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https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2180/38359/S102SqnRAF19170809v30007.2.pdf
f7a4f6c251944de14d4d8c982b327e4a
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
102 Squadron Collection
Description
An account of the resource
Thirty-one items.
The collection concerns material from the 102 Squadron Association and contains part of a Tee Emm magazine, documents, photographs, accounts of Ceylonese in the RAF, a biography, poems, a log book, cartoons, intelligence and operational reports, an operations order and an account by a United States Army Air Force officers secret trip to Great Britain to arrange facilities for American forces.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Harry Bartlett and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2019-05-23
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
102 Squadron Association
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Weekly appreciation of German air force on the western front - commands, groups and stations
Description
An account of the resource
Covers period 28 January 1944 to 4 February 1944. Lists units for long range bombers, long range recce, fighter bomber, twin engine fighters, tactical recce and coastal. Followed by short note of disposition of fighters on western front. Follows a table with numbers and types of aircraft at bases in France, Belgium, Netherlands, North West Germany, Denmark and Norway, South West Germany, South East Germany, and Russian Front. Notes on squadron strengths, training units, fighter bombers and single engine fighters. Followed by estimate of strength and disposition of single engine and twin engine rocket-motor fighters in the German Air Force as at 1 February 1944. Followed by table of order of battle changes.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-02-04
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-01-28
1944-02-04
1944-02-01
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France
Belgium
Netherlands
Germany
Denmark
Norway
Russia (Federation)
Russia (Federation)--Kaliningrad (Kaliningradskai︠a︡ oblastʹ)
France--Nîmes
France--Marseille
France--Toulouse
France--Biarritz
France--Bayonne
France--Pau
France--Cazaux (Gironde)
France--Bordeaux (Nouvelle-Aquitaine)
France--La Rochelle
France--Châteauroux
France--Tours
France--Brest
France--Saint-Méen
France--Mauron (Canton)
France--Dinard
France--Lannion
France--Morlaix
France--Cherbourg
France--Normandy
France--Evreux
France--Bernay (Eure)
France--Conches
France--Chartres
France--Paris
France--Orléans
France--Saint-Dizier (Haute-Marne)
France--Dole
France--Dijon
France--Reims
Belgium--Florennes
France--Laon
France--Nancy Region
France--Metz Region
France--Oise
France--Cambrai
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
Belgium--Sint-Truiden
Netherlands--Breda
Netherlands--Tilburg
Netherlands--Eindhoven
Netherlands--Uden
Netherlands--Venlo
Netherlands--Arnhem
Netherlands--Leeuwarden
Netherlands--Eelde
Netherlands--Twente
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Bad Lippspringe
Germany--Krefeld
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Osnabrück
Germany--Quakenbrück
Germany--Vechta
Germany--Oldenburg
Germany--Cuxhaven
Germany--Borkum
Germany--Wittmund
Germany--Jever
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Wunstorf
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Kassel
Germany--Husum (Schleswig-Holstein)
Germany--Schleswig-Holstein
Germany--Sylt
Germany--Magdeburg
Germany--Zerbst
Germany--Stendal
Germany--Jüterbog
Germany--Döberitz
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Berlin Region
Germany--Ludwigslust (Landkreis)
Germany--Parchim
Germany--Neuruppin
Germany--Mecklenburg (Region)
Poland--Chojna
Germany--Mainz (Rhineland-Palatinate)
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Wiesbaden
Germany--Frankfurt am Main Region
Germany--Wertheim (Baden-Württemberg)
Germany--Kitzingen
Germany--Fürth (Bavaria)
Denmark--Viborg
Denmark--Herning
Denmark--Kastrup
Norway--Kristiansand
Norway--Vanse
Norway--Stavanger
Norway--Sola
Norway--Bergen
Norway--Trondheim
Norway--Bodø
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Munich
Germany--Bad Wörishofen
Germany--Augsburg
Austria--Bad Vöslau
Austria--Vienna
Austria--Gänserndorf
Austria--Zeltweg
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Bulgaria
Black Sea
Denmark--Ålborg
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht. Luftwaffe
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Service material
Format
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Six page typewritten document
Conforms To
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Pending text-based transcription
Identifier
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S102SqnRAF19170809v30007
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Fw 190
Ju 88
Me 109
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2047/33328/ABiltonGHA960623-0001.1.pdf
68edbe099b5e26f2922404b2fb056c11
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2047/33328/ABiltonGHA960623.1.mp3
3f3f5cac621761fcd3088cee74a5d0fd
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Bilton, George Henry Albert
G H A Bilton
Description
An account of the resource
Nineteen items. The collection concerns George Henry Albert Bilton (b. 1923, 175723 Royal Air Force) and contains an oral history interview, his log book, correspondence and photographs. He flew operations as a flight engineer with 428 and 434 Squadron.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Anthony Bilton and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018-09-14
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
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Bilton, GHA
Transcribed audio recording
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Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[Music]
I: Were you born in Hull?
GB: Well, outside of Hull at Anlaby.
I: Which year were you born?
GB: 1923. October.
I: And what did your father do for a living?
GB: He was a coach builder for, well it’s now British Railway but first of all Hull and Barnsley. Then it was taken over by the London Northeastern and he built the coaches and the waggons. He was with them all his life.
I: Did you go to school in Anlaby?
GB: Anlaby Church of England School. And then the last two years I was at Hessle School when they closed the Church of England one down. I left school 1938.
I: So you were fourteen.
GB: Fourteen. Yeah.
I: Did you get a job?
GB: Yes. I went and got a job as an apprentice furniture salesman.
I: In Hull.
GB: In Hull. At Harry Jacobs Furniture.
I: Were you doing that when war broke out?
GB: Oh, I was still with them when war broke out. I was with them until I went into the Forces in 1942.
I: What was your reaction when you heard Chamberlain make the declaration that we were at war with Germany?
GB: Well, I think it was a bit too young and didn’t know anything about it but I volunteered for an ARP messenger boy and I was accepted and that kept us busy on a night time. Even with practices.
I: Where did you volunteer for it?
GB: Anlaby House which became the Central Headquarters for the ARP in Haltemprice. It is now the headquarters of Beverley Borough Council. The same house.
I: What kind of work did you have to do as an ARP messenger boy?
GB: Well, if any of the telephone lines were broken in a raid we had to go out and take messages from one post to another.
I: By foot?
GB: No. On our bikes.
I: Did you have a uniform?
GB: No. Just a steel helmet and an extra special gas mask. That’s all.
I: What was extra special about it?
GB: Well, it was more like the Services one. Not like the ordinary civilian gas mask.
I: What was the difference between the two?
GB: Well, it was heavier and, well and you just, you didn’t have the mask at the face. You had a small canister at the side.
I: So you didn’t have the protuberance.
GB: No. That’s right.
I: Did you have an arm band to show who you were?
GB: Yes. ARP messenger, that was all and the steel helmet with M on.
I: What did M mean? For messenger.
GB: For messenger.
I: Did you get paid for it?
GB: No. It was all voluntary. No. Nothing at all. You, you, when the sirens went you reported to Anlaby House and you stayed there until the siren all clear and then you went back home.
I: Whereabouts did you do this work?
GB: In Anlaby. The farthest we ever had to bring a message was from Anlaby to Cottingham when the lines were down.
I: Did you enjoy doing it?
GB: Oh yes. I did.
I: Could you have thrown it up any time you liked?
GB: Any time you wanted you could decide to finish and that was it.
I: Was there competition to get these jobs?
GB: Well, there was about four of us and that’s all they needed. They all went in the Forces and of the four there was one killed.
I: How did that happen?
[pause]
GB: It was a lad called John Harding. He was killed in Italy about a month after the war. He went all through the desert, all through Italy and he was killed about a month after the war moving shells from the artillery.
I: Were there any incidents that happened to you after you had done the messenger work?
GB: Not really.
I: That you can recount.
GB: No, there was, it was very very quiet in the area of Haltemprice. All the damage that was done was done in Hull. I think we had what five bombs dropped in the village of Anlaby and they were unexploded.
I: Whereabouts did they drop?
GB: At the, two or three hundred yards from Anlaby House down Woodlands Drive in a snicket.
I: A snicket being a cut through.
GB: A cut through. Yes. They did no damage. The Army came, found them and exploded them.
I: Was anybody injured?
GB: No. There was no injuries whatsoever.
I: When did the bombs drop on Anlaby? Which year would that have been?
GB: That was in the big raid of 1940. May the 8th 1941.
I: ’41. Any others that you remember that dropped in Anlaby?
GB: None at all. There was only the five.
I: Did you ever see the damage in Hull?
GB: Yes. I used to work in Hull. The place where I was employed in Jameson Street was completely gutted during the 1941 raid.
I: What was the name again?
GB: Harry Jacobs Furniture, Jameson Street.
I: What else did you see of the damage in Hull?
GB: All of Jameson Street were moved. Our offices were down Osbourne Street and that was severely damaged. You could see all of Paragon Square which was Hammonds at the time was gutted. There was a terrific amount of damage done and especially in the Stoneferry District where the oil mills were and the flour mills around it.
I: Did people come out of Hull to Anlaby to get away from the bombing?
GB: Yes, they did. They built a camp down Lowfield Road in Anlaby for displaced personnel from the raids and there was one built on Priory Road just outside Cottingham which was taken up by people who had been bombed out. Those two camps after the war housed the young couples who got married and they had no housing. When I got married in ’51 I finished up in one of those converted accommodations for a year before I got a house.
I: What were they like?
GB: Alright.
I: Just describe them.
GB: Well, they were two little bedroom. You had a small bedroom, small living room and there was a small like kitchen for cooking and doing your washing. In Priory Road where the camp is we spent a year in there didn’t we before we came to Cottingham. There were no housing at all and they were in use for about ten years before they were finally closed down.
I: What was the standard of accommodation like?
GB: Poor. Single bricks. Very damp. Corrugated roof.
I: Wasn’t it later used to house Poles?
GB: That’s correct. Yes.
I: Now, can you tell me how you came to be in the Air Force?
GB: I volunteered for air crew in, when I was eighteen in what we called a Selection Board. And I was accepted as a wireless operator air gunner.
I: When you, which year would this have been?
GB: That was 1941. I was eighteen in October ‘41 and I volunteered then and went down for an interview at Padgate. I went through the examinations. Then my medical and then the Aircrew Selection Board and I was accepted for training as a w/op a g.
I: Why did you volunteer for it?
GB: I was, I should have made a very very poor sailor and my father always said, ‘Don’t go in the Army.’ He’d had enough.
I: So you wanted to exercise a choice before you were directed.
GB: Before I was directed.
I: But you were. Did you become a w/op air gunner?
GB: No. There was, they had a tremendous influx of people wanting to be w/op a g’s and I think I’d been waiting about four months to go in and they were short of flight engineers for training so they asked me if I would like to take a test board and become a flight engineer for training. And I accepted that instead of waiting. So I was called up in August ’42. Went to Blackpool. Did my initial training footslogging and I stayed in Blackpool then for about ten months doing a flight mechanic and a fitter’s course. Passed out AC1 flight mechanic and AC1 fitter and I went down to St Athans for six weeks to do the Halifax course and I waited then in August ’43 and I was posted from St Athans up to Number 6 Group, a Heavy Conversion Unit 1664 which was then at Croft and I crewed up with a Canadian and English mixed crew on August 1943.
I: In that training did you run into any problems?
GB: None at all. The only time I got jankers was for failing to carry a bayonet whilst on duty [laughs] and I got seven days CB for it and I swore never again to do any punishment.
I: What happened to you on the CB?
GB: CB? Well, you reported at 6 o’clock after you’d done all your schoolwork for three hours of square bashing. Fifty five minutes square bashing, five minutes off with full kit. Saturday you scrubbed the NAAFI out at Squire’s Gate and it was a huge one. Sunday you reported after Church Parade on the hour every hour until 10 o’clock at night. That was enough. No more. So I kept my shoes clean after that.
I: Did you resent the punishment?
GB: Not really. It taught you to behave yourself.
I: What did you think of the quality of training that you got?
GB: Very good. The instructors were very good. I had no complaints whatsoever against any of the instructors. They were always fair and they helped you whenever. All the way through the course.
I: Were you taught what you had to know or did they miss any?
GB: Well, I think the original entries for flight engineers were given far too much training on engines. You didn’t have to become a fitter to become a flight engineer as they found out later. They shortened the course to about a twelve week course where it took me nearly a year. You didn’t have to be a qualified flight fitter engine to become a flight engineer.
I: What did a flight engineer have to do in a bomber?
GB: Look after chiefly the control of the engines, the petrol consumption, know the hydraulic systems and all the emergencies. Assist in take-off and landing.
I: If the pilot had been hit would you have been able to pilot it?
GB: It would have been a struggle. As a Halifax flight engineer you didn’t have any pilot training. You were never on the controls whereas in a Lancaster you were. You acted as a second pilot for take-off and landing but on a Halifax bomber the bomb aimer assisted in take-off and landing.
I: Now, you said that you were posted to 6 Group. Can you tell me about what 6 Group was?
GB: 6 Group was the Halifax group financed by the Royal Canadian Government. They provided all the aircraft and the crews were mixed. I had three English and four Canadians in the crew. The pilot was, pilot, navigator and the two gunners Canadians. The wireless operator, the bomb aimer and myself were the English members of the crew.
I: How was the crew formed?
GB: Well, I met the crew. They’d done their Operational Training Unit course and they were posted up to Croft and ten crews and ten flight engineers were told, ‘Sort yourselves out.’ And they picked me and I accepted them and I went with them. You weren’t allocated. You weren’t told, ‘You fly with that man.’ Or, ‘You fly with them.’ You were left to individually sort yourself out which crew you wanted to go with. So if you met a sergeant in the mess, you know you knew him and you had a drink or two before you crewed up you went to him.
I: How did you like serving with Canadians?
GB: Oh, they were very good. Very friendly. They didn’t have the bull. The discipline wasn’t as severe on the Canadian group as it was on the English groups.
I: Can you give an example?
GB: Well, I mean you mixed freely with the, when I was an NCO you mixed freely with the two officers. The Canadian officers. No trouble at all calling you by your Christian names.
I: Now, what was your first operational squadron?
GB: My first operational squadron? Well. I lost my first pilot. We went to 427 squadron and Sergeant Dresser went on his second second dickie trip and never came back.
I: 427 was your first.
GB: First squadron at Leeming. So we were a crew without a captain.
I: When did you join that squadron do you think?
GB: We joined 427 Squadron 4th of September and we left on the 23rd of September. We were posted back to 1659 Conversion Unit Topcliffe where there was another pilot waiting for us.
I: So did you do any operations —
GB: None at all.
I: At that base?
GB: No. None whatsoever there. As I say the pilot never came back from his second, second dickie to Frankfurt.
I: So you were posted to a new squadron.
GB: No. A new Conversion Unit for a new pilot. A new pilot by the name of Watkins, a flying officer who had been instructing in Canada for nearly two years. He’d been, come over and we crewed up with him on the 24th of September with Flying Officer Watkins at 1659 Conversion Unit Topcliffe and we went through our month training with him again until the 7th of October ’43 where we were posted to 428 Squadron, Middleton St George.
I: And it was then you started operations.
GB: Operations. Yes. The first operation we did was the 3rd of November.
I: Can you describe what you remember of it?
GB: Very very little. It was Dusseldorf and everything seemed to be on top of you at the first you know. You didn’t take it all in. All I seem to remember is a little bit of flak and the flares going down for target indicators for bombing. Everything happened so fast on your first two or three trips that you hadn’t adjusted to operational flying. I learned more on my second op. We went to Ludwigshafen on the 18th of November.
I: What happened then?
GB: Well, first of all we got coned over the target. We got the master searchlight on us which was a bluey colour and he followed us and we got out of him after a lot of evasive action and as soon as we got out a fighter opened up on us and we got a good hiding. The rear gunner was severely wounded. The IFF that we had was damaged. Monica, which we had was damaged. All the trimming wires for elevator and rudders were cut. We had petrol tank wires cut from one, two and four tanks. All hydraulic pipes were cut. We couldn’t close the bomb doors. They were fully opened. We were in a mess and we got hit about twenty one thousand feet and by the time the pilot got control we were down to fifteen thousand. We had no navigational aids and the navigator brought us back by straight navigation of the Pole Star. We were off track coming back when we crossed over Ostend at fifteen thousand feet and they hit us with everything.
I: They what?
GB: Hit us with everything. They opened up with everything they had and we couldn’t take any evasive action. We just had to go through it.
I: This was the flak.
GB: Yeah. There was flaming onions coming up in between the tail plane and the main plane. It was rough. And then we crossed the coast and we still didn’t know exactly where we were so the skipper called up. The emergency call sign then was Darkie and Woodbridge accepted the call and we did a full emergency landing there.
I: What was the emergency landing like?
GB: It was very rough. We couldn’t get the undercarriage, it came down but I couldn’t lock it down. We tried everything. Put in to a shallow dive, pulling out to see if we could just pulling into a shallow dive, pulling out to see if we could just jerk it that two or three inches to make it lock and we couldn’t do that. We were all in the emergency positions coming in to land and just as they pulled up to do a belly landing it just threw it that little bit forward, the wheels, and they locked. So we were alright. We came out. The rear gunner we, we’d patched him up. We’d pumped morphine into him and he went to Norwich Hospital. We never saw him again. He was very badly wounded in the head. And we spent the night there and then an aircraft flew us back the next morning to our base at Middleton St George.
I: What was the date of that?
GB: 18th of November.
I: And which Halifax was it? What was it called?
GB: NA O-Oboe. We were just off on a night operation at 16.45 on a trip which lasted seven hours and five minutes.
I: Did that put you off wanting to go on operations after that experience?
GB: Not really. We were in operations again on the 26th of November. We took two spare gunners and we went to Stuttgart and we had a reasonable trip. We had no fighter trouble but when we went to a diversionary raid being done on Frankfurt and the Germans had laid what they called you know the fighter flares, the path the Mosquitoes were taking oh and it looked rough. We bypassed it and Stuttgart was quite you know quite a normal trip. A bit of flak. No fighters. But I think that got the confidence of the crew back.
I: When you went on these trips to Stuttgart and Ludwigshafen could you see other planes being hit?
GB: Not on those two. No. I never saw anything anyone shot down over Ludwigshafen, Stuttgart or the first trip Dusseldorf.
I: How did your next operations go?
GB: Well, the next operation was January the 20th 1944, Berlin and that was a rough one.
I: Can you describe it?
GB: Well, at one part the Germans had laid a flare path for fighter flares and they were among the bomber stream and we were going down. You could see the fire from the German aircraft and a small amount coming from our aircraft. The Allied aircraft and then you’d just see a ball of fire and it would hold steady for a minute or two then it would just go in to a dive. That was quite an experience to see it. When we got to Berlin we were in the first wave and the target indicators were a few seconds late and we got caught in predictive flak because we were the first wave. We had no cover from the metal strips. The tin foil that we threw out. It didn’t affect, it didn’t help you it helped the people behind you and we were a little bit off. [pause]
I: Which was the worse? This Berlin one or the Ludwigshafen?
GB: Ludwigshaven. Ludwigshaven was the worst. I mean we got a lot of shell, a lot of holes, a lot of damage. This Berlin it was just that you were in the predicted flak. We didn’t get hit. We didn’t have any fighter trouble. Berlin, Ludwigshafen I’ll never forget it. Never.
I: Was Berlin a particularly dreaded place to go to?
GB: It was, yes. It was such a long, it was such a long stooge. It took us eight hours fifteen minutes. It was very tiring and it was overpowering on the target area because it was so heavily defended. There were so many searchlights. I think on the first one we lost about forty odd aircraft that night.
I: You said which particular Halifax you had. Did you always have the same one?
GB: No. That was Halifax NA U-Uncle on that Berlin trip.
I: Was there any competition to get the best aircraft?
GB: No. It was just what you were allocated. Our pilot later became a flight commander and he took any aircraft. I mean I think we were nearly always in a B flight when we flew aircraft.
I: What does that mean?
GB: Well, you had A flights and B flights.
I: As part of the squadron. To make up the squadron.
GB: The mark up the squadron. Yes. And the A flights were the first half of the alphabet and so the second B was the second half. We were either V-Victor, Q-Queenie, or O-Oboe later on that we flew in.
I: But was there any, ever any feeling that the more senior people were getting the best aircraft?
GB: No. No.
I: Or the best ground crews?
GB: No. The best ground crews were on operational squadrons. I thought so anyhow.
I: But was there any difference between the different ground crews that you had in your squadron?
GB: No. They were all first class. They all did a first-class job. The aircraft were always in good condition. We never turned back from thirty four trips from any trouble whatsoever.
I: What was the next operations that you had to do?
GB: Well, the next two I did were two mine laying stooges. One was to Kiel which was a quiet trip and the other one was down to la Rochelle which was a very long stooge. Eight hours ten minutes. That was the fourth of February ’44. Then we went to Berlin again on the 15th of February.
I: Was mine laying usually a quiet job?
GB: Yes. Well, it was a very hard job because you were by yourself. There would probably be about twenty aircraft you know to lay mines and you were on your own. You had no cover whatsoever. I mean the tin foil that you threw out didn’t help you. It more or less showed the Germans where you were because you were always ahead of the tin foil you were throwing out. There would be about twenty. Probably twenty two twenty three aircraft would go down to La Rochelle and lay two mines a piece. In between the island of la Rochelle and the mainland.
I: Did you ever call those gardening operations?
GB: They are gardening operations. I did the La Rochelle. I did two La Rochelles in February. One on the 4th and one on the 21st and then on the 25th I did a mine laying stooge to Copenhagen Sound.
I: Well, what was your next Berlin operation like? Was it any different from the first?
GB: It was the same as the first. A lot of flak. A lot of fighter activity but we never had an attack. That day, night we were diverted to Shipdham which was an American base and we were there for three days for bad weather. Our base was closed down and we stayed with the Americans. Had their hospitality.
I: What was the date of your second Berlin raid?
GB: 15th of February. We took off in NA Q-Queenie. We took off at 17.20. We were airborne for six hours fifty minutes.
I: What did you fear most over Berlin? Was it the night fighters or the flak?
GB: The night fighters. The flak no. It was the fighters. We were always looking out for fighters. You didn’t want, you didn’t want to battle with them you wanted to get out of their way because the armaments that we had was four 303s were just like peashooters to their cannons if you could see them and get out of their way. That was the main thing.
I: And then after Berlin? That second Berlin operation.
GB: After Berlin we did as I say two mine laying stooges to la Rochelle and Copenhagen Sound in February. Then March we started with another gardening operation mine laying to the mouth of the Gironde River which was seven hours fifty minutes. Then we started the pre-D-Day marshalling yards in the March of ’44 and it was the marshalling yard at Trappes. Now that one we had an absolute full bomb load, I’ll never forget it of eleven thousand five hundred pounders. We had eleven thousand five hundred and fourteen hundred gallons of petrol and it was made up of seven five hundred pounders and six one thousand pounders. That was the heaviest bomb load we’d ever taken and after the operation the marshalling yard at Trappes was never used again. It was, it was quite an easy trip. There was very very little flak. It was very light. No fighter trouble. We came, we did five hours forty minutes and there was bad weather at the aerodrome and we were diverted to Harwell. And we spent the night at Harwell and we left the next day back to base.
I: Now here you’ve given me a sheet headed “Target Token” relating to this Trappes raid on the 6th of March 1944. Can you tell me what this sheet signifies?
GB: Well, that is the marshalling yards there. Those are early flares, the photograph flares that we dropped to illuminate the target so we could take the photograph. Well, from that they could photograph from the headings that we were on. They could tell you exactly where those bombs straddled the target and the whole load went right across the marshalling yards.
I: So you’ve got the copy of the photograph.
GB: Of the photograph. Every crew member was presented with a copy of the photograph.
I: As a means of congratulating.
GB: Congratulating. More or less that you’d got the whole fifteen bombs right across the marshalling yard.
I: Any other marshalling yard operations that you did?
GB: Well, I know the next one we went to was, the next operation I did was another gardening trip to Kiel. We did the mining to the entrance to Kiel harbour. The next one was on the 25th of March. We went to Aulnoye. That was quite an easy trip. A marshalling yard. No trouble. Then on April our skipper had been promoted to squadron leader and we were posted 434 Squadron where he became B Flight commander.
I: Where was 434 Squadron?
GB: At Croft. It was a satellite aerodrome of Middleton St George. It was one that was built during the wartime use whereas Middleton St George was a peacetime aerodrome. The next marshalling yard we went to was Lisle. That was a quiet trip. That was on the 9th of April. We went on the 26th of April to Villeneuve St Georges. A French target. On the 29th we had a short gardening trip to the Frisian Islands. The mines we were laying were supposed to be for a convoy that was coming through. We laid the mines and the convoy was coming through. There was quite a bit of flak from the flak ships. That was then —
I: Were you hit?
GB: No. It was, we had no trouble. We seemed to be lucky again. There was a lot of flak from the flak ships but we had nothing. No holes whatsoever. Come to May, the 1st of May we went St Ghislian. And then on the 27th we went to Le Crepiet. They were quiet trips. Five hours and four and a half hours we did. On June the 15th we flew in J-Jig on a daylight to Boulogne and you could see the flak there. When we were going in there was one aircraft coming out with the whole of his starboard wing in flames. We never knew what happened to him.
I: Was that the first daylight raid?
GB: That was the first daylight I’d done. Yes.
I: How did you feel about that compared with the night raids?
GB: Well, you’re more confident because you could see what was happening and you knew you had fighter cover. It was just the flak but then flak you got used to. It never really bothered people unless you got hit with it badly.
I: What was the date of that bombing operation?
GB: 15th of June.
I: So this was after D-Day.
GB: After D-Day. I was on leave on D-Day. We were. And the next operation was to Disemont on the 21st of June.
I: What was the target in the Boulogne raid?
GB: On the Boulogne raid we were dropping bombs that exploded as soon as it hit the water to cause waves to go into the fence to destroy their MTB boats and that.
I: Do you think it worked?
GB: By all accounts yes. The reports we received afterwards it had been a successful raid and the docks got a good pasting as well. In July, we started off the 1st of July we went to a place called [Benayes or Beugnies] and when we got there there were no PFF markings so we bombed on Gee. There was quite a bit of flak and we lost all hydraulics and had to, we had to land using emergency undercarriage but I could never close the bomb doors. They were open all the way back and all the way for landing. And we had to use full emergency for getting the undercarriage down and the use of the flaps.
I: When was that?
GB: That was the 1st of June. We went in Q-Queenie that night.
I: 1st of July.
GB: 1st of July, sorry. They sent us back to the same target on the 6th of July. To [Benayes or Beugnies]. We went on G-George that time and it was a quiet trip.
I: Where is [Benayes or Beugnies]?
GB: It’s in France. All I can —
[recording paused]
GB: And after that I went to Caen on a daylight and on a night operation on the 18th of the 7th took off at 3.30 in the morning. That was when they started the big push and their breakthrough at Caen.
I: Was that a particularly big raid? A mass raid.
GB: Yes, it was a mass raid. They practically destroyed Caen that night and the Army moved forwards and they never stopped moving after that.
I: Do you have any memories of that raid?
GB: Yes, all I can remember was it was a dead easy raid. Flak not bothered. No fighters. No nothing. Just like a cross country.
I: Were you aware of all the other planes?
GB: Yes. They were all, they were all so close together. All bombing on one area. You could see them even though it was that time. Just two hours. It would be about 5.30. just dusk coming on.
I: So you didn’t have any opposition.
GB: Nothing at all. Nothing whatsoever. It was just like flying from here to Jersey on your holidays. No opposition whatsoever.
I: Do you think you hit your target?
GB: Well, we must have done because the Army never stopped moving. They took Caen. The next job after that it was a rough one. It was Hamburg. That was the 28th.
I: What happened then?
GB: Well, we were in the second wave and we were a bit late and we were at the scheduled height of bombing at seventeen thousand feet. There was somebody else above us and they dropped their bombs and we had, on our bombing run we just had to dive starboard to get out of the way of his bombs or we should have got the lot because they always had separate heights for bombing and we were late. Two minutes late. We were at seventeen and the next wave was at seventeen five. That was it. There was quite a bit of flak at Hamburg. That was the most terrifying thing. A full bomb load up there. And the skipper just dived starboard and we were on the bombing run. Where our bombs went we don’t know.
I: Was it common for planes to be hit by bombers above them?
GB: I don’t think so. I think it occasionally happened but this was too close.
I: What about collisions between bombers?
GB: I never saw any. Never saw any at all. I think they did happen but they were very few and far between.
I: And then —
GB: And then after that August was a very busy month. Our skipper had been promoted because our original wing commander, Wing Commander Bartlett had been lost. He’d been shot down and killed in action and our skipper was promoted and became wing commander of 434 Squadron. On the 1st of August we took J-Jig to Acquet in France. There was no PFF markings so the full bomb load was brought back. We brought the whole load back. On the 3rd of —
I: How dangerous was it to bring bombs back?
GB: Well, they weren’t fused. I mean they weren’t fused until you were bombing. Didn’t press the selector switches so they would be alright. It was just that we would have a heavy load for landing. After that on the 3rd we took J-Jig again to le Foret de Nieppe which was for fuel dumps. On the 4th of August again in J-Jig again we went to caves that were just outside Paris where the V-2 rockets were assembled and that was heavily defended with a daylight op and we were hit by flak. We got a few holes. We were caught in predictive flak. We were diverted on the 4th to Dalton.
I: Was this a V-2 place or a V-1 place?
GB: No. A V-2 place where they were assembling the, where they assembled where they assembled the rockets.
I: And where was it?
GB: Just outside Paris. Some from what we could understand from the briefing they were more or less mushroom caves and that. And then on the 5th we went to St Leu d’Esserent. On the 8th we went to a fuel dump just outside at Foret de Chantilly and that was hit and there was black smoke when we left up to fifteen thousand feet.
I: What do you think you hit there at Chantilly?
GB: It was a fuel dump. And on the 9th we went to Le Breteque. On the 12th of August we went to Brunswick. To Germany. On that raid according to recent record was a complete failure as everyone bombed on H2S as there were no markers went down so we bombed individually and there was no concentration.
I: Did you feel at the time that it was a failure?
GB: Well, it seemed to be a failure because there was no concentration of fires or anything. Then on the 14th we did the Army coop where the German divisions were trapped at Falaise. Now that was a very easy trip. There was no opposition whatsoever. The only thing wrong was that the Canadian group bombed their own troops. The Canadian Army had advanced past the markers and of course there was a few killed.
I: Was yours one of the bombers that dropped on the Canadians do you think?
GB: Hmmn.
I: Right.
GB: It wasn’t the Air Forces fault. It was the Army had advanced past the markers. And the last trip I did—
I: And that was what? That was the 14th was it?
GB: That was the 14th of August. We took off at 12.40. It was a five hour ten minute job. And the last trip I did was the 25th of August. We went to Brest to soften it up so the Yanks could take it. And that was quite easy. There was no trouble at all. I think they were more or less giving in. And that was on the 25th of August. There was bad weather back at base and we got diverted to Thorney Island. We spent the night at Thorney Island and then came back the next day and we were told that was it. We had finished our tour.
I: Had you done thirty?
GB: We’d done thirty four and one sea sweep. The skipper, the navigator and the bomb aimer were each awarded a DFC and myself, the wireless operator Jackie Bennett from Newcastle and Jimmy Silverman the rear gunner were granted a commission. That was our reward.
I: What happened to you then?
GB: Well, after that I was posted down to Bruntingthorpe which was 29 OTU and I was instructing on engine handling. I did very little flying. And a week at Blackpool on an Air Sea Rescue course which I thoroughly enjoyed. I only flew twice in the six months I was at OTU. I was never keen on Wellingtons.
I: Why not?
GB: Well, the Wellingtons were clapped out [laughs]
[pause]
GB: Then I went, I volunteered to go back on a second tour and I went in April ’45 with a Flight Lieutenant Kennedy. He made a crew up from 29 OTU and we went to 1651 Conversion Unit at Woolfox Lodge.
I: Why did you volunteer for a second tour?
GB: I didn’t like 29 OTU and I didn’t like what bit of flying I did do.
I: Why didn’t you like that OTU?
GB: Well, there was a little bit of too much bull. The group captain in charge was an ex-Cranwell boy and I think he thought it was still 1938 and not 1944.
I: So you preferred to risk your life.
GB: Yes.
I: Than have the bull?
GB: Have the bull. Yes.
I: Did you go back on ops in the end?
GB: Well, we did our conversion unit on to Lancasters and we were picked out unfortunately to go to Warboys for PFF training so by the time we’d finished the PFF training the war had finished. They had special training at Warboys and then we had to go through another course of automatic gun laying turret which was new to the gunners. By the time we’d finished those courses the war had finished. We finished up at 156 Squadron at Upwood and that was quite enjoyable because we did [pause] took ground crew on what was called a Cook’s Tour. We used to fly them over Germany up the Ruhr and show them all the damage that they’d helped to do in maintaining the aircraft. I did two of those Cook’s Tours in in June and we did a little bit of flying. I did an air test for the Royal Aeronautical Establishment. Another Cook’s Tour. We did a postmortem to Denmark where they did an actual like on operation to Denmark to see how the German radar system worked and that was on the 29th of June ’45. That was a five and a half hour.
I: Testing the radar defences.
GB: Yes. Of the, that the Germans had. Then we just did local flying and then for three days we were dumping. The 21st, the 24th and the 27th of July was dumping incendiaries in to the North Sea that were no good. And in the August of ’44 we, the 1st of August we did a passenger trip to Frankfurt and Nuremberg taking crew, ground crew in and bringing ground crew out. And we had a trip which made me want to go back to Italy when I got married but on the 15th of August ’45 we went to Bari in Italy and we had three days. Well, we crammed twenty of the 8th Army boys into a Lancaster fuselage, gave the a sick bag and put their kit in the bomb bays and flew them home. That was thoroughly enjoyable to see Italy.
I: Can I ask you about the difference between Lancasters and the Halifaxes. What did you feel about flying in the two?
GB: Well, on a Lancaster the flight engineer did the work of a second pilot. He did the throttles, looked after the undercarriage controls, flaps and everything. But as regards flying I still like the Halifax. Especially the Halifax Mark 3 with the Hercules Centaurus engines. It was a marvellous aircraft. There was more room in it. It could carry a bombload of twelve thousand pounds but it couldn’t carry the big bombs because they hadn’t the depth of the bomb bays. But I still liked the Halifax. I think it was because I did all my operations in them and I got through a tour with them.
I: Did the Halifax have any disadvantages?
GB: I don’t think so. Not the later ones. The one of the first lots, the first ones had a tendency to stall but they altered that by doing, altering the rudder system.
I: What did you learn in the Pathfinder course?
GB: I took a bomb aimer’s course and learned how to drop bombs [laughs] That’s the only difference.
I: How did you do that?
GB: Well, they give you a concentrated course on dropping practice bombs and that was the only difference.
I: Now, can I ask you some general questions about operations in the war. what was morale like amongst the bomber crews as far as you personally experienced it?
GB: Very good. Very high indeed. I only ever knew one person who went LMF and he was a member of our crew but everyone else that I knew enjoyed the life. It was a good life. I mean admittedly it was very very dangerous but it was a clean life. You came back to a clean bed and you came back to good food and you were treated well. You were given leave every six weeks. You were. You had extra rations when you came home. It was a dangerous job but they looked after you and discipline wasn’t severe on bomber squadrons. That was on the Canadian group anyhow. But aircrew was quite relaxed.
I: Could you see signs of LMF in this chap?
GB: No. No, we couldn’t. It was only the second trip after we got a good hiding and he never said anything on the night when we did the emergency landing at Woodbridge. When we came back the next day I met him in the Sergeant’s Mess in the afternoon and he said what had happened and I never saw him again. He was off the squadron as quick as that.
I: So you couldn’t think of any reason why he should have gone LMF.
GB: No. None at all. He was the mid-upper gunner and that was just it. He just threw the sponge in.
I: What did the rest of the crew think about him going LMF? Did you have sympathy or did you look down on him?
GB: I don’t think they looked down on him. They were just pleased that he’d gone so quick and nobody could dwell on the subject. And when we got two new gunners and as I say we were away within seven days of that operation on Stuttgart 18th to the 26th and we got two spare gunners. And after that we got two permanent gunners.
I: Were the aircrew superstitious? Did they have any lucky charms or anything like that?
GB: Yes, I’ve still got my little St Christopher cross and three us was always emptied our bladder on the starboard wheel before we took off. Myself, the rear gunner and the wireless operator.
I: This was a superstition was it?
GB: Always did it. Always, whether it was a daylight or a night op. Whether the groupie was there or anybody it was always emptied against the starboard wheel.
I: And did other crews do that?
GB: I think other crews always went in in certain order. Pilot first and like that.
I: What were the briefings like? Can you describe the scene when you got the briefings?
GB: Well, when it was the Berlin and you looked up and everyone said, ‘Berlin,’ everyone, ‘Oh.’ That was it. Then you just stepped back in silence and let them all give you the information. The German targets when you saw them when you saw the red lines leading you knew you were in for a warm night. The French targets everyone [clap] was happy.
I: They clapped.
GB: Well, there was that and a cheer when they said Caen or St Leu d’Esserent like that. I mean compared to the German targets they were easy. The only targets that we didn’t really like, the whole crew, was the mine laying duty because they, the majority of them were so long and there were so few of you you felt so exposed. I mean the Germans would probably leave you alone but then the next time they’d probably lose four five aircraft out of twenty odd. They would really come down on you like a tonne of bricks than leave you alone. When they hit you they hit you.
I: What do you feel about the criticism that has been lodged against Bomber Command since the war?
GB: I think its people who have got no idea about a war. They have no idea what the targets were like. Bombing had to be done. It was the only way of offensive against the Germans and I don’t think they take in to fact the amount of damage that we did do. The amount of people that were tied down. There was over a million people tied down in German defence. There was thirty thousand anti-aircraft guns and over, nearly ten thousand of those were eighty eight millimetre. Now if those eighty eight ten thousand millimetres had been used on the beaches of Normandy the Channel would have been blood red. They had, the German defences had all the ammunition they wanted up to within six weeks of the war. They were never short. They rationed the Army but they never rationed the local defence. And after all we did reduce production and if you reduced production by twelve and a half percent of the Tiger tanks it’s a heck of a lot because there was nothing could touch a Tiger. So I think the criticism has been very unfair because the boys went through hell.
I: When you were at these stations how and where did you spend your spare time?
GB: Well, at Middleton St George and Croft we used to go into Darlington and we all had one particular pub. The Fleece. And that’s where we spent our time. At the Fleece. But I was up there about eight or nine years ago and it’s been knocked down. The Old Fleece pub.
I: Did you put any kind of trophies or anything like that up in the bar?
GB: No. No, we just went there to drink and sing and other things.
I: Were there any breaches of security with people telling girlfriends about —
GB: Not to my knowledge.
I: Ops.
GB: No. No. If you were going up there for a night out you didn’t know anything because the station would be closed if there was a full ops on. There would only be probably only a few ground crew but the aircrew wouldn’t go, be allowed out. So most of the telephone lines were shut down. Were closed. You couldn’t make outside calls if there was ops on.
I: Did the German Air Force ever attack these airfields.
GB: No. Not to my knowledge. Not whilst ours.
Now, I think after the war had ended you went out to Burma.
Burma, yes. On 267 Squadron at Mingaladon. The squadron was keeping the airways open taking mail and passengers flying from Mingaladon in Burma up to Dum Dum at Calcutta. And then from, back again and then from Mingaladon to Bangkok. Bangkok, Saigon. Saigon to Kai Tak which is the aerodrome for Hong Kong on the mainland of Kowloon and they used to fly down to Singapore.
I: This is Dakotas.
GB: On Dakotas. Yes. And the flight engineers were all remustered as air quarter masters on those trips looking after the baggage and the passengers and I had about fifteen of the lads under me. We used to take them out on these trips which they thoroughly enjoyed going up to Calcutta. Spending a day in Calcutta and then coming back going down to Hong Kong. We had a thoroughly enjoyable time.
I: What kind of passengers were you moving?
GB: Well, RAF and Burmese and if you were coming from India you used to bring down the Indians who were coming down on business trips or anything like that. Used to bring our own people down to [unclear] and look after the stores. Generally taking mail across to Bangkok, Saigon.
I: So you were a bit like an airline.
GB: A bit like an airline. Yes. A bit rough and ready. I did one or two. I went to Saigon and worked with Saigon. Wanted to look around during the night time but we were informed that all personnel were on curfew and had to be in by 9 o’clock. And the biggest shock I ever had was walking into the hotel where we were billeted to be given a salute by a Jap prisoner of war with a rifle and fixed bayonets.
I: When was this that you were in Saigon?
GB: 12th of February ’46. Then from Saigon we’d go to Kai Tak which was the aerodrome for Hong Kong on the mainland and the people of the mainland which was a British colony I’ve never known people so friendly to see us. We were taken into cafes and restaurants and you could have everything you wanted.
I: In Hong Kong.
GB: In Hong Kong. But what I was surprised about Hong Kong is that they had everything on show and sale and the war had only been over for five months. You could go in and buy a Rolex Oyster watch. You couldn’t see them in Europe but they found them. They could. You could buy anything you wanted.
I: Were these Chinese who were —
GB: Yes. The —
I: You in Hong Kong.
GB: In Hong Kong where they were first class.
I: Coming back to Saigon did the Japanese soldiers do their job well?
GB: Yes, as far as I know they had no complaints. They guarded us well. But the trouble was just beginning to start then. There was just a bit of discontent amongst the Saigon people I think. It was just beginning to start with the Viet Cong. Just beginning to get unruly.
I: What did you see of disorder there?
GB: Nothing at the night time. That’s when it happened. During the day everything was normal. It was on a night time when they used to come and try and interfere on the aerodrome but we were in the town itself so we saw nothing.
I: So they were trying to attack the aerodrome.
GB: Trying to you know disrupt it more or less.
I: Did you see any French military presence there?
GB: Well, last I was there the only French presence was two Corvettes in the harbour. There was no French troops whatsoever. If the French had spent a little more time in French Indo China as it was then instead of parading around Europe they might have been in a bit better position out there.
I: Did you feel in much danger in Saigon?
GB: No. Not really. I wasn’t there long enough and the short time where the trouble was we were in the hotel out of the way.
I: You were telling me about 29 OTU at Bruntingthorpe was it called?
GB: Bruntingthorpe.
I: Where is that?
GB: Just outside Leicester.
I: And you were telling me about the excessive bull there that drove you to apply for a second tour. Can you give any examples of not —
GB: Well —
I: Without mentioning the group captain’s name any examples of the kind of bull that went on there?
GB: Well, we had once a month we had an officer’s dining in night where all the tables were put in the shape of a horseshoe with the group captain in the centre and then going left to right from squadron leader. From wing commander, squadron leader, flight lieutenant, flying officer down to pilot officer which was pre-war bull. Not wartime discipline. And then he would hold a full parade of the whole OTU and every officer and every airman would parade on the main runway and would march past the rostrum as though they were the guards which again goes back to pre-war. It should never have been done in wartime RAF. But the Australians didn’t like it because we had a lot of Australians go through there and they objected strongly. And in the Officer’s Mess we had a very big organ by a very well known organist. The organ, keyboard and the sound box system was flooded with beer. The Mess notice board all the Mess board notices were burned down by the Australians. The group captain had his own hook for his hat and coat with a bolt right through the wall. The peg was pulled out. Also, part of the wall [laughs] In fact they did so much damage the group captain closed the Officer’s Mess bar for a week. All because of bull.
I: Did you approve?
GB: No.
I: Of what the Aussies did?
GB: Yes. I did. But no one was allowed in the Officer’s Mess after 5.30 unless they were in full dress. No battle dress. I came back and I’ll tell you the exact day. We’d, I’d been out a cross country to check the pilot for engine handling on the 19th of February ‘45 and we took off at 12 o’clock and we’d been diverted to Husband Bosworth. And by the time we got back it was 16.35. I was pulled up for entering the Mess in battle dress and not allowed to have a meal, my evening meal until I had changed. And the evening meal finished at 19.00 hours which is 7 o’clock and I didn’t get in as I say until 16 —
I: Twenty five you said.
GB: That’s how bad, that’s how bad the bull was.
I: You also were telling me about another job you had I think in ’46 of having to deal with airmen’s possessions who had been killed.
GB: Yes.
I: In accidents.
GB: That was the, I did that at 29 OTU. The last job I had was on for in the July 1946 was Dakota KN585 was hit by lightning and crashed in to the Irrawaddy Delta at Bassein. The death roll was twenty two. By the time we got the bodies they were four days old and I had to [pause] another flight lieutenant and the local police identified the bodies and arranged burial which was a very distressing thing to do especially as five days later I was on my home.
I: How were the possessions dealt with?
GB: Well, most of the possessions that they had I had to burn because they’d been on the bodies and they had been five days in the swamp and they smelled terribly and there was very very little went home. And of the twenty two they had no identification. They were all just interred with no headstone. No one knew who they were. They were interred at the European Cemetery at that time in Bassein. They would later be moved to the War Graves.
I: But you were telling me about your special problem you had with the possessions of Australians.
GB: When I was at 29 OTU. Yes. With the letters I mean the Aussie boys would have two or three girlfriends and the trouble was sorting out the letters to make sure that the right ones went home and the other ones were destroyed. Of the, we had two crews killed whilst I was there. Eleven men died.
I: Would any of them leave wills?
GB: No. There was no wills. I never found a will in the, any of the airmen who I buried. I went through their personal effects.
[Music]
Dublin Core
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Title
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War Memoir - George Bilton
Description
An account of the resource
Talks of early life at school and work in Hull. Volunteered as ARP messenger and described duties and air raid damage in Hull. Volunteered as aircrew and initially selected for wireless operator/air gunner but later asked to change to air engineer. Trained in Blackpool and RAF St Athan. Crewed up with mixed Canadian British crew on Halifax HCU before being posted to 6 Group 427 Squadron. His pilot did not return from a second dickie orientation sorties so crew went back to conversion unit to crew up and train with new pilot. Then posted to 428 Squadron. Subsequently transferred to 434 Squadron when pilot promoted. Completed tout of 34 operations on Halifax. Gives detailed description of individual operations, experiences and activities. Describes flying in Halifax and discusses moral, discipline issues, operating with Canadians and other general comments. Did instructional tour after completing operational tour, offered commission, did not enjoy it and volunteered for second tour but curtailed by end of war. Comments on tours after war including one in Burma including dealing with casualties in from a Dakota crash in Egypt.
Creator
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G H A Bilton
Format
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Oral history
Language
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eng
Type
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Sound
Identifier
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ABiltonGHA960623
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Civilian
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Canadian Air Force
Conforms To
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Pending revision of OH transcription
Pending review
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Yorkshire
England--Hull
England--Lancashire
England--Blackpool
Wales--Vale of Glamorgan
England--Durham (County)
England--Leicestershire
Burma
Germany
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Ludwigshafen am Rhein
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Stuttgart
England--Berkshire
France
France--La Rochelle
France--Lille
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Caen
Germany--Hamburg
France--Paris
France--Creil
France--Falaise
Germany--Braunschweig
France--Brest
England--Sussex
England--Huntingdonshire
Italy
Italy--Bari
Denmark
Denmark--Copenhagen
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
France--Chantilly Forest
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Julie Williams
427 Squadron
428 Squadron
434 Squadron
6 Group
aerial photograph
Air Raid Precautions
aircrew
anti-aircraft fire
bomb aimer
bombing
C-47
civil defence
Cook’s tour
crewing up
flight engineer
Halifax
Heavy Conversion Unit
lack of moral fibre
Lancaster
military discipline
military ethos
military living conditions
military service conditions
mine laying
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Pathfinders
RAF Bruntingthorpe
RAF Croft
RAF Harwell
RAF Middleton St George
RAF St Athan
RAF Thorney Island
RAF Topcliffe
RAF Warboys
RAF Woodbridge
target indicator
target photograph
training
V-2
V-weapon
Wellington
Window
wireless operator / air gunner
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1765/30828/LLayneWH963102v1.2.pdf
92e993a538036ec434cab6f9f4840a3d
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Layne, Wally
Walter Henry Layne
W H Layne
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-06-07
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Layne, WH
Description
An account of the resource
100 items. The collection concerns Walter 'Wally' Layne (b. 1916, 963012, 40348 Royal Air Force) and contains his log book, prisoner of war diary, personal and official correspondence and photographs. He flew operations as a wireless operator with 97 Squadron and became a prisoner of war after being shot down.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by D Layne and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Wally Layne's observer's and air gunner's flying log book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LLayneWH963102v1
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Czech Republic
Denmark
France
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Czech Republic--Plzeň
Denmark--Copenhagen
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Rutland
England--Yorkshire
France--Brest
France--Dunkerque
France--Lorient
France--Saint-Nazaire
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Hamm (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Helgoland
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Leverkusen
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Munich
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Peenemünde
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Germany--Wuppertal
Italy--La Spezia
Italy--Milan
Italy--Turin
Netherlands--Amsterdam
Norway--Oslo
Wales--Gwynedd
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1940
1941
1942
1943
1941-07-06
1941-07-07
1941-07-08
1941-07-09
1941-07-12
1941-07-13
1941-07-17
1941-07-18
1941-07-20
1941-07-21
1941-07-24
1941-07-28
1941-07-29
1941-08-06
1941-08-07
1941-08-16
1941-08-17
1941-08-18
1941-09-02
1941-09-03
1941-09-06
1941-09-07
1941-09-20
1941-09-21
1941-09-29
1941-09-30
1941-10-10
1941-10-13
1941-10-20
1941-10-21
1941-10-23
1941-10-29
1941-10-30
1941-10-31
1941-11-08
1941-11-09
1942-01-02
1942-01-03
1942-01-10
1942-01-11
1942-01-14
1942-01-15
1942-02-06
1942-02-24
1942-02-25
1942-02-26
1942-02-27
1942-02-28
1942-03-09
1942-03-10
1942-03-11
1942-03-13
1942-03-23
1942-03-24
1943-04-02
1943-04-03
1943-04-04
1943-04-05
1943-04-08
1943-04-09
1943-04-10
1943-04-13
1943-04-14
1943-05-12
1943-05-13
1943-05-14
1943-05-23
1943-05-24
1943-05-25
1943-05-26
1943-05-29
1943-05-30
1943-06-28
1943-06-29
1943-07-08
1943-07-09
1943-07-12
1943-07-13
1943-07-24
1943-07-25
1943-07-26
1943-08-10
1943-08-11
1943-08-12
1943-08-13
1943-08-17
1943-08-18
1943-08-22
1943-08-23
1943-08-27
1943-08-28
1943-08-31
1943-09-01
1943-09-03
1943-09-04
1943-09-05
1943-09-06
1943-09-07
1943-09-22
1943-09-23
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Description
An account of the resource
Observer’s and air gunner’s flying log book for Walter Henry lane, wireless operator/air gunner, covering the period from 19 October 1940 to 23 September 1943, when he was shot down and became a prisoner of war. He was stationed at RAF Penrhos, RAF Cottesmore, RAF Lindholme, RAF Swinderby, RAF Skellingthorpe, RAF Waddington, RAF Winthorpe, RAF Woodhall and RAF Bourn. Aircraft flown in were Dominie, Whitley, Battle, Anson, Hampden, Manchester, and Lancaster. He flew total of 63 operations 36 with 50 Squadron and 27 with 97 Squadron. Targets were Brest, Hamm, Bremen, Cologne, Keil, Karlsruhe, Copenhagen, Oslo, Berlin, Hamburg, Dunkirk, Amsterdam, Essen, St Nazaire, Wilhelmshaven, Heligoland, Lorient, Duisburg, Frankfurt, Spezia, Pilsen, Dortmund, Dusseldorf, Wuppertal, Turin, Nuremberg, Milan, Peenemunde, Leverkusen, Mönchengladbach, Mannheim, Munich, and Hannover. His pilots on operations were Flight Lieutenant Fox, Sergeant Mudd, Pilot Officer Carter, Squadron Leader Mulford, Pilot Officer Helmore, Pilot Officer Bartley, Sergeant Flight Sergeant Lord and Flying officer Fletcher DFM.
14 OTU
1661 HCU
50 Squadron
97 Squadron
air sea rescue
aircrew
Anson
Battle
bombing
Bombing and Gunnery School
bombing of Hamburg (24-31 July 1943)
Bombing of Peenemünde (17/18 August 1943)
crash
Dominie
Gneisenau
Hampden
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Mk 1
Lancaster Mk 3
Manchester
mine laying
missing in action
Operational Training Unit
prisoner of war
RAF Bourn
RAF Cottesmore
RAF Lindholme
RAF Penrhos
RAF Skellingthorpe
RAF Swinderby
RAF Waddington
RAF Winthorpe
RAF Woodhall Spa
RAF Yatesbury
Scharnhorst
shot down
target indicator
training
Whitley
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/520/24264/LLucasWE122826v1.1.pdf
f8b8a2ebb89d539b28a771b379da14f0
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Lucas, Bill
William Ernest Lucas
W E Lucas
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Lucas, WE
Description
An account of the resource
15 items. Two oral history interviews with Squadron Leader Bill Lucas DFC (1917 - 2018, 1255396 Royal Air Force), his log book, brief memoir and photographs. He served as a pilot with 9, 15, 139 and 162 Squadrons. After the war he ran in the 1948 Olympics.
The collection was catalogued by Trevor Hardcastle.
Requires
A related resource that is required by the described resource to support its function, delivery, or coherence.
William (Bill) Ernest Lucas was born in Tooting Bec, London on the 16th January 1917, 3 years deep into World War One. Luckily for Bill he was not of age to endure with the fighting in the trenches. However, when Europe was engulfed into another worldwide conflict in 1939, this set way for Bill to become involved with the RAF and IBCC.
Growing up, Bill was an only child and left his school (Bec Grammar School) at the age of 15. He managed to get a job with a printers, which led to his second and only other job at an insurance company called the London and Lancashire. The company’s sports club enabled Bill to find his passion for athletics (especially running) and he was expected to participate in the 1940 Olympics until the war interfered. (https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/30884)
A photo of Bill in his running gear is shown in https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/30865 where he is running down 55 Graham Road in Surrey.
Bill instead competed in the 1948 Olympic Games as the games were also cancelled in 1944 due to World War Two. Luckily the games were hosted in London (https://olympics.com/en/olympic-games/london-1948) and Bill had retired from IBCC meaning that he had time to participate.
As seen in ‘Bill Lucas and the 1948 London Olympics’ (1948) https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/document/30866 Bill managed to come 6th in the Second Heat meaning he was one position off of being in the final on the 2nd August 1948! This collection also includes Bill in his older prime wearing his 1948 Olympic Games jacket and the official Olympic Games programme from 1948.
