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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1652/26481/SBriarsRA1299161v1.2.pdf
2a781daac7a5ee89fd2d6eb170264b96
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Casswell, Robert Ivan. Ralph Briars DFM
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1 Item. Was an air gunner on John Sanders and Roy Machin's crew on 49 Squadron. Collection consists of a memoir.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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2015-10-27
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
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Briars, R
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Transcription
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[picture]
REAR VIEW
Ralph Briars
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[photograph]
TO MARK AND AMANDA, IN THE FERVENT HOPE THAT THEY AND THEIRS NEVER BECOME INVOLVED IN WORLD UPHEAVALS SUCH AS HAPPENED BETWEEN 1939 AND 1945
DEDICATED FIRSTLY TO MY TRAVELLING COMPANIONS IN THOSE UNFRIENDLY SKIES, PARTICULARLY TO JOHN SANDERS WHO FLEW US THERE AND BACK, AND JAMES BARRON WHO GUIDED US. THE OTHERS AL AND ARTHUR, ROY AND TOMMY, ALL STRANGERS THROWN TOGETHER IN THE COMMON CAUSE.
SECONDLY TO BILL HUDSON WHO CAME WITH ME FROM GUNNERY SCHOOL TO FISKERTON, A WARMLY REMEMBER [sic] PERSON WHOSE FAVOURITE TIPPLE WAS GUINESS AND GIN-MIXED. SADLY HIS AIRCRAFT DID NOT RETURN FROM A RAID IN MARCH 1944, SHORTLY BEFORE WE WERE POSTED TO 617 SQUADRON.
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[underlined] FORE-WORD [/underlined]
TO EMPLOY A WELL WORN BUT NONE THE LESS ACCURATE CLICHÉ, LIFE IS FULL OF SURPRISES. THUS I PONDERD [sic] RUEFULLY, IN JANUARY 1944, ON FINDING MYSELF SITTING AT THE REAR OF A LANCASTER BOMBER EN ROUTE TO STETTING, WHICH IS THE WRONG SIDE OF DENMARK. NOT THAT I AM UNPATRIOTIC REALLY, BUT DURING THE TIME THAT HAD PASSED SINCE JOINING THR [sic] ROYAL AIR FORCE I DID THINK THAT SOMEONE OUGHT TO GET A MOVE ON AND WIN THE WAR BEFORE I BECAME INVOLVED.
THE R.A.F. INVITED ME TO JOIN IN 1941 ON THE ROSY PROSPECT THAT TRAINING AS A WIRELESS OPERATOR/AIR GUNNER – KNOWN IN THE TRADE AS A WOP/AG – WOULD FOLLOW INITIAL INSTRUCTION ON GETTING THE LEFT FOOT AND RIGHT ARM IN SYNCHRONISATION ON MOVING OFF. SO AWAY TO SAMPLE THE DELIGHTS OF THE BLACKPOOL LANDLADIES, BLESS-EM. SOME WERE LIKE MUVVERS, OTHERS LET YOU WASH IN THE YARD AND NO WARM SHAVING WATER. ONE LEARNED, USUALLY TOO LATE, NEVER TO EXPOUND THE VIRTUES OF THEIR COOKING – OR ANY OTHER ACTIVITY – FOR THE PERMANENT STAFF SOON HAD YOU OUT AND THEMSELVES IN, TO USE THE VERNACULAR, WITH THEIR FEET AND TRULY UNDER THE TABLE.
NOW I WOULD NOT SAY THE MORSE CODE IS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT TO LEARN GIVEN MORE TIME MY INSTRUCTORS WERE PREPARED TO OFFER, AND AS THE WAR WAS NOT GOING ALL THAT WELL I HAD TO DEPART FROM THIS POSH PART OF LANCASHIRE. ALTHOUGH I WAS A BIT MIFFED AT THE TIME, THE DECISION WAS EVENTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS, AS I WILL EXPAND LATER,..
SO THERE I WAS, WITH A FEW OTHER FAILURES, ON THE ISLE OF SHEPPEY, BEING INSTRUCTED ON A DIFFERENT SUBJECT, PARACHUTE AND CABLES. BEAR WITH ME, IF YOU WILL, YOU’LL NOT BELIEVE THE REST. SOME BRIGHT SPARK IN THE MIN. OF DEFFENCE [sic] INVENTED A FORM OF DEFENCE AGAINST LOW FLYING AIRCRAFT CONSISTING OF A ROW OF TUBES SET VERTICALLY AND CONTAINING ROCKETS TO WHICH WERE ATTACHED. [sic]
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LONG LENGTHS OF STEEL CABLE, WITH INCREDIBLE ACCURACY YOU FIRED THESE OFF JUST AS AN AIRCRAFT – PREFERABLE [sic] BELONGING TO THE OTHER SIDE – WAS ABOUT TO CROSS THE LINE, WHERE-UPON UP THEY WENT TO AROUND 800 FEET, EJECTING A PARACHUTE FIXED TO THE CABLE WHICH THEN SLOWLY DROPPED TO THE GROUND. IF THEN YOUR TARGET WAS NOT ENTANGLED IN THE STEEL CURTAIN, OR A SECOND ONE CAME ALONG, YOU NEEDED AT LEAST 30 MINUTES TO REFILL THE SYSTEM, PRESUMABLY THIS VISIONARY TYPE OF DEFENCE AROSE DURING THE PROBLEMS OF SUPPLYING CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AT THAT STAGE OF THE WAR, AND WAS USED TO DEFEND MERCHANT SHIPPING AS WELL AS AIR FIELDS.
ANYWAY, I WAS PACKED OFF TO SAVE THE R.A.F. BASE AT LINTON-ON-OUSE, NEAR YORK, AND IN THE PERIOD FROM CHRISTMAS 1941 TO AROUND FEBRUARY 1943 WE FIRED NOT ONE SHOT. NO DOUBT THE LUFTWAFFE HAD HEARD ABOUT IT ALL. DURING THIS EXCITING PERIOD I MADE REGULAR APPLICATIONS TO TRAIN AS AN AIR GUNNER, FOR NOT ONLY WAS THIS DEFENCE WORK FARCICAL – FOR EXAMPLE ONE COULD NOT OPERATE AFTER DARK AS THERE WAS NO REFERNCE [sic] TO JUDGE DISTANCE – OUT DEFENCE DUTIES WERE BEING SLOWLY TAKEN OVER BY THE NEWLY FORMED R.A.F. REGIMENT, WITH ALL THE ASSOCIATED ARMY STYLE TRAINING WHICH I COULD PLAINLY SEE WAS NOT GOING TO BE MY CUP OF TEA AT ALL.
EVENTUALLY I FOUND MYSELF IN ST. JOHNS WOOD, IN LONDON, ONCE AGAIN ON ASSESSMENTS AND INITIAL TRAINING LEADING TO A GUNNERY COURSE. THENCE TO BRIDLINGTON FOR THE REAL THING, WHERE AMONGST DIVERS ACTIVITIES WE SPENT HOURS IN A LOCAL GARAGE WHIRLING AROUND ON DIFFERENT TYPES OF GUN TURRETS MOUNTED UPON METAL FRAMES CONTAINING SMALL PETROL ENGINES WHICH SUPPLIED ELECTRIC AND HYDRAULIC POWER. NEARBY FLAMBOROUGH HEAD WAS USED FOR LIVE FIRING MUCH TO THE DISCOMFORT OF THR [sic] RESIDENT GULLS, FOR THE CONTINUAL USE OF OLD GUNS SEEMINGLY SO WIDENED THE BORE THAT TRACER BULLETS RARELY FOLLOWED EACH OTHER BUT WANDERED ABOUT LIKE GUNSHOT.
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THE NEXT STOP WAS DALCROSS, THE FLYING SCHOOL NEAR INVERNESS WHICH IS NOW THAT TOWN’S AIRPORT. WHERE WE SPENT SEVERAL WEEKS IN LOVELY WEATHER FLYING OVER THE MORAY FIRTH IN OLD DEFIANTS AND ANSONS FIRING AT TOWED TARGET DROGUES OR SEA MARKERS. MANY OF THE PILOTS WERE POLISH, TEMPORARILY WITHDRAWN FROM ACTIVE DUTY, AND THEY UNDERSTANDABLY WANTED TO RETURN TO BASHING THE HUN RATHER THAN FERRYING AROUND THREE TYRO GUNNERS AND THEIR INSTRUCTOR. ONE OCCURRENCE THAT WOULD INVITE A FLOW OF FURIOUS POLISH – THE PURPORT OF WHICH WAS CLEAR EVEN THOUGH THE LANGUAGE WAS NOT – WAS WHEN AFTER PAINFULLY CLIMING [sic] TO HEIGHT AND AWAITING THE ARRIVAL OF THE TARGET TOWING AIRCRAFT THE FIRST GUNNER IN THE TURRET SHOT OFF THE DROGUE. AMONGST US GUNNERS THIS WAS SEEN AS EVIDENCE OF GREAT PROWESS, BUT THE RESULT WAS RATHER A LONG HOPEFULL [sic] WAIT FOR A NEW DROGUE TO BE STREAMED BY THE TOWING AIRCRAFT, OR, AS MORE OFTEN HAPPENED, A RETURN TO THE AIRFIELD. EACH GUNNER FIRED 200 ROUNDS. THE TIPS OF WHICH HAD BEEN DIPPED IN A STICKY SORT OF PRINTERS INK, RED PURPLE OR GREEN, SO THAT THE HITS COULD BE COUNTED. THE PROCEDURE WAS FOR US TO LAND FIRST AND AWAIT THE DROPPING OF THE DROGUE TARGET, WHICH WE HAD TO LUG INTO THE SCOOL [sic] FOR ASSESSMENT. OH! THE EXCITEMENT! HOW MANY WOULD YOU HAVE? HAD YOU, IN FACT ANY? 10 WAS EXCELLENT 15 INCREDIBLE, MORE OFTEN IT WAS SINGLE NUMBERS. AIR TO AIR FIRING WAS WILDLY WASTEFUL, NONE OF YOUR HEAT-SEEKING MISSILES THEN!
WE DID A LOT OF GUN TURRET TRAINING, AND COULD EVENTUALLY WRITE OUR NAMES BY MEANS OF A PENCIL WEDGED INSIDE THE GUN BARREL WHICH ENABLED ONE TO TRACE THE LETTERS ONTO A BOARD HELD IN FRONT OF THE TURRET. HOURS WERE SPENT INSIDE LARGE WHITE WASHED DOMES WHERE MOVING FILMS OF VARIOUS ATTACKING AIRCRAFT WERE PROJECTED, AND WITH A TORCH STRAPPED TO THE GUN BARREL ONE HAD TO SHOW CONVINCING ABILITY TO TRACK AND LEAD THE TARGET. ALERTNESS WAS EVERYTHING, FOR SOMETIMES A BRITISH AIRCRAFT WOULD BE SHOWN, AND IF NOT
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IDENTIFIED HEAVY SARCASM WOULD BE OBSERVED BY THE INSTRUCTOR, HAD NOT THE SERVICE ENOUGH TROUBLES ALREADY?
THE END OF THE COURSE CAME AND WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE UNFORTUNATE SOUL WE ALL PASSSED [sic]. THERE WE WERE AGAIN, BACK ON THE OLD L.M.S., TRAIN, DESTINED FOR VARIOUS COMMANDS AND GROUPS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. PASSING ALONG THE GRAND SCOTTISH SCENE THROUGH AVIEMORE, PERTH AND CARSTAIRS, AND THEN BY WAYS DEVIOUS I ENDED THE JOURNEY, WITH ONE ACQUAINTANCE FROM DALCROSS, AT 14 C.T.U. [sic] 9 (OPERATIONAL TRAINING UNIT) AT COTTESMORE IN WHAT AT THE TIME WAS THE PLEASANT COUNTY OF RUTLAND.
HERE FOR THE FIRST TIME WE MET OTHER FLYING TRADESMEN, PILOTS, NAVIGATORS, WIRELESS OPERATORS AND BOMB AIMERS. FIVE TO A CREW FOR THE TIME BEING, AS WE TRAINED ON WELLINGTON TWIN ENGINE AIRCRAFT. IN A SURPRISING BUT SOMEHOW VERY BRITISH WAY, A NOVEL WAY OF FORMING CREWS WAS ADOPTED.
NOT FOR US A LIST OF WHO WOULD FLY WITH WHOM, WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED, BUT INSTEAD A PERIOD – FROM LONG MEMORY AROUND TWO DAYS – IN WHICH WE MADE OUR OWN SELECTION. ANYONE NOT CREWED UP IN THE TIME ALLOTTED WAS MADE UP WITH OTHERS SIMILARLY PLACED. SO IT WAS DOWN TO THE (GEORGE) AT OAKHAM, AND BY THE TIME WE WERE CHUCKED OUT MOST CREWS WERE ARRANGED. HOW, YOU MIGHT SAY, DID ONE CAREFULLY SELECT SUITABLE SKILLED, ALERT, ETC. COMPATRIOTS WITH WHOM TO GO SWANNING AROUND GERMAN SKIES? DID ONE EARNESTLY ASK A PILOT HOW MANY HAD HE WRITTEN OFF ALREADY, OR SEEK A NAVIGATORS OPINION ON THE TRIANGLE OF VELOCITIES? YOU MUST BE JOKING! AFTER A FEW DRINKS WE WERE ALL EXCELLENT FELLOWS! THIS NAVIGATOR STEADIED HIMSELF ON ME AND SAID HE HAD A PILOT, WAS I FIXED UP? SEEMINGLY REASONABLY RESPECTABLE I WANT ALONG WITH HIM TO SEE THE PILOT, WHO HAD TWO WINGS UP SO WAS CLEARLY RELIABLE, AND HE TOOK ME ON, WE THEN ALL FOUND A WIRELESS MAN APPARENTLY KNEW ALL THE PUBS IN NOTTINGHAM, AND ON---
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ON THE WAY BACK ASSISTED THIS CANADIAN BOMB AIMER WHO WAS NOT SURE WHICH WAY EAST OR WEST, AND SO SANDERS SAINTS WERE FORMED.
TOGETHER WE TRAINED AS A TEAM UNTILL [sic] THE END OF SEPTEMBER, FLYING OUT OF SATELLITE AIR FIELDS AT MARKET HARBOROUGH AND HUSBANDS BOSWORTH, TOTALLING AROUND 80 HOURS FLYING TIME. INITIALY [sic] THE PILOT WAS MOST INVOLVED IN FAMILIARISING HIMSELF, UNDER INSTRUCTION, WITH THE LARGER AND HEAVIER AIRCRAFT. ONE HAS SOME FEELING FOR HIM IN THIS, FOR HIS SKILL AND PROGRESS WERE WITHIN SIGHT AND SOUND OF THE REST OF US PASSENGERS DURING SEVERAL HOURS TAKINF [sic] OFF AND LANDING, COLLOQUIALLY KNOWN AS CIRCUITS AND BUMPS. HOWEVER JOHN SANDERS WAS QUITE UP TO ALL THIS, AND BEFORE LONG WE ALL HAD TO JUSTIFY OUR TRAINING DURING CROSS-COUNTRY EXERCISES, PRACTICE BOMBING AND GUNNERY. IN THESE THE PILOT AND NAVIGATOR WERE OF COURSE CONTINUALLY EXTENDING THEIR EXPERIENCE AND EXPERTISE, AS WAS THE WIRELESS OPERATOR, TUCKED UP IN HIS LITTLE NICHE, AND HERE I WOULD INTERPOSE MY FEELINGS TOUCHED UPON EARLIER CONCERNING MY SUMMARY EXIT FROM THE WIRELESS SCHOOL.
THE VITAL WIRELESS OPERATOR, - RECEIVING INFORMATION ABOUT WIND SPEED AND DIRECTION CHANGES, ALTERATIONS TO BOMBING TECHNIQUES, CHECKING THE INTERCOM, TUNING IN TO ENEMY AIRCRAFT AND THEIR CONTROLLERS WAVELENGTHS SO THEY COULD BE JAMMED VIA A MICROPHONE IN AN ENGINE COMPARTMENT, TRACKING POSSIBLE NIGHT FIGHTERS ON A SMALL VDU, - SAW LITTLE OF ACTUAL WAR. SOME MAY THINK IMAGINATION WOULD HAVE WORKED OVERTIME WONDERING WHAT WAS HAPPENING OUTSIDE, LISTENING AND FEELING BUT NOT KNOWING. THE SIGHTS I SAW FROM MY VANTAGE POINT AT THR [sic] REAR WERE NOT ALWAYS ENTIRELY REASSURING, BUT THAT’S REALITY, AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO NOT KNOWING AT ALL, WAS PREFERABLE.
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SHORTLY BEFORE LEAVING COTTESMORE AT THE END OF OCTOBER 1943 TWO MORE CREW MEMBERS ARRIVED, THE ENGINEER AND THE MID-UPPER TURRET GUNNER. WHILST THE FORMER COULD BE ACCOMMODATED IN THE DUAL COCKPIT OF THE WELLINGTON, THE NEW GUNNER WAS LESS FORTUNATE AND SPENT A FEW DRAUGHTY COLD SPELLS IN THE FUSELARGE [sic]. ROY MACHIN WAS A LITTLE LESS THAN DELIGHTED WITH LIFE, BUT IT WAS NOT LONG BEFORE WE MOVED AND HE HAD HIS OWN NEST.
SO IT WAS OFF TO THE LAST STAGE OF TRAINING AT WINTHORPE, NEAR NEWARK. THIS PERIOD OF SIX WEEKS WAS SIMILAR TO THAT AT COTTESMORE, EXCEPT THAT THIS UNIT, 1661 CONVERSION UNIT, FAMILIARISED US WITH THE SAME TYPE OF AIRCRAFT USED IN OPERATIONS, THE HALIFAX AND THE LANCASTER. I BELIEVE OUR 5 GROUP WAS PHASING OUT THE HALIFAX AT THE TIME, ANDWE [sic] ONLY FLEW ABOUT FIVE HOURS IN THEM. FROM THE GUNNERS POINT OF VIEW THE MAIN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO TYPES WAS THE BOULTON AND PAUL (BP) TURRET IN THE HALIFAX AND THAT MADE BY FRAZER-NASH IN THE LANCASTER. BOTH HAD FOUR GUNS FED BY AMMUNITION CONVEYED ON TRACKS FROM BINS NEAR THE CENTRE OF THE FUSELAGE TO AVOID UNWANTED WEIGHT AT THE REAR OF THE AIRCRAFT. THE BP TURRET WAS ELECTRICALLY OPERATED AND CONTROLLED BY A SINGLE JOYSTICK, WHEREAS THAT IN THE LANCASTER WAS HYDRAULICALLY DRIVEN WITH BICYCLE TYPE HANDLEBAR CONTROLS. I PREFERRED THE LATTER, PROBABLY DUE TO FAMILIARITY THOUGH BOTH HAD A SMOOTH AND PRECISE ACTION, EACH ‘303 BROWNING GUN FIRED ABOUT 1200 ROUNDS A MINUTE, AND WERE (HARMONISED) THAT IS FOCUSED FOR MAXIMUM CUMULATIVE EFFECT ON TARGET AT 400 YARDS. HAVING SEEN THE DEVASTATING RESULT OF SIX GUNS ON AN ENEMY AIRCRAFT DURING OUR FIRST OPERATION TO STETTIN WE HAD MUCH CONFIDENCE IN THEM.
THE PROBLEM WITH NIGHT OPERATIONS WAS, SIMPLY, SEEING THE ATTACKER. THE REAR GUNNER SEARCHED BEHIND AND BELOW, THE OTHER GUNNER BEHIND AND ABOVE, BOTH CONSTANTLY SCANNING THE SIDE AREAS AS WELL. THE MAIN DANGER CAME FROM TWIN ENGIND [sic] ME110’S AND JUNKERS 88’S NEITHER OF WHICH WAS ------
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PARTICULARY [sic] FAST BUT EASILY SURPASS A LADEN LANCASTER’S CRUISING SPEED OF 170 M.P.H. FURTHERMORE, SOME FIGHTERS WERE FITTED WITH UPWARD FIRING 20 M.M. CANNON, AND WOULD CREEP ALONG BELOW BOMBERS WHICH TENDEDTO [sic] SILHOUETTE AGAINST THE LIGHTER UPPER SKY. THEY WERE VERY DIFFICULT TO SEE, UNLESS THE GROUND WAS SNOW COVERED AND ALL WE COULD DO WAS TO CARRY OUT A BANKING SEARCH – THE PILOT DOING THE HARD WORK TILTING THE AIRCRAFT ENABLING THE AREA BELOW TO BE INSPECTED. THIS WAS, OF COURSE, DIFFICULT WITH A LOADED BOMBER, AND DOUBTLESS MANY GOOD CREWS WERE LOST DUE TO THE SHEER SLOG OF CONTINUAL SEARCHING AND A CONSEQUENT FALLING OFF OF EFFICIENT LOOKOUT.
THERE IS THOUGHT, HOWEVER THAT AS THE CANNON WERE, I BELIEVE, INCLINED AT 60 DEGREES ABOVE THE HORIZONTAL, IN ANY LIKELY FIRING ATTITUDE THE FIGHTER HAD TO BE BELOW, AND BEHIND, THUS WITHIN THE REAR GUNNERS FIELD OF SEARCH. PROVIDED NATURALLY IT WAS NOT TOO DARK TO SEE ANYTHING AT ALL!
MANY OF THE RADIAL ENGINED LANCASTER II WERE FITTED WITH AN EXTERNAL GUN POSITION OPERATED REMOTELY FROM WITHIN THE REAR FUSELARGE [sic], PROBABLY WITH A PERISCOPIC SIGHT VISIBILITY AT NIGHT WITH THE NAKED EYE IS OBVIOUSLY LIMITED AND MOST REAR TURRETS EVENTUALLY HAD THE PERSPEX PANEL FRONT OF THE GUNSIGHT REMOVED ENTIRELY. ANY FORM OR [sic] PERISCOPE WAS NO DOUBT FOUND TO HAVE SUCH A POOR FIELD OF VISION TO NOT JUSTIFY THE ADDITIONAL CREW MEMBER AND THE WEIGHT PENALTY INSTALLATION.
I HAVE INTERJECTED ONE OR TWO MATTERS FOR THE RECORD, AS THIS FORWARD TO THE DIARY FINISHES WITH COMPLETION OF THE COURSE AT WINTHORPE AND OUR POSTING TO 49 SQUADRON AT FISKERTON, A FEW MILES EAST OF LINCOLN, IN DECEMBER 1943.
A WORD ABOUT THE DEPTH OF TRAINING THE R.A.F. GAVE US. DESPITE THE WAR LOSSES OF PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL – MANY AND MUCH OR [sic] WHICH CAME BY HAZARDOUS SEA PASSAGES – THERE WAS NEVER ANY FEELING OF HASTE IN INSTRUCTING TRAINEES SO THEY COULD BE PASSED ON QUICKLY TO OPERATIONAL DUTIES.
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THE INSTRUCTING AND TRAINING SOMETIMES WAS UNIMAGINATIVE AND REPETITIVE, BUT IN THE OUTCOME IT WAS OF SUFFICIENT DEPTH FOR ONE TO ACHIEVE SOME SKILLS AND QUICK REACTION TO EVENTS. THIS IS PROBABLY TRUE OF THE OTHER SERVICES, AND SOMETHING FOR WHICH ALL TRAINEES SHOULD BE THANKFULL [sic]. HOWEVER, IT IS AN INEVITABLE FACT THAT IN WARTIME THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF TRAINING IS SUBJECT IN MANY RESPECTS TO LUCK, OR FATE, OR WHAT YOU WILL. THAT IS, BEING IN THE RIGHT PLACE AT THE RIGHT TIME OR BEING IN THE WRONG PLACE AT ANY TIME.
CONSIDER AIR COLLISIONS, A MATTER MUCH DISCUSSED IN THESE ‘80’S OBVIOUSLY IT CAN NEVER NOW BE KNOWN WHAT PROPORTION OF WARTIME LOSSES WERE DUE TO THIS CAUSE, BUT VISULISE [sic] THE FACTS. IN 1944 UP TO 800 OR SO BOMBERS TAKING OFF IN THE DARKNESS FROM DOZENS OF AIRFIELDS IN THE MIDLANDS AND EASTERN ENGLAND, NAVIGATION LIGHTS EXTINGUISHED BEFORE CROSSING THE COAST, ALL CLIMBING TOWARDS THE FIRST TURNING POINT. AS TIME TO BE OVER THE TARGET IS STAGGERD [sic] THROUGHOUT THE FORCE OVER A PERIOD OF SAY 20 MINUTES, AND THE NAVIGATOR FINDS SOME TIME MUST BE LOST, (DOG-LEGGING) IS RESORTED TO. SIMPLY THIS MEANS THE AIRCRAFT DIVERGES FROM THE COURSE BEING FOLLOWED AND RETURNS WHEN SUFFICIENT TIME HAS BEEN DROPPED.
THE IMPLICATION OF DELIBERATELY TURNING ACROSS THE PATHS OF MANY UNSEEN OTHERS AND RETURNING A LITTLE LATER STILL CHILLS ME. WHILST STILL OVER THE NORTH SEA IT WAS NOT UNUSUAL TO SEE AN EXPLOSION IN THE SKY, FOLLOWED BY BURNING DEBRIS, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY PREVIOUS AIR TO AIR FIRING IT WAS REASONABLE TO ASSUME A COLLISION HAD OCCURRED. SOMEWHAT WORSE WAS WHEN THE TARGET WAS REACHED AND GROUND MARKERS HAD NOT BEEN DROPPED, OR WERE IN THE WRONG POSITION OR HAD BURNT OUT, AND IT WAS NECESSARY TO CIRCLE WHILST AWAITING FRESH MARKERS. CLEARLY, NOT ALL AIRCRAFT WOULD BE CIRCLING CONCENTRICALLY!
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THEN UPON RETURN TO ENGLAND THERE WOULD BE A CONVERGING OF THE THRONG, WHICH FOR VARIOUS REASONS WOULD BE FROM MANY DIRECTIONS. ONCE AGAIN WITHOUT NAVIGATION LIGHTS UNTILL CLOSE TO BASE (OR NOT AT ALL IF THE LUFTWAFFE WAS INFILTRATING THE STREAM HOPING TO FIND SOMEONE ASLEEP) WHERE WE CIRCLED HOPEFULLY WELL AWAY FROM ONE ANOTHER BEFORE BEING CALLED TO LAND. THIS WAS IRKSOME AT WOODHALL SPA BECAUSE BEING CLOSE TO CONINGSBY THE RING OF MARKER LIGHTS GUIDING AIRCRAFT AROUND EACH FIELD ACTUALLY INTERSECTED AND TO AVOID COLLISIONS AT THIS POINT WE ALL HAD TO FLY THE DOUBLE CIRCLE THUS CONSIDERABLY EXTENDING THE TIME TAKEN TO LAND. THIS PROCEDURE WAS OF COURSE PARTICULARLY TIRING TO THE PILOT WHO HAD BEEN AT THE CONTROLS CONTINUALLY FOR MANY HOURS.
THE POINT OF ALL THIS IS TO REITERATE THAT THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF TRAINING CANNOT NECESSARILY OVERCOME CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE ODDS ARE ADVERSELY STACKED. THE MIRACLE IS THAT SO MANY SURVIVED THESE ODDS; THE SADNESS THAT SO MANY CAPABLE CREWS WERE LOST, OFTEN THROUGH CAUSES OTHER THAN ENEMY ACTION. AN EXAMPLE OF THIS IS MENTIONED IN THE NOTES CONCERNING A RAID ON A TARGET NEAR RHEIMS ON THE 31ST OF JULY.
AS TO THE DIARY, WELL, THIS WAS WRITTEN UP SHORTLY AFTER EACH TRIP, USUALLY IN BED FOLLOWING THE TRADITIONAL SUPPER OR BREAKFAST OF EGG AND BACON. I HAVE NO RECOLLECTION WHY I WROTE IT, IT’S JUST THE SORT OF THING I USED TO DO. THE DIARY WAS MISSING FOR YEARS, BUT I HAD A FEELING IT WOULD RE-APPEAR, AND WHEN IT DID I DECIDED TO PROPERLY LAY IT OUT BEFORE IT WENT AGAIN. DESPITE WINCING AT THE STYLE AND PROSE OF THOSE TIMES I FELT IT RIGHT TO REPRODUCE IT VERBATIN [sic], WARTS AND ALL.
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[underlined] 6 – 1 – 44 STETTIN [/underlined]
FELT MORE INTEREST THAN NERVOUSNESS ON THIS TRIP – QUEER,. NOT TOO COLD AT 22,000 FEET, TARGET WELL ALIGHT. ENGAGED 109 WHICH WAS FINALLY SEEN WITH BROWN SMOKE POURING HEAVILY FROM THE ENGINE, OUR DAMAGE WASA [sic] FEW BULLETS FROM M.U. THROUGH THE FUSELAGE AND ONE THROUGH THE TURRET, SHAKY DO! SIX HOURS BACK – TERRIBLE, SAW SUN RISE OVER THE SEA, TEA NEVER SO WELCOME. SHORT OF FUEL, S.O.S. PREPARED, READY TO DITCH, FINALLY MADE IT AND LANDED AT THE FIRST DROME, LUDFORD MAGNA. PRETTY TIRED, 9 HOURS 50 MINUTES IN THE AIR. DICKENDS [sic] OF A JOB TO KEEP AWAKE, LUCKILY BAGS OF CLOUD, NEVER DID LAND LOOK MORE WELCOME AS THE COAST OF LINCOLNSHIRE.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] 109 WAS A SINGLE ENGINE MESSERSCHMITT AIRCRAFT, NORMALLY A DAY FIGHTER, BUT OCCASIONALLY SEEN AT NIGHT. WHEN THE ATTACK TOOK PLACE WE HAD JUST ENTERED AN AREA ILLUMINATED BY FLARES DROPPED BY HIGH FLYING GERMAN AIRCRAFT; THE FIGHTER APPROACHED FROM NEARLY DEAD ASTERN, FIRING – BUT MISSING – ALL THE WAY IN. AS I STARTED FIRING I SAW TRACER PASSING OVERHEAD FROM ROY MACHIN IN THE – UPPER TURRET (M.U.) AND ALTHOUGH INTERUPTER [sic] GEAR SHOULD HAVE PREVENTED HIS FIRE FROM DAMAGING OUR AIRCRAFT IN THIS INSTANCE IT DID NOT, FORTUNATELY WITOUT [sic] DISASTROUS RESULTS.
[underlined] 14 – 1 – 44 BRUNSWICK [/underlined]
FAIRLY COLD, -32 CALL LIGHT REPEATEDLEY [sic] FLASHED FOR NO GOOD REASON, HAD TO SMASH BULB HAVING NO WISH TO ADVERTISE OUR POSITION. CLEAR MOST OF THE WAY, 7/10 OVER TARGET, FIRES WERE NOT SO GOOD AS BEFORE, SAW 110 BUT DID NOT ENGAGE, LITTLE FLAK, BAGS OF SEARCHLIGHTS, NO OTHER FIGHTERS SEEN. SCARECROW FLARES SEEN, TWO LOADS JETTISONED NEAR TEXEL,. ENGINEER SHORT OF OXYGEN, DROPPED MY KNIFE WITH LEAFLETS. BACK AT 10-30 BEST LANDING JACK MADE. EGG, SAUSAGE, AND BACON FOR SUPPER, LOVELY;
[underlined] NOTES NEXT PAGE [/underlined]
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[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] CALL LIGHT WAS A SIGNALLING LIGHT AT ALL CREW STATIONS FOR USE IN CASE OF FAILURE OF THE NORMAL INTERCOM, IN THE GUNNERS POSITION IT COULD BE SEEN FROM OUTSIDE THE AIRCRAFT. 110 WAS A TWIN ENGINE MESSERSCHMITT, MUCH USED AGAINST THE R.A.F. AT NIGHT. SCARECROW FLARES GAVE THE EFFECT OF AN AIRCRAFT EXPLODING PRESUMABLY EMPLOYED AGAINST MORALE. WHEN BOMBS HAD TO BE JETTISONED THE RESULTING LINE OF EXPLOSIONS GAVE AN INDICATION OF ROUTE TO ANY NIGHT FIGHTERS IN THE AREA. BETTER THE BOMBS WERE DROPPED (SAFE) BUT THIS WAS UNDESIRABLE OVER ENEMY OR OCCUPIED TERRITORY AS THEY COULD BE RECOVERD [sic] AND EXAMINED. FUSES WERE OFTEN RE-DESIGNED TO FRUSTRATE, UNEXPLODED BOMBS BEING MADE SAFE BY THE ENEMY. TO BE HONEST, HOWEVER, IN AN EMERGENCY NECESSITATING JETTISONING A HEAVY LOAD IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE (SAFE) OR (LIVE) ASPECT WOULD OFTEN BE CONSIDERED! 7/10 INDICATED PROPORTION CLOUD/SKY.
[underlined] 20 – 1 – 44 BERLIN (MY BIRTHDAY) [/underlined]
NICE TRIP, FELT QUITE GOOD ALL WAY, EXCEPT USUAL SINKING FEELING OVER TARGET; THIS WAS WELL LIT UP, ANOTHER BROCKS BENEFIT, SCARECROWS AND ROCKETS ABOUT, FLAK NOT TROUBLESOME, NO FIGHTERS SEEN. DICKENS OF A JOB TO KEEP EYES OPEN LAST TWO OR THREE HOURS, EVEN STICKING HEAD INTO THE WIND DOESN’T HELP MUCH. MIKE WAS U/S FOR A PERIOD, HEARD SKIPPER SAY WAS I ASLEEP, CHEEK! FIRED TEST BURST OVER TARGET, GUNS O.K. WASN’T VERY COLD. CAME HOME A BIT QUICKER THAN USUAL, HOPE ALL TRIPS ARE AS PEACEFUL.
[underlined] Notes [/underlined] (MIKE) WAS MICROPHONE BUILT INTO OXYGEN MASK AND OFTEN FROZE DUE TO BREATH EXHALATION FREEZING. EVENTUALLY SMALL HEATERS WERE FITTED INTO THE MASK, AND THESE CURED THE PROBLEM.
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[underlined] 21 – 1 – 44 MAGDEBURG [/underlined]
HAD LITTLE TROUBLE OURSELVES, NO ENGAGEMENTS, A FEW FIGHTERS SEEN, BAGS OF FIGHTER FLARES AND SOME SCARECROWS. MIKE FROZE AS WE CAME ON TO THE TARGET, LUCKILY THERE WAS NO TROUBLE, IT BECAME U/S 1 HOUR FROM BASE. SPOOF ON BERLIN ABSOLUTELY USELESS, THERE BEING NO FLAK, FLARES OR ANYTHING, RAN INTO COASTAL FLAK ON RETURN, NO DAMAGE. TARGET WELL ALIGHT, LIKE STETTIN, 3/10 CLOUD. DON’T KNOW HOW I KEPT AWAKE AFTER LAST EFFORT, DARNED TIRED NOW.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] (SPOOF) WAS A DIVERSIONARY RAID, OFTEN CARRIED OUT BY MOSQUITO AIRCRAFT TO SOW DOUBT INTO THE GERMAN DEFENCES AS TO THE REAL TARGET. LIKE MANY THINGS IN WARTIME, SOME WORKED, OTHERS DID NOT.
[underlined] 27 – 1 – 44 BERLIN [/underlined]
VERY QUITE TRIP ON THE WHOLE, WARM TOO, TEMP. ABOUT – MINUS 20, DIFFICULT TO CLIMB – OVER TARGET AT .17,500 FEET. 10/10 CLOUD OVER CITY, NO FIGHTERS SEEN, THO’ OBVIOUSLY ACTIVE, QUITE A NUMBER OF FIGHTER FLARES, SAW ONE LANC. ONLY, NOT MUCH DOING OVER THE TARGET, QUEER. LONG ROUTE BACK, TERRIBLE BIND, ARRIVED AT ENGLISH COAST BANG-ON, DON’T KNOW HOW JOCK DOES IT. JACK WHEELED KITE IN, PERFECT LANDING NO TROUBLE WITH MIKE THESE DAYS.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] (JOCK) WAS THE NAVIGATOR JAMES BARRON, A CHEERFUL, SCOT WHO GUIDED US THERE AND BACK WITH LITTLE FUSS BUT WITH MUCH EXPERTISE. LIKE MOST BRITISH AIRCRAFT OF THE TIME, THE LANCASTER NORMALLY LANDED ON TWO MAIN WHEELS AND THE TAIL WHEEL, (THREE POINT) LANDING. OCCASIONALLY THE PILOT WOULD TOUCH DOWN ON ONLY THE TWO MAIN WHEELS, HOLDING THE TAIL WHEEL OFF THE RUNWAY UNTILL SPEED REDUCED. THIS WAS MUCH MORE COMFORTABLE FOR THE REAR GUNNER.
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[underlined] 29 – 1 – 44 BERLIN [/underlined]
THE BOYS WERE CERTAINLY WAITING FOR US TONIGHT, SAW COMBATS ALL THE WAY IN FROM THE COAST, BAGS OF FIGHTER FLARES, ROUTE LIKE PICCADILLY IN PEACE TIME. FIRED AT ORIGIN OF GREEN TRACER, SAW SOMETHING FALLING. TARGET HORRIBLY WELL LIT UP, HOW WE GET AWAY WITH IT BEATS ME, MARVELLOUS PRANG, FAR BETTER THAN PREVIOUS, SAW GLARE WHILE NEAR ROSTOCK ON THE WAY BACK. BAGS OF CLOUD MOST OF RETURN, - VERY USEFUL. CLOUD AT BASE DOWN TO 800 FEET, DON’T CARE FOR HEDGE HOPPING IN EARLY MORNING. VERY TIRED, BUT WE GO ON LEAVE TOMORROW!
[underlined] 15 – 2 – 44 BERLIN [/underlined]
10/10 CLOUD OVER MOST OF GERMANY, LITTLE TROUBLE EXCEPT AT TARGET, - LOADS OF FIGHTER FLARES AND FAIR AMOUNT OF FLAK BELOW, NO FIGHTERS SEEN. GENERATOR WENT U/S AFTER TARGET, GYRO COMPAS [sic] U/S, HAD TO USE P4. JACK MANAGED WELL. 23,000 FEET ON THE WAY BACK, SUITS NOT VERY USEFUL OWING TO LOW VOLTAGE. R/T U/S AT BASE, HAD TO USE VERY’S TO COME IN. TARGET NOT MUCH TO LOOK AT GENERALLY
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] I DON’T REMEMBER HOW MANY GENERATORS THERE WERE, BUT CLEARLY MORE THAN ONE! THE P4 WAS A STANDBY MAGNETIC COMPASS, QUITE RELIABLE BUT NOT SO EASY FOR THE PILOT TO FOLLOW AS WAS THE GYRO COMPASS REPEATER. (SUITS) REFERS TO ELECTRICALLY WARMED SUITS WORN BY BOTH GUNNERS. THERE WAS NO HEATING IN THE FUSELAGE AFTER THE MAIN SPAR AT THE WIRELESS OPERATORS POSITION, -- AND NOT A LOT FORWARD EITHER. VERY’S ARE SIGNALLING PISTOLS, USED HERE TO SEEK LANDING PERMISSION BY FIRING APPROPRIATETCOLOUR [sic] TO RUNWAY CONTROLLER IN THE CARAVAN, WHO SIMILARLY RESPONDED.
I NOTE FROM MY LOG BOOK THAT DURING THESE FIRST SEVEN OPERATIONS 261 AIRCRAFT WERE LOST. TOWARDS THE END OF FEBRUARY THIS INFORMATION WAS OMITTED, PRESUMABLY FOR BEING TOO GLOOMY TO INCLUDE.
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[underlined] 19 – 2 – 44 LEIPZIG [/underlined]
ON THE WAY OUT COULD GET NO GUN DEPRESSION, AGREED TO GO ON, FLACK AND SEARCHLIGHTS OVER COAST, SAW A NUMBER OF COMBATS, AND AIR WAS FAIRLY LIVELY ALL THE WAY TO THE TARGET; ARRIVED EARLY AND HAD TO STOOGE AROUND UNTILL THE MARKERS WENT DOWN. NOT A LOT OF OPPOSITION OVER TARGET, WHICH BLAZED UP QUITE WELL. SOON AFTER LEAVING THE TARGET OXYGEN TUBE DISCONNECTED FROM MASK, AND HAD TO COME HOME SUCKING TUBE – NOT VERY COMFORTABLE CLOUD MOST OF THE TRIP, COLD TOO – MINUS 30.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] ONE OF THOSE TRIPS; DESPITE PRE-FLIGHT AIR TEST, FAULT OCCURRED IN TURRET HYDRAULICS THAT PREVENTED GUNS BEING DEPRESSED BELOW HORIZONTAL. FORTUNATELY WE WERE NOT ATTACKED, - AND 79 AIRCRAFT WERE LOST.
[underlined] 20 – 2 – 44 STUTTGART [/underlined]
COLD TRIP, ABOUT 20,000 FEET MOST OF THE WAY, WENT OVER READING, FELT QUITE HOMESICK. VERY QUIET TRIP, COUPLE OF FLAK BURSTS OVER FRENCH COAST SHOOK ME A BIT. MIKE FROZE UP SOME TIME BEFORE TARGET, GETTING A REGULAR HABIT. 5/10 OVER TARGET, SAW BITS OF GROUND, GOOD PRANG, NOT MUCH FLAK, FIGHTER FLARES DID NOT ARRIVE UNTIL ABOUT 15 MINUTES AFTER LEAVING. HAD TO LAND AT DUNHOLME OWING TO TAKE-OFF CRASH AT BASE. PRETTY TIRED, BED LOOKED GOOD TO ME
[underlined] 24 – 2 – 44 SCHWEINFURT [/underlined]
ARRIVED AT THE SOUTH COAST IN TIME TO GET MIXED UP IN HUN RAID; CONED BY OWN SEARCHLIGHTS, LUCKILY COLOURS OF THE DAY DOUSED THEM BUT IT WAS PRETTY WARM. OVER THE OTHER SIDE IT WAS VERY QUIET, DIDN’T SEE ONE FIGHTER FLARE OR COMBAT. GOOD VISION, NO CLOUD, BOMBS WELL CONCENTRATED ON TARGET, BAGS OF SMOKE -----
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--- AND FIRES AS WE LEFT, AIRCRAFT CLIMBED WELL 23,000 FEET WAY BACK; FOR ONCE MIKE DIDN’T FREEZE, BUT ICE FORMED ON MASK OVER FRANCE.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] COLOURS OF THE DAY WERE FIRED FROM A VERY PISTOL FOR IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES, RED/WHITE GREEN/RED ETC. COLOURS WERE CHANGED AT REGULAR INTERVALS, SOMETIMES EVERY 12 HOURS, LEST THE ENEMY USED THEM TO PROTECT THEMSELVES AGAINST OUR DEFENCES.
[underlined] 25 – 2 – 44 AUGSBURG [/underlined]
7 HOURS SLEEP, AND NO SQUARE MEAL BEFORE TAKE-OFF, BAD SHOW ARRIVED FRENCH COAST IN SOME LIGHT, PROMPTLY GOT SHOT-UP BY FIGHTER, FEW HITS ON PORT WING AND COCKPIT. LOTS OF ACTIVITY OVER FRANCE, SAW SEVERAL KITES GO DOWN. 30 MILES FROM TARGET LANCASTER BELOW SQUIRTED AT US, DAMAGED AIRCRAFT BEHIND DOOR SEVERELY, ON FIRE, ROY AND I PUT IT OUT, REAR TURRET U/S, NO OXYGEN, HAD TO GO FORWARD. BOMBS JETTISONED, STARBOARD ELEVATOR FABRIC STRIPPED, BALANCE TAB PRACTICALLY SHOT OFF, INTERCOM U/S, KITE DIFFICULT TO HANDLE, SKIPPER DID WIZARD JOB GETTING US HOME AND LANDING – SHAKY NIGHT.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] (SQUIRTED) – FIRED AT US FROM REAR TURRET. U/S – UNSERVICEABLE. THE FOLLOWING WAS ADDED TO MY DIARY ENTRY, UPON SUBSEQUENT EXAMINATION IT WAS FOUND THAT THE AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN HIT BY CANNON SHELLS SO IT SEEMS WE WERE HIT BY STRAY SHELLS AT THE IDENTICAL MOMENT THE LANCASTER FIRED. ALTERNATIVELY THE LUFTWAFFE WAS USING A CAPTURED LANCASTER WITH CANNON IN THE TURRET. THE 5 GROUP INVESTIGATOR THOUGHT IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY. WONDER IF WE’LL EVER KNOW? I STILL HAVE NO DOUBT AS TO WHAT I SAW THAT NIGHT. THE LANCASTER BELOW US WAS QUITE VISIBLE AT INTERVALS WHEN WE PASSED OVER PARTLY SNOW COVERD [sic] LAND, I HAD NOTICED IT EACH TIME THE TURRET WAS ROTATED IN THAT DIRECTION, AND NO ONE WAS MORE SURPRISED THAN I WHEN THE STREAM OF TRACER CAME TOWARDS US – AND WE WERE ON FIRE. THE DIRECTION OF THE SUSTAINED DAMAGE AND THE EXPLOSIVE EVIDENCE SUGGEST
S THAT POSSIBLY -------
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------- AND AT THE SAME TIME WE WERE STRUCK BY CANNON SHELLS FROM A NIGHT FIGHTER BELOW AND TO THE OTHER SIDE. IT SOUNDS A BIT THIN, BUT THE CASE WILL HAVE TO REST.
PILOT JOHN SANDERS WAS AWARDED A IMEADIATE [sic] D.F.C. THE WIRELESS OPERATOR ARTHUR WARD AND THE TWO GUNNERS ROY MACHIN AND RALPH BRIARS WERE AWARDED IMEADIATE D.F.M.
[underlined] 10 – 3 – 44 OSSUN [/underlined]
FIRST TRIP IN BRIGHT MOONLIGHT, FELT VERY OBVIOUS IN THE SKY, VISION ABOUT 3 MILES. EXPECTED BAGS OF FIGHTERS, BUT NONE SEEN, DIDN’T GET IT; OVER FRANCE AT 15,000 FEET TEMPERATURE MINUS 14, LOVELY, TARGET AT 8,000 FEET. CLEAR OVER OSSUN, HAD TO IDENTIFY TARGET FOR A CHANGE, WERE STOOGING AROUND FOR ABOUT 20 MINUTES BUT DIDN’T FEEL UNDULY WORRIED, - IT WAS TOO PEACEFUL. AL FINALLY SAW THE TARGET AND WE BOMBED, WE HAD D A’S SO DID NOT SEE RESULT, BUT SAW AND HEARD OTHER BOMBS GO OFF. SAW PYRENEES, LOKED [sic] GRAND BUT RATHER FORBIDDING. RATHER TIRED ON RETURN.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] AL WAS OUR CANADIAN BOMB-AIMER, D A’S WERE DELAYED ACTION BOMBS, JUST TO CONFUSE OUR FRENCH ALLIES, WHO NO DOUB-T [sic] HAQD TO DEFUSE THEM.
[underlined] 15 – 3 – 44 STUTTGART [/underlined]
BAGS OF OPPOSITION ON THE WAY IN, SAW SEVERAL COMBATS – AND SEVERAL GO DOWN, NOT SO GOOD, MAKES ONE WONDER WHO’S NEXT. FLAK HEAVY OVER TARGET, NO FIGHTER FLARES, SAW ONE COLLISION. BIT IF [sic] A MIX UP, PFF LATE, FEW T I’S UNTILL WE LEFT, APEARED [sic] TO BE QUITE A GOOD BLAZE ON TARGET LATER. VERY QUIET RETURN, SAW NOTHING; CLOUDS UP TO 20,000 FEET IN PLACES, CON TRAILS APPEARD [sic] NEAR FRENCH COAST, MOON BRIGHT, EXPECTED TROUBLE, NONE CAME.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] PFF WAS PATH FINDER FORCE WHO IDENTIFIED THE TARGET AND DROPPED TARGET IDENTIFIERS – COLOURED GROUND MARKERS WHICH THE MAIN FORCE FOLLOWING BEHIND SIGHTED UPON -----
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----- AND THESE WERE BACKED UP AS NECESSARY AS THR [sic] RAID PROGRESSED SO POOR OLD PFF HAD TO CIRCLE AROUND UNTIL EVERYONE HAD DONE THEIR BIT, NOT AN ENVIABLE JOB; CON. TRAILS THEN, AS NOW, OCCUR WHEN AIR CONDITIONS ARE SUCH THAT WATER VAPOUR IN EACH ENGINE’S EXHAUST BREEZES [sic] AND TRAILS ALONG WHITE PLUME, JUST RIGHT FOR A NIGHT FIGHTER TO FOLLOW. CHANGING HEIGHT DOWNWARDS WAS THE CURE AND THE PILOT PROMPTLY DID SO ON HEARING THE WAILS FROM THE GUNNERS.
[underlined] 30 – 3 – 44 NUREMBURG [/underlined]
VERY COLD TRIP, OPPOSITION HEAVY SOUTH OF RHUR, FULL MOON NO CLOUD TO KEEP FIGHTERS DOWN. USUAL TROUBLE, ROUTE TOO LONG, JERRY MARKING TRACK ON BOTH SIDES WITH COLOURED FLARES, 96 AIRCRAFT LOST A.M. WILL HAVE TO REVISE ROUTING METHODS. SAW AT LEAST A DOZEN KITES SHOT DOWN, BAD FOR MORALE IF NOTHING ELSE, SEVERAL ROCKETS OBSERVED. TARGET LOOKED POOR, THICK FLAK AT 17,000 TO 19,000 FEET. WAY BACK AGONY TO SIT TWO HOURS AND KEEP AWAKE. PERHAPS DAYLIGHTER WOULDN’T BE SUCH A STRAIN. TIRED AS HELL, BED;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] THE LOSSES ON THIS RAID WERE THE WORST SUSTAINED DURING ONE OPERATION. AIR CHIEF MARSHALL HARRIS LATER SAID THAT AGAINST AN EXPERIENCED, WILY ENEMY, WHO WAS FAMILIAR WITH MOST OF OUR AIR WAR STRATAGEMS BY 1944, THINGS WERE INEVITABLE OCCASIONALLY DISASTROUS. SEEMINGLY THE LONG STRAIGHT ROUTE LEGS WERE, HOPEFULLY, A RUSE TO SUGGEST TO THE LUFTWAFFE THAT WE WERE GOING TO NUREMBURG, WHERE UPON THEY WOULD, BY EXPERIENCE, SUSPECT WE WOULD SUDDENLY DIVERT ELSEWHERE AND DISPOSE THEIR FORCES ACCORDINGLY, THIS TIME THEY WERE NOT DECEIVED. TRULY ONE CANNOT WIN’EM ALL, PARTICULARLY IN WARTIME. REFERENCE TO (DAYLIGHTS) REFERRED TO DAY OPERATIONS, OF WHICH AT THAT TIME, WE HAD NO EXPERIENCE. WHEN, LATER, WE FLEW MANY SUCH RAIDS, I ADDED A FOOTNOTE TO THIS DIARY ENTRY – AFTER 22 DAYLIGHT TRIPS I FOUND THIS TRUE – WELL, THERE’S NO ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES.
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FOLLOWING THR NUREMBURG TRIP WE WERE POSTED, QUITE SUDDENLY AND FOR WHATEVER REASON, TO 617 SQUADRON AT WOODHALL SPA, NORTH OF BOSTON LINCOLNSHIRE. THE MUCH PUBLICISED RAIDS ON THE GERMAN DAMS AT MOHNE, SORPE AND EDER WERE CARRIED OUT BY THIS SPECIALLY FORMED SQUADRON, WHICH WAS SUBSEQUENTLY, THOUGH NOT ENTIRELY RETAINED FOR SPECIALISED OPERATIONS. LEONARD CHESHIRE WAS THE WING COMMANDER WHEN WE ARRIVED AND HE WAS REPLACED BY WILLY TAIT IN JULY, I THINK BOTH WERE OF SIMILAR MOULD AND MUCH RESPECTED.
[underlined] 18 – 4 – 44 JUVISY RAILWAY YARDS – PARIS [/underlined]
DARK NIGHT, 10,000 FEET ALL THE WAY, TEMPERATURE MINUS 5,. DROPPED FLARES TO HELP MOSQUITOES IDENTIFY MARSHALLING YARD, THEN CIRCLED AND BOMBED THEIR MARKER, SAW ONE MOSQUITO CIRCLING AT 2-3000 FEET APPARENTLY UNCONCERNED AT WHAT LITTLE FLAK THERE WAS, IMAGINED BOMBS SHOOK IT RATHER. NO FIGHTERS, FLAK SHIP IN THE CHANNEL FIRED AT US, WISH WE HAD BEEN LOW ENOUGH TO DO THE SAME. CIRCLED BASE FOR 50-55 MINUTES BEFORE COMING IN, - SHADES OF FISKERTON.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] MOSQUITOES WERE TWIN ENGINE AIRCRAFT, LARGELY BUILT OF PLYWOOD AND GLUED TOGETHER. FAST AND HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL IN VARIOUS ROLES – NIGHT FIGHTERS, BOMBERS THAT COULD DROP 4000 POUNDS ON BERLIN, RECONNAISSANCE AND CLANDESTINE MISSIONS INCLUDING CONVEYING DIPLOMATS AND OTHERS IN THE (VERY COLD) BOMB BAY BETWEEN BRITAIN AND SWEDEN. BOTH CHESHIRE AND TAIT USED THESE FOR TARGET MARKING, LATER CHANGING TO ANOTHER EXCELLENT DESIGN, THE ROLLS-ROYCE ENGINE MUSTANG FIGHTER. PHOTOGRAPHS SHOWED AN UNUSUALLY CONCENTRATED BOMBING PATTERN, AT THE TIME WE DID NOT FULLY APPRECIATE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS RAIL DISRUPTION SIX WEEKS OR SO BEFORE THE JUNE INVASION OF FRANCE. REFERENCE TO FISKERTON IS DUE TO THE GOOD OLD HABIT OF BELIEVING THE LAST WAS BETTER THAN THE NEW; ------
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------ INITIALLY I THINK WE FELT PROCEDURE AT WOODHALL WAS NOT TO THE STANDARD OF FISKERTON, IN OTHER WORDS WE WERE KEPT WAITING FOR OUR SUPPER; THIS SOMETIMES WAS DUE TO HAVING TO FLY AROUND TWO OUTER MARKER CIRCLES OF LIGHTS WHEN NEARBY CONNINGSBY WAS ALSO RECEIVING AIRCRAFT, AS MENTIOND [sic] IN THE FORWARD. TO BE FAIR, THOSE IN THE CONTROL TOWER WERE NO DOUBT JUST AS ANXIOUS TO GET US DOWN QUICKLY AS WE WERE; ONE’S FIRST DUTY WAS TO THE KING, THE SECOND TO GRUMBLE ABOUT THE METHOD OF SO DOING ..
[underlined] 20 – 4 – 44 PARIS – LA CHAPPELLE [/underlined]
INTRUDERS OVER AS WE TOOK OFF, STARTS STRAIN AT ONCE, STILL THERE WAS NO APPARENT TROUBLE. QUIET ALL IN AND OUT, BOMBED AT 11,500 FEET, TARGET, BEING NEARER THE CENTRE OF THE CITY, HAD QUITE A BIT OF MEDIUM AND LIGHT FLAK. LONG STRINGS OF RED AND GREEN CAME ALL ROUND, BURSTING ABOUT 1000 FEET BELOW, WITH BRIGHT SPARKLING FLASHES – PRETTY; AL WELL AND TRULY HIT THE YARDS WITH OUR BOMBS, CARRIED 12 X 1000 LBS BOMBS, NICE LOAD. SAW MOSQUITO RUN INTO AREA – AND SHOOT HELL OUT OF THEM. TEMPERATURE MINUS 5.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] (INTRUDERS) WERE NIGHT FIGHTERS PROWLING AROUND FOR SOMEONE LEAVING THEIR NAVIGATION LIGHTS ON TOO LONG AFTER TAKE-OFF MIND YOU, A TRICKY DECISION. LEAVE THEM ON FOR FRIENDS TO SEE – AND THE LUFTWAFFE, TURN THEM OFF AND RISK A COLLISION.
[underlined] 22 – 4 – 44 BRUNSWICK [/underlined]
LITTLE FIGHTER OPPOSITION IN OR OUT, CONDITIONS HAZY OVER TARGET ABOVE 18,000 FEET, SO WE DIVED THROUGH TO ABOUT 16,000 FEET TO BOMB, PFF A FEW MINUTES LATE SO IT WAS A NIGHT-MARE OF KITES COMING IN ALL DIRECTIONS. HEARD FLAK BURSTING FOR THE FIRST TIME, TARGET WAS WELL ON FIRE. LONG TRIP BACK, TO AVOID ANOTHER LANCASTER JACK DIVED SO SUDDENLY AND STEEPLY MY NEW THERMOS WAS BROKEN, MY KNEE BRUISED AND ALL THE AMMUNITION WAS THROWN OUT OF THE TANKS. -----
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----- INTRUDERS ALL THE WAY HOME, DARNED NUISANCE BUT WE HAD NO TROUBLE, TEMPERATURE MINUS 15 TO MINUS 20
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] AS MENTIONED IN THE FOREWARD, CIRCLING THE TARGET WHILST AWAITING MARKERS TO BE DROPPED BY THE PATHFINDERS WAS NOT THE MOST DESIRABLE OCCUPATION. LOOK AT THE MOANS AND GROANS, TOO, DON’T YOU KNOW THERE’S A WAR ON.
[underlined] 24 – 4 – 44 MILAN (ABORTED) [/underlined]
OUR FIRST BOOMERANG; (EARLY RETURN TO BASE) SHORTLY AFTER TAKE-OFF AN OIL PIPE IN THE TURRET BURST AND IN A FEW MINUTES THERE WAS NO OIL IN THE SYSTEM, - MOST OF IT WAS ON ME. AFTER A BIT OF NATTERY WE DECIDED TO RETURN, REMEMBERING THE LEIPZIG TRIP, AND IN VIEW OF A LONG JOURNEY – MILAN. PITY, BUT IT WAS THE BEST THING, BESIDES, WE GO ON LEAVE TOMORROW.
[underlined] 6 – 6 – 44 2ND FRONT (D-DAY) [/underlined]
AFTER NEARLY SIX WEEKS OF VERY BORING TRAINING AND INACTION WE DID OUR STUFF – SLINGING OUT WINDOW TO SIMULATE A CONVOY AND TO CONFUSE POOR JERRY; BY THE LACK OF OPPOSITION DURING TROOP LANDINGS IT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A USEFUL TRIP. TOOK TWO CREWS IN ONE KITE, ROY AND I TOOK TURNS AS FRONT GUNNER, QUITE A CHANGE. SAW SOME OF THE SHIPPING IN THE CHANNEL – GRAND SIGHT – ALSO THE LUFTWAFFE APPARENTLY ATTACKING A CONVOY, ONE SHIP CAUGHT FIRE AND BLEW UP. LOTS OF TUGS AND GLIDERS SEEN GOING OVER. QUIET TRIP.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] (WINDOW) WAS METALLIC COATED STRIP DROPPED TO CONFUSE ENEMY RADAR. WE FLEW OVAL COURSES, EACH CIRCUIT BEING PROGRESSIVELY NEARER FRANCE. THE INTERVALS OF DROPPING THE FOIL MATCHED THE SPEED OF AN IMAGINARY CONVOY IN THE CHANNEL APPROACHING THE COAST MILES TO THE EAST OF THE ACTUAL LANDING AREA IN NORMANDY -------
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------ I AM NOT NOW SURE, BUT POSSIBLY ANOTHER SQUADRON WAS WITH US. TWO CREWS BECAUSE OF THE QUANTITY OF WINDOW TO BE DROPPED. AGAIN, MANY AIRCRAFT ORBITING UNSEEN TO EACH OTHER OVER A FOUR HOUR PERIOD IN QUITE A NARROW SPACE. I DOUBT THE BLOOMIN’ INFANTRY BELOW CONCIDERED [sic] THERE WAS A LACK OF OPPOSITION! WE CAN ONLY HOPE OUR EFFORTS SOMWHAT [sic] REDUCED THE PRESSURE.
[underlined] 8 – 6 – 44 SAUMER (FRANCE) [/underlined]
FLEW THROUGH CLOUD MOST OF THE WAY THERE AND BACK, WEATHER CLEAR OVER TARGET. USUAL SCHEME, H2S KITES DROPPED FLARES AND MOSQUITOES MARKED WITH RED SPOT FIRES. SQUADRON CARRIED 12,000 POUNDER BOMBS, - LOOK LIKE TORPEDOES – AND WE TOOK 1,000 POUNDERS TO ATTACK NEARBY BRIDGE, WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE FAIRLY UNSUCESSFUL [sic]. BIG BOMBS MADE COLOSSAL FLASH AND WE SAW EARTH FLUNG TO HELL OF A HEIGHT, THIS WAS SUCESSFUL! FLAK FROM ONE GUN BURST AT OUR HEIGHT BUT ONLY IN ONE AREA, SO WE CIRCLED ROUND IT – NO FIGHTERS ARRIVED, - NO TROUBLE, DIVERTED TO METHERINGHAM AIRFIELD TO LAND BECAUSE OF LOW CLOUD.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] SAUMER WAS ON THE MAIN RAIL LINK TO NORTHERN FRANCE AND THE OPERATION WAS TO PREVENT PANZER DIVISIONS ARRIVING AT THE DEVELOPING BRIDGEHEAD AT NORMANDY. THERE ARE PICTURES SHOWING HOW COMPLETELY THE TUNNEL WAS BLOCKED. H2S WAS AN EARY [sic] FORM OF RADAR THAT GAVE THE NAVIGATOR A RATHER POOR PICTURE ON HIS VDU OF THE GROUND BELOW. RIVERS AND ESTUARIES SHOWED UP QUITE WELL, OTHER FEATURES WERE NOT EASILY DISTINGUISHABLE. THE EXTERNAL SCANNER WAS CONTAINED IN A PROMINENT HALF-EGG SHAPE HOUSING BELOW THE AIRCRAFT. THIS TRIP WAS THE FIRST TIME WE HAD COME ACROSS THE 12,000 LB. BOMB, CODE NAME (TALLBOY) AND WE SUBSEQUENTLY DROPPED MANY ON SPECIALIST TARGETS. THEIR TAIL FINS WERE OFFSET, AND WHEN DROPPED FROM NEARBY AIRCRAFT ONE COULD OBSERVE THEM STARTING TO SPIN AS THEY RAPIDLY FELL OUT OF SIGHT. MY LOG BOOK REVEALS THAT WITH CAPTAIN SANDERS I WENT TO METHERINGHAM BY ROAD TO FLY OUR LANCASTER BACK TO WOODHALL. AS FLIGHT ENGNEER [sic] (TEMPORARY UNPAID) I THINK I WAS PERMITTED TO RAISE THE UNDER-CARRIAGE (MY FINEST HOUR.)
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[underlined] 14 – 6 – 44 LE HAVRE [/underlined]
FIRST DAYLIGHT RAID – OVER THE TARGET ABOUT 10-30 P.M. FLEW IN FORMATION GOING, SOME SIGHT, WENT AS FRONT GUNNER AS WE STILL HAVE NO KITE OF OUR OWN. SECOND TO BOMB – WITH TALLBOY – TARGET QUIET UNTILL A FEW MINUTES BEFORE DROPPING THE BOMB, THEN THEY LET LOOSE BAGS OF LIGHT AND MEDIUM FLAK, PREDICTED, TOO AS BOMB LEFT FLAK HIT STARBOARD INNER ENGINE AND TOP TURRET, GUNNER OK, ENGINE HAD TO BE FEATHERED. E BOAT PENS, 25 FEET THICK, WERE HIT, GOOD BOMBING. SAW PART OF SPITFIRE ESCORT, NO ENEMY FIGHTERS SEEN, INTERESTING TRIP.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] THE LANCASTER WE FLEW FROM FISKERTON WHEN POSTED TO 617 SQUADRON IN APRIL 1944 REMAINED A 49 SQUADRON AIRCRAFT, ALTHOUGH WE USED IT ON SEVERAL OPERATIONS PENDING IT’S RETURN TO THAT SQUADRON. EVENTUALLY WE WERE ALLOCATED A 617 AIRCRAFT THAT HAD BEEN REPAIRED AFTER A SPOT OF BOTHER LATE IN 1943. OMINOUSLY NUMBERED ME562, IT NEVERTHELESS SERVED US WELL OVER NINE MONTHS FOR NINETEEN OR SO OPERATIONS, SURVIVED THE WAR AND WAS SOLD OUT OF SERVICE IN JANUARY 1947. BY CONTRAST, OF THE TWELVE OTHER OPERATIONAL LANCASTERS WE HAD FLOWN IN – EITHER ON RAIDS OR PRACTICE BOMBING OR OTHER EXERCISES – ONLY TWO SURVIVED, ONE BEING THE FIRST WE HAD FLOWN IN ON A CROSS-COUNTRY EXERCISE ON ARRIVAL AT FISKERTON.
[underlined] 15 – 6 – 44 BOULOGNE [/underlined]
FOUND PORT OUTER ENGINE MOUNTING HAD ALSO BEEN HIT AFTER LAST NIGHT, SO IT HAD TO BE CHANGED, THIS MADE US FORTY MINUTES LATE TAKING OFF BUT WE GOT OVER THE TARGET SHORTLY BEFORE REST OF KITES LEFT, VISIBILITY WAS VERY BAD WITH LOW CLOUD AND WE WERE TOLD TO RETURN TO BASE. BOB KNIGHTS, BEING A KEEN TYPE AND IN VIEW OF THE WORK THE GROUND CREW HAD DONE DECIDED TO BOMB. BAGS OF LIGHT AND MEDIUM FLAK, HOT FOR A FEW MINUTES, REAR TURRET AND OIL TANK HIT, NO ONE INJURED. TARGET LOOKED QUITE A MESS WHEN WE LEFT, SAW LITTLE FIGHTER COVER. TARGET HEIGHT 7,500 FEET. ------
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------ [underlined] NOTES [/underlined] HERE AGAIN, I FLEW WITH THE SAME PILOT AS THE DAY BEFORE. WHAT NOW PUZZLES ME IS WHY I FLEW FIVE SUCCESSIVE TRIPS WITH BOB KNIGHTS, AS FRONT GUNNER. WHAT WAS THE THEN P.O. SANDERS DOING ALL THIS TIME? I HAVE A FEELING HE WAS AWAY HAVING A BABY, FOR I HAVE A FAINT RECOLLECTION OF A CONSTANT AIR OF CRISIS CONCERNING THE EVENT. THERE WERE EVEN STRONG RUMOURS THAT A LANCASTER HAD BEEN BORROWED TO FURTHER THE ABOUT-TO-BE-FARTHER’S [sic] CAUSE.
[underlined] 19 – 6 – 44 WATTEN (PAS DE CALAIS) [/underlined]
TOOK OFF ABOUT 6 PM IN TRUE FIGHTER STYLE, ONE EACH SIDE OF THE RUNWAY, FLEW OVER IN FORMATION OF FIVE, WEATHER PERFECT. FIGHTER COVER OF SPITFIRES., MET US AT ORFORDNESS. TARGET 10-12 MILES INLAND, SAW RESULTS OF THE MARAUDERS WORK IN LOTS OF PLACES, A LITTLE FLAK OUTSIDE TARGET AREA DIDN’T TROUBLE US. CIRCLING FOR ABOUT 20 MINUTES BEFORE WING COMMANDER GAVE THE OK TO BOMB, TARGET DIFFICULT IT WAS IN A CLEARING ON THE EDGE OF A WOOD. BOMBING FAIR, BOMBAIMER’S [sic] A BIT DISAPPOINTED WITH RESULTS, WATCHED THE REST OF THE AIRCRAFT COMING IN TO BOMB AND THEN CAME HOME. BELIEVE BANDITS TURNED UP AS MOSQUITOES LEFT – GOOD SHOW, FLEW AT 17,000 FEET.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] THE OPERATION WAS AGAINST FLYING BOMB SITES AS WERE MANY OTHERS THIS MONTH AND AGAIN IN JULY. (MARAUDERS) WERE TWIN ENGINE AMERICAN BOMBERS MUCH USED BY THE TACTICAL AIR FORCES.
[underlined] 4 – 7 – 44 ST-LEV-D’ – ESSERENT (PARIS) [/underlined]
FULL MOON – EXPECTED – AND HAD A RECEPTION AS AT NUREMBURG, SEARCHLIGHT BELT JUST INSIDE COAST ANNOYING BUT NO FLAK. COMBATS SEEN ALL THE WAY IN AND OUT, AT TARGET WE TURNED AND HAD THE MOON BEHIND, HARDLY HELPFUL; FIGHTERS CAME IN FROM ALL DIRECTIONS, NEVER SEEN SO MUCH TRACER, GOT VERY MAD AND SCARED; ------
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------ JU88 AT LAST CAME NEAR ENOUGH TO GIVE IT TWO LONG SQUIRTS OF GUN FIRE AND IT APPEARED TO GO INTO ONE BIG BALL OF FIRE, LOST SIGHT OF IT BUT SKIPPER RECKONS IT BROKE IN HALF AND HIT THE DECK. UNABLE TO BOMB BECAUSE MARKERS INDEFINITE, PITY. FIGHTERS FOLLOWED ALL THE WAY TO OUR COAST, COULDN’T HAVE ANY COFFEE TILL WE GOT TO READING.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] TARGET HERE WAS A V.1 STORAGE DEPOT ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF PARIS. V1’S WERE PILOTLESS FLYING BOMBS V2’S WERE THE LATER GUIDED ROCKETS. THE LAUNCH SITES OF BOTH WERE THE FOCUS OF MUCH BOMBING EFFORT, AND WERE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO LOCATE.
[underlined] 17 – 7 – 44 WIZERNES (FRANCE) [/underlined]
TOOK OFF 11 A.M FLEW IN LOOSE BUNCH TILL REACHING TARGET, CLOSED UP A LITTLE THERE. WEATHER GRAND, ABOUT 1/10 CLOUD COVER OVER FRANCE, TARGET VISABLE [sic]. TARGET AREA HEAVILY BOMBED. SPITFIRE ESCORT, SAW NO HUN FIGHTERS, NO FLAK AT ALL, GENERALLY ALL WAS REMARKABLY QUIET. BOMBING SEEMED GOOD – ALTOGETHER VERY NICE AND QUIET TRIP. HAD TWO EGGS FOR DINNER, WONDER WHAT THE CATCH IS.
[underlined] 25 – 7 – 44 WATTEN [/underlined]
TOOK OFF ABOUT 07-00 FAIRLY CLEAR, COOL. SKY CLEARED NICELY OVER THE CHANNEL, TARGET EASILY SEEN. WATCHED KITES BEHIND AS WE RAN IN, SO INTERESTED THAT I FORGOT ABOUT DEFENCES, AND THEY LET GO SOME VERY ACCURATE FLAK JUST BEFORE BOMB WENT DOWN. DESPITE ALL THIS BOMBS WERE WELL DROPPED, GRAND SHOW ON BOMBAIMERS [sic] PART. WEAVED LIKE HELL FOR A FEW MINUTES TILL CLEAR OF AREA, NEVER FELT OR HEARD FLAK SO NEAR – SLUNG OUT SOME WINDOW MYSELF, STARBOARD TAILPLANE SLIGHTLY DAMAGED. SAW ONE KITE HIT IN ENGINE, SMOKE POURED OUT, ENGINE WAS FEATHERD [sic] AND THEY GOT BACK HOME.
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[underlined] 31 – 7 – 44 RILLY-LA-MONTAGE (NEAR RHEIMS) [/underlined]
WENT WITH ABOUT 200 MAIN FORCE KITES, - MADE A SIGHT WORTH SEEING. TARGET 120-150 MILES INLAND, JUST SOUTH OF RHEIMS, ANTICIPATED SOME JERRY ACTIVITY BUT NONE APART FROM HEAVY FLAK IN TARGET AREA. TARGET IN WOOD, DEPOT FOR FLYING BOMBS, RESULTS APPEARED GOOD, DIFFICULT TO ASSESS DUE TO SMOKE. JUST MANAGED TO WEAVE OUT OF THE WAY OF A STICK OF BOMBS FROM KITE ABOVE. BILL REID V.C. WAS HIT THE SAME WAY AND WAS LOST – SEE NOTES. WEATHER QUITE CLEAR. SPITFIRE ESCORT. ONE PIECE OF FLAK IN AIRCRAFT NOSE, AL (BOMB AIMER) DIDN’T KNOW TILL WE LANDED.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] BILL REID’S AIRCRAFT WAS TO ONE SIDE AND BELOW US AND WAS HIT BEHIND THE TOP TURRET BY A BOMB THAT DID NOT EXPLODE BUT SO DAMAGED THE FUSELAGE THAT IT MOMENTARILY SAGGED, THEN BROKE IN TWO AND SPUN AWAY. MIRACULOUSLY, BILL AND ONE OF HIS CREW SURVIVED. DURING THE LUNCH FOLLOWING THE SQUADRON MEMORIAL DEDICATION IN 1987, BILL TOLD US OF HIS FEELINGS AS HE FELL FROM THE STRICKEN LANCASTER, KNOWING HE HAD WON A FEW POUNDS GAMBLING, (THERE GOES THAT B----- REID) THEY WOULD BE SAYING (TAKING OUR MONEY WITH HIM) A LOVELY CHAP.
