the first firestorm and the use of Window. Writes that the next firestorm was Darmstadt on September 11 1944. Mentions subsequent firestorms at Magdeburg, Dresden, Pforzheim and Wurzburg. Goes on to mention justification for Dresden and lists those operations that his crew took part in. At the end mentions 617 Squadron attack on the Lützow.
Creator
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H G Adams
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One page handwritten document
Language
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eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Memoir
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MAdamsHG424504-170215-11
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Magdeburg
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Chemnitz
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Bremen
Poland--Gdynia
Poland
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943-07-24
1943-07-28
1944-09-11
1945-01-16
1945-02-13
1945-02-23
1945-03-16
1944-09-12
1944-09-18
1944-10-06
1944-12-17
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Tricia Marshall
5 Group
617 Squadron
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
bombing of Hamburg (24-31 July 1943)
Tallboy
Window
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/939/31097/MMackieGA855966-180130-02.2.jpg
c0681f83298d58ed5e7fbe4d7bd9df61
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Mackie, George
George Alexander Mackie
G A Mackie
Description
An account of the resource
Nine items. An oral history interview with George Mackie (1920 - 2020, 855966 Royal Air Force) with his log books, diary extract, list of operations, battle order and photographs. He flew operations as a pilot with 15 and 214 Squadrons.
The collection was catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-12-22
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
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Mackie, GA
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
15 SQUADRON WYTON
July 1941
6th N. France daylight
7th Frankfurt
12th N. France daylight
23rd La Rochelle daylight
25th Berlin abort
August 1941
25th Manheim
September 1941
19th Stettin
October 1941
12th Nuremburg
24th Brest
28th Pilsen
30th Paris
November 1941
1st Brest
15thh Kiel
25th Brest
27th Dusseldorf
January 1942
10th Emden
14th Hamburg
1651 HCU WATERBEACH
May 1942
30th Cologne 1,000
June 1942
1st Essen
22nd Cap d’ Antifer
July 1942
28th Hamburg abort
September 1942
17th Essen
214 SQUADRON VARIOUS AIRFIELDS
October 1943
17th Mining, Baltic
November 1943
14th Leverkusen
December 1943
1st Mining off Bordeaux
January 1944
4th N. France
21st Cherbourg
April 1944
20th Brussels
May 1944
1st Tours
8th Lanveoc-Poulmic
21st Kiel Bay
31st Saumur
June 1944
16th Kerkrade
July 1944
17th St Leu d’Esserent
24th Spoof
28th Stuttgart
August 1944
6th Spoof
12th Brunswick
17th Spoof
18th Bremen
September 1944
10th Holland
11th Darmstadt
12th Spoof
Losses 19 Stirlings 4 Fortresses
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
15 Squadron Wyton, 1651 HCU Waterbeach and 214 Squadron operations
Description
An account of the resource
List of operations from July 1941 until September 1943 for 15 Squadron, 1651 HCU at RAF Waterbeach and 214 Squadron at various airfields. Note at bottom; losses 19 Stirlings 4 Fortresses.
Format
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One page printed document
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MMackieGA855966-180130-02
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
Great Britain
Germany
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Netherlands
Czech Republic
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
France--La Rochelle
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Mannheim
Poland--Szczecin
France--Brest
Czech Republic--Plzeň
France--Paris
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Essen
France--Le Havre
Germany--Leverkusen
France--Bordeaux (Nouvelle-Aquitaine)
France--Cherbourg
Belgium
Belgium--Brussels
France--Tours
France--Poulmic
France--Saumur
France--Creil Region
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1941-07-06
1941-07-07
1941-07-12
1941-07-23
1941-07-25
1941-08-25
1941-10-12
1941-10-24
1941-10-28
1941-10-30
1941-11-01
1941-11-15
1941-11-25
1941-11-27
1942-01-10
1942-01-14
1942-05-30
1942-06-01
1942-06-22
1942-07-28
1942-09-17
1943-10-17
1942-11-14
1942-12-01
1943-01-04
1941-01-21
1943-04-20
1943-05-01
1943-05-08
1943-05-21
1943-05-31
1943-06-16
1943-07-17
1943-07-24
1943-07-28
1943-08-06
1943-08-12
1943-08-17
1943-08-18
1943-09-10
1943-09-11
1943-09-12
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
David Bloomfield
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
15 Squadron
1651 HCU
214 Squadron
B-17
bombing
bombing of Cologne (30/31 May 1942)
Heavy Conversion Unit
mine laying
RAF Waterbeach
RAF Wyton
Stirling
training
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1158/34264/MThorpJF1623333-160412-01.1.jpg
3cff49662d2e177e1a5f0429c25fb1ff
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1158/34264/MThorpJF1623333-160412-02.1.jpg
25068e5b76c5ed05c05bf11068db2dc3
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Thorp, John Foster
J F Thorp
Description
An account of the resource
Four items. An oral history interview with Warrant Officer John Foster Thorp (1924 - 2018, 1623333 Royal Air Force), a list of his operations, a page from a log book and notes on 467 Squadron and Lancaster R5868. He flew completed a tour of operations as a rear gunner with 467 Squadron.