When Hitler invaded Poland on September 1st 1939, Bill was 22 years old meaning that he was eligible to be part of Great Britain’s Army. Combining Bill’s hatred of the sea and his fathers recent experiences in the trenches, the RAF seemed to be the most compatible choice with Bill. (https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/520/30884/B[Author]LucasWEv10001.jpg)
Bill was not involved in Britain’s mightiest air conflict against Hitler’s Luftwaffe however, instead watching ‘The Few’ defeat the Nazi aircrafts and succeed. Being considered to be Nazi Germany’s first ‘major military defeat’, this allowed for Britain to continue fighting in the war (https://www.raf.mod.uk/our-organisation/our-history/anniversaries/battle-of-britain/ and to an extent, allowed Bill to continue his path of becoming an Squadron Leader.
It was November 1940 when Bill started his pilot training, but due to a bomber offensive being the only way to properly counter the Nazis, this was huge not just for Bill but Britain as a whole. There had never been a bomber offensive before in warfare. https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/520/30884/B[Author]LucasWEv10001.jpg
As seen in Bill’s official Pilot’s Log Book: (https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/520/24264/LLucasWE122826v1.1.pdf) his training consisted of being part of 16 Elementary Flying School at RAF Derby from 1940 to 41 , 8 School of Flying Training at RAF Montrose in 1941 and 20 Operational Training Units at RAF Lossiemouth in 1941 . He flew three different types of aircraft during his training, Miles Magister, Miles Master and Wellington I’s.
Bill’s training finally finished in August 1941 and he was posted to his first official squadron, IX Squadron at Honington. Here he flew the Wellington Bomber.
Will Cragg
Record of Service:
4 November 1940- 4 January 1941: 16 Elementary Flying Training School at RAF Derby flying Miles Magisters
9 January- 4 May 1941: 8 School of Flying Training at RAF Montrose flying Miles Masters
31 May 1941- 13 August 1941: 20 Operational Training Units at RAF Lossiemouth flying Wellington I’s
14 August 1941- 4 November 1941: 9 Squadron at RAF Honington flying Wellington III’s
4 November 1941- 30 December 1941: 26 Conversion Fleet at RAF Waterbeach flying Stirling’s
30 December 1941- 1 August 1942: 15 Squadron at RAF Wyton flying Whitley V’s
1 August 1942- 3 August 1942: 218 Conversion Fleet at RAF Marham flying Airspeed Oxfords
4 August 1942- 18 August 1942: 19 Operational Training Units at RAF Kinloss flying Whitley IV’s
19 August 1942- 13 August 1942: 3 Fighter Instructor Schools at RAF Hullavington flying Ansons
17 September 1942- 18 September 1942: 19 Operational Training Units at RAF Kinloss flying Halifax II’s
18 September 1942- 24 October 1944: 19 Operational Training Units at RAF Forres flying Mosquito III’s
30 October 1942- 19 December 1944: 1655 Mosquito Training Unit at RAF Warboys flying Mosquito IV’s
30 October 1944- 19 December 1944: 1655 Squadron at RAF Bourn flying Mosquito XX’s
7 June 1945- 28 June 1945: 162 Squadron at RAF Blackbushe flying Mosquito XXV’S
28 June 1945- 29 January 1946: 139 Squadron at RAF Upwood flying Lancaster III’s
29 January 1946: Station Head Quarters at RAF Upwood flying Mosquito XVI’s
William Cragg
William (Bill) Lucas was born on January 16th, 1917 in Tooting Bec, London. He was educated at Bec Grammar School, and left at the age of 15 to work at a printing company before moving to the insurers London and Lancashire to work as an assessor. While working there, he developed his talent for athletics with the Belgrave Harriers, with his best discipline being the 5000 metres. His goal was to compete at the 1940 Olympic games. However, in 1940, Bill was called up to help the war effort and mindful of his father’s advice to avoid the army and his own dislike of the sea, he chose to join the RAF.
Initially he trained as a fighter pilot on Miles Magisters and Miles Masters, but by the time he had finished training, the Battle of Britain had been won and the need for bomber pilots was more urgent. So, he was reallocated to bombers and trained to fly the Wellington at RAF Lossiemouth. Bill Lucas · IBCC Digital Archive (lincoln.ac.uk)
Following completion of pilot training in August 1941, he was posted to RAF Honington and joined 9 Squadron flying Wellingtons. He flew 14 operational sorties – notably Cologne and Hamburg – before converting to Stirlings at RAF Waterbeach. He then joined 15 (Bomber) Squadron at RAF Wyton, flying the Short Stirling and, by August 1942, Bill had completed a full tour of 30 operational sorties (over 40 operations in total). Bill experienced tense encounters with German defences, having to take evasive action and also getting caught in a cone of five or six searchlights. To get out of the searchlight glare he had to do things with the aircraft which it was never meant to do. Returning from one mission they flew too close to Kiel and the airframe amassed a lot of bullet holes and an alarming loss of fuel. Crossing the North Sea, the tank indicators showed practically nothing and they had to divert into Woodbridge in Suffolk. The groundcrew estimated there was less than twenty-five gallons of fuel left (probably less than 6 minutes of flying time).
He was released from operational duties and was posted to RAF Lossiemouth as a flying instructor. Then in December 1944, he returned to operational flying and was posted to 162 Squadron, part of the Pathfinder force, to fly the Mosquito, an aircraft he described as “a bit quicker and more responsive; a nice aeroplane”. He completed a further 34 operational sorites with 162 Squadron, including missions over Kiel, Berlin, Hannover and Magdeburg. In recognition of his war services, Bill was awarded the DFC and was Mentioned in Despatches.
Squadron Leader Bill Lucas was released from the Service in January 1946 and returned to the insurance job he had left to join the RAF. Eventually, he left the company to become an insurance broker. He also returned to athletics and the Belgrave Harriers; he ran in various internationals and competed for Great Britain in the 5000m at the 1948 London Olympics. Athletics remained with him for the rest of his life and he gave his spare time freely, working in prominent roles in the administration of athletics. He remained a Belgrave Harrier committee member well into his 90s. He became known as “the golden voice of British Athletics” for his many years as stadium announcer at the White City .
In his later years, Bill remained prominent in RAF and Aircrew Associations. He, along with a small Band of Sussex veterans, was instrumental in helping to raise funds for the construction of the Bomber Command Memorial in London’s Green Park and the International Bomber Command Centre.
Chris Cann
1940: Volunteered for the RAF
4 November 1940 – 4 January 1941: RAF Burnaston, No. 16 EFTS, flying Magister aircraft
9 January 1941 – 4 May 1941: RAF Montrose, No. 8 SFTS, flying Master aircraft
31 May 1941 – 13 August 1941: RAF Lossiemouth, No. 20 OTU, flying Wellington aircraft
14 August 1941 – 4 November 1941: RAF Honington, No. 9 Squadron, flying Wellington aircraft
1941: Commissioned into the officer ranks
4 November 1941 – 30 December 1941: RAF Waterbeach, No. 26 Conversion Flight, flying Stirling aircraft
30 December 1941 – 1 August 1942: RAF Wyton, No. 15 Squadron, flying Stirling aircraft
1 August 1942 – 3 August 1942: RAF Marham, 218 Conversion Flight
4 August 1942 – 18 August 1942: RAF Kinloss, No. 19 OTU, flying Whitley aircraft
19 August 1942 – 13 September 1942: RAF Hullavington, No. 3 FTS, flying Oxford aircraft
17 September 1942 – 18 September 1942: RAF Kinloss, No. 19 OTU, flying Whitley and Anson aircraft
18 September 1942 – 24 October 1944: RAF Foress, No. 19 OTU, flying Whitley and Anson aircraft
30 October 1944 – 19 December 1944: RAF Warboys, 1655 MTU, flying Mosquito and Oxford aircraft
19 December 1944 – 7 June 1945: RAF Bourn, 162 Squadron, flying Mosquito aircraft
7 June 1945 – 28 June 1945: RAF Blackbushe, 162 Squadron, flying Mosquito aircraft
28 June 1945 – 29 January 1946: RAF Upwood, 139 Squadron, flying Mosquito and Oxford aircraft
29 January 1946: Released from Service having attained the rank of Squadron Leader.
Chris Cann
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
W E Lucas’ pilots flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
Pilots flying log book for W E Lucas, covering the period from 7 November 1940 to 18 February 1946. Detailing his flying training, operations flown and instructor duties. He was stationed at RAF Derby, RAF Montrose, RAF Lossiemouth, RAF Honington, RAF Waterbeach, RAF Wyton, RAF Alconbury, RAF Kinloss, RAF Hullavington, RAF Forres, RAF Warboys, RAF Bourn, RAF Blackbushe (Hartford Bridge) and RAF Upwood. Aircraft flown in were Magister, Master, Wellington, Stirling, Whitley, Oxford, Anson, Halifax, Mosquito and Lancaster. He flew a total of 67 night operations. 10 with 9 Squadron, 23 with 15 Squadron and 34 with 162 Squadron. Targets were Cologne, Mannheim, Brest, Boulogne, Turin, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Genoa, Stettin, Lorient, Lubeck, Stuttgart, Warnemunde, Blaavands Point, Norderney, Essen, Emden, Bremen, Wilhelmshaven, Lemburg, Hanau, Nurnberg, Hannover, Berlin, Magdeburg, Erfurt, Kiel, Dessau and Osnabruck. <span>His first or second pilots on operations were </span>Sergeant Baker, Sergeant Bulford, Pilot Officer Saunders, Sergeant Cross, Sergeant Melville, Sergeant Bond, Sergeant Russell-Colins, Group Captain Kirkpatrick and Squadron Leader Walsh. He also lists his post war flying duties with 139 Squadron.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LLucasWE122826v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Denmark
France
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Netherlands
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Denmark--Ribe
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Derbyshire
England--Hampshire
England--Suffolk
England--Wiltshire
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Brest
France--Lorient
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Dessau (Dessau)
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Erfurt
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Hanau
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Lübeck
Germany--Magdeburg
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Norderney
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Osnabrück
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Italy--Genoa
Italy--Turin
Netherlands--Limburg
Poland--Szczecin
Scotland--Angus
Scotland--Moray
Germany--Rostock
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1940
1941-08-26
1941-08-27
1941-08-29
1941-08-30
1941-09-07
1941-09-08
1941-09-10
1941-09-11
1941-09-12
1941-09-13
1941-09-15
1941-09-16
1941-09-26
1941-09-28
1941-09-29
1941-09-30
1941-10-01
1941-10-20
1941-10-26
1942-03-25
1942-03-26
1942-03-28
1942-03-29
1942-04-28
1942-05-06
1942-05-07
1942-05-08
1942-05-09
1942-05-17
1942-05-18
1942-05-29
1942-05-30
1942-05-31
1942-06-01
1942-06-02
1942-06-03
1942-06-06
1942-06-07
1942-06-19
1942-06-20
1942-06-22
1942-06-23
1942-06-25
1942-06-26
1942-06-29
1942-06-30
1942-07-02
1942-07-03
1942-07-07
1942-07-08
1942-07-09
1944-12-21
1944-12-22
1944-12-23
1944-12-24
1944-12-28
1944-12-29
1945-01-01
1945-01-02
1945-01-03
1945-01-05
1945-01-06
1945-01-07
1945-01-08
1945-01-10
1945-01-11
1945-02-01
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-04
1945-02-05
1945-02-06
1945-02-08
1945-02-09
1945-02-10
1945-02-11
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-19
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-02-22
1945-03-03
1945-03-04
1945-03-05
1945-03-06
1945-03-07
1945-03-08
1945-03-09
1945-03-10
1945-03-13
1945-03-14
1945-03-15
1945-03-16
1945-03-20
1945-03-21
1945-03-22
1945-03-23
1945-03-27
1945-03-28
1945-04-03
1945-04-04
1945-04-05
1945-04-09
1945-04-10
1945-04-11
1945-04-12
1945-04-20
1945-04-21
1945-04-23
1945-04-24
1945-04-25
1945-04-26
1945-06-04
1945-07-16
1945-09-17
1945-09-21
1946
139 Squadron
15 Squadron
162 Squadron
19 OTU
20 OTU
9 Squadron
aircrew
Anson
bombing
bombing of Cologne (30/31 May 1942)
Cook’s tour
Flying Training School
H2S
Halifax
Lancaster
Magister
mine laying
Mosquito
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
pilot
RAF Alconbury
RAF Bourn
RAF Hartford Bridge
RAF Honington
RAF Hullavington
RAF Kinloss
RAF Lossiemouth
RAF Upwood
RAF Warboys
RAF Waterbeach
RAF Wyton
Stirling
training
Wellington
Whitley
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
V GROUP NEWS
[Stamp]
No 29. December, 1944
[Page break]
V GROUP NEWS
No 29. December, 1944.
[Page break]
Foreword by the A.O.C.
In this foreword I say Goodbye to 5 Group after two years of command, covering a period when the Group, in common with the other Groups in Bomber Command, has seen much hard fighting and very great damage inflicted on Germany. In particular, the Winter campaigns of 1942/43 and 1943/44 will be looked back upon in future years as outstanding examples of sustained courage and endurance on the part of the crews, some of whom made 12 or more attacks on Berlin alone. In those days neither the training organisation nor the factories could maintain a sufficient flow of crews and aircraft to keep pace with losses, and Squadrons were often 25% below establishment; but it was those campaigns, with the parallel campaigns by the U.S. forces, which were then arriving in strength, which finally put Germany on the defensive in the air. They forced her to turn over her production from bombers to fighters and to draw off for the protection of her industries many hundreds of aircraft which she badly needed to support her battle fronts. They marked the beginning of her decline as an Air Power.
During 1943 the new equipment which was beginning to come along was still far from perfect. There were no A.P.I’s to watch over course keeping; Gee and the D.R. Compass were still being introduced, and H.2.S. was yet to come; while systems of target marking were in their infancy. The past two years have, therefore, been periods of development and training which have had to be continued while a major campaign was in progress. In spite of the hard knocks which the Group has had to take, progress has been steady until, nowadays, targets are seldom missed when conditions are reasonably satisfactory.
The special technique against small targets which has been built up in this Group, based upon low level marking and off-set bombing, has achieved results which, in terms of bombs per acre over the target area, are unsurpassed by any other bombing force in the World. For this state of affairs, all in the Group share the credit – the aircrew for having down to a heavy training task at a time when they might hope that their period of arduous training lay behind them – the ground crews who have never failed to get an aircraft into the air if it was humanly possible to do so – the specialists in every branch for their ingenuity in servicing highly complicated mechanisms – and finally the whole body of personnel whose determination that the Group should never pull less than its full weight has been a great incentive to me personally and I believe to all the other senior officers throughout the Group.
It is, as a team, that the work has been done, and in saying Goodbye to its members, I include every officer, airman and airwoman in the Group. I thank you all for your extraordinary exertions over two difficult years and ask you to accept that the honour, which H.M. The King recently bestowed upon me as Air Officer Commanding, is a tribute to the growing list of targets destroyed and thus to the work of everyone in the Group.
I wish you all Good Luck.
V” group news. No. 29. December, 1944.
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[Drawing] tactics
December has been marked by the first serious attempts by the G.A.F. to intercept Bomber Command aircraft in daylight. On two separate occasions formations of 30 to 40 ME.109’s and FW.190’s attacked bomber gaggles and succeeded in destroying several bombers before the fighter escort came to the rescue. The enemy fighters showed a marked disinclination to attack the main gaggles which tightened formation when attacked, but concentrated on picking off stragglers and aircraft in the thinly spaced parts of the bomber stream. Although corkscrewing by stragglers proved effective in some cases, the main gaggles carried out no combat manoeuvres. Several fighters were claimed destroyed or damaged, including a claim by one mid-upper gunner of two destroyed – a good effort.
Although during these attacks some bombers fired a few Green Verey cartridges the fighter escorts never saw them. Crews should therefore in future continue firing Greens until it is obvious that the fighter escort has seen and engaged the enemy.
German night fighters are still expending considerable energy and fuel without achieving much success, and have again failed this month to offer effective opposition even to deep penetrations. There are signs, however, that the lack of success over Germany may tempt the enemy to resume intruder activity over this country. With the large number of aircraft now operating and with no IFF in use it will be very difficult to detect intruders returning with the main stream, particularly if the return route to the Group area is from the North Sea. Suitable action is being taken to deal with this danger, but crews must remain on the alert over this country, particularly when circling the airfield lights preparatory to landing, and should view with extreme suspicion any twin-engined aircraft seen, even if it is burning navigation lights.
V” group news. No. 29. December, 1944.
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[Drawing] operations
[Underlined] HEILBRONN – 4/5TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bombers:- Town - W/Cdr. Smith
Marshalling Yards – W/Cdr. Shorthouse.
A force of 292 aircraft took off to attack the town and marshalling yards. Nos. 53 and 55 Bases and 106 Squadron were detailed to attack the town. Aircraft were spread over an 85° sector, and crews were to aim at the red markers, delaying release as ordered.
No.56 Base was to attack the marshalling yards, which were to be marked with Yellow T.I., aircraft to aim at the T.I. and delay release dor4 seconds.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined]
[Underlined] TOWN [/underlined] Weather over the target varied between no cloud and 5/10ths alt. cu. at 12/14,000 feet. Illumination and marking went according to plan, and the marking was assessed as accurate. The markers cannot be plotted on the night photographs. An initial tendency for the bombing to undershoot was corrected by the Master Bomber, and a good sector attack developed. An area of 2000 X 1500 yards has been wiped out, and on the West side damage is severe and widespread. Only the outermost suburbs to the South and West have escaped lightly.
[Underlined] MARSHALLING YARDS [/underlined] One Yellow T.I. was assessed as 100 yards South of the Marking Point, but the Master Bomber was unable to distinguish it from flares burning on the ground, so did not issue any instructions. Crews also had difficulty in identifying the marker, and approximately 50% attacked the town instead. Subsequent reconnaissance has revealed only limited damage to the yards.
[Underlined] GIESSEN – 6/7TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Benjamin.
Target – Marshalling yards and town some 35 miles North of Frankfurt. Force 265 aircraft, the majority on the marshalling yards.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Normal marking and illumination were used. The marshalling yards were 1 1/2 miles South of the town, thus presenting a difficult marking problem. The solution was to select a common marking point to the South of the yards, and issue the marshalling yard force with two false wind vectors calculated to spread the bombs up the centre of the yard. The force on the town was to carry out normal overshoot procedure on a common heading.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Blind marking and illumination were good. One Red T.I. dropped visually is known to have been placed accurately on the marking point, while another has been plotted about 1 1/2 miles East of the town. It is apparent that the majority of crews attacked
“V” GROUP NEWS. No. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
the accurate T.I. while a small minority (which proved to be inexperienced crews) were attracted by the inaccurate marker. Photographs have shown that two sticks of incendiaries fell across the accurate T.I., one in the early stages of the attack, and another later. Only careless and slipshod bombing drill and failure to adhere strictly to briefing instructions could have been responsible for this.
Fortunately these loose sticks did not obliterate the accurate marker and a good concentration developed.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined]
[Underlined] MARSHALLING YARDS [/underlined] A heavy concentration fell on these yards, which almost entirely destroyed the round houses, and cause very considerable damage to rolling stock. At the Southern end of the yard, three tail bridges over the roadway were destroyed or very badly damaged, as were also the important fly-over bridges. The standard of concentration was equal to that on French marshalling yards.
[Underlined] TOWN [/underlined] The town has suffered heavily throughout, the main city area to the North being almost completely devastated by fire. Included in this devastation were a rubber works, the arsenal, the gas and water works, engineering works, and the power station.
[Underlined] URFT DAM – 8TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
The Urft Dam lies a few miles south of Duren. In the event of an enemy withdrawal, he might well blow up the dam and flood the surrounding country, thus seriously impeding Allied ground forces.
206 aircraft were despatched in an attempt to breech the crest of the dam overflow, and so forestall any action by the enemy at a critical period. The dam itself was too strong to be destroyed even by ‘Tallboy’ bombs.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] The main force were to attack in pairs of squadrons at five minutes [sic] intervals. Crews were to bomb visually.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Unfortunately 6 – 9/10ths cloud at 6 – 8,000 feet was encountered over the target, and only 128 aircraft identified and bombed. Due to weather conditions bombing was scattered and although hits were claimed, the dam was not breached.
[Underlined] URFT DAM – 11TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
This target was again attacked in daylight by 233 aircraft.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Similar to previous attack, though the overall T.O.T. was shorter. Aircraft carrying 12,000 lb bombs were to attack last.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Once again the weather for bombing was bad, cloud being 5 – 9/10ths at 6 – 8000 feet. 176 aircraft bombed through gaps in the cloud, and claimed hits. Army ground reports claim six hits on the spillway, bit the hoped for erosion had not taken place, although some reduction in the water level was apparent.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] OSLO FIORD – 13/14TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Benjamin.
Sixty-one aircraft of No.54 Base were detailed to attack enemy shipping in Oslo Fiord. The chief target was the cruiser Koln. It was known that this ship had been very active recently, but the chief difficulty lay in locating it, as it returned to different berths after each operation.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] No.54 Base provided their own illumination and marking. In the light of flares, Mosquitoes were to mark a selected position near the supposed anchorage of the ship, and the Lancasters were to aim visually.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] The target was reported to have moved North from the briefed position. This made visual identification extremely difficult, and bombing results were not observed. The force started to bomb in the vicinity of the proximity markers. On instructions from the Master Bomber, bombing was shifted to a large merchant vessel in the centre of the harbour. A little later, a cruiser believed to be the Koln was identified lying some two miles West of the marking point, and those crews who had not already bombed were ordered to attack the new target. Bomb splashes were observed round the cruiser, but no damage has been established.
[Underlined] MUNICH – 17/18TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- S/Ldr. Stubbs.
289 aircraft took off to attack this very important target, determined to atone for the last attack which was only partially successful. The illuminating and marking plan was normal, except that the visual Red T.I. were to be backed up with a White T.I. flashing ‘V’. The attack was to be in two man sectors, and bombing on the Red markers with overshoot as ordered.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather over the target was clear with good visibility. Marking and illumination went according to plan, and a good concentration of Red T.I. was achieved. Except for an initial stick of incendiaries which fell across the markers, crews reported good bombing and a successful sector attack. Although the town is of more substantial construction than other targets attacked successfully by this Group, day cover shows very considerable areas of severe damage spreading out from the main station, and covering the old centre of the town.
[Underlined] GDYNIA – 18/19TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/Cdr. Woodroffe.
This large Polish port is the main base for what remains of the elusive German Fleet, and at the time of the attack all except two of the larger operational units were present, as well as a large concentration of U-boats, and merchant shipping. 227 aircraft attacked the target.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] The target was out of range of Mosquitoes, so all marking was carried out by Lancasters. The target was to be illuminated blindly, and by the light of these flares a picked force of
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
the best bombing crews were to attack the pocket battleship LUTZOW visually. Marking for the main attack was to be a stick of Red and Green T.I. dropped visually at the South Western side of the docks. The Master Bomber was to select the most accurate of these T.I’s and instruct the main force to bomb it with a false wind vector.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather over the target was clear, but with moderate visibility and a smoke screen late in the attack. A few crews identified the LUTZOW and bombed her, and the remainder joined in the main attack. Illumination and marking was good, and the most Southerly T.I. was accurately backed up. Due, however, to an error of calculation before take-off (a reciprocal wind was used), the Master Bomber’s navigator issued a strong wind vector, and the main weight of the attack fell to the North and West of the berth where the main naval units were lying. Although day photographs show no damage to the main fleet, and old SCHLESIEN class battleship is down by the stern, and damage is visible to warehouses, floating docks and merchant shipping.
Instead of an outstanding success the Group achieved some slight damage incommensurate with the weight of the attack. This attack affords a good example, which all should note, of the far reaching effect of small mistakes.
[Underlined] POLITZ – 21/22ND DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- W/Cdr. Woodroffe.
207 aircraft took off to attack the synthetic oil plant, one of the most important and most heavily defended targets in Germany. It had already been attacked by American heavy bombers, but was back in full production at the time of the attack.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] The target was to be marked blindly with Yellow T.I. and White flashing ‘V’. In the light of flares, the marking point was to be marked with a stick of Red and Green T.I. The Master Bomber was to pick out the most suitable T.I. and order main force to bomb it with a false wind vector set on the bombsight.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather at the target was clear, but an extensive smoke screen was in action which made visual identification of the target very difficult. In addition to this, a number of flares did not light until they struck the ground, and others ignited just above the ground. These were confused with the Yellow proximity T.I. and added still further to the difficulties of the Master Bomber and visual markers. Nevertheless, Marker I, identifying what he considered to be the marking point, dropped his stick of Red and Green T.I’s. The Master Bomber called for an assessment, and three separate and independent assessments were made, two of 200 yards North, and one of 200 yards N.E. On the basis of this, the Master Bomber instructed Link I to work out a wind vector assuming the T.I’s to be 300 yards North of the marking point. This was then issued, and the main force called in to attack.
Night photographs show that the markers were centred some 2,000 yards North of the target and the main weight of the bombing was displaced accordingly.
The bomb aimer of the marker aircraft which dropped the stick of Red and Green T.I’s claims to have identified visually the marking point in relation to three well defined pin points, and there is no evidence to show why the markers fell so far North.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] ST. VITH – 26TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by 8 (P.F.F.) Group.
The target was a concentration of armour, troops and supplies inside the salient made by the new German thrust on the Western Front. Conditions for take-off were bad with very poor visibility, and only 26 aircraft took off for the attack.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Target was to be marked by Oboe aircraft with Red T.I, backed up with salvoes of Red and Green T.I. Bombing was to be direct on the markers, or as ordered by the Master Bomber.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Crews reported marking accurate and on time, and bombing was well concentrated.
[Underlined] RHEYDT – 27TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bomber:- Provided by 8 (P.F.F.) Group.
44 aircraft took off in conditions of poor visibility to attack the marshalling yards South of Munchen Gladbach, which were handling a large volume of military traffic for the German thrust on the Western Front.
[Underlined] PLAN] [/underlined] The method was controlled Oboe ground marking. The aiming point was to be marked initially with Red T.I., backed up with salvoes of Red and Green T.I. A Master Bomber was to direct the bombing.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather over the target was clear, and the first wave had no difficulty in identifying visually. The target was soon covered in a dense pall of smoke which tended to obscure the markers, but all crews reported a good concentration of bombing. P.R.U. cover shows severe damage in the yards, with a slight spread of bombing into the town area.
[Underlined] OSLO FIORD – 28/29TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
Master Bombers: S/Ldr. Benjamin and W/Cdr. Petty.
Two forces totalling 67 aircraft took off to attack shipping in Oslo Fiord. The larger force had for its target the cruiser Koln, lying off Horten on the West side of the Fiord, and the secondary force was to bomb any shipping seen off Moss on the Eastern shore.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Due to the very bright moon it was decided to dispense with flare illumination. The marking force was to drop Wanganui flares and Flame Floats near any large vessel seen, and the main force was to attack visually, running up-moon.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather over the target area was clear, but a thin layer of cloud at 15/20,000 feet diffused the moonlight, and made deceptive shadows on the water. Neither force could identify shipping clearly, but several large ships were bombed with unobserved results. One large merchantman off Moss may have been damaged by several near misses, and a small ship seen on the early night photographs had disappeared by the close of the attack.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] HOUFFALIZE – 30/31ST DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
The target was a concentration of enemy armour, troops and supplies concentrated In and around a village a few miles North of Bastogne. 156 aircraft took off for an attack in the early hours of the morning.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] The aiming point was to be marked with Red T.I. by Oboe aircraft, and crews were ordered to bomb direct. Due to the proximity of friendly troops, crews were ordered not to bomb unless the Red T.I. were positively identified.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] 5 – 8/10ths cloud was encountered at the target, and only 90 aircraft bombed, reporting a good concentration of bombing around the markers. The remaining aircraft were unable to identify the Red T.I. so brought their bombs back to Base, as ordered.
[Underlined] OSLO FIORD – 31ST DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
A force of 28 aircraft took off in search of shipping, especially the cruiser Koln, in the Fiord, including 12 aircraft of No.617 Squadron carrying 12,000 lb Tallboy bombs.
[Underlined] PLAN [/underlined] Marker aircraft were to illuminate the area and mark the ships and cruiser with Wanganui Flares and Flame Floats. Bombing was to be visual in the light of further flares. The Tallboy bombs were fused .5 seconds delay so that they would explode 100 feet under water. The remaining aircraft carried 1000 lb MC/GP bombs fused TD .025.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined] Weather over the target area was clear, and the cruiser, together with several merchantmen were claimed as identified. The cruiser was under way during the attack, which made marking and bombing very difficult. Results of the attack on the cruiser were unobserved, but a near miss on a large ship by a Tallboy swung her 90° to starboard and brought her to a standstill.
[Underlined] SPECIAL OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] IJMUIDEN – 15TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
The target was the concrete E/R boat pens, and was attacked by No.617 Squadron carrying 12,000 lb Tallboy bombs. Hits were obtained and the pens suffered further severe damage.
[Underlined] ROTTERDAM – 29TH DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
No.617 Squadron carried out another precision attack with 12,000 lb Tallboy bombs, the target being the concrete E. boat pens. Crews reported concentrated bombing, and P.R.U. cover confirms a heavy concentration of craters on and around the target, and two out of the three sections of the pens have been severely damaged by direct hits.
[Underlined] OSLO – 31ST DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
No.627 Squadron celebrated New Year’s Eve by a pinpoint attack by 12 aircraft on the Gestapo Headquarters in Oslo. The attack
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] OPERATIONS. [/underlined]
was carried out in two waves of six aircraft, and all the first wave reported successful bombing. The second wave was hampered by smoke and dust from the bomb bursts, but two aircraft identified the target and bombed. Flak was intense and all the aircraft were hit, but returned to base safely. Rumours current in Stockholm suggest that the attack was highly successful.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Diagram] gardening
Unfavourable weather caused many operations to be cancelled at the beginning of the month, but when conditions improved on the 14th December the Group Gardeners ‘set to’ at such a pace that our previous record of 520 vegetables was in danger of being beaten before the end of the year.
Reviewing the month’s activity, all Gardeners have been most decidedly successful in planting 415 vegetables by 84 sorties in little over a fortnight. This total, 35.6% of the Command effort (1162), places 5 Group well in the can of Gardening operations, and is a commendable achievement befitting the end of a hard but memorable year of war.
[Underlined] 55 BASE [/underlined]
55 Base evenly distributed their effort by most Squadrons operating nine sorties each, visiting a selection of Kattegat and Eastern Baltic areas. On one occasion this was combined with a Group bombing force on an important Naval Base, which, in conjunction with 106 Squadron’s lay, a few days before, produced some highly satisfactory results, denying the use of the Port to the enemy and closing his Exercise Areas for U-boats and surface craft outside. Southern Norway also received attention in co-operation with other Groups, directed primarily against the movement of troops and material for the Wehrmacht from Norway to Denmark. There is conclusive evidence to show that shipping in the Fjords was seriously held up. The closing of the main ports and the consequent dislocation of traffic, had an even greater importance than the actual number of casualties caused.
[Underlined] 54 BASE. [/underlined]
54 Base have surpassed previous records by the excellent performance of 106 Squadron and the Mosquitos of 627 Squadron.
[Underlined] Fine Work by Metheringham. [/underlined]
R.A.F. Station, Metheringham, have repeatedly succeeded in lifting eleven maximum loads under difficult conditions, and on one occasion raised their record to fifteen Gardeners loaded at short notice and ready by ‘take-off’ time. These results cannot be obtained without the co-operation and hard work of the Ground and Armament staffs, who are to be congratulated on a fine month’s work.
[Underlined] 174 Vegetables Planted by a Single Squadron. [/underlined]
106 Squadron have had the busiest month of any Gardening Squadron on record, and have successfully planted a total of 174 vegetables for 36 sorties.
[Underlined] An Outstanding Operation. [/underlined]
Quite the most outstanding operation performed by 106 Squadron was their lone visit to the Eastern Baltic in the Privet and Spinach areas, when 15 Gardeners delivered their loads off an enemy port on a round trip of 1810 miles. Taking into consideration that no other Gardeners were in operation on this night, it stands as one of the greatest Squadron penetrations, and all who took part are to be congratulated on their effort.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] GARDENING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] Mosquitos. [/underlined]
627 Squadron were able to perform their first operation with Mosquitos on the 29th December, when Gardeners were briefed for an important river target, high on the priority list. Four Gardeners were very successful in planting their vegetables in the correct area without opposition, while three others unfortunately had difficulty in the area and returned with their loads. This unusual method of Gardening promises well for the future, as specially selected areas can be planted where it is bound to cause the greatest inconvenience and damage to enemy traffic. The results of this small scale planting were most effectively obtained for the cost of eight Vegetables. Time, opportunity and weather permitting, will tell its own story with regard to the menacing effects of Mosquito Gardening in the forthcoming year.
[Underlined] SQUADRON SORTIES. [/underlined]
[Table of Gardening Sorties by Squadron]
[Underlined] 5 GROUP CALENDAR – 1944. VEGETABLES SUCCESSFULLY PLANTED [/underlined]
January 25
February Nil
March Nil
April 388
May 520
June 30
July 64
August 260
Sept. 77
October 316
November 126
December 415
[Underlined] Total Planted – 2221 [/underlined]
[Underlined] GROUP MONTHLY SUMMARIES – DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
No.5 Group 415
No.6 Group 232
No.1 Group 212
No.3 Group 168
No.4 Group 135
[Underlined] GARDENING POINTS. [/underlined]
(i) Only one Vegetable had to be jettisoned “Safe”. This was done in the correct manner.
(ii) All Gardeners unable to pin-point their target by H2S or ‘Visual’ returned with their load in the correct manner, or laid in Secondary Gardens.
(iii) 97.4% of the Vegetables dropped were planted successfully.
(iv) 12 Gardening areas were visited this month, covering a mileage flown of 98,230 miles in 7 nights.
[Underlined] CONCLUSION. [/underlined]
Although it is difficult to appreciate the results of our efforts without conclusive proof of sinkings or damage, it is firmly believed that many plantings have brought great success. It is estimated that at present the rate of sinking and/or damage, to enemy ships stands at 46 Vegetables per ship. It can therefore be satisfactorily assessed that, by planting 2221 Vegetables in the past twelve months, 5 Group alone have accounted for no less than [underlined] 48 ships SUNK [/underlined] or [underlined] DAMAGED. [/underlined] This figure gives at least one ship per week, and does not take into account the dislocation of shipping caused through closed ports, ships waiting to be discharged, extensive minesweeping operations and heavy
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] GARDENING. [/underlined]
repair work, combined with the feeling that it will be for ever unsafe to travel at sea until the bitter struggle ceases.
In conclusion it may be safely be said that it has been a splendid Gardening Year, and that all Gardeners have indeed maintained their high standard of efficiency; let us continue to do so, and face the year of 1045 with ever increasing zeal to destroy and annoy our enemy’s shipping.
[Underlined] THE FOLLOWING CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN REPORTED. [/underlined]
A German steamer was mined and sunk five miles SW of South Langeland about 15th November, 1944.
German BRYNGE was mined and sunk in Kalundborg Fyord in Summer of 1942. This ship was reported as mined in July 1941.
German MAGDELINE VINNEN (4594 G.T.) was in dock in November, 1944, for extensive repairs after mining.
German TELDE was under repair after being mined. This ship was reported as mined on 13th October, 1943.
Danisg VIBORG (2028 G.T.) was mined (i) on 1st September, 1944, (ii) on 17th September, 1944. The vessel reached port under her own power and as far as can be seen she is undamaged.
A Danish broadcast of 13th December, 1944, reported that wreckage of the motor vessel GRETE (51 G.T) was found North of Laeso in the Kattegat.
The Danish PHONIX (895 G.T.) struck a mine and grounded off Hals on 4th November, 1944.
An unidentified German vessel was also damaged by a mine off Hals on 4th November, 1944.
The German steamer CONSTANZA was heavily damaged by a mine off Kullen on 1st December, 1944.
Several overlapping reports give the following casualties in Oslo Fjord during November, 1944:-
(a) A tug mined and sunk in Horten Inner harbour on 29th November.
(b) The SVEIN (119 G.T.) damaged by a mine off Gulholmen on 16th November.
(c) Two M.T.B’s sunk by mines in the harbour at Horten on 29th November.
(d) A small merchant ship mined and sunk near Veslos, Horten.
An unidentified Finnish vessel of about 1000 G.T. was damaged by a mine in Oslo Fjord on 14th December, 1944.
A Swedish broadcast on 18th December reported that the Norwegian EGORVUS arrived at Bergen on 4th December. The ship was badly damaged aft, probably by a mine.
A German ship HERMINA was sunk by a mine in Stettiner Haff on 19th August, 1944.
The German S.S. ARION (2297 G.T.) was damaged by a mine near Nordenham in the Weser estuary during October, 1944.
The German hospital ship MONTE ROSE (13,882 G.T.) arrived Moss in Oslo Fjord on 12th November following repairs at Akers to make good damage caused by mining.
The Norwegian NINA (1,487 G.T.) was damaged by a mine off Schultzegrund on 27th October, 1944.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Drawing] signals
1944 was a memorable year in the Signals life of the Group, and we can look back with satisfaction on such accomplishments as the general installation of V.H.F. R/T equipment and Loran into all aircraft in the Group; the improvements obtained by the Coningsby Radar Development Party in the performance of H2S Mark III; and the evolution of the ideal technique of W/T control in the target area. Let us take each of these four items in turn, and see if there are any lessons to be learnt.
[Underlined] V.H.F. R/T. [/underlined]
When No.617 Squadron were carrying out training for their famous attack on the German Dams, it became obvious that the existing bomber R/T (T.R.1196) was incapable of providing the efficient inter-aircraft R/T communication required, owing to severe interference experienced at night on the frequency band used. The V.H.F. R/T set T.R.1143 was therefore fitted, and gave excellent results. V.H.F. R/T was used by 617 Squadron for several other special operations. In April, 1944, 5 Group began operating as a separate force on special targets – carrying out their own marking and controlling. It was decided that aircraft of the Illuminating and Controlling team should be equipped with V.H.F. R/T and the remainder of the force be controlled by W/T.
[underlined] H2S Interference. [/underlined]
All Lancaster aircraft of Nos.83 and 97 Squadrons were, therefore, equipped with T.R.1143 V.H.F. R/T sets. This was the first occasion on which V.H.F. R/T sets had been fitted to aircraft carrying the H2S equipment, and on the first operation it was found that very severe interference was caused to the V.H.F. R/T by the H2S. Test proved that the interference was being picked up by the base of the V.H.F. aerial which protruded through the aircraft skin near the H2S set. All V.H.F. aerials were immediately mounted outside the aircraft skin and this cured the trouble.
[Underlined] Main Force Fitting Programme. [/underlined]
In June 1944 it was decided to fit all the remaining aircraft of 5 Group with V.H.F. R/T, and by the end of July this fitting programme was completed – thanks to the good work of a small 26 Group fitting party, and to the enthusiastic support of individual Squadron Signal Sections.
[Underlined] Removal of S.B.A. [/underlined]
To ease the burden on these sections and to put an end to much useless waste of energy and material, S.B.A. equipment was removed from all 5 Group aircraft.
[Underlined] Inadvertent Radiation of Intercomm. [/underlined]
Airborne R/T equipment is normally operated by the pilot, and he must be able to change from receive to transmit with the
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
minimum of trouble. A small “press to speak” switch is therefore mounted on the control wheel, the mere pressing of which actuates a relay which causes the V.H.F. R/T to radiate. Occasionally relays come out of adjustment and occasionally pilots squeeze the “press to speak” switch unknowingly. It is not surprising, therefore, that we soon had cases of crew intercomm. being radiated continuously in the target area – almost completely ruining the control R/T. The ease with which the unwitting culprits were tracked down by their nicknames indicated a somewhat lax crew discipline.
The first countermeasure was an order to the effect that all transmitter crystals were to be removed from main force aircraft. This action proved to be an effective cure, but placed an added burden on the Wireless Mechanics. Bardney produced the answer – the fitting of a simple switch in the transmitter H.T. circuit – accessible from inside the aircraft. In all main force aircraft this switch is sealed in the off position after each D.I. check. In aircraft which may have to transmit the switch is placed in the on position. This scheme still left 20 or 30 aircraft liable to radiate intercom., and in spite of careful briefing and especial care of relays, the inevitable occurred and another operation was nearly ruined by one of the Illuminating Force radiating intercom. throughout the attack. Woodhall Spa produced the cure this time in the shape of a neon indicator which illuminated the words “Check VHF” everytime [sic] the V.H.F. R/T set was in the transmit condition.
[Underlined] Enemy Freya Interference. [/underlined]
During an attack in September, unusually severe interference was experienced from enemy Freya transmissions occurring on our V.H.F. R/T frequencies. With the prospect of an increasing number of operations over Freya Territory, this interference constituted a serious threat, and Headquarters, Bomber Command, made immediate arrangements for R.A.E. Farnborough to find a cure. Tests soon proved that the inclusion of a simple device known as a “series limitor” would completely eliminate Freya interference.
[Underlined] All aircraft change over to American SCR.522 sets. [/underlined]
Fortunately for 5 Group this modification coincided with the decision of higher authority to refit all our aircraft with the American V.H.F. R/T set SCR.552. This new set was already fitted with the series limitor. During the night of the 16th October the colossal task of setting up and changing 350 aircraft V.H.F. R/T sets was accomplished without a hitch. All pilots expressed themselves as highly satisfied with the excellent performance of the American sets, but there was a general complaint regarding the fact that the incoming V.H.F. R/T signals tended to swamp crew intercom. We were told to adjust the pre-set volume control in the set!
[Underlined] Effect of Icing on V.H.F. R/T Aerials. [/underlined]
The advent of winter and resulting increase in icing risks was brought home on the night 19/20th October when a large number of V.H.F. R/T aerials broke off. Our friends at R.A.E. once more came into the breach and quickly produced a modified form of mounting for the whip aerials so that they really could whip and thus prevent ice accretion. All aircraft are now being so modified as fast as the necessary parts arrive.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] Pilots’ Manual Volume Control. [/underlined]
No matter how carefully the pre-set volume control was adjusted it was found that it was impossible to cater for all requirements, and pilots continued to complain of the loud V.H.F. R/T signals jamming vital crew intercom. As a result of a unanimous demand from Bases made at the November Group Signals Conference, a number of volume controls were received for trial. These trials resulted in an immediate plea for general fitting throughout all Group aircraft, and this was acceded to.
[Underlined] R/T Speech Training. [/underlined]
The best R/T equipment – like the ordinary trunk telephone must be met half way with properly articulated speech. The average airman does not possess a natural telephone voice but the excellent R/T speech training unit at Woodlands, Stanmore, soon remedies this. During 1944 [underlined] 140 [/underlined] pilots of 5 Group have benefited from the instruction given by this School.
[Underlined] FINALE. [/underlined]
The closing days of 1944 thus found the final chapter of our V.H.F. R/T story completed – a pilots’ volume control – no more inadvertent radiation of intercom. – no more Freya or H2S interference – no more broken aerials – just perfectly clear R/T at a strength to suit all pilots.
It has been an interesting story and it is hoped that those about to sample the joys of V.H.F. R/T in bomber aircraft will benefit from our experiences.
[Underlined] THE DEVELOPMENT OF W/T CONTROL TECHNIQUE. [/underlined]
At first sight it would appear to be a simple matter to arrange for one aircraft to control 250 other aircraft in the target area by W/T. The T.1154/R.1155 W/T equipment carried by our Lancasters is very efficient and easy to manipulate, and the W/T frequencies available to the Group are as clear of interference as one can expect these days. It was found by grim experience, however, that the accuracy of tuning by the average operator was below the standard required for control purposes. On more than one occasion, we regret to say, the control operator was as much as 30 kc/s off frequency – with the result that few aircraft received the control signals.
[Underlined] Crystal Monitor. [/underlined]
It was found that the only certain way of ensuring that the control operator was precisely on frequency was to resurrect the crystal monitor type 2, and make him tune the transmitter by plugging his phones into the crystal monitor and tuning his transmitter to the dead space.
[Underlined] Crystal Controlled Transmitters. [/underlined]
This scheme proved a complete cure, but was rather cumbersome and profiting by Binbrook’s experiments, a number of Controllers’ W/T transmitters were modified for crystal control. All that was necessary was to plug the appropriate crystal into the master oscillator grid circuit. This certainly simplified the tuning problem, but deprived the operator of listening-through facilities, and also his ability to hear his own morse. This latter failing resulted in the transmission of poor morse, so the scheme was abandoned and we reverted to the crystal monitor.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] Transmission of Perfect Morse. [/underlined]
The job of finding W/T operators capable of transmitting perfect morse under rather nerve wracking conditions was slightly more difficult that the problem of accurate tuning. Operators who produced copy-book morse in the Squadron Training Room were sometimes found to possess nerves when they remembered that 250 other operators and several ground stations including Group Headquarters were hanging on every dot they made. A special test for Controller Operators was therefore introduced, covering morse, tuning ability, and correct procedure. During 1944, a total of 170 W/T Operators in the Group successfully passed the rigorous test, and many of these operators have since proved themselves on actual controlled operations.
[Underlined] Control Procedure. [/underlined]
To ensure that all aircraft W/T receivers are accurately tuned, the control operator transmits six callsigns a few minutes before target time. This transmission also enables the deputy control operator to check the tuning, and also to take over control if the transmissions are not heard. Thereafter throughout the attack, the control operator transmits two callsigns every minute unless control code signals are being handled. This scheme was evolved to enable W/T operators to concentrate on their tail warning device without missing any W/T signals.
[Underlined] Control Code. [/underlined]
To ensure speed and security, a special three-letter code covering all eventualities likely to arise during the illuminating, locating, marking and destroying of targets was evolved. A new code is used for each operation.
[Underlined] Deliberate Enemy Jamming. [/underlined]
To counter possible attempts by the enemy to jam the control frequency, an elaborate system of alternative frequencies and W/T guards is laid on for each operation, but happily, so far (touching wood) we have only been ‘jostled’ into doing this on two occasions and each time the scheme worked satisfactorily. We now realise just how effective 100 Group’s Countermeasure ‘Jostle’ really is!
[Underlined] Enemy Spoofing. [/underlined]
The Hun is quite capable of attempting to spoil a controlled attack by putting out spoof transmissions on our frequencies. To counter such attempts operators are reminded of the challenge procedure used with SD.0182 verification tables. No such attempt has, however, ever been made.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined]
With the experience of 170 successful controlled attacks behind us in 1944, it can be said that we now have a system which is guaranteed to produce excellent morse, precisely on frequency and at the exact time required. It has resulted in the birth of a brand of wireless operator of an efficiency far exceeding that attained in the old days of perpetual W/T silence. The never failing manner in which diversion signals, wind messages and ‘target attacked’ signals are handled reflects the effect which the 5 Group Signals procedure has had on its wireless operators. Their morale was never higher and their keenness never greater. They are a credit to the Radio Schools, O.T.U’s and Conversion Units who produced them. May they keep it up in 1945.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] H.2.S. MARK III. [/underlined]
In August, 1944, it was decided to exploit the blind bombing potentialities of H2S Mark III to the full, and resultant action took two parallel courses, viz:-
(a) An intensive training programme for set operators, with the object of thoroughly familiarising them with the equipment.
(b) Considerable cleaning up of the equipment to obtain increased accuracy, improved presentation and high sensitivity. This latter programme consisted of the selection of the most efficient units from the available H2S equipment and their embodiment into one aircraft installation, coupled with a detailed bench setting procedure.
This work naturally clashed with the prevailing shortage of Radar Mechanics. This was overcome by attachments from the Headquarters, Bomber Command, Radar Development Party, and from No.53 Base, as a result of a decision to curtail the fitting of H2S within that Base. Bench and workshop accommodation was extended in sympathy with the manpower increase.
Flight tests and H2S photography soon demonstrated that the scanner was a definite weakness in the equipment. Severe gaps appeared in the P.P.I. presentation, which made an accurate bombing run exceedingly difficult. Two mechanics under T.R.E. direction constructed a scanner tester with which the scanners could be tested on the ground. The gaps in the polar diagram were filled in by means of a sheet of perspex mounted on the face of the mirror, the ideal position of which was fond by trial and error. This treatment was successful with approximately 50% of the scanners.
[Underlined] The Perfect Scanner. [/underlined]
At this time a perfect scanner was loaned to Coningsby by T.R.E., and flight trials soon demonstrated that the adjective “perfect” was not an exaggeration. As a result, action was taken with our local manufacturer to cast a mirror to the perfect mirror. Trials with the cast mirror were carried out with the resultant paradox that the polar diagram was an improvement over the original. The production of cast mirrors was extended, and operational results proved that the presentation obtained was the best ever.
This labour reaped its dividends in no uncertain fashion; the ability of the operators to obtain best results from the equipment under operational conditions, coupled with the increased efficiency and accuracy of the equipment, were producing remarkably low bombing errors. Figures of a 300 yards error on the live bombing range were by no means uncommon. A still more satisfying substantiation, of course, came from the raid results.
[Underlined] H2S MARK IIIE. [/underlined]
In parallel with this improvement programme, two mechanics have been attached to T.R.E. to construct two sets of H2S Mark IIIE under T.R.E direction. Their work was completed in November, and the equipment transferred to Coningsby, where flight trials proved that it was vastly superior to H2S Mark III, and possessed the added advantage of requiring a less detailed setting up procedure. It is hoped to continue this story at a later date.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
As the operational policy of ‘evasion’ developed, Radar transmissions became more and more restricted, and as a reult [sic] it was decided to install Loran in all aircraft of No.5 Group. This was a bold decision, because the equipment had not been adequately proved operationally, and the prospects of jamming were menacing.
The fitting was carried out in two phases, as equipment became available. Firstly in Nos. 53 and 54 Bases, and finally in Nos. 55 and 56. Each programme was completed rapidly as a result of excellent co-operation between the Engineering and Signals Branches.
[Underlined] Teething Troubles. [/underlined]
Initial results were not so good; Loran required longer manipulation than Gee, and while targets were within Gee coverage, the new equipment did not offer much temptation. Furthermore, the divider circuits were temperamental and suitable areas for training were too far away to allow training flights to be carried out. However, a successful raid on Munich proved the worth of the equipment, and instated it as a very necessary aid outside the limits of Gee coverage. Each navigator was issued with a screwdriver and was instructed in the art of setting dividers in the air.
The trailing aerial was a nuisance. One very vicious specimen, which brought matters to a head “collected large lumps of Window, which jammed the aerial when the wireless operator attempted to wind it in when approaching the target. He succeeded in cutting it away whereupon it jammed the bomb doors; it was cut loose again and it wrapped itself around the rear turret”. Experiments were carried out, as a result of which it was found practicable to use the 27 ft. forward suspension of the T.R.1196 aerial and a suitable loading unit. This modification has been passed to Bomber Command.
A similar aerial was developed for Mosquito aircraft, for which the internal aerial for Loran had proved unsatisfactory.
H2S interference has been experienced. A modification to suppress the receiver during the H2S transmissions has been found successful on the bench, and is undergoing air tests.
[Underlined] Prospects. [/underlined]
It is a simple device to maintain, and in these days of acute shortage of Radar Mechanics, that is an important factor. It does not radiate any energy and is therefore quite safe to use on our deepest penetrations. We look forward to doing great things with Loran in 1945.
[Underlined] TELECOMMUNICATIONS. [/underlined]
1944 saw the final completion of the Base organisation, and the resolution of all queries concerning the positioning of Ops. switchboards and the occupation of Secon huts – both of which caused a considerable amount of heartburn and one time or another. The year saw only one new change, and this was the introduction of a new scheme to speed up the passing of operational information to Bases and Stations. New? We were told that we were going back to 1939 by introducing this scheme but whether new or old it has served one purpose very well.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
Prior to January, 1944, all operational “gen” had been passed by “scrambler” to Base or parent stations, and passed on by the latter to stations or satellites, and a very cumbersome and doubtful method it was. On at least one occasion the omission of the word “if” nearly wrecked an operation. Delays were excessive and the whole system needed a thorough overhaul.
It was decided, therefore, to enlist the aid of the teleprinter network, and the first move at Group was to put an ops. teleprinter in a specially built cubicle adjacent to the Ops. planning room. Bases and Stations were then asked to take similar action, which by hook or by crook they speedily carried out. The final step was to arrange for a simultaneous broadcast to all Bases and Stations and this presented some difficulties, because half the Group was still in the parent/satellite stage. Nevertheless, the difficulties were soon overcome, and the scheme became a working proposition.
The advantages have been manifest from the outset. Messages are handed to the teleprinter operator as soon as they are written out, and are teleprinted at once. The broadcast remains set up as long as planning continues, and handles no other traffic; it is strictly unidirectional. The moment messages are received at Bases and Stations they are handed into the Ops. Room. Thus the overall delay has been cut to the absolute minimum. At the same time speech circuits and “scrambler” phones have been relieved of a tremendous load, and are free for conferences and for the passing of sudden changes of planning detail. In addition to these points, the broadcast network has proved so efficient that operations can now be laid on at extremely short notice, e.g. thirty minutes between time of laying on and time of Flight Planning, a state of affairs quite unthinkable more than 12 months ago.
[Underlined] SIGNALS SECURITY. [/underlined]
Now that the Hun has lost his radiolocation network in France and the Low Countries, it is more than ever necessary that the maintenance of R/T, W/T and Radar silence should be strictly applied in accordance with briefing instructions. He must also never be allowed to note the difference between an operational and a non-operational day. In this connection, the following inadvertent radiation of intercom. on H/F R/T was actually heard by Waddington during a recent daylight operational take off:-
First Dim Wit: “What is going on down there?”
Second Dim Wit: “It is an Ops take off.”
First Dim Wit: “Where are we?”
Second Dim Wit: “Waddington.”
First Dim Wit: “I suppose their satellite is u/s.”
Needless to say, callsigns were not employed in this tea-time chatter otherwise there would have been most serious repercussions for someone.
[Underlined] CODES AND CYPHERS. [/underlined]
1944 saw a radical change in the cypher policy in Bomber Command. In January all cypher facilities were withdrawn from Stations, and Group assumed the responsibility for this traffic, transmitting it to Bases in plain language either by “scrambler”, teleprinter or postagram.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
This released two Section Officers from each Base, who were replaced by one Flight Officer, who became a librarian of all secret and confidential publications.
Early in the year R.A.F. Cypher Sergeants were posted into the Group to gain experience before overseas service, and they are now doing vital work in our forward communications in the battle zone.
Life went on uneventfully at Group until shortly before ‘D’ Day, when only the chosen few and the cypher officers knew the actual time and date of the invasion.
And then again, from early in September until the sinking of the Tirpitz, the Group Cypher Office enjoyed a spell of heavy traffic. After some difficulty in obtaining speedy transmission of messages, direct communication was obtained with Archangel, thus making it possible to deliver in Russia deciphered messages within one hour of origination.
It is occasions like these that relieve the dull monotony of a Cypher Officer’s life – the perpetual routine messages and amending and checking of documents – and make them feel that they are perhaps of some slight use.
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
Throughout December a large decrease in the number of W/T Controllers’ tests, due to adverse weather conditions, has shown that every available opportunity must be taken by the wireless operator (air) to carry out these tests. This requires good co-operation between the Signals Leader and the Squadron and Flight Commanders, and Signals Leaders must ensure that they carry out their part in placing all their requirements before these people, who will do their best to meet these requirements.