[underlined] 5 – 8 – 44 BREST [/underlined]
TOOK OFF 09-45, CLIMBED ON TRACK FOR A CHANGE. WEATHER PERFECT, COUNTRYSIDE LOOKED GRAND, ESPECIALLY IN THE SOUTH WEST. SPITFIRE’S MET US OFF SIDMOUTH. TARGET U-BOAT PENS, DIDN’T FEEL SO HAPPY KNOWING BREST’S REPUTATION FOR FLAK, OVER 80 HEAVY GUNS TO BE SHARED AMONGST SIXTEEN KITES. AS WE RAN IN FLAK BANGED VERY CLOSE, BUT CLEARED FOR BOMBING RUN. GOOD RESULTS, FIVE PENS HIT, REST VERY CLOSE. SAW ONE PARACHUTE FROM KITE THAT WAS LOST, QUEER THING, IT APPEARED TO BE UNDER CONTROL BUT MADE NO EFFORT TO COME HOME. WE HAD FLAK THROUGH THE NOSE AND ONE ENGINE COVER.
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[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] THE AIRCRAFT LOST AT BREST WAS PROBABLY F/LT CHENEY’S, AND BRINCKHILL’S BOOK (THE DAM BUSTERS) HAS A VIVID DESCRIPTION OF WHAT HAPPENED TO IT AFTER RECEIVING DIRECT FLAK SHELLS. THE PILOT AND TWO OTHERS WERE PICKED UP BY A FRENCH FISHING BOAT AND LATER RETURNED TO THE SQUADRON, THE REST WERE NEVER FOUND.
[underlined] 6 – 8 – 44 LORIENT [/underlined]
TOOK OFF ABOUT 18-00, WEATHER AND FLIGHT PLAN AS BEFORE, PROBABLY; SAW AN AIRFIELD BEING SHELLED NEAR TARGET. FLAK STARTED EARLY BUT AT 16,000 FEET WE SEEMED TO BE IN A FREE BELT, AS ABOVE AND BELOW IT WAS VERY THICK. BOMBING RUN GOOD, ALTOGETHER IT DIDN’T APPEAR TO BE SUCH A GOOD EFFORT AS YESTERDAYS, BUT DIFFICULT TO TELL REALLY. HEAVY FLAK FOR A FEW MINUTES OUT OF THE AREA, HIT IN TAILPLANE AND SPINNER, NO KITES LOST. HOPE THERE ARE NO MORE PENS TO HIT, JERRY GETS ANNOYED SOMEWHAT.
[underlined] 9 – 8 – 44 LA PALLICE [/underlined]
TOOK OFF 10-00, WEATHER GOOD. BEING A BIT LATE WE CUT ACROSS COUNTRY, PASSED QUITE CLOSE TO ALDERNEY AND GUERNSEY, EVENTUALLY CAUGHT UP WITH THE REST NEAR FRENCH COAST. WENT NEAR TO LORIENT AND FOLLOWED COAST TO THE TARGET. RAN IN FROM THE SEA, NO FLAK UNTILL BOMB WENT, RESULTS GOOD EXCEPT FOR ONE BOMB THAT WENT A LONG WAY WIDE AND HIT THE HARBOUR WORKS INSTEAD OF THE PENS. FLAK MODERATE, HIT ON ONE SPINNER. QUITEA [sic] LONG TRIP, SAW NO ENEMY FIGHTERS, ESCORT OF MUSTANGS AND SPITFIRES, MOST OF THEM MET US ON THE WAY BACK – HELPFUL; SKIPPER AND ROY’S THIRTIETH TRIP.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] ALTHOUGH AIRCREWS NORMALLY FLEW TOGETHER UNDER ONE PILOT, THERE WERE OCCASIONS WHEN INDIVIDUALS WOULD JOIN OTHER CREWS, AS I DID FOR SEVERAL TRIPS WITH BOB KNIGHTS. THE REASONS WERE MANY, SICKNESS OF ONE MEMBER MIGHT RESULT IN A REPLACEMENT FROM ANOTHER CREW, OR THE VARIOUS TRADES MIGHT BE FARMED OUT TO OTHER CREWS NEEDING TEMPORARY STAFF. ------
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------- THUS DIFFERENT MEMBERS OF THE SAME CREW OFTEN HAD VARYING NUMBERS OF OPERATIONAL SORTIES TO THEIR CREDIT, I SEEM TO REMEMBER THAT ON ARRIVING AT 49 SQUADRON OUR PILOT, JOHN SANDERS, FLEW HIS FIRST FLIGHT OVER GERMANY AS SECOND PILOT, SO HE WAS ONE UP ON THE REST OF US ALREADY; I SUPPOSE THE IDEA WAS TO SEE IF HE LIKED THE EXPERIENCE. . . . THE FIRST TOUR WAS THIRTY OPERATIONS, THE SECOND FIFTEEN.
[underlined] 11 – 8 – 44 LA PALLICE [/underlined]
TOOK OFF ABOUT 11.30, LOAD 6 X 2.000 LD. [sic] ARMOUR PIERCING, DON’T KNOW WHAT USE THESE ARE AGAINST PENS, - OURS NOT TO REASON WHY. ROUTE AS YESTERDAY, AS WAS THE ESCORT. MUCH MORE FLAK ON RUN IN, SAW ONE KITE HIT AND CONTINUE ON THREE ENGINES, HEARD LOTS OF BURSTS, BOMBS WENT DOWN BANG ON TARGET, WE WERE HIT IN THE AIRCRAFT NOSE AND ONE ENGINE, NOTHING SERIOUS. LANDED AT GROVE, SHORT OF PETROL. HOPE THIS TARGET IS FINISHED, FLAK FAR TOO ACCURATE FOR COMFORT,
[underlined] 12 – 8 – 44 BREST [/underlined]
TOOK OFF 07-00 – 12 HOURS AFTER LANDING. WEATHER PRETTY FOUL, TRIED TO CLIMB THROUGH CLOUD, BECAME ICED UP, HAD TO REDUCE TO 11,000 FEET AND CLIMB OVER CHANNEL. ONLY EIGHT KITES ON THE RAID, EXPECTED TO BE SHOT TO HELL, BUT LUCKILY FLAK WAS LIGHTER AND LESS ACCURATE THAN BEFORE, - ONE FLAK SHIP IN THE HARBOUR. PENS APPEARED TO RECEIVE SEVERAL DIRECT HITS, SMOKE POURED FROM GAP IN THE ROOF, SMALL DENT IN SPINNER, NOT BAD TRIP, INTERCOM BETTER THAN YESTERDAY, SO CREW WAS MORE SOCIABLE; SAW NO ESCORT, EXCEPT USUAL MOSQUITO.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] IT SEEMS WE HAD MORE DENTED SPINNERS THAN ANYTHING ELSE, WHICH IS PROBABLY VERY FORTUNATE, CURIOUS REFERENCE TOA [sic] MOSQUITO AS ESCORT, WHEREAS I KNOW VERY WELL IT WAS THE MARKING AIRCRAFT. PERHAPS THE CRACKS WERE BEGINNING TO SHOW.
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[underlined] 13 – 8 – 44 BREST [/underlined]
TOOK OFF 08-30, WEATHER GOOD. TARGET FOR US WAS A SHIP IN THE HARBOUR THAT MIGHT BE USED AS A BLOCKSHIP, OTHERS BOMBED PENS, AND 9 SQUADRON SUPPORTING HAD ANOTHER VESSEL. FLAK; COR! IT WAS HOT, JUST LIKE FIRST TIME TO BREST HIT IN UNDERCARRIAGE AND HYDRAULICS, BEFORE OUR BOMB LOAD (12 X 1.000 POUNDERS) WENT DOWN, BAGS OF HOT OIL AND VAPOUR IN THE NOSE, PANIC FOR A FEW MINUTES; TOMMY’S HARNESS WAS HIT AND THERE WERE OTHER HOLES. SAW ONE KITE GO DOWN, STRAIGHT DOWN AND BURST ON THE SHORE, NASTY, ONE BURST OF FLAK WAS PINK, - GREMLINS GOT ME AT LAST; ALTOGETHER FAR TOO LIVELY FOR MY LIKING.
[underlined] 14 – 8 – 44 BREST [/underlined]
TOOK OFF 08-30, USUAL TIME, WEATHER GOOD. AFTER YESTERDAYS EFFORT FELT LOUSY ON THE WAY ANTICIPATING EVERY SORT OF TROUBLE, THE OLD TUMMY GETS A BIT SORE THINKING OF FLAK THESE DAY’S. TARGET – SHIP IN THE HARBOUR AGAIN, 9 SQUADRON SUPPORTING RAN INTO TARGET IN MORE N.W. DIRECTION – OVER – BAY HEIGHT 16,200 FEET, FLAK BOUNCED US ABOUT A BIT BUT IT WASN’T QUITE SO BAD. PIECES OF FLAK THROUGH JACK’S SCREEN, MID UPPER TURRET AND ONE ENGINE, NOTHING SERIOUS. SAW SEVEN STICKS OF BOMBS GO DOWN, EACH JUST MISSED THE SHIP, HOPE SOMEONE HIT IT OR BACK WE GO ANOTHER DAY. BOMB LOAD 6 X 2,000 POUNDERS, ARMOUR – PIERCING.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] (STICKS) WERE THE ENTIRE BOMB LOAD DROPPED BY EACH AIRCRAFT. IT WAS INFURIATING TO WATCH THE FOUNTAINS OF SPRAY APPEAR AS EACH BOMB HIT THE WATER ON EITHER SIDE OF THE VESSEL. I WONDER IF IT EVER SANK, WE DIDN’T GO TO BREST AGAIN, THANK GOODNESS, (THE SHIP WAS THE GERMAN CRUISER GUEYDON) WE THEN WENT ON TO MORE INTERESTING THINGS. -----
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[underlined] 11 – 9 – 44 KAA FIORD NORWAY (VIA RUSSIA) [/underlined]
THE BIG ONE AGAINST THE GERMAN POCKET BATTLESHIP [underlined] TIRPITZ [/underlined], WHICH HAD SO FAR LED A CHARMED LIFE DESPITE A VARIETY OF ATTACKS BY EVERY – BODY EXCEPT THE ARMY, - AND SURVIVED THE LOT AS THE VESSEL WAS OUT OF RANGE FROM BRITAIN THE PLAN WAS TO FLY TO YAGODNIK, AN ISLAND AIRFIELD UPSTREAM FROM ARCHANGEL, REFUEL, CARRY OUT THE RAID, REFUEL AGAIN IN RUSSIA AND RETURN TO LINCOLNSHIRE. AS ADDITIONAL PETROL HAD TO BE CARRIED THE TOP TURRET WAS REMOVED, TOGETHER WITH MUCH OF THE AMMUNITION FOR THE REAR TURRET, SOME OF THE RADAR AND THE EXHAUST COWS [sic] FROM EACH ENGINE, - WHICH SEEMED RATHER EXTREME AND MAY HAVE BEEN DONE UNDER THE OLD DICTUM THAT EVERY LITTLE HELPS. A 250 GALLON FUEL WAS INSTALLED IN THE FUSELAGE, AND THE LENGTH OF THE TANK NECESSITATED THE DEPARTURE OF THE TOP TURRET. WE CARRIED TWELVE 450 POUND BOMBS – WHICH I HAVE A FEELING WERE A SORT OF SEA MINE – AND OTHERS HAD THE 12,000 POUND “TALLBOY”. THERE WERE TWENTY LANCASTERS FROM 617 AND EIGHTEEN FROM 9 SQUADRON. THE DIARY ENTRY:
TOOK OFF 19-00, HEADED FOR NORWAY AT 2,000 FEET, CLIMBED TO 6,000 FEET AT THE COAST TO CLEAR THE MOUNTAINS, BIT CLOUDY, SAW GLIMPSES OF THE PEAKS AT TIMES. SWEDEN WAS WELL LIGHTED, EVEN SAW NEON SIGNS OCCASIONALLY, SOME FLAK IN ONE AREA, ONE KITE DAMAGED. AS IT BECAME LIGHTER WE DROPPED TO AVOID CLOUD AT 500-1,000 FEET, CROSSED WHITE SEA VERY LOW, LOOKED SOMEWHAT INHOSPITABLE AND COLD. EVENTUALLY FOUND ARCHANGEL IN THE MOUTH OF THE RIVER, AND AFTER SOME SEARCHING CAME ACROSS THE AIRFIELD ON A [sic] ISLAND DOWN STREAM. LANDED ON GRASS WITH BOMBS ON BOARD. QUARTERS IN A OLD RIVER STEAMER, HAD TO CLEAN OUT, WASHING AND SANITARY CONDITIONS LOUSY. MEALS GOOD GENERALLY, PLENTY OF EGGS, BUTTER AND SUGAR. TEA WITHOUT MILK – IN GLASSES – SLIGHTLY SOUR BREAD AND SPAM WILL BE REMEMBERD [sic]; --------;
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----- SWAPPED CIGARETTES FOR CAP BADGES, COINS, PAPER MONEY AND BUTTONS. ENTERTAINED EVERY NIGHT WITH CONCERTS, FILMS AND DANCES. BAND COULD EVEN PLAY (LAMBETH WALK) SAND AND GRASS FIELD, WEATHER SLIGHTLY COLDER THAN AT HOME.
TOOK OFF 09-30 ON SEPTEMBER 15TH LOOSE GAGGLE, 1,000 FEET, ROUTE OVER FINLAND, SWEDEN AND NORWAY, A GOD-FORSAKEN COUNTRYSIDE OF HILLS, RIVERS, TIMBER AND MARSHES. WE LED J.W. FORCE AND CAME IN FROM A DIFFERENT DIRECTION. TO THE MAIN FORCE. SAW SMOKE GENERATORS START UP A FEW MINUTES BEFORE BOMBING, NUISANCE. SAW J.W’S SWINGING DOWN ON PARACHUTES, WEIRD SIGHT, FLAK SCATTERD [sic] AND INACCURATE, SUPRISING [sic] AS WE BOMBED AT 11,000 FEET, NO FIGHTERS. ONE KITE ONLY DAMAGED.
TOOK OFF 19-15 ON THE 16TH TO RETURN HOME. WEATHER DULL, POOR VISIBILITY, 1,500 FEET OVER FINLAND, CLIMED [sic] TO 7,000 OVER SEA AND SWEDEN. DARK NIGHT, SAW SOME AIRFIELDS LIGHTED, OCCASIONAL LIGHT FLAK. BAD WEATHER JUST AFTER LEAVING SWEDEN, HAD TO DROP TO 4,000 FEET TO CLEAR CLOUD AND HEAVY RAIN, OFF TRACK, RAN OVER NORTH DENMARK, SEARCHLIGHTS EVADED BY USING CLOUD COVER, FLAK SHIPS A DARN NUISANCE OFF COAST. CARRIED THREE OF ROSS’S CREW BACK. BET THEY WERE COLD IN THE FUSEELARGE [sic]. GLAD TO SEE ENGLISH SEARCHLIGHTS AND AIRFIELDS AGAIN – AND REAL EGG, BACON AND CHIPS ON RETURN.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] RE READING THE DIARY REMINDS ME OF THE PROFICIENCY OF OUR NAVIGATOR, JAMES BARON, WHO SO SKILLFULLY [sic] GUIDED OUR WAY TO RUSSIA AND BACK, BASICALLY WITH ONLY HIS EXPERTISE, MAP, AND SIX PAIRS OF ANXIOUS EYES TO ASSIST. NO NAVIGATIONAL AIDS IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD, SEVERAL AIRCRAFT FORCE-LANDED IN THE AREA WHEN FUEL RAN OUT IN THEIR VAIN SERCH [sic] FOR THE LANDING FIELD; SO FAR AS I RECALL, NO ONE WAS LOST, THE RUSSIANS BROUGHT THEM ALONG IN VARIOUS ANCIENT LIGHT PLANES AT INTERVALS. THERE IS A PHOTO OF A DOWNED LANCASTER, IT’S 12,000 POUND TALLBOY BOMB HURLED FREE ON LANDING INPACT [sic] AND LAYING FORLORNLY IN THE MUD. A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE FROM THE AIRCRAFT.
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THE CREWS INVOVLED [sic] WITH THESE CRASHED LANCASTERS CAME HOME IN OTHER AIRCRAFT AND THEIR AIRCRAFT LEFT IN RUSSIA.
THE RUSSIAN FILMS WERE TERRIBLE, LONG AFFAIRS OF CONTINUAL WAR SCENES, AND I SEEM TO RECALL THAT THE ROYAL NAVY CONTINGENT AT ARCHANGEL SENT SOME CARTOONS WHICH CHEERED US UP AND LEFT OUR HOSTS BAFFLED. LIVING AROUND THE AIRFIELD IN VARIOUS PRIMITIVE HUTS WERE SOME OF THE RUSSIAN STAFF, INCLUDING, NO DOUBT, THE LADIES WHO FELL ABOUT IN LAUGHTER WHEN ASKED FOR HOT WATER TO SHAVE WITH – SUCH WESTEN [sic] DECADENCE. THE MEN SPENT MUCH TIME PLAYING CARDS ON THE RIVER BANK. THEIR WIVES ONLY APPEARED WHEN CALLED TO HAVE LARGE TREE TRUNKS, THAT HAD FLOATED DOWN FROM THE URALS, HOISTED ON TO THEIR STURDY SHOULDERS BY THEIR CARING PARTNERS; IT WAS A PEACEFUL SCENE, ONLY DISTURBED BY THE SOUND OF CHOPPING AND SAWING WHILST THE INTERRUPTED CARD GAME CONTINUED. LENIN WOULD SURELY HAVE APPROVED. I JEST A LITTLE, WITHIN THE LIMITATION OF THE TIMES, THE RUSSIANS WE MET WERE GENERALLY KINDLY, GENEROUS HOSTS. THEY BEAT US HANDSOMELY AT FOOTBALL TOO.
THE WAIT FOR SUITABLE WEATHER ACCOUNTED MAINLY FOR THE FEW DAYS THAT PASSED BEFORE ATTACKING THE (TIRPITZ) AND THE TIME WAS PROBABLY USEFUL TO ENABLE SOME AIRCRAFT SERVICING TO BE DONE. I THINK OUR J.W. BOMBS WERE KNOWN FOR SOME REASON AS JOHNNY WALKERS, AND AS DESCRIBED, THEY FLOATED GENTLY DOWN ON PARACHUTES. IF THEY HIT SOMETHING SOLID THEY EXPLODED ON CONTACT, IF THEY FELL INTO THE WATER THEY WOULD SINK ARMED THEM SELVES AND RISE TO THE SURFACE HOPEFULLY DETONATING UNDER A SHIP IF NO TARGET WAS FOUND THEY WOULD SINK AGAIN AND MOVE 30 FEET AND REPEAT.
AT THE TIME OWING TO THE SMOKE SCREEN THE RAID WAS NOT THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN THAT SUCCESSFUL, BUT LATER IT WAS FOUND THAT TALLBOY NEAR MISSES HAD DAMAGED THE SHIP AND PREVENTED IT FROM RETURNING TO THE SEA.
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THE TAKE-OFF TO RETURN HOME TO ENGLAND WAS AN INTERESTING SIGHT FOR ONLOOKERS, AS REFUELLING HAD TO BE DONE WITH THE ONLY AVAILABLE LOWER OCTANE RATED PETROL SO THERE WAS SOME ENGINE COUGHING AND BANGING AS EACH LANCASTER SPED ALONG THE SO CALLED RUNWAY AND FINALLY STAGGERD [sic] INTO THE AIR.
[underlined] 23 – 9 – 44 DORTMUND-EMS CANAL [/underlined]
NIGHT TRIP AGAIN – DARNED IF I LIKE ‘EM TARGET – AQUEDUCT CARRYING CANAL ACROSS A RIVER, LOAD TALLBOY. HAD FIRST SHAKING WHEN TWO KITES COLLIDED OFF THE COAST; THEN ANTI-RADAR LIGHTS WERE LEFT UNCOVEREDAND [sic] FLASHES ALL ROUND THE TRIP. QUEER THINGS, RED GREEN AND YELLOW FLARES, ENORMOUS FLAK BURSTS, KITES GOING DOWN WITHOUT COMBAT, - NO TRACER USED BY FIGHTERS, I GUESS. SPOT FIRE JUST UNDER CLOUD, HAD SEVERAL TRIES TO BOMB, BUT IT BECAME COVERED JUST BEFORE RELEASE SO WE BROUGHT THE BOMB BACK FELT VERY TIRED AND SHAKEN ON RETURN, CURSE THE DARKNESS.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] I DON’T REALY [sic] RECOLLECT BEING UNDULY DISTURBED ABOUT OPERATIONS, BUT IT SEEMS THERE IS JUST A HINT OF BOTHER WITH MY DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENTS. USUALLY UNSYMPATHETICALLY REFERRED TO AS THE TWITCH, IT WAS QUITE OFTEN EVIDENT IN THE DEMEANOUR OF THOSE IN THEIR THIRD OR FOURTH TOUR.
[underlined] 29 – 10 – 44 KEMS BARRAGE (ON THE RHINE) [/underlined]
TOOK OFF 13-10 PLAN SEVEN KITES TO BOMB AT 7-6,000 FEET, SIX AT [underlined] 600 [/underlined] FEET, WE WERE ONE OF THE SIX, OF COURSE AFTER THE DRAW, MUSTANGS AS ESCORT AND ANTI-FLAK. WE BOMBED FIVE MINUTES AFTER HIGH FORCE, RAN IN TWO ABREAST DROPPING TALLBOY WITH DELAYED ACTION. NOT A LOT OF FLAK, BUT MACHINE GUNS VERY ACCURATE WHICH HIT TWO KITES AFTER BOMBING, THEY HIT THE DECK – HARD, SO ONLY FOUR OUT OF THE SIX MADE IT. MY PERSPEX WAS SHATTERED TWO SPLINTERS IN MY SHOULDER, (NOTHING MUCH) BLAZED AWAY AT FLAK POSTS, VERY HAPPY; AL’S BOMB ZIPPED OVER BARRAGE TOP, GATES FINALLY GAVE AWAY, GOOD JOB.
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[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] THIS WAS A PRE-EMPT EFFORT TO FORESTALL THE GERMANS FROM RELEASING THE PENT UP WATERS OF THE RHINE WHEN ALLIED GROUND FORCES WERE ABOUT TO CROSS. THE EFFECT OF A CONSIDERABLE HEAD OF WATER UPON TEMPORARY BRIDGES MAY BE IMAGINED. DURING A SWISS HOLIDAY IN THE MIDDLE 80’S WE TOOK A VERY FRAGILE BOAT TRIP TO A ROCKY ISLAND IN THE MIDDLE OF THE RHINE FALLS AT SCHAFFHAUSES, WHERE THE VIBRATION GRAPHICALLY DEMONSTRATED THE WEIGHT OF THE WATER FLOWING BY. THE TWO AIRCRAFT THAT WAS SHOT DOWN PILOTED BY (S/L WYNESS AND F/O HOWARD) IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT WYNESS AND HIS CREW MANAGED TO GETOUT [sic] OF THEIR AIRCRAFT AND INTO THE DINGHY TO SAIL DOWN THE RHINE TO GAIN THE SANCTUARY OF THE SWISS BANK BUT WERE SHOT BY THE GERMANS. PILOT JOHN SANDERS WAS AWARDED BAR TO HIS D.F.C.
[underlined] 29 – 10 – 44 TIRPITZ – TROMSO [/underlined]
TOOK OFF FROM LOSSIE MOUTH AT 2 A.M. AND LANDED BACK AT 2-55P.M. – DID I FEEL DONE. CROSSED NORWEGIAN COAST AT DAWN AND FLEW NORTH OVER SWEDEN, LOOKED VERY BLEAK AND COLD HAD TO ORBIT AT RENDEZVOUS, BOTH SQUADRONS WENT ON TO THE TARGET, BECAME VERY HAZY EVEN AT 15,000 FEET WITH 7-6/10’S CLOUD BELOW, SHIP HARD TO FIND, AL FINALLY BOMBED ON FOURTH RUN. BAGS OF FLAK, BUT VERY INACCURATE, ONE KITE HIT BADLY, LANDED IN SWEDEN. TERRIBLE STOOGE HOME, SAW NO LAND FOR FOUR HOURS, - HAD 16 HOURS SLEEP AT LOSSIE.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] THE VESSEL WAS MOVED SOUTHWARDS TO TROMSO AFTER THE SEPTEMBER ATTACK, POSSIBLY BECAUSE OF THE DAMAGED [sic] RECEIVED THIS PUT IT IN THE RANGE FROM LOSSIEMOUTH, AGAIN WITH LONG-RANGE FUEL TANKS. THE CLOUD PREVENTED ACCURATE BOMB-AIMING AND THE ‘TIRPITZ’ SURVIVED ONCE MORE, - BUT NEMESIS DREW NIGH; A SOME WHAT COMIC ASPECT OF THE LONG SEA CROSSING BACK WAS THE REASSURANCE GIVEN AT BRIEFING THAT ROYAL NAVY DESROYERS [sic] WOULD BE ON OUR RETURN ROUTE SHOULD ANY NEED TO PUT DOWN IN THE WATER ARISE. ------
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------ BY 1944 THE R.N. HAD QUITE PROPERLY DEVELOPED ITCHY GUN FINGERS WHERE AIRCRAFT WERE CONCERNED, PARTICULARLY IF THEY GAVE NO REGOGNITION [sic] SIGNALS. THUS WE WERE RATHER ALARMED TO FIND OURSELVES BEARING DOWN ON THIS MENACING LOOMING SHIP WITH AL IN THE NOSE FRANTICALLY DIGGING AROUND FOR THE COLOURS-OF-THE-DAY CARTRIDGES TO PUT IN HIS VERY PISTOL. I’M NOT SURE IF WE WERE ACTUALLY FIRED UPON, BUT CERTAINLY THE COLOURS WENT UP A TRIFLE LATE. ONE CAN IMAGINE THE IRATE OFFICER-OF-THE-WATCH DOWN THERE FUMING ‘THAT SHOWER’ UP THERE.
[underlined] NOVEMBER 1944 [/underlined]
MY LOG BOOK FOR THIS MONTH SHOWS ONLY A TRIP TO LOSSIEMOUTH FOR ANOTHER GO AT THE ‘TIRPITZ’, BUT THE WEATHER FORECAST WAS SUCH THAT WE RETURNED TO WOODHALL THE NEXT DAY.
MORE IMPORTANTLY, AN UN-DATED NOTE IS ADDED THAT MUST HAVE BEEN WRITTEN IN JANUARY 1945:- “BROKE MY FINGER WHILST TRYING TO FIX AN ESCAPE HATCH DURING NIGHT PRACTICE BOMBING – CLOT!! WENT U/S UNTILL AFTER CHRISTMAS. ROY AND AL MEANWHILE FINISHED THEIR SECOND TOUR, DIDN’T SEE AL AGAIN. LUCKILY MANAGED TO GET BACK WITH SANDY AND REMAINDER OF THE CREW.
NIGHT BOMBING PRACTICE AT WAINFLEET WAS NOT A FAVOURITE PASTIME, SO I DOUBT ANYONE REGRETTED THE EARLY RETURN ARISING FROM MY MISHAP. I CHERISH THE MEMORY OF OUR CAPTAIN SPEEDILY CALLING FOR AN AMBULANCE TO MEET US ON LANDING, AND HIS INSISTENCE ON HALF CARRYING ME DOWN THE AIRCRAFT LADDER TO THE GROUND. BEING A VERY FORTUNATE CREW, THIS WAS ABOUT THE WORST THING THAT HAPPENED TO US IN ALL THE TIME WE FLEW TOGETHER ON OPERATIONS.
THUS I DID NOT JOIN THE FINAL ATTACK ON THE “TIRPITZ” ON 29TH OF NOVEMBER, WHEN THE VESSEL CAPSIZED FOLLOWING DIRECT HITS WITH TALLBOY 12,000 POUND BOMBS; INSTEAD ROY MACHIN HAD A VIEW OF THE AFFAIR FROM THE TAIL RATHER THAN HIS ACCUSTOMED POSITION IN THE TOP TURRET. ONE OF THE MINOR MYSTERIES IS WHY NO ENEMY FIGHTERS APPEARED DURING THE LAST TWO RAIDS, WHEN IN NORWAY.
[page break]
35
[underlined] 3 – 2 – 45 PORTESHAVEN (HOLLAND) [/underlined]
TOOK OFF 14-00, TARGET MIDGET U-BOAT PENS. WEATHER CLEAR, HEIGHT 14,000 FEET. OVERCOAST [sic] SAW WALCHEREN ISLAND, NEARLY ALL FLOODED, TERRIBLE DEVASTATION. LONG RUN UP TO TARGET AND JUST BEFORE BOMB WENT FLAK WAS VERY ACCURATE THO’ NOT PARTICULARLY HEAVY. WE BOMBED SECOND AND I SAW THE REST OF THE EFFORT, WHICH EXCEPT FOR THREE WIDE THE REST WAS DEAD ON. P.R.L. COVER DETERMINED THAT THE WHOLE STRUCTURE HAD COLLAPSED. IT HAD FIFTEEN HOLES.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] P.R.L. WAS THE PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE UNIT, OFTEN FLYING MOSQUITOES, SOMETIMES SPITFIRES, USUALLY ALONE – DODGY IN DAYLIGHT.
[underlined] 6 – 2 – 45 BIELEFELD VIADUCT (GERMANY) [/underlined]
ON THIS THE LONGEST TRIP INTO THE REICH, WE DEFINITELY EXPECTED BANDITS, SO GAGGLE WAS TIGHTENED AND ALTOGETHER WE HAD TEN SQUADRONS OF SPITFIRES AND MUSTANGS AS COVER, - VERY NICE FOR SEVENTEEN KITES; SOME HEAVY FLAK AT AACHEN AND COOLENZ, OTHERWISE NONE. 10/10 CLOUD COVER MOST OF THE ROUTE, SAW NO BOMBING. VERY SURPRISED AT NO LUFTWAFFE – AND RELIEVED. SKY WAS FULL OF OUR COVER, AND YANKS WERE VERY ACTIVE WITH HEAVY STUFF.
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] BY 1944 THE AMERICAN AIRFORCE (U.S.A.A.F.) WERE WELL USED TO FORMATION FLYING NECESSITATED BY THEIR BOMBING TECHNIQUES, AND THE MUTUAL COVER AGAINST THE LUFTWAFFE. APART FROM INITIAL DISASTROUS DAYLIGHT SORTIES IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE WAR, BOMBER COMMAND IN EUROPE LARGELY RESORTED TO NIGHT RAIDS UNTILL D-DAY IN 1944. THEN THE (GAGGLE) WAS THOUGHT UP AS A LOOSE FORMATION TO GIVE SOME PROTECTION AGAINST FIGHTERS WHILST STILL RETAINING EACH BOMB-AIMERS DESCRIPTION AS TO THE MOMENT OF RELEASE. HOWEVER, I FEEL THE WORTHY INTENTION WAS DIMINISHED BY THE RESULT IN THE AIR, AS AFTER YEARS OF INDIVIDUAL FLYING IN THE DARK THE DISCIPLINE-AND WILL-NEEDED TO KEEP IN CLOSE FORMATION WAS JUST NOT THERE AND WE TENDED TO JUST TRUNDLE ALONG FAIRLY NEAR TO ONE ANOTHER; ------
[page break]
36
------ AS IT HAPPENED IT DID NOT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE ON THE DAYLIGHT TRIPS I FLEW ON. THERE IS NOT MUCH DOUBT IN MY MIND, HOWEVER, THAT AN ATTACK ON US BY THE LUFTWAFFE WOULD HAVE HAD SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES BEFORE OUR ESCORT COULD HAVE GOT AMONGST THEM. BOTH GERMANS AND AMERICANS FOUND THAT EFFECTIVE DEFENCE OF BOMBERS BY FIGHTERS IS MOST DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE AGAINST DETERMINED ATTACKS, SOME WILL ALWAYS SUCCEED.
[underlined] 6 – 2 – 45 IJMUIDEN (HOLLAND) [/underlined]
TOOK OFF 06-00 UNDER DULL HIGH CLOUD THAT PERSISTED WAY TO THE TARGET, SAW BAGS OF LIBERATORS FORMING UP ON THE WAY OUT. SPITFIRE ESCORT MET US OFF THE COAST. BOMBING RUN SEEMED PLAIN STUPID; INSTEAD OF RUNNING IN FROM THE SEA WE CIRCLED IN LAND, NEAR AMSTERDAM, AND HAD A LONG RUN UP TO TARGET IN HEAVY FLAK AREA. JACK LED GAGGLE AND DID THEY PASTE US, FOR JUST OVER TWO MINUTES WERE CONTINUALLY PREDICTED, - NEVER FELT AND HEARD SO MUCH. U-BOAT PENS WERE HIT,
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] NOW WE ARE CRITICISING ROUTEING[sic] – EVERYONE IS AN EXPERT AFTER TWO TOURS, THIS WAS THE LAST OPERATIONAL TRIP FOR ME. DURING RAIDS INVOLVING MANY AIRCRAFT FLAK WAS GENERALLY INDISCRIMINATE, BUT WHEN ONLY TWENTY OR THIRTY WERE OVERHEAD IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR THE DEFENCES TO FOCUS ON ONE BY RADAR AND (PREDICT) ITS COURSE AND FIRE ACCORDINGLY. FLAK BATTERIES WERE OFTEN IN FOURS, AND OCCASIONALLY ONE COULD SEE SUCCESSIVE BURSTS FOLLOWING BEHIND, EVEN WHEN TURNING. I NOTICED THIS PARTICULARLY DURING THE OCTOBER (TIRPITZ) RAID AS WELL AS THIS ONE. NOT A LOT COULD USEFULLY BE DONE – EXCEPT HOPE – IF ON THE BOMB RUN; EVENTUALLY, OF COURSE, WE FLEW OUT OF RANGE, OR THEY SELECTED ANOTHER LUCKY LOT FOR ATTENTION.
[page break]
37
[underlined] POSTSCRIPT [/underlined]
TO FORESTALL ANY BRIGHT SPARK WHO MAY HAVE COUNTED ONLY FORTY OPERATIONS IN THE DIARY, THERE WERE FIVE OTHER TRIPS MENTIONED BUT NOT DESCRIBED AS EACH TIME THE TARGET WAS NOT BOMBED DUE, TO CLOUD AT THE CRUCIAL POINT, FOUR WERE ‘V’ BOMB SITES IN NORTHERN FRANCE, THE OTHER LA PALLICE AGAINST U-BOAT PENS TO MY SURPRISE, AND NO DOUBT PLEASURE, THESE WERE INCLUDED IN THE TOTAL FOR TWO TOURS OF OPERATIONS, THAT IS FORTY FIVE TRIPS. THE ‘V’ WEAPONS WERE FIRSTLY SELF PROPELLED FLYING BOMBS DIRECTED AT LONDON, AND SECONDLY ROCKET PROPELLED MISSILES LAUNCHED FROM HOLLAND THAT FELL UPON THE CITY WITHOUT WARNING. FORTUNATELY THIS ALL STARTED AROUND THE SUMMER OF 1944, SO THE LAUNCH SITES WERE PROGRESSIVELY OVER RUN AS THE ALLIED LAND ARMIES MOVED EASTWARDS FROM NORMANDY LATER IN THE YEAR.
ONE MUST OBSERVE THAT AS A CREW WE WERE QUITE FORTUNATE, FOR I CANNOT RECALL ANYONE BEING HURT, NEITHER WERE THERE MANY DISAGREEMENTS. THE ONLY ONE OF THE LATTER THAT COMES TO MIND WAS AN ALTERCATION THAT AROSE WHILST WAITING AROUND OUTSIDE THE AIRCRAFT AS TO THE MERITS OF THE FLIGHT SANDWICHES ISSUED FROM THE OFFICERS PALACE AT THE PETWOOD HOTEL (OFFICERS MESS) COMPARED TO THOSE FROM THE SERGEANTS MESS; IMPORTANT MATTERS SUCH AS THIS COULD HAVE AFFECTED THE WHOLE COURSE OF THE WAR.
TO COMMENT ON LUCK, THERE IS A STORY OF THE BOMB-AIMER’S PARACHUTE HARNESS. WE WERE SETTLING DOWN AT DISPERSAL AWAITING TAXI CLEARANCE WHEN AN AGONISED CRY CAME FROM AL IN THE NOSE – I’VE FORGOT MY PARACHUTE HARNESS, JACK; MUCH HEAVY BREATHING FROM OUR ESTEEMED PILOT BRFORE [sic] HE GROUND OUT “YOU’D BETTER HURRY AND GET IT THEN” OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT. WITH INTEREST I WATCHED AL LEAP OUT, GRAB ONE OF THE GROUND CREW’S BIKES AND VANISH IN THE DIRECTION OF THE LOCKER ROOM, HEAD DOWN, PEDALLING FURIOUSLY. ------
[page break]
38
------ MEANWHILE, IN THE COCKPIT THE CAPTAIN AND ENGINEER WERE DECIDING TO SWITCH OFF THE ENGINES AS THEY WOULD OVERHEAT QUITE QUICKLY WHILST IDLING DUE TO THE LACK OF AIR PASSING THROUGH THE RADIATORS FROM THE PROPELLERS. WHEN AL REAPPEARED FULLY KITTED AND BREATHLESS, THE ENGINES WERE RE-STARTED. ONE, HOWEVER, STUTTERD [sic] BANGED AND BELCHED BLUE SMOKE, RAN VERY ROUGHLY FOR A FEW SECONDS AND FINALLY STOPPED WITH A SHUDDER THAT SHOOK THE WHOLE AIRCRAFT. SO WE ALL CLAMBERED OUT AND JOINED THE GROUND CREW CLUSTED [sic] UNDER THE OFFENDING ENGINE, ONE STILL HOPEFULLY CLUTCHING A FIRE EXTINGUISHER, SOME STAGING WAS PUSHED INTO PLACE AND A FITTER REMOVED THE COWLING AND LOOKED INTO THE WORKS. “T’ARIN’T ARF A MESS” HE INFORMED THE THRONG, “RECKIN IT’S THE CYLINDER HEAD, THERE’S BITS AND PIECES EVERYWHERE”. THUS, IT SEEMS, OUR LUCK HELD AGAIN WHO KNOWS, BUT FOR THE DELAY, WHETHER THAT ENGINE MIGHT HAVE FAILED ON TAKR-OFF [sic], AND WE HAD A 12,000 LB BOMB ON ABOARD.
SO THERE IT IS. ON COMPLETION OF THE TOURS I WAS SOON POSTED AWAY TO BECOME THE SHIFT NCO I/C THE PARACHUTE STORE AT WOOLFOX LODGE, AND WHERE THAT WAS I NOW HAVE NO IDEA. HOWEVER, WHILST THERE I HAD MY LAST FLIGHT IN A LANCASTER ON THE 20TH OF JUNE 1945, STANDING BEHIND THE PILOT ON A SIGHT SEEING TRIP OVER GERMANY IN DAYLIGHT. NO FIGHTERS, NO FLAX [sic] JUST GHASTLY DEVASTATION IN THE RHUR DOWN AS FAR AS COLOGNE AND EASTWARDS TO DORTMUND. WHICH REMINDS THAT ONLY A FEW WEEKS AGO WE WERE IN THE STATION AREA OF DORTMUND, WHERE EVEN THE TAXIS ARE MERCEDES BENZ REFLECTING THE GENERAL WEALTH. BARMY, AIN’T IT.
IN DECEMBER 1945 I MANAGED TO GET ON AN AIRFIELD CONTROL COURSE AT WATCHFIELD, NEAR SHRIVENHAM. HERE WE OCCASIONALLY FLEW IN ANSON AIRCRAFT, THE SAME AS AT GUNNERY SCHOOL SEEMINGLY SO MANY YEARS AGO. NOTHING HAD CHANGED, THE UNDERCARRIAGE STILL HAD TO BE WOUND UP AND DOWN BY HAND. HAVING SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED THE COURSE IN THE NEW YEAR, I WAS POSTED TO WELFORD, NEAR NEWBURY.
[page break]
39
WE WERE MARRIED AT THIS TIME SO I WAS ABLE TO COMMUTE FOR A WHILE VIA THE LAMBOURN VALLY [sic] RAILWAY AND PUSHBIKE. THE JOB AT WELFORD WAS LARGELY IN THE RUNWAY CARAVAN WHERE ONE IMPORTANTLY FLASHED LIGHJTS [sic] AND FIRED FLARES WHILST HOPEFULLY CONTROLLING AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS. ACCORDING TO THE SHIFT ONE WAS ON RATIONS WERE SENT OUT TO BE COOKED ON AN OLD PRIMUS STOVE, AND WHEN THE WEATHER WAS KIND IT WAS ALL SORT OF IDYLLIC, MUNCHING ON A BACON SANDWICH WITH A POT OF STRONG TEA HANDY, OBSERVING THE WILD LIFE ALL AROUND BEFORE THE FIRST AIRCRAFT TO LAND OR TAKE OFF DISTURBED THEM. INEVITABLY THIS COULD NOT LAST, AS WELFORD WAS BEING LESS AND LESS USED, AND SO I WAS SENT AWAY AGAIN, FIRST TO DISHFORTH IN YORKSHIRE AND FINALLY TO TERN HILL IN SHROPSHIRE. HERE I RECALL ENDLESS HOURS IN THE CONTROL TOWER LOGGING TRAINING HARVARD AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS. ONE HAD TO BE SURE THE NUMBERS THAT WENT OUT BALANCED THOSE THAT LANDED, OTHERWISE A GREAT FLAP AROSE, FOR WENLOCK EDGE AND THE WREKIN SEEMED TO ATTRACT THE UNWISE ATTENTION OF THE TYRO PILOTS.
EVENTUALLY THE R.A.F. AND I PARTED IN AUGUST 1946, WITH ME SENT TO OLYMPIA TO FIND A CIVVY SUIT. MY PARENTS HAD A FLAT AT POLPERRO AT THIS TIME, SO SYLVIA AND I WERE ABLE TO SOAK UP THE SUN IN THIS UNSPOILED VILLAGE BEFORE RETURNING TO NEWBURY AND WORK.
[underlined] WAS IT ALL WORTH IT; --- [/underlined] WELL, IT HAD TO BE, DIDN’T IT, AS I COME OUT UNSCATHED. AN ADVENTURE TO BE SURE, WITH GRAND AQUAINTANCES [sic] MET ON THE WAY. WITH OUR COMBINED GRATUITY WE BOUGHT SOME LAND ON WHICH OUR FIRST HOME WAS BUILT – BUT THAT’S ANOTHER STORY ----
RALPH BRIARS
BOURNMOUTH
1989
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Rear view - Ralph Briars memoir
Description
An account of the resource
Starts with tribute to crew and has colour photograph of a 617 Squadron Lancaster over Lincoln. Writes of his joining the RAF, selection as an air gunner and his basic training. Goes on with description of gunnery training, before going to OTU at RAF Cottesmore where he crewed (describes crew) up while training on Wellington. Carries on with description of heavy conversion unit flying Halifax and Lancaster. Provides description of turrets in both types. Provides a long description of a night sorties and discusses the level of training in the RAF for aircrew as well as problem of collisions. He is finally posted to become operational on 49 Squadron at RAF Fiskerton. He then provides a very detailed diary of the 14 operations he carried out on 49 Squadron followed by the 25 he carried out after the crew were posted to 617 Squadron. These sorties included the Saumur tunnel, V1 and V2 sites, the Tirpitz, Dortmund Ems canal and the Bielefeld viaduct. He concludes with some more anecdotes and his activities after he finished operational flying including getting married.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
R Briars
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1989
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Thirty-nine page printed document
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Memoir
Text. Diary
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
SBriarsRA1299161v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--London
England--Yorkshire
Scotland--Inverness-shire
Scotland--Inverness
England--Rutland
England--Leicestershire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Nottingham
Poland
Poland--Szczecin
Germany
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Magdeburg
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Schweinfurt
Germany--Augsburg
Germany--Nuremberg
France
France--Paris
Italy
Italy--Milan
France--Normandy
France--Saumur
France--Le Havre
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
France--Brest
France--Lorient
France--Creil
France--La Rochelle
Norway
Norway--Alta
Norway--Tromsø
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Netherlands
Netherlands--IJmuiden
Germany--Bielefeld
France--Tarbes
England--Hampshire
England--Bournemouth
France--Reims
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-01-06
1944-01-14
1944-01-20
1944-01-21
1944-01-27
1944-01-29
1944-02-15
1944-02-19
1944-02-20
1944-02-24
1944-02-25
1944-03-10
1944-03-15
1944-03-30
1944-04-18
1944-04-20
1944-04-22
1944-04-24
1944-06-06
1944-06-08
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
1944-06-19
1944-07-04
1944-07-17
1944-07-25
1944-07-31
1944-08-05
1944-08-06
1944-08-09
1944-08-11
1944-08-12
1944-08-13
1944-08-14
1944-09-11
1944-09-23
1944-10-29
1945-02-03
1945-03-02
1945-02-06
1944-03-31
1944-06-16
1944-07-05
1944-04-19
1944-06-09
1944-06-05
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Steve Christian
Steve Baldwin
1661 HCU
49 Squadron
617 Squadron
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
anti-aircraft fire
bombing
bombing of Nuremberg (30 / 31 March 1944)
bombing of the Boulogne E-boats (15/16 June 1944)
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
bombing of the Juvisy, Noisy-le-Sec and Le Bourget railways (18/19 April 1944)
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
Bombing of the Saumur tunnel (8/9 June 1944)
bombing of the Watten V-2 site (19 June 1944)
control caravan
control tower
Cook’s tour
crewing up
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Halifax
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Mk 2
Me 109
mid-air collision
Mosquito
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Normandy deception operations (5/6 June 1944)
Operational Training Unit
RAF Cottesmore
RAF Dalcross
RAF Fiskerton
RAF Husbands Bosworth
RAF Linton on Ouse
RAF Market Harborough
RAF Winthorpe
RAF Woodhall Spa
searchlight
service vehicle
Tallboy
Tirpitz
training
V-weapon
Wellington
Window
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1405/26420/LRobinsonFA33520v1.2.pdf
708f1dc7bd64207eea63cd6cffe934ff
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Robinson, F A
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2019-06-17
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Robinson, FA
Description
An account of the resource
Three items. The collection concerns Squadron Leader F A Robinson (b.1920, 33520 Royal Air Force) and contains his log books and a poem. He flew over 130 daylight operations with 1 PRU and 543 Squadron.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by P A Robinson and catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
F A Robinson’s flying log book for pilots. One
Description
An account of the resource
Flying log book for F A Robinson covering the period from 8 September 1938 to 22 January 1951. Detailing his flying training and operations flown, includes flight certificates, congratulatory messages and notes of appreciation from senior officers, a poem about 'Gremlins', newspaper clippings, photograph of a radar installation. He was stationed at RAF Cranwell (RAF College), RAF Old Sarum (S of AC), Abbeville (2 Squadron), RAF Odiham/Hendon (ROC Flt), RAF Hatfield/ Hendon (116 Squadron & 24 Squadron), RAF Benson/St. Eval (1 PRU & 543 Squadron). Aircraft flown in were Tutor, Hart, Hind, Audax, Hector, Lysander, Magister, Master, Roc, Stinson, Proctor, Spitfire, Anson, Wellington, Expediter, Oxford, Gladiator, Blenheim, Harvard, Tiger Moth, Hornet Moth, Meteor, Vampire. He flew over 130 daylight operations with 1 PRU and 543 Squadron. Photographic operations were flown over Le Havre, Honfleur, Cherbourg, Boulogne, Abbeville, Zeebrugge, Cap Gris Nez, Rotterdam, Antwerp, Ostend, Charleroi, Douai, Den Helder, Amsterdam, Lille, Bethune, St Omer, Leipzig, Ruhr, Flushing, Gronigen, Heppel, Cologne, Weert, Calais, Dunkirk, Nurnberg, Dortmund, Ems, Kiel, Emden, Cuxhaven, Franco-Spanish border, Brest, Bordeaux, St Nazaire, Ploumanac, Le Croisic, Ushant, St Lannion, Lorient, St Nazaire, Douarnez Bay, Pt Duraz, Morlaix, Toulouse, St Malo, Poissy, Lubeck, Travemunde, North German ports, Dortmund, Cologne, Stuttgart, Heilbronn, Frankfurt, Mezieres, Essen, Amsterdam, Swinemunde, Hamburg, Brussels, Liege, Gironde ports, La Pallice, Martha, Saarbrucken, Mealte, Aachen, Rouen, Alten fiord. The log book also lists his post war flights.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike French
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LRobinsonFA33520v.1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Norway
Belgium--Antwerp
Belgium--Brussels
Belgium--Charleroi
Belgium--Ostend
Belgium--Zeebrugge
England--Cornwall (County)
England--Hampshire
England--Hertfordshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Middlesex
England--Oxfordshire
England--Surrey
England--Wiltshire
France--Abbeville
France--Béthune
France--Brest
France--Calais
France--Cherbourg
France--Le Croisic
France--Douai
France--Douarnenez
France--Dunkerque
France--Le Havre
France--Honfleur
France--Lannion
France--Lille
France--Lorient
France--Charleville-Mézières
France--Morlaix
France--La Pallice
France--Poissy
France--Rouen
France--Toulouse
France--Ouessant Island
Germany--Aachen
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Cuxhaven
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Lübeck
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Saarbrücken
Netherlands--Amsterdam
Netherlands--Den Helder
Netherlands--Groningen
Netherlands--Rotterdam
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Netherlands--Weert
Norway--Altafjord
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Saarbrücken
France--Saint-Malo
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
Belgium--Liège
France--Bordeaux (Nouvelle-Aquitaine)
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
France--Ouessant Island
France--Saint-Nazaire
France--Cap Gris Nez
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1940-05-13
1940-05-14
1940-07-10
1940-07-11
1940-07-12
1940-07-23
1940-07-24
1940-07-29
1940-07-30
1940-08-02
1940-08-03
1940-08-06
1940-08-07
1940-08-10
1940-08-11
1940-08-14
1940-08-15
1940-08-18
1940-08-19
1940-09-11
1940-09-13
1940-09-18
1941-08-10
1941-08-17
1941-08-18
1941-08-19
1941-08-21
1941-08-22
1941-08-26
1941-08-27
1941-08-31
1941-09-02
1941-09-04
1941-09-16
1941-09-21
1941-09-22
1941-09-23
1941-09-26
1941-09-28
1941-10-02
1941-10-06
1941-10-13
1941-10-20
1941-10-23
1941-11-01
1941-11-03
1941-11-06
1941-11-12
1941-11-14
1941-11-18
1941-11-20
1941-11-24
1941-11-25
1941-12-01
1941-12-05
1941-12-07
1941-12-11
1941-12-13
1941-12-15
1941-12-19
1942-01-02
1942-01-04
1942-01-06
1942-01-09
1942-01-11
1942-01-12
1942-01-15
1942-01-16
1942-01-24
1942-01-26
1942-01-28
1942-02-02
1942-02-03
1942-02-05
1942-02-07
1942-02-08
1942-02-10
1942-02-11
1942-02-18
1942-02-19
1942-02-27
1942-03-05
1942-03-09
1942-03-24
1942-03-26
1942-03-27
1942-03-29
1942-04-02
1942-04-06
1942-04-12
1942-04-14
1942-04-16
1942-04-25
1942-04-30
1942-05-03
1942-05-06
1942-05-16
1942-05-18
1942-05-24
1942-05-28
1942-06-06
1942-06-17
1942-06-21
1942-06-22
1942-07-08
1942-07-18
1942-07-30
1942-08-06
1942-08-17
1942-08-18
1942-08-19
1942-08-23
1942-08-28
1942-09-11
1942-09-18
1942-10-04
1942-11-09
1942-11-10
1943-01-18
1943-06-25
1943-09-03
1943-09-05
1943-09-09
1943-09-13
1943-09-14
1943-09-19
1943-09-24
1943-09-26
1943-09-29
1943-10-09
1943-10-16
543 Squadron
aircrew
Anson
Blenheim
bombing
Flying Training School
Gneisenau
gremlin
Harvard
Lysander
Magister
Meteor
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
Photographic Reconnaissance Unit
pilot
Proctor
RAF Benson
RAF Cranwell
RAF Hatfield
RAF Hendon
RAF Odiham
RAF St Eval
Scharnhorst
Spitfire
Tiger Moth
Tirpitz
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1576/26032/LDentonDH1256316v1.1.pdf
5f6ad53a1df10feca9618224205170b6
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Denton, Dennis Hugh
D H Denton
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2020-01-14
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Denton, DH
Description
An account of the resource
59 items. The collection concerns Dennis Hugh Denton (b. 1920, 1256316 Royal Air Force) and contains his log book, documents, album and photographs. He flew 62 daylight operations with 21 and 226 Squadrons.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Angela Sadler and Pamela Hickson and catalogued by Trevor Hardcastle.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Dennis Denton's log book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LDentonDH1256316v1
Description
An account of the resource
Flying log book for Dennis Denton covering the period from 3 May 1941 to 8 March 1945. Detailing his flying training and operations flown. Includes a map of part of France including the Vitry area, his Gunnery Course results, Certificates and Proficiency Assessment, the Battle Order of 226 Sqdn as at 21 September 1944 and his aircraft being hit by anti-aircraft fire. He was stationed at RAF Yatesbury (2 Signals School), RAF Evanton (8 BGS), RAF Upwood (17 OTU), RAF Watton, RAF Oulton (139 Squadron); RAF Methwold (21 Squadron), RAF West Raynham (1428 Flt), RAF Bicester (13 OTU), RAF Swanton Morley (2 GSU), RAF Hartfordbridge (226 Squadron) and Vitry-en-Artois. Aircraft flown were Dominie, Proctor, Botha, Whitley, Anson, Blenheim, Bisley, Ventura, Defiant, Mitchell, Master, Dakota. He did two tours and flew 62 daylight operations with 21 and 226 Squadrons. Targets were IJmuiden, Morlaix, St Omer, Courtrai, Abbeville, Den Helder, Dunkirk, Rotterdam, St Briac, Cherbourg, Zeebrugge, Yainville, Poix, Floret d’Eperlecques, Floret d’Headine, Boulogne, Clermont, Rouen, Bergen op Zoom, Calais, Arnheim, Breskens, Amersfoort, Cadzand, Roermond, Deventer, Dunkirk, Wesel, Geemund, Duisburg, St Vith, Meppen, Neersbroich, Rees, Wegberg, Uden, Rheinberg, Xanten, The Hague. <span>His pilots on operations were </span>Sergeant Bellis, Wing Commander Kerr, Wing Commander Wood and Squadron Leader Edmond.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Belgium--Saint-Vith
Belgium--Zeebrugge
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Hampshire
England--Norfolk
England--Oxfordshire
England--Wiltshire
France--Abbeville
France--Calais
France--Cherbourg
France--Clermont-Ferrand
France--Dunkerque
France--Watten
France--Morlaix
France--Poix-du-Nord
France--Rouen
France--Saint-Briac-sur-Mer
France--Vitry-en-Artois
France--Yainville
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Meppen
Germany--Rees
Germany--Rheinberg
Germany--Wegberg
Germany--Xanten
Netherlands--Amersfoort
Netherlands--Bergen op Zoom
Netherlands--Breskens
Netherlands--Den Helder
Netherlands--Deventer
Netherlands--IJmuiden
Netherlands--Roermond
Netherlands--Rotterdam
Netherlands--Uden
Scotland--Ross and Cromarty
Belgium--Kortrijk
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
Germany--Wesel (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Netherlands--Hague
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike French
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1943-01-09
1943-01-22
1943-01-26
1943-01-29
1943-02-02
1943-02-03
1943-02-13
1943-02-17
1943-02-19
1943-02-26
1943-02-27
1943-03-29
1943-04-04
1943-04-15
1943-04-20
1943-04-21
1943-05-17
1943-05-24
1943-05-29
1943-06-11
1943-06-22
1943-06-24
1943-07-27
1943-07-29
1943-08-12
1943-08-30
1943-08-31
1943-09-02
1943-09-03
1943-09-04
1943-09-06
1943-09-08
1943-09-09
1944-08-25
1944-08-26
1944-08-28
1944-09-08
1944-09-09
1944-09-12
1944-09-13
1944-09-14
1944-09-15
1944-09-21
1944-09-23
1944-09-25
1944-09-26
1944-10-06
1944-10-13
1944-10-15
1944-10-24
1944-11-11
1944-11-15
1944-11-29
1944-12-02
1944-12-05
1944-12-24
1945-01-01
1945-01-05
1945-02-22
1945-02-23
1945-02-24
1945-02-25
1945-02-26
1945-02-28
1945-03-01
1945-03-03
13 OTU
139 Squadron
17 OTU
2 Group
21 Squadron
226 Squadron
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
anti-aircraft fire
B-25
Blenheim
Botha
C-47
Defiant
Dominie
Operational Training Unit
Proctor
RAF Bicester
RAF Evanton
RAF Hartford Bridge
RAF Methwold
RAF Oulton
RAF Swanton Morley
RAF Upwood
RAF Watton
RAF West Raynham
RAF Yatesbury
training
Ventura
Whitley
wireless operator / air gunner
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/939/25665/LMackieGA855966v2.1.pdf
373629f09a105028803c922e214a5645
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Mackie, George
George Alexander Mackie
G A Mackie
Description
An account of the resource
Nine items. An oral history interview with George Mackie (1920 - 2020, 855966 Royal Air Force) with his log books, diary extract, list of operations, battle order and photographs. He flew operations as a pilot with 15 and 214 Squadrons.
The collection was catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-12-22
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Mackie, GA
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[photograph]
[photograph]
Gm
[page break]
[assessment form]
([symbol]4690 – 117) Wt. 51983 – 5030 48,500 4/40 T.S. 700 FORM 414 (A)
[underlined] SUMMARY of FLYING and ASSESSMENTS FOR YEAR COMMENCING 1st [/underlined] August [symbol][underlined] 19 [/underlined] 43
([symbol] For Officer, Insert “JUNE” : For Airman Pilot, Insert “AUGUST.”)
S.E. AIRCRAFT Day Night M.E. AIRCRAFT Day Night TOTAL for year GRAND TOTAL All Service Flying
DUAL 81.00
PILOT 1070.00
PASSENGER – – – – 35.00
[underlined] ASSESSMENT of ABILITY [/underlined]
(To be assessed as:– Exceptional, Above the Average, Average, or Below the Average)
(i) AS A HB [symbol] PILOT Above the Average.
(ii) AS PILOT-NAVIGATOR/NAVIGATOR Above the Average.
(iii) IN BOMBING
(iv) IN AIR GUNNERY
[symbol] Insert :– “F.”, “L.B.”, “G.R.”, “F.B.”, etc.
[underlined] ANY POINTS IN FLYING OR AIRMANSHIP WHICH SHOULD BE WATCHED [/underlined]
– NIL –
Date 2nd Oct. 1943
Signature [signature] W/C
Officer Commanding 1651 Con Unit.
[page break]
[photograph]
[photograph]
[page break]
[photograph]
[page break]
[leave pass form]
SO.P. FLYING CONTROL
[underlined] R.A.F. Sub Form 295. [/underlined]
[stamp] Stamp of Station not Unit. [inserted] 35/89 [/inserted]
ROYAL AIR FORCE.
Monthly LEAVE PASS FORM 295
[deleted] This Pass is/is not valid for Northern Ireland and/or Eire [/deleted]
Station WITCHFORD Official No. 2016392
Rank Cpl Name DEAN
Form 1250 No. 1231123 has permission to be
absent from [deleted] his [/deleted][inserted] her [/inserted] quarters from 13.00 hrs on 18.11.43 to 13.00 hrs on 19.11.43 1943. for the purpose of proceeding on [deleted][underlined] leave [/underlined][/deleted] [inserted] SO.P. [/inserted] to NEWMARKET
[deleted] Pass [/deleted]
Date 16.11.43. J.A. Spring A/S/O. for Commanding Officer
[signature] Strike out the words inapplicable.
[continued on duplicate page]
[sick form]
[inserted] Pilot 214 Sqd. Chedburgh Bury St. Edmonds. [/inserted]
[underlined] CONFIDENTIAL [/underlined]
SICK REPORT
MEDICAL INSPECTION REPORT
R.A.F. Form 624.
Unit
Station [indecipherable word] Sands
Date 30/11/ 1943
Official No. G45866
Rank W/O
Name and Initials MACKIE. [inserted] (member of aircrew) [/inserted]
Whether a [missing letters]ulter or if [missing letters]or duty [symbol]
Disease Abrasion and bruising of [symbol] upper arm due to injury by shrapnel. E.A.
Medical Officer’s Remarks [indecipherable words]
Disposal [indecipherable word]
[symbol] Strike out whichever is not applicable.
[symbol] State nature of duty for which warned. In the case of [missing word] for medical inspection the reason, such as “joining the station,” etc. should be stated against their duties.
Orderly N.C.O.’s Signature
Medical Officer’s Signature Dr. Andrews HW
WI. 23194/1307. 205031. 6/42. V.B. 51-2700.
[page break]
[continued on duplicate page]
[newspaper cutting]
[missing letter]LANE KILLS FIVE CHILDREN
CRASHED ON SMALL FARM-HOUSE
Five children, aged from 1 to 9 years, were killed when an aircraft on Wednesday night crashed into Cliffe House, a small farmhouse near Amble, Northumberland. One of the crew was saved. The farmhouse is occupied by Mr. William Robson.
The children were Sylvia Robson (9), Ethel (7), Marjorie (5), William Matthew (3), and Sheila (1). They were in bed at the time following a party, and the father and mother and two friends, Mr. and Mrs. J. Rowall, of Pilston, Amble, were injured but not seriously.
The survivor of the crew said that the plane had been experiencing trouble, but the pilot managed to keep it in the air until he was safely over [missing word] town, but after that was unable to maintain control and crashed into the farmhouse.
The airman saved owed his life to the courage and promptitude of Mr. Rowall, who rushed out and pulled him from the ‘plane though the man’s clothes were on fire. He rolled him on the ground and put the fire out.
With the children’s deaths Mr. and Mrs. Robson have lost the whole of their family.
Mr. James Rowell told a Press Association reporter last night: “We heard a ‘plane flying very low. I shouted, “Look out!” and we all threw ourselves on the floor. The house collapsed above our heads, and, looking upwards we saw the sky. Mrs. Robson shouted “Oh my poor bairns!” and tried to make her way towards the stairs, which had been blown away.” The children’s partly-charred bodies were later recovered.
Mr. and Mrs. Robson would have been in bed when the ‘plane crashed if they had not been visited by the Rowells. Mr. Rowell said: “We are the luckiest people in the world to be alive to-day. The chairs we were sitting on were smashed, and the walls in that part of the house are not more than 3ft. high now.
[page break]
[sketch]
[inserted][missing word] Pontoon [missing word] Marked Dec 1943 [/inserted]
[inserted] Pedro (Honeyman) Downham Mkt December 1943 [/inserted]
[inserted] my Flight engineer South American [/inserted]
[page break]
[photograph]
[photograph]
Dick Gunton
Flight engineer
(died. Atkinson’s disease c. 1995)
[photograph]
? / MG owned by Gm
[page break]
[photograph]
[photograph]
[photograph]
[page break]
F/LT Vern L Scantleton DFC War Experience 2
On the 11th March 1944, I was called to the Wing Commanders office and told that I was to take Flight Lieutenant Cam Lye, a pilot in the Royal New Zealand Air Force and Roy Forbes, my navigator and a skeleton crew and go to Langford Lodge R.A.F. Station in Northern Ireland and fly back a B-17 aircraft. This on the surface looked to be a simple and routine exercise. Pilot Officer George Mackie and crew were to fly us over and wait until we had taken off which was to be the following morning. At this stage it is worth giving a few comments on George Mackie. George was one of the great characters of the Royal Air Force. In 1940, he was studying architecture at Edinburgh University when he joined the R.A.F. and gained his wings as a pilot. George was well read, witty, highly intelligent and one of the few to have had his log book endorsed as an exceptional pilot.
--
On the debit side, he was very bad tempered, argumentative, sarcastic, “red-ragger” and a true Scot in that he had an intense dislike for the British. He did little to conceal his various dislikes and thus paid a high price as he was only commissioned in 1944. With his ability, he should have won a commission in 1940 and with the passing of time and the loss of pilots, he could have reasonably have expected to have risen to the rank of at least Wing Commander by the end of the war. George apparently has not changed and fifty years later I was to read a humorous letter that he had written to Roy Forbes in New Zealand in which in part, he refers to the fact that his unmarried daughter lives in Spain and collects cats, dogs and men in that order. I well remember the trip across the Irish Sea as it was a beautiful day and as we approached the Isle of Man, George took the aircraft down to zero feet and skimmed across the waves. This is a very dangerous stunt as water is very deceptive and a moment’s inattention can put the aircraft into the drink. As we approached the Isle of Man, George raised the nose of the aircraft and we slid across the Island at tree top height, no doubt frightening the hell out of animals and humans alike.
[page break]
[photograph]
[page break]
[photograph]
[page break]
[underlined] No. 214 (F.M.S.) Squadron. [/underlined]
[underlined] BATTLE ORDER. [/underlined]
[underlined] 21st May, 1944 [/underlined].
Pilot – “N”(386) P/O Mackie & F/S. Hill. – “B”(382) W/O Morrison
Nav. – F/O O’Leary – F/Sgt. Mitchell
Wo/Air – P/O Campbell – F/Sgt. Thompson
A.B. – F/Sgt. Morris – Sgt. Finch
M.U.G. – F/Sgt. Flack – Sgt. Mael
A.G. – Sgt. Foll – Sgt. Wing
F/Eng. – Sgt. Honeyman – Sgt. Carr
Ball Gnr. – W/O Taylor
Spec. Op. – Sgt. Hoffman – Sgt. Lloyd
Pilot – “A”(384) F/O Corke – “H”(388) P/O Gilbert & F/Sgt. Archibald
Nav. – Sgt. Podger – F/O Knight
Wo/Air – Sgt. Bonner – F/O Crossman
A.B. – F/O Foskett – P/O McGilchrist
M.U.G. – Sgt. Roose – Sgt. Boyle
A.G. – F/Sgt. Boanas – F/Lt. Sharpe, AFC.
F/Eng. – Sgt. Barber – Sgt. Pugh
Ball Gnr. – Sgt. Delisle – F/Sgt. West
Sped. [sic] Op. – Sgt. Stelling – Sgt. Haveland
[underlined] CERTIFIED FLIGHT OVER FOUR HOURS DURATION [/underlined].
Briefing . . . . . . . . . . 18.00 hrs.
Meals . . . to be notified.
Officer i/c Operations: W/Cmdr. McGlinn.
[signature] F/Lt.
for Wing Commander, Commanding
No. 214 (F.M.S.) Squadron.
[page break]
From : 169724, P/O G.A. Mackie.
To : Wing Commander, Commanding No. 214 (F.M.S./B.S.) Squadron.
Date : 27th June, 1944.
Sir,
I have the honour to forward this [deleted] my [/deleted] application for your consideration.
My crew, undermentioned, and myself, wish to complete our tour of operations with a 3 Group Lancaster Squadron. The reason for the application is that the crew have been with 214 Squadron for 12 months now, and have done on an average only 16 operations each. I myself have been with 214 Squadron since 2nd October, 1943, and have done only 11 operations. (Second tour.) The navigator has been trained on H2S.
Nav. F/O O’Leary [inserted] .156452. [/inserted]
B/A. F/S. Morris [inserted] 1338960. [/inserted]
F/Eng. F/S. Honeyman [inserted] 1394447. [/inserted]
W/Op. P/O Campbell [inserted] 169395. [/inserted]
R/G. W/O Taylor [inserted] A.410278. [/inserted]
M.U.G. F/S. Fell [inserted] 141058595. [/inserted]
I have the honour to be, Sir, you obedient servant,
P/O
[page break]
[photograph]
SR386
[page break]
[photograph]
[photograph]
? Gunton
[photograph]
[page break]
To : O.C., No. 214 (F.M.S.) (B.S.) Squadron.
From : 169724 F/O G.A. Mackie.
Date : 19th August, 1944.
[underlined] Aerobatics over Moreton-on-Marsh [/underlined].
Sir,
I have the honour to report that on the night of 6/7 August I was diverted to Moreton-on-March while returning from an operational flight in Fortress aircraft Mk.11, HB.763.
I took off for base at mid-day on the 7th. After doing a normal circuit I lost height over the airfield, where the only activity was one Stirling aircraft taxying on the perimeter track. I then pulled up into a climbing turn to port, followed by a climbing turn to starboard. I then continued climbing on course.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
[page break]
[photograph]
? – Moorby – Fell – Taylor? – F/O Wells
W/O Taylor? NZ – ‘Pedro’ Honeyman Engineer – Gm – O’Leary Navigator – W/O Hoffman?
[photograph]
[page break]
[underlined] No. 214 (F.M[missing letter]) (B.S.) Squadron [/underlined].
[underlined] BATTLE ORDER 22nd AUGUST, 1944 [underlined].
[underlined] “G” (HB.774) [/underlined]
Pilot F/O Wright
Nav F/S Mulligger
WO/Air F/S Bates
A.B. W/O Sherbourne
M.U.G. W/O Robson
A/G F/S Southgate
F/Eng. Sgt. Williams
Wst. G. F/S Williams
Wst. G. Sgt. Barrett
Sp. Op. Sgt. Bayliss.
[underlined] “T” (HB.763) [/underlined]
Pilot W/O Lee
Nav W/O Gibbons
WO/Air Sgt. Smith
A.B. Sgt. Pitchford
M.U.G. Sgt. Barkess
A/G Sgt. Williamson
F/Eng. Sgt. Curtis
Wst. G. F/S Boag, DFM.
Wst. G. Sgt. Caulfield
Sp. Op. Sgt. McNamara.
[underlined] “B” (HB.788) [/underlined]
Pilot F/Lt. Bray
Nav F/O Blyth
WO/Air F/S Roberts
A.B. F/O Murphy
M.U.G. P/O McGarvis
A/G P/O Lyall
F/Eng. P/O Sainsbury
Wst. G. W/O Moore
Wst. G. F/O Bryant
Sp. Op. F/O Lang.
[underlined] “C” (HB.780) [/underlined]
Pilot F/O Bettles
Nav. F/O Evans
WO/Air F/O Kinzett
A.B. F/O McGilchrist
M.U.G. P/O Connolly
A/G F/S Smyth
F/Eng. F/O Cann
Wst. G. Sgt. Chalk
Wst. G. --
Sp. Op. Sgt. Peters.
[underlined] “Q” (HB.772) [/underlined]
Pilot F/O Rix
Nav. F/S Sargeant
WO/Air F/S Irvine
A.B. F/O Lovel-Smith
M.U.G. Sgt. Cuttance
A/G Sgt. Douglas
F/Eng. Sgt. Pond
Wst. G. Sgt. Gamble
Wst. G. Sgt. Burgess
Sp. Op. F/O Darracott.
[underlined] “R” (HB.765) [/underlined]
Pilot F/Lt. Lye
Nav. F/S Stemp
WO/Air F/S Ord-Hume
A.B. F/S Braithwaite
M.U.G. F/S Stokes
A/G Sgt. Knowlton
F/Eng. F/S Currie
Wst. G. F/O Ufton
Wst. G. F/S Lumley
Sp. Op. Sgt. Mackintosh.
[underlined] “D” (SR.378) [/underlined]
Pilot. F/O Mackie
Nav. F/O O’Leary
WO/Air. W/O Mooreby
A.B. F/S Morris
M.U.G. W/O Flack
A.G. F/O Wells, DFM.
F/Eng. F/S Honeyman
Wst. G. W/O Taylor
Wst. G. F/S Fell
Sp. Op. P/O Hoffman.
[underlined] “F” (SR.383) [/underlined]
Pilot. W/O Archibald
Nav. Sgt. Cottrell
WO/Air. F/S Shepherd
A.B. W/O Harriott
M.U.G. F/S Hodgson
A.G. Sgt. Larcombe
F/Eng. F/S Richardson
Wst. G. F/S Phillips
Wst. G. F/S Earle, DFM.
Sp. Op. Sgt. Herbert.
[underlined] CERTIFIED FLIGHT OVER FOUR HOURS DURATION. [/underlined]
Meals 17.45
Transport 18.15
Briefing 18.30
Officer i/c Operations – W/Cdr. D.J. McGlinn.
[underlined] NOTE. [/underlined]
THERE WILL BE NO ALTERATION TO THE BATTLE ORDER WITHOUT AUTHORISATION BY THE SQUADRON [underlined] COMMANDER OR HIS DEPUTY. [/underlined]
Keith EW Evans F/O
For Wing Commander, Commanding,
[underlined] No. 214 (F.M.S.) (B.S.) Squadron [/underlined].
[page break]
[underlined] Return of Operational Aircrew as at 16.00 hrs. on 31st August, 1944 [/underlined].
[underlined] “A” FLIGHT [/underlined].
Pilot F/Lt. Bray 22.
Nav. F/O Blyth 20.
WO/Air F/S. Roberts 19.
A.B. F/O Murphy 20.
M.U.G. P/O McGarvie 20.
