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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/743/20634/BCleggPVWilsonDv1.1.pdf
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Title
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Clegg, Peter Vernon
P V Clegg
Description
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Eight items and five sub-collections. Main collection contains a log of Pathfinder operations from RAF Wyton 1943 -1944, histories of the Avro repair facility at Bracebridge Heath, and Langar, a biography of Squadron Leader David James Baikie Wilson, biography of Squadron Leader Lighton Verdon-Roe, a book - Test Pilots of A.V. Roe & Co Ltd - S.A. 'Bill' Thorn, and two volumes of book - Roy Chadwick - no finer aircraft designer, Sub-collections contain a total of 29 items concerning the Aldborough Dairy and Cafe as well as biographical material, including log books for Alan Gibson, Peter Isaacson, Alistair Lang and Charles Martin. <br /><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1772">Aldborough Dairy and Cafe</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1768">Gibson, Alan</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1769">Isaacson, Peter</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1770">Lang, Alastair</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1771">Martin, Charles</a><br /><br /><br />The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Peter Clegg and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2015-07-02
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
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Clegg, PV
Transcribed document
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Transcription
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[underlined] A bomber pilot’s journey through WWII. [/underlined] Page 1.
(A Veteran from 617 Squadron – David Wilson).
Sqd. Ldr. David James Baikie Wilson, DSO, DFC and Bar – Head of Aerodynamic Development and Testing, and Test-Pilot, A.V. Roe & Co Ltd.
April 8th 1946 to August 23rd 1947 (killed in Tudor crash)
David James Baikie Wilson was born on January 16th 1917, in Highgate, London, to his Scottish mother and Norfolk-born father. His mother came from a tough sea-faring family called Baikie living in [inserted] Brisbane Street, [/inserted] Greenock, on the River Clyde, to the west of Glasgow. From her, David inherited a great resolution of character, and from his father he acquired a brilliant academic brain – a combination that does not often lead to its owner becoming a test-pilot.
David was the only child in the family, and his mother inserted the name of her Sea-Captain father, James Baikie, between “David” and “Wilson” to perpetuate the family name – as is the wont of many Scottish families.
David’s father and mother had moved down to North London prior to the birth, and remained in that area while he grew up. Attending the local Kingsbury County School, and later Berkbeck College in Fetter Lane, David soon proved himself extremely bright, academically, obtaining [inserted] School Certificate [/inserted] “Distinctions” in Pure Maths, General Physics and Chemistry and “Credits” in Advanced Maths, French, History and English. He left the College with Higher School Certificate in Pure and Applied Maths, Chemistry and Physics, and then went straight to London University, to try to gain a degree in some of these subjects. True to his academic form, he gained a B.Sc. (General) in Chemistry, Physics and Pure Maths in July 1937 and then studied Chemistry for a further two years, gaining a “First” in the “Special” B.Sc. category and [inserted] starting work at the British Oxygen Company in November 1938. [/inserted]
Combining a taste for something more exciting, with his studying, David was already very keen
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on aircraft and flying, and as the inevitable War loomed up he joined the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve (RAFVR), and was called up for deferred service in January 1940, training at Hendon (his nearest RAF base) for six months until June that year. Then he was called up properly to attend initial RAF training and selection, and spent the next two months being drilled and graded – as David had hoped – for pilot training in the Commonwealth. September 1940 saw him arrive in Southern Rhodesia at No 25 Elementary Flying Training School at Salisbury, and his pilot training started on September 18th with his first flight there in a Tiger Moth flown by his instructor, Flt/Sgt Marsden.
[Underlined] Pilot Training in Rhodesia [/underlined]
Flying in the [inserted] dry, [/inserted] sunny climate of Southern Rhodesia, David was able to [inserted] thoroughly [/inserted] enjoy his airborne experiences, and progress rapidly with the training routine. He went solo after 18 hrs 25 mins dual flying – indicative not so much of his own ability but the steady and rigorously adhered to procedures followed at the EFTS there, to cut down the early accident rate. It was not a spectacular time in which to go solo – rather the opposite – but David learned slowly but surely, and once learned, he never forgot, becoming a very sure-handed pilot.
Training progressed rapidly – David making three or four flights a day at times, and a lot of attention was paid to aerobatics, spinning, forced landing practice, and even night flying on the Tiger Moth! Some instrument flying was also done on the Tiger, and – a curious exercise – “abandoning an aircraft in flight”. His qualifying Cross-Country on October 31st was from Salisbury to Gatooma and back, and then he was posted out the same day, categorised a “Average” as a pilot, and recommended for “twin-engined types” in furthur training. He had gained his “Wings” on the Tiger Moth.
After a weeks’ leave, David now attended the No 21 S.F.T.S. at [inserted] Kumalo, [/inserted] Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia, to start training on Oxford aircraft. He had by now clocked up 65 hrs flying, 28 hrs 30 min of which
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was solo. His first flight in an Oxford was now made on November 11th 1940, with his [inserted] new [/inserted] instructor, Flying Officer Wood. David actually failed his first solo test on the Oxford, but managed all right on the second occasion, on November 14th, and from there on never looked back. As the training progressed, he passed a “Height-Test”, “Navigation”, “Navigator Test”, “Cross-Country”, “Low-flying”, “triangular cross-country on instruments”, “Formation”, “Progress”, and finally his passing-out test by the Chief Flying Instructor, Sqd. Ldr Hendrikz. With a total of 115 hrs now (55 hr 55 mins solo), David passed the first stage of the twin-engined Oxford Course on Dec 18th 1940, again classified as “Average” as a pilot.
The second stage started on December 30th now concentrating on tactical flying – making reconnaissance sorties, low-level bombing practice, and a lot of instrument and cross-country flying. There were night landings by floodlight, and many more low-level bombing runs at 1,000 ft, during which David’s mean bomb-dropping error crept down from 126 yds to 88 yds, and finally to 42 yds on average. Then they indulged in a bit of aerial gunnery from the Oxford, firing 90 rounds off from the Oxford’s single target gun. Near the end of the course, there were “ZZ” approaches, photography – “stereo pairs”, and “line-overlap”, and finally, formation flying. David passed out of No 21 S.F.T.S on February 12th 1941, with an “Average” grading again, having now flown 163 hrs 35 mins, of which 99 hrs 15 mins was solo. He was now posted to No 11 Operational Training Unit on Wellington bombers, at Bassingbourn, back in England.
[Underlined] Operations with 214 Squadron [/underlined]
At Bassingbourne [sic] David rapidly completed a further 75 hrs 40 mins flying on Wellington IO and IA aircraft, starting on May 21st 1941. He solo-ed on the Wellington after some 21 hrs 10 mins “dual” and “2nd pilot” flying, and then started to do a lot of night flying ranging from “circuits and bumps” to cross-country flying, mock bombing raids, air-to-air firing [inserted] and [/inserted] a North Sea Sweep. [Deleted] and [/deleted] Cross-country instrument flying was invariably from Bassingbourne [sic] to Wittering and Andover
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to Upper Heyford and return. At the end of all this, on June 26th 1941, David passed out of the O.T.U. and was posted to No 214 [inserted] (Federated Malay States) [/inserted] Squadron based at RAF Stradishall in Suffolk. This Squadron – as its name implies – was supported by the Malay Federation in WWII and several aircraft were paid for by funds raised in the States, including a Wellington II, W5442* coded BU-V, which David Wilson flew the first evening he arrived at the Squadron. After having an “Air Test” with one of the Flight Commanders, Sqd. Ldr. Field, in the morning of July 9th, David flew as Second Pilot to the Squadron Leader that same evening on his first operation – carrying a 4,000 lb “dookie” to drop on Osnabruk.** The raid was carried out by a total of 57 Wellingtons from No 3 Group, and, as discovered after the War, not many bombs fell on the target area. Two Wellingtons were lost that night, but David returned safely.
Only five days later, David was off on his next operation – this time to Bremen, to drop three 500 lb bombs and clusters of incendiaries. After this, raids followed in quick succession every two or three nights; Cologne, Rotterdam, Mannheim, Hamburg, Hanover, Duisburg, Keil, etc. Each time David was flying as Second Pilot to the Squadron Leader, or to a Sgt. Foxlee. On the night of July 25/26th, after raiding Hamburg with Sgt. Foxlee, they had to divert to Debden on the return, as their own base had poor weather and low visibility. The same thing happened on August 12th, on their return from Hanover, but this time David and Sqd. Ldr. Field diverted to Newmarket instead.
At this time, these attacks were mostly being directed at German ports, shipping and naval bases, or railway yards, but [inserted] their [/inserted] accuracy – or [inserted] the [/inserted] damage [inserted] caused [/inserted] - at this stage in the war, in hindsight, did not reach any great measure of success.
David recorded his longest operational flight so far on September 7th 1941, when he acted as Second pilot again for a Pilot Officer Barnard, and they bombed Berlin, taking 8 hrs 15 mins for the entire flight. Two sorties later – and on his own 6th operation – David was
* This Wellington was named “Sri Guroh” and had already completed some 25 successful raids before David flew it.
** See appendix 4 for details.
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the Captain of the aircraft for the first time, and this particular trip was a short one across the Channel to Le Havre. He flew a Wellington IC, N2850, but there was ten tenths cloud over the target, and they eventually dropped their bombs in the sea before returning to base
After this, David was the Captain on all his future operations, which included an attack on Hamburg on the night of September 29th carrying a 4,000 lb High Capacity blast bomb – and flying W5442, the old aircraft of the O.C. “B” flight, Sqd Ldr Field.
David was now allocated Wellington IC X9979 for his own crew to use, and this “Wimpy” stayed with him from October 2nd 1941 right up to the end of David’s tour of operations on January 31st 1942.
Many of his raids in October over the German sea ports were plagued by solid cloud cover, or bad weather, and they often bombed “blind” over the top of the targets. On November 7th David set out for Berlin again with six 500 lb bombs, but there was extremely bad cloud and icing over Germany, and Berlin, and so he unloaded his bombs over Osnabruck instead, on the return journey. This was one of Bomber Command’s biggest raids on Berlin to date, and there would be no more large raids on the capital until January 1943. The weather was equally bad over England on the return, and David [inserted] had to [/inserted] divert to another airfield.
Back [inserted] on [/inserted] September 1st, David and others in 214 Squadron began a series of low-level bombing practices, flying over their ranges at [inserted] Foxcote at [/inserted] 200 ft and dropping six bombs at a time. By December 9th they were dropping up to eight practice bombs a time, and on the 11th David, again flying at only 200 ft, dropped a massive 4,000 lb bomb from this low altitude! The end of the year 1941 arrived with David bombing Brest on December 23rd and 27th, trying to hit the Port area.
In January 1942, David was sent to Brest on four more occasions, having to divert to land at Harwell on one of these raids because of bad weather on the return. On January 21st he flew to Bremen to drop a 4,000 lb HC bomb, and then on the 28th came the final “Op” of the Tour – a raid on Münster. The cloud cover was again so bad that they returned home without dropping the bombload, and diverted to Waterbeach to land. David had safely completed his first Operational Tour, having flown
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289 hrs 50 mins in all with 214 Squadron, of which 199 hrs 35 mins were on actual operations. * He was now graded as “Above Average” as a pilot by 214’s C.O., Sqd. Ldr. Carr.
[Underlined] Becoming a Flying Instructor [/underlined]
For his traditional rest from operations, David was now posted to No1 Flying Instructors School at Church Lawford, near Rugby. He arrived there on February 24th 1942,[inserted] to start on the No22 War Course, and [/inserted] to be trained to teach others how to fly multi-engined aircraft. This course here lasted to April 21st, and during this time he was given intensive instruction on Oxford I’s and II’s, and (surprisingly enough) on some single-engined pre-war Avro Tutors!
David underwent day and night instruction, his mentor being a Flt. Lt. Mann, and sessions of any of the half dozen Avro Tutors were interspersed with the twin-engined flights on Oxford trainers. Between March 27th and April 2nd, he was sent down to Upavon to pass the 24th “Beam Approach” Course with flying honours (being graded “Above Average” again, and “Fit to Instruct”). This Course, in fact, was run as part of the Central Flying Scool [sic] of the RAF.
Then it was back to Church Lawford on the Oxford and Tutor, until he was finally passed out as a qualified instructor on April 20th 1942, rated as “Average” on both single and twin-engined aircraft.
[Inserted] David had been commissioned as a Pilot Officer out in Rhodesia, and on completion of this Course was made up to a Flying Officer, preparatory to commencing duties as an Instructor at RAF College Cranwell. [/inserted]
He arrived at Cranwell on May 1st [inserted] as a “B” Category Flying Instructor [/inserted] to start to instruct pupils at the College [inserted] Flying Training School [/inserted] how to fly the Oxford. Most of these were ordinary Leading Aircraftsmen (LAC’s) or Corporals, or Lieutenants (presumably the College Officer Cadets). By late June, a few Miles Master II single-engined trainers had been acquired, and David instructed on these as well. And at the
* See appendix 4 for details.
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end of July he was posted to No 7 Flying Instructors School at Upavon. This time to train others how to become “Instructors”!
David was becoming restless to be back on operations again, but had to put up with the daily round of flying Oxfords, Magisters and Masters again at Upavon, until the beginning of November 1942, when the CFI, Wing Cmdr GFR Donaldson, graded him out as “Above Average” again on David’s posting to 196 Squadron – a brand new night-bomber squadron formed on November 7th at Driffield in Yorkshire.
[Underlined] Second Tour, with 196 Squadron [/underlined]
David reported to 196 Squadron at Driffield on November 7th, and then was immediately sent off on a new Course called the “Captains of Aircraft” at Cranage [inserted] near Holmes Chapel [/inserted] in South Cheshire. It was the 12th intake at this Course, and David was lectured there on Navigation, and had to undertake six long cross-country exercises on Ansons, flown by a Course pilot, with David and two others on board having to act as Navigators in turn. The Course was an adjunct of the RAF’s Central Navigation School, and was intended to refine operational Captain’s navigating skills, for posting them to Coastal Command, or to Bomber stations where new 4-engined bombers with only one pilot were the norm.
While he was posted to Cheshire over the Christmas period of 1942/43 [inserted] Dec 21st to January 3rd [/inserted], David had some chance to attend some local functions and festivities, as he did not have time to return to his parents in Hendon. It was while the Station was giving a Dance for local people that David met a Cheshire girl called Elsie, who worked at a nearby I.C.I. Works connected with the Salt industry Elsie was a very personable girl, with a number of boyfriends, and David was a shy and quiet person, but the two became immediate friends, and kept up correspondence with each other when David re-joined 196 Squadron (now moved to Leconfield) after Christmas. One other course David had to attend for a few days, was at Westcott in Buckinghamshire, at No 1 Engine Control Demonstration Unit (E.C.D.U), to learn “Engine Handling”
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and “Petrol Consumption” there on the Wellington Mk III. (No flying was involved). Finally, on January 14th 1943, he took to the air at Leconfield on Wellington X HE179, to try some “circuits and bumps” on this new Mark of the bomber He then had a few “working-up” flights to get his [inserted] brand- [/inserted] new crew shaken down, trying out air-to-air firing with his gunners, and practice bombing using [inserted] new [/inserted] infra-red photography to record the results.
David’s first sortie with 196 Squadron [inserted] and the Squadron’s second operation [/inserted] was on the night of February 7th 1943, when he dropped seven 500 lb bombs on a new type of “area-bombing” raid on French ports with German U-Boat pens. This directive had been issued by the War Cabinet on January 14th, and because the new U-boat pens of solid concrete were too thick to penetrate, the towns themselves were obliterated instead (the French civilians had been warned to evacuate them).
Some 323 aircraft bombed Lorient that night, with the [inserted] new [/inserted] Pathfinders marking the target well. Seven aircraft were lost, two being Wellingtons. David’s crew obtained a good infra-red photograph of the bomb bursts.
It was back again to Lorient on February 13th, this time forming part of a raid of 466 aircraft in all, and dropping over 1,000 tons of bombs for the first time on a Bomber Command target. The French town of Lorient received more devastation, but the U-boat pens survived. Then it was Cologne on the 14th, and Emden on the 17th, but the latter raid was abandoned by David’s aircraft, due to heavy cloud cover. Just six Wellingtons had been sent to Emden that night to test the infra-red bomb sights, but only three found the target, and bombed it. David brought all his bomb load back.
Before February finished, David had been to Cologne again on the 26th (where two of his three 500 lb bombs “hung up” and he had to return to base with them) and St Nazaire on the 28th (again dropping a “mix” of 500 lb bombs and incendiaries).
In March David went to Hamburg, Essen (twice) Duisberg and Bochum, dropping a 4,000 lb “Cookie” on one of the Essen raids. This was the beginning of the “Battle of the Ruhr”, devised now by Bomber Command to paralyse German Industry. There was an increasing flow of new four-engined bombers to the Squadrons, and a build-up of the Pathfinder
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Force and their new marking techniques using Mosquitos guided by Oboe equipment, * and Lancasters etc, to continue illuminating the markers dropped by the “Mossies”. All this now led to ever more accurate raids on the German Ruhr industrial zone.
The first Essen raid, on March 5th, was well marked by the Pathfinder Force (PFF), and David’s Wellington was in the second of three waves over the target – the Krupps industrial complex. This night marked Bomber Command’s 100,000th sortie of the war, and it is likely that David’s 4,000 lb bomb was one of the many that helped destroy an area of the Krupps works that night. A week later he was over the same target again, with the more usual mixture of 500 lb bombs (many fuzed for a long delay action) and incendiaries. Even more of Krupps was reduced to rubble that night.
David normally flew with a crew of four in his aircraft, and his regular crew consisted of Pilot Officer Parkin, Sgt. Wakeley, Flt. Sgt, Allen and Sgt. Lund. Occasionally he would take another Sgt. Pilot on board to give him operational experience for the odd flight or two (before he went off to captain his own aircraft). His O.C. in “A” Flight was Sqd Ldr Ian R.C. Mack, and the 196 Squadron C.O. at this time was Wing Cmdr. A.E. Duguid.
David only had one “Op” in April, to Kiel on the 4th, but May was another intensive month, with successful visits to Dortmund, Duisburg, Bochum and Düsseldorf. Most of the aircraft sent on these raids were now four-engines types, and of 110 Wellingtons sent to Dortmund, six were lost. The equivalent numbers [inserted] of Wellingtons [/inserted] sent to the other three points were: Duisburg 112 (10); Bochum 104 (6); and Düsseldorf 142 (6). The last two raids did not have the desired effects as the Germans were now starting decoy markers and fires outside the cities, to lure the PFF and bombing aircraft away. But the Duisburg raid had been highly successful, the Port and August Thyssen steel factories being badly hit.
[Inserted] On May15th [inserted] 1943 [/inserted] the [deleted] Press [/deleted] [inserted] London Gazette [/inserted] released the news that David had been awarded a Distinguished Flying Cross (D.F.C.), for (as the citation stated) “completing numerous [inserted] operational [/inserted] missions, flying on many occasions to targets such as Cologne, Berlin, Kiel and Hamburg, where the fiercest opposition is encountered.
“Since the beginning of his operational career, his single aim has been to press home his attacks as accurately and efficiently as possible, and in this he has had many successes. His courage, skill and determination against all hazards have been an inspiration to the Squadron”. [/inserted]
In June 1943, David flew sorties to Düsseldorf, Krefeld and Wuppertal, using his normal Wellington X HE901 on most flights (he
* “Oboe” was a system in which radio beams were sent out from English points, to cross over a specific target, and the RAF aircraft fitted with the receiving equipment could tell exactly when to drop their markers.
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had previously used HE170 and MS488 for long spells at a time, all with 196 Squadron’s code letters ZO-. Two of his crew had been commissioned by now – Wakeley and Allen had been made Pilot Officers. (David himself was now a Flight Lieutenant). The Düsseldorf raid was very successful, and that on Krefeld equally so, devastating the city centres. Just prior to the Krefeld raid on June 21st, some “Monica” sets had been fitted to some of 196 Squadron’s Wellingtons, HE901 being one of them. David and his crew had conducted air teats with the new equipment on June 16th and 17th, and aerial exercises with fighters, to try out the operational aspects. “Monica” was the code name given to equipment which, installed in RAF bombers, would give warning of the approach of German night-fighters from the rear. This radar equipment gave out its own transmissions however, and later in the war, when a German Ju88 night fighter landed by mistake at Woodbridge on July 15th 1944, it was discovered that its “Flensburg” radar transmission detector set could “home in” from 50 miles away onto an RAF aircraft using Monica. The increasing losses of Allied bombers was being blamed on Monica, [inserted] “H2S” radar, [/inserted] and “I.F.F.” (Identification Friend or Foe) signals emanating from their aircraft, and instructions were immediately given to remove all “Monica” sets, use “H2S” only sparingly, and switch off “IFF” altogether over German territory.
The raid on Wuppertal on June 24th 1943, in which David dropped an entire load of incendiaries, devastated the Elberfeld half of the town (the other half had already been hit). Some 94% of the town was destroyed that night. 630 aircraft having taken part, and 6 Wellingtons out of 101 being lost (together with 28 Lancasters, Halifaxes or Stirlings).
David now made the last operational sortie of his second Tour, to Cologne again on July 3rd 1943. He was flying Wellington X HE901 [deleted] again [/deleted], with a new member of crew, Flt. Lt. Reaks (who had replaced P/O Allen), and the PFF successfully marked the industrial area of the town, on the East bank of the Rhine. Again, David’s load consisted entirely of incendiaries, and they bombed the target accurately, but on returning to England after a flight lasting 5 hrs 5 mins, had to divert to Westcott, Bucks, because
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of ground fog and bad weather in the North. This raid was noted for something else – the beginning of mass night-time attacks by German night-fighters over the target area – something not met before by the RAF – where the Luftwaffe units attacked from above, using the mass of fires, target indicators (T.I.’s) and searchlights below as illumination for the bombers. On this raid 30 aircraft were lost out of 653 despatched – 12 being claimed by the Luftwaffe night fighters. In hindsight David was lucky to finish his second Tour at this point, as the RAF raids over Germany began to meet increasing fighter opposition, leading to many losses.
[Underlined] Lancaster Conversion Unit [/underlined]
Again classed as “Above Average” [inserted] in his recent capacity as “Master Bomber” of 196 Squadron [/inserted], David Wilson was now posted to a Lancaster Conversion Unit [inserted] No 1660 [/inserted] at RAF Swinderby, to convert to flying four-engined heavy bombers. The reason he had had a shorter Tour than usual at 196 Squadron was because the Squadron was moving [inserted] its [/inserted] base down South now, and re-equipping with Stirling bombers. David neither liked the Stirling, nor the future role of the Squadron, which was to be on glider-tug and troop dropping rôles, and so he had quickly opted to go for a Lancaster Squadron posting. [Inserted] He had in fact volunteered to join 617 Squadron (now known as the “Dambusters”), who were now looking for a few more seasoned and “Above Average” graded pilots to replace the eight lost on their famous raid of May 16th/17th. Only men of exceptional experience and calibre would be accepted, and all crews had to show a very high accuracy in their bombing experience. David’s name had gone forward for consideration by 617’s C.O., Wing Cmdr. Guy Penrose Gibson, V.C., DSO and Bar, DFC and Bar, who was still in charge but about to be posted onto a temporary staff duty as a rest (against his wishes!). Provided he converted to the Lancaster successfully, he would be accepted. [/inserted]
And so Flt. Lt. David Wilson started at Swinderby on July 23rd 1943, learning the tricks of flying the mighty Lancaster – an aircraft that would endear itself to him for life. The Course was not long, only five weeks, and finished on August 30th, when David had completed his multi-engine transition to the big Avro machine designed by Roy Chadwick. The Lancasters at the Unit were old Mk I’s from early production runs by A.V. Roe & Co Ltd at Manchester, or Metropolitan-Vickers at Trafford Park, and some had originally been laid down as Manchesters, and converted on the line.
David firstly had “circuits and landings” practice, then “stalling”, “three and two engine flying”, “fire action”, and “three-engine overshoots”. Then came cross-country exercises, “time and distance”
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runs (practicing dropping bombs after a measured run-in from a known geographical position) “corkscrewing” (to avoid fighters at night), and “fighter affiliation” (practice in being “attacked” by fighters). Finally David made some bombing runs, dropping four bombs on Wainfleet Sands, then eight (getting a mean error of only 71 yds from the target), and finally a round-the-UK cross-country flight at night, from Swinderby to Ely, Bicester, Sidmouth, St. Tudwells (where he dropped two bombs, and hit the target), Strangford [inserted] Lough [/inserted] in N. Ireland Dumfries in Scotland, Aberdeen and back home! A large part of the return trip was flown on three-engines, the whole flight taking 5 hrs 35 mins – just like a typical raid over Germany.
Wing Cmdr. Everitt, the CO. of 1660 Conversion Unit, passed David out [inserted] on August 30th [/inserted] as “Above Average” once again on the Lancaster this time, and David thus had his posting to 617 Squadron confirmed, and joined them the same day at Coningsby, Lincolnshire. [Deleted] – the already famous 617 Squadron, otherwise known now as the “Dambusters”. [/deleted]
[Underlined] Joining the “Dambusters” [/underlined]
David Wilson joined 617 Squadron on August 30th 1944, the date the Squadron moved its home from Scampton to Coningsby, in Lincolnshire. Since its famous [inserted] first [/inserted] raid on the German dams on the night of May 16th/17th 1944, [sic] the Squadron had [inserted] briefly [/inserted] returned to [deleted] a rest period, and started [/deleted] operations again on July 15, raiding power stations in Northern Italy and landing [inserted] at Blida [/inserted] in N. Africa afterwards. [Inserted] (Blida was a [inserted] captured [/inserted] Allied aerodrome a few miles south-west of Algiers, in French North Africa). The Squadron’s third raid had been on the Italian port of Leghorn on the way back from Blida. And its fourth was a mass leaflet raid on major Italian cities on July 29th 1943, after which the aircraft landed at Blida again. (This time they positioned back to England without raiding any target on the way). [/inserted] With its high level of training [deleted] and accuracy [/deleted] in bomb dropping especially [inserted] at low level [/inserted] the Squadron was now being used for attacks on major targets which required a great deal of accuracy in placing their weapons. These targets by definition, were also likely to be very heavily defended.
David was airborne on September 1st, the second day after he arrived at Coningsby, and was promptly sent off on a low-level cross country. (With the “Dambusters”, low level meant just that – at 200 to 330 ft altitude! [inserted] all the way [/inserted]). Wing Cmdr Guy Gibson, VC, DSO and Bar, DFC and Bar had just relinquished command of the Squadron [inserted] on August 3rd) [/inserted] to [inserted] Acting [/inserted] Wing Cmdr George Holden, DSO, DFC [inserted] and Bar? [/inserted]
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and there were 10 [deleted] complete [/deleted] Lancaster [deleted] crews [/deleted] pilots left at that moment out of the original 21 that had been in the Squadron when the raid on the Dams was mounted. * Apart from David, the other new pilots [inserted] ① who had joined 617 since the Dams raid were F.O. W.H. Kellaway, DSO; at the end of June; P.O. B. [deleted] (“Bunny”) [/deleted] W. Clayton, DFC, CGM, early in July; [deleted] and [/deleted] Flt. Lt. R.A. Allsebrook, DSO, DFC, also early in July; [inserted] and Flt. Lt. E.E.G. [inserted] (“Ted”) [/inserted] Youseman, DFC, at the end of July. (Ted came from David Wilson’s old 214 Squadron). [/inserted]. All these pilots – like David – brought their old crews along with them as well, and so all eight men in each Lancaster found themselves suddenly flying with the famous “Dambusters”. One of these new arrivals had also crashed on August 5th on Ashley Walk Bombing Ranges, when it hit the slipstream of another Lancaster, but luckily the crew survived, but with the exception of one gunner did not fly with 617 again. [/inserted]
The [inserted] surviving [/inserted] Lancasters which had been used for the Dams raid were in the process of being returned to A.V. Roe & Co to have the special fittings removed and the enlarged (bulged) bomb doors put in their place. For the purpose of keeping the crews in training, however, other Lancasters had to be borrowed or drafted in, and the Lancaster which David flew on September 1st was one such – ED735 (KC-R) from 44 Squadron (where it had been called KM-K). This Lancaster had just [inserted] ② been fitted with new “deep-section bomb doors by Avros, to take the new 12,000 lb High Capacity Blast bombs, and was sent to the A&AEE at Boscombe Down this month, to measure the Position Errors. [/inserted]
The Dambusters had moved from a grass airfield at Scampton, to one with hard runways at Coningsby and were sharing the latter airfield now with other Lancaster Squadrons. [Deleted] No 619 [/deleted] (Another Lancaster Squadron that would henceforth [deleted] to [/deleted] work closely with 617 was No 619 [inserted] - based nearby at Woodhall Spa - [/inserted] ) David flew Lancaster EE144 (KC-S) on September 14th – this aircraft was normally used by Sqn Ldr. Holden.
David was [inserted] then [/inserted] engaged in intensive low-level cross-country flying for the first two weeks of September, working himself and his crew up to the required accuracy of bombing, air firing, and low-level navigating as befitted the high standards expected of the specialist squadron. Two of these flights were on aircraft that had originally been on the Dams raid – ED886 (AJ-O flown then by P.O. Bill Townsend) and ED921 (AJ-W of Flt. Lt. Les Munro). These had been altered back to carry normal bombs, and in common with 617’s other permanent Lancasters were now fitted with new radio altimeters which could be set to give the pilot warning of dropping below, say, 75 ft above the ground (where a “hiccuph” could mean flying into the deck”).
All this preparation was for 617’s next scheduled raid on one of the War’s earliest, and by now most heavily defended targets – the Dortmund-Ems Canal. It had been decided to try to breach this by moonlight, and at low level. The canal was of vital importance to the German War industry, as it joined the steel plants of the Ruhr
*(for Note see over →③
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[Underlined] footnote ③ FOOTNOTE [/underlined]
* The original [inserted] 21 [/inserted] pilots of 617 Squadron at the time of their first operation – the Dams raid – consisted of Wing Cmdr. Guy Gibson, VC, DSO and Bar, DFC and Bar; Flt. Lt. J.V. Hopgood, DFC; Flt. Lt. H.B. Martin, DSO and Bar, DFC and two Bars, AFC; Sqd Ldr. H.M. Young, DFC; Flt. Lt. W. Astell, DFC; Flt. Lt. D.J.H. Maltby, DSO, DFC; Sqd. Ldr. Henry Maudslay, DFC; P.O. L.G. Knight, DSO; Flt.Lt. D.J. Shannon, DSO and Bar, DFC and Bar; Sqd. Ldr. J.C. McCarthy, DSO, DFC; Sgt. [inserted] V.W. [/inserted] Byers; Flt Lt R.N.G. Barlow; P.O. Geoff Rice, DFC; Flt. Lt. J.L. Munro, DSO, DFC; F.O. W.C. Townsend, CGM, DFM; Flt Sgt. K.W. Brown, CGM; Flt. Sgt. Cyril [inserted] T [/inserted] Anderson; P.O. [inserted] Warner [/inserted] Ottley; P.O. [inserted] L.J. [/inserted] Burpee (all of whom had flown on the raid); and P.O. W. [inserted] G. [/inserted] Divall and Flt. Lt. Harold [inserted] S. [/inserted] Wilson (both of whom had not been included on the Dams raid).
The [inserted] eight [/inserted] killed on the raid were Hopgood, Young, Astell, Maudsley, Byers, Barlow, Ottley [inserted[ and [/inserted] Burpee; Guy Gibson, of course, had now been rested from “Ops”; Cyril Anderson had decided to return to his original Squadron, and Bill Townsend had been posted away to 1668 Conversion Unit. All this left just 10 of the original pilots.
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with the Baltic, enabling iron ore from Sweden to be barged to the steelworks, and finished parts (Eg of U-boats) to be sent North to the German ports.
It was lucky for David that he was still getting into training at that moment. On a cross-country on September 13th, he practiced low-level bombing from 300ft and 500 ft, and gained a mean error of 73 yds from the target centre; and on September 14th he dropped bombs on the ranges from 200, 300, [inserted] and [/inserted] 400 ft high, and got his average error down to 36 yds.
David was assigned to “B” Flight, under the leadership of Flt. Lt. J.L. (“Les”) Munro (a survivor of the Dams raid who had been hit by flak en route to the Sorpe Dam and had had to turn back because the radio/intercom had been destroyed). But due to his “working-up” period, he was not selected for the raid on the Dortmund-Ems Canal on September 14th/15th. This was meticulously planned – as usual – and eight of 617’s Lancasters would take part, dropping new 12,000 lb High Capacity thin-cased, bombs from low level (fuzed for an adequate delay). The crews selected were the new C.O., George Holden, Dave Maltby, Les Knight, Dave Shannon, Harold Wilson [inserted] (no relation to David) [/inserted], Athelsie Allsebrook, Geoff Rice and Bill Divall. All but Holden, and Allsebrook [deleted] and Divall [/deleted] were survivors of the original 617 Squadron, and they set off on the evening of the 14th, but en route to the target received news back from a “recce” Mosquito in front, that the weather was too bad over the target area for low-level bombing. Regretfully they turned for home, but as they did so at low level over the North Sea, Maltby’s Lancaster hit someone else’s slipstream, dipped a wing into the sea, cartwheeled – and that was that. Maltby and his crew all perished.
Back home at Coningsby, they re-planned the raid for the next evening, the 15th, and Mick [deleted] y [/deleted] Martin just back from leave, filled Maltby’s place. [Inserted] David Wilson flew two more cross-country flights on this day, using one of the original Dams raid Lancasters, ED886 (AJ-O) [deleted] glued back again [/deleted] They were his last practices, and he was not called up for the raid that night. [/inserted] As the [inserted] others [/inserted] flew low over darkened Holland, Holden, flying with [inserted] Guy Gibson’s old crew [/inserted] and leading the two flights, was hit by flak and he climbed to avoid a church steeple in a small town while the others behind swung low around the outside of the built-up area. Holden’s Lancaster, trailing flames, went down and his 12,000 lb bomb exploded with a blinding flash of light.
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It was his 30th birthday.
Over the target area, a ground mist obscured the markers they dropped, there was a lot of light flak about, and the escorting Mosquitos found it difficult to silence the flak, and the 617 pilots found it very difficult to see the canal. Allsebrook, who now acted as leader, dropped his bomb and helped to direct others onto the target, but then disappeared. He had been shot down leaving the area. Knight, flying low, hit some trees which damaged his two port engines, and asked Mick Martin’s permission to jettison the bomb. He tried desperately to get home, but after allowing his crew to bale out over Holland, was killed trying to crash land the Lancaster alone.
Rice tried in vain for an hour to find the target, was holed by flak, jettisoned his bomb and managed to return home to Coningsby. Harold Wilson was hit by flak too, and had to crash-land his Lancaster with the bomb on board. It went up soon after, killing all on board before they could escape. Divall was [inserted] also hit and crashed. [/inserted]
// Dave Shannon flew around for 70 minutes, before he managed to spot the Canal and drop his bomb. It hit the towpath and did not seem to breach the canal banks. And Mick Martin flew around for a long 90 minutes, repeatedly getting hit by flak, and finally dropping his bomb on his 13th run in. He was two hours overdue when he landed back at Coningsby, to find only Shannon and Rice there before him. There were just the three Lancasters back, out of the eight that had set off. And nothing to show for the losses.
Next day Mick Martin was made a Squadron Leader by the A.O.C. No 5 Group, Air Vice-Marshal the Honourable Ralph Cochrane, and temporarily given command of 617 Squadron. Martin immediately volunteered to go back to the Canal the next night, and said there were six of them left who could try it (Martin himself, Shannon, Rice, Les Munro, Joe McCarthy and Ken Brown). In addition to these Martin could now call on the newly posted Captains - David Wilson, Ted Youseman and Bunny Clayton.
Fortunately Sir Ralph insisted on the three latest survivors being rested for 617’s next raid, on the Antheor Viaduct near Cannes in the South of France, on September 16th. And because
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this operation followed on without a break, the three “new boys”, and [inserted] the three veterans, [/inserted] Munro, McCarthy and Brown [deleted] (all had taken part on the original Dams raid) [/deleted] were supported by six Lancasters from 619 Squadron as well, and all placed under 619’s C.O., Wing. Cmdr. Abercromby.
[Underlined] The Anthéor Viaduct [deleted] preparing for the Tirpitz [/deleted] [/underlined]
It was against this backdrop of tragedy that David Wilson now flew his first “Op” for 617 Squadron. The atmosphere couldn’t have been worse, but morale was still high. Other Squadrons were [inserted] now [/inserted] beginning to call 617 the “Suicide Squadron”, and there were [inserted] noticeably [/inserted] fewer requests from other pilots to transfer to it [deleted] now [/deleted]! However, the intensive training, and the work involved in the briefing to the raids, kept David’s mind off all that (and the fact that his namesake, Harold Wilson, had died the night before).
This was 617’s seventh operation (including the first abortive Dortmund-Ems sortie), and the target was difficult to find, not counting hard to bomb accurately when they reached it. The main railway link between Central and Southern France and Italy, ran along the coast from Fréjus/St. Raphael to Cannes, and a typical curving viaduct lifted it across a ravine at a point just east of Cap du Dramont, a few miles on the Cannes side of St. Raphael. This little place was called Anthéor, and was 617’s next headache.
David flew in [inserted] company with the other 617 veterans, [/inserted] his “B” Flight Commander, Flt. Lt. John Leslie Munro, DFC, [inserted] RNZAF [/inserted], Pilot Officer Kenneth Charles McCarthy, DSO, DFC, [inserted] RCAF [/inserted], Pilot Officer Kenneth William Brown, CGM, RCAF, and two other “new boys”, Flt. Lt. “Ted” Youseman DFC, and Pilot Officer “Bunny” Clayton, DFC, CGM. Although the target was on France’s South coast, they were expected to return to England on this raid – not land in N. Africa.
David took Lancaster JB 139 on this raid, (coded KC-X and recently transferred from 49 Squadron). His bomb load included one 4,000 lb “Blockbuster” and three 1,000 lb bombs, and his crew consisted of Flt Sgt Hurrel, F.O. Parkin, Flt. Sgt. Barrow, P.O. Allen, Sgt Lowe and Sgt Mortlock. When they found their target, they jockeyed for position down the
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ravine to the sea, and David [inserted] and the others [/inserted] released their bombs from 300 ft. [Inserted] The idea was to lob the bombs onto or between the arches of the bridge, but all seemed to go through the arches instead. [/inserted] The viaduct seem [sic] unscathed, however, - although it and the rail tracks were peppered with holes – and they flew back in the knowledge it would probably need further attempt.
After a flight of 10 hrs 20 mins, David Wilson put his Lanc down at Predannack in Cornwall, to refuel, before flying back to Coningsby later.
[Underlined] Preparing for another Dams raid [/underlined]
Mick Martin was firmly in charge of the Squadron now, interviewing new would-be 617 pilots, thinking about a method of them taking flares with them on future raids to mark the target and make it easier for all to bomb, and liaising with the A.O.C. 5 Group with regard to future targets for 617.
In fact Cochrane was scheming up another attack on a dam, this time the big installation at Modane in Northern Italy, which lay deep in the hills. But Cochrane duped even Mick Martin for a time – he pretended it was to be a raid on the German battleship Tirpitz in a Norwegian fjord, and this required flying over the hills, down the steep slope, across a short stretch of water and then over the ship (in reality, the dam in Italy)!
So Martin went looking for a suitable site to practice on, and found a hillside near Bangor in N. Wales, near the coast, where he could get 617 to try flying down the face of the slope to level out over the sea. He experimented with putting down his landing flaps, to 40° or so, but found although the Lanc would sink down the hillside better, he had to exceed the max speed with flaps down by some 60 mph, and thus risk [inserted] their [/inserted] collapse – with undoubted fatal results to aircraft and crew.
David flew in [inserted] Mick Martin’s [/inserted] Lancaster (EE150 [inserted] coded KC-Z [/inserted]) to the scene on September 18, with Dave Shannon, (one of the three Flight Commanders, with Munro and McCarthy) in the cockpit beside him, and the two of them took it in turns to try flying up and over the hills that Mick Martin had found. Next day David was up in the Midlands [inserted] in the same aircraft [/inserted], this time with his
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own Flight Commander, Les Munro, the two of them doing practice runs across the Derwent reservoir at very low level, and then they tried the hill near Bangor again, Les trying it out and handing over to David. It was all intensely demanding work, and the adrenalin flowed very freely!
Between September 19th and 23rd, the “dams” type training intensified, David flying dummy attacks over Derwent reservoir in ED735 (KC-R) [inserted] on the 19th, [/inserted], then on September 20th he used Guy Gibson’s old aircraft ED932 (AJ-G) of Dams raid fame to take up one of the special “Upkeep” weapons that they still held in store and he dropped this on a dummy low-level attack in the Wash. (Guy Gibson’s old aircraft, unlike the majority that had survived the Dams raid, had [inserted] not yet [/inserted] been converted to have the bulged bomb-doors, and the old cylindrical “Upkeep” canister was used on the original Barnes Wallis-designed release mechanism). Then, in the next three days came low-level cross-country formation flying, dropping bombs on the Wainfleet ranges. David dropped the first lot (of four bombs), getting a mean error of 64 yds, and on the second occasion dropped eight bombs from 800 ft high. Then came a night time cross country at low level on astro fixes only, and finally a trip to Castle Kennedy, and Turnberry in Ayrshire, carrying 14 [inserted] staff [/inserted] passengers in connection with these trials.
However, the very next day, September 24th, came a complete change of policy, and training. The reason was the development of a new, more accurate bomb-sight, and its ability to deliver two large new weapons that Dr Barnes Wallis had been developing recently – the 12,000 lb streamlined “Tallboy” bomb, and its big brother, the 22,000 lb “Grand Slam”. The Chief of Bomber Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, had been agonising over the future rôle of 617 Squadron with Sir Ralph Cochrane, and had concluded that it should stay in the latter’s 5 Group, and now become a “Special Duties” Squadron. Cochrane, on his part, decided to press ahead with Wallis’ new weapons, and get 617 equipped as fast as possible with the new bob-sight, to start dropping these expensive weapons.
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[Underlined] The Stabilising Automatic Bomb-Sight. [/underlined]
This SABS sight had been developed at the RAE at Farnborough back in 1941 by a man called Richards, and used the gyro principle in its stabilising system. It had been held up in its development by the fact that although it was a great deal more accurate than its predecessors, it did require a very careful straight and level approach at high altitude, on the run in to the target. Consequently the likelihood of Bomber Command taking heavier casualties from flak and fighters because of this, had resulted in its being “shelved” for the time being. But now, the development of these special weapons merited another look at it. A certain Sqd. Ldr. Richardson was now despatched post haste from the RAE to 617 Squadron at Coningsby, to see the SABS fitted, and perfected, in their Lancasters.
From September 24th, therefore, everything changed in David’s training. No longer was it low-level dams-type exercises, but he flew in EE150 [inserted] (KC-Z) [/inserted] this day, with Joe McCarthy acting as Captain for some of the time, making [inserted] the first [/inserted] high level dummy runs with the new SABS fitted. The next day, David took Bunny Clayton up with him, and Sqd Ldr. Richardson (by now dubbed “Talking Bomb” by the Squadron, for his propensity to talk bomb-sights from the moment he woke, until the moment he went to sleep), to check out the SABS in EE150 again.
Sqd Ldr Richardson was busy fitting the new SABS into all the aircraft, and then checking the installation by flying with it. He also knew that it took two to be accurate – the pilot on the one hand (to fly at a given height, and airspeed, on the final run in), and the bomb aimer on the other (who had to feed the correct data into the sight, and advise the pilot when he strayed off the necessary heading/approach speed). With the Squadron C.O. (Mick Martin), Richardson then evolved a system of each pilot being checked out, by someone senior, and each bomb-aimer being paired with different pilots – cross-checking the results against each other.
Thus David [sic] third flight (on September 26th) was with Mick Martin (now elevated to Sqd. Ldr. status),
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and they did high level bombing (HLB) from 6,000 ft gaining an average bombing error of 60 yds (this altitude was not “high” in the view of most other squadrons – but where 617 was normally flying below tree-tops and between haystacks, 6,000 ft really was “high” to them!
Next day (the 27th) David had two training sorties – one taking up Ken Brown to show him the ropes, dropping bombs at Wainfleet from 10,000 ft this time, and recording a mean error of 61 yds; the next sortie being with Bunny Clayton and flying at 5,000 ft and 7,000 ft, recording an error of 50 yds. (It was getting better!)
Next day David took Geoff Rice up, and also made a sortie by himself. On the latter he dropped three bombs from 10,000 ft, but an error in the altimeter setting led to a mean drop error of 143 yds this time. All this showed how essential it was to get all the readings correct, and here they ran into the problem of calculating the exact [inserted] ground level [/inserted] barometric pressure reading over the target so as to be able to correct the altimeters to give their exact height. Another problem was to obtain absolutely accurate outside air temperatures, and the exact speed of the Lancaster (determined by a combination of airflow and Static Pressure vents in the instrumentation, and known errors (Position Errors) in the Static Pressure System (caused by the location of the vents in the fuselage airflow). All this was essential but complicated and the RAE and A&AEE had to make tests on the Lancasters to give 617 the most effective results, and to increase the accuracy of information fed into the SABS.
For a few days the weather held up training, but it resumed in October with a vengeance. David was flying different Lancasters on each sortie, a new [inserted] Mark III [/inserted] DV246 (KC-U) that had just been delivered, ED932 (Gibson’s old aircraft now recoded AJ-V) [inserted] for low-level sorties [/inserted], JB139 (KC-X), ED915 (AJ-Q), or EE146 (KC-K). He [inserted] sometimes [/inserted] went up three times a day, usually it was twice each day, and his bombing errors read consecutively: 74 yds from 10,000 ft, 182 yds (10,000 ft) then only 21 yds from a 200 ft high low-level sortie, 26 yds (200 ft), 96 yds (10,000 ft), 88 yds (10,000 ft), 101 yds [deleted] (10,000 ft) [/deleted], 86 yds [deleted] 10,000 ft) [/deleted], 57 yds (all at 10,000ft)
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60 yds (from 12,000 ft), 47 yds (1,000 ft), and so on. They had great difficulty getting the accuracy to any greater limits – which really was going to be essential if Barnes Wallis’ big, expensive bombs were to be dropped (These had streamlined aerodynamic fins, and would spin at an increased speed as they dropped, giving different trajectories to the normal, unstreamlined weapons).
Slowly the results of the RAE and A&AEE testing were incorporated on the Lancasters, and Sqd Ldr Richardson’s observations, and things at last began to come together.
Mick Martin went up with David and acted as the bomb-aimer himself on October 16th, flying in ED932 on a low-level sortie. He managed a mean error of 105 yds from 250 ft altitude – not very good! (He obviously then appreciated the level of accuracy David’s normal bomb-aimer could achieve – of 21 to 26 yds!)