During December, 20 tests were carried out, and of these, 16 passed as fit for W/T Controller’s duties. The Squadrons who carried out these successful tests were:-
83 Squadron – 4
97 Squadron – 1
44 Squadron – 2
57 Squadron – 4
630 Squadron – 2
227 Squadron – 1
50 Squadron – 2
Controlled Operations.
Reception of W/T messages transmitted by the W/T Links was again very satisfactory. The standard of operating by the Link operators was quite good, though there is still room for improvement in procedure. Study of 5 Group Air Staff Instructions Sigs/1, and constant practice will eliminate these small mistakes. The transmission of the “Target Attacked” signals presents no problems to our operators, and we are
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] SIGNALS. [/underlined]
happy to state that up to date there have been no failures in this respect – keep it up.
[Underlined] Group W/T Exercise. [/underlined]
Despite the re-arranging of sections and times of this exercise, the results are far from satisfactory. Signals Leaders must have a drive on getting every Wireless Operator (Air) in their squadrons to take part in at least one exercise per month. The number of crews per squadron are such that, even if they have been operating the previous night there should still be available a quota of operators to carry out these exercises the following morning. If they are being detailed for other duties, point out the requirements of this exercise to your Squadron Commander. He will co-operate.
[Underlined] Points for Signals Leaders. [/underlined]
During the past year, Wireless Operators (Air) of this Group have shown that they can carry out most duties assigned to them, but a summary of the year’s work reveals that there are still a few loopholes in their work which require filling up. For instance, the number of manipulation failures for the year was 20. Now this is a very small percentage of the sorties flown, but it can and must be reduced until in 5 Group such a thing as a manipulation failure ceases to exist. Never let it be said that the equipment is better than the man. Also, the reception of, and action on, diversion messages still leaves much to be desired. These, and other weak points can only be overcome by proper instruction and practice.
[Underlined] Categorisation. [/underlined]
Now that the majority of Squadrons have an Analysis Officer attached for categorisation duties, the results of their labour should soon be forthcoming and all Wireless Operators categorised when they arrive on the Squadron, and at their 10, 20 and 30 sortie checks. The standard categorisation paper has met with universal approval and it now rests with the Signals Leader and his assistant to ensure that these tests are carried out as instructed.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] navigation
[Underlined] REVIEW OF NAVIGATION FOR THE YEAR, 1944. [/underlined]
During the past 12 months many innovations and improvements in Navigation have been initiated by No. 5 Group. The most notable of these are:-
(i) Introduction of the A.P.I. attachment, which ensures more accurate windfinding for bombing.
(ii) Introduction of the A.P.I. and A.P.I. attachment windfinding drills.
(iii) A reduction in the practice bombing vector error from 9 m.p.h. in January to 3.4 m.p.h. in December as a result of (i) and (ii) above. Also a corresponding decrease in the operational bombing wind finding errors, although this fact is difficult to determine for obvious reasons.
(iv) New log and chart work procedure, in which all duplication of work is eliminated.
(v) Introduction of the Categorisation scheme.
(vi) Appointment of Navigation Analysis Officers.
(vii) Reduction of the “Spread” of aircraft on operations from a concentration box 100 miles x 50 miles in January to a concentration box 50 miles x 25 miles in December. (Room for still more improvement here).
(viii) Elimination of Astro and a consequent increased amount of time available for teaching more essential subjects.
The most notable of these new activities were the Categorisation Scheme, coupled with the appointment of Analysis Officers and the monumental decrease in bombing wind finding errors. They have greatly increased the standard of navigation and bombing accuracy.
This improvement in navigation must continue and be accelerated. Suggestions as to how the present standard and technique can be further improved will be welcomed. So, go to it, and don’t be afraid to voice your opinions and suggestions – and make sure that 1945 is a year of Victory.
[Underlined] IMPORTANCE OF ACCURATE TRACK KEEPING AND TIMING. [/underlined]
The general standard of track keeping and timing which was achieved on the shorter range operations is still being maintained on the longer range sorties we are now undertaking. There are [underlined] STILL, [/underlined] however, a few STRAGGLERS. No matter what is said or done either by Group Headquarters or the Station and Squadron Navigation Officers the percentage of stragglers still remains the same. A few of them are unavoidable, e.g. genuine compass failure, late take off, failure of all Navigation instruments combined with sudden wind change; but the majority are due either to poor and indifferent navigation or else a lack of understanding of modern tactics.
Aircraft in the concentration enjoy first the protection afforded by other aircraft, second the protection of “Window” and
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
third the protection of the countermeasures provided by No.100 Group aircraft. It is therefore impossible for a fighter, once he has got into the stream, to home on to an individual aircraft in that concentration. On the other hand, it will be very simple for the fighter to home on to any straggler, because that aircraft will be isolated from the concentration and will therefore stand out. This applies to aircraft who are out in timing, as well as off track.
Concentration in both track keeping and timing is also a safeguard against flak. It is obvious that a compact mass of aircraft will completely black out a Cathode Ray tube, and make it impossible for any one aircraft to be singled out for attack. Also it is equally obvious that the chance of being hit is considerably diminished as all aircraft are passing through the defended area in a very short space of time.
So now you know!! Keep on track and on time throughout the whole operation and minimise tour chance of being shot down.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING VECTOR ERRORS. [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by squadrons this month is 4 m.p.h. exactly. This figure is an increase of .2 m.p.h. on last month’s figure. It is only fair to state, however, that much of the practice bombing this month has been done by the new crews, and this fact may account for the slight increase in the vector error. Remember the goal we set ourselves last month – an average vector error of below 3 m.p.h. Can we achieve it? The answer is YES – but only if EVERY navigator does his very best on every exercise. Let us start the New Year well and achieve our goal in the first month.
[Table of Average Practice Vector Errors by Squadron]
97 Squadron have been rising rapidly in this table and have now reached second place. Well done, and it is hoped that your ambition does not end there, but that you will go on and beat 9 Squadron, who have held the lead for seven consecutive months.
No.56 Base are still in the bottom half of the list. Next month we hope to see all their squadrons at least six places higher. What about it, No.56 Base?
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] THIS MONTH’S Bouquets [Drawing]
The names of the eight navigators, two from each Base, who submitted the best work this month are set out below. They have been chosen for their consistently accurate and methodical work, which includes good track keeping and timing, constant wind velocity and ETA checks and log and chart work of a very high order.
F/Sgt. Leigh – 106 Squadron
S/Ldr. Burnside – 97 Squadron
F/O. Reeves – 61 Squadron
F/Sgt. Edwards – 467 Squadron
F/Sgt. Treadwell – 189 Squadron
Sgt. Smith – 49 Squadron
W/O. Rose – 619 Squadron
F/Lt. De Friend DFM – 57 Squadron
P/O Searle, 227 Squadron, who has appeared in the last two summaries and W/O Murray, 50 Squadron, who appeared in the last summary, have both again submitted work of an exceptionally high standard. This is an excellent performance on the part of these two navigators and we congratulate them.
They have been omitted from this month’s list however, so as to give the remainder of the Group a chance!
[Underlined] UNION NEWS. [/underlined]
F/Lt. De Friend, D.F.M. – No.57 Squadron Navigation Officer, to be Station Navigation Officer, Fulbeck. Now S/Ldr.
[Underlined] ANALYSIS AND CATEGORISATION. [/underlined]
The Navigation Analysis is going very well. Analysis Officers on all Squadrons are doing an important job in a very efficient manner. Theirs is a tiresome and tedious job, but, if it is done conscientiously and well, it will pay handsome dividends in the form of better and more accurate navigation. It is to be hoped that all navigators are taking advantage of this extra service and are liaisoning [sic] with the analysis officers. Listen to what they have to say, note where you lost marks on your last sortie, and then follow their recommendations, and those if the Station Navigation Officer.
Lack of system is causing an appreciable loss of marks to some navigators, this applies particularly to the new crews. Working to a system will halve your navigational difficulties. The time to complete each cycle of operations is left for you to decide, but it is always best to work on an easy fraction of an hour, e.g. 10, 12 or 15 minutes. No system should have a time interval of more than 15 minutes.
The categorisation scheme has been in operation for 4 months
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
now and is well established. It is interesting to note that over this period, the number of “A+” and “A” category navigators has risen from 116 (12 Squadrons) to 203 (14 Squadrons), and the number of “C” and “D” category navigators has been reduced from 63 (12 Squadrons) to 28 (14 Squadrons). These figures are very encouraging. We should, however, have NO “C” or “D” navigators in the Group. Station Navigation Officers and Analysis Officers must concentrate on these crews until they reach at least the “B” category.
[Underlined] BRIEFING. [/underlined]
It has often been said that a really first class briefing is half the operation. Whether that statement is strictly accurate or not is difficult to say, but it is a fact that a well briefed crew has a far better chance of completing a successful sortie, no matter how adverse the conditions, than a badly briefed crew.
One or two navigation briefings which have been attended during the last month have been below the standard required. Station and Squadron Navigation Officers must pay particular attention to this aspect of their work. The most noticeable faults of briefing officers are:-
(i) Speaking too quickly;
(ii) Not raising their voice;
(iii) Speaking with a cigarette or pipe in the mouth;
(iv) Rushing through important details and not repeating them at least once;
(v) Failing to give a little advice on navigational details, particularly to the inexperienced navigators.
Navigation officers, do any of these faults apply to you? If so, then remedy them immediately, and give your navigators a chance. Squadron Navigation Officers should detail two deputies and train them to give a good briefing, so that a high standard will always be maintained.
Navigators do you always get the most out of each briefing? Do you listen to all the valuable information and advice given you and do you use it, or are you one of those people who knows all the answers and just don’t listen to the briefing officer. If so, then revise your ideas immediately. No matter how rushed you are, always listen to the Briefing Officer and make notes of all the important points. That extra 10 minutes attention in the briefing room will save you many a headache on the operation. Once you are airborne it is too late to remember something which you forgot to ask in the briefing room.
[Underlined] SAFETY HEIGHTS. [/underlined]
With the present tactics of flying low over parts of the Continent, it is essential to know the safety heights along the route. Do YOU always note the safety heights along the track and also for a distance 20 or 30 miles either side of track, just in case? Mark the spot heights in feet, on your plotting chart. This will act as a double check.
Several reports have been received from crews in recent weeks of aircraft crashing into high ground when flying low. None of these reports have yet been corroborated, but they may be true. So take warning and don’t end your days on the side of a mountain. It’s too cold this weather anyway.
Remember that spot heights on a topographical map of the Continent are always given in metres, with the exception of the Straits
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
of Dover sheet. All spot heights for Great Britain are given in feet.
[Underlined] SELF-ANALYSIS CHART. [/underlined]
Here is the second analysis chart fir you to complete. If you missed the fist one for any reason look it up now and answer those questions too.
(i) Have you read and do you know all the Air Staff Instructions and 5 Group Drills which apply to YOU?
(ii) Do you know all your compass drills?
(iii) Do you know the maximum coverage of each Gee chain and which is the best chain to use over (a) North Western Germany, (b) Southern France, (c) Frisian Islands, (d) Paris area, (e) North West Denmark?
(iv) Do you know the maximum height at which H2S should be switched on?
(v) Do you know the position on the return journey of an operation, from which you are allowed to relax your timing? Do you know why you are allowed to relax timing from this position, and why this position was chosen?
(vi) Do you know [underlined] all [/underlined] the Group flight plan speeds for climbing, diving, straight and level flight, with and without a bomb load?
(vii) Do you always fill in your Form 2330 correctly and hand it to the Me. Officer on return?
(viii) Do you always pass the drift to the pilot after each alteration of course, especially on the run up to the target?
(ix) Do you always check your altimeter with the pilot’s when descending, and do you regularly check your A.S.I. with the pilot’s? When there is a discrepancy between the two A.S.I’s which do you take as being accurate?
(x) Do you always make allowance for time of turn when altering course, e.g. 1/4 minute before E.T.A. for turns up to 30°, 1/2 minute between 31° and 60°, and 3/4 minute between 61° and 100°
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] radar nav:
[Underlined] REVIEW FOR THE YEAR 1944. [/underlined]
During the past 12 months considerable strides have been made by No.5 Group both with the introduction of new Radar navigational aids, and in the use of those that existed prior to the beginning of the year. The most notable have been:-
(i) The introduction of H2S MK.II into Nos. 44, 207 and 619 Squadrons.
(ii) The introduction of H2S MK.III into No.54 Base.
(iii) The introduction of an H2S categorisation scheme at Coningsby in order to ascertain the most efficient blind marker crews.
(iv) Experiments at Coningsby to determine the efficiency of H2S MK.III and the production of specially selected MK.III equipment to give far more efficient blind marking than before.
(v) Incorporation of the 184 indicator in H2S MK.III, which has enabled a blind bombing technique of releasing direct on the response to the developed to a high standard of proficiency. [sic]
(vi) The introduction of H2S photography both on MK.II and MK.III squadrons from which it has been possible to ascertain the positions of release of mines and T.I’s and also give us considerable H2S cover of the Continent.
(vii) The introduction of the R.F. Unit 27 for use with the Gee receiver.
(viii) Consequent upon the invasion of Europe, the introduction of Continental Gee chains which give more accurate coverage over Western Germany.
(ix) The introduction of Loran, which has resulted in long distance fixing, and a consequent improvement in D.R. navigation.
(x) The appointment of Station Radar Navigation Officers who are responsible for the application of, and training in, Radar Navigational aids throughout the Group.
Most notable of the above activities were the experiments at Coningsby, which have resulted in a considerable decrease in blind marking errors, and have produced equipment which has given far better responses on the H2S MK.III P.P.I. than ever before. Coupled with this is the introduction of Loran into the whole of the aircraft in No.5 Group, which has further raised the standard of navigation, and resulted in fixes being obtained over various areas of enemy territory with considerable success and without enemy interference of any kind. This was an ambitious scheme as it involved the fitting of all aircraft and the training of all navigators within a period of six to eight weeks, and great credit is due to the Radar sections and Loran Instructors for carrying it out without a hitch.
This improvement in navigation must continue and be accelerated in the forth coming year, not only by the introduction of new Radar
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
navigational aids, but by the raising of the standard of efficiency of the present equipment. Suggestions as to how this can be done will be welcome. Do not be afraid to let us have your ideas and opinions. No matter how trivial they may seem to you, they may have far reaching effects if applied throughout the whole Group. If you do this far better Radar navigation facilities may come into being, and possibly help to win the victory this year.
[Underlined] LORAN. [/underlined]
The majority of operators have made good use of this aid during the month and much information has been obtained on the operational value of the chain.
A summary of results obtained on the three long range operations is as follows:-
[Underlined] MUNICH [/underlined] Rate 4 signals, particularly the Master signal, were weaker than usual with considerable splitting, thus decreasing the value of the S.S. Chain as a whole on this particular sortie. Rate 5 signals were much stronger than previously reported, perhaps due to the southerly route taken. Investigations have been made into the possible causes of the difficulties experienced and have rather indicated that weather conditions were the primary cause of the Rate 4 signals’ weakness, as the worst meteorological conditions lay between the Rate 4 Master Station and the route taken. A plot of the first and last fixes taken on this operation indicates, however, that despite the difficulties outlined, Loran could have been used from 0400E on the outward route on 0700E on the return route. It is apparent from this plot that many operators did not make full use of this aid, and it can only be assumed that they did not persevere with the equipment to ensure fixing at frequent intervals.
The procedure of watching the signals and taking readings between splitting cannot be too highly stressed. A visit to the Radar Section at night now and again and watching the S.S. Loran Chain on the bench set will prove of great value if you wish to become really efficient on this excellent navigational aid.
[Underlined] GDYNIA & POLITZ [/underlined] Much to the surprise of the majority of Loran operators exceptional coverage was obtained on these attacks. Although the routes lay mainly outside the service area, signals were strong and fairly easily recognisable, and a considerable number of operators were able to obtain fixes from the Danish Coast to the target and return. Once again, however, the first and last fixes plotted indicate that operators are not persevering. It is appreciated that many little difficulties crop up in flight but when Loran is the only aid available there can be little excuse for not endeavouring to use it.
It should be possible to obtain a first and last fix plot which shows a concentration of fixes at the point of entry into the service area and another concentration at the target. Whether or not this can be achieved is entirely up to the skill and initiative of every individual operator.
The main snags encountered on operations this month were:-
(i) Incorrect alignment of dividers.
(ii) Dampness.
(iii) H2S interference.
(iv) Difficulties with the trailing aerial.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
Divider trouble appears to be an inherent fault of this equipment and has occurred more frequently in the past few weeks due to dampness. Switching the set on and leaving it for a little while to dry out may cure the trouble due to dampness. If the set does not react, then it is up to the operator to carry out the correct alignment procedure. Screwdrivers are trickling through slowly, and when all operators are equipped failures due to divider trouble should be things of the past.
In addition to divider trouble, there are still some operators who report equipment unserviceable although on check nothing can be found wrong. In the majority of these cases the remedy is simple such as turning up the brilliance, switching on the master switch, or checking and replacing blown fuses – small points but essential ones, and if you know your Loran Aircraft Drill you should have little trouble from this source.
As regards snags (ii) to (iv) the Radar Sections are working out means of counteracting efficiently the snags which have cropped up from these sources, and we expect to hear of their solution any day. 55 Base are busy with a fixed aerial which has already been used on operations with success.
Further trials are to be carried out and if successful it is intended to adopt this aerial throughout Group.
[Underlined] GEE. [/underlined]
Gee has again proved the most valuable navigation aid during the month, although from maximum fix plots it is evident that operators are still failing to obtain maximum coverage from the Continental chains.
With little or no jamming reported on the Continental chains there should be little difficulty in obtaining fixes to maximum range, and the spread between maximum fixes obtained by squadrons should be less than 1/2 a degree and not 3 degrees as is the case at the present time. The fact that all squadrons are also using Loran should not prevent operators from obtaining an occasional Gee fix as a check.
Due to circumstances beyond control, one of the Ruhr Gee Chain Stations has had to be moved away from the vicinity of the front line. This Stations [sic] has been re-sited and the Ruhr Chain has been renamed the Cologne Chain. Topographical Charts have been issued but once the front line is again stabilised it is anticipated the Ruhr Chain will once again come into being.
News has also been received of new lattice charts to a scale of one million. These charts covering the London-Berlin and London-Munich areas will give the lattice lines for the Continental Gee chains and they should be in general use by the end of January.
Navigators are reminded that the Eastern Chain is now phased for a point in the North Sea, and that inaccuracies occur in the chain South of a line Calais to Frankfurt. If you are flying below this line remember the fixes you obtain should be from either the Ruhr or Reims Chain and [underlined] not [/underlined] the Eastern Chain.
[Underlined] H2S [/underlined]
H2S Mark II have been used on two occasions during the month, and operators, despite their various activities with Gee and Loran,
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] RADAR NAVIGATION. [/underlined]
managed to obtain good results on the equipment. This is evident from the excellent P.P.I. photographs which have been produced both of the targets and landmarks on track. It is, however, evident from H2S reports that many operators are still failing to use H2S (when they can) for a check on the target. Although you are bombing visually, there is no reason why you should not set up your H2S for blind bombing – the Air Bomber’s remark “Bombs gone” will serve as an admirable check on your estimation of the release point on H2S.
The highlight of this month’s activities with H2S Mark III has been the introduction of H2S Mark IIIE which gives much more clearly defined response and incorporates sector scan. So far blind bombing errors on this equipment have averaged .4 of a mile. In addition a new scanner has been manufactured which is practically perfect, and it is anticipated will give far better reception on the P.P.I. than before. Further tests are being carried out before any general statement as to its efficiency is made.
Intense interest has been shown in this Group’s challenge to 8 (P.F.F.) Group for an inter-Group Blind Bombing Competition which 8 (P.F.F.) Group have accepted.
The final details of the competition are almost complete and the contest will take place during January on the neutral Bombing Range. Good luck 54 Base and may the best side win.
H2S Photography has improved considerably during the month with both Mark II and Mark III squadrons producing excellent results. Revised H2S Photographic Instructions have been issued, and every operator should visit the Photographic Section and acquaint himself with the provisions laid down in these instructions.
Once again the reputation of the Group has been maintained on Gardening sorties. Both photographs and plots indicate that plantings have been in the correct furrows. These results indicate that despite restrictions, operators can still use H2S efficiently when required.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] air bombing
1944 has been a year of exceptional progress from the bombing aspect of the activities of the Group. The average crew error for December 1943 was 295 yards at 20,000 feet, and our present results have not been achieved without a sustained effort on the part of everybody concerned to reduce that figure to the present error of 171 yards at 20,000 feet.
Changes have taken place in equipment and methods of training during the past year, and all possible means of improving the bombing accuracy of the Group have been investigated and, where possible, put into operation. The more important changes were as follows:-
The introduction of a completely new method of Bombing Analysis and the provision of a tour-expired Air Bomber to conduct the analysis on each squadron.
The categorisation of all crews on their ability to bomb accurately.
The installation of the Mark XIVA Bombsight.
A drive on the crew aspect of bombing training and the installation of Automatic Observers and sensitive skid recorders in selected squadrons to determine the errors due to inaccurate flying.
Permission to build two new targets at Wainfleet was obtained, and clearance for local dropping of T.I’s was granted.
A quarterly inter-squadron bombing competition was started, the winning squadron to hold a splendid trophy presented by Lord Camrose.
Crews were instructed to bomb on briefed tracks to provide training in operational methods.
An extension of flashlight targets took place early in the year but other commitments have caused the reduction of flashlight facilities at the present time.
Improved methods of transmitting bombing results from ranges has provided means of early analysis and assessment.
The two most notable events were the introduction of the new form of bombing analysis and the system of categorisation of crews on their ability to bomb accurately. Bombing analysis provides a method of determining the source of errors and has produced an excellent standard of wind finding, and bombsight maintenance, but it will not provide the maximum benefit until every captain studies the analysis of the exercises completed by his crew, and ensures that everything possible is being done to eliminate errors.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
The categorisation of crews, although based on practice bombing only, does give an indication of a crew’s ability on operations. When a crew obtains an A+ or A category it proves three things:-
(i) The Captain can make an accurate bombing run with no skidding turns or sudden changes in the flying attitude of the aircraft.
(ii) The Navigator can find a good wind.
(iii) The Air Bomber knows how to use his bombsight correctly and can guide the bombsight graticule [underlined] on [/underlined] to the target and not merely in the vicinity of the target.
It is reasonable to suppose that a bombing team displaying these qualities on a practice target can reproduce similar efficiency on a real precision target, but it would be unreasonable to suppose that a crew obtaining ‘C’ or ‘D’ category results during practice will obtain better results on a real target. Therefore it is essential that Squadron Commanders and Flight Commanders make every effort to provide these low category crews with as many opportunities as possible to improve their position.
The weather experienced recently, plus unavoidable commitments has reduced the time available for training, but a study of the summary of practice bombing illustrates the disparity in the number of bombs dropped by various squadrons.
During the coming year it will be more necessary than ever to maintain steady progress in bombing accuracy, targets will grow smaller and more valuable to the enemy. It is certain that the Hun will make strenuous efforts to defend them; his defences can be outwitted, but it is all of no avail if the percentage of bombs required to demolish a target fails to hit that target. A continuance of progress already made, and a repetition of the excellent co-operation existing between our crews, armourers and bombsight maintenance staffs will make an early end to the War something more than wishful thinking.
[Underlined] BOMBING RANGES. [/underlined]
The lifting of black-out restrictions on certain areas is causing some confusion in the identification of bombing ranges at night, and it is only by good fortune that serious accidents have been avoided. Bombing Leaders must make sure that crews taking off on a night bombing detail are conversant with the lighting arrangements at the Practice target. The installation of illuminated signal arrows on all Bomber Command ranges should eliminate any doubts concerning identification, and it is expected that all crews know the provisions of 5 Group Air Staff Instruction BL.24.
Another point which is not receiving the necessary attention is the firing of smoke-puffs during a practice bombing exercise. At least one smoke-puff [underlined] must [/underlined] be fired during every exercise, and to enable the range staff to find an accurate wind the smoke-puff must be fired directly over the range signals area. Some smoke-puffs intended for Epperstone have been fired over Nottingham, and the Hill’s Mirror (Observation) is not sufficiently mobile to cope with these approximations.
[Underlined] THE “LORD CAMROSE” TROPHY. [/underlined]
The trophy, awarded to the squadron producing the best average crew error over a period of three months, is leaving Skellingthorpe
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBER. [/underlined]
for Bardney. No.9 Squadron has achieved an outstanding result with an average crew error of 127 yards for 570 bombs, during the months of October, November and December. No.50 Squadron made a gallant attempt to retain the trophy for the third successive occasion, but their average crew error of 139 yards for 420 bombs during the same period only took them to second place.
No.9 Squadron’s success was made possible by the hard work and co-operation of all concerned with the bombing effort, and it will be necessary for other squadrons to obtain extraordinarily good results if the trophy is to change hands at the end of March.
Well done No.9 Squadron!!!
[Underlined] BOMBING ANALYSIS. [/underlined]
56 Base (S/Ldr. Walmsley) is making efforts to find ways and means of obtaining a true wind for purposes of bombing analysis. The method now adopted seems promising and after an extended trial it might be worthy of adoption by all Bases. A smoke-puff is fired at the commencement of the exercise and the wind found is recorded at the range. At the end of the exercise, when times and headings are passed to the Range, the A.P.I. wind used for the exercise and the A.P.I. wind found from the positions recorded during the exercise are both transmitted to the Range. All three winds are then sent on the same signal as the bombing results e.g.
SP 300/40
API 290/39
MAPI 305/42
If a squadron carries out four exercises it can be seen that twelve winds are easily available for analysis purposes.
[Underlined] SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION. [/underlined]
[Underlined] SQUADRON AVERAGE BOMBING ERROR FOR 8 EXERCISES. [/underlined]
1st 97 80
2nd 463 87
3rd 9 89
4th 630 95
5th 50 97
6th 467 106
7th 207 107
8th 619 108
9th 49 116
The remaining squadrons did not complete sufficient exercises to submit an entry.
No.97 Squadron have headed the Group competition after being placed second last month. Their effort during this month was undoubtedly the best in the Group, both in numbers and quality, and the Squadron is to be congratulated on the results. The efficiency of a squadron is reflected in the condition of its various Sections, and the Bombing Section at 97 Squadron H.Q. is an example of what it should be.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] DECEMBER’S OOUSTANDING CREW ERRORS. [/underlined]
SQDN. PILOT AIR BOMBER NAVIGATOR ERROR AT 20,000 FT. IN YARDS
44 F/O Daggett F/O Sharpe F/O Hindlay 55
50 F/O Lillies F/O Skinner Sgt Tye 71
189 F/O Herbert F/O Cottier F/O Skinner 43
207 F/O Cook F/S Boddy F/S D’Arcy 75
227 F/O Skipworth Sgt Steadman Sgt Ward 72
617 F/O Leavitt F/S Oldman F/O Withams 49
F/O Flatman F/O Kelly F/O McKie 53
F/L Dobson F/O Johnstone P/O Knight 55
619 F/L Brown F/S Meakin F/O Thanes 68
5 LFS F/O Blair F/S Bethune F/S McShane 74
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORISATION [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categorisations by Base]
Crews are categorised on the average crew error of their last three bombing exercises and the following limitations apply to the various categories:-
A+ 85 yards or less
A 140 yards or less
B 210 yards or less
C 280 yards or less
D Over 280 yards
All A+ crews can be congratulated on the exceptional standard of accuracy and efficiency attained by the bombing teams. It is not just luck which produces results, methodical work and attention to detail is the basis of accurate bombing.
[Underlined] AIR BOMBER QUIZ [/underlined]
1. What are the safety heights for the release of a 4000 lb. bomb over land and water?
2. What suction recordings must be obtained to ensure full bombsight serviceability?
3. What prevents condensation on the lens of the collimator?
4. Is it possible to do a “lights” check with bomb doors closed?
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
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[Underlined] AIR BOMBING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE. [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Results by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] engineering
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES FOR THE YEAR 1944. [/underlined]
On the completion of the first full year of Base Organisation, progress can now be reviewed. For inclusion in this Summary such a review must necessarily be very brief, but it is the intention to produce one in detail under separate cover so that lessons learnt during the year can be made clear, and faults can be analysed and suggestions made for improvements.
53 and 54 Bases have completed a full year unhindered by unheavals [sic]. 51 Base after a long period of excellent work in the Group transferred their affection wholly to 7 Group on formation of the separate training group. 56 Base, which was the original 52 Base at Scampton had unfortunately to break down their organisation at Scampton and rebuild it on new ground at Syerston. This did not retard progress to a great extent, but the smooth running efficiency of the Base Organisation was some weeks getting into its stride again. 55 Base is our only Base which is formed on a war-time station, and has been functioning as such for the latter half of the year; the problems of the economical and efficient running of this type of Base vary from those which are housed on stations built to peace-time design.
The basic principle behind the original scheme of Base organisation is the economy in man power, material and equipment, and this economy has been implemented in the Bases in 5 Group since their formation.
Conservation of equipment is the key note of serviceability. The least line of resistance is to remove an unserviceable item of equipment from an aircraft and fit a new item from the main stores caring little of what happens to the unserviceable item removed, which is returned to the main stores for ultimate transfer to a Repairable Equipment Depot. There is no doubt that up to a point, serviceability can be maintained with this short-sighted outlook; but by this means much equipment is en route between stations and R.E.D’s and between R.E.D’s and repair contractors, and much more is heaped up outside these various places waiting repair. So there must come a day when many particular items are in very short supply. By taking full advantage of the Base organisation and the repair facilities of the Base Major Servicing Sub-sections, the unserviceable item removed can be repaired and kept in circuit. It can be used time and time again, maintained in a serviceable condition, and a good Base can pay a dividend rather than rely on a subsidy. Such conservation of equipment has been made possible by the formation of the Base specialist repair bays, i.e. hydraulics, pneumatics, tyres, brakes, sparking plugs, propellers, metal repairs, modifications, power plants, instrument and electrical sections.
Much thought has been given to the building and improvement of these specialist bays and, for instance, the spark plug cleaning is now in its correct perspective. Due to a large amount of pressure and powers of local purchase being brought to bear, ideal cleaning and test equipment is available in Bases in this Group, and Bases are
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ENGINEERING. [/underlined]
capable of catering for cleaning and testing up to a thousand plugs a day. As Base organisation was a scheme devised subsequent to the building and planning of stations, no designed housing for the various sections was available; therefore improvisation of certain other rooms, buildings and sections has been necessary by local initiative. The equipment required for the repair and testing od the hundreds of components has not been available through Service sources, as the requirement at the time of Base sub-section organisation was not known to higher authority. Therefore local initiative was brought to bear again, and Base major servicing sections are now in possession of excellent test equipment which will cater for the efficient testing of the various services.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY. [/underlined]
[Table of 5 LFS Serviceability]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] training
[Underlined] PROGRESS DURING THE YEAR. [/underlined]
There were numerous changes and developments in training throughout 1944 to meet operational requirements and to deal with new equipment, particularly Radar devices. As a background to all that was new there was a constant pressure on basic flying and operational procedure in an endeavour to improve standards and enable crews to raid successfully in more rigorous conditions.
On other pages of this Summary, developments in training are dealt with in detail. The main task has been to produce sufficient crews of a good standard to do the job, and at the same time to form new squadrons.
The year opened with the Training Units in the throes of conversion to Stirling aircraft and the L.F.S. in its infancy. This 2-type training on 4 engined aircraft created many problems which made the life of aircrew under training extremely strenuous. New, at the end of the year a change-over is again in progress, but squadrons fortunately have a surplus of crews to help them through the Winter months until “all through” Lancaster training is in full swing.
Among the many new features introduced into training, the Categorisation of aircrew members was perhaps the most interesting and represents an attempt to increase the individual efficiency by frequent detailed tests of his ability and analysis of his results. As an essential part of this policy, various instructors and Analysis Officers were appointed to squadrons and the value of their work was soon evident.
Crew members thus have the opportunity of finding out quickly where they are wrong, why they are wrong and what they can do to improve their efficiency. Squadron Commanders and Specialist Officers can also place their fingers quickly on the weak spots in crews.
The year also saw the introduction of No.5 Group Aircraft Drills, Check Lists in aircraft, and the addition of several new and important Air Staff Instructions; one of the latest and most important being “Precautions against Hazards in Conditions of Cumulo Nimbus Cloud”.
Other new features were the production of the new Lancaster Aircrew Quiz and the standard No.5 Group Link Trainer Syllabus which was produced to meet the particular requirements of four engined pilots. All these things provide sufficient material for crews to “find the answers” if they are in doubt and give instructors the facts necessary for the production of high standard crews.
Figures are not the final measure of effort, and “figure chasing” invariably defeats its purpose. They do, however, provide a basis for comparison and do indicate if an effort is being made. The final measure comes in the assessment of raid damage, the casualty lists and the squadron record of early returns and abortive sorties.
It is interesting to note, therefore, that parallel to the
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING. [/underlined]
increase in sorties flown and bombs dropped, training hours and figures have also improved. The total of practice bombs dropped has increased and the error has gone down. Assessable fighter affiliation exercises have more than doubled themselves, and in particular, night affiliation grew from nothing to a satisfactory total of nearly 350 exercises in the first month of the Winter. Navigation errors came down. Link Trainer hours rose steadily and instrument flying standards improved – a little slowly perhaps but the ground was ploughed.
There must be no relaxation in training during 1945. It has no saturation point.
[Underlined] EVENTS DURING DECEMBER. [/underlined]
The exceptionally bad weather during December made regular training difficult, but despite this, Squadron Instructors completed 102 Category Checks, leaving 159 Category Checks to be done to give every pilot in the Group a Category. There are now 185 pilots in the Group holding Categories. Nos. 54 and 55 Bases are well behind the other Bases in their category tests. The following table shows the state of categorisation of pilots in the Group:-
[Underlined] CATEGORY OF PILOTS. [/underlined]
[Table of Pilot Categories by Base]
Total squadron training amounted to 2200 hours – a very big increase on the previous month owing to the weather. Of this total 1650 hours were by day and 550 by night. The average per squadron was 122 hours. Six squadrons were very low on the list – No.61 Squadron did 50 hours; 189 Squadron 58 hours; 227 Squadron 64 hours; 630 Squadron 65 hours; 44 Squadron 85 hours. It is hoped all these squadrons will double their efforts during January.
[Underlined] NO. 5 L.F.S. REPORT. [/underlined]
No. 5 L.F.S. produced 73 crews for squadrons at an average of 13 hours per crew. The Unit flew 1100 hours. Loran training was given during December, and bombing results showed improvement on November.
[Underlined] 1690 B.D.T. FLIGHT. [/underlined]
The Flight was “grounded” by weather for 14 days, but they flew whenever squadrons asked for details. A total of 252 day details and 91 night details were flown. This included 97 da details and 41 night details for No.75 Base.
Total hours for the Flight were 323, and the average hours per aircraft on charge was 24. Pilots averaged 18 hours per month.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] INSTRUMENT FLYING AND LINK [/underlined]
During the Winter of 1943 there was definite evidence that the standard of instrument flying was not sufficient to meet all the requirements of operational flying in conditions of adverse weather, and special attention was paid to this phase of flying throughout 1944. A summary of the action taken to improve instrument flying throughout the Group is tabulated below:-
(i) More flying on primary instruments, by the inclusion of specific exercises in the Heavy Conversion Units, and the inclusion of a test on this point in the Pilot’s Category Check.
(ii) A revival of the use of the “hood” to provide more genuine I.F. practice in the air in day light.
(iii) The issue of a standard 5 Group Link Trainer Syllabus to meet the particular requirements of pilots of four engined aircraft (corkscrew on instruments, and flying on primary instruments only, etc.).
(iv) A modification to the Link Trainer to enable the Artificial Horizon and Directional Gyro to be “toppled” during an exercise.
(v) The introduction of a new type Artificial Horizon with a reduced turn error.
(vi) The acquisition of additional Link Trainers and Instructors towards the end of the year, which now gives each squadron one machine and one instructor.
The effort made is revealed by the fact the Squadron Link Trainer hours rose from 495 hours in December, 1943, to 1804 hours in December, 1944 – just short of a four-fold increase. The new squadrons and new Link Trainers now make more practice easier, and the acid test is the squadron average spread equally over all pilots and flight engineers on strength, and most of all, the quality of the instrument flying.
December was the best month to date and congratulations go to Nos. 49, 467 and 50 Squadrons for having reached the target for pilots on the Link Trainer. This was the third consecutive month in which No.49 Squadron has reached their target. No.44 Squadron went very close to the squadron target of 132 hours, but the bulk of the time was done by the flight engineers, the pilots being below the average with a total of 44 hours.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] TRAINING. [/underlined]
[Underlined] LINK TRAINER TIMES. [/underlined]
[Table of Link Trainer Hours by Base and Squadron]
GRAND TOTAL – 1804 hrs.
ACTUAL AVERAGE PER SQUADRON – 78.8 hrs.
REQUIRED AVERAGE PER SQUADRON – 132 hrs.
+ SQUADRONS WHERE LINK TIMES ARE FAR TOO LOW.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
second thoughts for pilots
[Underlined] SWINGING ON TAKE-OFF. [/underlined]
There have been two swinging accidents on take off recently and on each occasion the Pilot flagrantly ignored the Lancaster Swinging Drill (No.5 Group Aircraft Drill No.5). Read the Drill through carefully again and make sure that both you and your Flight Engineer know it thoroughly.
[Underlined] FIDO LANDINGS. [/underlined]
The average hold-off tends to be too long and the landing too far up the runway. This is largely because Pilots, having an exaggerated idea of the bumpiness in the box, come in at too high an airspeed – 115 m.p.h. I.A.S. is quite sufficient. Check this tendency particularly when returning with full bomb load.
On the circuit “glare” makes it difficult to see other aircraft on the same level, or slightly above. Ensure a careful “circuit look-out” normally is maintained and that navigation, upper and lower identification lights are on.
Turn your cockpit lighting on full before entering the funnel. This will enable you to read your instruments in the glare on the approach.
[Underlined] OVERSHOOTING. [/underlined]
The following are the commonest causes of overshooting:-
(i) Airspeed too high on the approach into wind. It should be 120m.p.h. with a moderately laden aircraft on the initial approach, and [underlined] 105 – 110 m.p.h. over the boundary. [/underlined] With an all up weight of 55,000 lbs to 58,000 lbs. it should be 120 m.p.h. on the initial approach and [underlined] 115 m.p.h. over the boundary. [/underlined]
(ii) Too high over boundary. You should not be above 25 – 50 feet over the boundary by day or in the Green of the G.P.I. by night.
(iii) Throttles left open too long after the initial check thus prolonging the float.
[Underlined] LOSS OF CONTROL. [/underlined]
Straight and level instrument flying is fairly sound with the amount of practice that the average pilot has during training and operations, but instrument flying with Artificial Horizon or A.S.I. u/s, steep turns, combat manoeuvres, etc. are known to be weak through lack of practice. There is no reason why this weakness should exist as there are ample opportunities for instrument practice on N.F.T’s and training flights generally.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS. [/underlined]
[Underlined] CUMULO NIMBUS CLOUD. [/underlined]
Take special note of the new Air Staff Instruction Trg/6 – “Precautions against Hazards in conditions of Cumulo Nimbus Cloud”. This instruction contains three main points:-
(i) A Safety Area for climbing and descending.
(ii) A maximum height above which the aircraft is not to fly until it enters the Safety Area.
(iii) A minimum ”cross country” height above the cloud after climbing in the Safety Area.
Make sure you can see clear skies above by day or stars by night before climbing in the Safety Area. Do not fly in Cumulo Nimbus cloud. Turn round and fly clear.
[Drawing] Do [underlined] you [/underlined] always catch the “LATTICE LINE SPECIAL”
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] gunnery
[Underlined] “DECLINE AND FALL OF THE G.A.F.” [underlined]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
4/5.12.44 “P” – 106 Squadron – JU. 88
4/5.12.44 “Q” – 61 Squadron – ME.410
4/5.12.44 “M” – 189 Squadron – JU. 88
6/7.12.44 “V” – 630 Squadron -JU. 88
6/7.12.44 “B” – 57 Squadron – ME.110
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
6/7.12.44 “L” – 97 Squadron – JU. 88
6/7.12.44 “F” – 463 Squadron – ME.110
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
4/5.12.44 “A” – 619 Squadron – FW.190
4/5.12.44 “W” – 207 Squadron – JU. 88
4/5.12.44 “B” – 463 Squadron – JU. 88
6/7.12.44 “S” – 227 Squadron – JU. 88
6/7.12.44 “D” – 463 Squadron – JU. 88
6/7.12.44 “S” - 44 Squadron – ME.410
6/7.12.44 “O” – 619 Squadron – ME.110
6/7.12.44 “D” – 49 Squadron – FW.190
All the above claims have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
There was a marked increase in the number of combats this month, though the majority took place on the first two operations of of [sic] the month; the targets being Heilbronn and Giessen respectively. These two nights contributed 82 combats to the total of 101 for the whole of the month, and it will be noted that all the successes claimed were registered on these two nights.
Five enemy aircraft are claimed as Destroyed, two Probably Destroyed and eight Damaged. Five cases were noted of gunners firing on enemy aircraft attacking another Lancaster, and in one case the fighter was destroyed. In all the other cases the enemy aircraft broke off his attack. These gunners are to be congratulated on their vigilance and offensive spirit. See the fighter first and shoot first are the two best axioms for gunners; it has been proved that they pay.
[Underlined] RESULTS OF C.G.S. COURSES [/underlined]
F/O MacIntosh – 207 Sqdn – Cat. “B”
F/O Van Beck – 619 Sqdn – Cat “B”
F/O Ray – 97 Sqdn – Cat. “B”
P/O Hansom – 83 Sqdn – Cat. “B”
F/O Burnham – 467 Sqdn – Cat. “B”
P/O Annandale – 50 Sqdn. – Cat. “B”
It is good to note that the standard of candidates selected
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GUNNERY [/underlined]
for C.G.S. courses has been such as to show a return of 9 Cat. “B”s out of the last 9 nominations. Keep this up Gunnery Leaders, and submit to your Base Gunnery Leader any gunner who possesses the necessary qualifications for C.G.S. Gunners who have been categorised as “A+” on Squadrons should be automatic selections as candidates for C.G.S.
[Underlined] REVIEW OF ADVANCEMENT IN EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING DURING 1944 [/underlined]
1944 marked the advent of new training equipment and new ideas on training, which have resulted in a marked improvement in training on Squadrons.
The most important items are as under:-
1. Standard Free Gunnery Trainer.
2. Flash Trainer.
3. Turret Manipulation Assessor.
4. Skeet Ranges.
5. Self-towed Drogue.
6. Categorisation of Air Gunners.
7. Gunnery Analysis Officers.
8. Infra-Rad Photography on Night Fighter Affiliation Exercises.
9. A.G.L.T.
Of the above items, Categorisation of Gunners has gone ahead in Conversion Units and on Squadrons and every Squadron gunner now has a category. 92 Group have now followed suit and are now categorising gunners on similar lines.
Gunnery Analysis Officers were instituted on the basis of one Officer per Squadron, whose duties are to supervise and co-ordinate all training, both practical and theoretical, on Squadrons. These duties include Skeet Range shooting and assessment of all cine gyro assessor films. Each Officer has attended the Skeet Range Shooting Course and an Aessment [sic] Course at 1690 B.D.T. Flight.
[Underlined] GUNNERY AIR TRAINING [/underlined]
[Underlined] FIGHTER AFFILIATION – ORDER OF MERIT [/underlined]
The Order of Merit is based on the following system of marking:-
Night Affiliation (Camera and Infra-Red Film) – 10 points.
Night Affiliation (without Camera) – 8 points.
Day Affiliation (Gyro and Camera) – 5 points.
Day Affiliation (Camera only) – 3 points.
Day Affiliation (without Camera) – 1 point.
[Table of Fighter Affiliation Order of Merit by Squadron]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] GUNNERY. [/underlined]
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF AIR TRAINING EXERCISES. [/underlined]
[Table of Air Training Exercises by Squadron]
[Underlined] TOTAL OF AFFILIATION EXERCISES FOR DECEMBER – 502 [/underlined]
Bad weather and operational commitments have brought the total of Fighter Affiliation details for the month down with a rush; this month’s total being less than half of the total for November. Even with this low total, it is very satisfactory to note that [underlined] Night Affiliation exercises totalled 111, [/underlined] eleven of which were with Infra Red film. It is to be hoped that squadrons will fit the camera to the maximum number of aircraft carrying out Night Affiliation.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] armament
This year 1944 has seen the introduction into the Group of many new items of equipment and stores; a review of the changes and the part taken by Armament personnel in producing the right answers, or getting the inevitable gremlins out of new equipment will not come amiss in this issue.
[Underlined] BOMBS. [/underlined]
This subject is overshadowed by Tallboy; the introduction of this large egg has been most successful but has entailed a lot of hard work and hard thinking for armament personnel. Other bombs which arrived are the American series A.N.-M.44, 58, 59, 64, 65 and 76.
[Underlined] CLUSTER PROJECTILES. [/underlined]
The long awaited incendiary clusters have arrived in the form of Nos. 4, 14, 15 and A.N.M.17. So far these clusters have proved a mixed blessing, and have not yet replaced our old friend (or enemy) the S.B.C.
Handling clusters in the open resulted in many attempts to devise a satisfactory lay-out, but no really satisfactory method, providing adequate protection against weather and damage during handling, was evolved.
The A.O.C. came to the rescue with the Large Incendiary Store House Scheme. Successful trials have been carried out which indicate that this scheme will solve all our troubles, and damaged clusters will become a thing of the past, or a case of excessive handling.
[Underlined] BOMB GEAR. [/underlined]
The introduction of hydraulic winches has saved much sweat and many man-hours.
Modification No.74 has been incorporated to enable 18 bombs (20 when No.13 Station adaptors is available) to be dropped in one stick.
The Type N. Release slip arrived fortunately in small numbers, as snags were soon found to exist. No.53 Base have done a lot of work and finally produced a modification which it is expected will eliminate the danger of accidental release during bombing-up and de-bombing.
[Underlined] MARKER STORES. [/underlined]
Since No.5 Group has carried out its own target marking, many stores have been introduced, considerably complicating armament work in No.54 Base, and calling for local modifications to meet ever changing operational requirements.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ARMAMENT. [/underlined]
[Underlined] FUZES AND PISTOLS. [/underlined]
The introduction of new stores has brought with it a corresponding increase in the variety of Fuzes and Pistols. The quantity necessitated the approval of an additional storehouse.
[Underlined] BOMB HANDLING AND STORAGE. [/underlined]
Stacking trucks have made their appearance, and have proved useful tools. The cry is for more and we hope to see more during 1945.
Equipment for handling S.B.C’s including the heavy transporter (once again modified) is arriving, and all stations should be fully equipped early in 1945. Some of this equipment can be used in handling cluster projectiles and mines.
[Underlined] MINES. [/underlined]
The variety has increased and is still increasing, calling for carefully planned storage so that any type can be made available at very short notice.
[Underlined] TURRETS. [/underlined]
The F.N. 121 has arrived in small numbers. No.56 Base found some snags in the Servo Feed and initiated remedial action.
[Underlined] GUNS. [/underlined]
Great strides were made at the beginning of the year in solving the gun freezing problem. Experiments were carried out with various types of anti-freeze oil, both for the turret hydraulic system and for the guns themselves. Gun ejection seals were introduced and extensive firing trials carried out on operations to ascertain whether, in fact, it was the accumulation of ice on the breech block which caused failures, or the freezing of static oil in the Palmer Firing Gear. Attempts were made to raise the internal temperature of the turret by the use of first, the Galley heater, which proved unsuccessful, and secondly, with ducted heating both to the rear and mid-upper turrets. This type of heating has proved more successful, and is being incorporated in production aircraft, many of which are already in service.
[Underlined] MODIFICATIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS. [/underlined]
Apart from those already mentioned, Armament personnel were responsible for many bright ideas, some of which are reported below.
A de-belting and cleaning machine for .303 ammunition was designed an manufactured by R.A.F. Station, Swinderby. It is understood that Bomber Command is interested in this machine which has been working satisfactorily for some months.
The enlarging of trigger guards to enable gunners to have easy access to the triggers when wearing thick gloves. Now a Bomber Command modification.
Modification to F.N. 120 turrets to enable gunners to wear the pilot type parachute submitted by R.A.F. Waddington, now as a Command Modification.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ARMAMENT. [/underlined]
Heating for the Palmer Firing Valve Box, submitted by East Kirkby and issued as a Command modification.
Re-positioning of the MK.IIC C.G.S. Junction Box to enable the ‘C’ type parachute to be used in F.N.121 turrets. Submitted by R.A.F. Station, Waddington, and issued as a Bomber Command modification.
Improvements of Bomber Command Mod. No.3 to increase the Gunner’s vision, submitted by R.A.F. Waddington, and at present being investigated by Bomber Command.
All electrical firing gear in turrets. This modification submitted by Metheringham was at first turned down due to the inability to obtain the necessary solenoids. M.A.P. have recently shown interest in this modification and have requested full particulars.
The re-positioning of F.N. 50 Solenoids and the shortening of the Bowden Cable. This modification was submitted by R.A.F. Station, Bardney, as a means of preventing the Bowden Firing Cable from catching on the armour plating and causing run-away guns. Although not accepted, an alternative modification was incorporated in production.
East Kirkby were responsible for a modification to the No.44 Bomb pistol which facilitates the fitting of safety wires. Now a Command modification.
R.A.F. Station, Bardney, were responsible for the design and manufacture of a triple adaptor to enable 3 X 500 lb. bombs to be carried on the four centre stations of the Lancaster bomb bay. This modification aroused great interest both at Headquarters, Bomber Command, and at the Air Ministry, but was eventually turned down as the Ministry of Aircraft Production had, at this time, a similar development under way to achieve the same purpose. This adaptor took the form of a quintuple carrier slung across the bomb bay. It is understood that progress with this development is satisfactory.
Due to the delay in the manufacture of the new Heavy S.B.C. Transporter a protective plate to prevent damage to 4 lb. incendiary bomb tails when carried in S.B.C’s was introduced by R.A.F. Station, East Kirkby, and has since been issued as a Bomber Command modification.
[Underlined] BOMBING RANGES. [/underlined]
To meet the increased number of bombing targets required for practice bombing, personnel at Wainfleet Range erected two additional targets at Ingoldmells and Wrangle, the former was initially used as a dive bombing target. The range personnel worked hard to keep this target in repair and put up a tough fight against the sea assisted by well aimed bombs.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ARMAMENT FAILURES TABLE. [/underlined]
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A – MANIPULATION B – MAINTENANCE C – ICING D – TECHNICAL E – ELECTRICAL F – OBSCURE
[Page break]
[Drawing] flying control
A year ago, the “5 Group Quick Landing Scheme” was introduced, following trials at Skellingthorpe. During the year developments in the scheme have speeded up the landing times. In September, 1943, the Group average was 3.67 minutes. On the introduction of the scheme this average fell to 2.66 minutes in January, 1944. Since May, 1944, when it fell to 1.99 minutes, the figure has remained below 2 minutes and in December, 1944, reached its lowest level, 1.61 minutes.
The main alteration to the original scheme took place at the end of September, on the introduction of the Command Standard Landing Procedure, when the Group scheme was amended to bring it into line with the Command Scheme by advancing the initial call-up point to the funnel, increasing the height at the initial call and renaming the calling positions.
Developments in airfield lighting have assisted in this reduction of landing times, mainly in conditions of poor visibility. Sodium lights in the funnel and on the flarepath have been of great value. Speedier clearance of the runway and perimeter track have been assisted by the introduction of directional arrows and illuminated dispersal numbers.
Tarmac and asphalt used in the surfacing of runways and perimeter tracks have improved serviceability, though considerable difficulties have arisen in the case of satellite airfields carrying two squadron traffic.
Radar developments during the year foreshadow and entire change in flying control methods, when much of the present use of lighting will be subordinated to control through Radar. The increased heavy traffic in all areas of Bomber Command makes such development vitally necessary.
[Underlined] LANDING TIMES FOR DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
[Table of Landing Times by Base and Station]
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] photography
[Underlined] ANALYSIS DAY PHOTOGRAPHY – DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
[Table of Day Photographic Analysis Ranked by Squadron]
[Underlined] ANALYSIS NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHY – DECEMBER, 1944. [/underlined]
[Table of Night Photography Analysis Ranked by Squadron]
This photographic inter-squadron ladder is produced on the number of failures (excluding “Target Conditions” “T.C.”) incurred during the past month, as a percentage of the number of events.
+ 617 and 627 Squadrons are omitted from the ladder in view of the relatively low number of attempts of each.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] aircrew safety
[Underlined] THE PAST YEAR. [/underlined]
The drive to save lives of ditching bomber crews and crews forced to bale out or crash land was continued. It is hard to establish how many lives were lost due to ignorance of procedure, Safety Drills or equipment, but a review of successful incidents shows a trend towards better knowledge and understanding of the drills and a decline in the number of stupid mistakes.
The year saw the ‘K’ type personal dinghy come and go. It also saw the completion of successful trials in 5 Group of the prototype Back-type parachute, which it is hoped will soon be available to all heavy bomber crews. As an interim measure the Seat-type parachute was made compulsory for Pilots and Rear Gunners.
An ingenious “Warning horn” for emergency in the air was devised within the Group and tested successfully. It has been forwarded to Bomber Command for approval and general adoption. The horn gives audible warning to all crew members to bale out or prepare for ditching when the intercomm. has failed.
[Underlined] INTO THE SEA. [/underlined]
One known ditching occurred in the Group during December – an aircraft (believed to be of 189 Squadron), returning to a diversion airfield after attacking Politz, came down in the sea about 5 miles N.W. of Banff. No signals were received from this aircraft, the incident being reported from land, and in spite of an extensive search no survivors were picked up though an aircraft wheel was seen.
[Underlined] CRASH STATIONS. [/underlined]
There have been several crashes recently in the vicinity of airfields during return from operations in bad weather. Captains of aircraft are reminded of the “Crash Landing Drill” (Appendix ‘C’ to Drill No.8 of 5 Group Aircraft Drills refers). This Drill says “The Pilot is to order ‘Crash Stations’ as soon as a crash is imminent or probable, i.e. landing in bad visibility or when the aircraft has suffered damage which is likely to make a normal landing difficult”.
[Underlined] PARACHUTES. [/underlined]
It has been noticed that a lot of pilots and rear gunners are still not using the Seat-type parachutes on all flights. This is now compulsory. See Air Staff Instruction Trg./7.
[Underlined] DRILLS. [/underlined]
A reminder that Saturday morning is still the Safety Drill morning. Get a practice done once a week and you won’t get your feet wet if you have to ditch. It’s cold in the North Sea these days.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] accidents
In reviewing flying accidents for the past 12 months, it is only fair to record what the Group has achieved in effecting a reduction in the actual rate of accidents during the period. This is best shown pictorally by means of the following graph:-
[Graph of Aircraft Damaged per 10,000 hours through 1944.]