R/Gnr. P/O Lyall 19.
F/Eng. P/O Sainsbury 19.
W/Gnr. P/O Moore (30)13.
W/Gnr. F/O Bryant (31) 8.
Pilot F/Lt. [inserted]£[/inserted] Peden 25 1/2.
Nav. Sgt. Mather 23 1/2.
WO/Air F/S. Stanley, DFM. 19 1/2.
A.B. F/O Waters 25 1/2.
M.U.G. F/S. Lester 21 .
R/Gnr. W/O Phillips 22 1/2.
F/Eng. F/S. Bailey 22 1/2.
W/Gnr. F/S. Walker 14 1/2.
W/Gnr. F/S. Hepton 12 1/2.
Pilot F/Lt. Scantleton 19 .
Nav. F/O Forbes 20 .
WO/Air W/O McDonald 20 .
A.B. Sgt. Scott 19 .
M.U.G. F/S Hewitt 14 1/2.
R/Gnr. W/O Connolly (30)12 1/2.
F/Eng. Sgt. Nuttall 18 1/2.
W/Gnr. F/S. Taylor 17 1/2.
W/Gnr. P/O Milton (18)10 1/2.
Pilot F/O Corke 12 .
Nav. F/S. Podger 10 .
WO/Air F/S Bonner 9 .
A.B. F/O Foskett 10 .
M.U.G. F/S. Roose 10 1/2.
R/Gnr. W/O Boanas (24)12 .
F/Eng. F/S. Barber 10 1/2.
W/Gnr. W/O Delisle 9 .
W/Gnr. Sgt. Gregory 5 1/2.
Pilot F/O Lawson 19 1/2.
Nav. P/O Chappell 19 1/2.
WO/Air F/S. Atkinson 17 1/2.
A.B. W/O Halldorson 18 1/2.
M.U.G. P/O Knight 17 .
R/Gnr. W/O McCann 17 .
F/Eng. Sgt. Anstee 16 1/2.
W/Gnr. F/O Hawkins (21)15 .
W/Gnr. W/O Gill (34) 8 1/2.
Pilot F/Lt Gilbert 19 .
Nav. F/O Knight 22 .
WO/Air F/O Crossman 19 1/2.
A.B. P/O Watts (29) 8 1/2.
M.U.G. W/O Boyle 23 .
R/Gnr. F/O Claxton 17 .
F/Eng. F/S. Pugh 20 .
W/Gnr. W/O West 19 1/2.
W/Gnr. P/O Mardell (27)10 .
Pilot F/O [inserted]£[/inserted] Jackson 14 .
Nav. F/S. Harding 14 .
WO/Air F/S. Pollard 14 .
A.B. W/O Picciano 14 .
M.U.G. F/S. Hardie 16 .
R/Gnr. F/S. Bright 14 .
F/Eng. F/S. Bartlett 14 .
W/Gnr. P/O Jones, DFM. (27)10 .
W/Gnr. Sgt. Fletcher 3 1/2.
Pilot F/O Wright 16 .
Nav. F/S. Mullenger 16 .
WO/Air F/S. Bates 16 .
A.B. W/O Sherbourne 15 1/2.
M.U.G. W/O Robson (28) 10
R/Gnr. F/S. Southgate 17 .
F/Eng. Sgt. Williams 17 .
W/Gnr. F/S. Williams 17 .
W/Gnr. Sgt. Barrett 5 1/2.
Pilot W/O [inserted]£[/inserted] Archibald 10 1/2.
Nav F/S. Cottrell 10 1/2.
WO/Air F/S. Shepherd 10 1/2.
A.B. W/O Harriott 12 1/2.
M.U.G. F/S. Hodgson 10 .
R/Gnr. F/S. Larcombe 10 1/2.
F/Eng. F/S. Richardson 4 1/2.
W/Gnr. F/S. Phillips (26) 7 1/2.
W/Gnr. W/O Earle, DFM. (28) 5 1/2.
Pilot F/O Bettles (21) 15 1/2.
Nav. F/O Evans 19 .
WO/Air F/O Kinsett 19 1/2.
A.B. F/O McGilchrist 25 1/2.
M.U.G. P/O Connolly 23 1/2.
R/Gnr. F/S. Smyth 24 1/2.
F/Eng. F/O Cann 19 1/2.
W/Gnr. Sgt. Chalk 5 1/2.
W/Gnr.
Pilot F/Lt. Savage 3 1/2.
Nav. F/S. Pike 1 1/2.
WO/Air Sgt. Rishworth 1 1/2.
A.B. F/O Craven 1 .
M.U.G. Sgt. Astbury 1 1/2.
R/Gnr. Sgt. Kenney 1 1/2.
F/Eng. Sgt. Lee 1 1/2.
W/Gnr. Sgt. Judge 1 1/2.
W/Gnr. Sgt. Hamblett 1 1/2.
[underlined] “B” FLIGHT [/underlined].
Pilot S/L. Miller, DFC. (36)7 .
Nav. F/Lt. Graham, DFC. (34)8 1/2.
WO/Air W/O Lancashire (34)6 1/2.
A.B. F/Lt. Taffs (35)7 .
M.U.G. W/O Burn (29)7 1/2.
R/Gnr.
F/Eng. F/S. Cox 7 .
W/Gnr. W/O Rogers (25)7 .
W/Gnr. Sgt. Finnigan 3 1/2.
Pilot F/Lt. Puterbough 21 .
Nav. F/Lt. Dickson 18 1/2.
WO/Air F/S. Wright 19 .
A.B. W/O Joyce 18 .
M.U.G.
R/Gnr. W/O Bowman 20 .
F/Eng. Sgt. Parkington 19 .
W/Gnr. Sgt. Logan 15 .
W/Gnr. F/S. Brown (25) 7 .
Pilot F/Lt. [inserted]£[/inserted] Lye 14 1/2.
Nav. F/S. Stemp 14 1/2.
WO/Air F/S. Ord-Hume 14 1/2.
A.B. F/S. Braithwaite 14 1/2.
M.U.G. F/S. Stokes 15 .
R/Gnr. F/S. Knowlton 14 1/2.
F/Eng. F/S. Currie 15 .
W/Gnr. F/O Ufton (31) 8 .
W/Gnr. F/S. Lumley (28) 8 .
Pilot F/O Bayliss 16 1/2.
Nav. F/S. Creech 15 1/2
WO/Air F/S. Charlton 15 1/2.
A.B. W/O Crerar 15 1/2.
M.U.G. F/S. Edmonds 15 1/2.
R/Gnr. Sgt. Bailey 14 1/2.
F/Eng. Sgt. Carter 14 1/2.
W/Gnr. F/S. Wilson (13) 7 .
W/Gnr. Sgt. Christie 10 1/2.
Pilot F/O Rawlin 24 1/2.
Nav F/O Owen 20 .
WO/Air F/S. Bonnet 22 1/2.
A.B. F/S. Andrew 21 1/2.
M.U.G. Sgt. Ward 22 1/2.
R/Gnr. F/S. Fothergill 22 1/2.
F/Eng. F/S. Pottle 22 .
W/Gnr. W/O Stewart, DFM (25) 6 .
W/Gnr. W/O Heath (26) 8 .
Pilot F/O Mackie (20)16 1/2.
Nav. F/O O’Leary 21 1/2.
WO/Air W/O Mooreby 14 1/2.
A.B. F/S. Morris 23 1/2.
M.U.G. W/O Flack 21 .
R/Gnr. F/O Wells, DFM. (27) 5 1/2.
F/Eng. F/S. Honeyman 23 1/2.
W/Gnr. W/O Taylor 25 1/2.
W/Gnr. F/S. Fell 22 1/2.
Pilot F/O Morrison 15 .
Nav. F/S. Mitchell 15 .
WO/Air W/O Thompson 15 .
A.B. Sgt. Finch 15 .
M.U.G. W/O Lyon (29) 10 1/2.
R/Gnr. F/S. Wing 16 .
F/Eng. F/Sgt. Carr 12 .
W/Gnr. F/S. Mael 15 .
W/Gnr. F/S. Dutton (25) 7 1/2.
Pilot F/O Hill 15 .
Nav. P/O Honsinger 15 .
WO/Air [inserted]F[/inserted] /Sgt. Goodwin 15 .
A.B. F/O Harrison 14 .
M.U.G. F/S. Ives 15 .
R/Gnr. F/S. Andrews 17 1/2.
F/Eng. F/S. Gregory 15 .
W/Gnr. W/O Clark (28) 7 1/2.
W/Gnr. Sgt. Brown 9 1/2.
Pilot F/O Rix 3.
Nav. F/S. Sargeant 1.
WO/Air W/O. Irvine 1.
A.B. F/O Lovell-Smith 1.
M.U.G. [inserted]F[/inserted] /Sgt. Cuttance 1.
R/Gnr. [inserted]F[/inserted] /Sgt. Douglas 1.
F/Eng. Sgt. Pound 1.
W/Gnr. Sgt. Gamble 1.
W/Gnr. Sgt. Burgess 1.
Pilot F/Lt. Filloul (30) 2.
Nav. P/O Dodds 2.
WO/Air Sgt. Birkby 2.
A.B. F/O Dack 2.
M.U.G. Sgt. Benson 2.
R/Gnr. Sgt. Billington 2.
F/Eng. Sgt. Wilson 2.
W/Gnr. Sgt. Dobson 2.
W/Gnr. Sgt. Cooper 2.
[underlined] SQUADRON H.Q. PERSONNEL [/underlined].
W/Cmdr. D.D. Rogers 9. [underlined] Squadron Commander [/underlined]. F/Lt. D.J. Furner, DFC. (24) 7 1/2. [underlined] Navigation Officer [/underlined]. F/Lt. V.V. Doy (30) 5 1/2. ([indecipherable word]) [underlined] Signals Leader [/underlined].
F/O E.J. Phillips, DFC. (18) 11. [underlined] Gunnery Leader [/underlined]. F/Lt. R. Gunton (28) 9. [underlined] F/Eng. Leader [/underlined].
([underlined] Continued over [/underlined].)
[page break]
[newspaper cutting]
D.F.C. FOR CUPAR OFFICER
Flying Officer George A. Mackie (24), son of Mr and Mrs D.G. Mackie, Monreith, Cupar, who has been awarded the D.F.C., was educated at Bell Baxter School.
Prior to joining up in 1940 he was a student at Dundee College of Art. His father was colonel and O.C. of 1st Fife Home Guard.
Flying Officer Mackie, who has taken part in many operations against the enemy, in the course of which he has displayed the utmost fortitude, courage and devotion to duty, was commissioned in 1943, after service in the ranks.
[page break]
[assessment form]
([symbol]4690 – 117) Wt. 51983 – 5030 48,500 4/40 T.S. 700 FORM 414 (A)
[underlined] SUMMARY of FLYING and ASSESSMENTS FOR [deleted] YEAR [/deleted][inserted] 214 Squadron [/inserted] COMMENCING 1st [/underlined] October 1943 [symbol] 15 Sept [symbol][underlined] 19 [/underlined] 44
([symbol] For Officer, Insert “JUNE” : For Airman Pilot, Insert “AUGUST”)
S.E. AIRCRAFT Day Night M.E. AIRCRAFT Day Night TOTAL for year GRAND TOTAL All Service Flying
DUAL – – 1.30 –
PILOT – – 139.30 111.00 252.30 1409.40
PASSENGER – – – –
[underlined] ASSESSMENT of ABILITY [/underlined]
(To be assessed as:– Exceptional, Above the Average, Average, or Below the Average)
(i) AS A H.B. [symbol] PILOT Above the Average.
(ii) AS PILOT-NAVIGATOR/NAVIGATOR Above the Average.
(iii) IN BOMBING N.A.
(iv) IN AIR GUNNERY N.A.
[symbol] Insert :– “F.”, “L.B.”, “G.R.”, “F.B.”, etc.
[underlined] ANY POINTS IN FLYING OR AIRMANSHIP WHICH SHOULD BE WATCHED [/underlined]
Date 15 September 1944
Signature DD Rogers W/Cmdr.
Officer Commanding No 214 Squadron.
[newspaper cutting]
R.A.F. Awards
The following R.A.F. awards are announced to Scottish officers and airmen who have displayed the utmost fortitude, courage, and devotion to duty.
DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS. – Flying Officer George Alexander Mackie (Cupar), Flying Officer Thomas Newlands [indecipherable word] (Edinburgh), Pilot Officer Thomas Bowley [indecipherable word] Pilot Officer George [indecipherable words], and Warrant Officer John Wright (Glasgow).
[page break]
[stamp] SECRET
[stamp] IMMEDIATE
[inserted] 3310/6/2 [/inserted]
[inserted] 33/510
550
oc214 [/inserted]
RAY – SNO –[inserted] Snoring [/inserted] – FLS [inserted] Foulsham [/inserted] – OUL [inserted] oulton [/inserted] – NCK – MSM – SNG
V EDR NR HBC 140/12 ‘OP’
[stamp]12 SEP 1944 R.A.F. OULTON
FROM HQ BOMBER COMMAND 121840B
TO AIR MINISTRY WHITEHALL NOS 1 3 4 5 6 8 19 92 93 100 GROUPS
AND ALL BOMBER COMMAND BASES AND STATIONS IN THESE GROUPS
1 2 3 BOMBARDMENT DIVISION
INFO ADMIRALTY
SECRET QQY BT
[underlined] BOMBER COMMAND INTELLIGENTCE NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS NO 901 SECRE[missing letter][/underlined]
[underlined] PART II. [/underlined]
[underlined] NIGHT 11/12TH SEPTEMBER [/underlined].
DARMSTADT. 5/5 LANCASTERS OF 1 GROUP, 204/221 LANCASTERS AND 14/14 MOSQUITOES OF 5 GROUP ATTACKED IN CLEAR WEATHER WITH SLIGHT HAZE. MARKING WAS PUNCTUAL AND WELL PLACED AND BOMBING IS REPORTED AS VERY CONCENTRATED. FIRES QUICKLY GAINING SUCH A HOLD THAT THE ENTIRE TARGET AREA BECAME ENVELOPED IN A MASS OF FLAME, THE GLOW OF WHICH WAS VISIBLE 100 MILES AWAY. SLIGHT TO MODERATE [deleted] HEAC [/deleted] HEAVY FLAK WAS ENCOUNTERED, BUT FIGHTER ACTIVITY WAS EXPERIENCED THROUGHOUT THE ROUTE EAST OF 5 DEGREES EAST. PARTICULARLY IN THE TARGET AREA.
12 LANCASTERS ARE MISSING.
BERLIN. 41/47 MOSQUITOES OF 8 (PF) GROUP BOMBER FOR 21,000 FT. TO 28,000 FT. IN GOOD WEATHER CONDITIONS. T.I’S WERE WELL CONCENTRATED AND BOMBING WAS CARRIED OUT WITHIN THE MARKED AREA. ONE LARGE EXPLOSION AND SEVERAL SMALL FIRES ARE REPORTED. DEFENCES WERE MODERATE TO INTENSE HEAVY FLAK.
1 MOSQUITO IF MISSING.
STEENWIJK/HAVELTE A/F. 3/7 MOSQUITOES OF 8 (PF) GROUP ATTACKED AND BOMBED FROM 30,000 FT IN CLEAR WEATHER. THERE WERE NO DEFENCES.
MINELAYING. 7/8 LANCASTERS OF 1 GROUP 27/30 LANCASTERS OF 3 GROUP 18/20 HALIFAXES OF 4 GROUP AND 17/18 HALIFAXES OF 6 GROUP LAID MINES IN THE ALLOTTED AREAS.
[underlined] BOMBER SUPPORT. 100 GROUP [/underlined]
13/13 A/C PROVIDEDMANDREL SCREEN.
[inserted] GM – [/inserted] 5/5 A/C CARRIED OUT H.F. JAMMING, ACCOMPANYING THE BOMBERS TO DARMSTADT.
17/18 MOSQUITOES COMPLETED SERRATE PATROLS TO THE EAST, NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE DARMSTADT AREA, AND CLAIM 1 ME 110 DESTROYED AND 1 CHASE.
14/14 MOSQUITOES CARRIED OUT INTRUDER PATROLS OVER ENEMY A/F’S AND CLAIM 2 UNIDENTIFIED E/A DAMAGED.
12/12 MOSQUITOES CARRIED OUT HIGH LEVEL INTRUDER PATROLS IN THE DARMSTADT AREA AND IN THE VICINITY OF ENEMY NIGHT FIGHTER BEACONS IN DENMARK. 3 JU188’S ARE CLAIMED AS DESTROYED AND 1 JU 188 DAMAGED.
9/11 A/: COMPLETED SIGNALS INVESTIGATION PATROLS, ESCORTED BY 2 MOSQUITOES WHO CLAIM 5 CHASES.
[underlined] A.D.G.B. [/underlined]
16/17 MOSQUITOES PATROLED A/F’S IN GERMANY AND HOLLAND CLAIM: 1 JU88 DESTROYED
BT 121840B
MP BB+ [inserted] R2030 KQ [/inserted]
[page break]
[vertical][posting notice]
[inserted] 10524 02 214 Sqa [/inserted]
[underlined] POSTGRAM POSTING NOTICE [/underlined] A.M. FORM 1693
COPY “A”
TO: DESPATCHING GROUP
NO. GROUP
100
[cross hatched] COPY “B”
TO: DESPATCHING COMMAND
Bomber
COPY “C”
TO: RECEIVING GROUP
NO. GROUP
44
COPY “D”
TO: RECEIVING COMMAND
Transport
COPY “E”
TO:
[indecipherable]
(ACCOUNTS 2’d)
[indecipherable]
COPY “F”
TO:
[indecipherable words]
COPY “G”
TO:
[indecipherable words]
[/cross hatched]
ORGINATOR’S ADDRESS.
AIR MINISTRY,
LONDON, W.C.2.
TAKE ACTION ON THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTION
NAME AND RANK OF POSTING OFFICER} H.D. Wardle S/L for D.G. of P.
SERIAL REF. DGP/BC/8926/44/17
DATE 25.9.44.
PERSONAL NO. 169724
BASIC RANK. F/O
ACTING RANK –
NAME AND INITIALS Mackie G.A. [symbol]
BRANCH OR AIRCREW CATEGORY Pilot
[symbol] NATIONALITY
[symbol][underlined] POSTING/[deleted][indecipherable][/deleted][/underlined]
FROM: UNIT [circled] 214 Sqdn. [/circled] GROUP 100 DUTIES Flying RANK OF POST – }
TO: UNIT 1332 C.U. Langtown GROUP 44 DUTIES F/I RANK OF POST – } DATE OF EFFECT 2.10.44.
[underlined] ACTING RANK [/underlined] (QUOTING RANK AND DATE OF EFFECT) GRANTED RETAINED RELINQUISHED
[underlined] REMARKS [/underlined]
[underlined] ACTION AND CIRCULATION [/underlined]
1
[underlined] DESPATCHING GROUP [/underlined][inserted] HD [/inserted]
TO NOTE AND PASS TO
[underlined] DESPATCHING UNIT [/underlined]
FOR ACTION
2
[underlined] TO AIR MINISTRY POSTING BRANCH [/underlined]
CERTIFIED INDIVIDUAL HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED ACCORDINGLY AND P.O.R. ACTION TAKEN.
(UNIT) 214 Sqdn (SIGNED) GA Mackie F/Lt DATE 29/9
3
AIR MINISTRY ACTION:
TO [underlined] D.G. of P. (DUPLICATE RECORDS) [/underlined]
TO NOTE AND RETAIN
[symbol] DELETE AS APPROPRIATE. [symbol] PERSONNEL OF DOMINION AND ALLIED FORCES ONLY. [/vertical]
[page break]
[assessment form]
([symbol]6392 – 117) Wt 39210 – 2791 33,000 1/41 T.S. 700 FORM 414 (A)
[underlined] SUMMARY of FLYING and ASSESSMENTS FOR [deleted] YEAR [/deleted][inserted] Period [/inserted] COMMENCING [deleted] 1st [/deleted] 15/11/44 to 25/11/[/underlined]44[underlined]
([symbol] For Officer, Insert “JUNE” : For Airman Pilot, Insert “AUGUST.”)
S.E. AIRCRAFT Day Night M.E. AIRCRAFT Day Night TOTAL [deleted] for year [/deleted] GRAND TOTAL [deleted] All Service Flying [/deleted]
DUAL – – 8.20 – 8.20 8.20
PILOT – – – – LINK 6.00
PASSENGER – – – – – –
[underlined] ASSESSMENT of ABILITY [/underlined]
(To be assessed as:– Exceptional, Above the Average, Average, or Below the Average)
(i) AS A Range [symbol] PILOT PROFICIENT.
(ii) AS PILOT-NAVIGATOR/NAVIGATOR ) –
(iii) IN BOMBING –
(iv) IN AIR GUNNERY –
[symbol] Insert :– “F.”, “L.B.”, “G.R.”, “F.B.”, etc.
[underlined] ANY POINTS IN FLYING OR AIRMANSHIP WHICH SHOULD BE WATCHED [/underlined]
–
Date 25 th November, 1944
Signature [signature] F/Lt
Officer Commanding No.1527 B.A.T. Flight, Prestwick.
[page break]
[photograph]
[photograph]
[page break]
Canadian [symbol]
? name [photograph]
[photograph]
[page break]
[photograph]
[photograph]
[page break]
[sketch]
F/L Buckwell PI 8AM over the Med 10/5/45
[page break]
[sketch]
A boozer
Taff Price
Spring 45
Straight
[page break]
[photograph]
Sterling V
[page break]
[photograph]
[page break]
[photograph]
Peden Gm Gm’s car
Gunton
[page break]
[photograph]
[page break]
[photograph]
Gm with Turbo
[page break]
[photograph]
Feb, 1944 Sculthorpe
Lancashire (Seattle)
[photograph]
Escape photo
for forged papers if shot down
[page break]
[newspaper cutting]
SIR – Once again we get near Remembrance Day, which always brings back memories of one of the best friends I ever met in my life.
We met when serving on 57 Lancaster Sqdn during the last war.
We were friends because we had mutual interests, our love of poetry and cricket.
We were all very young in those days.
He was a ‘Lanc’ pilot who paid tribute to the 55,000 aircrew who were killed in bomber command flying on nightly ‘ops’ into Germany, many of who had also been our friends.
Only two weeks after writing his brief poem to lost friends he himself was shot down and killed flying over Cologne.
Sir, it would give me great pleasure if you would print the above poem he wrote.
I have never forgotten him.
ALF RIPPON,
Lincoln Road,
Stamford. [inserted] 1998 [/inserted]
Lines written by a wartime friend who died over Cologne
My brief sweet life is over
My eyes no longer see
No summer walks, no Christmas trees
No pretty girls for me
I’ve got the chop, I’ve had it
My nightly ‘ops’ are done
But in a hundred years and more
I’ll still be 21
[photograph]
Control-Tower staff Wychford nr Ely
1944
[photograph]
Elsie
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
George Alexander Mackie’s pilots flying log book. Two
Description
An account of the resource
Pilots flying log book two, for George Alexander Mackie, covering the period from 24 September 1943 to 17 February 1946. Detailing his instructor duties, operations flown and post war flying with 46 squadron. He was stationed at RAF Waterbeach, RAF Chedburgh, RAF Downham Market, RAF Tempsford, RAF Sculthorpe, RAF Oulton, RAF Longtown, RAF Nutts Corner, RAF Prestwick and RAF Stoney Cross. Aircraft flown were Stirling, Fortress, Oxford and Liberator. He flew a total of 22 operations with 214 squadron, 23 night and one daylight. Targets were Pertius D’Antioche, Leverkusen, Laeso, St Omer, Cherbourg, Otignies, Tours, Lanveoc-Poulmic, Kiel Bay, Saumer, Sterkrade, Saint Leu D’Esserent, Schouwen Island, Overflakee Island, Brunswick, Frisians, Bremen, Rotterdam, Darmstadt and Eindhoven. The log book also contains photos of himself, aircraft, crews and various sketches.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LMackieGA855966v2
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
Denmark
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--Kiel Bay
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Belgium--Ottignies
Denmark--Læsø
England--Bedfordshire
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Hampshire
England--Norfolk
England--Suffolk
France--Cherbourg
France--Creil Region
France--Poulmic
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
France--Saumur
France--Tours
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Leverkusen
Netherlands--Eindhoven
Netherlands--Overflakkee
Netherlands--Rotterdam
Netherlands--Schouwen-Duiveland
Netherlands--West Frisian Islands
Northern Ireland--Antrim (County)
Germany--Oberhausen (Düsseldorf)
Great Britain
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1943-10-17
1943-10-18
1943-11-19
1943-11-20
1943-12-01
1943-12-02
1944-01-04
1944-01-05
1944-01-21
1944-01-22
1944-04-20
1944-04-21
1944-05-01
1944-05-02
1944-05-08
1944-05-09
1944-05-21
1944-05-22
1944-05-31
1944-06-01
1944-06-16
1944-06-17
1944-07-07
1944-07-08
1944-07-23
1944-07-24
1944-07-25
1944-08-06
1944-08-07
1944-08-10
1944-08-11
1944-08-12
1944-08-13
1944-08-17
1944-08-18
1944-08-19
1944-09-11
1944-09-12
1944-09-13
1945
1946
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Steve Baldwin
11 OTU
1651 HCU
214 Squadron
aircrew
animal
arts and crafts
B-17
B-24
bombing
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
C-47
Flying Training School
Heavy Conversion Unit
Initial Training Wing
military living conditions
mine laying
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
pilot
RAF Chedburgh
RAF Downham Market
RAF Nutts Corner
RAF Oulton
RAF Prestwick
RAF Sculthorpe
RAF Stoney Cross
RAF Tempsford
RAF Waterbeach
Stirling
training
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/341/24682/LTinningHW19585v1.1.pdf
dce1da7637ab34989057226f81050674
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Tinning, Herbert
Herbert William Tinning
Herbert W Tinning
H W Tinning
H Tinning
Description
An account of the resource
Four items. An oral history interview with Herbert William Tinning DFC, his log book and three photographs. He flew operations as a navigator with 51 Squadron.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Herbert Tinning and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-03-14
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Tinning, HW
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Herbert Tinning’s Royal Australian Air Force Observer’s Air Gunner’s And W/T Operator’s Flying Log Book
Description
An account of the resource
Herbert Tinning’s Royal Australian Air Force Observer’s Air Gunner’s And W/T Operator’s Flying Log Book from 25th August 1942 to 11th March 1945. Recording his training as a navigator in Australia and Great Britain and a full tour of operations with 51 squadron, followed by a short period with 96 squadron (Transport Command). He was based at RAAF Cootamundra, RAAF Sale, RAAF Nhill, RAF Desford, RAF West Freugh, RAF Lichfield, RAF Church Broughton, RAF Marston Moor, RAF Snaith and RAF Leconfield. Aircraft in which flown: Anson, Battle, Tiger Moth, Wellington and Halifax. He flew 40 operations (19 day, 19 night, 2 abandoned/recalled) on the following targets in Belgium, France and Germany: Alencon, Boulogne, Brest, Caen (Emieville), Calais, Cape Griz Nez, Chateaudon, Collines-Beaumont, Croixdalle, Essen, Foret de Nieppe, Hannover, Haringzelles, Hasselt, Herquelingue, Homberg, Kiel, Kleves, Le Grand Rossignol, Le Havre, Les Catelliers, Marquise, Mont Fleury, Morsalines, Neuss (Dusseldorf), Oisemont, Siracourt, St Martin L’hortier, Sterkrade, Stuttgart, Trappes, Villers Bocage, Wilhemshaven and Wizernes. His pilot on operations was Flight Sergeant Moore. On 6th June 1944 he notes: “‘D’ DAY OPENING OF SECOND FRONT”. In October 1944 he notes “AWARDED - DFC”.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
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David Leitch
Cara Walmsley
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LTinningHW19585v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Air Force. Transport Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Australia
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
England--Derbyshire
England--Leicestershire
England--Staffordshire
England--Yorkshire
Scotland--Wigtownshire
Belgium--Hasselt
France--Alençon
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Brest
France--Caen
France--Calais
France--Cap Gris Nez
France--Châteaudun
France--Colline-Beaumont
France--Croixdalle
France--Haringzelles
France--Herquelingue
Belgium--Rossignol
France--Le Havre
France--Les Catelliers
France--Marquise
France--Morsalines
France--Oisemont (Canton)
France--Siracourt
France--Soligny-la-Trappe
France--Neufchâtel-en-Bray
France--Villers-Bocage (Calvados)
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Essen
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Homberg (Kassel)
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Kleve (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Germany--Neuss
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
New South Wales--Cootamundra
Victoria--Sale
Germany--Oberhausen (Düsseldorf)
France--Ver-Sur-Mer
France--Neufchâtel-en-Bray
Victoria
New South Wales
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
France--Nieppe Forest
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1942
1943
1944
1945
1944-05-10
1944-05-11
1944-05-12
1944-05-13
1944-05-31
1944-06-01
1944-06-02
1944-06-03
1944-06-04
1944-06-06
1944-06-07
1944-06-08
1944-06-09
1944-06-22
1944-06-23
1944-06-24
1944-06-25
1944-06-27
1944-06-28
1944-06-30
1944-07-01
1944-07-04
1944-07-06
1944-07-09
1944-07-17
1944-07-24
1944-07-25
1944-07-29
1944-07-30
1944-08-18
1944-08-19
1944-08-25
1944-08-26
1944-08-27
1944-09-10
1944-09-14
1944-09-15
1944-09-16
1944-09-17
1944-09-23
1944-09-24
1944-09-26
1944-09-27
1944-10-06
1944-10-07
1944-10-21
1944-10-23
1944-10-25
1652 HCU
27 OTU
51 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
Air Observers School
aircrew
Anson
Battle
bombing
Bombing and Gunnery School
bombing of the Normandy coastal batteries (5/6 June 1944)
bombing of the Pas de Calais V-1 sites (24/25 June 1944)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Flying Training School
Halifax
Halifax Mk 2
Halifax Mk 3
Heavy Conversion Unit
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
RAF Church Broughton
RAF Desford
RAF Leconfield
RAF Lichfield
RAF Marston Moor
RAF Snaith
RAF West Freugh
tactical support for Normandy troops
Tiger Moth
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/305/24579/LMillerRB423155v1.2.pdf
9f14a06741bef06dd5b293dcaa776f9c
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Miller, Robert
Robert Bruce Miller
Robert B Miller
Robert Miller
R B Miller
R Miller
Description
An account of the resource
Three items. An oral history interview with Robert Bruce Miller (1924 - 2021, 423155 Royal Australian Air Force) a photograph and his log book. He flew operations as a navigator with 51 Squadron.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Robert Miller and catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-04-30
2017-01-29
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Miller, RB
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Robert Miller’s observer’s and air gunner’s flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
Observer’s and air gunner’s flying log book for R B Miller, navigator, covering the period from 15 November 1942 to 10 April 1945. Detailing his flying training, operations flown and instructor duties. He was stationed at RCAF Winnipeg, RAF Clyffe Pypard, RAF West Freugh, RAF Abingdon, RAF Marston Moor, RAF Snaith, RAF Langar and RAF Woolfox Lodge. Aircraft flown in were Anson, Tiger Moth, Whitley, Halifax and Lancaster. He flew a total of 41 operations with 51 Squadron, 21 daylight and 20 night. His pilot on operations was Warrant Office Faulkner. Targets were Morsalines, Lens, Hasselt, Orleans, Aachen, Bourg Leopold, Trappes, Paris, Amiens, Douai, Foulliard, Martin St L’Hortier, Siracourt, Oisement, Mimoyecques, Wizernes, Villers Bocage, Croix D’Alle, Les Catalliers, Nucourt, Evrieville, Bottrop, Kiel, Foret de Nieppe, Tracey Bocage, Bois de Cassan, Nieppe, Hazebrouck, May-sur-Orne, Foret de Mormal, Brest, Hamburg, Lumbres, Venlo, Nordstern, Wilhelmshaven, Boulogne and Neuss.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Cara Walmsley
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LMillerRB423155v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
Canada
France
Great Britain
Germany
Netherlands
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Belgium--Hasselt
Belgium--Leopoldsburg
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Oxfordshire
England--Rutland
England--Wiltshire
England--Yorkshire
France--Amiens
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Brest
France--Caen
France--Cherbourg
France--Douai
France--Hazebrouck
France--Lens
France--L'Isle-Adam
France--Lumbres
France--May-sur-Orne
France--Neufchâtel-en-Bray
France--Nieppe
France--Nieppe Forest
France--Nucourt
France--Oisemont (Canton)
France--Orléans
France--Pas-de-Calais
France--Paris
France--Rennes Region
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
France--Villers-Bocage (Calvados)
France--Vire Region (Calvados)
Germany--Aachen
Germany--Bottrop
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Neuss
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Manitoba--Winnipeg
Netherlands--Venlo
Scotland--Wigtownshire
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
France--Morsalines
Manitoba
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1942
1943
1944
1945
1944-05-10
1944-05-12
1944-05-22
1944-05-23
1944-05-24
1944-05-25
1944-05-28
1944-05-31
1944-06-01
1944-06-11
1944-06-12
1944-06-13
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
1944-06-16
1944-06-17
1944-06-18
1944-06-22
1944-06-23
1944-06-24
1944-06-27
1944-06-28
1944-06-30
1944-07-01
1944-07-04
1944-07-06
1944-07-07
1944-07-09
1944-07-15
1944-07-16
1944-07-18
1944-07-20
1944-07-21
1944-07-23
1944-07-24
1944-07-28
1944-07-30
1944-08-03
1944-08-05
1944-08-06
1944-08-07
1944-08-08
1944-08-09
1944-08-25
1944-08-26
1944-08-27
1944-08-31
1944-09-03
1944-09-11
1944-09-14
1944-09-15
1944-09-23
1944-09-24
10 OTU
1651 HCU
1652 HCU
1669 HCU
51 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
Air Observers School
aircrew
Anson
bombing
Flying Training School
Halifax
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Master Bomber
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
RAF Abingdon
RAF Clyffe Pypard
RAF Langar
RAF Marston Moor
RAF Snaith
RAF West Freugh
RAF Woolfox Lodge
tactical support for Normandy troops
Tiger Moth
training
Whitley
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/743/20634/BCleggPVWilsonDv1.1.pdf
52fe453884f3b8aa4fb3ff000cb8677a
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Clegg, Peter Vernon
P V Clegg
Description
An account of the resource
Eight items and five sub-collections. Main collection contains a log of Pathfinder operations from RAF Wyton 1943 -1944, histories of the Avro repair facility at Bracebridge Heath, and Langar, a biography of Squadron Leader David James Baikie Wilson, biography of Squadron Leader Lighton Verdon-Roe, a book - Test Pilots of A.V. Roe & Co Ltd - S.A. 'Bill' Thorn, and two volumes of book - Roy Chadwick - no finer aircraft designer, Sub-collections contain a total of 29 items concerning the Aldborough Dairy and Cafe as well as biographical material, including log books for Alan Gibson, Peter Isaacson, Alistair Lang and Charles Martin. <br /><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1772">Aldborough Dairy and Cafe</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1768">Gibson, Alan</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1769">Isaacson, Peter</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1770">Lang, Alastair</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1771">Martin, Charles</a><br /><br /><br />The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Peter Clegg and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-07-02
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Clegg, PV
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[underlined] A bomber pilot’s journey through WWII. [/underlined] Page 1.
(A Veteran from 617 Squadron – David Wilson).
Sqd. Ldr. David James Baikie Wilson, DSO, DFC and Bar – Head of Aerodynamic Development and Testing, and Test-Pilot, A.V. Roe & Co Ltd.
April 8th 1946 to August 23rd 1947 (killed in Tudor crash)
David James Baikie Wilson was born on January 16th 1917, in Highgate, London, to his Scottish mother and Norfolk-born father. His mother came from a tough sea-faring family called Baikie living in [inserted] Brisbane Street, [/inserted] Greenock, on the River Clyde, to the west of Glasgow. From her, David inherited a great resolution of character, and from his father he acquired a brilliant academic brain – a combination that does not often lead to its owner becoming a test-pilot.
David was the only child in the family, and his mother inserted the name of her Sea-Captain father, James Baikie, between “David” and “Wilson” to perpetuate the family name – as is the wont of many Scottish families.
David’s father and mother had moved down to North London prior to the birth, and remained in that area while he grew up. Attending the local Kingsbury County School, and later Berkbeck College in Fetter Lane, David soon proved himself extremely bright, academically, obtaining [inserted] School Certificate [/inserted] “Distinctions” in Pure Maths, General Physics and Chemistry and “Credits” in Advanced Maths, French, History and English. He left the College with Higher School Certificate in Pure and Applied Maths, Chemistry and Physics, and then went straight to London University, to try to gain a degree in some of these subjects. True to his academic form, he gained a B.Sc. (General) in Chemistry, Physics and Pure Maths in July 1937 and then studied Chemistry for a further two years, gaining a “First” in the “Special” B.Sc. category and [inserted] starting work at the British Oxygen Company in November 1938. [/inserted]
Combining a taste for something more exciting, with his studying, David was already very keen
[Page break]
3/2
on aircraft and flying, and as the inevitable War loomed up he joined the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve (RAFVR), and was called up for deferred service in January 1940, training at Hendon (his nearest RAF base) for six months until June that year. Then he was called up properly to attend initial RAF training and selection, and spent the next two months being drilled and graded – as David had hoped – for pilot training in the Commonwealth. September 1940 saw him arrive in Southern Rhodesia at No 25 Elementary Flying Training School at Salisbury, and his pilot training started on September 18th with his first flight there in a Tiger Moth flown by his instructor, Flt/Sgt Marsden.
[Underlined] Pilot Training in Rhodesia [/underlined]
Flying in the [inserted] dry, [/inserted] sunny climate of Southern Rhodesia, David was able to [inserted] thoroughly [/inserted] enjoy his airborne experiences, and progress rapidly with the training routine. He went solo after 18 hrs 25 mins dual flying – indicative not so much of his own ability but the steady and rigorously adhered to procedures followed at the EFTS there, to cut down the early accident rate. It was not a spectacular time in which to go solo – rather the opposite – but David learned slowly but surely, and once learned, he never forgot, becoming a very sure-handed pilot.
Training progressed rapidly – David making three or four flights a day at times, and a lot of attention was paid to aerobatics, spinning, forced landing practice, and even night flying on the Tiger Moth! Some instrument flying was also done on the Tiger, and – a curious exercise – “abandoning an aircraft in flight”. His qualifying Cross-Country on October 31st was from Salisbury to Gatooma and back, and then he was posted out the same day, categorised a “Average” as a pilot, and recommended for “twin-engined types” in furthur training. He had gained his “Wings” on the Tiger Moth.
After a weeks’ leave, David now attended the No 21 S.F.T.S. at [inserted] Kumalo, [/inserted] Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia, to start training on Oxford aircraft. He had by now clocked up 65 hrs flying, 28 hrs 30 min of which
[Page break]
3/3
was solo. His first flight in an Oxford was now made on November 11th 1940, with his [inserted] new [/inserted] instructor, Flying Officer Wood. David actually failed his first solo test on the Oxford, but managed all right on the second occasion, on November 14th, and from there on never looked back. As the training progressed, he passed a “Height-Test”, “Navigation”, “Navigator Test”, “Cross-Country”, “Low-flying”, “triangular cross-country on instruments”, “Formation”, “Progress”, and finally his passing-out test by the Chief Flying Instructor, Sqd. Ldr Hendrikz. With a total of 115 hrs now (55 hr 55 mins solo), David passed the first stage of the twin-engined Oxford Course on Dec 18th 1940, again classified as “Average” as a pilot.
The second stage started on December 30th now concentrating on tactical flying – making reconnaissance sorties, low-level bombing practice, and a lot of instrument and cross-country flying. There were night landings by floodlight, and many more low-level bombing runs at 1,000 ft, during which David’s mean bomb-dropping error crept down from 126 yds to 88 yds, and finally to 42 yds on average. Then they indulged in a bit of aerial gunnery from the Oxford, firing 90 rounds off from the Oxford’s single target gun. Near the end of the course, there were “ZZ” approaches, photography – “stereo pairs”, and “line-overlap”, and finally, formation flying. David passed out of No 21 S.F.T.S on February 12th 1941, with an “Average” grading again, having now flown 163 hrs 35 mins, of which 99 hrs 15 mins was solo. He was now posted to No 11 Operational Training Unit on Wellington bombers, at Bassingbourn, back in England.
[Underlined] Operations with 214 Squadron [/underlined]
At Bassingbourne [sic] David rapidly completed a further 75 hrs 40 mins flying on Wellington IO and IA aircraft, starting on May 21st 1941. He solo-ed on the Wellington after some 21 hrs 10 mins “dual” and “2nd pilot” flying, and then started to do a lot of night flying ranging from “circuits and bumps” to cross-country flying, mock bombing raids, air-to-air firing [inserted] and [/inserted] a North Sea Sweep. [Deleted] and [/deleted] Cross-country instrument flying was invariably from Bassingbourne [sic] to Wittering and Andover
[Page break]
4.
to Upper Heyford and return. At the end of all this, on June 26th 1941, David passed out of the O.T.U. and was posted to No 214 [inserted] (Federated Malay States) [/inserted] Squadron based at RAF Stradishall in Suffolk. This Squadron – as its name implies – was supported by the Malay Federation in WWII and several aircraft were paid for by funds raised in the States, including a Wellington II, W5442* coded BU-V, which David Wilson flew the first evening he arrived at the Squadron. After having an “Air Test” with one of the Flight Commanders, Sqd. Ldr. Field, in the morning of July 9th, David flew as Second Pilot to the Squadron Leader that same evening on his first operation – carrying a 4,000 lb “dookie” to drop on Osnabruk.** The raid was carried out by a total of 57 Wellingtons from No 3 Group, and, as discovered after the War, not many bombs fell on the target area. Two Wellingtons were lost that night, but David returned safely.
Only five days later, David was off on his next operation – this time to Bremen, to drop three 500 lb bombs and clusters of incendiaries. After this, raids followed in quick succession every two or three nights; Cologne, Rotterdam, Mannheim, Hamburg, Hanover, Duisburg, Keil, etc. Each time David was flying as Second Pilot to the Squadron Leader, or to a Sgt. Foxlee. On the night of July 25/26th, after raiding Hamburg with Sgt. Foxlee, they had to divert to Debden on the return, as their own base had poor weather and low visibility. The same thing happened on August 12th, on their return from Hanover, but this time David and Sqd. Ldr. Field diverted to Newmarket instead.
At this time, these attacks were mostly being directed at German ports, shipping and naval bases, or railway yards, but [inserted] their [/inserted] accuracy – or [inserted] the [/inserted] damage [inserted] caused [/inserted] - at this stage in the war, in hindsight, did not reach any great measure of success.
David recorded his longest operational flight so far on September 7th 1941, when he acted as Second pilot again for a Pilot Officer Barnard, and they bombed Berlin, taking 8 hrs 15 mins for the entire flight. Two sorties later – and on his own 6th operation – David was
* This Wellington was named “Sri Guroh” and had already completed some 25 successful raids before David flew it.
** See appendix 4 for details.
[Page break]
3/5
the Captain of the aircraft for the first time, and this particular trip was a short one across the Channel to Le Havre. He flew a Wellington IC, N2850, but there was ten tenths cloud over the target, and they eventually dropped their bombs in the sea before returning to base
After this, David was the Captain on all his future operations, which included an attack on Hamburg on the night of September 29th carrying a 4,000 lb High Capacity blast bomb – and flying W5442, the old aircraft of the O.C. “B” flight, Sqd Ldr Field.
David was now allocated Wellington IC X9979 for his own crew to use, and this “Wimpy” stayed with him from October 2nd 1941 right up to the end of David’s tour of operations on January 31st 1942.
Many of his raids in October over the German sea ports were plagued by solid cloud cover, or bad weather, and they often bombed “blind” over the top of the targets. On November 7th David set out for Berlin again with six 500 lb bombs, but there was extremely bad cloud and icing over Germany, and Berlin, and so he unloaded his bombs over Osnabruck instead, on the return journey. This was one of Bomber Command’s biggest raids on Berlin to date, and there would be no more large raids on the capital until January 1943. The weather was equally bad over England on the return, and David [inserted] had to [/inserted] divert to another airfield.
Back [inserted] on [/inserted] September 1st, David and others in 214 Squadron began a series of low-level bombing practices, flying over their ranges at [inserted] Foxcote at [/inserted] 200 ft and dropping six bombs at a time. By December 9th they were dropping up to eight practice bombs a time, and on the 11th David, again flying at only 200 ft, dropped a massive 4,000 lb bomb from this low altitude! The end of the year 1941 arrived with David bombing Brest on December 23rd and 27th, trying to hit the Port area.
In January 1942, David was sent to Brest on four more occasions, having to divert to land at Harwell on one of these raids because of bad weather on the return. On January 21st he flew to Bremen to drop a 4,000 lb HC bomb, and then on the 28th came the final “Op” of the Tour – a raid on Münster. The cloud cover was again so bad that they returned home without dropping the bombload, and diverted to Waterbeach to land. David had safely completed his first Operational Tour, having flown
[Page break]
3/6
289 hrs 50 mins in all with 214 Squadron, of which 199 hrs 35 mins were on actual operations. * He was now graded as “Above Average” as a pilot by 214’s C.O., Sqd. Ldr. Carr.
[Underlined] Becoming a Flying Instructor [/underlined]
For his traditional rest from operations, David was now posted to No1 Flying Instructors School at Church Lawford, near Rugby. He arrived there on February 24th 1942,[inserted] to start on the No22 War Course, and [/inserted] to be trained to teach others how to fly multi-engined aircraft. This course here lasted to April 21st, and during this time he was given intensive instruction on Oxford I’s and II’s, and (surprisingly enough) on some single-engined pre-war Avro Tutors!
David underwent day and night instruction, his mentor being a Flt. Lt. Mann, and sessions of any of the half dozen Avro Tutors were interspersed with the twin-engined flights on Oxford trainers. Between March 27th and April 2nd, he was sent down to Upavon to pass the 24th “Beam Approach” Course with flying honours (being graded “Above Average” again, and “Fit to Instruct”). This Course, in fact, was run as part of the Central Flying Scool [sic] of the RAF.
Then it was back to Church Lawford on the Oxford and Tutor, until he was finally passed out as a qualified instructor on April 20th 1942, rated as “Average” on both single and twin-engined aircraft.
[Inserted] David had been commissioned as a Pilot Officer out in Rhodesia, and on completion of this Course was made up to a Flying Officer, preparatory to commencing duties as an Instructor at RAF College Cranwell. [/inserted]
He arrived at Cranwell on May 1st [inserted] as a “B” Category Flying Instructor [/inserted] to start to instruct pupils at the College [inserted] Flying Training School [/inserted] how to fly the Oxford. Most of these were ordinary Leading Aircraftsmen (LAC’s) or Corporals, or Lieutenants (presumably the College Officer Cadets). By late June, a few Miles Master II single-engined trainers had been acquired, and David instructed on these as well. And at the
* See appendix 4 for details.
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end of July he was posted to No 7 Flying Instructors School at Upavon. This time to train others how to become “Instructors”!
David was becoming restless to be back on operations again, but had to put up with the daily round of flying Oxfords, Magisters and Masters again at Upavon, until the beginning of November 1942, when the CFI, Wing Cmdr GFR Donaldson, graded him out as “Above Average” again on David’s posting to 196 Squadron – a brand new night-bomber squadron formed on November 7th at Driffield in Yorkshire.
[Underlined] Second Tour, with 196 Squadron [/underlined]
David reported to 196 Squadron at Driffield on November 7th, and then was immediately sent off on a new Course called the “Captains of Aircraft” at Cranage [inserted] near Holmes Chapel [/inserted] in South Cheshire. It was the 12th intake at this Course, and David was lectured there on Navigation, and had to undertake six long cross-country exercises on Ansons, flown by a Course pilot, with David and two others on board having to act as Navigators in turn. The Course was an adjunct of the RAF’s Central Navigation School, and was intended to refine operational Captain’s navigating skills, for posting them to Coastal Command, or to Bomber stations where new 4-engined bombers with only one pilot were the norm.
While he was posted to Cheshire over the Christmas period of 1942/43 [inserted] Dec 21st to January 3rd [/inserted], David had some chance to attend some local functions and festivities, as he did not have time to return to his parents in Hendon. It was while the Station was giving a Dance for local people that David met a Cheshire girl called Elsie, who worked at a nearby I.C.I. Works connected with the Salt industry Elsie was a very personable girl, with a number of boyfriends, and David was a shy and quiet person, but the two became immediate friends, and kept up correspondence with each other when David re-joined 196 Squadron (now moved to Leconfield) after Christmas. One other course David had to attend for a few days, was at Westcott in Buckinghamshire, at No 1 Engine Control Demonstration Unit (E.C.D.U), to learn “Engine Handling”
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and “Petrol Consumption” there on the Wellington Mk III. (No flying was involved). Finally, on January 14th 1943, he took to the air at Leconfield on Wellington X HE179, to try some “circuits and bumps” on this new Mark of the bomber He then had a few “working-up” flights to get his [inserted] brand- [/inserted] new crew shaken down, trying out air-to-air firing with his gunners, and practice bombing using [inserted] new [/inserted] infra-red photography to record the results.
David’s first sortie with 196 Squadron [inserted] and the Squadron’s second operation [/inserted] was on the night of February 7th 1943, when he dropped seven 500 lb bombs on a new type of “area-bombing” raid on French ports with German U-Boat pens. This directive had been issued by the War Cabinet on January 14th, and because the new U-boat pens of solid concrete were too thick to penetrate, the towns themselves were obliterated instead (the French civilians had been warned to evacuate them).
Some 323 aircraft bombed Lorient that night, with the [inserted] new [/inserted] Pathfinders marking the target well. Seven aircraft were lost, two being Wellingtons. David’s crew obtained a good infra-red photograph of the bomb bursts.
It was back again to Lorient on February 13th, this time forming part of a raid of 466 aircraft in all, and dropping over 1,000 tons of bombs for the first time on a Bomber Command target. The French town of Lorient received more devastation, but the U-boat pens survived. Then it was Cologne on the 14th, and Emden on the 17th, but the latter raid was abandoned by David’s aircraft, due to heavy cloud cover. Just six Wellingtons had been sent to Emden that night to test the infra-red bomb sights, but only three found the target, and bombed it. David brought all his bomb load back.
Before February finished, David had been to Cologne again on the 26th (where two of his three 500 lb bombs “hung up” and he had to return to base with them) and St Nazaire on the 28th (again dropping a “mix” of 500 lb bombs and incendiaries).
In March David went to Hamburg, Essen (twice) Duisberg and Bochum, dropping a 4,000 lb “Cookie” on one of the Essen raids. This was the beginning of the “Battle of the Ruhr”, devised now by Bomber Command to paralyse German Industry. There was an increasing flow of new four-engined bombers to the Squadrons, and a build-up of the Pathfinder
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Force and their new marking techniques using Mosquitos guided by Oboe equipment, * and Lancasters etc, to continue illuminating the markers dropped by the “Mossies”. All this now led to ever more accurate raids on the German Ruhr industrial zone.
The first Essen raid, on March 5th, was well marked by the Pathfinder Force (PFF), and David’s Wellington was in the second of three waves over the target – the Krupps industrial complex. This night marked Bomber Command’s 100,000th sortie of the war, and it is likely that David’s 4,000 lb bomb was one of the many that helped destroy an area of the Krupps works that night. A week later he was over the same target again, with the more usual mixture of 500 lb bombs (many fuzed for a long delay action) and incendiaries. Even more of Krupps was reduced to rubble that night.
David normally flew with a crew of four in his aircraft, and his regular crew consisted of Pilot Officer Parkin, Sgt. Wakeley, Flt. Sgt, Allen and Sgt. Lund. Occasionally he would take another Sgt. Pilot on board to give him operational experience for the odd flight or two (before he went off to captain his own aircraft). His O.C. in “A” Flight was Sqd Ldr Ian R.C. Mack, and the 196 Squadron C.O. at this time was Wing Cmdr. A.E. Duguid.
David only had one “Op” in April, to Kiel on the 4th, but May was another intensive month, with successful visits to Dortmund, Duisburg, Bochum and Düsseldorf. Most of the aircraft sent on these raids were now four-engines types, and of 110 Wellingtons sent to Dortmund, six were lost. The equivalent numbers [inserted] of Wellingtons [/inserted] sent to the other three points were: Duisburg 112 (10); Bochum 104 (6); and Düsseldorf 142 (6). The last two raids did not have the desired effects as the Germans were now starting decoy markers and fires outside the cities, to lure the PFF and bombing aircraft away. But the Duisburg raid had been highly successful, the Port and August Thyssen steel factories being badly hit.
[Inserted] On May15th [inserted] 1943 [/inserted] the [deleted] Press [/deleted] [inserted] London Gazette [/inserted] released the news that David had been awarded a Distinguished Flying Cross (D.F.C.), for (as the citation stated) “completing numerous [inserted] operational [/inserted] missions, flying on many occasions to targets such as Cologne, Berlin, Kiel and Hamburg, where the fiercest opposition is encountered.
“Since the beginning of his operational career, his single aim has been to press home his attacks as accurately and efficiently as possible, and in this he has had many successes. His courage, skill and determination against all hazards have been an inspiration to the Squadron”. [/inserted]
In June 1943, David flew sorties to Düsseldorf, Krefeld and Wuppertal, using his normal Wellington X HE901 on most flights (he
* “Oboe” was a system in which radio beams were sent out from English points, to cross over a specific target, and the RAF aircraft fitted with the receiving equipment could tell exactly when to drop their markers.
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had previously used HE170 and MS488 for long spells at a time, all with 196 Squadron’s code letters ZO-. Two of his crew had been commissioned by now – Wakeley and Allen had been made Pilot Officers. (David himself was now a Flight Lieutenant). The Düsseldorf raid was very successful, and that on Krefeld equally so, devastating the city centres. Just prior to the Krefeld raid on June 21st, some “Monica” sets had been fitted to some of 196 Squadron’s Wellingtons, HE901 being one of them. David and his crew had conducted air teats with the new equipment on June 16th and 17th, and aerial exercises with fighters, to try out the operational aspects. “Monica” was the code name given to equipment which, installed in RAF bombers, would give warning of the approach of German night-fighters from the rear. This radar equipment gave out its own transmissions however, and later in the war, when a German Ju88 night fighter landed by mistake at Woodbridge on July 15th 1944, it was discovered that its “Flensburg” radar transmission detector set could “home in” from 50 miles away onto an RAF aircraft using Monica. The increasing losses of Allied bombers was being blamed on Monica, [inserted] “H2S” radar, [/inserted] and “I.F.F.” (Identification Friend or Foe) signals emanating from their aircraft, and instructions were immediately given to remove all “Monica” sets, use “H2S” only sparingly, and switch off “IFF” altogether over German territory.
The raid on Wuppertal on June 24th 1943, in which David dropped an entire load of incendiaries, devastated the Elberfeld half of the town (the other half had already been hit). Some 94% of the town was destroyed that night. 630 aircraft having taken part, and 6 Wellingtons out of 101 being lost (together with 28 Lancasters, Halifaxes or Stirlings).
David now made the last operational sortie of his second Tour, to Cologne again on July 3rd 1943. He was flying Wellington X HE901 [deleted] again [/deleted], with a new member of crew, Flt. Lt. Reaks (who had replaced P/O Allen), and the PFF successfully marked the industrial area of the town, on the East bank of the Rhine. Again, David’s load consisted entirely of incendiaries, and they bombed the target accurately, but on returning to England after a flight lasting 5 hrs 5 mins, had to divert to Westcott, Bucks, because
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of ground fog and bad weather in the North. This raid was noted for something else – the beginning of mass night-time attacks by German night-fighters over the target area – something not met before by the RAF – where the Luftwaffe units attacked from above, using the mass of fires, target indicators (T.I.’s) and searchlights below as illumination for the bombers. On this raid 30 aircraft were lost out of 653 despatched – 12 being claimed by the Luftwaffe night fighters. In hindsight David was lucky to finish his second Tour at this point, as the RAF raids over Germany began to meet increasing fighter opposition, leading to many losses.
[Underlined] Lancaster Conversion Unit [/underlined]
Again classed as “Above Average” [inserted] in his recent capacity as “Master Bomber” of 196 Squadron [/inserted], David Wilson was now posted to a Lancaster Conversion Unit [inserted] No 1660 [/inserted] at RAF Swinderby, to convert to flying four-engined heavy bombers. The reason he had had a shorter Tour than usual at 196 Squadron was because the Squadron was moving [inserted] its [/inserted] base down South now, and re-equipping with Stirling bombers. David neither liked the Stirling, nor the future role of the Squadron, which was to be on glider-tug and troop dropping rôles, and so he had quickly opted to go for a Lancaster Squadron posting. [Inserted] He had in fact volunteered to join 617 Squadron (now known as the “Dambusters”), who were now looking for a few more seasoned and “Above Average” graded pilots to replace the eight lost on their famous raid of May 16th/17th. Only men of exceptional experience and calibre would be accepted, and all crews had to show a very high accuracy in their bombing experience. David’s name had gone forward for consideration by 617’s C.O., Wing Cmdr. Guy Penrose Gibson, V.C., DSO and Bar, DFC and Bar, who was still in charge but about to be posted onto a temporary staff duty as a rest (against his wishes!). Provided he converted to the Lancaster successfully, he would be accepted. [/inserted]
And so Flt. Lt. David Wilson started at Swinderby on July 23rd 1943, learning the tricks of flying the mighty Lancaster – an aircraft that would endear itself to him for life. The Course was not long, only five weeks, and finished on August 30th, when David had completed his multi-engine transition to the big Avro machine designed by Roy Chadwick. The Lancasters at the Unit were old Mk I’s from early production runs by A.V. Roe & Co Ltd at Manchester, or Metropolitan-Vickers at Trafford Park, and some had originally been laid down as Manchesters, and converted on the line.
David firstly had “circuits and landings” practice, then “stalling”, “three and two engine flying”, “fire action”, and “three-engine overshoots”. Then came cross-country exercises, “time and distance”
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runs (practicing dropping bombs after a measured run-in from a known geographical position) “corkscrewing” (to avoid fighters at night), and “fighter affiliation” (practice in being “attacked” by fighters). Finally David made some bombing runs, dropping four bombs on Wainfleet Sands, then eight (getting a mean error of only 71 yds from the target), and finally a round-the-UK cross-country flight at night, from Swinderby to Ely, Bicester, Sidmouth, St. Tudwells (where he dropped two bombs, and hit the target), Strangford [inserted] Lough [/inserted] in N. Ireland Dumfries in Scotland, Aberdeen and back home! A large part of the return trip was flown on three-engines, the whole flight taking 5 hrs 35 mins – just like a typical raid over Germany.
Wing Cmdr. Everitt, the CO. of 1660 Conversion Unit, passed David out [inserted] on August 30th [/inserted] as “Above Average” once again on the Lancaster this time, and David thus had his posting to 617 Squadron confirmed, and joined them the same day at Coningsby, Lincolnshire. [Deleted] – the already famous 617 Squadron, otherwise known now as the “Dambusters”. [/deleted]
[Underlined] Joining the “Dambusters” [/underlined]
David Wilson joined 617 Squadron on August 30th 1944, the date the Squadron moved its home from Scampton to Coningsby, in Lincolnshire. Since its famous [inserted] first [/inserted] raid on the German dams on the night of May 16th/17th 1944, [sic] the Squadron had [inserted] briefly [/inserted] returned to [deleted] a rest period, and started [/deleted] operations again on July 15, raiding power stations in Northern Italy and landing [inserted] at Blida [/inserted] in N. Africa afterwards. [Inserted] (Blida was a [inserted] captured [/inserted] Allied aerodrome a few miles south-west of Algiers, in French North Africa). The Squadron’s third raid had been on the Italian port of Leghorn on the way back from Blida. And its fourth was a mass leaflet raid on major Italian cities on July 29th 1943, after which the aircraft landed at Blida again. (This time they positioned back to England without raiding any target on the way). [/inserted] With its high level of training [deleted] and accuracy [/deleted] in bomb dropping especially [inserted] at low level [/inserted] the Squadron was now being used for attacks on major targets which required a great deal of accuracy in placing their weapons. These targets by definition, were also likely to be very heavily defended.
David was airborne on September 1st, the second day after he arrived at Coningsby, and was promptly sent off on a low-level cross country. (With the “Dambusters”, low level meant just that – at 200 to 330 ft altitude! [inserted] all the way [/inserted]). Wing Cmdr Guy Gibson, VC, DSO and Bar, DFC and Bar had just relinquished command of the Squadron [inserted] on August 3rd) [/inserted] to [inserted] Acting [/inserted] Wing Cmdr George Holden, DSO, DFC [inserted] and Bar? [/inserted]
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and there were 10 [deleted] complete [/deleted] Lancaster [deleted] crews [/deleted] pilots left at that moment out of the original 21 that had been in the Squadron when the raid on the Dams was mounted. * Apart from David, the other new pilots [inserted] ① who had joined 617 since the Dams raid were F.O. W.H. Kellaway, DSO; at the end of June; P.O. B. [deleted] (“Bunny”) [/deleted] W. Clayton, DFC, CGM, early in July; [deleted] and [/deleted] Flt. Lt. R.A. Allsebrook, DSO, DFC, also early in July; [inserted] and Flt. Lt. E.E.G. [inserted] (“Ted”) [/inserted] Youseman, DFC, at the end of July. (Ted came from David Wilson’s old 214 Squadron). [/inserted]. All these pilots – like David – brought their old crews along with them as well, and so all eight men in each Lancaster found themselves suddenly flying with the famous “Dambusters”. One of these new arrivals had also crashed on August 5th on Ashley Walk Bombing Ranges, when it hit the slipstream of another Lancaster, but luckily the crew survived, but with the exception of one gunner did not fly with 617 again. [/inserted]
The [inserted] surviving [/inserted] Lancasters which had been used for the Dams raid were in the process of being returned to A.V. Roe & Co to have the special fittings removed and the enlarged (bulged) bomb doors put in their place. For the purpose of keeping the crews in training, however, other Lancasters had to be borrowed or drafted in, and the Lancaster which David flew on September 1st was one such – ED735 (KC-R) from 44 Squadron (where it had been called KM-K). This Lancaster had just [inserted] ② been fitted with new “deep-section bomb doors by Avros, to take the new 12,000 lb High Capacity Blast bombs, and was sent to the A&AEE at Boscombe Down this month, to measure the Position Errors. [/inserted]
The Dambusters had moved from a grass airfield at Scampton, to one with hard runways at Coningsby and were sharing the latter airfield now with other Lancaster Squadrons. [Deleted] No 619 [/deleted] (Another Lancaster Squadron that would henceforth [deleted] to [/deleted] work closely with 617 was No 619 [inserted] - based nearby at Woodhall Spa - [/inserted] ) David flew Lancaster EE144 (KC-S) on September 14th – this aircraft was normally used by Sqn Ldr. Holden.
David was [inserted] then [/inserted] engaged in intensive low-level cross-country flying for the first two weeks of September, working himself and his crew up to the required accuracy of bombing, air firing, and low-level navigating as befitted the high standards expected of the specialist squadron. Two of these flights were on aircraft that had originally been on the Dams raid – ED886 (AJ-O flown then by P.O. Bill Townsend) and ED921 (AJ-W of Flt. Lt. Les Munro). These had been altered back to carry normal bombs, and in common with 617’s other permanent Lancasters were now fitted with new radio altimeters which could be set to give the pilot warning of dropping below, say, 75 ft above the ground (where a “hiccuph” could mean flying into the deck”).
All this preparation was for 617’s next scheduled raid on one of the War’s earliest, and by now most heavily defended targets – the Dortmund-Ems Canal. It had been decided to try to breach this by moonlight, and at low level. The canal was of vital importance to the German War industry, as it joined the steel plants of the Ruhr
*(for Note see over →③
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[Underlined] footnote ③ FOOTNOTE [/underlined]
* The original [inserted] 21 [/inserted] pilots of 617 Squadron at the time of their first operation – the Dams raid – consisted of Wing Cmdr. Guy Gibson, VC, DSO and Bar, DFC and Bar; Flt. Lt. J.V. Hopgood, DFC; Flt. Lt. H.B. Martin, DSO and Bar, DFC and two Bars, AFC; Sqd Ldr. H.M. Young, DFC; Flt. Lt. W. Astell, DFC; Flt. Lt. D.J.H. Maltby, DSO, DFC; Sqd. Ldr. Henry Maudslay, DFC; P.O. L.G. Knight, DSO; Flt.Lt. D.J. Shannon, DSO and Bar, DFC and Bar; Sqd. Ldr. J.C. McCarthy, DSO, DFC; Sgt. [inserted] V.W. [/inserted] Byers; Flt Lt R.N.G. Barlow; P.O. Geoff Rice, DFC; Flt. Lt. J.L. Munro, DSO, DFC; F.O. W.C. Townsend, CGM, DFM; Flt Sgt. K.W. Brown, CGM; Flt. Sgt. Cyril [inserted] T [/inserted] Anderson; P.O. [inserted] Warner [/inserted] Ottley; P.O. [inserted] L.J. [/inserted] Burpee (all of whom had flown on the raid); and P.O. W. [inserted] G. [/inserted] Divall and Flt. Lt. Harold [inserted] S. [/inserted] Wilson (both of whom had not been included on the Dams raid).
The [inserted] eight [/inserted] killed on the raid were Hopgood, Young, Astell, Maudsley, Byers, Barlow, Ottley [inserted[ and [/inserted] Burpee; Guy Gibson, of course, had now been rested from “Ops”; Cyril Anderson had decided to return to his original Squadron, and Bill Townsend had been posted away to 1668 Conversion Unit. All this left just 10 of the original pilots.
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with the Baltic, enabling iron ore from Sweden to be barged to the steelworks, and finished parts (Eg of U-boats) to be sent North to the German ports.
It was lucky for David that he was still getting into training at that moment. On a cross-country on September 13th, he practiced low-level bombing from 300ft and 500 ft, and gained a mean error of 73 yds from the target centre; and on September 14th he dropped bombs on the ranges from 200, 300, [inserted] and [/inserted] 400 ft high, and got his average error down to 36 yds.
David was assigned to “B” Flight, under the leadership of Flt. Lt. J.L. (“Les”) Munro (a survivor of the Dams raid who had been hit by flak en route to the Sorpe Dam and had had to turn back because the radio/intercom had been destroyed). But due to his “working-up” period, he was not selected for the raid on the Dortmund-Ems Canal on September 14th/15th. This was meticulously planned – as usual – and eight of 617’s Lancasters would take part, dropping new 12,000 lb High Capacity thin-cased, bombs from low level (fuzed for an adequate delay). The crews selected were the new C.O., George Holden, Dave Maltby, Les Knight, Dave Shannon, Harold Wilson [inserted] (no relation to David) [/inserted], Athelsie Allsebrook, Geoff Rice and Bill Divall. All but Holden, and Allsebrook [deleted] and Divall [/deleted] were survivors of the original 617 Squadron, and they set off on the evening of the 14th, but en route to the target received news back from a “recce” Mosquito in front, that the weather was too bad over the target area for low-level bombing. Regretfully they turned for home, but as they did so at low level over the North Sea, Maltby’s Lancaster hit someone else’s slipstream, dipped a wing into the sea, cartwheeled – and that was that. Maltby and his crew all perished.
Back home at Coningsby, they re-planned the raid for the next evening, the 15th, and Mick [deleted] y [/deleted] Martin just back from leave, filled Maltby’s place. [Inserted] David Wilson flew two more cross-country flights on this day, using one of the original Dams raid Lancasters, ED886 (AJ-O) [deleted] glued back again [/deleted] They were his last practices, and he was not called up for the raid that night. [/inserted] As the [inserted] others [/inserted] flew low over darkened Holland, Holden, flying with [inserted] Guy Gibson’s old crew [/inserted] and leading the two flights, was hit by flak and he climbed to avoid a church steeple in a small town while the others behind swung low around the outside of the built-up area. Holden’s Lancaster, trailing flames, went down and his 12,000 lb bomb exploded with a blinding flash of light.
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It was his 30th birthday.
Over the target area, a ground mist obscured the markers they dropped, there was a lot of light flak about, and the escorting Mosquitos found it difficult to silence the flak, and the 617 pilots found it very difficult to see the canal. Allsebrook, who now acted as leader, dropped his bomb and helped to direct others onto the target, but then disappeared. He had been shot down leaving the area. Knight, flying low, hit some trees which damaged his two port engines, and asked Mick Martin’s permission to jettison the bomb. He tried desperately to get home, but after allowing his crew to bale out over Holland, was killed trying to crash land the Lancaster alone.
Rice tried in vain for an hour to find the target, was holed by flak, jettisoned his bomb and managed to return home to Coningsby. Harold Wilson was hit by flak too, and had to crash-land his Lancaster with the bomb on board. It went up soon after, killing all on board before they could escape. Divall was [inserted] also hit and crashed. [/inserted]
// Dave Shannon flew around for 70 minutes, before he managed to spot the Canal and drop his bomb. It hit the towpath and did not seem to breach the canal banks. And Mick Martin flew around for a long 90 minutes, repeatedly getting hit by flak, and finally dropping his bomb on his 13th run in. He was two hours overdue when he landed back at Coningsby, to find only Shannon and Rice there before him. There were just the three Lancasters back, out of the eight that had set off. And nothing to show for the losses.
Next day Mick Martin was made a Squadron Leader by the A.O.C. No 5 Group, Air Vice-Marshal the Honourable Ralph Cochrane, and temporarily given command of 617 Squadron. Martin immediately volunteered to go back to the Canal the next night, and said there were six of them left who could try it (Martin himself, Shannon, Rice, Les Munro, Joe McCarthy and Ken Brown). In addition to these Martin could now call on the newly posted Captains - David Wilson, Ted Youseman and Bunny Clayton.
Fortunately Sir Ralph insisted on the three latest survivors being rested for 617’s next raid, on the Antheor Viaduct near Cannes in the South of France, on September 16th. And because
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this operation followed on without a break, the three “new boys”, and [inserted] the three veterans, [/inserted] Munro, McCarthy and Brown [deleted] (all had taken part on the original Dams raid) [/deleted] were supported by six Lancasters from 619 Squadron as well, and all placed under 619’s C.O., Wing. Cmdr. Abercromby.
[Underlined] The Anthéor Viaduct [deleted] preparing for the Tirpitz [/deleted] [/underlined]
It was against this backdrop of tragedy that David Wilson now flew his first “Op” for 617 Squadron. The atmosphere couldn’t have been worse, but morale was still high. Other Squadrons were [inserted] now [/inserted] beginning to call 617 the “Suicide Squadron”, and there were [inserted] noticeably [/inserted] fewer requests from other pilots to transfer to it [deleted] now [/deleted]! However, the intensive training, and the work involved in the briefing to the raids, kept David’s mind off all that (and the fact that his namesake, Harold Wilson, had died the night before).
This was 617’s seventh operation (including the first abortive Dortmund-Ems sortie), and the target was difficult to find, not counting hard to bomb accurately when they reached it. The main railway link between Central and Southern France and Italy, ran along the coast from Fréjus/St. Raphael to Cannes, and a typical curving viaduct lifted it across a ravine at a point just east of Cap du Dramont, a few miles on the Cannes side of St. Raphael. This little place was called Anthéor, and was 617’s next headache.
David flew in [inserted] company with the other 617 veterans, [/inserted] his “B” Flight Commander, Flt. Lt. John Leslie Munro, DFC, [inserted] RNZAF [/inserted], Pilot Officer Kenneth Charles McCarthy, DSO, DFC, [inserted] RCAF [/inserted], Pilot Officer Kenneth William Brown, CGM, RCAF, and two other “new boys”, Flt. Lt. “Ted” Youseman DFC, and Pilot Officer “Bunny” Clayton, DFC, CGM. Although the target was on France’s South coast, they were expected to return to England on this raid – not land in N. Africa.
David took Lancaster JB 139 on this raid, (coded KC-X and recently transferred from 49 Squadron). His bomb load included one 4,000 lb “Blockbuster” and three 1,000 lb bombs, and his crew consisted of Flt Sgt Hurrel, F.O. Parkin, Flt. Sgt. Barrow, P.O. Allen, Sgt Lowe and Sgt Mortlock. When they found their target, they jockeyed for position down the
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ravine to the sea, and David [inserted] and the others [/inserted] released their bombs from 300 ft. [Inserted] The idea was to lob the bombs onto or between the arches of the bridge, but all seemed to go through the arches instead. [/inserted] The viaduct seem [sic] unscathed, however, - although it and the rail tracks were peppered with holes – and they flew back in the knowledge it would probably need further attempt.
After a flight of 10 hrs 20 mins, David Wilson put his Lanc down at Predannack in Cornwall, to refuel, before flying back to Coningsby later.
[Underlined] Preparing for another Dams raid [/underlined]
Mick Martin was firmly in charge of the Squadron now, interviewing new would-be 617 pilots, thinking about a method of them taking flares with them on future raids to mark the target and make it easier for all to bomb, and liaising with the A.O.C. 5 Group with regard to future targets for 617.
In fact Cochrane was scheming up another attack on a dam, this time the big installation at Modane in Northern Italy, which lay deep in the hills. But Cochrane duped even Mick Martin for a time – he pretended it was to be a raid on the German battleship Tirpitz in a Norwegian fjord, and this required flying over the hills, down the steep slope, across a short stretch of water and then over the ship (in reality, the dam in Italy)!