David tried a run at 15,000 ft on October 17th – getting an error of 70 yds. But next day doing exactly the same, he only registered a mean error of 128 yds. (On both occasions he was flying ED932, now fitted up with the SABS system).
In the meantime, Mick Martin had been told by Cochrane to get the Squadron up to strength again in pilots and crews, and a good deal of interviewing had been carried out. Martin knew now that an extremely high degree of training and ultimate accuracy in dropping the new bombs was going to be needed, but the crews were going to have to be well blooded already with records to show that they could unflinchingly carry out day after day, the steady, straight run in to the target, whatever flak or defending fighter status. He sought only the very best and bravest of men, therefore, and rejected many applications on instinct. By the first week or so in October, however, he had selected a few more, including Pilot Officer F.E. Willsher – a young fair-haired boy of 19, only a year out of the school classroom; Flt. Lt Thomas Vincent O’Shaughnessy; Flying Officer Gordon Herbert Weeden; [deleted] and [/deleted] Warrant Officer “Chuffy” Bull; Flying Officer
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Geoffrey Stevenson Stout, DFC, [inserted] Flt Lt. R.S.D. Kearns, DFC, DFM; [/inserted] Pilot Officer Nicholas R Ross; [inserted] Sqd. Ldr William [inserted] R [/inserted] Suggett (to take over “A” Flight) [/inserted]; and Flying Officer J. (“Paddy”) Gingles. They all soon settled into the training routine, although both Ross and Bull hit trees on low-flying exercises, narrowly avoiding disaster each time.
David Wilson took up young Willsher on October 9th, to show him how the SABS worked on a 10,000 ft high-level bombing run, and in the afternoon of the same day, he flew ED932 at low level all through the Lake District and the Scottish Glens, taking 5 hrs 30 mins for the cross country. On the 11th he tried the SABS at 12 000 ft and got his error down to 60 yds, and then over the next few days he used it at 1,000 ft (Error=47 yds), 250 ft (with Mick Martin acting as bomb aimer again (Error=105 yds), then at 15,000 ft (Error=70 yds, with Sqd Ldr Richardson on board), then 15,000 ft again (128 yds). And so it went on with David flying his new Lancaster DV 246 [inserted]KC-U) [/inserted], or the two originals from the Dams raid, ED932 (AJ-V), or ED 924 [inserted] (AJ-Y) [/inserted], which had been flown by Cyril Anderson.
David took “Talking Bomb” down to the RAE at Farnborough on October 18th to have some modifications made to the SABS, then he flew the Sqd. Ldr. (who had been a Great War pilot in the RFC) up to the bombing range at West Freugh (near Stranraer) where they checked the bombsight out again at 14,000 ft and 8,000 ft.
As October drew to a close, the bugs seemed to be getting ironed out of the SABS system, as the various modifications were made to it, and after the sight went U/S two days running on practice bombing on 22nd and 23rd, at long last, on the afternoon of the 23rd, David flew over West Freugh again at 14,000 ft and dropped one 4,000 lb “Cookie” this time. It hit the 3-storey target building [inserted] at Braid Fell [/inserted] fair and square in the middle, demolishing it! (Average error = Zero!). On his next run, on the 25th, he dropped six 1,000 lb bombs from 14,000 ft, hit the target with one, gained a very near miss with a second, and put the other four close by ([inserted] Mean [/inserted] Error = 79 yds). Things were getting better!
[Underlined] Restarting Operations [/underlined]
November started off the same way – with more
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high and low level exercises. David had been allocated Guy Gibson’s old aircraft (ED932, AJ-V) on a permanent basis now, and he flew it on most of the practices. He did a run at 12,000 ft and dropped four [inserted] bombs (with [/inserted] an average error of 146 yds), then three bombs from 2,000 ft (53 yds), and then switched to one of Mick Martin’s latest ideas – bombing a PFF red Target Indicator from 15,000 ft. He scored a “bullseye” on it on November 5th (appropriately for Guy Fawkes night!), and with things now obviously getting to the stage where 617 Squadron was ready for operations with the SABS, David showed a VIP around his aircraft on November 6th (believed to be Roy Chadwick, Avro’s Chief Designer) and flew him back to Ringway in the afternoon.
Cochrane at Group had meanwhile decided it was time to test the SABS in action, and so Mick Martin was informed [inserted] that [/inserted] they were to raid the Anthéor Viaduct in Southern France again on November 11th – this time from 8,000 ft to avoid the flak from recently installed German defences.
On the morning of November 11th, David made one more practice flight in ED932, dropping 6 bombs from 15,000 ft and getting his mean error down to 89 yds. It was the best they could do, and he [inserted] then [/inserted] prepared for the evening’s operation. The Squadron despatched 11 aircraft, starting at 18.15, with Ted Youseman first off, and each being bombed-up with one 12,000 [inserted] lb [/inserted] H.C. Blast bomb. Mick Martin himself was leading the raid, and Dave Shannon and Les Munro were also flying, but Shannon had engine failure on take-off and had to abort. The others all got off safely – O’Shaughnessy, Rice, Bull, Clayton, Brown, Kearns, and David Wilson – and set course for Anthéor (David had two new members of his → [inserted] crew on this “op” – Flying officer Chandler and Warrant officer Holland, who were to stay with him ‘for some time (“Chan” Chandler had already survived 8 days in a dinghy in the N-Sea, after ditching in a 49 Sqd Hampden, returning from Düsseldorf in the early hours of July 1st, 1941). [/inserted]
They found the viaduct in half moonlight this time, but there were guns and searchlights to avoid, and there was another similar viaduct just to the West, in the bay by Agay, and this confused some crews sufficiently enough to aim at that. There were no direct hits, but Mick Martin’s bomb hit the railway line to one side of the viaduct, and several more got near misses, David’s bomb [inserted] being 30 yds out. [/inserted] But the viaduct survived, and the 10 Lancasters flew on to Blida again,
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in Algeria. There had been some ships just off the shore at Anthéor which had opened fire on some of the Lancasters, but none had been hit, and they all landed safely in N. Africa. They had a four day break there (taking full advantage of it as they had done before, to sample the local wines and unrationed food and fruit. [sic] They left on November 15th for Rabat in Morocco, and on the 17th flew home from Morocco to Coningsby, via the Bay of Biscay, loaded with Forces Christmas mail for home and fruit and wine. But one Lancaster never made it back – Ted Youseman and his crew were probably picked off by a German fighter, and were believed to have ditched in the sea south-west of Brest, perishing in the process.
{Underlined] New C.O.; new ideas. [/underlined]
While they had been away in N. Africa, a new C.O. had arrived to take command from Mick Martin (who had only been in charge on a temporary basis). His name – Wing Commander Geoffrey Leonard Cheshire, DSO and Bar, DFC – and he had dropped a rank from Group Captain, in order to take over 617. Mick Martin had some burning ideas now about marking targets first with flares, so the rest could bomb with the SABS system, and so did Cheshire too. He was to change 617’s role quite dramatically with his ideas – how dramatically, and how successfully none of them would have guessed in their wildest dreams!
After they were once more back at Coningsby, David tried out his SABS from 18,000 ft now, gaining an error of 137 yds for [inserted] dropping [/inserted] six bombs, and made a few routine air tests of his Lancaster (ED932) early in December. Cheshire also loaned out from 617 crews with McCarthy Clayton, Bull and Weeden, for a few days to the Special Duties Squadrons at Tempsford. They were needed to make pinpoint drops of guns and ammunition to the French Resistance [inserted] near Doullens (on the River Outhie in Northern France) [/inserted] on December 10th. The raid went badly, flak bringing down both Bull and Weeden’s aircraft with two of Bull’s crew, and all in Weeden’s being killed. McCarthy couldn’t find the target, and so he and Clayton went back on December 11th, and were successful this time. Cheshire and 617
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had lost two more valuable crews.
Almost immediately after this, 617 was detailed to bomb a [inserted] V1 [/inserted] Flying Bomb [inserted] launch [/inserted] site in the Pas de Calais, and Group decided to try out the SABS again at night, but this time, working on Martin and Cheshire’s ideas, arranged for the P.F.F to mark the wood concerned with incendiaries. [Inserted] → Mick Martin [inserted] – as Cheshire’s Deputy - [/inserted] had now taken over as O.C. “B” flight from Les Munro, and David Wilson was now flying as Mick’s right hand man. [/inserted] Nine Lancasters were [inserted] therefore [/inserted] sent off from 617 Squadron on December 16th, [inserted] led by Cheshire with Martin as his Deputy [/inserted] to bomb the “Ski-site” ** at Flixecourt on the Somme between Abbeville and Amiens. A single PFF Mosquito used the “Oboe” beam system of marking the target [inserted] with incendiaries [/inserted], and all nine 617 Lancasters dropped their single 12,000 ln H.C. Blast bombs as close to the burning wood as possible. David dropped his, and his bomb-aimer took a photograph of the aiming point to check on their return. [Inserted] His sortie lasted for 3 hrs 40 mins in all. [/inserted] Subsequent “recce” pictures showed the Squadron had collectively achieved a mean error of 94 yds – but the “Oboe” Mosquito had marked 350 yds from the target – and so all the bombs were wide! Cheshire was not amused.
David was up again on December 18th, doing a practice drop from 2,500 ft (Error-70 yds), and on the [inserted] morning of the [/inserted] 20th from 15,000 ft (Error=60 yds). This was a good, consistent result from differing altitudes and in different aircraft (ED932 and ME557). In fact ME557 [inserted] (KC-O) [/inserted] was a brand new Lanc, and David took a Ministry of Aircraft Production official up on the practice to check the [inserted] Napier [/inserted] compressors [inserted] supplying air to the SABS system [/inserted]. * It was also one of the first Lancasters fitted out to carry Barnes Wallis’ new 12,000 ln Tallboy streamlined bomb to be delivered to 617.
The next operation was on [inserted] the evening of [/inserted] December 20th to [inserted] the Cockerill steelworks [/inserted] [deleted] an armaments factory [/deleted] in a residential area of Liege, in Belgium. The bombing had to be accurate to avoid civilian casualties, so eight PFF Mosquitos preceded eight 617 Lancasters. The Mosquitos marked the target, but [deleted] as [/deleted] low cloud prevented the markers being seen, [inserted] Cheshire dived low to see for himself, and found the markers were well off the target. He therefore ordered [/inserted] the force [inserted] to [/inserted] return without bombing. David (and the [inserted] others [/inserted]) brought their 12,000 lb H.C. bombs back, and Geoff Rice was shot down by a night fighter, miraculously surviving alone out of his crew, to be taken prisoner. One more of the original 617 founders had gone.
* Recoded later as KC-S, this was the aircraft in which Flt. Lt. “Bill” Reid, VC, was shot down on July 31st 1944 (he survived).
** So-called because of the shape of the curved ramp V1 launch site.
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Two days later, on December 22nd, David was off again [inserted] (in AJ-V) [/inserted] to attack a [inserted] V1 [/inserted] Flying Bomb [inserted] launch [/inserted] site near Bellencombre, south-east of Dieppe, this time taking Flying Officer Len Sumpter, DFC, DFM as his [inserted] bomb-aimer [/inserted] [deleted] crew [/deleted] instead of F.O. Parkin. Sumpter had flown on the original Dams raid, been rested, and had just come back for a second tour with 617, [inserted] normally flying with Dave Shannon [/inserted]. But the PFF Mosquitos failed again, and David brought all 11 x 1,000 lb bombs back. There were no casualties, fortunately, but Cheshire was not impressed by these PFF failures
David had a few days leave, and resumed flying on the 31st, after Christmas. He missed the new attempt by 617 on December 30th to bomb Flixecourt again, with 10 Lancasters helped by six PFF Mosquitos. Once more the markers were 200 yds off target, 617 accurately straddled them, but because [inserted] of their accuracy [/inserted] missed the main target.
[Underlined] Sorting out the marking problem; a new base [/underlined]
At the beginning of January 1944, David was up on bombing practices again – high level from 15,000 ft (with an average error of 127 yds – and one bomb that toppled); then another of the same height with a better error (98 yds). That was on the morning of the 4th, and in the evening David was one of 11 Lancasters put up for attacking another Flying Bomb [inserted] launch [/inserted] site in the Pas de Calais area [inserted] – this time at Fréval. [/inserted] With the others, he bombed a PFF Target Indicator that they had dropped at very low level this time – but the T.I. was four miles from the target, however, and David brought a photo back to prove it. He blamed the PFF once more! This was obviously not good enough, and whereas 617 Squadron was now trained up to be the RAF’s most accurate bombing squadron, it was the Pathfinders who were now plainly not up to scratch! It was no good having accurate bombing on inaccurate target markers, and so Cheshire, Martin and Bob Hay (Flt. Lt. Robert Claude Hay, DFC and Bar, RAAF – 617’s bombing leader, and Mick Martin’s own bomb-aimer from the first raid on the Dams) put their heads together to work out their own in-house method of marking a target, and then bombing it with the rest of the Squadron. But they first had to prove that the System worked, and to do this they needed Cochrane’s
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permission from Group to discontinue using PFF assistance Cheshire, with his innocently youthful and matter-of-fact ways, soon got this.
Meanwhile, determined to get everyone’s accuracy up even further, David and the rest of 617 went on practicing, day after day, over the next 17 days of January. They made high-level bombing runs, low-level cross country flights, and usually pin-pointed targets all the way round in woodland areas – just like the V1 Flying Bomb sites. David flew these separate and original 617 Lancasters during this period – ED915, ED924 and his own ED932
On January 9th, after a practice over the Wainfleet Sands at low level, he and the others landed at Woodhall Spa – to be their new base from now onwards. Cochrane had decided that 617, with its special techniques, top priority targets – and more importantly, the forthcoming new Tallboy and 10-ton Grand Slam bombs they were to use – deserved a special one-squadron base secluded away from other camps. Woodhall Spa was a one-squadron aerodrome, and so 619 Squadron there moved to Coningsby (which could hold several squadrons), and 617 transferred in the reverse direction on January 9th 1944. → [Inserted] A few more pilots joined 617 at this time, including Lt. Nick Knilans, DSO, DFC (USAF), Flying Officer Geoffrey Stevenson Stout, DFC, and Flying Officer J.L. Cooper. [/inserted]
Over the next few days, operations now from Woodhall Spa and billeted in the delightful Petwood House Hotel (which served as the Officer’s Mess) David flew on low-level cross country sorties, but this time in formation. He flew his (and Guy Gibson’s old aircraft) ED932 for the last time on January 18th [inserted] across to Coningsby, [/inserted] and this veteran Lancaster was left there to be used by 61 Squadron in future (it survived the war intact, only to be eventually scrapped). On the 20th, David started some new tactics that Cheshire was devising – low flying over the Wash at only 60 ft high, and then flying across, and down, the aerodrome’s flarepath at 60 ft, practicing the tactics of dropping more Target Indicators onto a cluster dropped already by the leader (using the runway lights as imaginary markers). It was during this practicing on → [inserted] the 20th that O’Shaughnessy misjudged his height and hit a sea wall at Snettisham, crashing on the beach. He and one of his crew were killed, but the rest (one badly injured) survived to fight again. The Squadron had lost another [inserted] good [/inserted] pilot. [/inserted]
Next day, January 21st, Cheshire announced he had got permission to strike at a V1 [inserted] launch [/inserted] site again – but this time without using the PFF at all. That evening, they set out with even greater excitement than usual, for they knew they had to get a good result
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this time, to substantiate all their training.
David took another of his old mounts, JB139 [inserted] (KC-X) [/inserted], on this raid, and 617 put up 12 aircraft in all. The target was at Hallencourt, a few miles South of Abbeville, and Cheshire and Martin carried out their own new “Pathfinder” technique. First of all the leading pair dropped [inserted] Red Spot [/inserted] flares from 7,000 ft, then dived down [inserted] to about 400 ft, [/inserted] using their illumination of the target area to drop long-burning Target Indicators right on top of the Ski-site.* The rest of 617 then flew over, dropping their bombs on the T.I’s. David, in fact, carried 2 x 1,000 lb, 13 x 500 lb bombs and 6 flares in his Lancaster, and, in common with others, would have used the flares if necessary to help Cheshire and Martin to go on marking the target if their first T.I’s had gone out. But David didn’t need to use the flares on this occasion, nor did he drop all his bombs – only 7 x 500 lb and 1 x 1,000 were let go, and he brought the rest back. He got a good photograph of the aiming point [inserted] from his bombing level of 13,000ft, [/inserted] and when the crews got back to Woodhall Spa, they were jubilant. It had worked, and later “recce” pictures confirmed they had blasted the main target area – for a change!
Once again, in the next few days, David was hard at Cheshire’s new tactics again, doing low-level [inserted] (60 ft high) [/inserted] runs over Uppingham Reservoir, and practicing aiming at the flarepath at their base – or carrying out “Tomato” exercises (as they now referred to them). Then on January 25th came their second “Op” using their own marking [inserted] techniques [/inserted] on a V1 [inserted] launch [/inserted] site. Now it was Fréval [inserted] again [/inserted], and David was one of 12 617 Lancasters to head for the target, flying a Mk I (DV385, KC-A). [deleted] from 50 Squadron for a few days [/deleted] He carried 13 x 500 lb and 2 x 1,000 lb bombs and Cheshire and Martin dived in low again aided by a green Target Indicator dropped [inserted] in the general target area by the PFF, [/inserted] marked the target [inserted] with Red Spot flares [/inserted] in very gusty wind conditions, and David and the rest dropped their bombs exactly on target. It was a case of two out of two “bullseyes” for 617, and there were no losses from either raid.
[Underlined] Picking off the targets [/underlined]
Cochrane now realised that Cheshire and 617
* Cochrane had insisted that the marking had to be done from above 2,500 ft, but Cheshire and Martin had worked out the dive-bombing technique down to 400 ft!
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were now thoroughly capable of using their low-marking techniques on any number of specialised targets – and Cheshire had eventually told him of their habit of dive-bombing their Lancasters right down to 400 ft over the target. So Cochrane now picked a beauty for them – the new engine works at Limoges, in mid-western France. This was to be on February 8th, and so in the days leading up to this, David found himself practicing once again, this time dropping bombs on the ranges from 1,500 ft, 2,000 ft, then at 8,000 ft, 10,000 ft and finally 14,500 ft (at West Freugh). At low-level his mean error was 222 yds, but at 10,000 ft he got it down to 39 yds, and at West Freugh to 65 yds.
Finally, the 8th dawned, and in the evening 12 Lancasters took off for the Gnome et Rhône aero engine works at Limoges. Cheshire and Martin left 15 minutes before the rest – led by Dave Shannon and consisting of David, Ken Brown, Bob Knights (a new pilot), Knilans, Ross, Kearns, Willsher Clayton and Suggitt.
Para // Cheshire had worked out a special technique for this raid , as most of the workers were French, and the factory was close to a built-up area where many of them lived. There was cloud right along their route, but it broke just before they reached Limoges, on the River Vienne. Cheshire then flew over the factory roof three times, down to about 100 ft to warn all the night shift workers to leave, and take shelter. His aircraft, DV380 (Coded KC-N) had had some modifications to accommodate an RAF Film Unit crew, led by Sqd Ldr. Pat Moyna. Half its fuselage door was cut away to instal [sic] two 35mm movie cameras, and two large mirrors were fitted underneath to reflect as much light as possible (had Roy Chadwick, the Lancaster’s designer known, he would doubtless have considered it as sacrilege)!
After Cheshire’s third run, his crew could see the French workers streaming out of the factory, to their air raid shelters, and after waiting a few minutes, Cheshire went in to drop his cascading incendiary markers and Red Spot fires directly on top of the centre of the factory roofs. The Film crew had a beanfeast, obtaining some of the most remarkable shots of the War, as the cascades of light lit up the factory, river and railway yards nearby.
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Mick Martin then followed Cheshire in, flying his Lancaster DV402 (coded KC-P), and dropped his markers on top of Cheshires – After that Cheshire told the main force overhead to bomb, and he cruised around the area at 5,000 ft, to let the film crew record the event. They had a grandstand view, as the other 10 Lancasters (David was flying ME559, KC-Q) unloaded their weapons on the factory. Five of them carried 12,000 lb H.C. Blast bombs, the other seven – like David – [inserted] each [/inserted] dropped 12 x 1,000 lb bombs, and most of them were within the factory perimeter. David reckoned his stick fell slightly off target, and straddled the railway lines away from the factory.
Cheshire then ordered all crews home, but he flew around the burning, smoking factory in the moonlight at 100ft (or less) for half an hour, letting the Film crew complete a unique task. Even Cheshire’s crew got fidgety, trying to egg him on gently to start for home. As Moyna said afterwards: “Cheshire seemed as unconcerned as an assistant arranging a group photograph in a studio”! Finally, they turned out to the Bay of Biscay, and flew back over the sea. They all arrived back safely – Cheshire about an hour behind the rest. And the main achievement (for Cheshire) was a perfect record on film to show the AOC and all the others at Bomber Command HQ, illustrating how effective low-level marking could be.
[Underlined] Third attempt at Anthéor. [/underlined]
After the attack on Limoges, David’s next flight with 617 was another operation on February 12th – back to the Anthéor viaduct again. The Squadron had already attacked it twice, and the USAF once, but it was still intact and carrying almost 100,000 tons of German supplies down to the Italian Front each week. All these attacks had, however, served only to get the Germans to defend it more heavily each time, and the defences were formidable this time.
Once again 617 fielded 10 Lancasters for the “Op”. but Cheshire was concerned about the range at their disposal, for Cochrane refused permission for them to carry on to Sardinia this time, saying he needed 617 back in the UK after the raid. In order to squeeze every gallon of petrol into their tanks, they flew
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their Lancasters down to Ford aerodrome, between Bognor Regis and Littlehampton on the South Coast, using it as an advance base to refuel. Then Cheshire and Martin took off ahead of the others, climbing through bad icing conditions, and arrived some five minutes ahead of the main force.
It was a pitch black night and the narrow valley was full of all types of ack ack guns, which opened up in an absolute hail of flak. Cheshire tried three times to dive down the valet over the viaduct, and drop his load of markers and flares, but each time he was blinded by the flak and forced off course and out to sea. Martin then had a go, and Cheshire tried to get back inland to draw off the fire as he ran in, but was out of position as Mick slid down the dark ravine. As Mick levelled out over the viaduct, a 20mm cannon shell exploded through the bomb-aimers’s cupola, and Bob Hay was killed instantly, and the Flight Engineer, Ivan Whittaker injured in his legs.
Cheshire ordered Martin to fly on to Sardinia, and land there (where he had wanted the entire Squadron to go), and then he went in again himself, this time at 5,000 ft, above the ravine and out of range of the cannon fire. There was still a mass of heavy flak bursts, and David [inserted] in Lancaster ED763 (KC-D), [/inserted] and the others flying overhead thought it looked impossible for anyone to survive in that holocaust. Cheshire managed to drop some of his Red Spot markers, but they drifted to the beach side of the viaduct. With time over the target limited by having to return to the UK, Shannon up above now commenced the high-level bombing, and David and the others followed. David dropped his single 12,000 H.C. Blast bomb [inserted] from 9,500 ft [/inserted] and turned for home. Only one of these weapons dropped close to the viaduct, the rest falling closer to the beach, and once again the bridge remained intact! Finally, after a flight lasting seven hours exactly *, David touched down at Ford again, to refuel and rest, before flying back to Woodhall Spa that morning. [Deleted] The Lancaster he had used this time was ED763 (KC-D). [/deleted]
But fate had not finished with the Squadron yet, for next morning, as the 617 crews left Ford to fly up to Woodhall Spa, Sqd. Ldr. Bill
* David’s previous sortie to Limoges lasted 7 hrs 25 mins altogether but this was from Woodhall Spa. It took about an hour each way from there down to Ford.
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Suggitt climbed out to the West, and turned to starboard in DV382 (KC-J) to set course to the North-east. He had to climb up through the clouds shrouding [inserted] the [/inserted] South Downs, and just after 08.30 a tractor driver at Duncton Hill Farm saw the Lancaster impact on Littleton Down, above him. Wreckage spread everywhere, and all Suggitt’s crew died instantaneously, although Suggitt himself died two days later, still in a coma. Flight Sgt. John Pulford, DFM, the last but one survivor of Guy Gibson’s original raid crew, died in the crash. (The last survivor, Flt. Lt. Richard Trevor-Roper DFC, DFM, was killed on a 97 Squadron operation just 20 days later).
[Underlined] Improving the techniques. [/underlined]
After Mick Martin returned from Sardinia later, his Lancaster temporarily patched up, Cochrane sent him off for a rest period – much against his will. But Cochrane preferred living Flight Commanders to dead ones, and he had few survivors left now, of the original 617 founding pilots.
Then came some top-level Group and Command meetings – at one of which Cheshire appeared on the one hand, proposing greater use of his and Martin’s low-level marking techniques (preferably using Mosquitos in future), and on the other hand Air Vice Marshal Don Bennett [inserted] of 8 Group [/inserted] was strongly defending his PFF high-level marking (and being generally dismissive of 617 Squadron’s techniques).
Cochrane, however, gave Cheshire some leeway in his 5 Group, and set a string of targets now for 617 to attack where Cheshire could devise the necessary low-level marking himself. With Martin gone now, Cheshire took Les Munro as his Deputy, and Les became “B” Flight Commander, with David Wilson as his right hand man. Cheshire did not yet put in a bid for two Mosquitos (but he was busy making the necessary high-level contact in the RAF in order to obtain them quickly and painlessly when he needed them). He knew that the light, fast and manoeuvrable Mosquito would help to make diving onto the target so much easier, and also assist in avoiding the defensive flak.
The last half of February 1944 passed for David with no more than four training flights or air tests
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being flown, due to bad weather. The last of these, on February 29th, was a bomb-dropping exercise from 15,000 ft, where David’s crew scored a 100 yd average error. Then came another practice from 10,000 ft on the morning of March 2nd, followed by 617’s next operation the same evening – this time to the aero-engine works at Albert in the Pas de Calais, between Amiens and Bapaume. Because this was believed to be heavily defended (repairing as it did, vital BMW engines for Focke Wulf FW 190 fighters) Cochrane ordered Cheshire not to mark below 5,000 ft this time. This was Leonard Cheshire’s 75th operation, and David Wilson’s 67th, yet 617’s three Flight Commanders – Dave Shannon, Joe McCarthy and Les Munro were some way behind these totals themselves. Both McCarthy and Munro were now promoted to Squadron Leaders.
David’s aircraft, DV246 (KC-U) was loaded up completely this time with [inserted] 248 x 30 lb [/inserted] incendiaries, and Cheshire and Munro (as deputy) went ahead to position themselves down to 5,000 ft so as to identify the target when the flares were dropped by the leading 617 Lancasters [inserted] of the 13 flying [/inserted] overhead. Cheshire went in under the flares to drop his markers, but his aircraft’s SABS bombsight went U/S on the approach, and while he stood off [inserted] for his bomb-aimer [/inserted] to try to get it working, he called in Munro to drop markers [inserted] just [/inserted] as the flares burnt out. Munro’s markers were spot on, and 617 bombed the factory from higher up, practically all their bombs and certainly David’s load of incendiaries [/inserted] (dropped from 9,200 ft) [/inserted] hitting the factory dead-centre. It was a text book operation, and Cheshire’s diary entry was almost right when he wrote: “This factory will produce no more engines for the Hun!”
Two nights later, on March 4th, 617’s target was the small, but important [inserted] La Ricamerie [/inserted] needle-bearing factory at St. Etienne (to the South-west of Lyon). It was a very small target, in a narrow valley with 4,000 ft hills on either flank, and once again in a built-up area, meaning it had to be picked out surgically, without harming the French citizens if possible.
Again, 15 Lancasters were put up that night, Cheshire and Munro leading (the latter on three engines, as one had packed up after take off). But there was ten-tenths cloud over the target, as David Wilson recorded. He was carrying a Sqd Ldr. Doubleday that night in his usual mount, JB139 (KC-X), and 1,000 lb
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bombs. But Cheshire couldn’t mark the target because of the bad weather, and so they all brought their bombs back that night. David’s flight there and back lasted exactly four hours.
Six days later, with better weather forecast, 617 tried to hit St. Etienne again. This time 16 Lancasters set off for La Ricamerie factory – on the same night that 5 Group bombed the Michelin works at Clermont-Ferrand. This time Cheshire made six attempts to mark at very low level in the blackness, dropping them accurately on the last run, but they bounced beyond the factory. Munro followed, and dropped short, Shannon tried and his markers bounced beyond, and finally Arthur Kell (a new Australian pilot) made a low-level dive and planted incendiaries in the factory. The rest of 617 then bombed the incendiaries (to Cheshire’s commands), and David unleashed his 11 x 1,000 lb bombs [inserted] from X “X-Ray” on the second run in [/inserted] in two sticks, [inserted] dropping them from 8000 ft. [/inserted] When they returned safely, David’s bob-aimer believed they had missed the target, but when “Recce” photographs were obtained, 617 was delighted to see the target had been completely destroyed, and there was no damage to the built-up area outside!
There was no more training at the moment, and the next “Op” was on March 15th, to an aero-engine works at Woippy, on the Northern outskirts of Metz (on the R. Moselle, East of Paris). It was freezing cold weather and 617 and 619 Squadrons sent a combined 22 Lancasters up this night, but the target was hidden by cloud [deleted] again [/deleted]. David was carrying a single 12,000 H.C. Blast bomb in his [inserted] JB139 [/inserted] X “X-Ray” again, but there was no hope of bombing, and so they all brought their bombs back. This was a longer sortie – 5 hrs 30 mins – and one [inserted] 617 [/inserted] crew, flying with Flying Officer Duffy, were attacked by three night fighters on their return leg, and claimed all three shot down!
Next day, March 16th, 617 was off again, this time to bomb the Michelin tyre factory at Cataroux, Clermont-Ferrand. The 15 Lancasters they put up were joined by six from 106 Squadron that were fitted with [inserted] the [/inserted] new [inserted] H2S [/inserted] radar bombing equipment. These latter aircraft dropped the flares this time, and Cheshire
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Made his usual low-level dives over the Cataroux Michelin factory to warn the [inserted] French [/inserted] workers to take cover, dropping his markers on the third run – but a little short. He was being extremely careful once more, because the factory had these major sheds in its complex, but a fourth large building – the French workers canteen – had “on no account to be damaged, if possible”, (Group’s instructions). Cheshire then called in his three Flight Commanders, Munro, Shannon and McCarthy, and they all managed to drop their markers directly on the factory sheds. To do this, they had to have a constant rain of flares to illuminate the target, and David Wilson in JB139 released his six, to help their aim. Then Cheshire called up the others to bomb the newly laid markers and David released his [inserted] single [/inserted] 12,000 Blast bomb *, right on target, and turned for home. This trip lasted 6 hrs 40 mins in all, with the separate run-ins to drop flares, and then the weapon, and with poor weather conditions back at Woodhall Spa, David landed at Coningsby on the return, positioning back to base [inserted] later [/inserted] in the morning.
The “recce” pictures next morning showed the works entirely in flames – and yet the canteen was intact! In fact Cheshire had once again carried Sqd Ldr Pat Moyna and his Film Unit in his Lancaster, and filmed the progress of the bombing from low-level.
Off again on March 18th, David was one of 13 Lancasters this time from 617 Squadron, to bomb the French [inserted] “Poudrerie Nationale” [/inserted] explosives factory at Bergerac, on the R. Dordogne east of Bordeaux. Cochrane had meanwhile told Cheshire that he would try to obtain two Mosquitos, to carry on the low-level marking in greater safety, and therefore until they came, Cheshire must not do any more low-level marking below 5,000 ft. On this raid therefore, six other 5 Group Lancasters, using H2S, joined 617 Squadron, and Cheshire marked from 5,000 ft – spot on – followed by an equally accurate Munro. Shannon and McCarthy both marked an ammunition dump close by. Then the others started to bomb, and before David [inserted] (in JB139 again) [/inserted] dropped his 12,000 lb weapon on the factory [inserted] from 10,000 ft [/inserted], Bunny Clayton dropped his on the nearby
* Six crews carried this weapon on the raid (those with the most accurate bombing averages). This weapon was now referred to as “The Factory Buster”.
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ammunition dump, which exploded in a 15-second long, gigantic flash that blinded everybody. Cheshire, down below, looked up and saw the rest of 617’s Lancasters silhouetted above him against the sky. Then David’s bomb slammed into the powder works, and it disappeared in turn beneath a series of vast explosions. “The powder works”, Cheshire noted, “would appear to have outlived their usefulness!”
This route also took 6 hrs 40 mins from take-off to touch-down, and two days later (as usual now) on [inserted] March [/inserted] 20th, David was off again [inserted] in JB139 [/inserted] to another explosives works – this one at Angoulême, [inserted] North-east of Bordeaux [/inserted]. The pattern was repeated, six 5 Group Lancasters using H2S to drop flares, Cheshire leading 617’s total force of 14 Lancasters and marking from 5,000 ft again. This explosives factory, on a bend on the R. Charente there, performed in the same manner as the one at Bergerac. David dropped 1 x 8,000 lb and 1 x 1,000 lb bomb from 8,300 ft on top of this works, and the factory was completely – and spectacularly – destroyed. Some 6 hrs 5 mins later, David was safely back at Woodhall Spa, as were all 617 crews, and the Film Unit in Cheshire’s aircraft again.
[Underlined] Lyon – third time lucky [/underlined]
The fact that 617 would never leave a “demolition job” half-finished was becoming equally well known to Germans and British alike. The Germans were, in fact, beginning to draft in more defences to the vital plants in France that were supplying their War Effort. But nowhere was this reputation more tested than with their attack on the SIGMA aero-engine works near Lyon on the night of March 23rd 1944. Again six Lancasters of 106 Squadron were to act as the Flare droppers, and 617 put up 14 aircraft.
Cheshire told the 106 crews when to drop their flares, but the first lot were too far North, the second try fell short to the South, and final corrections failed to illuminate the actual target. Cheshire now had to send in his own 617 flare droppers, at altitude, and he just managed one dive over the target at 5,000 ft before they went out. He was not sure his markers had hit, but ordered the rest of 617 to bomb them. David was carrying 11 x 1,000 lb bombs [inserted] in JB139 [/inserted] this time, all fitted with long delay fuses (for the safety of the French
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civilians), so Cheshire had to fly around on his own afterwards to assess the results. They exploded eventually, and certainly something had been hit fair and square.
On the return, all but one 617 aircraft diverted to Tangmere – a fighter station near Chichester – only Nick Ross getting back to Woodhall Spa [inserted] (David’s sortie had lasted 6 hrs 45 mins by this time). [/inserted] There was very limited accommodation, and Cheshire and his Flight Commanders slept with some of the 617 crews in their billets, and on the floor – being last in that morning! When they returned to Woodhall Spa after resting, it was to discover that their target was untouched – they had bombed the wrong factory!
So, next day, March 25th, they went back again to finish the job. This time there were 22 Lancasters in all, including the half dozen from 106 Squadron, but Cheshire had re-organized the Flare-dropping force this time, putting 617’s Kearns in charge of all such flare usage – be it by 106 or 617 Squadron. Cochrane had allowed Cheshire to mark at low-level this time, if required, and as the flares went down Cheshire once again realised they were off target. Eventually he and Kearns got them back on the right target, and Cheshire and McCarthy simultaneously marked underneath. Cheshire then realised they had dropped their spot markers on the wrong buildings, and went in again, his second lot of red spot incendiaries again overshooting. Finally he called in McCarthy again, who hit the target with his last markers, and Cheshire ordered these to be bombed by the rest. Due to problems of communication, however, all the 617 crews orbiting overhead then bombed the early markers – missing the target once again! David’s load this time consisted entirely of 500 lb incendiary clusters and they obtained a good aiming point photograph – proving once back home again 7 hrs 20 mins later, that they had missed the right aero engine works for the second time!
Once more, therefore, 617 set out again on March 29th to try and complete the demolition job. This time 106 and 617 put up 19 Lancasters, and Cheshire was ordered to mark from 5,000 ft again. The flares
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dropped by 106 this time failed to ignite, and Kearns therefore ordered 617 crews to drop their flares. These were accurate, and Cheshire then marked carefully, getting his spot fires just a few yards out of the target centre. When David and the rest above bombed these, their average error put their bombs within the target area this time. David was carrying 1 x 8,000 lb and 1 x 1,000 lb bomb [inserted] in JB139 [/inserted] this occasion, [deleted] flying his usual X “X-ray” [/deleted], and his crew knew immediately that they had at last scored a “bulls-eye”. It took just 7 hrs this time, before they were back at base, third time lucky!
[Underlined] Mosquito marking; and marshalling yards. [/underlined]
Two days before this operation – the last that Cheshire flew and marked in a Lancaster – Cochrane said he had obtained the use of two Mosquitos for marking in future. Cheshire went to see them at Coleby Grange on the 27th, and then later on the day he returned from Lyon (the 30th) he had an hour’s dual instruction on it before flying it to Woodhall Spa. He decided that [inserted] McCarthy [/inserted], Shannon, Kearns and Fawke should join him on the Mosquitos as pilots, and they did some rapid dual instruction and test flights. And within two weeks Cochrane had given them two more Mosquitos.
David Wilson was on a few days leave at the beginning of April, and missed the next operation to the aircraft repair plant at Toulouse-Blagnac aerodrome on April 5th. This was the first time Cheshire used his Mosquito to do the target marking, and this time he was marking not just for 617 Squadron – in the lead – but for the whole of 5 Group which joined in the raid for the first full scale rest of operations to come. In addition to Cheshire’s Mosquito, 617 Squadron fielded 17 Lancasters, and 5 Group put up another 127 altogether. Cheshire found the target clear of cloud, and dived three times, dropping his markers right on target, despite considerable flak of all types. But the Mosquito was fast and agile, and the flak was inaccurate because of this. Munro and McCarthy had marked with Lancasters, and then 617 and other 5 Group Lancasters unloaded their bomb
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loads on the aircraft factory, and on other nearby targets too. All were destroyed, but Cheshire had to leave the scene early, as he was not sure of the range of the Mosquito at low altitude, without extra wing tanks.
When David returned from leave, he was immediately scheduled on the next raid on April 10th, this time to the Luftwaffe’s Signals Equipment Depôt at St. Cyr, by Versailles. He was given the new Lancaster, LM485 (KC-N), which Les Munro had flown in the Toulouse raid on the 5th, and bombed-up with 1 x 8,000 lb and 6 x 500 lb bombs. This raid was just carried out by 617, using Cheshire’s Mosquito and 17 Lancasters, and Cheshire eventually dive-bombed the target [inserted] down to 700 ft [/inserted] with his markers, after having trouble finding it in the dark. But he was spot on again, and David and the rest bombed the target [inserted] from 13,600 ft, [/inserted] destroying most of it.
Discussions at Bomber Command HQ now led to the C-in-C, Harris, agreeing now to let Cochrane have his own Pathfinder Force, within 5 Group, built around the special marking techniques developed by 617 Squadron. Thus Cochrane now received back two Lancaster Squadrons – 83 and 97 – which had originally been seconded to 8 PFF Group, and one Mosquito Squadron – 627 – [inserted] also [/inserted] from 8 Group, (much against the wishes of their A.O.C., Don Bennett).
The object now was to use the Mosquito squadron, and 617’s Mosquitos, for marking large targets, have the Lancasters of 83 and 97 Squadrons dropping the flares and acting as back-ups, and use 617 as the lead bombing squadron, and the others to bomb from a higher level. The next target was just such a place – the marshalling yards at Juvisy, 10 miles South of Paris.
David, meanwhile, had been back over the ranges again with 617, honing their skills all the time. He had “Talking Bomb” up with him on one high level from 15,000 ft, did some low-level flying, and then, on April 18th, was off to Juvisy with 201 other Lancasters in the Group, plus 617’s four Mosquitos [inserted] flown by Cheshire, Fawke, Shannon and Kearns.) [/inserted] Flying LM 485 [inserted] (KC-N) [/inserted] again, David was designated (as was the whole of 617 Sqd) to mark the target for the [inserted] Group’s Lancasters. [/inserted], and carried 6 x Red Spots,
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[inserted] 6 x 1,000 lb, and [/inserted] 4 x 500 lb bombs. The railway yards were on the West bank of the R. Seine, just on the south-east corner of Orly aerodrome, and [deleted] they covered such a large aera that the raid was split into two waves – one to attack the Southern half, the next (one hour later) to attack the Northern section. [/deleted] Cheshire found the Southern aiming point under flares dropped by 83 and 97 Squadrons above (although he had suffered a compass [inserted] failure [/inserted] in the Mosquito). He marked the yards successfully, and was backed up by the other [deleted] of the [/deleted] 617 Mosquitos, and David and the 617 Lancasters then unloaded their markers and bombs from 6,500ft fairly accurately on the target, [deleted] David and his 617 colleagues being the most [/deleted] with the rest of 5 Group – being trained in area (rather than spot) bombing – then carpeting the whole area. [Deleted] soon marked for the second wave, in Northern half of the yards, and again the results were accurate. [/deleted] The combined 5 Group method was becoming one of Bomber Command’s [inserted] most [/inserted] successful weapons!
On [inserted] the morning [/inserted] April 20th, David made his highest practice bombing run yet on Wainfleet Ranges – from 20,000 ft this time. He did not know it, but Cochrane was anticipating the arrival shortly of Barnes Wallis’ new Tallboy Bomb, and the higher it would be accurately dropped, the deeper it would penetrate in the ground before exploding, and creating an “earthquake” effect – bringing any building crashing (even if made of solid concrete).
The same evening (April 20th) David took part in another massed 5 Group attack – this time on the marshalling yards on the North side of Paris, at Porte de la Chapelle, just up the line from the Gare du Nord. He was flying LM485 (KC-N) this evening, and because these yards were very close to the residential tenement blocks surrounding them, extreme care was needed in dropping both markers and bombs. This raid was also even bigger than the one in Juvisy, because 5 Group also borrowed the services of some 8 Group PFF Mosquitos to drop markers by their Oboe equipment (using converging radio beams from UK stations), before 617’s Mosquitos, and Lancasters [inserted] of [/inserted] all three 5 Group marking Squadrons (617, 83 and 97) did their marker and bomb dropping, and then the 5 Group’s Lancasters bombed the target. There was a total of
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247 Lancasters, and 22 Mosquitos in all involved this night, and the raid was split into two waves, each about an hour apart, which attacked the Southern and Northern halves of the yards separately.
The Oboe markers were a little late over the target and there were inevitably some communication problems with all the aerial units involved, and Cheshire trying to control the different facets of the operation. But these were overcome, and another accurate blitzing of the target was achieved. David dropped [inserted] 6 x Red Spots, 6 x 1,000 lb and 4 x 500 lb [/inserted] bombs this time [inserted] from 6500 ft [/inserted], and achieved a direct hit on the aiming point. His sortie lasted 4 hrs 10 mins this time, and once again, all 617 aircraft – Mosquitos and Lancasters, returned safely, although 6 Lancasters from the other squadrons were lost. On the subject of Squadron losses, 617 itself was now very much below the average of most squadrons in this respect, helped no doubt by its training, and the fact that it had concentrated recently on French targets, rather than those in the most heavily defended parts of Germany. There were other reasons too – such as Cheshire’s acquaintance with an RAF officer who was [inserted] the [/inserted] Senior Controller of Beachy Head radar station, near Eastbourne. This had some new American equipment that gave long range cover for Fighter Command deep into France and the Low Countries, and the officer suggested that it could be used at night to warn 617’s Lancasters if they were being stalked by German nightfighters. Cheshire then had 617’s Lancasters fitted with special crystal pick-ups and the latest VHF sets (all with Cochrane’s approval) and from there on, they had valuable radar protection on their missions into the Continent.
[Underlined] Tallboys, and “Taxable”. [/underlined]
The next operation Cochrane planned for 617 was an attack on a German railway centre, and the first he chose was Braunschweig (Brunswick), to the east of Hannover, on the evening of April 22nd. This was historically important, as it was the first time that 617 and 5 Group employed their low-level marking activities over German soil. David, however, missed this operation, and the next ones on Munich [inserted] on April 24th [/inserted] (marshalling yards again) and the German
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tank and troop park at Mailly-le-Camp (May 3rd) – because he was busily engaged in working [inserted] up [/inserted] himself and a few [inserted] other [/inserted] specially selected 617 crews on the Barnes Wallis Tallboy bomb technique. For the most accurate bombing crews on the squadron had been selected to drop these new 12,000 lb weapons (and later, the 22,000 lb Grand Slam bombs too).
It is worth recording, however, that the Braunschweig raid saw 238 Lancasters and 17 Mosquitos of 5 Group, and 10 Lancasters of 1 Group take part, The result was not good, chiefly because there was low cloud and although 617 marked the yards successfully (in the light of flares dropped by 83 and 97 Squadron Lancasters above), other H2S aimed markers were inadvertently dropped farther South, and much of the main force bombed these. One Lancaster of 5 Group had left its radio transmitter on, and it jammed every direction Cheshire tried to give to the other crews. Four Lancasters were lost, but none from 617.
The Munich raid, on April 24, was by contrast an immense tactical success. A mixed force of 260 aircraft once more struck the railway yards there (as well as spreading out over other areas of the town) after Cheshire and 617 Mosquitos had marked the target, [inserted] and Cheshire flew around at low level through a considerable curtain of flak and searchlights. Diversionary raids were flown to Karlsrühr (by the main force), and on Milan (a spoof “Window” dropping exercise by six 617 crews), and the only casualty 617 suffered this time was Flt. Lt. J.L. Cooper (a recent joiner from 106 Squadron). His Lancaster was shot down en route to Munich as Aichstetten, just North-east of Lake Constance, and although his bomb-aimer was killed, the rest of the crew survived to be taken prisoner. [Inserted] Eight other Lancasters of 5 Group were also lost this night. [/inserted] They were lucky to be in Bavaria – for there was now a large price on the heads of 617 crews caught in France!
[Inserted] After this raid on Munich, Cochrane ordered 617 crews to have a weeks complete leave, and most used the rest to good effect. But one or two stayed behind, David Wilson being one.
One factor worth noting about this raid was that Cheshire could not obtain extra fuel tanks for 617’s four Mosquitos. They had to fly these to Manston, refuel on the runway and take off without warming up the engines, to be sure of getting to Munich. None of them believed they could get back to Manston, and yet all just made it – despite a German night fighter in the circuit when they landed! [/inserted]
The Mailly raid upset 617’s and 5 Groups recent success patterns with a vengeance – but it was [inserted] just [/inserted] one of these things (C’est la Guerre”). Mailly was a large French military training area South of Chalons-sur-
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Marne (itself just a few miles [inserted] South-east [/inserted] of Rhiems). Here, it was known the Germans had a Panzer division and their equipment in transit.
