2
25
40
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1903/36265/LSparkesW1601723v1.2.pdf
25a3efac8fffa42cd5b1a9de735e984e
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Sparkes, Ned
William Sparkes
W Sparkes
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-07-16
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Sparkes, W
Description
An account of the resource
56 items. The collection concerns Flight Sergeant William "Ned" Sparkes (1601722 Royal Air Force) and contains his log book and an album with photographs, newspaper cuttings and documents including descriptions of his operations. He flew operations as a flight engineer with 431 Squadron.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Clive Sparkes and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
W Sparkes’ navigator’s, air bomber’s and air gunner’s flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
Navigator’s, air bomber’s and air gunner’s flying log book for W Sparkes, flight engineer, covering the period from 30 August 1943 to 20 April 1952. Detailing his flying training, operations flown, instructor duties and post war flying with number 5 Ferry Pool, 241 Operational Conversion Unit, and 297, 53, 511 Squadrons. He was stationed at RAF St Athan, RAF Topcliffe, RAF Tholthorpe, RAF Croft, RAF Husbands Bosworth, RAF Bruntingthorpe, RAF Cottesmore, RAF Silloth, RAF Edzell, RAF Dishforth, RAF Schleswiglande and RAF Lyneham. Aircraft flown in were Halifax, Wellington, Lancaster, Lincoln, Fairchild, Warwick, Dakota, Anson, Dominie, Mosquito and Hastings. He flew a total of 36 operations with 431 Squadron, 34 night and 2 daylight. Targets were Dusseldorf, Leipzig, Frankfurt, Berlin, Trappes, Le Mans, Brest, Amiens, Courtrai, Vaires, Karlsruhe, Essen, Somain, St Ghislaine, St Valery, Boulogne, Calais, Merville, Conde-sur-Noireau, Arras, Wizernes, Biennais, Bremont, Dognes, Hamburg, Foret de Nieppe and St Leu D’Esserent. His pilot on operations was Flying Officer Badgery.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943-11-03
1943-11-04
1943-12-03
1943-12-04
1943-12-20
1943-12-21
1943-12-29
1943-12-30
1944-01-20
1944-01-21
1944-02-15
1944-02-16
1944-03-06
1944-03-07
1944-03-08
1944-03-11
1944-03-12
1944-03-13
1944-03-14
1944-03-15
1944-03-16
1944-03-17
1944-03-26
1944-03-29
1944-03-30
1944-04-22
1944-04-23
1944-04-24
1944-04-25
1944-04-26
1944-04-27
1944-05-01
1944-05-02
1944-05-07
1944-05-08
1944-05-11
1944-05-12
1944-06-04
1944-06-05
1944-06-06
1944-06-07
1944-06-09
1944-06-10
1944-06-12
1944-06-13
1944-06-15
1944-06-16
1944-06-28
1944-06-29
1944-07-01
1944-07-02
1944-07-13
1944-07-14
1944-07-18
1944-07-19
1944-07-23
1944-07-24
1944-07-28
1944-07-29
1944-08-03
1944-08-04
1944-08-05
1944-08-06
1944-08-25
1944-08-26
1945
1946
1949
1950
1951
1952
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Belgium--Kortrijk
Belgium--Saint-Ghislain
England--Cumbria
England--Durham (County)
England--Leicestershire
England--Rutland
England--Wiltshire
England--Yorkshire
France--Amiens
France--Amiens Region
France--Arras
France--Brest
France--Calais
France--Condé-sur-Noireau
France--Creil
France--Dieppe (Arrondissement)
France--Donges
France--Le Mans
France--Merville-Franceville-Plage
France--Nieppe Forest
France--Paris Region
France--Pas-de-Calais
France--Somain
France--Saint-Valery-en-Caux
France--Vaires-sur-Marne
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Schleswig-Holstein
Scotland--Angus
Wales--Glamorgan
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Air Force. Transport Command
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LSparkesW1601723v1
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
1659 HCU
1668 HCU
29 OTU
297 Squadron
431 Squadron
85 OTU
aircrew
Anson
bombing of the Normandy coastal batteries (5/6 June 1944)
C-47
Dominie
flight engineer
Halifax
Halifax Mk 3
Halifax Mk 5
Halifax Mk 7
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lincoln
Mosquito
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
RAF Bruntingthorpe
RAF Cottesmore
RAF Croft
RAF Dishforth
RAF Husbands Bosworth
RAF Lyneham
RAF Silloth
RAF St Athan
RAF Tholthorpe
RAF Topcliffe
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/911/36596/LKilleenKAL184115v1.1.1.pdf
86d5993a27e675d800ec10cb4ccbe2b1
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Killeen, Kenneth
Kenneth Alfred Leonard Killeen
K A L Killeen
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Flying Officer Kenneth Killeen (b. 1922, 184115, Royal Air Force), his log books, photographs and documents. He flew operations as a navigator with 115 Squadron.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Kenneth Killeen and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-07-03
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Killeen, KAL
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
K A L Killeen’s observer’s and air gunner’s flying log book
Description
An account of the resource
Observer’s and air gunner’s flying log book one, for K A L Killeen, navigator, covering the period from 3 April 1943 to 2 August 1946. Detailing his flying training, operations flown and duties with communications flights. He was stationed at SAAF Queenstown, RAF Childs Ercall (RAF Peplow), RAF Wratting Common, RAF Feltwell, RAF Witchford, RAF Gatwick, Buc, Reims, Frankfurt, Detmold and Buckeburg. Aircraft flown in were Oxford, Anson, Wellington, Stirling, Lancaster, Auster, Proctor, Fiesler Storch and Messenger. He flew a total of 29 operations with 115 Squadron, 7 day and 22 night. His pilots on operations were Flight Sergeant Thornton, Flight Lieutenant Shepherd, Flight Lieutenant Woods, Flight Lieutenant Dexter, Flying Officer Gould, Flying Officer Standen, Flight Lieutenant Pressland, and Flying Officer Halcombe. Targets were Courtrai, Le Mans, Duisburg, Boulogne, Aachen, Angers, Calais, Caen, Lisieux, Dreux, Gelsenkirchen, Le Havre, Valenciennes, Villers Bocage, Beauvoir, Nucourt, Chalon-sur-Marne, Emieville, Aulnoye, Homberg, Kiel, Stuttgart, Amaye-Sur-Seulles, Foret de Lucheux, Lille, Lens, Brunswick and Hamel.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
South Africa
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Belgium--Kortrijk
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Norfolk
England--Shropshire
England--Suffolk
England--Surrey
France--Angers
France--Boulogne-sur-Mer
France--Caen
France--Calais
France--Calvados
France--Châlons-sur-Marne (Arrondissement)
France--Dreux
France--Hamel (Nord)
France--Le Havre
France--Le Mans
France--Lens
France--Lille
France--Lisieux
France--Manche
France--Nord (Department)
France--Nucourt
France--Reims
France--Somme
France--Valenciennes
France--Villers-Bocage (Calvados)
France--Yvelines
Germany--Aachen
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Bückeburg
Germany--Detmold
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Homberg (Kassel)
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Stuttgart
South Africa--Queenstown
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Cara Walmsley
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LKilleenKAL184115v1
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1945
1946
1944-05-10
1944-05-11
1944-05-12
1944-05-19
1944-05-20
1944-05-21
1944-05-22
1944-05-25
1944-05-28
1944-05-29
1944-05-31
1944-06-01
1944-06-04
1944-06-06
1944-06-07
1944-06-10
1944-06-11
1944-06-12
1944-06-13
1944-06-14
1944-06-15
1944-06-16
1944-06-30
1944-07-02
1944-07-05
1944-07-06
1944-07-10
1944-07-15
1944-07-16
1944-07-18
1944-07-19
1944-07-20
1944-07-21
1944-07-23
1944-07-24
1944-07-25
1944-07-30
1944-08-08
1944-08-09
1944-08-10
1944-08-11
1944-08-13
1944-08-14
115 Squadron
1651 HCU
83 OTU
aircrew
Anson
bombing
bombing of the Le Havre E-boat pens (14/15 June 1944)
bombing of the Normandy coastal batteries (5/6 June 1944)
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
Proctor
RAF Feltwell
RAF Peplow
RAF Witchford
RAF Wratting Common
Stirling
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1986/37853/LBurnsideJGB155209v1.2.pdf
27f92f9c2249442b57bfc20b345a97ac
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Burnside, James Gordon Bennett
J G B Burnside
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-11-16
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Burnside, JGB
Description
An account of the resource
44 items. The collection concerns Flight Lieutenant James Gordon Bennett Burnside (b. 1909, 155209 Royal Air Force) and contains his log book, documents, correspondence and photographs. He flew operations as a flight engineer with 619 Squadron.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Reverend Canon Terence Alan Joyce and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
J G B Burnside navigator's, air bomber's and air gunner's flying log book
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LBurnsideJGB155209v1
Description
An account of the resource
Navigator’s, air bomber’s and air gunner’s flying log book for J G B Burnside, flight engineer, covering the period from 20 March 1943 to 14 July 1945. Detailing his flying training, operations flown and instructor duties. He was stationed at RAF St Athan, RAF Swinderby, RAF Woodhall Spa, RAF Coningsby, RAF Dunholme Lodge, RAF Wigsley, RAF Balderton and RAF Winthorpe. Aircraft flown in were Halifax, Lancaster, Oxford, and Stirling. He flew a total of 28 night operations with 619 Squadron. Targets were Dusseldorf, Bochum, Oberhausen, Krefeld, Hamburg, Milan, Mannheim, Berlin, Antheor Viaduct, Hagen, Hannover, Chalindry, Revigny, Courtrai, Kiel, Donges, and Stuttgart. One Cook's Tour flight is also recorded. his pilots on operations were Squadron Leader Churcher, Flying Officer Stout, Flying Officer Thompson, Flying Officer Whiteley and Flying Officer Leonard.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943-06-11
1943-06-12
1943-06-13
1943-06-14
1943-06-15
1943-06-21
1943-06-22
1943-07-29
1943-07-30
1943-08-02
1943-08-03
1943-08-07
1943-08-08
1943-08-09
1943-08-10
1943-08-15
1943-08-16
1943-08-23
1943-08-24
1943-08-31
1943-09-01
1943-09-17
1943-09-18
1943-10-01
1943-10-02
1943-10-08
1943-10-09
1943-11-03
1943-11-04
1943-11-18
1943-11-19
1943-11-25
1943-11-26
1943-12-16
1943-12-17
1944-01-01
1944-01-02
1944-01-27
1944-01-28
1944-02-15
1944-02-16
1944-07-12
1944-07-13
1944-07-18
1944-07-19
1944-07-20
1944-07-21
1944-07-24
1944-07-25
1944-07-26
1944-07-28
1944-07-29
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Belgium--Kortrijk
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
France--Chalindrey
France--Donges
France--Franche-Comté
France--Saint-Raphaël Region (Var)
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Hagen (Arnsberg)
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Krefeld
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Oberhausen (Düsseldorf)
Germany--Stuttgart
Italy--Milan
Wales--Glamorgan
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
1654 HCU
1661 HCU
619 Squadron
aircrew
bombing
bombing of Hamburg (24-31 July 1943)
Cook’s tour
flight engineer
Halifax
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Lancaster Mk 1
Lancaster Mk 3
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Oxford
RAF Balderton
RAF Coningsby
RAF Dunholme Lodge
RAF St Athan
RAF Swinderby
RAF Wigsley
RAF Winthorpe
RAF Woodhall Spa
Stirling
training
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1977/38299/LPalmerRAM115772v2.2.pdf
766f44ee456792c0f14f465ace4bfbca
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Palmer, Robert Anthony Maurice
R A M Palmer
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-10-30
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Palmer, RAM
Description
An account of the resource
38 items. The collection concerns Squadron Leader Robert AM Palmer VC, DFC and Bar (115772, Royal Air Force) and contains his log books, photographs, fact sheets, newspaper cuttings, documents, correspondence and a substancial history of his last operation. <br /><br />He flew one hundred and eleven operations as a pilot with 75, 149 and 109 Squadrons and was killed 23 December 1944 when leading a daylight operation as an Oboe marker.<br /><br />The collection also contains 51 items in a <a href="https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collections/show/2178">Photograph album</a>.<br /><br />The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Penny Palmer and catalogued by Nigel Huckins. <br /><br />Additional information on Robert AM Palmer is available via the <a href="https://losses.internationalbcc.co.uk/loss/221528/">IBCC Losses Database</a>
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Robert Palmer's pilot's flying log book. Two
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LPalmerRAM115772v2
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Description
An account of the resource
Robert Palmer’s RAF Pilot’s Flying Log Book from 12 May 1942 to 23 December 1944, detailing training and operations as a pilot and instructor. He was stationed at RAF Lossiemouth (No. 20 OTU), RAF Hullavington (No. 3 Flying Instructors School), RAF Abingdon (1501 BAT Flight), RAF Marham (1655 Mosquito Training Unit and 109 Squadron (PFF)). Aircraft flown: Tiger Moth, Wellington, Lysander, Anson, Oxford, Lancaster, Martinet, Mosquito. Records 80 operations (55 night, 25 day) on the following targets in Belgium, France, Germany and Netherlands: Aachen, Argentan, Aulnoye, Bientques, Bois de la Haie, Bois des Jardins, Bottrop, Bourg-Leopold, Calais, Cap Griz Nez, Chamblys, Chapelle Notre Dame, Chateaudon, Cologne/Gremburg, Contville, Courtrai, Donges, Dortmund, Duisberg, Dusseldorf, Eisenach, Falaise, Foret de Nieppe, Ghent, Hagen, Hamborn, Heimbach Dam, Homberg, Houlgate, Krefeld, Laon, Le Clipon, Le Havre, Leeuwarden, Lemars-Cappel, Les Hautes Boissons, Les Landes Vielle et Neuve, Leverkusen, Louvain, Mardyck, Marquise Mimoyecques, Mont Candon, Morsalines, Nucourt, Oberhausen, <span>Œuf-en-Ternois</span>, Osnabruk, Oisement-Neuville, Paris, Rennes, Ruhrort, Scholven, Soest, Sterkrade, Venlo, Volkel, Watten. Entry for 30/9/44 reads “Engine failure on take-off. Both injured”. Final entry for 23/12/44 reads “Failed to return”. Also includes various technical notes and the coat of arms for 109 Squadron (College of Arms January 1944).
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
England--Norfolk
England--Oxfordshire
England--Wiltshire
France--Nord-Pas-de-Calais
France--Normandy
France--Pas-de-Calais
France--Somme
Belgium--Ghent
Belgium--Leopoldsburg
Belgium--Louvain
France--Argentan
France--Aulnoye-Aymeries
France--Calais
France--Châteaudun
France--Dieppe
France--Donges
France--Dunkerque
France--Falaise
France--Houlgate
France--Laon
France--Le Havre
France--Morsalines
France--Nieppe Forest
France--Nucourt
France--Oise
France--Oisemont (Canton)
France--Paris
France--Rennes
France--Watten
Germany--Aachen
Germany--Bottrop
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Eisenach
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Hagen (Arnsberg)
Germany--Homberg (Kassel)
Germany--Krefeld
Germany--Leverkusen
Germany--Oberhausen (Düsseldorf)
Germany--Osnabrück
Germany--Soest
Germany--Urft Dam
Netherlands--Leeuwarden
Netherlands--Uden
Netherlands--Venlo
Scotland--Moray
Belgium--Kortrijk
France--Œuf-en-Ternois
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1942
1943
1944-02-03
1944-02-05
1944-02-07
1944-02-08
1944-02-10
1944-02-15
1944-02-18
1944-02-19
1944-02-20
1944-02-21
1944-02-22
1944-02-24
1944-02-25
1944-03-02
1944-03-12
1944-03-15
1944-03-18
1944-03-21
1944-03-23
1944-03-25
1944-03-26
1944-03-29
1944-03-30
1944-04-01
1944-04-09
1944-04-10
1944-04-11
1944-04-12
1944-04-13
1944-05-14
1944-04-18
1944-04-19
1944-05-01
1944-05-02
1944-05-03
1944-05-04
1944-05-07
1944-05-08
1944-05-10
1944-05-11
1944-05-12
1944-05-13
1944-05-19
1944-05-20
1944-05-21
1944-05-22
1944-05-23
1944-05-24
1944-05-25
1944-05-27
1944-05-28
1944-05-29
1944-05-30
1944-06-02
1944-06-03
1944-06-05
1944-06-06
1944-06-07
1944-06-08
1944-06-09
1944-06-17
1944-06-18
1944-06-23
1944-06-24
1944-06-30
1944-07-01
1944-07-05
1944-07-06
1944-07-10
1944-07-12
1944-07-13
1944-07-15
1944-07-16
1944-07-17
1944-07-20
1944-07-23
1944-07-24
1944-07-25
1944-07-28
1944-08-09
1944-08-10
1944-08-11
1944-08-14
1944-08-18
1944-08-19
1944-08-25
1944-08-27
1944-08-28
1944-08-29
1944-08-30
1944-08-31
1944-09-01
1944-09-03
1944-09-06
1944-09-08
1944-09-09
1944-09-10
1944-09-24
1944-09-26
1944-09-27
1944-09-28
1944-11-23
1944-11-25
1944-11-26
1944-11-28
1944-12-03
1944-12-05
1944-12-06
1944-12-23
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
David Leitch
109 Squadron
15 OTU
20 OTU
aircrew
Anson
bombing
bombing of the Normandy coastal batteries (5/6 June 1944)
Lancaster
Lysander
Magister
Martinet
Mosquito
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
Pathfinders
pilot
RAF Abingdon
RAF Hullavington
RAF Lossiemouth
RAF Marham
tactical support for Normandy troops
Tiger Moth
training
V-1
V-2
V-weapon
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1950/39395/SWhittakerH186316v10003.1.pdf
b3f0cef5bd351194a37240f6696e6218
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Whittaker, Harry
H Whittaker
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-09-24
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Whittacker, H
Description
An account of the resource
26 items. The collection concerns Sergeant Harry Whittaker (Royal Air Force) and contains his log book, documents and photographs. He flew operations as a bomb aimer with 158 and 635 Squadrons.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Simon Whittaker and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Harry Whittaker's flying log book
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
SWhittakerH186316v10003
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Description
An account of the resource
Flying log book for Harry Whitaker, bomb aimer and navigator, covering the period from 21 May 1942 to 22 November 1946. Detailing his flying training, operations flown and instructor duties. He was stationed at 10 Advanced flying Unit RAF Dumfries, 19 operational training Unit RAF Kinloss, 1652 Conversion Unit RAF Marston, 9 squadron RAF Waddington, 158 Squadron RAF Lissett, 635 Squadron RAF Downham Market, 17 Operational Training Unit RAF Silverstone, 156 Squadron RAF Whitton, 35 Squadron RAF Graveley and RAF Stradishall and 148 Squadron RAF Upwood. Aircraft flown in were Tiger Moth, Anson, Botha, Hampden, Blenheim, Magister, Lancaster, Whitley, Halifax, Wellington, York and Dakota. He flew a total of 59 operations, one night operation with 9 squadron, 13 night operations with 158 squadron, 19 Daylight and 26 night operations with 635 squadron. Targets were Pilsen, Berlin, Leipzig, Stuttgart, Schweinfurt, Augsburg, Le Mans, Frankfurt, Essen, Nantes, Haines St Pierre, Calais, Duisburg, Dortmund, Aachen, Rennes, Angers, Foret de Cerise, Cambrai, Lens, Renescure, Wizernes, Coquereaux, Nucourt, Vaires, Cagney, Courtrai, Fervay, Falaise, Tirlemont, Stettin, Russelsheim, Kiel, Soesterburg, Le Havre, Domburg, Gelsenkirchen, Cap Gris Nez, Sterkrade, Bergen, Saarbrucken, and Bari. He also flew 6 operation Dodge and a goodwill tour of the USA with 35 squadron. His pilots on operations were Flying Officer Hale, Flight Lieutenant Johnson, Flying Officer Catlin, Flight Lieutenant Hardy and Flight Lieutenant Stockwell.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1942
1943-04-16
1943-04-17
1944-01-28
1944-01-29
1944-01-30
1944-01-31
1944-02-15
1944-02-16
1944-02-19
1944-02-20
1944-02-21
1944-02-24
1944-02-25
1944-02-26
1944-03-01
1944-03-02
1944-03-13
1944-03-14
1944-03-18
1944-03-19
1944-03-23
1944-03-24
1944-03-25
1944-03-26
1944-03-27
1944-05-07
1944-05-07
1944-05-09
1944-05-10
1944-05-19
1944-05-20
1944-05-21
1944-05-22
1944-05-23
1944-05-24
1944-05-25
1944-05-27
1944-05-28
1944-05-29
1944-06-03
1944-06-04
1944-06-07
1944-06-08
1944-06-09
1944-06-11
1944-06-12
1944-06-13
1944-06-15
1944-06-16
1944-06-17
1944-07-05
1944-07-06
1944-07-10
1944-07-12
1944-07-15
1944-07-16
1944-07-18
1944-07-20
1944-07-21
1944-07-24
1944-07-25
1944-07-26
1944-08-15
1944-08-16
1944-08-17
1944-08-18
1944-08-25
1944-08-26
1944-08-27
1944-08-29
1944-08-30
1944-09-03
1944-09-05
1944-09-06
1944-09-08
1944-09-10
1944-09-23
1944-09-24
1944-09-25
1944-09-26
1944-09-27
1944-09-28
1944-09-30
1944-10-04
1944-10-05
1944-10-06
1944-10-19
1944-10-20
1944-10-23
1944-10-24
1945-07-05
1945-08-11
1945-08-13
1945-08-28
1945-08-30
1945-09-18
1945-09-21
1945-11-08
1945-11-10
1945-11-27
1945-11-29
1946
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
Czech Republic
France
Germany
Great Britain
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Belgium--Haine-Saint-Pierre
Belgium--Kortrijk
Belgium--Tienen
Czech Republic--Plzeň
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Norfolk
England--Northamptonshire
England--Suffolk
England--Yorkshire
France--Angers
France--Aumale
France--Bayeux Region
France--Caen Region
France--Calais
France--Cambrai
France--Falaise
France--Le Havre
France--Le Mans
France--Lens
France--Nantes
France--Nucourt
France--Pas-de-Calais
France--Rennes
France--Saint-Omer Region (Pas-de-Calais)
France--Vaires-sur-Marne
Germany--Aachen
Germany--Augsburg
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Essen
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Oberhausen (Düsseldorf)
Germany--Rüsselsheim
Germany--Saarbrücken
Germany--Schweinfurt
Germany--Stuttgart
Italy--Bari
Netherlands--Domburg
Netherlands--Soesterberg
Norway--Bergen
Poland--Szczecin
Scotland--Dumfries and Galloway
Scotland--Moray Firth
France--Coquereaux
France--Cap Gris Nez
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
148 Squadron
156 Squadron
158 Squadron
1652 HCU
17 OTU
19 OTU
35 Squadron
635 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
air gunner
aircrew
Anson
Blenheim
bomb aimer
bombing
Botha
crash
Goodwill tour of the United States (1946)
Halifax
Hampden
Heavy Conversion Unit
Lancaster
Magister
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operation Dodge (1945)
Operational Training Unit
Pathfinders
RAF Downham Market
RAF Dumfries
RAF Graveley
RAF Kinloss
RAF Lissett
RAF Marston Moor
RAF Silverstone
RAF Stradishall
RAF Upwood
RAF Warboys
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
Wellington
Whitley
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1792/45129/LWilsonH1342819v1.2.pdf
52ffc531f0d4bd6890a709034f5ca53f
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Wilson, Harold
H Wilson
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-01-09
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Wilson, H
Description
An account of the resource
24 items. The collection concerns Flight Sergeant Harold Wilson DFM (Royal Air Force) who flew two tours completing 45 operations as a bomb aimer on 9 and 97 squadrons. Collection contains an identity document, a letter, his flying log book, a memoir and photographs (including some while he was a member of a missing research and enquiry unit in Germany after the war).