So Martin went looking for a suitable site to practice on, and found a hillside near Bangor in N. Wales, near the coast, where he could get 617 to try flying down the face of the slope to level out over the sea. He experimented with putting down his landing flaps, to 40° or so, but found although the Lanc would sink down the hillside better, he had to exceed the max speed with flaps down by some 60 mph, and thus risk [inserted] their [/inserted] collapse – with undoubted fatal results to aircraft and crew.
David flew in [inserted] Mick Martin’s [/inserted] Lancaster (EE150 [inserted] coded KC-Z [/inserted]) to the scene on September 18, with Dave Shannon, (one of the three Flight Commanders, with Munro and McCarthy) in the cockpit beside him, and the two of them took it in turns to try flying up and over the hills that Mick Martin had found. Next day David was up in the Midlands [inserted] in the same aircraft [/inserted], this time with his
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own Flight Commander, Les Munro, the two of them doing practice runs across the Derwent reservoir at very low level, and then they tried the hill near Bangor again, Les trying it out and handing over to David. It was all intensely demanding work, and the adrenalin flowed very freely!
Between September 19th and 23rd, the “dams” type training intensified, David flying dummy attacks over Derwent reservoir in ED735 (KC-R) [inserted] on the 19th, [/inserted], then on September 20th he used Guy Gibson’s old aircraft ED932 (AJ-G) of Dams raid fame to take up one of the special “Upkeep” weapons that they still held in store and he dropped this on a dummy low-level attack in the Wash. (Guy Gibson’s old aircraft, unlike the majority that had survived the Dams raid, had [inserted] not yet [/inserted] been converted to have the bulged bomb-doors, and the old cylindrical “Upkeep” canister was used on the original Barnes Wallis-designed release mechanism). Then, in the next three days came low-level cross-country formation flying, dropping bombs on the Wainfleet ranges. David dropped the first lot (of four bombs), getting a mean error of 64 yds, and on the second occasion dropped eight bombs from 800 ft high. Then came a night time cross country at low level on astro fixes only, and finally a trip to Castle Kennedy, and Turnberry in Ayrshire, carrying 14 [inserted] staff [/inserted] passengers in connection with these trials.
However, the very next day, September 24th, came a complete change of policy, and training. The reason was the development of a new, more accurate bomb-sight, and its ability to deliver two large new weapons that Dr Barnes Wallis had been developing recently – the 12,000 lb streamlined “Tallboy” bomb, and its big brother, the 22,000 lb “Grand Slam”. The Chief of Bomber Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, had been agonising over the future rôle of 617 Squadron with Sir Ralph Cochrane, and had concluded that it should stay in the latter’s 5 Group, and now become a “Special Duties” Squadron. Cochrane, on his part, decided to press ahead with Wallis’ new weapons, and get 617 equipped as fast as possible with the new bob-sight, to start dropping these expensive weapons.
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[Underlined] The Stabilising Automatic Bomb-Sight. [/underlined]
This SABS sight had been developed at the RAE at Farnborough back in 1941 by a man called Richards, and used the gyro principle in its stabilising system. It had been held up in its development by the fact that although it was a great deal more accurate than its predecessors, it did require a very careful straight and level approach at high altitude, on the run in to the target. Consequently the likelihood of Bomber Command taking heavier casualties from flak and fighters because of this, had resulted in its being “shelved” for the time being. But now, the development of these special weapons merited another look at it. A certain Sqd. Ldr. Richardson was now despatched post haste from the RAE to 617 Squadron at Coningsby, to see the SABS fitted, and perfected, in their Lancasters.
From September 24th, therefore, everything changed in David’s training. No longer was it low-level dams-type exercises, but he flew in EE150 [inserted] (KC-Z) [/inserted] this day, with Joe McCarthy acting as Captain for some of the time, making [inserted] the first [/inserted] high level dummy runs with the new SABS fitted. The next day, David took Bunny Clayton up with him, and Sqd Ldr. Richardson (by now dubbed “Talking Bomb” by the Squadron, for his propensity to talk bomb-sights from the moment he woke, until the moment he went to sleep), to check out the SABS in EE150 again.
Sqd Ldr Richardson was busy fitting the new SABS into all the aircraft, and then checking the installation by flying with it. He also knew that it took two to be accurate – the pilot on the one hand (to fly at a given height, and airspeed, on the final run in), and the bomb aimer on the other (who had to feed the correct data into the sight, and advise the pilot when he strayed off the necessary heading/approach speed). With the Squadron C.O. (Mick Martin), Richardson then evolved a system of each pilot being checked out, by someone senior, and each bomb-aimer being paired with different pilots – cross-checking the results against each other.
Thus David [sic] third flight (on September 26th) was with Mick Martin (now elevated to Sqd. Ldr. status),
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and they did high level bombing (HLB) from 6,000 ft gaining an average bombing error of 60 yds (this altitude was not “high” in the view of most other squadrons – but where 617 was normally flying below tree-tops and between haystacks, 6,000 ft really was “high” to them!
Next day (the 27th) David had two training sorties – one taking up Ken Brown to show him the ropes, dropping bombs at Wainfleet from 10,000 ft this time, and recording a mean error of 61 yds; the next sortie being with Bunny Clayton and flying at 5,000 ft and 7,000 ft, recording an error of 50 yds. (It was getting better!)
Next day David took Geoff Rice up, and also made a sortie by himself. On the latter he dropped three bombs from 10,000 ft, but an error in the altimeter setting led to a mean drop error of 143 yds this time. All this showed how essential it was to get all the readings correct, and here they ran into the problem of calculating the exact [inserted] ground level [/inserted] barometric pressure reading over the target so as to be able to correct the altimeters to give their exact height. Another problem was to obtain absolutely accurate outside air temperatures, and the exact speed of the Lancaster (determined by a combination of airflow and Static Pressure vents in the instrumentation, and known errors (Position Errors) in the Static Pressure System (caused by the location of the vents in the fuselage airflow). All this was essential but complicated and the RAE and A&AEE had to make tests on the Lancasters to give 617 the most effective results, and to increase the accuracy of information fed into the SABS.
For a few days the weather held up training, but it resumed in October with a vengeance. David was flying different Lancasters on each sortie, a new [inserted] Mark III [/inserted] DV246 (KC-U) that had just been delivered, ED932 (Gibson’s old aircraft now recoded AJ-V) [inserted] for low-level sorties [/inserted], JB139 (KC-X), ED915 (AJ-Q), or EE146 (KC-K). He [inserted] sometimes [/inserted] went up three times a day, usually it was twice each day, and his bombing errors read consecutively: 74 yds from 10,000 ft, 182 yds (10,000 ft) then only 21 yds from a 200 ft high low-level sortie, 26 yds (200 ft), 96 yds (10,000 ft), 88 yds (10,000 ft), 101 yds [deleted] (10,000 ft) [/deleted], 86 yds [deleted] 10,000 ft) [/deleted], 57 yds (all at 10,000ft)
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60 yds (from 12,000 ft), 47 yds (1,000 ft), and so on. They had great difficulty getting the accuracy to any greater limits – which really was going to be essential if Barnes Wallis’ big, expensive bombs were to be dropped (These had streamlined aerodynamic fins, and would spin at an increased speed as they dropped, giving different trajectories to the normal, unstreamlined weapons).
Slowly the results of the RAE and A&AEE testing were incorporated on the Lancasters, and Sqd Ldr Richardson’s observations, and things at last began to come together.
Mick Martin went up with David and acted as the bomb-aimer himself on October 16th, flying in ED932 on a low-level sortie. He managed a mean error of 105 yds from 250 ft altitude – not very good! (He obviously then appreciated the level of accuracy David’s normal bomb-aimer could achieve – of 21 to 26 yds!)
David tried a run at 15,000 ft on October 17th – getting an error of 70 yds. But next day doing exactly the same, he only registered a mean error of 128 yds. (On both occasions he was flying ED932, now fitted up with the SABS system).
In the meantime, Mick Martin had been told by Cochrane to get the Squadron up to strength again in pilots and crews, and a good deal of interviewing had been carried out. Martin knew now that an extremely high degree of training and ultimate accuracy in dropping the new bombs was going to be needed, but the crews were going to have to be well blooded already with records to show that they could unflinchingly carry out day after day, the steady, straight run in to the target, whatever flak or defending fighter status. He sought only the very best and bravest of men, therefore, and rejected many applications on instinct. By the first week or so in October, however, he had selected a few more, including Pilot Officer F.E. Willsher – a young fair-haired boy of 19, only a year out of the school classroom; Flt. Lt Thomas Vincent O’Shaughnessy; Flying Officer Gordon Herbert Weeden; [deleted] and [/deleted] Warrant Officer “Chuffy” Bull; Flying Officer
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Geoffrey Stevenson Stout, DFC, [inserted] Flt Lt. R.S.D. Kearns, DFC, DFM; [/inserted] Pilot Officer Nicholas R Ross; [inserted] Sqd. Ldr William [inserted] R [/inserted] Suggett (to take over “A” Flight) [/inserted]; and Flying Officer J. (“Paddy”) Gingles. They all soon settled into the training routine, although both Ross and Bull hit trees on low-flying exercises, narrowly avoiding disaster each time.
David Wilson took up young Willsher on October 9th, to show him how the SABS worked on a 10,000 ft high-level bombing run, and in the afternoon of the same day, he flew ED932 at low level all through the Lake District and the Scottish Glens, taking 5 hrs 30 mins for the cross country. On the 11th he tried the SABS at 12 000 ft and got his error down to 60 yds, and then over the next few days he used it at 1,000 ft (Error=47 yds), 250 ft (with Mick Martin acting as bomb aimer again (Error=105 yds), then at 15,000 ft (Error=70 yds, with Sqd Ldr Richardson on board), then 15,000 ft again (128 yds). And so it went on with David flying his new Lancaster DV 246 [inserted]KC-U) [/inserted], or the two originals from the Dams raid, ED932 (AJ-V), or ED 924 [inserted] (AJ-Y) [/inserted], which had been flown by Cyril Anderson.
David took “Talking Bomb” down to the RAE at Farnborough on October 18th to have some modifications made to the SABS, then he flew the Sqd. Ldr. (who had been a Great War pilot in the RFC) up to the bombing range at West Freugh (near Stranraer) where they checked the bombsight out again at 14,000 ft and 8,000 ft.
As October drew to a close, the bugs seemed to be getting ironed out of the SABS system, as the various modifications were made to it, and after the sight went U/S two days running on practice bombing on 22nd and 23rd, at long last, on the afternoon of the 23rd, David flew over West Freugh again at 14,000 ft and dropped one 4,000 lb “Cookie” this time. It hit the 3-storey target building [inserted] at Braid Fell [/inserted] fair and square in the middle, demolishing it! (Average error = Zero!). On his next run, on the 25th, he dropped six 1,000 lb bombs from 14,000 ft, hit the target with one, gained a very near miss with a second, and put the other four close by ([inserted] Mean [/inserted] Error = 79 yds). Things were getting better!
[Underlined] Restarting Operations [/underlined]
November started off the same way – with more
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high and low level exercises. David had been allocated Guy Gibson’s old aircraft (ED932, AJ-V) on a permanent basis now, and he flew it on most of the practices. He did a run at 12,000 ft and dropped four [inserted] bombs (with [/inserted] an average error of 146 yds), then three bombs from 2,000 ft (53 yds), and then switched to one of Mick Martin’s latest ideas – bombing a PFF red Target Indicator from 15,000 ft. He scored a “bullseye” on it on November 5th (appropriately for Guy Fawkes night!), and with things now obviously getting to the stage where 617 Squadron was ready for operations with the SABS, David showed a VIP around his aircraft on November 6th (believed to be Roy Chadwick, Avro’s Chief Designer) and flew him back to Ringway in the afternoon.
Cochrane at Group had meanwhile decided it was time to test the SABS in action, and so Mick Martin was informed [inserted] that [/inserted] they were to raid the Anthéor Viaduct in Southern France again on November 11th – this time from 8,000 ft to avoid the flak from recently installed German defences.
On the morning of November 11th, David made one more practice flight in ED932, dropping 6 bombs from 15,000 ft and getting his mean error down to 89 yds. It was the best they could do, and he [inserted] then [/inserted] prepared for the evening’s operation. The Squadron despatched 11 aircraft, starting at 18.15, with Ted Youseman first off, and each being bombed-up with one 12,000 [inserted] lb [/inserted] H.C. Blast bomb. Mick Martin himself was leading the raid, and Dave Shannon and Les Munro were also flying, but Shannon had engine failure on take-off and had to abort. The others all got off safely – O’Shaughnessy, Rice, Bull, Clayton, Brown, Kearns, and David Wilson – and set course for Anthéor (David had two new members of his → [inserted] crew on this “op” – Flying officer Chandler and Warrant officer Holland, who were to stay with him ‘for some time (“Chan” Chandler had already survived 8 days in a dinghy in the N-Sea, after ditching in a 49 Sqd Hampden, returning from Düsseldorf in the early hours of July 1st, 1941). [/inserted]
They found the viaduct in half moonlight this time, but there were guns and searchlights to avoid, and there was another similar viaduct just to the West, in the bay by Agay, and this confused some crews sufficiently enough to aim at that. There were no direct hits, but Mick Martin’s bomb hit the railway line to one side of the viaduct, and several more got near misses, David’s bomb [inserted] being 30 yds out. [/inserted] But the viaduct survived, and the 10 Lancasters flew on to Blida again,
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in Algeria. There had been some ships just off the shore at Anthéor which had opened fire on some of the Lancasters, but none had been hit, and they all landed safely in N. Africa. They had a four day break there (taking full advantage of it as they had done before, to sample the local wines and unrationed food and fruit. [sic] They left on November 15th for Rabat in Morocco, and on the 17th flew home from Morocco to Coningsby, via the Bay of Biscay, loaded with Forces Christmas mail for home and fruit and wine. But one Lancaster never made it back – Ted Youseman and his crew were probably picked off by a German fighter, and were believed to have ditched in the sea south-west of Brest, perishing in the process.
{Underlined] New C.O.; new ideas. [/underlined]
While they had been away in N. Africa, a new C.O. had arrived to take command from Mick Martin (who had only been in charge on a temporary basis). His name – Wing Commander Geoffrey Leonard Cheshire, DSO and Bar, DFC – and he had dropped a rank from Group Captain, in order to take over 617. Mick Martin had some burning ideas now about marking targets first with flares, so the rest could bomb with the SABS system, and so did Cheshire too. He was to change 617’s role quite dramatically with his ideas – how dramatically, and how successfully none of them would have guessed in their wildest dreams!
After they were once more back at Coningsby, David tried out his SABS from 18,000 ft now, gaining an error of 137 yds for [inserted] dropping [/inserted] six bombs, and made a few routine air tests of his Lancaster (ED932) early in December. Cheshire also loaned out from 617 crews with McCarthy Clayton, Bull and Weeden, for a few days to the Special Duties Squadrons at Tempsford. They were needed to make pinpoint drops of guns and ammunition to the French Resistance [inserted] near Doullens (on the River Outhie in Northern France) [/inserted] on December 10th. The raid went badly, flak bringing down both Bull and Weeden’s aircraft with two of Bull’s crew, and all in Weeden’s being killed. McCarthy couldn’t find the target, and so he and Clayton went back on December 11th, and were successful this time. Cheshire and 617
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had lost two more valuable crews.
Almost immediately after this, 617 was detailed to bomb a [inserted] V1 [/inserted] Flying Bomb [inserted] launch [/inserted] site in the Pas de Calais, and Group decided to try out the SABS again at night, but this time, working on Martin and Cheshire’s ideas, arranged for the P.F.F to mark the wood concerned with incendiaries. [Inserted] → Mick Martin [inserted] – as Cheshire’s Deputy - [/inserted] had now taken over as O.C. “B” flight from Les Munro, and David Wilson was now flying as Mick’s right hand man. [/inserted] Nine Lancasters were [inserted] therefore [/inserted] sent off from 617 Squadron on December 16th, [inserted] led by Cheshire with Martin as his Deputy [/inserted] to bomb the “Ski-site” ** at Flixecourt on the Somme between Abbeville and Amiens. A single PFF Mosquito used the “Oboe” beam system of marking the target [inserted] with incendiaries [/inserted], and all nine 617 Lancasters dropped their single 12,000 ln H.C. Blast bombs as close to the burning wood as possible. David dropped his, and his bomb-aimer took a photograph of the aiming point to check on their return. [Inserted] His sortie lasted for 3 hrs 40 mins in all. [/inserted] Subsequent “recce” pictures showed the Squadron had collectively achieved a mean error of 94 yds – but the “Oboe” Mosquito had marked 350 yds from the target – and so all the bombs were wide! Cheshire was not amused.
David was up again on December 18th, doing a practice drop from 2,500 ft (Error-70 yds), and on the [inserted] morning of the [/inserted] 20th from 15,000 ft (Error=60 yds). This was a good, consistent result from differing altitudes and in different aircraft (ED932 and ME557). In fact ME557 [inserted] (KC-O) [/inserted] was a brand new Lanc, and David took a Ministry of Aircraft Production official up on the practice to check the [inserted] Napier [/inserted] compressors [inserted] supplying air to the SABS system [/inserted]. * It was also one of the first Lancasters fitted out to carry Barnes Wallis’ new 12,000 ln Tallboy streamlined bomb to be delivered to 617.
The next operation was on [inserted] the evening of [/inserted] December 20th to [inserted] the Cockerill steelworks [/inserted] [deleted] an armaments factory [/deleted] in a residential area of Liege, in Belgium. The bombing had to be accurate to avoid civilian casualties, so eight PFF Mosquitos preceded eight 617 Lancasters. The Mosquitos marked the target, but [deleted] as [/deleted] low cloud prevented the markers being seen, [inserted] Cheshire dived low to see for himself, and found the markers were well off the target. He therefore ordered [/inserted] the force [inserted] to [/inserted] return without bombing. David (and the [inserted] others [/inserted]) brought their 12,000 lb H.C. bombs back, and Geoff Rice was shot down by a night fighter, miraculously surviving alone out of his crew, to be taken prisoner. One more of the original 617 founders had gone.
* Recoded later as KC-S, this was the aircraft in which Flt. Lt. “Bill” Reid, VC, was shot down on July 31st 1944 (he survived).
** So-called because of the shape of the curved ramp V1 launch site.
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Two days later, on December 22nd, David was off again [inserted] (in AJ-V) [/inserted] to attack a [inserted] V1 [/inserted] Flying Bomb [inserted] launch [/inserted] site near Bellencombre, south-east of Dieppe, this time taking Flying Officer Len Sumpter, DFC, DFM as his [inserted] bomb-aimer [/inserted] [deleted] crew [/deleted] instead of F.O. Parkin. Sumpter had flown on the original Dams raid, been rested, and had just come back for a second tour with 617, [inserted] normally flying with Dave Shannon [/inserted]. But the PFF Mosquitos failed again, and David brought all 11 x 1,000 lb bombs back. There were no casualties, fortunately, but Cheshire was not impressed by these PFF failures
David had a few days leave, and resumed flying on the 31st, after Christmas. He missed the new attempt by 617 on December 30th to bomb Flixecourt again, with 10 Lancasters helped by six PFF Mosquitos. Once more the markers were 200 yds off target, 617 accurately straddled them, but because [inserted] of their accuracy [/inserted] missed the main target.
[Underlined] Sorting out the marking problem; a new base [/underlined]
At the beginning of January 1944, David was up on bombing practices again – high level from 15,000 ft (with an average error of 127 yds – and one bomb that toppled); then another of the same height with a better error (98 yds). That was on the morning of the 4th, and in the evening David was one of 11 Lancasters put up for attacking another Flying Bomb [inserted] launch [/inserted] site in the Pas de Calais area [inserted] – this time at Fréval. [/inserted] With the others, he bombed a PFF Target Indicator that they had dropped at very low level this time – but the T.I. was four miles from the target, however, and David brought a photo back to prove it. He blamed the PFF once more! This was obviously not good enough, and whereas 617 Squadron was now trained up to be the RAF’s most accurate bombing squadron, it was the Pathfinders who were now plainly not up to scratch! It was no good having accurate bombing on inaccurate target markers, and so Cheshire, Martin and Bob Hay (Flt. Lt. Robert Claude Hay, DFC and Bar, RAAF – 617’s bombing leader, and Mick Martin’s own bomb-aimer from the first raid on the Dams) put their heads together to work out their own in-house method of marking a target, and then bombing it with the rest of the Squadron. But they first had to prove that the System worked, and to do this they needed Cochrane’s
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permission from Group to discontinue using PFF assistance Cheshire, with his innocently youthful and matter-of-fact ways, soon got this.
Meanwhile, determined to get everyone’s accuracy up even further, David and the rest of 617 went on practicing, day after day, over the next 17 days of January. They made high-level bombing runs, low-level cross country flights, and usually pin-pointed targets all the way round in woodland areas – just like the V1 Flying Bomb sites. David flew these separate and original 617 Lancasters during this period – ED915, ED924 and his own ED932
On January 9th, after a practice over the Wainfleet Sands at low level, he and the others landed at Woodhall Spa – to be their new base from now onwards. Cochrane had decided that 617, with its special techniques, top priority targets – and more importantly, the forthcoming new Tallboy and 10-ton Grand Slam bombs they were to use – deserved a special one-squadron base secluded away from other camps. Woodhall Spa was a one-squadron aerodrome, and so 619 Squadron there moved to Coningsby (which could hold several squadrons), and 617 transferred in the reverse direction on January 9th 1944. → [Inserted] A few more pilots joined 617 at this time, including Lt. Nick Knilans, DSO, DFC (USAF), Flying Officer Geoffrey Stevenson Stout, DFC, and Flying Officer J.L. Cooper. [/inserted]
Over the next few days, operations now from Woodhall Spa and billeted in the delightful Petwood House Hotel (which served as the Officer’s Mess) David flew on low-level cross country sorties, but this time in formation. He flew his (and Guy Gibson’s old aircraft) ED932 for the last time on January 18th [inserted] across to Coningsby, [/inserted] and this veteran Lancaster was left there to be used by 61 Squadron in future (it survived the war intact, only to be eventually scrapped). On the 20th, David started some new tactics that Cheshire was devising – low flying over the Wash at only 60 ft high, and then flying across, and down, the aerodrome’s flarepath at 60 ft, practicing the tactics of dropping more Target Indicators onto a cluster dropped already by the leader (using the runway lights as imaginary markers). It was during this practicing on → [inserted] the 20th that O’Shaughnessy misjudged his height and hit a sea wall at Snettisham, crashing on the beach. He and one of his crew were killed, but the rest (one badly injured) survived to fight again. The Squadron had lost another [inserted] good [/inserted] pilot. [/inserted]
Next day, January 21st, Cheshire announced he had got permission to strike at a V1 [inserted] launch [/inserted] site again – but this time without using the PFF at all. That evening, they set out with even greater excitement than usual, for they knew they had to get a good result
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this time, to substantiate all their training.
David took another of his old mounts, JB139 [inserted] (KC-X) [/inserted], on this raid, and 617 put up 12 aircraft in all. The target was at Hallencourt, a few miles South of Abbeville, and Cheshire and Martin carried out their own new “Pathfinder” technique. First of all the leading pair dropped [inserted] Red Spot [/inserted] flares from 7,000 ft, then dived down [inserted] to about 400 ft, [/inserted] using their illumination of the target area to drop long-burning Target Indicators right on top of the Ski-site.* The rest of 617 then flew over, dropping their bombs on the T.I’s. David, in fact, carried 2 x 1,000 lb, 13 x 500 lb bombs and 6 flares in his Lancaster, and, in common with others, would have used the flares if necessary to help Cheshire and Martin to go on marking the target if their first T.I’s had gone out. But David didn’t need to use the flares on this occasion, nor did he drop all his bombs – only 7 x 500 lb and 1 x 1,000 were let go, and he brought the rest back. He got a good photograph of the aiming point [inserted] from his bombing level of 13,000ft, [/inserted] and when the crews got back to Woodhall Spa, they were jubilant. It had worked, and later “recce” pictures confirmed they had blasted the main target area – for a change!
Once again, in the next few days, David was hard at Cheshire’s new tactics again, doing low-level [inserted] (60 ft high) [/inserted] runs over Uppingham Reservoir, and practicing aiming at the flarepath at their base – or carrying out “Tomato” exercises (as they now referred to them). Then on January 25th came their second “Op” using their own marking [inserted] techniques [/inserted] on a V1 [inserted] launch [/inserted] site. Now it was Fréval [inserted] again [/inserted], and David was one of 12 617 Lancasters to head for the target, flying a Mk I (DV385, KC-A). [deleted] from 50 Squadron for a few days [/deleted] He carried 13 x 500 lb and 2 x 1,000 lb bombs and Cheshire and Martin dived in low again aided by a green Target Indicator dropped [inserted] in the general target area by the PFF, [/inserted] marked the target [inserted] with Red Spot flares [/inserted] in very gusty wind conditions, and David and the rest dropped their bombs exactly on target. It was a case of two out of two “bullseyes” for 617, and there were no losses from either raid.
[Underlined] Picking off the targets [/underlined]
Cochrane now realised that Cheshire and 617
* Cochrane had insisted that the marking had to be done from above 2,500 ft, but Cheshire and Martin had worked out the dive-bombing technique down to 400 ft!
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were now thoroughly capable of using their low-marking techniques on any number of specialised targets – and Cheshire had eventually told him of their habit of dive-bombing their Lancasters right down to 400 ft over the target. So Cochrane now picked a beauty for them – the new engine works at Limoges, in mid-western France. This was to be on February 8th, and so in the days leading up to this, David found himself practicing once again, this time dropping bombs on the ranges from 1,500 ft, 2,000 ft, then at 8,000 ft, 10,000 ft and finally 14,500 ft (at West Freugh). At low-level his mean error was 222 yds, but at 10,000 ft he got it down to 39 yds, and at West Freugh to 65 yds.
Finally, the 8th dawned, and in the evening 12 Lancasters took off for the Gnome et Rhône aero engine works at Limoges. Cheshire and Martin left 15 minutes before the rest – led by Dave Shannon and consisting of David, Ken Brown, Bob Knights (a new pilot), Knilans, Ross, Kearns, Willsher Clayton and Suggitt.
Para // Cheshire had worked out a special technique for this raid , as most of the workers were French, and the factory was close to a built-up area where many of them lived. There was cloud right along their route, but it broke just before they reached Limoges, on the River Vienne. Cheshire then flew over the factory roof three times, down to about 100 ft to warn all the night shift workers to leave, and take shelter. His aircraft, DV380 (Coded KC-N) had had some modifications to accommodate an RAF Film Unit crew, led by Sqd Ldr. Pat Moyna. Half its fuselage door was cut away to instal [sic] two 35mm movie cameras, and two large mirrors were fitted underneath to reflect as much light as possible (had Roy Chadwick, the Lancaster’s designer known, he would doubtless have considered it as sacrilege)!
After Cheshire’s third run, his crew could see the French workers streaming out of the factory, to their air raid shelters, and after waiting a few minutes, Cheshire went in to drop his cascading incendiary markers and Red Spot fires directly on top of the centre of the factory roofs. The Film crew had a beanfeast, obtaining some of the most remarkable shots of the War, as the cascades of light lit up the factory, river and railway yards nearby.
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Mick Martin then followed Cheshire in, flying his Lancaster DV402 (coded KC-P), and dropped his markers on top of Cheshires – After that Cheshire told the main force overhead to bomb, and he cruised around the area at 5,000 ft, to let the film crew record the event. They had a grandstand view, as the other 10 Lancasters (David was flying ME559, KC-Q) unloaded their weapons on the factory. Five of them carried 12,000 lb H.C. Blast bombs, the other seven – like David – [inserted] each [/inserted] dropped 12 x 1,000 lb bombs, and most of them were within the factory perimeter. David reckoned his stick fell slightly off target, and straddled the railway lines away from the factory.
Cheshire then ordered all crews home, but he flew around the burning, smoking factory in the moonlight at 100ft (or less) for half an hour, letting the Film crew complete a unique task. Even Cheshire’s crew got fidgety, trying to egg him on gently to start for home. As Moyna said afterwards: “Cheshire seemed as unconcerned as an assistant arranging a group photograph in a studio”! Finally, they turned out to the Bay of Biscay, and flew back over the sea. They all arrived back safely – Cheshire about an hour behind the rest. And the main achievement (for Cheshire) was a perfect record on film to show the AOC and all the others at Bomber Command HQ, illustrating how effective low-level marking could be.
[Underlined] Third attempt at Anthéor. [/underlined]
After the attack on Limoges, David’s next flight with 617 was another operation on February 12th – back to the Anthéor viaduct again. The Squadron had already attacked it twice, and the USAF once, but it was still intact and carrying almost 100,000 tons of German supplies down to the Italian Front each week. All these attacks had, however, served only to get the Germans to defend it more heavily each time, and the defences were formidable this time.
Once again 617 fielded 10 Lancasters for the “Op”. but Cheshire was concerned about the range at their disposal, for Cochrane refused permission for them to carry on to Sardinia this time, saying he needed 617 back in the UK after the raid. In order to squeeze every gallon of petrol into their tanks, they flew
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their Lancasters down to Ford aerodrome, between Bognor Regis and Littlehampton on the South Coast, using it as an advance base to refuel. Then Cheshire and Martin took off ahead of the others, climbing through bad icing conditions, and arrived some five minutes ahead of the main force.
It was a pitch black night and the narrow valley was full of all types of ack ack guns, which opened up in an absolute hail of flak. Cheshire tried three times to dive down the valet over the viaduct, and drop his load of markers and flares, but each time he was blinded by the flak and forced off course and out to sea. Martin then had a go, and Cheshire tried to get back inland to draw off the fire as he ran in, but was out of position as Mick slid down the dark ravine. As Mick levelled out over the viaduct, a 20mm cannon shell exploded through the bomb-aimers’s cupola, and Bob Hay was killed instantly, and the Flight Engineer, Ivan Whittaker injured in his legs.
Cheshire ordered Martin to fly on to Sardinia, and land there (where he had wanted the entire Squadron to go), and then he went in again himself, this time at 5,000 ft, above the ravine and out of range of the cannon fire. There was still a mass of heavy flak bursts, and David [inserted] in Lancaster ED763 (KC-D), [/inserted] and the others flying overhead thought it looked impossible for anyone to survive in that holocaust. Cheshire managed to drop some of his Red Spot markers, but they drifted to the beach side of the viaduct. With time over the target limited by having to return to the UK, Shannon up above now commenced the high-level bombing, and David and the others followed. David dropped his single 12,000 H.C. Blast bomb [inserted] from 9,500 ft [/inserted] and turned for home. Only one of these weapons dropped close to the viaduct, the rest falling closer to the beach, and once again the bridge remained intact! Finally, after a flight lasting seven hours exactly *, David touched down at Ford again, to refuel and rest, before flying back to Woodhall Spa that morning. [Deleted] The Lancaster he had used this time was ED763 (KC-D). [/deleted]
But fate had not finished with the Squadron yet, for next morning, as the 617 crews left Ford to fly up to Woodhall Spa, Sqd. Ldr. Bill
* David’s previous sortie to Limoges lasted 7 hrs 25 mins altogether but this was from Woodhall Spa. It took about an hour each way from there down to Ford.
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Suggitt climbed out to the West, and turned to starboard in DV382 (KC-J) to set course to the North-east. He had to climb up through the clouds shrouding [inserted] the [/inserted] South Downs, and just after 08.30 a tractor driver at Duncton Hill Farm saw the Lancaster impact on Littleton Down, above him. Wreckage spread everywhere, and all Suggitt’s crew died instantaneously, although Suggitt himself died two days later, still in a coma. Flight Sgt. John Pulford, DFM, the last but one survivor of Guy Gibson’s original raid crew, died in the crash. (The last survivor, Flt. Lt. Richard Trevor-Roper DFC, DFM, was killed on a 97 Squadron operation just 20 days later).
[Underlined] Improving the techniques. [/underlined]
After Mick Martin returned from Sardinia later, his Lancaster temporarily patched up, Cochrane sent him off for a rest period – much against his will. But Cochrane preferred living Flight Commanders to dead ones, and he had few survivors left now, of the original 617 founding pilots.
Then came some top-level Group and Command meetings – at one of which Cheshire appeared on the one hand, proposing greater use of his and Martin’s low-level marking techniques (preferably using Mosquitos in future), and on the other hand Air Vice Marshal Don Bennett [inserted] of 8 Group [/inserted] was strongly defending his PFF high-level marking (and being generally dismissive of 617 Squadron’s techniques).
Cochrane, however, gave Cheshire some leeway in his 5 Group, and set a string of targets now for 617 to attack where Cheshire could devise the necessary low-level marking himself. With Martin gone now, Cheshire took Les Munro as his Deputy, and Les became “B” Flight Commander, with David Wilson as his right hand man. Cheshire did not yet put in a bid for two Mosquitos (but he was busy making the necessary high-level contact in the RAF in order to obtain them quickly and painlessly when he needed them). He knew that the light, fast and manoeuvrable Mosquito would help to make diving onto the target so much easier, and also assist in avoiding the defensive flak.
The last half of February 1944 passed for David with no more than four training flights or air tests
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being flown, due to bad weather. The last of these, on February 29th, was a bomb-dropping exercise from 15,000 ft, where David’s crew scored a 100 yd average error. Then came another practice from 10,000 ft on the morning of March 2nd, followed by 617’s next operation the same evening – this time to the aero-engine works at Albert in the Pas de Calais, between Amiens and Bapaume. Because this was believed to be heavily defended (repairing as it did, vital BMW engines for Focke Wulf FW 190 fighters) Cochrane ordered Cheshire not to mark below 5,000 ft this time. This was Leonard Cheshire’s 75th operation, and David Wilson’s 67th, yet 617’s three Flight Commanders – Dave Shannon, Joe McCarthy and Les Munro were some way behind these totals themselves. Both McCarthy and Munro were now promoted to Squadron Leaders.
David’s aircraft, DV246 (KC-U) was loaded up completely this time with [inserted] 248 x 30 lb [/inserted] incendiaries, and Cheshire and Munro (as deputy) went ahead to position themselves down to 5,000 ft so as to identify the target when the flares were dropped by the leading 617 Lancasters [inserted] of the 13 flying [/inserted] overhead. Cheshire went in under the flares to drop his markers, but his aircraft’s SABS bombsight went U/S on the approach, and while he stood off [inserted] for his bomb-aimer [/inserted] to try to get it working, he called in Munro to drop markers [inserted] just [/inserted] as the flares burnt out. Munro’s markers were spot on, and 617 bombed the factory from higher up, practically all their bombs and certainly David’s load of incendiaries [/inserted] (dropped from 9,200 ft) [/inserted] hitting the factory dead-centre. It was a text book operation, and Cheshire’s diary entry was almost right when he wrote: “This factory will produce no more engines for the Hun!”
Two nights later, on March 4th, 617’s target was the small, but important [inserted] La Ricamerie [/inserted] needle-bearing factory at St. Etienne (to the South-west of Lyon). It was a very small target, in a narrow valley with 4,000 ft hills on either flank, and once again in a built-up area, meaning it had to be picked out surgically, without harming the French citizens if possible.
Again, 15 Lancasters were put up that night, Cheshire and Munro leading (the latter on three engines, as one had packed up after take off). But there was ten-tenths cloud over the target, as David Wilson recorded. He was carrying a Sqd Ldr. Doubleday that night in his usual mount, JB139 (KC-X), and 1,000 lb
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bombs. But Cheshire couldn’t mark the target because of the bad weather, and so they all brought their bombs back that night. David’s flight there and back lasted exactly four hours.
Six days later, with better weather forecast, 617 tried to hit St. Etienne again. This time 16 Lancasters set off for La Ricamerie factory – on the same night that 5 Group bombed the Michelin works at Clermont-Ferrand. This time Cheshire made six attempts to mark at very low level in the blackness, dropping them accurately on the last run, but they bounced beyond the factory. Munro followed, and dropped short, Shannon tried and his markers bounced beyond, and finally Arthur Kell (a new Australian pilot) made a low-level dive and planted incendiaries in the factory. The rest of 617 then bombed the incendiaries (to Cheshire’s commands), and David unleashed his 11 x 1,000 lb bombs [inserted] from X “X-Ray” on the second run in [/inserted] in two sticks, [inserted] dropping them from 8000 ft. [/inserted] When they returned safely, David’s bob-aimer believed they had missed the target, but when “Recce” photographs were obtained, 617 was delighted to see the target had been completely destroyed, and there was no damage to the built-up area outside!
There was no more training at the moment, and the next “Op” was on March 15th, to an aero-engine works at Woippy, on the Northern outskirts of Metz (on the R. Moselle, East of Paris). It was freezing cold weather and 617 and 619 Squadrons sent a combined 22 Lancasters up this night, but the target was hidden by cloud [deleted] again [/deleted]. David was carrying a single 12,000 H.C. Blast bomb in his [inserted] JB139 [/inserted] X “X-Ray” again, but there was no hope of bombing, and so they all brought their bombs back. This was a longer sortie – 5 hrs 30 mins – and one [inserted] 617 [/inserted] crew, flying with Flying Officer Duffy, were attacked by three night fighters on their return leg, and claimed all three shot down!
Next day, March 16th, 617 was off again, this time to bomb the Michelin tyre factory at Cataroux, Clermont-Ferrand. The 15 Lancasters they put up were joined by six from 106 Squadron that were fitted with [inserted] the [/inserted] new [inserted] H2S [/inserted] radar bombing equipment. These latter aircraft dropped the flares this time, and Cheshire
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Made his usual low-level dives over the Cataroux Michelin factory to warn the [inserted] French [/inserted] workers to take cover, dropping his markers on the third run – but a little short. He was being extremely careful once more, because the factory had these major sheds in its complex, but a fourth large building – the French workers canteen – had “on no account to be damaged, if possible”, (Group’s instructions). Cheshire then called in his three Flight Commanders, Munro, Shannon and McCarthy, and they all managed to drop their markers directly on the factory sheds. To do this, they had to have a constant rain of flares to illuminate the target, and David Wilson in JB139 released his six, to help their aim. Then Cheshire called up the others to bomb the newly laid markers and David released his [inserted] single [/inserted] 12,000 Blast bomb *, right on target, and turned for home. This trip lasted 6 hrs 40 mins in all, with the separate run-ins to drop flares, and then the weapon, and with poor weather conditions back at Woodhall Spa, David landed at Coningsby on the return, positioning back to base [inserted] later [/inserted] in the morning.
The “recce” pictures next morning showed the works entirely in flames – and yet the canteen was intact! In fact Cheshire had once again carried Sqd Ldr Pat Moyna and his Film Unit in his Lancaster, and filmed the progress of the bombing from low-level.
Off again on March 18th, David was one of 13 Lancasters this time from 617 Squadron, to bomb the French [inserted] “Poudrerie Nationale” [/inserted] explosives factory at Bergerac, on the R. Dordogne east of Bordeaux. Cochrane had meanwhile told Cheshire that he would try to obtain two Mosquitos, to carry on the low-level marking in greater safety, and therefore until they came, Cheshire must not do any more low-level marking below 5,000 ft. On this raid therefore, six other 5 Group Lancasters, using H2S, joined 617 Squadron, and Cheshire marked from 5,000 ft – spot on – followed by an equally accurate Munro. Shannon and McCarthy both marked an ammunition dump close by. Then the others started to bomb, and before David [inserted] (in JB139 again) [/inserted] dropped his 12,000 lb weapon on the factory [inserted] from 10,000 ft [/inserted], Bunny Clayton dropped his on the nearby
* Six crews carried this weapon on the raid (those with the most accurate bombing averages). This weapon was now referred to as “The Factory Buster”.
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ammunition dump, which exploded in a 15-second long, gigantic flash that blinded everybody. Cheshire, down below, looked up and saw the rest of 617’s Lancasters silhouetted above him against the sky. Then David’s bomb slammed into the powder works, and it disappeared in turn beneath a series of vast explosions. “The powder works”, Cheshire noted, “would appear to have outlived their usefulness!”
This route also took 6 hrs 40 mins from take-off to touch-down, and two days later (as usual now) on [inserted] March [/inserted] 20th, David was off again [inserted] in JB139 [/inserted] to another explosives works – this one at Angoulême, [inserted] North-east of Bordeaux [/inserted]. The pattern was repeated, six 5 Group Lancasters using H2S to drop flares, Cheshire leading 617’s total force of 14 Lancasters and marking from 5,000 ft again. This explosives factory, on a bend on the R. Charente there, performed in the same manner as the one at Bergerac. David dropped 1 x 8,000 lb and 1 x 1,000 lb bomb from 8,300 ft on top of this works, and the factory was completely – and spectacularly – destroyed. Some 6 hrs 5 mins later, David was safely back at Woodhall Spa, as were all 617 crews, and the Film Unit in Cheshire’s aircraft again.
[Underlined] Lyon – third time lucky [/underlined]
The fact that 617 would never leave a “demolition job” half-finished was becoming equally well known to Germans and British alike. The Germans were, in fact, beginning to draft in more defences to the vital plants in France that were supplying their War Effort. But nowhere was this reputation more tested than with their attack on the SIGMA aero-engine works near Lyon on the night of March 23rd 1944. Again six Lancasters of 106 Squadron were to act as the Flare droppers, and 617 put up 14 aircraft.
Cheshire told the 106 crews when to drop their flares, but the first lot were too far North, the second try fell short to the South, and final corrections failed to illuminate the actual target. Cheshire now had to send in his own 617 flare droppers, at altitude, and he just managed one dive over the target at 5,000 ft before they went out. He was not sure his markers had hit, but ordered the rest of 617 to bomb them. David was carrying 11 x 1,000 lb bombs [inserted] in JB139 [/inserted] this time, all fitted with long delay fuses (for the safety of the French
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civilians), so Cheshire had to fly around on his own afterwards to assess the results. They exploded eventually, and certainly something had been hit fair and square.
On the return, all but one 617 aircraft diverted to Tangmere – a fighter station near Chichester – only Nick Ross getting back to Woodhall Spa [inserted] (David’s sortie had lasted 6 hrs 45 mins by this time). [/inserted] There was very limited accommodation, and Cheshire and his Flight Commanders slept with some of the 617 crews in their billets, and on the floor – being last in that morning! When they returned to Woodhall Spa after resting, it was to discover that their target was untouched – they had bombed the wrong factory!
So, next day, March 25th, they went back again to finish the job. This time there were 22 Lancasters in all, including the half dozen from 106 Squadron, but Cheshire had re-organized the Flare-dropping force this time, putting 617’s Kearns in charge of all such flare usage – be it by 106 or 617 Squadron. Cochrane had allowed Cheshire to mark at low-level this time, if required, and as the flares went down Cheshire once again realised they were off target. Eventually he and Kearns got them back on the right target, and Cheshire and McCarthy simultaneously marked underneath. Cheshire then realised they had dropped their spot markers on the wrong buildings, and went in again, his second lot of red spot incendiaries again overshooting. Finally he called in McCarthy again, who hit the target with his last markers, and Cheshire ordered these to be bombed by the rest. Due to problems of communication, however, all the 617 crews orbiting overhead then bombed the early markers – missing the target once again! David’s load this time consisted entirely of 500 lb incendiary clusters and they obtained a good aiming point photograph – proving once back home again 7 hrs 20 mins later, that they had missed the right aero engine works for the second time!
Once more, therefore, 617 set out again on March 29th to try and complete the demolition job. This time 106 and 617 put up 19 Lancasters, and Cheshire was ordered to mark from 5,000 ft again. The flares
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dropped by 106 this time failed to ignite, and Kearns therefore ordered 617 crews to drop their flares. These were accurate, and Cheshire then marked carefully, getting his spot fires just a few yards out of the target centre. When David and the rest above bombed these, their average error put their bombs within the target area this time. David was carrying 1 x 8,000 lb and 1 x 1,000 lb bomb [inserted] in JB139 [/inserted] this occasion, [deleted] flying his usual X “X-ray” [/deleted], and his crew knew immediately that they had at last scored a “bulls-eye”. It took just 7 hrs this time, before they were back at base, third time lucky!
[Underlined] Mosquito marking; and marshalling yards. [/underlined]
Two days before this operation – the last that Cheshire flew and marked in a Lancaster – Cochrane said he had obtained the use of two Mosquitos for marking in future. Cheshire went to see them at Coleby Grange on the 27th, and then later on the day he returned from Lyon (the 30th) he had an hour’s dual instruction on it before flying it to Woodhall Spa. He decided that [inserted] McCarthy [/inserted], Shannon, Kearns and Fawke should join him on the Mosquitos as pilots, and they did some rapid dual instruction and test flights. And within two weeks Cochrane had given them two more Mosquitos.
David Wilson was on a few days leave at the beginning of April, and missed the next operation to the aircraft repair plant at Toulouse-Blagnac aerodrome on April 5th. This was the first time Cheshire used his Mosquito to do the target marking, and this time he was marking not just for 617 Squadron – in the lead – but for the whole of 5 Group which joined in the raid for the first full scale rest of operations to come. In addition to Cheshire’s Mosquito, 617 Squadron fielded 17 Lancasters, and 5 Group put up another 127 altogether. Cheshire found the target clear of cloud, and dived three times, dropping his markers right on target, despite considerable flak of all types. But the Mosquito was fast and agile, and the flak was inaccurate because of this. Munro and McCarthy had marked with Lancasters, and then 617 and other 5 Group Lancasters unloaded their bomb
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loads on the aircraft factory, and on other nearby targets too. All were destroyed, but Cheshire had to leave the scene early, as he was not sure of the range of the Mosquito at low altitude, without extra wing tanks.
When David returned from leave, he was immediately scheduled on the next raid on April 10th, this time to the Luftwaffe’s Signals Equipment Depôt at St. Cyr, by Versailles. He was given the new Lancaster, LM485 (KC-N), which Les Munro had flown in the Toulouse raid on the 5th, and bombed-up with 1 x 8,000 lb and 6 x 500 lb bombs. This raid was just carried out by 617, using Cheshire’s Mosquito and 17 Lancasters, and Cheshire eventually dive-bombed the target [inserted] down to 700 ft [/inserted] with his markers, after having trouble finding it in the dark. But he was spot on again, and David and the rest bombed the target [inserted] from 13,600 ft, [/inserted] destroying most of it.
Discussions at Bomber Command HQ now led to the C-in-C, Harris, agreeing now to let Cochrane have his own Pathfinder Force, within 5 Group, built around the special marking techniques developed by 617 Squadron. Thus Cochrane now received back two Lancaster Squadrons – 83 and 97 – which had originally been seconded to 8 PFF Group, and one Mosquito Squadron – 627 – [inserted] also [/inserted] from 8 Group, (much against the wishes of their A.O.C., Don Bennett).
The object now was to use the Mosquito squadron, and 617’s Mosquitos, for marking large targets, have the Lancasters of 83 and 97 Squadrons dropping the flares and acting as back-ups, and use 617 as the lead bombing squadron, and the others to bomb from a higher level. The next target was just such a place – the marshalling yards at Juvisy, 10 miles South of Paris.
David, meanwhile, had been back over the ranges again with 617, honing their skills all the time. He had “Talking Bomb” up with him on one high level from 15,000 ft, did some low-level flying, and then, on April 18th, was off to Juvisy with 201 other Lancasters in the Group, plus 617’s four Mosquitos [inserted] flown by Cheshire, Fawke, Shannon and Kearns.) [/inserted] Flying LM 485 [inserted] (KC-N) [/inserted] again, David was designated (as was the whole of 617 Sqd) to mark the target for the [inserted] Group’s Lancasters. [/inserted], and carried 6 x Red Spots,
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[inserted] 6 x 1,000 lb, and [/inserted] 4 x 500 lb bombs. The railway yards were on the West bank of the R. Seine, just on the south-east corner of Orly aerodrome, and [deleted] they covered such a large aera that the raid was split into two waves – one to attack the Southern half, the next (one hour later) to attack the Northern section. [/deleted] Cheshire found the Southern aiming point under flares dropped by 83 and 97 Squadrons above (although he had suffered a compass [inserted] failure [/inserted] in the Mosquito). He marked the yards successfully, and was backed up by the other [deleted] of the [/deleted] 617 Mosquitos, and David and the 617 Lancasters then unloaded their markers and bombs from 6,500ft fairly accurately on the target, [deleted] David and his 617 colleagues being the most [/deleted] with the rest of 5 Group – being trained in area (rather than spot) bombing – then carpeting the whole area. [Deleted] soon marked for the second wave, in Northern half of the yards, and again the results were accurate. [/deleted] The combined 5 Group method was becoming one of Bomber Command’s [inserted] most [/inserted] successful weapons!
On [inserted] the morning [/inserted] April 20th, David made his highest practice bombing run yet on Wainfleet Ranges – from 20,000 ft this time. He did not know it, but Cochrane was anticipating the arrival shortly of Barnes Wallis’ new Tallboy Bomb, and the higher it would be accurately dropped, the deeper it would penetrate in the ground before exploding, and creating an “earthquake” effect – bringing any building crashing (even if made of solid concrete).
The same evening (April 20th) David took part in another massed 5 Group attack – this time on the marshalling yards on the North side of Paris, at Porte de la Chapelle, just up the line from the Gare du Nord. He was flying LM485 (KC-N) this evening, and because these yards were very close to the residential tenement blocks surrounding them, extreme care was needed in dropping both markers and bombs. This raid was also even bigger than the one in Juvisy, because 5 Group also borrowed the services of some 8 Group PFF Mosquitos to drop markers by their Oboe equipment (using converging radio beams from UK stations), before 617’s Mosquitos, and Lancasters [inserted] of [/inserted] all three 5 Group marking Squadrons (617, 83 and 97) did their marker and bomb dropping, and then the 5 Group’s Lancasters bombed the target. There was a total of
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247 Lancasters, and 22 Mosquitos in all involved this night, and the raid was split into two waves, each about an hour apart, which attacked the Southern and Northern halves of the yards separately.
The Oboe markers were a little late over the target and there were inevitably some communication problems with all the aerial units involved, and Cheshire trying to control the different facets of the operation. But these were overcome, and another accurate blitzing of the target was achieved. David dropped [inserted] 6 x Red Spots, 6 x 1,000 lb and 4 x 500 lb [/inserted] bombs this time [inserted] from 6500 ft [/inserted], and achieved a direct hit on the aiming point. His sortie lasted 4 hrs 10 mins this time, and once again, all 617 aircraft – Mosquitos and Lancasters, returned safely, although 6 Lancasters from the other squadrons were lost. On the subject of Squadron losses, 617 itself was now very much below the average of most squadrons in this respect, helped no doubt by its training, and the fact that it had concentrated recently on French targets, rather than those in the most heavily defended parts of Germany. There were other reasons too – such as Cheshire’s acquaintance with an RAF officer who was [inserted] the [/inserted] Senior Controller of Beachy Head radar station, near Eastbourne. This had some new American equipment that gave long range cover for Fighter Command deep into France and the Low Countries, and the officer suggested that it could be used at night to warn 617’s Lancasters if they were being stalked by German nightfighters. Cheshire then had 617’s Lancasters fitted with special crystal pick-ups and the latest VHF sets (all with Cochrane’s approval) and from there on, they had valuable radar protection on their missions into the Continent.
[Underlined] Tallboys, and “Taxable”. [/underlined]
The next operation Cochrane planned for 617 was an attack on a German railway centre, and the first he chose was Braunschweig (Brunswick), to the east of Hannover, on the evening of April 22nd. This was historically important, as it was the first time that 617 and 5 Group employed their low-level marking activities over German soil. David, however, missed this operation, and the next ones on Munich [inserted] on April 24th [/inserted] (marshalling yards again) and the German
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tank and troop park at Mailly-le-Camp (May 3rd) – because he was busily engaged in working [inserted] up [/inserted] himself and a few [inserted] other [/inserted] specially selected 617 crews on the Barnes Wallis Tallboy bomb technique. For the most accurate bombing crews on the squadron had been selected to drop these new 12,000 lb weapons (and later, the 22,000 lb Grand Slam bombs too).
It is worth recording, however, that the Braunschweig raid saw 238 Lancasters and 17 Mosquitos of 5 Group, and 10 Lancasters of 1 Group take part, The result was not good, chiefly because there was low cloud and although 617 marked the yards successfully (in the light of flares dropped by 83 and 97 Squadron Lancasters above), other H2S aimed markers were inadvertently dropped farther South, and much of the main force bombed these. One Lancaster of 5 Group had left its radio transmitter on, and it jammed every direction Cheshire tried to give to the other crews. Four Lancasters were lost, but none from 617.
The Munich raid, on April 24, was by contrast an immense tactical success. A mixed force of 260 aircraft once more struck the railway yards there (as well as spreading out over other areas of the town) after Cheshire and 617 Mosquitos had marked the target, [inserted] and Cheshire flew around at low level through a considerable curtain of flak and searchlights. Diversionary raids were flown to Karlsrühr (by the main force), and on Milan (a spoof “Window” dropping exercise by six 617 crews), and the only casualty 617 suffered this time was Flt. Lt. J.L. Cooper (a recent joiner from 106 Squadron). His Lancaster was shot down en route to Munich as Aichstetten, just North-east of Lake Constance, and although his bomb-aimer was killed, the rest of the crew survived to be taken prisoner. [Inserted] Eight other Lancasters of 5 Group were also lost this night. [/inserted] They were lucky to be in Bavaria – for there was now a large price on the heads of 617 crews caught in France!
[Inserted] After this raid on Munich, Cochrane ordered 617 crews to have a weeks complete leave, and most used the rest to good effect. But one or two stayed behind, David Wilson being one.
One factor worth noting about this raid was that Cheshire could not obtain extra fuel tanks for 617’s four Mosquitos. They had to fly these to Manston, refuel on the runway and take off without warming up the engines, to be sure of getting to Munich. None of them believed they could get back to Manston, and yet all just made it – despite a German night fighter in the circuit when they landed! [/inserted]
The Mailly raid upset 617’s and 5 Groups recent success patterns with a vengeance – but it was [inserted] just [/inserted] one of these things (C’est la Guerre”). Mailly was a large French military training area South of Chalons-sur-
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Marne (itself just a few miles [inserted] South-east [/inserted] of Rhiems). Here, it was known the Germans had a Panzer division and their equipment in transit.
Cheshire and 617’s other three Mosquito pilots, Shannon, Fawke and Kearns, were ordered to mark at Mailly, but 617’s Lancasters were not detailed for this raid – which was just as well. Cheshire marked the target perfectly, and ordered the 5 Group Controller to order the first wave of Lancasters to bomb. But things started to go wrong then, as the [inserted] latter’s [/inserted] radio was subsequently found to be seriously off frequency, and his VHF set was being drowned by an American Forces broadcast. After some delay they started to bomb, but because the second wave was held back, Shannon and Kearns had to remark the target in the face of considerable flak. The second wave also bombed accurately, but in the delays caused by the lack of communication, and while Cheshire had to get the Deputy Controller to take over, German night fighters began to arrive in large numbers, and harried the Lancasters all the way back to Northern France. All the 617 crews returned safely, but 42 Lancasters were lost out of the 340 Lancasters and 16 Mosquitos sent on the raid by 5, 1 and 8(PFF) Groups. (This was an 11.6% loss rate – some three times the normal)!
David missed Braunschweig and Munich, because on April 22nd (the day after his return from La Chappelle) he took his old JB139 (originally KC-X, but now changed to KC-V) down to Boscombe Down to carry out trials with Barnes Wallis’ 12,000 ln Tallboy bomb. Sqd Ldr Richardson (“Talking Bomb”) was also there and over the next four days, David took him up several times daily, making high-level trials dropping prototype Tallboys from 18,000 ft each time. On the 26th he returned to Woodhall Spa, carrying seven of the scientists concerned with these tests. He had to break off the special Tallboy dropping exercises in May, however, as all 617’s crews were now engaged on one of their most boring exercises – yet [deleted] as [/deleted] it turned out, it was to be perhaps their most successful and decisive of all – Operation “Taxable”.
The [deleted word] squadron was being trained up to conduct a major “spoof” exercise on the day before D-Day.
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This would entail [inserted] two waves, each of 8 [/inserted] [deleted] 16 [/deleted] Lancasters, flying on instruments in short overlapping circuits, and dropping “Window” to try to indicate to the German shore defences that an invasion fleet was heading their way. (And of course it would be in a very different direction to that taken by the real fleet). The whole operation, once started, would have to be kept up [deleted] continuously [/deleted] for some four hours or more. [Deleted] to seem on the German radar as if a vast number of ships was slowly advancing in their direction. [/deleted] The continuous orbiting by the Lancasters had to be at low level [inserted] 3,000 ft [/inserted], start at a pre-arranged time near Dover, and advance gradually over a group of 18 surface vessels flying barrage balloons, as the vessels sailed beneath them towards the coast below Calais. Bundles of “Window” would have [inserted] to be dropped out every 12 seconds during the four hours. [/inserted]
The month of May, 1944 was probably the most boring in the Squadron’s history, as they practised, day after day, and usually for an hour or so at a time, the intricate navigational exercises that would enable them to fly these continuous orbits. David flew a total of 26hrs 20 mins altogether on these exercises, between May 6th and June 4th, in his Lancaster I, LM485 (KC-N). As the continuous orbiting was going to be a taxing operation, each Lancaster would have to have two crews on board, one relieving the other at the halfway point. David had as his relief pilot a Pilot Officer Sanders and his crew, and after May 13th they always flew together.
On May 18th, David tested out a new “automatic pilot” (or “George”) that Avro’s had fitted to his aircraft, to alleviate the strain of the exercise. These were fitted to all the other Lancasters. At the end of May the Squadron flew up to Yorkshire to practice over the North Sea, and dovetail the second wave of 8 Lancasters into the tricky take-over from the first wave – to keep dropping the “Window” without any gaps (lest the German radar show some strange interruptions in the “fleet’s” progress).
Finally, all was ready on the night of June 5th, and the first wave of 617’s Lancasters set off at about 23.00, the first wave finishing their intricate movements halfway across the Channel
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between Dover and the Pas de Calais coast at around 02.30, and being relieved by the second wave, who finished at around 05.00, after daybreak and by which time they were in sight of the French coast. Another Squadron, No 218, used six Stirling bombers fitted with G-H blind bombing radar units, working in the same fashion but a little more to the East of 617.
In the event, as David noted in his log book, the exercise was “believed very successful”. His total sortie lasted for 4 hrs 40 mins, and the entire Squadron was heartily glad when it was over!
[Underlined] Effect of the Tallboy raids [/underlined]
Two days later, 617 Squadron was back on its normal type of bombing operations again, but this time the raid was laid on suddenly, at short notice, to try to prevent a German Panzer Division reaching the D-Day bridgehead. They were moving up from Bordeaux, and Cochrane ordered 617 to take the newly arrived Tallboy bombs, and try to block a rail tunnel on their route. This was at Saumur, on the R. Loire West of Tours, on the South side of the river just before the railway crossed the Loire on a long, low bridge.
The Squadron was hurriedly bombed up with the 12,000 lb streamlined Tallboy, which had a casing of hardened chrome molybdenum steel and a filling of some 5,000 lbs of Torpex D1 explosive. It was some 21 feet long, and 3ft 2 ins in diameter, with four aerodynamically shaped fins, offset slightly to the airflow in order to spin the bomb as it dropped.
David flew his usual Lancaster (KC-N), which accommodated the Tallboy in its bombay, and had the latest deep-section bomb-doors which closed around the bomb and were also flush with the fuselage – except at the rear end, where they left a [inserted] small semi-circular [/inserted] gap around the bombs tail-fin. The rest of 617’s earlier Lancasters [inserted] in the “DV” or “JB” serial range [/inserted] had been similarly modified, or exchanged for newer aircraft with “ME” or “LM” serials. David’s crew – which had changed slightly over the last few months with postings, etc – consisted of → [inserted] Flying Officer G.A. Phillips (Flight Engineer), F/O J.K. Stott (Navigator), F/O D.W. Finlay (Bomb Aimer/Front Gunner) Warrant Officer H.G. Allen (Radio Operator), Flt. Sgt. H.D. Vaughan (Mid-upper gunner), and Flt. Lt. E.B. Chandler (Rear-gunner), [/inserted] [deleted] F.O. [inserted] D.W. [/inserted] Finlay, W.O. [inserted] H.G. [/inserted] Allen, Flt Sgt. [inserted] H.D. [/inserted] Vaughan, and Flt. Lt. E.B. Chandler, [/deleted] and everyone was looking forward to seeing what these new “Earthquake” bombs could accomplish.
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Cheshire marked the target in his Mosquito, as usual, dropping his markers by the light of the flares from four Lancasters of 83 Squadron above, and placing his Red Spots by the tunnel mouth at the Southern end. He was followed in by his other two Mosquitos (Shannon had had to return home with engine trouble, soon after take-off), and then he called up the 25 Lancasters of 617 that were circling above (this raid was a “maximum strength” affair)!
David’s bomb-aimer released their Tallboy at the → [inserted] end of his seventh run-in over the tunnel. On all the earlier 6 runs his bomb-aimer was unable to see the markers clearly at the tunnel’s South end. He waited for the North end to be marked – the secondary aiming point – and then bombed on the seventh run-in. His Tallboy fell away at the [/inserted] end of a careful, steady run-in, and – like the others – they were disappointed to see only a small red splash [inserted] of light [/inserted] below, as it buried itself deep in the ground – not the blinding, white flash that their 12,000 lb Blast bombs always made, lighting up the countryside. Because of this the 617 crews were a little doubtful whether the tunnel, or railway cutting had been hit properly, until “Recce” pictures [inserted] arrived] [/inserted] next day. These were remarkable. David had written in his log: “Operations – Railway Tunnel at Saumur. 12,000 lb Special. Poor shot, but tunnel badly damaged” [inserted] and his sortie had lasted exactly 6 hrs 20 mins [/inserted]. Which crater applied to which 617 crew was impossible to verify, but the aerial reconnaissance pictures showed all the huge round craters clustered around the Southern end to the tunnel. Two Tallboys had hit the railway lines fairly and squarely in the middle, on the tunnel approach (wrecking an overhead road bridge too), three had landed on the top edges of the cutting by the tunnel mouth, cascading earth onto the lines, but one (and to this day, nobody knows who dropped this) hit the hill above the tunnel some 50 [deleted] hundred [/deleted] yards from the tunnel mouth, and did just what Barnes Wallis had predicted – [deleted] buried itself in [/deleted] penetrated the ground right down by the tunnel roof, and blew an enormous crater in the hillside, exposing the tracks at the bottom and dumping thousands of tons of rubble on them. The 617 crews were greatly heartened by the result, and there had been no casualties.
The next Tallboy raid was on June 14th, and this time Cochrane had sought Barnes Wallis’ advice about using the weapon on German E-boat pens at coastal ports like Le Havre. These torpedo boats were proving a pest at night amongst the convoys of ships off the Normandy beach-head, and so the idea [inserted] was both [/inserted] of dropping the Tallboys to create “tidal waves” to swamp the E-boats
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in harbour.
The raid was Bomber Command’s first daylight raid since June 1943, and was to be a big one on the Port area of Le Havre. Two waves of Lancasters, from 1 and 3 Groups, were to attack in the evening, and at dusk (it was almost Midsummer’s day), but 617 were to go in first with Cheshire and two other marker Mosquitos, followed by 22 Lancasters each carrying the Tallboy bombs.
The 617 aircraft took off, with a fighter escort of Spitfires accompanying them, as it was still broad daylight over the target area. There was heavy flak over Le Havre, but Cheshire [deleted] Shannon and Fawke [/deleted] dived his Mosquitos right down into the thick of it, getting down to 7,000ft over the Pens, and dropped his Red Spot markers by the E-boar quayside Shannon, Fawke and the leading Lancasters who were watching, marvelled at the way Cheshire flew through a dense curtain of all types of A.A. fire, and survived.
Cheshire then told his other Mosquito pilots not to bother marking (as the first Spots he had laid were very visible), and told 617 to start to bomb on these. David’s Flight Commander, Les Munro, then led the Lancasters in at around 17,700 ft (several had already been hit in the engines and wings by flak, and turned back), and David and his crew [inserted] in LM 485 [/inserted] recorded a “Direct-Hit” with their Tallboy on the E-boat [deleted] Pens and [/deleted] wharves. All the 15 Tallboys dropped by 617 hit the target area (one went right through the roof of a large concrete E-Boat Pen), and the E-boats were literally blasted out of the water onto dry land, or blown apart. The post-raid photos showed 617 had wreaked immense damage in the Port area, and the subsequent two waves of 199 Lancasters in all, blitzed the rest of Le Havre, rendering the German Naval presence completely ineffective after that. Again, 617 had no losses.
With this success behind them, Cochrane sent them up again next day (June 15th 1944) to do the same at Boulogne. For these Tallboy operations, David always had a seven-man crew (rather than the old six-man complement), and he had now added a Sgt. King to his regulars. Still using [inserted] LM485 [/inserted] (KC-N), David was up with 21 other 617 Lancasters that evening. There was thick cloud over
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Boulogne this time, and Cheshire (his Mosquito heavily patched up from its ordeal by flak the previous day) dived down below the cloud to drop his markers from around 6,000 ft, once more in a hail of anti-aircraft gunfire. Although his Mosquito was hit several times he survived again, and his markers hit the E-Boat Pen area. He ordered the 617 Lancasters in, but as it was now dark and the cloud had thickened up at 13,000 ft, 10 of the crews could not see Cheshire’s markers below the overcast, and regretfully turned for home taking their precious Tallboys back (they had strict instructions never to waste them!). The remaining 12, however, (mostly more experienced, and leading crews) dived below the clouds, enduring the same barrage of flak that Cheshire had, and lined up over the Pens to drop their bombs. David was one of these, following Les Munro in, and himself followed by McCarthy, Kearns, Clayton, Howard, Poove, Knights, Stout, Hamilton and two others. Most of their aircraft were hit by flak, but David dropped his Tallboy from 8,000 ft, and recorded “Believed Good Shot”. His aircraft was hit by flak, and holed as well.
All the 617 crews got back to base (David was only airborne for 2 hrs 35 mins altogether – against 3 hrs 40 mins for the previous Le Havre raid), but several crew members of other aircraft were injured. Following 617 in to attack had been 133 other Lancasters and 130 Halifaxes, aided by 11 Mosquitos of 8 (PFF) Group, and these had bombed the rest of Boulogne. Only one Halifax [inserted] had been lost [/inserted], out of all the aircraft taking part, and in the two raids taken together, 617 had been largely responsible for the wrecking of some 133 German boats (mostly E-boats).
[Underlined] V2 sites. [/underlined]
The moment they had returned from the Boulogne raid, there was a lot of patching up of the aircraft to do. David’s KC-N was too badly holed to be quickly back in service, and so he was allocated another – DV 380, Wing. Cmdr. Cheshire’s original Lancaster (KC-N), but now re-coded KC-X.
The very morning they had returned from Boulogne, Cochrane had alerted Cheshire to get ready for a
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very important operation that evening (the 16th). Cheshire had only just got to bed but was told to get up again and attend an intelligence briefing right away. The V1 Flying Bombs had started dropping on London, and Intelligence sources had warned the War Cabinet of the imminent firing of two other secret weapons at London – the V2 rockets, and in the V3’s case, huge shells fired through incredibly long [inserted] “Super” [/inserted] gun barrels being built across the Channel in France (a forerunner of the Iraqi “Super”-guns of 1991). The concrete blockhouses hiding these weapons had to be attacked with Tallboys immediately, as the War Cabinet thought on the one hand they might have to order the evacuation of London, and on the other – if aimed at Portsmouth and Southampton, etc, they might interfere [inserted] with [/inserted] the invasion of France, and put it in jeopardy.
The result of all this was that [inserted] David and the other [/inserted] [deleted] the [/deleted] Squadron crews were aroused, and after briefing, stood by all day at their aircraft dispersals, waiting for the signal that the cloud cover over the target had cleared. The Lancasters were bombed-up, but then had to be unloaded, one by one on a rota, to avoid straining their undercarriages. Food was brought out to dispersals, but late in the evening the raid was cancelled – the cloud was still unbroken over the target. Not long after, they were stood-to again, and then stood-down, and so it went on over three days!. Eventually the crews were living in a detached state of limbo, with too little sleep and their metabolic clocks thoroughly upset.
Finally, on June 19th, the cloud cleared and they were off at last. The first target for 617 was a large concrete structure to the [inserted] West of [/inserted] Watten (North-west of St. Omer), on the edge of the Forêt d’Eperlecques. [Inserted] This was one of two large “Bunker” sites for launching V2’s, consisting of huge [inserted] semi- [/inserted] underground concrete bunkers, with large armoured doors. Both these sites were constructed to initially fire the vertical-standing V2 rockets at London, but they were intended later to launch V2’s with nuclear or chemical war-heads, directly as the USA. [/inserted] David took off from Woodhall Spa [inserted] in DV380 (KC-X) [/inserted], with 18 other Lancasters, and Cheshire and Shannon in their Mosquitos. As it was a daylight raid, they were escorted again by Spitfires, and Cheshire went down to 8,000ft over Calais, to find the target beyond the town. He was engaged by a terrific flak barrage, so dived flat out down to 2,000 ft, and released smoke markers (for daylight use) on the target.
* The remains of this structure, called “Blockhaus”, are kept today as a tourist museum.
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Having come through the barrage miraculously unscathed, Cheshire’s markers then failed to ignite, so Shannon then went in through a haze that was developing as the day wore on. He dropped the last of the smoke markers, and as Cheshire believed they were close enough to the blockhouse, ordered 617 to bomb it. David dropped his [inserted] Tallboy [/inserted] like the others, from 18,000 ft, but it “hung-up” momentarily, and recorded a near-miss on his aiming point – the smoke indicators. The rest dropped their weapons close to or on top of the markers, but when the raid was over and “Recce” pictures obtained, it was established that the markers had been some 70 yds wide of the target. Some Tallboys had dropped far enough away from the markers to fall beside (and one on top of) the concrete structure, and this proved sufficient to encourage the Germans not to use the site afterwards. * For some reason (perhaps connected with the repeated bombing-up and down over the three day wait) several Tallboys besides those on David’s Lancaster also “hung-up” – including those of Knilans, Ross and Howard (two of these were “freed”, but one had to be brought back).
Next day, the 20th, the second of these large “Bunker” sites, at Wizernes (just to the South-West of St. Omer) was given to 617, and this time 17 Lancasters set off, with Cheshire and two more Mosquitos in the lead David was still flying DV380, but he had only flown as far as Orfordness, near Woodbridge when Cheshire, in front of them, received information the cloud cover was too thick over the target, and recalled the Squadron (complete with Tallboys).
Two days later, they tried again, and reached the target area this time, but there was ten-tenths cloud over the area, and once more they brought [deleted] back [/deleted] the Tallboys back. Not to be outdone, 617 made a third attempt [inserted] the morning of [/inserted] June 24th, and this time the clouds had cleared. [Inserted] Again they had a fighter escort, [/inserted] and two Mosquitos led 16 Lancasters to the quarry in the North-facing hill near Wizernes station and Cheshire dived in to mark. His markers hung up, however, and he called Fawke in behind him. The flak was intense, and Fawke’s Mosquito and several 617 Lancasters above were hit, but David dropped his Tallboy from 17,400ft, recording a “Good Shot”. On the run in, John Edwards’ Lancaster DV413 (KC-G) was hit, and went
* After Allied troops had captured this site in Autumn 1944 → Barnes Wallis persuaded Bomber Command to let several Lancasters drop the new 22,000 lb Grand Slam bombs on this structure in mid November, to test their destructive force. [/inserted]
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down out of control, [inserted] some crew baling out on the way. [/inserted] The Lancaster exploded as it levelled out, [inserted] its pilot fighting [/inserted] desperately to effect a crash-landing, [deleted] in a field [/deleted], and the rest of the crew were trapped [deleted] out [/deleted] amongst the debris, or flung out onto the field where it pancaked. Only the Navigator, Wireless Operator and Bomb-aimer survived, to become POWs. The rest of the Squadron returned safely, albeit many of the aircraft had flak damage.
As David’s aircraft was also damaged, he promptly air-tested his old aircraft, LN485 (now itself repaired), the same afternoon (June 24th), and next day he was off [inserted] in it [/inserted] with 617 to attack a huge underground storage area for V1 Flying Bombs – at Siracourt, just South of the main road from St. Pol-sur-Ternoise to Hesdin (and East of Le Touquet). The Squadron put up 17 Lancasters, 2 Mosquitos – and a North American Mustang fighter flown by Cheshire.
Para // There was quite a story behind the acquisition of the Mustang, but suffice to say that the Station Commander at Woodhall Spa, together with Cheshire’s friendship with the American Air Force Generals Spaatz and Doolittle, resulted in their sending a Mustang over [inserted] on the morning of the 25th [/inserted] for Cheshire to try out. The 617 ground crews had to work hard to modify the under wing bomb attachments, to fit the necessary smoke markers and the Squadron navigator had to plot Cheshire’s courses for him, and help him jot down the information on his knee pad – for the Mustang was a single-seater. Cheshire had never flown one before, nor a single-engined aircraft for some time, and by the time it had been prepared he was adamant that he would use it on that evening’s raid. He also knew that he had no time to do “circuits and bumps” in it, to get to know its landing techniques – his first take-off would have to be on the operation, and his landing back would have to be in the dark!