Cheshire and 617’s other three Mosquito pilots, Shannon, Fawke and Kearns, were ordered to mark at Mailly, but 617’s Lancasters were not detailed for this raid – which was just as well. Cheshire marked the target perfectly, and ordered the 5 Group Controller to order the first wave of Lancasters to bomb. But things started to go wrong then, as the [inserted] latter’s [/inserted] radio was subsequently found to be seriously off frequency, and his VHF set was being drowned by an American Forces broadcast. After some delay they started to bomb, but because the second wave was held back, Shannon and Kearns had to remark the target in the face of considerable flak. The second wave also bombed accurately, but in the delays caused by the lack of communication, and while Cheshire had to get the Deputy Controller to take over, German night fighters began to arrive in large numbers, and harried the Lancasters all the way back to Northern France. All the 617 crews returned safely, but 42 Lancasters were lost out of the 340 Lancasters and 16 Mosquitos sent on the raid by 5, 1 and 8(PFF) Groups. (This was an 11.6% loss rate – some three times the normal)!
David missed Braunschweig and Munich, because on April 22nd (the day after his return from La Chappelle) he took his old JB139 (originally KC-X, but now changed to KC-V) down to Boscombe Down to carry out trials with Barnes Wallis’ 12,000 ln Tallboy bomb. Sqd Ldr Richardson (“Talking Bomb”) was also there and over the next four days, David took him up several times daily, making high-level trials dropping prototype Tallboys from 18,000 ft each time. On the 26th he returned to Woodhall Spa, carrying seven of the scientists concerned with these tests. He had to break off the special Tallboy dropping exercises in May, however, as all 617’s crews were now engaged on one of their most boring exercises – yet [deleted] as [/deleted] it turned out, it was to be perhaps their most successful and decisive of all – Operation “Taxable”.
The [deleted word] squadron was being trained up to conduct a major “spoof” exercise on the day before D-Day.
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This would entail [inserted] two waves, each of 8 [/inserted] [deleted] 16 [/deleted] Lancasters, flying on instruments in short overlapping circuits, and dropping “Window” to try to indicate to the German shore defences that an invasion fleet was heading their way. (And of course it would be in a very different direction to that taken by the real fleet). The whole operation, once started, would have to be kept up [deleted] continuously [/deleted] for some four hours or more. [Deleted] to seem on the German radar as if a vast number of ships was slowly advancing in their direction. [/deleted] The continuous orbiting by the Lancasters had to be at low level [inserted] 3,000 ft [/inserted], start at a pre-arranged time near Dover, and advance gradually over a group of 18 surface vessels flying barrage balloons, as the vessels sailed beneath them towards the coast below Calais. Bundles of “Window” would have [inserted] to be dropped out every 12 seconds during the four hours. [/inserted]
The month of May, 1944 was probably the most boring in the Squadron’s history, as they practised, day after day, and usually for an hour or so at a time, the intricate navigational exercises that would enable them to fly these continuous orbits. David flew a total of 26hrs 20 mins altogether on these exercises, between May 6th and June 4th, in his Lancaster I, LM485 (KC-N). As the continuous orbiting was going to be a taxing operation, each Lancaster would have to have two crews on board, one relieving the other at the halfway point. David had as his relief pilot a Pilot Officer Sanders and his crew, and after May 13th they always flew together.
On May 18th, David tested out a new “automatic pilot” (or “George”) that Avro’s had fitted to his aircraft, to alleviate the strain of the exercise. These were fitted to all the other Lancasters. At the end of May the Squadron flew up to Yorkshire to practice over the North Sea, and dovetail the second wave of 8 Lancasters into the tricky take-over from the first wave – to keep dropping the “Window” without any gaps (lest the German radar show some strange interruptions in the “fleet’s” progress).
Finally, all was ready on the night of June 5th, and the first wave of 617’s Lancasters set off at about 23.00, the first wave finishing their intricate movements halfway across the Channel
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between Dover and the Pas de Calais coast at around 02.30, and being relieved by the second wave, who finished at around 05.00, after daybreak and by which time they were in sight of the French coast. Another Squadron, No 218, used six Stirling bombers fitted with G-H blind bombing radar units, working in the same fashion but a little more to the East of 617.
In the event, as David noted in his log book, the exercise was “believed very successful”. His total sortie lasted for 4 hrs 40 mins, and the entire Squadron was heartily glad when it was over!
[Underlined] Effect of the Tallboy raids [/underlined]
Two days later, 617 Squadron was back on its normal type of bombing operations again, but this time the raid was laid on suddenly, at short notice, to try to prevent a German Panzer Division reaching the D-Day bridgehead. They were moving up from Bordeaux, and Cochrane ordered 617 to take the newly arrived Tallboy bombs, and try to block a rail tunnel on their route. This was at Saumur, on the R. Loire West of Tours, on the South side of the river just before the railway crossed the Loire on a long, low bridge.
The Squadron was hurriedly bombed up with the 12,000 lb streamlined Tallboy, which had a casing of hardened chrome molybdenum steel and a filling of some 5,000 lbs of Torpex D1 explosive. It was some 21 feet long, and 3ft 2 ins in diameter, with four aerodynamically shaped fins, offset slightly to the airflow in order to spin the bomb as it dropped.
David flew his usual Lancaster (KC-N), which accommodated the Tallboy in its bombay, and had the latest deep-section bomb-doors which closed around the bomb and were also flush with the fuselage – except at the rear end, where they left a [inserted] small semi-circular [/inserted] gap around the bombs tail-fin. The rest of 617’s earlier Lancasters [inserted] in the “DV” or “JB” serial range [/inserted] had been similarly modified, or exchanged for newer aircraft with “ME” or “LM” serials. David’s crew – which had changed slightly over the last few months with postings, etc – consisted of → [inserted] Flying Officer G.A. Phillips (Flight Engineer), F/O J.K. Stott (Navigator), F/O D.W. Finlay (Bomb Aimer/Front Gunner) Warrant Officer H.G. Allen (Radio Operator), Flt. Sgt. H.D. Vaughan (Mid-upper gunner), and Flt. Lt. E.B. Chandler (Rear-gunner), [/inserted] [deleted] F.O. [inserted] D.W. [/inserted] Finlay, W.O. [inserted] H.G. [/inserted] Allen, Flt Sgt. [inserted] H.D. [/inserted] Vaughan, and Flt. Lt. E.B. Chandler, [/deleted] and everyone was looking forward to seeing what these new “Earthquake” bombs could accomplish.
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Cheshire marked the target in his Mosquito, as usual, dropping his markers by the light of the flares from four Lancasters of 83 Squadron above, and placing his Red Spots by the tunnel mouth at the Southern end. He was followed in by his other two Mosquitos (Shannon had had to return home with engine trouble, soon after take-off), and then he called up the 25 Lancasters of 617 that were circling above (this raid was a “maximum strength” affair)!
David’s bomb-aimer released their Tallboy at the → [inserted] end of his seventh run-in over the tunnel. On all the earlier 6 runs his bomb-aimer was unable to see the markers clearly at the tunnel’s South end. He waited for the North end to be marked – the secondary aiming point – and then bombed on the seventh run-in. His Tallboy fell away at the [/inserted] end of a careful, steady run-in, and – like the others – they were disappointed to see only a small red splash [inserted] of light [/inserted] below, as it buried itself deep in the ground – not the blinding, white flash that their 12,000 lb Blast bombs always made, lighting up the countryside. Because of this the 617 crews were a little doubtful whether the tunnel, or railway cutting had been hit properly, until “Recce” pictures [inserted] arrived] [/inserted] next day. These were remarkable. David had written in his log: “Operations – Railway Tunnel at Saumur. 12,000 lb Special. Poor shot, but tunnel badly damaged” [inserted] and his sortie had lasted exactly 6 hrs 20 mins [/inserted]. Which crater applied to which 617 crew was impossible to verify, but the aerial reconnaissance pictures showed all the huge round craters clustered around the Southern end to the tunnel. Two Tallboys had hit the railway lines fairly and squarely in the middle, on the tunnel approach (wrecking an overhead road bridge too), three had landed on the top edges of the cutting by the tunnel mouth, cascading earth onto the lines, but one (and to this day, nobody knows who dropped this) hit the hill above the tunnel some 50 [deleted] hundred [/deleted] yards from the tunnel mouth, and did just what Barnes Wallis had predicted – [deleted] buried itself in [/deleted] penetrated the ground right down by the tunnel roof, and blew an enormous crater in the hillside, exposing the tracks at the bottom and dumping thousands of tons of rubble on them. The 617 crews were greatly heartened by the result, and there had been no casualties.
The next Tallboy raid was on June 14th, and this time Cochrane had sought Barnes Wallis’ advice about using the weapon on German E-boat pens at coastal ports like Le Havre. These torpedo boats were proving a pest at night amongst the convoys of ships off the Normandy beach-head, and so the idea [inserted] was both [/inserted] of dropping the Tallboys to create “tidal waves” to swamp the E-boats
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in harbour.
The raid was Bomber Command’s first daylight raid since June 1943, and was to be a big one on the Port area of Le Havre. Two waves of Lancasters, from 1 and 3 Groups, were to attack in the evening, and at dusk (it was almost Midsummer’s day), but 617 were to go in first with Cheshire and two other marker Mosquitos, followed by 22 Lancasters each carrying the Tallboy bombs.
The 617 aircraft took off, with a fighter escort of Spitfires accompanying them, as it was still broad daylight over the target area. There was heavy flak over Le Havre, but Cheshire [deleted] Shannon and Fawke [/deleted] dived his Mosquitos right down into the thick of it, getting down to 7,000ft over the Pens, and dropped his Red Spot markers by the E-boar quayside Shannon, Fawke and the leading Lancasters who were watching, marvelled at the way Cheshire flew through a dense curtain of all types of A.A. fire, and survived.
Cheshire then told his other Mosquito pilots not to bother marking (as the first Spots he had laid were very visible), and told 617 to start to bomb on these. David’s Flight Commander, Les Munro, then led the Lancasters in at around 17,700 ft (several had already been hit in the engines and wings by flak, and turned back), and David and his crew [inserted] in LM 485 [/inserted] recorded a “Direct-Hit” with their Tallboy on the E-boat [deleted] Pens and [/deleted] wharves. All the 15 Tallboys dropped by 617 hit the target area (one went right through the roof of a large concrete E-Boat Pen), and the E-boats were literally blasted out of the water onto dry land, or blown apart. The post-raid photos showed 617 had wreaked immense damage in the Port area, and the subsequent two waves of 199 Lancasters in all, blitzed the rest of Le Havre, rendering the German Naval presence completely ineffective after that. Again, 617 had no losses.
With this success behind them, Cochrane sent them up again next day (June 15th 1944) to do the same at Boulogne. For these Tallboy operations, David always had a seven-man crew (rather than the old six-man complement), and he had now added a Sgt. King to his regulars. Still using [inserted] LM485 [/inserted] (KC-N), David was up with 21 other 617 Lancasters that evening. There was thick cloud over
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Boulogne this time, and Cheshire (his Mosquito heavily patched up from its ordeal by flak the previous day) dived down below the cloud to drop his markers from around 6,000 ft, once more in a hail of anti-aircraft gunfire. Although his Mosquito was hit several times he survived again, and his markers hit the E-Boat Pen area. He ordered the 617 Lancasters in, but as it was now dark and the cloud had thickened up at 13,000 ft, 10 of the crews could not see Cheshire’s markers below the overcast, and regretfully turned for home taking their precious Tallboys back (they had strict instructions never to waste them!). The remaining 12, however, (mostly more experienced, and leading crews) dived below the clouds, enduring the same barrage of flak that Cheshire had, and lined up over the Pens to drop their bombs. David was one of these, following Les Munro in, and himself followed by McCarthy, Kearns, Clayton, Howard, Poove, Knights, Stout, Hamilton and two others. Most of their aircraft were hit by flak, but David dropped his Tallboy from 8,000 ft, and recorded “Believed Good Shot”. His aircraft was hit by flak, and holed as well.
All the 617 crews got back to base (David was only airborne for 2 hrs 35 mins altogether – against 3 hrs 40 mins for the previous Le Havre raid), but several crew members of other aircraft were injured. Following 617 in to attack had been 133 other Lancasters and 130 Halifaxes, aided by 11 Mosquitos of 8 (PFF) Group, and these had bombed the rest of Boulogne. Only one Halifax [inserted] had been lost [/inserted], out of all the aircraft taking part, and in the two raids taken together, 617 had been largely responsible for the wrecking of some 133 German boats (mostly E-boats).
[Underlined] V2 sites. [/underlined]
The moment they had returned from the Boulogne raid, there was a lot of patching up of the aircraft to do. David’s KC-N was too badly holed to be quickly back in service, and so he was allocated another – DV 380, Wing. Cmdr. Cheshire’s original Lancaster (KC-N), but now re-coded KC-X.
The very morning they had returned from Boulogne, Cochrane had alerted Cheshire to get ready for a
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very important operation that evening (the 16th). Cheshire had only just got to bed but was told to get up again and attend an intelligence briefing right away. The V1 Flying Bombs had started dropping on London, and Intelligence sources had warned the War Cabinet of the imminent firing of two other secret weapons at London – the V2 rockets, and in the V3’s case, huge shells fired through incredibly long [inserted] “Super” [/inserted] gun barrels being built across the Channel in France (a forerunner of the Iraqi “Super”-guns of 1991). The concrete blockhouses hiding these weapons had to be attacked with Tallboys immediately, as the War Cabinet thought on the one hand they might have to order the evacuation of London, and on the other – if aimed at Portsmouth and Southampton, etc, they might interfere [inserted] with [/inserted] the invasion of France, and put it in jeopardy.
The result of all this was that [inserted] David and the other [/inserted] [deleted] the [/deleted] Squadron crews were aroused, and after briefing, stood by all day at their aircraft dispersals, waiting for the signal that the cloud cover over the target had cleared. The Lancasters were bombed-up, but then had to be unloaded, one by one on a rota, to avoid straining their undercarriages. Food was brought out to dispersals, but late in the evening the raid was cancelled – the cloud was still unbroken over the target. Not long after, they were stood-to again, and then stood-down, and so it went on over three days!. Eventually the crews were living in a detached state of limbo, with too little sleep and their metabolic clocks thoroughly upset.
Finally, on June 19th, the cloud cleared and they were off at last. The first target for 617 was a large concrete structure to the [inserted] West of [/inserted] Watten (North-west of St. Omer), on the edge of the Forêt d’Eperlecques. [Inserted] This was one of two large “Bunker” sites for launching V2’s, consisting of huge [inserted] semi- [/inserted] underground concrete bunkers, with large armoured doors. Both these sites were constructed to initially fire the vertical-standing V2 rockets at London, but they were intended later to launch V2’s with nuclear or chemical war-heads, directly as the USA. [/inserted] David took off from Woodhall Spa [inserted] in DV380 (KC-X) [/inserted], with 18 other Lancasters, and Cheshire and Shannon in their Mosquitos. As it was a daylight raid, they were escorted again by Spitfires, and Cheshire went down to 8,000ft over Calais, to find the target beyond the town. He was engaged by a terrific flak barrage, so dived flat out down to 2,000 ft, and released smoke markers (for daylight use) on the target.
* The remains of this structure, called “Blockhaus”, are kept today as a tourist museum.
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Having come through the barrage miraculously unscathed, Cheshire’s markers then failed to ignite, so Shannon then went in through a haze that was developing as the day wore on. He dropped the last of the smoke markers, and as Cheshire believed they were close enough to the blockhouse, ordered 617 to bomb it. David dropped his [inserted] Tallboy [/inserted] like the others, from 18,000 ft, but it “hung-up” momentarily, and recorded a near-miss on his aiming point – the smoke indicators. The rest dropped their weapons close to or on top of the markers, but when the raid was over and “Recce” pictures obtained, it was established that the markers had been some 70 yds wide of the target. Some Tallboys had dropped far enough away from the markers to fall beside (and one on top of) the concrete structure, and this proved sufficient to encourage the Germans not to use the site afterwards. * For some reason (perhaps connected with the repeated bombing-up and down over the three day wait) several Tallboys besides those on David’s Lancaster also “hung-up” – including those of Knilans, Ross and Howard (two of these were “freed”, but one had to be brought back).
Next day, the 20th, the second of these large “Bunker” sites, at Wizernes (just to the South-West of St. Omer) was given to 617, and this time 17 Lancasters set off, with Cheshire and two more Mosquitos in the lead David was still flying DV380, but he had only flown as far as Orfordness, near Woodbridge when Cheshire, in front of them, received information the cloud cover was too thick over the target, and recalled the Squadron (complete with Tallboys).
Two days later, they tried again, and reached the target area this time, but there was ten-tenths cloud over the area, and once more they brought [deleted] back [/deleted] the Tallboys back. Not to be outdone, 617 made a third attempt [inserted] the morning of [/inserted] June 24th, and this time the clouds had cleared. [Inserted] Again they had a fighter escort, [/inserted] and two Mosquitos led 16 Lancasters to the quarry in the North-facing hill near Wizernes station and Cheshire dived in to mark. His markers hung up, however, and he called Fawke in behind him. The flak was intense, and Fawke’s Mosquito and several 617 Lancasters above were hit, but David dropped his Tallboy from 17,400ft, recording a “Good Shot”. On the run in, John Edwards’ Lancaster DV413 (KC-G) was hit, and went
* After Allied troops had captured this site in Autumn 1944 → Barnes Wallis persuaded Bomber Command to let several Lancasters drop the new 22,000 lb Grand Slam bombs on this structure in mid November, to test their destructive force. [/inserted]
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down out of control, [inserted] some crew baling out on the way. [/inserted] The Lancaster exploded as it levelled out, [inserted] its pilot fighting [/inserted] desperately to effect a crash-landing, [deleted] in a field [/deleted], and the rest of the crew were trapped [deleted] out [/deleted] amongst the debris, or flung out onto the field where it pancaked. Only the Navigator, Wireless Operator and Bomb-aimer survived, to become POWs. The rest of the Squadron returned safely, albeit many of the aircraft had flak damage.
As David’s aircraft was also damaged, he promptly air-tested his old aircraft, LN485 (now itself repaired), the same afternoon (June 24th), and next day he was off [inserted] in it [/inserted] with 617 to attack a huge underground storage area for V1 Flying Bombs – at Siracourt, just South of the main road from St. Pol-sur-Ternoise to Hesdin (and East of Le Touquet). The Squadron put up 17 Lancasters, 2 Mosquitos – and a North American Mustang fighter flown by Cheshire.
Para // There was quite a story behind the acquisition of the Mustang, but suffice to say that the Station Commander at Woodhall Spa, together with Cheshire’s friendship with the American Air Force Generals Spaatz and Doolittle, resulted in their sending a Mustang over [inserted] on the morning of the 25th [/inserted] for Cheshire to try out. The 617 ground crews had to work hard to modify the under wing bomb attachments, to fit the necessary smoke markers and the Squadron navigator had to plot Cheshire’s courses for him, and help him jot down the information on his knee pad – for the Mustang was a single-seater. Cheshire had never flown one before, nor a single-engined aircraft for some time, and by the time it had been prepared he was adamant that he would use it on that evening’s raid. He also knew that he had no time to do “circuits and bumps” in it, to get to know its landing techniques – his first take-off would have to be on the operation, and his landing back would have to be in the dark!
As the Mustang was a fast aircraft, David and the other 16 Lancasters and two Mosquitos took off ahead of Cheshire, and by the time they arrived at Siracourt, their C.O. was there, diving in to mark the concrete roof of the underground site with smoke indicators, and followed in by Shannon and Fawke. Then the 617 “gaggle” was called in to drop their Tallboys on the smoke, and David recorded a “Direct Hit” [inserted] from 18,800ft [/inserted], together with some of the others, while other Tallboys fell close by. Someone’s bomb pierced the
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16 ft thick concrete roof of the structure, [inserted] resulting in a spectacular collapse of the walls and ceiling, and others undermined the sides. [/inserted]
Three hours and five minutes after take-off, David was back on the ground at his base, and all had returned safely, including Cheshire in the Mustang.
There were still more sites to attack, but bad weather and thick clouds prevented 617 Squadron from further attacks for some days. [Deleted] In the days [/deleted] During this period, David only managed to get in one practice “Formation flight” and an “Air Test” (involving air-to-sea firing practice). Several times they stood by from dawn [inserted] onwards [/inserted], but raids were cancelled by the late afternoon. The urgency was in everyone’s minds, as the V1’s were now landing in London and the South-East in increasing numbers.
Finally the weather cleared again for the morning of July 4th, and they were briefed to attack a new V1 launch site located in underground caves in the limestone hill overlooking the River Oise, at St. Leu-d’Esserent, a little village North-west of Chantilly. These caves had been used before the war by French mushroom-farmers, but were now reinforced with concrete to store the V1’s, and their launching rails. [Deleted] and the gigantic barrels of the V3 guns [/deleted]
David’s Squadron put up 17 Lancasters, Cheshire in the Mustang, and his back-up in a single Mosquito for this daylight raid. Fawke in the Mosquito went ahead to get weather information, and then Cheshire arrived, dived very low over the caves and dropped his smoke markers accurately on top. Les Munro led in the Lancasters above, through fairly heavy, [deleted] and [/deleted] accurate, flak which caught several aircraft, but the Tallboys started to rain down on the site. One hit the main building, others dropped in the cave mouths and around the entrances to the site, all destroying a great deal of machinery. Many Germans [deleted] workers [/deleted] were trapped underground and some were entombed forever. David [inserted] flying in LM484 again, [/inserted] described his Tallboy hit [inserted] from 18,700ft [/inserted] as a “Fair Shot”, obtaining a good photograph of this exploding near the cave mouth. Once the limestone dust and debris had started to hide the target, some Lancasters had difficulty finding the aiming point, one was hit in all four engines and had to jettison the [inserted] Tallboy [/inserted] over the Channel on the run home [inserted] and [/inserted] one had its bombsight go u/s. Thus only 11 out of the 17 dropped Tallboys on the target,
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but the results were once again spectacular – although in many of these Tallboy raids, these were only seen at first hand after the Allies had captured the area, later in 1944.
All 617 crews returned safely [inserted] David’s own sortie lasting 4hrs 05 mins this time [/inserted], although some had been injured by shrapnel from Flakbursts. [Deleted] but [/deleted] Bomber Command sent in another force of [inserted] 5 Group [/inserted] Lancasters later that same evening – totalling some 231, with 15 Mosquitos for marking. German night-fighters were very active, and shot down 13 of the Lancasters around the target area – a high price to pay.
[Underlined] Last “Op” with 617 – V3 Site. [/underlined]
Two days later, [inserted] on July 6th 1944 [/inserted], David took off on his last operation with 617 Squadron, this time another daylight raid on a V3 site at Mimoyecques, where several “super-guns” were being set up. Cheshire flew his Mustang again, with a Mosquito to back him up, and the usual “gaggle” of 17 617 Lancasters followed higher up (usually around the 18,00 ft level). The “gaggle” was so named by Cheshire, but referred to the pattern 617 was now adopting in its bombing formations – normally four parallel rows of Lancasters (four or five to a row), each of the leaders flying at carefully planned 200 ft or 300 ft vertical separation from each other, and behind each of them, every subsequent Lancaster flying [inserted] in turn [/inserted] at 400 ft lower than the one in front. Thus the “gaggle” had the best chance of avoiding each others bombs in the run-up to the targets, and had a better sighting of the target as it began to become obscured from the markers and first hits. Generally speaking, if the Lancasters adhered closely to this box formation (which was not always possible), the last aircraft’s Tallboys should have released before the first started to explode (they were frequently given delayed-action fuzes).
The V3 site at Mimoyecques was in the chalk hills behind Calais, and Cheshire once again went in very low and dropped his markers on top of the tunnels. The rest then dropped their Tallboys, and David’s went down on target [inserted] from 19,000 ft [/inserted], but the burst wasn’t seen by his crew. Then he flew LM 485 (KC-N) back to
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Woodhall Spa, joining the others who all arrived safely. “Recce” photos later showed the V3 site to have been hit and straddled by the Tallboys and completely wrecked, once more entombing some Germans.
[Inserted] Sub heading [underlined] Leaving 617 Squadron [/underlined] [/inserted]
After landing from this short flight (David had been airborne only 2 hrs 45 mins on this last occasion), [deleted] their C.O. [/deleted] Cheshire was summoned to Cochrane’s Group HQ. Cochrane looked at Cheshire, and said quietly to him: “I’ve been looking at the records, and see you’ve sone 100 trips now. That’s enough, it’s time you had a rest!” And he told Cheshire it was no use arguing! He also added that his three Flight Commanders, [inserted] Dave [/inserted] Shannon, [inserted] Joe [/inserted] McCarthy and [inserted] Les [/inserted] Munro had to come off as well, with David Wilson too. Mimoyecques had been David’s own 90th Operation [/deleted] as well [/deleted], and although the Flight Commanders had done fewer trips, they had [inserted] all [/inserted] been flying on “Ops” continuously for some two years.
So David was rested simultaneously with his CO and Flight Commanders. He had joined 617 in time for its seventh operation (and its first visit to the Anthéor viaduct) on September 16th 1943, and had been with the Squadron for over two months before Cheshire had arrived to take over from [inserted] Mick Martin [/inserted] the temporary C.O. When he joined there had been 10 of the original Dams raid pilots still flying in 617, but when he left, the last three – the Flight Commanders – left with him. It was the end of an era in 617, and David was very proud to have fought and lived alongside those famous names. As for himself, he has never really had the recognition that he deserved for his part in the 40 Operations mounted by 617 between September 16th 1943 and July 6th 1944, but this is no doubt because he was an inherently shy man – though a very tough one in his quiet [inserted] Scottish [/inserted] way.
With all of them being suddenly rested from 617, the 5 Group A.O.C. began to confer some long deserved awards on them. Cheshire had been given a second Bar to his DSO on April 18th 1944 (while with 617) and now, two months after leaving, he was awarded the Victoria Cross, for four years of continuous bravery (unique because it was not for one specific act of gallantry). Shannon was awarded a Bar to his DSO, and Munro was awarded a DSO (McCarthy had just been awarded a Bar [inserted] to his DFC. [/inserted] David was justly awarded a Bar to his DFC (gazetted on June 29th
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1944. This was [inserted] then [/inserted] followed up on November 26th 1944 by his second decoration with 617 – a DSO. (The delay in the award of the DSO was probably occasioned by the departure of Wing Cmdr Geoffrey Leonard Cheshire, VC, DSO and two Bars, DFC, M.I.D., and the arrival and settling-in of his successor at 617, Wing Cmdr J.B. (“Willie”) Tait, DSO and Bar, DFC, MID).
The citation for David Wilson’s Bar to his DFC read: “Since the award of his first DFC in May 943, this officer has completed a third tour of operational duty, during which his experience, determination and devotion to duty have been displayed in the course of many sorties As a captain of aircraft, he can always be relied upon to complete his tasks in the face of the heaviest enemy opposition. He has a long and distinguished record of operational flying.”
And when the DSO was gazetted on November 26th this citation said: “This officer has taken part in numerous missions over enemy territory, including attacks on Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen, Cologne and Mannheim. He is now in his 3rd Tour, and has completed many sorties demanding a high standard of skill and accuracy. He has proved himself to be an ideal leader and his example has been most inspiring.”
“. [sic]
It is interesting to look back on David’s three tours of operations to see the difference in training required by any pilot flying with 617, and the other squadrons. In his time with 214 Squadron (his first tour) David flew a total of 289 hrs 50 mins, of which 199 hrs 35 mins was on operations, and just 90 hrs 15 mins doing Squadron training and exercises, etc. In this case the training hours amounted to 31% of the total. With 196 Squadron, training hours (34hr 35mins out of a total of 135 hrs 40 mins) amounted to 25%. But in 617 Squadron, David’s training accounted for 239 hrs 45 mins out of 420 hrs 55 mins – or a massive 57% of his total time! For each operational hour flown, he had flown over an hour’s worth of practice – nearly all bomb-aiming. This just illustrates the degree to which Guy Gibson (who started it), followed by Mick Martin and Geoffrey Cheshire, had insisted on the very highest level of low and high-level bombing accuracy.
At the end of his third tour, David had flown 90 missions, lasting for a total of 481 hrs 50 mins, and trained for a further 364 hrs 35 mins in these squadrons.
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[Inserted] As for David’s Lancaster [deleted] that [/deleted] [inserted] in which [/inserted] he finished his days [deleted] in [/deleted] at 617 (LM485, KC-N), this aircraft survived a further V1 site attacks, two attacks on the German battleship Tirpitz in Norway (as KC-U), and further raids on Norway, etc, [deleted] in 1945, [/deleted] surviving the War to be scrapped in October, 1945. His other favourite, JB139 (KC-X, and later -V) was shot down over Brest on August 5th 1944, piloted by Don Cheney, R.C.A.F., who survived, with three of his crew (four were killed). The remains of the Lancaster can still be seen in the shallow water of St. Anne-la-Palud Bay, nearby. [/inserted]
[Underlined] Marriage, No5 L.F.S, and the E.T.P.S. [/underlined]
Now that David had obtained a welcome break from operations, he and Elsie were married on July 22nd 1944, and he snatched a quick two weeks leave before finally saying goodbye to 617 Squadron [inserted] at a mammoth farewell party [/inserted] on August 7th, and reporting to his new posting, No5 Lancaster Finishing School at Syerston, Notts, the next day.
David was now made [inserted] up to [/inserted] a Squadron Leader, and [deleted] at first [/deleted] put in charge of “B” Flight at 5 LFS. He was later [deleted] at Syerston until March 13th 1945, becoming [/deleted] appointed the Chief Flying Instructor of the whole School on October 4th, and remained its CFI until he ended his posting there on March 13th 1945. During this time he put many other budding Lancaster pilots through their paces on the School’s well worn (and operationally expired) Lancasters. They were mostly Flying Officers, but there were a few Warrant Officers, Pilot Officers and Flight Lieutenants, and the odd Squadron Leader converting onto the four-engined bombers.
David put all his pupils through the full training steps, which included “stalling practice”, “steep turns”, “three and two engine flying”, “three engine overshoots and landings”, apart from routine circuits and bumps, and night flying.
On several occasions he managed a trip in a Lancaster, or the unit’s Oxford “hack”, to visit 617 at Woodhall Spa, usually taking Sqd Ldr. Poore over as well (both of them had served with the Dambusters). And a number of the Lancasters David taught on at the LFS had once flown in 617 Squadron.
In March 1945, having come to the end of his
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Posting to the LFS, David applied to go on one of the Engine Test Pilot’s Courses at Boscombe Down. He was accepted on the No 3 Course there, and started the Course on March 15th 1945.
This was the third and last of the early Courses to be held at Boscombe Down, due mainly to the construction of hard runways on the aerodrome, leading to a veritable log-jam of aircraft taking off or landing on the restricted grass areas.
David’s Course lasted until October 2nd that year – a period of 6 1/2 months – and David was one of 31 test-pilots to complete it successfully. Amongst other subsequently famous names on the course with him were [inserted] Lt. [/inserted] Peter Twiss RN (to become Chief Test-Pilot for Fairey Aviation), [inserted] Sqd. Ldr. [/inserted] Charles McClure, who then took over from “Roly” Falk as Wing Cmdr. And Chief Test-Pilot at the R.A.E. at Farnborough, Flt. Lt. J.O. Lancaster who went to Boulton Paul, Saunders Roe, and finally Armstrong Whitworth; Ron Clear, from Airspeeds; and Lt. Cmdr. J.B.V. Burgerhorst, who went to Fokkers.
Five of the 31 on the Course were to lose their lives testing aircraft (the corresponding losses on the 1st Course were 5 out of 13, [deleted] and [/deleted] on the 2nd 7 out of 28, and the 4th, 7 out of 33). This eventual “loss” rate from the early courses was on average almost 23% , illustrating the high price paid in the lives of exceptionally brave and talented young men, by the advancement of Britain’s and other countries’, aviation industries.
As described in the chapters in these Volumes about Jimmy Owell, Ricky Esler and Jimmy Nelson, etc, the ETPS Course proceeded for David along the normal lines. The previous Commandant, Gp. Capt. J.F. McKenna [inserted] AFC [/inserted], had just been killed in a Mustang at the beginning of David’s Course, and his place was taken by Gp Capt. H.J. Wilson, AFC, who had been a senior test-pilot at the RAE. The Assistant Commandant was Wing Cmdr H.P. “Sandy” Powell, AFC, who also acted as the Chief Test-flying Instructor.
David flew the [inserted] range of [/inserted] ETPS aircraft, which at that time included an Oxford, Harvards, Lancaster
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Swordfish, Mosquitos, Tempest [inserted] I and II and V, [/inserted] Spitfire IX and XXI Boston, [deleted] Sptifire IX [/deleted], [inserted] and the [/inserted] Meteor I. The last machine was the first jet aircraft that David had flown, but it provided no undue problems for him.
By the beginning of October, David had passed the difficult classroom studies, and the flying examinations, with ease, and after qualification, he accepted a post as test-pilot in “B” Squadron ( [deleted] the [/deleted] multi-engine aircraft) at the A & AEE at Boscombe Down, to last until his demob on March 15th 1946.
At the A & AEE, he started flying there on January 10th 1946, and undertook some firing trials on a new Avro Lincoln, flew a Lancaster to measure “speed/power curves”, practiced bombing runs in a Mosquito VI, and carried out other tests on a Halifax III, Dakota, Warwick, etc. Then his Service career was over, and David was demobbed.
[Underlined] A Career at A.V. Roe & Co. [/underlined]
With his brilliant academic qualifications, his war-time record, and qualifications now as a test-pilot, David Wilson [inserted] now [/inserted] had a great deal to offer the world. He was immediately offered a job at RAF Cranwell, and in fact the College was very keen to employ him, but David had written to Sir Roy Dobson, Managing Director now of A.V. Roe & Co. Ltd. at Manchester, to seek a post there – not necessarily in the Flight Test Dept., but perhaps connected with the Design side.
Sir Roy offered David the post of “Manager – Aerodynamic Development and Testing”, and David promptly accepted, starting work at Woodford [inserted] on April 8th 1946 [/inserted] at a salary of £800 per annum, with the promise of an early rise to £900 p.a. He was now 29 years of age, and had a total of 1807 flying hours to his credit.
David’s new job was immediately very tied up with examination of the Tudor airliner designs – both the Mark I and Mark II that were on order for BOAC and BSAA. A considerable amount of aero-dynamic research was going on into the problems affecting these designs, and several establishments
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Apart form Avro’s were engaged in a dramatic race to find the answers. The description of these problems can be found in the stories of Bill Thorn and Jimmy Orrell in these Volumes, but suffice to say that David and his Dept. were soon very busy liaising with Roy Chadwick, [deleted] the [/deleted] Avro’s Chief Designer (and from February 1947, their Technical Director), and the Test-pilots at Woodford to try to overcome the Tudor’s bad stalling characteristics, and excessive drag problems.
Once settled in at Woodford, David decided he had better keep his hand in at flying, and so [inserted] he had a medical on January 1st 1947, and [/inserted] took out a Civilian Flying Licence (No 24644) on March 26th 1947, not valid for flying Public Transport aircraft, but enough to cover him for test-flying at Woodford.
[Inserted] It was also early in 1947 before David and his wife were called to Buckingham Palace to receive the DSO he had won in 617 Squadron – so great had been the queue of people at the end of the War. As he was now a civilian, David had to receive the decoration in civilian clothes. [/inserted]
David was by now living at 3, Leith Rd, Sale, Cheshire, some miles from Woodford and closer to the Southern side of Manchester, and he and his wife Elsie now had a baby daughter, Carol. He was very satisfied with his work at Woodford, and he was starting to fly as Second pilot to Ken Cook and others, and rapidly getting the taste of flying back again. → [Inserted] For instance he went up with Ken on November 25th 1946 [inserted] and Reg Knight on November 27th [/inserted] in the Anson C.Mk XIX Series 2 VL 310, to conduct “Trailing Static Tests”[inserted] “Asymmetric and P.E.” tests. On December 1st he was flying with Reg Knight in Tudor I G-AGPF, doing tests at 25,000’. [/inserted] On December 30th and 31st he was up again with Ken in the Anson XII NL172 doing “Trimmer Setting” tests with the C of G fully forward and full aft, and “Single-engine” tests loaded up to 10,000 lbs weight.
In January 1947, David was flying with Ken again, doing “Trim” tests and “Loop swinging” on York MW322, checking “Stalling speeds” [inserted] and “P.E’s” [/inserted] on Avro XIX G-AGNI, and conducting “Pressurization and Heating” trials on the Tudor I G-AGRJ. And in May 1947 he was flying with Reg Knight in the Tudor I G-AGRI, Anson VM172 and Tudor IV G-AHNI, carrying out “stalls”, “stabilities”, “levels” and other aero-dynamic tests. [/inserted] And it was because of his flying ability, coupled with his interest in sampling the stalling characteristics of the new Tudor II, and observing the reaction of the [inserted] newly-shaped [/inserted] wool-tufted wing fillets fitted to it that he flew as Second-pilot with Bill Thorn on [inserted] that fateful [/inserted] August 23rd 1947. He was not originally → [inserted] scheduled to be the No 2 pilot on this flight as Bill had intended to take Reg Knight up with him. But Reg (see the next Chapter) had to go down to see his mother at Nuneaton, at very short notice, due to a dispute she was having over a new house. And Fate thus decreed that David would take his place. [/inserted]
So Bill Thorn and David Wilson taxied out in G-AGSU that sunny Saturday morning at a little after 10.50 (GMT), carrying Roy Chadwick (Avro’s Technical Director) and Stuart Davies (now the Chief Designer), with their Flight Engineer Eddie Talbot, and radio operator J. Webster. And soon after lift off on the main runway, Bill Thorn got into difficulties with Britain’s largest passenger aircraft (at that time), because of the aileron circuits being mistakenly reversed during work in the factory. The Tudor tilted right over onto
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Its starboard wing, the tip touched the ground and the Tudor II sideslipped slowly into a field, crumpling the wing, sliding along the stubble on its belly, and then decelerating into a group of oak trees surrounding a deep pond. The trees broke up the fuselage and wings, and the long nose of the Tudor fractured, and dropped the cockpit end into the pond, drowning the two pilots. But for the presence of water, they would undoubtedly have survived.
Thus, David’s career with Avro’s came to a sudden halt, along with the great Chief Test-pilot sitting beside him, and the man in the back who had designed all these magnificent machines, - and the Lancaster bomber in which David had spent so much of an eventful wartime career, and survived because of its strength and performance. Certainly, if he had to die, he could not have died in the company of any greater men than these.
Roy Dobson, who should have been on the test flight himself, but had skipped it because he was called to his office for an urgent ‘phone call, tried to cope with the tragedy that afternoon from his office at Woodford. The relatives of the other occupants, dead or injured, were contacted by various means, but David’s wife Elsie was mistakenly overlooked for a time. With a young daughter to bring up, and a home to try to keep together, things looked bleak. But when Sir Roy realised how difficult things were, he went out of his way to do all he could for Elsie. He had Avro’s arrange to pay off the mortgage, [inserted] and [/inserted] and give her a monthly sum for quite some time. He sent presents for Carol from time to time, and used to bring them back for the little girl from his overseas trips.
Sir Roy was greatly affected by the accident, and genuinely grief-stricken over the deaths of his life-long friend and colleague, Roy Chadwick, and Bill Thorn and David Wilson. He advised Elsie Wilson to brief a good solicitor and sue A.V. Roe & Coe for damages, so that she could be awarded compensation, and although Elsie found this difficult, and at times could hardly understand what was going on, eventually she was awarded damages and these were held by the Court in 2 1/2 % War Loan on trust for her daughter, with the income being paid regularly.
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In fact David’s daughter Carol was eventually offered a Dr. Barnes Wallis Scholarship, had her mother wanted to accept this (out of the two per year that the great aircraft and bombs designer had set up out of his own money). This could have entitled Carol to attend Christ’s Hospital (Girls School,) in Hertfordshire, but Elsie declined, in order to keep the family close together.
David was buried in Woodford Church, near Roy Chadwick and Bill Thorn, and where Sir Roy and Lady Dobson now also lie. The funeral was a very grand affair, attended by hundreds of colleagues of the crew from all walks of life, the Ministries, RAF and 617 Squadron, and other Aviation companies. Afterwards, Sir Roy said of David:
“He was a brilliant young man, and a technician of extraordinary aptitude and ability, who would soon have made his mark on the company. His loss is going to be most severely felt”.
And it was, no less than by his daughter Carol, who to this day remains devoted to the war hero father she scarcely remembers, and her mother Elsie, who has remarried, but still lives in Cheshire not many miles from Woodford, and under the flight path to Ringway Airport.
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[Underlined] Appendix [/underlined] P1
[Underlined] Sqd. Ldr. David James Baikie Wilson, DSO, DFC & Bar [/underlined]
[Underlined] List of Operations (3 Tours) [/underlined]
[Underlined] With No 214 Sqd: [inserted] (Wellington IC). [/inserted] Target Bomb load make-up Total Bombs dropped [/underlined]
1941 July 9* Osnabrück. 1 x 4000 4,000
July 14* Bremen 3 x 500 + Incendiaries. 1,500 +
July 17* Cologne 1 x 4000 4,000
July 20* Rotterdam 1 x 1,000, 3 x 500, + Incendiaries 2,500 +
July 23* Mannheim 1 x 4000 4,000
July 25* Hamburg ? ?
Aug 12* Hanover ? ?
Aug 16* Duisburg ? ?
Aug 19* Kiel 6 x 500 3,000
Aug 22* Mannheim ? ?
Aug 27* Mannheim ? ?
Aug 31* Cologne 1 x 1000, 5 x 500 3,500
Sep 2* Frankfurt 1 x 4000. (Retd, engine trouble) –
Sep 7* Berlin ? ?
Sep 8* Kassel ? ?
Sep 11 Le Havre ? ?
Sep 15 Brest 1 x 1,000, 4 x 500, 1 x 250 3,250
Sep 17 Karlsruhe 1 x 1,000, 4 x 500 3,000
Sep 29 Hamburg 1 x 4,000 HCMI 4,000
Oct 3 Antwerp 1 x 1,000, 6 x 500, 1 x 250 4,250
Oct 10 Cologne 1 x 1,000, 5 x 500, 1 x 250 3,750
Oct 12 Bremen ? ?
Oct 13 Dusseldorf 1 x 1,000, 5 x 500, 1 x 250 3,750
Oct 21 Bremen 1 x 1,000, 5 x 500 3,500
Oct 23 Kiel 1 x 1,000, 3 x 500, 1 x 250 2,750
Oct 31 Bremen Bad Wx, retd with bombs. –
Nov 7 Berlin 6 x 500 (Bad Wx, Osnabruck bombed) 3,000
Nov 9 Hamburg 6 x 500, 1 x 250 3,250
Dec 23 Brest 6 x 500 3,000
Dec 27 Brest 6 x 500 3,000
1942 Jan 2 Brest ? ?
Jan 8 Brest ? (Bad Wx, bombs returned) –
Jan 11 Brest 6 x 500, 3,000
Jan 21 Bremen 1 x 4,000 4,000
Jan 26 Brest 6 x 500 3,000
Jan 28 Munster ? (Bad Wx, bombs returned) –
[Underlined] TOTAL = 36 MISSIONS Total hours with Squadron = 289:50 [/underlined]
[Underlined] Total hours on “Ops” = 199:35 [/underlined]
* Flying as Second-pilot on these raids (Rest as Captain).
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[Underlined] Appendix [/underlined] P2
[Underlined] With No 196 Squadron. (Wellington X) [/underlined]
1943 Feb 7 Lorient 7 x 500 3,500
Feb 13 Lorient 3 x 500, 6 Containers 1,500 +
Feb 14 Cologne 3 x 500 6 Containers
Feb 17 x Emden ? Bad Wx. Bombs returned. –
Feb 26 Cologne 3 x 500, +Incendiaries (2 x 500 bombs hung up, returned) 500 +
Feb 28 St. Nazaire 3 x 500 + Incendiaries 1,500 +
Mar 3 Hamburg 3 x 500 + Incendiaries 1,500 +
Mar 5 Essen 1 x 4,000 4,000
Mar 12 Essen 3 x 500 + Incendiaries 1,500 +
Mar 26 Duisburg 3 x 500 + Incendiaries 1,500 +
Mar 29 Bochum 3 x 500 + Incendiaries 1,500 +
Apr 4 Kiel 1 x 4,000 4,000
May 4 Dortmund 2 x 500, 6 x SBC 1,000 +
May 12 Duisburg 1 x 4,000 4,000
May 13 Bochum 1 x 4,000 4,000
May 25 Düsseldorf 2 x 500, 7 x SBC 1,000 +
June 11 Düsseldorf ? ?
Jun 21 Krefeld ? ?
Jun 24 Wuppertal (Elberfeld) Incendiaries only. ?
Jul 3 Cologne Incendiaries only ?
[Underlined] Total = 20 Missions Total hours with Squadron = 135:40 [/underlined]
[Underlined] Total hours on “Ops” = 101:05 [/underlined]
[Underlined] With 617 Squadron. (Lancaster I and III) [/underlined]
1943 Sep 16 Antheor Viaduct. 1 x 4,000, 3 x 1,000 7,000
Nov 11 Antheor Viaduct. 1 x 12,000, HC 12,000
Dec 16 Flixecourt xx 1 x 12,000 HC 12,000
Dec 20 Liege 1 x 12,000 HC Bomb returned, raid abortive (due PFF) –
Dec 22 Abbeville-Amiens. xx 11 x 1,000. Bombs brought back (due PFF failure) –
1944 Jan 4 Pas de Calais (Flying Bomb Site) ? Bombs dropped 4 miles from target due PFF error ?
Jan 21 Hallencourt. xx 2 x 1,000, 13 x 500, 6 Flares. Only 1 x 1,000 and 7 x 500 dropped 4,500
Jan 25 Fréval (Pas de Calais) xx 2 x 1,000, 13 x 500 8,500
Feb 8 Limoges 12 x 1,000 12,000
Feb 12 Antheor Viaduct 1 x 12,000 12,000
x Daylight raid.
xx Flying bomb site. (V1 weapon).
[Page break]
[Underlined] Appendix [/underlined] P3
[Underlined] With 617 Sqd cont’d [/underlined]
1944 March 2 Albert All Incendiaries ?
March 4 St. Etienne. ? Bad Wx. Returned –
March 10 St. Etienne 11 x 1,000 11,000
March 15 Woippy (near Metz). 1 x 12,000. Bad Wx. Returned. –
March 16. Clermont Ferrand 1 x 12,000, 6 Flares 12,000
March 18 Bergerac 1 x 12,000 12,000
March 20 Angouleme 1 x 8,000, 1 x 1,000 9,000
March 23 Lyons 11 x 1,000 11,000
March 25 Lyons ? x 500, Incendiaries ?