The graph is self-evident and the consistent decrease in the rate throughout practically the whole year is something of which we can be proud. At the same time, without wishing to belittle the efforts of the those who have been responsible for achieving this reduction, we must not be misled by these figures into thinking that the accident rate is by any means satisfactory.
The hard fact still remains that in 12 months 360 aircraft were seriously damaged in flying accidents. Of these4 125 were totally destroyed including 60 cases in which one or more members of the crew received fatal injuries. In squadrons you can probably recall a fatal crash and perhaps a taxying collision and you may even have been involved in an accident yourself. We at Group as onlookers see most of the game; the accidents we can call to mind are not just isolated instances and it is for this reason that the above figures are quoted: to emphasise the serious consequences of accidents and to make quite clear that great effort is still required if we are to fulfil our aim of entirely eliminating unnecessary loss of lie and unnecessary damage to aircraft.
[Underlined] CAUSE AND PREVENTION. [/underlined]
If you have read past issues of ‘V’ Group News you will have seen repeated references to taxying accidents. It is not surprising therefore, that when examining all the avoidable accidents which have occurred during the year, we find that no less than 32% occurred whilst taxying. Barely is there the slightest excuse for this type of accident, particularly as Air Staff Instructions give adequate advice as to the means of safe taxying. Read Flying Control 24.
Overshoots and heavy landings together accounted for 22% of the avoidable accidents. These two causes have been linked together because
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] ACCIDENTS. [/underlined]
the root cause of each often lies in the approach and a good approach is dependent to a very great extent upon speed. Remember that when landing heavily laden there is no need for an excessively high final approach speed: 115 m.p.h. but never faster.
The next most serious cause from the point of view of numbers was swinging during take off and landing, accounting for 16% of the total. Once again we repeat the warning to open throttles slowly, easily and smoothly, and do not open up to full throttle before travelling 500 yards down the runway irrespective of your load.
A reminder to Squadron Commanders. Do not forget Air Staff Instruction Ops.2/47. This will help materially in the general drive to keep accidents down to a minimum.
[Underlined] THE NEW YEAR. [/underlined]
Thank you for the results achieved in 1944. You have proved what can be done and it only remains for this success to be continued and bettered in 1945.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] equipment
[Underlined] USE OF EQUIPMENT. [/underlined]
The Powers that Be are becoming very anxious about the large quantity of Service Equipment which is being mis-used. Instances quoted are Navigation Bags used for weekend holdalls, blankets as table coverings, etc. Equipment Officers can help the Station Commanders to stop this mis-use by pointing out any irregularities that come to their notice.
[Underlined] DISCREPANCIES IN BARRACK INVENTORIES. [/underlined]
Attention is drawn to Headquarters, Bomber Command, letter BC/50816/E.1 dated 19th December, 1944. If the station has not already broken down the Barrack Inventory into site inventories, under A.M.O. A.559/43, this should be done at once.
[Underlined] IN RETROSPECT. [/underlined]
The Equipment Officers and their staffs very rarely see the result of their work. Nevertheless the work they have put in during the last year has certainly helped the Group’s achievements. Without their good work this Group would not have done as much as it has. The New Year motto for the Equipment Section is “We get ‘em, you smash ‘em – we getcha some more!”
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
education [Drawing]
During December, Bomber Command opened its own E.V.T. school at Bourne. The aim is to train instructors for E.V.T. work after the cessation of hostilities with Germany. Groups are being asked to supply 10 instructors for each course, so that it is essential that a steady influx of volunteers is forthcoming from stations. Lists are submitted from Stations monthly, and the last two or three returns have not brought in nearly enough names to ensure the success of the scheme. There should always be publicity on stations asking for volunteers, and the importance of the work must be impressed on suitable candidates. It is realised that some men are put off by the fact that conditions of service have not yet been published, and by the idea the E.V.T. work might postpone demobilisation. It is thought that conditions of service will not be unfavourable, and great emphasis must be laid on the fact that no one will be kept in the service after they are due to be demobilised. It is clear that to postpone demobilisation after a person’s group is named to leave the service would destroy the whole foundation on which the scheme has been built.
The end of December makes a logical break in the winter programme, when the work of the last three months can be reviewed. Many stations have produced fairly good results, no station has done all that can be done even under present conditions. Classes at Lincoln have been well attended, there have been successful classes on stations. Some very good work has been done with aircrew cadets and handicraft and music clubs have flourished. There are still many deficiencies however. There are some stations where no classes are organised for Matriculation. It cannot be that on a station of strength 1000, there are not six people who want to take this important examination. The only explanation is bad publicity and lack of drive on the part of the Education Officer. Some stations have, as yet, no facilities for woodwork, while suggestions for the formation of cookery classes and instruction in Home Nursing for W.A.A.F. have brought little result. In some cases there is an inclination to wait for this Headquarters to arrange lectures and not enough initiative of the part of stations to obtain good lecturers themselves.
To an outside observer, the difference in the standard of News Rooms is very surprising. It is realised that some stations have better facilities for display and more comfortable furniture than others, although this is not always the fault of circumstances, but rather a lack of interest and initiative. Sometimes this deficiency is not on the side of the Education Officer, but often that officer is to blame for not making the best of his opportunities. There should be a frequent alteration of display material, with news and topical articles up to date. There is not enough variety of topics and far too many maps reproducing the same localities. One large map of Europe and one of the Far East are sufficient for keeping the War Fronts up to date. The large number of airmen using the News Rooms is a proof that far more time and attentions should be given by the officers concerned in making the rooms really first class.
The service as a whole has shown a greater realisation of the importance of education in the last six months. It is up to Education Officers to take advantage of this increased interest and to make their work attractive and appealing to the personnel of their station.
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] decorations
The following IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O R.L. BLUNSDON DFC
P/O A.F. JONES DFC
F/O R.C. LAKE DFC
F/L E.F.A. JONES DFC
S/L A.G. WILLIAMS DFC
F/SGT A.H. HORRY DFM
P/O J.E. STOWELL DFC
P/O E. SHIELDS DFC
P/O D. MacINTOSH DFC
P/O W.D. TWEDDLE DFC
F/O R.C. HARVEY DFC
F/O F. SOWERBY DFC
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/O J.H.C. BRAHAM DFC
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O A.J. WALKER DFC
F/O T.H.J. PLAYFORD DFC
W/O L.J. HAZELL DFC
P/O N. EVANS DFC
A/F/L R.E. KNIGHTS, DFC DSO
F/O A.E. KELL, DFC BAR TO DFC
W/C J.B. TAIT, DSO & 2 BARS, DFC & BAR 3RD BAR TO DSO
The following NON-IMMEDIATE awards were approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O S.J. BRISTOW
F/O N. STOCKWELL DFC
SGT H. McKNOX DFM
F/SGT A.J. FROST DFM
F/SGT E.R. BOLAND DFM
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O H.F. ARNOLD DFC
F/O L.M. PEDERSON DFC
P/O J.C. FLEMING DFC
P/O J.A. CASTLES DFC
F/SGT E.R.G. HAINES DFM
F/SGT J. CHRISTIAN DFM
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON (CONTD) [/underlined]
SGT J. SKIDMORE DFM
SGT J.A. RICHARDS DFM
W/O L.W.J. THOMAS DFM
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L R.N. QUINN, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O F.N. DAVIS DFC
F/O W.J. DAVIS DFC
A/F/O N. BALLANCE DFC
F/SGT F.A. KIRBY DFM
F/SGT E.T. MANNING DFM
F/SGT H. LEWIS DFM
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O O.C. THOMAS DFC
F/O W.F. MARTIN DFC
F/SGT M.J. THORNE DFM
F/O K.E. BLY DFC
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O D.W. SIMMONS DFC
W/O V.G. BURGESS DFC
F/SGT J.H. KEENAN DFM
W/O A.F.C. HARROW DFC
SGT J.A. LYON DFM
P/O E.J.H. ROBERTS DFC
[Underlined] 83 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/O P.W. ALLWOOD DFC
A/F/O P.C. CORNISH DFC
F/O T.P. JUPP, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/SGT I.O. HARRIS DFM
F/O L. HATCHER, AFM DFC
F/SGT G.S. HAZELTINE DFM
F/O R. HOBBS DFC
F/O R.E.H. FOOTE, DFC BAR TO DFC
A/W/O W.G. TROTTER DFC
F/SGT M. BRENNAN DFM
W/O J.E. HUDSON DFC
P/O V.J. ROBLEY DFC
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O J.A. PEARCE DFC
A/W/O G.D. MOIR DFC
A/F/L N.N. PARKER DFC
A/F/L G.H. LAING, DFC BAR TO DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON (CONTD) [/underlined]
F/SGT G. BROWN DFM
W/O A.J. CROLL, DFM DFC
W/O F.H. GREEN DFC
A/F/L G.H.R. POLSON, DFC, DFM BAR TO DFC
F/O P.J. HUMPHREYS DFC
F/SGT D.S. NICHOLLS DFM
F/SGT J.D. McINGLIS DFM
A/S/L T.H. MAKEPEACE, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/SGT W. MANDERSON DFM
F/SGT R. MOORE DFM
P/O A.A. AVELINE DFC
[Underlined] 106 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/F/O J. NETHERWOOD DFC
F/O L. COEN DFC
A/S/L J.W. ALLINSON
[Underlined] 207 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/O W. McINTOSH, DFM, DFC BAR TO DFC
F/O E. OAKES DFC
P/O C.B. SUTHERLAND, DFC BAR TO DFC
P/O G.D. CHESWORTH DFC
P/O J.S. COOK DFC
W/O G.W.J. AINSWORTH DFC
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O W.G. EVANS DFC
W/O T.J. McLEAN, DFM DFC
A/F/O J. GINGLES, DFM DFC
[Underlined] 627 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L R.L. BARTLEY, DFC BAR TO DFC
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/S/L R.E. MILLICHAP DFC
F/L J.W. MARTIN DFC
F/O J.W. LENNON DFC
F/O M.A.J. BEAUDOIN DFC
A/F/L D.E. HAWKER DFC
F/O G.J. BATE DFC
F/O L.A.V. WOOD DFC
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
[Drawing] war savings
[Table of War Savings by Station]
[Underlined] GRAND TOTAL NATIONAL SAVINGS FOR DECEMBER, 1944 - £6,476. 7. 11d.
A- Approximate number of pence per head.
B – Approximate percentage of personnel saving.
C – Total savings.
[Page break]
It Happens Every Day!!
When A.C.W. Mary Jones arrived at Station Z,
She saw the Station Signals Off., and unto him she said,
“I’ve nine days leave to come, good sir, and it would be a boon
“If I could have it right away. My boy friend’s sailing soon”.
Without delay the woeful Waaf was whisked upon her way,
And when her time was up she sent a message reading “Pray
“Extend my leave a further week; the ship is still in port”.
The Signals Off. agreed to this – he was a decent sort.
But when the girl requested yet a further forty-eight,
He quite forgot his decency and telegraphed, irate,
“Return at once to unit”, but the errant maiden tarried,
And wired “I want another fortnight more, for I am getting married,
“The church is fixed; the guests are warned. This afternoon at two
“By special licence we’ll be wed. Our hours of bliss are few
“So please agree”. Defeated he confirmed this new request,
And fourteen days ensued of peace, with no word from the pest.
On day fifteen a gentle knock upon his office door
Announced that Mary Smith (nee Jones), was back in camp once more,
And wished to have an interview, which he with some elation
Agreed to give, because he wished a fuller explanation.
The genial soul was quite prepared to overlook the past;
A little talk was his intent, and so he gently gassed,
And maundered on, and moralised for quite a lengthy spell.
‘Mongst other things – “My dear”, he said, “I’m pleased to see you well;
“And now that you are back you’ll do your very best I know.
“The section’s very under-staffed. We need you ever so!”.
He stopped at last. The girl then spoke. (You’ll guess her purpose maybe).
“Oh sir” I’d like my ticket please” I’m going to have a baby!”
ANON. (Circa 1945.).
“V” GROUP NEWS. NO. 29. DECEMBER, 1944.
[Page break]
war effort
[Table of Aircraft and Sorties Carried out by Squadron]
[Underlined] NOTES: [/underlined] Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “Successful Sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties, Nos. 9, 49, 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another Squadron, the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons. Squadrons above establishment are calculated on an establishment of 20.
[Page break]
[Blank Page]
[Page break]
[Blank page]
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
V Group News, December 1944
5 Group News, December 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 29, December 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and articles on tactics, operations, gardening, signals, navigation, this month's bouquets, radar navigation, air bombing, engineering, training, second thoughts for pilots, gunnery, armament, flying control, photography, aircrew safety, accidents, equipment, education, decorations, war savings, it happens every day, and war effort.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-12
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Anne-Marie Watson
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
68 printed sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MStephensonS1833673-160205-18
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Kattegat (Baltic Sea)
Belgium--Houffalize
Belgium--Saint-Vith
Denmark--Kalundborg
Denmark--Langeland
England--Lincolnshire
Germany--Euskirchen (Kreis)
Germany--Giessen (Hesse)
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Munich
Germany--Rheydt
Netherlands--Ijmuiden
Netherlands--Rotterdam
Norway--Oslo
Poland--Gdynia
Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)
Germany--Urft Dam
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-12
5 Group
air gunner
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
demobilisation
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
flight engineer
Gee
gremlin
H2S
Lancaster
Master Bomber
mine laying
Mosquito
navigator
Pathfinders
pilot
radar
rivalry
Tallboy
training
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/997/10411/SMaddockLyonR2205669v10005.2.jpg
0c7d42817ad73eeb8211efd15750f665
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Maddock-Lyon, Roy. Scrap book
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Maddock-Lyon, R
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-03-21
Description
An account of the resource
20 pages. The scrap book contains items about Roy Maddock-Lyon's aircraft being shot down over Holbæk in Denmark 14 February 1945 and his subsequent evasion. It contains correspondence, photographs of the wreckage of his aircraft ZA-X, and what happened to his crew.<br />
<p>This collection also contains items concerning John Grayshan and Albert Berry. Additional information on <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/211033/">John Grayshan</a> and <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/202051/">Albert Berry</a> is available via the IBCC Losses Database.</p>
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The remains of Halifax Mk 3 ZA-X
Description
An account of the resource
Five photographs of a Halifax Mk III 'ZA-X'.
Photograph 1 is a modern side view of a Halifax, captioned ' Halifax Mk III 'ZA-X''.
Photograph 2 is a Halifax on fire, captioned ' The plane coming down on fire.'
Photograph 3 is the rear of its fuselage, captioned 'Rear section of the Halifax fuselage'.
Photograph 4 is a section of the fuselage, captioned 'Fuselage of the plane'.
Photograph 5 is heavily damaged and captioned 'Remains of the pilot and engineers' area'.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One colour and four b/w photographs on an album page
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
SMaddockLyonR2205669v10005
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1945-02-14
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Denmark
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1945-02-14
10 Squadron
crash
Halifax
Halifax Mk 3
shot down
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/997/10412/SMaddockLyonR2205669v10006.2.jpg
821cf4ecb64bfc52ce07e27283790317
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Maddock-Lyon, Roy. Scrap book
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Maddock-Lyon, R
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-03-21
Description
An account of the resource
20 pages. The scrap book contains items about Roy Maddock-Lyon's aircraft being shot down over Holbæk in Denmark 14 February 1945 and his subsequent evasion. It contains correspondence, photographs of the wreckage of his aircraft ZA-X, and what happened to his crew.<br />
<p>This collection also contains items concerning John Grayshan and Albert Berry. Additional information on <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/211033/">John Grayshan</a> and <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/202051/">Albert Berry</a> is available via the IBCC Losses Database.</p>
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The remains of Halifax Mk 3 ZA-X
Description
An account of the resource
Five photographs of the crashed Halifax Mk 3 'ZA-X'.
Photograph 1 is captioned 'Remains of Mid-Upper Gun Turret'.
Photograph 2 is captioned 'A Propeller'.
Photograph 3 is captioned 'Remains of Rear Gun Turret'.
Photograph 4 is captioned 'Engine, Propeller and shaft aft'.
Photograph 5 is captioned 'Fuselage seen from the end. Source: Holback Museum, photo by Christian Melgaard. Fuselage viewing towards the Pilots Engineers area. Mid Upper Turret was at the Top'.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Five b/w photographs on an album page
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
SMaddockLyonR2205669v10006
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Denmark
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1945-02-14
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1945-02-14
10 Squadron
crash
Halifax
Halifax Mk 3
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/934/36497/MLovattP1821369-190903-62-01.1.pdf
e9891efa9d1c16d6be963b2ca020c36f
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/934/36497/MLovattP1821369-190903-62-02.1.1.pdf
bdbdeeb28a2c1b19b1ed1f87649c704c
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Lovatt, Peter
Dr Peter Lovatt
P Lovatt
Description
An account of the resource
117 items. An oral history interview with Peter Lovatt (b.1924, 1821369 Royal Air Force), his log book, documents, and photographs. The collection also contains two photograph albums. He flew 42 operations as an air gunner on 223 Squadron flying B-24s. <br /><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1338">Album One</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/2135">Album Two</a><br /><br />The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Nina and Peter Lovatt and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-09-27
2019-09-03
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Lovatt, P
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Radio War Waged by the RAF Against Germany 1940-1945
Description
An account of the resource
A thesis written by Peter in 2002, for his Phd.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Peter Lovatt
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2002-07
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Great Britain
England--London
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
England--Norfolk
England--Norfolk
France--Dieppe
France--Cherbourg
England--Norwich
England--Swanage
England--Malvern
Germany--Berlin
England--Cornwall (County)
Canada
Newfoundland and Labrador
England--Devizes
France--Paris
England--Chatham (Kent)
Austria
Poland
England--Cheadle (Staffordshire)
England--Daventry
England--Orford Ness
England--Aldeburgh
England--Bawdsey (Air base)
Scotland--Dundee
Scotland--Perth
England--Christchurch (Dorset)
Russia (Federation)
Scotland--Firth of Forth
Germany--Baden-Baden
Germany--Krefeld
Germany--Borkum
Denmark
Norway
Germany--Bredstedt
France--Brest
Netherlands
Germany--Husum (Schleswig-Holstein)
Norway--Klepp
Germany--Stollberg (Landkreis)
Netherlands--Den Helder
Netherlands--Bergen op Zoom
France--Seine-Maritime
France--Cape La Hague
France--Manche
France--Morlaix
Germany--Lörrach
Italy--Noto
England--Tunbridge Wells
England--Harpenden
England--Somerset
England--Henfield (West Sussex)
England--Petersfield
France--Dieppe
England--Portsmouth
Scotland--Orkney
England--Rochester (Kent)
England--Essex
France--Le Havre
England--Hagley (Bromsgrove)
England--Gloucestershire
England--Bridport
England--Coventry
England--Bristol
France--Cassel
France--Poix-du-Nord
England--Radlett (Hertfordshire)
England--Henfield (West Sussex)
England--Cheadle (Staffordshire)
France--Bayeux
England--Kingsdown (Kent)
England--Harleston (Norfolk)
France--Barfleur
France--Cape La Hague
France--Le Mont-Saint-Michel
France--Cancale
France--Penmarc'h
France--Groix
France--Saint-Nazaire Region
France--Saint-Malo
England--Seaton (Devon)
England--Salisbury
Wales--Swansea
England--Droitwich
France--Brittany
England--Manchester
England--Chatham (Kent)
France--Chartres
France--Vannes
Poland--Lubin (Województwo Dolnośląskie)
Egypt
Libya
England--Lydd
England--Helston
England--Chivenor
England--Marske-by-the-Sea
England--Nottingham
England--Birmingham
Slovakia
Czech Republic
Italy
France
England--Milton Keynes
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
England--Devon
England--Dorset
England--Hampshire
England--Herefordshire
England--Kent
England--Northamptonshire
England--Staffordshire
England--Suffolk
England--Sussex
England--Wiltshire
England--Worcestershire
England--Yorkshire
England--Lancashire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Warwickshire
Germany--Kleve (North Rhine-Westphalia)
France--Ouessant Island
Great Britain Miscellaneous Island Dependencies--Jersey
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Air Force. Fighter Command
Wehrmacht. Luftwaffe
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Personal research
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
80 printed sheets
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MLovattP1821369-190903-62-01
100 Group
101 Squadron
109 Squadron
214 Squadron
218 Squadron
Anson
B-17
B-24
Blenheim
bombing
Churchill, Winston (1874-1965)
Do 217
Gee
Gneisenau
Goering, Hermann (1893-1946)
ground personnel
H2S
Harris, Arthur Travers (1892-1984)
He 111
Hitler, Adolf (1889-1945)
Hudson
Ju 52
Ju 88
Morse-keyed wireless telegraphy
Oboe
P-51
Pathfinders
Photographic Reconnaissance Unit
radar
RAF Biggin Hill
RAF Boscombe Down
RAF Defford
RAF Martlesham Heath
RAF Oulton
RAF St Athan
RAF Waddington
RAF Wyton
Scharnhorst
V-1
V-2
V-weapon
Wellington
Whitley
Window
Women’s Auxiliary Air Force
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/501/22544/MCurnockRM1815605-171114-012.2.pdf
9b4c8e2553331a037c7dc2406bba8fd6
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Curnock, Richard
Richard Murdock Curnock
R M Curnock
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Curnock, RM
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-04-18
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
92 items. An oral history interview with Warrant Officer Richard Curnock (1924, 1915605 Royal Air Force), his log book, letters, photographs and prisoner of war magazines. He flew operations with 425 Squadron before being shot down and becoming a prisoner of war.
The collection has been licenced to the IBCC Digital Archive by Richard Curnock and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The Kriegie November 2011
Description
An account of the resource
News-sheet of the RAF ex-POW Association. This edition covers a charity motorcycle rode commemorating Roger Bushell, Charles Hancock's Long March told by his daughter, Book reviews, Alfie Fripp's revisit to Stalag Luft 3, Goings-on at Zagan, a dinner at RAF Henlow and a three part TV series about the Long March.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
The RAF ex-POW Association
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2011-11
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
18 printed sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCurnockRM1815605-171114-012
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Australian Air Force
Royal Air Force. Coastal Command
Wehrmacht. Luftwaffe
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Dover
Netherlands--Eindhoven
Netherlands--Arnhem
Germany--Celle
Germany--Barth
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Colditz
Germany--Berchtesgaden
Germany--Füssen
Italy--Stelvio Pass
England--Capel (Kent)
Austria--Kaunertal
Liechtenstein
Austria--Feldkirch
Germany--Baden-Baden
Germany--Trier
Netherlands--Dokkum
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Poland
Germany--Spremberg
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Bremen
England--Bristol
France--Lille
Italy--Turin
Denmark--Esbjerg
Netherlands--Amsterdam
Poland--Żagań
Germany--Düsseldorf
France--Dunkerque
Belgium--Ieper
Germany--Bad Fallingbostel
Italy
France
Germany
Denmark
Austria
Belgium
Netherlands
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
England--Gloucestershire
England--Kent
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
103 Squadron
104 Squadron
166 Squadron
207 Squadron
214 Squadron
218 Squadron
220 Squadron
35 Squadron
460 Squadron
50 Squadron
619 Squadron
77 Squadron
88 Squadron
air gunner
aircrew
bale out
Blenheim
Boston
crewing up
Distinguished Flying Cross
entertainment
escaping
Fw 190
Hudson
Lancaster
memorial
mess
navigator
P-51
prisoner of war
RAF Abingdon
RAF Attlebridge
RAF Biggin Hill
RAF Elsham Wolds
RAF Hendon
RAF Henlow
RAF Leeming
RAF Waddington
shot down
Spitfire
sport
Stalag Luft 3
Stalag Luft 6
the long march
Wellington
Whitley
wireless operator / air gunner
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/997/10471/SMaddockLyonR2205669v10017.1.jpg
50cb10a39d9e75e826fa26117add0532
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Maddock-Lyon, Roy. Scrap book
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Maddock-Lyon, R
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-03-21
Description
An account of the resource
20 pages. The scrap book contains items about Roy Maddock-Lyon's aircraft being shot down over Holbæk in Denmark 14 February 1945 and his subsequent evasion. It contains correspondence, photographs of the wreckage of his aircraft ZA-X, and what happened to his crew.<br />
<p>This collection also contains items concerning John Grayshan and Albert Berry. Additional information on <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/211033/">John Grayshan</a> and <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/202051/">Albert Berry</a> is available via the IBCC Losses Database.</p>
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[photograph]
The graves of Jonny and Red Berry
[page break]
[photograph]
Caterpillar Club Membership Card.
[newspaper cutting]
Over 20,000 ‘Escapers’
MEMBERSHIP of the Caterpillar Club, Britain’s most famous “escapers” organisation, has topped the 20,000 mark after six years of war.
Membership is confined to those who have made forced descents by parachutes. Nearly 10,000 men have had their claims ratified within the last nine months. Among them are a large number of P.o.W.
Among the members are Wing Commander Bader, two V.C.s – Squadron Leader J. B. Nicholson and Flight-Lieutenant Reid – and Air Vice-Marshall Bennett, the Pathfinder chief who landed in Sweden.
Members are planning a big V-celebration when the war prisoners return home.
Over 20,000 Escapers.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
The graves of Johnny and Red Berry. Roy Maddock-Lyon's Caterpillar Club membership card and a newspaper cutting
Description
An account of the resource
Item 1 is an image of the graves of F/O Grayshan and Serg Berry, captioned 'The graves of Jonny and Red Berry'.
Item 2 is a Caterpillar Club membership card issued to Sgt Roy Maddock-Lyon, captioned 'Caterpillar Club Membership Card.'
Item 3 is a newspaper cutting referring to 20,000 'Escapers' belonging to the Caterpillar Club, captioned 'Over 20000 Escapers.'
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One photograph, one printed card and one newspaper cutting on an album page
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
SMaddockLyonR2205669v10017
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Denmark
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Georgie Donaldson
aircrew
bale out
Bennett, Donald Clifford Tyndall (1910-1986)
Caterpillar Club
final resting place
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/186/3583/LMarshallS1594781v1.1.pdf
8560cff2a1aae43ff2cda4b6080884ba
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Marshall, Syd
S C Marshall
Description
An account of the resource
Ten items. The collection contains two oral history interviews with Warrant Officer Sidney Charles Marshall (1924 - 2017, 1594781 Royal Air Force), his decorations, training notes, photographs and a photograph album. Syd Marshall was a flight engineer with 103 Squadron and flew operations from RAF Elsham Wolds.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Syd Marshall and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-05-08
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
AMarshallS150508
Access Rights
Information about who can access the resource or an indication of its security status. Access Rights may include information regarding access or restrictions based on privacy, security, or other policies.
Permission granted for commercial projects
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LMarshallS1594781v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Atlantic Ocean
Denmark
Germany
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
Atlantic Ocean--Helgoland Bight
Atlantic Ocean--Kattegat (Baltic Sea)
Denmark--Ebeltoft
Germany--Aschaffenburg
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Essen
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kleve (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Germany--Koblenz
Germany--Ludwigshafen am Rhein
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Munich
Germany--Pforzheim
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Ulm
Germany--Wanne-Eickel
Germany--Wiesbaden
Wales--Vale of Glamorgan
Germany--Freiburg im Breisgau
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1945
1944-10-14
1944-10-15
1944-10-19
1944-10-20
1944-10-23
1944-10-24
1944-10-25
1944-10-28
1944-10-30
1944-10-31
1944-11-04
1944-11-05
1944-11-06
1944-11-09
1944-11-11
1944-11-12
1944-11-22
1944-11-23
1944-11-27
1944-11-28
1944-11-29
1944-12-03
1944-12-04
1944-12-05
1944-12-06
1944-12-07
1944-12-15
1944-12-16
1944-12-17
1944-12-18
1944-12-22
1944-12-23
1945-01-05
1945-01-06
1945-01-07
1945-01-08
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1945-01-16
1945-01-17
1945-01-28
1945-01-29
1945-02-01
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-04
1945-02-05
1945-02-07
1945-02-08
1945-02-15
1945-02-16
1945-02-18
1945-02-19
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-02-22
1945-02-23
1945-02-25
1945-02-26
1945-02-27
1945-03-01
1945-03-02
Title
A name given to the resource
Syd Marshall's flying log book for navigators, air bombers, air gunners and flight engineers
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Description
An account of the resource
The log book covers the training an operational career of Flight Engineer Syd Marshall from 28 July 1944 to March 1945, with occasional notes added through 2008. He joined 103 Squadron at RAF Elsham Wolds on 27 September 1944, from where he flew in Lancasters on 8 daylight and 28 night time operations either over Germany or minelaying in the seas around Denmark: Aarus Bay, Helgoland, Kattegat, Ebeltoft, Aschaffenburg, Bochum, Cologne, Dortmund, Duisburg, Essen, Freiburg, Gelsenkirchen, Hannover, Karlsruhe, Kleve, Koblenz, Ludwigshafen am Rhein, Mannheim, Merseburg, Munich, Pforzheim, Stuttgart, Ulm, Wanne-Eickel, Wiesbaden, Heimbach. His pilot on operations was Flight Lieutenant Morgan. Payload details are shown for some operations.
103 Squadron
1667 HCU
aircrew
Anson
bombing
C-47
flight engineer
Halifax
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
mine laying
RAF Elsham Wolds
RAF Hemswell
RAF Sandtoft
RAF St Athan
training
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/377/6709/LDawsonSR142531v1.1.pdf
6abbc58e3bc5bd55a8c78eafc9746dec
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LDawsonSR142531v1
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Description
An account of the resource
Pilots flying log book for Stephen Dawson, covering the period from 11 June 1939 to 30 March 1942. Detailing his flying training, operations and instructor duties. He was stationed at RAF Southampton, RAF Hastings, RAF Hatfield, RAF Little Rissington, RAF St Athan, RAF Cottesmore, RAF Finningly, RAF Lindholme, RAF Swinderby, RAF Upwood and RAF Swanton Morley. Aircraft flown were, Cadet, Tiger Moth, Anson, Hampden and Oxford. He flew a total of 31 night operations with 50 Squadron. Targets were, Dusseldorf, Hannover, Bordeaux, Brest, Berlin, Keil, Lorient, La Rochelle, Copenhagen, Duisberg, Soest, Cologne, Bremen, Hamburg, Karlsruhe, Magdeburg and Frankfurt.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Denmark
France
Germany
Great Britain
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Denmark--Copenhagen
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Gloucestershire
England--Hampshire
England--Hertfordshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Norfolk
England--Rutland
England--Sussex
England--Yorkshire
France--Brest
France--La Rochelle
France--Lorient
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Magdeburg
Germany--Soest
Wales--Vale of Glamorgan
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Düsseldorf
France--Bordeaux (Nouvelle-Aquitaine)
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1939
1940
1941
1942
1941-02-04
1941-02-10
1941-02-11
1941-02-15
1941-02-21
1941-03-12
1941-03-13
1941-03-14
1941-03-15
1941-03-18
1941-03-20
1941-03-21
1941-03-23
1941-03-24
1941-04-08
1941-04-09
1941-04-10
1941-04-11
1941-04-13
1941-04-14
1941-04-15
1941-04-16
1941-04-20
1941-04-21
1941-04-24
1941-04-25
1941-06-02
1941-06-03
1941-06-11
1941-06-12
1941-06-13
1941-06-14
1941-06-15
1941-06-21
1941-06-22
1941-06-24
1941-06-25
1941-06-27
1941-06-28
1941-06-29
1941-06-30
1941-07-04
1941-07-05
1941-07-16
1941-07-17
1941-07-20
1941-07-21
1941-08-05
1941-08-06
1941-08-08
1941-08-09
1941-08-12
1941-08-13
1941-08-29
1941-08-30
1941-09-02
1941-09-03
Title
A name given to the resource
Stephen Dawson's pilot's flying log book. One
14 OTU
25 OTU
50 Squadron
aircrew
Anson
bombing
Flying Training School
Hampden
Initial Training Wing
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
pilot
RAF Cottesmore
RAF Finningley
RAF Hatfield
RAF Lindholme
RAF Little Rissington
RAF St Athan
RAF Swanton Morley
RAF Swinderby
RAF Upwood
Tiger Moth
training
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/552/10402/LMaddockLyonR2205669v1.2.pdf
1dcb206504c9fe86e71aeb2f698cef0e
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Maddock-Lyon, Roy
R Maddock-Lyon
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MaddockLyon, R
Description
An account of the resource
Seven items. An oral history interview with Roy Maddock-Lyon (- 2023, 2205669 Royal Air Force), his log book, service material, silk escape map and an album. He served as a flight engineer with 10 Squadron from RAF Melbourne until he was shot down on his 18th operation over Denmark 14 February 1945. Two of his crew were killed but he evaded with the help of the Danish resistance.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Roy Maddock-Lyon and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-03-21
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Roy Maddock-Lyon's flying log book for navigators, air bombers, air gunners and flight engineers
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LMaddockLyonR2205669v1
Description
An account of the resource
Flying log book for navigators, air bombers, air gunners, flight engineers for Roy Maddock-Lyon, flight engineer, covering the period from 12 June 1944 to 2 May 1946. Detailing his flying training, operations flown and post war flying duties. He was stationed at, RAF St Athan, RAF Rufforth, RAF Melbourne, RAF Linton-on-Ouse and RAF Wethersfield. Aircraft flown in were, Halifax, C-47 and Oxford. He flew a total of 18 operations with 10 squadron, 2 daylight and 16 night. Targets were, Essen, Cologne, Gelsenkirchen, Munster, Sterkrade, Duisburg, Hagen, Osnabruck, Bingen, Hannover, Bohlen and baling out over Denmark on operation 18 on 14 February 1945, gardening. His pilot on operations was Flying Officer Grayshan. He evaded and returned to duty on 27 February from Sweden.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Denmark
Germany
Great Britain
Sweden
England--Essex
England--Yorkshire
Germany--Bingen (Rhineland-Palatinate)
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Essen
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Hagen (Arnsberg)
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Oberhausen (Düsseldorf)
Germany--Osnabrück
Germany--Saxony
Wales--Vale of Glamorgan
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944
1945
1946
1944-10-23
1944-10-24
1944-10-25
1944-10-28
1944-10-30
1944-10-31
1944-11-06
1944-11-18
1944-11-21
1944-11-28
1944-11-29
1944-11-30
1944-12-02
1944-12-03
1944-12-06
1944-12-22
1944-12-30
1945-01-05
1945-01-12
1945-01-14
1945-01-15
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
10 Squadron
1663 HCU
1665 HCU
aircrew
bale out
bombing
C-47
Cook’s tour
evading
flight engineer
Halifax
Halifax Mk 3
Heavy Conversion Unit
killed in action
mine laying
Oxford
prisoner of war
RAF Carnaby
RAF Linton on Ouse
RAF Melbourne
RAF Rufforth
RAF St Athan
shot down
training
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/997/10466/SMaddockLyonR2205669v10012.1.jpg
7ceb4875921b76a1bd8d858e99035479
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Maddock-Lyon, Roy. Scrap book
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Maddock-Lyon, R
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-03-21
Description
An account of the resource
20 pages. The scrap book contains items about Roy Maddock-Lyon's aircraft being shot down over Holbæk in Denmark 14 February 1945 and his subsequent evasion. It contains correspondence, photographs of the wreckage of his aircraft ZA-X, and what happened to his crew.<br />
<p>This collection also contains items concerning John Grayshan and Albert Berry. Additional information on <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/211033/">John Grayshan</a> and <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/202051/">Albert Berry</a> is available via the IBCC Losses Database.</p>
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Roy Maddock-Lyon's escape Route to Sweden and a ticket from Malmo to Stockholm
Description
An account of the resource
Item 1 - A map of Eastern Denmark annotated with the site of the crash, Charluttenlund and Falsterbo Canal.
Item 2 is a ticket from Malmo to Stockhol issued to Roy Maddock-Lyon.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1945-02-20
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One coloured map and one printed ticket on an album page
Language
A language of the resource
eng
dan
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Map
Text
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
SMaddockLyonR2205669v10012
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Civilian
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Denmark
Sweden
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1945-02-20
crash
evading
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/997/10467/SMaddockLyonR2205669v10013.1.jpg
8d6348b1b26c5ab0398f412fcfd73f9a
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Maddock-Lyon, Roy. Scrap book
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Maddock-Lyon, R
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-03-21
Description
An account of the resource
20 pages. The scrap book contains items about Roy Maddock-Lyon's aircraft being shot down over Holbæk in Denmark 14 February 1945 and his subsequent evasion. It contains correspondence, photographs of the wreckage of his aircraft ZA-X, and what happened to his crew.<br />
<p>This collection also contains items concerning John Grayshan and Albert Berry. Additional information on <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/211033/">John Grayshan</a> and <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/202051/">Albert Berry</a> is available via the IBCC Losses Database.</p>
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Roy Maddock-Lyon's Danish Identity Card and a map of Blockade Runners Flight Path
Description
An account of the resource
Item 1 is a Danish Identity card issued to Roy Maddock-Lyon under the name Peter Jensen. It includes a head and shoulders photograph.
Item 2 is a sketch map of Scandanavia and Great Britain with four routes described as 'Blockade Runners'. Captioned 'The map shows the various routes chosen for the courier flights'. and 'Copied from "Blockade Runners", Sweden's Lifeline in the Second World War.' and 'Blockade Runners Flight Path'.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One printed card and a sketch map on an album page
Language
A language of the resource
dan
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Map
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
SMaddockLyonR2205669v10013
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Civilian
Royal Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Denmark
Great Britain
Sweden
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
evading
Resistance
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/997/10468/SMaddockLyonR2205669v10014.2.jpg
bb3d3741c59ff98367455614395b67d3
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Maddock-Lyon, Roy. Scrap book
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Maddock-Lyon, R
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-03-21
Description
An account of the resource
20 pages. The scrap book contains items about Roy Maddock-Lyon's aircraft being shot down over Holbæk in Denmark 14 February 1945 and his subsequent evasion. It contains correspondence, photographs of the wreckage of his aircraft ZA-X, and what happened to his crew.<br />
<p>This collection also contains items concerning John Grayshan and Albert Berry. Additional information on <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/211033/">John Grayshan</a> and <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/202051/">Albert Berry</a> is available via the IBCC Losses Database.</p>
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
From: Sgt. F. Maddock-Lyon (2205669), No 10 Squadron, R.A.F..
To: [indecipherable word] Air Attache, Stockholm.
Date: 22nd February, 1945.
[Underline] Report on crash of 10 Squadron in Denmark on the night of the 14th/15th February, 1945, and subsequent escape of certain members of the crew to Sweden.[/underlined]
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following report.
2. On the night of the 14th/15th February we were detailed for a special operation which entailed crossing Denmark. The crew consisted of:-
P/O. J. GRAYSHAN (Pilot)
F/S. A.J. BERRY (navigator)
P/O. S. [indecipherable] (Bomb aimer)
F/S. P.F. ANDREWS (W/T. operator)
F/S. N.L. MILLS (Mid upper gunner)
Sgt. R. MADDOCK-LYON (Engineer)
F/S. J. PAYNE (Rear gunner)
3. We set course from base (10 Squadron) at 1010 hrs. for Flamborough Head at 1000 ft.. This height we maintained until 0060N was reached and we then climbed to 15,000 ft. to the Danish Coast, when we again climbed to 16,000 ft., which we maintained over Denmark to Point ‘A’. At the time I was making my log out when suddenly there was blinding flash, followed by a terrible bang. I immediately looked through the astrodome to see what damage had been done and I saw a fire begin on the port wing in the centre and rear behind the inboard engine. Before [deleted][indecipherable word][/deleted] I could feather the inboard engine the flames had enveloped the whole wing, so the pilot gave the order to “Prepare to bale out”. I put the pilot his parachute on and put my own on. Then he gave the order “Bale out”. During this time he had put the plane into an almost vertical descent. I
Roy’s initial interrogation report (a,b,c.) from Malmo.
[page break]
went down to the front escape hatch (under the navigator’s table) and found that the door was jammed or frozen. Then there was a tearing of metal and the next I remember is floating down to earth with my parachute open, [underline] minus [/underlined] flying boots, gloves and helmet. On landing in about 6” of mud I collected my parachute and Mae West and harness and covered them with mud as best I could as I was very dazed and headed for the road which was about 160 yards away. I went to Point ‘B’, where they washed and fed me and put me to bed.
4. Next morning I awoke and outside the house were about 12 German soldiers studying parts of the plane, especially [underline] Article ‘N’ [/underlined]. At 1600 hrs. person ‘Z’ arrived and told me he would come for me at 2000 hrs. to take me to point ‘C’. I told him about article ‘N’ and next morning he told me it had been taken care of. (During this or future time I did not see any of the crew except one body which was carried on a stretcher covered up, so I could not see his face.) ‘Z’ then told me we were going to point ‘D’ and I was to go in civilian clothes, which I did. At ‘D’ I was shown by [sic] room (16th February) and taken care of by person ‘Y’.
5. Next day, 17th February, person ‘X’ came for me and I was taken to contact ‘N’ at point ‘E’, where I got article ‘N’. Person ‘Y’ came for me and took me to ‘F’, where I remained until 1715 hrs. on 19th February. During this time ‘V’ took me round and showed me various places taken over by the Gestapo and military authorities and told me of sabotage done by the Resistance Movement. Details of these places will be given when required.
6. At 1715 on the 19th February I left ‘F’ and returned to point ‘E’ where at 1815 I was taken to point ‘G’. ‘U’ then took me to point ‘N’, where I remained until 2115, when I was taken for some food by ‘T’ as ‘U’ had left. The boat was going from ‘E’ to point ‘J’ but I left at point ‘K’, which is in Sweden,
7. I promise the statement here is the truth of my activities in Demark from 2030 on the night of the 14th February to the morning of the 20th February 1945.
(Sd.).. Maddock-Lyon (R.A.F.)
[signature]
Sergeant.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Report on crash of aircraft of 10 Squadron in Denmark on the night of 14th/15th February 1945, and subsequent escape of certain members of the crew to Sweden
Description
An account of the resource
A detailed report on the flight over Denmark, the explosion on the aircraft and evacuating the damaged aeroplane. The subsequent evasion to Sweden is also described.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Roy Maddock-Lyon
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1945-02-22
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Two typewritten sheets on an album page
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Diary
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
SMaddockLyonR2205669v10014
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Denmark
Sweden
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1945-02-14
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Georgie Donaldson
Steve Baldwin
10 Squadron
aircrew
crash
evading
flight engineer
Resistance
shot down
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1511/43400/MCarterT625517-160519-01.1.pdf
1fa88cda4bebf006827a1956ea6aaa82
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Carter, Thomas
T Carter
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-05-19
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Carter, T
Description
An account of the resource
Five items. The collection concerns Sergeant Flight Sergeant Thomas Carter (652517 Royal Air Force) and contains pages from his log book, decorations and documents. He flew operations as a flight engineer with 100 Squadron and was killed 20/21 April 1943. <br /><br />The collection was loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Norma Carter and catalogued by Barry Hunter. <br /><br />Additional information on Thomas Carter is available via the <a href="https://losses.internationalbcc.co.uk/loss/103797/">IBCC Losses Database</a>.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Rapport
Description
An account of the resource
Copy of Original Danish Police Report dated 1943 detailing the discovery of the body of an RAF Airman in a fjord near Ringkobing and his subsequent burial with a translation of the report into English dated 1996. There is an explanation as to why the name of the airman was incorrectly recorded.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Rinkobing Police
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1943-05-24
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Denmark
Denmark--Ringkøbing
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Civilian
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Language
A language of the resource
dan
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Nine printed sheets
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MCarterT625517-160519-01
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending text-based transcription
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943-04-21
aircrew
bale out
final resting place
flight engineer
killed in action
Lancaster
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1773/31274/PFOMetheringhamAF19040032.1.jpg
49a04abe4c3995e996316cefc95a42f0
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
RAF Metheringham collection
Description
An account of the resource
131 items. The collection is from the Royal Air Force Metheringham Airfield Visitor Centre and contains photographs of aircraft, aircrew, other RAF personnel and places. Includes some target and reconnaissance photographs. Many items are concerned with 106 Squadron at RAF Metheringham and RAF Syerston.
The collection has been licensed to the IBCC Digital Archive by the RAF Metheringham Airfield Visitor Centre and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2019-01-31
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
FOMetheringhamAF
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Royal Air Force Metheringham Airfield Visitor Centre which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Pilot in cockpit and funeral
Description
An account of the resource
Top - an RAF officer wearing tunic with pilot's brevet and medal ribbons sitting in the right hand seat of an aircraft cockpit looking back. Submitted with description 'S/Ldr Ron Churcher seated in an aircraft cockpit'.
Bottom - a group of German soldiers firing into the air with cross in the foreground. Another group of personnel on the right. Submitted with description 'Wehrmacht soldiers firing a salute at the military funeral of P/O Harry Stoffer (106 Sqn) and other aircrew at Aabenbraa cemetery, Denmark, 02/05/1942'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1942-05-02
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Two b/w photographs mounted on an album page
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PFOMetheringhamAF19040032
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Wehrmacht
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Denmark
Denmark--Åbenrå
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1942-05-02
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending identification. Things
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is property of the Royal Air Force Metheringham Airfield Visitor Centre which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.
106 Squadron
aircrew
final resting place
killed in action
pilot
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/934/22537/LLovattP1821369v1.1.pdf
d03b3c127e00f6788f8a0a2501ab6d56
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Lovatt, Peter
Dr Peter Lovatt
P Lovatt
Description
An account of the resource
117 items. An oral history interview with Peter Lovatt (b.1924, 1821369 Royal Air Force), his log book, documents, and photographs. The collection also contains two photograph albums. He flew 42 operations as an air gunner on 223 Squadron flying B-24s. <br /><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1338">Album One</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/2135">Album Two</a><br /><br />The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Nina and Peter Lovatt and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-09-27
2019-09-03
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Lovatt, P
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Peter Lovatt's navigator’s, air bomber’s and air gunner’s flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
Flying log book for Peter Lovatt covering the period from 12 April 1944 to 20 June 1945. Detailing his flying training and operations flown. He was stationed at RAF Burnaston (16 EFTS), RAF Barrow/Walney Island (10 AGS), RAF Oulton (223 Squadron). Aircraft flown in were Tiger Moth, Anson, Liberator, Fortress. He flew a total of 38 night-time bomber support operations with 223 Squadron, many providing Window cover for the main force. Main force targets were Duisburg, Denmark, Bochum, Hanover, western Ruhr, Neuss, Essen, Gladbach, Merseburg, Karlsruhe, Ludwigshaven, Mannheim, Nurnburg, Magdeburg, Stuttgart, Siegen, Dresden, Wiesbaden, Wotton, Dortmund-Ems canal, Freiburg, Kamen, Munster, Frankfurt, Ulm, Hamburg, Kiel, Augsburg and Wesel. His pilots on operations were Flight Lieutenant Hastie and Flying Officer Spicer.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Terry Hancock
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LLovattP1821369v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Denmark
Germany
Great Britain
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
England--Cumbria
England--Derbyshire
England--Norfolk
Germany--Augsburg
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Mönchengladbach
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Kamen
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Ludwigshafen am Rhein
Germany--Magdeburg
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Merseburg
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Neuss
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Siegen
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Ulm
Germany--Wiesbaden
Germany--Wesel (North Rhine-Westphalia)
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Freiburg im Breisgau
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-10-07
1944-10-09
1944-10-11
1944-10-19
1944-10-25
1944-10-26
1944-11-01
1944-11-04
1944-11-18
1944-11-21
1944-11-28
1944-11-30
1944-12-02
1944-12-04
1944-12-12
1944-12-15
1944-12-17
1944-12-21
1944-12-24
1945-01-05
1945-01-07
1945-01-08
1945-01-14
1945-01-16
1945-01-22
1945-01-28
1945-01-29
1945-02-01
1945-02-02
1945-02-03
1945-02-13
1945-02-14
1945-02-15
1945-02-20
1945-02-21
1945-02-23
1945-02-24
1945-02-28
1945-02-29
1945-03-03
1945-03-07
1945-03-13
1945-03-23
1945-03-24
1945-04-02
1945-04-03
1945-04-08
1945-04-09
1945-04-13
1945-04-14
1945-04-15
1945-04-16
1945-05-17
1699 HCU
223 Squadron
air gunner
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
B-17
B-24
bombing
bombing of Dresden (13 - 15 February 1945)
Cook’s tour
Flying Training School
Heavy Conversion Unit
Ju 88
RAF Barrow in Furness
RAF Oulton
Tiger Moth
training
Window
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/150/1567/LBellinghamPF1397635v1.2.pdf
1fbc8b7942f76eed3db897aeedc910f4
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Bellingham, Peter
Peter F Bellingham
Peter Bellingham
P F Bellingham
P Bellingham
Description
An account of the resource
Three items. An oral history interview with Pilot Officer Peter Frederick Bellingham (b. 1923, 1391638 Royal Air Force), a photograph and his log book. Peter Bellingham trained in South Africa as a bomb aimer and flew 30 Special Operations Executive operations in Halifaxes and Stirlings with 138 Squadron from RAF Tempsford.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Peter Bellingham and catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2016-11-21
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Bellingham, PF
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Peter Bellingham’s observer's and air gunner's flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
The log book covers the training and operational career of bomb aimer Peter Bellingham from 10 March 1943 to 21 February 1946. After training in South Africa he flew Halifaxes and Stirlings with 138 Squadron, taking part in 30 night operations over Denmark, France, Germany, and Norway. These were special operations involving the dropping of containers, packages and pigeons to agents, outcome logged either as ‘Joy’ or ‘No joy’. His pilots on operations were Strathearn and Flight Lieutenant Moffat. Landed with FIDO once, did a Cook’s tour over the Netherlands and Germany before becoming an instructor. Aircraft flown included: Oxford, Anson, Wellington, Stirling, Halifax and Warwick.
Creator
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Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Format
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One booklet
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Text. Log book and record book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LBellinghamPF1397635v1
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1945
1946
1944-07-03
1944-07-04
1944-07-05
1944-07-07
1944-07-08
1944-07-09
1944-07-10
1944-07-11
1944-07-23
1944-07-24
1944-07-25
1944-07-26
1944-07-27
1944-07-28
1944-07-30
1944-07-31
1944-08-04
1944-08-05
1944-08-06
1944-08-07
1944-08-08
1944-08-09
1944-08-10
1944-08-11
1944-08-12
1944-08-29
1944-08-30
1944-09-28
1944-09-29
1944-09-30
1944-10-01
1944-10-04
1944-10-05
1944-10-15
1944-10-16
1944-11-01
1944-11-02
1944-11-07
1944-11-08
1944-11-26
1944-11-27
1944-11-29
1944-11-30
1944-12-24
1944-12-25
1945-02-21
1945-02-22
1945-02-23
1945-02-25
1945-02-26
1945-02-27
1945-03-04
1945-03-05
1945-06-19
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Denmark
France
Germany
Great Britain
Norway
South Africa
England--Bedfordshire
England--Buckinghamshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Suffolk
South Africa--Port Elizabeth
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
11 OTU
138 Squadron
1657 HCU
17 OTU
Advanced Flying Unit
aircrew
animal
Anson
bomb aimer
bombing
Cook’s tour
FIDO
Halifax
Heavy Conversion Unit
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
RAF Manby
RAF Oakley
RAF Silverstone
RAF Tempsford
RAF Turweston
RAF Westcott
RAF Woodbridge
Special Operations Executive
Stirling
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/743/19703/MCleggPV[DoB]-150710-010001.pdf
e92546a0df93cd6e5c1d97fe9cd36a63
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Clegg, Peter Vernon
P V Clegg
Description
An account of the resource
Eight items and five sub-collections. Main collection contains a log of Pathfinder operations from RAF Wyton 1943 -1944, histories of the Avro repair facility at Bracebridge Heath, and Langar, a biography of Squadron Leader David James Baikie Wilson, biography of Squadron Leader Lighton Verdon-Roe, a book - Test Pilots of A.V. Roe & Co Ltd - S.A. 'Bill' Thorn, and two volumes of book - Roy Chadwick - no finer aircraft designer, Sub-collections contain a total of 29 items concerning the Aldborough Dairy and Cafe as well as biographical material, including log books for Alan Gibson, Peter Isaacson, Alistair Lang and Charles Martin. <br /><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1772">Aldborough Dairy and Cafe</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1768">Gibson, Alan</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1769">Isaacson, Peter</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1770">Lang, Alastair</a><br /><a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/1771">Martin, Charles</a><br /><br /><br />The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Peter Clegg and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2015-07-02
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
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Clegg, PV
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[Photograph] – Joan Gardiner [indecipherable word] WAAF Pat Dey of 156 PFF Sqn.
[page break]
* While at School near Berchtesgarten, [sic] Hitler & his entourage used to pass the gates frequently. The School would line the road and salute ‘Heil Hitler’ when his car passed. One day he slowed and stopped, noticing Pat Dey did not salute. He asked her ‘why’? She said: “Because I am English!”
She worked for an Australian boss before the War began. One day she said she wanted a few minutes to go and sign on for the RAF. He said: “don’t be silly – War is a man’s job – you’ll never be able to stomach it.” How wrong he was!
She worked at Bomber Command HQ at High Wycombe before 156 Sqn, on bombing raid plotting. She was fluent in German.
At 156 Sqn she got to know A V-M Don Bennett – C-in-C of the Pathfinder Group at Wyton, and became a family friend, doing baby-sitting for them.
Page 1
Example of ‘Met’ chit used in Ops briefings.
Form 2324.
METEOROLOGICAL OFFICE, [indecipherable word]
LOCAL FORECAST from [indecipherable word] hours 2/3/44 date.
ROUTE FORECAST [indecipherable word] TO [indecipherable word] till [indecipherable word] hours [indecipherable word] date.
Time of Origin: [indecipherable word] hours [indecipherable words]
[underlined] SURFACE WIND: [/underlined] NW to WNW, 10-15 knots. Gusting locally to 20 knots.
{underlined] UPPER WIND: [/underlined] 2000 feet 310 degs 35 knots. 5000 feet 300 degs 40 knots.
[underlined] WEATHER: [/underlined] Wintry showers, isolated this morning but more widespread this afternoon.
[underlined] VISIBILITY: [/underlined] Mainly 4 to 8 miles but 1 to 3 miles in showers.
[underlined] CLOUD: [/underlined] Small amounts of Sc (Stratocumulus) at 2/3000ft top 4/5000ft this morning apart from local increase in showers to 6/10
[page break]
Page 2
[underlined] 26TH APRIL 1943 [/underlined]
DUISBURG.
Paramatta. 133M & 356H. & 72 P.F.F. [missing] will be dropped at Position ‘A’ 5145N 0642E. by [missing] Mosquitos Squadron.
[missing] exact A/P with Ground markers T.I Red [missing] as backers up will keep the A/P marked with T.I Green throughout
[missing] their bombs with maximum precision at the T.I red if these are [missing] centre of cluster of T.I Green. ZERO = 0215
[list T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPHS. REMARKS.]
[missing] with small amounts of cloud 10/10ths to E. of target. At the beginning [missing] selected crews were attacking good concentration was [missing] of main force attacked fires spread until finally area [missing] mainly ENE of red T.I’s. 14 photographs attempted.