As the Mustang was a fast aircraft, David and the other 16 Lancasters and two Mosquitos took off ahead of Cheshire, and by the time they arrived at Siracourt, their C.O. was there, diving in to mark the concrete roof of the underground site with smoke indicators, and followed in by Shannon and Fawke. Then the 617 “gaggle” was called in to drop their Tallboys on the smoke, and David recorded a “Direct Hit” [inserted] from 18,800ft [/inserted], together with some of the others, while other Tallboys fell close by. Someone’s bomb pierced the
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16 ft thick concrete roof of the structure, [inserted] resulting in a spectacular collapse of the walls and ceiling, and others undermined the sides. [/inserted]
Three hours and five minutes after take-off, David was back on the ground at his base, and all had returned safely, including Cheshire in the Mustang.
There were still more sites to attack, but bad weather and thick clouds prevented 617 Squadron from further attacks for some days. [Deleted] In the days [/deleted] During this period, David only managed to get in one practice “Formation flight” and an “Air Test” (involving air-to-sea firing practice). Several times they stood by from dawn [inserted] onwards [/inserted], but raids were cancelled by the late afternoon. The urgency was in everyone’s minds, as the V1’s were now landing in London and the South-East in increasing numbers.
Finally the weather cleared again for the morning of July 4th, and they were briefed to attack a new V1 launch site located in underground caves in the limestone hill overlooking the River Oise, at St. Leu-d’Esserent, a little village North-west of Chantilly. These caves had been used before the war by French mushroom-farmers, but were now reinforced with concrete to store the V1’s, and their launching rails. [Deleted] and the gigantic barrels of the V3 guns [/deleted]
David’s Squadron put up 17 Lancasters, Cheshire in the Mustang, and his back-up in a single Mosquito for this daylight raid. Fawke in the Mosquito went ahead to get weather information, and then Cheshire arrived, dived very low over the caves and dropped his smoke markers accurately on top. Les Munro led in the Lancasters above, through fairly heavy, [deleted] and [/deleted] accurate, flak which caught several aircraft, but the Tallboys started to rain down on the site. One hit the main building, others dropped in the cave mouths and around the entrances to the site, all destroying a great deal of machinery. Many Germans [deleted] workers [/deleted] were trapped underground and some were entombed forever. David [inserted] flying in LM484 again, [/inserted] described his Tallboy hit [inserted] from 18,700ft [/inserted] as a “Fair Shot”, obtaining a good photograph of this exploding near the cave mouth. Once the limestone dust and debris had started to hide the target, some Lancasters had difficulty finding the aiming point, one was hit in all four engines and had to jettison the [inserted] Tallboy [/inserted] over the Channel on the run home [inserted] and [/inserted] one had its bombsight go u/s. Thus only 11 out of the 17 dropped Tallboys on the target,
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but the results were once again spectacular – although in many of these Tallboy raids, these were only seen at first hand after the Allies had captured the area, later in 1944.
All 617 crews returned safely [inserted] David’s own sortie lasting 4hrs 05 mins this time [/inserted], although some had been injured by shrapnel from Flakbursts. [Deleted] but [/deleted] Bomber Command sent in another force of [inserted] 5 Group [/inserted] Lancasters later that same evening – totalling some 231, with 15 Mosquitos for marking. German night-fighters were very active, and shot down 13 of the Lancasters around the target area – a high price to pay.
[Underlined] Last “Op” with 617 – V3 Site. [/underlined]
Two days later, [inserted] on July 6th 1944 [/inserted], David took off on his last operation with 617 Squadron, this time another daylight raid on a V3 site at Mimoyecques, where several “super-guns” were being set up. Cheshire flew his Mustang again, with a Mosquito to back him up, and the usual “gaggle” of 17 617 Lancasters followed higher up (usually around the 18,00 ft level). The “gaggle” was so named by Cheshire, but referred to the pattern 617 was now adopting in its bombing formations – normally four parallel rows of Lancasters (four or five to a row), each of the leaders flying at carefully planned 200 ft or 300 ft vertical separation from each other, and behind each of them, every subsequent Lancaster flying [inserted] in turn [/inserted] at 400 ft lower than the one in front. Thus the “gaggle” had the best chance of avoiding each others bombs in the run-up to the targets, and had a better sighting of the target as it began to become obscured from the markers and first hits. Generally speaking, if the Lancasters adhered closely to this box formation (which was not always possible), the last aircraft’s Tallboys should have released before the first started to explode (they were frequently given delayed-action fuzes).
The V3 site at Mimoyecques was in the chalk hills behind Calais, and Cheshire once again went in very low and dropped his markers on top of the tunnels. The rest then dropped their Tallboys, and David’s went down on target [inserted] from 19,000 ft [/inserted], but the burst wasn’t seen by his crew. Then he flew LM 485 (KC-N) back to
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Woodhall Spa, joining the others who all arrived safely. “Recce” photos later showed the V3 site to have been hit and straddled by the Tallboys and completely wrecked, once more entombing some Germans.
[Inserted] Sub heading [underlined] Leaving 617 Squadron [/underlined] [/inserted]
After landing from this short flight (David had been airborne only 2 hrs 45 mins on this last occasion), [deleted] their C.O. [/deleted] Cheshire was summoned to Cochrane’s Group HQ. Cochrane looked at Cheshire, and said quietly to him: “I’ve been looking at the records, and see you’ve sone 100 trips now. That’s enough, it’s time you had a rest!” And he told Cheshire it was no use arguing! He also added that his three Flight Commanders, [inserted] Dave [/inserted] Shannon, [inserted] Joe [/inserted] McCarthy and [inserted] Les [/inserted] Munro had to come off as well, with David Wilson too. Mimoyecques had been David’s own 90th Operation [/deleted] as well [/deleted], and although the Flight Commanders had done fewer trips, they had [inserted] all [/inserted] been flying on “Ops” continuously for some two years.
So David was rested simultaneously with his CO and Flight Commanders. He had joined 617 in time for its seventh operation (and its first visit to the Anthéor viaduct) on September 16th 1943, and had been with the Squadron for over two months before Cheshire had arrived to take over from [inserted] Mick Martin [/inserted] the temporary C.O. When he joined there had been 10 of the original Dams raid pilots still flying in 617, but when he left, the last three – the Flight Commanders – left with him. It was the end of an era in 617, and David was very proud to have fought and lived alongside those famous names. As for himself, he has never really had the recognition that he deserved for his part in the 40 Operations mounted by 617 between September 16th 1943 and July 6th 1944, but this is no doubt because he was an inherently shy man – though a very tough one in his quiet [inserted] Scottish [/inserted] way.
With all of them being suddenly rested from 617, the 5 Group A.O.C. began to confer some long deserved awards on them. Cheshire had been given a second Bar to his DSO on April 18th 1944 (while with 617) and now, two months after leaving, he was awarded the Victoria Cross, for four years of continuous bravery (unique because it was not for one specific act of gallantry). Shannon was awarded a Bar to his DSO, and Munro was awarded a DSO (McCarthy had just been awarded a Bar [inserted] to his DFC. [/inserted] David was justly awarded a Bar to his DFC (gazetted on June 29th
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1944. This was [inserted] then [/inserted] followed up on November 26th 1944 by his second decoration with 617 – a DSO. (The delay in the award of the DSO was probably occasioned by the departure of Wing Cmdr Geoffrey Leonard Cheshire, VC, DSO and two Bars, DFC, M.I.D., and the arrival and settling-in of his successor at 617, Wing Cmdr J.B. (“Willie”) Tait, DSO and Bar, DFC, MID).
The citation for David Wilson’s Bar to his DFC read: “Since the award of his first DFC in May 943, this officer has completed a third tour of operational duty, during which his experience, determination and devotion to duty have been displayed in the course of many sorties As a captain of aircraft, he can always be relied upon to complete his tasks in the face of the heaviest enemy opposition. He has a long and distinguished record of operational flying.”
And when the DSO was gazetted on November 26th this citation said: “This officer has taken part in numerous missions over enemy territory, including attacks on Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen, Cologne and Mannheim. He is now in his 3rd Tour, and has completed many sorties demanding a high standard of skill and accuracy. He has proved himself to be an ideal leader and his example has been most inspiring.”
“. [sic]
It is interesting to look back on David’s three tours of operations to see the difference in training required by any pilot flying with 617, and the other squadrons. In his time with 214 Squadron (his first tour) David flew a total of 289 hrs 50 mins, of which 199 hrs 35 mins was on operations, and just 90 hrs 15 mins doing Squadron training and exercises, etc. In this case the training hours amounted to 31% of the total. With 196 Squadron, training hours (34hr 35mins out of a total of 135 hrs 40 mins) amounted to 25%. But in 617 Squadron, David’s training accounted for 239 hrs 45 mins out of 420 hrs 55 mins – or a massive 57% of his total time! For each operational hour flown, he had flown over an hour’s worth of practice – nearly all bomb-aiming. This just illustrates the degree to which Guy Gibson (who started it), followed by Mick Martin and Geoffrey Cheshire, had insisted on the very highest level of low and high-level bombing accuracy.
At the end of his third tour, David had flown 90 missions, lasting for a total of 481 hrs 50 mins, and trained for a further 364 hrs 35 mins in these squadrons.
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[Inserted] As for David’s Lancaster [deleted] that [/deleted] [inserted] in which [/inserted] he finished his days [deleted] in [/deleted] at 617 (LM485, KC-N), this aircraft survived a further V1 site attacks, two attacks on the German battleship Tirpitz in Norway (as KC-U), and further raids on Norway, etc, [deleted] in 1945, [/deleted] surviving the War to be scrapped in October, 1945. His other favourite, JB139 (KC-X, and later -V) was shot down over Brest on August 5th 1944, piloted by Don Cheney, R.C.A.F., who survived, with three of his crew (four were killed). The remains of the Lancaster can still be seen in the shallow water of St. Anne-la-Palud Bay, nearby. [/inserted]
[Underlined] Marriage, No5 L.F.S, and the E.T.P.S. [/underlined]
Now that David had obtained a welcome break from operations, he and Elsie were married on July 22nd 1944, and he snatched a quick two weeks leave before finally saying goodbye to 617 Squadron [inserted] at a mammoth farewell party [/inserted] on August 7th, and reporting to his new posting, No5 Lancaster Finishing School at Syerston, Notts, the next day.
David was now made [inserted] up to [/inserted] a Squadron Leader, and [deleted] at first [/deleted] put in charge of “B” Flight at 5 LFS. He was later [deleted] at Syerston until March 13th 1945, becoming [/deleted] appointed the Chief Flying Instructor of the whole School on October 4th, and remained its CFI until he ended his posting there on March 13th 1945. During this time he put many other budding Lancaster pilots through their paces on the School’s well worn (and operationally expired) Lancasters. They were mostly Flying Officers, but there were a few Warrant Officers, Pilot Officers and Flight Lieutenants, and the odd Squadron Leader converting onto the four-engined bombers.
David put all his pupils through the full training steps, which included “stalling practice”, “steep turns”, “three and two engine flying”, “three engine overshoots and landings”, apart from routine circuits and bumps, and night flying.
On several occasions he managed a trip in a Lancaster, or the unit’s Oxford “hack”, to visit 617 at Woodhall Spa, usually taking Sqd Ldr. Poore over as well (both of them had served with the Dambusters). And a number of the Lancasters David taught on at the LFS had once flown in 617 Squadron.
In March 1945, having come to the end of his
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Posting to the LFS, David applied to go on one of the Engine Test Pilot’s Courses at Boscombe Down. He was accepted on the No 3 Course there, and started the Course on March 15th 1945.
This was the third and last of the early Courses to be held at Boscombe Down, due mainly to the construction of hard runways on the aerodrome, leading to a veritable log-jam of aircraft taking off or landing on the restricted grass areas.
David’s Course lasted until October 2nd that year – a period of 6 1/2 months – and David was one of 31 test-pilots to complete it successfully. Amongst other subsequently famous names on the course with him were [inserted] Lt. [/inserted] Peter Twiss RN (to become Chief Test-Pilot for Fairey Aviation), [inserted] Sqd. Ldr. [/inserted] Charles McClure, who then took over from “Roly” Falk as Wing Cmdr. And Chief Test-Pilot at the R.A.E. at Farnborough, Flt. Lt. J.O. Lancaster who went to Boulton Paul, Saunders Roe, and finally Armstrong Whitworth; Ron Clear, from Airspeeds; and Lt. Cmdr. J.B.V. Burgerhorst, who went to Fokkers.
Five of the 31 on the Course were to lose their lives testing aircraft (the corresponding losses on the 1st Course were 5 out of 13, [deleted] and [/deleted] on the 2nd 7 out of 28, and the 4th, 7 out of 33). This eventual “loss” rate from the early courses was on average almost 23% , illustrating the high price paid in the lives of exceptionally brave and talented young men, by the advancement of Britain’s and other countries’, aviation industries.
As described in the chapters in these Volumes about Jimmy Owell, Ricky Esler and Jimmy Nelson, etc, the ETPS Course proceeded for David along the normal lines. The previous Commandant, Gp. Capt. J.F. McKenna [inserted] AFC [/inserted], had just been killed in a Mustang at the beginning of David’s Course, and his place was taken by Gp Capt. H.J. Wilson, AFC, who had been a senior test-pilot at the RAE. The Assistant Commandant was Wing Cmdr H.P. “Sandy” Powell, AFC, who also acted as the Chief Test-flying Instructor.
David flew the [inserted] range of [/inserted] ETPS aircraft, which at that time included an Oxford, Harvards, Lancaster
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Swordfish, Mosquitos, Tempest [inserted] I and II and V, [/inserted] Spitfire IX and XXI Boston, [deleted] Sptifire IX [/deleted], [inserted] and the [/inserted] Meteor I. The last machine was the first jet aircraft that David had flown, but it provided no undue problems for him.
By the beginning of October, David had passed the difficult classroom studies, and the flying examinations, with ease, and after qualification, he accepted a post as test-pilot in “B” Squadron ( [deleted] the [/deleted] multi-engine aircraft) at the A & AEE at Boscombe Down, to last until his demob on March 15th 1946.
At the A & AEE, he started flying there on January 10th 1946, and undertook some firing trials on a new Avro Lincoln, flew a Lancaster to measure “speed/power curves”, practiced bombing runs in a Mosquito VI, and carried out other tests on a Halifax III, Dakota, Warwick, etc. Then his Service career was over, and David was demobbed.
[Underlined] A Career at A.V. Roe & Co. [/underlined]
With his brilliant academic qualifications, his war-time record, and qualifications now as a test-pilot, David Wilson [inserted] now [/inserted] had a great deal to offer the world. He was immediately offered a job at RAF Cranwell, and in fact the College was very keen to employ him, but David had written to Sir Roy Dobson, Managing Director now of A.V. Roe & Co. Ltd. at Manchester, to seek a post there – not necessarily in the Flight Test Dept., but perhaps connected with the Design side.
Sir Roy offered David the post of “Manager – Aerodynamic Development and Testing”, and David promptly accepted, starting work at Woodford [inserted] on April 8th 1946 [/inserted] at a salary of £800 per annum, with the promise of an early rise to £900 p.a. He was now 29 years of age, and had a total of 1807 flying hours to his credit.
David’s new job was immediately very tied up with examination of the Tudor airliner designs – both the Mark I and Mark II that were on order for BOAC and BSAA. A considerable amount of aero-dynamic research was going on into the problems affecting these designs, and several establishments
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Apart form Avro’s were engaged in a dramatic race to find the answers. The description of these problems can be found in the stories of Bill Thorn and Jimmy Orrell in these Volumes, but suffice to say that David and his Dept. were soon very busy liaising with Roy Chadwick, [deleted] the [/deleted] Avro’s Chief Designer (and from February 1947, their Technical Director), and the Test-pilots at Woodford to try to overcome the Tudor’s bad stalling characteristics, and excessive drag problems.
Once settled in at Woodford, David decided he had better keep his hand in at flying, and so [inserted] he had a medical on January 1st 1947, and [/inserted] took out a Civilian Flying Licence (No 24644) on March 26th 1947, not valid for flying Public Transport aircraft, but enough to cover him for test-flying at Woodford.
[Inserted] It was also early in 1947 before David and his wife were called to Buckingham Palace to receive the DSO he had won in 617 Squadron – so great had been the queue of people at the end of the War. As he was now a civilian, David had to receive the decoration in civilian clothes. [/inserted]
David was by now living at 3, Leith Rd, Sale, Cheshire, some miles from Woodford and closer to the Southern side of Manchester, and he and his wife Elsie now had a baby daughter, Carol. He was very satisfied with his work at Woodford, and he was starting to fly as Second pilot to Ken Cook and others, and rapidly getting the taste of flying back again. → [Inserted] For instance he went up with Ken on November 25th 1946 [inserted] and Reg Knight on November 27th [/inserted] in the Anson C.Mk XIX Series 2 VL 310, to conduct “Trailing Static Tests”[inserted] “Asymmetric and P.E.” tests. On December 1st he was flying with Reg Knight in Tudor I G-AGPF, doing tests at 25,000’. [/inserted] On December 30th and 31st he was up again with Ken in the Anson XII NL172 doing “Trimmer Setting” tests with the C of G fully forward and full aft, and “Single-engine” tests loaded up to 10,000 lbs weight.
In January 1947, David was flying with Ken again, doing “Trim” tests and “Loop swinging” on York MW322, checking “Stalling speeds” [inserted] and “P.E’s” [/inserted] on Avro XIX G-AGNI, and conducting “Pressurization and Heating” trials on the Tudor I G-AGRJ. And in May 1947 he was flying with Reg Knight in the Tudor I G-AGRI, Anson VM172 and Tudor IV G-AHNI, carrying out “stalls”, “stabilities”, “levels” and other aero-dynamic tests. [/inserted] And it was because of his flying ability, coupled with his interest in sampling the stalling characteristics of the new Tudor II, and observing the reaction of the [inserted] newly-shaped [/inserted] wool-tufted wing fillets fitted to it that he flew as Second-pilot with Bill Thorn on [inserted] that fateful [/inserted] August 23rd 1947. He was not originally → [inserted] scheduled to be the No 2 pilot on this flight as Bill had intended to take Reg Knight up with him. But Reg (see the next Chapter) had to go down to see his mother at Nuneaton, at very short notice, due to a dispute she was having over a new house. And Fate thus decreed that David would take his place. [/inserted]
So Bill Thorn and David Wilson taxied out in G-AGSU that sunny Saturday morning at a little after 10.50 (GMT), carrying Roy Chadwick (Avro’s Technical Director) and Stuart Davies (now the Chief Designer), with their Flight Engineer Eddie Talbot, and radio operator J. Webster. And soon after lift off on the main runway, Bill Thorn got into difficulties with Britain’s largest passenger aircraft (at that time), because of the aileron circuits being mistakenly reversed during work in the factory. The Tudor tilted right over onto
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[Insertions to previous page]
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Its starboard wing, the tip touched the ground and the Tudor II sideslipped slowly into a field, crumpling the wing, sliding along the stubble on its belly, and then decelerating into a group of oak trees surrounding a deep pond. The trees broke up the fuselage and wings, and the long nose of the Tudor fractured, and dropped the cockpit end into the pond, drowning the two pilots. But for the presence of water, they would undoubtedly have survived.
Thus, David’s career with Avro’s came to a sudden halt, along with the great Chief Test-pilot sitting beside him, and the man in the back who had designed all these magnificent machines, - and the Lancaster bomber in which David had spent so much of an eventful wartime career, and survived because of its strength and performance. Certainly, if he had to die, he could not have died in the company of any greater men than these.
Roy Dobson, who should have been on the test flight himself, but had skipped it because he was called to his office for an urgent ‘phone call, tried to cope with the tragedy that afternoon from his office at Woodford. The relatives of the other occupants, dead or injured, were contacted by various means, but David’s wife Elsie was mistakenly overlooked for a time. With a young daughter to bring up, and a home to try to keep together, things looked bleak. But when Sir Roy realised how difficult things were, he went out of his way to do all he could for Elsie. He had Avro’s arrange to pay off the mortgage, [inserted] and [/inserted] and give her a monthly sum for quite some time. He sent presents for Carol from time to time, and used to bring them back for the little girl from his overseas trips.
Sir Roy was greatly affected by the accident, and genuinely grief-stricken over the deaths of his life-long friend and colleague, Roy Chadwick, and Bill Thorn and David Wilson. He advised Elsie Wilson to brief a good solicitor and sue A.V. Roe & Coe for damages, so that she could be awarded compensation, and although Elsie found this difficult, and at times could hardly understand what was going on, eventually she was awarded damages and these were held by the Court in 2 1/2 % War Loan on trust for her daughter, with the income being paid regularly.
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In fact David’s daughter Carol was eventually offered a Dr. Barnes Wallis Scholarship, had her mother wanted to accept this (out of the two per year that the great aircraft and bombs designer had set up out of his own money). This could have entitled Carol to attend Christ’s Hospital (Girls School,) in Hertfordshire, but Elsie declined, in order to keep the family close together.
David was buried in Woodford Church, near Roy Chadwick and Bill Thorn, and where Sir Roy and Lady Dobson now also lie. The funeral was a very grand affair, attended by hundreds of colleagues of the crew from all walks of life, the Ministries, RAF and 617 Squadron, and other Aviation companies. Afterwards, Sir Roy said of David:
“He was a brilliant young man, and a technician of extraordinary aptitude and ability, who would soon have made his mark on the company. His loss is going to be most severely felt”.
And it was, no less than by his daughter Carol, who to this day remains devoted to the war hero father she scarcely remembers, and her mother Elsie, who has remarried, but still lives in Cheshire not many miles from Woodford, and under the flight path to Ringway Airport.
[Page break]
[Underlined] Appendix [/underlined] P1
[Underlined] Sqd. Ldr. David James Baikie Wilson, DSO, DFC & Bar [/underlined]
[Underlined] List of Operations (3 Tours) [/underlined]
[Underlined] With No 214 Sqd: [inserted] (Wellington IC). [/inserted] Target Bomb load make-up Total Bombs dropped [/underlined]
1941 July 9* Osnabrück. 1 x 4000 4,000
July 14* Bremen 3 x 500 + Incendiaries. 1,500 +
July 17* Cologne 1 x 4000 4,000
July 20* Rotterdam 1 x 1,000, 3 x 500, + Incendiaries 2,500 +
July 23* Mannheim 1 x 4000 4,000
July 25* Hamburg ? ?
Aug 12* Hanover ? ?
Aug 16* Duisburg ? ?
Aug 19* Kiel 6 x 500 3,000
Aug 22* Mannheim ? ?
Aug 27* Mannheim ? ?
Aug 31* Cologne 1 x 1000, 5 x 500 3,500
Sep 2* Frankfurt 1 x 4000. (Retd, engine trouble) –
Sep 7* Berlin ? ?
Sep 8* Kassel ? ?
Sep 11 Le Havre ? ?
Sep 15 Brest 1 x 1,000, 4 x 500, 1 x 250 3,250
Sep 17 Karlsruhe 1 x 1,000, 4 x 500 3,000
Sep 29 Hamburg 1 x 4,000 HCMI 4,000
Oct 3 Antwerp 1 x 1,000, 6 x 500, 1 x 250 4,250
Oct 10 Cologne 1 x 1,000, 5 x 500, 1 x 250 3,750
Oct 12 Bremen ? ?
Oct 13 Dusseldorf 1 x 1,000, 5 x 500, 1 x 250 3,750
Oct 21 Bremen 1 x 1,000, 5 x 500 3,500
Oct 23 Kiel 1 x 1,000, 3 x 500, 1 x 250 2,750
Oct 31 Bremen Bad Wx, retd with bombs. –
Nov 7 Berlin 6 x 500 (Bad Wx, Osnabruck bombed) 3,000
Nov 9 Hamburg 6 x 500, 1 x 250 3,250
Dec 23 Brest 6 x 500 3,000
Dec 27 Brest 6 x 500 3,000
1942 Jan 2 Brest ? ?
Jan 8 Brest ? (Bad Wx, bombs returned) –
Jan 11 Brest 6 x 500, 3,000
Jan 21 Bremen 1 x 4,000 4,000
Jan 26 Brest 6 x 500 3,000
Jan 28 Munster ? (Bad Wx, bombs returned) –
[Underlined] TOTAL = 36 MISSIONS Total hours with Squadron = 289:50 [/underlined]
[Underlined] Total hours on “Ops” = 199:35 [/underlined]
* Flying as Second-pilot on these raids (Rest as Captain).
[Page break]
[Underlined] Appendix [/underlined] P2
[Underlined] With No 196 Squadron. (Wellington X) [/underlined]
1943 Feb 7 Lorient 7 x 500 3,500
Feb 13 Lorient 3 x 500, 6 Containers 1,500 +
Feb 14 Cologne 3 x 500 6 Containers
Feb 17 x Emden ? Bad Wx. Bombs returned. –
Feb 26 Cologne 3 x 500, +Incendiaries (2 x 500 bombs hung up, returned) 500 +
Feb 28 St. Nazaire 3 x 500 + Incendiaries 1,500 +
Mar 3 Hamburg 3 x 500 + Incendiaries 1,500 +
Mar 5 Essen 1 x 4,000 4,000
Mar 12 Essen 3 x 500 + Incendiaries 1,500 +
Mar 26 Duisburg 3 x 500 + Incendiaries 1,500 +
Mar 29 Bochum 3 x 500 + Incendiaries 1,500 +
Apr 4 Kiel 1 x 4,000 4,000
May 4 Dortmund 2 x 500, 6 x SBC 1,000 +
May 12 Duisburg 1 x 4,000 4,000
May 13 Bochum 1 x 4,000 4,000
May 25 Düsseldorf 2 x 500, 7 x SBC 1,000 +
June 11 Düsseldorf ? ?
Jun 21 Krefeld ? ?
Jun 24 Wuppertal (Elberfeld) Incendiaries only. ?
Jul 3 Cologne Incendiaries only ?
[Underlined] Total = 20 Missions Total hours with Squadron = 135:40 [/underlined]
[Underlined] Total hours on “Ops” = 101:05 [/underlined]
[Underlined] With 617 Squadron. (Lancaster I and III) [/underlined]
1943 Sep 16 Antheor Viaduct. 1 x 4,000, 3 x 1,000 7,000
Nov 11 Antheor Viaduct. 1 x 12,000, HC 12,000
Dec 16 Flixecourt xx 1 x 12,000 HC 12,000
Dec 20 Liege 1 x 12,000 HC Bomb returned, raid abortive (due PFF) –
Dec 22 Abbeville-Amiens. xx 11 x 1,000. Bombs brought back (due PFF failure) –
1944 Jan 4 Pas de Calais (Flying Bomb Site) ? Bombs dropped 4 miles from target due PFF error ?
Jan 21 Hallencourt. xx 2 x 1,000, 13 x 500, 6 Flares. Only 1 x 1,000 and 7 x 500 dropped 4,500
Jan 25 Fréval (Pas de Calais) xx 2 x 1,000, 13 x 500 8,500
Feb 8 Limoges 12 x 1,000 12,000
Feb 12 Antheor Viaduct 1 x 12,000 12,000
x Daylight raid.
xx Flying bomb site. (V1 weapon).
[Page break]
[Underlined] Appendix [/underlined] P3
[Underlined] With 617 Sqd cont’d [/underlined]
1944 March 2 Albert All Incendiaries ?
March 4 St. Etienne. ? Bad Wx. Returned –
March 10 St. Etienne 11 x 1,000 11,000
March 15 Woippy (near Metz). 1 x 12,000. Bad Wx. Returned. –
March 16. Clermont Ferrand 1 x 12,000, 6 Flares 12,000
March 18 Bergerac 1 x 12,000 12,000
March 20 Angouleme 1 x 8,000, 1 x 1,000 9,000
March 23 Lyons 11 x 1,000 11,000
March 25 Lyons ? x 500, Incendiaries ?
March 29 Lyons 1 x 8,000. 1 x 1,000 9,000
Apr 10 St. Cyr. 1 x 8,000, 6 x 500 11,000
Apr 18 Juvisy 4 x 1,000, 4 x Red Spots 4,000
Apr 20 La Chapelle 12 x 1,000 12,000
Jun 5 D-Day decoy mission
Jun 8 Saumur Tunnel 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
Jun 14 Le Havre Pens 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
Jun 15 Boulogne Pens 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
Jun 19 Watten xx 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
Jun 20 Wizernes xx – Tallboy Raid recalled over Channel –
Jun 22 Wizernes xx Tallboy Bad Wx. Bomb brought back. –
Jun 24 Wizernes xx 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
Jun 25 Siracourt xx 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
July 4 St. Leu d’Esserent. Xx 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
July 6 Mimoyecques xx 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
[Underlined] Total – 34 Missions Total hours with Squadron = 420:55 [/underlined]
[Underlined Total hours on “Ops” = 181:10 [/underlined]
[Underlined] Grand total (3 tours) = 90 Operational Flights. [/underlined]
[Underlined] Grand total of flying hours with Squadrons = 846:25 [/underlined]
[Underlined] Grand total of flying hours on Operations = 481:50 [/underlined]
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Title
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A bomber pilot’s journey through WWII
Description
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Biography of Squadron Leader David James Baikie Wilson, DSO, DFC and Bar (1917 - 1947). He flew operations as a pilot with 214, 196 and 617 Squadrons before becoming Head of Aerodynamic Development and Testing, and Test-Pilot at A V Roe & Co Ltd. He was killed 23 August 1947 in the Avro Tudor crash.
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Peter V Clegg
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IBCC Digital Archive
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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handwritten sheets
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eng
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BCleggPVWilsonDv1
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1944-04-05
1944-04-06
1944-06-05
1944-06-06
1944-06-08
1944-06-09
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
1944-06-16
1944-06-19
1944-06-20
1944-06-22
1944-06-24
1944-06-25
1944-07-04
1944-07-05
1944-07-06
1945
1946
1947-08-23
1944-04-18
1944-04-19
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Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Belgium--Antwerp
Belgium--Liège
England--Cheshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Suffolk
France--Albert
France--Angoulême
France--Bergerac
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Brest
France--Clermont-Ferrand
France--Creil
France--Le Havre
France--Limoges
France--Lorient
France--Lyon
France--Mimoyecques
France--Pas-de-Calais
France--Saint-Cyr-sur-Mer
France--Saint-Étienne (Loire)
France--Saint-Nazaire
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
France--Saumur
France--Siracourt
France--Watten
France--Woippy
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kassel
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Krefeld
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Wuppertal
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Osnabrück
France--Watten
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
11 OTU
1660 HCU
1668 HCU
196 Squadron
214 Squadron
5 Group
617 Squadron
8 Group
aircrew
Bennett, Donald Clifford Tyndall (1910-1986)
bombing
bombing of the Boulogne E-boats (15/16 June 1944)
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
bombing of the Juvisy, Noisy-le-Sec and Le Bourget railways (18/19 April 1944)
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
bombing of the Mimoyecques V-3 site (6 July 1944)
Bombing of the Saumur tunnel (8/9 June 1944)
bombing of the Siracourt V-weapon site (25 June 1944)
bombing of the Watten V-2 site (19 June 1944)
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
bombing of Toulouse (5/6 April 1944)
Boston
C-47
Chadwick, Roy (1893-1947)
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
crash
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Service Order
final resting place
Flying Training School
Gibson, Guy Penrose (1918-1944)
Grand Slam
grief
H2S
Halifax
Halifax Mk 3
Harvard
Heavy Conversion Unit
incendiary device
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Lincoln
Meteor
Mosquito
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Normandy deception operations (5/6 June 1944)
Oboe
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
P-51
Pathfinders
pilot
promotion
RAF Bassingbourn
RAF Boscombe Down
RAF Church Lawford
RAF Coningsby
RAF Cranage
RAF Cranwell
RAF Driffield
RAF Leconfield
RAF Stradishall
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
RAF Upavon
RAF Wainfleet
RAF Woodhall Spa
Spitfire
Stirling
Tallboy
Tiger Moth
training
V-1
V-2
V-3
V-weapon
Wallis, Barnes Neville (1887-1979)
Wellington
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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IBCC Digital Archive
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Stephenson, S
Description
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
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V GROUP NEWS
NOVEMBER 1944 No 28
[Drawing] [9 and 617 Squadron Crests] TIRPITZ
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[Blank Page]
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Foreword by A.O.C.
In sending Christmas greetings to all ranks of 5 Group, I do so with the greater pleasure because through their combined efforts over the past months, the hitting power of the Group has been raised to a new high level, and greater harm inflicted on the enemy than ever before. In November the Group completed the destruction of the Tirpitz, an event which brought in messages of congratulations from all branches of the Service and from many of our Allies. In November also, the Group again cut the Dortmund Ems and Mitteland canals thus ensuring that an overwhelming burden of traffic should continue to be thrown on the German railways. While to ensure that this task should be made even more difficult the Group also took part in the general campaign against railway centres, achieving highly satisfactory results.
These results were made possible by the steady improvement in the efficiency with which attacks are undertaken, and in the greater numbers of aircraft available. To give two examples of this improved efficiency. In November last year, the average Squadron error in practice bombing from 20,000 feet was 310 yards; this November it is 160 yards. This means that the number of bombs which may be expected to fall within the central area of a target is now four times as great as it was a year ago, and this is borne out by photographs. Similar improvements in airmanship and crew discipline are shown by the reduction in landing times and in the lower accident rate. A year ago the average interval between aircraft landing at night was 3.18 minutes, and the best Station in November, 1943, only achieved 2.56 minutes. These times have now been halved, with a consequent reduction in the hazards of landing after an operation in conditions of poor visibility or low cloud, or when intruders are active.
Improvements on a like scale have been achieved in all other branches and sections and the serviceability rate is now higher than ever before, while the percentage of technical failures leading to early returns has been halved. These are most gratifying results deserving the highest praise; yet in no branch of Group activity have we yet reached the summit of our abilities or fulfilled our maximum expectations.
It is clear that the War will not now be over by Christmas although we can be fairly confident that this will be the last Christmas of the War in Europe. What is required therefore is a firm resolve to do everything in our power to reduce the number of days during which the War will continue to drag on. As a start I would ask air crews to aim at a reduction of the bombing error from 160 yards to 120 yards, and ground crews to determine that no aircraft shall remain on the ground if it can possibly be got ready in time to take off on operations. Although the ultimate release of the bombs is the province of the aircrew, the scale of their effort depends
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] FOREWORD BY A.O.C. [/underlined]
upon the exertions of everybody on each Station, and it is to everyone, aircrew and ground crew, that I send this Christmas message urging them to put forward their every endeavour so that in spite of all that winter weather means, we continue to increase our pressure on the enemy, and thus hasten on his collapse.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] THE END OF THE TIRPITZ [Drawing]
That moment when the Admiral Von Tirpitz was suddenly enveloped in smoke and flame and spray, from a cascade of Tallboy bombs was not merely the T.O.T. of an operations; it was the culmination of two months planning, training, toil and patience. After the abortive attacks on 15th September, and the 13th October, there was universal determination to try again. Statistical analysis of bombing results showed thatthree [sic] hits, and several near misses, could be anticipated, if the Bomb Aimers could get their graticules on the ship; the designers and users of the Tallboy were confident that the weapon would sink any battleship.
Time and the weather were the chief adversaries. Tromso is in the Gulf Stream, and the prevailing Westerly wind causes persistent Stratus cloud. The sky is only clear when the wind is Easterly, and about five such days could be expected in November. The end of November was the expiration of the time limit for a daylight attack this year. On the 26th of November, the sun does not rise above the horizon, and for a few days after, there would be enough twilight at mid-day to bomb. After that there would be no light until the Spring. It was obvious that there was a nice problem of long range weather forecasting, and that the slightest opportunity could not be wasted.
On the 5th of November, there was a false start, because the fickle weather set fair, and then deteriorated, but on the 11th the force once more flew to its advance bases. As this was the third week-end in succession that this avalanche had descended upon them, the inhabitants if the advanced bases had mixed feelings, which they courteously concealed. The force consisted of 36 Tallboy Lancasters, the Film Unit Lancaster, a meteorological reconnaissance Mosquito, and Transport aircraft. The Lancasters had been specially modified for the previous attempt. After the experience of the Russian operation, it was clear that the all up weight could safely be increased to 70,000 lbs. Merlin 24 power units, and extra tanks in the fuselage to bring the petrol capacity up to 2,400 gallons, had been installed. Mid-turrets, and every removeable item of equipment not needed for this operation, had been taken out. The all-up weight for take-off was then between 68,000 and 69,000 lbs. This was a most formidable striking force - - - 36 aeroplanes which could attack a target 1100 miles away, with 12,000 lb bombs.
The force took off to attack the Tirpitz for the third time at 03.00 hours on 12th November. The preliminary forecast had been poor, threatening convection cloud over the Norwegian coast, with a low freezing level, and high icing index, while there was no guarantee of the target being clear of Strato-cumulus, the meteorologists’ hoodoo. The met. reconnaissance Mosquito landed at Lossiemouth two hours before take-off, and improved this forecast, but not much. There was no convection cloud, but there were patches of Stratus. Remembering how they were cheated by the weather on the previous occasion, crews were determined, but not optimistic.
The flight plan was to fly low, less than 2,000 feet above the water, to a turning point at 65.00N 06.47E, then turn due East and climb to cross the Norwegian mountains, then lose height and turn North, flying
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] THE END OF THE TIRPITZ [/underlined]
East of the mountains. It was expected that this would prevent detection by the German radar system along the Norwegian coast.
The weather was fine and clear for take-off, in pleasant contrast to the previous occasion, when it had poured with rain. This was to prove an omen. The force was distributed over three airfields to avoid congestion, and aircraft set course without delay for the rendezvous point at North Unst. All aircraft burned navigation lights to assist keeping together, and flew at 185 R.A.S., the most economical cruising speed for the first part of the flight. The engine settings were 1800 R.P.M. and about 4 1/2 lbs boost, giving a consumption of almost exactly 1 A.M.P.G. The route was studded with flame floats, which crews were using diligently for checking drift.
It was twilight at the Norwegian coast and map reading, after a long period of D.R. navigation, soon put all aircraft back on track. By the time the mountains were crossed, it was broad daylight, and large areas of Strato-cumulus were depressingly evident, while every lake was covered with Stratus. Map reading in the mountains, particularly when they are snow-covered, and the lakes are frozen, is tricky. The rendezvous, Akka Lake, was only recognisable because the sheet of cloud which covered it conformed exactly to its shape. The first view of Tromso therefore, with no cloud and no smoke, and of the Tirpitz in her anchorage, massive, black and unmistakeable, was better than any crew had dared to hope for, and the job was then as good as done.
Flak was plentiful but inaccurate, and there were no fighters. The only impediment to the bombing was the smoke which hung, black and brown over the ship from the first bomb strikes, and the guns. It was impossible to be certain of results through that smoke, but fairly late in the attack, a plume of white smoke shot up two or three hundred feet like a jet. The last aircraft to leave watched the ship heel slowly on to one side. The Film Unit aircraft was able to take photographs of the ship throughout the entire action, and the last photographs showed that the attack had been a complete success, and that the Tirpitz had capsized. This was confirmed by a reconnaissance aircraft, less than two hours after the attack, who reported the bottom of the ship just above the water.
Why the Tirpitz was not adequately protected by fighters, the only protections against high level bombing, can at present be only a matter for conjecture here, and may be being more thoroughly investigated by the German High Command. The ship must have been aware of the approach of the force, at least half an hour before the attack, once the climb to bombing height was commenced from the rendezvous. It may be that the German Navy did not rate the bombing accuracy of the Royal Air Force as high as it does now, or that fighters were despatched to intercept, but too late. After the attack, which was delivered by 29 aircraft, 18 of 617 Squadron and 11 of 9 Squadron, all aircraft dived towards the sea, and until well out of range of Norwegian fighter bases, flew low. No fighters were seen at all on this operation, or for that matter on the two previous ones. All aircraft landed without incident with the exception of one, of which the crew is known to be safe.
Thus was brought to an end the inglorious career of one of the largest and most heavily armed and armoured ships afloat.
The following gives a brief outline of the career of the Tirpitz:-
(i) April 1st, 1939. Launched at Wilhelmshaven.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] THE END OF THE TIRPITZ [/underlined]
(ii) March, 1942. Attacked off the Loften Islands by Naval aircraft of H.M.S. Victorious. (Unserviceable for four months)
(iii) July, 1942. Attacked by a Russian submarine. (Undergoing repairs at Trondheim until December).
(iv) After a complete refit, the earlier months of 1943 were spent in trials, cruises, and the training of the crew for naval operations.
(v) September 9th, 1943. Tirpitz raided the Island of Spitzbergen in the face of negligible opposition.
(vi) September 22nd, 1943. Midget submarines of H.M. Navy attacked and badly damaged the Tirpitz in Alten Fiord. (Next six months spent in Alten Fiord undergoing repairs).
(vii) April, 1944. Tirpitz once again ready to go to sea, when she was attacked by Naval aircraft and once again sent into retirement.
(viii) July 17th, August 22nd, 24th and 29th, 1944. With signs of completion of repairs, Tirpitz was once again attacked by Naval aircraft, this time by Barracudas, and was again rendered unseaworthy.
(ix) September 15th, 1944. Attacked by 5 Group Lancasters flying from Russian bases. Damaged by at least one hit.
(x) October 29th, 1944. Attacked by 5 Group Lancasters. On this occasion cloud over the target rendered the attack inconclusive.
(xi) November 12th, 1944. Attacked in clear weather by Lancasters of No. 5 Group carrying Tallboy bombs, and capsized at her berth West of Tromso.
The coup-de-grace was delivered without the loss of a single life of the attacking force. The success of this attack cannot be measured in terms of the thousands of gallons of fuel used, hundreds of hours flown, or the number of 12,000 lb bombs dropped. The mere existence of the Tirpitz in her Northern berth has threatened all our convoys to and from Russia and North Atlantic shipping, and has cost the lives of a number of Fleet Air Arm crews who have attacked her, and has tied down a not inconsiderable force of the British Home Fleet in Northern Bases.
As the Commander-in-Chief himself has said, there was no doubt about the ultimate fate of the Tirpitz once the crews were able to draw a bead on her, and those who took part have received many congratulations on their magnificent achievement.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] gardening
German Ports and their approaches have been the main target for our Gardeners this month; the remainder of the Command effort continued to be directed against the Kattegat area.
Penetrations to the enemy’s door step were evenly shared by all squadrons, and P.P.I. photographs reveal neat patterns of well planted vegetables in their allotted positions. 126 vegetables were successfully laid, and it is already known that great disturbances were caused off a certain German harbour; shipping came to a stand still for several days, while the local harbour master was at pains to find a safe channel “out” or “in” for his concentrated shipping traffic jam.
No.627 Squadron have now joined the Group Gardening Force, and were most unfortunate in their first sortie, owing to unexpected weather conditions in the target area. But like true Gardeners they returned to base with their valuable load. Well done, and better luck next time.
[Tables Showing Command and Group Summaries of Vegetables Planted]
[Underlined] NEWS EXTRACTS OF ALLIED OPERATIONS AGAINST SHIPPING. [/underlined]
Some German captains of coal ships are reported to have opposed successfully attempts to make them sail to Western Norwegian ports from Oslo. Colliers sent from Germany cannot be unloaded – as the coal dumps in the Oslo area are full, and therefore lose valuable time while waiting for discharge. This shows weakness in administration if ships are in fact allowed to leave Germany for places where coal is either not wanted or cannot be discharged.
It is reported that in various ports, Norwegian crews have refused to sail, and in some cases foreign crews have left their ships.
The enemy has been short of crews for his merchant ships for some time. There is little chance of his being able to find substitutes for crews which refuse to sail. If these reports are true, then dislocation to shipping must be considerable.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] operations
[Underlined] HOMBERG – 1ST NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Smith
Operations opened with a daylight attack by 226 aircraft on the synthetic oil plant at Homberg, a few miles to the North West of Duisburg.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] By the time the main force reached the target area, the target itself was covered by a layer of 10/10ths cloud, 8,000 – 10,000 feet. Gee reception was poor, and the wind-finding was consequently not up to the usual standard. The first wave arrived over the target about two minutes before the Wanganui flares went down, and were unable to attack. This illustrates the importance and the difficulty of accurate timing when marking is by Oboe. They brought their bombs back. 158 main force aircraft bombed the sky markers, which were reported as scattered. 54 were abortive, and twelve bombed alternative or last resort targets.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] (i) The chances of success of this operation were still further prejudiced by an aircraft which had its V.H.F. transmitter switched on during the entire period of control. The Master Bomber’s orders were jammed, and very few crews were able to hear his instructions. The pilot of the aircraft concerned, was gripping the press-to-speak switch continuously in the target area. Arrangements are now in hand to substitute the bombing switch on the control wheel for the existing press-to-speak switch. The bombing switch cannot possibly be operated accidentally.
Incidentally on each occasion on which intercom. has been inadvertently radiated during an operation, much unnecessary chatter has been heard, and the crews have addressed each other by their Christian or nick-names. This not only displays a low standard of crew discipline, but is also contrary to Ni.5 Group Air Staff Instruction TRG/18 which reads as follows:-
“To obviate the risk of confusion over the aircraft intercommunication system, members of aircrews are to address each other according to their duty in the aircraft, viz:-
Captain
Navigator
Bomb Aimer
Wireless Operator
Engineer
Mid-upper
Tail Gunner”
(ii) Fighter Command reported that the formation was good, reasonably compact, and easy to escort.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] DUSSELDORF – 2/3RD NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
187 aircraft of the Group took part in a combined Command attack on Dusseldorf, the chief administrative centre of the Ruhr. An undamaged portion of the built-up area on the eastside of the Ruhr was selected for attack.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Marking was to be carried out by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. using both ground and skymarkers. Crews were to use their own navigation winds for bombing. A mixed load of H.E. and incendiaries was carried. Possible cloud cover of as much as 6/10ths – 9/10ths cu. and strato cu. was forecast in the target area, and crews were given separate aiming instructions for attacking the Wanganui flares.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] The weather over the target proved to be clear, with the normal industrial ground haze. 177 aircraft attacked the primary target, aiming at the ground markers. Marking was reported as accurate, and the bombing was believed to have been well concentrated, with the exception of a few aircraft whose photographs showed that they bombed short. The sorties of these crews have been cancelled. Reconnaissance has revealed that a very heavy concentration of bombs fell in the Northern suburbs which were the target, and the whole area was virtually destroyed. This practically completes the entire destruction of Dusseldorf. In addition, all the important industrial plants in this area, including the large Rheinmetal-Borsig armament works, were severely damaged, and scarcely a building has escaped either complete destruction or heavy damage.
[Underlined] DORTMUND-EMS CANAL – 4/5TH NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr Smith
Deputy:- S/Ldr Churcher
The importance which the Germans attach to the Dortmund-Ems Canal as one of their main transport arteries was amply demonstrated by the fact that both branches of the canal, breached and emptied by the 5 Group raid on 23/24th September, were repaired within less than six weeks, and in full working order. The same stretch of canal was therefore attacked for a second time, by 176 main force aircraft on 4/5th November.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] The aiming point, on the narrow island separating the two branches of the canal, was to be marked direct by Mosquitoes of No.54 Base with Red T.I’s. All aircraft carried a bomb load of 14 X 1,000 G.P’s and crews were ordered to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the red T.I’s.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] There was no cloud in the target area, and visibility was good. Illumination and marking was punctual, but the markers fell some two hundred yards N.N.E. of the marking point and these, together with the T.I’s dropped by the backers up, formed a concentration at which the main force aimed their bombs.
The resulting concentration was the best the Group has yet achieved. An analysis shows that all but 5% of the bombs are contained in a circle radius 530 yards about the M.P.I. This works out at 25 bombs per acre per 1,000 bombs dropped around the M.P.I. and far exceeds any previous results. Both branches of the canal were once again breached and drained, and where the eastern arm crosses the river Glane bombs have penetrated through the bed of the canal.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] This attack pulverised the Eastern subsidiary channel but only the fringe fell over the Western area with the result that the damage was soon repaired. It draws attention to the serious effect of even a slight vector or marking error when attacking such small targets.
[Underlined] MITTELLAND CANAL – 6/7TH NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Smith.
This canal, which joins the Dortmund-Ems canal at Gravenhorst, connects the Ruhr with Osnabruck, Hanover, Brunswick, Magdeburg and Berlin. A section of it near Gravenhorst was selected for an attack by 248 aircraft on 6/7th November.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Mosquitoes were given a point to mark up against the embankment on the Northern side of the canal. A tolerance of 200 yards to either side of the embankment was allowed. Winds were to be found by aircraft of the flare force, and a vector broadcast to the main force by this Headquarters, to shift the bombing some 300 yards along the canal to the North East. With a surface wind from the West, it was hoped to lay a lozenge shaped concentration across the canal at an angle of approximately 30°.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Owing to a combination of unforeseen circumstances, this attack was abortive, and the Master Bomber ordered the force to return to base with their bombs. This operation is an example of how things can go wrong, in spite of careful planning. The snags encountered are listed below:-
(i) There were 7 H.2.S. failures amongst the aircraft of the Blind Marker and Flare Forces, an altogether exceptional number.
(ii) The target area winds were found to be much stronger than forecast, although accurate in direction. The flares were consequently scattered and too far to the East, and although two Mosquitoes found the canal junction there was insufficient illumination for them to identify the marking point.
(iii) One of the Mosquito markers eventually identified the marking point, and succeeded in dropping a Red T.I. close to the bridge nearby, but it unfortunately fell into the canal, and was extinguished before any backing up could take place.
An additional cause of confusion was the choice of Green T.I’s for both the route markers and the Primary Blind Markers, and in future different colours will be used.
[Underlined] HARBURG – 11/12TH NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/Cdr. Woodroffe.
A force of 245 aircraft was despatched to attack the oil refinery and storage installations and the town centre at Harburg, on the South side of the River Elbe, opposite Hamburg.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] There were four aiming points, A, B, C, and D, the first three in the dock area to the North-West of the town and the fourth (D) in the town centre. All aircraft were to approach on a heading of 143° T. Approximately 70% of the force carried on H.E. load: (those attacking the oil plant) and 30% an incendiary load (for the town area).
A suitable marking point was selected, upwind of the target area. At H – 11, blind markers were to drop T.I. Green on the target, these were to be followed by flares, in the light of which Mosquitoes were to drop T.I. Red on the marking point.
[Underlined] Primary Method. [/underlined] Aircraft on aiming points A, B and C were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the T.I’s releasing without any delay. False vectors were to be applied to the bombsight to bring the bombs onto the aiming points. Aircraft on aiming point D were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the T.I. Red, on the ordered heading, delaying the release for 26 seconds.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] The weather was clear, except for a thin layer of stratus at 8,000 feet, and the Master Bomber decided on the primary plan. The flares were rather late, but they were dropped accurately, and Marker 2 dropped a Red T.I. estimated as 80 yards West of the aiming point. These were backed up by further Red T.I’s in positions assessed as 200 yards North and 200 yards South. The actual positions of the markers cannot be identified on the night photographs. The main force was instructed to attack the resulting concentration of Red T.I’s according to plan. Bombing in the early stages was reported as rather scattered, but a good concentration developed later, and at the end of the attack, both target areas were well alight.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] Both these targets had previously been attacked on daylight by aircraft of the U.S.A.A.F. on three recent occasions previous to the 5 Group attack, and although considerable damage by H.E. is seen in the oil refinery area, and damage to residential and business property, and the marshalling yards in the Northern half of the town, no precise statement of the damage inflicted by this night attack can at present by [sic] given.
[Underlined] DUREN – 16TH NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber provided by P.F.F.
Duren lay on the main road between Aix la Chappelle and Cologne, and therefore on the direct route of the Allies’ advance to the Ruhr in that sector. The entire town was a fortified area containing troops, munitions and other supplies. A force of 214 aircraft, was despatched to destroy the buildings, their contents, and the defences, and in addition to block the roads and crossings. No.1 Group also provided a force of over 200 aircraft to attack the same target.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] In view of the weather conditions en route, Bases were ordered to form up in “gaggles” on a time basis, and a leader was appointed for each pair of Squadrons. Marking for the attack was controlled musical parramatta, provided by No.8 Group. Primary markers were to mark the aiming point with Red T.I’s and other P.F.F. aircraft were to keep the aiming point marked with T.I. Red and Green throughout the attack. If the T.I’s became obscured, the Master Bomber was to give aiming instructions with reference to the upwind edge of the smoke.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
In view of the proximity of American troops, very strict orders were given that bombs were not to be dropped unless:-
(i) The T.I’s could be clearly seen.
(ii) The target could be positively identified.
(iii) A timed run could be made from a positively identified position not more than 3 miles from the target.
The Master Bombing Switch was used on this occasion, as an additional precaution against the premature release of bombs. Aircraft were also ordered to home on Gee along the ‘B’ lattice line on the last leg into the target, with the release-point co-ordinated set up.
[Underlined] RESULTS [underlined] The weather was clear over the target, but there was ground haze and smoke from a previous attack. The attack was carried out according to plan. Marking was accurate and the bombing very concentrated; crews bombed either the T.I’s or the upwind edge of the smoke, according to the instructions of the Master Bomber whose controlling was reported to have been excellent. The centre of Duren was entirely devastated, only a few walls being left standing. To the South and East, scattered buildings were largely gutted or destroyed, and all roads were rendered impassable. The town marshalling yards, previously damaged in a U.S.A.A.F. raid, received a further severe mauling.
[Underlined] DORTMUND-EMS CANAL – LADBERGEN – 21/22 ND NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Stubbs.
Reconnaissance revealed that the Germans were making strenuous efforts to repair the damage inflicted on this canal by 176 of the Group on 4/5th November. It was decided to attack this target in the same place once again, to prevent this repair work from being carried out and if possible to add to the damage caused in the previous attacks.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Illumination and marking in normal sequence. Mosquitoes to mark aiming point with Red T.I. Main force crews to aim the first bomb of the stick at the Red T.I. or as ordered by the Master Bomber. Bomb load maximum load 1,000 lb. A few aircraft carried 6 X 1,900 lb G.P. bombs.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] 123 Lancasters and 5 Mosquitoes attacked. The weather in the target area was 6 – 9/10ths strato cu. base 4,000 feet, with good visibility below. Flares were accurate and on time, and the Mosquitoes were able to identify and mark the aiming point. The Master Bomber called the main force in to bomb as planned and the attack was concluded without a hitch.
A very satisfactory concentration was achieved round the markers, and subsequent reconnaissance shows that very great damage has been done. Both branches of the canal have been breached where they cross the River Glane, and both arms have once again been drained, flooding considerable areas of surrounding countryside, and leaving many barges high and dry. The Western embankment of the main canal has been breached in one position for about 150 feet. The subsidiary arm of the canal has been so heavily cratered that its outline can scarcely be recognised. Once again a long stretch of this important canal has been drained, many barges have been destroyed, and others lie with their cargoes high and dry on the canal bed.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] MITTELLAND CANAL – GRAVENHORST – 21/22ND NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/Cdr. Woodroffe.
The Mittelland canal, which runs from East to West from Berlin to the Ruhr, joins the Dortmund-Ems canal (which runs South to North, to connect the Ruhr with the North Sea) a few miles East of Rheine. A section of this canal, just East of its junction with the Dortmund-Ems, was selected for attack with the intention of severing both these important arteries.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] A bridge across the canal was selected as the aiming point and a suitable position near the bank some 500 yards to the S.W. as a marking point. The illumination and marking plan was as usual, but in this case the markers were not to be attacked direct, but crews were to aim the centre bomb of the stick at the Red T.I’s dropped by the Mosquitoes, and a false vector set on the bombsight was calculated to bring the bombs onto the aiming point. Ordered bombing height was 8 – 9,500 feet.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Illumination and marking were punctual and accurate, but 8/10ths to 10/10ths strato cu, base about 4,000 feet, was encountered in the target area, and the Master Bomber ordered the main force to bomb below cloud. 137 Lancasters and 6 Mosquitoes attacked. A good concentration developed, but there was some undershooting, which was inevitable owing to the change in height and the difficulty of vectoring when so low. Nevertheless, the canal has been breached on the West side for a distance of some 50 feet immediately South of the bridge, which was the aiming point. The canal itself has been almost emptied in this stretch and many barges are stranded. In addition many barges have been damaged by direct hits, and both banks of the canal have been heavily cratered.
[Underlined] TRONDHEIM – 22/23RD NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Stubbs.
A force of 178 aircraft took off to attack the submarine pens.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] A suitable marking point was selected near the pens. The usual blind marker and flare sequence was ordered, and in the light of the flares, Mosquitoes were to drop Red T.I’s to mark the marking point. A false wind vector was to be used to shift the bombs onto the aiming point. Bombing heights, 9,000 to 12,000 feet.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather conditions favoured a precision attack such as this: the target area was located without difficulty, and flares and two blind marker Green T.I’s were dropped accurately. Unfortunately the enemy was able to put a smoke screen into operation, which effectively obscured both the marking and aiming points, and the Mosquitoes were unable to mark. Unfortunately the target lay immediately outside a Norwegian town, thus precluding blind bombing, and the Master Bomber was reluctantly obliged to order the force to return to base with their bombs.
[Underlined] MUNICH – 26/27TH NOVEMBER. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Stubbs.
Weather conditions over the target promised to be ideal for an attack on Munich, during the night of 26/27th November, so a maximum
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
effort was ordered. The weather at bases and en route was very tricky, and the decision to go ahead with the attack was not made until the last possible moment. 278 aircraft took off, many with a visibility in the region of 1,000 yards and cloud base 600 feet. A fine achievement.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Two major sectors of the town were selected, one radiating between 019° T. and 060° T, from the marking point, and the other between 081° T. and 150° T. The aircraft in the first sector to carry 1 X 1,000 MC/GP plus maximum ‘J’ incendiary clusters, and those in the second sector 4 lb incendiary clusters, with 50% of them carrying 1 X 4,000 lb bomb.
The two major sectors were sub-divided, and sector headings and appropriate delays were allotted in the usual way. No. 9 Squadron aircraft each carrying 1 X 12,000 lb H.C. bomb were spread throughout all sectors.
Illumination and marking in the normal sequence, bombing heights 16,000 – 20,000 feet.
With freezing level at 2,000 feet and a front lying approximately over the English Channel with tops generally at 20,000 feet, with occasional cu. nimb. Up to 25,000 feet, the flight plan presented a difficult problem. It was eventually decided that, after take off, aircraft should fly South over England below 2,500 feet, maintaining this height until the front had been crossed. Aircraft were to fly over the top of the front on the homeward route, losing height behind it.
The route to the target was chosen to give the enemy as little warning as possible: it lay South of Switzerland, crossed Lakes Maggiore and Como, and then went N.N.E. to the target, across the Alps. This plan was entirely successful, and the defences did not come to life until the attack was well under way.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] The Master Bomber was delayed taking off, so Marker I, who was the deputy, conducted the opening phases of the attack. Illumination and blind marking went as planned. At H – 7 a Red T.I. was dropped, and assessed as almost on the marking point. At this moment the Master Bomber arrived, assumed control, and confirmed the accuracy of the Red T.I. Backers-up were called in, and marking was completed by H – 1. One Red T.I. which was assessed as wide to the North was cancelled by a Yellow T.I. The main force was then ordered to attack as planned.
Pilot’s reports were very enthusiastic about the success of this attack, but a large proportion of the night photographs plotted show ground detail to the South of the target, and it is now clear that the point marked was some 2/3,000 yards too far South. Nevertheless at least half of the attack went into the town and Southern suburbs and considerable damage should have been caused.
[Underlined] REMARKS [/underlined] This was the first occasion on which the Group as a whole has used Loran, and the results were very satisfactory. The concentration on the return route showed a marked improvement on the degree of concentration previously achieved.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] signals
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATOR (AIR). [/underlined]
[Underlined] CONTROLLED OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
W/T operating by the W/T link operators throughout November maintained a fairly high standard, and reception of their transmissions by the Main Force operators was also of a high order. 54 Base again supplied all the W/T link operators and both squadrons are to be congratulated on their efficiency. This result has been accomplished by hard training.
Two interesting incidents which took place on the night of the 11th and 22nd respectively are worthy of mention. On the night of the 11th, four minutes before the first bombing wind was due to be transmitted back to Group, sever ‘jostling’ was experienced on the frequency. Prompt action by the C.S.O. enabled this frequency to be cleared just in time for controlling to commence. We again realise just how effective this countermeasure is. On the night of the 22nd propagation conditions were such that reception at all the Group Ground Stations was practically impossible, yet when crews returned it was found that ait to air reception was perfect and 100% reception accomplished.
The Link 1 and 2 operators who carried out control duties during the month were:-
Night 4th F/O Booth 83 Squadron Link 1
F/O Chapman 83 Squadron Link 2
Night 6th F/Sgt Manderson 97 Squadron Link 1
F/Sgt Whitehead 97 Squadron Link 2
Night 11th W/O John 97 Squadron Link 1
F/Sgt Utting 97 Squadron Link 2
Night 12th F/O Ward 617 Squadron Link 1 )Tirpitz
Sgt Morgan 9 Squadron Link 1 ) attack
Night 22nd Sgt Smith 97 Squadron Link 1
Sgt Moroney 97 Squadron Link 2
Night 27th W/O John 97 Squadron Link 2
F/Lt Summerscales 83 Squadron Link 3
[Underlined] W/T CONTROLLERS’ TESTS. [/underlined]
During the month 61 Wireless Operators took part in the test as detailed in 5G.S.I. No.13 and out of this number 54 passed as fit for W/T Link duties. Tabulated below are the number of operators per squadron who took part in these tests.
[Table of Numbers of Wireless Operator Tests by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] GROUP W/T EXERCISE. [/underlined]
The Group W/T Exercise during last month was disappointing, due to a number of squadrons not yet having all their equipment installed in their new training rooms, Signals Leaders are asked to exert pressure in the right direction to hurry along the completion of these training rooms so as to enable advantage to be taken of this organised and highly profitable training. We extend a hearty welcome to the Heavy Conversion Units of No.75 Base to take part in these exercises, and hope they will find the exercise interesting and of instructional value.
[Underlined] POINTS FOR SIGNALS LEADERS. [/underlined]
During regrading tests throughout the month it was distressing to find that very few Wireless Operators (Air) knew anything at all about the V.H.F. equipment TR.5043. Now this is definitely Signals equipment, and all Wireless Operators (Air) should know at least sufficient about the installation to enable them to rectify any simple fault which may occur in the air, such as the replacing of fuses, power leads, aerial connections etc. Particular instruction should be given to the drill for checking whether the set is on transmit or receive.
The introduction of the Bomber Command Diversion Schedule has filled a long felt want, and will be much appreciated by all Wireless Operators (Air). Like all other publications it will only fulfil [sic] its rightful purpose if it is always kept amended up to date, and the responsibility for amending all copies lies with the Signals Leader. He should ensure that all “Wilmot” signals are received and any amendments to the Bomber Command Diversion Schedule are embodied immediately.
[Underlined] SIGNALS FAILURES. [/underlined]
The total percentage of Signals Failures against sorties flown for the month of November, was 1.82 which shows a decrease of 0.497 against the figure for October. It will be seen from the Signals Failure Monthly Circular that there was also a decrease during October, the percentage decrease for both months being 0.619. This achievement is really outstanding when one realises the unfavourable weather conditions the servicing personnel have encountered over this period. It all goes to show that IT CAN BE DONE – good show chaps!
There is also a bouquet this month for the Wireless Operators (Air) – there were no manipulation failures; an excellent state of affairs.
During the month not one sortie was cancelled (Class A) as the result of a signals defect. How many realise that this record has been maintained over the past 5 months?
[Underlined] I.F.F. COURSES. [/underlined]
Five courses involving 57 Wireless Mechanics drawn from all stations in the Group were held at Morton Hall during the month. Great keeness [sic] was shown and the instructor, Sergeant Ryder, reports very favourably on the standard attained. The Chief Signals Officer took the opportunity of discussing with each course the problems connected with aircraft servicing and was able to obtain some useful ‘gen’. The fact that a vast majority of our Group 1 tradesmen are still looking forward to an early return to civilian occupations was once more confirmed, and was countered by a graphic description of life in the peace-time airforce which it is hoped may have the effect of changing some of their minds.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] V.H.F. R/T – TR.5043. [/underlined]
[Underlined] SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
The TR.5043 gave good serviceability during November, there were ten failures reported against more than 2,000 sorties. Four of the failures (all in one Base) were “NOTHING HEARD – NO FAULT FOUND”. Are Signals Officers doing all in their power to prevent this type of defect? There were two cases of Aerials Type 147 breaking; this is a decrease in comparison with the figure for October.
During the month, exhaustive experiments were carried out at Metheringham by 3 R.A.E. specialists in connection with aerial breakages. The result of these experiments is, that [underlined] all [/underlined] Lancaster aircraft TR.5043 aerials (including H.2.S. aircraft) can safely be fitted in strict accordance with B.C.S.P. No.10.
[Underlined] VOLUME CONTROLS. [/underlined]
Three different types of volume controls for operation by the pilot are now undergoing test in various Lancaster aircraft in the Group. Results to date are somewhat varied, some pilots stating that the new control in ‘bang on’ whilst others aver that the minimum position still permits incoming V.H.F. R/T Signals to interfere with intercom. We are determined to find the ideal before launching a general fitting programme.
[Underlined] V.H.F. R/T COURSES. [/underlined]
No.1 Radio School, Cranwell, has undertaken to give all Signals Officers in the Group a four-day course on the V.H.F. R/T set TR.5043.
The first two courses report enthusiastically on the efficiency with which this course is being run and they thoroughly enjoyed the brief opportunity to be immune from telephone calls and other diversions whilst learning all there is to know about this interesting set.
[Underlined] INADVERTENT RADIATION ON INTERCOM. [/underlined]
Yet another case has occurred of crew intercom. being radiated on V.H.F. R/T in the target area. This resulted in serious inconvenience by jamming to some extent the R/T traffic. It had been considered that all possible action had been taken to prevent this sort of thing happening. All Main Force aircraft have a switch fitted in the H.T lead to the V.H.F. Transmitter, and this switch is locked in the ‘Off’ position prior to take off. All aircraft which may be called upon to transmit on their V.H.F. R/T, have this switch in the ‘On’ position, but are equipped with a Neon light indicator positioned near the navigator which lights up whenever the V.H.F. set is transmitting. In spite of these precautions, however, an aircraft of the illuminating force inadvertently radiated intercom. on V.H.F. It seems that it will be necessary to reposition the neon indicator, and also make use of the pilot’s bomb release switch in lieu of the existing press-to-speak switch which unfortunately is in such a position on the control wheel that it can be gripped, and pressed, in the ‘On’ position accidentally. The Pilot’s bomb release switch is fitted on the control wheel in such a way that it cannot possibly be actuated accidentally.
[Underlined] RADAR. [/underlined]
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
The closing days of the month saw the final stages of the Loran fitting programme. This fitting programme almost brought back reminiscences of the Monica Mark V days, and much credit must be accorded to the wholehearted efforts of the Engineering and Radar personnel who installed the bracketry and equipment in double-quick time.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
The successful use of the equipment on the Munich operation on the night 26/27th gave a very useful fillip to enthusiasm, and effectively squashed the mutterings of the “doubting Thomases”. The serviceability figures, in view of the usual manipulation troubles and initial “bugs”, are promising. It has been found that the indicator becomes unusually temperamental when damp, but waterproof covers should clear this trouble.
Shortage of the main boxes and lack of spare components were sources of complaints, but both will be cleared almost directly.
[Underlined] A.G.L.(T). [/underlined]
Despite the spring tides at Fulbeck which threaten to engulf the Radar workshop, the A.G.L.(T) situation is well in hand. No physical success has been claimed, and the shortage of equipped aircraft is acute, but much useful data has been brought to light, which should do much to assist the final development of this device.
[Underlined] H.2.S. MARK III. [/underlined]
Progress at Coningsby is steady. The scanner trouble has been cleared, gaps in the polar diagram have been filled in by a simple modifications [sic] which consists of strategically mounting a 16” X 6” sheet of perspex on the mirror. We [underlined] know [/underlined] it does the job all we want to know is [underlined] how [/underlined] it does it. Improvements to the scanner testing equipment have effected considerable economy in flying hours.
[Underlined] MONICA. [/underlined]
The addendum to Monica to defeat the Hun, reached its flying trials this month which were very encouraging, and earned official sanction for the Group to experiment with Monica. All credit for this device must go to F/O Tovey of 53 Base. His prototype made all Walt Disney’s conceptions look very ordinary but he continued to work on the idea tirelessly and patiently, and with T.R.E. assistance brought forth a very workable unit, of which we hope a lot more will be heard.
[Underlined] SECURITY. [/underlined]
This month has seen the introduction of the long awaited Bomber Command Diversion Schedule. As the tag has it “The mountains shall labour and bring forth a ridiculous little mouse”. In this case at least, an eighteen month gestation has produced a noble offspring. There is one note of ridicule, introduced we imagine by some frolicsome “printer’s devil”, and this defect in the Schedule required one of the three following ‘mods’ for its eradication:-
(i) The Schedule to be mounted on a bracket and swivel fixed to the W/Op’s (Air) table.
(ii) All W/Op’s (Air) to be fitted with swivel vertebrae above the shoulders.
(iii) The even numbered pages of the Schedule to be printed “the other way up”.
The last of these three ‘mods’ has been requisitioned, and until it appears we wish you good luck and happy diversions.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] YOU HAVE BEEN WARNED. [/underlined]
The Field Security Police have a multitude of duties,
And amongst other things these precious beauties
Sit in post offices and monitor calls,
And lap up every word that falls
From the lips of Service folk;
This is by no means a joke,
Though it may seem to be at first.
The police laugh simply fit to burst
Whenever they hear some solemn voice say,
“This is an Ops. circuit so we needn’t scramble, heh?”
And the other bloke
Says, “Oke!”
When this happens you might guess,
They take it down in shorthad, [sic] (more or less),
And after a court-marital –
To which they’re very partial –
The perpetrators of the crime
Do “time”,
Or they may, it is feared,
Be cashiered!
It all depends upon the rank,
AC Plonk or Flight Lieutenant Blank.
The moral is by now quite clear, I’m sure.
NO circuits can be trusted as secure.
When secrets must be spoken, your preamble
Must always be the magic words, “Please scramble!”
Ops. circuits only give you what you need,
And that is NOT security but Speed!
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] navigation
[Underlined] WHAT ARE THE QUALITIES OF A GOOD NAVIGATOR? [/underlined]
A good navigator may be summed up as one who works hard all the time, uses his intelligence constantly and makes a conscious effort to be on track and on time throughout every operation.
Do you think you fill that category? To assist you in answering the first question, below is a self analysis chart for you to complete. Be honest with yourself in answering these questions.
[Underlined] SELF ANALYSIS CHART. [/underlined]
[Underlined] QUESTIONS. [/underlined]
(1) Do you [underlined] always [/underlined] work to a system, and a regular time interval?
(2) Do you [underlined] always [/underlined] make a “snap” alteration of course immediately you ascertain you are off track?
(3) Do you check your ETA’s [underlined] regularly [/underlined] every 15 minutes?
(4) When coming into Gee range to you [underlined] always [/underlined] believe the first Gee fix you obtain and act on it?
(5) When no fixing aids available, do you [underlined] always [/underlined] obtain a D.R. position every 15 minutes?
(6) Do you [underlined] always [/underlined] “home” on your Southern or Eastern Lattice lines as instructed.
(7) Do you [underlined] always [/underlined] check your compasses every 20 minutes?
(8) Do you [underlined] always [/underlined] find a w/v over the ideal period of time, i.e. between 15 and 40 minutes.
(9) When necessary to you [underlined] always [/underlined] dog leg or alter IAS so as to arrive at each turning point exactly on time?
This is by no means a comprehensive list, but if you answer all the questions frankly, you will obtain a good assessment of your own ability. If you can say “Yes” to only 70% or less, you are below average; 80% you are average; 90% ad above you can consider yourself a good navigator.
Make a note of the points on which you lose marks, then rectify them [underlined] immediately [/underlined]. Further lists will appear in the next two summaries, so keep a note of your results on this test and by January you will have a complete assessment of yourself.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] WINDFINDING. [/underlined]
The importance of finding accurate w/v’s, [underlined] and using them, [/underlined] has been stressed constantly for the last five years. One would therefore think that, as a result of all this “binding” every Navigator would now realise the importance of windfinding. BUT, unfortunately this is not so, Why?
We now have four “gen boxes” given us to assist in finding really accurate w/v., i.e. Gee, Loran, H.2.S. and A.P.I. All these instruments have been tested very thoroughly and have been proved accurate. All Navigators acknowledge the accuracy of these instruments and trust individual fixes and A/P’s obtained, but when it comes to joining two of these positions together, i.e. fix and Air Position, and obtained a w/v, many Navigators automatically become dubious. If the w/v obtained agrees fairly well with that forecast, or the last few w/v’s found, it is considered accurate. BUT, on the other hand if it differs by any appreciable amount, then in 7 out of every 10 instances a Navigator will say he got a “duff fix”, or else the A.P.I. is overreading!! In other words many Navigators just haven’t the confidence in themselves. Are YOU one of these? If you are, then reform yourself!
It is not generally appreciated that, even with a so-called steady wind the direction is never constant to within 30°, and the speed is never constant to within 10 or 15 miles an hour, so how can you expect to find idential [sic] w/v’s, and in any case how are you to know that there hasn’t been a sudden wind change caused by an unpredicted front or other reason?