March 29 Lyons 1 x 8,000. 1 x 1,000 9,000
Apr 10 St. Cyr. 1 x 8,000, 6 x 500 11,000
Apr 18 Juvisy 4 x 1,000, 4 x Red Spots 4,000
Apr 20 La Chapelle 12 x 1,000 12,000
Jun 5 D-Day decoy mission
Jun 8 Saumur Tunnel 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
Jun 14 Le Havre Pens 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
Jun 15 Boulogne Pens 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
Jun 19 Watten xx 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
Jun 20 Wizernes xx – Tallboy Raid recalled over Channel –
Jun 22 Wizernes xx Tallboy Bad Wx. Bomb brought back. –
Jun 24 Wizernes xx 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
Jun 25 Siracourt xx 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
July 4 St. Leu d’Esserent. Xx 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
July 6 Mimoyecques xx 1 x 12,000 Tallboy 12,000
[Underlined] Total – 34 Missions Total hours with Squadron = 420:55 [/underlined]
[Underlined Total hours on “Ops” = 181:10 [/underlined]
[Underlined] Grand total (3 tours) = 90 Operational Flights. [/underlined]
[Underlined] Grand total of flying hours with Squadrons = 846:25 [/underlined]
[Underlined] Grand total of flying hours on Operations = 481:50 [/underlined]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
A bomber pilot’s journey through WWII
Description
An account of the resource
Biography of Squadron Leader David James Baikie Wilson, DSO, DFC and Bar (1917 - 1947). He flew operations as a pilot with 214, 196 and 617 Squadrons before becoming Head of Aerodynamic Development and Testing, and Test-Pilot at A V Roe & Co Ltd. He was killed 23 August 1947 in the Avro Tudor crash.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Peter V Clegg
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Anne-Marie Watson
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
handwritten sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Personal research
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
BCleggPVWilsonDv1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1944-04-05
1944-04-06
1944-06-05
1944-06-06
1944-06-08
1944-06-09
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
1944-06-16
1944-06-19
1944-06-20
1944-06-22
1944-06-24
1944-06-25
1944-07-04
1944-07-05
1944-07-06
1945
1946
1947-08-23
1944-04-18
1944-04-19
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Belgium--Antwerp
Belgium--Liège
England--Cheshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Suffolk
France--Albert
France--Angoulême
France--Bergerac
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Brest
France--Clermont-Ferrand
France--Creil
France--Le Havre
France--Limoges
France--Lorient
France--Lyon
France--Mimoyecques
France--Pas-de-Calais
France--Saint-Cyr-sur-Mer
France--Saint-Étienne (Loire)
France--Saint-Nazaire
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
France--Saumur
France--Siracourt
France--Watten
France--Woippy
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kassel
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Krefeld
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Wuppertal
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Osnabrück
France--Watten
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
11 OTU
1660 HCU
1668 HCU
196 Squadron
214 Squadron
5 Group
617 Squadron
8 Group
aircrew
Bennett, Donald Clifford Tyndall (1910-1986)
bombing
bombing of the Boulogne E-boats (15/16 June 1944)
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
bombing of the Juvisy, Noisy-le-Sec and Le Bourget railways (18/19 April 1944)
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
bombing of the Mimoyecques V-3 site (6 July 1944)
Bombing of the Saumur tunnel (8/9 June 1944)
bombing of the Siracourt V-weapon site (25 June 1944)
bombing of the Watten V-2 site (19 June 1944)
bombing of the Wizernes V-2 site (20, 22, 24 June 1944)
bombing of Toulouse (5/6 April 1944)
Boston
C-47
Chadwick, Roy (1893-1947)
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
crash
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Service Order
final resting place
Flying Training School
Gibson, Guy Penrose (1918-1944)
Grand Slam
grief
H2S
Halifax
Halifax Mk 3
Harvard
Heavy Conversion Unit
incendiary device
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Lincoln
Meteor
Mosquito
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Normandy deception operations (5/6 June 1944)
Oboe
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
P-51
Pathfinders
pilot
promotion
RAF Bassingbourn
RAF Boscombe Down
RAF Church Lawford
RAF Coningsby
RAF Cranage
RAF Cranwell
RAF Driffield
RAF Leconfield
RAF Stradishall
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
RAF Upavon
RAF Wainfleet
RAF Woodhall Spa
Spitfire
Stirling
Tallboy
Tiger Moth
training
V-1
V-2
V-3
V-weapon
Wallis, Barnes Neville (1887-1979)
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/275/10063/LHughesAM417845v1.2.pdf
b342f70b6f3bea68f97cea8b2c7ffee6
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Hughes, Angas
Angas Hughes
Angas M Hughes
A M Hughes
A Hughes
Description
An account of the resource
29 items. An oral history interview with Flight Sergeant Angas Murray Hughes (b. 1923, 417845 Royal Australian Air Force), his logbook, prisoner of war identity cards and dog tags, two memoirs and 21 photographs. Angas Hughes flew 32 operations as a bomb aimer with 467 Squadron from RAF Waddington. One of the aircraft he flew in was Lancaster R5868, S-Sugar, now at RAF Hendon. He was shot down in September 1944 and became a prisoner of war.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Angas Hughes and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-10-01
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Hughes, AM
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Angas M Hughes’ Royal Australian Air Force observer’s air gunner’s and wireless operator’s flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
Royal Australian Air Force observer’s air gunner’s and wireless operators flying log book for Angus Murray Hughes, covering the period from 24 October 1942 to 26 September 1944. He was stationed at RAAF Mount Gambier, RAAF Port Pirie, RAAF Nhill, RAF West Freugh, RAF Lichfield, RAF Swinderby, RAF Syerston and RAF Waddington. Aircraft flown were, Anson, Battle, Wellington, Stirling and Lancaster. He flew a total of 31 operations with 467 (RAAF) squadron, before being reported missing on operation number 32 to Karlsruhe. He flew 13 Daylight and 18 night operations. Targets were, Poitiers, Aunay-sur-Odon, Chatellerault, Gelsenkirchen, Limoges, Prouville, St. Leu D’Esserent, Thiverny, Courtrai, Stuttgart, St Cyr, Caen, Laroche, Siracourt, Troissy. Givors, Gilze-Rijen, Stettin, L’isle Adam, Darmstadt, Brest, Le Havre, Boulogne, Bremerhaven, Rheydt, Dortmund-Ems Canal and Karlsruhe. His pilot on operations was Flying Officer Millar.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text. Log book and record book
Text
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1942
1943
1944
1944-06-12
1944-06-13
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
1944-06-16
1944-06-19
1944-06-20
1944-06-21
1944-06-22
1944-06-23
1944-06-24
1944-06-25
1944-07-04
1944-07-05
1944-07-07
1944-07-08
1944-07-09
1944-07-20
1944-07-21
1944-07-24
1944-07-25
1944-07-30
1944-07-31
1944-08-01
1944-08-03
1944-08-05
1944-08-07
1944-08-08
1944-08-11
1944-08-12
1944-08-15
1944-08-16
1944-08-17
1944-08-18
1944-08-25
1944-08-26
1944-09-05
1944-09-10
1944-09-11
1944-09-12
1944-09-17
1944-09-18
1944-09-19
1944-09-20
1944-09-23
1944-09-24
1944-09-26
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Australia
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
South Australia
Victoria
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Staffordshire
Belgium--Kortrijk
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Brest
France--Caen
France--Châtellerault
France--Givors
France--Le Havre
France--Limoges
France--L'Isle-Adam
France--Marne
France--Normandy
France--Oise
France--Pas-de-Calais
France--Poitiers
France--Saint-Cyr-sur-Mer
Germany--Bremerhaven
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Rheydt
Germany--Stuttgart
Scotland--Dumfries and Galloway
Poland--Szczecin
Poland
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
France--Aunay-sur-Odon
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LHughesAM417845v1
1660 HCU
27 OTU
467 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
Air Observers School
aircrew
Anson
Battle
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of Luftwaffe night-fighter airfields (15 August 1944)
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
bombing of the Pas de Calais V-1 sites (24/25 June 1944)
Bombing of Trossy St Maximin (3 August 1944)
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Lancaster Mk 1
Lancaster Mk 3
missing in action
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
RAF Lichfield
RAF Swinderby
RAF Syerston
RAF Waddington
RAF West Freugh
Stirling
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
V-1
V-weapon
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/16/19615/LAtkinsonA1042303v1.1.pdf
4976658f4383bc124022f9606cde9a15
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Atkinson, Arthur
Arthur Atkinson
A Atkinson
Description
An account of the resource
Seven items. An oral history interview with Warrant Officer Arthur Atkinson (1922 - 2020, 1042303 Royal Air Force) his log book, service material and two photographs. Arthur Atkinson trained as a wireless operator and spent eighteen months at RAF Ringway before being flying 34 operations with 61 Squadron from RAF Coningsby and RAF Skellingthorpe.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Arthur Atkinson and catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-06-23
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Atkinson, A
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Arthur Atkinson’s observers and air gunners flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
Observers and air gunners flying log book for Arthur Atkinson, wireless operator, covering the period from 28 April 1943 to 19 January 1946 and from 16 September 1950 to 30 September 1950. Detailing his flying training, operations flown, instructor duties and post war flying with 19 reserve flying school. He was stationed at RAF Stormy Down, RAF Yatesbury, RAF Bobbington (RAF Halfpenny Green), RAF Husbands Bosworth, RAF Winthorpe, RAF Syerston, RAF Coningsby, RAF Skellingthorpe, RAF Silverstone and RAF St Athan. Aircraft flown in were, Dominie, Proctor, Anson, Wellington, Stirling, Lancaster and Oxford. He flew a total of 34 operations with 61 squadron, 30 night and 4 daylight operations. Targets were, Stuttgart, Toulouse, Tours, Aachen, Paris, Brunswick, Munich, Schweinfurt, Bordeaux, Lille, Bourg-Leopold, Duisburg, Eindhoven, Nantes, Ferme D’Urville, St Pierre du Mont, Argentan, Rennes, Gelsenkirchen, Limoges, Prouville, Vitry, Beauvoir, St Leu D’Esserent, Culmont-Chalindrey, Nevers, Caen, Thiverny, Courtrai, St Cyr and Givors. <span>His pilot on operations was</span><span> F</span>light Lieutenant Acott.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LAtkinsonA1042303v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Belgium--Kortrijk
Belgium--Leopoldsburg
England--Leicestershire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--West Midlands
England--Wiltshire
France--Abbeville Region
France--Argentan
France--Beauvoir-sur-Mer
France--Cherbourg Region
France--Caen
France--Givors
France--Lille
France--Limoges
France--Nantes
France--Nevers
France--Rennes
France--Saint-Cyr-sur-Mer
France--Saint-Pierre-du-Mont (Landes)
France--Senlis Region
France--Toulouse
France--Tours
France--Vitry-sur-Seine
Germany--Aachen
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Munich
Germany--Schweinfurt
Germany--Stuttgart
Netherlands--Eindhoven
Wales--Bridgend
Wales--Vale of Glamorgan
France--Bordeaux (Nouvelle-Aquitaine)
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
France--Langres
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1945
1946
1950
1944-03-15
1944-03-16
1944-04-05
1944-04-06
1944-04-10
1944-04-11
1944-04-12
1944-04-18
1944-04-19
1944-04-20
1944-04-21
1944-04-22
1944-04-23
1944-04-24
1944-04-25
1944-04-26
1944-04-27
1944-04-28
1944-04-29
1944-05-10
1944-05-11
1944-05-12
1944-05-19
1944-05-20
1944-05-21
1944-05-22
1944-05-23
1944-05-24
1944-05-25
1944-05-27
1944-05-28
1944-06-03
1944-06-04
1944-06-06
1944-06-07
1944-06-08
1944-06-09
1944-06-21
1944-06-22
1944-06-23
1944-06-24
1944-06-25
1944-06-27
1944-06-28
1944-06-29
1944-07-04
1944-07-05
1944-07-12
1944-07-13
1944-07-15
1944-07-16
1944-07-18
1944-07-19
1944-07-20
1944-07-21
1944-07-25
1944-07-26
1944-07-27
14 OTU
1661 HCU
17 OTU
61 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
bombing
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
bombing of the Juvisy, Noisy-le-Sec and Le Bourget railways (18/19 April 1944)
bombing of the Normandy coastal batteries (5/6 June 1944)
bombing of the Pas de Calais V-1 sites (24/25 June 1944)
bombing of Toulouse (5/6 April 1944)
Dominie
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
Proctor
RAF Coningsby
RAF Halfpenny Green
RAF Husbands Bosworth
RAF Silverstone
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF St Athan
RAF Stormy Down
RAF Syerston
RAF Winthorpe
RAF Yatesbury
Stirling
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
Wellington
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2405/44014/LMillsJF14682v1.1.pdf
7ffa8d8d9a954c03eabfa884a8e7e0a9
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Mills, Joseph Forster
Description
An account of the resource
Three items. The collection concerns Flying Officer Joseph Forster Mills (b. 1916, 174682 Royal Air Force) and contains a copy of his log book and correspondence. He flew operations as a navigator with 61 Squadron. Many of his operations were flown in Lancaster ED860.
The collection was donated to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Jane Towler and catalogued by Digital Archive staff.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2021-07-20
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Mills, JF
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Joseph Forster Mills flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
Flying log book for J F Mills, Navigator, covering the period from 20 September 1942 to 24 September 1950. Detailing his flying training, operations flown and post war flying with 1332 heavy conversion unit, 246 squadron, number 23 reserve flying school and 59 squadron. He was stationed at RCAF London, RAF Kingstown, RAF Staverton, RAF Moreton Valance, RAF Saltby, RAF Market Harborough, RAF Wigsley, RAF Skellingthorpe, RAF Coningsby, RAF Longtown, RAF Northolt and RAF Bassingbourn. Aircraft flown in were Anson, Tiger Moth, Wellington, Halifax, Lancaster, York, Oxford, and Hastings. He flew a total of 38 operations with 61 squadron, 5 Daylight and 33 night. His pilots on operations were Wing Commander Scott, Wing Commander Doubleday, Flying Officer Street, Flight lieutenant Forrest, Pilot Officer Auckland, and Flying Officer Stone. Targets were Berlin, Magdeburg, Leipzig, Stuttgart, Schweinfurt, Chateauroux, Frankfurt, Nuremburg, Tours, Aachen, Paris, Brunswick, Louailles, Brest, Duisburg, Saumur, St Pierre du Mont, Argentan, Poitiers, St Cyr, Givors, Cahagnes, St Leu D’Esserent, Sequeville, Ladbergen, Essen, Lutzkendorf and Bremen. He also flew 3 operation Exodus and 2 Cooks tours.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
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Great Britain. Royal Air Force
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
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eng
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Text
Text. Log book and record book
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One booklet
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IBCC Digital Archive
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
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LMillsJF14682v1
Spatial Coverage
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Canada
France
Germany
Great Britain
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Cumbria
England--Gloucestershire
England--Leicestershire
England--Lincolnshire
England--London
France--Argentan
France--Brest
France--Caen Region
France--Châteauroux
France--Creil Region
France--Givors
France--Le Mans Region
France--Paris
France--Poitiers
France--Saint-Cyr-sur-Mer
France--Saint-Pierre-du-Mont (Landes)
France--Saumur
France--Tours
Germany--Aachen
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Magdeburg
Germany--Merseburg Region
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Schweinfurt
Germany--Stuttgart
Ontario--London
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1942
1943
1944-01-20
1944-01-21
1944-01-22
1944-01-30
1944-01-31
1944-02-15
1944-02-16
1944-02-19
1944-02-20
1944-02-21
1944-02-24
1944-02-25
1944-03-01
1944-03-02
1944-03-10
1944-03-11
1944-03-15
1944-03-16
1944-03-18
1944-03-19
1944-03-22
1944-03-23
1944-03-24
1944-03-25
1944-03-30
1944-03-31
1944-04-10
1944-04-11
1944-04-12
1944-04-13
1944-04-18
1944-04-19
1944-04-20
1944-04-21
1944-04-22
1944-04-23
1944-05-06
1944-05-07
1944-05-08
1944-05-09
1944-05-19
1944-05-20
1944-05-21
1944-05-22
1944-05-23
1944-05-31
1944-06-01
1944-06-05
1944-06-06
1944-06-07
1944-06-12
1944-06-13
1944-07-25
1944-07-26
1944-07-27
1944-07-28
1944-07-29
1944-07-30
1944-08-05
1944-08-06
1944-08-07
1945-03-03
1945-03-04
1945-03-11
1945-03-14
1945-03-15
1945-03-22
1945-04-30
1945-05-04
1946
1949
1950
61 Squadron
aircrew
Anson
bombing
Cook’s tour
Halifax
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
navigator
Operation Exodus (1945)
Oxford
RAF Bassingbourn
RAF Coningsby
RAF Market Harborough
RAF Northolt
RAF Saltby
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF Staverton
RAF Wigsley
Tiger Moth
training
Wellington
York
-
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France--Saint-Cyr-sur-Mer
Title
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Saint-Cyr-sur-Mer [place]
Description
An account of the resource
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Title
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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IBCC Digital Archive
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Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
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Base [underlined] Int [/underlined]
Wadd 9
Skell 10
[Indecipherable]
Base 1
minuted
V GROUP NEWS V
APRIL 1944 [deleted] CONFIDENTIAL [/deleted] NUMBER 21
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
Last month I said that it was up to us to undertake the training and to give the thought necessary to prove that we were right in our view that night bombing could be made more accurate than day bombing. During April we have gone a long way towards furnishing the proof. The concentration of bombs which was achieved during some of the attacks, notably those on the marshalling yards at La Chappelle and Juvisy, and against some of the small aircraft factories, was outstanding, and probably represents the greatest weight of bombs in a small areas which has yet been achieved in this war.
By previous standards, therefore, our results have been excellent. But there is still much more to be done before we can afford to be satisfied. We can, however, say that the system of marking, which was pioneered by W/Cdr Cheshire and 617 Squadron, has been applied with success to larger operations, including the highly successful attack on Munich. Nevertheless, in all our attacks during April we inflicted less damage than could have been caused by the weight of bombs carried, and I want crews to think carefully over the reasons which I outline below and to take note of the remedies which are being applied.
[Underlined] Communications [/underlined]
On nearly all targets a proportion of the effort was misplaced due to a failure in communications. It is recognised that the T.R. 1196 operates on an unsuitable frequency and cannot be relied upon. Furthermore, the wireless link which, on occasions, has proved highly satisfactory, is not well suited to the transmission of anything except short instructions in a pre-arranged code. The solution to these communication problems is the introduction of V.H.F. throughout the Group and this policy has now been approved by the Air Ministry although some little time must elapse before all squadrons are fitted. In the meantime, Wireless Operators must ensure a very high degree of efficiency in handling communications.
[Underlined] Smoke [/underlined]
The smoke given off by the bombs has, on many occasions, obscured, or partially obscured, the markers and has made bomb aiming exceedingly difficult during later stages of an attack. Delay action fuses will soon be available once more and their use on certain types of target will ensure that the aiming point is clearly visible throughout the whole run up. An additional method of avoiding the smoke nuisance by aiming off, is described below.
[Underlined] Bombing Errors [/underlined]
There is no doubt that crew bombing errors are still too large and that the pattern of bombs plotted around these precision targets bears a remarkably close relationship to the pattern of bombs plotted around the practice targets at Wainfleet. A proportion of crews obtain good results up to the performance of the sight, which is well under 100 yards. Other crews seem content with results between 200 and 300 yards and a small proportion manage to drop bombs at even greater distances from heights of 10,000 feet or below. There are many causes for these errors but all can be remedied if crews determine that every load of bombs carried out of this country shall fall fair and square on the aiming point.
In the past, the majority of errors in practice bombing have been due to wrong winds, but this source of error should be virtually eliminated by the introduction of the A.P.I. wind finding method. This method will also be used by selected crews on operations so that the bombing winds transmitted to the main force should be more accurate than in the past.
A further source of bombing error has been unserviceable instruments and many Air Bombers are still failing to take the close personal interest in their bombsight which is essential if they are to obtain good results. Although the Instrument Repairer forms the fourth member of the bombing team, it is the Air Bomber who uses the instrument and who must ensure that any difficulties, however trivial, are immediately reported so that they can be put right.
A third main source of error arises out of the manner in which the Pilot flies the aircraft. I find that a number of pilots are still attempting to turn the aircraft flat when making their final corrections during the run up and I can only say to them that such action may easily throw the bombs off by 100 or 200 yards, and that every turn, however small, must be made with the appropriate angle of bank. Far better not to turn at all at the last moment rather than risk a sked. Even a skid of 2° or 3°.
Finally there are errors due to the Air Bomber. Errors which can only be avoided by constant practice in directing the pilot over objects on the ground on every flight; by learning how to adjust in plenty of time for a drift greater or less than that set on the sight. This will become of increasing importance with the introduction of the technique described below.
The accumulative effect of all these errors results in the employment of too many aircraft on each attack, or, put another way, we knock out too few targets each night with the force available. There are many targets which could be destroyed with the effort of a single squadron if the bombing errors could be reduced to 100 yards. These are targets which, at present, have to be attacked by a Base.
I have referred above to the new technique which is being introduced for attacks against small targets on which it is essential that the whole weight of bombs should fall. In the past we have endeavoured to put a marker on the aiming point and, if there were two or more aiming points to put down two or more markers. Examples are some of the railway marshalling yards, or the dispersed hangars making up the aircraft factories at Toulouse. There are several disadvantages in this method of marking. First, the markers often fall through the roofs of buildings and are consequently difficult to see. Secondly, they may be blown out by the concentrated bombing which follows or, if not blown out, obscured by smoke.
It is now proposed that the markers shall be laid by Mosquitos on the upwind edge of the target and that the bombs shall be displaced by the simple expedient of setting a false wind vector on the sight. Recent trials at Wainfleet have shown that a displacement of 300 yards does not unduly complicate the Air Bomber’s run up. If, therefore, the target is 1000 yards long or consists of scattered buildings, one aiming point will be put down and portions of the force will be given different wind settings which will offset their bombs accurately on to the various parts of the target which it is desired to erase. By this means, the target can be scientifically covered and improved results obtained from fewer aircraft.
Success depends, however, on accurate bombing and I would again ask all crews to tackle this problem and to determine that, during May, they will not be satisfied with a bombing error, whether on the practice ranges or against small precision targets, of more than 100 yards from the aiming point or the M.P.I. if a false wind has been applied.
Nothing can more quickly bring this war to a close than the regular achievement of bombing errors of this order.
The arrival in 5 Group of Nos. 83, 97 and 627 Squadrons on attachment from P.F.F. provides the Group with the means of marking targets with great accuracy and I consequently look forward to a steady reduction throughout May in the number of aircraft which have to be detailed for the destruction of these small targets, and by this means to a steady increase in the effective aid which this Group can give in the great offensive which lies ahead.
[Page break]
PROGRESS OF SERVICING
One of the major problems of the Engineering Branch is to maintain large numbers of aircraft which are of very complex design, with a limited number of tradesmen and with the use of the minimum quantity of test equipment. At the same time, the serviceability state must be high; therefore the time taken over periodical maintenance must be short and the work efficiently carried out.
Early in the war the number of really experienced tradesmen was comparatively few. All the men were exceptionally keen, and to make full use of experienced tradesmen on jobs requiring the greatest amount of skill, a reorganisation of the system of aircraft maintenance was effected.
Originally the squadrons on a station worked as independent units, each squadron being divided into two or three flights according to the number of aircraft held. Each of these flights had its own separate maintenance “set up”, with all equipment required for minor and major inspections. Each of these flights also kept its own supply of spares and tools, and minor and major inspections on aircraft were carried out by the ground crew who remained with the aircraft for all purposes including daily servicing.
This was so obviously uneconomical, not only in equipment, spares and tools, but also in the employment of skilled men and expenditure of man hours, that the new scheme was brought into force very soon after the commencement of hostilities.
The maintenance layout then consisted of the Flying Flights and a Maintenance Flight. Squadrons were still maintained as separate units, but the detailed maintenance was carried out in “M” (Maintenance Flight), i.e. minor and major inspections, acceptance checks and engine or power plant changes, whilst in the Flying Flights, daily inspections, refuelling and rectification of petty unserviceability only was necessary. The man power was of course split up accordingly, the more skilled and experienced men forming the maintenance gangs, whilst the men with less experience were employed in the flying flights.
The economy was marked and as can be visualised, only one squadron store, one pool of ground equipment for aircraft inspections and one set of test equipment for the various ancilliary trades were necessary. The economy however which made itself felt as much as anything was the saving of man-hours caused by the use of highly skilled men on detailed maintenance in the Maintenance Flight, with the result that a generally higher serviceability state was achieved.
There was a certain amount of opposition to this scheme by those who though that flights would lose their identity and spirit. This did not happen.
At a later date a further change in maintenance organisation took place. This was the formation of Station Maintenance. The resources of all squadrons on a station were pooled, and a Station Major Servicing Section was formed, catering for all major servicing work for all squadrons on the station.
These two improvements were merely forerunners of the present Base Maintenance Organisation and the advantages from the aircraft maintenance point of view are manifold.
With this scheme, squadrons do not carry out any of the detailed maintenance, this being left to the Base Major Servicing or Repair and Inspection Squadron. All tradesmen with the exception of the daily servicing squadron are controlled entirely by the Chief Technical Officer, so that by far the greatest amount of maintenance work which goes to keep the squadron at a high serviceability figure is carried out by tradesmen who, whilst working for the squadrons may not be known by members of the squadron.
It would appear therefore that those who said that we would lose the Squadron spirit etc., stood a good chance of being correct. These fears were proved groundless; the spirit has grown to embrace something which was very rare in the early days of the war. Not only have we squadron spirit which has never been as strong as it is now, but we also have pride in the station and Base achievements, and progress of the Group has naturally followed.
An extract from a letter written by a Flight Commander to the Base Maintenance Staff at his Base is typical of the spirit which exists at present. The letter refers to certain aircraft which had been modified, and brought up to operational standard in time for a specific operation, and continues:-
“It is known that in order to have these aircraft ready for operational requirements it was necessary for the staff to sacrifice much of their leisure time and to work long hours without relief.
“Occasions such as this bring forcibly to notice the excellent work being performed daily by the ground staff, and show how necessary it is for us to have their co-operation.
“We member [sic] of aircrew know that we can rely on the ground staff to help in every way possible, and we hope that we can show our appreciation by carrying out the duties in our particular sphere with the same thoroughness, perseverance, and resourcefulness which we have learned to expect from the members of ground staff.”
GARDENING
Interrogation, Easter Monday:-
“That wasn’t a U-boast, it was me – low!”.
Thus, when 5 Group staged a large scale comeback to gardening, out of six aircraft specially detailed to mine a stretch of water in the Eastern Gardens about the width of a runway, 4 (3 of 106 and 1 of 49 Squadrons) were successful despite heavy opposition, and the remaining 2 (49 Squadron) after valiant attempts, during which good use was made of firing the front guns, correctly planted in another furrow. The remaining 50 gardeners put down 244 vegetables off ports in the Gulf of Danzig. Two were missing and one returned early after jettisoning safe in the North Sea. This operation took place almost exactly on the fourth anniversary of the opening by 5 Group of Bomber Command’s mining offensive. During the four years over 30,000 vegetables have been planted, and over 1,000,000 tons of enemy shipping accounted for.
On 18/19th April, and again on 23/24th April, the approaches to Swinemunde received a total of 125 vegetables.
These attacks in the Baltic fill what was a serious gap in the mining campaign in these waters. This year intensive minelaying has been carried out by the Command to the West of Pomeranian Bay with highly successful results. One effect of this, however, was to intensify the use of mine-free waters further east as:-
(i) Training areas for all types of Warships especially U-boats.
(ii) Supply routes for vital imports and military exports to Scandinavia.
(iii) Supply routes to the North Russian front.
Press reports describe very great congestion throughout the Baltic due to closing of ports and channels; P.R.U. cover of the Western Baltic shows some of this, but was unfortunately not obtained of the 5 Group Gardens. Ground reports of sinkings are hard to come by, and take time to reach us, so for the moment we must wait for the news – which will surely come providing our mines were well and truly laid in the swept channels.
The summary of the month’s work is as follows:-
Sorties 80
Successful 77
%age successful 96.25
Mileage flown 126,880
Total vegetables planted 388
The Squadrons responsible were:- 44, 49, 57, 630, 207 and 106.
The Command effort for this month resulted in the successful planting of 2,643 vegetables in some 40 gardens ranging from South West France to the Gulf of Danzig. About half this total was planted in the Baltic, a quarter in the North Sea and the remainder in the Bay of Biscay and Channel. This is easily a record – the previous highest total for one month being 1,869, in April, 1943. A German Naval Correspondent of Transocean, states that in the Channel alone it has been necessary to treble the mine sweeping effort, but discreetly does not mention the Baltic. The problem that faces the German mine sweeping effort is to cope with a great increase in mining spread over some 2000 miles of shipping lanes. The same correspondent complains that we sometimes use 12 different types of mines necessitating the use of numbers of ships fitted with different types of sweeps to clear the same patch, [sic] of water. In fact, the number of different
(Continued in previous column)
types of mine now in use is about four times that number.
A special word of praise is due to the Armament Staffs for their complete success in the unfamiliar work of preparing and loading the vegetables. In particular, East Kirkby’s effort on the 9th April, in sending off 108 in good order, was outstanding. In some cases the weekly stock return continues to be rendered incorrectly, chiefly due to confusion about the different types sterilisers for the new and old marks of mines. The correct use of these sterilisers will literally be a matter of life and death to any of our forces who may operate in areas where we use them, and now is the time therefore, to clear up any doubts as to exactly what types are held.
Station Tracings have proved something of a stumbling block, as have some of the details required in Raid Reports. Both are designed to answer the question – “where do those mines actually fall”, using all the available evidence. Naturally the planning and success of future operations, especially the “triphibious” variety, depend to a large extent on the accuracy of this information.
5 Group News. No. 21. April, 1944. Page 2.
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
There has been a marked improvement in the navigation this month. Navigators are now realising how important it is to obtain constant checks on their position by intelligent use of either H2S or application of the broadcast w/v’s.
H2S navigators and bomb aimers are checking and cross checking all fixes they receive. If the navigator obtains constant D.R. positions along track, say every 15 minutes, and corrects these positions as ground speed checks are obtained, then it is impossible to obtain wrong fixes on the H 2 S. All Navigators should ensure that bomb aimers cross check every fix obtained, no matter how confident they may be. Also remember that a track made good, w/v and G/S check can be obtained from an unknown response. Very few operators make use of this.
The majority of navigators now use the broadcast w/v’s in an intelligent manner. There are a few, however, who [underlined] do not. ALL NAVIGATORS [/underlined] are to make a regular practice of obtaining a D.R. position by use of broadcast winds every 30 minutes – and do not forget to use the “Past” w/v!! If the D.R. position obtained places the aircraft off track, alter course immediately and regain track. Now that 5 Group operate alone, concentration is even more important. Station Navigation Officers must have a concentrated drive in this direction, and ensure that all H 2 S navigators are making the fullest possible use of their equipment, and also that the remainder are making full use of broadcast w/v’s, by obtaining constant D.R. positions checks on ground speed etc.
The importance of timing was discussed in last month’s “News”. We would do well however, to reconsider this subject seriously. Accurate timekeeping is more important now than ever before. The largest discrepancies in timing occur on the return journey. This is due partly to the fact that aircraft do not all bomb at the same time and therefore do not leave the target at the same time. To overcome this it may be necessary to establish a concentration point on the return journey, situated close to the target. It is obvious, however, that many navigators make no effort to achieve good timing; they merely carry on and get there “sometime or other”. There are a few pilots who consistently fly at greater speeds than those laid down, and consequently on the return journey are some 10 or 15 minutes ahead of the main force, By so doing they give the Hun a few extra minutes warning of the route home, apart from exposing themselves to individual interception. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers must watch for and stem any tendency for bad time-keeping. Sufficient navigational aids are now available to ensure that you are on track and on time. Now it is up to [underlined] YOU [/underlined].
[Underlined] BROADCAST W/V’S [/underlined]
April has been a very good month for broadcast w/v’s, particularly since the Group began operating alone. Windfinders have been doing an excellent job. On two occasions this month more than 300 w/v’s were received from aircraft – an excellent effort. Windfinders are transmitting all the winds they obtain. If you note a sudden change in the wind direction or speed, then provided you are satisfied with the fixes used, send back [missing word] w/v immediately.
There are one or two cases, however of navigators chosen as windfinders not realising their responsibility. One navigator for instance, stated that he just couldn’t be bothered to send back w/v’s!! Another said that sufficient w/v’s were being sent back by other aircraft, so he didn’t bother either. Those few navigators who are chosen as windfinders must realise that the whole Group is navigating on the w/v’s they transmit to Base. We cannot afford to have anyone “not bothering”. So buck up chaps, the vast majority of you are doing an excellent job, but those few, who just “don’t bother” – well -- !!
Many experiments have been carried out on French targets to ascertain the most accurate and practical method of obtaining a bombing W/V, which must of course, be a w/v prevailing in the target area. The experiments have proved that the most accurate method is to use a datum point in conjunction with the A.P.I. It is hoped therefore that this method will be adopted on all future operations where practical. Any suggestions or criticisms on this subject will be welcomed.
[Underlined] ASTRO NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
It has been decided that Astro can no longer be considered as an essential aid to navigation. Much time has been devoted to teaching this subject to Navigators, but the results obtained do not justify this training. Therefore this training time is to be devoted to improving the general standard of navigation. More time is to be devoted to plotting and computing two of the weakest links in navigation at the moment.
This decision for not mean that Astro is now “dead” and can be forgotten by all., It is still a standby aid, and all navigators should keep themselves in practice. There have been isolated incidents where a Polaris shot or an Astro fix have been the means of saving an aircraft. You may find yourselves in such a predicament one night – so be ready.
All Astrographs and sextants are to be withdrawn from aircraft, but those navigators who are considered by the Station Navigation Officer as competent Astro Navigators may draw the equipment from the station stores.
[Underlined] SUGGESTIONS AND IDEAS [/underlined]
(i) Many station and squadron navigation officers find it impossible to spend as much time as they would like in supervising the work of a new navigator, and teaching him all the things he should know. To overcome this [underlined] East Kirkby [/underlined] put each navigator under the care of a very experienced navigator whose responsibility it is to supervise the other at briefing, to check his log and chart the next day, and to pass on to him all useful information and “tips”. In short the senior navigator acts as a “father” to the “sprog”.
This scheme is working extremely well, and should be adopted by all squadrons.
(ii) Many navigators cannot remember to check compasses regularly. [Underlined] Dunholme [/underlined] have overcome this by marking red or green dots on the face of the Astro watch. This serves as a constant reminder to the navigator. It is recommended that compasses be checked every 20 minutes, and therefore the dots on the face of the Astro watch should be spaced accordingly.
(iii) [Underlined] Metheringham [/underlined] suggest that since Astro will no longer be used to any great extent that astrograph films should be treated and used instead of Gee charts. The procedure would be to mark on the film the lattice lines in the same way as on the Gee Charts. The film or films applicable for each night’s operation would be placed in the aircraft before take-off.
There are two great advantages:-
(a) Fixes would be plotted directly on the plotting chart, thus saving time and reducing the risk of errors.
(b) It would not be necessary to carry a large supply of Gee Charts as at present.
[Underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined]
We welcome the arrival of the 3 P.F.F. squadrons to this Group. There is no doubt that we shall be able to pick up from them many useful ideas and suggestions. These will be passed on to Squadrons as soon as possible.
It is hoped that all station navigation Officers will make a determined effort to visit these 3 squadrons whilst they are attached to the Group.
[Underlined] AIR POSITION INDICATOR [/underlined]
It was stated in last month’s Summary that one A.P.I. was being modified by having a “miles flown counter” fitted. This has been done & has been tested by No.617 Squadron on three 6-hour cross countries, undertaken at operational height.
The results are as follows:-
Miles flown registered on counter = 2927
Miles flown calculated by navigator = 2892
Percentage error = 1.2
These tests have proved conclusively that the over reading error in the A.P.I. is negligible.
Permission is now being obtained from Bomber Command for the fitting of the “air miles flown” counter to all A.P.I’s. The manufacturers state however, that the modification may not be retrospective.
There is still considerable difference of opinion as to the best method of using the A.P.I. One third of the Group prefer to reset, the remainder prefer the “graphical” resetting method. It is not necessary to lay down any one method of use but Station Nav Officers must ensure that all Navigators use one of the above two methods.
Station navigations officers are to discuss the use of the A.P.I. with all navigators. Any suggestions on improvements or methods of resetting etc. should be tried out immediately and if successful passed to Group Headquarters.
[Underlined] ANSWERS TO LAST MONTH’S QUIZ [/underlined]
1. Put the switch on the heading Control unit to “Manual” and by means of the setting knob adjust the line of flight marker until it corresponds to the true course as indicated by the P.4 compass. Maintain the switch on “manual” until the D.R. compass is functioning correctly, when you should switch to “Auto”.
(Continued on page 4, Column1.)
GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944.
[Page break]
NAVIGATION (CONTD.)
(Continued from page 3 column 3)
2. To obtain ground returns, tune in brightest responses on the P.P.I. by means of brightness, contrast, gain and tuning controls. To obtain correct height set range drum at zero and adjust the range marker ring by means of the height control until it is on the first ground returns.
3. (i) Check the pinpoint yourself, visually and by the aid of D.R.
(ii) If pinpoint correct, alter course immediately to regain track by 30° if more than 10 miles off track, by 15° if less than 10 miles off track.
4. You would lose the time in hand by flying small dog legs, preferably either side of track, and of a maximum duration of 2 minutes. Dog legs to be completed before reaching a position 50 miles from the target. Navigator must use his own discretion as to the most suitable area in which to lose time.
5. (i) France (ii) Germany (French name for AACHEN) (iii) Germany (iv) Belgium (v) Czecho-Slovakia (vi) Germany (Part of Berlin).
6. Stuttgart to London.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
S/Ldr Quinn, DFC. Sqdn Nav. Officer 50 Sqdn to Stn Nav. Officer, Skellingthorpe.
F/Lt Cunningham 50 Sqdn promoted to Sqdn Nav. Officer.
F/Lt. Waterkeyn Sqdn Nav. Officer 44 Sqdn to P.F.F.
F/Lt. Woodhouse, DFM. H2S Instructor, Metheringham to Sqdn. Nav. Officer, 44 Squadron.
P/O Blackham 49 Squadron to H2S Instructor, Metheringham.
F/Lt. Bone, DFC. H2S Instructor Swinderby to Sqdn. Nav. Officer 106 Squadron.
F/Lt. Murphy Sqdn. Nav. Officer No. 467 Sqdn. to No. 61 Squadron (with W/Cdr Doubleday)
F/O Abbott 467 Squadron promoted to Sqdn. Nav. Officer.
F/Lt. Bonefield Sqdn. Nav. Officer, No. 9 Squadron – Missing.
F/Lt. Jones Nav. Officer, 1660 Con. Unit to Sqdn. Nav. Officer 9 Squadron.
S/Ldr. Georgeson, DFC. Sqdn. Nav. Officer No.83. Squadron.
S/Ldr Stevens, DFC. Sqdn. Nav. Officer, No.97 Squadron.
HONOURS & AWARDS [Cartoon]
The following immediate awards have been approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O M.R. HEAD D.S.O.
[/Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J. CHATTERTON D.F.C.
P/O R.T. MANNING D.F.C.
P/O J. BRADBURN D.F.C.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT. A. WARD D.F.M.
SGT. R. MACHIN D.F.M.
SGT. R.A. FRIARS D.F.M.
P/O SANDERS D.F.C.
SGT. R.H. HUDSON D.F.M.
P/O A.W. SHINN D.F.C.
F/L. D. MILLER, D.F.C. D.S.O.
F/O J.E.W. ADAMS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O H.H. LLOYD D.F.C.
W/CDR. A.W. HEWARD D.F.C.
F/O G.A. BERRY D.F.C.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J.S. LUDFORD D.F.C.
F/O F.A. THOMAS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O H.H. FARMILOE D.S.O.
F/O S. HALLIWELL, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
P/O D. PAULL D.F.C.
SGT. P. MCGABNEY D.F.M.
P/O D.C. FREEMAN D.F.C.
SGT. L. CHAPMAN C.G.M.
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O F. GRIFFITHS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT T.W.J. HALL D.F.M.
F/O R.F. ANDERSON D.F.C.
P/O G.S. MILNE D.F.C.
F/O J.B. LATHAM D.F.C.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR. J.R. BALMER D.F.C.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR G.L. CHESHIRE, D.S.O. & BAR 2nd Bar to D.S.O.
S/LDR J.L. MUNRO, D.F.C. D.S.O.
F/L C.K. ASTBURY, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
S/LDR J.C. MCCARTHY, D.S.O. D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
W/O W.G. BICKLEY C.G.M.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L W. KELLAWAY, D.S.O. Bar to D.S.O.
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/CDR A.S. JOHNSON D.S.O.
The following non-immediate awards have been approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O E.J. KNELL D.F.C.
F/O R.H. SMITH D.F.C.
F/L J.F. MITCHELL D.F.C.
F/O J.N.G. WYATT D.F.C.
F/SGT. K.J. DAGNALL D.F.M.
F/SGT R.N. BROWN D.F.M.
SGT. E. SULLIVAN D.F.M.
SGT. E.R. BAKER D.F.M.
F/SGT. E.G.B. COLE D.F.M.
F/SGT. T.F. PARSONS D.F.M.
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/SGT J. MURPHY D.F.M.
F/O D.C. ARMSTRONG D.F.C.
F/SGT. A. HOLDEN D.F.M.
W/O G.A. WILKIE D.F.C.
P/O G.G. WHITEHEAD D.F.C.
F/SGT J.R. OSWICK D.F.M.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT. J. CHALONER D.F.M.
SGT. (NOW P/O [sic] A.E. BOASE D.F.M.
P/O H.C. DARNTON D.F.C.
P/O G. SERGEEV D.F.C.
SGT. R. JEFCOCK D.F.M.
F/SGT (NOW P/O) W.A. MOORE D.F.M.
F/L D.J. BACON D.F.C.
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O W.C.B. SMITH D.F.C.
F/O E.C. WEATHERSTONE D.F.C.
P/O A. BEALE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O A.W. FEARN D.F.C.
F/L R.V. MUNDY D.F.C.
F/L R.K. EGGINS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J.H. PULLMAN D.F.C.
[/Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L J. SEARS, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
P/O R.E. KNIGHTS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O E.C. GREENHALGH D.F.C.
S/LDR A.R. DUNN D.F.C.
F/SGT. M.D.J. PARKINSON D.F.M.
F/SGT. L. BENDING D.F.M.
F/SGT. T.J. FLOWER D.F.M.
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.O.P. BEATTY D.F.C.
P/O D.E. FREEMAN D.F.C.
P/O H. THOMAS D.F.C.
P/O L.W. MITCHELL D.F.C.
P/O C.M. LAWES D.F.C.
F/SGT. P. PULLAR D.F.M.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O J. ROBERTSON D.F.C.
P/O W.T. LOFTUS D.F.C.
P/O W. BOOTH D.F.C.
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
SGT. R.W. JAGGS D.F.M.
F/O H. McDONALD D.F.C.
F/O C.H. JOHNSON D.F.C.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O N.H. KOBELKE D.F.C.
W/O H. McCABE D.F.C.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 4
[Page break]
SIGNALS/RADAR
April has provided another milestone on our road to the fullest use being made of radiations and echoes helping to get more bombs on the target. V.H.F. R/T has been fitted to two more squadrons – W/T has provided almost 100% communication between Controllers and Main Forces – the serviceability of all Radar devices has improved.
We are grateful to all those outside the Group who have helped us so readily – particularly 92 Group and the Signals Schools with their special drive to train Wireless Operators to read morse through severe interference and to tune their W/T sets with one eye on a C.R.T.
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
A hearty welcome to all those faces, both old and new, that have appeared within the Group since our last edition.
April 1944 will long be remembered in the history of 5 Group as a month of hard work, which was crowned with the success it so richly deserved. Wireless Operators (Air) played their part with the energy and determination that is always to be found when there is an extra job to be done, and a large slice of the credit for our recent achievements is due to them.
As usual, the “Back Room Boys” at stations and in our own W/T cabin at Headquarters gladly threw their weight into the fray, and we are indebted to them. Their keenness has always been an inspiration.
Several points have been brought out this month, first and foremost being the quality of morse emanating from the Controllers’ aircraft. There has been a noticeable difference between operators, which, if all past suggestions re training had been acted upon, should never re-occur.
It has been stressed time and again that ANY ONE Wireless Operator (Air) may be called upon to transmit control signals and the only way to ensure perfection is by constant practice.
In this connection, it is pointed out that the Group exercise is an ideal medium for improvement of morse (although not even a whisper of control code must be allowed to pass through the other), and during the coming month the exercise frequency will be closely watched.
Signals Leaders, get this fact thoroughly instilled into your flock – “The ultimate success or failure of future operations may depend on the ability of a Wireless Operator to send or receive signals”. Display it in your training room, convert it into morse symbols, give morse tests regularly each week for we have reached a stage in the conflict where every minute spent in training counts one hundred fold in the air.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The following is a combat report from 619 Squadron for the night of 22/23 April:-
“The first indication was a contact by W/Op. on Visual Monica Mark V at 1,800 yards… E/A dropped back out of gunner’s sight and W/Op reported it 800 yards astern down… E/A broke away to starboard and disappeared from gunner’s sight, W/Op again reported E/A 1100 yards, closing slowly…E/A disappeared and was reported once again by the W/Op.”
The outcome of this combat was one JU. 88 probably destroyed. Sgt. Brady, Wireless Operator (Air) deserves the highest praise for his reporting.
You see, it can be done, and when handled in the proper manner not only SAVES YOUR AIRCRAFT but probably destroys a Hun, which reduces the total that can be put in the air against you on the following operation.
Once again, there is only one path to take to success, and that path is labelled TRAINING. Constant practice with your Early Warning devices will pay handsome dividends.
Points for Signals Leaders to include in their “daily ration” to the Section:-
(i) Spare Groups No.12 and 15 in CD.0250.
(ii) X114 and X623 are still being used by some careless operators.
(iii) Log keeping could improve (we have seen some good logs this month).
(iv) More practice – or has that been mentioned somewhere before?
F/O Cook, D.F.M., has gone to No.9 Sqdn., as Signals Leader.
F/Lts Gronow and Chambers, D.F.C. are the Signals Leaders of Nos.83 and 97 Squadrons respectively, who are to be congratulated in accepting such a sudden change of procedure and dovetailing into the 5 Group system with the minimum of trouble.
[Underlined] SIGNALS MAINTENANCE [/underlined]
Facts and Figures about Failures
Out of a total of 2034 operational sorties during the month, 34 Signals failures were reported. Although these represent an increase over last month’s figure, this can be attributed almost entirely to the rise in Category 4 failures (miscellaneous). It is again stressed that Category 4 failures are most unsatisfactory. Most of the failures in this Category are of the type “Equipment reported u/s. O.K. on ground test. No fault found.” Every effort must be made to pin down any reported failure to some definite cause.
An investigation into failures in this Group over the past year reveals some interesting results. Apart from an unfortunate month in February, the percentage of failures shows a slight decrease over the year. This unfortunate February figure coincides with a large percentage of miscellaneous failures as well as a large percentage of T.1154/R.1155 failures. Category I (Equipment) failures show a general tendency to rise during the year. The other categories (2 and 3) have a see saw effect and no general conclusion can be made.