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Barbara Armstrong and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Harold Wilson's flying log book
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LWilsonH1342819v1
Description
An account of the resource
Harold Wilson’s Flying Log Book from 28/11/42 to 2/4/54, detailing training, operations and instructional duties as an Air Bomber (and later Navigator). Also contains various memorabilia including a photograph, reunion invitation and newspaper clipping about the award of the DFM. Based at: Port Elizabeth (42 Air School), Jurby (No. 5 Air Observer School), RAF Cottesmore, RAF Saltby, RAF Market Harborough (all No. 14 Operational Training Unit), RAF Wigsley (No. 1654 Conversion Unit), RAF Bardney (No. 9 Squadron), RAF Warboys (PFF Navigation Training Unit), RAF Coningsby (No. 97 Squadron), RAF Manby (Empire Air Armament School), RAF Swinderby (No. 1660 Heavy Conversion Unit and 201 Advanced Flying School), RAF Middleton St George (No. 2 Air Navigation School), RAF Scampton (No. 230 Operational Training Unit), RAF North Luffenham (No. 240 Operational Training Unit), RAF Oakington (No. 30 Squadron), RAF Perth (No. 11 Reserve Flying School). Aircraft flown: Anson, Oxford, Blenheim, Wellington, Halifax, Lancaster, Dakota.
Records a total of 45 operations (42 night, 3 day) with 9 and 97 Squadron. Targets in Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands are: Berlin, Leipzig, Frankfurt, Stettin, Brunswick, Magdeburg, Stuttgart, Schweinfurt, Augsburg, Marignane, Munich, Clermont Ferrand, Toulouse, Louailles, Annecy, Amiens, Maisy, St. Pierre du Mont, Argentan, Rennes, Poitiers, Greil (Saint-Leu-d'Esserent), Culmont Chalindrey, Nevers, Courtrai, Donges, Givors, Brest, Deelen Airfield, Bordeaux, Darmstadt and Konigsberg.
His pilot on all operations was F/O Lasham.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One colour photocopy
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
David Leitch
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
South Africa
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Belgium--Kortrijk
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Durham (County)
England--Huntingdonshire
England--Leicestershire
England--Lincolnshire
England--Nottinghamshire
England--Rutland
France--Amiens
France--Annecy
France--Argentan
France--Bordeaux (Nouvelle-Aquitaine)
France--Brest
France--Calvados
France--Clermont-Ferrand
France--Donges
France--Givors
France--Haute-Marne
France--Marignane
France--Nevers
France--Oise
France--Poitiers
France--Rennes
France--Sablé-sur-Sarthe
France--Toulouse
Germany--Augsburg
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Braunschweig
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Russia (Federation)--Kaliningrad (Kaliningradskai︠a︡ oblastʹ)
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Magdeburg
Germany--Munich
Germany--Schweinfurt
Poland--Szczecin
Germany--Stuttgart
Great Britain Miscellaneous Island Dependencies--Isle of Man
Netherlands--Gelderland
Scotland--Perth
South Africa--Port Elizabeth
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1942
1943-12-02
1943-12-03
1943-12-16
1943-12-17
1943-12-20
1943-12-23
1944-01-05
1944-01-14
1944-01-21
1944-01-22
1944-01-27
1944-01-28
1944-02-15
1944-02-16
1944-02-19
1944-02-20
1944-02-24
1944-02-25
1944-02-26
1944-03-01
1944-03-02
1944-03-09
1944-03-10
1944-03-15
1944-03-16
1944-04-22
1944-04-23
1944-04-24
1944-04-25
1944-04-26
1944-04-27
1944-04-29
1944-04-30
1944-05-01
1944-05-02
1944-05-06
1944-05-07
1944-05-09
1944-05-10
1944-05-19
1944-05-20
1944-05-31
1944-06-01
1944-06-06
1944-06-07
1944-06-08
1944-06-09
1944-06-12
1944-06-13
1944-07-04
1944-07-05
1944-07-12
1944-07-13
1944-07-15
1944-07-16
1944-07-20
1944-07-21
1944-07-24
1944-07-25
1944-07-26
1944-08-11
1944-08-12
1944-08-13
1944-08-14
1944-08-15
1944-08-16
1944-08-17
1944-08-18
1944-08-25
1944-08-26
1944-08-27
1945
1946
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
14 OTU
1654 HCU
1660 HCU
9 Squadron
97 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
aircrew
Anson
Blenheim
bomb aimer
bombing of Luftwaffe night-fighter airfields (15 August 1944)
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
bombing of the Normandy coastal batteries (5/6 June 1944)
C-47
Cook’s tour
Distinguished Service Medal
Halifax
Halifax Mk 2
Heavy Conversion Unit
Initial Training Wing
Lancaster
Lancaster Mk 1
Lancaster Mk 3
memorial
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
Pathfinders
RAF Bardney
RAF Bourn
RAF Coningsby
RAF Cottesmore
RAF Jurby
RAF Manby
RAF Market Harborough
RAF Middleton St George
RAF North Luffenham
RAF Oakington
RAF Saltby
RAF Scampton
RAF Swinderby
RAF Warboys
RAF Wigsley
training
Wellington
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2531/45191/LKerevanJ1450867v1.2.pdf
b4664ef90efdd969b3483600818ab3d5
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Kerevan, James
J Kerevan
Description
An account of the resource
Two items. The collection concerns James Kerevan (b. 1909, 1450867 Royal Air Force) and contains his log book and a photograph. He flew operations as a wireless operator with 90 Squadron.
The collection was loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Austin Kerevan and catalogued by IBCC Digital Archive staff.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2019-09-21
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Kerevan, J
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
James Kerevan’s navigator’s, air bomber’s and air gunner’s flying log book
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
Great Britain. Royal Air Force
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One booklet
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Mike Connock
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
LKerevanJ1450867v1
Description
An account of the resource
Navigator’s, air bomber’s and air gunner’s flying log book for J Kerevan, wireless operator, covering the period from 16 April 1943 to 12 October 1945. Detailing his flying training, operations flown and instructor duties. He was stationed at 2 Radio School RAF Yatesbury, 5 Air Gunners School RAF Stormy Down, 2 (Observers) Advanced Flying School RAF Millom, 26 Operational Training Unit RAF Little Horwood, 26 Operational Training Unit RAF Wing, 1665 Conversion Unit RAF Woolfox Lodge and 90 Squadron RAF Wratting Common. Aircraft flown in were Dominie, Proctor, Anson, Wellington, Stirling, Oxford, and Warwick. He flew a total of 26 night operations with 90 squadron plus one air sea rescue and 3 early returns. Targets were Frisians, Gironde, Ailly-le-Haut, Abbeville, Cherbourg, Heligoland, Kiel, Kattegat, Amiens, Laon and Courtrai, other were described as mine laying or special operations. His pilot on operations was Warrant Officer Poynton.
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Atlantic Ocean--Kattegat (Baltic Sea)
Atlantic Ocean--North Sea
Belgium--Kortrijk
England--Buckinghamshire
England--Cumbria
England--Rutland
England--Suffolk
England--Wiltshire
France--Abbeville
France--Abbeville Region
France--Amiens
France--Cherbourg
France--Gironde
France--Laon
Germany--Helgoland
Germany--Kiel
Netherlands--West Frisian Islands
Wales--Bridgend
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943-12-20
1943-12-20
1944-01-03
1944-01-04
1944-01-05
1944-01-14
1944-01-15
1944-01-21
1944-01-22
1944-01-25
1944-01-26
1944-01-27
1944-01-28
1944-01-30
1944-01-31
1944-02-11
1944-02-12
1944-02-15
1944-02-16
1944-02-19
1944-02-20
1944-02-21
1944-02-22
1944-02-23
1944-02-25
1944-03-04
1944-03-05
1944-03-16
1944-03-17
1944-03-18
1944-03-19
1944-03-20
1944-03-23
1944-03-24
1944-03-25
1944-03-26
1944-03-31
1944-04-01
1944-04-05
1944-04-06
1944-04-09
1944-04-10
1944-04-11
1944-04-12
1944-04-13
1944-04-19
1944-04-20
1944-04-22
1944-04-23
1944-04-24
1944-05-07
1944-05-08
1944-05-09
1945
1665 HCU
26 OTU
90 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
Air Gunnery School
aircrew
Anson
bombing
Dominie
Heavy Conversion Unit
mine laying
Operational Training Unit
Oxford
Proctor
RAF Little Horwood
RAF Millom
RAF Stormy Down
RAF Wing
RAF Woolfox Lodge
RAF Wratting Common
RAF Yatesbury
Stirling
training
Wellington
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1165/34342/MTownsleyH994575-180615-02.2.pdf
fa03f4144b5b062bc0ff376672b00fbc
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Townsley, Henry
H Townsley
Description
An account of the resource
Four items. An oral history interview with Warrant Officer Henry Townsley DFM (b. 1920, 994575 Royal Air Force), a memoir, list of operations and artwork. He flew operations as a flight engineer with 97 Squadron.
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by Henry Townsley and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2018-03-14
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
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Townsley, H
Dublin Core
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Title
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Details from log book of Henry Townsley DFM
Description
An account of the resource
While on 97 Squadron, lists 55 operations over two tours from January 1943 to September 1944, with date, pilot, aircraft and target. Goes on to mention award of DFM and lists aircraft flown with their history. His pilots on operations were Pilot Officer Munro and Flight Lieutenant Baker.
This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.
Creator
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H Townsley
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943-01-14
1943-01-27
1943-01-30
1943-02-02
1943-02-03
1943-02-13
1943-02-14
1943-02-18
1943-02-25
1943-02-26
1943-02-28
1943-03-01
1943-03-03
1943-03-05
1943-03-08
1943-03-09
1943-03-26
1943-03-27
1943-03-29
1943-04-03
1943-04-04
1943-04-10
1943-05-04
1943-05-23
1943-05-25
1943-05-29
1943-06-11
1943-06-12
1943-06-20
1943-06-23
1943-06-28
1943-07-03
1943-07-27
1944-04-20
1944-04-24
1944-04-28
1944-04-29
1944-05-01
1944-05-07
1944-05-22
1944-05-24
1944-06-06
1944-06-09
1944-06-12
1944-06-21
1944-06-24
1944-07-25
1944-08-01
1944-08-03
1944-08-09
1944-08-26
1944-08-29
1944-09-11
1944-06-05
1944-06-25
Spatial Coverage
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Great Britain
England--Lincolnshire
England--Cambridgeshire
Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
France
Italy
Germany
Norway
France--Gironde Estuary
Germany
Germany--Düsseldorf
Germany--Hamburg
Germany--Cologne
France--Lorient
Italy--Milan
Germany--Wilhelmshaven
Germany--Nuremberg
France--Saint-Nazaire
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Essen
Germany--Munich
Germany--Duisburg
Germany--Kiel
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Wuppertal
Germany--Bochum
Germany--Friedrichshafen
Italy--La Spezia
Germany--Schweinfurt
Norway--Oslo
France--Clermont-Ferrand
France--Toulouse
France--Tours
Germany--Braunschweig
Netherlands
Netherlands--Eindhoven
France--Saint-Pierre-du-Mont (Landes)
France--Argentan
France--Étampes (Essonne)
France--Poitiers
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
France--Somme
Belgium
Belgium--Kortrijk
Germany--Stuttgart
France--Pas-de-Calais
France--L'Isle-Adam
France--Creil
France--Châtellerault
Russia (Federation)
Russia (Federation)--Kaliningrad (Kaliningradskai︠a︡ oblastʹ)
Germany--Darmstadt
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Text. Log book and record book
Text. Personal research
Format
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Four page printed document
Identifier
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MTownsleyH994575-180615-02
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
15 Squadron
166 Squadron
8 Group
9 Squadron
97 Squadron
aircrew
bombing
bombing of Hamburg (24-31 July 1943)
bombing of the Normandy coastal batteries (5/6 June 1944)
bombing of the Pas de Calais V-1 sites (24/25 June 1944)
Bombing of Trossy St Maximin (3 August 1944)
Distinguished Flying Medal
flight engineer
Ju 88
mine laying
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Pathfinders
RAF Bourn
RAF Coningsby
RAF Woodhall Spa
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/2097/34661/BBrindKJBrindKJv1.1.pdf
b8c765f6e18d169a6bc660eb824a7028
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Brind, Kenneth John
Brind, K J
Description
An account of the resource
Two items. The collection concerns Kenneth John Brind (b. 1922 Royal Air Force) and contains his memoir and transcript of the ceremony awarding him the Légion d'Honneur. He flew operations as a navigator with 626 Squadron.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Angela Way and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Date
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2018-04-30
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. Some items have not been published in order to protect the privacy of third parties, to comply with intellectual property regulations, or have been assessed as medium or low priority according to the IBCC Digital Archive collection policy and will therefore be published at a later stage. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal, https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/collection-policy.
Identifier
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Brind, KJ
Transcribed document
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Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
[Royal Air Force 626 Squadron crest]
A Year In The Life
By
K.J. Brind
[page break]
To My Beloved
MARY,
our children
and grandchildren
I wish to express my appreciation to
"The Wickenby Register"
and in particular to its president
Don Wells and archivist
Jim MacDonald who, as well as
flying on many of the operations
described here, researched and
provided me with much of the factual
information in this book.
i
[page break]
A Year In The Life
By Kenneth Brind
In the village of Aldbourne on October 17th 1922, Ken was born to William and Emily Brind, the oldest of their three sons. Educated at St. Michael's School and Marlborough Grammar School, he entered the Royal Air Force shortly after the outbreak of World War II.
Trained as an Air Navigator, he flew a tour of operations with 626 Squadron Bomber Command, was commissioned and continued to serve in the RAF after the war as a navigation instructor, fighter controller and administrative officer.
He transferred to the RCAF in 1955 and served in a similar capacity until his retirement from military service in 1968.
This book is a description of the events which took place between his 21st and 22nd birthdays.
iii
[page break]
[photographs]
Kenneth John Brind CD C de G
[photograph]
Able Two
iv
[page break]
Prelude To Action
I'm not quite sure where to begin this narrative, but I suppose the R.A.F. Hospital Rauceby, Lincs. would be as good a place as any. I was there because of a pilonoidal sinus which was operated on and refused to heal so I spent a fairly lengthy period from early October 1943 to January 1944 (including my 21st Birthday on October 17th) out of action. It was my wife, Mary, who insisted I get treatment so I suppose, in a way, I owe her my life.
I had trained as a navigator and, after graduation from #10 Observers Advanced Flying Unit, Dumfries Scotland, had spent much of 1943 with a crew captained by Sgt. Geoff Clark. Geoff and I had met at No. 18 Operational Training Unit, Finningley, in May 1943, and taking an instant liking to each other, decided to throw in our lot together and jointly invited other crew members, bomb aimer, wireless operator and air gunner, to join us. During the summer we learned to operate as a crew on Wellington aircraft and completed our first operational sortie, which was an O.T.U. training exercise, on July 25th to Alencon, France, dropping leaflets inviting the Germans to surrender! On August 4th we moved on to No. 1656 Conversion Unit at Lindholme, picked up a flight engineer and second air gunner and learned to operate the Avro Lancaster Bomber. During the conversion process we had one very unfortunate experience. We were at the end of the runway one very dark night in the middle of September when another Lancaster taxiing behind us collided with our rear turret. One engine of the following aircraft smashed into the turret with Graham Uttley inside. Both pilots switched off all engines immediately and we managed to extricate Graham, but he was dead before the ambulance arrived. Another rear gunner immediately joined us and by the end of September the crew of Sgt. Clark, Pilot; Sgt. Brind, Navigator; Sgt. Naylor, Bomb Aimer; Sgt. Parkinson, Flight Engineer; Sgt. Whitmarsh, Wireless Operator; Sgt. Sugden and Sgt. Walker, Air Gunners was considered competent and ready to join a squadron, and were duly posted to No. 625 Squadron, Kelstern.