Therefore in future, do not mistrust your fixes, A.P.I. readings and resultant w/v’s. Take great care in obtaining these readings and in plotting them accurately, but once you’ve got them treat them as correct – and [underlined] USE [/underlined] the resultant w/v!
[Underlined] COMPASSES. [/underlined]
Do [underlined] YOU [/underlined] always check your Compasses every 20 minutes? This question has been asked already, but it will bear repeating. There are now 3 instruments dependent on the serviceability of the D.R. Compass, namely H.2.S., A.P.I. and Mk.XIV Bombsight, besides of course the safety of the aircraft itself. It is, therefore, of paramount importance that the D.R. Compass is fully serviceable all the time.
A recent analysis showed that very few Navigators ever pay sufficient attention to their compasses. Are YOU one of these people who take the Compasses for granted, or do you carry out your checks methodically. Do you for example, ever go out to your aircraft and assist in the swinging, or do you even ask the Compass Adjusters on their return how your compasses are? Do you always carry a compass key in your pocket? Have a look and make sure before you answer the last question. Are you thoroughly conversant with the symptoms of a toppled gyro, and do you know the procedure to be adopted to correct the gyro? [Underlined] But above all, [/underlined] do you know that you should never return early because one of your compasses is unserviceable?
An analysis is carried out after every Group concentration plan has been completed to ascertain why certain aircraft are off track. On every occasion the answer for [underlined] AT LEAST ONE AIRCRAFT [/underlined] is that vague phrase “COMPASSES U/S”, which, on further examination, means nothing more than “Compasses desynchronised”.
The safety of an aircraft and its crew was therefore jeopardised because the crew [underlined] forgot to check their compasses! [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
Longer range targets will be the the priority this Winter and that means deep penetration into a heavily fortified Germany. Accurate Navigation will therefore be absolutely essential and this is directly dependent on the accuracy of your compasses. Be compass minded then – learn all you can about them, know your drills and manipulation procedures off by heart – and above all [underlined] CHECK YOUR COMPASS REGULARLY. [/underlined]
Use the Astro Compass when there is any discrepancy between the P.4 and D.R. Compasses.
Station and Squadron Navigation Officers must continue to drive hard on this subject, checking all new crews on their arrival See that they are thoroughly conversant with the drills, faults, remedies and manipulation procedures, and make it clear to them that on no account do they return early if one compass is unserviceable.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING VECTOR ERRORS. [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by the squadrons this month is 3.8 m.p.h. This is excellent. This figure shows a decrease of .5 m.p.h. We have achieved our goal of an average vector error below 4 m.p.h. Can we now possibly reduce this error to below 3 m.p.h.? If we can then all navigators can truthfully say they are contributing to very largely to the high standard of bombing we are achieving. Go to it! and see what records you can break this month.
[Table of Average Vector Errors by Squadron]
It will be noted that three squadrons of No.53 Base occupy the first three places this month, the two “old faithfuls”, Nos. 9 and 50 Squadrons, still retaining their lead on the rest of the Group. No. 56 Base Squadrons are all down towards the bottom of the list. They can, and have, done very much better than this. Com on No.56 Base, let us see you at the top next month!
Apologies to No. 57 Squadron for last month. Their average vector error was inadvertently shown as 4 m.p.h., whereas it should have read 3.5 m.p.h.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
[Drawing] THIS MONTH’S Bouquets [Drawing]
The names of the eight navigators who submitted the best work this month as [sic] set out below. They have been chosen for their consistently accurate and methodical work, which includes good track-keeping and timing, constant wind velocity checks and checking of E.T.A’s and log and chart work of a very high order.
F/O Hart – No.467 Squadron
P/O Briggs No.83 Squadron
F/O Martin No.106 Squadron
F/O Skinner No.189 Squadron
P/O Searle No.227 Squadron
F/Sgt Shapman No.207 Squadron
F/O Kay No.630 Squadron
F/Sgt Murray No. 50 Squadron
Note that P/O SEARLE appears for the second time. Good work SEARLE – keep it up!
[Underlined] TIMING. [/underlined]
In last month’s summary a long article was written on the slackness of timing on the return journey. Three causes of this “timing spread” were suggested and you were asked to eliminate them and so bring about a much needed improvement in the return journey concentration. Base, Station and Squadron Commanders and Navigation Officers were also asked to have a “drive” in this direction. Only one operation has been carried out since this letter was sent, and on this raid there was a very big improvement. In fact the concentration on the return journey was better than that going to the target!! This is good, keep it up, and make it your aim to achieve the concentration we desire, i.e. “an area covering not more than 50 miles in length and 10 miles in width” – and no more.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS. [/underlined]
F/Lt. Markham – No.463 Squadron to be Squadron Navigation Officer.
F/Lt. Martin – No.61 Squadron to be Squadron Navigation Officer.
F/Lt. Bennett, D.F.M. – No.617 Squadron Navigation Officer to be Station Navigation Officer, Woodhall. (now S/Ldr.).
F/O Bayne, D.F.C. – No.617 Squadron to be Squadron Navigation Officer.
F/Lt. De Boos, D.F.C. – No.627 Squadron Navigation Officer, tour expired, posted to No.7 Group.
F/Lt. Tice – No.627 Squadron to be Squadron Navigation Officer.
S/Ldr. Kelly, D.F.C. – Station Navigation Officer, Fulbeck, missing on operations.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] radar nav:
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
This new navigational aid has only been used to any great advantage on one operation this month. Despite the difficulties in training and the short time since the introduction of the Loran equipment, operators made full use of the facility it affords, and it has proved without doubt a useful addition to our navigational equipment. The fact that to the present time no interference has been encountered which would make fixing difficult does not imply that the Hun will not attempt to jam the equipment and with this fact in mind every possible operator must use Loran to its fullest advantage whilst it is still possible.
There are one or two points which have arisen in the manipulation and use of this equipment which must be stressed. They are:-
(i) Loran operators are not spending sufficient time in the recognition of signals – particularly differentiation between 1st and 2nd Hop E sky waves. Perseverence [sic] and close watch of the signals on Sweep Speed 3 will ascertain whether the signals are the correct ones. It is appreciated that very little, if any, training can be carried out on the S.S. Loran Chain and operators must endeavour to use time on operations for sky wave training. If you are uncertain as to the appearance of sky waves your obvious remedy is to visit the Radar Training Room after 1630 hours any day and you can get all the gen on the sky waves by using the S.S. or North Eastern Loran Chain on a bench set. Why not make this a nightly feature until you are sure in the identification of all signals.
(ii) No system of taking position lines at regular intervals is being followed. It is no use taking a position line from one rate and keep transferring it along track for an undeterminable number of times to give you fixes with position lines from the other rate. Try taking position lines at regular intervals of say 10 minutes e.g.:-
Rate 4 at 2010 and 2020 and so on.
Rate 5 at 2011 and 2021 and so on.
(iii) The time base readings are easily upset by movement of the fine strobe control during the switching of the Sweep Speed Control through position 5, 6 and 7. Watch this carefully or else you are going to get false fixes. If necessary use your left hand for switching the Sweep Speed Control.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
(iv) Several operators reported the four dividers out of alignment but a few using commonsense [sic] and initiative correctly aligned the dividers and obtained full use of the equipment. As the dividers, particularly A, B, C and D are very critical, alignment checks must be made:-
(a) After switching on procedure has been carried out.
(b) Every two hours when LORAN is in use.
(c) After any large changes of temperature or pressure.
An Aircraft Drill has been produced and is available at all units, detailing the alignment procedure. Loran operators must know this procedure fully and screwdrivers have been made a general issue to all navigators in order that alignment corrections can be made in the air. It is important, however, that operators should know the symptoms of incorrect alignment before they attempt any correction at all. Loran Instructors or Radar Officers will supply all the “gen” on this.
A slight modification to the Loran set is being introduced shortly which enables operators to change the basic rate so that the new North Eastern Loran Chain can be used. This North Eastern Loran Chain the details of which will be available shortly, gives coverage over the whole of the North Sea and should be very useful on Northern trips. It is, however, emphasised that as this Chain is not as accurate as the Norther Gee Chain, Gee must be used to the limit of its coverage. The present charts are to a scale of one to three million and therefore hopeless for Bomber Command navigation. Representations have been made for larger scale charts and these will be distributed as soon as they are received at this Headquarters.
[Underlined] GEE. [/underlined]
Welcome changes have been made this month in the Continental Gee Chain frequencies with the intention of giving far better facilities from the Ruhr and Rheims Chains. However emphasis is placed upon the correct setting up of the R.F.27 tuning dial to obtain the best reception. Great care is therefore to be exercised in setting the dial correctly when changing from one frequency to another.
The Rheims Chain continues to give excellent results with ranges reported as great as 0930E. Interference is slight and on most occasions non-existent. On the Munich operation the Chain could have been used to considerably greater advantage if suitable charts had been available in time.
The Ruhr Chain is still producing disappointing results and below the standard of the Rheims Chain. A and C Station signal strengths are fairly good. The B and D signals are weak limiting the operational value of the Chain. Sine wave jamming and Heavy Grass has been reported in the Brunswick and Cologne areas.
The Eastern Chain gave excellent results on the Harburg operation, many operators obtaining fixes in the target area. This indicates either the meteorological conditions were favourable for Gee that night, or that the enemy has transferred his jamming to other frequencies.
Representatives have again been made for the production of miniature lattice charts for the Continental Chain as the navigator nowadays has to carry no less than eighteen topographical lattice charts if he is to be prepared for any emergencies. The total area covered by these topographical lattice charts can be reproduced on approximately four miniature lattice charts.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] H.2.S. [/underlined]
H.2.S. silence is still being maintained on the Group with total restriction on the use of H.2.S. Mark II and part restriction on H.2.S. Mark III. With the risk of early warning of operations, and until the efficiency of the enemy night fighter equipment is definitely ascertained, it is the policy of this Group to give the enemy as little help from H.2.S. sources as is possible.
H.2.S. operators are reminded that although the use of H.2.S. Mark II is almost totally restricted it may be possible that at some future date consent will be given to its use again. H.2.S. Mark II can be used from the enemy coast on the return journey. This relaxation of the restrictions is intended for training purposes and operators should make the best use of this time to raise their standard of efficiency. H.2.S. is and will remain the most efficient navigational aid over enemy territory because it cannot be jammed efficiently, and with the introduction of new Marks it will again come into general use. All Marks of H.2.S. are manipulated in a similar manner and thorough knowledge of Mark II will ensure more efficient use of the later Marks.
54 Base still continue to make great strides in the use of H.2.S. Mark III as an efficient bombing aid and trials are continuing to ascertain the accuracy of individual sets of H.2.S. equipment by means of ground Radar plots at positions of bombs gone on various targets. Complete analysis of every run is being made to ascertain the errors due to equipment and to the human element. Those due to the equipment can be eliminated. It is up to the individual operators to eliminate the inaccuracy due to human error.
H.2.S. Photography is proceeding satisfactorily throughout the Group, although all main force photographs, except those from 106 Squadron, are of landmarks in this country. From these training photographs it is evident that the standard is improving, and operators are taking a little more time in the manipulation of the camera. There are, however, still one or two unsatisfactory details which can be overcome:- For instance, some operators still persist in having a 10 mile zero as big as a half crown thus distorting the photograph obtained. Remember is should be the size of a sixpence. Others persist in having lights on or letting the daylight into the compartment when taking the photographs thus wasting negatives and printing material. If you persist in making these mistakes during training, far more may be made during an operational sortie due to operational stress. 54 Base have produced some excellent operational photographs, particularly those taken on the operation to Munich. These photographs show the lakes and valleys in the Alps as clearly as on a relief map. The photographs also indicate that the target and lakes nearby are very well defined on the H.2.S. Mark III P.P.I. and will no doubt prove useful for any future attacks.
Squadrons of 55 Base and 106 Squadron have carried out several mining sorties during the month, the results of which have been excellent. The importance of this work cannot be too highly stressed and H.2.S. training on these squadrons is being carried out with this type of operation in mind. There are several convenient landmarks on the East Coast which can be used for mining runs and the number of P.P.I. photographs which have been received indicate that some operators are making use of them during training. The important fact is that all operators on these squadrons must be able to release mines accurately on H.2.S. We cannot afford to lay them outside the normal channels, where they may be a danger to our own shipping.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] tactics
This month the German Night Fighter Force has again failed to offer effective opposition to Bomber Command’s night offensive. The German fighter controllers have been bewildered by the profusion of Window spoofs, Mosquito raids and Intruders, combined with the main attacks, and have failed to intercept the bomber stream with an effective number of fighters. Night fighter are, however, still the biggest danger, and there is no reason to suppose that, once they have contacted the bomber stream, they are any less efficient than they were last Winter. A night fighter, particularly if equipped with upward firing cannon, is a formidable adversary, and a crew must be on the top line to combat it successfully. Good crew discipline is essential. In particular, intercommunications between the pilot and gunners must be clear and concise. Idle chatter and the use of Christian names on the intercom. may mean attending interrogation at Dulag Luft instead of Base.
There are indications that the enemy may, in the very near future, send up fighters against our daylight attacks, particularly on the deeper penetrations we shall be making in the coming months. The fighter escort will deal with what it can, but crews must be prepared for small formations of enemy fighters to get through the escort. This will provide a quick and decisive answer to the ever recurrent problem of stragglers. The enemy may well use jet fighters for these attacks, but crews should remember that, although their speed is very high, there is nothing miraculous about these aircraft. In an attack they behave like conventional fighters and should be treated as such. Although they are armed with 30 m.m. cannon, these have such a low muzzle velocity that, for accurate shooting, they are not effective over 400 yards, which will give gunners a good chance of shooting back.
A final warning. A case has come to light recently where a captain admitted letting his rear gunner leave his turret over France and the sea when returning from the target. This is criminal. German night fighters are often ordered to follow the bomber stream across friendly territory, and well out to sea, and captains must remember that an operation finishes in dispersal, and not a moment sooner.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] air bombing
The activities of the Group in the operational sphere have mostly been intended to destroy small targets rather than to bomb areas of large cities.
Despite unfavourable weather conditions on frequent occasions, the results have been reasonably satisfactory from the Air Bomber’s point of view and the necessity of maintaining a high standard of precision bombing must be apparent. Obtaining the best possible results on precision targets at night, when visual identification is impossible, necessitates a thorough knowledge of the tactical plan and the ability to carry it out to the letter. The plots of the incendiary attacks on sectors illustrate that the majority of Air Bombers are doing their best to guide the aircraft over the marking point, but it must be realised that after the dummy bombing run on to the marker, it is essential that the aircraft should be on the briefed track as quickly as possible. As soon as the marker comes into the intersection of the bombsight graticule and is reported by the Air Bomber, the immediate reactions of the bombing team are as follows:-
(a) The Navigator commences to count off the required number of seconds consistent with the basic delay plus the delay for the incendiary bombs.
(b) The Pilot turns on to the course given by the Navigator prior to reaching the target area, and confirms that he is on the correct course.
(c) The Air Bomber does a last minute check of the bombing panel and releases the bombs on the executive word from the Navigator.
The correct observance of this procedure will ensure that the required incendiary concentration falls in the areas where the maximum amount of damage can be caused.
Now that Winter has arrived, all Air Bombers must be prepared for icing in the bomb-bay. The only preventative measure that can be undertaken is to see that the release slip heater for No.13 station is switched on at take-off, but by a careful examination of the bomb-bay after landing, it will be possible to see if any incendiaries have fallen from the S.B.C’s on to the doors and the ground crew will know what to expect when they open the bomb-doors. A careful examination of the bomb-bay after the aircraft has been flying below freezing level for some time will help to prevent any accidents on the ground after landing. It should be remembered that there will be no indication of bombs hanging-up due to icing, when the Air Bomber does his lights check.
The importance of switch drill, and accuracy in bombsight settings, must be frequently stressed by Bombing Leaders at every possible opportunity. An error of one or two degrees in bombsight levelling will give a large error on the ground, and despite the difficulty in setting the correct levelling figure on the computor [sic] box, every effort must be made to see that it is correct to the nearest degree. Constantly check your switches and bombsight on the way to the target, and remember that your target is not a town or city, but a small area in that town or city, and to hit is successfully you must be accurate as if bombing a practice target.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] NOVEMBER’S OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] SQDN. PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR ERROR AT 20,000 FT. IN YARDS. [/underlined]
9 F/O Newton F/Sgt Flynn F/Sgt Grant 71
F/L Marsh F/O Carr F/Sgt Haydon 66
F/O Coater F/Sgt Boag F/Sgt Black 57
F/O Williams F/Sgt Gold Sgt Lockerbie 53
50 F/O Jones Sgt Jarmy Sgt Davis 77
F/O Ling F/Sgt Howard F/O Rutland 68
83 F/O Inniss F/O Morrison F/Sgt Dormer 73
F/L Weber Sgt Summers Sgt Thorn 76
97 F/O Greening Sgt Nutt F/Sgt Cairn 72
F/L Brooker F/O Pearce F/O Brown 42
F/O Ryan Sgt Kirkby F/O Sabine 56
F/O Royston-Piggott W/O Bate F/Sgt Madley 73
106 P/O May Sgt George F/Sgt Barling 61
207 F/O Rose Sgt Weaver Sgt Bell 75
617 F/O Ross P/O Tilby F/O O’Brien 63
F/O Gingles W/O Hazell F/Sgt Johnson 70
F/L Sayers P/O Weaver F/O Strom 73
F/O Martin F/Sgt Day F/Sgt Jackson 54 54
F/O Joplin F/Sgt Hebbard F/Sgt Fish 71
630 F/O Baker F/Sgt Leyden F/Sgt Taeuber 66
F/O Miller F/O Banks W/O Wildey 74
F/O Martin and crew, No.617 Squadron, have for the second successive month, obtained two crew errors of less than 60 yards at 20,000 feet. These results are obtained only by concentration on the part of Pilot and Air Bomber and are commendable efforts.
F/L Brooker and crew, No.97 Squadron, obtained the excellent result of 42 yards using the Mark XIV Bombsight.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS. [/underlined]
P/O Willmot, No.49 Squadron, obtained fifth place on the Bombing Leader’s Course, being awarded a “B” Category.
There have been no changes in the squadrons during November.
All Bombing Leaders are asked to make a point of seeing that their returns are forwarded to Group Headquarters as soon as possible after the end of each week and month.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING . [/underlined]
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] SQUADRON AVERAGE ERROR [/underlined]
1 9 65 yards
2 ) 97 70 yards
2 ) 619 70 yards
4 630 71 yards
5 49 72 yards
6 83 73 yards
7 44 74 yards
8 207 86 yards
9 463 87 yards
10 57 88 yards
11 50 100 yards
12 467 114 yards
13 106 124 yards
14 61 125 yards
15 189 126 yards
The top place in the Group Competition has again changed hands, 9 Squadron having improved on their last month’s entry by 8 yards, and they are well ahead of the next six Squadrons who submitted entries all within 6 yards.
No. 9 Squadron are to be congratulated on their excellent bombing and it is hoped that they can hold their place against the strong opposition which will be provided by other squadrons during December.
No.55 Base have repeated their recent consistently good bombing and all five squadrons are included in the first ten, 619 Squadron showing the greatest improvement with a decrease of 23 yards on their October result.
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORISATION. [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categorisation by Base]
Crews are categorised on the average crew error of their last three practice bombing exercises and the following limitations apply to the various categories:-
A+ 85 yards or less
A 140 yards or less
B 210 yards or less
C 280 yards or less
D Over 280 yards.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28 NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE. [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Results by Squadron]
No. 627 Squadron dropped 409 bombs at heights lower than 1000 feet with an average error of 71 yards.
172 T.I’s were dropped producing an average error of 191 yards.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] QUIZ. [/underlined]
1. If you find you are getting no air supply after switching on the air control what is the first thing to check?
2. Which pistol is liable to operate even though the bomb has been released “SAFE”?
3. What is used to indicate the presence of Allied troops during close support attacks on targets near the front line?
[Underlined] BIGCHIEF COMPETITION. [/underlined]
The two entries received in this competition have both been sent in from Strubby.
G/Capt. Jeudwine – 138 yards at 20,000 ft.
W/Cdr. Milward (619 Sqdn.) – 205 yards at 20,000 ft.
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION. [/underlined]
The solitary entry for this competition came from 55 Base.
F/Lt. Linnett (57 Sqdn.) – 104 yards.
F/Lt Rumgay (617 Sqddn.) has completed several excellent exercises using the S.A.B.S. which unfortunately, cannot be included in the competition.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING. [/underlined]
The total number of practice bombs dropped during November shows a considerable decrease when compared with October’s figures (2577 against 3898). Adverse weather conditions made practice bombing impossible on many days during the month, but some Squadrons made maximum use of the available opportunities.
The average crew error, although slightly higher than last month, is very satisfactory and special mention must be made of 9 Squadron’s efforts which produced and average error of 122 yards.
There are occasions when considerable congestion has been caused at Bombing Ranges because of the large number of aircraft attempting to bomb at the same time. It is only possible to allocate two targets to each Base and this congestion should be reduced with closer co-operation between Squadron Bombing Leaders, and the staggering of Bombing times allocated to each aircraft.
Bombing Leaders are also reminded that night practice bombing programmes should be transmitted to Ranges before 1800 hours if possible.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
incendiary attacks
[Underlined] BRUINSWICK – 14/15TH OCTOBER [/underlined]
It is probable that with the limited time available before an operation, crews may not appreciate the complete picture of the plan of which each squadron forms a component part. It is proposed, therefore, to take one of the incendiary attacks which this Group has carried out, giving in broad outline the intention, plan and execution of the attack.
The target chosen is Brunswick, which was selected for attack by this Group on the 14/15th October. Appended is a P.R.U. photograph of the town of Brunswick, showing the damage inflicted by the attack, bounded by the red line. The smaller areas bounded by green lines represent damage prior to the 14/15th October. The attack was highly successful but nevertheless illustrated how even small deviations from the agreed plan can jeopardise success.
[Underlined] INTENTION. [/underlined]
Brunswick has always been an important communications centre due to its position on the trade route from Hamburg to Southern Germany and its importance increased with the development of inland waterways and railways. Its pre-war major industries were swiftly placed on a war footing to supply the German armed forces and the beginning of the war also saw the rapid development of major aircraft and engineering industries in the town, particularly in the Northern and Southern suburbs.
It is not surprising therefore that this town, lying as it does within range of bases in Great Britain, has received regular attention from the Allied Air Forces. Since the strategical bombing of Germany began, a total of 6129 tons of bombs have been reported as dropped on the town by Bomber Command alone. But in common with a few other towns, like STUTTGART and FRANKFURT, it bore an unusually charmed life. While bombing depended upon visual methods of target finding, this was partly explained by the lack of good water landmarks near the town, but the difficulty of finding and bombing the target persisted after the introduction of RADAR aids, as will be seen from the following summary of major Bomber Command raids this year, including two by this Group, which left the town almost unscathed.
14/15th January – 472 aircraft
22/23rd April – 256 aircraft
22/23rd May – 211 aircraft
13/14th August – 350 aircraft
These raids are additional to several A.S.A.A.F. raids directed specific factories which were in the main successful.
[Underlined] PLAN. [/underlined]
There are two main alternative methods of carrying out an incendiary attack on a town of this nature. The first is to put the T.I’s on the centre of the town and to bomb these direct. This method
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] INCENDIARY ATTACKS [/underlined]
has a number of disadvantages the most important being that T.I’s in a built up area will seldom show up as brightly as those dropped on open ground, so that any markers which may be wide of the target will almost certainly attract the bombing. This occurred on the first attack on Konigsberg. Moreover, as soon as bombing starts the markers become obscured by incendiaries and smoke, and have to be continually backed up, this adding to the risk of inaccurate markers falling outside the town.
The alternative is to select a marking point which us likely to be easily recognisable by the marker force and located somewhere on the upwind side of the target. Provided visibility is reasonable all markers should fall within 300 yards of the marking point. If each crew is then given a heading on which to fly and a number of seconds to delay the release of bombs, the whole target area should in theory be covered with an even density of incendiaries and thus be totally destroyed.
It should be noted that this system entails the most precise bombing by each crew otherwise some areas will receive too many incendiaries and others will be left unburnt. The method by which each crew is to pass precisely over the markers and thus get on to the exact heading is laid down in Air Staff Instructions, and must be known to all.
[Underlined] NARRATIVE [/underlined]
(i) [Underlined] Weather. [/underlined] The weather at the target was clear with slight ground haze.
(ii) [Underlined] Marking. [/underlined] At H – 11 the first green T.I. dropped blind as a proximity marker, went down followed almost immediately by the first flares. At H – 8 the second flare wave dropped and by this time three more green T.I’s had gone down. Mosquito Marker No.3 gave a “Tallyho” and went in to mark, his T.I. being assessed as 200 yards to the North of the marking point. The Master Bomber ordered the remaining Mosquitos to back up 200 yards to the South. The backing up eventually resulted in 2 T.I’s roughly on the marking point, one 300 yards S.E. which probably fell in water and quickly went out, and one wide marker 800 yards to the West. This error was due to a variety of causes of which undue haste was probably the major. At H – 1 the markers were ordered off the target and the main force instructed to attack. The illustration shows the positions of the Red T.I’s in relation to the marking point as assessed from night photographs.
[Diagram]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] INCENDIARY ATTACKS. [/underlined]
(iii) [Underlined] Main Force Bombing. [/underlined] The attack went mainly according to plan although the Master Bomber had to instruct crews to steady down as there were some wide sticks in the early stages. These few loose sticks are a regrettable feature of all attacks, and it is hard to understand crews who have carried their loads all the way to the target can allow themselves to release them in open country on the edge of the target when a few more seconds would enable them to be placed on the aiming point. At H + 8 the main force were instructed to complete bombing and return to base.
[Photograph – missing] This photograph is a still from film shot by a 463 Squadron Lancaster equipped with cine apparatus. The photograph was taken six minutes after the main force bombing started, and can be clearly picked out on the P.R.U. cover as the North East corner of the sector allotted to Nos. 50 and 61 Squadrons.
[Underlined] DAMAGE ASSESSMENT [/underlined]
The greater part of the central core of the town was contained in the central sector shown on the tracing overlay. The two boundary sectors also contain a portion of this central core, all of which was fully built up and therefore highly vulnerable to incendiary attack. Whilst the primary intention of the raid was to destroy the central core of the town, two squadrons were allotted to an area to the East and North East which is less fully built up, as a trial to see what damage could be achieved by a small force.
An examination of photographs shows that of the three markers remaining after Marker D had become extinguished, only A showed up clearly, and that markers B and C became covered by incendiaries from a load released short, and may not have been clearly visible to bomb aimers. This left the extreme Westerly T.I. clearly visible throughout the attack and as a
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Photograph]
[Page break]
[Photograph with Overlay Showing Bombing Sectors] BRUNSWICK 14/15 OCTOBER.
[Page break]
[Underlined] INCENDIARY ATTACKS [/underlined]
result all incendiary loads had a tendency to fall in the Westerly part of a central sector or else in the Western sector, or even West of this. There was also a tendency for loads to overshoot rather more than planned. As far as it is possible to estimate from available data about 90% of the loads other than those which were dropped loosely outside the area, fell within the central core of the town but only a few scattered sticks on the N.E. area. This was clearly due to crews using the Westerly marker as their datum point, thus shifting the whole area of attack some hundreds of yards to the West.
[Underlined] CONCLUSION [/underlined]
It can be seen that the greater part of the central core of the town has been completely destroyed, and that there has also been some damage in the more Northerly sectors. Damage in the North East sector is slight due to the shifting of the marking point. The attack therefore illustrates the manner in which any marker wide of the concentration will draw on itself undue attention. It also illustrates the harm that can be done by loads of incendiaries dropped on the markers thus making them difficult to see. Apart from these two points the attack was extremely well carried out, timings were accurate, winds found were excellent and the great majority of aircraft attacked exactly on the headings laid down. Incidentally one reason for the marker which went wide was the tendency on previous attacks for some crews before H hour. As a result of experience the Mosquito markers who are marking from below 1,000 feet like to be clear of the target with a minute or two in hand. It is obviously essential that the markers should not be hurried in their task and crews must on no account bomb before H hour unless the Master Bomber calls them in earlier.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
war effort
[Table of Sortied Carried Out with Results by Squadron]
[Underlined] NOTES: [/underlined] Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “Successful sorties per aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties, Nos. 9, 49, 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another Squadron, the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons.
Squadrons above establishment are calculate on an establishment of 20.
[Drawing] training
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF PILOTS. [/underlined]
During the month the scheme for the Categorisation of Heavy Bomber pilots in the Group was issued. Full details are contained in this Headquarters’ letter reference 209/Trg. dated 18th November, 1944. The success of this scheme depends on co-operation between Squadron/Flight Commanders and the Squadron Instructors to see that crews are available for their initial and 10 and 20 Sortie Checks so that a Category can be awarded or revised.
The Squadron Instructor has a vital responsibility. He must be thoroughly familiar with Pilots’ Notes for the Lancaster, relevant Air Staff Instructions and in particular No.5 Group Aircraft Drills. Some Squadrons have already completed a number of Category Tests, which incidentally are done in the New Crew Check and 10 and 20 Sortie Checks. No separate test is necessary.
A preliminary examination shows that some of the Category Test Proformas have been completed accurately, others show a definite tendency to overmark. An [underlined] A+ [/underlined] Category should not be lightly awarded because it amounts to an “Exceptional” assessment. One proforma showed 100% marks for Captaincy! Section No.8 requires special care. A pilot scoring full marks for Captaincy must be faultless (and we’re all human).
The number of pilots categorised in the ten days following the introduction of the scheme is as follows:-
[Table of Pilot Categorisations by Base]
A total of 177 New Crew and 10/20 Sortie Checks were done during the month (including the Category tests in the above table), leaving 101 checks outstanding. Nearly half the outstanding checks were in 56 Base, where a temporary shortage of aircraft, absence of dual sets and a deficiency of a Squadron Instructor, gave the Base more than its share of problems.
Total squadron training hours amounted to 4,000 hours day, and 1,300 hours night – about 700 hours less than the previous month. (We blame the weather again). Now that the Winter is on us the old skeleton (“No training – aircraft are bombed-up”) is rattling its ancient bones. Lock it up. We’ve heard the jingle before. If the Met. gives half a chance of training, get a couple of aircraft per Flight de-bombed as soon as the operation is cancelled.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION AND 1690 B.D.T. FLIGHT. [/underlined]
Fighter affiliation results are encouraging. Squadrons did a grand total of 1105 exercises on 500 details – nearly two exercises per gunner in the Group.
Night affiliation by squadrons continues to climb to higher figures. This time it totalled 314 exercises of which 76 were done with 100 Group Mosquitoes, and the remainder with 1690 B.D.T. Flight. This was the fourth successive month to show an increase.
1690 B.D.T. Flight during the month was reduced from 26 aircraft to 12 by the withdrawal of the Spitfires and Martinets. It continued, however, to assist No.7 Group with day and night details for 75 Base, and a few night details for 72 Base. The Flight flew 560 hours on 670 details. Pilots averaged 23 hours, the Hurricanes 33 hours, the Spitfires 16 hours and the Martinets 9 hours.
Night affiliation by the Flight was the highest ever, rising from 94 details in October to 139 in November, thus exercising nearly 300 gunners in the hours of darkness; (a first rate performance bearing in mind the persistent bad weather).
It is satisfying to hear on the hook-up that on one night the Flight booked 33 night details. They were not all done owing to the weather, but on the night of 28th November, 22 details were completed – a record night for the Flight. On five nights on the last week of the month, 89 details were done. This shows what can be achieved when the weather is fit. Incidentally, the moon was up. Bear in mind that affiliation on dark nights provide the real test.
[Underlined] 5 L.F.S. TRAINING. [/underlined]
Unusually bad weather during the month affected No.5 L.F.S. Only two days during the month were fit for full flying, but despite this, and repairs to the perimeter track, full advantage was taken on of every opportunity and 5 L.F.S. completed the training of 92 crews for squadrons and had 11 crews within a day of finishing their course at the end of the month. The total of 92 crews was 6 crews in excess of Command estimate.
The Unit flew a total of 1344 hours. The average hours flown per aircraft on charge was 48. There were two avoidable accidents during the month. The rigorous policy of “quality and not quantity” is being followed and three crews have already been put up for disposal on the grounds of poor captaincy.
The crews posted during the month averaged 12 hours 35 minutes training at the Unit, nearly 2 hours more than the previous month. This was largely due to extra time being given to the short cross country exercise to give additional navigational instruction. Loran training has also been introduced and crews are getting 7 hours ground training on their course.
12 Instructors were recategorized by E.C.F.S. during the month. Two obtained A2 Categories and the remainder B Categories ([Underlined] Note: [/underlined] These Categories have no relation to the Pilots’ Categorisation Scheme introduced by 5 Group). The Examining Flight expressed the opinion that the standard of instruction at 5 L.F.S. was slightly above the average for Four Engined Training Units.
The next month’s commitment for 5 L.F.S. is 100 crews, less wastage. If the weather is reasonable, the Unit can do it as it always has in the past.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] INSTRUMENT FLYING (LINK). [/underlined]
[Underlined] NEW EXERCISES. [/underlined]
The exercises in the Instrument Flying Syllabus on the Link are being revised to include exercises designed to cover operational procedure, and to practice more thoroughly and stimulate the pilot’s interest in keeping his I.F. up to scratch.
[Underlined] NEW LINK TRAINERS. [/underlined]
When installation of the new Link Trainers is complete, there will be one available for each squadron in the Group. This will put the ideal squadron monthly total times for pilots (50 – 60 hours) within reach of every squadron. Many squadrons will have double the amount of Link Time available. This extra time can only be used efficiently if a Link Trainer Programme is organised and kept going by the officer detailed by the squadron for co-ordination of I.F. and Link Training (Air Staff Instruction TRG/3 refers).
[Underlined] PRIMARY OBJECT OF THE LINK TRAINER. [/underlined]
Units whose Flight Engineers have done double the time of the Pilots seem to have lost sight of the primary object of the Link Trainer; that is to keep pilots in constant practice in all forms of instrument flying. The ideal is for pilots and flight engineers times to be equal.
[Underlined] LINK TIMES. [/underlined]
Squadron Link hours generally are improving. The total pilot times were [underlined] DOUBLE [/underlined] the previous month. There are, however, still weak places in the chain, which are easily visible from the training return. Two squadrons in both 53 and 54 Bases and one in 55 Base have done less than 20 hours pilot time per month.
[Table of Link Trainer Times by Base and Squadron]
GRAND TOTALS: Pilots – 742 hours. Flight Engineers- 764 hours. Other Aircrew – 101 hours.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] gunnery
[Underlined] “DECLINE AND FALL OF THE G.A.F.” [/underlined]
[Underlined] DESTROYED. [/underlined]
2.11.44 – “D” – 207 Sqdn. – FW.190 C.
2.11.44 – “D” – 227 Sqdn. – JU.88 C.
4/5.11.44 – “L” – 227 Sqdn. – 2 Jet A/c.
6/7.11.44 – “R” – 630 Sqdn. – FW.190 C.
6/7.11.44 – “X” – 61 Sqdn. – JU.88 C.
6/7.11.44 – “X” – 61 Sqdn. – Jet A/c.
6/7.11.44 – “J” – 467 Sqdn. – Jet A/c.
6/7.11.44 – “R” – 227 Sqdn. – Jet A/c.
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED. [/underlined]
4/5.11.44 – “S” – 207 Sqdn. – ME.109 C.
[Underlined] DAMAGED. [/underlined]
6/7.11.44 – “B” – 189 Sqdn. – JU.88 C.
Claims annotated ‘C’ have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
From a total of 84 combats during the month, 7 were claimed to have been with jet propelled aircraft of which 5 were claimed as destroyed. The other claims stand at 4 destroyed, 1 probably destroyed, and 1 damaged, all of which have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command. The correct identity of the reported jet aircraft is now under consideration by the experts and no claims are being considered until a decision has been reached as to whether these phenomena are in fact jet propelled aircraft or some form of jet projectile.
Two aircraft were surprised by under attacks. The first warning being when the aircraft was hit by cannon fire. In both cases the aircraft were extensively damaged and casualties to the crew incurred. The answer to these under attacks is 100% crew co-operation and correct and frequent “Banking Search”.
[Underlined] RESULTS OF C.G.S. COURSES. [/underlined]
W/O HANSON 97 Sqdn. Cat. ‘B’
F/O KETHRO 5 L.F.S. Cat. ‘B’.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] GUNNERY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] AIR TRAINING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] ORDER OF MERIT. [/underlined]
[Tables of Fighter Affiliation Results by Squadron]
Note: Figures in the above table represent “Points”.
[Underlined] TOTAL OF AFFILIATION EXERCISES FOR NOVEMBER:- 1105. [/underlined]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] GUNNERY. [/underlined]
The Order of Merit will, in future, be based on a points system, points being allotted as follows:-
Night Affiliation with Camera and Infra Red Film 10 points
Night Affiliation without Camera 8 points
Day Affiliation with Gyro and Camera 5 points
Day affiliation with Camera 3 points
Day Affiliation without Camera 1 point
The total of night affiliation exercises continues to increase and it is hoped that the Gunnery Leaders will co-operate with Squadron and Flight Commanders to ensure that the maximum number of details are flown whenever operations and weather permit. The importance of this exercise cannot be over emphasised and the aim of every Squadron should be to achieve at least one exercise per crew per month.
It is apparent from the training returns that certain Squadrons are not making the maximum use of their Gyro camera assemblies during day affiliation exercises. These assemblies must be fitted on every possible occasion. Gunnery Analysis Officers are now established on each Squadron and it is their duty to assess the films taken during these exercises and to keep a proper for future reference for categorisation etc.
No. 53 Base are to be congratulated on setting the pace as regards outdoor night vision training. Each Squadron within the Base has fitted up a simple obstacle course which has been in use regularly by Squadron gunners. Other Bases would be well advised to follow the lead of No.53 Base in this simple, but very effective, practical form of instruction.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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Leave it to Smith [Drawing]
“Pass over yesterday’s fighter affil. reports will you Bill, and let’s see how some of those new crews are panning out. – Correct directions given – Range usually 800 yards – Range O.K. corkscrew appeared slow – Range 700 yards, corkscrew very good – Ranges generally good 600 to 650 yards – Range good – Range varied from 300 to 900 yards – gunners poor – corkscrew good. Who on earth was flying ‘N’ Nuts yesterday Bill – with two clueless gunners the crew can’t be anywhere near fit for operations?”
“One moment Dick – ‘N’ Nuts – that Clarkson – a new crew with only a Mid-Upper, but we put old Smith in there as Rear Gunner as he wants to get finished and since his old skipper went sick he’s had no crew; he only needs a half dozen to finish his second tour.”
“Smith always seems to have wads of clues, he’s certainly been operating for ages without getting himself bumped off. Quite a lot of the time as a spare too – the pilots seems to like to have him in the aircraft.”
“I suppose Bill, that Smith is O.K. Somehow we always seem to have taken it for granted. I must say he seemed very rusty when we gave him that Sighting test, didn’t he, but as he said, he’d only just come out of Sick Quarters and wasn’t feeling at all himself. We were going to give him another shot later on but somehow we never have. Let’s do it right away and clear our consciences. See if you can find him in the Gunnery Section as he’s not down for D.I. this morning, and as you go you might hand down the questions!”
Bill put his head into the Gunnery Section, W/O Smith, who was sitting by the fire greeted him enthusiastically. “Good morning, Sir, anything doing today?”
“Haven’t heard of anything as yet Mr. Smith, but in the meantime the Gunnery Leader wants you in his office.”
Mr Smith entered the Gunnery office not quite so enthusiastically. “Good morning Mr. Smith, come in and sit down. It seems a good morning to give you that sighting test again, but before we start that, what on earth happened in your fighter affil. show yesterday? – Look at this report – Range varied 300 to 900 yards. It’s appalling, isn’t it Mr. Smith?”
“Very bad indeed Sir, very bad indeed. I’ll go and chase up that new gunner in the Mid Upper right away, tell him to pull his finger out, Sir. You leave him to me Sir, I’ll see he’s ‘bang on’ in a few days.”
“But you know, Mr. Smith, he got a very good report from his Gunnery School, really a very good report. Of course, I know none of the crew have had any operational experience as yet, but that wouldn’t affect his range estimation would it?”
“Well Sir, you know how they turn them out these days, they’re not trained like us old stagers were. You leave him to me, Sir – a couple of ops and he’ll be quite O.K., in fact if you don’t mind, Sir, I’d like to start on him right away, no time like the present, Sir!” – Brr - Brr – Brr – Brr –
“One moment Mr. Smith while I answer the ‘phone” – “Gunnery Leader speaking – What – Maximum effort tonight – Flight planning at
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] LEAVE IT TO SMITH. [/underlined]
twelve. Right you are, thank you. Sorry Mr. Smith, I’m afraid you’ll have no time to teach your other gunner to-day as your crew is sure to be on the battle order and I’m afraid we’ll have to leave your sighting test over to another day as well, as I’ve got plenty to get on with at the moment.”
“Sorry about the sighting Sir, I was feeling just in the mood for a bit of sighting this morning. I’d have surprised you, Sir. Oh, and about that Mid Upper Sir, don’t you worry. I’ll be there myself Sir, and I’ll look after them all. You leave it to me, Sir. ‘N’ Nuts our aircraft again, Sir?” “Yes.” “Thank you Sir.”
‘N’ for Nuts was homeward bound. Her crew was feeling elated. They had bombed – they were well on the way back. The coast line showed ahead and beyond it the sea, pale in the moonlight.
“O.K. Mid Upper?”
“O.K. Pilot.”
“O.K. Rear Gunner?”
“On the job skip.”
“Good – we’re trusting to you Smithy if we get in trouble!”
“Skip, in this visibility, I could see a Jerry take off. Just leave it to me.”
‘N’ for Nuts was overdue. ‘N’ for Nuts was missing. In the Gunnery Section someone said “Poor old Smith, all the ops he’s done and then gets himself bumped off by flying with a sprog crew.”
Far away Unterleutnant Hans Hoffman was buying beer. His Gruppen-Fuhrer was pleased with him. He stood in front of the fire, a tankard in his hand. “Three time before I chase Lancaster, Lancaster see me coming, Lancaster corkscrew, I fire, I miss. Lancaster fire back, sometimes he hit me, sometimes not but always I miss. I am sprog. But last night things different. I see Lancaster, I chase, range 800 yards, 600, 500, 400, 300 yards, Lancaster still no corkscrew, no nothing. I press the button, I cannot miss – Lancaster go ‘pouf’. Lancaster fall in the sea. I feel I am no longer sprog. Lancaster sprog. I give my Lancaster a name to remember it by, I think of an English name, very English, I call my Lancaster ‘Schmidt’.”
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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Second Thoughts for Pilots
YOUR CHARTER AGAINST ACCIDENTS – 7 GOLDEN RULES
I TAXY CAREFULLY – use the landing lamp at night.
II ON TAKE OFF – open the throttle slowly, easily & smoothly.
III NEVER BREAK CLOUD WITHOUT A FIX
IV AVOID CUMULO-NIMBUS CLOUD – it’s the hazard of the overcast.
V BEFORE LANDING – always get a corrected Q.F.E.
VI WATCH THE APPROACH ACROSS THE BOUNDARY – 105 – 110 m.p.h. without bombs – 115 m.p.h. with bombs.
VII DON’T HAVE ACCIDENTS – [/underlined] OF ANY KIND!! [/underlined]
CUT THIS OUT & PIN IT UP IN YOUR FLIGHT OFFICE
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[Drawing] accidents
26 aircraft were damaged in accidents in the Group during November. 11 were totally destroyed, 4 are CAT. B, 7 CAT.AC, while 4 were only CAT. A. There is the possibility that two of these aircraft were lost as a result of enemy action, but out of the remainder, 21 were either destroyed or damaged [underlined] in accidents which were avoidable. [/underlined] L.F.S. damaged 2, leaving 19 to be chalked up against the squadrons. October produced 14. The Group, therefore, damaged 7 more this month. Bad weather or not, this is going the wrong way.
Here is the month’s list of avoidable accidents. Some of these accidents damaged more than one aircraft, so that the accident and damage totals do not tally:-
[Tables of Accidents for Squadrons and L.F.S.]
[Underlined] Q.F.E’S AGAIN. [/underlined]
Last winter a number of Lancasters crashed on return from long trips because pilots took no account of the dangers attending a large drop in barometric pressure after take off. Altimeters not reset to the lower pressure engendered a false sense of security and the aircraft either hit the sea when returning at low heights or undershot in bad visibility. Consequent upon these accidents Air Staff Instruction FC/19 dated 17.1.44 was issued, but what was thought to be a bogey well and truly laid has popped up again this month. Two aircraft were damaged, one in fact totally destroyed, in accidents of this nature.
One returned to a diversion airfield in very bad weather and crashed 300/400 yards short of the flarepath. The pilot says that just before hitting the ground his altimeter was reading 400 ft. He had tried to get a Q.F.E. by R/T but bad reception nullified his efforts. He then proceeded with his approach and good fortune alone prevented a fatal crash. No use was made of W/T to obtain the necessary Q.F.E., which on this particular night had dropped many millibars in a short time.
The other aircraft hit the water while making a long sea crossing on return from an operation. The pilot had been briefed that at certain positions the barometric pressure would be much lower than at the target or at base, and details were given. He came down low beneath cloud (contrary to orders at briefing which stipulated a return height
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] ACCIDENTS. [/underlined]
of 2500 ft) and hit the sea, with his altimeter still indicating some hundreds of feet. The pressure at the target was still on the instrument.
Read Air Staff Instruction FC/19 and get this Q.F.E. business buttoned up. Remember that falling pressures spell trouble. Talk to the Met. Officer anyway. You can’t know too much. Incidentally, the second of these two accidents again shows the danger of ignoring the flight plan.
[Underlined] COLLISIONS IN THE CIRCUIT. [/underlined]
Two aircraft from the same airfield returned from operations one night last month, and collided at the entrance to the funnel. – Fourteen lives were lost. The evidence put forward at the subsequent investigation was sufficient to show that the aircraft which called up first either made a very wide circuit or contacted Flying Control before reaching the call up position. The second pilot likewise, called up at the wrong positions and, further was at the wrong height when he did so. These digressions led to tragedy. The moral needs no pointing. 5 Group Quick Landing Scheme must be followed [underlined] to the letter, [/underlined] and any pilot who disregards this instruction in any way is a menace to his colleagues, who are just as keen as he is to get down to “bacon and eggs”. The importance of good flying discipline on the circuit cannot be too strongly impressed on pilots. Keeping a good lookout until the aircraft is safely back in dispersal with engines stopped is part of it.
[Underlined] TAXYING. [/underlined]
It is apparently impossible for a month to go past without a serious taxying accident. A feature of such incidents recently has been the failure of pilots to warn Flying Control that they are about to leave dispersal. Consequently, as happened in one particular incident this month, Flying Control did not have the chance to control the traffic on an airfield at night. This, allied with disobedience of taxying instructions and the absence of taxying lights or aldis lamp led to a bad collision at night. Sever disciplinary action is bound to follow accidents of this kind. There can be no excuse.
[Underlined] OBSCURE ACCIDENTS. [/underlined]
There are four obscure crashes this month still under investigation. At present there is insufficient known about them for the cause to be commented upon.
[Underlined] STAR AWARDS. [/underlined]
The table below gives details of avoidable accidents by squadrons for November. This table is not final. It only contains those accidents which are known definitely to be avoidable. A few will remain undecided till the results of investigations now in progress are known.
[Table of Avoidable Accidents and Star Awards by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] armament
[Underlined] A VISIT TO FRANCE. [/underlined]
An account of the visit of a representative of this Headquarters to France will be of interest to all Armament personnel. This item under the heading “The Proof of the Pudding….” will give Armament personnel a very good idea of what devastation is wrought when bombs are delivered to the right place.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT BULLETIN. [/underlined]
The Armament Bulletin of December contains much valuable information, not only of interest to Armament personnel but also to Air Bombers and Air Gunners. In fact this issue contains much of particular interest to Air Bombers, so circulate your copy.
[Underlined] BOMB STORE – SUPERVISION. [/underlined]
Tour expired Aircrew Officers have become available for supervision work in bomb dumps. These officers have undergone a course of training and should be of great assistance to Armament Officers, and a further improvement in the general condition of the bomb dump is expected.
[Underlined] INCENDIARY STORE HOUSE. [/underlined]
The trials with the large incendiary store house which are being carried out at East Kirkby are now almost completed, and in the near future details of the most satisfactory lay-out will be available to Units.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES. [/underlined]
The Armament failures table would have shown considerable improvement had it not been for Col. ‘C’ – ‘Icing’. Col. ‘F’ – ‘Obscure’ is however, still far too popular. An improvement has been shown over last month with 23 as against 29 obscure failures. These obscure failures are causing more concern to the armament staff at this Headquarters than failures which are classed under other headings, because steps can usually be taken to remedy a known fault, whereas if the fault remains obscure it may well recur frequently before it is finally diagnosed. It is, therefore, essential that greater efforts be made to obtain all possible information regarding these obscure failures, thus tracking the “gremlin” to his lair where he can be dealt with. Column ‘A’ tells its own tale and is a matter which should be brought to the attention of Bombing Leaders.
[Underlined] CO-OPERATION. [/underlined]
The armament staff at this Headquarters are always out to help the armament staffs at Bases and Stations in every way possible, but it is felt that many of the questions passed direct to this Headquarters concerning equipment and transport etc. could well be dealt with by the appropriate branch at Station and Base level. The equipment chapter of this number of well worth reading.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES TABLE [/underlined]
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A – MANIPULATION. B – MAINTENANCE. C – ICING. D – TECHNICAL. E – ELECTRICAL. F – OBSCURE.
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the proof of the pudding….
We assembled at Headquarters, Bomber Command, for a final briefing on the programme we were going to carry out. The object of the visit was to examine French targets which had been subjected to concentrated bombing by Bomber Command aircraft.
The targets visited included the following:-
ISLE D’ADAM – storage site.
ST. LEU D’ESSERENT – flying bomb storage site in limestone caves.
WIZERNE – storage and probable firing site for flying bombs, situated in a chalk quarry.
WATTEN – probably intended for the storage and manufacture of hydrogen peroxide.
MIMOYECQUES – site tunnelled into solid chalk and probably intended for V2, or some other unknown weapon.
JUVISY – Marshalling yard.
TRAPPES – Marshalling tard.
From Le Bourget we travelled to Paris by road in two cars which had been put at our disposal by S.H.A.E.F. and which were to remain with us for the rest of the visit. Our first job in Paris was to visit the Army Headquarters and obtain sufficient rations to tide us over for five or six days, since we were not permitted to purchase food from French cafes or restaurants. We then travelled to a very comfortable hotel situated near the Arc de Triomphe, where we were to be the guests of the American Forces for our first night in Paris, and although the majority of buildings in France are without any form of heating we were lucky enough to be billeted in a hotel which had all the comforts of home. The following morning at 0930 hours we loaded our kit in the cars and set off for Isle d’Adam.
[Underlined] ISLE D’ADAM [/underlined]
This site consisted of a number of wooden storage huts with reinforced brick chimney stacks and situated in thick woods. The huts were sunk approximately 12 to 15 feet below ground level and the surrounding earth had been reinforced with sloping brick walls.
The whole site had been subjected to concentrated bombing with medium calibre bombs, all huts having been severely damaged. The majority in fact were completely demolished apart from the brick chimney stacks which were still standing. Approximately 3/4 of a mile from the storage huts was a large chateau reputed to have been used by the German officers controlling the site. This chateau had also received damage from several 1000 lb. bombs and although not entirely uninhabitable, a great deal of damage had been done to one side of the building exposing a maze of twisted steel girders and blasted concrete. The woods in which this site was situated were dotted with numerous one-man foxholes sunk approximately 4 feet deep, carefully boarded up to form a small firing aperture and provided with a small and very uncomfortable wooden seat. Having satisfied ourselves that no above-surface storage huts
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING… [/underlined]
could withstand concentrated H.E. bombing, we ploughed our way back through the mud, and set off again for St. Leu d’Esserent.
[Underlined] ST. LEU D’ESSERENT. [/underlined]
This site had been constructed some years ago by tunnelling into the limestone and had been cleaned up in recent years and used for the storage of flying bombs. The whole cliff area had been excavated to form two main tunnels and numerous intercommunicating passages and storage bays covering many hundreds of yards. So complicated was the layout inside these tunnels that the Hun had found it necessary to number all passages and bays, and to paint arrows on the walls to prevent anyone from becoming lost; in spite of this, we did experience a certain amount of difficulty in finding our way into daylight again.
Bomber Command’s attack had resulted in three separate subsidences of the tunnel roof, one by a Tallboy hit which had completely sealed one the main tunnel and crushed two flying bombs complete with warheads. The remaining two had apparently been caused by multiple hits with 1000 lb. bombs. Unfortunately it was not possible to make a complete examination of the damage due to the presence of mines.
Many bomb trolleys and hydraulic jacks were found, the majority of which were badly damaged although there were some serviceable items. The entire area between the caves and the River Oise had been very heavily hit by H.E. and French labour was being employed in clearing up the devastation to railway lines, roads etc. The empty case of a 250 lb. Red T.I. was seen approximately 50 yards from the railway lines between the railway and the caves. Unfortunately the village of St. Leu d’Esserent was very close to the site and as must invariably happen, had received considerable damage.
Having decided that we had seen enough for one day we set off again for Amiens where we were to be billeted for the night. The procedure for obtaining a billet is very simple. Each town in France has its Town Major who is responsible, amongst other things, for the billeting of all troops either staying in or passing through the town, and it was he who furnished us with the necessary chits to obtain a night’s lodging in the official hotel. Unfortunately Amiens is one of the towns without heating and those of us who had brought additional blankets found that they came in very useful. At first we were billeted two in a room and each pair had to toss up as to who would be the lucky one to sleep in the bed, the unlucky one having to spend the night on the floor!! Fortunately several rooms were vacated later in the day which enabled us all to spend the night in comparative comfort. No food was provided at the hotel and once again we had to resort to the use of our tinned rations – hash, meat and beans.
We left Amiens at 0900 hours intending to visit the sites at Wiserne and Watten and push on to St. Omer for the night. On the way to Wizerne however, we came across a temporary flying bomb launching ramp at Crepy only 20 yards from the main road, so we took the opportunity of checking up on this structure. The ramp had been bombed and badly damaged by H.E. and, in addition, the Hun had taken the precaution of demolishing the loading end of the ramp. Nevertheless, it was possible to get a very good idea of what the finished job looked like. The ramp itself was approximately 2ft. 6 inches wide and mounted on small steel girders at an angle of approximately 35° to 40° to the horizontal. The ramp had been snapped in the centre and it was not possible therefore, to estimate to what height it had originally projected. A large crater some yards from the end of the launching ramp was mute evidence of a flying bomb which had “returned early” and two incomplete flying bombs were also seen some yards from the launching ramp.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING… [/underlined]
[Underlined] WIZERNE. [/underlined]
The Wizerne site situated in a chalk quarry, is reputed to have been constructed by several thousand prisoners assisted by Italian labour and work was commenced in the Summer of 1943. The centrepiece of the site is a large concrete dome approximately 300 feet in diameter and 12 feet thick on the circumference. This thickness was undoubtedly greater in the centre of the dome, and at the time of his departure, the Hun was in the process of dumping an additional layer of soil on top of the dome. Around the circumference of the dome was a collar approximately 25 feet wide reinforced by huge concrete buttresses. It is not known whether these buttresses supported this collar round its entire periphery or whether they were utilised as additional supports at the front of the quarry where the collar protruded slightly over the quarry edge. Three such buttresses were, however, plainly visible as the result of a Tallboy hit on the face of the quarry just below the collar, and which had brought down part of the cliff face.
[Photograph]
Just below and slightly to the left of the dome is a concrete structure (pointing in the direction of London) which was presumed to be a launching ramp as its vertical walls were grooved for the mounting of launching rails. This launching tunnel has been canted over several degrees by the Tallboy hit referred to above.
A series of tunnels approximately 18 feet across, had been cut through the chalk and extended inside the quarry for approximately 500 yards. These tunnels formed the workings, the main entrance of which was along the railway track below and to one side of the dome at normal ground level. At the end of these tunnels a vertical shaft approximately 100 feet deep extended to the surface. This shaft was permanently reinforced with timber and may probably have been intended as a lift shaft.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING… [/underlined]
It was in the neighbourhood of this shaft that a Tallboy had hit the edge of the quarry face and buried several hundred workers. Royal Engineers, who were making a survey of this site, were faced with the difficulty and unpleasant task of removing tons of rock and chalk to ascertain whether the bodies inside contained any useful information.
The whole area outside the excavations, which was littered with railway lines, machinery, cranes and subsidiary buildings, had been very badly damaged by H.E.
It was interesting to note that the concreting of the tunnels was in sections and no effort appeared to have been made to interlace the various sections. Consequently a hit by a 1000 lb. bomb upon the entrance had penetrated and blown one complete section of tunnelling (approximately 12 feet thick) several feet away from the rest of the tunnel.
One member of the party was fortunate enough to have paid a previous visit to this site and was able to take us to a cottage nearby where the good lady heated up our rations for us and also provided a very welcome bottle of beer with our lunch and the usual bowl of black coffee.
[Underlined] WATTEN. [/underlined]
We left Wizerne soon after lunch for the site at Watten, a building which produced one of the biggest mysteries of the trip and provoked much argument as to its intended use. The site consisted of a reinforced concrete building located at the edge of a vastly wooded forest. The building is approximately 50 feet wide and contains four floors each divided into numerous rooms, and storage bays all heavily reinforced with concrete. The whole structure is built around a skeleton of steel girders supported internally by the numerous dividing walls.
One Tallboy hit on top of the main structure had dislodged a huge piece of concrete reputed to weigh approximately 300 tons and had dropped it on to a small concrete outbuilding. Attempts had been made to repair the damage caused to the roof by this Tallboy hit, and the majority of the concrete had already been relaid. A Tallboy crater whose edge was only a few feet from the main building and which was approximately 100 feet in diameter, had apparently caused no damage to the structure.
This site had to be approached on foot and the devastation on the way to the target was indescribable. Hundreds of trees had been torn up in the forests and large areas had been completely cleared of the timber as a result of this concentrated bombing.
It was interesting to note that the Hun had made some effort to camouflage the entrance of this site, particularly over the rail track.
We arrived at St. Omer in the early evening and once again the Town Major did his stuff and found us a billet in a French hotel, again without heating. Our first job was to hand over our rations to our landlady who served these up for us on a large table in the centre of what in this country would be the public bar, the locals sitting around in their chairs taking a very great interest in all that was going on. Our entertainment that evening was provided for us at the hotel, as luckily a dance had been laid on. We were amazed to see how much the French idea of dancing differs from ours.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING… [/underlined]
[Underlined] BOULOGNE. [/underlined]
On Sunday morning we set off for Mimoyecques but made a slight detour on the way and inspected the docks at Boulogne. Destruction in the dock area was very heavy, some of which had been caused by bombing, but the majority by demolition. In spite of this several large unloading points had been established. The town of Boulogne was also very badly hit, presumably by shelling, and whole areas of the town had been completely flattened. Several concrete pill-boxes were seen in the dock area, all of which were marked with a large red cross and it was believed that they were used for the German wounded.
[Underlined] MIMOYECQUES. [/underlined]
Our next target, Mimoyecques, consisted of one main tunnel approximately 1000 yards long which runs from S.E./N.W. into the chalk hillside, and running throughout the full length of the tunnel is a railway track. Lateral tunnels branch off from this main tunnel at regular intervals, all of which are approximately 16 feet wide and have cemented dome shaped roofs. These lateral tunnels join up with a further passage parallel to the main tunnel and from this passage several inclined shafts led up to what was presumed to be the firing platform. On top of the hillside are six vertical shafts descending to the bottom floor, two of which had received direct hits from small calibre bombs (the tail unit of a 500 lb G.P. was found nearby) The general appearance on top of the hill was that of a ploughed field and it was almost impossible to define individual craters. Several Tallboy craters were, however, seen, one which had pierced and blocked the tunnel in which the labourers had been working.
Here again the Major in charge of the surveying party informed us that several hundreds of workers were known to have been trapped in the tunnel, thinking that the safest place during a raid was this “bomb proof” excavation.
Engineers had just commenced to survey this site and were busy collecting all papers etc. which had been left by the Hun. One of the papers discovered was a roll of personnel employed on the construction of the site and included Russians, Flemish, French and Spanish workers and it is understood that large numbers of Russian women were employed as slave labour on this site. Several of the rooms in the hillside had been used as dormitories and heavy locks on the doors suggested that some of the workers had been locked in at night to prevent their escape. A further room had been set aside for use as a sick quarters and it was interesting to see that crepe paper bandages had been in use.
Our next two targets being Juvisy and Trappes marshalling yards both in the Paris area, we decided to return to Paris direct from Mimoyecques and not, as had previously been intended, to spend a second night at St. Omer. The fact that night life in Paris was in full swing and that our comfortable hotel was still at our disposal had nothing, of course, to do with our decision.
[Underlined] JUVISY AND TRAPPES. [/underlined]
Our first impression on visiting the marshalling yards at Juvisy and Trappes was that both targets had been very much saturated by bombing and it is impossible to give any idea of the complete devastation of the entire areas covered by the marshalling yards. It is estimated that it will take the very minimum of 12 months to bring any semblance of order into either of these targets. Locomotives had been hurled one on top of the other, lines had been turned up and flung against rolling
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] THE PROOF OF THE PUDDING… [/underlined]
[Photograph] JUVISY MARSHALLING YARDS
stock, repair sheds, engine rooms and other buildings had been severely damaged. The French were rather annoyed to think that we had attacked the yards at an angle, resulting in severe damage to a neighbouring village, and not up and down the lines. Our French not being particularly good we did not make any effort to teach them the theory of bombing.
The following day we were due to return to this country but were able to spend a few hours in the morning shopping in Paris. This may sound attractive but on looking at prices in the various shops a few thousand francs did not go very far. If one wishes to purchase any small gold object such as a brooch, it is first necessary to surrender the equivalent amount of gold by weight before the purchase can be made; thus you pay a very high price for workmanship involved and not for the quality of the gold.
Transportation throughout France is very difficult. No issue of petrol is made to civilians and what few cars are seen all provide their own fuel (producer gas), and it is a common sight to see a car pull up and the driver get out and stoke up the fire before proceeding!! Taxis in Paris have completely disappeared and have been replaced by cycle taxis and handsome cabs, the cycle taxis consisting of a home made carriage of numerous designs and towed by a bicycle.
Many of the famous monuments in Paris, including the Arc de Triomphe are badly bullet scarred from snipers who held out after the city had been occupied and several incidents of street to street fighting would be seen at several points.
At 1530 hours we took off from Le Bourget for Croydon. This time the trip was far more interesting as the weather was comparatively good and we were able to get a final aerial view of bomb scarred France.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] aircrew safety
Two known ditching incidents occurred this month – a Lancaster of 83 Squadron accidentally struck the sea in the Wash and finally came to rest on a sandbank, the crew of six being saved; a Mosquito of 627 Squadron having contacted Sundburg airfield in the Shetlands, on V.H.F. disappeared without trace.
The Operational Research Section at Bomber Command Headquarters has been studying the incidents of ditching within the Command, and a copy of this report has been sent to each station under cover of letter reference 5G/251/26/ASR dated 20th November, 1944.
The report, on very sound arguments, draws the conclusion that the proportion of Command’s losses over the sea to the total can be as high as 26%. It is clearly shown that many more rescues have been made of crews who have used radio than of crews who have not, but at the same time it is pointed out that more rescues could have been effected had the crews concerned carried out the [underlined] correct [/underlined] W/T procedure and started this procedure at the [underlined] first sign of trouble. [/underlined]
The waste of valuable crews will continue until captains of aircraft realise the necessity of quick radio action when in trouble (this can always be cancelled should the emergency pass) and the need for more and more Dinghy Drill practice.
There are no grounds to suppose that aircrew are any more prepared for emergency abandonment by parachute than they are for ditching, so that a large number of casualties must also occue [sic] through lack of practice in Parachute Drills.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] flying control
American Hight Lighting is now installed at 15 U.S.A.A.F. stations and at a few stations in Bomber Command. It is essential that aircrews should be acquainted with the lay-out of this “high intensity lighting for low visibility”. Senior Control Officers should ensure that the information is given to aircrews at lectures, in case any station with the installation uses it on diversion.
On this matter of diversion, keep up your lectures on the Bomber Command Standard procedure. There are still occasions when diverted aircraft are said to use “any method except the Standard procedure”. Local divergences create hazards. If even one reply on R/T is varied, if some unusual auxiliary lights are laid, if the Airfield Lighting is misused, hazards are created for visitors, and even greater hazards for your own aircrews. They become so accustomed to the local variations that, when they are diverted, a standard lay-out “foxes” them, reduces landing times and may even imperil other aircrews if the visibility is clamping down. Overhaul the whole of your local lay-out, ensure that it complies with A.P.3024, and Air Staff Instructions, and above all, see that even if it does comply, it has not little local “extras” which will deceive a visitor.
If you have any ideas that, in your opinion, would help, submit them, but do not put them into practice until a test has been agreed upon. Remember, that however good and practical your idea may be [underlined] for local application [/underlined] it may be unsuitable for universal use and may be turned down on those grounds alone. Remember, too, that almost all existing lighting and power circuits are loaded to capacity. A few extra lights here or there may not seem much, but may turn the scales sufficiently to impair the use of the operational teleprinter at your Headquarters.
Landing times for November, set out below, are based on returns received from Stations. “Dead” times have already been deducted in accordance with instructions from Headquarters, Bomber Command.
[Underlined] LANDING TIMES FOR NOVEMBER [/underlined]
[Table of Landing Times by Base and Station]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] equipment
[Underlined] EQUIPMENT AND HOW TO GET IT. [/underlined]
Once upon a time, a man, who laboured in the town of Wadd and was named Serg Armt, finding he lacked something for the machine he worked with, straightaway sent a message to his superiors at Wadd, his Overlords at Mort and the Kings of Wick, asking for this something which his machine lacked.
But alas! – all Serg Armt received was a message from the Kings of Wick, saying “We are not a Maintenance Unit”.
Nevertheless, the men at Mort, who received the original message, immediately spoke words to Equip of Wadd who as once went and gave Serg Armt the something he required. Thus the machine had been repaired before the message from the Kings of Wick arrived at Wadd.
[Underlined] MORAL. [/underlined]
They say two sides of a triangle are together longer than the third. So in future ask the Station Equipment Officer first. That’s why he’s there.
[Underlined] RADIATOR SUPPLY. [/underlined]
Equipment Officers will see that the Radiator Group Pool system is to continue. We hope now that Command have control of issues the difficulties in getting radiators will be lessened.
[Underlined] URGENT DEMANDS. [/underlined]
A.M.O. A.481/43 has been added to by A.M.O. A.1109/44. Equipment Officers should draw the attention of all Specialist Officers to this new A.M.O.
[Underlined] NEW REGISTERS. [/underlined]
This month sees the introduction, at two Bases, of the new Manifold Voucher Registers. It is too early to give any comments on these Registers, but we hope by the end of the year to sum up their usefulness, and to overcome any faults. Base Equipment Officers should keep a watchful eye on their use, and report to Group any major difficulties that might arise.
[Underlined] LAUNDRY ARRANGEMENTS FOR AIRMEN ON POSTING. [/underlined]
A considerable amount of unnecessary discomfort is being given to airmen who have been posted without their laundry. Equipment Officers are to make sure that an airman, when posted, has been issued with kit to replace items at the laundry. Bomber Command letter BC/3000/13/E.2 dated 18th August, 1944, deals with this type of issue in detail.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
education [Drawing]
November 15th was the date by which the Air Officer Commanding required Discussion Groups to be “in full swing”. Most stations have reorganised their teams of Group Leaders which had been allowed to become somewhat out of during the Summer. It is on these leaders that the success or failure of the schemes depends, since, properly led discussion groups are popular. So often does it happen, that an officer claims that meetings are regarded by the airmen and airwomen as a ‘bind’, - when really it is his own inadequate leadership that has made his group a failure.
Leaders must make some effort to find out what the scheme sets out to do, and the best way of achieving its aims. A great deal has been written about the object of the scheme, and if officers are still in doubt about how to set about running their group, they should contact their Education Officer and find out, rather than grope blindly into the work and only obtain average results. To new group leaders – your group will improve as they get to know you, and you learn by experience how to handle them, so don’t be discouraged if your first attempt is not as successful as you would have wished.
On December 16th, there is a Group One Day Course at the Usher Art Gallery in Lincoln on “National Insurance”. Speakers are men and women who have theoretical and practical knowledge of the scheme and should provide a great deal of useful information. Leaders, apart from those detailed, are invited to attend providing they give their names to their Education Officer.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] engineering
[Underlined] GENERAL. [/underlined]
During the month of November only an average number of sorties was carried out by the Group but the hours flown were quite extensive, as also was the work carried out by the maintenance staffs.
The outstanding achievement of the month was the manufacture and fitting of the necessary parts for the fitment of Loran, all aircraft being completed within three weeks.
[Underlined] OPERATIONAL FIALURES. [/underlined]
C.T.O’s are reminded that the signal reporting failures must be sent off the day following the operation, and when the signal stated that the defect is under investigation, this must be followed up by a further signal when the cause of failure is known. If C.T.O’s do the reporting correctly, much telephoning will be avoided.
The operational failures increased over the previous month and were 1.77%.
The ‘Big Hand’ goes to Nos.9, 50 and 617 Squadrons for having no operational failures due to engineering during November, this being their second trouble free month is succession.
[Underlined] GROUND EQUIPMENT. [/underlined]
An improvement is noticeable throughout the Group in the maintenance of Group Equipment, though in some instances the equipment is still far short of the desired standard.
[Underlined] INSTRUMENTS AND ELECTRICAL. [/underlined]
The introduction of the Gyro Gun Sight into general service has necessitated the training of Instrument Repairers in the maintenance of the sight. A short course was instituted at Fulbeck which was attended by representatives from all Bases who profited well from the experience gained by Fulbeck personnel during the past 3 – 4 months. Details of the test equipment necessary for efficient maintenance has been circulated to all Bases and Stations, and these test sets must be manufactured locally as they are not yet available from Service sources.
The high light of the month was the sinking of the Tirpitz, and this cannot be allowed to pass without a special word of praise to those Instrument Repairers of Bardney and Woodhall who have tirelessly maintained the Bombsights. They can fell that they played their part with the aircrews in achieving this success.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
[Table of 5 LFS Aircraft Serviceability]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ENGINEERING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FLIGHT ENGINEERS. [/underlined]
In the near future all Flight Engineers will be categorised on their ability in the air and on the ground. It is hoped that by this categorisation the standard of Flight Engineers will be improved.
The categorisation will be divided into two parts – Air and Ground. The first part, Air, will consist of the 5 Group Lancaster Drills, log keeping, a technical examination and an examination on airmanship.
The second part, Ground, will be a practical test on refuelling aircraft, Daily Inspection Airframe and Daily Inspection Engines. It is appreciated that many Flight Engineers have not had the opportunity to learn as much about their aircraft from the technical aspect as would be desired; to overcome this, instructions on Airframe and Engines will be given in each squadron. When Flight Engineers have completed the second part they will receive a Certificate of Proficiency.
Keen competition is anticipated and it should be the desire of every Flight Engineer to obtain at least an ‘A’ pass; no doubt many will get the maximum – an ‘A+’ pass.
Instructions have been issued by Headquarters, Bomber Command, with regard to the flap operation of a Lancaster. Now that a standard drill has been laid down, Flight Engineer Leaders must instruct all their Flight Engineers to use this drill on all occasions, at the same time advising them always to check the flap gauge when flaps are selected fully down; if there is a tendency for flaps to creep back, the flap control should be brought back to the neutral position, and then reselected to the fully down position. Under no circumstances should the flap control be taken to the “up” position on the final approach as this may cause the aircraft to sink.
[Boxed] [Underlined] INTER-BASE SQUASH COMPETITION. [/underlined]
A/Cdr. Pope, D.F.C., A.F.C., Base Commander. 56 Base, has very kindly offered a silver challenge cup to be contested for within the Group in an Inter-Base Squash Competition on the American system.
Details of this latest 5 Group “Racquet” have already been circulated around the Bases, and it is hoped that the battles will be well under way early in the New Year, to decide who is to wrest the Trophy from the clutches of 56 Base.
In the meantime decision of the Competition is in the lap of the Gods. But there is no doubt that, as the bridegroom said some years later “The Best Man always wins”. [/boxed]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] photography
The failures this month for night photography increased to 13.18% as compared with 4.92% for the previous month. This is a serious increase and while it is fully appreciated that inclement weather, particularly the incessant rain, is bound to have caused a certain number of failures, it cannot be stated that the increase quoted above entirely resulted from this cause.
During Winter months it is imperative that maintenance is thorough, and that efforts are made to eliminate all causes of technical failures, particularly those which are known as “avoidable”. Every photographer must bear in mind, that cameras are carried on operations for one purpose only, that is, to being back film which has been exposed over the target, and which, when processed, will result in plottable ground detail photographs from which the success of the raid can be assessed. Photographic personnel whether engaged upon camera maintenance or processing can, if they will make the necessary effort, reduce the number of technical failures to a much smaller figure.