[page break]
Page 3
[underlined] 27TH APRIL 1943 [/underlined]
DORTMUND.
Paramatta. Zero Hour. 0200 hrs.
Flares to be dropped short of target by Mosquitos 4 mls. E of [missing]
[missing] Red & Green T.I’s.
[missing] of special a/c will attack Soest as first running [missing] target. T.I. Yellow to be dropped at position C to [missing].
[list T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPHS. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 28th APRIL 1943 [/underlined]
Stand down.
[missing] of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Group laid mines. 23 a/c are missing.
[page break]
4
[underlined] 29th APRIL 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 09.35HRS. [/underlined] STAND DOWN.
[underlined] 30TH APRIL 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940HRS. [/underlined] Target received – ESSEN.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical (meaning Oboe-guided) Wanganui. 290 Heavies to 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups. & 35 P.F.F/ (8 Mosquitos.) Tracking flares red steady will be dropped on track 5 mins short of the release point at position A as telephoned. (51’45’N 06’56’E). Tracking flares green steady will be dropped on track 2 1/2 mins short of release point at 5137N 0657E.
Release point flares will be red with green stars with one white for longer burning.
Main force a/c to [indecipherable word] tracking flares as guide for bombing run up should aim bombs at release point flares on exact heading 200M & 165mph indicated.
All flares will ignite at 16000ft.
Zero hour. 2359. Changed to 0230.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Owing to height of cloud both navigational & release point flares went into cloud very quickly & all a/c bombed on white flares on approximate position. White flares seen. Glow of fires seen below cloud, large white explosion lit up underside of cloud at 0305 hrs.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 12 a/c missing over ESSEN. 1 from 1 Group, 5 from 4 Group, 5 from 5 Group, 1 from 405. late of 7 squadron over BOCHOLT.
Photographic Cover shows further damage to KRUPPS. Attack gave rise to serious annoyance among the authorities. Described as “terror raid by Jewish and Bolshevic [sic] air pirates.”!
[page break]
5
[underlined] 1ST MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1100HRS. [/underlined] Target. DUISBURG. ‘D’
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Same as for ESSEN 30th April/1st May. Zero hour. 0005.
[deleted] Route – Base – 53’17N 02’12E. – EGMOND – 5200N [/deleted]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 1300HRS. [/underlined] OPS CANCELLED
[underlined] 2nd MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0931HRS. [/underlined] Target – Area 1. DUISBURG. Area 2. BREMEN.
[underlined] METHOD. Area I. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta - Ground Marking. Zero hour 0030hrs. Landmark T.I’s Yellow will be dropped at 5141N 0645E. Mosquitoes will mark exact A/P with T.I. red. Other P.F.F. a/c acting as backers up will keep A/P marked with T.I. Green.
Main Force to aim bombs at T.I. red if visible otherwise at centre of area covered by T.I Green.
[underlined] Area II. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground marking. Landmark flares red steady will be dropped by early a/c only at 5405N 0750E. Landmark T.I. Yellow will be dropped at 5400N 0855E. by all P.F.F. a/c. target will be marked with ground markers T.I. Green.
Main Force a/c to aim their bombast centre of area covered by all T.I. Green. No attempt at visual identification to be made. Flares white & Ground markers T.I. [deleted] Green [/deleted] Red will also be dropped in target area for use of PFF a/c only. Landmark T.I. Yellow to be dropped at 5345N 0835E.
[underlined] 1800HRS. [/underlined] Briefed.
[underlined] 2026 HRS. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta on Area I confirmed.
[underlined] 2110 HRS. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[page break]
6
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 3RD MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940 HRS. [/underlined] Target. Area I DUISBURG. Area II BREMEN
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Area I. Musical Paramatta unless further met. Information makes sky-marking necessary. Zero hour 0030 hrs. Method as for yesterday. Mosquitoes, - Z-3, Z, Z+7, Z+13, Z+19, Z+25, Z+31, Z+37, Z+43. Area II. Newhaven Ground marking. As for yesterday.
[underlined] 1800HRS. [/underlined] Briefing
[underlined] 1801 HRS. [/underlined] OPS. CANCELLED.
[page break]
7
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 4TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0932HRS. [/underlined] Target – DORTMUND. A/P 160° 350yds from ‘A’
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta. 0100HRS. Zero. 116 Mediums + 388 heavies + 71 PFF Mosquitoes will drop landmark ground markers T.I. Yellow at 5152N 0726E. Mosquitoes will then accurately mark exact A/P with ground marker T.I. Green at Z-3, Zero, Z+7, Z+13, Z+19, Z+25, Z+31, Z+37. Other P.F.F. a/c acting as backers up will keep A/P marked throughout attack with T.I. red.
Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at T.I. Green if visible, if not at centre of pattern of T.I. red. A small attack for training purposes will be carried out on Rheine at Z+20.
[underlined] 1800HRS. [/underlined] Briefed. A.O.C’s message to crews read. Photographs of line up taken.
F/L LANG AND SGT. CLARK SINCE REPORTED SAFE.
[page break]
8
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
‘T’ first a/c to return to base made three unsuccessful attempts to land after which owing to the aerodrome being ‘red’ all a/c were either diverted to Honiley or went of their own accord. Visibility there was found to be even worse than Warboys and a/c which had not already been instructed to land elsewhere were told to return and land at Marham. Finally landing at Marham, Chedworth, Sleap, Honeybourne, Stanton Harcourt, Whitchurch, High Ercall, Pershore and one ‘J’ baled out successfully. Interrogations then proceeded during the following day until 1900 hrs!
[underlined] SUMMARY [/underlined] 4 a/c missing P.F.F. 1 from 83, 1 of 156, 2 of 35. 30 a/c missing from Command. Owing to the misconduct of W/C Donaldson who, according to the Main Force, apparently dropped his Red T.I.s on the Dutch coast, he said as far as night photographs show succeeded in developing up to 6 mls. North of the target.
[page break]
9.
[underlined] 5TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations – 156 Squadron returned to base at various times during the day.
[underlined] 6TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1012 HRS. [/underlined] Stand down for P.F.F. with the exception of 109 Squadron.
[underlined] 7TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1008 HRS. [/underlined] Target – DUISBURG Backers-up not required – 6 Main Force only.
[underlined] 1040 HRS. METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta or Musical Wanganui depending on later met: information. If [underlined] Musical Paramatta [/underlined] Mosquitoes will drop preliminary warning groundmarkers T.I. yellow at 5145N 0644E. Mosquitoes will then mark exact A/P with groundmarkers T.I. red which will be dropped at Z-5, Z, Z+5, Z+10, Z+15, Z+20. These groundmarkers will each burn for 7 minutes. No backers up. Main Force to aim bombs with max. precision at T.I. red. If [underlined] Musical Wanganui. [/underlined] Mosquitoes will drop tracking flares red steady at 5145N 0644E. 2nd tracking flares green steady will be dropped on track at 5136N 0645E.
Release point flares red with green stars and white stars for longer burning will be dropped at Z, Z+5, Z+10, Z+15, Z+20. All flares igniting at 16000ft. Main Force a/c will aim their bombs with max. precision at centre of release point flares on exact heading of 200°M IAS 143kts with bomb sights set for height, air speed & zero wind.
195 heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 Group + 17 (L) P.F.F. + 7 Mosquitoes.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 1745 HRS. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[page break]
10.
[underlined] 8TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0930HRS. [/underlined} MAKE & MEND. Tunis and Bizerta [sic] fallen.
[underlined] 9TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000HRS. [/underlined} Target – DUISBURG. [underlined] METHOD [/underlined] Musical Wanganui. 87 mediums + 355 heavies + 8 Mos. + 31 PFF = 482 a/c. Zero. 0200hrs. Tracking flares red steady will be dropped on track at 5150N 0644E. Tracking flares green steady will be dropped on track at 5138N 0644E. Release point flares will be red with green stars with flares white for longer burning. Main Force a/c should aim bombs at centre of release point flares on heading 200°M at IAS 165mph (143kts) with bombsight set for true height, airspeed & zero wind. All flares igniting at 16,000ft.
Mosquitoes will drop release point flares at Z, Z+5, Z+10, Z+15, +20, +25, +30, +35.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
A/C sent to Wyton for take off as Warboys runway was u/s.
[underlined] 1800HRS. [/underlined] Briefing.
[underlined] 1805HRS. [/underlined] Probability of change of method to Musical Paramatta.
[underlined] 2220 HRS. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[page break]
11.
[underlined] 10TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0937HRS. [/underlined] No operations in Command tonight.
[underlined] 11TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0941HRS. [/underlined] Target – BOCHUM. [underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta. 115 Mediums + 431 Heavies + 100 PFF. Zero hour 0015HRS.
[underlined] WORLD’S RECORD WEIGHT CARRYING ATTACK. [/underlined]
Mosquitoes with ground mark A/P with T.I. red at Z-3, Z+1, Z+7, Z+12, Z+17, Z+22, Z+27, Z+32, Z+37.
These will be backed up by other P.F.F aircraft dropping groundmarkers T.I. Green.
Main Force a/c should drop their bombs on the T.I. red if these are seen, otherwise at the estimated centre of the area covered by T.I. Greens. Length of attack Z – Z+45.
Preliminary warning Ground markers T.I. Yellow will be dropped by Mosquitoes at 5146N 0712E.
[underlined] 1726HRS. [/underlined] Area 2. DUISBURG. Main Force crews only will be required if Area 2.
[underlined] 1810HRS. [/underlined] Backers-up scrubbed.
[underlined] 1820HRS. [/underlined] P.F.F. cancelled except for 109 Squadron.
[underlined] 1726HRS. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] for DUISBURG. To be Musical Wanganui. As for method 9th May 1943. Sortie information as for 12th May 1943.
[underlined] 12TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1017HRS. [/underlined] Target – DUISBURG. 8 backers up with their best bomb aimers & 10 Main Force.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta. 120M + 437H. – 89 PFF + 9 Mos: Zero. 0200hrs. Landmarkers T.I. Yellow will be dropped by all Mosquitos [sic] at 5140N 0645E. Exact aiming point will be marked by Mosquitoes with T.I. red at Z-3, Z+1, Z+7, Z+12, Z+22, Z+27, Z+32, Z+37. to be backed up by other PFF dropping T.I. Green. Main Force should aim bombs at T.I. red if visible otherwise at the centre of the pattern of all T.I. Green.
[page break]
12.
[underlined] 12TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET: DUISBURG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 35 a/c missing – 4 P.F.F. Very good concentration on A/P shown by photographs. 1560 tons of bombs dropped – greatest weight achieved against any city in a single attack.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] All crews reported good concentration of markers & fires. One large explosion with big orange glow lasting 6 to 7 sec: at about 0216hrs. Glow of fires seen from Dutch Coast on homeward journey.
[underlined] DAYLIGHT COVER. [/underlined] This shows that the central area of DUISBURG itself is wrecked. Main railway station almost completely destroyed. Centre of DUISBURG-RUHRORT burned out. [indecipherable words]
[page break]
13.
[underlined] 0950HRS. [/underlined] Target – Bochum a/c ‘Q’. PLZEN.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Area I. Musical Paramatta. 104 M + 300 Heavies + 35 PFF + 8 Mos: Area II. Newhaven Groundmarking.
‘Y’ a/c will drop T.I. Yellow at 51°29N 0940E to be backed up by 156 Squadron. ‘Y’ a/c will drop T.I. White at 51°00N 11°02E to be backed up by all P.F.F. Target to be marked blindly by T.I. Green and sticks of White flares. 3L/83, 1L/97, 5L/156, will act as visual markers & will, if A/P is positively identified mark A/P with Red T.Is. If further illumination is necessary a further stick of flares may be used.
Backers up will aim T.I. reds at the exact centre of T.I. red visible. Main Force may for training purpose identify the A/P for themselves in the light of flares, otherwise at the centre of all T.I. red visible. T.I. White and T.I. Yellow will be dropped as navigational aids at the same positions on the route home.
[underlined] 1800HRS. [/underlined] Briefing
[underlined] PLZEN – RESULTS. [/underlined] Main concentration was North of the SKODA WORKS – eleven photographs plotted on the works. Although therefore some damage must have been done, no very important results are expected.
[underlined] BOCHUM. [/underlined] Heavy and well concentrated attack. Smoke from fires on the following day prevented good photographs from being taken, but the industrial area on the N.W. of the city centre has been badly hit and the central area largely devastated.
[page break]
14.
[underlined] TARGETS: PLZEN AND BOCHUM [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY PLZEN. [/underlined] Early arrivals pinpointed works & early T.I. reds dropped on western edge of works & some to N.W. Attack later spread until area 8 x 10mls was covered. Smoke screen which came into operation prevented later pinpointing.
[underlined] BOCHUM. [/underlined] Ground haze prevented identification of ground detail. This a/c was early on the target & no final assessment of success of the raid can be given, but glow of fires could be seen from the Dutch Coast.
[page break]
15.
[underlined] 14TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations – Training. “Interrogation of Prisoners of War” shown to R.A.F. & WAAF personnel. Berlin attacked by 12 Mosquitoes.
[underlined] 15TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations in P.F.F. Command: gardening (mine laying). 2 Group 3 Mosquitoes attack on Berlin and 19 Lancasters attack the Ruhr with 6 Mosquitoes of 2 Group. 1 a/c of 4 Group missing on gardening.
[underlined] 16TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations. Attack on the Moehne, [sic] Sorper, [sic] & Eder dams by 19 Lancasters.
[underlined] 17TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations.
[underlined] 18TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations. Dinghy drill at “The Pike and Eel”.
[underlined] 19TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations. T.I. demonstration at Lakenheath and Rushford Ranges by P.F.F. for benefit of new crews in Bomber Command. S/L Grant in ‘P.’ and W/O Busby in ‘X’ from 156.
[underlined] 20TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations.
[underlined] 21ST MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations.
[page break]
16.
[underlined] 22ND MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations. M.I.9 Lecture by F/O Grainger.
[underlined] 23RD MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940HRS. [/underlined] MAXIMUM effort on DORTMUND.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta.
Mosquitoes will drop groundmarkers T.I. Yellow at 5145N 0728E as an aid to Navigation.
Mosquitoes will mark the exact A/P with T.I. red at Z-2, Z+1, Z+8, Z+14, Z+20, Z+26, Z+32, Z+38, Z+44, Z+50, Z+56. These will be backed up by P.F.F. a/c with T.I. Green.
Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at the T.I. red if these are visible otherwise at the estimated centre of the area covered by all T.I. Green.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 163 Mediums + 535 Heavies + 119 P.F.F. = 817 a/c.
[underlined] list by Squadron of aircraft numbers, roles and losses involved [/underlined]
[underlined] BRIEFING. [/underlined] 1800HRS. – New briefing room.
[page break]
17
[underlined] TARGET: DORTMUND [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Markers confined to an area with a diameter of about 1 mile. Main Force covered Red T.I. area tailing off to the N & NE 4-5mls. in pear-shaped pattern. The intense glow & smoke from fires in the later stages prevented red T.Is from being seen.
Heavy flak. Moderate “predicted” at first – tailed off in quality & quantity. Negligible L/F. Moderate S/Ls (searchlights) sometimes in cones – mostly singly.
[page break]
18.
[underlined] 24TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1940HRS. [/underlined] MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 25TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000HRS. [/underlined] Target – DÜSSELDORF.
underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta. Groundmarkers T.I. Yellow will be dropped at 5100N 0634E throughout period of attack as an aid to navigation, & backed up by LANCASTER backers up. Mosquitoes will mark the exact A/P with groundmarkers T.I. red at:- Z-2, Z+1, Z+8, Z+14, Z+20, Z+26, Z+32, Z+38, Z+44, Z+50. Other P.F.F. a/c acting as backers up will keep the A/P marked with Green T.Is. Main Force a/c should aim their bombs exactly at the T.I red if visible otherwise at the estimated centre of the pattern of T.I. Green. Groundmarkers T.I. Yellow will be dropped at 5117N 0630E by practice ‘Y’ a/c as an aid to navigation.
[underlined] EFFORTS. [/underlined] 155 Mediums + 513 Heavies + 117 P.F.F. = 785 a/c. Zero hour – 0130HRS.
[underlined] BRIEFING. [/underlined] 1800HRS.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 759 a/c attacked:
[underlined] list by Group, of aircraft numbers involved and missing [/underlined]
[page break]
19.
[underlined] TARGET: DÜSSELDORF [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY {/underlined] Very conflicting reports received from crews. Early crews unable to see any markers below cloud layer at 8/10,000ft. Apparent gap in T.I. reds in early part of attack seemed to result in scattering of Green T.Is into red T.is reported dropped at 0207hrs and 0210 1/2 hrs. about 1 1/2mls apart resulted in two Green T.I. areas. If these do not agree with Mosquito then enemy is using decoys. Fires reported by last a/c to cover area about 1 1/2mls in diameter.
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20
[underlined] 26TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000 HRS. [/underlined] Target – COLOGNE. Area 2. DUISBERG.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] MUSICAL PARAMATTA. Ground marking with red T.I. by Mosquitoes and Green T.I.s by backers up. Preliminary warning Yellow T.I. will be dropped by fire raisers of 7 Squadron using ‘Y’ only at 5105N 0025E. These will be maintained by backers up of 7, 35, 83 and 156 Squadron who will aim their Yellow T.I. at those previously dropped. Mosquitoes will then act as precision ground markers and will drop their red T.I. in salvo on the A/P.
Then PFF a/c will act as Backers up aiming their Green T.I. at the Red T.I. if seen otherwise at the estimated centre of the pattern of Green T.I. visible overshooting by 2 seconds in either case.
Fire-raisers and main force will aim their bombs at the Red T.I. if visible otherwise at the centre of all the Green T.I.s visible otherwise at the centre of all the Green T.I.s visible using ‘Y’ as an aid if fitted. ‘Y’ a/c may, if no T.I.s are seen, drop their bombs blind on ‘Y’.
[underlined] AFTERNOON. [/underlined] KING GEORGE and QUEEN ELIZABETH visit Wyton to meet Air Crews. Representatives of each PFF squadron present. F/L COOK and Crew from 156 Squadron.
[underlined] 1800 HRS. [/underlined] Briefing. ‘Y’ F/L COOK to carry Dictaphone.
[underlined] 2153 HRS. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED
[page break]
21.
[underlined] TARGET: COLOGNE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 27TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1010 HRS. [/underlined] Target – ESSEN.
[underlined] Method [/underlined] Musical Wanganui or Musical Paramatta according to weather conditions. No Backers-up on ‘Y’ type a/c required from 150.
[underlined] 1800 HRS. [/underlined] Briefing
[underlined] 2045 HRS. [/underlined] Method to be Musical Wanganui.
[page break]
22.
[underlined] TARGET: ESSEN [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Good concentration achieved with incendiaries inclined to fall short. Good fires seen through breaks in cloud. Flak reports vary – generally considered moderate barrage. 3 a/c hit – ‘B’ F/O PRICHARD – both by flak and another Lancaster over the target. S/L’s few, occasionally small cones through breaks in cloud. ‘B’ F/O PRICHARD carried the dictaphone, but it was broken on return.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing [/underlined]
14 Mosquitoes of 2 Group attacked JENA (ZEISS works) in daylight – 3 missing.
[underlined] 28TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
No operations for P.F.F. Bombing, fighter affiliation and other training. 12 a/c of 2 Group on Zeebrugge missing. [missing sentence]
[page break]
23.
[underlined] 29TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] METHOD [/underlined] MUSICAL PARAMATTA. Preliminary warning Yellow T.I will be dropped by 2S/7 + 2H/35 special a/c at 5059N 5626E This will be maintained by ‘Y’ type backers up. Mosquitoes will then act as precision groundmarkers dropping Red T.I. in salvo on the A/P.
Other P.F.F. a/c will act as Backers up aiming their Green T.I. at the Red T.I. if seen, otherwise at the estimated centre of all green T.I. visible and overshooting by 1 second in either case.
Landmarkers Yellow T.I. will be dropped by ‘Y’ a/c at 5033N 0723E on the route home as an aid to navigation and to help the main force avoid defended areas on leaving the target.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK [/underlined] 113 Mediums + 479 Heavies + 117 P.F.F. Zero hour = 0045 hrs. Dictaphone carried by ‘Y’ F/L COOK, but failed to work.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] The most concentrated raid of the war.
[underlined] list by Group, aircraft numbers involved and missing [/underlined]
[page break]
24.
[underlined] TARGET: WUPPERTAL [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] It is considered by all crews that this attack achieved a good concentration of T.I. marking & consequently good fires were started around this concentration. The fire raising technique appears to have been very successful in the early part of [words missing]
[page break]
25.
[underlined] 30TH MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0947 HRS. [/underlined] Stand down for all P.F.F. Squadrons.
[underlined] 31ST MAY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0948 HRS. [/underlined] All Squadrons stood down.
[underlined] 1ST JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0952 HRS. [/underlined] No operations in P.F.F. Training only. Sgt. Wedd lecture on “New Guinea”
[underlined] 2ND JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
No operations in P.F.F.
[underlined] 3RD JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
No operations for 156 Squadron.
[underlined] 4TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940 HRS. [/underlined] Target BOCHUM. Secondary Target MUNSTER. GOODWOOD effort.
[underlined] METHOD for BOCHUM. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta. Mosquitoes will drop Groundmarkers T.I. Yellow at Position A 5148N 0713E. as an aid to navigation. Backers up will keep Position A marked also with T.I. Yellow. Mosquitoes will mark the exact A/P with Groundmarkers T.I. Red at Z-3, Z, Z+7, Z+12, Z+17, Z+22, Z+27, Z+32, Z+37, Z+42. Backers up will keep A/P marked with Groundmarkers T.I. Green. Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at the T.I. red if visible otherwise at the centre of the pattern of T.I. Green.
For information P.F.F. are carrying out a separate attack on MUNSTER from Z+25 to Z+35 using red and green T.I.s
[missing words]
[page break]
26.
[underlined] 5TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1002 HRS. [/underlined] Target OBERHAUSEN. 15 main force only.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Wanganui. Tracking flares red steady will be dropped by all Mosquitoes at Position A 5142N 0615E.
Tracking flares green steady will be dropped by all Mosquitoes at Position B. 5136N 0652E.
Release point flares red with green stars & white for longer burning will be dropped by all Mosquitoes to ignite at 18,000ft in such a position that all main force a/c aiming their bombs at them on a heading of 199M. at 143kts I.A.S. will hit the A/P.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 272 heavies + 43 P.F.F. Zero hour: 0100hrs.
[underlined] 1538 hrs. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[underlined] 6TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1030 HRS. [/underlined] Targets OBERHAUSEN & MUNSTER.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and targets [/underlined]
[underlined] METHODS. Munster. [/underlined] ‘Y’ a/c only will attack at Z+10 & Z+12. by special equipment. [underlined] Oberhausen. [/underlined] Tracking flares red steady will be dropped by all Mosquitoes on Track 8.5 N. Mls. short of the release point.
Release point flares red with green stars & white for longer burning will be dropped by all Mosquitoes to ignite at 18,000ft so that all main force a/c aiming [missing words]
[page break]
27
[underlined] 6TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined] (CONT:)
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 274 heavies + 38 P.F.F. Zero hour: 0100hrs.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 1800 HRS. [/underlined] Briefing.
[underlined] 1803 HRS. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[page break}
28
[underlined] 7TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 12.15 HRS. [/underlined] Target MÜNSTER: 1 ‘Y’ + 3 visual marker. + 6 main force. Target MÜLHEIM: 11 Backers-up.
[underlined] METHOD MULHEIM. [/underlined] Yellow T.I. will be dropped by special a/c of 7 & 35 squadron on their way to Munster at Position A. 5150N 0637E. This will be maintained by Backers-up of 35 and 405 Squadron who will aim their Yellow T.I. at those previously dropped.
Mosquitoes will then act as precision groundmarkers and will drop their red T.I. in salvo on the A/P.
Other P.F.F. a/c will act as backers up aiming their Green T.I. at the red T.I. if seen otherwise at the estimated centre of all the Green T.I. visible overshooting by 3 seconds in either case.
Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at the red T.I.s if visible otherwise at the estimated centre of all Green T.I.s visible.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 120 Mediums + 576 Heavies + 49 P.F.F. Zero hour: 0100 HRS. Z - Z+50.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers and type involved [/underlined]
[underlined] MÜNSTER. [/underlined] All blind marker illuminators of 7 & 35 squadron will drop T.I. Yellow blindly at Position A. 5150N 0637E as a navigational aid to a/c attacking Mülheim.
‘Y’ a/c will act as finders and will mark the target area blindly with Green T.I. proceeding on the same heading for 10 seconds before releasing a stick of flares at 4 seconds interval. The Visual Markers will then mark the A/P with red T.I.
Main Force a/c are permitted to identify the A/P visually in the light of flares for [missing words] release their bombs at the estimated centre
[page break]
29.
[underlined] 7TH June 1943 [/underlined] (CONT.)
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 69 heavies of P.F.F. Zero hour: 0100 HRS.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
P.F.F. a/c are to fly strictly between the height limits of 15,800ft and 16,200ft between meridians 0600E and 0700E on the route to & from the target.
[underlined] 1900 HRS. [/underlined] Zero hour now 0115 hrs.
[underlined] 2200 HRS. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[page break]
30
[underlined] TARGETS: MÜNSTER AND MÜLHEIM [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
31
[underlined] 8TH June 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1040 HRS. [/underlined] Target – MÜNSTER. PFF only.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Blind bombing by P.F.F. ‘Y’ a/c.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined]
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
G/Capt. Collings assumed Command 156 Squadron.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Fighter Command intruders over Dutch aerodromes from midnight – 0300 HRS.
[underlined] 1900 HRS. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 9TH June 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1115 HRS. [/underlined] Targets for 156 Squadron – MÜNSTER 1 [indecipherable number] + 10 main force. ESSEN 10 Backers Up.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] ESSEN. Mixed Musical Paramatta.
Preliminary warning flares Green steady will be dropped by Mosquitoes at Position 5137N 0730E. 4 nautical miles to S/B of main force track. Mosquitoes will then drop release point flares red with green stars & white for [missing words] by all Mosquitoes with red T.Is.
[page break]
32
[underlined] 9TH June 1943 [/underlined] (CONT:)
Other P.F.F. backers-up will drop their Green T.I on the red T.I visible. If groundmarkers are invisible backers-up will revert to main force aiming their bombs at the centre of the release point flares on a heading of [missing] at 143kts. and bringing their Green T.I. back.
[underlined] MÜNSTER. [/underlined] Skymarking and groundmarking by special a/c for non ‘Y’ a/c. Special ‘Y’ a/c will drop flares green with red stars then T.I red. If cloud conditions are suitable for groundmarking no flares will be dropped. Other ‘Y’ a/c will bomb by aid of their special equipment.
[underlined] 2155 HRS. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[underlined] 10TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1940 HRS. [/underlined] MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 11TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1055 HRS. [/underlined] TARGETS RECEIVED. Area I. DUSSELDORF. MUNSTER (Y a/c.) Area II. BREMEN. Area III EMDEN.
[underlined] METHODS. MUSICAL PARAMATTA. [/underlined] DUSSELDORF.
Preliminary warning Yellow T.I will be dropped at 5101N 0633E. by Mosquitoes, and backed up by other P.F.F. a/c.
Mosquitoes will act as precision groundmarkers dropping Red T.I on the exact A/P. They will also drop sky markers red with green stars & white igniting at 14000ft.
Other P.F.F. a/c will act as backers-up aiming their Green T.I at the Red T.I seen otherwise at the centre of all Green T.I overshooting by 3 seconds in either case. If groundmarkers are not visible backers-up will revert to main force bringing their T.Is back.
Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at the Red T.Is seen otherwise at the centre of all Green T.Is visible. If release point flares are used a/c should bomb on a heading of 042M at 143kts.
[page break]
33
[underlined] 11TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined] (CONT:)
[underlined] MUNSTER. [/underlined]
‘Y’ a/c will act as finders marking the target area with Yellow T.I proceeding on the same heading for 10 seconds before releasing a stick of flares at 5 secs. interval.
Visual markers will mark the A/P with red T.I after positive visual identification in the light of flares.
Main Force a/c are permitted to identify visually for practice purposes, otherwise they will aim their bombs at the estimated centre of all T.I reds visible or at the centre of all Yellow T.I seen with with an overshoot of 3 seconds. All ‘Y’ a/c should bomb blindly on ‘Y’
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined]
DUSSELDORF. 148 mediums + 612 heavies + 44 P.F.F. Zero hour 0120 hrs.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[underlined] MÜNSTER. [/underlined] 69 heavies of P.F.F. Zero hour 0120 hrs.
[underlined] list of aircraft roles, aircraft numbers and Squadron [/underlined]
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34
[underlined] TARGETS: MÜNSTER AND DÜSSELDORF [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
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35
[underlined] 12TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1040 HRS. [/underlined] Target – BOCHUM.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta.
Yellow T.I will be dropped by the first 2 Mosquitoes only at 5142N 0712E. Mosquitoes then act as precision groundmarkers dropping Red T.I in salvo on the A/P.
Other P.F.F. a/c will act as Backers-up, aiming Green T.I at the Red T.I if seen, otherwise at the centre of all Green T.I visible overshooting by 3 seconds in either case.
Main Force a/c will aim their bombs at the T.I Red if seen, otherwise at the estimated centre of all T.I Green visible.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 429 Heavies + 64 P.F.F.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
Thin layer of 7/10ths cloud at about 10/12,000ft over the target did not prevent Ground-markers from being seen. T.Is do not appear to have been dropped with the usual accuracy. 25 a/c missing. P.F.F. 1-97 F/S Thomas. 1-83 F/O Tilbury.
[underlined] Photographs. 18th June. [/underlined]
Damage is widespread and severe. In the central city area. 130 acres of business and residential property have been devastated, some 700 buildings having been destroyed or damaged.
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36
[underlined] TARGET: BOCHUM. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 13TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 10.10 HRS. [/underlined] STAND DOWN. Marham only operating and small amount of gardening.
[underlined] 14TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000 HRS. [/underlined] Target – OBERHAUSEN. All Squadrons stood down except for 109 – figures 6 + 2.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 17 a/c on Oberhausen. 1 a/c on gardening.
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37
[underlined] 15TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940 HRS. [/underlined] All P.F.F. stood down. “BULLSEYE” exercise with T.I demonstration. 5 a/c. Q G/C COLLINGS. D F/S RYAN. F/O LUTZ. F/S WINTERBON. F/L MANDENO.
[underlined] 1740 HRS. [/underlined] BULLSEYE Scrubbed.
[underlined] 16TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1025 HRS. [/underlined] Target – KREFELD-UERDINGEN. Derby Effort.
[underlined] 1355 HRS. [/underlined] Target changed to COLOGNE.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined]
Green flares steady will be dropped by ‘Y’ a/c at Position 5105N 0620E. All ‘Y’ a/c will drop flares Red/Green stars and white to ignite at 18,000ft in such a position that other a/c aiming their bombs on a heading of 117M at 143kts I.A.S. should hit the A/P.
‘Y’ a/c will also drop groundmarkers T.I. Green.
Main Force a/c should aim their bombs at the estimated centre of the skymarkers, but if T.I Green can be seen through cloud at the centre of all T.I Greens visible in preference to the skymarkers.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
All crews bombed on sky markers, but no results seen. 3 a/c attacked Last Resorts.
[underlined] GERMAN COMMUNIQUE. [/underlined] 17TH JUNE 1943.
During last night British Bombers attacked Western Germany & bombs were dropped on residential areas particularly in COLOGNE causing casualties among the population and damage to buildings including 4 hospitals & 3 churches.
[page break]
38.
[underlined] TARGET: COLOGNE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
39
[underlined] 17TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
BULLSEYE exercise and T.I demonstration.
Q. G/C COLLINGS. D. F/S RYAN. L. F/S WINTERBON. E. F/O LUTZ. H. F/S ROSE.
S/Ls ineffective owing to cloud. T.I demonstration at Rushford Range with Red T.Is backed up by Green T.Is and White T.Is to simulate incendiaries. T.I Yellow dropped at Lakenheath as preliminary warning groundmarkers. T.Is very well placed at both ranges.
[underlined] 18TH June 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
[underlined] 19TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET [/underlined] LE CREUSOT.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
MONTCHANIN
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined]
Special a/c [deleted] will /[deleted] of 7 & 35 Squadrons will drop the following on route:-
A) Flares green steady at 4920N 0045W. B) T.I Yellow at 4730N 0110E. C) T.I red at 4705N 0310E. On the way home D) T.I red at 4800N 0202E.
[underlined]LE CRUESOT. [/underlined]
1. [indecipherable digit] S/7 + 2H/35 will blindly illuminate the target with long sticks of flares white
[page break]
40
2. Remaining illuminators [sic] will continue to illuminate the target with long sticks of flares white dropped after definite visual identification and will release their HE. on the A/P.
3. All above illuminator a/c (in 1 & 2) will carry on to MONTCHANIN and will illuminate it with sticks of flares white at 6 second intervals whilst in a rate 1 turn to the left around the Southern edge of the [symbol]. (triangle symbol meaning target)
4. Main Force Stirlings and Halifaxes [sic] will drop their bombs with maximum accuracy on the A/Ps detailed only after definite visual identification in the light of flares marking 2 or more bombing runs as necessary. Bombs to be brought back if A/Ps are not definitely identified.
[underlined] MONTCHANIN. [/underlined]
1. Illuminator a/c will illuminate the A/P as detailed above (Para. 2.)
2. 3L/83 + 3L/156 will after definite visual identification drop T.I Green on the exact A/P.
3. Blind illuminators, visual markers, & main force Lancasters will aim bombs at the A/P using T.I Green as a guide.
4. All a/c are to leave the target by 0215 hrs.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] LE CREUSOT 244 Heavies of 3, 4 and 6 Groups. MONTCHANIN 26 Heavies of P.F.F.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
Some crews report seeing blue flashes from the target area and are sure that a proportion of the effort fell on the target. Smoke from the Le Creusot attack floated across the target towards the end of the attack. Markers were not necessary in existing conditions. W/O BROWN ‘M’ took a photograph of the A/P.
23rd June 1943. Cover received to date shows no hits on MONTCHANIN.
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41
[underlined] TARGET: MONTCHANIN [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] 20TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
156 stood down.
56 Lancasters of 5 Group & 4 Lancasters of P.F.F attacked the old Zeppelin works at Friedrichshaven [sic] now used as an R.D.F. equipment factory. Many buildings were seen to be hit. Subsequent photographs showed severe damage to parts of the works. The Lancasters continued from Friedrichshaven [sic] and landed in North Africa.
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[underlined] 21ST JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET. [/underlined] KREFELD.
[underlined] METHOD. MUSICAL PARAMATTA. [/underlined]
I. Mosquitoes will act as precision ground-markers dropping Red T.I in salvo on the A/P. To guard against the possibility of technical failure of Mosquitoes, selected ‘Y’ a/c in 2 waves will mark the A/P with Yellow T.I with the aid of special equipment only if, on arrival, no red T.Is are seen.
II. Backers-Up aim Green T.I at Red T.I, if seen, otherwise at the estimated centre of the concentration of Yellow T.I. If Backers-Up can see neither Red nor Yellow T.Is they should aim Green T.Is at the centre of the pattern of Green T.Is.
III. Main Force a/c are to aim their bombs at the T.I red if seen, otherwise at the centre of the concentration of T.I Green. T.I Yellow should be ignored.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] Zero hour: 0130 hrs. 108 mediums + 474 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 114 P.F.F. = 696 a/c.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[page break
43
[underlined] NIGHT FIGHTER ACTIVITY. [/underlined]
8 Mosquito Night Fighters operating in the Bomber Stream. 8 Intruder Mosquitoes operating at GILZE RIJEN, VENLO, DEELEN, TWENTE ENTSCHEDE, [sic] BERGEN ALKMAAR, ST. TROND, FLORENNES. Free lance Mosquitoes will be operating at LAON and DIZIER.
[underlined] 0240HRS. [/underlined] Wellington from Upper Heyford crashed on No.I runway. Operational a/c to land on No.3.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
All crews report an excellent attack with markers well concentrated, no strays. Bombing effort confined to an area 1 1/2 mls. square. A few Yellow T.Is were dropped unnecessarily were by 156 Squadron!
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
Photographs. 24th June. Damage is extremely heavy & concentrated in the centre of the city, particularly round the Adolf Hitler Platz. Out of 1,100 acres of fully built-up town area it is estimated that about 900 acres have been devastated. There is also severe damage to the industries on the N.E. side of the town & to barracks on the N.W.
Reinforcements both for fire and police services are said to have been requested as far afield as Dortmund and Munster. The number of people killed is thought to have been around 2,000.
[page break]
44
[underlined] TARGET: KREFELD [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
45
[underlined] 22ND JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000HRS. [/underlined] Target: [deleted] OBERHAUSEN. [/deleted] GELSENKIRCHEN.
[underlined] 1320HRS. [/underlined] Target: MULHEIM.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] MUSICAL PARAMATTA.
I. Preliminary warning T.I Yellows will be dropped by Mosquitoes at 5143N 0652E 7 statute miles to port of main force track.
II. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] will mark the exact A/P with T.I Red at Z-3, Z+1. 7, 13, 19, 25, 31, 36.
III. [underlined] Backers Up [/underlined] will keep the A/P marked with T.I. Green.
IV. [underlined] Main Force a/c [/underlined] aim there bombs at T.I Red if visible otherwise at the estimated centre of the pattern of T.I Green.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 54 mediums + 437 heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 63 P.F.F. = 554 a/c. Zero hour 0120 hrs.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined]
6 to 8 Beaufighters will be operating on the Bomber Command route. Mosquitoes and Bostons will be operating over Dutch airfields from 2359 – 0330hrs
[page break]
46.
[underlined] TARGET: MULHEIM [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Marker concentration was good, the Greens spread over an area radius 1 mile. The main attack was also concentrated, with incendiaries tending to fall short at the beginning. The last a/c over the target reports a fire area about 2 mls, square in which 3 large fires were burning. Large explosions reported in the [symbol] area at 0122, 0134 and 0147 hrs.
[underlined] 23RD JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0955 hrs. [/underlined] Make and Mend.
[page break]
47
[underlined] 24TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1000 HRS. [/underlined] Target – ELBERFELD. A/P ‘A’
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta.
I. T.I Yellow will be dropped by [underlined] special a/c [/underlined] at 5059N 0626E by special equipment if serviceable, otherwise aiming their T.I at those already dropped. 4 special a/c attacking at Z+2 will arrive at Pos: A 2 mins early – drop their markers, do a rate 1 orbit before proceeding to the target.
II. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] then drop T.I red in salvo on the A/P.
III. [underlined] Backers-Up [/underlined] aim Green T.I at red if seen otherwise the estimated centre of Green T.I.
IV. [underlined] Main Force [/underlined] aim bombs at T.I red if seen otherwise at centre of all T.I Green visible.
V. T.I Yellow will be dropped by [underlined] special a/c [/underlined] on return at 5033N 0723E by means of their special equipment.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 102 Mediums + 441 Heavies + 76 P.F.F. = 619 a/c. 630 a/c. took off. 517 a/c attacked primary. 25 a/c attacked last resort.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined]
[underlined] INTRUDERS & FIGHTERS. [/underlined]
Intruders will be operating in the Bomber Command stream. A wing of Spitfires will meet bombers on return covering the route for a/c returning late.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
33 a/c are missing.
[underlined] list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles [/underlined] [incomplete]
[page break]
48
[underlined] TARGET: ELBERFELD. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY [/underlined]
In the early stages both markers and main force were well concentrated although incendiaries again tended to undershoot. Later smoke up to 9000ft made it difficult to see markers except when cascading, & therefore concentration of main force tended to fall off incendiaries stretching [missing words]
[page break]
49
[underlined] 25TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
P.F.F. stood down except for 109 Squadron.
Target GELSENKIRCHEN.
[list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, missing]
[underlined] 26TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0943HRS. [/underlined] 156 Squadron stood down. Mosquitoes of P.F.F attacked DUISBURG AND HAMBURG.
[underlined] 27TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down. Lecture on ‘ESCAPE’ by F/L Yelland given to Air Crew.
[underlined] 28TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET: [/underlined] COLOGNE.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Mixed Musical Paramatta and Wanganui.
I. Preliminary warning flares Green steady will be dropped by Mosquitoes on track at 5041N 0647E 18.7 statute mls. short of release point.
II. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] mark release point with flares red with green stars and white at Z-4, Z, Z+5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35. They will also mark the A?P with T.I red at the same times.
III. [underlined] Backers-Up [/underlined] A/P marked with T.I Green only if red are visible. Otherwise they will revert to Main Force. [missing sentence]
[page break]
50
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 85 Mediums + 437 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 73 P.F.F. Zero hour 0140 hrs. T.O.T. Z to Z + 40.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined]
9 Mosquitoes + 2 Bostons 0030-0315. 6-8 Beaufighters operating in Main Bomber stream.
[underlined] TARGET: COLOGNE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY [/underlined] 10/10ths cloud over the [symbol] with tops 7/8,000ft. Competent a/c crews to bomb on either markers or cascading T.I reds before they disappeared through cloud. Early a/c on [symbol] report that opening markers were late. All T.I Green brought back. No accurate estimate of attack can be given. Explosions reported 0158, 0211 & 0244.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 12/97 & 24/35 missing. 25 a/c in Command [missing]
[page break]
51
[underlined] 29TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
[underlined] 30TH JUNE 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
[underlined] 1ST JULY 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 2ND JULY 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
[underlined] 3RD JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1005 hrs. [/underlined] Target – COLOGNE.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Musical Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] 1. Mosquitoes [/underlined] will drop preliminary warning flares Green steady on track at 5045N 0648 1/2E. 14 1/2 nautical mls short
[underlined] 2. Mosquitoes [/underlined] will drop sky-markers red with green stars and white at Z-4, Z, Z+5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40. They will also drop T.I red on the exact A/P at the same times.
[underlined] 3. [/underlined] If these T.I Red are visible through cloud, [underlined] Backers-Up [/underlined] will keep the A/P marked with T.I Green. If none are visible Backers-Up revert to main force and bring T.Is back.
[underlined] 4. [/underlined] Main Force aim bombs at :- 1. T.I Red if visible. 2. Centre of T.I Green. 3. Release Point flares heading [indecipherable digits] M I.A.S. 143 kts.
[underlined] 5. [/underlined] All flares to ignite at 12,000ft.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 94 Mediums + 525 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 72 P.F.F. Zero hour 0130hrs.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
52
[underlined] TARGET: COLOGNE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] There appeared to be a time lag of 2 minutes between the sky-markers dropped at 0114 hrs and ground-markers at 0116 hrs. Marker concentration good. Main attack reasonable, but again tending to undershoot as much as 2-3 mls. but in built up area. Smoke seen rising at 0116 hrs made early crews suspect a smoke screen. Smoke at end of attack up to 15,000ft. Fires seen from 40 mls away. One a/c ‘Y’ F/L Cook bombed last resort BONN/HANGELAR A/D. (aerodrome) Bombs hung up over the target and as they were near the end of the attack Captain decided not to run in again. Fires were started on the A/D where a/c beaming nav lights were seen circling.
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined]
3 Mosquitoes on Venlo, 3 on Gilze Rijen, 3 on St. Trond, 3 on Florennes, 2 on [indecipherable word], 2 on [indecipherable word], 6 Beaufighters operating in B. Command stream.
[underlined] RESULTS.] 30 a/c missing. P.F.F. 1 of 97, 1 0f 405, 1 0f 35. 4 group. 4H + 4W [missing words]
[page break]
53
[underlined] 4TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
Target: HAGEN.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta.
1. T.I Yellow will be dropped by [underlined] ‘Y’ a/c [/underlined] on route to the target at 5153N 0724E (to keep clear of MÜNSTER).
2. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] will drop T.I red in salvo on the exact A/P at Z-3, Z+1, 7, 12, 17, 22.
3. [underlined] Backers-Up [/underlined] aim T.Is and bombs at the T.I red if visible, otherwise at the centre of the concentration of T.I Green overshooting by 2 seconds in either case.
4. [underlined] Main Force [/underlined] a/c aim their bombs at the T.I red if visible, otherwise at the estimated centre of the pattern of T.I Green.
[underlined] 5. Y a/c [/underlined] drop T.I Yellow on the return route at 5048N 0716E (to keep clear of COLOGNE)
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined]
39 Mediums + 309 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 44 P.F.F.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] BRIEFING [/underlined] 1800 hrs.
[underlined] 1810 hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 5TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1025 hrs. [/underlined] Target: ESSEN. 139 squadron. 4 a/c HAMBURG. 4 a/c COLOGNE.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Sky-marking.
1. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] will drop tracking flares red steady on track at Pos: 5047N 0658E [missing words] release point.
[page break]
54
[underlined] 2. Mosquitoes [/underlined] drop tracking flares GREEN steady at 5138N 0659E 10 nautical miles short of release point.
3. [underlined] Mosquitoes [/underlined] drop release point flares red with green stars & flares white at 0126, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55.
[underlined] 4. Main Force [/underlined] aim bombs at centre of release point flares on heading 197M at 143 kts I.A.S.
If this method is used BACKERS-UP bring green T.Is back.
[underlined] 5. [/underlined] All flares will ignite at 16,000ft.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 398 Heavies & 41 P.F.F. = 439 a/c.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
Zero hour = 0130 hrs. T.O.T. Z to Z+30.
BRIEFING. 1800 hes.
1805 hrs. OPERATIONS CANCELLED
[underlined] 6TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
Target:- ESSEN. Main Force only. ‘A’ S/L MANSFIELD 156 squadron.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Musical Wanganui.
[underlined] 1315 hrs. Operations cancelled. 139 Squadron 4 a/c on COLOGNE 4 a/c DUSSELDORF.
[underlined] 7TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down except for 139 Squadron. 4 a/c DUISBERG. 4 a/c COLOGNE
[page break]
55
[underlined] 8TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1030 HRS. [/underlined] Target COLOGNE.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Musical Wanganui and Paramatta.
[underlined] 1. [/underlined] Preliminary warning flares Green steady will be dropped by all Mosquitoes on track at 5041N 0640E 18.2 nautical mls. short of release point.
[underlined] 2. [/underlined] Release point flare red with green stars and flares white will be dropped by Mosquitoes at:- 0110, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40. They will also mark the A/P with red T.Is at the same time.
[underlined] 3. [/underlined] If the latter are visible Backers-Up will keep the A/P marked with T.I Green.
[underlined] 4. [/underlined] Main Force a/c bomb in the following order of preference:- 1) T.I Red. 2) Centre of T.I Green. 3) Centre of release point flares on exact heading of 023M at a speed of 143 kts.
All flares ignite at 17,000ft. red T.Is cascade from 10,000ft. green T.Is cascade from 3,000ft until Z+15, then one T.I Green from each Backer-Up will cascade from 10,000ft.
[underlined] 5. [/underlined] T.I Yellow will be dropped by 2L/7 at 5040N 0715E. These will be backed up by all Lancasters of 97 Squadron & 1 B/U of 83 Squadron.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 435 Heavies + 55 P.F.F.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
Zero hour = 0110 hrs. T.O.T. Z to Z+35.
[underlined] 1800 hrs. [/underlined] Effort reduced. Z to Z+20 T.O.T.
[page break]
56
[underlined] TARGET: COLOGNE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Sky-markers were late, the first one being seen at 0115 hrs. owing to 10/10ths cloud very little was seen of the attack, but large explosions were observed at 0115, 0117 and 0122 hrs. One crew bombed on Green T.Is seen to cascade at 0109 hrs. and one bombed on E.T.A. Glow of fires seen to be starting beneath cloud.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[list by group, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
3 Mosquitoes of P.F.F. attacked DUISBURG. Nil missing
[underlined] Gardening. [/underlined]
[words missing]
[page break]
57
[underlined] 9TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] GELSENKIRCHEN.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] To sky-mark the Release Point.
[underlined] 1 [/underlined] Tracking flares red steady will be dropped by Mosquitoes 20 1/2 m. short of Release point at 5153N 0708E.
[underlined] 2 [/underlined] Tracking flares Green steady will be dropped by Mosquitoes 11.4 n.m. short of release point at 5144N 0705E.
[underlined] 3 [/underlined] Release point flares red/green and flares white will be dropped by Mosquitoes, so that main force a/c on a heading of 196M at 143 kts I.A.S. will hit the A/P.
[underlined] 4 [/underlined] All flares to ignite at 17,000ft.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 426 Heavies + 32 P.F.F. Zero hour 0110 hrs.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Target identified by sky-markers. Glow of fires seen through cloud indicated reasonably concentrated attack.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[list by group, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
58
[underlined] 10TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down. Invasion of Sicily announced.
[underlined] 11TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] TURIN.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] 1. [/underlined] Route markers Green steady will be dropped by ‘Y’ a/c at 4544N 0553E. These will be backed up by Backers-Up only if they are able to identify the lake visually.
[underlined] 2. ‘Y’ a/c [/underlined] will act as Finders and mark the [symbol] area with Yellow T.I proceeding on the same heading & releasing stick of flares at 6 seconds interval. 1st bundle to be dropped in salvo with Yellow T.I.
[underlined] Visual Markers [/underlined] then mark A/P with Red T.I when they have definitely identified it, using Yellow T.I as guide only. They will [underlined] not [/underlined] drop Red T.I unless absolutely certain of the A/P.
[underlined] Backers-Up [/underlined] aim Green T.I at centre of all Red T.I visible or centre of Green overshooting by 2 seconds in either case. Last resort – aim Green T.Is at the centre of all Yellow T.Is if visible.
[underlined] Non-marker a/c. [/underlined] aim bombs at Red T.I if seen, otherwise at the centre of all Green T.Is. [deleted] If [/deleted]
If on arrival at the [symbol] area cloud conditions make it impossible to see T.Is all ‘Y’ a/c will mark the release point with flares red/green stars. In these circumstances squadrons to detail 1/2 their special a/c to mark after Zero & the other 1/2 to orbit & mark after Z+9. Backers-Up then revert to non-markers & along with other main force aim bombs on heading 126M at 143 kts.
[underlined] 3. [/underlined] Route markers flares Green steady as in Para 1. Zero hour 0120 hrs.
[underlined] 1725 hrs. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled
[page break]
59
[underlined] 12TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target. [/underlined] TURIN.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground marking. As for 11th July 1943.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 422 Heavies + 57 P.F.F.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0040 hrs. T.O.T. Z to Z+30.
[underlined] BRIEFING. [/underlined] 1815 hrs.
[underlined] 1600 HRS. [/underlined] Figures changed. F. R. M. Z. N to go as Main Force. 224 Lancs of 1 & 5 Groups + 57 P.F.F.
[underlined] Alteration to Method. [/underlined] Zero hour. 1045 hrs T.O.T. Z to Z+15.
[underlined] 1. [/underlined] Route marker flares Green steady will be dropped on Lake Annecy backed up by Backers-Up.
[underlined] 2. [/underlined] Route markers Yellow T.I will be dropped by ‘Y’ a/c of 156 squadron backed up by Backers-Up of 156 squadron at 4544N 0305E.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Yellow T.Is from blind markers all fell in town area. Red T.Is reported very accurate. The first 2 bundles of Reds fell about 1 ml. apart one either side of the river – the 3rd fell close to the Red on the A/P. All Red markers & subsequently Green markers reported excellent concentration. Main Force attack well concentrated, practically no run back except for a few incendiaries. Route marking also reported very good, both Lake Annecy and Lake Bourget marked on run to target.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 295 a/c detailed. 1 Group 108 Lancs. [missing words]
[page break]
60
[underlined] TARGET: - TURIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base. Bradwell Bay – Dungeness – Cayeux – Lake Annecy – TURIN – 4544N 0305E – 4630N 0110W – 4630N 0250W – 4700N 0600W – 4830N 0630W – ST. EVAL – Base.
[page break]
61 [inserted] No pages for July 13th – 22nd (On leave?) [/inserted]
[underlined] 23RD JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] HAMBURG or MUNCHEN GLADBACH. A/C required 3 B/M, 13 B/Up, 5 Non-markers.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta or Wanganui.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 55 Mediums + 610 Heavies + 110 P.F.F.
[underlined] 1800 hrs. [/underlined] Briefing
[underlined] 1830 hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 24TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target. [/underlined] HAMBURG. 139 Squadron. 4 a/c DUISBERG. 3 a/c KIEL. 2 a/c LÜBECK. 2 a/c BREMEN. 2 a/c Target to be advised.
[underlined] Requirements. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles] Our figures increased to 24 a/c.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
1. Route markers T.I. Yellow will be dropped by special a/c at 5411N 0850E.
2. Target will be marked by visual markers with T.I. Red, backed up by T.I. Green. Long sticks of flares white and T.I. yellow may be seen in the target area, for the exclusive benefit of P.F.F. only.
3. Main Force attack T.I. Red visible or centre of T.I. Green.
4. [missing words] T.I. Yellow will be dropped by special a/c at 5343N 0836E.
[page break]
62
[underlined] TARGET: HAMBURG [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base. 5400N 0300E – 5445N 0700E – 5355N 0945E – Hamburg – 5315N 1000E – 5435N 0600E – 5400N 0300E – Base.
[page break]
63
[underlined] MESSAGE TO CREWS FROM THE C-in-C. [/underlined]
Hamburg is the 2nd largest city in Germany, the most important port and a vital war industrial area. It was the place whence the rot started which spread throughout Germany in 1918. It was the last part of Germany to adhere to Germany and may well be the first to come unstuck. It has been bombed before but not as you, and still more the Germans, understand bombing. To-night, you start the real battle of Hamburg, and you are going to write it off. This is no ordinary or routine operation and each one of you will, I know, do your utmost.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 76 Mediums + 604 Heavies + 116 P.F.F.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Weather over the target was nil cloud with fair visibility. This enabled, although a smoke screen was in operation, our visual markers to pinpoint tributaries and built up area and to put 3 x T.I. Red which were already down on the target. These were positioned one to the West, one Central and one well to the East. His own T.I. Red was placed along with the centre one. Later a/c report that a good concentration was achieved for a target of this description, but that the attack was diverted roughly by the Alsten, 75% falling on the West and 25% to the east. Exceedingly good fires were seen and a large explosion was observed at 0108 hrs. Smoke was rising over the target in a large column up to 18/20,000ft.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
No a/c missing from P.F.F. 12 a/c missing in Command. ‘Windows’ carried for the first time proved presumably to be a success. “Zephyr” also used for the first time.
6 Beaufighters operated S. of line 5300N and W. of 0700E from 0200-0230 hrs. 13 Mosquitoe [sic] intruders operating from 2330-0330 over A/Fs. [missing words]
[page break]
64
[underlined] German Broadcast. [/underlined]
A strong formation of British bombers a terror raid against Hamburg last night. The population suffered heavy losses and considerable damage was caused to residential quarters and cultural monuments and public buildings. According to reports so far available 17 of the attacking bombers were shot down by the Air Defences of N.W. German Coastal areas and in the Norwegian area.