With our training now completed it seemed a good time to get the very minor surgery required to fix my pilonoidal sinus so I reported to the hospital. What we didn't know was that my recovery would take much longer than expected and that Geoff and the boys would not be able to await my return. They were forced to commence operations without me and were shot down over Berlin two days before Christmas, on December 23rd, 1943. They were all killed. I never met my replacement as Navigator, but I have always had guilt feelings that I should have been with them. Had I been there things might have been different. One thing is certain, they were a group of dedicated, enthusiastic, well trained young men.
Following my discharge from hospital I went on sick leave and it was not until April 1944 that the doctors certified me ready to crew up again and return to the war. In the meantime Mary had become pregnant and gone to Aldbourne where she would be safe. She had been with me during my O.T.U. and Conversion Unit Training.
I met Flying Officer Hicks and his crew at No. 1662 Conversion Unit, Blyton on May 14th. So many Lancasters had been lost during the winter of 1943/44 that they had been withdrawn
1
[page break]
[photograph]
The Wellington Crew
No. 18 O.T.U. Finningley
July 1943
Sgt. G. Uttley Sgt. W.E. Whitmarsh
Sgt. K.J. Brind Sgt. G.E. Clark Sgt. R.A. Naylor
from the heavy conversion units and replaced by Halifaxes. So crews converted on to the Halifax, then to the Lancaster at No. 1 Lancaster Finishing School, Hemswell. I did 3 cross country exercises (1 day and 2 night) with my new crew on the Halifax followed by a short conversion at No.! L.F.S. on to the Lancaster (with which I was very familiar from my time spent with my former crew) and then to No.626 Squadron, Wickenby on June 5th, 1944.
I should mention some of the characteristics of the Lancaster which by now had become the preeminent bomber aircraft of the Royal Air Force. It had a wingspan of 102 feet with a
2
[page break]
[photograph]
The Lancaster Crew
No. 626 Sqdn. Wickenby
July 1944
F/S J. Saletto F/S K.J. Brind F/L.A.C. Hicks F/O C. Bursey F/O P.M. Graves
Sgt. A.B. Jones Sgt. S.G. King
length of 69 feet and maximum height of 20 feet 6 inches. Powered by four Rolls Royce Merlin engines each developing 1,460 horsepower it had a maximum speed of 240 knots at 15,000 feet fully loaded and a cruising speed of 175 knots. The range varied with the load carried being 2,200 nautical miles with a 7,000 lb load, and 1350 nautical miles with a 22,000 lb load. Maximum fuel capacity was 2,154 gallons. Maximum bomb load varied with modifications which were made but essentially the main force carried not more than 15,000 lbs. Service ceiling was 19,000 – 20,000 feet depending on load and maximum ceiling was 24,000 feet. Take off distance loaded was 1,550 yards and the rate of climb was 250 ft/minute. Landing distance was approximately 1,000 yards. Maximum take off weight was 72,000 lbs. The aircraft carried a
3
[page break]
defensive armament of 3 gun turrets, the front carrying 2 x .303 machine guns, the mid upper the same and the rear turret 4 x .303's. Later the mid upper and rear turret were equipped with 2 x .5's. The primary navigation system was "GEE" by which the navigator could calculate the position of his aircraft by observing the time taken to receive pulse signals from three different ground stations. By now the enemy was aware of frequencies, etc., and jammed the signals before one reached the European coast. The other radar navigation system was "H2S". Here the aircraft transmitted signals which were reflected back from the terrain over which it was flying by providing a map of coastlines, islands, rivers, etc. But because the aircraft was transmitting it became vulnerable to interception by enemy fighters or prediction by anti aircraft guns. So it had to be used with discretion. The crew required to man this aircraft was seven as I have already mentioned.
My new crew was quite different from my previous one. Here 3 of the 7 were officers and Arthur Hicks himself was ten years older than I. He had done most of his flying training in the U.S.A., at Pensacola, Florida, and wore a silver bracelet proclaiming his proficiency. The other officers in the crew were Peter Graves, a burly London policeman, the bomb aimer and Bill Bursey, strangely enough the rear gunner, both were Flying Officers. The other N.C.O.s were Jack Saletto, an Australian and sole survivor of a 460 squadron crew, the wireless operator, Stan King, a youngster from London, the flight engineer, and Bert Jones the mid upper gunner.
We were welcomed by the Squadron Commander, Wing Commander Rodney, in his office and advised of two things; one was that a crew had just completed a tour of operations (the first to do so for some time) and the second was that the invasion (Operation Overlord) was to take place tomorrow, so we had arrived at a good time. We were then allocated to "A" Flight with whom we would remain for the duration of our tour with the squadron. We settled into our quarters but this crew, being mixed, officers and N.C.O.s, did not all share the same accommodation. The officers went to their quarters and the N.C.O.s to theirs.
The next few days saw us getting acclimatized, going through the various administrative procedures to ensure we would be paid and fed and generally getting to know our way around.
On June 13th an aircraft was made available for us to demonstrate that we were ready to operate so we took it on a 5 1/2 hour night cross country. On our return we were debriefed and our logs and charts were analyzed and checked. We passed muster.
4
[page break]
Operation No. 1 Rheims
The invasion of Europe (Operation Overlord) had commenced on June 6th 1944 and the allied armies were struggling to establish a bridgehead in Normandy. The Germans were trying to reinforce their defences so railway marshalling yards became prime targets. So it was that our first operation was against the railway yards at Rheims, France. It was June 22nd.
Our route took us from Wickenby to Gravesend then south to cross the English coast near Hastings, across the channel to a point on the French coast just east of Dieppe then south east directly towards the target. After bombing we headed west to a point just west of Dieppe then north back across the channel to make a landfall near Brighton, thence to Reading and back to base.
The bombload was 9,000 lbs consisting of eighteen 500 lb high explosive bombs which Peter Graves dispatched without difficulty. The aiming point was marked with cascading yellow target indicators (TI's) at H-5 and H-4 (H being the Time on Target of the first wave of bombers) and backed up with green TIs. The initial markers were scattered and short of the target but the Master Bomber backed up with red spot fires.
The weather called for patchy clouds enroute increasing to 9/10's clouds with tops at 6,000 feet. As the main force was at 18 – 20,000 feet some crews could not see the reds so bombed the glow of the markers through the clouds. The weight of the attack fell on the sorting sidings cutting every line and destroying 61 rail cars.
Ground defences were not heavy but there was heavy flak (anti-aircraft fire) and searchlights in the Abbville area. We were coned in searchlights for several minutes which is always a hair-raising experience but Hicky put the nose down and we eventually dived clear and resumed our homeward course. We returned to base without further incident and landed at approximately 0240 having been airborne for four hours and forty minutes.
Of the 19 aircraft of 626 Squadron which had started out one developed an engine fire, aborted the mission and returned to base, and one (Sgt. Woolley and crew) was shot down and all on board were killed. Bomber Command always kept statistics and on this night our squadron loss was 5.26%. Statistically if we continued at this rate we would last for twenty missions and our tour called for 30. We ate our eggs and bacon and went to bed.
5
[page break]
Operation No. 2 Les Hayons
In the summer of 1944 the Germans had developed their "ultimate weapons" the V1 and V2 and were using them indiscriminately against London and Southern England. The V1 was a winged bomb with a jet propelled engine which flew until it ran out of fuel then crashed and exploded. The V2 was a rocket propelled bomb which left the ground on a high trajectory, crossed the channel and came almost straight down on to it's target. There was some defence against the V1 in that it could be shot down by ground fire or by a fighter aircraft. There was no defence against the V2. The launching sites for both were in the Pas de Calais area of Northern France and in the low countries so the obvious way to eliminate the problem was to destroy the launching sites and storage sheds on the ground. A job for Bomber Command.
Our first attack against a launching site followed two days after our trip to Rheims, on June 24th, and the target chosen for 626 Squadron was Les Hayons in the Pas de Calais. These operations were not considered difficult as they were fairly short with not too much time over enemy territory. Our squadron's contribution of 17 aircraft included the squadron commander.
We took off at 1535 hours with a bomb load of 9,000 lbs (18 x 500 lb bombs) and climbed enroute to our bombing height of 18,000 feet. There were scattered patches of cloud between 3 and 8,000 feet, but the target area was clear with good visibility.
Our route took us again to Gravesend (but this time in daylight), to Hastings where we crossed enroute outbound, then straight to the target crossing the French coast near Calais. Calais was heavily defended and we came under a heavy and accurate flak attack on our approach to the target area, but fortunately we did not see any enemy aircraft. The aiming point was marked by red TIs but they were not dropped until after several of us had already bombed the target. Visibility was good and we were able to identify the launch ramps and storage buildings visually and attack them. We came under attack again as we crossed the French coast on our way home. We returned via Reading and arrived at Wickenby having been airborne 3 hours and 40 minutes. Two of our squadron aircraft sustained damage from the flak attack but no one was injured.
6
[page break]
Operation No. 3 Ligescourt
The next day we were at it again. This time our target was the flying bomb site at Ligescourt just a few miles from Les Hayons which we visited yesterday. But now we were going in the early morning rather than late afternoon. Twice in less than 24 hours.
Take off commenced at 0722 hours and our aircraft, A2 (Able Two) was airborne at 0730. The 626 squadron force was again 17 aircraft each carrying 18 x 500 lb bombs. The weather again was cloudy over England clearing over the channel with no cloud and excellent visibility in the target area.
The target marking of cascading red and yellow TIs was carried out by Mosquito aircraft. The red TIs were 2 minutes late and were slightly north east of the target but visibility was so good that the bomb aimers were able to visually identify and attack the target.
For some reason we did not come under the accurate flak attack which we experienced yesterday. Except for a few bursts at Berck sur Mer we were trouble free. A lone German fighter was sighted over the channel and was promptly shot down by spitfires of No. 11 Group who were providing fighter cover for us. The squadron sustained no losses and there were no reports of damage to our aircraft.
We again returned via Reading and at 1045 hours landed at Wickenby. At this period of the war everyone avoided flying over London so as not to impede those defending the city against flying bombs, so we were routed east or west of London depending on the location of the target.
7
[page break]
Operation No. 4 Sirracourt
It was now June 29th and operations scheduled for the 27th and 28th had been cancelled because of poor weather. There was now a slight improvement with a forecast of fair to cloudy with light showers. At 1000 hours we were advised that the daylight operation planned for yesterday was to be put on at once. Lots of rushing around getting everything ready, bombs, fuel, briefing, etc. The target was another flying bomb launching site, this time at Sirracourt, a few miles south of Les Hayons and Ligescourt.
For this operation we were joined by aircraft of 12 squadron which shared Wickenby with us. The force consisted of 29 Lancasters, 15 from 626 and 14 from 12 squadron. We were part of a concentrated attack on flying bomb launching sites by 286 Lancasters and 19 Mosquitoes of Bomber Command.
Our bomb load for this operation was a mixture of 1,000 lb and 500 lb high explosive for a total of 13,000 lbs per aircraft. Fuel load was 1,450 gallons. We always knew from the fuel and bomb loads, even before being given the target at briefing, whether we were going on a short or long trip. The maximum fuel load for a Lancaster was 2,154 gallons. We knew if full fuel load was called for the trip would be long and the bomb load smaller to remain within the maximum takeoff weight of 72,000 lbs. Conversely on shorter trips we carried less fuel and more bombs.
Getting 29 Lancasters off one runway takes a little time but we had got it to a fine art. Number one started rolling and when he was halfway down the runway number two started. By the time number one became airborne number two was halfway along and number three started so there were always 3 aircraft on or just leaving the runway. It was very efficient so long as there were no problems.
The first aircraft took off at 1151 and we were airborne at 1210 hours. Our route to the target was again via Gravesend and Dungeness and the weather was good to within a few miles of the target, then the cloud thickened to about 7/10s with tops at about 14,000 feet which meant that Peter Graves could not visually identify the target so we reduced height to bomb at 12,500 ft. We were above the clouds but came under intense and accurate heavy flak from the French coast to the target. We were again escorted by 11 Group Spitfires and saw no enemy fighters.
The target marking was by red TIs cascading from 4,000 feet on to the Master Bomber's yellow TIs cascading from 3,000 feet. Unfortunately, the Master Bomber was shot down while dropping his yellow TIs. This resulted in scattered bombing particularly in the early stages of the attack. Because of the weather it was difficult to assess the results of the attack but at 1402 hours a large explosion was reported with smoke rising to 4,000 feet.
We again returned via Reading and arrived back at Wickenby at 1540 hours. Four of Wickenby's aircraft were hit by flak, two from each squadron and one from 12 Squadron (P/O Underwood) was lost. It was on fire and abandoned in the air and crashed at Troisvaux. The pilot, navigator and rear gunner were killed while the wireless operator, bomb aimer, flight engineer and mid upper gunner were all taken prisoner of war. The Wickenby loss rate was 3.45%.
8
[page break]
Operation No. 5 Vierzon
Vierzon is a town some 120 miles south of Paris. It was a major rail and transportation centre for German troops and supplied on their way to the front some 160 miles to the north west. It was our "target for tonight" on June 30th and 31 Lancasters from Wickenby were detailed for the mission. Twelve Squadron supplied 13 and 626 Squadron 18.
Take off commenced at 2151 hours and our aircraft became airborne at 2155 with a bomb load of 13,000 lbs, mixed 1,000 and 500 lb high explosive and 1,450 gallons of fuel. We climbed towards Reading, the assembly point, and reached our operational altitude earlier than normal as we were briefed for 8 - 10,000 feet instead of our usual 18 - 20,000 feet. We were aware that disruption of rail traffic was vital to stop German troops and supplies reaching the beachhead in Normandy. We were also aware that inaccurate bombing would kill innocent French civilians. Targets were, therefore, brilliantly lit with chandelier flares and to ensure accuracy we flew at less than half our normal bombing height. From Reading we headed to a point midway across the channel then crossed the French coast between Dieppe and Le Havre and headed south towards the target.
On arrival in the target area we found the aiming point illuminated with flares and marked with impact yellow TIs backed up by red spot fires. The TIs fell to the north east of the yards but the reds were accurate and the bombing was concentrated on them. The Master Bomber instructed the main force to bomb between two sets of TIs. At 0119 hours a broadcast was heard on the radio telephone (RT), not the Master Bomber's voice but using his call sign, instructing the main force to cease bombing and go home. No code word for "stop bombing" was used so the broadcast was ignored. Shortly after a Canadian voice interjected over the RT telling the German, in the most ungentlemanly fashion, what to do.
In spite of everything the bombing appeared to be extremely accurate and results showed that all through lines were cut, much of the rolling stock and two thirds of the locomotive depot was destroyed. Regretfully residential and business property to the east of the target was severely damaged.
There was some light flak in the target area and because of our reduced altitude, it was exploding at our height but the one searchlight was shot out by the first marker. The fighters were initially confused as to our location but after we had been over enemy territory for 54 minutes they were ordered to Orleans and, having identified our target, they attacked with considerable ferocity. They made contact by moonlight and held the bomber stream for 80 miles on the return route when most of our losses occurred.
This was the deepest penetration my crew had made so far and in spite of all the activity going on around us we were able to fly home unscathed and arrived back at Wickenby at 0325 hours having been airborne for 5 1/2 hours.
Of Wickenby's aircraft on this night one from 626 Squadron aborted the mission with an electrical failure and one from 12 Squadron was damaged by light flak. Four combats with fighter were reported, 3 by 12 Squadron aircraft and one from 626. Of the 30 Wickenby aircraft
9
[page break]
to reach the target 4 were lost, two from each squadron. 12 Squadron lost P/O Honor and P/O Pollard, and both crews were killed. 626 lost P/O Pocock who was killed together with his whole crew on their very first operation, and P/O Orr who was killed together with his flight engineer and both gunners while his navigator, bomb aimer and wireless operator managed to bail out. The navigator and bomb aimer were both wounded and taken prisoner but the wireless operator evaded capture.
Bomber Command loss rate for this operation was 11.86% while that for Wickenby was 12.9%. We had paid the price for operating a lower level than normal. 626 Squadron had lost 2 aircraft out of 18, a loss rate of 11.1%, the highest we had experienced since starting our tour. It was now 9 days since we started operational flying and we had already flown on 5 operations. And so we reached the end of June 1944.
On July 1st the weather was cloudy but becoming fair with showers – 23 Lancasters were detailed for a night attack which was cancelled. "Salute the Soldier Week" was held from July 1st to 8th with a target of £2000. Whether the target was reached is not known. A discipline notice on the bulletin board read "Airmen with cycles in their charge fitted with "rat trap" pedals are to ensure that all sharp points liable to damage footwear are filed off".
10
[page break]
Operation No. 6 Domleger
On July 2nd the weather was cloudy becoming fair with showers later. Twenty five Lancasters from Wickenby were detailed against a flying bomb site at Domleger. We were part of a force of 286 Lancasters and Mosquitoes attacking 2 flying bomb sites. 626 Squadron provided 14 aircraft. Domleger was in the vicinity of the other flying bomb sites we had already attacked. Our bomb load was 13,000 lbs mixed 500 and 1,000 lbs high explosive.
We were the first aircraft to takeoff and were airborne at 1215 hours and climbed to our normal bombing height of 18,000 feet enroute to Gravesend. The weather as we progressed was 8 - 10/10s cloud with tops between 7 and 10,000 feet.
As we approached the target area the Master Bomber instructed all crews to bomb on DF (Direction Finding) radar or radio then 3 minutes before H hour these instructions were cancelled and we were instructed to bomb the TIs. In the meantime we reduced height to 14,000 feet, the cloud layer broke, and a large hole enabled us to bomb visually at 1415 hours. As with all visual bombing the concentration was good with smoke rising to 5,000 feet.
There was a minimal amount of light flak in the target area but considerable heavy flak in the Abbville area on the homeward route. No enemy fighters were seen, fighter cover again being provided by 11 Group.
Our losses were nil and only one of our aircraft was hit by flak with no casualties. We returned to Wickenby 3 1/2 hours after we left.
On July 4th twenty-two Lancasters from Wickenby were detailed as part of a force of 151 plus 6 markers against the railway yards at Les Aubrais near Orleans. 626 Squadron's effort was 11 aircraft.
Take off commenced at 2147 with our aircraft becoming airborne at 2200 hours. All went well until we were over France and, as we thought, heading in the direction of the target. But at H hour when the target should have been in view, or at least the TIs should have appeared ahead of us, there was nothing to be seen. We were flying over an unbroken layer of cloud and were certainly not where we were supposed to be. As the navigator it was my responsibility to know where we were at all times. Something had gone wrong and I was not certain what it was. We could not go on to the target, we didn't even know where it was, so Hicky made the only decision possible. We would head for home. It is a rather scary position to be in – flying around over enemy territory with 9,000 lbs of bombs on board – knowing you are somewhere between your base and your target, but not knowing how to get to either and with navigational equipment which is unserviceable. Under such conditions you revert to basics. I stuck my head into the astrodome and located Polaris – the North Star, and directed Hicky to fly north, using the star to steer by. We knew that by flying north we would cross the French coast and eventually the English channel but at this point did not know where or when. Once we had settled on course I was able to assess what had happened.
The Distant Reading (DR) compass had become destabilized and was slowly rotating so that we had not been steady on any course but going round in a huge circle. We were alone and
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at the mercy of any defences we might encounter. In the meantime, Hicky, Peter Graves and Stan King were all looking ahead searching for any sign of the French coast. Bert Jones and Bill Bursey in the gunners turrets were searching the black skies for anything approaching us while Jack Saletto and I were working feverishly for any bearings or any radar fix which would help us locate our position. Then it happened! Heavy flak appeared before us and about the same time the H2S told me we were approaching Le Havre, one of the most heavily defended ports on the coast. We had no choice but to fly through the defences which we proceeded to do weaving gently to try and prevent the anti aircraft prediction radar getting a "lock on" to us, and we were lucky enough to get through unscathed and headed out over the channel.