In vetting the photographic failure reports which pass through this Headquarters, it is noted that when aircraft have not operated for several days there is always an increase in the failure rate immediately after a Stand Down period; furthermore, there are still too many unexplained failures, and in many cases the report is so obscure that it is of little value, mainly because the photographic personnel have failed to assess the evidence of the film correctly. This results in misleading other specialist officers to whom the film is passed. It should be the effort of all concerned to produce a photographic result which will be useful to the Air Staff, and when failures occur, get down to the proper cause and report it accurately.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF PHOTOGRAPHY. [/underlined]
[Table of Photographic Failures by Squadron]
[Page break]
[Drawing] decorations
The following IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined}
F/L C.D. KEIR, DFC DSO
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/O D.T. IBBOTSON DFC
F/SGT S.W. WALTERS CGM
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
S/L C.B. OWEN, DFC DSO
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L G.E. FAWKE, DFC DSO
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L P.F. MALLENDER DFC
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L R. REEVE DFC
F/O M.E. ANDERTON DFC
P/O G.A. SANGSTER DFC
F/O H.F.S. MITCHELL DFC
SGT C.L.S. WILLIAMS DFM
P/O H.O. REDMOND DFC
F/O A. BOSWARD DFC
F/O H.C. CLARK DFC
P/O H.T. FORREST DFC
SGT T.W. POWELL DFM
SGT W.F. BELBEN DFM
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O C.E. BINION DFC
P/O F.G. DAVEY DFC
F/SGT F.W. STROUD DFM
F/SGT A.O. KENNEDY DFM
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L G.E. DICKSON DFC
F/O D. BRADY DFC
F/O W.F. EDWARDS DFC
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J.H.F. WHYTE DFC
F/O J.D. MOUAT DFC
P/O S.H.K. EYRE DFC
F/O A. SLYWCHUK DFC
P/O D.A.T. MILLIKIN DFC
P/O L.W. PETHICK DFC
F/SGT F.B. KNOTT DFM
F/O R.H.W. LAWRENCE DFC
F/SGT J.E. TAYLOR DFM
F/O A.N. FRANKLAND DFC
F/SGT K.H. SNEDDON DFM
F/O D. EGGLESTON DFC
F/O G.S. PYLE DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J. CASTAGNOLA DFC
F/SGT G.P. GAUWELOOSE DFM
P/O E.C.W. ANDERSON DFC
S/L D.I. FAIRBURN DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L G.L.P. DUNSTONE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O R.K.W. GLOVER DFC
F/O B.M. ACOTT DFC
P/O F. NORTON DFC
P/O R.A.E. DEAR DFC
F/L W.E. JEAVONS DFC
P/O D. STREET DFC
P/O J.F. MILLS DFC
SGT G.R. GILBERT DFM
SGT D. BOOTHBY DFM
F/O R.B. WARD DFC
SGT P.T. HADDON DFM
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L C.P. McDONALD, DFM, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/SGT S.R. LAMBERT DFM
F/O D.A. JENNINGS DFC
F/O A.K. IRWIN DFC
A/F/L D.W. WOOLLEY, DFM DFC
W/O A.C. MATTHEWS DFC
F/L A.R. GALBRAITH DFC
F/O W. FITCH DFC
A/F/L G. ROBINSON, DFM DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] DECORATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON. [/underlined]
A/F/L F.P.L. BROOME DFC
F/SGT K. FORREST DFM
F/SGT H. WILSON DFM
A/F/L T. CAMPBELL DFC
F/O J. PEDEN DFC
W/O J.J.H. MAXWELL DFC
P/O W.R. DORAN DFC
P/O C.A.P. THOMPSON DFC
W/O E.H. HANSEN DFC
P/O A.P. BOULTBEE DFC
P/O A.J. TINDALL DFC
F/SGT S. OSBORNE DFM
P/O E.J. WATSON DFC
P/O W.A. REFFIN DFC
P/O W.D. KNOWLES DFC
P/O C.W. HOWE DFC
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O A.A. HARRIS DFC
A/F/O P.C. BROWNE DFC
A/F/O A.R. KITTO DFC
A/F/O P.A. FYSON DFC
F/O P.R.J.M. MAVAUT DFC
A/F/O J.G. THOMPSON DFC
A/F/O H. ARCHER DFC
W/O R.E. CARMICHAEL DFC
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L S.E. PATTINSON, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O D.M. GRANT DFC
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/L B.A. BUCKHAM DFC
F/O A.B.L. TOTTENHAM DFC
F/O N.W. SAUNDERS DFC
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L L.C. DEIGNAN DFC
P/O L.G. BURDEN DFC
F/O T.C. TAYLOR DFC
P/O H.R. GOODWIN DFC
P/O J.W. WAUGH DFC
F/O J.L. SAYERS DFC
F/O E.G. PARSONS DFC
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.A. MARSHALL DFC BAR TO DFC
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O M.D. BRIBBIN, DFM DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO.28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] war savings
[Table of War Savings by Station]
NOTES: In column (a) above, A indicates the number of pence saved per head of strength.
B indicates the percentage of personnel saving.
and C indicates the total amount saved through the Unit Savings Group.
In column (b) above, the sum indicated as saved by Syerston, also includes the savings by deduction from Pay Ledgers for Fulbeck and Balderton.
In column (c) only stations with Class ‘A’ Camp Post Offices are included.
[Underlined] GRAND TOTAL NATIONAL SAVINGS FOR NOVEMBER: £7,843, 17.10d.
[Page break]
[Drawing] volte face
For day after day, and for year upon year
Of this utterly futile inordinate war
We’ve fought the unspeakable Gremlin;
From aircraft and engines, wherever they were,
We’ve harried and hounded and chased them galore,
And prevent the brutes from assemblin’.
Our aim was unvaried and clearly defined,
No quarter or mercy was ever displayed;
No cavilling, fear, or dissemblin’.
Undeterred by defeat, in our ranks you would find
A resurgence of effort – the foemen were made
To cower in their shelters a-tremblin’.
Yet with ultimate victory looming in sight,
The powers that rule us have altered their stand
And ordered a truce with the Gremlin;
And the tribe’s C.in C. is respectably dight
As a uniformed “wingco”, an officer grand,
(Or something quite closely resemblin’).
ANON. (CIRCA 1944).
[Boxed] The cover for this month’s News has been designed by Sgt. Morley of this Headquarters. Suggested designs are still invited from all personnel within the Group. [/boxed]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 28. NOVEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
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[Page break]
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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V Group News, November 1944
5 Group News, November 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 28, November 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and articles on the end of the Tirpitz, gardening, operations, signals, navigation, this month's bouquetes, radar navigation, tactics, air bombing, incendiary attacks, war effort, training, gunnery, leave it to Smith, second thoughts for pilots, accidents, armament, the proof of the pudding, aircrew safety, flying control, equipment, education, engineering, photography, decorations, war savings, and volte face.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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1944-11
Contributor
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Anne-Marie Watson
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
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75 printed sheets
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Photograph
Identifier
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-20 nov 44
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
Germany
Great Britain
Norway
England--Lincolnshire
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Creil
France--Juvisy-sur-Orge
France--L'Isle-Adam
France--Mimoyecques
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
France--Soligny-la-Trappe
France--Watten
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Düren (Cologne)
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Homberg (Kassel)
Germany--Hörstel
Germany--Ladbergen
Germany--Mittelland Canal
Germany--Munich
Norway--Tromsø
Norway--Trondheim
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-10
1944-11
5 Group
617 Squadron
9 Squadron
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of the Boulogne E-boats (15/16 June 1944)
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
bombing of the Mimoyecques V-3 site (6 July 1944)
bombing of the Watten V-2 site (19 June 1944)
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
flight engineer
Gee
gremlin
H2S
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Oboe
Operation Catechism (12 November 1944)
pilot
radar
rivalry
Tallboy
Tirpitz
training
wireless operator
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
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Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
V GROUP NEWS V
9 Wadd.
10 Skell.
6 Bard.
JULY 1944 [deleted] SECRET [/deleted] [Stamp] NO.24
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
Within the past few months the German defence of occupied Europe by day has greatly weakened and in consequence new methods of attack have become feasible. Day fighters are unable to challenge our great superiority and night fighters have not so far been risked in daylight combat. Recently therefore an increasing proportion of attacks have been by day, and since these provide some novel problems, I would like aircrew to know the reasons behind our present tactics, and the developments which we hope to see.
Apart from enemy defences there is one difficulty which is at present inherent in daylight operations to a greater extent than in night operations, and that is smoke. By night markers can usually be seen through considerable clouds of smoke, but by day their brilliance is insufficient, and those crews who bomb towards the end of an attack will seldom be able to see the aiming point. It may therefore, be necessary to order crews to offset the bombsight, or overshoot from a clearly defined aiming point outside the target area. These are however palliatives and the solution for targets where cratering is required us the half-hour delay fuse which will enable the whole attack to be completed before the bombs start to explode. These fuses will shortly be available in quantity.
Another difficulty is cloud which by day is more prevalent than by night, especially the cumulus type which can so easily mar the bombing run by shrouding the target at a critical moment. For daylight attacks therefore, except where the sky is clear, I should expect a higher proportion of crews to have to bring their bombs back, because it is essential that they should not be released aimlessly over occupied territory. I hope all crews are now aware of the importance of this instruction and will never allow their natural wish to release their bombs to override their judgement on this point.
As regards the tactics to be adopted on daylight attacks there are, broadly speaking, two alternatives. The first is to adopt a close formation built up of Flights, Squadrons and Bases, with aircraft flying in tight Vics so as to provide supporting fire against fighters. The second method is to employ our normal night technique and to fly in an organised mass in which aircraft are evenly spaced in height and throughout the length of the stream.
The first alternative calls for considerable training and although it increases fire power such formations are difficult to manoeuvre and more vulnerable to flak. Heavy flak is more accurate by day than at night only to the extent that the operators of the various predictor instruments can pick out individual aircraft or formations, against which the fire of the batteries can be directed. If aircraft are flying in a close formation there is generally no difficulty in ranging instruments upon it and very accurate fire results. If however aircraft are flying in loose mass it is almost impossible to ensure that all the various “Predictor” teams will select the same aircraft and, in general, fire will be no more accurate than by night, that is to say, it will only be directed into the general mass of aircraft. This is an important point because it has been found by experience that large and tightly packed formations must fly at heights above 26,000’ to ensure reasonable immunity from flak, and such heights are beyond the present capabilities of the Lancaster.
The next point is protection against fighters. So far we have not come up against enemy fighter opposition when our own fighter escort has been present, but the danger is always present if the column loses cohesion, as was shown on the occasion of the attack against the Bois-de-Cassan, when the force became split up after flying through thunder cloud. Our fighters, numerous as they are, cannot protect a column or [sic] more than a certain length, and any aircraft which are outside the area of fighter cover must expect to be attacked. On the way to the target and on the return the column should be as short as possible, but should open out on approaching the target so as to enable crews to take a steady bombing run without having to worry unduly about other aircraft or falling bombs. This opening out will normally be achieved by providing a turn before and after the target so that Bases can spread out by making a wide turn and close in by cutting the corner, on the way through the target.
A daylight operation calls for a high measure of control and good flight discipline. Control will in future be by TR.1196 within the Squadron and Base formations and by V.H.F. to the Group as a whole when passing through the Target area. The “shepherd” in a Lightning or a Mosquito will continue to keep a watchful eye on any who may stray away from the protection of the mass and hand them over to the fighter escort.
Conditions in which daylight operations take place will change as the war develops, and crews must be prepared for evolution od the tactics employed. The tactics will, however, always aim at providing conditions in which every crew can attack the target with the utmost confidence and with all the accuracy of which the bombsight is capable.
July was a month of hard work but also a month of notable progress in the War. Over the past three years the weight of bombs dropped by this Group has gone up as follows:
May, June, July, 1942. – 2,780 toms
May, June, July, 1943. – 11,505 tons
May, June, July, 1944. – 31,107 tons.
This increased tonnage is a tribute to the steadily growing efficiency of all ranks throughout the Group and to the improvements which have been made in the reliability of aircraft and equipment. It is a magnificent effort to achieve such a tremendous aadvance [sic] in the striking power of the Group in so short a time, and the peak has not yet been reached, as August will certainly show.
During July, No. 51 Base raised their total figures once more and passed out 150 trained crews. No. 5 L.F.S. completed a second month is succession with no flying accidents and I again congratulate them on a fine achievement.
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SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]
How much affiliation have you done? The facilities are now available in the Group and you should take every opportunity of crossing swords with the Hurricanes of 1690 B.D.T. Flight. A point about “rolling in the corkscrew”. Don’t “roll” on your ailerons alone. Use rudder firmly in conjunction with the ailerons and you will roll smoothly during a manoeuvre, Be precise in your air speeds and amount of bank. The Base Training pilots have picked up this point when giving you a final check over before going on operations. There is one good corkscrew and must be flown accurately. Your gunners should get the chance they deserve.
Instrument flying needs constant practice. You’ve got dark nights and long trips to come so don’t let your instrument flying get rusty because you are doing some “daylights”. The points to remember about instrument flying are:-
(i) Trim your aircraft carefully.
(ii) Trust your instruments.
(iii) Fly smoothly.
Take care in taxying when you are being marshalled by ground crew. Let the airman sit in the pilot’s seat in dispersal sometime and show him how limited is your field of vision when anyone is standing too close to the nose of the aircraft.
Don’t follow a “curve of approach” on your bombing run. Insist that your Navigator gives you the drift in degrees as the correct turning point for the run in to the target. If the target markers are not dead ahead when you first see them, correct immediately by means of an “S” turn so that the aircraft’s nose points at the markers along the predetermined track, then turn the aircraft port or starboard for the number of degrees of drift given by the Navigator. The aircraft should then be tracking towards the markers. The motto is “Bomb on the correct heading with the graticule intersection of the bombsight astride the aiming point”.
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]
Your gunners are now to have categories. It is up to yourself to get A-plus category. Half the job depends on you. If your corkscrew is accurate and your gunners apply the right deflection, your Cine-Gyro film will be a good one and so will the category. Get all the practice you can with the Hurricanes of 1690 B.D.T. Flight.
Though priority for squadron practices belongs to Gunnery, you must keep your bombing category up as well. Some pilots are still doing flat turns. Avoid them like the plague. The Lancaster will [underlined] NOT [/underlined] flat turn but merely swings itself in the direction of the intended turn and then flies crab wise to its track in much the same direction as before. While the nose swinging the pilot has the illusion of turning for the following reasons:-
(i) The nose of the aircraft moves round the horizon.
(ii) The directional gyro revolves.
(iii) The turn indictor shows rates of turn
Have you given your Flight Engineers any experience in handling the controls? Flight Engineers are now officially recognised as the pilot’s mate in Lancasters, and as a result are getting some elementary training before joining the Group. This Headquarters has laid down that they must do regular Link Exercises, and, at the Captain’s discretion, be given 15 minutes at the controls during non-operational flights of more than an hour’s duration. There’s a drill issued by this Headquarters for changing seats in the air. Have you read it? It’s Drill No.10 of the 5 Groups Aircraft Drills.
There’s another drill which you may have overlooked now that the warmer nights are here. Drill No.12 – Oxygen and Anti-Frostbite Drill – which makes Captains responsible for inspecting air gunners in their crew once a week with the gunners fully dressed in operational flying kit. When did you last check your gunners?
GARDENING
Three Gardening operations were carried out this month by 5 Group; two in the Kattegat and one in a certain heavily defended and very restricted harbour. In the former area we were dependent upon cloud cover, which in the case of 55 Base’s effort let us down, but gave 44 Squadron its chance a few days later. The last operation was carried out by 57 and 630 Squadrons in the face of intense opposition. In all cases gardening was done on H 2 S and some good P.P.I. photographs were obtained. Two aircraft were missing.
The Command total this month was 708 vegetables, the majority of which were again directed against the U-boat bases. The interference which these pests have been able to cause to our invasion forces has been negligible and we have evidence that gardening has played a big part in producing this happy state of affairs.
Mr. Wood, of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, gave a most interesting lecture on the economic dislocation caused by our strategic gardening. He was able to give his lecture to 5 Group Air Staff, the Aircrew School and 44, 57, 630 and 207 Squadrons.
Vegetable stocks are now on the increase again and this probably presages some more planting before the Autumn harvest.
WAR EFFORT
[Table of War Effort showing Sorties with Star Awards by Squadron]
Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “successful sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties Nos. 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another squadron, the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons.
ERRATUM The one avoidable accident for 61 Squadron shown in the June issue occurred in May. The error is regretted, but it will not affect the next award of the Silver Lancaster Trophy which is based on the months July/September.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS (GENERAL) [/underlined]
The meaning of this heading may not be completely clear to Signals and Radar Officers. At a recent Command Conference recommendations were formulated regarding future establishments at Stations, Bases and Groups. It was considered that Officers who held the rank of S/Ldr. and above should be known as Signals (General) and should be qualified in both the Communications and Radar aspects of Signals. If this scheme is approved, only Officers thus qualified will be eligible for promotion to the higher ranks. Base Signals Officer are to afford Radar Officers every opportunity to absorb the communications side now. It is suggested that a good way of starting this is to bring Radar Officers on to the Duty Signals Officers Roster. At the same time Signals Officers must take more than a passive interest in Radar matters.
An experiment is being conducted within No. 53 Base to see how far it is possible to merge the duties of Wireless and Radar Mechanics. Miracles are not expected of this scheme, but it is felt that greater co-operation between the two trades will result in a saving of labour, test equipment and tools.
[Underlined] COMMUNICATIONS (OPERATIONS) [/underlined]
The success of the present type of controlled operation depends more and more on the efficiency of communications channels. Although all aircraft in the Group are now fitted with V.H.F., there must be no relaxation in the drive to perfect the W/T system of control since the latter must always be on standby in cases of VHF unserviceability or interference, or in cases where VHF cannot fulfil the requirement. The success achieved on our communications channels is due in no small measure to the hard work of the Wireless Mechanic. The C.S.O. would like to take this opportunity of congratulating all Signals Servicing personnel on having completed the third successive month with no failures due to faulty maintenance.
[Underlined] W/T FAILURES [/underlined]
Of the 2,856 sorties flown during the month of July, there were 36 W/T failure reports. The percentage shows a slight increase over the figure for June. The maintenance staffs have again come out on top with no servicing failures; as in previous months, equipment and component defects have been the cause of 75% of the total snags. There were three manipulation failures – one could have been avoided if the crew concerned had religiously tested their helmets prior to take off. Not a single aircraft throughout the month failed to take off on its mission as a result of signals equipment being at fault. There were, however, 3 early returns – one was due to the above mentioned manipulation fault.
From the equipment aspect the R1155 output valve (V8) again proved to be the most troublesome. Units must submit Defect Reports for these valves and so assist this Headquarters in hastening a remedy.
[Underlined] V.H.F. [/underlined]
All operational aircraft in the Group are now fitted with either TR.1143 or TR. 1143A The fitting programme proceeded particularly well and ended ahead of schedule. With the increased number of sorties and the consequent increase in work, the maintenance personnel have excelled themselves.
During the most recent operations, the interference that was being experienced on V.H.F. has decreased considerably, and there is every indication that this is due to the V.H.F. frequencies being used. R.A.E. Farnborough have evolved a series pulse transmission limiter, which, when fitted to the V.H.F. receiver, is claimed to supress all Radar pulse interferences. This modification is being tried at Coningsby, but since its introduction no interference has been apparent. A more detailed account of this device may be available for the next issue of the V Group News.
[Underlined] MANDREL [/underlined]
Mandrel has now been removed from all aircraft of the Group. This countermeasure is still being effectively operated by other means, and the equipment released from our aircraft is to be put to good use elsewhere. The Group Countermeasure Party is to remain in existence to assist with the maintenance of Carpet II in the Pathfinder Squadrons and, later on, will play a part in the installation and servicing of Boozer.
[Underlined] RADAR [/underlined]
Very extensive operations were carried out during July with the pace being stepped up considerably. Generally speaking Radar serviceability remained on the same footing as for June, although a few ups and downs were experienced on the various types of equipment.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
The way was again shown by Gee with a percentage serviceability of 97.24 for a total of 2643 completed sorties. This was a slight decrease from the previous months [sic] record figure of 97.77. Although we had expected to see the serviceability increase instead of decrease, a period of approximately ten days in which we were unable to obtain replacements put a considerable strain on servicing. It is hoped that we shall not have to go through this again.
[Underlined] MONICA [/underlined]
By completing 478 out of a total of 501 sorties without any difficulty whatever, Monica V took over second position on the serviceability chart for July. This figure gives a percentage serviceability of 95.41, which is an increase of 1.52 per cent on June. The Squadrons who are using this equipment are to be congratulated for their progress in the standard of their servicing, and now let us look forward to August for a corresponding increase over July’s figures.
Monica IIIA fell to third position but we feel certain that despite the great difficulty in obtaining replacements, which are now almost non-existent, the 93.79 per cent serviceability obtained for 805 completed sorties, will be brought up during August and return this Tail Warning Device to its proper place.
By putting in a great number of late hours, and hard work, an excellent replacement has been developed during the past four weeks for Monica IIIA and Monica V. The two equipments which are in good supply, namely Monica I. Transmitters and Receivers and Fishpond indicators, have been combined to give us a further type of Visual Monica. The service trials and operational use of the first set have proved most satisfactory, and now by local production it is hoped to create a source of replacements for the present devices of which we are so sorely in need.
[Underlined] REPEATER INDICATOR [/underlined]
This secondary warning indicator, which we told you about in last months [sic] News has now reached the production stage and by the end of August we should see a large number of them in operational use. Production has had to be handled locally by the Base Workshops who are now turning out the boxes; when produced these will be delivered to No. 53 Base for final completion and testing.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
This past month brought back several high level bombing operations, and with it a slight decrease in the percentage serviceability of H2S Mk. II. Of the 1298 sorties completed, 90.16 per cent were free of all difficulties. This is a drop of 1.6 per cent below June. Replacement of the high voltage condensers is now taking place on the production line but so far none have been received in the Group for retrospective fitting to units already held by Squadrons. Judging from the considerable number of cases of flashing, this remains one of the greatest sources of break-down. It is strongly emphasised that all causes of breakdown must be conscientiously reported in accordance with A.M.O. A. 869/43, as this is the only method by which these difficulties can be brought to light and dealt with effectively.
H 2 S Mk. III shows a slight improvement during July. A total of 6 difficulties was experienced out of 95 completed sorties, which gives a percentage serviceability of 93.69. Servicing conditions on 83 and 97 Squadrons are made rather more difficult because of the two types of H 2 S equipment and this calls for a high degree of organisation on the part of the Radar Branch. When the complete changeover to Mk. III has taken place conditions should ease quite considerably.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
The number of completed sorties with Fishpond carried out during the past month was 1260 of which 90.24 per cent gave very satisfactory results. The difficulties experienced were largely due, as was to be expected, to the unserviceability of H 2 S. With the higher degree of training now being carried out the benefit derived from this equipment has been increased to very large extent.
The intensity of operations will be still greater during the coming month, and this in turn will call for every effort on the part of Radar Sections. We have seen a very gratifying increase in the efficiency of all types of equipment during the past six months, and now we look forward to August to bring the efficiency even closer to the degree we all know possible.
(Continued on Page 4 Column 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24.. JULY, 1944. PAGE 3.
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SIGNALS (CONTD:)
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
July brought no outstanding performance in aircrew signals but Operators did quite well in their reception of Controllers and Wind Broadcast messages, sometimes under difficult conditions due to static interference. This augers well for future operations, and with constant practice at the morse buzzer a higher standard can yet be reached.
A scheme will soon be in operation for the further classification of Wireless Operators in this Group, and tests will be set each operator to assess his eligibility for classification in the Grades laid down. The scheme will be an amplification of the tests laid down in 5 Group Signals Instruction No. 13.
[Underlined] CONTROLLERS WIRELESS OPERATORS [/underlined]
The standard of W/T operating by all Controller Wireless Operators during the past month was very good and 83 and 97 Squadrons are to be congratulated on their practice efforts which effected this improvement. Now the writer would like to see other Squadrons following their example and have their Wireless Operators carry out the tests laid down in 5 Group Signals Instruction No. 13. I know they can do it, so come along and have their names inscribed in the register of “Wireless Operator Controller”.
[Underlined] V.H.F. MANIPULATION [/underlined]
All aircraft in the Group are now fitted with TR.1143. How many Wireless Operators (Air) have been along to their W/T Maintenance Sections to find out how it works? What are the crystal frequencies? How many times is this frequency multiplied, and how? What are the power supplies? Where are the fuses? It is your duty to know all these answers and advise your Captain on its proper functioning.
[Underlined] W/T EXERCISE [/underlined]
The Group W/T Exercise has, like the Curate’s Egg, been good and bad in parts. Some very good exercises have taken place, particularly one exercise when sixty-two messages were transmitted and received correctly in one and a quarter hours operating, There is still the tendency of some Operators, however, to revert to the old idea of the “Survival of the Slickest”. Now this is definitely not good operating, and this tendency, once it is developed in an Operator, may lead to dire trouble both for himself and some other unfortunate Operator who happens to be in the air at the same time.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The majority of attacks were again reported over the target while the Wireless Operator was on W/T watch. The new instruction whereby the Wireless Operator does not log the Controllers instructions provided his Captain is satisfied with the serviceability of his V.H.F., should enable him to concentrate more on his E.W.D. in this vulnerable area.
[Underlined] CALLSIGNS [/underlined]
July saw the abolition of Squadron Callsigns within Bomber Command. This step, whatever prompted it, is desirable in that it is a simplification. Now the one R/T S.A.C.S. can be used at Base or elsewhere, on V.H.F. or H.F. on Darky or ‘L.F.C.’. the whole thing becomes a ‘Piece of Cake’. But one precaution must still be observed. On pre-operational flights to advanced bases, or during Squadron moves, an S.A.C.S. must be obtained from the station of destination. Should the terminus station not have an S.A.C.S. available then this Headquarters can supply, and this use of the appropriate callsign provides a simple little countermeasure designed to fox the enemy listening service.
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) %age of personnel contributing
(c) Total amount saved
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTAL SAVED £21,504 0 10
ARMAMENT
The attention of Armament Officers has been fully occupied in dealing with operational bomb loads and changes of loads. The excellent way in which Armament staffs have worked has enabled the Group bombing effort to be maintained at a very high level. Considerable attention has been paid to the care in handling and loading bombs, thus avoiding damage to tail units, but some tails have been damaged due to various causes. Most of these tail units are repairable, but this takes time which could well be employed on other work. It is hoped that during August the number of tail units damaged will be reduced considerably.
BOMB DUMPS have been, to a considerable extent, reorganised and improved. It is well known that all bomb dumps are grossly overloaded and it is only by the careful planning and maintenance of tidy conditions that a reasonable degree of safety can be guaranteed; by far the biggest factor is careful planning and unloading stores in the right place, thus avoiding double handling and general loss of efficiency due to unnecessary work.
CO-OPERATION WITH BOMBING LEADERS has led to many excellent results. One particular case is quoted where the Station Armament Officer prepares a pro-forma whenever he suspects that an armament failure is due to manipulation. A Senior Air Bomber is appointed by the Bombing Leader to visit the Station Armoury daily and collect any forms relating to the past 24 hours work. The Air Bomber then interviews the crews concerned investigating all the details of the failure, reports this to the Bombing Leader, and if a difference of opinion exists, the Bombing Leader contacts the Armament Officer with all the facts available and the matter is settled amicably. This liaison is making a very considerable decrease in the number of failures due to manipulation recorded in the Squadron concerned. “No copyright is claimed – please copy”.
BOMB TROLLEYS. Care and maintenance of these items will always pay in the long run, and grossly overloaded trolleys, apart from being an unsafe practice, will lead to rapid wear or failure of the trolley itself.
(Continued in column 2)
Continued from column 3
Trolley maintenance must, therefore, be kept up, and more particularly so during the present period when trolleys are being used so frequently. A modification will shortly be introduced to render the type “D” trolleys more useful in dealing with the transport of 1000 lb and 500 lb bombs. Detailed information will be circulated immediately.
FAILURES TABLE
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A =AMANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING
D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 4.
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NAVIGATION
This month has seen a return to medium range targets, and Navigators have had opportunity to put to the test their skill and efficiency. Broadcast W/V’s have been used on 3 occasions with varying degrees of accuracy.
Track keeping and timing was good, with one or two exceptions. On almost every operation there are 2 or 3 aircraft between 10 and 30 miles off track. In the majority of instances this is attributable to u/s Compasses or instruments but there are several examples of bad navigation. Track keeping and timing are vital to the success of any operation and everything must therefore be done to achieve concentration. There were no early returns through Navigational failures this month. This is as it should be. Every effort is to be made by Station and Squadron Navigation Officers to see that no early returns are caused through Navigational errors, such as incorrect fixing and computations, or through u/s Compasses. The vast majority of Navigational early returns are attributable to alleged D.R. Compass failures. If the D.R. Compass is suspected carry out the correct drill for synchronisation and checking. If the fault is still not remedied then press on immediately using the P4 compass. Check true course with the Astro Compass regularly, using the quick method of sighting on Polaris. But DON’T, on any account, turn back with a u/s D.R. Compass.
BROADCAST WIND VELOCITIES
The use of broadcast w/v’s on the three Stuttgart raids proved very useful practice. As stated above, they brought to light many mistakes and deficiencies, the most important of which are as follows:-
(a) Insufficient w/v’s found and transmitted. Difficulty is sometimes experienced by the W/Op when transmitting the winds to Base. This is being remedied by the Signals Section. Navigators MUST now do their share and find w/v’s regularly.
(b) Winds are often found over too large an area. The ideal windfinding period is 15 to 20 minutes. Winds applying for a period of 40 minutes or more are almost useless.
(c) Wind messages incorrectly coded.
Very few of the Navigators who were the “windfinders” of last winter are still operating, and therefore, it was expected that “teething troubles” would be experienced It is the responsibility of Base, Station and Squadron Navigation Officers to eliminate these various mistakes and errors. Do all windfinders appreciate the importance of their task? It must be made quite clear to them that non-H2S crews rely entirely on the broadcast w/v’s when out of Gee range. Serious consequences may be the result of poor or indifferent windfinding. The accuracy of bombing is also directly affected by the found winds since the broadcast bombing winds are forecast from those transmitted by aircraft.
The standard and accuracy of winds found by the detailed crews has, so far, been very good. If we eliminate points (a), (b) and (c) above, we shall achieve accuracy. So go to it, all of you, and let us see that you can do!
[Underlined] NAVIGATIONAL TECHNIQUE [/underlined]
It is difficult to arrive at a perfect navigational technique, e.g. how often to obtain a w/v check, E.T.A. check, etc. Many methods have been adopted and others experimented with, but the perfect technique has not yet been found. One school of thought argues that a Navigator should “work his fingers to the bone” and obtain maximum w/v and E.T.A. checks. Another school argues that this is a waste of time and unnecessary. The ideal is surely in between, i.e. regular, but not too regular fixes, w/v and E.T.A. checks, and a maximum amount of time available for checking of all computations. Skellingthorpe are working on these lines as an experiment. Their procedure is as follows:- Obtain a w/v and E.T.A. check every 20 minutes and a check fix every 10 minutes. All Navigators can easily cope with this amount of work and, what is more important, they have plenty of time in which to check and re-check all computations. The charts turned in by the Skellingthorpe Navigators using this system are good. The charts are not cluttered with a multitude of fixes and wind arrows and their work is very accurate. All Squadrons and Stations are urged to experiment with this or any similar method, and note whether greater accuracy is achieved. Whatever method if adopted, it must allow the Navigator time in which to plot the wind vector accurately. It must also allow him sufficient time in which to re-check all his computations and calculations.
[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF FOUND WINDS [/underlined]
The O. R. S. Section at H.Q. 5 Group have analysed the target winds found by all Navigators on the following three raids:-
KIEL 23/34 July, 1944.
POMMEREVAL 24/25 June, 1944.
REVIGNY 18/19 July, 1944.
The intention was to find the consistency of Navigator’s found winds and to compare the mean found wind with the forecast w/v. The analysis showed that the winds found by Navigators were very consistent and gave a probable vector error of 7 m.p.h; with the exception of Revigny where it was just under 10 m.p.h. This is good, but there were several “wide” wind velocities; some were almost reciprocals, obviously caused by incorrect resetting of the A.P.I. or by inaccurate plotting. On the Revigny attack the w/v was light and variable and consequently a large spread was experienced, 2/3rds of the wind velocities were in the Westerly section and 1/3rd in the Easterly section.
If the wind speed is only say 8 m.p.h. then 15 minutes wind is represented by a vector 2 miles in length. Any slight inaccuracy in either the Gee or H2S fix will make a very considerable change in wind velocity. The greatest possible care must therefore be taken when obtaining a gee or H2S fix for finding a wind velocity, and more particularly when the wind speed is very light.
From the three attacks analysed the mean found wind differed from the Met., forecast w/v by the following amount:-
(i) KIEL Vector difference of 17 mph.
(ii) POMMEREVAL Vector difference of 8 mph.
(iii) REVIGNY Vector difference of 8 mph.
Base and Station Navigation Officers can themselves very easily analyse all winds found over a certain area by plotting them on a large scale plotting rose. It does not take more than 10 to 15 minutes to plot all the winds for one Station. The mean average w/v can then be seen at a glance and from this it is possible to pick out the “wides”. This should be repeated for 2 or 3 areas of the same operation. The inaccurate windfinders will stand out. It is then possible to trace the causes of these “wide” w/v’s. Was the inaccurate w/v obtained immediately after resetting the A. P. I. or vectoring? If so, there is the answer. Was it caused by inaccurate transferring of Gee fixes? Did the Navigator measure the w/v vector correctly or otherwise? All S.N.O.’s are to report their findings to Group as soon as possible.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
F/Lt Anderson, D.F.C. No. 1654 C.U. to be Nav. Leader.
S/Ldr Schofield SNO. Fiskerton posted to P.F.F.
F/Lt Kelly, D.F.C. No. 617 Sqdn. to be Station Nav. Officer, Fiskerton.
F/Lt Edwards, D.F.C. No.44 Sqdn to be Navigation Officer.
F/Lt Lascelles, D.F.C. No. 1654 C.U. to be Nav. Officer 50 Sqdn.
S/Ldr Stevens, D.F.C. Navigation Officer 97 Squadron missing on operations.
S/Ldr Galienne, D.F.C. Navigation Officer 83 Sqdn. posted to No. 8 Group – tour expired.
S/Ldr Blair, D.S.O., D.F.C. No.83 Squadron to be Sqdn. Nav. Officer.
F/Lt Martin, D.F.C. No.630 Squadron to be Sqdn. Nav. Officer.
F/Lt De Friend, D.F.M. H.Q. No.5 Group to be Squadron Nav. Officer No.57 Squadron.
[Underlined] A.P.I. WINDFINDING ATTACHMENT [/underlined]
This is a new instrument, designed to enable navigators to find a very accurate w/v over a short period of time. The instrument gives a reading to the nearest hundredth of a nautical mile and is very simple to use. The w/v is found by the closed ground circuit method, i.e. pass over a datum point, complete an orbit of 3 – 5 minutes duration and again pass over the datum point at the same height and on the same heading.
Numerous tests have been carried out by R.A.E. Farnborough and the average vector error of 63 winds found, checked by smoke puff w/v’s, was 3 m.p.h! Nos. 9 and 467
(Continued on page 6, col. 2)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 5.
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RADAR/NAV
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Gee ranges during the month have been considerably better than of late, probably due to the introduction of the 27 units into Squadrons. However, it is still noted that some Squadrons are capable of obtaining Gee to far greater advantages than others. This is mainly due to the attention paid by these Squadrons to the importance of constant training in reading signals through jamming or grass. Squadrons not so successful may well keep this in mind.
Serious consideration is now being paid to the probability of bombing on Gee, particularly when weather conditions in Northern France prevent a visual attack. The success of such an attack depends upon each individual Navigator taking part. Every effort must be made by each Navigator to develop the technique required in this type of blind bombing and to familiarise himself with the setting up and manipulation of the Gee Indicator. No Navigator should be satisfied until at least 75% of the Gee practice bombing runs he makes are within a quarter of a mile of the Aiming Point. Don’t waste your opportunities, the Watch Office on your airfield is as good a target as any, and every return to base in daylight should be turned into a Gee practice bombing run. Station Navigation Officers are to watch this point.
This month has brought us news of yet another Gee chain – the Channel chain, intended to give more accurate facilities over the Pas de Calais and Paris areas. Locking tests are being carried out and its facilities will be available on the RF.27 Unit in a short time. Lattice Maps are now available, and Stations should see that they have sufficient quantity of stock before the chain is made available. These Lattice Maps are 500:000 topographical maps overprinted with lattice lines. It is appreciated that, although the maps are not ideal from a Bomber Command standpoint, the demands of A.E.F. and T.A.F. had to be met and a compromise reached. A word of warning – the C lattice lines on the Channel Chain Series Maps are coloured BLUE. This is due to the green colouring of the map which prevents Green lattice lines being overprinted.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
With the longer range targets now being attacked, H 2 S is once again coming to the forefront. Although Gee continues to give abnormal ranges, it still remains for the H 2 S Navigators to provide the majority of broadcast winds. Stress is therefore to be made in all stages of training on the navigational use of H2S, and its importance in windfinding.
With the numerous short range targets that have been recently attacked, considerable slackening off in the use of H2S has been noted. This was particularly evident in the raid on STUTTGART on July 28/29th, when the average number of H2S fixes taken by each by each operator on two Squadrons in the Group amounted to four. It is apparent that H2S operators on these two Squadrons, quite content with going round on Gee on short range targets, thought the same method could be applied in the case of a long range target and just didn’t make use of H2S to the full extent. H2S is the best Navigational aid produced, and it is a sheer waste of man hours in servicing if operators are not using it to best advantage. In addition operators on H2S Squadrons must remember that the non H 2 S Squadrons are dependent on them for broadcast winds when out of Gee range. Drastic action may have to be taken against operators who continue to regard H2S as a mere plaything and don’t use it to advantage.
Whilst emphasis is to be placed on the Navigational use of H2S, blind bombing is not entirely to be disregarded. An H2S Blind Bombing Competition is being held monthly and all Squadrons have been asked to participate. By means of this competition, a keen spirit of rivalry should be developed amongst the Squadrons and Bases, and some idea of the Group average error in blind bombing obtained. 54 Base have been carrying out trials during the month on blind marking by Wanganui flares, the idea being to lay an initial line of Wanganui flares downwind across the target and assess it for line. If correct, the backers-up line up visually on the initial line and release blind for H2S for range only. These trials have proved that by this method the concentration of Wanganui flares across the target can be kept within a band 1/2 a mile wide. This is a great improvement on the methods used in the past.
467 Squadron are now being equipped with H 2 S and it will be interesting to note the capabilities of the Australian crews on this equipment. Although training progress is slow due to heavy operational commitments, the Squadron does not lack enthusiasm for the equipment, and it may be well for the other Squadrons to look to their laurels.
NAVIGATION TRAINING
The total hours flown on navigational exercises during July were probably higher than ever before. In one night’s flying 218 hours were clocked by 52 aircraft on cross countries (including bombing). Several Command Diversions have been carried out, which have proved excellent training, especially in the use of Gee as the routes have been near enough to the continent to encounter jamming. Unfortunately they do not provide good H 2 S or searchlight training.
Considerable difficulty has been experienced by some pupil Navigators when using the Swinderby 6 minute system. The system was designed to assist the pupil in achieving speed and accuracy of work. This has been achieved in the main, but unfortunately a few pupils have become thoroughly confused and have not used fixes, wind velocities obtained, etc., in an intelligent manner. The 6 minute system is now not being used by any Navigator until he reaches the final stage of his Conversion Unit training. This is an experiment and we are now waiting to see if an improvement in the general standard of Navigation results.
Almost all aircraft in the Base are now fitted with API’s. Very little trouble has been experienced with these instruments and navigators arriving at Squadrons should now be 100% conversant with the use of them. If they are not, let us know immediately and action will be taken.
The Base is now training 75% of the input on H2S. The air training has had to be reduced for each crew, but every H2S crew passing out should have sufficient training to enable them to fly with the equipment immediately they reach the Squadrons – so relieving the Squadron Radar-Navs. of the basic ground training.
The “drive” on accurate windfinding, particularly for practice bombing still continues. The average vector error attributed to wind finding is the same as last month’s figure, i.e. 8 miles per hour. Every effort is being made to reduce this figure and our target for next month is a mean vector error of 5 m.p.h.
[Underlined] NAVIGATION (Continued from page 5.) [/underlined]
Squadrons have also tested the accuracy and efficiency of the instrument. All the crews concerned obtained equally good results.
It is unfortunate that the instrument can only be used effectively by completing a ground circuit, it cannot therefore be used for obtaining normal Navigational winds. We shall, however, be able to find a very accurate bombing w/v in the target area. A quota of A.P.I. attachments have been demanded and will be fitted to as many aircraft as possible.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING WINDs [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by all Squadrons and Conversion Units this month is as shown in the adjoining table.
Average Errors: Squadrons – 7.5
Con. Units – 8.0
The Con. Unit figure is the same as last month’s, but the Squadrons average error has increased by 1/2 m.p.h. There is a very noticeable improvement in No. 57 Squadron, who have reduced last month’s error by 3 1/2 m.p.h.
[Table of Average Vector Error by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 6
[Page break]
ENGINEERING
[Underlined] GENERAL [/underlined]
Again a large number of sorties has been carried out, and this has called for big efforts to maintain the normal high standard of serviceability. Enemy action damage forms quite the greatest cause of unserviceability, and C.T.O’s are to review carefully each aircraft which appears to be a CAT. AC. If it is at all possible the repair must be carried out by the unit, if normal maintenance commitments permit, as otherwise larger numbers of aircraft will be stacked up on the CAT. AC. repair list, the Contractors (C.R.O) will become overburdened and long delays will take place before the aircraft is back in service. The striking force will then be reduced accordingly, as replacements for the CAT. AC. awaiting repairs will not be available in sufficient numbers. Base Engineer Officers and Chief Technical Officers must watch this trend and take the action which will give the highest serviceability.
[Underlined] DEFECTS [/underlined]
Cancellations and Early Returns which were due to matters concerning the Engineering Branch reduced the Group effort by 1.29%. Whilst the majority of these were due to defects which will be covered by modification action in the course of time, at least five should not have occurred and could have been prevented by more efficient servicing. The responsibility for three rests with the electricians and two with the fitters. The total Group summary of defects will be passed to Stations separately. No.50 Squadron is the only Squadron which went right through the month without a single operational failure due to Engineering, and is given a “big hand”.
The failure of the pipe oil relief valve to dual drive should be entirely eliminated with the fitment of the rubber connections in accordance with Headquarters, Bomber Command modification Merlin/2.
[Underlined] MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
Many improvements are being effected in the design of ground equipment and ideas which have emanated from stations in this Group have been accepted for general application. For instance, the Wheel Transporter designed by R.A.F. Station, Fiskerton, has been accepted and in the near future should be issued to all stations. This device enables one man to transport a wheel fairly easily over short distances, and the transporter being also the carriage whereby the wheel is offered up into position on the aircraft, this gives a large saving in man power.
A Power Plant Transporter will be available in limited supply within the next few weeks and will enable two power plants to be moved at a time, the loading and unloading being comparatively simple and not requiring a crane. Adaptors will also be issued in due course to enable wheels or propellors to be moved on this same chassis. This item of equipment covers a long felt need in transporting the items mentioned, and was devised originally by 51 Base, Swinderby.
It is pleasing to see Bases taking the initiative in the manufacture of such items as Sand Blasting Machines so that an up to date sparking plug bay can be organised at each Base. Sufficient of the modern torque load tests are now available at each Base sparking plug bay, and when each is fully equipped with the items required to clean sparking plugs in an up to date manner, a great saving in personnel will be possible as the cleaning, gapping and testing of 1,000 plugs a day is a reasonable proposition with this modern equipment.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of Stirling and Lancaster Aircraft Serviceability]
DECORATIONS
The following IMMEDIATE awards have been approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/Sgt J.J. SHIPLEY D.F.M.
P/O W.R. HORNE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O C. LACEY D.F.C.
P/O W.R. GREEN D.F.C.
F/O G.P. LACE, D.F.M. D.F.C.
F/O R.L. BIENVENU D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L A.W. DOUBLEDAY, D.F.C. D.S.O.
P/O D.E. WHITE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/W/C J. SIMPSON D.S.O.
W/O R.M. CLARK D.F.C.
A/F/L G.F. BAKER, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/O A.H. JONES D.F.C.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/Cdr R. KINGSFORD-SMITH, D.F.C. D.S.O.
Sgt K. De H. HAMBLIN D.F.M.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O S. JOHNS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined}
F/O N.R. ROSS, D.F.C. D.S.O.
F/O W.A. DUFFY D.F.C.
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O F.F. MOLINAS D.F.C.
Sgt T.F. FROGLEY D.F.M.
TRAINING
The intensity of operations in July was well-matched by the strenuous efforts of 51 Base to provide a maximum number of crews for Squadrons. The total of 150 crews trained and over 9,000 hours flown provided the highest figures in the history of the Base. [Underlined] The target for August is as many crews as Instructors, aircraft and weather can produce. [/underlined]
Gunnery was well to the fore. The training in Early Warning Devices was intensified and fighter affiliation was given a high priority. The Stirling Conversion Units returned a record figure of exactly 1,000 Gyro exercises during their affiliation. The categorisation of Gunners was introduced towards the end of the month and 51 Base in future will pass all gunners to Squadrons with a category which will be an invaluable guide to Base and Squadron Gunnery Leaders.
The categorisation of gunners follows closely on the bombing categorisation which has already proved its worth. Incidentally, 1660 Conversion Unit set a new record within the Base by returning an average error of less than 200 yards for all crews bombing in June. Proposals are in hand for the categorisation of the remaining members of the crew.
Instructors pressed on steadily with navigation and H2S training and 75% of all crews are now being trained to use H2S. The importance of accurate navigation is not being overlooked because crews commencing training now will be starting in Squadrons as the longer nights and the longer trips come along.
The standard of instructors is receiving special attention and the early formation of the Bomber Command Instructors School which 5 Group has campaigned for over a long period will give new Instructors a greater opportunity to get into their stride quickly and on the right lines. Until the school is in full operation, Flight Commanders can help new instructors tremendously by flying with them when they are giving dual, and passing on advice from their greater experience after the flight is over.
[Underlined] NEW CREWS IN SQUADRONS [/underlined]
The policy of giving new crews a short period of supervised training in Squadrons to “put on the final polish” before they operate has proved successful. During the month the Instructors attached to Bases completed the training of 134 new crews and carried out thirty-one 10 and 20 sortie checks.
The corkscrew received considerable attention in the Squadron training and 51 Base welcomed constructive criticism and suggestions to ensure uniformity on instruction. In the light of tests carried out by the instructors in the operational Bases, 51 Base is making a special point of checking the speed and angles of bank in the corkscrew and emphasising the importance of the bomber making good a mean track during fighter affiliation. One or two crews have been finishing up almost on a reciprocal after being engaged by a fighter.
[Underlined] NIGHT AFFILIATION WITH HURRICANES [/underlined]
To make night affiliation with Hurricanes easier the fighters of 1690 B.D.T. Flight which had been detached to Operational Bases were centralised as Scampton under S/Ldr. Munro, D.S.O., D.F.C., formerly of 617 Squadron. The fighter pilots put in some intensive night
(Continued on page 9, col. 2)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 7
[Page break]
A VISIT TO NORMANDY
There are few of us who can accept the speed of air travel as a commonplace thing. To be at one minute in Group Headquarters, studying the detailed maps of the aiming points in the late afternoon, and then to be having supper with the noise of the Normandy guns rumbling in the distance, gave one a feeling which, to say the least, was uncanny.
We picked up our Dakota at Northolt and crossed the French coast just East of the Cherbourg Peninsula. Flying along parallel to the coast it was evident that the task of unloading was still priority job No.1. Many landing strips were passed – I believe there are about 15 in all – looking very neat and tidy from the air. They are mostly single runway strips made from the rich brown earth which has been levelled and rolled, and provide a very good surface.
We landed on a strip North-West of Caen, and were transported to the Headquarters of the 2nd Army. The camp was quite small, being situated in a field, and relying on tents for its main accommodation. The Messes were semi-dugouts, but nevertheless quite comfortable. The dinner was excellent and was finished off by some very good Camembert cheese, made in Normandy.
The organisation of the staff of the Headquarters was very similar to a Bomber Group staff. The bulk of the planning was done by the Chief of Staff, who had to advise his various specialist officers, e.g. Plans, Intelligence, Artillery, Equipment, Engineering, C.S.O., etc. The nerve centre of Headquarters is the Operations Room, which consisted of four caravans in a square, the centre of which was covered over, thus forming a central room with four control rooms. Contact with forward troops and armour is maintained by R/T and W/T and all communications of progress or otherwise, terminate in this Operations Room, where a complete state of the advance is maintained.
We had a talk by the Intelligence and Operations Officers, who put us in the picture as to the disposition of our own and the enemy troops, and finally by the Chief of Staff, who detailed to us the plan of attack and what we were out to achieve. The main object of the bombardment, which was to take place early the next day, was to pulverise the positions South-East and East of Caen that our armour could move through with ease, and thus enable the bulk of our weight to cross the River Orne, and join the general advance Southwards. A great factor in the success of this operation was the absence of German Air Force activity. Through lack of space East of the Orne the bulk of our troops and armour had been drawn on the Western Banks with the vehicles right up to the actual Bridges, ready to move over as soon as the force on the Eastern side of the river had vacated their ground by moving South. Had the enemy reconnaissance spotted these columns, then no doubt the success of our attack would have been seriously impaired.
On the way to our tents we saw a lot of ant-aircraft activity in the form of tracer, star shells and heavy flak, and in addition there was a perpetual rumble of heavy guns operating on the front South-West of Caen.
We were called at 03.30 hours, and after breakfast set out in cars for a hill position to the North-West of the iron foundry at Colombelles, which was one of the 5 Group aiming points. The weather looked favourable, there were only very local patches of fog, and there was a clear sky. The journey was started in darkness, which was rather frightening as there was a vast amount of traffic on the roads, and only the very minimum of lighting was allowed. Dawn broke and the weather was still holding as we passed through village after village on route to our view point. The villages varied considerably, some having sustained only minor damage, whilst others had been virtually flattened. The stench in some of these ruins was appalling and was due to the dead animals and human beings buried in the ruins, and which we had not yet had time to extricate.
Eventually we drove into a wood, and parked the cars, and walked up through a village, past a ruined chateau, to our vantage point, where we could see the factory quite clearly. As we were arriving the artillery, which was some 1,000 yards behind us, started attending to the German anti-aircraft positions. To our unaccustomed ears the din was terrific, although an A.A. Officer, who was with us, said that was merely a softening up process and that the really heavy barrage would not start until H Hour, which was 07.45.
Our photographic Mosquito formed the vanguard of the mass of Heavies, which we could hear approaching. Then came a red T.I., from an invisible Mosquito, and shortly afterwards a yellow T.I., dropped by the P.F.F. Master Bomber, fell across the aiming point. The hum of Merlins had now developed into a roar, and the Lancasters came in an absolute horde. You could see the bombs leaving the aircraft and we saw the first four sticks fall straight across the factory. It was a grand sight to see the red flashes of light sweeping one after the other throughout the length of the aiming point, but unfortunately that was just about the last glimpse we had of any ground detail, for columns of smoke and dust arose and blocked out everything.
The newspapers have already described the bombardment and I cannot improve on their eloquence. The Heavies were in a continuous stream for some 20 minutes, and the noise, and particularly the feel of the blast, was out of all proportion to what one had anticipated. Then came the Mediums, Marauders and Bostons, dropping fragmentation and other non-cratering bombs over the central area, over which our troops and armour would advance, and then the American Heavies, in silver formations against a clear blue sky. Typhoon dive bombers were also in the fun; you could see them wheeling in the sunlight at about 8,000’ before they turned into their headlong dive and disappeared in the mushroom of smoke. So widespread was the dust and smoke that even where we were we all looked as if we had just come out of a flour mill.
At 07.45, which was the H Hour for the advance, the artillery opened up at full blast. We were directly between them and their objective, and there was a perpetual scream of shells going over our heads.
We watched the bombing for about three hours and then walked back to have a look at the chateau behind us. This had been a fine old residence, but had been severely damaged. It had been vacated at very short notice and contained some fine old furniture, in the way of old oak armchairs and long settles. However, all furniture, crockery, children’s toys, books and papers had been blasted about the rooms, which were sometimes two feet deep in debris. One odd thing which I saw just outside the chateau was a lock of human hair tied with a piece of pink ribbon. One wondered what story lay behind it.
We then walked back to the village and had a look at the gun positions. The guns were literally everywhere, and the crews were heaving shells in, pulling the string, and heaving in the next one, as fast as they could go. At close range you felt the blast hit you in the eyes and then heard a sharp report.
We then drove down the coast and on the way passed guns firing away incessantly. One would drive along a road and find a dozen or so lined up against the hedge and shooting over your heads, and yet it is odd how human beings, and even animals can accustom themselves to this din. What children there were didn’t seem to mind the noise, and in one field with approximately a dozen guns in it, there were four horses grazing quite unconcerned.
At the coast we looked around a German coastal concrete blockhouse, which was underground for the most part, and was very well equipped with central heating, air conditioning and periscope.
We then drove along to Arramanches, where we saw a conversion from a seaside resort to a busy port. Two concrete moles, each approximately a mile in length, had been towed across, piece by piece, and sunk into position to form an outer protection to the port. Inside these moles was the main dock consisting of a large concrete and iron structure, some 500 yards long and 50 yards wide. This had massive superstructures, cranes and derricks, and was handling cargoes from the large vessels which lay alongside. This quay was situated about 1/2 mile from the shore and parallel to it, and was connected to each end by large pontoon slipways, over which was a constant stream of heavy traffic to and from the ships. The whole installation had been towed over from this country, piece by piece, and assembled.
We had a quick snack at the dockside and then went down to Bayeaux [sic], a fine town which had received no damage at all, and which our forces had taken on the evening of D Day. Food was plentiful here, the shops being well stocked with bread, cheese and farm butter.
We returned from Bayeaux [sic] to the Headquarters of the 2nd Army, where we arrived about 5 o’clock. Roads everywhere were full of troops and amour on the move. The roads were dusty and tanks threw up vast clouds of dust which temporarily reduced visibility to nil. On arrival at the Headquarters we went straight to the Operations Room and learned that as far as could be ascertained, the
(Continued on page 9, col. 3)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1844. PAGE 8
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
During July 37 aircraft were damaged to an extent which rendered them unserviceable for more than 48 hours. 11 were the result of accidents known to be avoidable. Some of the others are classified as obscure at the moment, as investigations are incomplete, but will be recategorized later in the month.
Of the avoidable accidents 4 occurred in Squadron aircraft and consisted of 3 CAT AC. and 1 CAT E. 6 were damaged in 51 Base – 2 CAT AC., 3 CAT E. and 1 CAT B., and 1 was a CAT AC. Hurricane of 1690 Flight.
Classifications are as follows:-
Taxying – 3
Overshoots landing – 2
Swings landing – 2
Swings taking off – 1
Other taking off errors – 1
Miscellaneous – 2
Excluding those accidents at present unclassified, there were two fewer “avoidables” in July than in June, and, what is more, the past two months have produced a far smaller of this type of accident than the average for March to May. Keep it up and we will reach the top of the Bomber Command ladder and remain there.
Here is a selection of the month’s avoidables:-
[Underlined] TAXYING. [/underlined] A Lancaster was taxying down a runway where another was stationary (compass swinging) in broad daylight. The pilot made the old mistake of assuming he could get past. He didn’t – until his wing smashed the nose of the other aircraft.
A Stirling was returning to dispersal. The pilot reports he was unable to throttle back his port outer engine. He ran off the track and hit an oil bowser.
[Underlined] OVERSHOOTING. [/underlined] At night a Mosquito overshot a 1400 yards runway in good visibility. It entered the overshoot area and as then taxied back through a wire fence. No taxying light was used. This speaks for itself.
A Stirling pupil on his first solo was caught out in bad weather and after trying various airfields finally found one where he attempted to land. He overshot mainly because of poor visibility.
A Stirling on 3 engines was deliberately swung when the pilot saw he was going to overshoot. Deliberate swinging is now forbidden, and all pilots are to take note. The aircraft must be kept straight. There is far less risk of serious damage when the overshoot area is used. A swing almost invariably results in broken undercarriage legs.
[Underlined] SWINGS. [/underlined] A Lancaster rudder pedal slipped when the pilot was levelling off for a landing. The result was a violent swing which broke the undercarriage. All Lancasters are now being modified to prevent rudder pedals slipping out of the ratchet at critical moments.
In bad visibility a Stirling on 3 engines made an approach to the wrong runway. At 200’ he realised his mistake and went round again with difficulty. The aircraft was diverted to another airfield where it approached at an angle to the runway. A heavy landing was made and the aircraft swung and crashed. Cloud base was down to 600’ – visibility 3 miles – accident still under investigation.
[Underlined] OTHERS. [/underlined] A Stirling had just taken off when violent juddering was experienced. The pilot throttled back and landed in the overshoot area – CAT E. – nothing has been found wrong technically. Instructors should warn pupils before going solo of the common causes of juddering on take off. This is the second accident of this nature in 6 weeks.
A Verey pistol was accidentally fired off in an aircraft. It did quite a bit of damage. The full facts are not yet known but it is evident someone was careless.
A Lancaster pilot jettisoned his bombs too low and sustained damage to his aircraft. He landed safely at base.
[Underlined] SILVER LANCASTER COMPETITION [/underlined]
July begins the second leg of the Silver Lancaster Competition. So far, the Units stand as follows (it must, however, be remembered that this list is subject to revision when the full facts of all accidents for July are known): 49, 50, 57, 106, 61, 619, 207, 467, 463, 97, 83 – all [underlined] NIL; [/underlined] 9, 44, 617, 627 – 1 avoidable accident each; 1660 – 5; 1661 – Nil; 1654 – 3; L.F.S. – Nil; 1690 Flt. – 1.
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF DAMAGE – FORMS 765(C) [/underlined]
The first of July saw the new aircraft damage category – A (R) - come into force. Many units have completely ignored the order which was an amendment to A.M.O. A. 1348/43. All Units are reminded that aircraft under this category are not counted against them in the Bomber Command accident ladder, so it is definitely to their advantage, and to the Group as a whole, that the Forms 765 (c) should be correctly made out. Aircraft affected are those which have had a replacement of a major component (e.g. engine, propellor, rudder), as a result of an accident, [underlined] in 48 hours. [/underlined]
[Underlined] TRAINING (Contd. From page 7, col.3) [/underlined]
training and logged over 30 hours night flying in a week, so that they are now ready to tackle any crew the Squadrons like to put up. Full details of the organisation and procedure have been issued and Squadrons are urged to take advantage of this first class facility. From now on the policy must be NIGHT AFFILIATION IS ON EVERY NIGHT.
Operational crews had little opportunity for further Squadron PRACTICES because of operations. Some useful work was done, however, in between sorties. Incidentally Flight Commanders should note that the term PRACTICE is to be used instead of TRAINING for non-operational exercises done by Operational crews. This Command ruling makes the distinction between operational crews who are fully trained and who are “practising” to improve their standards, and new crews under training who have still got something to learn.
EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] RETURN OF EQUIPMENT BY UNITS TO M.Us & R.E.Ds. [/underlined]
Complaints have been received from No. 40 Group that Units are not carrying out instructions in returning serviceable and repairable equipment to M.Us and R.E.Ds.
The attention of Equipment Officers is again drawn to A.M.O. A. 736/43 as amended by A.M.Os. A.1132/43 and A.210/44, also to Bomber Command Equipment Staff Instruction No. 35. These A.M.Os and Instructions give full details on the returning of serviceable and repairable equipment, and must be complied with.
The following points are specially important and every Equipment Officer must make certain that these are carried out:-
(a) Except for Quartz Crystals, [underlined] all [/underlined] Cat.C. equipment in Section 10 must be returned to No. 3 R.E.D.
(b) Items for which there are special transit cases, must be packed in these cases.
(c) Items in 1A and E should be returned to G.E.Ds.
(d) Cat. A. items are to be packed and vouched separately from other unit returns.
(e) Separate vouchers for each Vocab. Section.
(f) [Underlined] ALL [/underlined] equipment must be labelled.
(g) Cases addressed to particular sites should only contain equipment for those sites.
Every Equipment Officer should make certain that his staff knows and carried out all the instructions on the return of equipment, since equipment turning up at the wrong M.U. causes great delay to that M.U’s work.
[Underlined] PLATFORMS, AIRCRAFT INSPECTION [/underlined]
Attention is drawn to A.M.O. N. 714/44 dealing with the introduction of a new type of Inspection platform for Lancaster aircraft.
[Underlined] A VISIT TO NORMANDY [/underlined]
(Continued from page 8, column 3)
battle was going well. Our advances were better than originally hoped for, and the Army were extremely pleased with the bombing. Little resistance had been met in the area North-East and East of Caen, but considering the attention given by our aircraft and artillery this fact is not surprising.
Unfortunately we were not allowed to go and see results of the bombing even though our forces had moved through the positions, so we returned again to our landing strip, after making our farewells and thanks to the officers who had extended their hospitality to us, and looked after us so well. The Dakota awaited us and we took off again for Northolt, leaving behind us the battle area, which was still shrouded in dust and smoke.
The main thing which struck me throughout the visit was the atmosphere of efficiency which dominated everywhere. The running of the camp, traffic control, organisation of salvage and supply dumps, gave one the impression that everyone had a job to do, knew what that job was, and was wasting no time in getting on with it.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 9
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AIR SEA RESCUE
During July three aircraft of the Group are known to have come down in the sea. “H” of 630 Squadron hit the sea when returning from operations at a low altitude, there were two survivors. A Mosquito of 627 Squadron ditched off Cherbourg – the full story of this is not yet available as the crew is still in Normandy. “C” of 207 Squadron crashed into the sea whilst jettisoning bombs.
There were several unusual aspects of the ditching of “H” of 630 Squadron which are the subject of a formal investigation. At the time of the impact the aircraft was flying at 200 – 210 m.p.h. and the crew were not at their usual stations because of an intercomm failure. The Navigator and Air Bomber were sitting up at the Navigator’s table and the Wireless Operator was forward without Mae West or parachute trying to rectify the intercomm failure.
Fortunately the sea was calm and the Pilot, Air Bomber, Wireless Operator and Navigator got out. The fuselage broke in half and the Rear Gunner, whose turret was on the beam, succeeded in leaving after he had gone under a few feet. The Rear Gunner did not contact the other survivors until an hour after impact.
On leaving the fuselage, the Navigator made the Wireless Operator get into the dinghy first; when the Navigator followed the dinghy sank below the surface. As the Wireless Operator had no Mae West the Navigator left him to get what support he could from the dinghy and rejoined the others holding on to the aircraft.
After approximately 30 minutes the fuselage sank, and the Navigator calling to the others to follow him, swam across to the dinghy which had drifted some distance away. The Pilot and Air Bomber never reached the dinghy and the Navigator set out to look for them but was forced to give up when overtaken by cramp. These two were not seen again.
By chance the Navigator found the “Makers” Pack and knowing it contained the signal pistol and cartridges he tried to open it. The Rear Gunner appeared making his way to support the Wireless Operator, who was in a bad way. After a two hour struggle, the Navigator succeeded in extracting the pistol and cartridges and 40 minutes after firing the first signal a Naval trawler picked up the Rear Gunner and Navigator, who had been 3 1/2 hours in the water. The Wireless Operator, in spite of the Rear Gunner’s efforts, had succumbed.
[Underlined] SAFETY DRILL COMPETITION RESULTS [/underlined]
[Table of Safety Drill Competition Results by Base and Squadron]
[Underlined] Note: [/underlined]
In June a total of 390 aircrew were rescued from the sea against 240 (47.2%) in May. Unfortunately the precise number of unsuccessful incidents is not known and so the percentage of aircrew saved cannot be expressed. In addition 243 non-flying personnel were saved – 218 in the Channel area. Air Sea Rescue aircraft flew 1,176 sorties in the Channel Area alone!
RECENT GOOD SHOWS
Whilst on a daylight operation, an aircraft of 106 Squadron flown by F/Sgt. Netherwood was severely damaged by flak. He was forced to feather both port engines. The port wing and tyre were damaged and hydraulics rendered unserviceable, but in spite of this, F/Sgt. Netherwood carried out his bombing run successfully, completed his attack and, showing great skill, flew his damaged aircraft back to Base where he made an emergency landing without further damage to his aircraft or injury to his crew.
F/O McCracken of 49 Squadron was returning from a night operation when his aircraft was attacked by an enemy fighter. The trimming tabs. A.S.I., intercomm., R/T, hydraulics and D.R. Compass were rendered unserviceable. Fires were started in the two inner engines and in the bomb-bay and the Navigator and two Gunners were wounded. The fires were extinguished, and in spite of the damage to his aircraft, F/O. McCracken flew back to this country and carried out a successful landing at an emergency airfield.
An aircraft of 61 Squadron, piloted by F/O Aukland, collided with another Lancaster over the target. Both port engines and the port main plane were severely damaged. Showing fine airmanship P/O Aukland flew the aircraft back to this country where he made a successful emergency landing.
Another pilot in 61 Squadron P/O Hallett, carried out a successful landing in difficult conditions. He aircraft had been heavily engaged by enemy defences and the Rear Gunner was wounded, the port tyre punctures and hydraulics rendered unserviceable. In spite of this damage, P/O Hallett carried out a good landing without flaps or brake pressure.
AIRCREW VOLUNTEERS
(a) New Volunteers.
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training.
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Station]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 10
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
[Underlined] “A MISS IS AS GOOD AS A MILE” [/underlined]
There has been an increase in the number of attacks carried out against Flying Bomb sites, stores and rocket sites. To bombing crews, these targets present a difficult problem. They are extremely well camouflaged, small and heavily fortified and further, suffer negligibly from blast damage. In consequence, a stick of bombs that fails to make a direct hit is of no value. The “misses” on marshalling yard bottlenecks may do damage to railway tracks, wagon sheds and rolling stock. Misses on aerodrome hangars may crater runways, damage dispersed aircraft and spread chaos in the ‘communal site’. Misses against Flying Bomb installations, however, merely make holes which can be filled in.
It is, therefore, essential that all crews make the most accurate attacks within their power, and realise that a miss will have no value at all – there can be no ‘fluke’ damage.
Owing to repeated operations and poor weather, there is but limited opportunity for bombing practice at the bombing ranges, so every advantage must be taken of the exercises completed.
A detailed analysis must follow each practice to eliminate all faults both human and mechanical.
Air Bombers must examine their bombsights in accordance with 5 Group Aircraft Drills, (Drill No. 9, Appendix “C”) at every opportunity and further ensure that the operational procedure as detailed in Drill No.3 is carried out conscientiously.
If all this is done, it will naturally follow that the sticks of bombs aimed at these enemy installations will be more accurate.
They are not impregnable but they are impervious to near misses.
Direct hits are being obtained only by A+ or A crews. There are far too few of this category at the Group’s disposal. A determined effort must be made by every crew to strive for this category from the initial exercise attempted in 51 Base. Every crew that fails to obtain an “A” exercise at any practice must, in conjunction with the Bombing Leader, discover the reason why.
Remember! ONLY DIRECT HITS WILL CAUSE DAMAGE!!!
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORISATION [/UNDERLINED]
A+ Crews – 85 yds or less
A Crews – 140 yds or less
B Crews – 210 yds or less
C Crews – 280 yds or less
D Crews – Over 280 yds.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
Congratulations to F/Lt. MATHESON and crew 49 Squadron, on obtaining the first A+ category with the Mark XIV Bombsight!
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Results by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
[Underlined] JULY’S OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS [/underlined]
Apologies are due to 1661 Conversion Units, R.A.F. Station, WINTHORPE. In last month’s NEWS 2 excellent crew errors of 1661 Conversion Unit were credited to 1654 Conversion Unit. This was indeed unfortunate as the error of 53 yards obtained by F/Sgt McKechnie and crew was a Unit Record. Once again only Crew Errors below 80 yards can be recorded.
Squadron or Con. Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Error at 20,000 feet (in yards)
44 F/O Cartwright F/O Beaton F/O Olson 69
F/O Freestone F/O Woollam Sgt Gage 68
49 F/O Russell Sgt Reid Sgt Millar 79
F/L Matheson F/O Mathews Sgt Launder 60, 59 & 75
106 F/L Taylor P/O Power F/S Watson 39
83 F/O Meggeson P/O Franklin F/O Wicker 47, 72 & 57
97 F/O Edwards F/O Barker F/L Burt 57 & 66
83 F/O Kelly Sgt Burleigh F/O Irwin 79
463 P/O Garden F/S Murrell W/O Turner 79
1654 F/S Wilson Sgt Stuart F/O Howarth 74 & 76
F/O Hughes Sgt Buxton Sgt Dunckerly 72
Sgt McGregor Sgt Bache Sgt Chadwick 62
1660 F/S Herbert F/O Cleary Sgt Maxwell 78
Sgt Hart Sgt Bell Sgt Green 53
F/O Joplin F/S Hibberd Sgt Fish 45
F/S Harper F/S Williams Sgt Cooper 71
1661 F/S Hayler Sgt Hearn P/O Winterburn 69
F/O Judge F/S Gore P/O Cook 71
Congratulations are extended to F/O MEGGESON and crew (83 Squadron) and F/Lt. MATHESON and crew (49 Squadron) for each obtaining 3 outstanding crew errors using the S.A.B.S. and Mark XIV Bombsight respectively.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 11
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONT.)
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
Congratulations to 1660 C.U. Swinderby, the [underlined] FIRST [/underlined] Conversion Unit to achieve the average crew error for a month of less than 200 yards.
[Underlined] 627 Squadron [/underlined] report an outstanding dive-bombing exercise by F/Lt BARTLEY – releasing at 500 ft.- his average error was 5 1/2 yards.
[Underlined] 54 Base. [/underlined] W/Cdr. JEUDWINE, carrying out an initial exercise in a Lightning aircraft, dive bombing, averaged 9 1/2 yds. for 6 bombs.
[Underlined] 44 & 619 Squadrons (R.A.F. Stn. DUNHOLME) [/underlined] Station Armament Officer has sectioned one of each type of fuse in use and these are displayed in the Bombing Offices.
[Underlined] 1661 C.U. (F/LT PRICE). [/underlined] P/O HARROP and crew obtained direct hits on Flashlight Bullseye target at Bristol on night of 29/30th July.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE BOMBING RANGES [/underlined]
[Underlined] WAINFLEET BOMBING RANGE. [/underlined] 4407 bombs aimed by 923 aircraft.
[Underlined] EPPERSTONE BOMBING RANGE. [/underlined] 1666 bombs aimed by 285 aircraft.
[Underlined] OWTHORPE BOMBING RANGE. [/underlined] 1535 bombs aimed by 287 aircraft.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS CORNER [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/O CAMPBELL, D.F.C. [/underlined] (Aircrew School – R.A.F. Station Scampton) has moved to No. 9 Squadron as Bombing Leader, for his 2nd tour.
[Underlined] F/L NUGENT [/underlined] becomes Bombing Leader to 61 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/LT McDONALD, [/underlined] tour expired, has moved to H.Q. No. 6 Group.
[Underlined] F/LT BILLINGTON [/underlined] (207 Squadron) has moved to 54 Base.
[Underlined] P/O LINNETT [/underlined] becomes Bombing Leader to 207 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/LT ASTBURY [/underlined] (617 Squadron) is tour expired and has moved to H.Q.54 Base to supervise S.A.B.S. training.
F/O FOULKES (630 Squadron) has succeeded F/Lt Farara as Bombing Leader.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ COURSES [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/O NUGENT [/underlined] was 5th on No. 85 Course with “B” Category.
[Underlined] F/O NAWELL [/underlined] (463 Sqdn.) and [underlined] F/O FOULKES [/underlined] (630 Squadron) were 2nd and 11th respectively on No. 86 Course with “B” Categories.
[Underlined] F/O McMASTER [/underlined] (1654 C.U.) was 12th with “B” Category on No. 87 Course.
[Underlined] THE BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
Maximum entries were obtained in the Competition this month; the results are below. 52 Base are to be congratulated on obtaining the first 3 places in the Squadron Competition.
[Underlined] SQUADRON COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st 49 Squadron 61 yards
2nd 44 Squadron 65 yards
3rd 619 Squadron 66 yards
4th 9 Squadron 71 yards
5th 207 Squadron 72 yards
6th 97 Squadron 88 yards
7th 83 Squadron 90 yards
8th 630 Squadron 94 yards
9th 50 Squadron 99 yards
10th 463 Squadron 101 yards
11th 106 Squadron 103 yards
12th 57 Squadron 109 yards
13th 61 Squadron 119 yards
14th 467 Squadron 128 yards
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st 1661 Con. Unit 56 yards
2nd 1660 Con. Unit 67 yards
3rd 1654 Con. Unit 76 yards
4th 5 L.F.S. 151 yards
Congratulations 1661 Con. Unit!!!!