[underlined] 25TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] U.S.A.A.F. [/underlined] Fortresses attacked HAMBURG in daylight and North German Coastal areas including ROSTOCK, KIEL and LÜBECK.
[underlined] 0958 hrs. [/underlined] Target: HAMBURG – Alternative ESSEN.
[underlined] 1150 hrs. [/underlined] A/C required of 156 Squadron. 3 B/Markers. 1 V/Marker. 11 B/Up. 5 N/Markers.
[underlined] Methods. [/underlined] HAMBURG. Newhaven Ground-marking. ESSEN. Musical Paramatta.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] HAMBURG. 71 Mediums + 538 Heavies + 97 P.F.F. = 706 a/c. ESSEN. 71 Mediums + 538 Heavies + 85 P.F.F. = 694 a/c.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
Zero hour. 0030 hrs.
[underlined] 1800 hrs. [/underlined] Briefing. Area I Cancelled.
[missing words]
[page break]
65
[underlined] TARGET: ESSEN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base – 5313N 0253E – 5153N 0638E – Essen – Nordwijk [sic] – 5300N 0210E – Base.
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined] Mosquitoes. 4 a/c DEELEN. 4 a/c TWENTE. 4 a/c GILZE RIJEN. 4 a/c VENLO. 3 a/c BERGEN. 3 a/c LIPPSTADT. 3 a/c ST. TROND.
[missing words] Bomber Command track.
[page break]
66
[underlined] 2330 hrs. BOMBER COMMAND BROADCAST. [/underlined] Mussolini has resigned and Bagdolio [sic] has taken his place.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Large patch of alto. cum: and industrial haze prevented a clear view of the main attack. Route markers (T.I. Yellow) appear to have been dropped accurately with good concentration. All crews reported good concentration of T.I. Reds and Greens around target area. Several large fires seen, and 2 huge explosions at approx. 0036 hrs & 0105 hrs. Moderate, erratic heavy flak over the target and slight amount of light flak. Results: P.F.F. 3 missing. 25 a/c in Command.
[underlined] 26TH JULY 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] 1015 hrs. [/underlined] MAKE & MEND for P.F.F. except for 139 Squadron. 6 Mosquitoes on HAMBURG.
[underlined] U.S.A.A.C. [/underlined]
[underlined] HAMBURG. [/underlined] 127 Fortresses took off to attack the ship yards and aero engine factory.
[underlined] HANNOVER. [/underlined] 122 Fortresses took off to attack the Tyre & Rubber Factory & Synthetic Rubber works.
P.F.F. 6 Mosquitoes on HAMBURG.
[underlined] 27TH JULY 1943. [/underlined]
[deleted] [underlined] 0948 hrs. Target: HAMBURG. [/underlined] [/deleted] [underlined] P. I. [indecipherable letter] [/underlined]
[deleted] [underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] [/deleted]
[underlined[ ESSEN. [/underlined] Considerable fresh damage on KRUPPS. Many fires burning throughout town.
[underlined] HAMBURG. [/underlined] Considerable damage seen outside smoke area – including BLOHM & VOSS works.
[underlined] ELBERFELD. [/underlined] Almost complete destruction throughout the town.
[underlined] GELSENKIRCHEN. {/underlined] A [missing words]
[page break]
67
[underlined] 27TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0948 hrs. [/underlined] Target: HAMBURG.
[underlined] A/C Requirements. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK [/underlined] 76 Mediums + 591 Heavies + 112 P.F.F. Zero hour 0100 hrs.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
Route markers T.I. Yellow will be dropped at 5418N 0840E by 7 & 405 Squadrons. Route markers T.I. Yellow will also be dropped at 5352N 1025E by 35 Squadron. Blind markers mark target with T.I. Yellow by ‘Y’ equipment. Visual markers cancelled, become Backers-Up. Backers-Up aim Green T.I at Yellow T.I on Green T.I. Re-centrers – qualified ‘Y’ Backers-Up spread evenly throughout the attack to drop Green T.I by means of special equipment if it is functioning properly.
[underlined] MESSAGE FROM C-IN-C. [/underlined] The Battle of HAMBURG continues – your opening blow was first rate – it may take 1/2 a dozen for the knock out, but knock out it will be, final & complete. Photo’s of ESSEN yesterday – mostly smoke covered but sufficient to show your devastation in & around KRUPPS and to the housing areas around the A/P. In the last 5 months you have inflicted upon Germany the greatest continuous series of military disasters in history. At present that fact is only just beginning to dawn upon the exponents of the more archaic forms of warfare, but it has dawned on Germany and resonates throughout Germany. From inflicting military disasters you are now proceeding to administer catastrophies. [sic] If you keep it up, and I know you will, you will be saving the lives of millions in the other forces of the United Nations & in the Occupied Countries and you will have Germany on her knees before the leaves have fallen. I will not ask you to do your best. I know you always [missing words]
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[underlined] TAREGET: - HAMBURG [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – 5448 0430E – 5407N 1025E – 5342N 1025E – [symbol] – 5320N 0930E – 5435N 0620E – 5448N 0430E – Base.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] The Yellow T.Is dropped by blind-markers were generally well placed & concentrated. Backers-Up seem to have had little difficulty in placing their Greens amongst the Yellows, although in later stages Green T.Is fell into smoke. Early crews report that on arrival flares were still
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69
[underlined] 28TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
P.F.F. No operations for 156 Squadron. 4 Mos: of P.F.F. attacked HAMBURG. Fires still burning.
[underlined] 29TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
Target: Area I. HAMBURG. 4’Y’. B/M 2‘Y’ Re-C. 13 B/Up. 2 N/M. II. [underlined] SOLINGEN [/underlined] & REMSCHEID. 9 B/Up. 2 N/M.
Area I. Paramatta Zero. 0045 hrs. Area II. Musical Paramatta. z 0115 hrs.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] Area I. 92 M + 590 Heavies + 116 P.F.F.
Area I. Confirmed.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta.
i. Route markers T.I. Red with flares Red will be dropped at 5413N 0850E
ii. Special a/c will ground mark the A/P with T.I. Yellow.
iii. Backers-Up back up the initial ground marking with T.I. Green.
iv. Main Force a/c aim bombs at the centre of all Green & Yellow T.I visible.
v. Route markers T.I. Red & flare Red will be dropped at 5340N 0848E
vi. Spoof markers T.I. Yellow to attract night fighters will be dropped at 5332N 0733E
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Weather – Nil cloud, ground vis: impaired by much smoke haze. Early crews found many fires still burning on arrival. Yellow T.Is were dropped slightly early at approx.: 0037 hrs. Concentration fair – some dropped S. of river about 1 1/2 [indecipherable word] from main concentration. Green T.Is good. Tendency to undershoot later. Main Effort good with large fires left burning, but observation of results hampered by smoke.
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70
[underlined] TARGET: HAMBURG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base 5430N 0500E – 5430N 0700E – 5403N 0944E – Hamburg – 5323N 0938E – 5430N 0630E – 5430N 0500E – Base.
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71
[underlined] 30TH JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 1005 hrs. [/underlined] MILAN. 2’Y’ 5 B/Up. GENOA 3 ‘Y’ 5 B/Up. TURIN 3’Y’ 5 B/Up.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] TURIN and Milan – Newhaven Ground-marking. GENOA. Illumination.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 100 Lancasters of 1 & 5 Groups + P.F.F. Zero hour. 0135 hrs TURIN. 0155 hrs. MILAN & GENOA.
[underlined] 1745 hrs. [/underlined] 156 squadron – Operations cancelled.
[list by Group of aircraft numbers and types] attacked REMSCHEID. Markers became concentrated as attack developed and smoke rose to 10000ft. 15 a/c are missing.
[underlined] 31ST JULY 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940 hrs. [/underlined] Target: HAMBURG.
[underlined] A/C Requirements. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
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[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 70 Mediums + 437 Heavies + 73 P.F.F = 580 a/c. Zero hour 0200. T.O.T. Z-3 to Z+44.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
Route markers T.I. Red will be dropped off track at 5250N 0840E by 156 Squadron.
Spoof markers T.I. Yellow will be dropped at 5342N 0835E on the homeward journey by Mosquitoes of 139 squadron.
[underlined] ROUTE. [/underlined] Base – 5430N 0515E – 5245N 0725E – 5245N 1000E – HAMBURG – 5400N 1000E – 5430N 0700E – 5430N 0500E – Base.
[underlined] INTRUDER ACTIVITY. [/underlined] 2 Mos: Leeuwarden. 2 Mos: Twente Entschede.[sic] 4 Mos: Vetchta. 3 Mos: Vetchta 3 Mos: Schleswig-Jagel. 3 Mos: Ardorf. 3 Mos: Westland/Sylt. [sic]
[underlined] 2050 hrs. [/underlined] Squalls & Thunderstorm warning.
[underlined] 2250 hrs. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[underlined] 1ST AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down. 15 Stirlings. 3 Group. 14 Wellingtons. 4 Group. Minelaying.
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73
[underlined] 2ND AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: HAMBURG. & HARBURG. Alternative KIEL.
[underlined] A/C Requirements. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking. Zero hour 0200 hrs.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 74 Mediums + 575 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups. + 100 P.F.F. on [deleted] DA [/deleted] HAMBURG and HARBURG.
[underlined] 1755 hrs. [/underlined] Area I confirmed.
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined] 26 Mosquitoes and 6 Beaufighters operating in the Bomber stream.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
10 Lancasters out of 21 attacked the primary. A bank of Cu.Nim. covered the coast at Pos: A up to 17,000’ – breaks occurred between this point and the last turning point before the target (5300N 1000E) where a large area of Cu. Nim. Cloud, base about 10,000’, tops above 25,000’ was encountered giving severe icing, electrical and thunder storms. 10 a/c managed to penetrate to the target area where some bombed on Special Equipment. One a/c bombed below cloud and reported some fires still burning. 9 a/c attacked last resorts or jettisoned and 2 a/c returned early.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] [list by Group, Squadrons, aircraft numbers, roles and missing]
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[underlined] TARGET: HAMBURG [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: - CROMER – 5422N 0400E – 5420N 0700E – 5345N 0832E – 5300N 1000E – HAMBURG – 5400N 1000E – 5430N 0700E – 5422N 0400E – CROMER.
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75
[underlined] 3RD AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Make and Mend.
[underlined] 4TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Targets: TURIN, GENOA & MILAN.
A/C Required: 8 Y + 9 B/Up.
Method: Newhaven Groundmarking. Zero hours. TURIN = 0120 hrs. GENOA & MILAN: 0145 hrs.
150 Heavies of 1 & 5 Groups (50 a/c each [symbol])
[underlined] 1755 hrs. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[underlined] 5TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: MILAN. 7 & 156 squadrons only required. [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
Route. Base – Reading – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – N. end of Lake Bourget – [symbol] – return same route.
[underlined] 1756 hrs. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
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76
[underlined] 6TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: MILAN. 83 squadron will provide a Raid Commentator. 156 squadron will provide a reserve Raid Commentator.
BULLSEYE. Z. F/S Slade.
Route: Wrexham – Sevenake (I.R.A) – 5020N 0050W – N. Foreland – Westminster Bridge (I.R.A) – Odstone Down – Otmoor – (T.I. Demonstration.)
[underlined] 1755 hrs. [/underlined] Operations Cancelled.
[underlined] 7TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: TURIN, GENOA, MILAN.
A/C Required. TURIN/GENOA [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles] MILAN. [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
Route markers flares Green steady will be dropped at 4547N0550E out & back.
[underlined] MILAN. [/underlined]
Blind markers Mark A/P with T.I Red flares White. Backers-Up mark visually with T.I. Green or aim Green at T.I. Red or T.I Green already down.
[underlined] TURIN & GENOA. [/underlined] Method the same.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 50 a/c of 1 & 5 Groups on each [symbol]. Zero: TURIN: 0100 hrs. [missing words]
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[underlined] TARGETS: MILAN – GENOA – TURIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route. Base – Reading – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – N. end of Lake Bourget – [symbol] – return same route.
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78
[underlined] SUMMARIES. [/underlined]
Primary: GENOA.
Nil cloud – good visibility. All crews report a good concentration, docks and harbours clearly seen in the light of flares. Smoke screen was in operation, but blowing out to sea. Fires started and glow was seen quite a distance from the target.
[underlined] Primary: MILAN. [/underlined]
Nil cloud – good visibility. Attack was reported well concentrated with one load of Red T.Is about 5 mls. to the N.W. One large explosion believed Gas Works seen at 0124 hrs.
[underlined] Primary: TURIN. [/underlined]
Few patches of cloud, but great visibility. Attack was considered the worst concentration of the three. One large and about five small fires seen by a/c on homeward route from GENOA.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 2 a/c of 5 Group missing.
[underlined] 8TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down. 35 & 405 Squadrons on Italy. later cancelled.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0040 hrs. T.O.T. Z to Z+30.
[underlined] BRIEFING. [/underlined] 1815 hrs.
[underlined] 1600 HRS. [/underlined] Figures changed. F. R. M. Z. N to go as Main Force. 224 Lancs of 1 & 5 Groups + 57 P.F.F.
[underlined] Alteration to Method. [/underlined] Zero hour. 1045 hrs T.O.T. Z to Z+15.
[underlined] 1. [/underlined] Route marker flares Green steady will be dropped on Lake Annecy backed up by Backers-Up.
[underlined] 2. [/underlined] Route markers Yellow T.I will be dropped by ‘Y’ a/c of 156 squadron backed up by Backers-Up of 156 squadron at 4544N 0305E.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Yellow T.Is from blind markers all fell in town area. Red T.Is reported very accurate. The first 2 bundles of Reds fell about 1 ml. apart one either side of the river – the 3rd fell close to the Red on the A/P. All Red markers & subsequently Green markers reported excellent concentration. Main Force attack well concentrated, practically no run back except for a few incendiaries. Route marking also reported very good, both Lake Annecy and Lake Bourget marked on run to target.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 295 a/c detailed. 1 Group 108 Lancs. [missing words]
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79
[underlined] 9TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: MANNHEIM.
[underlined] A/C required. [/underlined] ] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] NEWHAVEN GROUNDMARKING.
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 400 Heavies of 1, 4, 5, & 6 Groups + 53 P.F.F. Zero hour. 0130 hours.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Area I. Leverkusen. Area II. Ludwigshaven [sic]. Changed to MANNHEIM. Early arrivals found a thin layer of cloud at about 8,000ft. This began to break up and late arrivals reported as little as 3/10ths. Attack started reasonably concentrated with T.I. Reds covering an area approx: 2mls. across – later the raid tended to scatter with a [indecipherable word] of markers in the centre and the main attack again tending to undershoot. One large explosion at 0137 hrs lasting well over a minute. Defences slight to moderate H/F. Not more than 50 S/Ls. Crews report that on the way out to the target on the leg Bradwell Bay & Dungeness, they were illuminated and in the case covered for 5 mins: by our own S/Ls in spite of the fact that the appropriate letter of the period was repeatedly flashed. It is requested that strong protests be made.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] P.F.F. 2 missing. 5 Group: 2 missing. 1 Group: 2 missing. 6 Group: 1 missing.
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80
[underlined] TARGET: MANNHEIM. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route. Base – Bradwell Bay – Dungeness – Le Touquet – Mannheim – 4920 0820E – Le Touquet – Dungeness – Bradwell Bay – Base.
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81
[underlined] 10TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: NÜRBURG.
[underlined] A/C required. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 573 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5, & 6 Groups + 106 P.F.F. Zero hour. 0100 hrs.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] NEWHAVEN GROUNDMARKING.
[underlined] 1. [/underlined] Spoof-markers T.I. Red and T.I. Green will be dropped by 139 Squadron on MANNHEIM.
[underlined] 2. [/underlined] Blindmarkers mark the A/P with T.I. Red & flares White. Visual Markers identify and drop T.I. Yellow. Backers-Up use T.I. Green. Non-markers aim at centre of T.I. Green.
[underlined] 3. [/underlined] On route home B/Markers of 83 drop 1 x 250 lb. Incen: at 4919N 0826E backed up by Backers-Up of 156 squadron also with 1 x 250 lb I.B.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Red markers scattered over target on track principally in two batches. Greens attempted to concentrate, doing so principally on the Eastern loads of Reds, but still covered an area 5 x 3mls. Cloud prevented any accurate observation and little was observed except some glow of fires on cloud when crews were in the Karlsruhe area.
F/S STEPHENS. ‘Z’. On his first flight from this squadron had two combats, first with an Me 110. M/U/G & T/G both opened fire – captain reports accurate fire by Gunners. E/A (enemy aircraft) did not return fire. 2 minutes later an Me 109 [deleted] attacked [/deleted] approached. T/G got in a burst – E/A did not attack.
F/O SHANAHAN. ‘R’. Gee ‘Y’ and W/T all failed & on the return route the Navigator F/O Stafford used D/R (direct reckoning) to return to base.
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[underlined] TARGET: NÜRNBURG [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route – Beachy Head – Le Treport – 4935N 1040E – NÜRNBURG – 4917N 0826E – Le Treport – Beachy Head.
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83
[underlined] 11TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
[underlined] 12TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Targets: MILAN and TURIN. [underlined] 139 Squadron – 8 Mos: BERLIN [/underlined] 156 squadron required for MILAN only.
[underlined] A/C Required – MILAN. [/underlined] [underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 439 Heavies + 66 P.F.F.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] TURIN. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking. Zero hour. 0115 hrs.
W/C WHITE ‘S’ to act as Raid Commentator.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
One or two crews reported a small amount of thin patchy cloud. The majority report nil cloud & good vis: with slight ground haze. In the initial stages of the attack T.I Reds dropped by B/Markers were somewhat scattered, but the general opinion is that this was put right by the T.I. Y. & the excellent instructions of the Master of Ceremonies, which resulted in the T.I.G. falling in a good concentration. The main force achieved a fair concentration with perhaps a tendency to fall a bit short, but summarising up the results the blame can be placed on the R.A.F if the Italians in MILAN don’t pack in to-morrow & use the excellent fires started for their peace celebrations.
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[underlined] TARGET: MILAN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route. Base – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – N. end of Lake Bourget – MILAN – 4520N 0905E - S. end of Lake Bourget – Cabourg – Selsey Bill.
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[underlined] 13TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
156 squadron stood down: MAKE & MEND for Command.
[underlined] 14TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
156 squadron stood down. 7, 83 and 156 squadron attacked MILAN. 139 squadron attacked BERLIN.
[underlined] 15TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Target: MILAN.
[underlined] METHOD. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking. Zero hour 0015 hrs.
[underlined] A/C REQUIRED. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 150 Heavies + 49 P.F.F. Note: No a/c to cross the French Coast before 2140 hrs.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Green T.Is well concentrated in area about 2mls. across at worst. Crews report T.I. Yellow very accurately dropped on actual A/P. Main attack reasonably concentrated with some incendiaries tending to fall short as usual. Large fires reported by later a/c.
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86
[underlined] TARGET: MILAN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
10 Lancasters – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – N. end Lake Bourget – 4540N 0912E – MILAN – 4520N 0905E – S. end of Lake Bourget – Carbourg – Selsey Bill.
3 Lancasters – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – N. end Lake Bourget – MILAN – 4520N 0905E – S. end of [missing words]
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87
[underlined] 16TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Stand down for 156 squadron.
[underlined] 17TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: PEENEMUNDE. [/underlined] R.D.F. Experimental Establishment.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Shifters [/underlined] are A/P movers.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] 0015 hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+40.
[underlined] Phase I. [/underlined] A/P. ‘F’
Blind markers mark A/P with T.I. Red & flares White. Make 2nd run to drop bombs. Visual markers mark exact A/P with T.I. Yellow. Backers-Up aim Green T.I. at T.I. Yellow or T.I. Red. Non-marker a/c go in with the Blind-markers using their anti-personnel bombs against defences – then make a second run & aim H.E. at the Centre of T.I. Green.
[underlined] Phase II. [/underlined] A/P ‘B’.
At Z+24 Shifters move the A/P.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 430 heavies + 94 P.F.F.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] T.I. Reds rather scattered up the length of the target, with a lot about 2mls. [missing word] the W. of A/P ‘B’ of the T.I. Yellows one load overshot slightly & fell in woods S. of A/P ‘F’ and load of T.I. Green also fell in woods to the S. of A/P ‘F’. One load of Green T.Is also fell [missing words] along lay-out. Main attack
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[underlined] TARGET: PEENEMUNDE. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route. – Cromer – 5520N 0829E – 5441N 1320E – RUDEN ISLAND – PEENEMUNDE – MANDO ISLAND – 5500N 0500E – CROMER.
First shifter reported attack at that time concentrated on A/Ps ‘B’ & ‘F’ and subsequently attacked
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89
[underlined] 17TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined] (Cont:)
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
41 a/c missing – A large number of combats were seen and the majority of losses may probably be attributed to this cause, as defences over the target were negligible.
[underlined] 18TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
P.I.U. report on PEENUMUNDE.
75% damage to works. A/P ‘F’ practically wiped out – living quarters. A/P ‘B’ Southern hanger hit. workshops hit. A/P ‘E’ Damaged. A/P ‘A’ Not hit.
[underlined] 19TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] TURIN. All Lancasters. ALESSANDRIA. U/T ‘Y’ a/c. BERLIN Mosquitoes.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground marking.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 511 heavies + 90 P.F.F on TURIN. 18 P.F.F on Alessandria.
[underlined] 1655 hrs: [/underlined] Ops cancelled.
[underlined] 20TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
Command Combined ‘BULLSEYE’ 3 a/c T.I. dropping. 2 a/c full sortie.
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90
[underlined] 21ST AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
[underlined] 22ND AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
underlined] Target: [/underlined] LEVERKUSEN.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Musical Paramatta.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 419 Heavies + 50 P.F.F.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hour [/underlined] 2300 hrs. T.O.T. Z-4 to Z+36.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
Owing to weather over the target being from 8/10ths to 10/10ths cloud with tops 16/17000ft (most crews reporting 10/10ths), no T.I. Red were seen on bombing. Crews were compelled to bomb on E.T.A. and Special Equipment. Fires, which seemed to be mainly incendiaries, were scattered over a very wide area. No T.I. Green were dropped by this squadron.
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Only 4 Mosquitoes worked, the remainder having technical troubles. Only 2 heavy crews (both non-markers) claim to have bombed on T.Is. All backers-up claim to have brought back their T.I but one a/c J/7 F/L Amekstein returned with only [indecipherable word] T.I. So the other fellow presumably went with the bombs. All crews except the two mentioned above dropped on E.T.A on fires
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[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Southwold – Knocke [sic] – 5025N 0705E – 5042N 0730E – Leverkusen – 5103N 0620E – Nordwijk [sic] – 5235N 0330E – Hainsboro’ – Base.
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[underlined] 23RD AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required.[/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 516 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups led by 127 a/c P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2345 hrs. T.O.T. Z-3 to Z+40.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta.
1. Mosquitoes drop T.I. Red at 5250N 0652E & Green T.I at 5235N 0702E as route markers. Blind markers of 83 squadron drop Red spot fires at 5217N 1232E – backed up by 97 squadron.
2. Blind markers mark A/P with T.I. Red.
3. Backers-Up aim Greens at the centre of T.I. Reds overshooting by 2 seconds, or if no reds seen at the centre of T.I. Green.
4. Re-centres use special equipment.
5. Non-markers aim bombs at centre of T.I. Reds or T.I. Greens.
Master of Ceremonies will be in operation from Z-1 to Z+10. 1L/405.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
T.I. dropping on the whole was good with no cloud and only a slight haze over the target. The first Reds appeared to form two points of attack east & West. The first Greens dropped midway between, around which the attack developed. Later re-centrers are of the opinion that the attack drifted slightly South as [indecipherable word] by their Special Equipment. Later fires, however, covered the whole area and the attack is considered a success. The Hun appeared to defend the target by the employment of a large concentration of S/L’s to operating with night fighters as flak was only moderate.
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[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base – Hainsboro’ – 5305N 0220E – EGMOND – 5250N 1347E – BERLIN – 5250N 1340E – 5420N 1225E – MANDO – 5420N 0300E – HULKHAM BAY – Base.
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94
[underlined] ‘F’ F/S STEVENS. [/underlined]
On approaching the target at 19,000ft our a/c was covered by a large number of S/Ls. Bombs were dropped in the centre of Red T.Is and almost at once our a/c was badly hit by flak. The inter-comm was rendered u/s and the S/B outer caught fire. The navigator and M/U/G were badly and the port wing severely damaged. The S/B outer was at once feathered. Almost immediately an enemy fighter attacked ‘F’ killing the Rear-Gunner Sgt. Atkee. Evasive action was taken & the fighter lost. As the navigator was u/s. and there was no inter-comm. The pilot steered more or less due North. About 5 minutes later the port outer engine caught fire and was feathered. Pilot carried on for about 1 1/2 hrs. losing height down to 7,000ft. The W/Op. hence succeeded in repairing the morse key and got a fix. The pilot turned on to 280 and the navigator who had been bandaged up by the W/Op. managed to plot the fix and give a course for home. During passage through the Baltic the crew had been warned to prepare for ditching. Order was cancelled when Captain discovered rear gunner trapped in his turret. The W/Op continued to get fixes until the English Coast was reached when the pilot made a safe landing at ATTLEBRIDGE aerodrome.
Captain. F.S Stevens. Bomb Aimer. [missing] Navigator. Sgt. Clegg. M/U/Gunner. [missing] W/Operator. Sgt. Stocks. Rear Gunner. Sgt. Atkee. F/Engineer. [missing]
F/S Stevens, Sgt Clegg and Sgt. Stocks have received an immediate award of the D.F.M.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 726 detailed – 58 missing.
[list by Group, aircraft type and numbers involved, roles and numbers missing]
[page break]
95
[underlined] 24TH AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All P.F.F. squadrons stood down except 139 Squadron. Command – Gardening. P.R.U. pilot who was over Berlin to broadcast in the 9 o’clock news.
[underlined] 25th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
Make and Mend for all Squadrons.
[underlined] 26th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MANNHEIM. All squadrons except 105 & 109 required.
[underlined] A/C Requirements. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] 1128 hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 27th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined]NÜRNBERG.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] method. [/underlined] {deleted] Paramatta. [/deleted] Newhaven.
[words missing] bomb (500 or 1000 MC) on HEILBRONN
[page break]
96
[underlined] TARGET: NÜRNBERG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Beachy Head – 5005N 0125E – 4856N 1100E – NURNBERG – 4938N 1108E – 5005N 0126E – Beachy Head – Base.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
In the early stages of the attack the Red T.Is were rather scattered, but one or two reports give the impression that the majority fell slightly to the S & SE of the A/P. later Backers-Up and Recentrers appear to have somewhat corrected this, as later [words missing]
[page break]
97
there is every probability that a wide area of the town was covered. Fires are reported to be widely spread, but on built-up area. One Visual marker ‘Y’ F/L Cook did not drop his T.I yellow owing to interference by a cone of S/Ls which held & dazzled him on the bombing run. His second attempt was spoilt by smoke & fire.
Defences – Flak very mild – S/Ls active co-operating with fighters. Large amount of fighter activity.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[list by Group, aircraft type and numbers involved, roles and numbers missing]
Photographs show main Concentration – P.F.F. E & SE – Main Force very scattered SE & E.
[underlined] 28th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
[underlined] 29th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
[underlined] 30th AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down. Other squadrons MUNCHEN GLADBACH. SPECIAL TARGET IN FRANCE. [words missing]
[page break]
98
[list by Group, aircraft type and numbers involved, roles and numbers missing]
[underlined] SPECIAL TARGET IN FRANCE. [/underlined]
[list by Group, aircraft type, numbers involved and numbers missing]
[underlined] 31ST AUGUST 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Ordinary Paramatta.
Routemarkers T.I.G. at 5152N 1143E by blind markers of 83 squadron backed up by backers up of 156 squadron. Blind markers mark A/P with T.I. Red. Backers-Up aim T.I. Green at T.I. Red on centre of T.I. Green. Re-centres use special equipment to re-centre. Non-markers aim HE at centre of T.I. Red. Route markers T.I. Green at 5152N 1143E by blind markers of 83 squadron backed up by 156 squadron.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 534c heavies + 102 P.F.F. Zero hour. 2330 hrs.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles] [words missing]
[page break]
99
[underlined] BERLIN. 31ST AUGUST 1943 [/underlined] (Cont:)
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: HAPPISBURGH – 5322N 0323E – 5147N 1108E – 5217N 1405N [sic] – BERLIN – 5100N 0930E – 5030N 0720E – CAYCUX – BEACHY HEAD.
[page break]
100
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
7 – 10/10ths thin strato-cum: tops about 5,000ft. While some Red T.Is were dropped on time, owing to late arrivals, blind markers were active for about 20 minutes. Red T.Is scattered, but generally at the beginning in two sections about 4 mls. apart. As the raid progressed the markers became still more scattered. Some of the backers-up finding no T.Is to guide them.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
German broadcast. “Re-organised Berlin Ack-Ack defences inflicted extremely heavy losses on the attackers. British bomber formations were dispersed & mostly had to jettison their bombs. Effective defences prevented the Bomber a/c from making a concentrated attack”.
[list by Group, aircraft type and numbers involved, roles and numbers missing]
F/S FRY. ‘P’ Combat with unidentified T/E E/A. M/U/G opened fire. No results observed.
F/O WRIGHT ‘T’ M/U/G opened fire on unidentified T/E E/A at 400yds range & T/G opened fire immediately afterwards. No return fire experienced from E/A which dived steeply to starboard & disappeared. An explosion was seen on the deck behind 30/60 seconds afterwards.[deleted] During [/deleted] E/A claimed as probably destroyed.
[underlined] SPECIAL TARGET IN N.W. FRANCE. [/underlined]
41 a/c detailed – Nil missing.
[underlined] BRAUWEILER. [/underlined]
8 Group. 5 Mosquitoes [missing word] Missing.
[page break]
101
[underlined] 2ND SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] 5028N 0354E. Special target in France.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 30 Mediums + 11 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2200 hours.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
10 a/c attacked dropping 10 x T.I. Green. 60 x 1000 G.P. Weather was 9/10ths thin strato-cum tops 8,000ft. Good concentration of markers with one load of Green T.Is at the most 1/2 ml. off.
One large explosion at about 2203 hrs lit up cloud for about 3 seconds. No other large explosions seen.
One heavy flak gun about every 2 minutes.
[underlined] 3RD SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
102
[underlined] Method [/underlined] Paramatta.
Routemarkers red spot fires at Pos: 5238N 0820E.
Preliminary warning markers. T.I. Yellow at Brandenburg.
Blind-markers drop T.I. red.
Backers-Up keep A/P marked with T.I. Green.
Non-markers aim bombs at the centre of T.I. Red.
Y Backers-Up act as normal backers-up unless cloud conditions make it necessary to revert to Wanganui.
Routemarkers T.I. Red L/B. at 5432N 1334E.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2315 hrs.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 244 heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 81 P.F.F.
‘U’ F/O Foderingham and 5 of crew crashed at Snetterton Heath.
[underlined] 1630 hrs. [/underlined] Briefing. SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR, secretary of State for Air, attended briefing and gave a talk on the progress of the war.
[underlined] SUMMARY [/underlined]
Weather over the target was chiefly nil cloud, but with occasional whisps [sic] of very thin cloud at varying heights, with moderate to good visibility.
At the start of the attack, T.I. Reds covered an area of approx. 3 sq. m. but as later good concentration of Reds was achieved, which was backed up admirably by T.I. Greens to form a light cluster. Ground fires and many explosions were seen around the T.I. Concentration, with smoke rising up to approx: 19,000ft. The general impression is that the attack was a success & far exceeds the previous raids. Flak was only moderate, but the S/Ls were as active as usual, working in cones, track indicating & for illumination for fighters.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
‘R’. F/O SHANAHAN. Missing from 156. F/L Stafford. W/O Collins. Sgt. Hoyle. F/S Denyer. F/S Wilson. W/O Dodds, 3/L of 7 Squadron.
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103
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Great Yarmouth – 5245N 0330E – EGMOND – 5240N 0900E – Brandenburg – Berlin – 5233N 13422E – 5555N 1325E – 5800N 1100E -5700N 0600E – Brancaster.
[page break]
104
[underlined] 4TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
156 Stood down.
[underlined] 5TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MANNHEIM. Area II. MUNICH. Area I.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] I & II. Newhaven.
Area II.
Routemarkers T.I. Reds L/B at 4933N 0608E.
Blind-markers mark A/P with T.I. Red after a timed check from KAISERSLAUTERN.
Visual markers mark A/P with T.I. Green & Yellow if seen. no overshoot. Later Backers-up aim T.I. Green at the centre of all T.I. Green overshooting by 2 seconds.
Re-centrers after Z+12 drop T.I. Green by means of special equipment.
Non-markers may identify visually or aim at centre of T.I. Reds.
Routemarkers T.I. Red Spot at 4928N 0608E.
[underlined] A/C Required [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
491 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 107 P.F.F. T.O.T. Z-4 to Z+36.
[underlined] Route. [/underlined] Base – Reading – Beachy Head – 4952N 0040E – 4937N 0300E – Kaiserslautern – Mannheim – 4919E [sic] 0830E – 4937N 0300E – 4952N 0040E – Beachy Head – Reading Base. Backers-Up & Re-centrers from 4937N 0300E – Mannheim.
[page break]
105
[underlined] TARGET: MANNHEIM. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Beachy Head – 4952N 0040E – 4937N 0300E – (KAISERSLAUTERN V/M. B/M & N/M) – MANNEHEIM – 4919N 0830E – 4937 0300E – 4952N 0040E – Beachy Head – Base.
[page break]
106
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
The blind-markers achieved a good concentration and were mainly on time although some were still visible at 2313 hrs. The yellows were in the centre of a very good concentration of greens. Later a/c report a large number of good fires and it is estimated that this is the best attack made on this target. A number of explosions were reported principally from 2259/2303hrs. One N/F claimed destroyed.
“X” F/S HEWITT.
KAISERSLAUTERN. 2312 hrs. 19000ft. S/E a/c was sighted by T/G doing a diving attack from Port quarters up, & opened fire at range of 150 yds firing orange tracer which passed underneath the Lancaster: T/G & M/U/G fired 4 & 2 second bursts respectively. Strikes observed on E/A’s port wing & fuselage & E/A was seen in flames in a shallow dive which became steeper & subsequently E/A burst into flames on the ground. E/A DESTROYED.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
3 a/c missing from P.F.F.
E/156. F/O PRICHARD. 2 of 7 squadron.
P.F.F.
This was undoubtedly one of the best “Y” attack the P.F.F. have ever achieved. The timing throughout was good. The ‘Y’ a/c were reasonably concentrated – probably due largely to the fact that only 10 dropped T.I’s and all those a/c who were doubtful about their ‘Y’ bombing brought their T.I back. The town was thus successfully illuminated for the Visual markers who all appear to have identified the A/P and bombed it accurately. The backing up and recentring was well maintained and accurate throughout the raid.
[page break]
107
[underlined] 6TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET: [/underlined] MUNICH.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined]
362 Heavies + 74 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
[underlined] ZERO HOUR. [/underlined] 2330 hrs.
[underlined] BRIEFING: [/underlined] 1530 hrs.
[underlined] INTRUDERS. [/underlined] 6 Beaus operating in the Bomber stream. 2 Mosquitoes over the main target.
[underlined] 2155 hrs. [/underlined] Warning from Group. German Intruder a/c are definitely expected to be very active tonight at time of return, especially between 0300 – dawn. All stations are warned to have defences ready to meet these intruders who are expected to be over here in force. It is stressed that this is no ordinary warning.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
7/10 – 9/10ths thin stratus 8/10000ft moderate to good visibility. Cloud interfered with technique. Reds seemed quite concentrated. Greens in early stages were well concentrated were considered by later crews to be more scattered although cloud prevented adequate observation. The glow of fires were seen from 160/200 mls. away. One large explosion at 2335 hrs. ONE N/FIGHTER CLAIMED AS DESTROYED.
[underlined] H/156. S/L COATES. [/underlined]
Detailed as a BACKER-UP. At the beginning of the bombing run tracer was observed coming from port quarters down passing under the wing of the Lancaster. Captain was weaving slightly to S/B & increased his turn to a steep diving turn to S/B . 2 bursts of approx. 3-8 seconds duration were fired by E/A, hits being scored
[page break]
108
[underlined] TARGET: MUNICH. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Beachy Head – 5000N 0115E – Freiburg – 4740N 1006E – MUNICH – 4758N 1145E – 4806N 0735E – 4806N 0235E – Cabourg – Belsey Bill – Reading - Base
on port inner engine, S/B tail plane, & port side of fuselage & bomb bays. Gunners were blinded by the brightness of E/A’s tracer & no member of the crew sighted the E/A. T/G opened fire simultaneously with the E/A’s second burst giving a 2-second burst towards the judged apparent notion of where the E/A would be. E/A was not observed to break away. Both [missing words]
[page break]
109
[underlined] Z/156. F/L MANIFOLD [/underlined]
Detailed as Backer-Up. 18mls. S.W. of the target when doing gentle weaving action S/E (Single-Engined) E/A (Enemy Aircraft) sighted by T/G on the S/B quarter 20 down, making a quarter attack, range 800yds. T/G gave directions to Captain “Down port, up S/B” T/G opened fire at 400yds range with 2-3 second burst, all guns being in operation. Flash was observed on E/A who immediately broke his attack, climbing to port quarter and smoke & sparks were seen trailing backwards. This was confirmed by the M/U/G & the W/Op. who was standing in the astrodome. When positioned on the port beam above, flames enveloped the E/A which dived vertically down through the clouds & an explosion was seen through cloud by members of the crew as fighter hit ground. THIS A/C DEFINITELY CLAIMED AS DESTROYED.
T./G. F/O CURRIE. M/U/G Sgt. ROSIE.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
404 a/c despatched.
[list by Group, aircraft numbers & types involved and aircraft missing]
[underlined] 7TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
All squadrons stood down.
35 squadron. PONGO.
[page break]
110
[underlined] 8TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] 156 squadron. 4 B/M. 8 B/U. 5 N/M.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 335 Heavies + 82 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta..
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0010hrs.
[underlined] 1745hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED
[underlined] 1745hrs. ITALIANS SIGN ARMISTICE – UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER. [/underlined]
[underlined] 9TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN. Alternative FRANKFURT
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 356 Heavies + 97 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] BERLIN. Paramatta. FRANKFURT. Newhaven.
[underlined] Zero hour.. [/underlined] Berlin. 0115hrs. Frankfurt 0200hrs.
[underlined] 1645hrs. [/underlined] Berlin Confirmed.
[underlined] 1800hrs. [/underlined] Zero hour changed to 0130hrs.
[underlined] 2107hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[page break]
111
[underlined] 10TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 11TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
No operations.
[underlined] 12TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
No operations.
[underlined] 13TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
156 stood down. 5 Mosquitoes 139 Squadron on DUISBERG. 5 Mosquitoes 139 Squadron on COLOGNE.
[underlined] 14TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
8 Mosquitoes 139 squadron on BERLIN. 1 Mosquito missing
T.I. Demonstration at RUSHFORD. F/S PALMER 156. observing a/c.
[underlined] 15TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target:- [/underlined] MONTLUÇON
156 & 83 Squadrons stood down except for F/S Fry from N.T.U. (Navigation Training Unit)
[underlined] STRENGTH OF ATTACK. [/underlined] 314 Heavies + 64 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2330hrs.
[page break]
112
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
[underlined] Target: MONTLUÇON. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
Attack a great success. P.I.U. photographs show a large amount of damage to the DUNLOP RUBBER TYRE FACTORY.
[list by Group, aircraft numbers & types involved]
5 U.S.A. Fortresses took part under the control of 3 Group. 3 a/c missing.
[underlined] DORTMUND-EMS CANAL. [/underlined] [underlined] words missing? [/underlined]
8 Lancasters of 5 Group carried out an attack on the embanked stretch of the canal, 4mls. E. of GREVEN using 12,000lb. Thick ground haze made identification extremely difficult. Of the 3 a/c which returned only 2 succeeded in identifying the target. 6 Mosquitoes of Fighter Command escorted the Lancasters (617 Squadron.)
7 Mosquitoes of 139 Squadron on BERLIN.
[underlined] 16TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MODANE. (French Alps.)
[underlined] A/C Required [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
113
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 304 Heavies + 66 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Visual Groundmarking.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0001hrs.
[underlined] TARGET: MODANE. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Selsey Bill – Carbourg – 4735N 0045E – 4512N 0535E – MODANE – 4735N 0120E – Carbourg – Selsey Bill.
[page break]
114
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Weather over the target varied from nil to 3/10ths patchy cloud at about 10,000ft with good vis: in the early stages of the attack, but smoke, presumably from T.Is interfered in the later stages. Our 3 visual markers identified the A/P visually by the river and marshalling yards clearly in the moonlight. T.I. Reds were extremely well concentrated with the exception of one which was dropped approx.: 2m. S.W. on a hillside. The main concentration of T.I. Reds was backed up by the Backers-Up dropping T.I. Green. Some fires were seen burning around the A/P & many bomb explosions were seen around the marshalling yard & river. A large proportion of the main force appeared to drop their bombs wide on the hillside. The general opinion is, however, that the attack was a success.
A. F/S FRY.
T/E (Twin Engined) Single tail aircraft reported by T/G flying parallel on port quarter 15 up range 700yds. As aircraft was not definitely identified our Lanc:: turned S/B. Then a/c turned in making a beam attack & T/G gave instructions to turn port. M/U opened fire. No strikes observed.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
From photographs plotted a cluster of P.F.F. are on the A/P and one or two main force. The rest are scattered to the E & NE, towards the town.
[underlined] 17TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
156 squadron stood down.
N.T.U. on “BULLSEYE” 7 a/c.
[page break]
115
[underlined] 18TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
STAND DOWN.
[underlined] 19TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 20TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
STAND DOWN.
[underlined] 21ST SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
ALL HEAVY SQUADRONS STOOD DOWN.
Bullseye & T.I. Demonstration.
[list aircraft letters and ranks and names of pilots]
[underlined] 22ND SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Targets: [/underlined] AREA I. HANNOVER. – SPOOF: OLDENBURG. AREA II BOCHUM.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] HANNOVER.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] BOCHUM. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles] [information missing]
[page break]
116
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
615 Heavies + 29 Mediums + 82 P.F.F on HANNOVER. 31 P.F.F. on OLDENBURG.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
[deleted] Route marke [/deleted]
[underlined] 1630hrs.. [/underlined] Area I Confirmed.
[underlined] Intruder Activity. [/underlined]
[list of aircraft numbers, aircraft type and targets]
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2130hrs
[underlined] T.O.T.. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+25.
[underlined] SUMMARY. HANNOVER. [/underlined]
Judged by the position of the Yellow T.Is blind markers tended to overshoot. Green T.Is generally well concentrated. Fires in an area about 3mls x 1 mile. on track across target – could be seen from Enemy Coast on return. Red T.Is dropped over STEINHUDER LAKE 2117h
[underlined] OLDENBURG. [/underlined]
Nil cloud – good visibility.
Reds well concentrated, greens scattered. Some fires reported in target area.
[underlined] ‘Y’ S/L COOK. [/underlined]
After second run over target and bombs had been dropped a load of incendiaries fell on the Lancaster dropped by a Halifax. Port outer engine set on fire & hydraulic gear for both turrets severed – gear u/s – ‘Y’ smashed. Incendiaries burning in the a/c which W/Op threw out of the flare Shute. Shortly after leaving the target attacked by [words missing] u/s & the inter-comm. Evasive action taken.
[page break]
117
[underlined] TARGET: HANNOVER. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] ROUTE. [/underlined] 12 Lancasters: Cromer – 5350N 0400E – (5240N 0920E B/Ms, U/Ms, N/Ms) – HANNOVER – 5210N 0945E – 5350N 0400E – Cromer.
4 Lancasters: Cromer – 5350N 0400E – 5309N 0645E – OLDENBURG – 5420N 0620E 5420N 0 [indecipherable digit] 00E – Wells.
[page break]
118
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] HANNOVER - OLDENBURG. [/underlined] The spoof raid was successful – bombing not very concentrated. A few Mosquitoes strayed out towards Bremen defences, but the correct town was hit & the raid undoubtedly attracted some fighters & this assisted the main operation. Preliminary reports of the main attack were most encouraging, but this optimism was not justified by the photo plot or daylight recco. Three crews who aimed visually were very near the A/P but the majority of blind markers overshot the aiming point by 3-4mls. & unfortunately it was their markers which the backers-up maintained. For once the main force did not undershoot the markers to any great extent, with the result that most of the bombing took place to the SE of the town & a PRU a/c reported that no fires were burning in Hannover town centre. Photographs however prove that there were some fires burning [deleted] round [/deleted] around the A/P & it is probable that considerable damage was done. Although probably only a small proportion of the total bomb load fell on the town, it seems unlikely that there was any large scale devastation as was first expected.
P.F.F. 1 missing.
[underlined] 23RD SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGETS. [/underlined] MANNHEIM & DARMSTADT.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] HANNOVER.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 541 heavies & mediums of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 78 PFF on Mannheim. 29 a/c of PFF on Darmstadt.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Groundmarking.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2130hrs.
[page break]
119
[underlined] TARGETS: MANNHEIM & DARMSTADT. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE:- BASE – CLACTON – 5058N 0254E – 4955N 0750E – Target – (4920N 0843E DARMSTADT) – 49 [indecipherable digits] 0820E – 4800N 0400E – 4830 0030W – 4920N 0040W – SELSEY BILL – READING – BASE.
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120
[underlined] SUMMARY. MANNHEIM. [/underlined]
Nil cloud, good visibility. Blind markers well concentrated and accurate. Visual markers claimed to have identified A.P. without any doubt. Green markers well concentrated apart from occasional strays. Main force effort caused good fires with incendiaries undershooting considerably. Large explosion seen at 2156hrs in North end of target. 1 a/c attacked last resort DARMSTADT as nothing seen at MANNHEIM on arrival.
[underlined] DARMSTADT. [/underlined]
Red marker concentration reasonably good although some fell well away. Green T.Is generally good. Ground fires seen starting as a/c left. One large explosion seen at 2135hrs – believed gas holder, also seen by Mannheim crews.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
2 a/c of P.F.F. missing, both of 97 Squadron. Photographic plot shows a very bad scatter to the N.W. back along track, and although a high proportion of photographs are unplottable because of fire-tracks, it seems that the main force bombing spread back badly. A P.R.U. sortie the following afternoon reported fires still burning in the town.
[list by Groups, of aircraft missing]
[underlined] 24TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
156 squadron stood down. Mine-laying by 1, 3 and 6 Groups. 8 Group. 4 Mosquitoes on DUISBERG.
[underlined] 25TH SEPTEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] KIEL.
[underlined] A/C required: [/underlined] 8 B/M. 6 Supporters.
Zero hour [missing words] later changed to 0230hrs.
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121
[underlined] 26TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Area I. HANNOVER. AREA II. BOCHUM.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
Area I. 5 B/M. 2 V/M. 4 B/U. 7 Supporters. [underlined] Spoof [/underlined] 1 B/M. 2 Supporters. Area II. 2 B/U. 90 Supporters.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
Area I. 578 Heavies + 23 Mediums + 89 P.F.F. Area II. 354 Heavies + 42 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0030hrs.
[underlined]1730hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 27TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Area I. HANNOVER. AREA II. KIEL.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] HANNOVER.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
590 Heavies + 24 Mediums + 89 P.F.F. 28 on BRUNSWICK.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2330hrs.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] HANNOVER.
Nil cloud – good vis: T.I. Yellows fairly concentrated, estimated about 3 loads of Red T.Is dropped and Greens backed up well. Incendiaries were reported as falling short about 30% of the effort being short of [missing words]
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122
[underlined] TARGETS: HANNOVER & BRUNSWICK. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE. Base – Southwold – 5237N 0330E – Egmond – 5235N 0800E – 5234N 0900E – [symbol] – 5210N 0945E – 5238N 0800E – Egmond – Southwold – Base.
Brunswick [missing words]
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123
and could be seen from the Dutch Coast on the homeward run
[underlined] Brunswick. [/underlined]
Reds seemed rather scattered. Green T.Is away from the Reds. Some fires seen as a/c left. Many night fighters flames were seen over CELLE and the target & the attack is therefore considered to have been successful as a “Spoof”.
[underlined] German Intruders. [/underlined] Operated over this country. Bombs dropped on warboys aerodrome.
[underlined] RESULTS: [/underlined]
38 a/c missing [list by Group of aircraft missing]
From preliminary reports attack appeared to fall to the NE. N & NW.
[underlined] 28TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
156 Squadron stood down.
[underlined] 29TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET: [/underlined] BOCHUM.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Musical Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] 2045HRS.
[underlined] A/C required: [/underlined] [list by squadron of aircraft numbers & roles] [words missing]
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124
[underlined] TARGET: BOCHUM.[/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 372 Heavies + 24 Mediums + 45 P.F.F.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
1 a/c ‘2’ Sgt Maclean landed at Newmarket short of petrol. ‘C’ F/S Ray [deleted] landed [/deleted] attempted to land at Downham Market but overshot and crashed at Wimbotsham.
Weather over the target was clear & enabled Paramatta to be used. 1st T.I. Red dropped on time. All crews bombed on ground markers except one who bombed skymarker at 2054hrs. The T.I. concentration was good, with the exception of 2 x T.I. Green which were reported dropped at 2053 4/5mls. NE. Many fires were started but had a scatter of several miles and undershooting.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
High standard of accuracy was achieved by markers. From photographic cover since received it is seen that a large amount of damage was done and the raid proved to be very successful.
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125
[underlined] 30TH SEPTEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET.[/underlined] STETTIN.
156 squadron required.
[underlined] 1255HRS. [/underlined] OPERATIONS cancelled.
[underlined] 1ST OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] STUTTGART.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 6 B/M. 2 V/M. 1 B/U. 3 Supporters. Spoof. 2 B/M. 2 Supporters.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 523 Heavies + 81 P.F.F. 32 P.F.F. on Spoof.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2235hrs. T.O.T. Z-4 to Z+25.
[underlined] 1340hrs. [/underlined] Area I. Scrubbed. Area II. Hagen. [underlined] Zero hour [/underlined] 2100hrs. [underlined] A/C required: [/underlined] 4 Supporters. [underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 209 Heavies + 37 P.F.F. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-3 to Z+12.
[underlined] 1450hrs. [/underlined] Area I still on.
[underlined] 1615hrs. [/underlined] Area I scrubbed.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
9 – 10/10ths cloud tops 5/6,000ft. Despite cloud conditions T.Is clearly discernible on ground. Three out of four crews report first Red T.Is dropped on time, followed 1/2 a minute later by first greens. Early T.I.G well placed with slight tendency to overshoot. Fires starting & 2 crews report a large explosion at 2103hrs.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
There was a gap in the mosquito marking early in the attack, but this was covered by the Backers-Up who kept the A/P marked throughout the attack. Accuracy of mosquitoes & B/Up alike was of a high standard.
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126
[underlined] TARGET: HAGEN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – 5310N 0150E – Egmond – 5145N 0800E – HAGEN – 5030N 0730E – 5020N 0132E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
[underlined] 2ND OCTOBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MUNICH.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 203 Heavies of 1 & 5 Groups + 86 P.F.F
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2230 hours. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+14.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
Weather nil cloud – good vis: B/markers more concentrated than previously. Visual markers seemed rather scattered. Green T.Is were well concentrated in centre of yellows. Good fires were reported well concentrated in target area with incendiaries undershooting as usual. Large explosions at 2231 & 2239hrs. Main force a/c arrived in [symbol] area as much as 20 mins early doubling the time of the attack & allowing night fighters to get organised.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[list by Groups, of aircraft missing]
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127
[underlined] TARGET: MUNICH. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Harwich – 5125N 0230E – 4950N 0310E – 4826N 0745E – 4128N 1052E – 4800N 1120E – MUNICH – 4810N 1151E – 4945N 1280E – 4808N 0733E – Cayeux – Beachy Head – Base.
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128
[underlined] 3RD OCTOBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] KASSEL.
139 Squadron. HANNOVER.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 467 Heavies + 87 P.F.F. Spoof. HANNOVER. 10 Mosquitoes.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2115hrs. [underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] Z-25.h.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+23.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
Nil cloud. Ground visibility. Although flares illuminated town, many of the Yellow T.Is seemed to fall to the E. No red T.Is were seen dropped. Green T.Is seemed reasonably well concentrated. Ground fires were started with much of the effort falling short as usual and as a consequence it is anticipated that the Henschel works will have been well attacked. One very large explosion seen by some crews when about 100mls. from the target at about 2200hrs. The spoof attack on Hannover very successful as lanes of N/F flares laid across town & S/Ls in Ruhr area seemed to [indecipherable word] a/c in Hannover direction.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Timing of all marker crews were good the attack opening shortly before the scheduled time & the A/P marking was maintained. General tendency of B/Markers was to undershoot & the spread of PFF was roughly from the A/P to 2 1/2m ESE. Main force do not appear to have followed P.F.F. & although great destruction was caused in the town there was a bad scatter N. P.I.U. showed fires burning the next day.
[list by Groups, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
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129
[underlined] TARGET: KASSEL [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE:- Base – Cromer – 5320N 0400E – N. tip of TEXEL – 5228N 0910E – 5147N 0340E – KASSEL – 5112N 0938E – 5030N 0720E – 5018N 0132E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
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130
[underlined] 4TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target:[/underlined] FRANKFURT A/MAIN. [underlined] SPOOF [/underlined] LUDWIGSHAVEN: Area II. STUTTGART.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C required: [/underlined] Area I.
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 361 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5, & 6 Groups + 67 P.F.F. Spoof: 50 Heavies of 1 Group + 12 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2130hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+18. Spoof. Z-9 to Z-7.
[underlined] Summary. FRANKFURT. [/underlined]
Nil cloud, good visibility. T.I. Yellow seemed reasonably well concentrated. 3 red T.I’s fell in target area well concentrated – covered area about 1ml. square. 1 Red T.I. dropped about 3-4 mls. South – Did not attract attack – did not seem to be decoy. Green T.I’s backed up well. Many fires burning some good. Generally not very concentrated. Incendiaries a little more concentrated than usual. One large red explosion at 2137hrs.
[underlined] LUDWIGSHAVEN. [/underlined]
Nil cloud – slight haze. Reds occupied triangular area about 2ml. sides: greens about same area – fires starting up – results seem good for general number detailed.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] The results of the Spoof [symbol] were very bad due mainly to bad manipulation. There is however evidence of some marking on the A/P, although most of the attack probably missed the mark. A considerable amount of bombing
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131
[underlined] TARGET: FRANKFURT & LUDWIGSHAVEN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Reading – Beachy Head – 5020N 0135E – 4934N 0752E – Frankfurt – 5016N 0845E -5020N 0135E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
Spoof: As above – 4934N 0752E – LUDWIGSHAVEN – 5010N 0900E – 5 [indecipherable digits] N 0845E – [indecipherable word]
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132
[underlined] 5TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] GELSENKIRCHEN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Parraamatta. [sic]
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] 156 squadron Supporters only. Stand down requested.