We still had our 9,000 lbs of high explosive just beneath where we were sitting and the prospect of landing with it still on board, in the dark, was not a pleasant one so, discretion being the better part of valour, it was decided to jettison our bomb load over the channel. We were back within GEE range by now so I selected a spot well away from the shipping lanes which were very busy between southern England and the Normandy beachhead and Peter dropped them safe, i.e. not fused, into the English Channel.
We returned home without further incident after almost 6 hours and had to report that we had aborted the mission. The log showed the reason as "DR compass unserviceable". So for us this counted for naught and our number was still 6 completed operations.
For the rest of the squadron the night had been successful. The assessment of the attack was that all through rail lines were cut and a large quantity of rolling stock destroyed or damaged.
626 Squadron reported one aircraft damaged and one combat with a JU88. 12 Squadron lost one aircraft with the pilot (F/S Turner), bomb aimer and flight engineer taken prisoner and the other four crew members killed.
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Operation No. 7 Dijon
On July 5th the weather was fair to cloudy with moderate visibility. I had our instrument technicians working on the DR compass and had the master unit replaced and swung. Hopefully it will be O.K. for tonight we go to Dijon.
Twenty two Lancasters from Wickenby, 12 from 12 and 10 from 626 Squadron were part of a force of 154 detailed against the marshalling yards at Dijon, a city some 160 miles south east of Paris and about 60 miles from the Swiss border. Because of the distance involved the fuel load and bomb loads were adjusted and we carried 9,500 lbs (8 x 1,000 lb and 3 x 500 lb).
We took off at 2000 hrs in daylight and were gradually wrapped in darkness as we headed towards France. Our route took us south west from Wickenby to Bridport crossing the English coast just west of Weymouth. We then headed south to a point near the Channel Islands before turning south east towards France. We had deliberately kept clear of the European battlefield and now crossed the coast at a point some 35 miles north of Rennes and moved in a series of zig zags towards the target area. A tactic used by Bomber Command was to try not to indicate to the enemy until the last minute where the actual target was, so we finally headed to a point north west of Dijon then made a sudden turn south east for a relatively short bombing run over the marshalling yards before turning west and heading for home.
The weather over England was 10/10 cloud with tops to 7,000 feet so we soon climbed through it and were in the clear above. The cloud layer dispersed by mid channel and visibility was perfect from then on. Perfect visibility is a two edged sword though, not only can you see where you are going and who is with you, but you can also be seen by the enemy fighters and anit aircraft defences. Visibility was so good that the Swiss Alps were clearly visible from a distance of one hundred miles or so. It was worth the trip just to see Mont Blanc at 15,780 feet glistening in the moonlight.
There was a good deal of light flak in the target area which considerably troubled the Master Bomber. Initial yellow TIs were dropped by using radar and were found to be one mile north west of the target. The Deputy Master Bomber arrived in the target area ahead of the Master Bomber and dropped one red and one yellow TI within 50 yards of the aiming point. Bombing was accurate though some crews bombed the early markers. Photographic reconnaissance assessed that all the through rail lines were cut and the locomotive round house and workshops destroyed.
There was some night fighter activity over the target and as far as Tours on the way home. Four of 626 Squadron crews reported combat with night fighters and one of our aircraft was damaged.
We returned home on a reciprocal route and arrived back at Wickenby at 0440 hours after a flight of 8 hours 40 minutes and the furthest penetration yet into Fortress Europe. There were no losses.
Until now our operations were against flying bomb sites to reduce these attacks on Southern England, and railway marshalling yards and communication centres in France to try
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[map]
[underlined] DIJON [underlined].
[underlined] 5/6 JULY 1944 [underlined].
[page break]
to prevent German reinforcements from reaching the battle area. Now we were going to use bomber aircraft as heavy artillery in direct support of the forces on the ground. The Allied armies had established a beachhead in Normandy but were experiencing difficulty in breaking out and advancing. Particularly troubling was Caen where German resistance was especially stubborn.
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Operation No. 8 Caen
On July 7th a Bomber Command force of 283 Lancasters, 164 Halifaxes and 20 Mosquitoes were detailed against troops and armour at Caen. Wickenby's contribution was 30 Lancasters, 13 from 12 Squadron and 17 from 626. The weather was cloudy with intermittent rain in the morning, fair later. The operation was scheduled for evening.
The bomb load was 13,000 lbs, mixed 1,000 and 500 lbs high explosive. Takeoff commenced at 1910 hours and we became airborne at 1930. The enroute weather was 7 – 8/10's cloud with a base at 5,000 feet and tops at 12,000 feet until nearing the French coast then clearing to small amounts of broken cloud only.
Target marking with red and yellow TIs was on time and accurate which made the work of the bomb aimer that much easier. However, there was intense heavy and light flak in the target area. After all we were attacking an army on the ground who were well trained and well equipped and who were going to defend themselves. As we flew through the target area there was smoke, exploding shells, exploding bombs and aircraft everywhere. A very confusing scene.
However, the bombs straddled the markers and it was apparent that a raid of outstanding success was achieved. Photo reconnaissance showed the bulk of the bombing fell within a radius of 450 yards with very few isolated sticks of bombs.
A message from 2nd Army Headquarters read "The heavy bombing that took place this evening was a wonderfully impressive show. The 2nd Army would like appreciation and thanks passed to all crews".
One of 626 Squadron's aircraft aborted with an unserviceable port inner engine. Three of 12 Squadron and 3 of 626 Squadron aircraft were damaged. Among them was ours. We were hit by flak in the mid upper turret and the front windscreen over the target but fortunately none of us was injured though Bert Jones obviously had a close call.
626 Squadron lost one aircraft (P/O Oram) which was hit in the target area and subsequently became uncontrollable. The crew abandoned over the channel and 5 of them were rescued from the sea and returned to fly again. Unfortunately, both air gunners were killed. The squadron loss rate was 5.9%.
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Operation No. 9 Tours
Thirty-four Lancasters from Wickenby were detailed against Tours on July 12th as part of a force of 378 Lancasters and 7 Mosquitoes attacking railway targets. This was a continuation of the attacks against marshalling yards and communication centres in France in support of Operation Overlord. Dijon, Orleans, Vierzon and Rheims were previous targets. 626 Squadron's contribution was 18 aircraft. As with previous attacks of this type the bomb load consisted of 1,000 and 500 lb high explosive. On this occasion it was again 13,000 lbs with 2,000 gallons of fuel.
Again, we headed southwest from Wickenby to Bridport and crossed the English coast near Weymouth then south east to the French coast and the target. After the attack we returned to Bridport via the Channel Islands then back to Wickenby.
The weather was clear enroute except for some broken patches of medium cloud. There was some thin cloud between 4 – 6,000 feet north of the target area but it cleared before we arrived and all that remained in the target area was some haze.
The first TIs undershot the aiming point by 500 yards, but the Master Bomber was able to direct the main force to overshoot the markers. As the target was clear the marshalling yards were visible and bombing was concentrated on the target though smoke rising to 9,000 feet eventually obscured it.
Photo reconnaissance confirmed the target to be completely covered in craters with all railway tracks cut, the bridge collapsed and embankment roads obliterated. The storage sidings and railcars were so covered with close packed craters an estimation of railcars destroyed could not be made.
Some light flak and sporadic heavy flak was experienced and fighters were active on the homeward journey. A diversionary raid to the low countries drew many night fighters from the main raid.
One of our aircraft sustained flak damage while in the target area and one of 12 Squadron reported an engagement with a JU88. There were no losses.
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Operation No. 10 Caen
On July 18th an early morning raid in direct support of the British Second Army against troops and armour east of Caen was ordered. This was the second occasion we were used as heavy artillery prior to a ground attack against enemy troops. The allied armies at this stage of Overlord were experiencing very stubborn resistance all along the front and even though we had helped by bombing Caen on July 7th resistance east of Caen was still very strong, and a major attack was required.
Bomber Command's force was 667 Lancasters, 260 Halifaxes and 15 Mosquitoes – over 900 aircraft in all. 38 of the Lancasters were from Wickenby with 626 Squadron providing 20. The bomb load was again 13,000 lbs with 11 x 1,000 lbs and 4 x 500 lbs.
Whereas our raid on July 7th was in the evening, on this occasion takeoff commenced at 0300 hours so that we were over the target at first light. The enroute weather consisted of low cloud over England with thick haze at the English coast. It cleared as we crossed the channel and the target area was clear with excellent visibility.
The marking was by low bursting red TIs from H-5 to H-1 then by yellow TIs bursting at 4,000 feet leaving a trail of white smoke. Markers were accurate and punctual except for one which the Master Bomber identified as being 100 yds south. Accurate marking and bombing was essential as we were attacking the enemy a short distance ahead of our own troops, a fact we were all well aware of. Bombing commenced one minute early and excellent concentration was achieved. The aiming point was soon obscured by dust and smoke but the TIs were still visible.
Flak was negligible in the target area but accurate predicted heavy flak was encountered as we left. No enemy fighters were seen as cover was again provided by No. 11 Group.
Three of 12 Squadron and 3 of 626 Squadron aircraft were hit by flak, including ours, but fortunately no one was injured. One of 626 Squadron found a live 1,000 lb bomb rolling on the closed bomb bay doors after leaving the target area. I had failed to release with the rest of the bomb load but was safely jettisoned over the channel.
We arrived back at Wickenby at about 0700 to debrief, breakfast and bed.
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Operation No. 11 Courtrai
Courtrai was a rail centre and marshalling yard some 50 mile west of Brussels, the Belgian capital, through which supplies, reinforcements and equipment passed on their way from Germany to the front. It was our first target not in France and received the attention of 302 Lancasters and 15 Mosquitoes on the night of July 20th. 35 Lancasters from Wickenby were detailed as part of this force and 626 Squadron's contribution was 18.
The bomb load was again 13,000 lbs with the usual mixture of 1,000 and 500 lbs high explosives. Our route took us south east to Orfordness, across the North Sea to the Belgian coast west of Ostend then to the target.
We took off at 2330 and climbed in darkness towards the coast. We passed through a 10/10th layer of cloud over England which cleared as we crossed the North Sea. As we approached the Belgian coast we were startled to see a streak of light from the ground rush vertically past us at tremendous velocity and disappear above us. It was a rocket propelled V2 on it's way to London. One launching site down there somewhere which needed to be dealt with, or perhaps it had been and was already repaired. We were aware, of course, that the German war machine, with it's huge quantity of slave labour, worked to repair everything which we damaged as soon as possible.
In the target area there was no cloud but some haze with fair visibility. As we were climbing out Hicky was having some trouble with the Constant Speed Unit (CSU) on the port outer engine which he and Stan King were unable to stabilize but we carried on with them nursing the problem as this was not a very long trip.
As we approached the target Mosquitoes marked the aiming point with red TI's at H-8. Other pathfinders dropped flares and red and green TIs. The marking was on time and accurate and resulted in bombing being well concentrated on the target. Peter Graves released our bombs at 0156 hours. Photo reconnaissance reported that reception, forwarding and sorting sidings were utterly destroyed. A large water tank was hurled from the centre of the track to property outside the yard. The main loco sheds, passenger station, and a bridge carrying 5 tracks across a road were all virtually destroyed.
Flak defences were light but fighters were extremely active in the light of our marker flares (we could be seen from above silhouetted against them) and near Ostend and over the sea on our way home. The result was predictable, 5 of 626 and 2 of 12 Squadron crews reported combat but the only damage to returning aircraft came from a 626 and 12 Squadron aircraft which collided in circuit over the aerodrome on return. Both landed safely but the incident emphasised the importance of proper height and distance separation in the landing pattern particularly when returning a large number of aircraft in a short space of time. After returning from any operation everyone is stressed and tired and anxious to land as soon as possible.
However, we did suffer major casualties. One of 626 Squadron (F/O Wilson) and one of 12 Squadron (P/O Hagarty) were lost and both crews were killed, and another of 626 Squadron (F/O Bowen) was shot down over the target. The rear gunner was killed but all others either evaded or were taken prisoner.
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[map]
[underlined]COURTRAI. [/underlined].
[underlined] 20/21 JULY 1944 [/underlined].
[page break]
The Wickenby loss rate was 8.57% while Bomber Command's was 2.84%. 626 Squadron lost 2 of 18 – 11.1%. Hicky nursed A2 back home and we landed at Wickenby after being airborne 3 hours 15 minutes.
I should mention here that we have now completed 11 operations, 6 by day and 5 by night (and aborted one) and have been hit by flak only twice and so far never attacked by an enemy aircraft. The navigation section at Wickenby had a sign on the wall which read, "KEEP ON TRACK, KEEP ON TIME, KEEP ON LIVING". A Bomber Command operation was always a concentration in time and space with literally scores of aircraft crossing a target every minute. If you could stay on track and on time you were assured of being somewhere in the centre of a huge gaggle of aircraft. It was generally the stragglers or those who wandered off course who were attacked by fighters. My crew maintained that my ability as a navigator kept us close to the middle of the pack and minimized the risk, but I like to think that it was a crew effort. Everything that went on outside the aircraft around us even if it seemed inconsequential was reported and if necessary acted upon.
Weather on the 21st and 22nd of July was cloudy with drizzle and moderate visibility. On the 21st 28 Lancasters from Wickenby were detailed against Dortmund but the operation was cancelled and on the 22nd 36 were detailed for a daylight operation which was also cancelled. On the 21st we took advantage of the cancellation to carry out some fighter affiliation exercises to keep the gunners sharp. They had not yet had to fire their guns in self defence. On July 23rd the weather was cloudy but visibility was good and our target was announced as Kiel naval base.
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Operation No. 12 Kiel
A force of 519 Lancasters, 100 Halifaxes, and 10 Mosquitoes were detailed against Kiel and Wickenby's contribution was 33 with 15 of these from 626 Squadron. This was our first attack against a target in Germany and our first purely strategic attack, so we were both excited and apprehensive. Kiel was a port city on the Baltic Sea with shipyards, a naval base and manufacturing facilities known to be well defended.
We took off at 2100 hours on July 23rd and climbed through a layer of cloud with tops about 5,000 feet into the clear with good visibility. We carried 9,000 lb of bombs (18 x 500 lbs). Our route took us to Mablethorpe then across the North Sea to a point west of the North Frisian Islands then east into Germany proper and on to a southerly heading for the bomb run. This route gave me a good opportunity to use the H2S equipment to fix our position accurately before entering enemy territory. H2S was the radar equipment which transmitted a signal from the aircraft to the ground and the returns showed features such as islands, coastlines, etc. So we were on track and on time as we crossed the German coast and headed for Kiel and our target at 21,000 ft.
The target marking was by sticks of flares which were dropped at H-6 followed by Path Finder Force (PFF) marking the aiming point with mixed red and green TIs. The marking was punctual, reasonably accurate but scattered in the early stages. As we were above cloud and the markers were only visible by glowing through the clouds Peter bombed what he could see, as did all the other bomb aimers.
So we were unable to access the accuracy of the bombing until later when photo recce showed that severe damage was caused to the north east portion of the shipyards, buildings and hangars of the airfield and seaplane base were partially destroyed and considerable damage was caused to a large barracks and other buildings in the marine depot. As we left the target area we could see the glow of the fires reflecting on the clouds for a hundred miles.
We experienced heavy flak and some light flak in the target area, some of which appeared to come from ships in the harbour. There were a few searchlights. There was some fighter activity over the target and on the homeward route for distance of about 100 miles.
Two of 12 Squadron's aircraft reported combat and one of 626 Squadron engaged an ME 110 on two occasions some two minutes apart at 16,000 feet.
No damage was reported and no casualties. I have no report on Bomber Command losses for this operation but Wickenby and 626 Squadron had none.
I should mention that F/O Hicks was promoted to F/Lt and I was promoted to F/Sgt during July. These were the only promotions my crew received during our tour.
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[map]
[underlined] KIEL [/underlined].
[underlined] 23/24 JULY 1944 [underlined].
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Operation No. 13 Stuttgart
On July 25th the weather was fair becoming cloudy with intermittent rain when Bomber Command decided to send a force of 412 Lancasters and 138 Halifaxes against Stuttgart, a large manufacturing city in southern Germany. 25 of the Lancasters were from Wickenby with 626 Squadron providing 12 of them.
The bomb load was fairly typical for operations against major German targets being 1 x 2,000 lb high explosive bomb and 12 incendiary clusters. For a mission to southern Germany full fuel tanks of 2,154 gallons were required.
Takeoff commenced at 2058 and seven minutes later we roared down the runway and off for our longest trip so far to a German target. The route took us a long way south before turning east towards the target area. We went to Reading then south across the channel and turned east after we were well south of Paris. We then went almost to the Swiss border before turning north east towards the major centres in that general area in the hope of confusing the defences. Our target could have been any one of half a dozen cities, including Frankfurt, Russelheim, Mannheim, Karlsruhe or Stuttgart. We made our final turn on to the bomb run between Karlsruhe and Stuttgart. The weather enroute was cloudy and in the target area there was 10/10th thin cloud with a base about 16,000. At 20,000 feet we were above this layer.
Sticks of flares and red TIs were dropped at H-6, P.F.F. then marked the aiming point with mixed red and green TIs. Release point flares of green and yellow stars were also dropped. The result of all this was that the bombing was scattered as several separate groups of markers each attracted concentrated bombing. Many fires were observed taking hold well and the glow from these was visible for 150 miles on the homeward route. This was the first occasion we had carried incendiary bombs which were designed to create damage by fire as opposed to damage by high explosive.
In spite of our efforts to conceal our route and target the enemy guessed we were going to Stuttgart some 30 minutes before H hour and elements of 14 night fighter Gruppen were deployed against us. Numerous combats were reported but flak was light to moderate over the target itself.
Our route home was also circuitous and was, in general, a reciprocal of our outbound flight. We came back via Reading and let down to arrive over Wickenby and land again after 8 hours 35 minutes of flying time.
Two of 626 aircraft failed to reach the target for quite different reasons. On one the navigator was sick so they returned early and the second was attacked before reaching the target, the bomb doors were damaged and would not open so they were forced to return with their bomb load still on board. They landed safely despite a flat tire[sic] caused by the enemy action. Two other 626 aircraft were damaged by flak as was one of 12 Squadron. Combat with night fighters was reported by 2 of 12 Squadron and 3 of 626 Squadron. There were no losses.
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Operation No. 14 Stuttgart
We returned from our long haul against Stuttgart in the early morning of July 26th, had a day off on the 27th and were detailed for the same target again on the 28th. Whilst we appreciated the necessity to follow up raids on some targets for a variety of strategic reasons those of us who were called upon to make the trip were not too enthusiastic. You may get away with bearding the lion in his den once but not twice in 3 days so we expected strenuous opposition.
The 22 Lancasters from Wickenby were part of a Bomber Command force of 494 Lancasters and 2 Mosquitoes. 626 Squadron's contribution was 10 aircraft.
Our route out and back was very similar to three nights ago with Reading the assembly point. Wickenby takeoff commenced at 2115 hours and again we were amongst the first to go taking off at 2120 hours. The weather had changed somewhat since the 25th. Now we encountered strata cumulus on the outward route with 10/10th low cloud with some slight breaks in the target area.
The target was marked with long sticks of flares and red TIs were dropped at H-6. P.F.F. then marked the aiming point with green and red TIs. Release point flares with green and yellow stars were also dropped so for the main force the marking for both the Stuttgart raids was very similar. Bombing was well concentrated on the markers but because they were scattered so was the bombing. Three groups of fires and 3 large explosions were seen. Photo recce later reported that many parts of the old city were devastated, the main railway station being damaged. It became apparent to myself and my crew that the further we had to travel to reach a target the more scattered the bombing became, and the less likely we were to achieve good concentration. Thus the importance of keeping on track and keeping on time became imperative.
There was moderate flak in the target area but there was intense fighter activity from south west of Paris all the way to and over the target but things were pretty quiet on the way home.