Intercom. failures over the year show a pronounced tendency to decrease, while T.1154/R.1155 failures show a corresponding pronounced increase. The reason for the former can be put down to the energetic drive which Signals Officers have kept up in their Squadron Maintenance Sections against this type of fault. The reason for the latter is not hard to find. During the past year the W/T installation has come into its own again and is an essential piece of equipment for the success of current operations. Whereas in the past unserviceability of the of the main W/T installation may have gone by unnoticed, now it cannot escape report.
[Underlined] THE OLD ORDER CHANGETH…. [/underlined]
Authority has finally been given for the removal of S.D.A. equipment from all Lancaster aircraft in 5 Group. This event has fortunately coincided with the partial introduction of V.H.F. (T.R.1143) installation. Command have agreed in principle that the fitting of V.H.F. is a necessity for the success of the type of operation now being undertaken by 5 Group, and every endeavour is being made to find sufficient equipment to fit all 5 Group squadrons. Careful thought has been given to the possibility of utilising the S.B.A. connectors as a small contribution to ease the very tight V.H.F. equipment production. The only small saving envisioned is the main receiver aerial and lead in; the length of the aerial will, of course, have to be shortened.
[Underlined] RADAR [/underlined]
Last month saw a great improvement in the serviceability of all Radar equipment. However, before anyone relaxes and sticks his chest out, it should be remembered that the advent of warm, dry weather was a contributory cause. In addition, many sorties have been at lower altitudes than usual, which would eliminate many of those non-reproduceable faults.
(Continued on page 6, col.1)
Then and Now – and how!!
[Underlined] Then [/underlined] In Ancient times, the D.S.O.
Performed his duties staid and slow.
He did his routine work by day,
And dozed his duty nights away,
Untroubled save for threats of violence
‘Gainst those who busted wireless silence!
[Underlined] Now [/underlined] The aethor’s full of legal dope
Which we receive, (at least we hope!).
It’s also full of surplus dits
Transmitted by the brainier twits;
While brighter souls – misguided clots –
Originate redundant dots!
Amendments to a basic plan
Are never ending, and unman
The D.S.O. who, frantic, chases
Vital gen in awkward places;
And rubs – with bitter rueful tear –
His Port, or Telephonic, Ear!
Poor chap, how like a sponge his brain,
Which, like a sponge, he’ll learn to squeeze;
And fill it daily once again
With brand new gen – with practiced ease!!
ANON (CIRCA 1944)
5 GROUP NEWS. APRIL, 1944. NO.21 PAGE 5.
[Page break]
SIGNALS (CONT.)
(Continued from Page 8, col.3)
Having however, realised the existence of those contributory causes, it is possible to say that a considerable increase in serviceability was due to more efficient maintenance and manipulation. It is sincerely hoped that this improvement will continue.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
A total of 767 sorties was flown with H.2.S, with 99 defects for a serviceability rate if 87.87. This is an increase of 10% over March. With an extra effort, and the weather on our side it could be made over 90% in May.
There has been a noticeable drop in filament transformer failures, largely due to the weather and height conditions. It is not expected that we will see the end of filament transformer breakdowns until the new type is introduced. The same is true for the 2000v condensers.
The expansion of H 2 S training in Conversion Units should go a long way towards eliminating the alarming number of manipulation failures. Manipulation and maintenance failures can be eliminated by constant training.
The arrival of 83 and 97 Squadrons has given us a taste of equipment to come. These Squadrons have a few Mark III sets and every one is very pleased with their performance. To date, the serviceability of the equipment is 92.8% which is very satisfactory for a new set. In this connection a debt is owed to 8 Group for having pioneered so well and eliminated most of the teething troubles. We can now look forward to a general changeover to Mark III with confidence in our ability to maintain and use it.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
Fishpond was 86% serviceable, an increase of 8% over March. This increase is of little value of W/Ops are not fully trained in the use of this equipment. The necessity for the Navigator – W/Op co-ordination cannot be overemphasised. Efforts have been made to reduce the minimum range below its present 600 – 800 yards. These have been unsuccessful, but it is believed the “back room boys” are now on the right track, so an answer should be forthcoming soon.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
As usual, Gee is top man when it comes to serviceability. In 96.5% of sorties, Gee was 100& serviceable. This reflects credit on both maintenance personnel and navigators, as it is an increase of 1.2% over last month. Gee could be made almost 100% serviceable; those last few percent are hard to get, but keep trying. The next few months of dry weather should give ample opportunity to break all records.
[Underlined] MONICA MARK IIIA [/underlined]
The expression “Ever Upwards” could be fittingly applied to Mark IIIA serviceability. This Group has watched Monica grow from an idea to a headache when the word “Switchmotor” nearly drove a Radar mechanic mad, and now to a reliable and efficient tail warning device. April serviceability was 91.6% out of 534 sorties, an increase of 1.3% on March.
An examination of combat reports provides innumerable examples of Monica’s capabilities in the hands of a trained operator. The fitting of 10 aircraft at 5 L.F.S. should relieve squadrons of a great deal of preliminary training.
[Underlined] MONICA MARK V [/underlined]
Another 5 Group “baby” (Lulu to some) is growing up, after a rather shaky beginning. Out of 299 sorties flown, 259 were trouble free for a serviceability rate of 86.7% - an increase of 5%. Now that the initial teething snags are over, it should be possible to make Mark V follow the footsteps of IIIA and push serviceability to 90%.
TACTICS
[Underlined] PRECISION ATTACKS [/underlined]
The big step made this month towards perfection of target marking, with its detailed methods of target illumination, initial marking, assessing, backing up, and controlling the force, although introducing many new ideas and problems, has brought little change in basic tactics. Indeed more attention than ever must be directed to tactics, particularly to precise orders and instructions given out for each operation. Special attention must be paid to timing and track keeping, adherence to allocated heights, compliance with instructions from the Controller and an exact knowledge of the marking method. These are dealt with separately.
[Underlined] TIMING AND TRACK KEEPING [/underlined]
The force employed on each target is now normally very much smaller than that in the past. This means that greater accuracy is needed in timing and keeping on track. It also means that if you stray a few miles off track with force of 150 aircraft or less, you are more likely to be singled out by G.C.I. than if you stray the same distance with a force of 800aircraft. Timing is vital. Only a limited number of target markers are dropped, and unless all aircraft are ready to bomb on time, these may be obscured by smoke or blown out by the bombs that drop before yours, and in any case may be difficult to locate.
[Underlined] HEIGHT BAND [/underlined]
The allocation of height bands to Bases, which means that each crew must fly at a given height, has been introduced for several reasons and entirely for your own protection. Firstly, it is intended to protect the force against a collision risk, mainly in the target area, where it may be necessary to do dog legs. Secondly, as a countermeasure against barrage flak. The Hun must now put up the same number of rounds into a very much larger area than before, thus decreasing the chance of individual aircraft being hit. Thirdly, combined with extremely accurate timing, the length of the stream can be very much shorter, and therefore less liable to interception by radio controlled fighters. To achieve the full advantage of this scheme, it must be accompanied by a drive by each Captain to make sure that Window is always thrown out correctly, particularly OVER THE TARGET AREA. If this is done, then there is no reason why crews at the lower heights need have any concern. It is, however, their duty to tighten up the normal crew search procedure and to be aware of fighters which may attack from above.
[Underlined] CONTROLLER’S INSTRUCTIONS [/underlined]
It is essential to comply strictly with the Controller’s instructions throughout the attack, and his decisions should never be questioned in the air. A wrongly timed load of incendiaries dropped whilst the Mosquitos are examining the roof tops to assess the marking, may upset the whole routine and possibly divert the main weight of the attack.
[Underlined] TARGET MARKING METHODS [/underlined]
All crews must be quite clear before leaving the briefing room of the colour of the spot-fires to be used, and the details of the controlling code. It doesn’t pay to be doubtful after you have taken off. You must be ready to carry out orders given over the target without hesitation.
(Continued in col.2)
TACTICS (Continued from Col.3)
[Underlined] TAIL WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The fruits of good training in tail warning devices are borne out by the following Combat Report. Each month there are many similar instances of fighters which have been beaten off because the correct drill has been carried out. Each month there are also instances of fighter damage sustained, and the fighter that did it is not picked up until after the attack. It pays to practice the reporting code at least once a day!
“First indication was contact by W/Optr. on Visual Monica Mk.V, 1,800 yards, Port Quarter down. Pilot altered course and E/A followed and closed in to 800 yards. W/Optr. ordered corkscrew to Port, and at the same time E/A opened fire and scored hits on tail unit on Lancaster “G”. R/G sighted E/A at 500 yards, Port beam down 30° and opened fire. E/A fired again and missed Lancaster. W/Optr. reported E/A closing in slowly and R/G sighted it at 500 yards astern level. R/G opened fire and E/A broke away to Starboard Quarter up. Hits claimed on E/A which disappeared from Gunner’s sight. W/Optr. again reported E/A on starboard quarter up at 1,100 yards and closing slowly. Rear and Mid-Upper Gunners sighted E/A simultaneously at 500 yards, Starboard Quarter level. Both gunners opened fire and scored hits on E/A which broke away at 300 yards, diving to Port Quarter down with smoke pouring from both engines.”
The Station Commander’s comments are self-explanatory: “I consider that Mark V Monica saved this crew. The Wireless Operator’s commentary was excellent, and the crew co-operation of a very high standard.”
FLYING CONTROL (Continued from page 15)
play a part in the final choice. From the condition of the airfield right down to such small items as the cleanliness of the flare path party room will be reviewed, so if you want to top the bill S.F.C.O’s, start cracking the whip NOW.
[Underlined] BLIND LANDING EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
It has been decided by this Group to remove all S.B.A. equipment from operational aircraft and it is hoped that in the not too distant future other and better means will be introduced. The first piece of equipment which we hope to get is a P.P.I. which will be installed in the watch tower and on which will be indicated the positions of all aircraft in the circuit.
Other equipment such as Radar Landing Beam, coupled with a Radar G.P.I. Radar Homing Beacons will all follow in due course. These will naturally give Flying Control Officers more work and more responsibilities but with the increased safety of aircraft this work and the short training required will be well repaid.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 6
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
April has been a most satisfying month for the bombing crews of 5 Group. Numerous precision attacks have been carried out with a great measure of success. The front pages of the Daily Press made public the achievements of 5 Group when they printed the after-bombing photographs of the marshalling yards at JUVISY, South of Paris. Equal success rewarded the attacks at TOURS and LA CHAPPELLE. The raid on MUNICH was successful, and a fair measure of success resulted from the attacks on BRUNSWICK and SCHWEINFURT. Finally, further small factories near OSLO, BORDEAUX and CLERMONT FERRAND are now devastated.
[Underlined] HOW HAS ALL THIS BEEN ACHIEVED? [/underlined]
Firstly, of course, most credit is due to the marking success of 54 Base. The next main contribution to the Group’s success has been the intense practice bombing carried out by the squadrons for the last year.
Owing to the very limited time available for bombing training at Conversion Units the final co-ordination of the bombing team has to be carried out on the squadrons. Much credit is due to the Conversion Units for their efforts, and particular praise is due to the Lancaster Finishing School who have elevated the importance of crew practice bombing to the extent of averaging between 12,000 and 18,000 feet in all bombing exercises over the last three months!!!
However, the crews are inexperienced with both aircraft and bombsight on arrival in the squadrons and intensive training is essential to bring them into line with the precision our operations require.
[Underlined] THE MARK XIV BOMBSIGHT [/underlined]
This bombsight has proved its worth. Although it is by no means a perfect sight, it is true that provided it is expertly maintained by the Instrument Sections and carefully handled by the Air Bombers, it can put bomb loads on to a target.
Air Bombers should make sure that their bombsights [underlined] are [/underlined] serviceable. It is the most important individual item of equipment that your aircraft carried, and as such should be the most carefully maintained. Its best test is on the practice bombing range – 6 bombs aimed accurately on different headings should produce a CLOSE GROUP. If not, then SOMETHING is wrong – report it to the instrument section – help them to find out what is wrong and then test it again. It may not always be possible to get this test exercise in the air – if not you must do the next best – carry out the exhaustive N.F.T. check.
In every P.R.U. picture there are sticks off the main concentration – it is almost certain that these sticks are wide because they were aimed with an unserviceable bombsight – are they yours? Were you absolutely certain that on Juvisy, La Chappelle, Tours, Brunswick, Munich or Schweinfurt, your bombsight was functioning correctly – when did you last do practice bombing with it – did you give is a thorough check during your N.F.T. or Ground Check? Did you??
[Underlined] NOTE [/underlined]
O.R.S. at Bomber Command have conducted a painstaking analysis of 5 Group’s practice and operational bombing. They report that
(Continued on Page 8 Column 1)
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING TRAINING [/underlined]
(ERRORS IN YARDS CONVERTED TO 20,000 FEET)
[Table of Bombing Training achievements by Squadron and Conversion Units]
[Underlined] THE BEST RESULTS FOR APRIL. [/underlined]
In previous months all crew errors at 20,000 ft. of less than 150 yards were listed in this column However, in April [underlined] 103 [/underlined] such results were obtained and it is therefore impossible to record them all. The crew errors of less than 100 yards are shown this month but it is confidently expected that in future space will only permit inclusion of results of less than 75 yards. It is possible – the list below proves it – therefore it must be done!!!
Squadron or Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Crew Error at 20,000 ft
9 S/Ldr. Keir F/Sgt. Coates P/O. Lewis 54 yards
44 F/O. Oldham F/O. Petts Sgt. McKerrow 99 yards
49 F/Lt. Adams F/Sgt. Underwood S/Ldr. Evans 84 yards
F/O. Edwards F/O W. Smith F/Sgt. Cavanagh 83 yards
50 P/O. Lundy F/O. Bignall F/Sgt. Jordan 90 yards
P/O. McFarlin Sgt. Ball Sgt. Elliott 75 yards
F/O. Botha Sgt. Thompson F/O. Bishton 95 yards
S/Ldr. McLeod Sgt. Price F/Lt. Cunningham 80 yards
61 P/O. Ascott F/Sgt. May F/O. Ward 98 yards
F/O. Jeavons Sgt. Graham F/Sgt. Dow 93 yards
F/O. Paul P/O. Cook P/O. Griffin 40 yards
W/Cdr. Stidolph F/O. Aley F/O. Dyer 71 yards
F/Sgt. Woolnough F/O. Ravenscroft F/O. Haggerstone 71 yards
467 F/Lt. Marshall F/Sgt. Borman F/O. Easton 96 yards
619 P/O. Roberts F/Sgt. DeViell F/Sgt. Lott 43 yards
P/O. Saunders F/O. Rosenfield F/Sgt. Greacen 84 yards
630 F/Lt. Roberts F/Sgt. Jeffery F/Sgt. Davies 75 yards
S/Ldr. Calvert F/Sgt. Hogg F/O. Beaudoin 95 yards
Sgt. Mallinson Sgt. Pomeroy Sgt. Nassau 73 yards
F/O. Joblin F/O. Beeson F/O. Lambton 80 yards
1654 F/O. McLaughlan Sgt. Leeson F/O. Phillips 90 yards
F/Sgt. Pethick Sgt. Wallace F/O. Baldwin 82 yards
P/O. Richards Sgt. Buckby Sgt. Fazackerley 93 yards
F/O. Long F/O. De Sautels Sgt. Thomas 88 yards
1661 Sgt. Marsh Sgt. Carr ? ? 98 yards
5 LFS F/O. Oldham F/O. Petts Sgt. McKerrow 98 yards
617 F/O. Knights F/Sgt. Bell ) The best two 49 yards
S/Ldr. Munro F/Lt. Astbury ) exercises 53 yards
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 7
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONTD:)
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION. [/underlined]
APRIL has produced the first maximum entry for the Competition since its inception in June, 1943. Some excellent results have been submitted and hearty congratulations are due to 61 Squadron for their outstanding exercises. The results are as follows:-
PILOTS AND AIR BOMBERS NAVIGATORS
1st 61 Squadron – 55 Yards 1st 50 Squadron – 59 Yards.
2nd 619 Squadron – 63 Yards 2nd 61 Squadron – 84 Yards.
3rd 49 Squadron – 71 Yards 3rd 619 Squadron – 96 Yards.
4th 50 Squadron – 80 Yards 4th 630 Squadron – 98 Yards
5th 44 Squadron – 81 Yards 5th 463 Squadron – 111 Yards.
6th (630 Squadron – 90 Yards 6th 44 Squadron – 125 Yards.
(106 Squadron – 90 Yards 7th 57 Squadron – 136 Yards.
8th 207 Squadron - 101 Yards 8th 467 Squadron – 141 Yards.
9th 9 Squadron – 112 Yards 9th 49 Squadron – 152 Yards.
10th 463 Squadron – 116 Yards 10th 106 Squadron – 163 Yards.
11th 467 Squadron – 125 Yards 11th 9 Squadron – 167 Yards.
12th 57 Squadron – 135 Yards 12th 207 Squadron – 188 Yards.
Group Captain Butler (R.A.F. Dunholme Lodge) produced a token cup to celebrate 44 Squadron’s victory in March. It is hoped that 44 will pass on the token to 61 Squadron.
It is noteworthy that the three Squadrons of 52 Base are all in the first five.
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION. [/underlined]
Only two entries were received this month:-
1st F/Lt. FARARA (630 Sqdn) – 85 yds.
2nd F/Lt. McDONALD (61 Sqdn) – 160 yds.
Congratulations F/Lt. Farara!!
(Continued from Page [sic]
our errors on both are similar – that means that 5 Group Bombing Teams achieve substantially the same results on German targets that they obtain at Wainfleet, Epperstone, Owthorpe and Bassingham Ranges, therefore, it merely remains to improve our results on the “home” ranges in order to obtain more hits on the “away” targets.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] 106 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/Lt. Wake DFC) reports that their descent from top position in the Bombing Competition is only temporary and is due to their best crews finishing about the same time. Other Squadrons are warned that 106 intend to be back at the top by the end of May.
[Underlined] 44 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/Lt. Lowry) have constructed an effective Mk.XIV mock-up as follows:-
1. No suction used – Gyros are counter-balanced in Sighting Head and Computor.
2. All electric motor is used to obtain pressure.
3 Airspeed and Height operation is obtained by connecting two external sylphan tubes to the static and pitot heads of Computor Unit. Attached to sylphan tubes are adjustable thumb screws to enable airspeed and height indicators to be carried throughout their range.
This go ahead Bombing Section have also introduced the use of Navigator’s Log Books (an idea borrowed from 5 L.F.S Syerston) in which are posted all permanent information such as Bomb T.V’s Conversion of True to Indicated Wind speed tables, etc. and is also used to carry target maps and operational bomb load instructions.
[Underlined] 1661 Con. Unit. [/underlined] (F/Lt. Brewer, DFC.) have completed the installation of Mk. XIV bombsight complete, in the A.M.B.T. A really first-class job by all concerned!!!
[Underlined] 61 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/Lt. MacDonald) Competition winners for April, report that W/Cdr. STIDOLPH and crew set the pace with a Crew Error of 71 yds. This aroused competitive spirit to a marked degree in the Squadron. The following result was obtained:-
Crew Error ar 20,000 ft. – 40 yards
Navigator’s Error – 25 yards
Pilot & Air Bomber’s Error – 37 yards
The crew were:- Pilot – F/O PAUL
Air Bomber – P/O COOK
Navigator – P/O GRIFFIN
[Underlined] 9 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/Lt. Bell, DFC.) reports the following excellent method of plotting crater positions from night photographs.
Plot the centre of the photograph on tracing paper pinned on to the target illustration. Mark the heading accurately from the compass rose on the tracing. Calculate distance between centre of the bombing photograph and centre of bomb craters commencing with position of bomb and flash release. The distance from this position to the centre of the photograph is the ground speed of the aircraft in feet per second multiplied by the flash setting; a deduction being allowed for the 5° aft tilt of the camera.
Forward travel of the bombs can be noted in A.P.1730A.Vol.1. to which must be added or subtracted the distance due to the wind component.
Plot this distance forward along track on the tracing paper and the approximate position of the centre of the stick is recorded. The stick length is known and should be drawn to scale. This method if accurate provided that:-
(i) the aircraft maintains heading and attitude from bomb release to explosion of flash (this can be checked by study of pre-bombing frames on the film)
(ii) There is only a small error due to cross trail - allowance can be made for this if necessary.
9 Squadron have found that their plots using this method are accurate to within 100 yards by subsequent comparisons with P.R.U. photographs.
[Underlined] 617 Sqdn. [/underlined] (F/L Astbury, D.F.C) reports the following outstanding exercise:-
F/L Clayton, Pilot, F/O Watson, Air Bomber, carried out an application exercise from 20,000 ft. And averaged 73 yards. Two of the six bombs were DIRECT HITS!!
[Underlined] “G”N” [sic] FROM THE BOMBING RANGES [/underlined]
(I) [Underlined] Wainfleet [/underlined] – plotted 5,492 bombs aimed by 1,044 aircraft during April. Thus in one month 28 tons of practice bombs have been dropped at this range.
(ii) [Underlined] Epperstone [/underlined] – plotted 990 bombs aimed by 200 aircraft.
(iii) [Underlined] Owthorpe [/underlined] – plotted 916 bombs aimed by 147 aircraft.
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ. [/underlined]
1. What would happen to the Mk. XIV Bombsight if the Port Inner engine had to be feathered?
2. How would you use the Quadrant Plate and Pointer at 13,000 feet?
3. How could you jettison a load of incendiaries “SAFE” with reasonable certainty?
4. If the Pilot operated the Jettison toggle what would happen to your Jettison bars and what extra action is necessary to put them back to “SAFE”?
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER. [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/Lt. Abbott [/underlined] is now Bombing Leader at 49 Squadron. It is noted that 49 moved from hitherto unplaced position in the Competition up to [underlined] 3rd [/underlined] in April.
[Underlined] F/Lt. Stoney, DFC. [/underlined] (1660 Con.Unit) has moved to 97 Squadron for his 2nd tour of operations. Good Luck!
[Underlined] F/O Lowans, DFM. [/underlined] has moved from 49 Squadron to 54 Base where he is attached for Bombing Leader duties.
[Underlined] F/O Tibbs (207 Squadron) [/underlined] obtained “B” category on No. 79 Bombing Leaders Course.
[Underlined] F/O Kennedy (619 Squadron) [/underlined] and F/O Martins (106 Sqdn) obtained “B” categories on No. 80 Course.
[Underlined] P/O Ball, DFM. (1660 Con. Unit) [/underlined] has been attached to Headquarters, Bomber Command for Bombing Analysis duties.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 8
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RADAR/NAV
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
Considerable changes have taken place in H2S training during the month, the most notable being:-
(i) H2S training has been expanded at the Conversion Units to cover 12 crews per course, to meet increased demands of the squadrons.
(ii) To standardise training throughout the Group, a Ground Training Syllabus has been issued outlining the minimum amount of ground training to be carried out by H2S crews, whether trained on squadrons or Conversion Units.
(iii) Greater emphasis is being placed on the Navigational aspect of H2S to increase further the reliability of fixes and winds obtained.
A concentrated drive is being made by all Instructors to improve D.R. navigation by H2S, to ensure that failures due to lack of confidence and inability to interpret the P.P.I. are things of the past. The tendency to slur over H2S navigation must be overcome as a successful H2S bombing run is largely dependent on a correct navigational approach to the target. This does not mean however that blind bombing is to be relegated to a mere fraction of the training time; on the contrary a large part of training can be devoted to blind bombing technique when crews are able to navigate accurately by H2S and ensure that the target is reached at the correct time.
Manipulation failures still continue to be reported and every effort must be made by operators to prevent such failures being attributed to their neglect. Now that the Air Bomber is required to sit in the navigator’s compartment and manipulate the H2S equipment, manipulation failures should be on the downward path. Two heads are usually better than one and with the list of H2S faults and remedies, one of them should at least have some knowledge of the symptoms and their correction. The impression conveyed is that many of these manipulation failures are due to lack of understanding of the equipment. The Technical Radar Officer is always willing to part with “gen” providing questions are asked. Don’t be afraid to worry these officers because in the long run by asking questions about your equipment you are probably saving their time and yours.
Leica cameras are now being used to photograph the P.P.I. on training flights and several remarkable prints have been obtained. particularly [sic] on Edinburgh and London. Two squadrons are now equipped and it is eventually hoped to obtain further cameras for the remainder. With the advent of P.P.I. photography blind bombing can be carried out irrespective of cloud cover and accurate results obtained. Much information can also be obtained on the definition of built up areas and it is hoped eventually to relate individual bright responses with definite structures in these built up areas. It is therefore essential that the camera operator fills in the photographic interrogation report in a concise and accurate manner, enabling much valuable information to be obtained for use of H2S crews on future operations.
The results of the blind bombing competition have now been received and are published below. All crews who participated are to be congratulated on the excellent results obtained.
[Underlined] Final Order Captain Squadron Av. Error. in miles. [/underlined]
1 P/O Rogers 630 .33
2 F/S Canever 57 .38
3 P/O Manning 44 .42
4 F/L Smith 57 .46
5 P/O Ross 57 .46
6 P/O Higgs 44 .48
7 F/O Bayley 57 .49
8 F/L Healy, DFC. 49 .60
9 F/O Penman 106 .64
10 P/O Shinn 49 .65
11 P/O Jones, J. 49 .66
12 F/O Thomas 57 .87
13 F/L Kellaway, DSO. 630 1.12
14 F/L Roberts, DFC. 630 1.15
One point arising out of blind bombing on H2S which has been noticeable on operations during the last month is that many H2S operators who claim to mark blind are unduly influenced by the markers showing a lack of faith in the instrument. Complete confidence can only be built up by sufficient training in which advantageous use should be made of the synthetic trainer.
Talking about synthetic trainers, East Kirkby have introduced a modification to the trainer which gives correct crystal current movement and a tuning position, thus enabling operators to practice manipulation on the trainer. It is hoped to introduce this modification to other trainers in the Group as soon as the technical details are settled.
This month we welcome 83, 97 and 627 Squadrons into the Group. They have brought with them new equipment and methods and it is felt that as pioneers in H2S much can be learnt from them. It is hoped that all H2S Instructors will take the opportunity of visiting these squadrons and utilising the information gained to the benefit of their respective units.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Gee range has improved considerably during the month and many navigators obtained fixes over targets attacked. However, there is still a tendency to neglect Gee when jamming appears.
Some navigators had opportunities of using the new North Eastern chain this month with gratifying results, many fixes being obtained further than 8° East, and off chart coverage. Providing navigators continue to give reports on the reception they receive outside the limits of the present lattice charts, something can be done to produce additional charts.
Coding has not caused any confusion, and the blinking of the “A” pulse appears to have been a success. There is one point, however, which must be borne in mind by all navigators and wireless operators regarding the use of coding in distress signals. All fixes passed for transmission during distress procedure must give the true lattice line values and therefore the coding figures must be deducted by the navigator from the indicator readings prior to passing the fix to the Wireless Operator. Watch this or you will be plotted miles away from your true position.
Manipulation failures are still too high and these can be overcome only by constant practice in setting up and correction of faults. Many navigators to whom manipulations faults have been attributed are still changing over alternator plugs with the set switched on resulting in fuses being blown. When changing the R. F. Units or alternator plugs, Gee must be switched OFF.
The following is an extract from a report on Gee which should be of interest to all navigators:-
“There seems to be a popular idea with navigators that XF’s necessarily give extra range. This is based on the fact that when they were first introduced, they gave extra ranges before the enemy had time to organise counter measures. The main advantage of XF’s is not to give extra range but to make the enemy spread his jamming over more than one frequency, tending to make it less intense on any one frequency”
Another point is that many navigators are using stud settings and RF Units which have not been detailed for the operation in question. There is even a case this month of a navigator using a chain which was not detailed, and he claimed far greater range though admitted the fixes were unpotable.
(Continued on page 14, col.2)
Link Trainer
The nil returns for 630, 617 and 627, and the very low return for 57 Squadron were due to the absence of Link Trainers at East Kirkby and Woodhall. Machines were, however, installed at these Stations at the end of the month and it is hoped these Squadrons will make up the deficiency by an increased effort next month. A revised Link Trainer Syllabus is being drafted and should be available to Units by the middle of the coming month. The amount of Link done on the squadrons still warrants improvement and it is hoped that the new Syllabus will assist in this.
[Table of Link Trainer Sessions by Squadron and Unit]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 9
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[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoons]
April, and the first few days of May, saw the last of the two Group Competitions – the Lancaster Seven-a-Side Rugger Trophy, and the Matz Cup.
[Underlined] The Lancaster Seven-a-Side Competition [/underlined] has had a very mixed reception. Although designed on a Group inter-squadron basis, to include every crew in each Squadron, and having a system of points that favoured squadrons fielding the greatest number of teams, no squadron outside 53 Base even began the competition. But within 53 Base it was an amazing success. 86 teams took part, and the resulting increase in fitness, and the keenness that developed, fully repaid the efforts of A/Cdre. Hesketh who originated the competition. Next season this is going to be one of the Rugger high-lights, with a smashing Boxing Day final meeting of all the squadron finalists, followed by “noggins for all” round “Ye Olde Yule Logge”.
[Underlined] The Matz Soccer Cup. [/underlined] Coningsby crowned a successful soccer season by beating Winthorpe 2 – 0 in the Matz final on the Lincoln City ground on 6th May. In their semi-final game, Coningsby met the Group “giants” – Scampton – at Waddington, and emerged successfully after a terrific duel. Winthorpe had to play three games with Metheringham before they got to the semi-final stage. Then they defeated Skellingthorpe 3 – 2, after being 2 goals down with only twenty minutes to go. The final was worthy of the competition, and produced a clean, hard fought duel, perfectly even in the first half, but with the Coningsby forwards more dangerous than their opposites in the second. Winthorpe goalie and backs are to be congratulated on their fight, they certainly kept the flag flying. Coningsby’s first goal came from a penalty, their second from a beautifully placed header into the corner of the net in classic “corner kick” style. Coningsby were minus their professional left winger, Colinridge, but his successor ably filled the bill, and the forwards were presented with many openings by a clever half back division. After the game, Mrs. Cochrane presented the cup in the stand, and the A.O.C., who had been a delighted spectator, congratulated the teams in the dressing rooms on their splendid show. Later the teams had tea together in Lincoln, and later again the Cup was christened with the traditional quart of “old and mild”, we hope.
[Underlined] The Wines Rugger Trophy. [/underlined] Dunholme are hot on the scent of this “pot”, and it will take a good side to stop them. Winthorpe are in the remaining semi-final with Waddington. It is proposed to polish off the semi-final and the final before the 14th, leaving King Willow in peaceful possession.
[Underlined] 5 Group Mixed Hockey Trophy. [/underlined] East Kirkby reached the final by beating the redoubtable Swinderby on their own ground. It now remains for Metheringham to play Waddington and the winner to meet Scampton, to provide the other finalist. This competition must be polished off quickly, before hardening grounds make the ball a little too lively for all but the steel shinned types. This new competition has proved very successful and should provide a most interesting final.
[Underlined] FOOTBALL [/underlined]
SCAMPTON played eight Station matches, during the month, of which they lost only one, 2 – 1 to R.A.F. Ingham. In the semi-final replay of the Lincoln and District Amateur Cup they defeated R.A.F. Wickenby 3 – 0. In the final with Lincoln Rovers on City ground they played magnificently for a 5 – 4 victory, finishing the game with only nine men. Now they are all out for the Lincoln and District League Championship. They have had a most brilliant season.
DUNHOLME had six games, of which they won four. Their two losses were to Scampton – 1 – 5, and to Headquarters 5 Group 3 – 4. Eight inter-section games were played off.
FISKERTON laid out two soccer pitches during the month and gained a considerable impetus in ensuing activity. The station team won its last three Lincoln League games. A combined league and knock-out competition is running with eleven teams competing. 49 Squadron has three teams entered. Two games per day is common; B.A.T. Flight v Echelon have already fought three pointless duels, playing extra time in the last two games. Which shows what a new pitch can do.
BARDNEY have a very strong team, and won six out of their seven April games, including Coningsby and Skellingthorpe, Matz winners and semi-finalists, among their victims. They challenge all comers to do battle! and they are keen, they even cycled to a match – and won!!
METHERINGHAM were unlucky in having three station games cancelled. They played three losing to Digby and 373 Battery, Woodhall, but beating Woodhall Spa 5 – 2. Inter-section fixtures (league and knock-out) produced 14 games, Squadron Armoury, the League champs, being knocked out by R.A.F. Regiment.
H.Q. 5 GROUP team is building up steadily, the laying out of a pitch having provided a much needed stimulus. After winning the opening game against Wigsley, 3 – 1, on the new pitch, the Group lost to Skellingthorpe away. Six games yielded four wins, a draw with 93 M.U. the old rivals, and one defeat. In early May, there was much creaking of joints when an officer’s team emerged minus winter woollies and held the Group side to a mere 3 – 1 triumph.
RUGBY
DUNHOLME, finalists in the Wines Trophy, have a powerful side. They defeated Swinderby 8 – 0 in the Wines’ second round, defeated 2 A.A. Command School both away and at home, and Scampton 7 – 6 on the latter’s ground. They are all out for the Wines Trophy and beat Fiskerton 27 – 0 in the semi-final.
METHERINGHAM with a greatly improved side held Waddington to a 9 – 0 victory, and win one and lost one with R.A.F. Digby.
[Underlined] HOCKEY [/underlined]
SCAMPTON certainly got in plenty of practice, with eight April games. They won five, knocking Syerston out of the Group Trophy, their victories also included Ingham, Faldingworth and 5 Group. They are in a strong position for the Trophy competition.
H.Q. 5 GROUP team is most active. Through the generosity of Swinderby they hold “home” games there pending completion of their Morton Hall pitch. During April they played six games winning two, with one draw. East Kirkby proved their downfall in the Group Trophy. A friendly three game duel with Swinderby has produced one win each and one draw. It is hoped to continue hockey, even if only in inter-section “sixes” throughout the summer.
[Underlined] GENERAL JOTTINGS. [/underlined]
SOFT-BALL 0 Fiskerton have a team in the Lincoln area league. Metheringham are also running a team, playing in a Digby League. 5 Group H.Q. have a willing, if unskilled, nucleus who like to “play ball”. There should be some scope for friendly games within the Group.
TENNIS and BOWLING – Bardney and Metheringham are lucky in having village facilities available, and the games are in full swing.
CYCLING is popular in Bardney. The tough kind with a “cow’s horn” handlebar and a “tail up” racing crouch. Any ex “roadmen” are welcomed to compete in a friendly “25”. A perimeter track is the proposed venue.
CRICKET – The great concern of every captain’s heart is the pitch. The sacred sward where worms and birds both “fear to tread” is THE FOCUS OF ALL CRICKETERS THOUGHTS. May we remind stations that it will be appreciated if they will keep to the date schedule of the Group competition, and not insist on a too Velvet like patch before playing their first round.
WAR SAVINGS
FISKERTON are to be congratulated on another fine effort in National Savings this month. Last month’s increase of 143% to £884 has again been increased by 34% to £1185.
FISKERTON will doubtless be only too pleased to pass on details of their fruitful methods to other Stations – if only to get a bit of competition!!
(a) Pence saved per head of strength.
(b) Percentage of personnel saving.
(c) Total amount saved.
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTALS 6309.13.4.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 10
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ACCIDENTS
[Underlined] SLIGHT IMPROVEMENT IN ACCIDENT RECORD [/underlined]
The month of April showed a welcome drop in the number of accidents in the Group compared with March, but though there was a large increase in total flying hours, this accident rate did not improve in the same ratio, and is still well below the Group’s best standards.
In all 40 aircraft were damaged during the month, 19 of which were classed as “avoidables”. The remainder were classed as technical failures or obscure. The total of “avoidables” may be subject to alteration as one or two accidents occurring at the end of the month have not been fully investigated and are not included. At the moment they appear to be technical failures or entirely obscure.
[Underlined] AVOIDABLE [/underlined]
The details of the avoidable accidents are as follows:-
Ground collision (including taxying) – 6
Swings … 2
Heavy landings …2
Low flying … 2
Overshoots landing … 2
Mid air collisions … 2
Errors of judgement landing … 1
Other errors of judgement … 2
TOTAL … 19
51 Base accounted for 11 and Squadrons 8.
[Underlined] M.T. COLLISIONS & TAXYING [/underlined]
There were again two M.T. accidents this month. In spite of strenuous efforts to stamp out this type of accident it still recurs. Next month [underlined] MUST [/underlined] be “M.T. Accident Free”.
Of the taxying accidents two occurred at night and two during the day. One of the “night” accidents was caused primarily by the pilot neglecting to use an Aldis lamp or taxying light. He struck an obstruction just off the dispersal lead in. In this instance his Flight Engineer was aware of the obstruction but did not warn his captain. Both log books were endorsed in RED.
A Lancaster pilot had just landed landed [sic] and was proceeding round the perimeter, when he told his Engineer to cut the outer engines. The Flight Engineer did so, but opened the starboard outer throttle fully before the propeller stopped turning. The engine roared into life and swung the aircraft off the perimeter. Again, the log books of both pilot and F/E were endorsed in RED.
[Underlined] SWINGS AND HEAVY LANDINGS [/underlined]
Both Swings this month were on take off – one Stirling and one Lancaster.
In the Stirling the pupil pilot swung off the runway, throttled back completely as per drill, but did not stop before his aircraft struck another in dispersal.
The Lancaster pilot ignored all he had ever been told about take-off procedure, handed over his throttles too soon to the Flight Engineer, swung to port at “full power”, over-corrected and broke his undercarriage on a final swing to starboard. His bomb load exploded. Luckily the crew got clear before this happened.
This pilot made another mistake in running up to +4 lbs, 2650 revs. against the brakes.
Heavy landings were of the usual pattern. One occurred at Conversion Unit in unfavourable weather conditions. The other was the result of a Lancaster pilot levelling off too high and not using the engine to correct.
[Underlined] MID-AIR COLLISIONS [/underlined]
There have been four mid-air collisions in the Group in recent months – two in April. There are so many aircraft over this country both by day and night that crews must keep absolutely on their toes at all times. We hear reports of “narrow squeaks” almost every
[Cartoon]
Dot and Dash, the immaculate W.A.A.F’s … “and I’d have been all right if that Stirling hadn’t backed into me”
day. The answer, of course, is to maintain a thorough look-out.
Don’t ignore the new “look-out” drill which was sent out this month. There should be no tendency to relax when an aircraft comes back into the circuit after an Op. or any other flight. The danger of collision is always present, and as the pilot is necessarily busy with his cockpit drills, it is up to the rest of the crew, especially gunners, to ensure the safety of the aircraft by keeping up a search and warning the captain of other aircraft.
[Underlined] OTHER INCIDENTS [/underlined]
A pupil pilot in a Stirling was out of line with the runway at 500’ on a good clear night. He landed anyway, off the runway, and knocked over the wind sock.
An Instructor in a Lancaster in showery weather, also found himself out of line with the runway. Instead of going round again he landed off the runway. His speed was excessive and he overshot. A deliberate ground loop placed the aircraft – CAT AC.
A Conversion Unit Mid-Upper Gunner was unloading his guns after a flight. One went off and fired a round into the “fin”. The fin had to be replaced. Gunners! make sure your guns are on “Safe” – all of them.
One Lancaster crashed this month in obscure circumstances. The aircraft was seen coming out of cloud in a high power dive. The tail fell off and then the aircraft broke up. The suggestion at the moment is that the pilot lost control in daylight in cumulo-nimbus cloud. The Accidents Investigation Branch may produce further evidence.
Further proof of the merits of the Lancaster came out this month. An aircraft returned on two engines after being badly shot up. On making an approach at a strange airfield, the pilot could not get his wheels down and went round again from a low height. Unfortunately on his second attempt the pilot overshot on a short flarepath and crashed.
RECENT GOOD SHOWS
P/O Milne of 50 Squadron displayed exceptional airmanship, and also proved that the Lancaster can be flown on two engines even with a load. He lost both starboard engines while outward bound on ops., at 3,000 feet. Forced to return to Base, he jettisoned the fuel from the inboard tanks and effected a perfect approach and landing still carrying full bomb load.
F/Sgt Young, a pupil at 5 L.F.S., put up a good show which also reflects credit on his Instructor. Shortly after take-off on his first solo in a Lancaster, the starboard tyre burst. F/S. Young was diverted to Woodbridge where he made a successful landing without causing any further damage to the aircraft.
F/Sgt. White and F/Sgt Millikan, the Navigator and Air Bomber of a crew under training at Conversion Unit, set an example which would have done credit to an experienced crew. While on a high level cross country flight, their pilot passed out through lack of oxygen and lost control of the aircraft. F/Sgt Millikan regained control of the Stirling and under the direction of F/Sgt White who assumed the responsibility of captain, they flew the aircraft for 1 1/2 hours back to Base when the pilot had recovered sufficiently to land the aircraft.
The “Plumbers Union” have also distinguished themselves. F/Sgt Gledhill, a Staff Engineer of 1660 Conversion Unit, was a member of a crew of a Stirling. While the aircraft was taxying to dispersal, the port inner caught fire. The Graviner had no effect, and F/Sgt Gledhill promptly removed the engine cowling and extinguished the fire with a hand extinguisher, saving the aircraft from much more serious damage.
(Continued on page 12, col.3)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 11
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] CLAY PIGEON SHOOTING [/underlined]
F/Lt. Lucas of Flying Training Command visited the Group during April to advise on the subject of Clay Pigeon Shooting, this Officer is stationed at 54 Group Headquarters, and is responsible for Clay Pigeon Shooting in the I.T.W’s. It was obvious that we are getting little if any training value out of clay pigeon shooting at present, due to the lack of proper ranges and the fact that very few Gunnery Leaders have ever had instruction in the art.
A trap house was constructed at Waddington from sandbags, and seven firing points laid out; this work was done in two days. The lay-out in use at I.T.W’s has two trap houses, but this was not considered necessary for our purpose. A request has been made for an officer from Flying Training Command to be attached to the Group to give advice and instruction to all stations, and the possibility of constructing a sandbag trap house on each station is under consideration. A demonstration of the lay-out at Waddington, makes it obvious that clay pigeon shooting must be done on a properly constructed range under the supervision of an instructor; under these conditions it is an excellent quickening exercise and when gunners are proficient in hitting clays, they have confidence in themselves.
[Underlined] .5 UNDER DEFENCE GUN. [/underlined]
Six squadrons have aircraft fitted with this gun and squadrons have been asked for opinions on the value of the gun on operations, and if H 2 S is preferred to the gun, as the aircraft can obviously only have one or the other. Opinions given to date are not very favourable as several snags have been encountered during the trials carried out so far. With the gunner strapped in his seat it is difficult to follow the gun round on the beam; it is difficult for the gunner to get his head down behind the sight as it tends to push the oxygen mask upwards on the gunners face; and also considerable vibration is experienced on the sight when the gun is fired.
[Underlined] COMBATS [/underlined]
Combats for April numbered 81, resulting in 5 enemy aircraft claimed as destroyed, 1 as probably destroyed and 7 damaged. The maximum number for any one operation was 24 and this was on the 22/23rd April on Brunswick five claims being made on that night; 1 destroyed, 1 probable and 2 damaged. Combats on French targets were few, but these sorites are not to be treated lightly by air gunners and the most vigilant search is to be maintained at all times. Squadrons must include instruction on search during night vision training. Search from the rear turret is difficult as it entails the rear gunner standing or crouching in a most uncomfortable position for short periods to enable him to see below and astern; this must be carried out as the view below is very poor when the gunner is in the seat.
[Underlined] SELF TOWED DROGUES [/underlined]
This practice has not been carried out on the scale it was hoped for, due to a variety of reasons, the main one being the shortage of brackets for attachment to the aircraft. Some Stations have had difficulty in obtaining the material for the manufacture of these items and snags have been met in obtaining the quick release unit. Gunnery Leaders should press for this equipment to enable a consensus of opinion to be obtained on the value of the exercise. Self tow at night with the drogue illuminated is the best step and should present no difficulties when Squadrons are satisfied that the existing equipment is satisfactory.
[Underlined] RESULTS OF C.G.S. COURSE. [/underlined]
[Underlined] NO. 77 COURSE. [/underlined]
F/O Wyand – 9 Sqdn. – 83.8% - Cat. “B”.
F/O Fisher – 1660 C.U. – 77.8% - Cat. “B”.
[Underlined] SPECIALIST SIGHTING COURSE AT MANBY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] COURSE NO. 14. [/underlined]
F/O Gross – 1660 C.U. – Cat. “B”.
[Underlined] COURSE NO. 17. [/underlined]
P/O Hammond – 619 Sqdn. – Cat. “A”.
Congratulations to P/O Hammond on obtaining first place on the course.
This Month’s Bag
[Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
49 Sqdn. “M” 20/21st April,1944 FW.190 C.
106 Sqdn. “G” 22/23rd April,1944 ME.109 C.
467 Sqdn. “N” 26th April,1944 FW.190 C.
630 Sqdn. “B” 29/30th April,1944 FW.190 C.
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
619 Sqdn. “G” 22/23rd April,1944 JU. 88 C.
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
44 Sqdn. “Z” 9/10th April,1944 ME.110 C.
207 Sqdn. “A” 22/23rd April, 1944 ME.210 C.
467 Sqdn. “W” 22nd April,1944 ME.109 C.
630 Sqdn. “J” 24th April,1944 FW.190 C.
630 Sqdn. “T” 24th April,1944 ME.109 C.
97 Sqdn. “Q” 24th April,1944 JU.88 C.
[Table of Air Training for April showing Fighter Affiliation and Air Firing Exercises by Squadron]
[Underlined] ACCIDENTS (Contd. From page 11, col.3) [/underlined]
- AND SHOWS NOT SO GOOD
A Stirling made a crash landing last month and the only man injured was the rear gunner. He was also unique in that he was the only man not in his crash position.
A Squadron aircraft crashed in poor visibility. There were several diversion airfields available and the pilot was told to stand by and orbit Base. But he thought he’d come down to have a look!! He and two occupants were killed as a result.
Two aircrew baled out over the Wash. They did not take their ‘K’ type dinghy, and so threw away their last chance.
An experienced captain was recently forced to make an early return. His Flight Commander removed his pitot head cover for him when he landed.
Another “gen man” thought it unnecessary to await the ground crew’s signal to leave dispersal. He taxied into the tail of an aircraft in front of him. Both aircraft are CAT A/C!!
A very much sadder and wiser crew landed badly shot up recently. They explained they had lost the Concentration. The pilot had put red on black on one course. Yes it can still happen!!
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 12
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
The number of photographic attempts during the month of April was 1635, of these 952 produced plottable ground detail, this increase being due to better conditions and the type of attack. It will be seen from the analysis that the percentage of failures is still excessive with a considerable increase in failures attributed to “no flash” illumination”. [sic]
There can be no doubt that, in the past, many flash failures were passing through as “flash muffled by cloud”, since it is impossible to assess bombing frames exposed by the light from fires on the ground when cloud conditions are 10/10ths. This is no attempt to draw attention to the high percentage of Armament failures; failures, whatever the cause, result in the loss of very valuable information and represent a loss in efficiency.