[underlined] 6TH OCTOBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRANKFURT-AM-MAIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 156 squadron. 6 B/M. 2 V/M. 9 B/Up. 4 Supporters.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2130hrs.
[underlined] 1650hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[underlined] 7TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] STUTTGART.
[underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] FRIEDRICHSHAVEN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0005hrs.
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133
Mosquitoes will also carry out attacks on MUNICH & AACHEN.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
262 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 and 6 Groups + 66 P.F.F. 16 P.F.F. on Friedrichshaven.
[underlined] Route. STUTTGART. [/underlined]
Base – Reading – Beachy Head – 5004N 0122E – 4822N 0542E – 4800N 0750E – STUTTGART – 4852N 0920E – 4840N 0500E – 5004N 0122E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
[underlined] FRIERICHSHAVEN. [/underlined]
Base – Reading – Beachy Head – 5004N 0122E – 4822N 0542E – 4800N 0750E – 4800N 0900E – [symbol] – 4851N 0828E – 4840N 0500E – 5004N 0122E – B. Head – Reading – Base.
[underlined] SUMMARY. STUTTGART [/underlined]
10/10ths cloud. T.I’s visible through cloud. The first Yellows fell on time followed by a further batch some 6-10mls. to the N.E. These followed the marker for 2 separate attacks, both concentrations being backed up by T.I.G. There are no reports of T.Is being dropped outside either of these concentrations. Some a/c dropped sky-markers in preference to T.I’s but generally these were so scattered that they could not be aimed at. Two crews report seeing Red T.Is but in view of cloud conditions it was impossible to identify them with certainty. Glow of good fires was seen above both concentrations & from one particularly large fire in the Northern area smoke was rising above cloud level.
[underlined] FRIERICHSHAVEN. [/underlined] 10/10ths cloud. 1st red T.I’s dropped on time & were seen as a glow above cloud. Only one captain (Q.) was able to make any definite report as to concentration, which he described as good by both Greens & Reds. Two crews report greenish-blue explosion at 0001hrs.
[underlined] RESULTS. PFF [/underlined] The weather was not very suitable for ground-marking and this resulted resulted [sic] in a certain amount of confusion amongst the B/Markers, some of whom dropped their T.I.Y. while others correctly resorted to emergency Wanganui & dropped release point lanes. The result seems to have been 2 separate concentrations about 5-6ms apart on track. No PRU results are so far to hand.
[list by Groups, of aircraft missing]
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134
[underlined] TARGETS: STUTTGART + FRIEDRICHSAVEN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.] [missing information]
[page break]
135
[underlined] 8TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] HANNOVER. 139. BERLIN & MANNEHEIM & AACHEN. 105 & 109. KÖLN.
[underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] BREMEN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
391 Heavies + 25 mediums of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 79 PFF. on HANNOVER. 100 Stirlings + 25 PFF on Bremen. 8 Mosquitoes of 139 on Berlin.
[underlined] Zero hours. [/underlined] HANNOVER. 0130hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+ 20. BREMEN. 0115hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+ BERLIN. 0120hrs.
[underlined] Summary: [/underlined] HANNOVER.
Nil cloud – good vis: Markers of all types were put down well and are reported by all crews as being accurate. Early arrivals reported a few reds backed up by one load of Greens about 3m. N. of [symbol], but these were fortunately ignored. At 0140hrs a few reds were also reported well to the W. of the concentrations but by this time fires were burning very well over the entire area of the centre of the town. One large explosion reported at 0142hrs.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined] HANNOVER. [underlined] BREMEN. [/underlined]
[list by Groups, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
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136
[underlined] TARGETS: HANNOVER & BREMEN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Routes: Base – 5320N 0350E – N. tip of Texel – 5225N 0800 – 5240N 0948E – HANNOVER – 5156N 0918E – [missing information]
[page break]
137
[underlined] 9TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
No operations for heavies. 6 Mosquitoes on BERLIN. [deleted] 4 Mosquitoes on COLOGNE. 4 Mosquitoes on DUISBERG. [/deleted]
[underlined] 10TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 11TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 12TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 13TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
8 Group: 4 Mosquitoes COLOGNE. 4 Mosquitoes DUISBERG. MAKE AND MEND ALL OTHER SQUADRONS.
[page break]
138
[underlined] 14TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 15TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND.
[underlined] 16TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
8 Group. 9 Mosquitoes on DORTMUND. 91 Group. 4 Whitleys – Leaflets. 92 Group. 4 Wellingtons – Leaflets. MAKE AND MEND ALL OTHER SQUADRONS.
[underlined] 17TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
8 Group. 6 Mosquitoes on BERLIN. 3 Mosquitoes on AACHEN. 1 Group. 12 Wellingtons mine-laying. 3 Group. 32 Stirlings mine-laying. 6 Group. 5 Wellingtons mine-laying. 91 Group. 2 Whitleys – Leaflets. 93 Group. 7 Wellingtons – Leaflets. 1 Whitley – Leaflets.
[page break]
139
[underlined] 18TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Area I HANNOVER. Area II. GELSENKIRCHEN. 139. BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: Area I. [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined]
293 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 64 P.F.F. 8 Mosquitoes of 139 squadron on BERLIN.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2015hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+14.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
9/10ths cloud, tops 15/17000ft. 4 crews reported Red T.I’s dropped at 2011hrs & 2016hrs, but the majority of crews bombed either the glow of Green T.I’s on the glow on cloud in the area where T.I Yellow & Green had been seen cascading. One visual marker (‘X’ S/L Manifold) came below cloud and bombed the centre of two cluster of greens approx: 2mls apart. Only one crew reported seeing a sky-marker at 2014hrs. Incendiaries scattered over a wide area. One very large explosion at approx.: 2015hrs.
[underlined] results. [/underlined]
[list by Groups, of aircraft numbers involved and missing]
[page break]
140
[underlined] TARGET: HANNOVER. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[underlined] Route: [/underlined] Base – Cromer – 5320N 0350E – N. end of Texel – 5240N 0948E – HANNOVER – 5155N 0920E – 5233N 0436E – 5245N 0330E – Southwold – Base.
[underlined] V/M. [/underlined] After N. end of Texel – 5225N 0820E – 5255N 0835E – 5246N 0849E – 5240N 0948E for route-marking to aid Mosquitoes on Berlin.
[underlined] 19TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] AUGSBURG. [underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] MUNICH
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 3 B/M. 2 V/M. 6 B/Up. 8 Supporters. MUNICH 2 B/M.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 497 Heavies + 83 P.F.F. on Augsburg. 15 Heavies of 1 group + 26 PFF on Munich.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2200hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+18. MUNICH. Z-13. [missing information]
[page break]
141
[underlined] 20TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Area I. LEIPZIG. Area II STETTIN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
83 squadron to operate from Warboys.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 281 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 72 P.F.F. on LEIPZIG. 10 Mosquitoes of 139 squadron on BERLIN.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2100hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+11.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 8/10 – 10/10ths cloud. Yellow & Green T.I’s were seen by most crews generally very scattered. The attack seems to have concentrated over an area of at least 100 square miles. Some fires were seen – unable to say in what part of HUNLAND!
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] The attack was completely spoiled by bad weather especially that encountered en-route. Many a/c were iced up & lost their A.S.I.s & other instruments. Also owing to external ice the special equipment went u/s on several a/c & only 3 a/c (R. P/O Slaper & X. S/L Manifold/156) dropped emergency Wanganui flares. A few a/c dropped Yellow T.I & these were widely scattered. Like P.F.F the main force found the weather too much for them with the result that no concentration at all was achieved. The Germans have admitted some damage in Leipzig but there is no reason to suppose that this was anything but the incidental damage which is inevitable in a big raid.
[underlined] Losses. [/underlined] [deleted] KASSEL. [/deleted]
[list by Group, of aircraft losses]
[page break
142
[underlined] TARGET: LEIPZIG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Cromer – 5320N 0350E – N. end of TEXEL – 5253N 0740E – 5236N 1152E – 5202N 1242E – LEIPZIG – 5106N 1211E – 5253N 0740E – N. end of TEXEL – 5320N 0350E – Cromer – Base.
[underlined] 21ST OCTOBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND for all Heavy Squadrons.
8 Group. 1 Mosquito DORTMUND. 3 Mosquitoes BUDERICH (NW. Dusseldorf.) 1 Mosquito AACHEN. 3 Mosquitoes EMDEN
[page break]
143
[underlined] 22ND OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] KASSEL..
[underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] FRANKFURT AM MAIN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 474 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 79 P.F.F. on KASSEL. 36 P.F.F. on FRANKFURT.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2055hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+16. Z-25 to Z-16 on FRANKFURT.
[underlined] Summary. KASSEL. [/underlined]
Nil cloud. Good vis: apart from one load of Yellow T.I’s which fell at 2044hrs 5 mins early – the Yellows were accurate and well placed. At least 3 loads of T.I. Red were dropped accurately placed & well concentrated. Green T.I’s backing up very well. Crews on Frankfurt attack on passing Kassel reported very good fires burning. Large explosion seen about 2100hrs. Crews consider a good raid.
[underlined] FRANKFURT. [/underlined] Nil cloud. First Red T.I. fell about 2 mins: early. Red T.I’s intended to scatter over town area. Green T.I’s generally West not good concentration.
[underlined] Results. P.F.F. [/underlined] Technically this was probably the best attack P.F.F. has ever carried out, certainly the best Newhaven against a defended German target. The illuminating and blind-marking was excellently done with a slight tendency to overshoot. All nine visual markers identified the A/P – of the 8 who dropped T.I’s 6 [indecipherable word] so far plotted all within 1ml. of the A/P. The B/Up were nearly as accurate, & there was a good crop of supporter photographs on and around the A/P.
[list by Groups, aircraft types, numbers involved, roles and aircraft missing] [missing information]
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144
[underlined] TARGET: KASSEL & FRANKFURT. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
145
[underlined] 23RD OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
All heavy squadrons MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 24TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
All heavy squadrons stood down.
2 a/c required for BULLSEYE. ‘P’ F/L Stannard. ‘F’ Sgt. Turner.
[underlined] 1620hrs. [/underlined] Bullseye cancelled.
[underlined] 25TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND for all heavies.
[underlined] 26TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND for all heavy squadrons.
FIDO Demonstration at Graveley.
[underlined] 27TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
35 Squadron on LEVERKUSEN – Scrubbed later.
All other heavies stood down.
[page break]
146
[underlined] 28TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavy squadrons.
[underlined] 29TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavy squadrons.
[underlined] 30TH OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target.: [/underlined] LUDWIGSHAVEN. 35 on Leverkusen.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 8 B/M – 2 V/M. 6 B/U. 4 Supporters.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven Ground-marking.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2015hrs.
[underlined] 1613hrs. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[underlined] 31ST OCTOBER 1943. [/underlined]
All heavies stood down.
[underlined] 1ST NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavy squadrons.
[underlined] 2ND NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all squadrons.
[page break]
147
[underlined] 3RD NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] DUSSELDORF.
[underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] COLOGNE.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
DUSSELDORF. [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
COLOGNE. [list by Squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Musical Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] Paramatta.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 1945hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-3 to Z+20. [underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] Z-10 to Z-1.
Serrate will be on – Mosquitoes and Beaufighters.
[underlined] SUMMARY. DUSSELDORF. [/underlined]
Nil cloud – good vis: apart from slight haze. The first reds T.I’s & sky markers fell about one minute late. After the first red T.I. had fallen at 1944hrs there was a lapse of about 10 minutes before further reds were dropped. Subsequently concentration of markers appeared to be good and fires in compact area were taking a good hold as the later crews left the target.
[underlined] KÖLN [/underlined] Nil cloud. Considerable haze. Red T.I’s were dropped five minutes early while N/156 was covered by S/Ls. Subsequent Reds fell in line N to S. about 8/10mls in length. Greens were well concentrated around the S. concentration which it is feared may have been BONN.
[underlined] Last Resort. OVERHIT area. [/underlined] T/156. Primary not attacked as first Red T.I’s were dropped early & were ignored by a/c which continued on track for 8 minutes before turning back. After [deleted] about [/deleted] 2 minutes it was decided to drop bombs as otherwise a/c would have
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148
[underlined] TARGET: DUSSELDORF & COLOGNE. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
1 a/c BONN area – L/156 – Last resort.
Primary not attacked for similar reasons to T/156.
[page break]
149
[underlined] RESULTS: [/underlined]
[underlined] DUSSELDORF. [/underlined]
P.F.F. 8 Group. [list of aircraft type, numbers involved and missing]
[list by Groups, of aircraft type, numbers involved and missing]
[underlined] KÖLN [/underlined]
P.F.F. 8 Group. [list of aircraft type, numbers involved and missing]
[underlined] 4TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
Make & Mend.
[underlined] 5TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] 6TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
Mosquitoes on BOCHUM, DUISBERG, DUSSELDORF.
‘K’ W/C WHITE ‘X’ S/L MANIFOLD Hooded flare demonstration at RUSHFORD.
[page break]
150
[underlined] 7TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] AUGSBURG.
[underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] MUNICH.
[underlined] A/C required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 524 heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 70 PFF. on AUGSBURG. 15 Heavies of 1 Group + 41 PFF.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] AUGSBURG – Newhaven. MUNICH – Parramatta.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0300hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+16.
Serrate will be on – Mosquitoes & Beaufighters. Mosquitoes also operating North & South of Augsburg against Night fighters.
[underlined] Briefing [/underlined] 1700hrs.
[underlined] 2120hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED. 10/10ths cloud over the target.
‘BULLSEYE’ ‘N’ F/O DOCHERTY.
[page break]
151
[underlined] 8TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] AUGSBURG.
[underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] MUNICH.
[underlined] A/C required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 339 Heavies + 72 P.F.F on AUGSBURG. 15 Heavies + 42 P.F.F on MUNICH.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] AUGSBURG – Newhaven. MUNICH – Paramatta.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 03015hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] AUGSBURG. Z-6 to Z+!2. MUNICH. Z-12 to Z.
12 Beaufighters operating in the Bomber stream. 12 Mosquitoes intruding.
[underlined] 2205hrs. [/underlined] OPERATION CANCELLED.
[underlined] 9TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRIEDRICHSHAVEN.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
152
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 312 Lancasters + 90 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0400hrs.
[underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+12.
[underlined] A/P [/underlined] The main shed of the old Zeppelin works. Possibility of diversions.
[underlined] 1700hrs. [/underlined] MAIN OPERATION cancelled.
[underlined] 10TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] KÖNIGSBERG.
[underlined] Alternative: [/underlined] DANZIG.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 8 B/M. 2 V/M. 3 B/Up. 8 Supporters.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2100hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+10.
[underlined] Briefing [/underlined] 1330hrs.
[underlined] 1345hrs [/underlined] Area I & II both cancelled. [underlined] Target: [/underlined] MODANE.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 240 Heavies of 1 & 5 Groups + 75 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0300hrs. . [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-7 to Z+12.
[underlined] 1645hrs. [/underlined] Zero hour changed to 0100hrs.
[underlined] 1730hrs. [/underlined] Briefing.
[page break]
153
[underlined] TARGET: - MODANE [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Base – Reading – Selsey Bill – Cabourg – 4735N 0045E – 4512N 0542E – MODANE – 4735N 0120E – Cabourg – Selsey Bill – Reading – Base.
[page break]
154
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Nil cloud – slight haze in the valley. First red T.I dropped at approx.: 0057hrs. on or near the A/P. Further reds slightly overshot & a few fell on the mountain side, one very early in the attack – main concentration then formed near bend in river by eastern marshalling yard, greens falling mostly in this area with the exception of one which fell 1-2mls. South. Our visual markers arrived late over the target having been misled by river in valley S. of MODANE. One arrived in time to identify visually, later smoke filled the valley. Some incendiaries overshot to the North.
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] The marking of the target was excellent – timing however was bad & most a/c arrived late. It was intended that the first visual markers should endeavour to visually mark the A/P by moonlight only & if necessary the 2nd lot of visuals should identify by the light of flares dropped by B/Markers.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
The raid was no doubt a great success from every point of view. A large number of plotted photographs show that the largest part of the attack fell exactly where it was intended. Crews reported fires and a number of explosions of varying sizes & some crews are of the opinion that an ammunition train blew up. There is no doubt that full photographic cover of the area will show extensive damage to the marshalling yards & tunnel entrance. The far reaching results of this excellent raid will be felt & much appreciated by the allied armies fighting in Italy.
No a/c were missing from Command.
[underlined] 11TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRIEDRICHSHAVEN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 7 B/M. 3 V/M. 4 B/Up. 7 Supporters.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2230hrs.
[underlined] 1825hrs. [/underlined] MAIN OPERATION CANCELLED.
[underlined] CANNES. [/underlined] attacked by 4 & 6 Group + 35 & 97 squadrons. 4 a/c missing ANTWERP viaduct attacked by 10 Lancs. of 617 squadron.
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155
[underlined] 12TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[underlined] 13TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[underlined] 14TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[underlined] 15TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[underlined] 16TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target:[/underlined] AREA I. LUDWIGSHAVEN. AREA II. LEVERKUSEN. SPOOF FRANKFURT.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] Area I. Now Leverkusen. 2 B/Up. 6 supporters. Area II. Ludwigshaven. 7 B/M. 1 V/M. 5 B/Up. 6 Supporters. Frankfurt. 3 B/M.
[underlined] Zero hours. [/underlined] Area I. 2000hrs. Area II. 2020hrs. Spoof 2010-12hrs
[underlined] Methods. [/underlined] Area I. Paramatta, Area II. Newhaven.
[missing timing] OPERATIONS cancelled.
[page break]
156
[underlined] 17TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] 0940hrs. [/underlined] All heavies MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 1210hrs.[/underlined] 156 required for target MANNHEIM ‘B’.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list of 156 squadron ‘Y’ aircraft numbers involved]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 70 + P.F.F.
[underlined] Method.. [/underlined] Blind-bombing by means of ‘Y’.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs.
[underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] Mosquitoes of 139 squadron will carry out a spoof attack on BONN. at 1935hrs.
[underlined] TARGET: MANNHEIM. ‘B’ [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: base – reading – Beachy Head – 5010N [missing information]
[page break]
157
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
Varying amounts of cloud 7/10ths to nil. The majority of the attack covered an area about 2-2mls. across but some reports show a wide scatter by a few a/c. At about 2007hrs a large explosion resulted in a large fire. Some other fires reported at 2005hrs approximately one red T.I seen dropped about NNW of the target. This was seen by nearly all crews but there are conflicting opinions as to whether dummy or not. Bombing was much hampered by moisture freezing on inside of Perspex. One a/c attacked SCHIFFERSTADT mistaking it for MANNHEIM.
[underlined] 18TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGETS: [/underlined] BERLIN. MANNHEIM.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] BERLIN. Lancasters.
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
Halifaxes [sic] & some Lancasters on MANNHEIM.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] PARAMATTA.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2100hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-4 to Z+12.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 379 Heavies of 1, 3, 5, & 6 Groups + 70 P.F.F.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] A number of crews experienced difficulty with special equipment in identifying Brandenburg, and therefore the Red T.I’s were scattered, and were dropped over a rather longer period of time than briefed. Green T.I’s were difficult to see owing to cloud but were more concentrated than the Red. While thick cloud made observation of results difficult later crews reported seeing glows of fires on cloud. At approximately 2112hrs a large explosion. Spoof fighter flares were considered inaccurate – some crews reporting them having been dropped on the route out of the [symbol]. Apparently only 2 or 3 skymarkers were released.
[page break]
158
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Naisboro’ – 5310N 0400E – 5240N 0900E – 5225N 1235E – BERLIN – 5233N 1350E – 5212N 1350E – 5100N 0930E – 5030N 0720E – CAYEUX – Beachy Head – Base.
Two Cuckoos landed Warboys. W/C Adams. 49 squadron 5 Group. Sgt Shearer. 101 squadron 1 Group.
[underlined] Results. BERLIN. [/underlined] 450 a/c detailed [underlined] MANNHEIM. [/underlined] 401 a/c detailed. [missing information]
[page break]
159
[underlined] 19TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
156 squadron stood down.
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] LEVERKUSEN. 3, 4 & 6 Groups. 10 Mosquitoes + 6 Halifaxes from P.F.F.
[underlined] Results: [/underlined] 5 a/c missing of 267 a/c.
[underlined] 20TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 21ST NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND
[underlined] 22ND NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Sky-marking & Ground-marking.
[underlined] A/C Required [/underlined] [list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 612 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 121 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+20.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 10/10ths cloud tops 10/12,000ft – layers to 20,000ft. First skymarkers were dropped punctually & thereafter fell in unbroken succession throughout attack forming two clusters about 4mls. apart N & S. Some Red & Green T.I’s were seen cascading but quickly disappeared into cloud. A few crews reported seeing Red & Yellows dropped together. Good fires were started which were visible for at least 100mls. many crews reported an unusually large explosion at 2022hrs.
[page break]
160
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base. Cromer. – 5310N 0400E – 5240N 0900E – 5236N 1221E – BERLIN – 5225N 1350E -5200N 1350E – 5223N 1200E – 5240N 0900E – 5310N 0400E – CROMER. BASE.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] [list by Groups of aircraft types and numbers missing]
P.F.F. – “The squeals of the enemy point to a most highly successful attack”.
[page break]
161
[underlined] 23RD NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Paramatta.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 329 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 90 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+15.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 9/10ths cloud. All crews report good concentration with skymarkers in a line approx.: N & S. about 1 ml. in length – one isolated about 4m. N.E. Glow of fires over whole area & smoke seen coming through cloud.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined] German Communiqué – 1300hrs. 24.11.43. On the evening of 23 November the Reich capital was again attacked by strong British formations. This terror raid caused more damage in several districts. In addition to residential districts, numerous public buildings, including churches, welfare institutions & cultural monuments were destroyed. Fighter formations & A.A of the Luftwaffe in spite of difficult conditions for defence shot down 19 E/A.
[list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
P.F.F. [list of aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
[page break]
162
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Cromer – 5310N 0400E – 5240N 0900E – 5236N 1221E – BERLIN – 5225N 1350E – 5200N 1350E – 5223N 1200E – 5240N 0900E – 5310N 0400E – Cromer – Base.
[page break]
163
[underlined] 24TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[deleted] Target: [/deleted] MAKE & MEND ALL HEAVIES
[underlined] 25TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] LANCASTERS – BERLIN. HALIFAXES – FRANKFURT.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 2 Primary B/Markers. 4 Sec: B/Markers. 6 Supporters.
[underlined] FRANKFURT. [/underlined] [list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] BERLIN. 2115hrs. FRANKFURT 2000hrs.
[underlined] Z1340hrs. [/underlined] Zero hours changed Berlin – 1345hrs Frankfurt – 0230hrs.
[underlined] 1450hrs. [/underlined] Zero hours changed again BERLIN – 0400hrs. FRANKFURT – 0245hrs. T.O.T. Z-5 to Z+10.
[underlined] 2230hrs. [/underlined] BERLIN cancelled – Supporters transferred to Frankfurt.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] NEWHAVEN
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] [deleted] 426 [/deleted] [inserted] 215 [/inserted] Heavies + 33 P.F.F.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] Apparently winds were much stronger than given in Met. Forecast. This combined with conditions of 9-10/10ths cloud varying from 19/15,000ft has obviously resulted in a scattered attack. Most crews report seeing Red T.I’s going quickly into cloud, but it is thought that these are just as likely to have been sky-markers in their initial stages as any attempt on the part of the Hun to simulate T.I. Red. One crew reports being able to see below cloud on return and to have seen fairly good fires burning. Many crews report a large fire burning in France – believed to be Lille.
[page break]
164
[underlined] TARGET: FRANKFURT. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: BASE – Reading – Beachy Head – 5020N 0130E 5015N 0800E – FRANKFURT – 5000N 0100E – 4945N 0900E – 5020N 0130E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
[underlined] RESULTS & SUCCESS.. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. Analysis. [/underlined] It is inevitable that an attack carried out under unexpected cloud conditions such as those over Frankfurt must spread very badly. Many main force were reduced to bombing on what markers they could see before they disappeared into cloud.
P.F.F. [list of aircraft type, numbers involved and missing] [list by Groups, of aircraft type, numbers involved and missing]
[page break]
165
[underlined] 26TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Targets: [/underlined] BERLIN. STUTTGART.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] STUTTGART. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] BERLIN – Paramatta. STUTTGART – Newhaven.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] BERLIN – 384 Heavies + 74 P.F.F. STUTTGART – 170 Heavies + 31 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hours: [/underlined] BERLIN. 2115hrs [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+12. STUTTGART. 2030hrs [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+8.
[underlined] SUMMARIES. BERLIN. [/underlined]
Large break occurred in cloud over [symbol]. One salvo of Red & Yellow T.I’s seen at 2113hrs and although small clusters of T.I. Red fell to the N.W. & to the S.E. the main backing up appears to have concentrated [indecipherable word] the T.I. Red & yellow. Later in the attack incendiaries seemed to be undershooting but fires were burning in the centre of the city.
[underlined] STUTTGART. [/underlined]
8-9/10ths thin cloud tops 8,000ft. Sky-markers & T.I. Yellow were dropped on time and also some T.I. Red were seen cascading. There was a concentration of T.I. Yellow & T.I. Green covering a fairly wide area. Good fires were seen burning through cloud. Few signs of night fighters over the [symbol] but great activity of all sorts – flak, S/Ls & many fighter flares around Frankfurt.
[underlined] ROUTE – BERLIN.[/underlined]
BASE – READING – BEACHY HEAD – 5020N 0130E – 5020N 0910E – 5215N 1210E – BERLIN – 5240N 1350E – [missing information]
[page break]
166
[underlined] TARGETS: BERLIN AND STUTTGART. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.] [missing information]
[page break]
167
[underlined] 26TH NOVEMBER 1943 (cont:) [/underlined]
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. Analysis. [/underlined] The only Special B/Markers to bomb dropped his T.I’s 8mls. N.W. of the A/P. These T.I’s attracted a considerable proportion of backing up and bombing, but luckily the attack appeared to have spread mostly to the SE of this position under the influence of normal ‘Y’ a/c. The centre of the area marked by B/Markers appears to have been about 5mls. W. of the A/P. Considerable damage has clearly been caused in the area to the North & West of the Tiergarten.
[underlined] BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
[underlined] STUTTGART. [/underlined]
[list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing]
[underlined] 27TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
ALL HEAVIES MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
168
[underlined] 28TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
All Heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 29TH NOVEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
All Heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 30TH NOVEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MUNICH
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined] BERLIN.
[list of 156 squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2015hrs.
[underlined] 1551hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 1ST DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] LEIPZIG.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 6 Primary B/M. 5 Sec: B/M. 2 V/M. 3 B/U. 5 Supporters.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs.
[underlined] 2233hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[page break]
169
[underlined] 2ND DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 543 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 107 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs. altered later to 2006hrs.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Paramatta.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
5/10ths cloud tops 5,000ft. First Red T.I’s were apparently dropped at 2004hrs. and owing to different cloud cover conditions varying reports have been submitted by crews some not seeing T.I’s. Opinions generally seems to be that Markers were scattered along a line running approximately 3m. N-S with concentrations at extremities. From Special equipment observations it seems that the Southern concentration was probably in the centre of the city. Last [deleted] er [/deleted] B/Up on confirm that the fires confirmed with there [sic] impressions. Several crews reported dense clouds of smoke rising.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Plotted photographs cannot show a complete picture due to the cloud cover but it is probable that the greatest part of the raid was dropped in the S.E outskirts of Berlin.
[list by Groups, of aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing] [missing information]
[page break]
170
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: - BASE – HAISBORO’ – 5250N 0330E – 5235N 0440E – 5238N 1004E – 5236N 1220E – BERLIN – 5230N 1350E – 5255N 1350E – 5238N 1004E – 5235N 0440E – 5250N 0330E – HAISBORO’ – BASE.
[page break]
171
[underlined] 3RD DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Area I. LEIPZIG. Area II. BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 465 Heavies + 106 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0400hrs.
Mosquitoes of 627 and 139 squadrons will carry on from 5225N 1225E to BERLIN following a Spoof attack.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
10/10ths thin cloud – tops above 6,000ft. First T.I’s and sky-markers fell about 3 minutes early. A good concentration of T.I. Red developed and, according to experienced crews the best concentration of sky markers yet achieved. There was a slight overshoot of one T.I. Red to the South. T.I. Green backed up well though a few followed the overshoot. However in its later stages the concentration seemed to tighten up. Several explosions were seen, one large one at 0403hrs approximately – glow of many fires was seen & black smoke rising through cloud. Fighter flares seen on the way in. Out from the target route markers S. of Koblenz were very scattered some being dropped N. of Frankfurt. It seems that the HUN is becoming familiar with this route into the target and that night fighters wait near Hannover for routemarkers then follow the Bomber stream.
[underlined] Success. & Results. [/underlined]
Daylight cover confirms the success of the attack. The W. area of the city was covered by smoke rising to a great height & in the E. half of the target area upwards of 20 good fires were still burning furiously.
[page break]
172
[underlined] TARGET: LEIPZIG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: BASE – HAISBORO’ – 5250N 0330E – 5235N 0435E – 5240N 0810E – 5225N 1222E – LEIPZIG – 5105N 1205E – 5015N 0740E – 5010N 0130E – BEACHY HEAD – READING – BASE.
[list by Group, aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing] [missing information]
[page break]
173
[underlined] 4TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
All heavies MAKE & MEND.
8 Group, 9 Mos: FLAMBURG. 5 Primary. 1, 3, & 4 Groups mine-laying.
[underlined] 5TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 6TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 7TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND. SECURITY FILMS SHOWN.
[underlined] 8TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 9TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
174
[underlined] 10TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 11TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 12TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 13TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 14TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 15TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
175
[underlined] 16TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 400 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 91 P.F.F. + 15 Mosquitoes.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Wanganui & Paramatta.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 10/10ths thick cloud about 7,000ft. First red T.I’s & Sky-markers dropped early at 1956hrs. Early in the attack concentration of sky markers appeared to be fairly good, but in the later stages more ragged, stretching across the [symbol] from E – W. From H2S observations it would appear that the main weight of the attack fell on the centre of the city. Thick cloud prevented observation of T.I’s on the ground except as a vague glow. Many crews reported dummy Red T.I’s several miles to the N & NE of the target. Numerous fighter flares were seen from the Dutch coast to beyond the [symbol]. ‘Spoof’ fighter flares were seen being dropped & 2 crews report seeing fighters heading for them. Fighters were also reported as crossing the Dutch coast to the first turning point at sea to meet the a/c.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[list by Groups, of aircraft numbers involved, roles and missing
Visibility on return was extremely bad and a number of a/c crashed on landing.
[deleted] 19.12.43 [/deleted]
[page break]
176
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – 5250N 0330E – 5235N 0440E – 5238N 1005E – 5238N 1220E – BERLIN – 5243N 1400E – 5455N 1143E – 5525N 0938E – 5523N 0825E – 5510N 0700E – Base.
[page break]
177
[underlined] 17TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 18TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 19TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
One crew of 5 Group – mission 16/17-12-43 reported picked up by launches looking for ‘W’ F/L Aubert.
[underlined] 20TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRANKFURT.[underlined] Spoof. [/underlined] MANNHEIM.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[underlined] FRANKFURT. [/underlined] [list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 600 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5, & 6 Groups + 93 P.F.F. on Frankfurt. 27 Heavies P.F.F. + 30 Heavies of 1 Group on Mannheim.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] FRANKFURT 1935 MANNHEIM 1925.
Intruders operating.
[page break]
178
[underlined] TARGETS: FRANKFURT AND MANNHEIM. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE. Base – Southwold – 5130N 0440E – 5032N 0510E – 5015N 0730E – FRANKFURT/MANNHEIM – (5005N 0905E 4930N 0902E) 5030N 0900E – 5032N 0510E – 5130N 0440E 5215N 0300E – Southwold – Base.
[page break]
179
[underlined] 20TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined] (CONT:)
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] FRANKFURT.
6-9/10ths strato cm. with large breaks. First T.I. Yellows dropped on time. Some crews report they dropped early and one fell short over Wiesbaden. One of our supporters bombed these. T.I. Yellows then formed a rather scattered line E – W across the target. Backers up on later in the attack reported a circular concentration of T.I. Yellow with T.I. Red falling NW at approx: 1932hrs & others up to 10m. NE. T.I. Green were dropped approx: in the centre of the Yellows. Fires were very scattered following 2 concentrations but burning well. Large explosion 1947hrs.
[underlined] MANNHEIM. [/underlined]
2-3/10ths cloud. Red T.I’s dropped very accurately & well backed up by Greens. From visual identification crews report that Reds fell between marshalling yards & Rhine. Good fires started.
[underlined] P.F.F. RESULTS. [/underlined] FRANKFURT.
The timing of the B/Markers was very good. Owing to cloud conditions no visual markers were able to identify the A/P. backers up had great difficulty in selecting the centre of T.I. Yellow as these were confused with the flames. The flares drifted rapidly Eastwards & tended to produce an overshoot & considerable scatter. Plotted photographs stretch from the A/P up to 5m. E & SE.
[underlined] MANNHEIM. [/underlined] Little of the attack can have fallen in Ludwigshaven but it is probable that some damage was caused to parts of MANNHEIM. Photographs show 3-8mls. overshoot .
P.F.F. 3 missing. Command 42 a/c.
[underlined] 21ST DECEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
180
[underlined] 22ND DECEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 23RD DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 353 Heavies 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 90 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Paramatta.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2045hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+12.
Mosquitoes Spoof on Leipzig – Fighter flares on Berlin & Routemarking.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] put back to 0400hrs.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] Attack opened on time the first reds being seen at 0357.5hrs. Red T.I’s visible as a glow on cloud well concentrated. At 0407hrs 11 skymarkers seen over [symbol]. One Green fell to E of main concentration. Dummy reds seen to N.W. From H2S observations it would appear that the attack began well on the A/P with a tendency to spread slightly to the E & SE. Several large explosions reported – one at 0410hrs.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
16 a/c missing.
[page break]
181
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – 5220N 0300E – 5030N 0608E – 5033N 0940E – 5050N 1227E – 5205N 1310E – [symbol] – 5302N 1327E – 5235N 0943E – 5240N 0300E – Southwold – Base.
[page break]
182
[underlined] 24TH DECEMBER 1943 [/underlined]
MAKE and MEND all Heavies.
CHRISTMAS EVE.
[hand drawing of holly] [underlined] 25TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] TARGET.[/underlined] BERLIN. Present from BUTCH.
[underlined] 1000hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED!!
[underlined] 26TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE AND MEND
[underlined] 27TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[underlined] Message from A.O.C. [/underlined] All crews to fly today to blow the alchohol [sic] out of their lungs.
BATTLE CRUISER ‘SCHARNHORST’ sunk off NORWAY.
[underlined] 28TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND all heavies.
[page break]
183
[underlined] 29TH DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 604 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 106 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2000hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+18.
[underlined] Spoof Attacks. [/underlined] Leipzig & Magdeburg. By Mosquitoes.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Wanganui and Paramatta.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 10/10ths cloud – tops 6/10,000ft. The first T.I’s & skymarkers were dropped punctually at 1958hrs or slightly before T.I’s disappeared quickly into cloud, but a good concentration of skymarkers was achieved in a line E to W. H2S observations appear to indicate that the concentration was slightly to the SE of the centre of the city. Two crews report seeing T.I. Red & skymarkers 20m. S. of Berlin at 1949hrs. There are few definite reports of fires burning as glow was difficult to distinguish from that of Red T.I’s. Fighter flares mostly seen between Dummer See [sic] & Leipzig.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Reports are consistent in reporting a reasonable concentration. The enemy has become remarkably reticent on the results of the recent raids on Berlin. All the evidence however seems to point to this raid being successful.
19 a/c missing.
[page break]
184
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Cromer – 5320N 0400E – 5230N 0820E – 5137N 1220E – [symbol] – 5302N 1327E – 5300N 1145E – 5245N 0830E – 5320N 0400E – Cromer – Base.
[page break]
185
[underlined] 30H DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 31ST DECEMBER 1943. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRANKFURT.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 156 Squadron. 8 P.B/M. 2 V/M. 3 B.B/U. 2 V.B/U. 6 Supporters.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 508 a/c of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups. 110 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 1945hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+15.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed.
[underlined] 1459hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 1ST JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] WHITEBAIT.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 369 a/c of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 87 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0300hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+12.
[page break]
186
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: Base – Southwold – 5240N 0330E – 5238N 0438E – 5250N 0912E – 5236N 1220E – BERLIN – 5210N 1338N [sic] – 5050N 1210E – 5030N 0720E – 5030N 0135E – Beachy Head – Reading – Base.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] First sky-markers dropped on time, T.I’s were invisible owing to cloud. Skymarkers fairly concentrated at the beginning, tending to scatter over a line about 4mls. N – S. No fires seen. Large explosion at 0306hrs.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[missing information] P.F.F. Success. Impossible to assess results [missing information]
[page break]
187
[underlined] 2ND JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 320 Heavies of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 85 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0315hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+14.
Changed to 0245hrs owing to change of route.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
[blank]
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Practically impossible to assess success of raid but crews were more optimistic than on the previous nights raid in their reports. Main force groups report the concentration of release point flares as good.
8 Group 10 missing Command 18 missing
[page break]
188
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: Base – Southwold – 5245N 0330E – 5250N 0850E – 5325N 1240E – BERLIN – 5210N 1310E – 5150N 1030E – 5230N 0820E – 5245N 0330E – Southwold Base.
[page break]
189
[underlined] 3RD JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 4TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 5TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] STETTIN. [underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 325 Heavies 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 92 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven or Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0345hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+12.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] Nil cloud, vis: good, haze nil, snow on ground, cloud bank crossed target. Short duration. Apart from one or two reports of Red & Green T.I’s being dropped early, particularly T.I. Green, the markers achieved a good concentration. White flares were considered unnecessary due to very good visibility & snow. The visual marker definitely identified the A/P. Red T.I’s were considered a little scattered with some falling on the islands on the E. side of the River Oder in the Freihafen area. Attack generally considered very concentrated & successful. One large explosion seen about 0409hrs.
[page break]
190
[underlined] TARGET: STETTIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE. BASE – 5600N 0600E – 5600N 1300E – 5405N 1323E – STETTIN – 5325N 1450E – 5500N 1505E – 5600N 1300E – 5600E [sic] 0600E – Base.
[underlined] RESULTS & SUCCESS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Doubtless a good attack – plotted night photographs & crews reports are most optimistic. Judging by plotted photographs from this group there seems to have been a slight spread to the west [missing words]
[page break]
191
[underlined] 6TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 7TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 8TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Z633.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 156 Squadron. 3 B.M.I. 1 V/M. 3 Supporters.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Newhaven.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2030hrs.
[underlined] 1605hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 9TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 10TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
192
[underlined] 11TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 12TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 13TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 14TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BRUNSWICK.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 416 of 1, 3, 5 & 6 Groups + 93 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven. or Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 1915hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+12.
[page break]
193
[underlined] TARGET: BRUMSWICK. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: Base – Haisboro’ – 5305N 0400E – 5250N 0930E – BRUNSWICK – 5200N 1030E – 5230E [sic] 0820E – 5305N 0400E – Haisboro’ – Base.
[page break]
194
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined]
First markers. Green T.I’s & skymarkers R/Green stars were reported dropped at 1907.5hrs. The concentration was considered good at the commencement, stringing out in a line of attack 5/7 miles long subsequently. There appears to have been a gap of about 7 mins from approx: 1912 – 1919hrs in the skymarkers, with but an occasional Green T.I after 1912hrs. There is a suspicion that dummy T.I. Reds were dropped. One marker dropped T.I. Yellow over the target, together with T.I. Green & sky-markers at 1907hrs. No concrete results to report due to cloud & only small glow seen by crews on return journey, although last backer up reports good glow on cloud. Magdeburg ‘spoof’ considered too near. Many N/F flares over target in line of track in & particularly out. Concentration of N/F N & NE of Hannover.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
38 a/c missing.
[underlined] 15TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 16TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 17TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[page break]
195
[underlined] 18TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 19TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
[underlined] 20TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 659 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 112 P.F.F. & Mosquitoes.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 1935hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+18.
[underlined] SUMMARY [/underlined]
10/10ths cloud tops 8,000ft with small breaks. First skymarkers & T.I. Red were dropped on time. T.I.’s disappeared very quickly into cloud, & sky markers formed two concentrations, one big & one small, which were soon joined in a line about 2 – 3 miles long running approx.: parallel to track NW – SE. According to H2S checking the larger concentration was over the centre of the city, possibly a little to the E. There was a gap in the sky-marking of about 3 mins – 1944 – 1947hrs. Large explosion seen in S. part of [symbol]. 1942hrs.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] Difficult to assess results owing to cloud.
[page break]
196
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: base – 5425N 0400E – 5245N 0800E – 5337N 1055E – 5328N 1240E – BERLIN – 5220N 1330E – 5138N 1220E – 5207N 0750E – 5338N 0532E – 5340N 0400E – Cromer – Base.
[page break]
197
[underlined] 21ST JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] MAGDEBURG.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 560 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 117 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Newhaven or Wanganui if necessary.
[underlined] Zero. [/underlined] 2300hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-6 to Z+18. [underlined] Berlin [/underlined] 2253hrs.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
Thin layer cloud 8-8/10ths – clear to SE. Some crews report T.I. Red dropped with T.I. Green in fairly good concentration. The T.I. Red is reported short of target. Skymarkers were well concentrated and in general bombing good, although incendiaries reported well to S. of [symbol]. Fires burning well with smoke well up to 12,000ft. Glow of fires seen at coast on return. Large explosion at 2309hrs.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
[underlined] P.F.F. [/underlined] 9 a/c missing. It is feared that the main weight of the raid fell to the East and S.E of the town, and little damage is likely in the town centre.
[underlined] Command. [/underlined] 54 a/c missing.
[page break]
198
[underlined] TARGET: MAGDEBURG. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
199
[underlined] 22ND JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 23RD JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 24TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies make & mend.
[underlined] 25TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] FRANKFURT
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
156 Squadron. 3 B.M.I. I V/M. 4 B.B.U. 2 Vis: B/U. 9 Supporters.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 638 Heavies + 107 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method [/underlined] Newhaven – Emergency Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2050hrs.
Mosquitoes precede Main attack dropping Window. Other Mosquitoes to act as spoof markers on Stuttgart & Karlsruhe.
[underlined] 1635hrs. [/underlined] All operations cancelled.
[underlined] 2125hrs. [/underlined] N.T.U. a/c F/L [indecipherable word] crashed at Ramsey.
[page break}
200
[underlined] 26TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 27TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 422 Lancasters of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 84 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2030hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+12.
Mosquitoes drop Window from Dummer See to Berlin. Mosquitoes drop route-markers. Mosquitoes drop spoof fighter flares. 12 Mosquitoes attach AACHEN with T.I. Green & bombs.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] The attack opened on time & two of the early crews reported a good initial concentration of R/P flares. Later there was a spread in a line or crescent formation, variously reported at different times in the attack as being E – W and N – S and from 1/2 ml to as much as 8mls. in length. T.Is quickly disappeared in cloud. Glows of good fires was seen and some crews reported this as being visible for 100mls. after leaving the target. One crew reported a large fire 30m. S.W. of Berlin. Routemarker flares red steady were reported as accurately placed except at Pos: Q which was thought to be about 10mls. S. of track. Crews [missing information]
[page break]
201
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Cromer – 5345N 0430E – 5155N 1010E – 5237N 1158E – 5235N 1150E – BERLIN – 5215N 1350E – 5050N 1210E – 5030N 0735E – 5020N 0132E – Dungeness – Bradwell Bay – Base.
[page break]
202
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] 1 a/c P.F.F. missing.
[underlined] P.F.F. Analysis. [/underlined] There is no evidence of the concentration achieved and crews’ reports vary considerably. It appears however that there was a considerable spread up and down wind as would be expected, and that the initial marking was rather spread but tended to become more concentrated later. Owing to complete lack of photographic evidence of all kinds it is impossible to give any accurate estimate of the success achieved. There is every reason to expect however that this raid has added further considerable damage to the already extensive devastation.
[underlined] 28TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 566 Heavies + 113 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 0315hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+15.
Mosquitoes drop window & drop T.I. Red on Hannover.
[page break]
203
[underlined] Target: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
Route: Base – Cromer – 5510N 0700E – 5510N 1035E – Berlin – 5223N 1345E – 5235N 1405E – 5510N 1010E – 5510N 0700E – Cromer – Base.
4 Halifaxes P.F.F. Sylt. 63 Stirlings of 3 Group Mine-laying Sylt area.
[page break]
204
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
First R/P flares fell at 0309/0310hrs. The attack then opened on time. Crews report that a good concentration of R/P flares was achieved and well maintained throughout although there were a few to the South of the main concentration. Most crews reported that the glow of T.I’s could be seen below cloud but attack was apparently Wanganui. One very big explosion was seen at 0314hrs, second at 0325hrs, third at 0349hrs and one a/c saw one at 0400hrs when well away from the target. The 0325hrs. explosion reported to be vivid green. Spoof flares & Yellow T.Is seen.
[underlined] Results. [/underlined]
P.F.F. 6 a/c missing. Command. 43 missing
[underlined] P.F.F. Summary. [/underlined] Again very difficult to assess owing to lack of observation of results and night photographs, but crews who have been to Berlin a number of times during the series of attacks were unanimous in considering it the best attack on Berlin so far. A very impressive fire area was seen by later crews & the glow on the clouds could be seen for a distance of 165mls. on the homeward journey. Many impressive explosions were reported in the target area & one at Z-1 was unanimously reported as being the largest & most violent explosion a lot of the crews taking part in the attack had seen. [deleted] When [/deleted]
[page break]
205
[underlined] 29TH JANUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 30TH JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] Goodwood on BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 392 heavies + 94 P.F.F.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Mixed Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2015hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+12.
Mosquitoes to drop window & spoof fighter flares on target, also spoof red flares. Mosquitoes to act as fire watchers after attack. Mosquitoes also drop T.I. Red & Green on Brunswick.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined] 10/10ths st.cm. tops 12,000ft. Skymarker concentration from the beginning was very good with a few strays, & this concentration appears to have been maintained throughout the attack. Little was seen of results while a/c were over the target but on the way home later crews report a large glow from the target. One crew reported a dummy T.I. Red at least 10mls. N. of the target, darker in colour than our own – fell very slowly before going into cloud. Our own T.Is were only visible for approx.: 30 before disappearing in cloud.
[page break]
206
[underlined] Target: BERLIN. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
ROUTE: Base – 5435N 0500E – 5438N 1100E – BERLIN – 5200N 1325E -5200N 0920E – 5240N 0800E – 5250N 0400E – Southwold – Base.
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined] P.F.F. 8 a/c missing
Thick cloud over the target made results exceptionally difficult to judge, but main force crews were enthusiastic as to the concentration of R/P flares. The glow of large fires was seen in the later half of [missing words]
[page break]
207
[underlined] 31ST JANUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 1ST FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 2ND FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 3RD FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
Newish crews required for Cross Country and T.I. Demonstration at Whittlesey and Rushford Ranges. ’W’ W/O Trotter. Marker. ‘H’ F/O Cameron. ‘S’ Sgt. Cuthilll. ‘L’ F/S Doyle. ‘F’ P/O Samson.
2105hrs. Exercise abandoned owing to enemy activity.
[underlined] 4TH FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[page break]
208
[underlined] 5TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend. Mosquitoes on BERLIN.
[underlined] 6TH FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavy a/c of P.F.F. to take part in Navigational exercise.
1245hrs. Exercise postponed on account of weather.
“SOMEBODY TALKED” security film shown in Officers’ Mess.
[underlined] 7TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
Navigation exercise postponed.
“SOMEBODY TALKED” shown in Sergeants’ Mess.
[underlined] 8TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
Navigational exercise to take place.
[list of navigational exercise aircraft identifier letter and pilots]
[missing information]
[page break]
209
[underlined] 9TH FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend. T.I. trials scrubbed.
[underlined] 10TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
VISIT OF KING & QUEEN.
1245. King & Queen visited Ops Room.
G/Capt. Collins posted to R.A.F. Bourne. G/Capt. Searby to R.A.F. Warboys.
[underlined] 11TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 12TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
MAKE & MEND.
All heavies P.F.F. Navigational Exercise.
1613hrs. Exercise cancelled.
[underlined] 13TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN. Spoof: FRANKFURT-ON-ODER.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] BERLIN: 2 P.B.M. 4 B.B.U. 3 V.B.U. 5 Supporters. FRANKFURT: 2Y. BB/U.
[page break]
210
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 594 Heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 91 P.F.F.
[underlined] 1555hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 14TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
All heavies Make & Mend.
[underlined] 15TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN. [underlined] Spoof: [/underlined] FRANKFURT-ON-ODER.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
BERLIN. 2 P.B.M. 3 B.B.U. 6 V.B.U. 4 Supporters. FRANKFURT. 3 B.M. 3 B.U. Kiel Fjord: - 4 a/c of 35 Squadron.
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 703 heavies of 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 96 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour. [/underlined] 2115hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+20.
[underlined] Method. [/underlined] Paramatta & Wanganui mixed.
[underlined] Route: [/underlined] Base – 5450N 1100E – 5525N 0700E – 5510N 1000E – 5430N 1230E – [symbol] – 5210N 1250E – 5240N 1100E – 5240N 0855E – 5340N 0400E – Haisboro’ – Base.
Mosquitoes dropping spoof route-markers – fighter flares – window. 6 [deleted] / [/deleted] M/139 act as firewatchers after main attack is over.
[underlined] SUMMARY. [/underlined] The attack appeared to have opened early, some crews reported seeing first Wanganui flares & Red T.Is as early as 2110hrs. Reports on concentration of Wanganui flares vary considerably, some stating they fell in tight cluster while others say they were very scattered. The general impression, however, is that they spread but in a line or arc SW/NE. Owing to thick 10/10ths cloud T.Is were not visible for long & possibly for the same reason no glow of good fires could
[page break]
211
[underlined] TARGET: BERLIN & FRANKFURT-ON-ODER. [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
212
[underlined] RESULTS. [/underlined]
P.F.F. Missing 7 a/c
[underlined] P.F.F. Analysis. [/underlined]
Results difficult to assess although a glow of fires was reported crews did not think they were as plentiful as on previous attacks. Mosquitoes over the target after the attack finished however report large areas of effective fires burning in the city, and the column of smoke which rose to 20,000ft was particularly impressive. T.I. is practically impossible to say for certain which area of Berlin received the main weight of the attack, but crews who checked the position on navigational aids were of the opinion that the attack opened slightly to the West of the city area & spread in later stages towards the centre.
[underlined] 16TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required 1st Wave. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] 2nd Wave. [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Zero hours: [/underlined] 1st Wave. 2125hrs. 2nd Wave 2330hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+8.
[underlined] Strength of Attack: [/underlined] 57 P.F.F. + 280 Main Force. 55 P.F.F. + 270 main Force.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Paramatta & Wanganui.
[underlined] 1503hrs. [/underlined] Operations cancelled.
[page break]
213
[underlined] 17TH FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN. [underlined] Alternative: [/underlined] LEIPZIG.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
156. 1st Wave: 3 P.B.M. 3 B.B.U. 2 V.B.U. 4 supporters. 2nd Wave: 3 P.B.M. 3 B.B.U. 1. V.B.U. 2 Supporters.
[underlined] Strength of Attack: [/underlined] 615 Heavies + 110 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hours: [/underlined] 1st Wave: 2135hrs. LEIPZIG. 2150hrs. 2nd Wave: 0055hrs. LEIPZIG. 0005hrs.
[underlined] 1600hrs. [/underlined] OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 18TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] BERLIN.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined] 156: 8 P.B.M. 4 B.B.U. 4 V.B.U. 5 Supporters.
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] 0330hrs.
[underlined] Routes: [/underlined] Alternative route home for a/c on [symbol] after Z+8.
[underlined] 1215hrs [/underlined] Snow Warning.
[underlined] 1639hrs. [/underlined] ALL OPERATIONS CANCELLED.
[underlined] 19TH FEBRUARY 1944 [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] LEIPZIG.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[page break]
214
[underlined] Strength of Attack. [/underlined] 736 Heavies 0f 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6 Groups + 108 P.F.F. 4H/35 + 50 Stirlings gardening Kiel Fjord.
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] 0400hrs. [underlined] T.O.T. [/underlined] Z-2 to Z+19.
[underlined] Method: [/underlined] Mixed Wanganui & paramatta.
[underlined] Summary. [/underlined]
First Wanganui flares and red T.Is dropped about 4” early. A good concentration of Wanganui flares quickly formed in oval formation NE/SW. One load of skymarkers fell 5 to 10mls South of main concentration but was not backed up. Skymarking was well maintained until 0405hrs when there was a gap of about 4 minutes after which marking was resumed but more sparsely than before. Another gap of a few minutes occurred at about 0400hrs. Only a vague glow of T.I’s was visible through cloud.
Glow of good fires could be seen through cloud in later stages with dense clouds of black smoke rising above 10,000ft. large explosions reported at 0358, 0435 & 0438hrs.
[page break]
215
[underlined] Target: LEIPZIG [/underlined]
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
216
[underlined] 20TH FEBRUARY 1944. [/underlined]
[underlined] Target: [/underlined] STUTTGART.
[underlined] A/C Required: [/underlined]
[list by squadron, aircraft numbers involved and roles]
[underlined] Method [/underlined] Mixed Wanganui & Paramatta.
[underlined] Strength of Attack: [/underlined] 597 Heavies + 103 P.F.F.
[underlined] Zero hour: [/underlined] 0400hrs.
[page break]
217 (last page)
Feb 20th, 1944.
[list a/c. PILOT. T.OFF. T.O.T. LANDED. PHOTOGRAPH. REMARKS.]
[page break]
[photograph] F/S WINTERSON. [photograph] P/O GROVE. [photograph] SGT. SMITH. [photograph] SGT. DUCHENÉ [photograph] SGT. BEMBRIDGE. F/O. RYAN. [photograph] F/O. GENTLE. [photograph] SGT. WALEMBY. [photograph] SGT. HEDGE. [photograph] F/L AUBERT. [photograph] F/L SAMUEL. [photograph] F/S FISHER. [photograph] F/L MACKAY. [photograph] F/O PETRIDES. [photograph] P/O HALPERIN. [photograph] F/S HOOPER.
[page break]
Names of the 5 photographs from BOTTOM LINE OF PREVIOUS PAGE.