Two of 626 Squadron aircraft were damaged, both by fighter attack. One of 12 Squadron and 3 of 626 reported combats, and two of 12 Squadron (F/O Downing and F/O White, and one of 626 Squadron (F/Sgt Ryan) were shot down. Everyone in all 3 aircraft were killed except F/Sgt Ryan's navigator who became a prisoner. It was F/O Downing's 28th operation – two short of completing his tour. The loss rate for Bomber Command was 7.86%, for Wickenby 13.64%, and for 626 Squadron 10%.
German records for this night show that F/Sgt Ryan's aircraft was engaged in an air battle with a night fighter flown by Martin Becker which had taken off from Nurenburg. Becker's report shows that the Lancaster 626/Y2 was destroyed with serious burning to the starboard wing. "Parts fell off" reads the radio operator's log book. Only the navigator was saved by parachute. All other crew members were interred in a joint grave at Vachinger and in 1948 re-interred in a special cemetery for allied airmen at Durnbach near Munich. 626/Y2 was one of 4 British aircraft destroyed by Martin Becker that night. He was credited with destroying 58 aircraft during the war.
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We flew unmolested back to Wickenby, landed at 0515 hours, debriefed, had some sleep and went home for a few days leave. We did not know until we returned from leave that we had sustained a good sized hole in the starboard tailplane. It was repaired while we were away.
We had now completed almost half of our operational tour without any major problem and while we were unscathed through 14 operations between June 22nd and July 28th, our squadron, 626, had lost 7 aircraft as had 12 Squadron. So it averaged out to one Lancaster lost on each operation we had flown. In terms of crews the record shows that 77 crew members were killed and 12 taken prisoner. I must emphasize that this was the casualty figure for the operations on which I personally flew. There were others taking place when my crew was on stand down and I do not have the figures for these.
I mentioned earlier that I had taken Mary to Aldbourne while I was flying with the squadron. Just about all of the crew members who had wives and families preferred them to be away from the base. Fighting a war from a base in Britain and getting back to that base after each foray against the enemy was a radical departure from the accepted norm but it was the official opinion of the Air Force and the opinion of the combatants that they preferred their loved ones to be somewhere away where they would not be in day to day contact with what was going on. Can you imagine saying to your wife "Oh by the way dear I shall be late tonight I have to go and bomb Germany". The lady's nerves would be shattered after a week or two of this. When I was at O.T.U. Mary had given me a rag doll which looked rather like a gremlin (those of us who have seen gremlins know what they look like). This one was long and skinny with a green jacket and pants and a pointed cap. It was a good luck charm which I carried with me on every operation suspended over my navigation table. It never let me down.
So it was good to head for Aldbourne to see Mary and my family for a few days. Mary was by now about 6 1/2 months pregnant with Keith, our first child, and was in the longing way for sharp tasting fruit. She had already stripped the gooseberries from my mother's bushes and was waiting for apples to ripen a bit. She told me that she and my mother listened to the radio every morning to hear what Bomber Command had been up to the night before and to hear what losses we had sustained, then they waited hoping there would not be a telegram. If they hadn't heard by noon they figured I was still safe. This is certainly not the way to go through a pregnancy and thank goodness it was the only one she had to undergo in this way. My leave was over and I returned to Wickenby on August 6th but not until after a tearful farewell. Mary and my mother did not know if they would ever see me again so it was a poignant departure. I arrived back to typical summer weather for Britain, cloudy with intermittent light rain or showers and occasional sunny periods.
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Operation No. 15 Air-sur-Lys
On August 8th the weather was fair in the morning and afternoon with a build up of thunderstorms in the evening. I have not yet mentioned the American 8th Air Force who by now had been in Britain for some time and were operating by daylight only. Their tactics were different to ours – where we tried to sneak in under cover of darkness and escape without detection, they flew in huge formations and tried to fight their way in and out. Their bomber aircraft, B17s and B24s primarily, were much more heavily armed than we were but carried a significantly smaller bomb load. During this period of the war we were able to dovetail our operations with theirs with considerable success. They would visit a target by day, and we would repeat the effort by night. On this occasion we were to attack oil storage facilities at Air-sur-Lys in the morning but deferred to the 8th Air Force as they wished to attack the same target. So we were somewhat surprised when we were told that the U.S.A.F. had bombed the wrong target and we were going anyway.
Bomber Command detailed a force of 170 Lancasters and 10 Mosquitoes to attack two oil storage targets. Wickenby supplied 25 aircraft, 13 from 12 Squadron and 12 from 626.
I mentioned the forecast was for thunderstorms in the evening and as takeoff commenced at 2150 large thunderstorms lay across our intended track east of Lincoln. We climbed through the cumulo nimbus clouds but conditions were very difficult and numerous course alterations were necessary to avoid the worst of the weather. Once clear of the storm we were able to head for Orfordness, the assembly point. We were carrying our usual bomb load for this type of operation, 13,000 lbs of 1,000 and 500 lbs high explosive. After leaving Orfordness weather improved and by the time we reached the target there was no cloud and visibility was moderate to good.
Mosquitoes marked the aiming point at H-4 with red TIs. Other pathfinders backed up with green TIs. The reds were scattered but the greens were accurate so crews bombed the greens which resulted in accurate bombing. A large orange explosion at 2334 was followed by a dense column of black smoke indicating a direct hit on an oil storage tank. The glow of fires was visible for 75 miles. Photo recce showed many bombs in the target area; all the building[s] had their roofs stripped and there were hits on the canal wharf and rail tracks.
There was some flak and some fighter opposition was experienced. The fighters appeared to be using searchlights as assembly points but the tactic was not very successful.
We got back to Wickenby after a relatively short flight of 2 hours 55 minutes. One of 12 Squadron's aircraft was hit by flak and sustained some damage but no casualties. Another of 12 Squadron reported an engagement with a "Fishpond" radar indicator in which the rear gunner fired a burst but no enemy was seen.
We suffered our worst problems from the weather. Three aircraft, 2 from 12 and 1 from 626, aborted the operation. One was unable to get out of the Cu Nim and another dropped 12,000 feet in a Cu Nim. Not only are there violent currents and downdraughts in these clouds but also severe icing under certain conditions. The third aircraft to abort had it's starboard outer Constant
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Speed Unit (CSU) unserviceable so returned to base. Interestingly enough we had the same problem on our operation No. 11 to Courtrai, but elected to press on.
There were no losses on this night and we have now reached the halfway mark of our tour of operations. I wonder if the second half will be any more difficult than the first. Our gunners still have not fired their guns in anger. Let's keep our fingers crossed.
On August 9th the weather was not good and we were stood down for the day.
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Operation No. 16 Ferme du Forestal
On August 10th 15 of Wickenby's Lancasters were detailed, as part of a Bomber Command force of 60 Lancasters and 20 Mosquitoes, against flying bomb sites. Our target was Ferme du Forestal in the Pas de Calais area of Northern France.
This was a morning operation with takeoff commencing at 1045 hours. The enroute weather was cloudy, breaking up over the English Channel but thickening again from the French coast. Over the target was a 10/10th layer with a base about 2,000 feet. We carried our normal 13,000 lbs of bombs.
The Mosquitoes marked the aiming point with red TIs cascading from 5,000 feet and leaving smoke trails but because of the cloud in the target area we descended from our bombing height of 10,000 to try and get below the cloud layer and bomb visually. Our aircraft was successful in identifying the target and Peter bombed the launching ramp which he could see clearly.
We were then supposed to climb back to 10,000 feet for the return journey but chose to continue down to treetop level and return "on the deck". As we flew across fields and houses at rooftop level we could clearly see the local inhabitants waving a friendly greeting though I expect some of them were startled to hear a heavy bomber roar overhead. A short distance from the coast we passed near a military rifle range and as we flew past first Peter from the front turret, then successively Bert Jones and Bill Bursey all fired a few rounds in the general direction of the targets. This was much more fun than stooging back at 10,000 feet. As we approached the coast we were fired upon by the local defenders but they didn't expect to see the enemy approach them from the rear so by the time they had us in their sights we were safely out to sea. We climbed back to 10,000 feet over the channel and returned home, after a flight of 3 hours 35 minutes, as briefed.
One of 626 Squadron aircraft aborted the mission as he could not find the target, and one was hit by flak and damaged, but no one was hurt. Bomber Command did not sustain any losses.
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Operation No. 17 Falaise
On August 12th 626 Squadron participated in two attacks against widely divergent targets, one in support of the invasion forces in northern France and the other against a strategic target, Brunswick, Germany, some 120 miles west of Berlin.
I guess we were lucky on this occasion as we were selected with two other crews for the shorter mission to Falaise. We were part of a force of 91 Lancasters, 36 Halifaxes, 12 Stirlings and 5 Mosquitoes detailed for this target.
We took off at 2336 hours and climbed towards Reading on a clear summer night with no cloud. From Reading we headed to Selsey Bill on the English south coast (a place I used to visit as a child on Sunday school outings from Aldbourne) thence across the channel to the target. As we approached the French coast the cloud thickened until over the target it was 10/10th with tops about 8 – 10,000 feet.
The target marking was by flares and red TIs backed up by green TIs. They were plentiful and accurate and in spite of the cloud layer we were able to bomb accurately laying our 13,000 lbs of HE across the target. The bombing was well concentrated and extensive damage was done. The German army used Falaise as a hardened position from which they were determined not to fall back, so the allies were left with no alternative but to attack it. There was some flak, both heavy and light, and some fighter activity in the target area, but the Bomber Command loss rate was nil. We returned back to Wickenby via Reading and landed safely after a trip of just over 3 hours.
In the meantime 22 Lancasters, 11 each from 12 Squadron, and 626 Squadron, were detailed as part of a force of 242 Lancasters and 137 Halifaxes against Brunswick. They commenced their takeoff at 2116 hours so we were able to watch them go before we departed ourselves.
They experienced clear weather until 50 miles from the target when it clouded over to 10/10th in the target area. They carried a bomb load of 1 x 2,000 lbs and 12 clusters of incendiaries, the typical bomb load for strategic targets.
There was no marking carried out on this target so crews bombed using their H2S equipment. H2S shows a differentiation between land and water, but it was much more difficult to differentiate between land and built up areas so bombing was not concentrated and not very effective though scattered damage was seen with hits on the power station and gas works.
Both light and heavy flak were experienced and there was considerable fighter activity particularly from the target back to the North Sea. One 626 aircraft reported several combats but no damage.
One 12 Squadron aircraft (F/O Hancox) was shot down and all on board, except the wireless operator and mid upper gunner were killed, and one 626 Squadron (F/O Bennett) was attacked by a fighter and set on fire. The crew bailed out and 4 were taken prisoner. The wireless operator, mid upper gunner and rear gunner were all killed.
Wickenby's loss rate was 9.09% while that of Bomber Command was 7.12%.
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Operation No. 18 Falaise
By August 14th the allied armies had managed to push forward on both sides of Falaise and had effectively trapped a very large force of the enemy in a pocket extending from Falaise to Posigny. To save allied lives on the ground we were asked to bomb them into surrender.
So 16 Lancasters from Wickenby were part of a force of 411 Lancasters, 352 Halifaxes, and 42 Mosquitoes detailed against this target, which would be our last operation in direct support of the invasion armies. 626 Squadron's contribution was 10 aircraft.
We took off at 1207 carrying a bomb load of 13,000 lbs high explosive and climbed towards Reading, our assembly point, then south to the coast and across the channel. We did not climb to our normal height but levelled out at 7,000 feet as we were briefed to choose our own bombing height depending on weather in the target area. We flew above a cloud layer until we reached the English coast then the cloud thinned as we crossed the channel and the target area was clear. With some 800 aircraft all heading in the same direction it seemed the sky was full, a huge gaggle stretching from the French coast all the way back to the English coast. Fighter aircraft from 11 Group provided cover and could be seen above us.
As we approached the target, and wishing to bomb as accurately as possible, we reduced height to 3,000 feet. We knew that our own troops were within 2,000 years of the aiming point which was marked with green TIs, but which quickly became obscured by smoke. There was considerable fire from the ground as the enemy fought back. Peter released the bombs and we turned away to clear the target area for those behind and as we did so the aircraft received a sudden violent pounding. We had been hit but at this point did not know with what or by whom. Then Bill Bursey's voice from the rear turret, "Skipper I've been hit, and I'm bleeding". The aircraft was still flying so we knew it had not sustained fatal damage. Peter Graves, having dropped his bombs was now free to assist Bill and went to the back of the aircraft. As he made his way he reported flak damage all the way to the rear turret. By now Bert Jones had left the mid upper turret to assist and between them they got Bill out of his turret and forward to the rest bed where they lay him down and administered morphine from the first aid kit carried on all aircraft. Peter then applied field dressings to Bill's wounds and made him as comfortable as possible. The important thing now was to get Bill to a hospital as soon as possible so Hicky and I discussed our options. We elected to go for Boscombe Down which we knew could handle a Lancaster and was close to a major hospital in Salisbury (I knew the area well as Mary and I had been stationed at Old Sarum, next door, some 3 years before).
I calculated a course for Boscombe Down and we were on our way. Over the channel Hicky wanted to check that the aircraft would not do any unusual manoeuvres when placed in the landing configuration so we climbed above a suitable patch of cloud and he and Stan King carried out a practice approach on the cloud including reducing power and speed, lowering the undercarriage, applying full flap and stalling on to the cloud patch as though landing on it. Satisfied that all systems were O.K. we continued to Boscombe Down.
We called Boscombe on the emergency frequency and were given permission to land our
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wounded rear gunner. We were met by an ambulance, doctor and medical team. Bill was removed from the rest bed and transferred by ambulance to the American General Hospital, Salisbury.
We had the aircraft checked by the engineering and technical people at Boscombe to make sure we could take it off again, took a look at all the shrapnel [sic] holes, climbed aboard and headed back to Wickenby, arriving in time for supper.
We were the only Wickenby aircraft to sustain damage but 12 Squadron had one aircraft abort the mission. It was forced to abandon over the target when the electrical supply to the bomb release mechanism failed. He brought his bombs back.
Photo recce assessed that every street in Falaise was blocked by craters or rubble and whole sections of the town were completely devastated. The German troops surrendered shortly after their bombardment.
We later discovered that Bill Bursey had received a gunshot wound to the right leg and a shrapnel wound to the right thigh with a fractured femur. The Americans came round the hospital next day and offered him a "Purple Heart" for shedding blood against the enemy. Bill declined with thanks. He did not return to the squadron and never flew with us again. The next day we were joined by Sgt. Stott, his replacement, who was also a sole survivor from another crew. So now out of the seven crew members, 3 of us were sole survivors, Saletto, Stott and I.
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Operation No. 19 Stettin
On the night of August 16th 461 Lancasters of Bomber Command were detailed against Stettin. Wickenby's contribution was 24 aircraft shared equally between the two squadrons. Stettin was a major city on the Baltic and some 120 miles north east of Berlin. It is now part of Poland. It was a long, long way from Wickenby and entailed a crossing of the North Sea from Mablethorpe to a point near the Danish coast at 5600N 0800E then due east across Denmark to Longitude 1045E, then south east across the Kattegat, the Danish island passing west of Copenhagen, and the Baltic Sea to the target. Much of the time we expected to be under enemy attack as Denmark had been occupied by German troops for some time.
We took off at 2041 hours carrying 1 x 2,000 lb and 12 incendiary clusters, rendezvoused at Mablethorpe and headed across the North Sea climbing as high as we could get with a full fuel and bomb load. The weather enroute was clear across the North Sea and Denmark building up to 10/10th cloud with tops at 17,000 feet over Germany but cleared just short of the target which was free of cloud. Our outward trip was long but relatively uneventful. On these long North Sea crossings I always attempted to get as many accurate GEE fixes as possible prior to losing it to the enemy jamming. It was very important to get an appreciation of the wind, to compare it to that forecast and to calculate a correction to be applied to courses and speeds once we were out of range of GEE. So I always attempted to get a fix and calculate the wind every 6 minutes. This gave me a good understanding of what was happening with regard to the weather, which always stood us in good stead when I had to navigate on DR (Dead Reckoning) as we became further away from England. There was light to moderate flak at isolated points on route and some fighter activity. Because there were good coastline responses on the H2S I was able to navigate without difficulty to the target.
Flares and green TIs were dropped at H-6 and P.F.F. marked the aiming point with mixed red and green salvoes backed by red TIs. There were so many markers and decoys operated by the enemy that Peter had difficulty identifying which one he should bomb. In the confusion of aircraft, flak, tracer fire and target markers we overshot and rather than bomb the wrong target went round again. With everyone keeping a sharp eye out for other aircraft in our vicinity Hicky closed the bomb doors and made a gentle turn to the left and eventually a complete 360 degree turn and we came over the target a second time. This time Peter selected the proper target marker and the bombs were duly released. We were all glad to leave the target area. Going across the target and being shot at once is dangerous enough but twice? Phew!! We left the area with relief and headed north west to cross Denmark then south west across the North Sea back home. There was some flak and isolated fighter activity on the way home but Wickenby did not sustain any losses. However, 2 of 12 Squadron reported combat where the gunners fired but were not fired upon and 3 aircraft, 2 from 12, and 1 from 626 were hit by flak. There were no casualties. Bomber Command losses were 5 aircraft – 1.08%.
The attack was considered successful with fires in the centre and south east of the city though considerable bombing was attracted by the decoys or wrong marking. Photo recce
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showed severe damage to shipbuilders Oderwerke A.G., sugar refinery and naval fitting out yard. Also a large area of devastation in the town centre.
This operation took us 8 1/2 hours from takeoff to landing back at Wickenby and the crew becomes very tired particularly on a long stooge home across the sea. Once clear of the Danish coast we are reasonably safe from enemy attack so Hicky put the aircraft on auto pilot and everyone relaxes. I am sure there were periods when I was the only one awake and the only reason for this was that it was my job to get us back home.
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Operation No. 20 Russeheim [sic]
On August 25th a force of 412 Lancasters were ordered against the Opel Works at Russelheim [sic]. Among them were 18 aircraft from each of Wickenby's two squadrons: a maximum effort. On July 25th and 28th we had paid visits to Stuttgart which together with Russelheim, Frankfurt, Mannheim and Karlsruhe form a heavily defended portion of southern Germany. Our trip to Stuttgrat [sic] on July 28th had not been a happy one for Wickenby aircraft so we approached Russelheim with some trepidation.
We carried a full fuel load of 2,154 gallons and a bomb load of 1 x 4,000 lb (Cookie) and 12 clusters of 4lb incendiaries. Our route was quite similar to that used previously for this area. Reading was the assembly point then south across the channel to a point S.W. of Paris, then east north east in a series of zig zags to the target. The weather was good all the way and the target area was clear with slight haze. Takeoff commenced at 1957 hours.
The target was well marked following sticks of flares dropped at H-7. The aiming point was then marked with mixed red and green TIs and backed up by red TIs.
The bombing was well concentrated and the fires could be seen for 150 miles. Photo recce showed severe damage to the plant with all the major units hit, including assembly shops, research labs, drop forge, machine shop and aircraft engine shop.
The target area was, as expected, well defended with intense heavy flak and very active fighters which made contact with the bomber stream in the target area and well into the return journey.
One of 12 Squadron aborted the mission with a sick navigator. Seven of 12 Squadron's aircraft reported combat with night fighters and one was so badly damaged that it crash landed on return and was written off. The only casualty in this aircraft was the navigator who suffered superficial wounds. One other 12 Squadron aircraft was hit by flak. One 626 Squadron aircraft suffered damage caused, it was believed, by an unusual incident. Shortly after bombing the aircraft was thrown out of control by a nearby explosion. All four engines cut but the pilot and engineer managed to get them restarted and flew home safely. It is believed the explosion was another aircraft blowing up. It is interesting that while 7 of 12 Squadron reported combat none of 626 did. However, 626 did lose two aircraft. F/O Harris who, together with 3 members of his crew were taken prisoner, the other 3 were killed and F/O Whetton who was killed together with all of his crew except the bomb aimer who was taken prisoner.
The Bomber Command loss rate for this operation was 3.64%, that for Wickenby 5.56%, while that for 626 Squadron, 11.1%.