Photographic and Armament personnel must co-operate with each other to establish the [underlined] real cause [/underlined] of these failures; Type 35 camera controls and photo flash fuse settings must be identical with each other. It is not enough to set the control pointer to the required setting. Make sure that the timing of the control agrees with that indicated upon the setting dial before it is fitted to the aircraft; adjustments can be made to the pointer where necessary.
It is again necessary to stress that once the aircraft have returned from the attack, the production of the photographic results in the minimum period of time is essential to the Air Staff. The majority of the section personnel are aware of this fact, but improvement can be made by better organisation and attention to the following:-
(i) Ensure that everything is ready to commence processing as soon as the first magazines arrive (at one section seven minutes were lost between the time of the first magazine going into the darkroom and the lights being switched off).
(ii) The photographer detailed to receive the film magazine from the aircrew must obtain essential information and pass the first four or six magazines to the processing section in the quickest possible manner. (One section wasted valu-
{Continued on Page 14 Column 3)
[Table of Photographic Analysis Results by Squadron]
TRAINING
[Underlined] RECORD MONTH FOR TRAINING BASE [/underlined]
During April, 51 Base flew more hours and passed out more crews than ever before in its existence. The Stirling Conversion Units produced a grand total of 5500 flying hours, and the Lancaster Finishing School a total of almost 1900 hours. The Lancaster Finishing School posted 109 crews to squadrons and 95 crews were posted into the Lancaster Finishing School for Lancaster training.
These results were achieved as a result of strenuous efforts on the part of maintenance personnel and instructional staffs throughout the Base, despite the fact that the first ten days of the month produced little flying owing to bad weather. The operational stations in the Group assisted by providing their airfields for circuits and landings when training base airfields were overcrowded.
With excellent co-operation between this Group and 10 and 12 Fighter Groups, Training Base flew Bullseyes on 18 nights. Crews also took part in Command Bullseyes, including three spoofs over the North Sea which, in addition to providing good D.R. practice for the Navigators, helped divert the enemy’s fighter strength from the operations against enemy centres in France.
The main concern during the month has been burst tyres on Lancasters and Stirlings, and every precaution is being taken to reduce these to a minimum, because it is fully appreciated that the minor mishap caused by a burst tyre can well lead to a serious accident. The overall total of accidents for the Base is still too high, and the staff is pressing forward strongly with an “accident reduction” drive.
The forthcoming expansion in Training Base by which 132 crews are to be produced each month, has led to a revision of the Ground Syllabus and the Flying Syllabus. The revised Flying Syllabus is not yet effective, but will come into operation during May. There has been an expansion of H 2 S training in the two Units at present equipped for this training, and when 1654 Conversion Unit at Wigsley becomes productive, the periodical shortage of H 2 S crews should cease.
AIR SEA RESCUE
It is a very easy thing, when ordered to practice Parachute or Dinghy Drills to go out to an aircraft sit around smoking for half an hour and then report back to the Flight Office “D.C.O.” These drills are the “Safety Drills” and the instinct of self preservation alone should make crews practice them until “Practice makes Perfect”.
Generally speaking parachute drills are carried out more conscientiously than Dinghy Drills, but in recent incidents in this Group it appears that even this drill is not receiving the attention it should. Note the findings of the investigating officer after a recent fatal accident. “It seems doubtful whether the crew had done the amount of parachute drill accredited to them in the “Flight Records”. In other words completed records may save you a lot of bother, but unless the records are true they are valueless and wasteful.
Let us face facts. Even [underlined] you [/underlined] may be shot down and bale-out or ditch some time or other. If you have just a rough working knowledge of the drills, some of the crew will probably save their lives, but, equally probably, some will lose their lives. If you and your crew are word and action perfect in the drill, you will live to fight again, and get a good spell of “Survivors’ leave” into the bargain. Most probably!
Saturday morning had now been set aside as the time when every available crew is to spend at least an hour on these Safety Drills. It should also be regarded as a suitable time to acquaint aircrews with the latest safety equipment and modifications. This period, however, should not be regarded as an excuse for not doing drills at other times. There’ll be the odd occasion when you are elsewhere on a Saturday morning.
One Base has issued instructions that crews are to be ordered at Briefing, from time to time, that they are to do these drills after landing from Operations – when tired and in darkness, when their physical condition is similar to that when facing a real “Bods out” or ditching, or baling our [sic] conditions. This is a very good way of doing things – you get the maximum benefit, as you are already in full flying kit, with the minimum of effort.
In March 36.9% of aircrews in all Groups who ditched in “Home Waters” were saved, while 397 lost their lives. The fact that 73 lives were lost in crews where other members were saved stresses the importance of drills. The Americans are still making better use of your Air Sea Rescue Service than you are.
[Underlined] ARMAMENT (Continued from Page 15 Col.2) [/underlined]
stations in the near future to service the F.N.64 turrets prior to their being returned to Maintenance Units – a step in the right direction at last. All Armament Officers can assist in speeding up this servicing process by ensuring that a hydraulic turret test rig and a complete set of tools are available for the party when they arrive. Don’t leave it until the day the party is expected, and so waste a day collecting the equipment from various dispersed points around the station. Do it now and ensure that the floor space at present cluttered up by these turrets is made available for more important equipment.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 13
[Page break]
ENGINEERING
A record number of sorties has been carried out during April and it was pleasing to note that note that the cancellations due to technical defects were: Early Returns .73% - Cancellations .69% - both being very definite improvements.
The number of engine failures which occur and necessitate change of an engine before the completion of its life are not decreasing at the rate we should expect now that a more reliable engine forms the bulk of our holdings. The Merlin 24 from which we expected such high performance is doing its best to produce this performance. It is however handicapped by the fact that paddle-blade propellers and AY/118 constant speed units have invariably been fitted to this type of engine, the results being that instances are occurring of over speeding and the odd case of engine disintegration. Action is in hand to fit modified C.S.U’s and this must go ahead with all possible speed.
The Merlin 28 and 38 still suffer from loss of coolant occasionally, and we still get failures due to fracture of the oil pipe to the dual drive, mainly due to the slow rate at which the modified oil pipe is being supplied.
It is pleasing to see the local improvements which are being carried out by C.T.O’s the improvement of technical sites on the “self help” scheme and the general clean-up and overhaul of equipment.
Although the introduction of a technical adjutant was mainly to allow the C.T.O. to be out amongst the aircraft more, there may be a tendency for the C.T.O’s to leave too much to the technical adjutant. This is a point which must be watched and although it is not the intention to pin the C.T.O. to his office, he must keep a tight control on correspondence, returns and technical reports and keep “au fait” with all leaflets and technical letters issued.
[Underlined] ELECTRICAL AND INSTRUMENTS [/underlined]
It is gratifying to note that the maintenance of the Mk.XIV Bombsight improves month by month, as is evidenced by recent photographs of targets after a visit by 5 Group. Ground crews in general share in these achievements, but the instrument repairer deserves a special pat on the back for the hours well spent in tuning and levelling the Bombsights to produce these results.
The same degree of accuracy is unfortunately not apparent in the A.P.I./A.M.U. Cases are still being reported of “racing” of the A.M.I. despite the fitting of Command Modification No. 57. This “racing” can be attributed in most cases to incorrect tension of the relay spring and as no test equipment is yet available the fault cannot be laid at the door of bad maintenance. Efforts are being made to obtain the necessary tension gauges so that this fault can be cured. In the meantime units must make every effort to complete the manufacture of the Coningsby A.P.I./A.M.U. test bench, details of which were forwarded several weeks ago.
April witnessed the introduction of new equipment the responsibility of which rests on the instrument repairer. The most important is the nitrogen installation. It is not necessary to demand the ground charging equipment, but units must advise their Equipment Officer when an aircraft with nitrogen is received so that the necessary steps can be taken to obtain the charging equipment. At the same time the Group electrical officer must also be informed.
The other item of new equipment arriving in aircraft is the Mk.VIII Automatic Control, the introduction of which should ease maintenance problems. The Group servicing van has been round all operational stations to give preliminary instructions on the maintenance of this instrument and courses of three weeks’ duration will shortly become available to those personnel who have already attended the Mk.IV Control course. The question of the inferior luminous markings of the Mk.IA repeater has been brought to the notice of Headquarters Bomber Command, and it is hoped that an improvement will be made shortly.
The Electrical Sections – particularly those in Base major servicing units – continue to do a good job of work, despite the increasing number of modifications in which the Electrician is involved. Further modifications of an operational necessity are on the way, so electrical officers must give all future suggested modifications very serious consideration before submitting them to higher authority, if the electrical sections are not to be overburdened.
A word about Bumph. There appears to be a rooted objection among electrical officers to put pen, pencil or typewriter – if you can get one – to paper. Base and Station electrical officers must realise that it is impossible to get on without a certain minimum of paper work and promptness in replies is essential. If you are asked to reply to a question by a certain date make sure that your reply is one time.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of aircraft serviceability for Stirling and Lancaster]
[Underlined] RADAR/NAV. (Contd. From Page 9 Column 3) [/underlined]
This dangerous habit must cease. Some navigators seem to use R.F. Units and Stud Settings as toys to be changed and switched about to see what fixes they can obtain; the result is incorrect fixes, and chaos. These navigators are playing right into the enemy’s hands, particularly if they obtain signals which do not emanate from our Gee Stations!”
All Navigators must realise the importance of the above points as it is possible that in future several operations per night may be planned with an XF possibility for each operation. If navigators persist in using XF’s which are not assigned to them and phased for their route, there will be multitudes of incorrect fixes, and possibly casualties as a result of careless navigation.
Flight Engineers
In the past the Flight Engineers have been selected from Group I or II tradesmen; having been in the R.A.F. for long periods they gained quite considerable experience of many types of aircraft and engines, and therefore the changeover to their new duties was easy.
To-day we are faced with the problem of having to train pupils who perhaps a few weeks ago, had never seen inside an aircraft. During their training in the early stages, many subjects are taught which would appear to have no bearing on their job as Flight Engineers; this must be done however, so that later in the course, when boost control, hydraulics and pneumatics are explained, the pupil will have the basic knowledge to understand them. This takes time, and as we must produce more and more Flight Engineers, time cannot be spared to train them as Fitters. They are trained as Flight Engineers but perhaps a few corners remain that can be “polished off” by the Flight Engineer Leader.
The Flight Engineer Leader in a Squadron is responsible for training new members until he is satisfied that after a personal check, they can carry out the duties as laid down in A.M.O. A.538/43. He must make them continue their practical training, and whenever possible let them be with the ground crews on Daily Inspections, or any other work on their aircraft. Only in this way will good aircraft familiarisation be gained.
The training to be carried out in Squadrons must consist of Daily and Between Flight Inspections, instructions on the electrical panel, log keeping and engine limitations. The last subject is most important; only last month an early return which could have been avoided was made by a crew in this Group. On this occasion the oil pressure dropped to 50 lbs. per square inch at 20,000 feet, but the temperature remained at 80°C. Engine limitations laid down in A.P. 2062C (Pilot’s Notes) are:-
Oil Pressure minimum 45 lbs. per sq. in.
Oil temp. maximum 90°C.
[Underlined] PHOTOGRAPHY (Continued from Page 13 Col.1) [/underlined]
able time in processing a batch of films which had not been exposed, for the simple reason that the bombs had been brought back. This was negligence on the part of the airman who took over the magazines from the aircrew.
The photographic N.C.O. is responsible for the first film analysis and must decide whether it is a success or failure. Despite repeated instructions, many instances still occur where films are sent to this Headquarters as successes when in fact they are failures, and failures which should be classified as successes. This wastes the time spent on correspondence and telephone calls. One N.C.O. stated that it was because everything was required in a rush; this is true. THE AIR STAFF MUST HAVE PHOTOGRAPHIC RESULTS as soon as they can be produced and in ensuring this there must be no reduction of effort. Once the prints have been despatched, all films should be carefully re-examined, to ensure that no mistakes have been made.
Now that Headquarters, Bomber Command have reduced the amount of photographic printing, an improvement in the printing quality is expected. Faint ground details which could be plotted is often lost through poor processing and printing.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 14
[Page break]
ARMAMENT
[Underlined] BOMB DUMPS [/underlined]
The expression “unable owing to pressure of work” has become the password for excusing a dirty and untidy bomb dump. A slovenly bomb dump is too often the hall mark of poor workmanship and the effect is cumulative until unstacked empty cases, broken trollies and transporters disposed at random are taken for granted.
It takes little longer during a fusing operation to stock the tail boxes when removing the tails, rather than strew them indiscriminately over a large area; the effort is not great but the resultant tidiness is surprising.
A scene reminiscent of Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow can be avoided if only a few men are employed on cleaning up after a fusing detail. If the broken transporters, trollies and liners are not repairable, write them off for scrap metal – the country needs it.
[Underlined] PHOTOFLASH [/underlined]
Nearly 7% of the total number of photoflashes carried in April have been classed as flash failure. The classification flash failure is given when:-
(i) There is no indication of illumination on frames 6, 7 and 8 (or 4, 5 and 6 in the old sequence) of the film.
(ii) The fusing wire from the fuse is brought back.
(iii) There is no indication of violent evasive action on any of the bombing frames.
(iv) The camera control is checked and found correct.
(v) The electrical circuit and release slip are found serviceable.
This figure of 7% is excessive and so much higher than any previous month that it must be assumed, as in many cases the same lot numbers were used over two consecutive months, that some of this 7% was, in fact, incorrect fuse setting and bad maintenance. Co-operation with the photographic section can solve this problem.
[Underlined] “J” CLUSTERS [/underlined]
Loading ramps and rollers for 500 lb “J” clusters should be spring cleaned so that the clusters which are now arriving in quantity may be loaded directly on the rollers, thus saving double humping.
[Underlined] SUPPLY [/underlined]
Owing to the present precarious supply position of certain weapons the C.O. and personnel of No.93 M.U. have been called upon to produce stores at a moment’s notice from nowhere. To the credit of 93 M.U. these stores always turn up, but it is realised how much extra work is entailed in meeting a rush demand.
The staff of 93 M.U. are extremely well informed regarding the requirements and difficulties of operational armament, but it is doubted if Armament Officers realise the difficulties of the M.U. who handled nearly 30,000 tons of bombs last month.
It is suggested that Armament Officers could spend a profitable day by accompanying an Austin to the M.U. and see for themselves how large scale humping is organised.
[Underlined] MANIPULATION FAILURES. [/underlined]
A marked increase in manipulation failures has been apparent this month resulting in a large number of bombs and pyrotechnics being returned to base. The more outstanding “boobs” are set out below:-
1. 2 S.B.C’s complete with contents returned to Base – distributor arm fouled by the quadrant peg card. No jettison action carried out.
2. The following stores were returned to Base due to non-[underlined] selection [/underlined]:-
2 x 4.5” photoflashes
2 x 250 lb Target Indicators
2 x 7” Hooded Flare Clusters
1 x 1000 lb M.C.
NO FURTHER COMMENT IS NECESSARY.
[Underlined] FN.64 TURRETS [/underlined]
The turret servicing party is visiting all
(Continued on Page 4 Column 2) [sic]
[Table of Failures by Squadron]
FLYING CONTROL
The high standard of landing achieved last month has been maintained during April. It is significant to note that SKELLINGTHORPE who pioneered this scheme when it was first introduced and in fact, carried out all the trials, have risen to the top of the ladder with an excellent average of 1.85 minutes.
The most outstanding figure for the month, however, is 30 aircraft landed in 36 minutes at Waddington. This is, in fact, the finest performance which has ever been put up within the Group and possibly within the Command. The following are some examples of really first-class performances for the month:-
[Table of Selected Flying Control Sessions by Stations]
[Underlined] FLYING CONTROL COMPETITION [/underlined]
It is hoped to introduce shortly a competition embracing all Flying Control aspects. This will be judged on a quarterly basis and the condition and efficiency of every part of the Station Flying Control organisation will
(Continued on Page 6 Column 2)
[Table of April Landing Times by Station]
Aircrew Volunteers
(a) New Volunteers
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944. PAGE 15
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
Our brief this month was abundantly clear. With the Allied air offensive continuing almost uninterruptedly on a rising scale against communications targets and airfields, it appeared certain that our own role would be integrated in the common plan to wear down the Western Wall. To this end we have seen during the course of the month a revolution in our bombing technique confirming the undoubted accuracy of low level precision attacks.
The importance of hammering railway targets as a means of reducing the enemy’s capacity to meet a threat from the West was fully recognised. On 10/11th TOURS was effectively attacked, followed by JUVISY and LA CHAPELLE on 18/19th and 21/22nd respectively. The results in each case were impressive. At Tours an exceptional concentration with over 100 hits fell on the track disrupting all communications. A particularly high precedent was established at Juvisy. Here we achieved one of the greatest concentrations of craters yet obtained on a target of this type – the attack almost completely devastating the marshalling yards.
The attack on La Chappelle was no less successful. Damage is severe at the southern end of the Marshalling Yard which sustained the main weight of the attack. Large fires were still burning in the area the day following the raid, and it could be seen that tracks had been severed at several important junctions. The importance which the enemy attaches to keeping his railroads open, and the difficulties which he is experiencing in handling even high priority traffic is perhaps reflected in the fact that some 50000 Germans have now been transported into France to relieve the situation and, furthermore, German branch lines have been torn up to provide new tracks.
This wearing down process is also being applied with particular attention to the Luftwaffe itself, its sources of supply being very seriously threatened by repeated attacks on aircraft factories. On 5/6th, 605 tons of bombs were dropped on four plants at TOULOUSE. The S.N.C.A.S.E. Aircraft Assembly Plant has sustained serious damage to its three main buildings – the assembly plant, component store, and testing shop. At the A.I.A. Works, every building is more or less severely damaged, while the Aircraft Factory buildings are all damaged – amongst those completely destroyed being the components manufactory shop, components store, drawing offices, heat treatment and plate shop. The Montaudran Airfield is now without its three principal hangars, and has suffered damage to other unidentified buildings.
Coupled with the first attack on St. Medard-on-Jalles (reported later) was a raid on the KIELLER Airframe Factory near OSLO – PRU cover is not complete, but the photographs available indicate that damage is considerable in the North Eastern part of the target area, including heavy destruction in the Bayerische Motorenwerke.
It is perhaps interesting to note that following the attack on CLERMONT FERRAND Aulnat Aircraft Factory, the sick bay is almost the only building undamaged. It is open to some doubt as to whether this fact can be accepted as a tribute to our precision bombing, but whatever the position may be in this respect, it is manifest that this Repair Factory will not be available to the enemy for a long time to come.
The attack on the ST CYR Signals Equipment Depot on 10/11th was highly successful – resulting in the destruction of several of the principal buildings in the Depot.
Although the focus of attention was directed on rail centres and other special targets in the occupied zone, this concentration in policy did not imply that other forms of attack would be discontinued; still less that they were conceived independently of the supreme invasion task. In fact four “blitz” attacks were staged during the course of the month. AACHEN was singled out for attack on 11/12th. Throughout the city – particularly to the South and South West, industrial and residential damage has been fairly severe, while the Main Station and sidings, large Passenger Station, Locomotive Sheds, and Goods Depot Shed have suffered heavily. Reconnaissance following our attack on BRUNSWICK on 22/23rd is not complete, but from the photographs obtained, it can be seen that damage is considerable in the business/residential area South of the City Centre, with many hits in the South Eastern marshalling yards. A high measure of success also attended the attack on MUNICH on 24/25th.
[Underlined] RIDER [/underlined]
Until that date this Nazi birthplace had escaped serious damage, but it is now known that the town has suffered its first heavy battering. No interpretation of the reconnaissance photographs is yet available but even to the unpractised eye it is obvious that the target is severely hit. Widespread areas of devastation are apparent in the old city (which is 30 - 40% gutted) continuing in a wide sear from East to West up to and including the Main Railway Station. The Nazi Party meeting place Kreig Ministerium and Prinz Leopold Platz, to mention but a few of the important Municipal Buildings are either destroyed or severely damaged.
Fierce fighter activity was encountered in defence of SCHWEINFURT on 26/27th. Despite this violent reaction, however, the attack was pressed home, resulting in severe damage to all five ball-bearing plants, in particular to the Deutsche Star Kugalhalter where two thirds of the machine shops have been demolished. The adjoining marshalling yards have also sustained damage, and there are many incidents throughout the town.
No less important were our minelaying trips on 9/10th, 18/19th and again on 23/24th. These sorties probably lack the spectacle of a bombing attack, but their sinister loads will doubtless reap a very real contribution in the war harvest.
The culminating stage of the month was in the final raid on 29/30th against the Explosives Works at ST. MEDARD-on-JALLES. A pass had already been made at this same target the previous night, but had been frustrated by unfortunate weather conditions. So with redoubled vigour another attack was launched. On this occasion the weather chose to be our ally, and the opportunity afforded was seized to produce one of the most impressive pyrotechnic displays. For more than half an hour the target was in the throes of a succession of violent explosions. The greatest concentration of the attack fell to the North East of the works area extending across the centre of the works to the western border. A most heartening result and an inspiring conclusion to the month’s work.
The above achievements were contributed by 1950 Lancs and 84 Mosquitos – 88.6% of which were successful in attacking the primary, with 2.5% casualties.
WAR EFFORT
[Table of Statistics by Squadron showing Availability, Sorties, Results and Points]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.21. APRIL, 1944
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V Group News, April 1944
5 Group Newsletter April 1944
Description
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Five Group Newsletter, number 21, April 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about process of servicing, gardening, navigation, honours and awards, signals / radar, tactics, air bombing, radar / navigation, link trainer, sports, war savings, accidents, gunnery, training, air sea rescue, engineering, armament, flying control, operations and war effort.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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1944-04
Contributor
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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16 printed sheets
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-25
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
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France
Germany
Great Britain
Norway
England--Lincolnshire
France--Clermont-Ferrand
France--Tours
France--Toulouse
France--Saint-Cyr-sur-Mer
France--Saint-Médard-en-Jalles
Germany--Aachen
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Munich
Germany--Schweinfurt
Norway--Oslo
Temporal Coverage
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1944-04
1944-04-05
1944-04-06
1944-04-18
1944-04-19
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of the Juvisy, Noisy-le-Sec and Le Bourget railways (18/19 April 1944)
bombing of Toulouse (5/6 April 1944)
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
pilot
radar
RAF Coningsby
RAF East Kirkby
RAF Metheringham
RAF Waddington
RAF Wainfleet
rivalry
sport
training
wireless operator
-
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
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Stephenson, S
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20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
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V GROUP NEWS V
9 Wadd.
10 Skell.
6 Bard.
JULY 1944 [deleted] SECRET [/deleted] [Stamp] NO.24
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
Within the past few months the German defence of occupied Europe by day has greatly weakened and in consequence new methods of attack have become feasible. Day fighters are unable to challenge our great superiority and night fighters have not so far been risked in daylight combat. Recently therefore an increasing proportion of attacks have been by day, and since these provide some novel problems, I would like aircrew to know the reasons behind our present tactics, and the developments which we hope to see.
Apart from enemy defences there is one difficulty which is at present inherent in daylight operations to a greater extent than in night operations, and that is smoke. By night markers can usually be seen through considerable clouds of smoke, but by day their brilliance is insufficient, and those crews who bomb towards the end of an attack will seldom be able to see the aiming point. It may therefore, be necessary to order crews to offset the bombsight, or overshoot from a clearly defined aiming point outside the target area. These are however palliatives and the solution for targets where cratering is required us the half-hour delay fuse which will enable the whole attack to be completed before the bombs start to explode. These fuses will shortly be available in quantity.
Another difficulty is cloud which by day is more prevalent than by night, especially the cumulus type which can so easily mar the bombing run by shrouding the target at a critical moment. For daylight attacks therefore, except where the sky is clear, I should expect a higher proportion of crews to have to bring their bombs back, because it is essential that they should not be released aimlessly over occupied territory. I hope all crews are now aware of the importance of this instruction and will never allow their natural wish to release their bombs to override their judgement on this point.
As regards the tactics to be adopted on daylight attacks there are, broadly speaking, two alternatives. The first is to adopt a close formation built up of Flights, Squadrons and Bases, with aircraft flying in tight Vics so as to provide supporting fire against fighters. The second method is to employ our normal night technique and to fly in an organised mass in which aircraft are evenly spaced in height and throughout the length of the stream.
The first alternative calls for considerable training and although it increases fire power such formations are difficult to manoeuvre and more vulnerable to flak. Heavy flak is more accurate by day than at night only to the extent that the operators of the various predictor instruments can pick out individual aircraft or formations, against which the fire of the batteries can be directed. If aircraft are flying in a close formation there is generally no difficulty in ranging instruments upon it and very accurate fire results. If however aircraft are flying in loose mass it is almost impossible to ensure that all the various “Predictor” teams will select the same aircraft and, in general, fire will be no more accurate than by night, that is to say, it will only be directed into the general mass of aircraft. This is an important point because it has been found by experience that large and tightly packed formations must fly at heights above 26,000’ to ensure reasonable immunity from flak, and such heights are beyond the present capabilities of the Lancaster.
The next point is protection against fighters. So far we have not come up against enemy fighter opposition when our own fighter escort has been present, but the danger is always present if the column loses cohesion, as was shown on the occasion of the attack against the Bois-de-Cassan, when the force became split up after flying through thunder cloud. Our fighters, numerous as they are, cannot protect a column or [sic] more than a certain length, and any aircraft which are outside the area of fighter cover must expect to be attacked. On the way to the target and on the return the column should be as short as possible, but should open out on approaching the target so as to enable crews to take a steady bombing run without having to worry unduly about other aircraft or falling bombs. This opening out will normally be achieved by providing a turn before and after the target so that Bases can spread out by making a wide turn and close in by cutting the corner, on the way through the target.
A daylight operation calls for a high measure of control and good flight discipline. Control will in future be by TR.1196 within the Squadron and Base formations and by V.H.F. to the Group as a whole when passing through the Target area. The “shepherd” in a Lightning or a Mosquito will continue to keep a watchful eye on any who may stray away from the protection of the mass and hand them over to the fighter escort.
Conditions in which daylight operations take place will change as the war develops, and crews must be prepared for evolution od the tactics employed. The tactics will, however, always aim at providing conditions in which every crew can attack the target with the utmost confidence and with all the accuracy of which the bombsight is capable.
July was a month of hard work but also a month of notable progress in the War. Over the past three years the weight of bombs dropped by this Group has gone up as follows:
May, June, July, 1942. – 2,780 toms
May, June, July, 1943. – 11,505 tons
May, June, July, 1944. – 31,107 tons.
This increased tonnage is a tribute to the steadily growing efficiency of all ranks throughout the Group and to the improvements which have been made in the reliability of aircraft and equipment. It is a magnificent effort to achieve such a tremendous aadvance [sic] in the striking power of the Group in so short a time, and the peak has not yet been reached, as August will certainly show.
During July, No. 51 Base raised their total figures once more and passed out 150 trained crews. No. 5 L.F.S. completed a second month is succession with no flying accidents and I again congratulate them on a fine achievement.
[Page break]
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]
How much affiliation have you done? The facilities are now available in the Group and you should take every opportunity of crossing swords with the Hurricanes of 1690 B.D.T. Flight. A point about “rolling in the corkscrew”. Don’t “roll” on your ailerons alone. Use rudder firmly in conjunction with the ailerons and you will roll smoothly during a manoeuvre, Be precise in your air speeds and amount of bank. The Base Training pilots have picked up this point when giving you a final check over before going on operations. There is one good corkscrew and must be flown accurately. Your gunners should get the chance they deserve.
Instrument flying needs constant practice. You’ve got dark nights and long trips to come so don’t let your instrument flying get rusty because you are doing some “daylights”. The points to remember about instrument flying are:-
(i) Trim your aircraft carefully.
(ii) Trust your instruments.
(iii) Fly smoothly.
Take care in taxying when you are being marshalled by ground crew. Let the airman sit in the pilot’s seat in dispersal sometime and show him how limited is your field of vision when anyone is standing too close to the nose of the aircraft.
Don’t follow a “curve of approach” on your bombing run. Insist that your Navigator gives you the drift in degrees as the correct turning point for the run in to the target. If the target markers are not dead ahead when you first see them, correct immediately by means of an “S” turn so that the aircraft’s nose points at the markers along the predetermined track, then turn the aircraft port or starboard for the number of degrees of drift given by the Navigator. The aircraft should then be tracking towards the markers. The motto is “Bomb on the correct heading with the graticule intersection of the bombsight astride the aiming point”.
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]
Your gunners are now to have categories. It is up to yourself to get A-plus category. Half the job depends on you. If your corkscrew is accurate and your gunners apply the right deflection, your Cine-Gyro film will be a good one and so will the category. Get all the practice you can with the Hurricanes of 1690 B.D.T. Flight.
Though priority for squadron practices belongs to Gunnery, you must keep your bombing category up as well. Some pilots are still doing flat turns. Avoid them like the plague. The Lancaster will [underlined] NOT [/underlined] flat turn but merely swings itself in the direction of the intended turn and then flies crab wise to its track in much the same direction as before. While the nose swinging the pilot has the illusion of turning for the following reasons:-
(i) The nose of the aircraft moves round the horizon.
(ii) The directional gyro revolves.
(iii) The turn indictor shows rates of turn
Have you given your Flight Engineers any experience in handling the controls? Flight Engineers are now officially recognised as the pilot’s mate in Lancasters, and as a result are getting some elementary training before joining the Group. This Headquarters has laid down that they must do regular Link Exercises, and, at the Captain’s discretion, be given 15 minutes at the controls during non-operational flights of more than an hour’s duration. There’s a drill issued by this Headquarters for changing seats in the air. Have you read it? It’s Drill No.10 of the 5 Groups Aircraft Drills.
There’s another drill which you may have overlooked now that the warmer nights are here. Drill No.12 – Oxygen and Anti-Frostbite Drill – which makes Captains responsible for inspecting air gunners in their crew once a week with the gunners fully dressed in operational flying kit. When did you last check your gunners?
GARDENING
Three Gardening operations were carried out this month by 5 Group; two in the Kattegat and one in a certain heavily defended and very restricted harbour. In the former area we were dependent upon cloud cover, which in the case of 55 Base’s effort let us down, but gave 44 Squadron its chance a few days later. The last operation was carried out by 57 and 630 Squadrons in the face of intense opposition. In all cases gardening was done on H 2 S and some good P.P.I. photographs were obtained. Two aircraft were missing.
The Command total this month was 708 vegetables, the majority of which were again directed against the U-boat bases. The interference which these pests have been able to cause to our invasion forces has been negligible and we have evidence that gardening has played a big part in producing this happy state of affairs.
Mr. Wood, of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, gave a most interesting lecture on the economic dislocation caused by our strategic gardening. He was able to give his lecture to 5 Group Air Staff, the Aircrew School and 44, 57, 630 and 207 Squadrons.
Vegetable stocks are now on the increase again and this probably presages some more planting before the Autumn harvest.
WAR EFFORT
[Table of War Effort showing Sorties with Star Awards by Squadron]
Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “successful sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties Nos. 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another squadron, the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons.
ERRATUM The one avoidable accident for 61 Squadron shown in the June issue occurred in May. The error is regretted, but it will not affect the next award of the Silver Lancaster Trophy which is based on the months July/September.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS (GENERAL) [/underlined]
The meaning of this heading may not be completely clear to Signals and Radar Officers. At a recent Command Conference recommendations were formulated regarding future establishments at Stations, Bases and Groups. It was considered that Officers who held the rank of S/Ldr. and above should be known as Signals (General) and should be qualified in both the Communications and Radar aspects of Signals. If this scheme is approved, only Officers thus qualified will be eligible for promotion to the higher ranks. Base Signals Officer are to afford Radar Officers every opportunity to absorb the communications side now. It is suggested that a good way of starting this is to bring Radar Officers on to the Duty Signals Officers Roster. At the same time Signals Officers must take more than a passive interest in Radar matters.
An experiment is being conducted within No. 53 Base to see how far it is possible to merge the duties of Wireless and Radar Mechanics. Miracles are not expected of this scheme, but it is felt that greater co-operation between the two trades will result in a saving of labour, test equipment and tools.
[Underlined] COMMUNICATIONS (OPERATIONS) [/underlined]
The success of the present type of controlled operation depends more and more on the efficiency of communications channels. Although all aircraft in the Group are now fitted with V.H.F., there must be no relaxation in the drive to perfect the W/T system of control since the latter must always be on standby in cases of VHF unserviceability or interference, or in cases where VHF cannot fulfil the requirement. The success achieved on our communications channels is due in no small measure to the hard work of the Wireless Mechanic. The C.S.O. would like to take this opportunity of congratulating all Signals Servicing personnel on having completed the third successive month with no failures due to faulty maintenance.
[Underlined] W/T FAILURES [/underlined]
Of the 2,856 sorties flown during the month of July, there were 36 W/T failure reports. The percentage shows a slight increase over the figure for June. The maintenance staffs have again come out on top with no servicing failures; as in previous months, equipment and component defects have been the cause of 75% of the total snags. There were three manipulation failures – one could have been avoided if the crew concerned had religiously tested their helmets prior to take off. Not a single aircraft throughout the month failed to take off on its mission as a result of signals equipment being at fault. There were, however, 3 early returns – one was due to the above mentioned manipulation fault.
From the equipment aspect the R1155 output valve (V8) again proved to be the most troublesome. Units must submit Defect Reports for these valves and so assist this Headquarters in hastening a remedy.
[Underlined] V.H.F. [/underlined]
All operational aircraft in the Group are now fitted with either TR.1143 or TR. 1143A The fitting programme proceeded particularly well and ended ahead of schedule. With the increased number of sorties and the consequent increase in work, the maintenance personnel have excelled themselves.
During the most recent operations, the interference that was being experienced on V.H.F. has decreased considerably, and there is every indication that this is due to the V.H.F. frequencies being used. R.A.E. Farnborough have evolved a series pulse transmission limiter, which, when fitted to the V.H.F. receiver, is claimed to supress all Radar pulse interferences. This modification is being tried at Coningsby, but since its introduction no interference has been apparent. A more detailed account of this device may be available for the next issue of the V Group News.
[Underlined] MANDREL [/underlined]
Mandrel has now been removed from all aircraft of the Group. This countermeasure is still being effectively operated by other means, and the equipment released from our aircraft is to be put to good use elsewhere. The Group Countermeasure Party is to remain in existence to assist with the maintenance of Carpet II in the Pathfinder Squadrons and, later on, will play a part in the installation and servicing of Boozer.
[Underlined] RADAR [/underlined]
Very extensive operations were carried out during July with the pace being stepped up considerably. Generally speaking Radar serviceability remained on the same footing as for June, although a few ups and downs were experienced on the various types of equipment.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
The way was again shown by Gee with a percentage serviceability of 97.24 for a total of 2643 completed sorties. This was a slight decrease from the previous months [sic] record figure of 97.77. Although we had expected to see the serviceability increase instead of decrease, a period of approximately ten days in which we were unable to obtain replacements put a considerable strain on servicing. It is hoped that we shall not have to go through this again.
[Underlined] MONICA [/underlined]
By completing 478 out of a total of 501 sorties without any difficulty whatever, Monica V took over second position on the serviceability chart for July. This figure gives a percentage serviceability of 95.41, which is an increase of 1.52 per cent on June. The Squadrons who are using this equipment are to be congratulated for their progress in the standard of their servicing, and now let us look forward to August for a corresponding increase over July’s figures.
Monica IIIA fell to third position but we feel certain that despite the great difficulty in obtaining replacements, which are now almost non-existent, the 93.79 per cent serviceability obtained for 805 completed sorties, will be brought up during August and return this Tail Warning Device to its proper place.
By putting in a great number of late hours, and hard work, an excellent replacement has been developed during the past four weeks for Monica IIIA and Monica V. The two equipments which are in good supply, namely Monica I. Transmitters and Receivers and Fishpond indicators, have been combined to give us a further type of Visual Monica. The service trials and operational use of the first set have proved most satisfactory, and now by local production it is hoped to create a source of replacements for the present devices of which we are so sorely in need.
[Underlined] REPEATER INDICATOR [/underlined]
This secondary warning indicator, which we told you about in last months [sic] News has now reached the production stage and by the end of August we should see a large number of them in operational use. Production has had to be handled locally by the Base Workshops who are now turning out the boxes; when produced these will be delivered to No. 53 Base for final completion and testing.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
This past month brought back several high level bombing operations, and with it a slight decrease in the percentage serviceability of H2S Mk. II. Of the 1298 sorties completed, 90.16 per cent were free of all difficulties. This is a drop of 1.6 per cent below June. Replacement of the high voltage condensers is now taking place on the production line but so far none have been received in the Group for retrospective fitting to units already held by Squadrons. Judging from the considerable number of cases of flashing, this remains one of the greatest sources of break-down. It is strongly emphasised that all causes of breakdown must be conscientiously reported in accordance with A.M.O. A. 869/43, as this is the only method by which these difficulties can be brought to light and dealt with effectively.
H 2 S Mk. III shows a slight improvement during July. A total of 6 difficulties was experienced out of 95 completed sorties, which gives a percentage serviceability of 93.69. Servicing conditions on 83 and 97 Squadrons are made rather more difficult because of the two types of H 2 S equipment and this calls for a high degree of organisation on the part of the Radar Branch. When the complete changeover to Mk. III has taken place conditions should ease quite considerably.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
The number of completed sorties with Fishpond carried out during the past month was 1260 of which 90.24 per cent gave very satisfactory results. The difficulties experienced were largely due, as was to be expected, to the unserviceability of H 2 S. With the higher degree of training now being carried out the benefit derived from this equipment has been increased to very large extent.
The intensity of operations will be still greater during the coming month, and this in turn will call for every effort on the part of Radar Sections. We have seen a very gratifying increase in the efficiency of all types of equipment during the past six months, and now we look forward to August to bring the efficiency even closer to the degree we all know possible.
(Continued on Page 4 Column 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24.. JULY, 1944. PAGE 3.
[Page break]
SIGNALS (CONTD:)
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
July brought no outstanding performance in aircrew signals but Operators did quite well in their reception of Controllers and Wind Broadcast messages, sometimes under difficult conditions due to static interference. This augers well for future operations, and with constant practice at the morse buzzer a higher standard can yet be reached.
A scheme will soon be in operation for the further classification of Wireless Operators in this Group, and tests will be set each operator to assess his eligibility for classification in the Grades laid down. The scheme will be an amplification of the tests laid down in 5 Group Signals Instruction No. 13.
[Underlined] CONTROLLERS WIRELESS OPERATORS [/underlined]
The standard of W/T operating by all Controller Wireless Operators during the past month was very good and 83 and 97 Squadrons are to be congratulated on their practice efforts which effected this improvement. Now the writer would like to see other Squadrons following their example and have their Wireless Operators carry out the tests laid down in 5 Group Signals Instruction No. 13. I know they can do it, so come along and have their names inscribed in the register of “Wireless Operator Controller”.
[Underlined] V.H.F. MANIPULATION [/underlined]
All aircraft in the Group are now fitted with TR.1143. How many Wireless Operators (Air) have been along to their W/T Maintenance Sections to find out how it works? What are the crystal frequencies? How many times is this frequency multiplied, and how? What are the power supplies? Where are the fuses? It is your duty to know all these answers and advise your Captain on its proper functioning.
[Underlined] W/T EXERCISE [/underlined]
The Group W/T Exercise has, like the Curate’s Egg, been good and bad in parts. Some very good exercises have taken place, particularly one exercise when sixty-two messages were transmitted and received correctly in one and a quarter hours operating, There is still the tendency of some Operators, however, to revert to the old idea of the “Survival of the Slickest”. Now this is definitely not good operating, and this tendency, once it is developed in an Operator, may lead to dire trouble both for himself and some other unfortunate Operator who happens to be in the air at the same time.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The majority of attacks were again reported over the target while the Wireless Operator was on W/T watch. The new instruction whereby the Wireless Operator does not log the Controllers instructions provided his Captain is satisfied with the serviceability of his V.H.F., should enable him to concentrate more on his E.W.D. in this vulnerable area.
[Underlined] CALLSIGNS [/underlined]
July saw the abolition of Squadron Callsigns within Bomber Command. This step, whatever prompted it, is desirable in that it is a simplification. Now the one R/T S.A.C.S. can be used at Base or elsewhere, on V.H.F. or H.F. on Darky or ‘L.F.C.’. the whole thing becomes a ‘Piece of Cake’. But one precaution must still be observed. On pre-operational flights to advanced bases, or during Squadron moves, an S.A.C.S. must be obtained from the station of destination. Should the terminus station not have an S.A.C.S. available then this Headquarters can supply, and this use of the appropriate callsign provides a simple little countermeasure designed to fox the enemy listening service.
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) %age of personnel contributing
(c) Total amount saved
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTAL SAVED £21,504 0 10
ARMAMENT
The attention of Armament Officers has been fully occupied in dealing with operational bomb loads and changes of loads. The excellent way in which Armament staffs have worked has enabled the Group bombing effort to be maintained at a very high level. Considerable attention has been paid to the care in handling and loading bombs, thus avoiding damage to tail units, but some tails have been damaged due to various causes. Most of these tail units are repairable, but this takes time which could well be employed on other work. It is hoped that during August the number of tail units damaged will be reduced considerably.
BOMB DUMPS have been, to a considerable extent, reorganised and improved. It is well known that all bomb dumps are grossly overloaded and it is only by the careful planning and maintenance of tidy conditions that a reasonable degree of safety can be guaranteed; by far the biggest factor is careful planning and unloading stores in the right place, thus avoiding double handling and general loss of efficiency due to unnecessary work.
CO-OPERATION WITH BOMBING LEADERS has led to many excellent results. One particular case is quoted where the Station Armament Officer prepares a pro-forma whenever he suspects that an armament failure is due to manipulation. A Senior Air Bomber is appointed by the Bombing Leader to visit the Station Armoury daily and collect any forms relating to the past 24 hours work. The Air Bomber then interviews the crews concerned investigating all the details of the failure, reports this to the Bombing Leader, and if a difference of opinion exists, the Bombing Leader contacts the Armament Officer with all the facts available and the matter is settled amicably. This liaison is making a very considerable decrease in the number of failures due to manipulation recorded in the Squadron concerned. “No copyright is claimed – please copy”.
BOMB TROLLEYS. Care and maintenance of these items will always pay in the long run, and grossly overloaded trolleys, apart from being an unsafe practice, will lead to rapid wear or failure of the trolley itself.
(Continued in column 2)
Continued from column 3
Trolley maintenance must, therefore, be kept up, and more particularly so during the present period when trolleys are being used so frequently. A modification will shortly be introduced to render the type “D” trolleys more useful in dealing with the transport of 1000 lb and 500 lb bombs. Detailed information will be circulated immediately.
FAILURES TABLE
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A =AMANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING
D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 4.
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
This month has seen a return to medium range targets, and Navigators have had opportunity to put to the test their skill and efficiency. Broadcast W/V’s have been used on 3 occasions with varying degrees of accuracy.
Track keeping and timing was good, with one or two exceptions. On almost every operation there are 2 or 3 aircraft between 10 and 30 miles off track. In the majority of instances this is attributable to u/s Compasses or instruments but there are several examples of bad navigation. Track keeping and timing are vital to the success of any operation and everything must therefore be done to achieve concentration. There were no early returns through Navigational failures this month. This is as it should be. Every effort is to be made by Station and Squadron Navigation Officers to see that no early returns are caused through Navigational errors, such as incorrect fixing and computations, or through u/s Compasses. The vast majority of Navigational early returns are attributable to alleged D.R. Compass failures. If the D.R. Compass is suspected carry out the correct drill for synchronisation and checking. If the fault is still not remedied then press on immediately using the P4 compass. Check true course with the Astro Compass regularly, using the quick method of sighting on Polaris. But DON’T, on any account, turn back with a u/s D.R. Compass.
BROADCAST WIND VELOCITIES
The use of broadcast w/v’s on the three Stuttgart raids proved very useful practice. As stated above, they brought to light many mistakes and deficiencies, the most important of which are as follows:-
(a) Insufficient w/v’s found and transmitted. Difficulty is sometimes experienced by the W/Op when transmitting the winds to Base. This is being remedied by the Signals Section. Navigators MUST now do their share and find w/v’s regularly.
(b) Winds are often found over too large an area. The ideal windfinding period is 15 to 20 minutes. Winds applying for a period of 40 minutes or more are almost useless.
(c) Wind messages incorrectly coded.
Very few of the Navigators who were the “windfinders” of last winter are still operating, and therefore, it was expected that “teething troubles” would be experienced It is the responsibility of Base, Station and Squadron Navigation Officers to eliminate these various mistakes and errors. Do all windfinders appreciate the importance of their task? It must be made quite clear to them that non-H2S crews rely entirely on the broadcast w/v’s when out of Gee range. Serious consequences may be the result of poor or indifferent windfinding. The accuracy of bombing is also directly affected by the found winds since the broadcast bombing winds are forecast from those transmitted by aircraft.
The standard and accuracy of winds found by the detailed crews has, so far, been very good. If we eliminate points (a), (b) and (c) above, we shall achieve accuracy. So go to it, all of you, and let us see that you can do!
[Underlined] NAVIGATIONAL TECHNIQUE [/underlined]
It is difficult to arrive at a perfect navigational technique, e.g. how often to obtain a w/v check, E.T.A. check, etc. Many methods have been adopted and others experimented with, but the perfect technique has not yet been found. One school of thought argues that a Navigator should “work his fingers to the bone” and obtain maximum w/v and E.T.A. checks. Another school argues that this is a waste of time and unnecessary. The ideal is surely in between, i.e. regular, but not too regular fixes, w/v and E.T.A. checks, and a maximum amount of time available for checking of all computations. Skellingthorpe are working on these lines as an experiment. Their procedure is as follows:- Obtain a w/v and E.T.A. check every 20 minutes and a check fix every 10 minutes. All Navigators can easily cope with this amount of work and, what is more important, they have plenty of time in which to check and re-check all computations. The charts turned in by the Skellingthorpe Navigators using this system are good. The charts are not cluttered with a multitude of fixes and wind arrows and their work is very accurate. All Squadrons and Stations are urged to experiment with this or any similar method, and note whether greater accuracy is achieved. Whatever method if adopted, it must allow the Navigator time in which to plot the wind vector accurately. It must also allow him sufficient time in which to re-check all his computations and calculations.
[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF FOUND WINDS [/underlined]
The O. R. S. Section at H.Q. 5 Group have analysed the target winds found by all Navigators on the following three raids:-
KIEL 23/34 July, 1944.
POMMEREVAL 24/25 June, 1944.
REVIGNY 18/19 July, 1944.