F/L LITTLE, F/O FLYNN, SGT .JONES, SGT. MACLACHLAN, SGT. TRUMAM
[photograph] F/O SMITH. [photograph] P/O SMITH. [photograph] F/O PHILPS. [photograph] SGT. CORDRAY. [photograph] F/O GOODWIN. [photograph] SGT. MARSHALL. [photograph] F/L VINCENT. [photograph] SGT. CLARKE. [photograph] SGT. HATWELL. [photograph] SGT. SWINNEY. [photograph] SGT. HODGES. [photograph] S/L SAMMY HALL. [photograph] F/L YOUNG. [photograph] SGT. [indecipherable name]. [photograph] P/O [indecipherable name]. [photograph] SGT. [indecipherable name] [missing photograph] SGT. HODGES. [photograph] SGT. [indecipherable name]. [photograph] W/C DUIGAN. [photograph] SGT. KING. [photograph] S/L MANDENO. [photograph] Sgt. Forbes. [photograph] [indecipherable name]. [photograph] SGT. CURTIS. [5 indecipherable names]
[page break]
[photograph] SGT. MARSON. [photograph] SGT. WILLETT. [photograph] SGT. OTTEY. [photograph] SGT. EDWARDS. [photograph] SGT. SHACKLADY. [photograph] SGT. BOWMAN. [photograph] SGT. BROWN. [photograph] F/S STEWART. [photograph] SGT. HAVARD. [photograph] SGT. HANDLEY. [photograph] SGT. THORINGTON. [photograph] P/O KERRY. [photograph] P/O CARTER. [photograph] SGT. DURAT. [photograph] SGT. DALTON. [photograph] SGT. CHAPMAN. P/O ROBERTS [photograph] P/O THOMPSON. [photograph] SGT. WILKINSON. [photograph] F/L CRAMPTON. [photograph] SGT. SCOTT. [photograph] F/O WOODSEND. [photograph] P/O BAGG. [photograph] SGT. LEADER.
[page break]
[photograph] W/C DONALDSON. [photograph] S/L LAWSON. [photograph] F/O DRAKE. [photograph] SGT. LAWRENCE. [photograph] F/L VERDON ROE. [photograph] F/S BANKS. [photograph] F/O TOWNSEND. [photograph] P/O JOLLY. [photograph] S/L GRIMSTON. [photograph] F/S VOLANTE. [photograph] F/L MACPHERSON. [photograph] F/L KEARS. [photograph] P/O MOLLER. [photograph] F/S PRICE. [photograph] SGT. BARNHAM. [photograph] P/O BARCLAY. [photograph] W/C WOMERSLEY. [photograph] F/S GILES. [photograph] SGT. YOUNG. [photograph] F/S ELCORTE. [photograph] W/O GREAVES.
[page break]
[photograph] SGT. WALLIS. [photograph] SGT. WALDER. [photograph] F/S CASE. [photograph] F/S McLENNAN. [photograph] F/S TREMBLAY. [photograph] S/L MOIR. [photograph] F/O INNES. [photograph] SGT. BRAMLEY. [photograph] SGT. MACPINLAY. [photograph] SGT. HAZELGRAVE. [photograph] SGT. WEBB. [photograph] SGT. FOLLAND. [photograph] S/L GRANT. [photograph] P/O WALKER. [photograph] SGT. SALTER. [photograph] SGT. DOBSON. [photograph] SGT. IRWIN. [photograph] F/S WHITE. [photograph] SGT. [indecipherable name] [photograph] [missing name]
[page break]
[photograph] F/O GOODLEY. P/W. [photograph] S/L BALL. [photograph] P/O GINGER JONES. P/W. [photograph] F/SGT. PERCY. [photograph] SGT. THOMPSON. [photograph] W/C HOOLWAY. [photograph] F/S HART. [photograph missing] P/O TURK. [photograph] F/O LUFF. [photograph] F/S HEAP. [photograph] P/O HORAN. [photograph] F/S ATKIN. [photograph] W/O SAUNDERS. [photograph] F/O McKENNA. [photograph] SGT. CHAPMAN. [photograph] P/O DAVIES. [photograph] F/S HOLDERNESS. [photograph] F/S McHUGH. [photograph] SGT. MURRAY. [photograph] F/L LANG. [photograph] F/L GREY. [photograph] F/S RIDINGS. [photograph] Sgt. LEE. [photograph] F/S VENN. [photograph] Sgt WOOD.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Description
An account of the resource
Operational Record ledger created by Pat Falkinder (nee Day). Running log book which includes briefing, targeting, crews and methods of prosecution for various bombing operations. It includes a photographs of Pat Day in uniform and several aircrew.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Robin Christian
David Bloomfield
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Format
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224 photocopied sheets
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Identifier
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MCleggPV[DoB]-150710-01
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
Title
A name given to the resource
Operational Record ledger
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
Czech Republic
Denmark
France
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Belgium--Antwerp
Belgium--Florennes
Belgium--Sint-Truiden
Belgium--Zeebrugge
Czech Republic--Plzeň
Denmark--Manø Island
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Southwold
France--Bourget Lake
France--Cannes
France--Cayeux-sur-Mer
France--Laon
France--Modane
France--Montchanin
France--Montluçon
France--Saint-Dizier (Haute-Marne)
Germany--Augsburg
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Bocholt
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Bonn
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Bremen
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Elberfeld
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Freiburg im Breisgau
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Heilbronn
Germany--Jena
Germany--Kaiserslautern
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Kassel
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Koblenz
Germany--Krefeld
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Lübeck
Germany--Ludwigshafen am Rhein
Germany--Magdeburg
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Mülheim an der Ruhr
Germany--Munich
Germany--Münster in Westfalen
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Oberhausen (Düsseldorf)
Germany--Oldenburg
Germany--Peenemünde
Germany--Rostock
Germany--Schifferstadt
Germany--Soest
Germany--Stuttgart
Italy--Genoa
Italy--Milan
Italy--Turin
Netherlands--Breda
Netherlands--Leeuwarden
Netherlands--Texel
Netherlands--Venlo
Poland--Gdańsk
Poland--Szczecin
Russia (Federation)--Kaliningrad (Kaliningradskai︠a︡ oblastʹ)
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Hamburg
Russia (Federation)
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Germany--Frankfurt (Oder)
Netherlands--Twente
England--Suffolk
156 Squadron
anti-Semitism
B-17
bombing
bombing of Hamburg (24-31 July 1943)
Bombing of Peenemünde (17/18 August 1943)
briefing
ground personnel
Halifax
incendiary device
Lancaster
mine laying
Mosquito
Pathfinders
RAF Wyton
Scharnhorst
target indicator
Women’s Auxiliary Air Force
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1239/16174/CCattyMA-180822-010008.2.jpg
83e2d78b6ca0b92d0a9b674bbce30829
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Catty, Martin Arthur. Gee charts
Description
An account of the resource
Nine items. Miniature Lattice Chart book containing charts for Great Britain and the surrounding seas.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
CCattyMA-180822-01
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
North Sea
Description
An account of the resource
Gee chain covering the Southern North Sea, East Britain, South Norway and Denmark.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One printed chart
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
CCattyMA-180822-010008
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
Norway
Denmark
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Map. Navigation chart and navigation log
Map
aircrew
Gee
navigator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/747/40649/MColingEF1481171-220427-020001.2.jpg
97b6d93a690d3f5dcd5975e8253cc9f7
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/747/40649/MColingEF1481171-220427-020002.2.jpg
76883ed8c2dea139c90fc4c4b797c05e
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Coling, Eric
E Coling
Description
An account of the resource
10 items. The collection concerns Eric Frederick Coling (1921 - 2018 1481171 Royal Air Force) and contains his memoir, photographs, log book, service documents, letters and an oral history interview. Eric flew operations as a bomb aimer with 50 Squadron before ditching, drifting for several days and time and becoming a prisoner of war.
The collection was catalogued by Lynn Corrigan.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018-01-10
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Coling, E
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
No. 50 Squadron Royal Air Force In World War Two
The Diary of a WWII Bomber Squadron - Part 5, 1942 to 1943
Description
An account of the resource
Diary of 50 Squadron based at RAF Skellingthorpe including night bombing of Bochum, Germany; laying mines in the Baltic Sea off Gdynia, Poland with the loss of one aircraft; ditching in the North Sea off Denmark, having been attacked by the night fighter of Oberleutnant Werner Speidel. Confirmation via Red Cross of safety of six crew members with the loss at sea of navigator, Sergeant Bernard 'Bunny' Ridsdale. The survivors, Pilot Officer R M Code RCAF, Sergeant H J Boyton RAFVR, Sergeant E F Coling RAFVR, Sergeant A E Langford RAFVR, Sergeant C R Moad RCAF and Pilot Officer A Noble RCAF were made prisoners of war.
During the month of September 1943 the squadron lost 6 aircraft and 21 men killed with 7 being prisoners of war. All aircraft are noted as now being equipped with 'Monica' and some additionally equipped with 'Mandrell.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943-09-29
1943-09-30
1943-10-03
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
Germany
Germany--Bochum
Denmark
Denmark--Esbjerg
Denmark--Thyborøn
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Canadian Air Force
Language
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eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Format
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Two page typed document
Conforms To
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Pending text-based transcription
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MColingEF1481171-220427-020001, MColingEF1481171-220427-020002
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
50 Squadron
ditching
Lancaster
Lancaster Mk 1
Lancaster Mk 3
mine laying
prisoner of war
RAF Skellingthorpe
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2180/38354/S102SqnRAF19170809v30002.2.pdf
d5a6b02b425b86a2de8782af43508861
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
102 Squadron Collection
Description
An account of the resource
Thirty-one items.
The collection concerns material from the 102 Squadron Association and contains part of a Tee Emm magazine, documents, photographs, accounts of Ceylonese in the RAF, a biography, poems, a log book, cartoons, intelligence and operational reports, an operations order and an account by a United States Army Air Force officers secret trip to Great Britain to arrange facilities for American forces.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Harry Bartlett and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2019-05-23
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
102 Squadron Association
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
No 100 (S.D.) Group - intelligence raid analysis
Description
An account of the resource
Details of operation to Berlin on 15/16 February 1944. Gives numbers of Bomber Command aircraft involved for 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8 Groups. Details other targets - spoof to Frankfurt, Mosquitos to Aachen and mine laying. Weather, Enemy raid reaction - detailed report on actions of enemy aircraft. Controlled night fighter figures, lists German aerodromes involved. Detailed list of countermeasures used by Bomber Command.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-02-15
1944-02-16
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany
Germany--Frankfurt (Oder)
Germany--Aachen
Germany--Berlin
Netherlands
Netherlands--Texel
Great Britain
England--Essex
England--Harwich
England--Norfolk
Netherlands--Leeuwarden
Netherlands--Terschelling
Germany--Schleswig
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Rostock
Germany--Oldenburg
Germany--Osnabrück
Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)
Russia (Federation)--Kaliningrad (Kaliningradskai︠a︡ oblastʹ)
Germany--Fürstenwalde (Brandenburg)
Germany--Jüterbog
Poland
Germany--Brandis (Saxony)
Denmark
Denmark--Ålborg
Poland--Kołobrzeg
Germany--Stuttgart
Netherlands--Den Helder
England--Great Yarmouth
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht. Luftwaffe
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Format
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Four page typewritten document
Conforms To
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Pending text-based transcription
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
S102SqnRAF19170809v30002
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
1 Group
100 Group
3 Group
4 Group
5 Group
6 Group
8 Group
anti-aircraft fire
bombing
Halifax
Lancaster
mine laying
Mosquito
Stirling
Wellington
Window
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1794/35730/MWilsonRC1389401-170113-100002.1.pdf
2eae94bb927f83b9bbfa6215308853ca
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Wilson, Reginald Charles
R C Wilson
Description
An account of the resource
166 items. The collection concerns Reginald Charles Wilson (b. 1923, 1389401 Royal Air Force) and contains his wartime log, photographs, documents and correspondence. He few operations as a navigator with 102 Squadron. He was shot down on 20 January 1944 and became a prisoner of war.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Janet Hughes and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-01-13
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Wilson, RC
Transcribed document
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading.
Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[underlined] MY POW DAYS - POSTSCRIPT [/underlined]
Caterpillar Club
I became a member of this Club soon after the end of WW2. I registered that I had saved my life, having baled out of an aircraft on fire and out of control. In freefall, I manually pulled the ripcord of my Irving parachute, which released the parachute canopy and supporting shroud lines.
The Club has no structure, committees or branches, but is still famous for its huge worldwide membership of airmen who have saved their lives by parachute.
The Wright Brothers of America designed and launched their rudimentary Wright Flyer aircraft at Kittyhawk in 1903. But it was many years before an acceptable parachute was designed to save the lives of aircrew escaping from disabled aircraft.
The Centenary of the 1903 event was celebrated at the Biggin Hill Airshow in 2003, when Barbara and I were invited to a VIP Marquee with a number of the Caterpillar Club members who resided in the London area.
Leslie Irving was the American pioneer who developed the successful parachute. In 1911 at the age of sixteen he jumped from a static balloon, and continued his interest in designing parachutes. In 1919 he designed a parachute pack, using pure silk for the large canopy and the shroud lines, and a ripcord for manual release of the parachute after baling out. His design proved that you could parachute safely from an aircraft in flight. However there was doubt that it was safe to bale out from a stricken 'plane. Until in 1922, Lieutenant H.R. Harris made an emergency jump using this Irving parachute. As a result of his experience the American Air Force adopted the Irving design that same year. And in 1925 the RAF chose the Irving seat pack parachute for their use. WW2 brought about a huge demand for parachutes (seat and chest packs).
In 1922 Irving decided to form a club of those who had saved their lives and Harris was to be the first member. Irving named it the Caterpillar Club and by 1945 there were 34,000 members! (The caterpillar is symbolic of the silk worm which descends gently to earth from heights, by spinning a silky thread from which to hang.)
The Irving Parachute Company gives every member a certificate and a gold tie/lapel pin, shaped like a caterpillar, and with red eyes (red eyes if the aircraft was on fire). The recipient's name and rank are engraved on the reverse.
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The Post War Years
One month after WW2 ended, our surviving crew of four met at Laurie Underwood's wedding. This was a time of great celebration for us and we didn't waste time reminiscing about the RAF or the previous 15 months in captivity!
I remained in the RAF until August 1946 but no longer on flying duties. During this time I was promoted to Flight Lieutenant. I had several months on leave after which I attended an RAF Administration course and eventually was posted to RAF Hornchurch, where I was in charge of the Overseas Holding Unit. This Unit was responsible for looking after RAF personnel, serving in Germany and on leave in the UK. Some, who were on compassionate leave, needed more time to deal with their problems; some, on normal leave, had applied for an extension of leave on compassionate grounds (often 'passionate' rather than compassionate!); some just went absent without leave and had to be arrested by the RAF police! It was not the most exciting job, but I was able to live at home and it filled the time until I was back in 'civvy street'.
After we were all demobbed, the ensuing years were spent on developing our careers etc. I returned to Unilever and eventually became a management consultant. George Griffiths continued flying as a pilot in a civilian air transport company and then, a senior captain with British Airways. Laurie studied accountancy and eventually, as sales manager of Philips, sold mechanised and later computerised accountancy equipment. Johnny Bushell developed tuberculosis shortly after the war, contracted as a result of poor conditions in Stalag1VB. He had one lung partially removed and was awarded a full war disability pension. He was still able to work and became a housing officer for Bedford Council. Johnny remained a bachelor, but George, Laurie and I married and raised families, which gave us little time to muse about our wartime experiences.
Remembering our wartime experiences
Apart from exchanging Christmas cards and an occasional meeting up with Laurie and John, in my business travels around the UK, we didn't meet as a group. I had lost contact with George Griffiths until, sometime in the 1970's, I managed to locate his wife's parents in Craven Arms and they gave me his address. He was still serving with British Airways when, some time later, I phoned him - at precisely 8 o'clock GMT on 20 January (the anniversary of the exact time when we were shot down). This became a pleasant ritual, and every year by this means, we congratulated ourselves on our lucky survival.
I retired in 1984, and George who lived in Ruislip retired some time later. Barbara and I managed to visit George when we stayed over at Northolt to see Barbara's mother - this would be in the early 1990's. George had done some retirement research at the RAF Museum at Hendon, and had obtained photographs and information about the four crew we had lost. They were all killed. Two were buried in the 1939-45 Berlin War Cemetery, and two were
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remembered on the Runnymede Memorial, as they had no known graves. Also, George had obtained (through a German archivist) details of how and where we were shot down. We were not shot down by flak, or a bomb through our wing from one of our aircraft above as first throught, but by an ace night fighter pilot. The archivist had also traced the crash point of our plane in Berlin. In support of this information he had sent George a photograph, a 'history' of the night fighter pilot, and a map of the exact point where the 'plane debris had fallen. (George had landed in waste ground, amongst the wreckage.)
Our 50 year reunion
All this information, and reading several books about Bomber Command and the Berlin Raids, stimulated my thoughts, which had remained dormant on this subject for many years. As a result, we and our wives arranged to meet at a Peterborough Hotel on our 50th Anniversary, to exchange our personal experiences and to celebrate our survival. We dined and raised our glasses "to absent friends" at the exact hour (8pm GMT, 20 January 1994). This was our first meeting as a group since June 1945!
A cousin of Laurie Underwood, hearing about this celebration, contacted the BBC and arranged that a TV Team and a Radio car would attend this meeting, in the afternoon prior to our dinner at 8pm. We were requested to bring any memorabilia we had; which meant we were able to fill in a number of gaps in our experiences. Johnny and I learned how George, when the plane was 'on fire' over Berlin, had been held in his seat, with his head thrust forward and the throttle levers behind his ears, when the plane went into a spiral dive. He had a vivid recollection of seeing the altimeter 'unwind' from 17000ft through 7000ft before he blacked out! He regained consciousness and was 'in the air' in freefall, after the plane's fuel tanks had exploded and he had been blown out of the aircraft. He was now only hundreds of feet from the ground, but managed to pull his parachute ripcord. His parachute opened but was still 'on the swing' when he hit the ground, with the debris of the aircraft around him. Although in shock he had landed virtually unscathed.
Laurie told Johnny and I how, immediately after arriving at Stalag Luft3 Poland in February 1944, he was recruited as an extra lookout, whilst they completed the escape tunnel 'Harry' for the Great Escape. Laurie being a latecomer was not included in the escape. He was lucky, as 50 of the 76 who did escape and who were recaptured, were murdered on the orders of Hitler. Laurie and George, like me, had to march away from their prison camp as the 'Front Line' approached at the end of January 1945. In their case it was the Russians on the Eastern Front. They marched in freezing conditions and then entrained on 2 February to Malag camp, where they stayed until 10 April. They then marched again for two weeks across Northern Germany, and were liberated a week later on 2 May 1945, just south of Ludbeck on the Baltic, by the British Army.
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Thus, by the end of our celebrations at Peterborough, we had learnt more4 about each other's experiences. BBC made a three minute video tape of the occasion, which was sent out over Yorkshire and Look East Television on the Eight O'clock News that night. George and I were interviewed in a BBC radio van and a three minute radio tape of the interview was broadcast from Cambridge also. The tape was so popular that it was broadcast three times.
Following this occasion I began to compile some of my experiences in Bomber Command, and assemble documents, and letters received after being shot down etc.
Runnymede War Memorial
In August 1994 Barbara and I attended the annual Memorial Service, arranged by the Aircrew Association, at the Runnymede War Memorial. This was particularly important to me as we were able to view the names of the two of the four members of my crew - Flight Engineer L Bremner and Mid-upper Gunner C Dupueis - who were killed and have no known graves. Their names are recorded within in the cloisters of the Memorial, and 1994 ws the 50th anniversary of their death. The Memorial lists some 22,000 names of RAF personnel without known graves, who were killed in WW2.
Laurie and Beryl's Golden Wedding in Wetherby and other Yorkshire visits
In June 1995, it being Laurie's Golden Wedding Anniversary, we all met again, this time in Laurie's home town Wetherby, Yorkshire. After the celebrations we took the opportunity of visiting the Yorkshire Air Museum at Elvington, which was a satellite airfield to RAF Pocklington during the war. They were in the process of rebuilding a Halifax Mk 3 Bomber to represent the most famous wartime Halifax, 'Friday 13th', which achieved 128 bombing missions. It was displayed on Horse Guards Parade in London after the war and then broken up!; whereas a Lancaster has a 'place of honour' in the RAF Memorial Flight, and another is displayed in the RAF Museum at Hendon for all time.
There were over 6000 Halifax aircraft built during the war. They were used for over 80,000 bombing and mine laying missions in Europe in Bomber Command, and supported the other armed forces on D Day and in the continuing liberation of Europe. They operated in the Middle-East, and in Coastal Command attacking U-boats in the North Sea and North Atlantic. They also towed airborne troops in gliders to Normandy on D Day, later to Arnhem and, in the final stages of the war, to the crossing of the Rhine.
It beggars belief that any Government would scrap every Halifax built, taking into account its contribution to the success of WW2 and its place in history, but they did!
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It was not until 1983 that there was enough historical interest to consider restoring a Halifax. Yorkshire being the 'birthplace' of the aircraft, it was natural that the Yorkshire Air Museum would take on the task. In 1984, they found the fuselage of a Halifax that had crashed in the Hebrides in 1945. It had been bought by a farmer and used as a hen house! This was acquired by the Museum and moved to Yorkshire. Parts were collected from almost all corners of the world. Pieces from at least three Halifax aircraft were used: the wings came from a post-war Hastings and the engines were donated by the French Air force, (who flew Halifax bombers from Elvington in 1943). The nose section had to be rebuilt from scratch with the help of British Aerospace, aided by volunteer engineers. When we visited the Museum the aircraft was still only partially assembled. It was some years later before it was completed and is now on display, as 'Friday 13th', in its own hanger[sic]. As far as I know, contributions to its construction, both in effort and cost, were all voluntary; no Government money was ever offered.
We also took the opportunity, mainly for the benefit of Laurie and George, of visiting another Museum in Yorkshire. (This site was originally a British POW Camp for German prisoners of war and now converted to a WW2 Museum). One of its exhibits was the replica of the escape tunnel 'Harry' used at Stalag Luft3 for the escape of 76 RAF prisoners (50 of whom were murdered when recaptured). The tunnel was of particular interest, as it displayed the pump system for providing ventilation and the novel trolley mechanism for moving the escapees along its whole length, to the end of the tunnel.
Tom Nelson and Stalag1VB
On 23 December 1995, the Daily Mail had a double page spread featuring life in Stalag1VB, and particularly what happened at Christmas in 1944, when American prisoners of war arrived. Taken prisoner at the Battle of the Bulge, they were in a very sorry state, physically and mentally. The article had been supplied by Tom Nelson (and included a large photograph of him). I did not know Tom Nelson in Stalag1VB as he had been in another barrack block whilst I was there. But I met him in OflagV11B when we were both moved to this camp in February 1945. We shared the same room with two Australian army chaps, until we marched out on 15 April 1945. Apart from a chance meeting, and a fleeting hello in London in 1946, I had not seen him since our liberation at the end of April 1945.
I got in touch with the Daily Mail, and they agreed to forward a letter to him but they would not give me his address. I wrote him a letter and included photocopies of my drawings of OflagV11B, from my wartime logbook. In particular there was a drawing of 'our room', which he and I had signed, along with our two Australian colleagues.
A week or so later I received a phone call (at least two hours long) from an amazed Tom Nelson. He said his memory of OflagV11B was a bit hazy but the signature on the drawing was without doubt his, and we agreed to meet at the RAF Club in Piccadilly and renew our memories.
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After Tom was demobbed, he worked for several American airlines in flight operations, and married Pat, an American. He spent time in America and Germany and returned to UK to run a travel agency. It was then that he joined the Stalag1VB ex-POW Group and attended their annual reunions in Edinburgh. As a result he had collected photographs, drawings, poems and various records about 1VB. He brought these along to the RAF Club, and I was able to copy them.
The most important information I learnt from him, was what had happened to the Muhlberg Stalag1VB Camp Site in 1945, after this area in Germany became part of the Russian Zone. At first Stalag 1VB ex-kriegies, returning to visit the Camp Site post war, were told by the Russians or members of the GDR (German Democratic Republic), that it had been occupied by German refugees who had nowhere to live. And as there were barracks, electricity and water available here, they had made it their home. These were complete lies:
The Camp had become Special Internment Camp No. 1 (with even more barbed wire than Stalag1VB), where Germans who were considered to be a danger to the Soviet State, or for any 'reason', could be interned without any evidence or trial. They were not allowed visitors, parcels, or help of any sort, and were not able to communicate with anybody outside the camp. In a short time it became a filthy, disease-ridden place. This camp remained open until November 1948, during which time about 22,000 'victims of communism' passed through it. Some 6700 of them died of starvation or disease during this period and were buried in mass graves, just northeast of what previously was the RAF compound when I was there. Many others were moved to Soviet camps and never heard of again. All this information was withheld from the general population, and those who did know were threatened with punishment if they disclosed it.
After the closure of the Camp, the Russians removed all the wooden barracks for workers' huts elsewhere. Other structures were sold to local farmers. In the end nothing was left except the concrete foundations of the washhouses,[sic] the barracks, and the 40-holer latrines and the static water 'reservoirs'. The Russians then decided to obscure the place by planting birch trees overall. Soon the site became overgrown with trees and brush.
Now that the Russians have left, East and West Germany unified, and the lies and cloak of secrecy exposed, many of the relatives of those who died in the camp have visited the site. They have put crosses in the area of the mass graves and the place has become a shrine, with its own Memorial.
I met Tom several times in the next few years at the RAF Club but later, he suffered from double vision and did not travel on his own. He put me in contact with Stalag1VB ex-POW Group, which by now was much depleted, and with fewer members had moved their venue south, to Peterborough.
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Public Records Office at Kew
In August 1999 Barbara and I visited the Public Records Office as I needed some more detail for my RAF memoirs on my operational flights in 102 Squadron. Also, as my first pilot had been killed, I wanted to know the circumstances in which my second pilot Sqdn. Ldr. G. A. Harvey, withdrew from flying on medical grounds, yet was later awarded a DFC. This left our crew 'headless' and meant we were destined to fill in as 'spares' until another pilot was posted to the squadron. Being a spare was not an enviable roll to have in operational flying, especially if you were the navigator!
I found the Records Office a fantastic place for providing information. All operational squadrons had their records held on microfilm and every operation throughout the war was accessible. Other documents such as RAF Station records and medal award citations were the original documents, but surprisingly still available on request. Harvey's DFC citation was in great detail and stated his award was long overdue. He had clocked up 390 operational hours in the Middle East in 1940-41.
Mel Rolfe and 'Flying into Hell'
During the period 1999 - 2000, Laurie was in touch with Mel Rolfe, the author of two successful books about crews' experiences in Bomber Command, and was planning to write a third book. As a result of this meeting, Laurie, Johnny and I (but Laurie being the prime subject) featured in one of 20 chapters in the book entitled 'Flying into Hell', which was published in 2001. Our chapter focussed on our first operation, mine-laying, during which we were badly hit by flak and had to bring damaged mines back, in an aircraft without radar or hydraulic power. And our last operation, when we were shot down over Berlin by an ace night fighter plane, with incredible escapes for the four survivors.
In order to advertise his book, Mel Rolfe contacted local newspapers and BBC Radio and gave them the addresses of those mentioned in the chapters. Laurie, Johnny and I, all gave newspaper interviews. Laurie and I also gave 25 minutes live radio interviews, Laurie from Leeds and I from Essex. We were able to get copies of the newspaper articles and tapes of the radio broadcasts. Sadly George Griffiths, our pilot, who had the most remarkable escape, had died suddenly in 1998 and thus could not be featured in any interviews.
Planned visit to the Stalag1VB site
In year 2000 the son of a member of Stalag1VB ex-POW Group, Tony Drewitt, offered to organise a visit to Muhlberg and the Stalag 1VB site, which was enthusiastically taken up by the members of the Group (this included Tom Nelson, Johnny Bushell and myself).
In 1944 Tony Drewitt's father (Harry Drewitt) had lost his best friend in 1VB. His friend had been shot dead by a guard, as he leaned over the trip wire to pick some wild strawberries. In recent years Tony and family have gone to
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Germany, visited Muhlberg Stalag1VB site and the Berlin 1939-45 War Cemetery. His friend and all those British & Commonwealth POWs who died in Stalag1VB, (previously interred in Neuburxdorf cemetery), are buried there.
On these visits to the Stalag1VB site, the Drewitt family met Mayor Brendel and others who, since 1990 (after the Russians and the GDR had left), have openly publicised the atrocities perpetrated in Muhlberg Special Internment Camp No. 1, (previously Stalag1VB). To this end they have formed the Munlberg Initiative Group, to make the Muhlberg Camp a permanent memorial. They have cleaned up the main road through it, marking out the various areas of the camp, and where the mass graves and memorial of the Special Camp No. 1 is situated. Where possible, they have revealed the foundations of the cookhouses, barrack washhouses and latrines etc, which is all that is left of the original camp - see my notes about Stalag 1VB under 'Tom Nelson'.
Mayor Brendel and the Muhlberg Initiative Group welcomed the idea that a party of British ex-POWs and families might wish to visit the site, and said that Muhlberg would like to host to the visit.
Every year ex-kriegies from Poland, France and other countries visit the Neuburxdorf cemetery (about 4000 POWs who dies in 1VB were buried here originally). It now has a War Memorial to represent all the nations who had prisoners there. This visit is now combined with the service, held in the Muhlberg Camp, for the German civilian post war victims who died in the Special Internment Camp No. 1.
As a result, Tony Drewitt agreed with Mayor Brendel that she would arrange the hotel accommodation in Muhlberg, and host an evening dinner with the Initiative Group. The date would coincide with the remembrance services at Neuburxdorf cemetery and Muhlberg Camp site. Coaches would be available for all planned visits.
Visit to Berlin, Muhlberg, Stalag1VB, related sites and Colditz
Day 1
There were over 90 ex-POWs, family and friends including Tom Nelson, Johnny Bushell, Barbara and myself, who flew to Schonefeld, Berlin on 6 September 2001. (The airfield was only a few miles from where I landed by parachute on 20 January 1944)
We were taken in two coaches (which, with their drivers and guides, were to 'look after us' for the rest of our visit), to Treff Park Hotel, about 6 miles southeast of Brandenburg Gate. We had dinner, and then a coach tour of central Berlin. Although the tour was impromptu, with a helpful but inexpert guide, it was sufficient to give us a glimpse of the contrasts between 'East' and 'West'. We had a passing view of the main shopping centres which showed that the 'East' looked deprived with poor buildings, displays and lighting etc. We also viewed the famous graffiti on the remains of the Berlin
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Wall and, at my request, the new Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church alongside the ruins of the original. The original church was destroyed on 22 November 1943, the second Berlin raid that I was on. It was a somewhat similar Memorial to that of Coventry Cathedral, destroyed in 1940, with the exception that Coventry Cathedral was deliberately destroyed.
Day 2
The following morning we were taken to the 1939 - 45 British War Cemetery, where nearly 2900 RAF aircrew, killed furing the Battle of Berlin and other raids in East Germany, are buried. (Only 800 of the 4000 shot down in the Battle of Berlin, survived this operation - John and I are two of these). Many whole crews are buried together, in lines of seven graves, running up to the Stone of Remembrance and on as far as the Cross.
The Cemetery is situated in an area of woodland, which is part of the Grunewald Forest in the district of Charlottenburg, west of Berlin. It was beautifully maintained, as are all British War Graves. Barbara and I together with Johnny Bushell, took some time locating and placing poppies on the graves of our two crew members who are buried here: F/Sgt. K F Stanbridge (Co-Pilot), and P/O. E Church (Wireless Operator), as they were not side-by-side, but on opposite ends of the Cemetery. We found Ken Stanbridge's grave first and I remembered that Ken had passed George Griffith's parachute to him, not long before the aircraft went into a spiral dive. George lived and Ken didn't. Visiting Eric Church's grave had a particular significance for me, as he had helped Laurie Underwood and me, kick out the jammed escape hatch, and he should have followed us out. But the 'plane must have gone into the spiral dive immediately after we had baled out, and he had no chance to bale out - just a few seconds, between life and death. George, Laurie, John and I, were incredibly lucky to survive this event.
Following personal visits to the graves of colleagues, Reverend Michael Whelton (a friend of Tony Drewitt who was acting as the 'Padre' for the party) held a short but emotional service. Then a wreath was placed on the Stone of Remembrance before we continued our itinerary to the centre of Berlin.
I was glad that Johnny and I had been able to make this visit to the Cemetery after so many years and it closes a chapter in my mind.
In Berlin, we first visited the Brandenburg Gate. This also had some significance for me, for it was 18000 ft. above here that we were attacked by a night fighter and shot down in 1944. Our target had been Hitler's Chancery which was just south of the Gate. Our second visit was to the Reichstag, a short distance away. The Reichstag was not destroyed during WW2. After the re-unification of East and West Germany in October 1990, when Berlin became the Capital again, it was to house the German Parliament. It was renovated by the British Architect Sir Norman Foster, who had been chosen to do the work. His idea was to enlarge the Plenary Hall and add a new modern glass cupola, from which the public could view Parliament in action - its main feature. The task was completed in 1999. Although the cupola could be seen
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from outside the building, we didn't have time to go inside to view it, before we continued our journey south to Muhlberg.
We travelled about 75 miles to Muhlberg through mostly open countryside, passing several buildings or barracks that were once occupied by the Russians, and were now in a dilapidated state.
Muhlberg is a small town on the river Elbe, noted for its number of Renaissance buildings (which luckily escaped damage when the Russians advanced through it on their way to Berlin in April 1945). But today the town is also remembered for its close proximity to the Prisoner of War Camp, Stalag1VB which, post-war, became 'Special Internment Camp No. 1' where German civilians suffered under Russian Occupation.
On arrival we were met by Mayor Brendel and a number of helpers, who took us to our small hotels or private accommodation dotted around the town. In the evening we were invited to a reception in the Town Hall organised by Mayor Brendel and the Muhlberg Initiative Group.
The reception was addressed by a Representative from Berlin, to all of us from the Stalag1VB ex-POW Group and those connected with the Muhlberg Initiative Group; this being the 11th. Anniversary of their Memorial and Remembrance Meetings.
In the address he explained that Initiative Groups were formed all over Germany (after the Reunification in 1990), by survivors of the Special Internment Camps, to remember and make known the atrocities perpetrated by the Russians during their occupation. To this end the Initiative Groups have preserved sites like Muhlberg, Buchenwald, Sachsenhausen etc, and set up small museums, containing documents and photographs, so that the younger generations (their children and grandchildren) will know about these dark days of their history. To these memories they have added the wartime atrocities of Nazi Germany, in their own country and the occupied countries of Europe. In Muhlberg, they have also included Stalag1VB, as it is said hundreds of thousands of POWs from all over the world, passing through the camp from 1939-1945, suffered from cold, damp, overcrowding, poor inadequate food and lack of hygiene. There were many deaths, many more than those recorded in Neuburxdorf Cemetery, including thousands of Russian POWs who died of typhus in the early years of the war and were buried elsewhere.
After the address, to complete the evening we were hosted to a fantastic buffet dinner, provided by the people of Muhlberg, who really did appreciate our visit to their town.
Day 3
The following day (punctuated by heavy bouts of rain) we visited the small Muhlberg museum which had, apart from their local history, records, drawings and artefacts donated by ex POWs from 1VB. This was followed by a lunch of
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soup, goulash, hunks of bread and coffee (warming and very welcome), provided by the Town Fire Service. Luckily it was in a Marquee, erected for the occasion, which sheltered us from the drenching downpours.
In the afternoon we were taken in our coaches to Neuburxdorf and we viewed the railway sidings, where all POW's had 'disembarked' from their cattletrucks, for their march to the sinister Stalag1VB in the middle of the flat fields of Saxony. I recall the ground was covered with slushy snow and the camp site looked as if [it] were in the extremities of Siberia!
After the visit we proceeded to the Neuburxdorf Cemetery to attend the annual memorial service for all POWs (Polish, French, British, etc.), who died in 1VB and were buried here. During this service, our exPOW Stalag1VB Group dedicated a plaque, which was laid in the Cemetery as a Memorial to the 60 British POWs, who were buried here and now removed to the Berlin site. The plaque was donated by the Canadian RCAF.
To complete the day's visits we travelled the short distance to the Stalag![1] VB site. We drove through what was originally the East Gate. The lagerstrasse or main road was still there, but now flanked with birch trees and undergrowth which covered the whole site. As described earlier, the Muhlberg Initative Group and associates had cleared some parts of the camp to reveal the concrete foundations of washhouses and latrines. They had marked out the areas of the various compounds and the two cookhouses. As my barracks was close to the French cookhouse, Barbara, John, Tom Nelson and I, were able to locate the area of the barracks, but due to the undergrowth we were unable to reach it. But we were able to get to the site of our 40-holer latrine, which still had (though somewhat crumbled) the concrete foundation and septic tank below. It still had four open channels in the concrete base. Over each channel there had been a long wooden rectangular box as a seat with ten holes in it, (so 40 of us could be there at one sitting!)
We were only a short distance away from the mass burial site of the victims of Special Camp No. 1, just a few yards to the north-east of us. Here, there is now a large Cross erected as a Memorial to the 6700 German detainees who died of starvation and disease (1945-48). Amongst the undergrowth, near the Cross, there were many smaller crosses put there by relatives and friends over previous years.
We joined the Muhlberg Initiative Group, again in a drenching downpour, with relatives and friends (of several nationalities), for their annual service of remembrance, at the Memorial. Then we made a further inspection of the remnants of the Camp, nearer the West Gate entrance, before returning in our coaches to Muhlberg.
So we said 'goodbye' to the site of Stalag1VB and Special Camp No. 1. It was now a 'sleeping forest' of birch trees, encompassing (in this terrible place) the memories and miseries of probably hundreds of thousands of 'prisoners' from many nations, who passed through it during the war years and the aftermath.
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On return to Muhlberg, we attended yet another Memorial Service in the Church, just for ourselves this time, before we had our evening meal in the Town Hall. This was followed by Lew Parsons (our Chairman) giving a slide presentation of photographs of Stalag1VB to local people, including some older children, who afterwards asked us questions about the camp and WW2.
Day 4
On our 4th day we visited two preserved POW Camp sites, Jacobsthal and Zeithain. Both were originally slave camps for Russion POWs. Later Jacobsthal was a punishment camp for Stalag1VB I believe, (though Zeithan seemed to have more evidence of Russion prisoners). We were told that many tens of thousands of Russians who died of a typhus epidemic in 1941-42, are buried in mass graves beneath the lawns at the entrance to this camp. It now has a Memorial Archway, erected by the Russians during their occupation after the war.
At Zeithain, the Initiative Group had built a wooden hut to illustrate the type of barracks used to house POWs. We had to criticise it, as it did not illustrate the conditions under which prisoners had to live. It had no rickety three-tier bunks, it was not overcrowded or dilapidated, it had no floor of bricks set in earth, and it did not indicate the unhygienic state of living. They also had a small museum which included photographs showing guards and others, mistreating and punishing prisoners.
Our next visit was 30 miles or so southwest, for a tour of Colditz Castle. We had lunch in a restaurant first and then (in the pouring rain again), we made our way up hill to this gaunt formidable place.
Colditz Castle, first mentioned in 1014, built on a hill overlooking the rive Mulde, was never used as a stronghold. It was destroyed by fire in 1504, and rebuilt in 1583. Used as a residence and then a hunting lodge, the building was not popular and fell into decay. In the 1800s the State took it over as an alms house and then a workhouse. In 1929 it was used as an asylum, then a prison for anti-fascists and finally an old folks' home until 1939, when it became a POW Camp until 1945.
Colditz was used for high ranking officers and persistent escapees, as it was considered to be, because of its design and location, virtually escape proof. In fact it became an 'academy for escapers'. Over the period of the war, 300 escape attempts were made - only 120 prisoners got out but were recaptured, 31 escapees got home. The camp was a hive of ingenuity, manufacturing German uniforms, forging documents, and finding ways to get out via the main gates. The most audacious plan was to build a glider for two escapees, to be launched from the roof. It was to be catapulted to give it gliding speed to get over the river Mulde. This was to be achieved by dropping a bath tub filled with concrete, 60 feet 'through' the floors of the castle, to pull a cable attached to the glider. The glider was built in an attic, behind a false wall above the Chapel, but the plan was never carried out as the war ended sooner than expected. (Later another glider was built to the plan specifications and tested
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successfully!) One of the first British escapers to get home was Airey Neave. Post-war he became an MP and was murdered by the IRA, when his car was blown up by a bomb in the Palace of Westminster car park.
Our visit to Colditz covered only a small part of the building, mainly the rooms adjacent to the spiral staircase. At the top of the building we saw a copy of the famous glider and some of the rooms of the high ranking POWs. A museum covered several floors with photographs, displays of escape clothing, forged keys and documents, 'rubber stamps' for approving passes etc., a sewing machine made of wood and several other artefacts. A 'tunnel' constructed by the French POWs was exposed. It was unusual, in that it was made up of channels located between walls and floors and not as you would think, dug underground. My general impression was that Colditz was a claustrophobic place compared with the three camps I experienced. But they were probably better supplied with food than we were and had better amenities.
The camp was liberated on 16 April 1945 by American forces. They had made rapid advances to the east and did not know that this castle was a POW camp. The Germans were still defending the town and castle approaches. The Volkssturn ('Home Guard'), now integrated with the Wehrmacht by Hitler, were also active in its defence. The American Commander was just about to order the shelling of the Castle, when Allied flags were waved from windows high up in the building! This saved the day and the order was cancelled - another bout of 'friendly fire' was averted, and no doubt casualties as well!
After this visit we returned to Muhlberg, stopping on the way to view Strehla on the river Elbe, where the Americans and the Russians met in April 1945. It was fifteen miles or so south of Torgau, which was later named as the official meeting place, on 4 May 1945. In the evening we returned to the Town Hall for our final meal of the tour.
Day 5
After breakfast we assembled at the Town Hall and said goodbye to the people of Muhlberg. We travelled, accompanied by Mayor Brendel, to Holzdoff Airbase (where her son was stationed) for a presentation by the Stn. Commander.
Holzdoff was a Helicopter Base (a part of the new German Airforce) and was involved in civil duties. The Commander gave a detailed talk about the work of the station. We were given a tour of the hanger[sic] responsible for the maintenance of the helicopters and a demonstration by the fire fighting services. This was followed by a snack, before we continued our journey to Schonefeld and back to Stansted.
We arrived back in Stansted on the evening of 10th September, after a very busy and successful tour. We were to find that we were back 'in the present day' - just a few hours before the atrocities perpetrated by terrorists in New York (nine/eleven!) were to make a 'world change' of momentous proportions.
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Tom Nelson and his American wife, both knew New York well, and were very upset about what had happened. Sadly Tom, who had not been completely fit for some time, died suddenly later that year, in November 2001.
Stalag1VB ex-POW Group Reunions in Peterborough
The 1VB reunions were held every year over the weekend nearest to the 23 April, which was the day the camp was liberated by the Russians. Barbara and I have attended these in April, years 2002-4 and we will attend next year, which will be the 60th anniversary of liberation day, Saturday 23 April 2005, and the final reunion for the Group. This will be a memorable occasion. No doubt the day will end with an even more rousing rendition of 'Land of Hope and Glory' which is sung every year. It was sung in 1VB, in place of the National Anthem, which was disallowed.
Medals
After my 80th birthday I decided that, for the sake of my children and grandchildren, I should claim my medals. According to my assessment I was entitled to four. If Bomber Command had been awarded a campaign medal, it would have been five. Air Chief Marshall Sir Arthur Harris said that 'every butcher, baker, and candlestick maker' within 200 miles of the front got a campaign medal ... but not Bomber Command'. The post-war government was embarrassed about the heavy loss of life in the bombing of Dresden, and the aircrews got the blame for it! As a result a campaign medal was not granted, despite their courage and dedication, in high risk bombing operations night after night. Bomber Command aircrews, mostly in their early twenties, carried out orders in a total war situation, and suffered the highest casualties of all the British and Commonwealth forces during the whole of WW2.
In fact my claim for medals finally amounted to three; the fourth medal, the Defence Medal, required three years' non-active service. After deducting elevan and half months training time abroad, I could only muster two years nine months, even adding my Home Guard time before I joined the RAF. The rest of my war service (one year three months) was as a POW, and I was told by a civil servant in the Medal Agency, that the time as a POW didn't count! (In America, there was an additional medal - for being a POW!)
My medals are:-
* 1939 - 1945 Star - active service.
* Aircrew Europe Star - aircrew active service Europe 1939 - D Day 1944
* War Medal - general service.
These are still in a small cardboard box with a piece of ribbon for each rolled up in it, sent to me by registered post. There was no covering letter, only a printed list of all the medals available, with their ribbon colours, so that you can match the medal to the ribbon yourself.
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Footprints on the Sands of Time (Bomber Command Prisoners of War in Germany 1939 - 45) by Oliver Clutton-Brock
This unique book, published in 2003, covers the German POW Camps. It includes anecdotes and stories of aircrew in the camps, covering capture, escape, liberation, those who were wounded, suffered illness and many that were murdered. It lists all the 10,999 POWs, who did not suffer in any way like those in the 'Holocaust' yet, nevertheless, experienced poor living conditions in German hand. They owe their health and many of them their lives, largely due to the food, clothing etc. supplied to the camps by the International Red Cross.
I add a few comments here about the treatment of POWs featured in this book, which I have not referred to directly in my experiences. It is important to include them here, as they are the additional risks that aircrew were exposed to, when they baled out near or in the target area, in the last two years of the war.
Also I refer to escaping and getting back to England, which only a tiny number succeeded in doing, despite the large number of prisoners who attempted it.
Additional risks to Aircrew in 1943-45
From mid-1943 onwards, after baling out into enemy territory, the treatment received on capture was a matter of luck. Many were humiliated, beaten and murdered. It was estimated, that one-in-twenty captured aircrew never returned home, overall more than 800 RAF were lynched or shot.
Personally my capture was reasonably civilised. Apart from the hint, at a suburban police station, that I was a 'terrorflieger', and experiencing with a part of other captured RAF, ugly threats from a crowd of civilians at a Berlin main railway station, I was ok. But of course we were under armed guard at the time!
Interrogation at Dulag Luft for me was a relatively mild experience, and the 'heat treatment' I received lasted only a couple of days. However this book states the Kommandant and some of his staff were tried for War Crimes in 1945, and he was given five years' imprisonment for his use of heat treatment (from 1943 onwards), and for withholding urgent medical attention from some wounded aircrew whilst they were being interrogated.
Following the Hamburg raids in August 1943 when the port and town were virtually destroyed, Himmler ordered the police not to interfere with the lynching of aircrew (who had baled out) by the civilian population. In March 1944 after the murder of the 50 escapees from Stalag Luft 3 POW Camp, Hitler ordered that airmen making emergency landings in Germany should not be protected by Wehrmacht from the atrocities perpetrated by the enraged population. In June 1944 Goring, Ribbentrop, and Himmler stated that airmen
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strafing trains, non military targets etc, would not be protected as POWs. In 1944 generally, there was a 'drip down' from the Nazi leaders to all the Military and Luftwaffe, not to interfere when civilians had taken action against captured airmen. They were also encouraged to take the lives of the hated 'terrorflieger'. After the Dresden bombing in February 1945, Goebbels stated that the 1929 Geneva Convention wasn't worth the paper it was written on. He hinted to the neutral Swedish press, that more heavy raids could result in all RAF and American airmen POWs, now in custody, being summarily executed! Hitler subsequently dropped the plan.
Churchill, early in 1945, was fearful of reprisals against all POWs in Germany. He suggested to Roosevelt and Stalin that a warning to Germany - not to maltreat prisoners - should be made by the Allies. But it was not until 23 April 1945, (due to the prevarication of Stalin,) that warning leaflets were dropped over Germany. By that time the war was almost over.
The worst excesses of murder happened during the last 12 months of the war and this book describes a number of them. The following example relates to what happened to a flight sergeant rear funner from my squadron (102). On 24 December 1944, a Halifax on a raid to Mulheim, was shot down near Neuss. All seven crew baled out, but only F/Sgt J G Williams was known to be captured at the time. He was taken by car, by the police, and handed over to Kreisliter Johannes Esser (Nazi Party Official) who took him to a room where he was reproached and beaten for bombing the town. He was then shot in the head and his body taken to a cellar, where it was wrapped in paper and sacking and tied with string. Esser and another, then took the body by car and threw it into a stream running into the Rhine.
On 28 September 1946, Esser was sentenced to death by a Military Court and hanged in Hameln prison, on 23 January 1947.
It is possible that the pilot and mid-upper gunner were also murdered on the same day. No details are known, but a letter from the MOD, as late as 1982, to their next of kin, suggests that a war crime was committed against them and four Germans were tried for the killings, in 1948. Looking up 102 Squadron records, I find that three of the crew were killed (murdered?) and the remaining four survived as POWs. This is an example of the 'hairs breadth', between life and death, when members of the same crew were captured by different Germans, probably only a few hundred yards apart.
Escaping - 1939 to 45
Despite the large number of Bomber Command POWs, there were only 34 successful escapes from prison camps, of aircrew, during 1939 - 45. Most of these were by aircrew, exchanging their identities with working parties who worked and lived outside the main prison camps. There were eleven (over the war period) who made their escape from Stalag V111B by this means. Not all got back to England in good time; some former Polish aircrew (now in RAF) stayed with the Polish Resistance until the war ended! Others stayed with Underground Forces until liberated by the Allies.
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There were two escapes, both from Stalag Luft 3 that were made via tunnels. The most famous, the 'Great Escape': 76 POWS (out of 200 planned) managed to get out before the tunnel was discovered. Unfortunately 73 were recaptured and Hitler ordered the murder of 50 of them, as a reprisal. Only three, two Norwegians and one Dutchman, all in the RAF, managed to get back to England.
The other, earlier escape, planned at the beginning of summer 1943, 'The Wooden Horse', was probably the most ingenious and most successful of them all. Everyday a wooden vaulting horse was carried out to the same spot, only 30 metres from the wire. While other prisoners exercised, Eric Williams, Michael Codner and Oliver Philpot, would dig from a trap door beneath it. After 114 days of work, the three men finally escaped on 29 October 1943. All three, Oliver Philpot separately, caught a train from the local station, Sagan. Philpot posing as a Norwegian reached Danzig, slipped aboard a ship and arrive in Sweden on 3 November and was taken by police to the British Legation in Stockholme the next day. The other two got to Stettin, then by ship to Copenhagen, and finally to Sweden and the British Legation in Stockholm on 13 November. After being delayed by a spell of bad weather, they were flown home at the end of December.
I met Oliver Philpot at the end of the 1950s, when he was Chairman of Truefoods (a Baby Foods Company), then owned by Unilever. I was in Organisation Division and doing an assignment there. Shortly afterwards he was made the Head Office Manager of Unilever House.
Memories of my RAF service
1. These are contained in the following documents, computer files and on floppy disc:-
BOMBER - deals with my time in the RAF until I was shot down.
NOEL COWARD - a poem paying tribute to Bomber Command
POW DAYS - covering my prisoner of war days to the end of the war
POW Days Postscript - covering events post war until 2004
2. There are also other records and papers:-
* Pilots Log Book and Observers/Navigators Log Book.
* A wartime log written as a POW, which also contains photos and sketches (unfortunately not completed).
* Two binders
Red - containing telegrams and letters from relatives and friends, and memorabilia, after I was shot down and became a POW.
Blue - containing details or [of] my bombing raids and when I was shot down over Berlin, with drawings and photographs.
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* All my POW letters to my parents.
* There are short one-page descriptions of the following events
- 'RAF arrive with pyjamas'
- 'Friendly Fire'
- Our Incredible Escape'
* The following events covered in my documents have supporting records
- 50th anniversary of our survival, celebrated at the Post House, Peterborough: there are photographs, a 3 minute video tape broadcast over the BBC 'Look East' network; a 3 minute radio tape of me and George Griffiths (Pilot) broadcast several times over BBC Cambridge Radio; Laurie Underwood also produced a video tape of the whole event.
- Attending Runneymede Memorial Service (ACA) to pay our respects to the two of our crew who have no known graves - photographs and programme of the service.
- Laurie Underwood's golden wedding anniversary, visit to the Yorkshire Air Museum to see the Halifax Bomber being rebuilt - photographs
- Tom Nelson meetings - his Daily Mail newspaper article re Christmas at Stalag1VB, photographs, drawings, poems of Stalag1VB, also photographs obtained from the Stalag1VB website
- Visit to Kew Public Records Office - extracts from 102 Squadron micro film operational records, original records of Pocklington Station and S/Ldr Harvey's DFC citation.
- Visit to Germany covering Berlin, Muhlberg, Stalag 1Vb site etc. - photos and data (including descriptions of Stalag 1VB post war from the German Muhlberg Initiative Group). There is also a map of the area highlighting places connected to our visit and when I was shot down.
- Two local newspaper articles and two 25 minute radio tapes (also recorded on a CD), of live interviews of me at BBC Radio Essex and Laurie Underwood via a telephone link to BBC Radio Leeds, used to advertise the book 'Flying into Hell'.
3 A number of books about Bomber Command, the Berlin Raids, a book and two journals about 102 Squadron, and two books about RAF POWs were used in making my own records
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4 Sundry items that support my records:-
- Banner of all Bomber Command Squadrons
- Banner of all Halifax Bomber Squadrons
- My Commission Parchment
- Framed picture and separate copies (one black & white and one coloured picture) of Stalag 1VB layout.
- Photo album of my training days in USA and Canada
- Photo of a Halifax 3 Bomber and a large model, made by my son-in-law, David Hughes
March 2005
19
Dublin Core
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Title
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My POW Days - Postscript
Description
An account of the resource
Reg starts with a page about the Caterpillar Club then describes his life after the war. Over the years he had many reunions and he undertook research regarding the four crew members who died the night they were shot down. In 2001 he and 90 or so ex-prisoners of war went on a tour of German war graves, Stalag IVB and Colditz.
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Reg Wilson
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2005-03
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Great Britain
England--Craven Arms
England--London
England--London
England--Peterborough
Germany--Lübeck
England--Runnymede
England--Wetherby
Scotland--Edinburgh
Germany--Mühlberg (Bad Liebenwerda)
England--London
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Colditz
Germany--Torgau
Germany--Dresden
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Mülheim an der Ruhr
Germany--Neuss
Poland--Żagań
Poland--Gdańsk
Sweden--Stockholm
Poland--Szczecin
Denmark--Copenhagen
Poland
Germany
Denmark
Sweden
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
England--Shropshire
England--Sussex
England--Yorkshire
England--Surrey
England--Bishop's Stortford
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Canadian Air Force
Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht. Luftwaffe
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eng
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19 printed sheets
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MWilsonRC1389401-170113-100002
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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IBCC Digital Archive
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Pending text-based transcription. Under review
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Sue Smith
102 Squadron
aircrew
anti-aircraft fire
bale out
bombing
Caterpillar Club
Churchill, Winston (1874-1965)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Dulag Luft
escaping
final resting place
Goebbels, Joseph (1897-1945)
Goering, Hermann (1893-1946)
Halifax
Halifax Mk 3
Harris, Arthur Travers (1892-1984)
Hitler, Adolf (1889-1945)
Lancaster
memorial
mine laying
navigator
pilot
prisoner of war
RAF Elvington
RAF Hendon
RAF Hornchurch
RAF Pocklington
Red Cross
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano (1882-1945)
Stalag 8B
Stalag Luft 3
Stalin, Joseph (1878-1953)
the long march