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[map]
[underlined] RUSSELHEIM. [/underlined]
[underlined] 25/26 AUGUST 1944. [/underlined]
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Operation No. 21 Stettin
We had visited Stettin on August 16th and had been briefed several times between the 16th and 29th but weather had forced cancellations. So here we are on August 29th poised to go once again. The crews involved were concerned that our intentions may already have been communicated to the enemy and the element of surprise lost. So we expected a difficult time.
The total force consisted of 402 Lancasters and one Mosquito. For Wickenby the contribution was 31 aircraft. For 626 Squadron it was again a maximum effort of 18 aircraft. We were of course carrying a maximum fuel load of 2,154 gallons and our bomb load on this occasion was a total of 8,440 lbs - 1 x 4,000 lb H.E., 660 x 4 lb incendiaries and 60 x 30 lb incendiaries. If you add in 7 men, thousands of rounds of ammunition and the various other stores we carried such as bundles of "window" we were very close to our maximum takeoff weight of 72,000 lbs. Window was the code name for specially designed metal strips which, when dropped from an aircraft, gave a similar radar response to the aircraft itself. We dropped them by the thousands when in an area of high enemy defensive activity to confuse the defenses.
We were among the first to takeoff and on this occasion were followed down the runway by F/O "Lofty" Lofthouse whose crew shared our Nissen hut. As we left the ground and climbed away Lofty was moving along the runway when his feet slipped on the rudder pedal and he "ground looped" the aircraft. A ground loop is a rotation in the horizontal plane and inevitably tears off the undercarriage as it did on this occasion, the story was that Lofty required wooden blocks attached to the rudder pedals to reach them properly and his feet had slipped while pumping the pedals to keep the aircraft straight under full power. Sgt. Stott from his observation point in our rear turret looked right down on this incident and yelled to warn us all. In the few seconds it took for the rest of us to have a look every door and hatch on Lofty's aircraft had opened and seven bodies were running in every direction. Fortunately for everyone his bombs did not explode. Had they done so not only would his crew have been killed but we would have been blown out of the sky as we were very close. A fully laden aircraft now lay in the centre of the runway so it could no longer be used. We were O.K. as we were already airborne but there was a delay on the ground while the whole matter was sorted out, the runway changed and the departure of the rest of the force reorganized. I have spoken recently with Ernie Peressini, the bomb aimer in Lofty's crew, who now lives in Victoria, and he remembers the incident vividly even after 50 years.
We rendezvoused at Mablethorpe and set course north east across the North Sea but remained below a layer of cloud with tops at 5,000 feet to stay below the enemy's radar warning system. We were routed further north than on our last visit to Stettin passing over northern Denmark before heading south east towards the target. We were so far north that to get to the target we had to fly over Sweden which was a neutral country. This was deliberate and we were briefed to head for Sweden if we were unable to get home for any reason. Better to land in a neutral country than to be taken prisoner of war. We stayed low across the sea until approaching the Danish coast then climbed to our operational altitude and remained there until near the target. Below us were layers of thin cloud with tops at 17,000 feet.
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The target marking was punctual and accurate. At H-7 the target was illuminated by long sticks of flares followed by red and green TIs on the aiming point.
We experienced some light flak over Denmark but the serious problem on this night was fighters. The main force was plotted over the Danish coast and interceptions commenced immediately and continued to the target with a few on the return from the target. There was heavy flak in the target area, some bursts being so large they could only have come from high calibre naval guns. Searchlights were also very active. As we were approaching above the clouds in moonlight it was not difficult to see or be seen. As we neared the target the Master Bomber called us down below the cloud layer which was between about 12 and 14,000 feet. We let down and bombed at 12,000 feet.
The results of the bombing were good because we could see the markers as visibility was clear below the cloud layer. As well as high explosive we were all carrying large quantities of incendiaries and very soon fierce fires were burning with smoke almost to our bombing altitude. P.R.U. reported that buildings in Stettiner Oderwerke Shipbuilding A.G. were gutted, Labelsdorf Bahnhof Gasworks destroyed, telegraph office and five factories severely damaged. Three merchant vessels were sunk in the port.
We turned north west after bombing to head back to northern Denmark before returning across the North Sea. The fighter activity decreased as we left the target largely because a well timed force of Mosquitoes attacked Berlin and this drew them away from us. Letting down in the target area involves risks which are not normally there when all aircraft fly over at their predetermined altitude. In this case we were below someone else who did not reduce as low as we and released his bombs while above us. The consequence was that we were hit in the port wing by an incendiary bomb dropped from above. Fortunately for us it smashed right through the wing without damaging vital controls or control surfaces and did not set us on fire. We were very fortunate.
Two of Wickenby's aircraft aborted this operation. I have already mentioned F/O Lofthouse. The second abort was a 12 Squadron aircraft which started out but the wireless operator lost his nerve after setting course so the crew returned. Incidents of nerve failure on the part of crew members were not very frequent, fortunately, but I am sure there were times when we all felt like this poor wireless operator. I think what prevented more of it was the fact that everyone felt an overwhelming loyalty to their crew and would not do anything to let the crew down. On the rare occasion when it did happen the victim left the squadron immediately and was posted to a unit on the Isle of Sheppey in the Thames estuary, east of London for disposal. The R.A.F. used the term L.M.F., Lack of Moral Fibre, to describe these unfortunate souls and their hasty removal from the squadron was to ensure that their inability to cope did not spread. After all, we were all living on the edge wondering each time whether we would return.
Four of 626 Squadron crews reported combat with night fighters, two on the outward trip, one over the target and one on the return. Five of our aircraft sustained damage, including ours, being holed in the port wing, but others were more severe and one had to land at Dunholme Lodge being unable to get back to Wickenby.
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One of 12 Squadron (F/O Spurrs) was shot down over the target. Everyone who managed to bail out was taken prisoner but the two gunners were killed. One of 626 Squadron (F/O Hawkes) was attacked over the Kattegat on the way towards the target and he was able to maintain control only long enough to allow the crew to bail out, but they were close enough to Sweden that they all landed there and were interned. They were carrying a second pilot along for experience so there were 8 instead of the usual 7 aboard. The advice to head for Sweden if possible was sound.
F/O Hawkes later reported "On September 1st we were taken to Falun and kept for 2 days in an interment [sic] camp. On September 3rd we were billeted in the Solliden Pensionat Hotel, where we stayed until October 24th. On that day we were taken to Stockholm and stayed at the Continental Hotel until October 27th when we were sent by air to the U.K." On August 31st, 2 days after they were shot down, the squadron received the news that they were safe.
We left the target area and headed north west passing over Malmo, Sweden which, being neutral, was well lit. We climbed across the Baltic to 20,000 feet as we still had to cross Denmark which was defended. We were glad we did as the squadron aircraft which was attacked by a night fighter in this area was flying at only 14,000 feet.
We successfully negotiated our crossing of Denmark and proceeded out to sea before commencing a gradual let down towards the English coast. At 10,000 feet we took off our oxygen masks and breathed normally for the first time for several hours. Hicky, as was his wont, lit his pipe and the rest of us in the cabin enjoyed a cigarette. We came back into GEE range so I was able to fix our position accurately and get us safely home. We landed at Wickenby without further incident having been airborne 9 hours 35 minutes which turned out to be the longest of our 30 operations. Wickenby loss rate was 6.45% while that of Bomber Command was 5.71%. 626 Squadron's loss rate was 5.55%, one out of the 18 which were detailed to go, or 5.88% one out of the 17 which actually went, but in this particular incident the crew, having landed safely in Sweden, were all returned to the squadron.
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[map]
[underlined] STETTIN. [/underlined]
[underlined] 29/30 AUGUST 1944. [/underlined]
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Operation No. 22 St. Requier
We had not arrived back from Stettin until the early morning of August 30th (about 0630) so by the time we had debriefed, had a meal and got to bed the sun was high in the sky. We did not fly again that day but on the following day August 31st we carried out another attack against a V2 rocket store at St. Requier.
Twenty Lancasters from Wickenby were detailed as part of a Bomber Command force of 418 Lancasters, 147 Halifaxes and 36 Mosquitoes raiding 9 rocket storage sites. There were 10 from each squadron. St. Requier was the most southerly of the Pas de Calais targets.
We took off at 1325 hours carrying 15,000 lbs of H.E. (13 x 1,000 and 4 x 500 lb) and climbed towards Reading our assembly point, climbing through a cloud layer with tops at 17,000 feet. We encountered severe icing as we passed through the clouds. Ice builds up on leading edges of aerofoils and on the propellers. Leading edges were always de-iced if we knew we would be experiencing icing, to try and prevent build up reaching dangerous proportions. It was always reassuring to know that it was not building up on the propellers when you could hear the chunks of ice hitting the side of the fuselage as it flew off. Disconcerting at first, but reassuring as one got used to it. We cleared the tops and flew towards the target at 18,000 feet. The cloud formation changed to broken as we crossed the channel and approached the target.
The aiming point was marked by red TIs which were backed up with green and yellow throughout the attack. The marking was scattered consequently the bombing was not concentrated and some bombs fell between the target and the village. There was only light flak near Abbeville and little was experienced in the target area so there was really no excuse for not pressing home the attack.
Two of Wickenby's aircraft aborted this operation both under rather unusual circumstances. One of 12 Squadron was instructed to abandon by the Master Bomber and one of 626 found the target covered by cloud. I would think that both probably arrived late.
In spite of there not being a heavy concentration of flak what there was was predicted with great accuracy and no less than 5 of Wickenby's aircraft were hit by it, some with serious results. Two of 12 Squadron were hit, one so severely that he crash landed at Woodbridge. The pilot and second pilot received shrapnel wounds to the right leg, the bomb aimer had a shattered left foot and wounds to the right foot and the flight engineer had shrapnel wounds to the right ankle and left wrist. All of these crew members were at the front of the aircraft so the exploding flak was very close to the front. In crash landing at Woodbridge they went to an airfield which was specially equipped to handle such emergencies. The R.A.F. had equipped several airfields very close to the east coast for such eventualities - Manston, Woodbridge and Manby amongst them. They were equipped with long, wide runways, foam, special lighting to disperse fog, heavy equipment to move crashed aircraft quickly out of the way and of course, emergency medical facilities.
Three of 626 Squadron were also hit by flak. One had no casualties but one was damaged so that he was forced to feather both inboard engines and jettison his bombs. He made an
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emergency landing at Manston. The third (F/O Oram) suffered perspex wounds to the face and his flight engineer shrapnel wounds to the left leg. This is the same F/O Oram who on July 6th was hit and, with his crew, had to abandon his aircraft over the channel with the loss of his gunners.
We flew unmolested back to Wickenby and landed safely after a trip of 3 1/4 hours. The Bomber Command loss rate was 1%. All of Wickenby's aircraft got back to England but not to Wickenby so officially we had losses.
And so passed the month of August 1944. We had flown 8 operations since returning from leave and been briefed for several others which were cancelled for one reason or another. Of the 8, five were by night, 3 of which were long flights into Germany (2 to Stettin). We had sustained damaged to our aircraft on two occasions and had lost rear gunner Bill Bursey to injury.
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Operation No. 23 Le Havre
The allied armies had advanced south and spread outward from their initial bridgehead and it was now time to head eastward along the coastal areas and towards Paris. A deep water port was needed and the obvious one was Le Havre so on September 6th a force of 311 Lancasters, 30 Mosquitoes and 3 Stirlings was detailed against the German fortifications at Le Havre. This was the same Le Havre that had opened up on us when we were all alone on July 4th. Wickenby's contribution was 21 Lancasters of which 626 provided 11.
The weather was mainly cloudy with showers and thunder all day so it was decided to go in the evening but even then there was no improvement.
Takeoff commenced at 1656 hours and we followed a route pretty well due south taking us east of London to the target area. Our bomb load was 15,000 lbs H.E. We experienced 10/10th cloud all the way to the target and in the target area the base was at 7,000 feet with heavy rain.
The target marking commenced with green TIs at H-5 backed up with red TIs bursting at 4,000 feet and cascading leaving white smoke trails. Though we were above cloud these TIs burned with such intensity they could be seen and we had the added advantage of H2S. I was able to pinpoint the target and confirm for Peter that he was running up on the correct aiming point. There was some heavy flak in the target area but it was not severe. The bombing was accurate, a large explosion at 1927 hours was followed by flames and black smoke – probably a fuel storage.
One of 626 Squadron aborted on instructions from the Master Bomber.
Bomber Command sustained no losses on this operation and Wickenby aircraft all returned without damage. We landed back at Wickenby after a flight of 3 1/2 hours.
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Operation No. 24 Le Havre
On September 10th we were called upon to make a repeat visit to Le Havre to attack strong points which had survived the attack of September 6th. Bomber Command dispatched a force of 521 Lancasters, 426 Halifaxes and 45 Mosquitoes of which 33 Lancasters were from Wickenby. 626's contribution was 17 aircraft of a total force of nearly 1,000 attacking various targets.
Takeoff commenced at 1643 hours and we climbed on a southerly heading through broken cumulus cloud with tops about 10,000 feet. Above the cloud the sky was clear all the way to the target area with good visibility. We again carried 15,000 lb of H.E. The marking was similar to our attack of September 6th with green TIs and H-5 followed by red TIs bursting at 4,000 feet leaving trails of white smoke. However, on this occasion as the visibility was good the bomb aimers were able to see the aiming point and the bombing was concentrated in this area. Near misses were reported on 6 gun batteries, close enough to incapacitate them, and damage to business property.
There was no opposition and no losses or casualties were sustained. We arrived back at Wickenby after just under 4 hours of flying time. The army captured Le Havre shortly after.
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Operation No. 25 Frankfurt
I mentioned earlier there were a number of German cities in the southern part of the state which were considered good strategic targets. On September 12th we were detailed for another attack on Stuttgart which was changed at 1345 hours to Frankfurt. Wickenby's contribution to a force of 378 Lancasters and 9 Mosquitoes was 34 Lancasters, of which 626 Squadron supplied 15. We must have had an influx of new crews because no less than 7 of the 15 carried second pilots along for experience before going with their own crews. Our second pilot was F/O Hollowell.
The bomb load for this operation was 1 x 4,000 lb., 14 x 4 clusters and 120 x 4 lb incendiaries. The fuel load was 1,900 gallons, not quite full tanks. We took off at 1808 hrs.
Our route was fairly typical for an operation to this area. We headed for Reading, then south to cross the coast at Beachy Head. We then proceeded [sic] to 48°N 05°E passing north of Paris then north east towards the target. After bombing we turned west, crossed the French coast near Calais and home via Orfordness.
The weather en route was clear all the way and the target was also clear with some slight haze. Because we would be flying over friendly territory for much of the outward leg we were allowed to fly at low level and climb to our bombing height prior to reaching the target area. On the leg north of Paris another aircraft flying close to us flicked his navigation light on and off a couple of times. Bert Jones reported this from his mid upper turret and while we were considering the significance Stan King said "My God, we've got our nav lights on". They were promptly switched off. Our thanks went out to our unknown benefactor. It's not advisable to assist the enemy by lighting up your location.
When we reached the target we found that the Pathfinder Force had dropped long sticks of flares at H-7. The aiming point was then marked with mixed salvoes of red and green TIs and kept marked with red TIs. Crews were able to identify the target by the light of the flares. Most target markers were just south of the marshalling yards.
The bombing was concentrated though tended to spread a little to the west. Smoke rose to some 5,000 feet and the fires were visible for 100 miles. Photo recce showed that large areas of the city were severely damaged. The main railway station was half destroyed with damage to workshops and engine sheds. Twelve factories, the gas works and power station were also damaged.
Some light flak and moderate heavy flak was experienced up to about 18,000 feet but we managed to get above it. Numerous searchlights were coning, believed to be cooperating with night fighters which were active inward, over the target and outward.
One of 626 Squadron was coned over Mannheim, extensively damaged by heavy flak and landed at Woodbridge at the emergency airfield there. Two of 12 Squadron were attacked and damaged by night fighters. The mid upper gunner of one received gunshot wounds to both legs.
One of 626 Squadron (F/O Thorpe) was attacked by a night fighter and destroyed. Thorpe, his wireless operator and mid upper gunner were taken prisoner, all other crew members
45
[page break]
including the second pilot, who was along for experience, were killed. It was his first and only operation. His crew were returned to the Lancaster Finishing School to crew with another pilot.
We arrived back at Wickenby after flying for 7 hours 55 minutes. F/O Hollowell thanked us for the experience and went on to complete a tour with his own crew.
The Bomber Command loss rate was 4.39%, that of Wickenby 2.94% and 626 Squadron 6.66%
46
[page break]
FRANKFURT 12-9-44
626 SQUADRON
A/C
(a) Captain - 2nd PIL. (b) Nav. - W/Op (c) B/A - F/E (d) MuG - R/G
JB661 C2
(a) F/O G.A. Price - P/O R. McAinsh (b) Sgt. F.B. Beaton - Sgt. B. Walley (c) F/S T.H. Lightfoot - Sgt. S.A. Frew (d) Sgt. V.A. Lane - Sgt. J. Lee
LM113F2
(a) F/O T.H. Ford (b) F/S J.M. Jackson - W/O H.A.S. Tween (c) F/S J.C. Payne - Sgt. R.A. Wood (d) Sgt. J.C. Moore - Sgt. P.L. Potter
PD295 B2
(a) F/O G. Lofthouse (b) P/O R.C. McMillan - F/S A.V. Bettney (c) W/O E. Peressini - Sgt. K.W.T. Adams (d) F/S R.W. Smith - F/S F.C. Child
LM141 D2
(a) F/O D.S. Nelson (b) F/O T.R. Murray - P/O R.J. Lacey (c) F/O V.H. Halstead - Sgt. O. Old (d) Sgt. A.M. Walker - Sgt. C.C. Merriman
PB412 Z2
(a) F/O W.J. Cook (b) F/S H. Sulz - Sgt. L.A. Rolfe (c) F/S K.C. McCormick - Sgt. D.W. Garside (d) Sgt. A.H. Jones - F/S E. Smith
PA990 R2
(a) F/O G.A. Green - F/O R.J. Tierney (b) F/S W.A. Stephens - F/S W.A. Dickson (c) F/O K.E.F. Taylor - Sgt. O.F. Farley (d) Sgt. W. Norman - F/S G.C. Newton
ND163 T2
(a) F/O R.A. Collens - P/O L.A. Titmuss (b) F/Lt. J.H. Leuty - Sgt. K.T. Rainbird (c) F/S W.E. Birch - Sgt. H.S. Merry (d) Sgt. E.W. Roberts - Sgt. H. Davy
PB411 Y2
(a) F/O H. Winder - Sgt. R.C. Yule (b) P/O J.J. McDevitt - Sgt. A.W. Reid (c) F/S M. Parker - Sgt. H.S.G. Rich (d) Sgt. R.A. Albone - P/O W.G. Green
LL959 A2
(a) F/Lt. A.C. Hicks - F/O R.A. Hollowell (b) F/S K.J. Brind - F/S J. Saletto (c) F/O P.M. Graves - Sgt. S.G. King (d) Sgt. A.B. Jones - Sgt. D. Stott
PD287 U2
(a) F/O J.Y.N. Walbank - F/O R.M.Smith (b) F/S L.A. Sparrow - F/S J.M. Dewar (c) F/S R.N. Purves - Sgt. E. Shepherd (d) F/S G. Derrington - F/S J.C. Harris
LM137 G2
(a) F/O D.R.B. Thorpe - F/O G.T. Bolderstn (b) F/S A.C.L. Cox - Sgt. J. Peart (c) F/S S.E. Dunnett - Sgt. F.C. Foster (d) F/S R.H. Cross - F/S L.F. Beattie
NF907 K2
(a) F/O E. Fitzsimmons (b) F/S G.E. Dunsford - Sgt. C. Summers (c) F/S J.V. Gray - Sgt. D.W. Richards (d) Sgt. D. De Silva - F/O G.A. Pearce
LM689 N2
(a) F/O R.G. Harvey (b) Sgt. S.J. Partridge - Sgt. J.L. Nuttall (c) F/O R. Kelly - Sgt. R. Heys (d) Sgt. J.K. Hogan - Sgt. G.T. McMasters
PD 286 02
(a) F/O J.C. Campbell (b) F/O R. Cluston - F/S R.C. Champagne (c) F/S W.F. Palmer - Sgt. J. Akhurst (d) Sgt. J.G. Reynolds - Sgt. A.D. Winser
LL961 S2
(a) F/O E.W. Parker (b) Sgt. E. Arrowsmith - F/S J.D. McPherson (c) Sgt. J. Tordoff - Sgt. R.H. Westrop (d) Sgt. W.J. Standen - Sgt. G. Hopkins
AIR 27-2146 PUBLIC RECORDS OFFICE
With the weather fair to fine, 378 Lancasters carried out the last major attack on Frankfurt of the war.