The intention was to find the consistency of Navigator’s found winds and to compare the mean found wind with the forecast w/v. The analysis showed that the winds found by Navigators were very consistent and gave a probable vector error of 7 m.p.h; with the exception of Revigny where it was just under 10 m.p.h. This is good, but there were several “wide” wind velocities; some were almost reciprocals, obviously caused by incorrect resetting of the A.P.I. or by inaccurate plotting. On the Revigny attack the w/v was light and variable and consequently a large spread was experienced, 2/3rds of the wind velocities were in the Westerly section and 1/3rd in the Easterly section.
If the wind speed is only say 8 m.p.h. then 15 minutes wind is represented by a vector 2 miles in length. Any slight inaccuracy in either the Gee or H2S fix will make a very considerable change in wind velocity. The greatest possible care must therefore be taken when obtaining a gee or H2S fix for finding a wind velocity, and more particularly when the wind speed is very light.
From the three attacks analysed the mean found wind differed from the Met., forecast w/v by the following amount:-
(i) KIEL Vector difference of 17 mph.
(ii) POMMEREVAL Vector difference of 8 mph.
(iii) REVIGNY Vector difference of 8 mph.
Base and Station Navigation Officers can themselves very easily analyse all winds found over a certain area by plotting them on a large scale plotting rose. It does not take more than 10 to 15 minutes to plot all the winds for one Station. The mean average w/v can then be seen at a glance and from this it is possible to pick out the “wides”. This should be repeated for 2 or 3 areas of the same operation. The inaccurate windfinders will stand out. It is then possible to trace the causes of these “wide” w/v’s. Was the inaccurate w/v obtained immediately after resetting the A. P. I. or vectoring? If so, there is the answer. Was it caused by inaccurate transferring of Gee fixes? Did the Navigator measure the w/v vector correctly or otherwise? All S.N.O.’s are to report their findings to Group as soon as possible.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
F/Lt Anderson, D.F.C. No. 1654 C.U. to be Nav. Leader.
S/Ldr Schofield SNO. Fiskerton posted to P.F.F.
F/Lt Kelly, D.F.C. No. 617 Sqdn. to be Station Nav. Officer, Fiskerton.
F/Lt Edwards, D.F.C. No.44 Sqdn to be Navigation Officer.
F/Lt Lascelles, D.F.C. No. 1654 C.U. to be Nav. Officer 50 Sqdn.
S/Ldr Stevens, D.F.C. Navigation Officer 97 Squadron missing on operations.
S/Ldr Galienne, D.F.C. Navigation Officer 83 Sqdn. posted to No. 8 Group – tour expired.
S/Ldr Blair, D.S.O., D.F.C. No.83 Squadron to be Sqdn. Nav. Officer.
F/Lt Martin, D.F.C. No.630 Squadron to be Sqdn. Nav. Officer.
F/Lt De Friend, D.F.M. H.Q. No.5 Group to be Squadron Nav. Officer No.57 Squadron.
[Underlined] A.P.I. WINDFINDING ATTACHMENT [/underlined]
This is a new instrument, designed to enable navigators to find a very accurate w/v over a short period of time. The instrument gives a reading to the nearest hundredth of a nautical mile and is very simple to use. The w/v is found by the closed ground circuit method, i.e. pass over a datum point, complete an orbit of 3 – 5 minutes duration and again pass over the datum point at the same height and on the same heading.
Numerous tests have been carried out by R.A.E. Farnborough and the average vector error of 63 winds found, checked by smoke puff w/v’s, was 3 m.p.h! Nos. 9 and 467
(Continued on page 6, col. 2)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 5.
[Page break]
RADAR/NAV
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Gee ranges during the month have been considerably better than of late, probably due to the introduction of the 27 units into Squadrons. However, it is still noted that some Squadrons are capable of obtaining Gee to far greater advantages than others. This is mainly due to the attention paid by these Squadrons to the importance of constant training in reading signals through jamming or grass. Squadrons not so successful may well keep this in mind.
Serious consideration is now being paid to the probability of bombing on Gee, particularly when weather conditions in Northern France prevent a visual attack. The success of such an attack depends upon each individual Navigator taking part. Every effort must be made by each Navigator to develop the technique required in this type of blind bombing and to familiarise himself with the setting up and manipulation of the Gee Indicator. No Navigator should be satisfied until at least 75% of the Gee practice bombing runs he makes are within a quarter of a mile of the Aiming Point. Don’t waste your opportunities, the Watch Office on your airfield is as good a target as any, and every return to base in daylight should be turned into a Gee practice bombing run. Station Navigation Officers are to watch this point.
This month has brought us news of yet another Gee chain – the Channel chain, intended to give more accurate facilities over the Pas de Calais and Paris areas. Locking tests are being carried out and its facilities will be available on the RF.27 Unit in a short time. Lattice Maps are now available, and Stations should see that they have sufficient quantity of stock before the chain is made available. These Lattice Maps are 500:000 topographical maps overprinted with lattice lines. It is appreciated that, although the maps are not ideal from a Bomber Command standpoint, the demands of A.E.F. and T.A.F. had to be met and a compromise reached. A word of warning – the C lattice lines on the Channel Chain Series Maps are coloured BLUE. This is due to the green colouring of the map which prevents Green lattice lines being overprinted.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
With the longer range targets now being attacked, H 2 S is once again coming to the forefront. Although Gee continues to give abnormal ranges, it still remains for the H 2 S Navigators to provide the majority of broadcast winds. Stress is therefore to be made in all stages of training on the navigational use of H2S, and its importance in windfinding.
With the numerous short range targets that have been recently attacked, considerable slackening off in the use of H2S has been noted. This was particularly evident in the raid on STUTTGART on July 28/29th, when the average number of H2S fixes taken by each by each operator on two Squadrons in the Group amounted to four. It is apparent that H2S operators on these two Squadrons, quite content with going round on Gee on short range targets, thought the same method could be applied in the case of a long range target and just didn’t make use of H2S to the full extent. H2S is the best Navigational aid produced, and it is a sheer waste of man hours in servicing if operators are not using it to best advantage. In addition operators on H2S Squadrons must remember that the non H 2 S Squadrons are dependent on them for broadcast winds when out of Gee range. Drastic action may have to be taken against operators who continue to regard H2S as a mere plaything and don’t use it to advantage.
Whilst emphasis is to be placed on the Navigational use of H2S, blind bombing is not entirely to be disregarded. An H2S Blind Bombing Competition is being held monthly and all Squadrons have been asked to participate. By means of this competition, a keen spirit of rivalry should be developed amongst the Squadrons and Bases, and some idea of the Group average error in blind bombing obtained. 54 Base have been carrying out trials during the month on blind marking by Wanganui flares, the idea being to lay an initial line of Wanganui flares downwind across the target and assess it for line. If correct, the backers-up line up visually on the initial line and release blind for H2S for range only. These trials have proved that by this method the concentration of Wanganui flares across the target can be kept within a band 1/2 a mile wide. This is a great improvement on the methods used in the past.
467 Squadron are now being equipped with H 2 S and it will be interesting to note the capabilities of the Australian crews on this equipment. Although training progress is slow due to heavy operational commitments, the Squadron does not lack enthusiasm for the equipment, and it may be well for the other Squadrons to look to their laurels.
NAVIGATION TRAINING
The total hours flown on navigational exercises during July were probably higher than ever before. In one night’s flying 218 hours were clocked by 52 aircraft on cross countries (including bombing). Several Command Diversions have been carried out, which have proved excellent training, especially in the use of Gee as the routes have been near enough to the continent to encounter jamming. Unfortunately they do not provide good H 2 S or searchlight training.
Considerable difficulty has been experienced by some pupil Navigators when using the Swinderby 6 minute system. The system was designed to assist the pupil in achieving speed and accuracy of work. This has been achieved in the main, but unfortunately a few pupils have become thoroughly confused and have not used fixes, wind velocities obtained, etc., in an intelligent manner. The 6 minute system is now not being used by any Navigator until he reaches the final stage of his Conversion Unit training. This is an experiment and we are now waiting to see if an improvement in the general standard of Navigation results.
Almost all aircraft in the Base are now fitted with API’s. Very little trouble has been experienced with these instruments and navigators arriving at Squadrons should now be 100% conversant with the use of them. If they are not, let us know immediately and action will be taken.
The Base is now training 75% of the input on H2S. The air training has had to be reduced for each crew, but every H2S crew passing out should have sufficient training to enable them to fly with the equipment immediately they reach the Squadrons – so relieving the Squadron Radar-Navs. of the basic ground training.
The “drive” on accurate windfinding, particularly for practice bombing still continues. The average vector error attributed to wind finding is the same as last month’s figure, i.e. 8 miles per hour. Every effort is being made to reduce this figure and our target for next month is a mean vector error of 5 m.p.h.
[Underlined] NAVIGATION (Continued from page 5.) [/underlined]
Squadrons have also tested the accuracy and efficiency of the instrument. All the crews concerned obtained equally good results.
It is unfortunate that the instrument can only be used effectively by completing a ground circuit, it cannot therefore be used for obtaining normal Navigational winds. We shall, however, be able to find a very accurate bombing w/v in the target area. A quota of A.P.I. attachments have been demanded and will be fitted to as many aircraft as possible.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING WINDs [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by all Squadrons and Conversion Units this month is as shown in the adjoining table.
Average Errors: Squadrons – 7.5
Con. Units – 8.0
The Con. Unit figure is the same as last month’s, but the Squadrons average error has increased by 1/2 m.p.h. There is a very noticeable improvement in No. 57 Squadron, who have reduced last month’s error by 3 1/2 m.p.h.
[Table of Average Vector Error by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 6
[Page break]
ENGINEERING
[Underlined] GENERAL [/underlined]
Again a large number of sorties has been carried out, and this has called for big efforts to maintain the normal high standard of serviceability. Enemy action damage forms quite the greatest cause of unserviceability, and C.T.O’s are to review carefully each aircraft which appears to be a CAT. AC. If it is at all possible the repair must be carried out by the unit, if normal maintenance commitments permit, as otherwise larger numbers of aircraft will be stacked up on the CAT. AC. repair list, the Contractors (C.R.O) will become overburdened and long delays will take place before the aircraft is back in service. The striking force will then be reduced accordingly, as replacements for the CAT. AC. awaiting repairs will not be available in sufficient numbers. Base Engineer Officers and Chief Technical Officers must watch this trend and take the action which will give the highest serviceability.
[Underlined] DEFECTS [/underlined]
Cancellations and Early Returns which were due to matters concerning the Engineering Branch reduced the Group effort by 1.29%. Whilst the majority of these were due to defects which will be covered by modification action in the course of time, at least five should not have occurred and could have been prevented by more efficient servicing. The responsibility for three rests with the electricians and two with the fitters. The total Group summary of defects will be passed to Stations separately. No.50 Squadron is the only Squadron which went right through the month without a single operational failure due to Engineering, and is given a “big hand”.
The failure of the pipe oil relief valve to dual drive should be entirely eliminated with the fitment of the rubber connections in accordance with Headquarters, Bomber Command modification Merlin/2.
[Underlined] MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
Many improvements are being effected in the design of ground equipment and ideas which have emanated from stations in this Group have been accepted for general application. For instance, the Wheel Transporter designed by R.A.F. Station, Fiskerton, has been accepted and in the near future should be issued to all stations. This device enables one man to transport a wheel fairly easily over short distances, and the transporter being also the carriage whereby the wheel is offered up into position on the aircraft, this gives a large saving in man power.
A Power Plant Transporter will be available in limited supply within the next few weeks and will enable two power plants to be moved at a time, the loading and unloading being comparatively simple and not requiring a crane. Adaptors will also be issued in due course to enable wheels or propellors to be moved on this same chassis. This item of equipment covers a long felt need in transporting the items mentioned, and was devised originally by 51 Base, Swinderby.
It is pleasing to see Bases taking the initiative in the manufacture of such items as Sand Blasting Machines so that an up to date sparking plug bay can be organised at each Base. Sufficient of the modern torque load tests are now available at each Base sparking plug bay, and when each is fully equipped with the items required to clean sparking plugs in an up to date manner, a great saving in personnel will be possible as the cleaning, gapping and testing of 1,000 plugs a day is a reasonable proposition with this modern equipment.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of Stirling and Lancaster Aircraft Serviceability]
DECORATIONS
The following IMMEDIATE awards have been approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/Sgt J.J. SHIPLEY D.F.M.
P/O W.R. HORNE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O C. LACEY D.F.C.
P/O W.R. GREEN D.F.C.
F/O G.P. LACE, D.F.M. D.F.C.
F/O R.L. BIENVENU D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L A.W. DOUBLEDAY, D.F.C. D.S.O.
P/O D.E. WHITE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/W/C J. SIMPSON D.S.O.
W/O R.M. CLARK D.F.C.
A/F/L G.F. BAKER, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/O A.H. JONES D.F.C.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/Cdr R. KINGSFORD-SMITH, D.F.C. D.S.O.
Sgt K. De H. HAMBLIN D.F.M.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O S. JOHNS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined}
F/O N.R. ROSS, D.F.C. D.S.O.
F/O W.A. DUFFY D.F.C.
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O F.F. MOLINAS D.F.C.
Sgt T.F. FROGLEY D.F.M.
TRAINING
The intensity of operations in July was well-matched by the strenuous efforts of 51 Base to provide a maximum number of crews for Squadrons. The total of 150 crews trained and over 9,000 hours flown provided the highest figures in the history of the Base. [Underlined] The target for August is as many crews as Instructors, aircraft and weather can produce. [/underlined]
Gunnery was well to the fore. The training in Early Warning Devices was intensified and fighter affiliation was given a high priority. The Stirling Conversion Units returned a record figure of exactly 1,000 Gyro exercises during their affiliation. The categorisation of Gunners was introduced towards the end of the month and 51 Base in future will pass all gunners to Squadrons with a category which will be an invaluable guide to Base and Squadron Gunnery Leaders.
The categorisation of gunners follows closely on the bombing categorisation which has already proved its worth. Incidentally, 1660 Conversion Unit set a new record within the Base by returning an average error of less than 200 yards for all crews bombing in June. Proposals are in hand for the categorisation of the remaining members of the crew.
Instructors pressed on steadily with navigation and H2S training and 75% of all crews are now being trained to use H2S. The importance of accurate navigation is not being overlooked because crews commencing training now will be starting in Squadrons as the longer nights and the longer trips come along.
The standard of instructors is receiving special attention and the early formation of the Bomber Command Instructors School which 5 Group has campaigned for over a long period will give new Instructors a greater opportunity to get into their stride quickly and on the right lines. Until the school is in full operation, Flight Commanders can help new instructors tremendously by flying with them when they are giving dual, and passing on advice from their greater experience after the flight is over.
[Underlined] NEW CREWS IN SQUADRONS [/underlined]
The policy of giving new crews a short period of supervised training in Squadrons to “put on the final polish” before they operate has proved successful. During the month the Instructors attached to Bases completed the training of 134 new crews and carried out thirty-one 10 and 20 sortie checks.
The corkscrew received considerable attention in the Squadron training and 51 Base welcomed constructive criticism and suggestions to ensure uniformity on instruction. In the light of tests carried out by the instructors in the operational Bases, 51 Base is making a special point of checking the speed and angles of bank in the corkscrew and emphasising the importance of the bomber making good a mean track during fighter affiliation. One or two crews have been finishing up almost on a reciprocal after being engaged by a fighter.
[Underlined] NIGHT AFFILIATION WITH HURRICANES [/underlined]
To make night affiliation with Hurricanes easier the fighters of 1690 B.D.T. Flight which had been detached to Operational Bases were centralised as Scampton under S/Ldr. Munro, D.S.O., D.F.C., formerly of 617 Squadron. The fighter pilots put in some intensive night
(Continued on page 9, col. 2)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 7
[Page break]
A VISIT TO NORMANDY
There are few of us who can accept the speed of air travel as a commonplace thing. To be at one minute in Group Headquarters, studying the detailed maps of the aiming points in the late afternoon, and then to be having supper with the noise of the Normandy guns rumbling in the distance, gave one a feeling which, to say the least, was uncanny.
We picked up our Dakota at Northolt and crossed the French coast just East of the Cherbourg Peninsula. Flying along parallel to the coast it was evident that the task of unloading was still priority job No.1. Many landing strips were passed – I believe there are about 15 in all – looking very neat and tidy from the air. They are mostly single runway strips made from the rich brown earth which has been levelled and rolled, and provide a very good surface.
We landed on a strip North-West of Caen, and were transported to the Headquarters of the 2nd Army. The camp was quite small, being situated in a field, and relying on tents for its main accommodation. The Messes were semi-dugouts, but nevertheless quite comfortable. The dinner was excellent and was finished off by some very good Camembert cheese, made in Normandy.
The organisation of the staff of the Headquarters was very similar to a Bomber Group staff. The bulk of the planning was done by the Chief of Staff, who had to advise his various specialist officers, e.g. Plans, Intelligence, Artillery, Equipment, Engineering, C.S.O., etc. The nerve centre of Headquarters is the Operations Room, which consisted of four caravans in a square, the centre of which was covered over, thus forming a central room with four control rooms. Contact with forward troops and armour is maintained by R/T and W/T and all communications of progress or otherwise, terminate in this Operations Room, where a complete state of the advance is maintained.
We had a talk by the Intelligence and Operations Officers, who put us in the picture as to the disposition of our own and the enemy troops, and finally by the Chief of Staff, who detailed to us the plan of attack and what we were out to achieve. The main object of the bombardment, which was to take place early the next day, was to pulverise the positions South-East and East of Caen that our armour could move through with ease, and thus enable the bulk of our weight to cross the River Orne, and join the general advance Southwards. A great factor in the success of this operation was the absence of German Air Force activity. Through lack of space East of the Orne the bulk of our troops and armour had been drawn on the Western Banks with the vehicles right up to the actual Bridges, ready to move over as soon as the force on the Eastern side of the river had vacated their ground by moving South. Had the enemy reconnaissance spotted these columns, then no doubt the success of our attack would have been seriously impaired.
On the way to our tents we saw a lot of ant-aircraft activity in the form of tracer, star shells and heavy flak, and in addition there was a perpetual rumble of heavy guns operating on the front South-West of Caen.
We were called at 03.30 hours, and after breakfast set out in cars for a hill position to the North-West of the iron foundry at Colombelles, which was one of the 5 Group aiming points. The weather looked favourable, there were only very local patches of fog, and there was a clear sky. The journey was started in darkness, which was rather frightening as there was a vast amount of traffic on the roads, and only the very minimum of lighting was allowed. Dawn broke and the weather was still holding as we passed through village after village on route to our view point. The villages varied considerably, some having sustained only minor damage, whilst others had been virtually flattened. The stench in some of these ruins was appalling and was due to the dead animals and human beings buried in the ruins, and which we had not yet had time to extricate.
Eventually we drove into a wood, and parked the cars, and walked up through a village, past a ruined chateau, to our vantage point, where we could see the factory quite clearly. As we were arriving the artillery, which was some 1,000 yards behind us, started attending to the German anti-aircraft positions. To our unaccustomed ears the din was terrific, although an A.A. Officer, who was with us, said that was merely a softening up process and that the really heavy barrage would not start until H Hour, which was 07.45.
Our photographic Mosquito formed the vanguard of the mass of Heavies, which we could hear approaching. Then came a red T.I., from an invisible Mosquito, and shortly afterwards a yellow T.I., dropped by the P.F.F. Master Bomber, fell across the aiming point. The hum of Merlins had now developed into a roar, and the Lancasters came in an absolute horde. You could see the bombs leaving the aircraft and we saw the first four sticks fall straight across the factory. It was a grand sight to see the red flashes of light sweeping one after the other throughout the length of the aiming point, but unfortunately that was just about the last glimpse we had of any ground detail, for columns of smoke and dust arose and blocked out everything.
The newspapers have already described the bombardment and I cannot improve on their eloquence. The Heavies were in a continuous stream for some 20 minutes, and the noise, and particularly the feel of the blast, was out of all proportion to what one had anticipated. Then came the Mediums, Marauders and Bostons, dropping fragmentation and other non-cratering bombs over the central area, over which our troops and armour would advance, and then the American Heavies, in silver formations against a clear blue sky. Typhoon dive bombers were also in the fun; you could see them wheeling in the sunlight at about 8,000’ before they turned into their headlong dive and disappeared in the mushroom of smoke. So widespread was the dust and smoke that even where we were we all looked as if we had just come out of a flour mill.
At 07.45, which was the H Hour for the advance, the artillery opened up at full blast. We were directly between them and their objective, and there was a perpetual scream of shells going over our heads.
We watched the bombing for about three hours and then walked back to have a look at the chateau behind us. This had been a fine old residence, but had been severely damaged. It had been vacated at very short notice and contained some fine old furniture, in the way of old oak armchairs and long settles. However, all furniture, crockery, children’s toys, books and papers had been blasted about the rooms, which were sometimes two feet deep in debris. One odd thing which I saw just outside the chateau was a lock of human hair tied with a piece of pink ribbon. One wondered what story lay behind it.
We then walked back to the village and had a look at the gun positions. The guns were literally everywhere, and the crews were heaving shells in, pulling the string, and heaving in the next one, as fast as they could go. At close range you felt the blast hit you in the eyes and then heard a sharp report.
We then drove down the coast and on the way passed guns firing away incessantly. One would drive along a road and find a dozen or so lined up against the hedge and shooting over your heads, and yet it is odd how human beings, and even animals can accustom themselves to this din. What children there were didn’t seem to mind the noise, and in one field with approximately a dozen guns in it, there were four horses grazing quite unconcerned.
At the coast we looked around a German coastal concrete blockhouse, which was underground for the most part, and was very well equipped with central heating, air conditioning and periscope.
We then drove along to Arramanches, where we saw a conversion from a seaside resort to a busy port. Two concrete moles, each approximately a mile in length, had been towed across, piece by piece, and sunk into position to form an outer protection to the port. Inside these moles was the main dock consisting of a large concrete and iron structure, some 500 yards long and 50 yards wide. This had massive superstructures, cranes and derricks, and was handling cargoes from the large vessels which lay alongside. This quay was situated about 1/2 mile from the shore and parallel to it, and was connected to each end by large pontoon slipways, over which was a constant stream of heavy traffic to and from the ships. The whole installation had been towed over from this country, piece by piece, and assembled.
We had a quick snack at the dockside and then went down to Bayeaux [sic], a fine town which had received no damage at all, and which our forces had taken on the evening of D Day. Food was plentiful here, the shops being well stocked with bread, cheese and farm butter.
We returned from Bayeaux [sic] to the Headquarters of the 2nd Army, where we arrived about 5 o’clock. Roads everywhere were full of troops and amour on the move. The roads were dusty and tanks threw up vast clouds of dust which temporarily reduced visibility to nil. On arrival at the Headquarters we went straight to the Operations Room and learned that as far as could be ascertained, the
(Continued on page 9, col. 3)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1844. PAGE 8
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
During July 37 aircraft were damaged to an extent which rendered them unserviceable for more than 48 hours. 11 were the result of accidents known to be avoidable. Some of the others are classified as obscure at the moment, as investigations are incomplete, but will be recategorized later in the month.
Of the avoidable accidents 4 occurred in Squadron aircraft and consisted of 3 CAT AC. and 1 CAT E. 6 were damaged in 51 Base – 2 CAT AC., 3 CAT E. and 1 CAT B., and 1 was a CAT AC. Hurricane of 1690 Flight.
Classifications are as follows:-
Taxying – 3
Overshoots landing – 2
Swings landing – 2
Swings taking off – 1
Other taking off errors – 1
Miscellaneous – 2
Excluding those accidents at present unclassified, there were two fewer “avoidables” in July than in June, and, what is more, the past two months have produced a far smaller of this type of accident than the average for March to May. Keep it up and we will reach the top of the Bomber Command ladder and remain there.
Here is a selection of the month’s avoidables:-
[Underlined] TAXYING. [/underlined] A Lancaster was taxying down a runway where another was stationary (compass swinging) in broad daylight. The pilot made the old mistake of assuming he could get past. He didn’t – until his wing smashed the nose of the other aircraft.
A Stirling was returning to dispersal. The pilot reports he was unable to throttle back his port outer engine. He ran off the track and hit an oil bowser.
[Underlined] OVERSHOOTING. [/underlined] At night a Mosquito overshot a 1400 yards runway in good visibility. It entered the overshoot area and as then taxied back through a wire fence. No taxying light was used. This speaks for itself.
A Stirling pupil on his first solo was caught out in bad weather and after trying various airfields finally found one where he attempted to land. He overshot mainly because of poor visibility.
A Stirling on 3 engines was deliberately swung when the pilot saw he was going to overshoot. Deliberate swinging is now forbidden, and all pilots are to take note. The aircraft must be kept straight. There is far less risk of serious damage when the overshoot area is used. A swing almost invariably results in broken undercarriage legs.
[Underlined] SWINGS. [/underlined] A Lancaster rudder pedal slipped when the pilot was levelling off for a landing. The result was a violent swing which broke the undercarriage. All Lancasters are now being modified to prevent rudder pedals slipping out of the ratchet at critical moments.
In bad visibility a Stirling on 3 engines made an approach to the wrong runway. At 200’ he realised his mistake and went round again with difficulty. The aircraft was diverted to another airfield where it approached at an angle to the runway. A heavy landing was made and the aircraft swung and crashed. Cloud base was down to 600’ – visibility 3 miles – accident still under investigation.
[Underlined] OTHERS. [/underlined] A Stirling had just taken off when violent juddering was experienced. The pilot throttled back and landed in the overshoot area – CAT E. – nothing has been found wrong technically. Instructors should warn pupils before going solo of the common causes of juddering on take off. This is the second accident of this nature in 6 weeks.
A Verey pistol was accidentally fired off in an aircraft. It did quite a bit of damage. The full facts are not yet known but it is evident someone was careless.
A Lancaster pilot jettisoned his bombs too low and sustained damage to his aircraft. He landed safely at base.
[Underlined] SILVER LANCASTER COMPETITION [/underlined]
July begins the second leg of the Silver Lancaster Competition. So far, the Units stand as follows (it must, however, be remembered that this list is subject to revision when the full facts of all accidents for July are known): 49, 50, 57, 106, 61, 619, 207, 467, 463, 97, 83 – all [underlined] NIL; [/underlined] 9, 44, 617, 627 – 1 avoidable accident each; 1660 – 5; 1661 – Nil; 1654 – 3; L.F.S. – Nil; 1690 Flt. – 1.
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF DAMAGE – FORMS 765(C) [/underlined]
The first of July saw the new aircraft damage category – A (R) - come into force. Many units have completely ignored the order which was an amendment to A.M.O. A. 1348/43. All Units are reminded that aircraft under this category are not counted against them in the Bomber Command accident ladder, so it is definitely to their advantage, and to the Group as a whole, that the Forms 765 (c) should be correctly made out. Aircraft affected are those which have had a replacement of a major component (e.g. engine, propellor, rudder), as a result of an accident, [underlined] in 48 hours. [/underlined]
[Underlined] TRAINING (Contd. From page 7, col.3) [/underlined]
training and logged over 30 hours night flying in a week, so that they are now ready to tackle any crew the Squadrons like to put up. Full details of the organisation and procedure have been issued and Squadrons are urged to take advantage of this first class facility. From now on the policy must be NIGHT AFFILIATION IS ON EVERY NIGHT.
Operational crews had little opportunity for further Squadron PRACTICES because of operations. Some useful work was done, however, in between sorties. Incidentally Flight Commanders should note that the term PRACTICE is to be used instead of TRAINING for non-operational exercises done by Operational crews. This Command ruling makes the distinction between operational crews who are fully trained and who are “practising” to improve their standards, and new crews under training who have still got something to learn.
EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] RETURN OF EQUIPMENT BY UNITS TO M.Us & R.E.Ds. [/underlined]
Complaints have been received from No. 40 Group that Units are not carrying out instructions in returning serviceable and repairable equipment to M.Us and R.E.Ds.
The attention of Equipment Officers is again drawn to A.M.O. A. 736/43 as amended by A.M.Os. A.1132/43 and A.210/44, also to Bomber Command Equipment Staff Instruction No. 35. These A.M.Os and Instructions give full details on the returning of serviceable and repairable equipment, and must be complied with.
The following points are specially important and every Equipment Officer must make certain that these are carried out:-
(a) Except for Quartz Crystals, [underlined] all [/underlined] Cat.C. equipment in Section 10 must be returned to No. 3 R.E.D.
(b) Items for which there are special transit cases, must be packed in these cases.
(c) Items in 1A and E should be returned to G.E.Ds.
(d) Cat. A. items are to be packed and vouched separately from other unit returns.
(e) Separate vouchers for each Vocab. Section.
(f) [Underlined] ALL [/underlined] equipment must be labelled.
(g) Cases addressed to particular sites should only contain equipment for those sites.
Every Equipment Officer should make certain that his staff knows and carried out all the instructions on the return of equipment, since equipment turning up at the wrong M.U. causes great delay to that M.U’s work.
[Underlined] PLATFORMS, AIRCRAFT INSPECTION [/underlined]
Attention is drawn to A.M.O. N. 714/44 dealing with the introduction of a new type of Inspection platform for Lancaster aircraft.
[Underlined] A VISIT TO NORMANDY [/underlined]
(Continued from page 8, column 3)
battle was going well. Our advances were better than originally hoped for, and the Army were extremely pleased with the bombing. Little resistance had been met in the area North-East and East of Caen, but considering the attention given by our aircraft and artillery this fact is not surprising.
Unfortunately we were not allowed to go and see results of the bombing even though our forces had moved through the positions, so we returned again to our landing strip, after making our farewells and thanks to the officers who had extended their hospitality to us, and looked after us so well. The Dakota awaited us and we took off again for Northolt, leaving behind us the battle area, which was still shrouded in dust and smoke.
The main thing which struck me throughout the visit was the atmosphere of efficiency which dominated everywhere. The running of the camp, traffic control, organisation of salvage and supply dumps, gave one the impression that everyone had a job to do, knew what that job was, and was wasting no time in getting on with it.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 9
[Page break]
AIR SEA RESCUE
During July three aircraft of the Group are known to have come down in the sea. “H” of 630 Squadron hit the sea when returning from operations at a low altitude, there were two survivors. A Mosquito of 627 Squadron ditched off Cherbourg – the full story of this is not yet available as the crew is still in Normandy. “C” of 207 Squadron crashed into the sea whilst jettisoning bombs.
There were several unusual aspects of the ditching of “H” of 630 Squadron which are the subject of a formal investigation. At the time of the impact the aircraft was flying at 200 – 210 m.p.h. and the crew were not at their usual stations because of an intercomm failure. The Navigator and Air Bomber were sitting up at the Navigator’s table and the Wireless Operator was forward without Mae West or parachute trying to rectify the intercomm failure.
Fortunately the sea was calm and the Pilot, Air Bomber, Wireless Operator and Navigator got out. The fuselage broke in half and the Rear Gunner, whose turret was on the beam, succeeded in leaving after he had gone under a few feet. The Rear Gunner did not contact the other survivors until an hour after impact.
On leaving the fuselage, the Navigator made the Wireless Operator get into the dinghy first; when the Navigator followed the dinghy sank below the surface. As the Wireless Operator had no Mae West the Navigator left him to get what support he could from the dinghy and rejoined the others holding on to the aircraft.
After approximately 30 minutes the fuselage sank, and the Navigator calling to the others to follow him, swam across to the dinghy which had drifted some distance away. The Pilot and Air Bomber never reached the dinghy and the Navigator set out to look for them but was forced to give up when overtaken by cramp. These two were not seen again.
By chance the Navigator found the “Makers” Pack and knowing it contained the signal pistol and cartridges he tried to open it. The Rear Gunner appeared making his way to support the Wireless Operator, who was in a bad way. After a two hour struggle, the Navigator succeeded in extracting the pistol and cartridges and 40 minutes after firing the first signal a Naval trawler picked up the Rear Gunner and Navigator, who had been 3 1/2 hours in the water. The Wireless Operator, in spite of the Rear Gunner’s efforts, had succumbed.
[Underlined] SAFETY DRILL COMPETITION RESULTS [/underlined]
[Table of Safety Drill Competition Results by Base and Squadron]
[Underlined] Note: [/underlined]
In June a total of 390 aircrew were rescued from the sea against 240 (47.2%) in May. Unfortunately the precise number of unsuccessful incidents is not known and so the percentage of aircrew saved cannot be expressed. In addition 243 non-flying personnel were saved – 218 in the Channel area. Air Sea Rescue aircraft flew 1,176 sorties in the Channel Area alone!
RECENT GOOD SHOWS
Whilst on a daylight operation, an aircraft of 106 Squadron flown by F/Sgt. Netherwood was severely damaged by flak. He was forced to feather both port engines. The port wing and tyre were damaged and hydraulics rendered unserviceable, but in spite of this, F/Sgt. Netherwood carried out his bombing run successfully, completed his attack and, showing great skill, flew his damaged aircraft back to Base where he made an emergency landing without further damage to his aircraft or injury to his crew.
F/O McCracken of 49 Squadron was returning from a night operation when his aircraft was attacked by an enemy fighter. The trimming tabs. A.S.I., intercomm., R/T, hydraulics and D.R. Compass were rendered unserviceable. Fires were started in the two inner engines and in the bomb-bay and the Navigator and two Gunners were wounded. The fires were extinguished, and in spite of the damage to his aircraft, F/O. McCracken flew back to this country and carried out a successful landing at an emergency airfield.
An aircraft of 61 Squadron, piloted by F/O Aukland, collided with another Lancaster over the target. Both port engines and the port main plane were severely damaged. Showing fine airmanship P/O Aukland flew the aircraft back to this country where he made a successful emergency landing.
Another pilot in 61 Squadron P/O Hallett, carried out a successful landing in difficult conditions. He aircraft had been heavily engaged by enemy defences and the Rear Gunner was wounded, the port tyre punctures and hydraulics rendered unserviceable. In spite of this damage, P/O Hallett carried out a good landing without flaps or brake pressure.
AIRCREW VOLUNTEERS
(a) New Volunteers.
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training.
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Station]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 10
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
[Underlined] “A MISS IS AS GOOD AS A MILE” [/underlined]
There has been an increase in the number of attacks carried out against Flying Bomb sites, stores and rocket sites. To bombing crews, these targets present a difficult problem. They are extremely well camouflaged, small and heavily fortified and further, suffer negligibly from blast damage. In consequence, a stick of bombs that fails to make a direct hit is of no value. The “misses” on marshalling yard bottlenecks may do damage to railway tracks, wagon sheds and rolling stock. Misses on aerodrome hangars may crater runways, damage dispersed aircraft and spread chaos in the ‘communal site’. Misses against Flying Bomb installations, however, merely make holes which can be filled in.
It is, therefore, essential that all crews make the most accurate attacks within their power, and realise that a miss will have no value at all – there can be no ‘fluke’ damage.
Owing to repeated operations and poor weather, there is but limited opportunity for bombing practice at the bombing ranges, so every advantage must be taken of the exercises completed.
A detailed analysis must follow each practice to eliminate all faults both human and mechanical.
Air Bombers must examine their bombsights in accordance with 5 Group Aircraft Drills, (Drill No. 9, Appendix “C”) at every opportunity and further ensure that the operational procedure as detailed in Drill No.3 is carried out conscientiously.
If all this is done, it will naturally follow that the sticks of bombs aimed at these enemy installations will be more accurate.
They are not impregnable but they are impervious to near misses.
Direct hits are being obtained only by A+ or A crews. There are far too few of this category at the Group’s disposal. A determined effort must be made by every crew to strive for this category from the initial exercise attempted in 51 Base. Every crew that fails to obtain an “A” exercise at any practice must, in conjunction with the Bombing Leader, discover the reason why.
Remember! ONLY DIRECT HITS WILL CAUSE DAMAGE!!!
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORISATION [/UNDERLINED]
A+ Crews – 85 yds or less
A Crews – 140 yds or less
B Crews – 210 yds or less
C Crews – 280 yds or less
D Crews – Over 280 yds.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
Congratulations to F/Lt. MATHESON and crew 49 Squadron, on obtaining the first A+ category with the Mark XIV Bombsight!
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Results by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
[Underlined] JULY’S OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS [/underlined]
Apologies are due to 1661 Conversion Units, R.A.F. Station, WINTHORPE. In last month’s NEWS 2 excellent crew errors of 1661 Conversion Unit were credited to 1654 Conversion Unit. This was indeed unfortunate as the error of 53 yards obtained by F/Sgt McKechnie and crew was a Unit Record. Once again only Crew Errors below 80 yards can be recorded.
Squadron or Con. Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Error at 20,000 feet (in yards)
44 F/O Cartwright F/O Beaton F/O Olson 69
F/O Freestone F/O Woollam Sgt Gage 68
49 F/O Russell Sgt Reid Sgt Millar 79
F/L Matheson F/O Mathews Sgt Launder 60, 59 & 75
106 F/L Taylor P/O Power F/S Watson 39
83 F/O Meggeson P/O Franklin F/O Wicker 47, 72 & 57
97 F/O Edwards F/O Barker F/L Burt 57 & 66
83 F/O Kelly Sgt Burleigh F/O Irwin 79
463 P/O Garden F/S Murrell W/O Turner 79
1654 F/S Wilson Sgt Stuart F/O Howarth 74 & 76
F/O Hughes Sgt Buxton Sgt Dunckerly 72
Sgt McGregor Sgt Bache Sgt Chadwick 62
1660 F/S Herbert F/O Cleary Sgt Maxwell 78
Sgt Hart Sgt Bell Sgt Green 53
F/O Joplin F/S Hibberd Sgt Fish 45
F/S Harper F/S Williams Sgt Cooper 71
1661 F/S Hayler Sgt Hearn P/O Winterburn 69
F/O Judge F/S Gore P/O Cook 71
Congratulations are extended to F/O MEGGESON and crew (83 Squadron) and F/Lt. MATHESON and crew (49 Squadron) for each obtaining 3 outstanding crew errors using the S.A.B.S. and Mark XIV Bombsight respectively.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 11
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONT.)
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
Congratulations to 1660 C.U. Swinderby, the [underlined] FIRST [/underlined] Conversion Unit to achieve the average crew error for a month of less than 200 yards.
[Underlined] 627 Squadron [/underlined] report an outstanding dive-bombing exercise by F/Lt BARTLEY – releasing at 500 ft.- his average error was 5 1/2 yards.
[Underlined] 54 Base. [/underlined] W/Cdr. JEUDWINE, carrying out an initial exercise in a Lightning aircraft, dive bombing, averaged 9 1/2 yds. for 6 bombs.
[Underlined] 44 & 619 Squadrons (R.A.F. Stn. DUNHOLME) [/underlined] Station Armament Officer has sectioned one of each type of fuse in use and these are displayed in the Bombing Offices.
[Underlined] 1661 C.U. (F/LT PRICE). [/underlined] P/O HARROP and crew obtained direct hits on Flashlight Bullseye target at Bristol on night of 29/30th July.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE BOMBING RANGES [/underlined]
[Underlined] WAINFLEET BOMBING RANGE. [/underlined] 4407 bombs aimed by 923 aircraft.
[Underlined] EPPERSTONE BOMBING RANGE. [/underlined] 1666 bombs aimed by 285 aircraft.
[Underlined] OWTHORPE BOMBING RANGE. [/underlined] 1535 bombs aimed by 287 aircraft.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS CORNER [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/O CAMPBELL, D.F.C. [/underlined] (Aircrew School – R.A.F. Station Scampton) has moved to No. 9 Squadron as Bombing Leader, for his 2nd tour.
[Underlined] F/L NUGENT [/underlined] becomes Bombing Leader to 61 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/LT McDONALD, [/underlined] tour expired, has moved to H.Q. No. 6 Group.
[Underlined] F/LT BILLINGTON [/underlined] (207 Squadron) has moved to 54 Base.
[Underlined] P/O LINNETT [/underlined] becomes Bombing Leader to 207 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/LT ASTBURY [/underlined] (617 Squadron) is tour expired and has moved to H.Q.54 Base to supervise S.A.B.S. training.
F/O FOULKES (630 Squadron) has succeeded F/Lt Farara as Bombing Leader.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ COURSES [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/O NUGENT [/underlined] was 5th on No. 85 Course with “B” Category.
[Underlined] F/O NAWELL [/underlined] (463 Sqdn.) and [underlined] F/O FOULKES [/underlined] (630 Squadron) were 2nd and 11th respectively on No. 86 Course with “B” Categories.
[Underlined] F/O McMASTER [/underlined] (1654 C.U.) was 12th with “B” Category on No. 87 Course.
[Underlined] THE BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
Maximum entries were obtained in the Competition this month; the results are below. 52 Base are to be congratulated on obtaining the first 3 places in the Squadron Competition.
[Underlined] SQUADRON COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st 49 Squadron 61 yards
2nd 44 Squadron 65 yards
3rd 619 Squadron 66 yards
4th 9 Squadron 71 yards
5th 207 Squadron 72 yards
6th 97 Squadron 88 yards
7th 83 Squadron 90 yards
8th 630 Squadron 94 yards
9th 50 Squadron 99 yards
10th 463 Squadron 101 yards
11th 106 Squadron 103 yards
12th 57 Squadron 109 yards
13th 61 Squadron 119 yards
14th 467 Squadron 128 yards
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st 1661 Con. Unit 56 yards
2nd 1660 Con. Unit 67 yards
3rd 1654 Con. Unit 76 yards
4th 5 L.F.S. 151 yards
Congratulations 1661 Con. Unit!!!!
[Underlined] BOMBING LADDER [/underlined]
617 and 627 Squadrons maintain a bombing “ladder”; top positions this month are as follows:-
[Underlined] 617 Squadron 627 Squadron [/underlined]
1st F/LT KEARNS & CREW F/LT BARTLEY
2nd F/O DUFFY & CREW F/LT DEVIGNE
3rd F/O KELL & CREW F/LT GRAY
[Underlined] BIGCHIEF COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st A/CDR. POPE (H.Q. No.52 Base) 114 yards
2nd G/CAPT. WEIR (R.A.F. Stn. Fiskerton) 116 yards
[Underlined] ?? BOMBING QUIZ ?? [/underlined]
1. What check must you make if bomb firing switch cannot be removed from stowage, with bomb doors open?
2. What is the difference between “George” pressure and Pescopump suction as applied to the Mk. XIV Bombsight?
3. What bombing errors would you expect is the suction was low at the Mark XIV Sighting Head?
4. What Mk. XIV settings are necessary for a “Wanganui” attack?
THE LORD CAMROSE
[Crest]
BOMBING TROPHY
A silver model of a 12,000 lb. bomb has been presented to the Group by Lord Camrose. The A.O.C. has decided to award this trophy to the Squadron with the most accurate High Level bombing results, calculated on the results obtained with the Mk. XIV Bombsight between the 1st January and 30th June, 1944.
No. 50 Squadron, R.A.F. Station, Skellingthorpe, have achieved the best average error over this period and the A.O.C. will present them with the trophy as soon as possible.
The bombing trophy will be held for a period of 3 months and the next award will be announced on the results obtained between 1st July and 30th September, 1944.
The final figures for the first 6 months of the year are as follows:-
[Table of Average Crew Error by Squadron]
That line [drawing]
will cost you
a donation
to the
PARCELS FUND
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 12.
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
Though failures for the month of July show no overall increase on the month of June, actually photographic failures increased almost 100%. On the whole this was caused by the tape join on composite colour film failing to pass round the guide roller on the ‘receive side’ of the magazine, and condensation of moisture which deposits itself inside the lens front component, on the rear lens surface, or under the glass register plate during certain conditions of temperature and humidity.
The former of these two failures should be relatively easy to overcome. A thorough testing of all film magazines under power using a composite film should reveal those which will cause film stoppage. A film magazine has been sectioned and it was found that the metal of the outside casing increases in thickness towards the closed end leaving insufficient clearance for the thickness of two films and the tape. The cure for this is to request the C.T.O. to arrange for the clearance to be increased by ‘routing’ out some of the metal.
Moisture condensation has been one of the most persistent causes of photographic failures during both night and day operations, unfortunately a cure has not yet been found for cameras installed in Lancaster aircraft. Trials are being carried out, however, and much can be done by efficient maintenance. Particular care must be taken to avoid the dampness in camera muffs when these are in use.
It is evident that many defective camera units are being exchanged without N.C.O.’s reporting the defect. There is no hope of any remedial action unless failures are reported in the proper manner. Form 1022 action may appear to be a useless waste of paper, but if used intelligently and completed with all the essential information, Air Ministry will take all appropriate action to rectify manufacturing and design defects. This is particularly important because the F.24 camera is now being replaced by the American version, the K.24.
It is again necessary to remind all photographers of the importance of producing photographic results with the utmost speed, without sacrificing photographic efficiency. Photographic N.C.O.’s are to re-examine their internal organisation with the object of producing better results in less time. Where section personnel are overstaffed, this must be regarded as a temporary state, personnel surpluses are bound to be absorbed at short notice, and no replacements will be available. The volume of photographic work being produced in photographic sections has increased enormously and no operational section should complain of lack of work or variety, but the peak has not yet been reached. Increased efforts on the part of all photographic personnel will be necessary as the photographic equipment used during operations increases.
ANALYSIS OF NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHY
[Table showing Photography Statistics - Night and Day, showing Attempts and Failures by Squadron]
LINK TRAINER
[Table of Link Trainer Sessions by Squadron]
For the second month is succession there was an increase in Link Trainer Times throughout the Group, but there is still room for improvement. Special attention is again drawn to the 5 Group Link Trainer Syllabus with emphasis on those exercises with the artificial horizon and directional Gyro blanked off. Pilots should also take advantage of the Corkscrew Exercise to polish up their corkscrew procedure for the present drive on gunnery.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 13
[Page break]
GUNNERY
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF AIR GUNNERS [/underlined]
Instructions have now been issued to Squadrons and Units to categorise all Air Gunners immediately. Gunners arriving from O. T. U. ‘s are to be categorised at Aircrew Training School and will be re-categorised at Conversion Units before proceeding to a Squadron. Squadron Gunnery Leaders will, in the future, know the capabilities of new arrivals from their categories and will be able to concentrate immediately on training the backward gunners to a higher standard and improved category. Gunners holding the higher categories will be tested and reassessed after 10 and 20 sorties, but those with the lower categories will be required to have a test every two weeks until they have graduated to a higher category. Base Gunnery Leaders are responsible for the categorisation of Gunners in Squadrons within their respective Bases, and a big improvement in the standard of Gunnery throughout the Group is anticipated.
[Underlined] OPERATIONS – COMBATS [/underlined]
As was to be expected, the Hun reacted to our continuous raids in France and the Low Countries by bringing down his night fighter Squadrons from Germany. This has resulted in increased numbers of combats on those operations where he has been successful in intercepting the stream. The large number of 57 combats tool place on the night 28/29th July, when Stuttgart was attacked. Visibility was good above 10/10ths cloud and the Group claimed 13 destroyed and 1 damaged. Other good nights were 4/5th with 36 combats, 6 enemy aircraft being claimed destroyed and 3 damaged, and 18/19th when 4 enemy aircraft were claimed destroyed. A total of 27 enemy aircraft were claimed as destroyed during the month, which is over 10% of the combats. This is a big improvement on previous months and to keep it up, at the expense of Hun Night Fighter’s morale gunners must be 100% efficient in all departments and use their sights correctly during combats.