[Underlined] BOMBING LADDER [/underlined]
617 and 627 Squadrons maintain a bombing “ladder”; top positions this month are as follows:-
[Underlined] 617 Squadron 627 Squadron [/underlined]
1st F/LT KEARNS & CREW F/LT BARTLEY
2nd F/O DUFFY & CREW F/LT DEVIGNE
3rd F/O KELL & CREW F/LT GRAY
[Underlined] BIGCHIEF COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st A/CDR. POPE (H.Q. No.52 Base) 114 yards
2nd G/CAPT. WEIR (R.A.F. Stn. Fiskerton) 116 yards
[Underlined] ?? BOMBING QUIZ ?? [/underlined]
1. What check must you make if bomb firing switch cannot be removed from stowage, with bomb doors open?
2. What is the difference between “George” pressure and Pescopump suction as applied to the Mk. XIV Bombsight?
3. What bombing errors would you expect is the suction was low at the Mark XIV Sighting Head?
4. What Mk. XIV settings are necessary for a “Wanganui” attack?
THE LORD CAMROSE
[Crest]
BOMBING TROPHY
A silver model of a 12,000 lb. bomb has been presented to the Group by Lord Camrose. The A.O.C. has decided to award this trophy to the Squadron with the most accurate High Level bombing results, calculated on the results obtained with the Mk. XIV Bombsight between the 1st January and 30th June, 1944.
No. 50 Squadron, R.A.F. Station, Skellingthorpe, have achieved the best average error over this period and the A.O.C. will present them with the trophy as soon as possible.
The bombing trophy will be held for a period of 3 months and the next award will be announced on the results obtained between 1st July and 30th September, 1944.
The final figures for the first 6 months of the year are as follows:-
[Table of Average Crew Error by Squadron]
That line [drawing]
will cost you
a donation
to the
PARCELS FUND
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 12.
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
Though failures for the month of July show no overall increase on the month of June, actually photographic failures increased almost 100%. On the whole this was caused by the tape join on composite colour film failing to pass round the guide roller on the ‘receive side’ of the magazine, and condensation of moisture which deposits itself inside the lens front component, on the rear lens surface, or under the glass register plate during certain conditions of temperature and humidity.
The former of these two failures should be relatively easy to overcome. A thorough testing of all film magazines under power using a composite film should reveal those which will cause film stoppage. A film magazine has been sectioned and it was found that the metal of the outside casing increases in thickness towards the closed end leaving insufficient clearance for the thickness of two films and the tape. The cure for this is to request the C.T.O. to arrange for the clearance to be increased by ‘routing’ out some of the metal.
Moisture condensation has been one of the most persistent causes of photographic failures during both night and day operations, unfortunately a cure has not yet been found for cameras installed in Lancaster aircraft. Trials are being carried out, however, and much can be done by efficient maintenance. Particular care must be taken to avoid the dampness in camera muffs when these are in use.
It is evident that many defective camera units are being exchanged without N.C.O.’s reporting the defect. There is no hope of any remedial action unless failures are reported in the proper manner. Form 1022 action may appear to be a useless waste of paper, but if used intelligently and completed with all the essential information, Air Ministry will take all appropriate action to rectify manufacturing and design defects. This is particularly important because the F.24 camera is now being replaced by the American version, the K.24.
It is again necessary to remind all photographers of the importance of producing photographic results with the utmost speed, without sacrificing photographic efficiency. Photographic N.C.O.’s are to re-examine their internal organisation with the object of producing better results in less time. Where section personnel are overstaffed, this must be regarded as a temporary state, personnel surpluses are bound to be absorbed at short notice, and no replacements will be available. The volume of photographic work being produced in photographic sections has increased enormously and no operational section should complain of lack of work or variety, but the peak has not yet been reached. Increased efforts on the part of all photographic personnel will be necessary as the photographic equipment used during operations increases.
ANALYSIS OF NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHY
[Table showing Photography Statistics - Night and Day, showing Attempts and Failures by Squadron]
LINK TRAINER
[Table of Link Trainer Sessions by Squadron]
For the second month is succession there was an increase in Link Trainer Times throughout the Group, but there is still room for improvement. Special attention is again drawn to the 5 Group Link Trainer Syllabus with emphasis on those exercises with the artificial horizon and directional Gyro blanked off. Pilots should also take advantage of the Corkscrew Exercise to polish up their corkscrew procedure for the present drive on gunnery.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 13
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF AIR GUNNERS [/underlined]
Instructions have now been issued to Squadrons and Units to categorise all Air Gunners immediately. Gunners arriving from O. T. U. ‘s are to be categorised at Aircrew Training School and will be re-categorised at Conversion Units before proceeding to a Squadron. Squadron Gunnery Leaders will, in the future, know the capabilities of new arrivals from their categories and will be able to concentrate immediately on training the backward gunners to a higher standard and improved category. Gunners holding the higher categories will be tested and reassessed after 10 and 20 sorties, but those with the lower categories will be required to have a test every two weeks until they have graduated to a higher category. Base Gunnery Leaders are responsible for the categorisation of Gunners in Squadrons within their respective Bases, and a big improvement in the standard of Gunnery throughout the Group is anticipated.
[Underlined] OPERATIONS – COMBATS [/underlined]
As was to be expected, the Hun reacted to our continuous raids in France and the Low Countries by bringing down his night fighter Squadrons from Germany. This has resulted in increased numbers of combats on those operations where he has been successful in intercepting the stream. The large number of 57 combats tool place on the night 28/29th July, when Stuttgart was attacked. Visibility was good above 10/10ths cloud and the Group claimed 13 destroyed and 1 damaged. Other good nights were 4/5th with 36 combats, 6 enemy aircraft being claimed destroyed and 3 damaged, and 18/19th when 4 enemy aircraft were claimed destroyed. A total of 27 enemy aircraft were claimed as destroyed during the month, which is over 10% of the combats. This is a big improvement on previous months and to keep it up, at the expense of Hun Night Fighter’s morale gunners must be 100% efficient in all departments and use their sights correctly during combats.
Successes have been achieved by those gunners who have used their equipment to the full and who are also alert and efficient in their search procedure. Particular mention should be made of F/O McIntosh and P/O Sutherland of 207 Squadron, who have followed up their achievement of last month of 3 enemy aircraft destroyed in one night, with a further 2 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed during July. With the Mark IIIN sight now installed in turrets, gunners must get used to watching tracer and target through the sight, and this can only be achieved by practice. Hose piping with tracer has very rarely, if ever, been successful and will never be effective. Casualties among the enemy night fighter personnel must affect their efficiency and morale, and if we can be sure that each combat will result in a destroyed or damaged Hun, this end will be attained. “The few” do it regularly each month, so it is up to the remainder to follow their excellent example.
[Underlined] GUNNERY LEADERS’ MOVEMENTS [/underlined]
61 Squadron – F/Lt Glover
50 Squadron – F/Lt Mills
5 L. F. S. – F/Lt Crawford
THIS MONTH’S BAG [Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
Sqdn A/C letter Date Type of E/A.
97 “L” 4/5 July ME.41o [sic] (c)
61 “Y” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
617 “A” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “F” 4/5 July ME.109 (c)
9 “L” 4/5 July ME.210 (c)
630 “T” 4/5 July DO.217 (c)
57 “E” 6/7 July ME.210 (c)
83 “D” 7/8 July S/E (c)
207 “M” 12/13 July ME.109 (c)
61 “N” 18/19 July U/I (c)
57 “B” 18/19 July ME.109 (c)
630 “N” 19 July U/I (c)
106 “Z” 20/21 July T/E
44 “Q” 24/25 July S/E
83 “L” 24/25 July JU. 88
50 “R” 25 July ME.109 (c)
207 “L” 26/27 July ME.410
9 “W” 28/29 July ME.110 (c)
49 “P” 28 July FW.190 (c)
49 “U” 28 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “M” 28/29 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “K” 28/29 July JU. 88 JU. 88 ME.109
619 “X” 28/29 July JU. 88
463 “H” 28/29 July ME.410
463 “D” 28/29 July ME.109
207 “U” 28/29 July JU. 88 1 Flying Bomb
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
9 “N” 4/5 July ME.110 (c)
57 “R” 12/13 July JU. 88 (c)
44 “F” 14/15 July ME.109 (c)
57 “O” 18/19 July JU. 88 (c)
61 “N” 18/19 July JU. 88 (c)
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
630 “V” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
630 “Y” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
630 “Q” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
9 “Z” 7/8 July JU. 88
467 “C” 7 July ME.210 (c)
463 “A” 25 July ME.109
207 “Z” 25/26 July ME.410 (c)
49 “F” 28 July JU. 88 (c)
106 “C” 28/29 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “X” 28/29 July JU. 88 (c)
Claims annotated (c) have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF COMBATS [/underlined]
No. of Combats 207
E/A Destroyed 28
E/A Probably Destroyed 5
E/A Damaged 10
AIR TRAINING CARRIED OUT IN CONVERSION UNITS AND SQUADRONS DURING JULY.
[Table of Fighter Affiliation Exercises by Squadron]
FIGHTER AFFILIATION GRAND TOTAL = 1774
[Underlined] ODD JOTTINGS [/underlined]
Flash trainers are now installed at each Station and training is going ahead. Emphasis should be laid on the training for quickening of mental reaction rather than a further means of teaching aircraft recognition. Instructions for the use of the Flash Trainer have been issued by Bomber Command and these must be adhered to.
Skeet ranges have been erected now on the majority of Stations and training should commence immediately in liaison with the P.F.O.
A ‘back-type’ parachute is now on trial in the Group. Reports as to it’s [sic] suitability are awaited and will be made known in due course.
F/Lt. Jones, Sighting Adviser to Bomber Command, visited Swinderby and lectured on the “Pictorial Strip” Method of Assessing Cine-Gyro films. Instructions will be issued in the near future.
Squadron Gunnery Leaders should refer to A.M.O. N.978/43 and demand necessary number of Spectacles Mk.VIII Anti-glare for their Squadron gunners. These spectacles should be worn at times when glare conditions exist. The stores section and reference numbers are:-
22C/961 Medium A.
22C/962 Large A.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 14
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
[Underlined] ST. LEU D’ESSERENT 4/5TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Cheshire [/underlined]
The first operation of the month was an attack on the flying bomb storage depot at St. Leu D’Esserent, North East of Paris, on the West bank of the river Oise. 229 aircraft from the Group were detailed.
MARKING The target was identified by the Marker Force, but the markers fell mainly in a direction North East to South East of the aiming point.
RESULTS An accurate concentration of bombs fell round the markers, but photographic cover from P.R.U. showed that the M.P.I. of this concentration was some 400 yards slightly north east of the aiming point, and on the eastern side of the river. Heavy damage was done to the railway yards adjoining. No. 617 Squadron took part in the operation and were allocated a separate aiming point.
CONTROL Several “snags” occurred in the control of this operation:-
(i) The Master Bomber experienced trouble with his VHF set, and he was unable to pass instructions either to No. 617 Squadron or to the main force, W/T links or flare force.
(ii) the Deputy Controller, hearing no instructions from the Master Bomber, issued orders for the 617 Squadron attack, but failed to establish contact with the W/T link aircraft of the main force.
(iii) W/T link No. 1 was damaged by a fighter and had to return to Base. He passed the message “Returning to base” to W/T link II; this was sent in plain language and resulted in a few aircraft of the main force returning to base. The message he should have sent should merely have been “take over”; this could not have caused any mis-understanding. W/T Link II then took over control of the attack, and no further difficulties were experienced.
[Underlined] ST. LEU D’ESSERENT 7/8th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined]
225 Aircraft from the Group were detailed to make a second attack on this target which was to be marked by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and by No. 54 Base.
MARKING The marking was opened by Oboe, the second marker falling on the marking point. The flare force then came in, dropping their flares accurately over the target area. In the light of these, the marking point was identified by a 54 Base marker, who dropped 2 red spot fires which were assessed by the marker leader as 100 yards South of the Aiming Point. Night photographs show them to have been 247° - 185 yards. The Marker Leader then called upon the remaining Mosquitos to back up and drop their markers 100 yards North of the red spot fires. The Master Bomber then called in the main force to bomb, and an accurate concentration of bombs was reported to have developed round the markers, which were further backed up by Red T.I.’s.
RESULTS P.R.U. photographs show that the Northern Central, and Southern tunnel entrances were severely hit, and that considerable damage was done to the railway supplying the site, and also to the main railway lines. At least one aircrew bombed before the time ordered for the main force to attack, and before the Master Bomber gave the order to attack. This endangered the Mosquito Aircraft and prevented full backing up being carried out. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the success of a controlled attack upon small targets depends on rigid adherence by all crews to the Standing Instructions laid down, and to compliance with instructions issued by the Master Bomber or his deputy.
CONTROL W/T was very good. VHF R/T suffered interference, through a fault in the intercommunications system in the Master Bomber’s aircraft.
[Underlined] CULMONT/CHALINDREY 13/14TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined]
157 aircraft were detailed to attack the railway junction and repair depot. The attack took place in conditions of no cloud and good visibility. There were two aiming point, Eastern and Western, and the attack on each was scheduled to open simultaneously. One marking point was chosen, bombing to be carried out by the vector method.
MARKING Flare illumination was punctual and accurate. Owing to a fault in the Master Bomber’s No.1 V.H.F. set, the deputy controller temporarily took over the direction of the attack. The latter gave orders for the attack on the Western aiming point to commence, and this went ahead according to plan. Some six minutes later, the Master Bomber had changed to his alternative V.H.F. set, and took charge of the attack on the Eastern aiming point. This was then completed without further breakdown of the communications.
RESULTS Windfinding was good on this operation, and the correct vector was passed for both the East and West aiming point. P.R.U. photographs reveal a very heavy concentration of craters all over the area od the locomotive sheds, and many locomotives were damaged. The lines are obliterated by craters in this area. The rail junctions east of the sheds is severed in many places. The construction of lines at the South end of the target and all other lines leading to the South West have been cut in many places.
CONTROL W/T control was excellent on both aiming points. VHF R/T very good, after the Master Bomber had changed to his stand-by set.
[Underlined] VILLENEUVE ST. GEORGES (RAILWAY YARDS) 14/15TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Jeudwine [/underlined]
118 aircraft from all Bases were detailed to attack the Railway marshalling Yards South of Paris, the marking to be carried out by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. and by 54 Base.
The weather was clear at first, but thin cloud drifted over during the attack, giving 5/10ths cover at about 7,000 feet at the time of the attack.
MARKING The Oboe markers were placed in the marshalling yards, one to the N.W. of the aiming point and two to the East. The first flares lit up the aiming point and Mosquitos dropped two red spot fires. Some bombs were dropped on the red spot fires but the Master Bomber considered that more marking was required, and ordered bombing to cease. More flares were called for, and by their aid Mosquito backers-up dropped two more red spot fires and a green T. I. The Master Bomber added one 1,000 lb red and one green T. I., and having assessed the marking as accurate gave the order to bomb the concentration of red and green markers. Towards the end of the attack, there was a slight spread towards the northern end of the marshalling yards.
CONTROL W/T communication on this raid was entirely satisfactory. A small percentage of aircraft complained of interference on V.H.F.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows that the main weight of the attack fell on the extreme Eastern edge of the sorting sidings, spreading across the fields to the East, but heavy damage was caused to tracks and rolling stock in these sidings, and the Eastern through lines Paris – Dijon were cut.
[Underlined] NEVERS (RAILWAY JUNCTION AND LOCOMOTIVE DEPOT) 15/16TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined]
109 aircraft from all Bases were ordered to attack the railway junction and locomotive depot at Nevers. The flare and marker forces were provided by No. 54 Base.
MARKING Flares were dropped over the target area on time, and a 1,000 lb green T.I. was dropped in the correct position as a datum point. A hold up in the marking occurred in the early stages, as the marker leader inadvertently released his two red spot fires in the early part of his dive and they fell some 500 yards short, and North of the aiming point. These were subsequently cancelled by a yellow T.I. The aiming point was re-marked with two more red spot fires, which were assessed as having fallen along the axis of the railway lines. The main forces were ordered by the Master Bomber to bomb the red spot fires. Bombing developed, and the concentration, in the estimation of the Master Bomber, was some 150 yards West of the target. He therefore sent out a vector to bring the remaining bombs back to the aiming point.
CONTROL Control on both W/T and VHF R/T was satisfactory. Wind-finding was good, and the vector issued by the Master Bomber correct.
RESULTS P. R. U. photographs show a very heavy concentration of craters from the junction right through the marshalling yards to their southern extremity by the main station. This concentration is so intense at a centre about 450 yards south of the junction, that all lines and rolling stock have been obliterated. The road bridge over the yard has been damaged but
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944 PAGE 15
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OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
not severed and the workshops to the East side of the yard have been severely damaged. On this occasion, the Group carried a load of 100% delayed action bombs. 25% of the bombs were fused L.D. 6 – 144 hours, and the remainder 1/2 hour or 1 hour delay. To enable the Master Bomber, and the crews themselves, to have some indication where the sticks were dropping, all aircraft carried one tail trace attachment in their load.
[Underlined] CAEN – DAY 18TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: P.F.F. and 54 Base (W/Cdr. Jeudwine) [/underlined]
203 aircraft from the Group were detailed to attack special targets in the Caen area, in direct support of our troops in Normandy. The attack was designed to eliminate certain enemy strong points and concentrations of armour, to enable tour troops to occupy the Suburbs of Caen and the East bank of the Orne and to make a break through into the open country South east of the town. Aircraft from other Bomber Command Groups also took part in this operation, and some 5,000 tons of bombs were dropped. Two areas were allotted to No. 5 Group.
MARKING Marking was carried out by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and the attack was controlled by a Master Bomber also supplied by the P.F.F. The markers were accurately placed, and the attack on both areas was carried out according to plan.
CONTROL The directions of the Master Bomber were clearly heard by all crews.
RESULTS Eye witnesses on the ground testify to the accuracy of the bombing, and no reports have been received of any bombs having been dropped in the sectors occupied by our own troops. All crews will know of General Montgomery’s acknowledgement of the success of this attack, which enabled the Allied Forces to attain their immediate objectives.
[Underlined] REVIGNY (MARSHALLING YARDS) 18/19TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Jeudwine [/underlined]
116 aircraft from the Group were detailed to attack the Marshalling Yards at Revigny, the marking to be carried out by No.54 Base.
MARKING One 1,000 lb Red T.I. was dropped by the marker leader, which was assessed as 50 yards 050° from the aiming point. Night photographs show this assessment to have been correct. The Master Bomber then gave the order for the Main Force to bomb the Red T.I. In the early stages of bombing a very large explosion occurred some 300 yards from the aiming point, followed by fires and smoke which obscured the Red T.I. The Master Bomber gave the order for the fires to be attacked, but during an orbit he once again saw the Red T.I. burning on the ground, countermanded his second order and issued further instructions to continue bombing the T.I. No further instructions were issued until the “Cease bombing” signal was given.
An examination of the bomb craters shown in P.R.U. photographs, gives the approximate mean point of impact of the bombs as 350 yards 100° from the aiming point. The wind velocity broadcast for the use of the main force was 120° 17 m.p.h., whereas an analysis of all winds found shows the average to have been 240° 05 m.p.h. Two facts are clear:-
(a) The marker stated to be on the railway attracted practically no bombs.
(b) The wind was very light and variable, but was not strong enough to displace the M.P.I. by some 350 yards.
A study of all the raid reports indicates that the majority of crews bombed on a red marker; in many cases this was reported to be faint. A few crews also mention the presence of a green T.I. none of which were in fact dropped, and some reported having bombed fires, on the Master Bomber’s instructions. The experienced crews of No. 627 Squadron reported a terrific explosion which was corroborated by most of the main force crews. In addition there are reports of aircraft seen burning in the vicinity of the red marker.
RESULTS P.R.U. photographs show a building about 200 yards South East of the aiming point, which not only received a hit or hits, but also appears to have blown up and to have been damaged by fire. It is highly probable that this attracted the attention, and was probably the aiming point of some bomb aimers. It seems fairly clear from the plot examined that the majority of crews did in fact bomb something which was about 200 yards South East of the aiming point and this would account for some of the vector error. Only a few sticks of bombs have actually straddled the railway lines themselves.
CONTROL W/T Control was excellent; VHF R/T satisfactory.
[Underlined] THIVERNY (FLYING BOMB STORAGE) EVENING 19TH JULY [/underlined]
[Master Bomber: S/Ldr Owen [/underlined]
The chalk cliffs and caves at Thiverny, North of Paris, known to be a site for the storage of flying bombs, were the target for 106 aircraft of the Group in the evening of July 19th. The main marking was to be carried out by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. backed up if necessary by markers of 54 Base.
MARKING The initial Oboe marking was late and a 54 Base marker dropped 4 red T.I’s. These, however, fell some 500 yards short and the Master Bomber gave orders for these to be attacked, with a 500 yards overshoot. Some Yellow Oboe T.I’s were then dropped and fell on the aiming point, and the Master Bomber immediately gave orders for these to be attacked. The bombing was somewhat scattered, and did not approach the standard achieved during our night attacks on tactical targets.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover, nevertheless, shows the target area liberally plastered with bomb craters, and considerable damage was also caused to the railway yards adjoining, and supplying the storage site. There is, however, no subsidence of earth into the caves, and the entrances are not blocked, though the main road to Creil is blocked by craters.
This was the second large-scale daylight attack within two days, but it involved a much deeper penetration into enemy occupied territory than the daylight attack on the Caen area.
The necessity for maintaining as compact a formation as possible was stressed at briefing, and this was in fact achieved on the route to the target. However, late marking caused aircraft to orbit, and thus split up the formation on the return route.
A general directive on tactics to be employed by a night bomber force when employed on daylight operations has been received from H.Q.B.C. and passed to Bases, but these may have to be modified in the light of experience.
Bases have been asked to submit comments, proposals and suggestions on daylight tactics to this Headquarters and any points which may call for immediate action will be dealt with during the Flight Planning for any particular operation.
CONTROL W/T control satisfactory. Master Bomber’s VHF was technically serviceable, but suffered from much interference. He gave instructions to change to the alternative channel but only part of the main force received the order.
[Underlined] COURTRAI (MARSHALLING YARDS) 20/21st JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
The marshalling yards at Courtrai were the target for 198 aircraft of the Group on the night of July 20/21st., and the attack took place in good weather, no cloud, slight haze but visibility generally good.
MARKING The marking was to be carried out by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and by markers of No. 54 Base.
The first Oboe was dropped accurately. Flares followed; these were close to the town of Courtrai, but nevertheless the target was identified and the aiming point marked with a green T.I. assessed at 100 yards 230° by the Marker Leader, and confirmed by the Master Bomber. Actual positions could not be plotted from night photographs. Mosquitos were ordered to back up, and further Green T.I’s. were dropped, and these covered the length of the Marshalling Yards. The Master Bomber then ordered bombing on the Green T.I.’s. A large explosion occurred shortly afterwards and smoke resulting from this tended to obscure the markers. The Master Bomber at this stage ordered bombing to cease, to enable backers-up to drop further markers; more Green T.I’s were accurately placed, and bombing was resumed, until the Master Bomber gave the “Cease bombing” signal.
CONTROL W/T control excellent. V.H.F. generally satisfactory, but about 15% of main force complained of excessively loud VHF signals which interfered with their intercommunication. Action has been taken to eliminate trouble from this source.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows that very severe damage was done to the marshalling yards on this attack. Locomotive and repair shops were partially destroyed, also much rolling stock and over at least half of the target areas, the configuration of the tracks has been obliterated.
[Underlined] KIEL – 23/24th JULY [/underlined]
Kiel was the target for 100 Lancasters of the Group while six aircraft were detailed to
(Continued on page 17, col. 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 16
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FLYING CONTROL
[Underlined] QUARTERLY COMPETITION. [/underlined]
Congratulations to Skellingthorpe who have been selected as being the most efficient station in the Group from the Flying Control aspect. During the quarter’s survey of flying control for this competition features of interest have been noted at several station. Below are examples of initiative shown.
[Underlined] Syerston. [/underlined]
An indicator panel which is electrically operated from the control panel has been installed. The insertion of the aircraft pin causes a light to show on the indicator panel in the aircraft’s position.
[Underlined] East Kirkby and Coningsby. [/underlined]
An illuminated indicator panel showing wind direction, runway in use, perimeter track and dispersals, has been installed in the Control Room.
[Underlined] Bardney. [/underlined]
A very thorough job has been made of the daylight letters at this station by building them in shallow concrete.
[Underlined] Spilsby. [/underlined]
Experiments are being carried out at this station with the Stud ‘B’ control transferred to the roof of the Watch Office. From this vantage point the control officer commands a view of the entire circuit and by marrying R/T and visual information of the position of aircraft on the circuit the control officer can assist in aircraft spacing.
General initiative has been shown on all stations and the effort put in by flying control staffs in internal decoration is to be commended. Inter-station visits can help considerably. So get to know your neighbour’s gadgets and if they are any use to you adapt them to your purpose.
[Underlined] QUICK LANDING. [/underlined]
The Group average is well under the 2 minute mark, though there is a slight increase on the average landing time for June. There are still some stations who are unable to maintain a constant high landing rate and who feel that because they are single squadron stations they cannot expect to attain the figures compatible with those of two squadron stations. Yet all these single squadron stations during the month do put up good figures on one or two nights. With good discipline the landing drill will give low landing times always, and the reason for these discrepancies can only be bad drill either in the air or on the ground.
Some station in the Group find a stop watch very helpful in obtaining even spacing in the circuit. A position (for example “flaps”) is selected and the intervals between aircraft are timed by means of the stop watch. The intervals should be approximately 1 minute, and should this spacing not be maintained then the flying control officer should instruct the aircraft either to delay or close up for the appropriate number of seconds.
One final word about the role of the flying control officer on Stud ‘B’ whose duty it is to assist the aircraft in their spacing around the circuit. Overshoots waste time, are unnecessary and must be reduced to the absolute minimum, and an active “Stud ‘B’ Officer” can do much to achieve this.
[Underlined] JULY LANDING TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of Landing times by Station]
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OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
lay mines in Kiel Bay. This was a return to a long range strategic target which took the enemy by surprise. 10/10th strato. cu. cloud covered the target and rendered the searchlights ineffective.
MARKING Crews bombed either Wanganui sky Markers or Red and Green T.I’s which could be seen through the cloud. Marking was carried out by the P.F.F.
RESULTS Results of bombing were not observed but crews reported the glow of fires seen through the cloud, in the target area. Night photographs taken with the bombing show no ground detail, and complete P.R.U. cover has not been obtained hence no assessment of the success of the raid can yet be made.
[Underlined] STUTTGART AND DONGES (24/25th JULY) [/underlined]
[Underlined] Donges Master Bomber: W/Cdr Woodroffe. [/underlined]
Two strategic targets were allocated to this Group for the night of 24/25th July, first the town of Stuttgart, a centre of precision engineering, and second, oil installations and storage tanks at Donges, near St. Nazaire.
100 aircraft took part in the Stuttgart attack. The weather over the target was 9 – 10/10ths cloud, and crews bombed either on Wanganui sky markers or the glow of fires seen through the clouds, as ordered by the Master Bomber who was controlling the attack. Weather conditions made observations of bombing results impossible, and night photographs show no ground detail.
104 aircraft from all Bases were detailed for the attack on Donges, which took place in favourable weather conditions of no cloud but slight haze.
MARKING The target was marked by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and by marker aircraft of No. 54 Base. The Oboe markers went down on time, and were assessed as 200 yards from the Aiming Points. A 54 Base Mosquito dropped his Green T.I. in a position which was assessed as 200 yards 120° from the aiming point. Actual position from night photographs 150 yards 152°. The Master Bomber then ordered the remaining Mosquitos to back up the Green T.I. overshooting by 200 yards.
RESULTS Crews reported that a good concentration of bombs fell round the markers, and P.R.U. photographs show that a great deal of damage was done to installations and many oil tanks were totally destroyed. The oil jetty received two direct hits on the railway lines supplying the site.
CONTROL W/T Control was excellent, and VHF R/T best results so far obtained.
[Underlined] ST. CYR (EVENING 25th July) [/underlined]
The military depot and port at St. Cyr was the target for 97 Lancasters of No. 53 Base plus 106 Squadron, in daylight on July 25th. The attack took place below 10/10ths cloud at 12,000 feet in good visibility.
MARKING The target was accurately marked throughout the attack by Oboe markers of the P.F.F., although the majority of bomb aimers were able to identify their individual aiming points and bombed visually.
Full fighter cover was provided throughout the attack. Very few enemy fighters were seen but accurate heavy flak was met with in the target area and as many as 49 aircraft were hit, which represents 52.1% of the total force. One aircraft only is missing from this operation.
RESULTS Crews’ reports were most enthusiastic about the results of this raid, and P.R.U. photographs show that very considerable damage was done, and a heavy concentration of bomb craters covers the whole target area.
CONTROL W/T and VHF R/T both good.
[Underlined] STUTTGART – 25/26th JULY [/underlined]
Stuttgart was raided for the second night in succession, and on this occasion 84 Lancs of 52 and 55 Bases took part. The target was to be marked by the P.F.F., with whom 13 aircraft of No. 97 Squadron operated. Weather conditions over the target were reported as hazy and several layers of thin cloud between 16/22,000 feet.
MARKING The marking was a combination of sky markers and T.I’s, though the majority of crews bombed the ground markers which were seen through the cloud. The marking was reported as somewhat scattered, though in the later stages of the attack crews reported a large fire area, which could still be seen from 30 miles away on the homeward route.
RESULTS Insufficient ground detail appears on the night photographs to enable markers to be plotted, or the accuracy of the attack to be assessed, but crews generally are of the opinion that the attack was more successful than the previous one.
[Underlined] GIVORS – 26/27th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bombers: Northern A/P – W/Cdr Porter
Southern A/P – W/C Woodroffe [/underlined]
The marshalling yards at Givors, a few miles South of Lyons, were the target for 178 aircraft from the Group on this night.
There were two aiming points, the North and South, and the attack on each was under a separate Master Bomber. Marking to be carried out by No. 54 Base. Weather conditions both en route and over the target were most unfavourable, and much cumulus and cu.nimb. cloud, with rain and thunderstorms was encountered. The Mosquito markers experienced serious icing and difficulty with their equipment, and had to return to base.
MARKING The Master Bombers received the winds transmitted by selected windfinding crews according to plan. The Master Bomber (Northern aiming point) was unable to identify his target in the light of the flares dropped by the flare force, and dropped a Wanganui marker on a time and distance run from Lyons; he followed this up by dropping his own reserve flares, but was still unable to locate the target.
The Southern aiming point Master Bomber had succeeded in locating his target, and dropped two Green T.I’s which he assessed as accurately placed, so he ordered the main force to attack them. Actual positions of markers plotted from night photographs from the Southern Aiming Point :- (i) 1,350 yards 007°. (ii) 1,360 yards - 024°. (iii) 2000 yards - 034°. They were soon obscured, so the Master Bomber stopped the bombing while he dropped four more Green T.I’s and having assessed them ordered the main force to start bombing again on a heading of 345°, undershooting by 5 seconds. At this point the Northern Aiming Point Master Bomber, still unable to identify his target, ordered his force to bomb the Green T.I’s with similar instructions.
RESULTS P. R. U. photographs show that in spite of the most unfavourable weather conditions some damage was caused in both targets. Both round houses in the Marshalling Yards have been damaged, and there are about seventeen hits affecting the tracks between the yards and the railway junction.
CONTROL VHF R/T and W/T control were both very good, in spite of unusually heavy static interference.
[Underlined] STUTTGART – 28/29th JULY [/underlined]
Stuttgart was attacked for the third time within a week on the night of July 28/29th. 176 aircraft from the Group took part in this attack. Well broken cloud was met over the channel en route, and this increased to 9/10 strato cumulus, with tops about 8,000 feet over the target; visibility was good.
MARKING P.F.F. marking consisted of Green T.I’s and sky markers. The majority of crews bombed the Green T.I’s which could be clearly seen through the thin layer of cloud. Owing to cloud cover the accuracy of the markers and the success of the attack could not be assessed. Defences were reported to have been much stronger than on the two previous raids, but once again no trouble was experienced from searchlights. Many fires, the glow of which could be seen through the cloud, were left burning, and these could be seen 50 miles away on the return journey.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover now shows that about 300 acres in the centre of the city have been devastated in these three raids, and very considerable damage has also been caused in the Eastern part of the city.
[Underlined] CAHAGNES (NORMANDY) DAY 30th JULY [/underlined]
106 aircraft from the Group were assigned a special task in support of military operations in Normandy, the attack to take place at 08.00 hours.
Weather en route was 8 – 10/10th strato. cu. tops 4/5,000 feet, which broke to little or none over the channel, but re-formed a few miles North of the French Coast. At the target there was 9 – 10/10ths cloud, tops 5,000 feet and base 2,000 feet. These conditions rendered precision bombing impossible, and orders were given for the force to return to base.
[Underlined] JOIGNY LAROCHE, RILLY LA MONTAGNE DAY 31st JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
The Marshalling Yards at Joigny Laroche and the railway tunnel at Rilly La Montagne near Rheims, were the target for two striking
(Continued on page 18, col.1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 17
[Page break]
forces provided by the Group in daylight on 31st July.
Each force was sub-divided into two. One half of the Rilly force to attack the Northern entrance to the tunnel and the railway lines, and the other half the Southern entrance and lines. In the same way the Southern force were split up, half to attack the marshalling yards and half to attack the engine roundhouses.
RESULTS The weather at both targets was clear, with slight haze. At Rilly all crews identified both aiming points visually although a P.F.F. marker was dropped half way between the two tunnel entrances as a marking point. Attacks on both aiming points were reported to be accurate and P.R.U. photographs show damage at both ends of the tunnel, and hits on the railway lines.
At Joigny all crews identified the canal, river, and triangular bridge and railway junction and were able to pick out their respective aiming points. Here again, good bombing concentrations were reported, and substantial damage was caused. This is confirmed by P.R.U. photographs.
CONTROL W/T control on both targets was satisfactory, but VHF control on the Rilly attack was seriously interfered with at one stage by a main force aircraft whose V.H.F. set remained on “transmit”, owing to a technical defect; a great deal of unnecessary chatter was heard by all other main force aircraft, but fortunately the offender changed frequency before the target was reached. VHF control on Joigny Laroche was satisfactory. In order to prevent the control of an attack being jeopardised in future, by aircraft VHF sets being left on “transmit” either through carelessness or through some technical defect, orders have been given for the “transmit” crystals in all main force aircraft to be removed pending the introduction of a modification whereby the transmit crystal can be isolated.
[Underlined] SPECIAL ATTACKS MADE BY 617 SQUADRON MARQUISE MIMOYECQUES – DAY 6th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
This target, an installation believed to be connected with the enemy’s long range rocket projectile, was attacked in daylight by 17 aircraft of No. 617 Squadron in good weather conditions.
MARKING The Master Bomber marked the target with 2 Red Spot Fires, one of which was a direct hit on the aiming point, the second dropping immediately to the West. Fourteen aircraft attacked: two crews brought their bombs back, because they were unable to identify the aiming point, and one crew did not drop their bomb as the bombsight became unserviceable.
RESULTS P.R.U. photographs taken after the arrack, later in the day, show 11 craters within 250 yards of the aiming point, including one direct hit and two near misses.
CONTROL Control of this attack by VHF, and W/T was satisfactory.
(Continued on page 19, col. 3)
It is proposed in future to give some details in the V Group News about 5 Group precision bombing patterns. After each attack the P.R.U. cover is examined by O.R.S., 5 Group, who construct a crater plot, which in conjunction with the marker plot prepared from night photographs shows the success of the attack.
Bombs dropped can be divided into two classes:-
(a) those which are aimed at the markers or aiming point.
(b) those which are loose, i.e. ought never to have been dropped.
The purpose of the O.R.S. analysis is to determine:-
(i) The proportion of loose bombs.
(ii) The spread of the aimed bombs around the M. P. I., that is to discover the size of the 5 Group bombing pattern.
(iii) The distance of the Marker chosen as the point of aim from the target to be destroyed, and the distance of the mean point of impact of the bomb pattern from the marker.
The results of these three calculations determine the success of the attack, and permit the Air Staff to calculate the number of bombs which must in future be despatched to destroy a given target.
For the purpose of the V Group Monthly News the results of these three calculations for each attack will be shown as follows:-
(i) Percentage of loose bombs.
(ii) Estimate of the radius of the circle containing half the bombs.
(iii) The distance of the M.P.I. of the aimed bombs from the aiming point. That is made up of two components, the error with which the point of aim us indicated, and the systematic error of aiming by the bomb aimers.
It is not always possible to provide such a complete picture for each attack; because sometimes clouds spoil the P.R.U. cover or make the plotting of markers impossible. On some occasions it is not practicable even to separate with accuracy the 5 Group bomb craters on the P.R.U. cover, from those produced by previous attacks of other Groups or Commands. It is, therefore, proposed to issue each month a table giving the results of those attacks which have so far been analysed. The table appended gives some of the results for April, May, June and July respectively. It has been impossible to include all the results for each month in the present table; but as additional calculations are made fresh results will be issued in subsequent monthly summaries.
[Table of Bombing Pattern Results by Date]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 18
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[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoon]
[Underlined] CRICKET [/underlined]
[Underlined] Group Cricket Trophy. [/underlined] July saw the last of the trophy. Syerston and Woodhall, the two section winners, met at Coningsby on a gloriously sunny afternoon. Woodhall batted first and had the best of the wicket, which began to crumble a little later in the game. Warburton opened the Syerston attack and was turning the ball amazingly on so dry a wicket. He bowled throughout the Woodhall innings, and returned the splendid analysis of 7 for 26. Woodhall produced some lively batting, but lost one or two cheap wickets in the opening stages. Stanford hit a brisk 34, which gave them a much needed fillip, and the tail wagged with great vigour, Vaughan hitting a very timely 27 not out. The Woodhall innings produced the respectable total of 123. Warburton opened the Syerston innings, and with only a few runs on the board, Woodhall missed a golden opportunity of running him out. His partner pushed a ball to mid-off and called a single, not counting on the snappy pick-up and throw-in that Stanford produced. Warburton ran his hardest, but had the wicket keeper held the return he would have been yards out. After his escape Warburton batted right through the Syerston innings making 45 not out, a splendid contribution to his side’s total of 87. Tuxford got 4 Syerston wickets for 25 in the dour Woodhall attack. In the absence of the Base Commander, G/Capt. Philpott had the pleasure of presenting Woodhall, his own team, with the Trophy, a very handsome silver bowl. F/O Denning, Coningsby P.F.O., is to be congratulated on his arrangements for the game which had to be completed in rather less than an hour; he has just cause to be proud in seeing another Group Trophy brought home to roost alongside the Matz Cup.
[Underlined] H.Q. 5 GROUP. [/underlined] The Group side managed four games during the month. On the 2nd against 93 M.U. they suffered a 158 – 25 reverse, being well and truly dampened by a rain storm that persisted throughout their innings. For the M.U. Kinder scored 44 and took 7 wickets. On the 18th, Group avenged their defeat by a 83 – 68 win over the M.U. Wigsley defeated the Group side at Morton Hall, scoring 110 for 6 against 31 for 10. F/L Pearcey, for Wigsley, scored 40 and took 5 Group wickets. The last of the month’s games was with Newark Town at Newark. Group fielded their strongest side and won by 152 – 75. Sprawson hit 41 and Todd 37, but the outstanding performance was by S/L Unwin who took 9 wickets for 36, eight of them clean bowled, a welcome return to his old form.
[Underlined] DUNHOLME LODGE [/underlined] played 6 games returning the following outstanding results:-
v Welton Home Guard at Dunholme Welton 27 – 10 Dunholme 99 – 10
v De Aston School at Dunholme De Aston 35 – 10 Dunholme 88 – 10
v No. 7 I.T.C. at Lincoln I.T.C. 135 – 10 Dunholme 163 – 6
v Wickenby at Dunholme Wickenby 32 – 10 Dunholme 108 – 9
v Hemswell at Hemswell Hemswell 165 – 5 Dunholme 85 – 9
v Waddington at Waddington Waddington 72 – 10 Dunholme 81 – 10
The best individual performance was by F/S. Wallin, who hit 85 not out, against Lincoln I.T.C.
The Station Cricket Knock-Out is in full swing, S. H. Q. Sgts. having reached the 2nd round, while 44 Squadron Air Crew Officers beat 44 Squadron Aircrew Sgts. by 2 runs to qualify for the 2nd round.
[Underlined] METHERINGHAM [/underlined] put up a strong fight against Woodhall in the semi-final of the Group Trophy, scoring 67 – 10 against Woodhall’s 73 – 6. At one period, Metheringham had high hopes of winning as Stanford (Woodhall’s Aussie Star) was run out for five, but the Woodhall batting proved too good in the long run.
Two inter-station games were played, Bardney being beaten by 98 – 3 to 44 – 10. The side failed at East Kirkby, scoring 39 against Kirkby’s 90 for 9.
Inter-Squadron and inter-section games produced six matches, in all a busy cricket month.
[Underlined] GENERAL [/underlined]
Any Squadron that ‘fancies its chance’ at Soft Ball is invited to ring Dunholme Lodge and make a date.
The approach of the Winter Sports season is already felt and, taking the ‘pessimistic’ view that even after Berlin some of us will still be in the Mob, negotiations are in progress to obtain official blessing for sufficient transport to run a Soccer League. As soon as a firm basis is reached, a meeting of all P.F.O.’s will be called and arrangements and fixture dates agreed. But irrespective of the establishment of a League, the Matz Soccer Cup, Wines Rugger Cup and 5 Group Hockey Trophy will be fought for, and the dates and arrangements for these Tourneys can best be served by a Group representative gathering.
OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
[Underlined] WIZERNES – DAY – 17th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Tait. [/underlined]
17 Lancasters of No.617 Squadron, of which 16 took off, were detailed to attack the constructional works, believed to be connected with the enemy’s long range rocket projectiles. 1 Mustang and 1 Mosquito were to mark the aiming point.
MARKING The Red T.I’s of both the Mustang and Mosquito fell in the same place, approximately 100 yards N.E. of the concrete dome. The 12,000 lb bombs were dropped from heights varying between 16,600 and 18,600 feet.
RESULTS There were no direct hits on the dome, but P.R.U. photographs show two large craters in the quarry some 30 – 50 yards from the entrance which caused a minor landslide. Three bombs were seen to fall within 70 yards North West of the Aiming Point, and a further four within 50 yards to the South East. Later crews were unable to identify the Aiming Point visually, owing to haze and smoke from the earlier bombs, and aimed their bombs on its estimated position.
CONTROL W/T control on this operation was good, but considerable interference was experienced on VHF believed to be due to enemy jamming.
[Underlined] WIZERNES 20/21st JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
15 Lancasters and 3 Mosquitos were detailed to attack the rocket site at Wizernes. The target was covered with 8 – 10/10ths low stratus, and the operation was abandoned.
[Underlined] WATTEN – DAY – 25th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Woodroffe [/underlined]
Constructional works at Watten, believed to be connected with the enemy’s intended use of long range rocket projectiles, were the target for 16 Lancasters of No. 617 Squadron in daylight on July 25th. The target was to be marked by 1 Mosquito and 1 Mustang.
MARKING Weather in the target area was clear with excellent visibility, and in these conditions the Master Bomber considered that marking was unnecessary and the majority of aircraft bombed on the first run up.
RESULTS A detailed interpretation of the photographic cover of this raid has not yet been received, but three probable hits are shown within the complex. One has removed a portion of the concrete from the roof of the large building on the North side. The others are just North East of the main building and just North of the North East corner. The access facilities on the Eastern side appear to be completely destroyed.
CONTROL No communications difficulties were experienced, either on VHF R/T or W/T.
There are points arising from these attacks which merit special attention. These may be enumerated as follows:-
(a) Minor troubles with V.H.F. sets. These are inherent when aircraft are equipped with new apparatus, and crews are unfamiliar with its operation. Snags
(Continued in col. 2)
are being eliminated one by one, and it is hoped that during August they will be entirely eliminated. Several crews have been guilty of leaving their sets on transmit. Not only has this seriously interfered with the control of the operation, but it has also revealed much unnecessary crew chatter. The remedy for this has been to remove the “transmit” crystals from all main force aircraft.
(ii) [sic] Some crews have been guilty of bombing before H Hour, or before orders to commence have been received from the Master Bomber. Not only does this disobedience of orders display bad crew discipline, but, what is more serious, it endangers the marker aircraft flying at a lower level, and on occasion has prevented successful backing up by the marker force.
(iii) T.I. markers must be released from a height which will allow them to cascade; if they are dropped too low, they will break up when they hit the ground or ricochet for some considerable distance. The minimum should be 700 – 800 feet.
(iv) Bombing by the vector method. This has proved to be very successful, and our attacks carried out by this method at night have proved to be rather more accurate than the direct method.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 19
[Page break]
TACTICS
[Underlined] NEW FIELDS [/underlined]
Four phases of our bomber offensive have been applied this month, as follows:-
(i) Heavy night attacks on Germany (three Command attacks on Stuttgart and one on Kiel).
(ii) Heavy short range day attacks (combined attack on Caen, 18th July).
(iii) Daylight precision attacks by the Group force.
(iv) Night precision attacks by the Group force.
Opportunities have therefore been provided for studying:-
(i) Enemy night fighter reaction to the resumption of heavy night raids on German cities.
(ii) Enemy day fighter reaction to large and small forces operating over and beyond the battle zone.
(iii) The virtues of day bombing (visually and on markers) compared with normal night precision attacks.
(iv) The best disposition of aircraft (opposed to strict formation flying) for heavy bomber attacks by day.
The night attacks on Germany brought into use a new and extensive countermeasure scheme, designed to outwit the skilful deployment of enemy night fighter defences in Germany. Details of this scheme must remain secret for the time being, but the careful routeing of Bullseyes has been one of the foremost elements of the plan and has frequently delayed the interception of our bombers. On the Kiel attack, the fighters were kept almost completely at bay, which resulted in an exceptionally low loss rate.
Stuttgart, after three heavy attacks, has suffered extensive damage, mainly from fire. It is interesting to note that the last attack (the most successful) depended largely on blind (Wanganui) marking. As a result of new Pathfinder equipment, we hope crews will not have to face tough German fighter opposition in the coming months without the reward of good marking and more successful blind attacks.
It is particularly important that all crews should revise their knowledge of enemy defences and concentrate on achieving perfectly executed combat manoeuvres. Crews who have completed their first sorties on lightly defended occupied targets, must learn the art of getting out of searchlight cones, and, most important, must be on the top line with gunnery, night vision and the technique of interpreting and applying the correct tactics to Monica and Fishpond. With a firm knowledge of what defences to expect and what to do if you are a victim of fighters, flak or searchlights, you can achieve bombing accurately on defended targets equal to that on some of the recent attacks in France.
The heavy attack at dawn on Caen gave us the first opportunity of studying the appearance of a close concentration of 1,000 aircraft. From observations on the trip, it was estimated that the collision and bomb damage risks were exceptionally high, but analysis shows that there were no collisions and only one aircraft in this Group was damaged by falling bombs, and yet all aircraft made a good bombing run and there were no loose sticks outside the target area. One fact was clearly confirmed, however – that any aircraft at night or in the daytime which manoeuvres unnecessarily in the stream is endangering not only its own crew but the rest of the force.
More daylight operations towards the end of the month and at the beginning of August have introduced new problems – the best disposition of aircraft to prevent too much congestion at the target and to provide an effective defence against fighters and flak. It must not be forgotten that a formidable fighter force is still available to the Hun, and although it has not been seen so far in daylight, our forces must be so disposed to be ready to meet heavy fighter opposition.
Daylight concentration requires even more accurate flying than at night. Leaders of each element must keep their speeds and heights accurately. They must appreciate that following aircraft cannot execute tight turns and sudden increases or decreases in speed. Similarly, all aircraft must keep behind the Leaders as briefed, to ensure that the correct distribution of aircraft is achieved at the target.
On the whole, these operations have shown that our heavy bomber force can now be adapted for night and day strategic and tactical bombing with a good measure of success. Even the weather has been beaten by the skilful efforts of the Master Bomber and determination of the crews. The attack at DONGES (Night 24/25th July) was accompanied by thick Cu.Nb. cloud en route which forced some of the Mosquito markers to turn back. In spite of low cloud, lightning, rain and poor visibility at the target, a successful attack was delivered and a large oil storage depot destroyed.
[Underlined] BRIEFING ORDERS [/underlined]
Many instances have been recorded recently of crews failing to follow the Flight Plan. One example is the report of a number of experienced crews who kept low on the return from Wesseling (21/22nd June) as ordered, who observed aircraft being attacked at heights up to 12,000 ft. A great many considerations go into planning these days, and this incident shows that people with their own ideas on how to get to the target and back come up against the very thing that the plan is designed to avoid.
A gross breach of flight discipline was recently reported, when the Group was ordered to keep below 5000 feet for the first leg out to sea. British Radar plotted some of our aircraft at 8-10,000 feet. This, of course, is just inviting the Hun fighters to come out to meet you, and even a few aircraft doing this sort of thing will nullify the effect of the whole countermeasure and spoofing plan.
[Underlined] COMBATS [/underlined]
An examination of this month’s combat reports shows again that you can be attacked and get away with it if you do the right thing. A crew of 9 Squadron was attacked and followed continuously for an hour by an A. I. fighter. The first indication was on Boozer, and the development of the attacks was recorded on Monica. The aircraft was corkscrewing practically the whole time. By keeping to the correct drill this crew outwitted a very persistent and probably experienced night fighter pilot.
A large number of combats are still first made known by the appearance of tracer. A good search and a constant vigil on Monica and Fishpond is the only answer to this at the moment. One of the main faults has been misuse of early warning devices. Several crews have obtained contacts at 2,000 yards and yet have taken no action until the fighter has been seen by gunners at ranges from 500 to 250 yards. The fighter has thus been able to close in with a steady aim and damage the aircraft by opening fire before a corkscrew was commenced, or at the moment of starting it. Early warning devices have been fitted to ensure early action (i.e. corkscrew at 750 yards and do not wait for a visual). People who do the right thing may still be fired at, but the fighter is put off and the tracer passes over the fuselage instead of through it.
At least two captains have reported that after persistent attacks from enemy fighters they dived their aircraft away from the fighter in a manner to indicate that their aircraft was out of control. The foundation for these ideas is completely discounted by the experience of fighter pilots. The enemy is rarely deceived, and nothing is more dangerous than to manoeuvre in this way. The fighter is only too pleased to find an opportunity of diving after the bomber, completing his work and claiming a confirmed victory. Flames coming from an engine prompted one of the pilots to dive away. Diving to put out a fire is fatal, as more heat is generated in the engine and the added draught will assist the flames to spread. In addition, an already weakened structure will possibly be strained to breaking point in the dive. Decisions are difficult to make in a tight corner, but tactical manoeuvres have been thought out purposely for the best defence, and continued practice in corkscrew and the correct patter will prevent panic in these awkward moments.
[Underlined] BLACK MAGIC [/underlined]
We know the Hun is clever but, believe it or not, the following extracts are from combat reports of experienced crews:-
“We were attacked by an enemy aircraft which had been shot down.”
“The enemy aircraft was seen to go into a [underlined] swallow [/underlined] dive.”
“The rear gunner continued firing after the rear turret had been feathered.”
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
V Group News, July 1944
5 Group News, July 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 24, July 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about second thoughts for pilots, gardening, war effort, signals, armament, war savings, navigation, radar navigation, navigation training, engineering, training, decorations, a visit to Normandy, accidents, equipment, air sea rescue, recent good shows, aircrew volunteers, air bombing, the Lord Camrose bombing trophy, photography, link trainer, gunnery, operations, flying control, sports, and tactics,
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-07
Contributor
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Anne-Marie Watson
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
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22 printed sheets
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Identifier
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-28
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Belgium--Kortrijk
England--Lincolnshire
France--Caen
France--Chalindrey
France--Creil
France--Donges
France--Givors
France--Marne
France--Marquise
France--Migennes
France--Mimoyecques
France--Nevers
France--Paris
France--Saint-Cyr-sur-Mer
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
France--Tours
France--Watten
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Stuttgart
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-07
1944-07-04
1944-07-05
1944-07-06
1944-07-18
1944-07-30
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
bombing of the Mimoyecques V-3 site (6 July 1944)
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Oboe
pilot
radar
rivalry
sport
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
V-2
V-3
V-weapon
wireless operator
-
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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16607/MCheshireGL72021-181210-050057.1.jpg
285d54df42be107e4ba3aa1681c4d33d
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Wizernes
Description
An account of the resource
Target photograph showing open countryside with fields and roads. In the centre a large area with many craters. Caption '246, W.S., 24.6.44, 8", 17200, 150 degrees, B1, O, 617'. On the reverse '51:96/28'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-24
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-050056, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050057
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-24
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
617 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
target photograph
V-2
V-weapon
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16606/MCheshireGL72021-181210-050054.1.jpg
d1a29a7dd0272753e4df8564e47e40fc
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3bda930fe78f1d05820a7ca36e3c2f37
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Wizernes
Description
An account of the resource
Target photograph showing open countryside with fields and roads. In the centre is a large area with many craters. Caption '242, W.S., 24.6.44, 8", 17300, 1`12 degrees, R., R., 617'. On the reverse '51:96/26'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-24
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-050054, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050055
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-24
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
617 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
target photograph
V-2
V-weapon
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16605/MCheshireGL72021-181210-050052.1.jpg
84249a5df2391f91105e3cdc6711e382
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16605/MCheshireGL72021-181210-050053.1.jpg
cba0ce1ac50b15bcfa5e9ff71f5d82d0
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Wizernes
Description
An account of the resource
Target photograph showing open countryside with fields and roads. In the centre a large area with many craters. Caption '238, W.S., 24.6.44, 8", 17000, 124 degrees, Y., Y., 617'. On the reverse '51:96/25'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-24
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-050052, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050053
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-24
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
617 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
target photograph
V-2
V-weapon
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16604/MCheshireGL72021-181210-050050.1.jpg
556e61637c3f99c2e0b6f056ae6758e7
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16604/MCheshireGL72021-181210-050051.1.jpg
8a59b0f687522b3beb6e030e9fc83a8c
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Wizernes
Description
An account of the resource
Target photograph showing open countryside with fields and roads. Centre right is a large area with many craters. Caption '230, WS, 24.6.44, 8", 16300, 140 degrees, T., T., 617'. On the reverse '51:96/24'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-24
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-050050, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050051
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-24
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
617 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
target photograph
V-2
V-weapon
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16603/MCheshireGL72021-181210-050040.2.jpg
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bcfa159ddbcc71420b28d34e5de6f96a
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bd8c91196f42329277fa05c260e935d0
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Wizernes
Description
An account of the resource
Sequence of five target photographs taken at intervals from the same aircraft. All show open countryside with fields and roads. The nose of the bomb is visible on left edge centre in first image and further right in the second. A large area with many craters appears on the right in the third image and moves to the left in the last. Caption 'sequence number, W.S., 24.6.44, 8", 17000, 130 degrees, V., V., 617'. Sequence numbers 224 to 228. On the reverse in order '51:96/19, 20, 21, 22, 23'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-24
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Five b/w photographs
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-050040, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050041, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050042, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050043, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050044, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050045, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050046, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050047, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050048, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050049
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-24
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
617 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
target photograph
V-2
V-weapon
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16602/MCheshireGL72021-181210-050038.2.jpg
a5f8198dbcccb556376a22c8a564a6da
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16602/MCheshireGL72021-181210-050039.2.jpg
8f4153cc2fd40b83281a8520045a87b5
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Wizernes
Description
An account of the resource
Target photograph showing open countryside with fields and roads. Bottom right quadrant is a large area with many craters. Caption '221, W.S., 24.6.44, 8", 16500, 115 degrees, D., D., 617'. On the reverse '51:96/18'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-24
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-050038, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050039
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-24
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
617 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
target photograph
V-2
V-weapon
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16601/MCheshireGL72021-181210-050038.1.jpg
a5f8198dbcccb556376a22c8a564a6da
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16601/MCheshireGL72021-181210-050039.1.jpg
8f4153cc2fd40b83281a8520045a87b5
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Wizernes
Description
An account of the resource
Target photograph showing open countryside with fields and roads. Bottom right quadrant is a large area with many craters. Caption '221, W.S., 24.6.44, 8", 16500, 115 degrees, D., D., 617'. On the reverse '51:96/18'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-24
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-050038, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050039
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-24
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
617 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
target photograph
V-2
V-weapon
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16600/MCheshireGL72021-181210-050034.2.jpg
147f829b761fb9ae9e8a05412974ca80
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16600/MCheshireGL72021-181210-050035.2.jpg
54ec83bfb17ace1cba7d45d02fe7de59
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c71f3c0de8f389f6a1307ae31c32fbd1
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Wizernes
Description
An account of the resource
Sequence of two target photographs taken at intervals from the same aircraft. Show open countryside with fields and roads. Large area with many craters top left in first image moving to centre in second. Caption 'sequence number, W.S., 24.6.44, 8", 16600, 300 degrees, P., P., 617'. Sequence numbers 218 and 219. On the reverse in order '51:96/17. 17'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-24
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Two b/w photographs
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-050034, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050035, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050036, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050037
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-24
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
617 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
target photograph
V-2
V-weapon
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16599/MCheshireGL72021-181210-050032.2.jpg
7484682b56265592866ba3901e93d88c
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16599/MCheshireGL72021-181210-050033.2.jpg
a93c1d0ee9255c44a9394d42ebf70972
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Wizernes
Description
An account of the resource
Target photograph showing open countryside with fields and roads. In the top left an are with large number of craters. Caption '216, W.S., 24.6.44, 8", 17000, 136 degrees, H., H., 617'. On the reverse '51:06/15'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-24
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-050032, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050033
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-24
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
617 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
target photograph
V-2
V-weapon
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16598/MCheshireGL72021-181210-050030.1.jpg
6f7632c7bc8fd9997201395c48d28a6f
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16598/MCheshireGL72021-181210-050031.1.jpg
75caafd54d38399ad56323da5be71077
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Wizernes
Description
An account of the resource
Target photograph showing open countryside with fields and roads. In the centre an area with a large number of craters. Caption '213, W.S, 24.6.44, 8", 16500, 136 degrees, A., A., 617'. On the reverse '51:96/14'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-24
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-050030, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050031
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-24
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
617 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
target photograph
V-2
V-weapon
-
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Wizernes
Description
An account of the resource
Sequence of two target photographs taken at intervals from the same aircraft. Showing open countryside with fields. The is an area with large number of craters just left of centre of first image which moves to upper left in the second. Caption 'sequence number, W.S., 24.6.44, 8", 17000, 130 degrees, B., B., 617'. On the reverse in order '51:96/12, 13'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-24
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Two b/w photographs
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-050026, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050027, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050028, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050029
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-24
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
617 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
target photograph
V-2
V-weapon
-
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Wizernes
Description
An account of the resource
Sequence of two target photographs taken at intervals from the same aircraft. Shows open countryside with fields. In the centre of first image is an area with a large number of craters. This area is on the left in the second image. Caption 'sequence number, W.S., 24.6.44, 8", 16900, 140 degrees, J., L., 617'. Sequence numbers 206 and 207. On the reverse in order '51:96/10, 11'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-24
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Two b/w photographs
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-050022, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050023, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050024, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050025
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-24
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
617 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
target photograph
V-2
V-weapon
-
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Wizernes
Description
An account of the resource
Sequence of six target photographs taken from the same aircraft at intervals during drop of tallboy. In the first image the bomb is visible in the bottom left quadrant, slightly further to the right in the second and in the third. The town bottom right in the first image moves the centre over the sequence. There is an extensively cratered area to the right of the town. All images are captioned with a number starting 199 and 'W.S., 24.6.44, 8", 16700, 122 degrees, E1., F., 617'. Sequence numbers 199-204. On the reverse in order '51:96/4 ,5, 6, 7, 8, 9'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-24
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Six b/w photographs
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-050008, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050009, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050010, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050011, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050014, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050015, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050016, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050017, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050018, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050019, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050020, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050021
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-24
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
617 Squadron
aerial photograph
bombing
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
target photograph
V-2
V-weapon
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16594/MCheshireGL72021-181210-050007.2.jpg
f53f2525cc09a1f7bb822961b7a0b3b2
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Wizernes
Description
An account of the resource
Note 'WIZERNES, THE WHOLE TARGET AREA NOW APPEARS ONE MASS OF CRATERS. REPAIRS ARE POSSIBLY IN POXXXXXX PROGRESS ON THE W. SIDE OF THE "DOME" SHAPED UNIT. THE RAILWAY LINES AND OTHER ROAD APPROACHES HAVE BEEN SEVERED IN MANY PLACES. THE WHOLE AREA IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS APPEARS TO LACK ANY SIGN OF ACTIVITY'.
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Correspondence
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-050007
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One-page typewritten note
bombing
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
V-2
V-weapon
-
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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16593/MCheshireGL72021-181210-050006.1.jpg
4f54bfafc34da4c4c8dd98409b858f2b
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[underlined] DATE [/underlined]: 24th. JUNE 1944.
[underlined] TARGET [/underlined]: CONSTUCTIONAL WORKS, WIZERNES.
[underlined] ZERO HOUR [/underlined]: 1750 HOURS.
[underlined] CREWS [/underlined]:
[underlined] LEADER & MARKER NO.1 [/underlined]]: W/Cdr. Cheshire [underlined] A/C. Letter [/underlined]: Mos ‘N’
Navigator: F/O. Kelly
[underlined] Bomb Load [/underlined]:
4 Smoke Bombs
2 Red Spot Fires.
[underlined] MARKER NO.2 [/underlined]: F/L. Fawke. [underlined] A/C. Letter [/underlined]: Mos. ‘Q’
Navigator: F/O. Bennett
[underlined] Bomb Load [/underlined]:
4 Smoke Bombs
2 Red Spot Fires.
[underlined] DEPUTY LEADER [/underlined]: S/Ldr. Munro. [underlined] A/C. Letter [/underlined]: ‘W’
F/Ebgineer [sic]: F/S. Appleby.
Navigator: F/L Rumbles. [underlined] Bomb Load [/underlined]: 1 ‘Tallboy’
W/Operator: F/O. Pigeon.
A/G. M.U.: P/O. Howarth.
Air Bomber: F/L. Astbury.
A/G. Rear: F/O. Weeks.
[underlined] CAPTAIN [/underlined]: S/Ldr. McCarthy. [underlined] A/C. Letter [/underlined]: ‘Y’
F/Engineer: F/O. Radcliffe.
Navigator: F/O. MacLean. [underlined] Bomb Load [/underlined]: 1 ‘Tallboy’
W/Operator: W/O. Eaton.
A/G. M.U.: W/O. Batson.
Air Bomber: F/O. Daniel.
A/G. Rear: F/L. Rodger.
Front Gunner: P/O. Heggie.
[page break]
[underlined] CREWS [/underlined]:
[underlined] CAPTAIN [/underlined]: F/L. Wilson. [underlined] A/C. Letter [/underlined]: ‘N’
F/Engineer: F/S. Cherrington.
Navigator: F/O. Stott. [underlined] Bomb Load [/underlined]: 1 ‘Tallboy’
W/Operator: F/O. Allen.
A/G. M.U.: F/S. Vaughn.
Air Bomber: F/O. Finlay.
A/G. Rear: F/L. Chandler.
[underlined] CAPTAIN [/underlined]: F/L. Poore. [underlined] A/C. Letter [/underlined]: ‘O’
Navigator: F/O. Roberts.
F/Engineer: F/S. Johnson. [underlined] Bomb Load [/underlined]: 1 ‘Tallboy’
W/Operator: F/S. Thompson.
A/G. M.U.: F/S. Tookey.
Air Bomber: F/O. Elsey.
A/G. Rear: F/S. Castleman.
[underlined] CAPTAIN [/underlined]: F/L. Clayton. [underlined] A/C. Letter [/underlined]: ‘H’
F/Engineer: F/O. Hill.
Navigator: F/O. Buttle. [underlined] Bomb Load [/underlined]: 1 ‘Tallboy’
W/Operator: F/O. Chalmers.
A/G. M.U.: F/S. Sharp.
Air Bomber: F/O. Watson.
A/G. Rear: F/S. Hume.
[underlined] CAPTAIN [/underlined]: F/L. Williams. [underlined] A/C. Letter [/underlined]: ‘B’
F/Engineer: Sgt. Soilleux.
Navigator: F/O. Talbot. [underlined] Bomb Load [/underlined]: 1 ‘Tallboy’
W/Operator: F/S. Potter.
A/G. M.U.: F/S. Blagdon.
Air Bomber: F/O. Walker.
A/G. Rear: Sgt. Mathews.
Front Gunner: Sgt. Craig.
[underlined] CAPTAIN [/underlined]: F/L. Edwards. [underlined] A/C. Letter [/underlined]: ‘C’
F/Engineer: F/O. King.
Navigator: F/O. Pritchard. [underlined] Bomb Load [/underlined]: 1 ‘Tallboy’
W/Operator: F/S. Hobbs.
A/G. M.U.: P/O. Johnston.
Air Bomber: F/S. Brook.
A/G. Rear: F/S. Isherwood.
Front Gunner: F/S. Price.
[page break]
[underlined] CAPTAIN [/underlined]: F/L. Howard. [underlined] A/C. Letter [/underlined]: ‘D’
F/Engineer: Sgt. Hawkins.
Navigator: F/O. MacDonald. [underlined] Bomb Load [/underlined]: 1 ‘Tallboy’
W/Operator: F/S. Lucan.
A/G. M.U.: W/O. Woods.
Air Bomber: F/S. Hartley.
A/G. Rear: F/S. Clarke.
[underlined] CAPTAIN [/underlined]: F/O. Ross. [underlined] A/C. Letter [/underlined]: ‘R’
F/Engineer: F/O. Girling.
Navigator: F/O. Davies. [underlined] Bomb Load [/underlined]: 1 ‘Tallboy’
W/Operator: F/S. Hickson.
A/G. M.U.: F/O. Platt.
Air Bomber: W/O. McClellan.
A/G. Rear: F/O. Tuxford.
[underlined] CAPTAIN [/underlined]: F/O. KNIGHTS. [underlined] A/C. Letter [/underlined]: ‘A’
F/Engineer: P/O. Twells.
Navigator: F/O. Rhude. [underlined] Bomb Load [/underlined]: 1 ‘Tallboy’
W/Operator: F/O. Hosie.
A/G. M.U.: F/S. Pengelly.
Air Bomber: P/O. Bell.
A/G. Rear: F/S. Derham.
[underlined] CAPTAIN [/underlined]: F/O. Willsher. [underlined] A/C. Letter [/underlined]: ‘T’
F/Engineer: F/S. Hurdiss.
Navigator: F/O. Playford. [underlined] Bomb Load [/underlined]: 1 ‘Tallboy’
W/Operator: P/O. Bell.
A/G. M.U.: F/S. Salter.
Air Bomber: P/O. Everett.
A/G. Rear: F/O. Witherick.
[underlined] CAPTAIN [/underlined]: F/O. Kell. [underlined] A/C. Letter [/underlined]: ‘P’
F/Engineer: P/O Clark.
Navigator: F/O. Hager. [underlined] Bomb Load [/underlined]: 1 ‘Tallboy’
W/Operator: P/O. Evans.
A/G. M.U.: P/O. Snell.
Air Bomber: F/O. Morieson.
A/G. Rear: Sgt. Ronald.
[page break]
[underlined] CREWS [/underlined]:
[underlined] CAPTAIN [/underlined]: F/O. Cheney. [underlined] A/C. Letter [/underlined]: ‘V’
F/Engineer: Sgt. Rosher.
Navigator: P/O. Welch. [underlined] Bomb Load [/underlined]: 1 ‘Tallboy’
W/Operator: F/S. Pool.
A/G. M.U.: F/S. McRostie.
Air Bomber: F/S. Curtis.
A/G. Rear: F/S. Wait.
[underlined] CAPTAIN [/underlined]: F/L. Reid. [underlined] A/C. Letter [/underlined]: ‘S’
F/Engineer: F/S. Stewart.
Navigator: F/O. Peltier. [underlined] Bomb Load [/underlined]: 1 ‘Tallboy’
W/Operator: F/O. Luker.
A/G. M.U.: F/S. Holt.
Air Bomber: P/O. Rolton.
A/G. Rear: W/O. Hutton.
[underlined] CAPTAIN [/underlined]: F/O. Stanford. [underlined] A/C. Letter [/underlined]: ‘F’
F/Engineer: Sgt. Judson.
Navigator: P/O. Butler. [underlined] Bomb Load [/underlined]: 1 ‘Tallboy’
W/Operator: W/O. Jordon.
A/G. M.U.: F/S. Griffiths.
Air Bomber: W/O. Clarke.
A/G. Rear: F/O. Jewell.
[underlined] CAPTAIN [/underlined]: P/O. Gingles. [underlined] A/C. Letter [/underlined]: ‘L’
F/Engineer: Sgt. Henderson.
Navigator: F/O. Beale. [underlined] Bomb Load [/underlined]: 1 ‘Tallboy’
W/Operator: W/O. Riley.
A/G. M.U.: F/L. Scott-Kiddie.
Air Bomber: F/S. Hazell.
A/G. Rear: F/O. Hal
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Crew list for Wizernes operation
Description
An account of the resource
Date 24 June 1944, target, zero hour 1750 hours. Lists leader and marker no 2 crews in Mosquito and sixteen crews in Lancaster all armed with Tallboy bombs.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-06-24
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Four page typewritten document
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Service material
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-050003, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050004. MCheshireGL72021-181210-050005, MCheshireGL72021-181210-050006
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-24
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Steve Christian
David Bloomfield
617 Squadron
aircrew
bombing
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
Lancaster
Mosquito
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Tallboy
target indicator
V-2
V-weapon
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1252/16592/MCheshireGL72021-181210-050002.1.jpg
3182b48bff1f1a46d36e1f65c789690e
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Cheshire, Leonard
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard
Baron Cheshire
Description
An account of the resource
374 items concerning Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC, OM, DSO & Two Bars, DFC. Collection consists of photographs of people, vehicles, places, aircraft, weapons and targets; documents including, private and service letters, signals, telegrams, intelligence reports, crew lists and official documents. Cheshire served on 102 and 35 Squadrons and commanded 76 and 617 Squadrons. The collection includes details of 617 Squadron's precision bombing operations. Also included are two sub-collections: one containing 21 photographs of Tinian and Saipan, the other consisting of 37 audio tapes of speeches given by Cheshire after the war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by The Leonard Cheshire Archive and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
underlined] CONSTRUCTIONAL WORKS, WIZERNES. [/underlined] [underlined] DAYS 20th,22nd,24th. JUNE [/underlined].
[underlined] NARRATIVE. [/underlined]
The Squadron continued to stand by, during day and night, for further attacks on Constructional Works. The next target to be allocated was that at Wizernes, which lies some three or four miles south of St. Omer.
The weather remained unfavourable and two abortive sorties were flown, the first on the 20th. June and the second on the 22nd. June. In both cases adverse conditions were encountered over the target and all the aircraft had to bring their bombs back to Base.
Favourable weather was forecast on the 24th June and 2 Mosquitoes and 16 Lancasters were detailed and took off for the attack. Extremely clear weather was found over the target and as it was considered that the red spot fires, previously used as markers, would not show up well F/Lt. Fawke dropped four smoke bombs to act as area markers. The Aiming Point was extremely difficult to identify and the large number of bomb craters already in existence in the immediate target area and for some miles around did not help in this difficult task.
Intense and accurate heavy flak was met on the run in and at 1749 1/2 hours Aircraft ‘G’, F/Lt. Edwards, was seen to have been hit in the port wing. The aircraft lost height slowly at first with flames spreading from the wing to the tailplane, as the rate of descent increased, three members of the crew were seen to bale out and the plane eventually crashed in flames. F/O. Knight’s aircraft was also hit but the damage was not serious.
All the aircraft bombed visually but their efforts were somewhat hampered by the large amount of chalk dust and smoke thrown up by bomb bursts. Four bombs fell around the dome shaped construction peculiar to this target and two were seen to fall on the railway tracks leading into the target, but apart from these bombs results were unobserved.
Flak opposition remained intense and accurate throughout the bombing and route out. Fortunately there were no further casualties and no further damage sustained.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Constructional works, Wizernes, days 20th, 22nd, 24th June, narrative
Description
An account of the resource
States that the next constructional works target was at Wizernes three or four miles south of St Omer. Reports two abortive sorties due to weather on 20th and 22nd June. Favourable weather forecast for 24 June. Two Mosquitos and 16 Lancasters took off for attack. Describes marking and difficulty in identifying aiming point due to large number of existing craters. Describes heavy defensive fire and one aircraft shot down and another damaged. All aircraft bombed visually but aiming hampered by chalk dust and smoke.
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Service material
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCheshireGL72021-181210-050002
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-06-20
1944-06-22
1944-06-24
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Cheshire, Leonard. Bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
License
A legal document giving official permission to do something with the resource.
Royalty-free permission to publish
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Steve Christian
David Bloomfield
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One-page typewritten document
anti-aircraft fire
bombing
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
Lancaster
Mosquito
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
shot down
target indicator
V-2
V-weapon