12 Squadron dispatched 19 aircraft and all returned safely. 626 Squadron detailed 16 aircraft but F/O Jones failed to take off. On return, F/O Collens landed at Woodbridge with flak damage. LM137 UM-G2, F/O Thorpe failed to return.
F/O D.R.B. Thorpe. PIL.
F/O G.T. Balderstone RCAF 2nd PIL. Killed.
P/O A.C.L. Cox NAV. Killed.
Sgt. J. Paert. [sic] W/T
F/Sgt. S.E. Dunnett B/A. Killed.
Sgt. F.C. Foster F/E. Killed.
F/Sgt. R.H. Cross. MuG
F/Sgt. L.F. Beattie R/G. Killed.
[page break]
Operation No. 26 Rheine-Hopsten
The allied armies had by now broken out from their original bridgehead and pushed north west through Belgium into Holland, and a strategy was conceived for a massive airborne landing using gliders and paratroops in the Arnhem area to create a bridgehead across the Rhine River and ultimately link up with the forward moving army. On September 16th our job was to neutralize German held airfields in the area to minimize the opposition to our landings the next day. Different squadrons and different bases were allocated to specific targets. This was a pinpoint precision attack rather than area bombing.
Wickenby's target was the airfield at Rheine-Hopsten, other squadrons were given other targets. Thirty one Lancasters, 19 from 12 Squadron, and 12 from 626 were detailed for this attack.
Because of the nature of the target, buildings, runways, etc. we carried 10,000 lbs of H.E., in the form of 20 x 500 lb bombs. This was a night attack and we took off at 2200 hours climbing to Mablethorpe, then across the North Sea to a point on the Dutch coast just north of The Hague and so to the target.
The weather en route was good with small amounts of cloud and the target area was clear with slight ground haze. The target marking was carried out by "Oboe" equipped Mosquitoes. Oboe was a modification of the GEE navigation system used for precision bombing and marking. As the allied armies moved across Europe they overran some of the Jamming stations so we were able to use our navigation aids further east. On this night I was able to get accurate GEE fixes all the way to the target. So as we approached the target and I advised the crew we were there the target markers appeared before us. They consisted of red TIs. We had already opened the bomb doors and Peter had fused the bombs so release was a simple matter.
We experienced a small amount of light flak in the target area and night fighters were active but we did not engage in any night fighter activity. The night was very dark so visual assessment of the attack was not possible but photo recce showed that the airfield sustained considerable damage. At least 75 craters were created including 45 on the main runway and 3 on the secondary with 13 on the taxi way. The airfield was out of commission for 48 hours which was the object of our exercise.
The glider troops landed at Arnhem the next day but their effort (and ours) was for nought as they were never able to link up with the main army, became over extended, and were either captured or killed. A costly mistake, it was made into a very successful film, called "A Bridge Too Far" after the war.
Two of 12 Squadron reported combat with night fighters but no damage and no casualties were sustained by Wickenby aircraft on this night. Nor indeed did Bomber Command lose any aircraft. We arrived back at Wickenby and landed after a flight of almost 4 hours. F/O Hollowell completed his first operation with his own crew on this night.
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We were now into our last 5 operations. The conventional wisdom among Bomber Command crews was that if you weren't shot down during your first 5 missions, when you were inexperienced, you would be during your last 5 when you became over confident. We hoped our last few would be against lightly defended targets. Some hope, as it turned out.
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Operation No. 27 Calais
The allied armies had now fanned out across Europe but had bypassed a number of strong points along the French and Belgian coasts where the opposition was very stiff. One such strong point was Calais and the area surrounding the city which was our target on September 20th. This was an operation which had previously been planned for the 21st but was brought forward to the 20th. The Bomber Command force consisted of 437 Lancasters, 169 Halifaxes and 40 Mosquitoes. Wickenby's contribution was 39 Lancasters of which 626 Squadron provided 20. We assembled at a point east of London and headed straight for the target in the afternoon, but conditions were very cloudy with poor visibility which improved a little as we crossed the channel. In the target area there were thin layers of stratus with tops about 4,000 feet.
We carried 15,000 lbs of 1,000 and 500 lb H.E. Target marking was by green TIs from H-5 and H-3 then red TIs bursting at 2,000 feet leaving a trail of white smoke. The Master Bomber called us down to 3,000 feet and we bombed from there against the TIs which were accurately placed on the aiming point. Our own troops were only some 2.000 yards away so accurate bombing was mandatory, and as there was no real opposition not too difficult.
One interesting aspect of this operation was revealed by photo recce - a gun casement which received several direct hits only suffered shallow depressions in it's roof. Reinforced concrete several feet thick required much more than 1,000 lb bombs to do any real damage.
There was no damage to any of Wickenby's aircraft but we did have great difficulty getting back on the ground when we arrived home, as the weather had deteriorated significantly while we were away. We landed at 1750 hours after almost 4 hours flying. Comber Command loss rate was 0.15% - one aircraft.
It was now some seven weeks since we had leave and the rule of thumb was every six weeks or so, so off we went for a few days vacation. Aldbourne looked about the same as it always did but Mary had increased her measurements somewhat. She was now about 3 weeks away from her due date and was pretty uncomfortable. Stan King was getting engaged on this leave and had invited us to attend the party at his parents home on the outskirts of London. My mother did not want us to go as she was worried Mary might give birth on the train or in a London taxi or somewhere. However, being young and impetuous we decided to take the chance, so off we went to London. We were to stay at the King home by invitation of Stan's parents but when the party was in full swing the air raid sirens went off and we all trooped to the air raid shelter in the basement of their home, and there we stayed. It was ironic that in spite of the raids the R.A.F. and U.S.A.F. had carried out against the V1 and V2 launching sites the Germans were still able, as late as September 1944, to submit London to harassing air raids.
As a result of their efforts we never did get to bed and the next day took the train back to Hungerford and the bus to Aldbourne.
The few days went all too quickly but now we only had 3 more operations to complete and I felt very confident of success.
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Operation No. 28 Westkapelle
At the beginning of October there was some uncertainty about who should be going where. For example – on October 1st 40 aircraft were to standby for a tactical target in Northern France. At 1415 the squadrons were stood down. Then at 1730 they were again placed on standby for an attack on Bergen, which was cancelled at 1845 hours. On October 2nd at 1100 hours the squadrons were stood down and at 1645 18 aircraft were ordered to standby for an operation against Westkapelle tomorrow. And so it was that on October 3rd we became part of a force of 252 Lancasters and 7 Mosquitoes detailed against tactical targets in north west Europe. The 18 Wickenby aircraft were equally divided between the squadrons.
As I have already mentioned the allied armies moved out from their bridgehead but bypassed the coastal ports and cities and "mopped up" later when they had been softened by the air forces. They now needed a major supply port in Belgium and Antwerp had been captured but it's approaches were still under German guns. The island of Walcheren dominates the sea approach and was well defended. So the idea was to breach the sea wall at Westkapelle, at the western tip of the island, and allow flood waters to overrun the German positions.
A "Dambuster" type raid but with ordinary high explosive bombs. We carried 12,500 lbs consisting of one 4,000 lb, 8 x 1,000 lb and one 500 lb H.E. We took off at noon, headed to Aldeburgh, near Ipswich, then straight across the North Sea to the target. There was a cloud layer right from base to target but the base was at 5,000 feet so we stayed below where visibility was good.
The target marking was by green TIs at H-5 backed up by red TIs. The pathfinders were punctual, their initial marking undershot slightly but it didn't matter as we could see the target clearly as we approached. There were some small puffy clouds below the main layer so to make absolutely certain we went as low as was safe. We dropped our bombs from 1,500 feet which is, in fact, below the safety height for a 4,000 pounder and we felt the compression hit the aircraft as it exploded. We climbed away from the target and as we turned for home could see we had made a hole in the sea wall and water was already pouring through.
The photo recce report stated that the original breach was enlarged to approximately 130 yards due to the corrosive action of water passing through. A vast area was inundated, with sea water at least 2 miles inland and to the boundaries of Middleburg and Flushing.
There was some flak activity in the target area, mostly from Flushing, but Wickenby aircraft did not experience any damage or casualties.
The squadron commander, who participated in this operation had an unusual experience when he came under what may have been a mock attack by two fighter aircraft believed to be Mustangs. His rear gunner fired a short burst which appeared to be sufficient to drive them off as they were not seen again.
We landed back at Wickenby after a flight of 2 hours 50 minutes.
Bomber Command did not lose any of it's aircraft in today's efforts.
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Operation No. 29 Saarbrucken
While the British and Canadian armies pushed north east through Belgium and Holland, the American Third Army was heading east into Germany and were now some 20 miles from Saarbrucken and the other industrial towns which we had previously attacked in this area. Our attack on Saarbrucken on October 5th was at the request of the advancing Americans.
Thirty-nine Lancasters from Wickenby were part of a force of 531 Lancasters and 20 Mosquitoes detailed against Saarbrucken. 626 Squadron supplied 19. This was, of course, a night operation and takeoff commenced at 1817 hours.
Our route took us to Gravesend, Beachy Head, south to the French coast then east to the target. We climbed through a layer of 10/10th cloud which persisted to about 6°E then gradually cleared so that the target had merely some thin broken cloud and ground haze. Our bomb load was one H.E., a 4,000 lb "Cookie" and 7,000 lb of incendiaries for a total of 11,000 lbs.
The target marking consisted of long strings of flares over the target at H-7 followed by salvoes of red and green TIs.
For some reason there were no searchlights in the target area. There was however a moderate, heavy flak barrage with explosions above 15,000 feet. There were also some enemy fighters active in the target area.
Because visibility was good we were able to see that the markers were accurate and good concentrated bombing ensued. Several large explosions were observed and smoke rose to 12,000 feet. The glow of the fires could be seen for 100 miles on the return journey. At 2036 hours the Master Bomber gave the code word to abandon the mission adding that allied troops were getting near the target. Our aircraft had not been furnished with the code word, consequently most crews bombed the target. Photo reconnaissance showed that the steel works of Vereinigte Huttenwerke had every large building damaged. The Luttgens Wagon Factory, the Maschinenbau A.G. and the Portland Cement Werke were severely damaged. The infantry Barracks, the Dragoon Barracks and the Artillery Barracks were all gutted.
On leaving the target area we headed north west and crossed the French coast near Calais. We returned to Wickenby only to find the airfield fogged in and were unable to land. This presented a major problem as most of the airfields in the Lincolnshire area were similarly fogged in and it was from this area that many of the 531 Lancasters originated. However, the operations people on the ground were able to find diversionary airfield which were open and everyone got down safely. We landed at Methwold in East Anglia and spent the night there returning to Wickenby the next day.
One of 626 Squadron aborted this mission. He got airborne but his starboard inner engine cut out over base so he had no alternative but to land again.
Two of Wickenby's aircraft sustained flak damage, one from each squadron and one from 626 had two encounters with fighters but did not sustain any damage. Wickenby did not lose any aircraft on this occasion but Bomber Command lost 3 for a loss rate of 0.54%.
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Operation No. 30 Emmerich
There are certain days, certain events which are imprinted indelibly on the mind. The declaration of war, the day you marry, the birth of your children, days of great joy or great expectations or great terror. Such a day was October 7th, 1944. The weather was fairly typical for early October in Lincolnshire – cloudy with occasional rain.
The airborne landings at Arnhem had failed and there were heavy concentrations of enemy troops in the area of Arnhem, Nijmegen, Emmerich and along the Rheine river. Wickenby's target was to be Emmerich and this was the first daylight attack on Germany from Wickenby.
Forty-two Lancasters were detailed as part of a Bomber command force of 340 Lancasters and 10 Mosquitoes. Each squadron provided 21 aircraft – a maximum effort. We carried one 4,000 lb H.E. and 2520 x 4 lb incendiaries in clusters for a total of 14,080 lbs. We climbed to rendezvous at Cromer, on the Norfolk coast then cross the North Sea to The Hague and so to the target.
We had climber through a 10/10ths layer of cloud and at our bombing height of 10-12,000 feet we were in bright sunshine above it. Three hundred and forty Lancasters in a huge gaggle all headed in the same direction, sun glinting on perspex cabins and turrets. As we approached the Dutch coast the cloud cleared and all that remained was a slight ground haze.
I had given Hicky the final course to the target and as we approached I was standing between he and Stan King and slightly behind so I could see ahead, all round and behind us. We were nicely in the middle of the stream. Peter Graves was prone in the bomb aimers position in the nose watching the target coming down the drift wires of his bomb site. The flak was intense (we later learned the Germans had turned their 88mm anti tank weapons skyward and the shells were exploding at our altitude) and we were on a straight and level bombing run. Peter's voice over the intercom "Steady, Steady, Bomb Doors Open". Hicky, "Bomb Doors Open". Ahead I can see the intensity of the exploding flak – an aircraft is hit and catches fire. As it loses height I see one – two – three parachutes drifting down but no more. Then another is hit, this time a part of the wing is blown off and the aircraft spirals down – again parachutes but not seven. I think – my God, we're next. After all this time – after dark cold nights in the skies over major German cities – after warm sunny afternoons against V1 launching ramps in France – after 29 operations we are going to get written off. "Left, Left – Steady". I look behind just in time to see a Lancaster right behind us take a direct hit and spin out of control. "Steady, Steady – Bombs gone – Bomb Doors Closed".
The aircraft leaps as the 14,080 lbs of bombs drop away – then – thud – we are hit. "Bomb Doors Closed". We climb and turn away from the target and check for damage. No one is hurt and everything seems to be O.K. so we head for home. We have survived – we've come through – a cheer goes up from the crew, all the pent up emotion is released.
The reports state that there was moderate to intense predicted heavy flak from 11-13,000 feet on the run up, through the target and for a few miles after leaving the target area. No enemy aircraft were seen. Fighter cover was provided by 11 Group.
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Mosquitoes marked the aiming point with green TIs at H – 5 and maintained the marking with red TIs. The marking was accurate and the Master Bomber instructed the main force to bomb the red TIs. Bombing was accurate and many fires were started with smoke drifting up to 12,000 feet.
Allied troops who were only 8 miles south west must have had a good view of the afternoons activities.
The flight home, though routine, was full of joy as we knew we would not be called upon to do this kind of thing again. We landed at Wickenby after 4 hours 15 minutes of flying.
Wickenby did not lose any aircraft on this operation, but 3 of 12 Squadron and 4 of 626 sustained varying amounts of flak damage. Our aircraft, A2, had the "port undercarriage holed by heavy flak in the target area".
After briefing I sent Mary a telegram to let her know I had completed my tour of operations then we took our ground crew out to the local pub to celebrate our joint success. These were the men who kept A2 serviceable for us and who repaired her when we brought her back damaged. A rip roaring good time was had by all.
[telegram]Brind Cherry Tree
Aldbourne [indecipherable word]
Tour completed love darling
Ken[/telegram]
The next day the 8th was Sunday so we could not proceed with our clearance until the 9th (Mary's 22nd Birthday) which we did with all despatch and headed for home and leave on 10th. Just as a matter of interest the weather on the 8th, 9th and 10th was cloudy with rain and drizzle and no operations were scheduled for either day.
I arrived at Aldbourne on October 10th and of course by now Mary is due to have her baby.
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On the morning of October 12th she started in labour, we were driven to Savernake Hospital by a lady of the W.V.S. (Women's Volunteer Service) and at 6 pm Keith John arrived. All in all a masterpiece of timing.
The crew went their several ways after we had finished our tour. The normal practice was to become an instructor at an O.T.U. or H.C.U. I went briefly to Wigtown, Scotland, accepted a commission, and managed to get a posting to Cardington, Bedford where I became O.C. Headquarters Unit and where Karol was born. Gillian, Janet and Rod were to come along later. Jack Saletto was commissioned and returned to his native Australia. Peter Graves, the policeman, transferred to the Provost Branch and went to Germany after the war was over as a member of the control commission. The others were demobbed at the end of the war. Hicky went home to pursue his career as a civil engineer. I heard later he had died in the 1960s of a heart attack. Stan King went home, married his sweetheart, had a family, worked in the printing industry and died on December 1st, 1982.
Bert Jones went home to Yorkshire where he married and had a family. He became an Assistant Executive Engineer with the post office and died in retirement on December 16th, 1989.
Casualties sustained by 626 Squadron and 12 Squadron from the operations in which our crew participated:- 626 lost 10 Lancasters with 43 crew members killed, 12 taken P.O.W. and 8 Interned (albeit briefly) in Sweden. 12 Squadron lost 11 Lancasters with 58 crew members killed and 19 taken P.O.W. And, of course, there were a number of occasions when aircraft arrived home with wounded crew on board, the one most vividly remembered was the injury to Bill Bursey on August 14th. Our aircraft was damaged by flak on 5 occasions and by one of our own once (the incendiary through the wing on August 29th) but we never came under attack by enemy fighters and our gunners never did have to fire their guns in our defence. At the conclusion of our operational tour F/L Hicks was awarded the D.F.C. and later I received the Belgian Croix de Guerre with Palme.
I had spent my 21st Birthday in hospital, I had lost my first crew, I had crewed up again and completed a tour of operations, I had gone home afterwards and taken Mary to hospital where she had given birth to Keith on October 12th and on October 17th I celebrated my 22nd Birthday. All in all an eventful year.
55
[page break]
ROYAUME DE BELGIQUE
[crest]
[italics] Le Ministredela Défense Nationale
a l'honneur de faire savoir [/italics] au
Flight Sergeant: Kenneth - John [underlined] B R I N D [//underlined],
que, par Arrêté de S.A.R.,le Prince Régent, du 16.1.1947,No 3424,
LA CROIX DE GUEERE 1940 AVEC PALME,
lui a été décernée,
"Pour le courage et la bravoure dont il a fait preuve dans les glorieuses batailles qui ont amené la libération de la Belgique."
[signature]
56
[page break]
The Wickenby Squadrons
Twelve Squadron moved from Binbrook to Wickenby on September 25th, 1942. It was and still is a permanent R.A.F. squadron with battle honours dating from World War I to the Gulf War.
Their first WWII operation from Wickenby was on September 26th 1942 when 6 Wellingtons laid mines in the Baltic Sea. One aircraft was lost.
The Wellingtons were replaced by Lancasters in November 1942. On November 7th, 1943 No. 626 Squadron was formed from "C" Flight of 12 Squadron. Their first operation was on November 10th. The last operation of 12 and 626 Squadrons from Wickenby was against Berchtesgaden on April 25th 1945.
Both squadrons played a prominent role in Bomber Command offensive, and suffered their proportion of the heavy losses, with 763 members of 12 Squadron and 317 members of 626 Squadron losing their lives on operations from Wickenby, a total of 1,080 Killed in Action.
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Bomber Command Statistics
Air Crew Casualties
Of the 125,000 who trained and served in Bomber Command there were 73,841 Air Crew Casualties:
47,268 Killed in Action
[underlined] 8,232 [/underlined] Killed in Accidents
55,500 Total Killed (44.4% of total)
9,938 Shot down and taken P.O.W.