The collection was catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-04-12
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Thorp, JF
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
John Thorp's list of operations
Description
An account of the resource
Lists 34 operations between 28 May 1944 and 19 September 1944. 467 Squadron RAAF. On last sortie noted that Wing Commander Gibson VC was master bomber and was killed on return flight. In addition first operation was in Lancaster R5868 which is now in the RAF museum.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-05-28
1944-05-31
1944-06-03
1944-06-06
1944-06-08
1944-06-19
1944-06-21
1944-06-23
1944-06-24
1944-06-27
1944-06-29
1944-07-04
1944-07-14
1944-07-15
1944-07-18
1944-07-19
1944-07-24
1944-07-25
1944-08-09
1944-08-11
1944-08-14
1944-08-16
1944-08-23
1944-08-25
1944-08-26
1944-08-31
1944-09-07
1944-09-10
1944-09-11
1944-09-17
1944-09-18
1944-09-19
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
France
France--Cherbourg
France--Saumur
France--Argentan
France--Rennes
France--Watten
France--Pas-de-Calais
Germany
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
France--Limoges
France--Somme
France--Vitry-le-François
France--Beauvois
France--Oise
France--Paris
France--Nevers
France--Caen
Germany--Stuttgart
France--Poitiers
France--Givors
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
France--Brest
Poland
Poland--Szczecin
Germany--Darmstadt
France--L'Isle-Adam
Russia (Federation)
Russia (Federation)--Kaliningrad (Kaliningradskai︠a︡ oblastʹ)
France--Le Havre
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Personal research
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Two page handwritten document
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MThorpJF1623333-160412-01, MThorpJF1623333-160412-02
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
467 Squadron
bombing
Gibson, Guy Penrose (1918-1944)
Lancaster
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
tactical support for Normandy troops
V-weapon
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1165/34342/MTownsleyH994575-180615-02.2.pdf
fa03f4144b5b062bc0ff376672b00fbc
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Townsley, Henry
H Townsley
Description
An account of the resource
Four items. An oral history interview with Warrant Officer Henry Townsley DFM (b. 1920, 994575 Royal Air Force), a memoir, list of operations and artwork. He flew operations as a flight engineer with 97 Squadron.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Henry Townsley and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018-03-14
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Townsley, H
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Details from log book of Henry Townsley DFM
Description
An account of the resource
While on 97 Squadron, lists 55 operations over two tours from January 1943 to September 1944, with date, pilot, aircraft and target. Goes on to mention award of DFM and lists aircraft flown with their history. His pilots on operations were Pilot Officer Munro and Flight Lieutenant Baker.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
H Townsley
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943-01-14
1943-01-27
1943-01-30
1943-02-02
1943-02-03
1943-02-13
1943-02-14
1943-02-18
1943-02-25
1943-02-26
1943-02-28
1943-03-01
1943-03-03
1943-03-05
1943-03-08
1943-03-09
1943-03-26
1943-03-27
1943-03-29
1943-04-03
1943-04-04
1943-04-10
1943-05-04
1943-05-23
1943-05-25
1943-05-29
1943-06-11
1943-06-12
1943-06-20
1943-06-23
1943-06-28
1943-07-03
1943-07-27
1944-04-20
1944-04-24
1944-04-28
1944-04-29
1944-05-01
1944-05-07
1944-05-22
1944-05-24
1944-06-06
1944-06-09
1944-06-12
1944-06-21
1944-06-24
1944-07-25
1944-08-01
1944-08-03
1944-08-09
1944-08-26
1944-08-29
1944-09-11
1944-06-05
1944-06-25
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
England--Cambridgeshire
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
France
Italy
Germany
Norway
France--Gironde Estuary
Germany
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Cologne
France--Lorient
Italy--Milan
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Germany--Nuremberg
France--Saint-Nazaire
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Essen
Germany--Munich
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Kiel
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Wuppertal
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Friedrichshafen
Italy--La Spezia
Germany--Schweinfurt
Norway--Oslo
France--Clermont-Ferrand
France--Toulouse
France--Tours
Germany--Braunschweig
Netherlands
Netherlands--Eindhoven
France--Saint-Pierre-du-Mont (Landes)
France--Argentan
France--Étampes (Essonne)
France--Poitiers
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
France--Somme
Belgium
Belgium--Kortrijk
Germany--Stuttgart
France--Pas-de-Calais
France--L'Isle-Adam
France--Creil
France--Châtellerault
Russia (Federation)
Russia (Federation)--Kaliningrad (Kaliningradskai︠a︡ oblastʹ)
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Text. Personal research
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Four page printed document
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MTownsleyH994575-180615-02
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
15 Squadron
166 Squadron
8 Group
9 Squadron
97 Squadron
aircrew
bombing
bombing of Hamburg (24-31 July 1943)
bombing of the Normandy coastal batteries (5/6 June 1944)
bombing of the Pas de Calais V-1 sites (24/25 June 1944)
Bombing of Trossy St Maximin (3 August 1944)
Distinguished Flying Medal
flight engineer
Ju 88
mine laying
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Pathfinders
RAF Bourn
RAF Coningsby
RAF Woodhall Spa