Successes have been achieved by those gunners who have used their equipment to the full and who are also alert and efficient in their search procedure. Particular mention should be made of F/O McIntosh and P/O Sutherland of 207 Squadron, who have followed up their achievement of last month of 3 enemy aircraft destroyed in one night, with a further 2 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed during July. With the Mark IIIN sight now installed in turrets, gunners must get used to watching tracer and target through the sight, and this can only be achieved by practice. Hose piping with tracer has very rarely, if ever, been successful and will never be effective. Casualties among the enemy night fighter personnel must affect their efficiency and morale, and if we can be sure that each combat will result in a destroyed or damaged Hun, this end will be attained. “The few” do it regularly each month, so it is up to the remainder to follow their excellent example.
[Underlined] GUNNERY LEADERS’ MOVEMENTS [/underlined]
61 Squadron – F/Lt Glover
50 Squadron – F/Lt Mills
5 L. F. S. – F/Lt Crawford
THIS MONTH’S BAG [Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
Sqdn A/C letter Date Type of E/A.
97 “L” 4/5 July ME.41o [sic] (c)
61 “Y” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
617 “A” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “F” 4/5 July ME.109 (c)
9 “L” 4/5 July ME.210 (c)
630 “T” 4/5 July DO.217 (c)
57 “E” 6/7 July ME.210 (c)
83 “D” 7/8 July S/E (c)
207 “M” 12/13 July ME.109 (c)
61 “N” 18/19 July U/I (c)
57 “B” 18/19 July ME.109 (c)
630 “N” 19 July U/I (c)
106 “Z” 20/21 July T/E
44 “Q” 24/25 July S/E
83 “L” 24/25 July JU. 88
50 “R” 25 July ME.109 (c)
207 “L” 26/27 July ME.410
9 “W” 28/29 July ME.110 (c)
49 “P” 28 July FW.190 (c)
49 “U” 28 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “M” 28/29 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “K” 28/29 July JU. 88 JU. 88 ME.109
619 “X” 28/29 July JU. 88
463 “H” 28/29 July ME.410
463 “D” 28/29 July ME.109
207 “U” 28/29 July JU. 88 1 Flying Bomb
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
9 “N” 4/5 July ME.110 (c)
57 “R” 12/13 July JU. 88 (c)
44 “F” 14/15 July ME.109 (c)
57 “O” 18/19 July JU. 88 (c)
61 “N” 18/19 July JU. 88 (c)
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
630 “V” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
630 “Y” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
630 “Q” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
9 “Z” 7/8 July JU. 88
467 “C” 7 July ME.210 (c)
463 “A” 25 July ME.109
207 “Z” 25/26 July ME.410 (c)
49 “F” 28 July JU. 88 (c)
106 “C” 28/29 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “X” 28/29 July JU. 88 (c)
Claims annotated (c) have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF COMBATS [/underlined]
No. of Combats 207
E/A Destroyed 28
E/A Probably Destroyed 5
E/A Damaged 10
AIR TRAINING CARRIED OUT IN CONVERSION UNITS AND SQUADRONS DURING JULY.
[Table of Fighter Affiliation Exercises by Squadron]
FIGHTER AFFILIATION GRAND TOTAL = 1774
[Underlined] ODD JOTTINGS [/underlined]
Flash trainers are now installed at each Station and training is going ahead. Emphasis should be laid on the training for quickening of mental reaction rather than a further means of teaching aircraft recognition. Instructions for the use of the Flash Trainer have been issued by Bomber Command and these must be adhered to.
Skeet ranges have been erected now on the majority of Stations and training should commence immediately in liaison with the P.F.O.
A ‘back-type’ parachute is now on trial in the Group. Reports as to it’s [sic] suitability are awaited and will be made known in due course.
F/Lt. Jones, Sighting Adviser to Bomber Command, visited Swinderby and lectured on the “Pictorial Strip” Method of Assessing Cine-Gyro films. Instructions will be issued in the near future.
Squadron Gunnery Leaders should refer to A.M.O. N.978/43 and demand necessary number of Spectacles Mk.VIII Anti-glare for their Squadron gunners. These spectacles should be worn at times when glare conditions exist. The stores section and reference numbers are:-
22C/961 Medium A.
22C/962 Large A.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 14
[Page break]
OPERATIONS
[Underlined] ST. LEU D’ESSERENT 4/5TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Cheshire [/underlined]
The first operation of the month was an attack on the flying bomb storage depot at St. Leu D’Esserent, North East of Paris, on the West bank of the river Oise. 229 aircraft from the Group were detailed.
MARKING The target was identified by the Marker Force, but the markers fell mainly in a direction North East to South East of the aiming point.
RESULTS An accurate concentration of bombs fell round the markers, but photographic cover from P.R.U. showed that the M.P.I. of this concentration was some 400 yards slightly north east of the aiming point, and on the eastern side of the river. Heavy damage was done to the railway yards adjoining. No. 617 Squadron took part in the operation and were allocated a separate aiming point.
CONTROL Several “snags” occurred in the control of this operation:-
(i) The Master Bomber experienced trouble with his VHF set, and he was unable to pass instructions either to No. 617 Squadron or to the main force, W/T links or flare force.
(ii) the Deputy Controller, hearing no instructions from the Master Bomber, issued orders for the 617 Squadron attack, but failed to establish contact with the W/T link aircraft of the main force.
(iii) W/T link No. 1 was damaged by a fighter and had to return to Base. He passed the message “Returning to base” to W/T link II; this was sent in plain language and resulted in a few aircraft of the main force returning to base. The message he should have sent should merely have been “take over”; this could not have caused any mis-understanding. W/T Link II then took over control of the attack, and no further difficulties were experienced.
[Underlined] ST. LEU D’ESSERENT 7/8th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined]
225 Aircraft from the Group were detailed to make a second attack on this target which was to be marked by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and by No. 54 Base.
MARKING The marking was opened by Oboe, the second marker falling on the marking point. The flare force then came in, dropping their flares accurately over the target area. In the light of these, the marking point was identified by a 54 Base marker, who dropped 2 red spot fires which were assessed by the marker leader as 100 yards South of the Aiming Point. Night photographs show them to have been 247° - 185 yards. The Marker Leader then called upon the remaining Mosquitos to back up and drop their markers 100 yards North of the red spot fires. The Master Bomber then called in the main force to bomb, and an accurate concentration of bombs was reported to have developed round the markers, which were further backed up by Red T.I.’s.
RESULTS P.R.U. photographs show that the Northern Central, and Southern tunnel entrances were severely hit, and that considerable damage was done to the railway supplying the site, and also to the main railway lines. At least one aircrew bombed before the time ordered for the main force to attack, and before the Master Bomber gave the order to attack. This endangered the Mosquito Aircraft and prevented full backing up being carried out. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the success of a controlled attack upon small targets depends on rigid adherence by all crews to the Standing Instructions laid down, and to compliance with instructions issued by the Master Bomber or his deputy.
CONTROL W/T was very good. VHF R/T suffered interference, through a fault in the intercommunications system in the Master Bomber’s aircraft.
[Underlined] CULMONT/CHALINDREY 13/14TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined]
157 aircraft were detailed to attack the railway junction and repair depot. The attack took place in conditions of no cloud and good visibility. There were two aiming point, Eastern and Western, and the attack on each was scheduled to open simultaneously. One marking point was chosen, bombing to be carried out by the vector method.
MARKING Flare illumination was punctual and accurate. Owing to a fault in the Master Bomber’s No.1 V.H.F. set, the deputy controller temporarily took over the direction of the attack. The latter gave orders for the attack on the Western aiming point to commence, and this went ahead according to plan. Some six minutes later, the Master Bomber had changed to his alternative V.H.F. set, and took charge of the attack on the Eastern aiming point. This was then completed without further breakdown of the communications.
RESULTS Windfinding was good on this operation, and the correct vector was passed for both the East and West aiming point. P.R.U. photographs reveal a very heavy concentration of craters all over the area od the locomotive sheds, and many locomotives were damaged. The lines are obliterated by craters in this area. The rail junctions east of the sheds is severed in many places. The construction of lines at the South end of the target and all other lines leading to the South West have been cut in many places.
CONTROL W/T control was excellent on both aiming points. VHF R/T very good, after the Master Bomber had changed to his stand-by set.
[Underlined] VILLENEUVE ST. GEORGES (RAILWAY YARDS) 14/15TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Jeudwine [/underlined]
118 aircraft from all Bases were detailed to attack the Railway marshalling Yards South of Paris, the marking to be carried out by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. and by 54 Base.
The weather was clear at first, but thin cloud drifted over during the attack, giving 5/10ths cover at about 7,000 feet at the time of the attack.
MARKING The Oboe markers were placed in the marshalling yards, one to the N.W. of the aiming point and two to the East. The first flares lit up the aiming point and Mosquitos dropped two red spot fires. Some bombs were dropped on the red spot fires but the Master Bomber considered that more marking was required, and ordered bombing to cease. More flares were called for, and by their aid Mosquito backers-up dropped two more red spot fires and a green T. I. The Master Bomber added one 1,000 lb red and one green T. I., and having assessed the marking as accurate gave the order to bomb the concentration of red and green markers. Towards the end of the attack, there was a slight spread towards the northern end of the marshalling yards.
CONTROL W/T communication on this raid was entirely satisfactory. A small percentage of aircraft complained of interference on V.H.F.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows that the main weight of the attack fell on the extreme Eastern edge of the sorting sidings, spreading across the fields to the East, but heavy damage was caused to tracks and rolling stock in these sidings, and the Eastern through lines Paris – Dijon were cut.
[Underlined] NEVERS (RAILWAY JUNCTION AND LOCOMOTIVE DEPOT) 15/16TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined]
109 aircraft from all Bases were ordered to attack the railway junction and locomotive depot at Nevers. The flare and marker forces were provided by No. 54 Base.
MARKING Flares were dropped over the target area on time, and a 1,000 lb green T.I. was dropped in the correct position as a datum point. A hold up in the marking occurred in the early stages, as the marker leader inadvertently released his two red spot fires in the early part of his dive and they fell some 500 yards short, and North of the aiming point. These were subsequently cancelled by a yellow T.I. The aiming point was re-marked with two more red spot fires, which were assessed as having fallen along the axis of the railway lines. The main forces were ordered by the Master Bomber to bomb the red spot fires. Bombing developed, and the concentration, in the estimation of the Master Bomber, was some 150 yards West of the target. He therefore sent out a vector to bring the remaining bombs back to the aiming point.
CONTROL Control on both W/T and VHF R/T was satisfactory. Wind-finding was good, and the vector issued by the Master Bomber correct.
RESULTS P. R. U. photographs show a very heavy concentration of craters from the junction right through the marshalling yards to their southern extremity by the main station. This concentration is so intense at a centre about 450 yards south of the junction, that all lines and rolling stock have been obliterated. The road bridge over the yard has been damaged but
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944 PAGE 15
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OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
not severed and the workshops to the East side of the yard have been severely damaged. On this occasion, the Group carried a load of 100% delayed action bombs. 25% of the bombs were fused L.D. 6 – 144 hours, and the remainder 1/2 hour or 1 hour delay. To enable the Master Bomber, and the crews themselves, to have some indication where the sticks were dropping, all aircraft carried one tail trace attachment in their load.
[Underlined] CAEN – DAY 18TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: P.F.F. and 54 Base (W/Cdr. Jeudwine) [/underlined]
203 aircraft from the Group were detailed to attack special targets in the Caen area, in direct support of our troops in Normandy. The attack was designed to eliminate certain enemy strong points and concentrations of armour, to enable tour troops to occupy the Suburbs of Caen and the East bank of the Orne and to make a break through into the open country South east of the town. Aircraft from other Bomber Command Groups also took part in this operation, and some 5,000 tons of bombs were dropped. Two areas were allotted to No. 5 Group.
MARKING Marking was carried out by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and the attack was controlled by a Master Bomber also supplied by the P.F.F. The markers were accurately placed, and the attack on both areas was carried out according to plan.
CONTROL The directions of the Master Bomber were clearly heard by all crews.
RESULTS Eye witnesses on the ground testify to the accuracy of the bombing, and no reports have been received of any bombs having been dropped in the sectors occupied by our own troops. All crews will know of General Montgomery’s acknowledgement of the success of this attack, which enabled the Allied Forces to attain their immediate objectives.
[Underlined] REVIGNY (MARSHALLING YARDS) 18/19TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Jeudwine [/underlined]
116 aircraft from the Group were detailed to attack the Marshalling Yards at Revigny, the marking to be carried out by No.54 Base.
MARKING One 1,000 lb Red T.I. was dropped by the marker leader, which was assessed as 50 yards 050° from the aiming point. Night photographs show this assessment to have been correct. The Master Bomber then gave the order for the Main Force to bomb the Red T.I. In the early stages of bombing a very large explosion occurred some 300 yards from the aiming point, followed by fires and smoke which obscured the Red T.I. The Master Bomber gave the order for the fires to be attacked, but during an orbit he once again saw the Red T.I. burning on the ground, countermanded his second order and issued further instructions to continue bombing the T.I. No further instructions were issued until the “Cease bombing” signal was given.
An examination of the bomb craters shown in P.R.U. photographs, gives the approximate mean point of impact of the bombs as 350 yards 100° from the aiming point. The wind velocity broadcast for the use of the main force was 120° 17 m.p.h., whereas an analysis of all winds found shows the average to have been 240° 05 m.p.h. Two facts are clear:-
(a) The marker stated to be on the railway attracted practically no bombs.
(b) The wind was very light and variable, but was not strong enough to displace the M.P.I. by some 350 yards.
A study of all the raid reports indicates that the majority of crews bombed on a red marker; in many cases this was reported to be faint. A few crews also mention the presence of a green T.I. none of which were in fact dropped, and some reported having bombed fires, on the Master Bomber’s instructions. The experienced crews of No. 627 Squadron reported a terrific explosion which was corroborated by most of the main force crews. In addition there are reports of aircraft seen burning in the vicinity of the red marker.
RESULTS P.R.U. photographs show a building about 200 yards South East of the aiming point, which not only received a hit or hits, but also appears to have blown up and to have been damaged by fire. It is highly probable that this attracted the attention, and was probably the aiming point of some bomb aimers. It seems fairly clear from the plot examined that the majority of crews did in fact bomb something which was about 200 yards South East of the aiming point and this would account for some of the vector error. Only a few sticks of bombs have actually straddled the railway lines themselves.
CONTROL W/T Control was excellent; VHF R/T satisfactory.
[Underlined] THIVERNY (FLYING BOMB STORAGE) EVENING 19TH JULY [/underlined]
[Master Bomber: S/Ldr Owen [/underlined]
The chalk cliffs and caves at Thiverny, North of Paris, known to be a site for the storage of flying bombs, were the target for 106 aircraft of the Group in the evening of July 19th. The main marking was to be carried out by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. backed up if necessary by markers of 54 Base.
MARKING The initial Oboe marking was late and a 54 Base marker dropped 4 red T.I’s. These, however, fell some 500 yards short and the Master Bomber gave orders for these to be attacked, with a 500 yards overshoot. Some Yellow Oboe T.I’s were then dropped and fell on the aiming point, and the Master Bomber immediately gave orders for these to be attacked. The bombing was somewhat scattered, and did not approach the standard achieved during our night attacks on tactical targets.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover, nevertheless, shows the target area liberally plastered with bomb craters, and considerable damage was also caused to the railway yards adjoining, and supplying the storage site. There is, however, no subsidence of earth into the caves, and the entrances are not blocked, though the main road to Creil is blocked by craters.
This was the second large-scale daylight attack within two days, but it involved a much deeper penetration into enemy occupied territory than the daylight attack on the Caen area.
The necessity for maintaining as compact a formation as possible was stressed at briefing, and this was in fact achieved on the route to the target. However, late marking caused aircraft to orbit, and thus split up the formation on the return route.
A general directive on tactics to be employed by a night bomber force when employed on daylight operations has been received from H.Q.B.C. and passed to Bases, but these may have to be modified in the light of experience.
Bases have been asked to submit comments, proposals and suggestions on daylight tactics to this Headquarters and any points which may call for immediate action will be dealt with during the Flight Planning for any particular operation.
CONTROL W/T control satisfactory. Master Bomber’s VHF was technically serviceable, but suffered from much interference. He gave instructions to change to the alternative channel but only part of the main force received the order.
[Underlined] COURTRAI (MARSHALLING YARDS) 20/21st JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
The marshalling yards at Courtrai were the target for 198 aircraft of the Group on the night of July 20/21st., and the attack took place in good weather, no cloud, slight haze but visibility generally good.
MARKING The marking was to be carried out by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and by markers of No. 54 Base.
The first Oboe was dropped accurately. Flares followed; these were close to the town of Courtrai, but nevertheless the target was identified and the aiming point marked with a green T.I. assessed at 100 yards 230° by the Marker Leader, and confirmed by the Master Bomber. Actual positions could not be plotted from night photographs. Mosquitos were ordered to back up, and further Green T.I’s. were dropped, and these covered the length of the Marshalling Yards. The Master Bomber then ordered bombing on the Green T.I.’s. A large explosion occurred shortly afterwards and smoke resulting from this tended to obscure the markers. The Master Bomber at this stage ordered bombing to cease, to enable backers-up to drop further markers; more Green T.I’s were accurately placed, and bombing was resumed, until the Master Bomber gave the “Cease bombing” signal.
CONTROL W/T control excellent. V.H.F. generally satisfactory, but about 15% of main force complained of excessively loud VHF signals which interfered with their intercommunication. Action has been taken to eliminate trouble from this source.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows that very severe damage was done to the marshalling yards on this attack. Locomotive and repair shops were partially destroyed, also much rolling stock and over at least half of the target areas, the configuration of the tracks has been obliterated.
[Underlined] KIEL – 23/24th JULY [/underlined]
Kiel was the target for 100 Lancasters of the Group while six aircraft were detailed to
(Continued on page 17, col. 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 16
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FLYING CONTROL
[Underlined] QUARTERLY COMPETITION. [/underlined]
Congratulations to Skellingthorpe who have been selected as being the most efficient station in the Group from the Flying Control aspect. During the quarter’s survey of flying control for this competition features of interest have been noted at several station. Below are examples of initiative shown.
[Underlined] Syerston. [/underlined]
An indicator panel which is electrically operated from the control panel has been installed. The insertion of the aircraft pin causes a light to show on the indicator panel in the aircraft’s position.
[Underlined] East Kirkby and Coningsby. [/underlined]
An illuminated indicator panel showing wind direction, runway in use, perimeter track and dispersals, has been installed in the Control Room.
[Underlined] Bardney. [/underlined]
A very thorough job has been made of the daylight letters at this station by building them in shallow concrete.
[Underlined] Spilsby. [/underlined]
Experiments are being carried out at this station with the Stud ‘B’ control transferred to the roof of the Watch Office. From this vantage point the control officer commands a view of the entire circuit and by marrying R/T and visual information of the position of aircraft on the circuit the control officer can assist in aircraft spacing.
General initiative has been shown on all stations and the effort put in by flying control staffs in internal decoration is to be commended. Inter-station visits can help considerably. So get to know your neighbour’s gadgets and if they are any use to you adapt them to your purpose.
[Underlined] QUICK LANDING. [/underlined]
The Group average is well under the 2 minute mark, though there is a slight increase on the average landing time for June. There are still some stations who are unable to maintain a constant high landing rate and who feel that because they are single squadron stations they cannot expect to attain the figures compatible with those of two squadron stations. Yet all these single squadron stations during the month do put up good figures on one or two nights. With good discipline the landing drill will give low landing times always, and the reason for these discrepancies can only be bad drill either in the air or on the ground.
Some station in the Group find a stop watch very helpful in obtaining even spacing in the circuit. A position (for example “flaps”) is selected and the intervals between aircraft are timed by means of the stop watch. The intervals should be approximately 1 minute, and should this spacing not be maintained then the flying control officer should instruct the aircraft either to delay or close up for the appropriate number of seconds.
One final word about the role of the flying control officer on Stud ‘B’ whose duty it is to assist the aircraft in their spacing around the circuit. Overshoots waste time, are unnecessary and must be reduced to the absolute minimum, and an active “Stud ‘B’ Officer” can do much to achieve this.
[Underlined] JULY LANDING TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of Landing times by Station]
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[Blank page]
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OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
lay mines in Kiel Bay. This was a return to a long range strategic target which took the enemy by surprise. 10/10th strato. cu. cloud covered the target and rendered the searchlights ineffective.
MARKING Crews bombed either Wanganui sky Markers or Red and Green T.I’s which could be seen through the cloud. Marking was carried out by the P.F.F.
RESULTS Results of bombing were not observed but crews reported the glow of fires seen through the cloud, in the target area. Night photographs taken with the bombing show no ground detail, and complete P.R.U. cover has not been obtained hence no assessment of the success of the raid can yet be made.
[Underlined] STUTTGART AND DONGES (24/25th JULY) [/underlined]
[Underlined] Donges Master Bomber: W/Cdr Woodroffe. [/underlined]
Two strategic targets were allocated to this Group for the night of 24/25th July, first the town of Stuttgart, a centre of precision engineering, and second, oil installations and storage tanks at Donges, near St. Nazaire.
100 aircraft took part in the Stuttgart attack. The weather over the target was 9 – 10/10ths cloud, and crews bombed either on Wanganui sky markers or the glow of fires seen through the clouds, as ordered by the Master Bomber who was controlling the attack. Weather conditions made observations of bombing results impossible, and night photographs show no ground detail.
104 aircraft from all Bases were detailed for the attack on Donges, which took place in favourable weather conditions of no cloud but slight haze.
MARKING The target was marked by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and by marker aircraft of No. 54 Base. The Oboe markers went down on time, and were assessed as 200 yards from the Aiming Points. A 54 Base Mosquito dropped his Green T.I. in a position which was assessed as 200 yards 120° from the aiming point. Actual position from night photographs 150 yards 152°. The Master Bomber then ordered the remaining Mosquitos to back up the Green T.I. overshooting by 200 yards.
RESULTS Crews reported that a good concentration of bombs fell round the markers, and P.R.U. photographs show that a great deal of damage was done to installations and many oil tanks were totally destroyed. The oil jetty received two direct hits on the railway lines supplying the site.
CONTROL W/T Control was excellent, and VHF R/T best results so far obtained.
[Underlined] ST. CYR (EVENING 25th July) [/underlined]
The military depot and port at St. Cyr was the target for 97 Lancasters of No. 53 Base plus 106 Squadron, in daylight on July 25th. The attack took place below 10/10ths cloud at 12,000 feet in good visibility.
MARKING The target was accurately marked throughout the attack by Oboe markers of the P.F.F., although the majority of bomb aimers were able to identify their individual aiming points and bombed visually.
Full fighter cover was provided throughout the attack. Very few enemy fighters were seen but accurate heavy flak was met with in the target area and as many as 49 aircraft were hit, which represents 52.1% of the total force. One aircraft only is missing from this operation.
RESULTS Crews’ reports were most enthusiastic about the results of this raid, and P.R.U. photographs show that very considerable damage was done, and a heavy concentration of bomb craters covers the whole target area.
CONTROL W/T and VHF R/T both good.
[Underlined] STUTTGART – 25/26th JULY [/underlined]
Stuttgart was raided for the second night in succession, and on this occasion 84 Lancs of 52 and 55 Bases took part. The target was to be marked by the P.F.F., with whom 13 aircraft of No. 97 Squadron operated. Weather conditions over the target were reported as hazy and several layers of thin cloud between 16/22,000 feet.
MARKING The marking was a combination of sky markers and T.I’s, though the majority of crews bombed the ground markers which were seen through the cloud. The marking was reported as somewhat scattered, though in the later stages of the attack crews reported a large fire area, which could still be seen from 30 miles away on the homeward route.
RESULTS Insufficient ground detail appears on the night photographs to enable markers to be plotted, or the accuracy of the attack to be assessed, but crews generally are of the opinion that the attack was more successful than the previous one.
[Underlined] GIVORS – 26/27th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bombers: Northern A/P – W/Cdr Porter
Southern A/P – W/C Woodroffe [/underlined]
The marshalling yards at Givors, a few miles South of Lyons, were the target for 178 aircraft from the Group on this night.
There were two aiming points, the North and South, and the attack on each was under a separate Master Bomber. Marking to be carried out by No. 54 Base. Weather conditions both en route and over the target were most unfavourable, and much cumulus and cu.nimb. cloud, with rain and thunderstorms was encountered. The Mosquito markers experienced serious icing and difficulty with their equipment, and had to return to base.
MARKING The Master Bombers received the winds transmitted by selected windfinding crews according to plan. The Master Bomber (Northern aiming point) was unable to identify his target in the light of the flares dropped by the flare force, and dropped a Wanganui marker on a time and distance run from Lyons; he followed this up by dropping his own reserve flares, but was still unable to locate the target.
The Southern aiming point Master Bomber had succeeded in locating his target, and dropped two Green T.I’s which he assessed as accurately placed, so he ordered the main force to attack them. Actual positions of markers plotted from night photographs from the Southern Aiming Point :- (i) 1,350 yards 007°. (ii) 1,360 yards - 024°. (iii) 2000 yards - 034°. They were soon obscured, so the Master Bomber stopped the bombing while he dropped four more Green T.I’s and having assessed them ordered the main force to start bombing again on a heading of 345°, undershooting by 5 seconds. At this point the Northern Aiming Point Master Bomber, still unable to identify his target, ordered his force to bomb the Green T.I’s with similar instructions.
RESULTS P. R. U. photographs show that in spite of the most unfavourable weather conditions some damage was caused in both targets. Both round houses in the Marshalling Yards have been damaged, and there are about seventeen hits affecting the tracks between the yards and the railway junction.
CONTROL VHF R/T and W/T control were both very good, in spite of unusually heavy static interference.
[Underlined] STUTTGART – 28/29th JULY [/underlined]
Stuttgart was attacked for the third time within a week on the night of July 28/29th. 176 aircraft from the Group took part in this attack. Well broken cloud was met over the channel en route, and this increased to 9/10 strato cumulus, with tops about 8,000 feet over the target; visibility was good.
MARKING P.F.F. marking consisted of Green T.I’s and sky markers. The majority of crews bombed the Green T.I’s which could be clearly seen through the thin layer of cloud. Owing to cloud cover the accuracy of the markers and the success of the attack could not be assessed. Defences were reported to have been much stronger than on the two previous raids, but once again no trouble was experienced from searchlights. Many fires, the glow of which could be seen through the cloud, were left burning, and these could be seen 50 miles away on the return journey.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover now shows that about 300 acres in the centre of the city have been devastated in these three raids, and very considerable damage has also been caused in the Eastern part of the city.
[Underlined] CAHAGNES (NORMANDY) DAY 30th JULY [/underlined]
106 aircraft from the Group were assigned a special task in support of military operations in Normandy, the attack to take place at 08.00 hours.
Weather en route was 8 – 10/10th strato. cu. tops 4/5,000 feet, which broke to little or none over the channel, but re-formed a few miles North of the French Coast. At the target there was 9 – 10/10ths cloud, tops 5,000 feet and base 2,000 feet. These conditions rendered precision bombing impossible, and orders were given for the force to return to base.
[Underlined] JOIGNY LAROCHE, RILLY LA MONTAGNE DAY 31st JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
The Marshalling Yards at Joigny Laroche and the railway tunnel at Rilly La Montagne near Rheims, were the target for two striking
(Continued on page 18, col.1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 17
[Page break]
forces provided by the Group in daylight on 31st July.
Each force was sub-divided into two. One half of the Rilly force to attack the Northern entrance to the tunnel and the railway lines, and the other half the Southern entrance and lines. In the same way the Southern force were split up, half to attack the marshalling yards and half to attack the engine roundhouses.
RESULTS The weather at both targets was clear, with slight haze. At Rilly all crews identified both aiming points visually although a P.F.F. marker was dropped half way between the two tunnel entrances as a marking point. Attacks on both aiming points were reported to be accurate and P.R.U. photographs show damage at both ends of the tunnel, and hits on the railway lines.
At Joigny all crews identified the canal, river, and triangular bridge and railway junction and were able to pick out their respective aiming points. Here again, good bombing concentrations were reported, and substantial damage was caused. This is confirmed by P.R.U. photographs.
CONTROL W/T control on both targets was satisfactory, but VHF control on the Rilly attack was seriously interfered with at one stage by a main force aircraft whose V.H.F. set remained on “transmit”, owing to a technical defect; a great deal of unnecessary chatter was heard by all other main force aircraft, but fortunately the offender changed frequency before the target was reached. VHF control on Joigny Laroche was satisfactory. In order to prevent the control of an attack being jeopardised in future, by aircraft VHF sets being left on “transmit” either through carelessness or through some technical defect, orders have been given for the “transmit” crystals in all main force aircraft to be removed pending the introduction of a modification whereby the transmit crystal can be isolated.
[Underlined] SPECIAL ATTACKS MADE BY 617 SQUADRON MARQUISE MIMOYECQUES – DAY 6th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
This target, an installation believed to be connected with the enemy’s long range rocket projectile, was attacked in daylight by 17 aircraft of No. 617 Squadron in good weather conditions.
MARKING The Master Bomber marked the target with 2 Red Spot Fires, one of which was a direct hit on the aiming point, the second dropping immediately to the West. Fourteen aircraft attacked: two crews brought their bombs back, because they were unable to identify the aiming point, and one crew did not drop their bomb as the bombsight became unserviceable.
RESULTS P.R.U. photographs taken after the arrack, later in the day, show 11 craters within 250 yards of the aiming point, including one direct hit and two near misses.
CONTROL Control of this attack by VHF, and W/T was satisfactory.
(Continued on page 19, col. 3)
It is proposed in future to give some details in the V Group News about 5 Group precision bombing patterns. After each attack the P.R.U. cover is examined by O.R.S., 5 Group, who construct a crater plot, which in conjunction with the marker plot prepared from night photographs shows the success of the attack.
Bombs dropped can be divided into two classes:-
(a) those which are aimed at the markers or aiming point.
(b) those which are loose, i.e. ought never to have been dropped.
The purpose of the O.R.S. analysis is to determine:-
(i) The proportion of loose bombs.
(ii) The spread of the aimed bombs around the M. P. I., that is to discover the size of the 5 Group bombing pattern.
(iii) The distance of the Marker chosen as the point of aim from the target to be destroyed, and the distance of the mean point of impact of the bomb pattern from the marker.
The results of these three calculations determine the success of the attack, and permit the Air Staff to calculate the number of bombs which must in future be despatched to destroy a given target.
For the purpose of the V Group Monthly News the results of these three calculations for each attack will be shown as follows:-
(i) Percentage of loose bombs.
(ii) Estimate of the radius of the circle containing half the bombs.
(iii) The distance of the M.P.I. of the aimed bombs from the aiming point. That is made up of two components, the error with which the point of aim us indicated, and the systematic error of aiming by the bomb aimers.
It is not always possible to provide such a complete picture for each attack; because sometimes clouds spoil the P.R.U. cover or make the plotting of markers impossible. On some occasions it is not practicable even to separate with accuracy the 5 Group bomb craters on the P.R.U. cover, from those produced by previous attacks of other Groups or Commands. It is, therefore, proposed to issue each month a table giving the results of those attacks which have so far been analysed. The table appended gives some of the results for April, May, June and July respectively. It has been impossible to include all the results for each month in the present table; but as additional calculations are made fresh results will be issued in subsequent monthly summaries.
[Table of Bombing Pattern Results by Date]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 18
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[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoon]
[Underlined] CRICKET [/underlined]
[Underlined] Group Cricket Trophy. [/underlined] July saw the last of the trophy. Syerston and Woodhall, the two section winners, met at Coningsby on a gloriously sunny afternoon. Woodhall batted first and had the best of the wicket, which began to crumble a little later in the game. Warburton opened the Syerston attack and was turning the ball amazingly on so dry a wicket. He bowled throughout the Woodhall innings, and returned the splendid analysis of 7 for 26. Woodhall produced some lively batting, but lost one or two cheap wickets in the opening stages. Stanford hit a brisk 34, which gave them a much needed fillip, and the tail wagged with great vigour, Vaughan hitting a very timely 27 not out. The Woodhall innings produced the respectable total of 123. Warburton opened the Syerston innings, and with only a few runs on the board, Woodhall missed a golden opportunity of running him out. His partner pushed a ball to mid-off and called a single, not counting on the snappy pick-up and throw-in that Stanford produced. Warburton ran his hardest, but had the wicket keeper held the return he would have been yards out. After his escape Warburton batted right through the Syerston innings making 45 not out, a splendid contribution to his side’s total of 87. Tuxford got 4 Syerston wickets for 25 in the dour Woodhall attack. In the absence of the Base Commander, G/Capt. Philpott had the pleasure of presenting Woodhall, his own team, with the Trophy, a very handsome silver bowl. F/O Denning, Coningsby P.F.O., is to be congratulated on his arrangements for the game which had to be completed in rather less than an hour; he has just cause to be proud in seeing another Group Trophy brought home to roost alongside the Matz Cup.
[Underlined] H.Q. 5 GROUP. [/underlined] The Group side managed four games during the month. On the 2nd against 93 M.U. they suffered a 158 – 25 reverse, being well and truly dampened by a rain storm that persisted throughout their innings. For the M.U. Kinder scored 44 and took 7 wickets. On the 18th, Group avenged their defeat by a 83 – 68 win over the M.U. Wigsley defeated the Group side at Morton Hall, scoring 110 for 6 against 31 for 10. F/L Pearcey, for Wigsley, scored 40 and took 5 Group wickets. The last of the month’s games was with Newark Town at Newark. Group fielded their strongest side and won by 152 – 75. Sprawson hit 41 and Todd 37, but the outstanding performance was by S/L Unwin who took 9 wickets for 36, eight of them clean bowled, a welcome return to his old form.
[Underlined] DUNHOLME LODGE [/underlined] played 6 games returning the following outstanding results:-
v Welton Home Guard at Dunholme Welton 27 – 10 Dunholme 99 – 10
v De Aston School at Dunholme De Aston 35 – 10 Dunholme 88 – 10
v No. 7 I.T.C. at Lincoln I.T.C. 135 – 10 Dunholme 163 – 6
v Wickenby at Dunholme Wickenby 32 – 10 Dunholme 108 – 9
v Hemswell at Hemswell Hemswell 165 – 5 Dunholme 85 – 9
v Waddington at Waddington Waddington 72 – 10 Dunholme 81 – 10
The best individual performance was by F/S. Wallin, who hit 85 not out, against Lincoln I.T.C.
The Station Cricket Knock-Out is in full swing, S. H. Q. Sgts. having reached the 2nd round, while 44 Squadron Air Crew Officers beat 44 Squadron Aircrew Sgts. by 2 runs to qualify for the 2nd round.
[Underlined] METHERINGHAM [/underlined] put up a strong fight against Woodhall in the semi-final of the Group Trophy, scoring 67 – 10 against Woodhall’s 73 – 6. At one period, Metheringham had high hopes of winning as Stanford (Woodhall’s Aussie Star) was run out for five, but the Woodhall batting proved too good in the long run.
Two inter-station games were played, Bardney being beaten by 98 – 3 to 44 – 10. The side failed at East Kirkby, scoring 39 against Kirkby’s 90 for 9.
Inter-Squadron and inter-section games produced six matches, in all a busy cricket month.
[Underlined] GENERAL [/underlined]
Any Squadron that ‘fancies its chance’ at Soft Ball is invited to ring Dunholme Lodge and make a date.
The approach of the Winter Sports season is already felt and, taking the ‘pessimistic’ view that even after Berlin some of us will still be in the Mob, negotiations are in progress to obtain official blessing for sufficient transport to run a Soccer League. As soon as a firm basis is reached, a meeting of all P.F.O.’s will be called and arrangements and fixture dates agreed. But irrespective of the establishment of a League, the Matz Soccer Cup, Wines Rugger Cup and 5 Group Hockey Trophy will be fought for, and the dates and arrangements for these Tourneys can best be served by a Group representative gathering.
OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
[Underlined] WIZERNES – DAY – 17th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Tait. [/underlined]
17 Lancasters of No.617 Squadron, of which 16 took off, were detailed to attack the constructional works, believed to be connected with the enemy’s long range rocket projectiles. 1 Mustang and 1 Mosquito were to mark the aiming point.
MARKING The Red T.I’s of both the Mustang and Mosquito fell in the same place, approximately 100 yards N.E. of the concrete dome. The 12,000 lb bombs were dropped from heights varying between 16,600 and 18,600 feet.
RESULTS There were no direct hits on the dome, but P.R.U. photographs show two large craters in the quarry some 30 – 50 yards from the entrance which caused a minor landslide. Three bombs were seen to fall within 70 yards North West of the Aiming Point, and a further four within 50 yards to the South East. Later crews were unable to identify the Aiming Point visually, owing to haze and smoke from the earlier bombs, and aimed their bombs on its estimated position.
CONTROL W/T control on this operation was good, but considerable interference was experienced on VHF believed to be due to enemy jamming.
[Underlined] WIZERNES 20/21st JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
15 Lancasters and 3 Mosquitos were detailed to attack the rocket site at Wizernes. The target was covered with 8 – 10/10ths low stratus, and the operation was abandoned.
[Underlined] WATTEN – DAY – 25th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Woodroffe [/underlined]
Constructional works at Watten, believed to be connected with the enemy’s intended use of long range rocket projectiles, were the target for 16 Lancasters of No. 617 Squadron in daylight on July 25th. The target was to be marked by 1 Mosquito and 1 Mustang.
MARKING Weather in the target area was clear with excellent visibility, and in these conditions the Master Bomber considered that marking was unnecessary and the majority of aircraft bombed on the first run up.
RESULTS A detailed interpretation of the photographic cover of this raid has not yet been received, but three probable hits are shown within the complex. One has removed a portion of the concrete from the roof of the large building on the North side. The others are just North East of the main building and just North of the North East corner. The access facilities on the Eastern side appear to be completely destroyed.
CONTROL No communications difficulties were experienced, either on VHF R/T or W/T.
There are points arising from these attacks which merit special attention. These may be enumerated as follows:-
(a) Minor troubles with V.H.F. sets. These are inherent when aircraft are equipped with new apparatus, and crews are unfamiliar with its operation. Snags
(Continued in col. 2)
are being eliminated one by one, and it is hoped that during August they will be entirely eliminated. Several crews have been guilty of leaving their sets on transmit. Not only has this seriously interfered with the control of the operation, but it has also revealed much unnecessary crew chatter. The remedy for this has been to remove the “transmit” crystals from all main force aircraft.
(ii) [sic] Some crews have been guilty of bombing before H Hour, or before orders to commence have been received from the Master Bomber. Not only does this disobedience of orders display bad crew discipline, but, what is more serious, it endangers the marker aircraft flying at a lower level, and on occasion has prevented successful backing up by the marker force.
(iii) T.I. markers must be released from a height which will allow them to cascade; if they are dropped too low, they will break up when they hit the ground or ricochet for some considerable distance. The minimum should be 700 – 800 feet.
(iv) Bombing by the vector method. This has proved to be very successful, and our attacks carried out by this method at night have proved to be rather more accurate than the direct method.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 19
[Page break]
TACTICS
[Underlined] NEW FIELDS [/underlined]
Four phases of our bomber offensive have been applied this month, as follows:-
(i) Heavy night attacks on Germany (three Command attacks on Stuttgart and one on Kiel).
(ii) Heavy short range day attacks (combined attack on Caen, 18th July).
(iii) Daylight precision attacks by the Group force.
(iv) Night precision attacks by the Group force.
Opportunities have therefore been provided for studying:-
(i) Enemy night fighter reaction to the resumption of heavy night raids on German cities.
(ii) Enemy day fighter reaction to large and small forces operating over and beyond the battle zone.
(iii) The virtues of day bombing (visually and on markers) compared with normal night precision attacks.
(iv) The best disposition of aircraft (opposed to strict formation flying) for heavy bomber attacks by day.
The night attacks on Germany brought into use a new and extensive countermeasure scheme, designed to outwit the skilful deployment of enemy night fighter defences in Germany. Details of this scheme must remain secret for the time being, but the careful routeing of Bullseyes has been one of the foremost elements of the plan and has frequently delayed the interception of our bombers. On the Kiel attack, the fighters were kept almost completely at bay, which resulted in an exceptionally low loss rate.
Stuttgart, after three heavy attacks, has suffered extensive damage, mainly from fire. It is interesting to note that the last attack (the most successful) depended largely on blind (Wanganui) marking. As a result of new Pathfinder equipment, we hope crews will not have to face tough German fighter opposition in the coming months without the reward of good marking and more successful blind attacks.
It is particularly important that all crews should revise their knowledge of enemy defences and concentrate on achieving perfectly executed combat manoeuvres. Crews who have completed their first sorties on lightly defended occupied targets, must learn the art of getting out of searchlight cones, and, most important, must be on the top line with gunnery, night vision and the technique of interpreting and applying the correct tactics to Monica and Fishpond. With a firm knowledge of what defences to expect and what to do if you are a victim of fighters, flak or searchlights, you can achieve bombing accurately on defended targets equal to that on some of the recent attacks in France.
The heavy attack at dawn on Caen gave us the first opportunity of studying the appearance of a close concentration of 1,000 aircraft. From observations on the trip, it was estimated that the collision and bomb damage risks were exceptionally high, but analysis shows that there were no collisions and only one aircraft in this Group was damaged by falling bombs, and yet all aircraft made a good bombing run and there were no loose sticks outside the target area. One fact was clearly confirmed, however – that any aircraft at night or in the daytime which manoeuvres unnecessarily in the stream is endangering not only its own crew but the rest of the force.
More daylight operations towards the end of the month and at the beginning of August have introduced new problems – the best disposition of aircraft to prevent too much congestion at the target and to provide an effective defence against fighters and flak. It must not be forgotten that a formidable fighter force is still available to the Hun, and although it has not been seen so far in daylight, our forces must be so disposed to be ready to meet heavy fighter opposition.
Daylight concentration requires even more accurate flying than at night. Leaders of each element must keep their speeds and heights accurately. They must appreciate that following aircraft cannot execute tight turns and sudden increases or decreases in speed. Similarly, all aircraft must keep behind the Leaders as briefed, to ensure that the correct distribution of aircraft is achieved at the target.
On the whole, these operations have shown that our heavy bomber force can now be adapted for night and day strategic and tactical bombing with a good measure of success. Even the weather has been beaten by the skilful efforts of the Master Bomber and determination of the crews. The attack at DONGES (Night 24/25th July) was accompanied by thick Cu.Nb. cloud en route which forced some of the Mosquito markers to turn back. In spite of low cloud, lightning, rain and poor visibility at the target, a successful attack was delivered and a large oil storage depot destroyed.
[Underlined] BRIEFING ORDERS [/underlined]
Many instances have been recorded recently of crews failing to follow the Flight Plan. One example is the report of a number of experienced crews who kept low on the return from Wesseling (21/22nd June) as ordered, who observed aircraft being attacked at heights up to 12,000 ft. A great many considerations go into planning these days, and this incident shows that people with their own ideas on how to get to the target and back come up against the very thing that the plan is designed to avoid.
A gross breach of flight discipline was recently reported, when the Group was ordered to keep below 5000 feet for the first leg out to sea. British Radar plotted some of our aircraft at 8-10,000 feet. This, of course, is just inviting the Hun fighters to come out to meet you, and even a few aircraft doing this sort of thing will nullify the effect of the whole countermeasure and spoofing plan.
[Underlined] COMBATS [/underlined]
An examination of this month’s combat reports shows again that you can be attacked and get away with it if you do the right thing. A crew of 9 Squadron was attacked and followed continuously for an hour by an A. I. fighter. The first indication was on Boozer, and the development of the attacks was recorded on Monica. The aircraft was corkscrewing practically the whole time. By keeping to the correct drill this crew outwitted a very persistent and probably experienced night fighter pilot.
A large number of combats are still first made known by the appearance of tracer. A good search and a constant vigil on Monica and Fishpond is the only answer to this at the moment. One of the main faults has been misuse of early warning devices. Several crews have obtained contacts at 2,000 yards and yet have taken no action until the fighter has been seen by gunners at ranges from 500 to 250 yards. The fighter has thus been able to close in with a steady aim and damage the aircraft by opening fire before a corkscrew was commenced, or at the moment of starting it. Early warning devices have been fitted to ensure early action (i.e. corkscrew at 750 yards and do not wait for a visual). People who do the right thing may still be fired at, but the fighter is put off and the tracer passes over the fuselage instead of through it.
At least two captains have reported that after persistent attacks from enemy fighters they dived their aircraft away from the fighter in a manner to indicate that their aircraft was out of control. The foundation for these ideas is completely discounted by the experience of fighter pilots. The enemy is rarely deceived, and nothing is more dangerous than to manoeuvre in this way. The fighter is only too pleased to find an opportunity of diving after the bomber, completing his work and claiming a confirmed victory. Flames coming from an engine prompted one of the pilots to dive away. Diving to put out a fire is fatal, as more heat is generated in the engine and the added draught will assist the flames to spread. In addition, an already weakened structure will possibly be strained to breaking point in the dive. Decisions are difficult to make in a tight corner, but tactical manoeuvres have been thought out purposely for the best defence, and continued practice in corkscrew and the correct patter will prevent panic in these awkward moments.
[Underlined] BLACK MAGIC [/underlined]
We know the Hun is clever but, believe it or not, the following extracts are from combat reports of experienced crews:-
“We were attacked by an enemy aircraft which had been shot down.”
“The enemy aircraft was seen to go into a [underlined] swallow [/underlined] dive.”
“The rear gunner continued firing after the rear turret had been feathered.”
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944.
Dublin Core
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Title
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V Group News, July 1944
5 Group News, July 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 24, July 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about second thoughts for pilots, gardening, war effort, signals, armament, war savings, navigation, radar navigation, navigation training, engineering, training, decorations, a visit to Normandy, accidents, equipment, air sea rescue, recent good shows, aircrew volunteers, air bombing, the Lord Camrose bombing trophy, photography, link trainer, gunnery, operations, flying control, sports, and tactics,
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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1944-07
Contributor
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Anne-Marie Watson
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
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22 printed sheets
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Identifier
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-28
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Belgium--Kortrijk
England--Lincolnshire
France--Caen
France--Chalindrey
France--Creil
France--Donges
France--Givors
France--Marne
France--Marquise
France--Migennes
France--Mimoyecques
France--Nevers
France--Paris
France--Saint-Cyr-sur-Mer
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
France--Tours
France--Watten
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Stuttgart
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-07
1944-07-04
1944-07-05
1944-07-06
1944-07-18
1944-07-30
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
bombing of the Mimoyecques V-3 site (6 July 1944)
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Oboe
pilot
radar
rivalry
searchlight
sport
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
V-2
V-3
V-weapon
wireless operator