[underlined] 8,403 [/underlined] Wounded
18,341 (14.6% of total)
[underlined] 73,841 [/underlined] Casualties (59% of total)
58
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
A year in the Life
Description
An account of the resource
Ken Brind's autobiography detailing his tour of operations.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
KJ Brind
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
France--Alençon
Great Britain
England--Aldeburgh
Germany--Berlin
United States
Florida--Pensacola
France--Reims
England--Gravesend (Kent)
England--Hastings
France--Dieppe
England--Brighton
England--Reading
France--Domléger-Longvillers
France--Pas-de-Calais
France--Calais
France--Berck-sur-Mer
England--London
England--Dungeness
France--Vierzon
France--Le Havre
France--Orléans
France--Dijon
England--Bridport
England--Weymouth (Dorset)
France--Rennes
Great Britain Miscellaneous Island Dependencies--Channel Islands
Europe--Mont Blanc
France--Tours
France--Normandy
France--Caen
Belgium--Kortrijk
Belgium--Brussels
Belgium--Ostend
Germany--Dortmund
Germany--Kiel
England--Mablethorpe
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Rüsselsheim
Germany--Mannheim
Germany--Karlsruhe
Germany--Nuremberg
Germany--Munich
England--Selsey (West Sussex)
France--Falaise
England--Old Sarum (Extinct city)
Poland--Szczecin
Atlantic Ocean--Kattegat (Baltic Sea)
Denmark--Copenhagen
Sweden
Sweden--Malmö
Sweden--Falun
England--Beachy Head
Germany--Rheine
Netherlands--Arnhem
Netherlands--Hague
Netherlands--Vlissingen
Norway--Bergen
Belgium--Antwerp
Netherlands--Walcheren
Germany--Saarbrücken
Germany--Emmerich
Netherlands--Nijmegen
England--Cromer
Germany--Berchtesgaden
England--Marlborough
Florida
Poland
France
Germany
Denmark
Belgium
Netherlands
Norway
Europe--Frisian Islands
England--Berkshire
England--Dorset
England--Kent
England--Lincolnshire
England--Norfolk
England--Suffolk
England--Sussex
England--Wiltshire
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Civilian
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Language
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eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Memoir
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
62 printed sheets
Identifier
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BBrindKJBrindKJv1
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
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Sue Smith
12 Squadron
1656 HCU
18 OTU
460 Squadron
625 Squadron
626 Squadron
Advanced Flying Unit
air gunner
aircrew
anti-aircraft fire
B-17
B-24
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of the Pas de Calais V-1 sites (24/25 June 1944)
Distinguished Flying Cross
entertainment
evading
FIDO
Gee
H2S
Halifax
Heavy Conversion Unit
incendiary device
Ju 88
killed in action
lack of moral fibre
Lancaster
Lancaster Finishing School
Me 110
mine laying
Mosquito
navigator
Nissen hut
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Oboe
Operational Training Unit
P-51
Pathfinders
Photographic Reconnaissance Unit
pilot
prisoner of war
RAF Binbrook
RAF Blyton
RAF Boscombe Down
RAF Cardington
RAF Dumfries
RAF Dunholme Lodge
RAF Finningley
RAF Hemswell
RAF hospital Rauceby
RAF Kelstern
RAF Lindholme
RAF Manby
RAF Manston
RAF Methwold
RAF Wickenby
RAF Wigtown
RAF Woodbridge
searchlight
Spitfire
tactical support for Normandy troops
target indicator
training
V-1
V-2
V-weapon
Wellington
Window
wireless operator
-
Dublin Core
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Spatial Coverage
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Belgium--Kortrijk
Title
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Kortrijk [place]
Courtrai; Courtray; Kortryk; Kortrik
Description
An account of the resource
This page is an entry point for a place. Please use the links below to see all relevant documents available in the Archive.
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/408/7632/SChattertonJ159568v10552.1.jpg
50175350ec3089ab8c8a796abf83cb03
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/408/7632/SChattertonJ159568v10553.1.jpg
b02d1b2859412ceb23a5943c89385f1d
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Chatterton, John. 44 Squadron operations order book
Description
An account of the resource
Collection consists of 521 items which are mostly Operations orders, aircraft load and weight tables and bomb aimers briefings for 44 Squadron operations between January 1944 and April 1945. <br /><br />The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by M J Chatterton and catalogued by Nigel Huckins. <br /><br />This collection also contains items concerning Dewhurst Graaf and his crew, and Donald Neil McKechnie and his crew. Additional information on <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/109020/">Dewhurst Graaf</a> and <a href="https://internationalbcc.co.uk/losses/115642/">Donald Neil McKechnie</a> is available via the IBCC Losses Database.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2016-03-14
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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Chatterton, J
Transcribed document
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Transcription
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COURTRAI
DATE 20-7-44
G.O.L.
FTQSJY A.P.K.V.H.EZ
[Table of Bomb Loads and Preselect]
[Table of Aircraft Height]
BOMBING HEIGHT. 10’ – 14,000’ BOMBING HEADING.
H+1 – 3 H+3 – 5 H+5 – 7 H+7 - 9
[underlined] WAVE 1. WAVE 2. WAVE 3. WAVE 4. WAVE 5. [/underlined]
COLOUR FILM: V. [deleted]R[/deleted] P.T.S. [deleted]O[/deleted]K.G.J.L.
RESET W S & D.
[page break]
PFF Prelim. oboe TI. Red bombing 7 mins. Cascading from 4000’
H – 6 .H – 5. H – 4. (Point SW of [symbol] – may be
3 A/C flares H – 5. Dropping 9 – 6 & ? clusters flares.
3 Mosq. mark AP- long burning TI Green (1000lb) + 1 Mosq. with a 36 minute burner.
If correct will be backed up by similar TI’s Green.(5) by SABS
Yellow TI’s cancel
When main force come in they should see GREEN TI’s on AP & possibly Remains of Red TI’s down to the SW of [symbol]
Aim at MPI of all markers not cancelled or as directed by the controller.
All A/C to carry photo flashes.
[underlined] Spoof [/underlined] Flares & TI’s 25 mls East of B at H-7 to -10. {H-10 – H-9 6 Lancs – [undecipherable]}[sic] 4 Mosq. TI’s Spoof Controller on VHF.
[symbol] No a/c to bomb before H+1 unless ordered by controller.
Mosq. Cannot possibly work properly.
[underlined] Bombing Winds [/underlined] By H-5 for mean height.
Weather recce by H-30 (Mosquito).
Wave
F 1 13,000 [tick] x
H 2 11,000 x
G 3 11,000 x
E 2 13,000 x
A 3 12,000’ x
J 3 13,000’ x
L 1 11,000’ [tick] x
Y 1 10,000’ [tick] x
Z 1 12,000’ [tick] x
V 4 10,000’ x
P 4 11,000’ x
T 4 12,000’ x
Q 4 13,000’ x
S 3 14,000’ x
O 2 14,000’ x
K 2 12,000’ x
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Bomb aimers briefing 20 July 1944 - Courtrai
Description
An account of the resource
Shows two bomb loads for operation, one for six aircraft the other for seven. Details distributor, preselection and false height settings as well as Window, timing, bombing heights and wave H+ times for four waves. On the reverse Pathfinder marking, Mosquito marking, bombing instructions, spoof attack and other information. Lists aircraft letters with wave and height.
Date
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1944-07-20
Format
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Two sides front form document partially filled in on the reverse handwritten
Language
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eng
Type
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Text
Text. Service material
Identifier
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SChattertonJ159568v10552, SChattertonJ159568v10553
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
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Belgium
Belgium--Kortrijk
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-07-20
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Rights
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Contributor
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Steve Baldwin
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
briefing
Lancaster
Mosquito
Oboe
Pathfinders
target indicator
Window
-
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Stephenson, Stuart
Stuart Stephenson MBE
S Stephenson
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Identifier
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Stephenson, S
Description
An account of the resource
20 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Transcribed document
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Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
V GROUP NEWS V
9 Wadd.
10 Skell.
6 Bard.
JULY 1944 [deleted] SECRET [/deleted] [Stamp] NO.24
FOREWORD by A.O.C.
Within the past few months the German defence of occupied Europe by day has greatly weakened and in consequence new methods of attack have become feasible. Day fighters are unable to challenge our great superiority and night fighters have not so far been risked in daylight combat. Recently therefore an increasing proportion of attacks have been by day, and since these provide some novel problems, I would like aircrew to know the reasons behind our present tactics, and the developments which we hope to see.
Apart from enemy defences there is one difficulty which is at present inherent in daylight operations to a greater extent than in night operations, and that is smoke. By night markers can usually be seen through considerable clouds of smoke, but by day their brilliance is insufficient, and those crews who bomb towards the end of an attack will seldom be able to see the aiming point. It may therefore, be necessary to order crews to offset the bombsight, or overshoot from a clearly defined aiming point outside the target area. These are however palliatives and the solution for targets where cratering is required us the half-hour delay fuse which will enable the whole attack to be completed before the bombs start to explode. These fuses will shortly be available in quantity.
Another difficulty is cloud which by day is more prevalent than by night, especially the cumulus type which can so easily mar the bombing run by shrouding the target at a critical moment. For daylight attacks therefore, except where the sky is clear, I should expect a higher proportion of crews to have to bring their bombs back, because it is essential that they should not be released aimlessly over occupied territory. I hope all crews are now aware of the importance of this instruction and will never allow their natural wish to release their bombs to override their judgement on this point.
As regards the tactics to be adopted on daylight attacks there are, broadly speaking, two alternatives. The first is to adopt a close formation built up of Flights, Squadrons and Bases, with aircraft flying in tight Vics so as to provide supporting fire against fighters. The second method is to employ our normal night technique and to fly in an organised mass in which aircraft are evenly spaced in height and throughout the length of the stream.
The first alternative calls for considerable training and although it increases fire power such formations are difficult to manoeuvre and more vulnerable to flak. Heavy flak is more accurate by day than at night only to the extent that the operators of the various predictor instruments can pick out individual aircraft or formations, against which the fire of the batteries can be directed. If aircraft are flying in a close formation there is generally no difficulty in ranging instruments upon it and very accurate fire results. If however aircraft are flying in loose mass it is almost impossible to ensure that all the various “Predictor” teams will select the same aircraft and, in general, fire will be no more accurate than by night, that is to say, it will only be directed into the general mass of aircraft. This is an important point because it has been found by experience that large and tightly packed formations must fly at heights above 26,000’ to ensure reasonable immunity from flak, and such heights are beyond the present capabilities of the Lancaster.
The next point is protection against fighters. So far we have not come up against enemy fighter opposition when our own fighter escort has been present, but the danger is always present if the column loses cohesion, as was shown on the occasion of the attack against the Bois-de-Cassan, when the force became split up after flying through thunder cloud. Our fighters, numerous as they are, cannot protect a column or [sic] more than a certain length, and any aircraft which are outside the area of fighter cover must expect to be attacked. On the way to the target and on the return the column should be as short as possible, but should open out on approaching the target so as to enable crews to take a steady bombing run without having to worry unduly about other aircraft or falling bombs. This opening out will normally be achieved by providing a turn before and after the target so that Bases can spread out by making a wide turn and close in by cutting the corner, on the way through the target.
A daylight operation calls for a high measure of control and good flight discipline. Control will in future be by TR.1196 within the Squadron and Base formations and by V.H.F. to the Group as a whole when passing through the Target area. The “shepherd” in a Lightning or a Mosquito will continue to keep a watchful eye on any who may stray away from the protection of the mass and hand them over to the fighter escort.
Conditions in which daylight operations take place will change as the war develops, and crews must be prepared for evolution od the tactics employed. The tactics will, however, always aim at providing conditions in which every crew can attack the target with the utmost confidence and with all the accuracy of which the bombsight is capable.
July was a month of hard work but also a month of notable progress in the War. Over the past three years the weight of bombs dropped by this Group has gone up as follows:
May, June, July, 1942. – 2,780 toms
May, June, July, 1943. – 11,505 tons
May, June, July, 1944. – 31,107 tons.
This increased tonnage is a tribute to the steadily growing efficiency of all ranks throughout the Group and to the improvements which have been made in the reliability of aircraft and equipment. It is a magnificent effort to achieve such a tremendous aadvance [sic] in the striking power of the Group in so short a time, and the peak has not yet been reached, as August will certainly show.
During July, No. 51 Base raised their total figures once more and passed out 150 trained crews. No. 5 L.F.S. completed a second month is succession with no flying accidents and I again congratulate them on a fine achievement.
[Page break]
SECOND THOUGHTS FOR PILOTS
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]
How much affiliation have you done? The facilities are now available in the Group and you should take every opportunity of crossing swords with the Hurricanes of 1690 B.D.T. Flight. A point about “rolling in the corkscrew”. Don’t “roll” on your ailerons alone. Use rudder firmly in conjunction with the ailerons and you will roll smoothly during a manoeuvre, Be precise in your air speeds and amount of bank. The Base Training pilots have picked up this point when giving you a final check over before going on operations. There is one good corkscrew and must be flown accurately. Your gunners should get the chance they deserve.
Instrument flying needs constant practice. You’ve got dark nights and long trips to come so don’t let your instrument flying get rusty because you are doing some “daylights”. The points to remember about instrument flying are:-
(i) Trim your aircraft carefully.
(ii) Trust your instruments.
(iii) Fly smoothly.
Take care in taxying when you are being marshalled by ground crew. Let the airman sit in the pilot’s seat in dispersal sometime and show him how limited is your field of vision when anyone is standing too close to the nose of the aircraft.
Don’t follow a “curve of approach” on your bombing run. Insist that your Navigator gives you the drift in degrees as the correct turning point for the run in to the target. If the target markers are not dead ahead when you first see them, correct immediately by means of an “S” turn so that the aircraft’s nose points at the markers along the predetermined track, then turn the aircraft port or starboard for the number of degrees of drift given by the Navigator. The aircraft should then be tracking towards the markers. The motto is “Bomb on the correct heading with the graticule intersection of the bombsight astride the aiming point”.
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]
Your gunners are now to have categories. It is up to yourself to get A-plus category. Half the job depends on you. If your corkscrew is accurate and your gunners apply the right deflection, your Cine-Gyro film will be a good one and so will the category. Get all the practice you can with the Hurricanes of 1690 B.D.T. Flight.
Though priority for squadron practices belongs to Gunnery, you must keep your bombing category up as well. Some pilots are still doing flat turns. Avoid them like the plague. The Lancaster will [underlined] NOT [/underlined] flat turn but merely swings itself in the direction of the intended turn and then flies crab wise to its track in much the same direction as before. While the nose swinging the pilot has the illusion of turning for the following reasons:-
(i) The nose of the aircraft moves round the horizon.
(ii) The directional gyro revolves.
(iii) The turn indictor shows rates of turn
Have you given your Flight Engineers any experience in handling the controls? Flight Engineers are now officially recognised as the pilot’s mate in Lancasters, and as a result are getting some elementary training before joining the Group. This Headquarters has laid down that they must do regular Link Exercises, and, at the Captain’s discretion, be given 15 minutes at the controls during non-operational flights of more than an hour’s duration. There’s a drill issued by this Headquarters for changing seats in the air. Have you read it? It’s Drill No.10 of the 5 Groups Aircraft Drills.
There’s another drill which you may have overlooked now that the warmer nights are here. Drill No.12 – Oxygen and Anti-Frostbite Drill – which makes Captains responsible for inspecting air gunners in their crew once a week with the gunners fully dressed in operational flying kit. When did you last check your gunners?
GARDENING
Three Gardening operations were carried out this month by 5 Group; two in the Kattegat and one in a certain heavily defended and very restricted harbour. In the former area we were dependent upon cloud cover, which in the case of 55 Base’s effort let us down, but gave 44 Squadron its chance a few days later. The last operation was carried out by 57 and 630 Squadrons in the face of intense opposition. In all cases gardening was done on H 2 S and some good P.P.I. photographs were obtained. Two aircraft were missing.
The Command total this month was 708 vegetables, the majority of which were again directed against the U-boat bases. The interference which these pests have been able to cause to our invasion forces has been negligible and we have evidence that gardening has played a big part in producing this happy state of affairs.
Mr. Wood, of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, gave a most interesting lecture on the economic dislocation caused by our strategic gardening. He was able to give his lecture to 5 Group Air Staff, the Aircrew School and 44, 57, 630 and 207 Squadrons.
Vegetable stocks are now on the increase again and this probably presages some more planting before the Autumn harvest.
WAR EFFORT
[Table of War Effort showing Sorties with Star Awards by Squadron]
Squadrons are placed in the above table in order of “successful sorties per average aircraft on charge”. In view of their special duties Nos. 83, 97, 617 and 627 Squadrons are shown separately. In cases where a crew has flown in an aircraft of another squadron, the sortie is divided between the two Squadrons.
ERRATUM The one avoidable accident for 61 Squadron shown in the June issue occurred in May. The error is regretted, but it will not affect the next award of the Silver Lancaster Trophy which is based on the months July/September.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944.
[Page break]
[Underlined] SIGNALS (GENERAL) [/underlined]
The meaning of this heading may not be completely clear to Signals and Radar Officers. At a recent Command Conference recommendations were formulated regarding future establishments at Stations, Bases and Groups. It was considered that Officers who held the rank of S/Ldr. and above should be known as Signals (General) and should be qualified in both the Communications and Radar aspects of Signals. If this scheme is approved, only Officers thus qualified will be eligible for promotion to the higher ranks. Base Signals Officer are to afford Radar Officers every opportunity to absorb the communications side now. It is suggested that a good way of starting this is to bring Radar Officers on to the Duty Signals Officers Roster. At the same time Signals Officers must take more than a passive interest in Radar matters.
An experiment is being conducted within No. 53 Base to see how far it is possible to merge the duties of Wireless and Radar Mechanics. Miracles are not expected of this scheme, but it is felt that greater co-operation between the two trades will result in a saving of labour, test equipment and tools.
[Underlined] COMMUNICATIONS (OPERATIONS) [/underlined]
The success of the present type of controlled operation depends more and more on the efficiency of communications channels. Although all aircraft in the Group are now fitted with V.H.F., there must be no relaxation in the drive to perfect the W/T system of control since the latter must always be on standby in cases of VHF unserviceability or interference, or in cases where VHF cannot fulfil the requirement. The success achieved on our communications channels is due in no small measure to the hard work of the Wireless Mechanic. The C.S.O. would like to take this opportunity of congratulating all Signals Servicing personnel on having completed the third successive month with no failures due to faulty maintenance.
[Underlined] W/T FAILURES [/underlined]
Of the 2,856 sorties flown during the month of July, there were 36 W/T failure reports. The percentage shows a slight increase over the figure for June. The maintenance staffs have again come out on top with no servicing failures; as in previous months, equipment and component defects have been the cause of 75% of the total snags. There were three manipulation failures – one could have been avoided if the crew concerned had religiously tested their helmets prior to take off. Not a single aircraft throughout the month failed to take off on its mission as a result of signals equipment being at fault. There were, however, 3 early returns – one was due to the above mentioned manipulation fault.
From the equipment aspect the R1155 output valve (V8) again proved to be the most troublesome. Units must submit Defect Reports for these valves and so assist this Headquarters in hastening a remedy.
[Underlined] V.H.F. [/underlined]
All operational aircraft in the Group are now fitted with either TR.1143 or TR. 1143A The fitting programme proceeded particularly well and ended ahead of schedule. With the increased number of sorties and the consequent increase in work, the maintenance personnel have excelled themselves.
During the most recent operations, the interference that was being experienced on V.H.F. has decreased considerably, and there is every indication that this is due to the V.H.F. frequencies being used. R.A.E. Farnborough have evolved a series pulse transmission limiter, which, when fitted to the V.H.F. receiver, is claimed to supress all Radar pulse interferences. This modification is being tried at Coningsby, but since its introduction no interference has been apparent. A more detailed account of this device may be available for the next issue of the V Group News.
[Underlined] MANDREL [/underlined]
Mandrel has now been removed from all aircraft of the Group. This countermeasure is still being effectively operated by other means, and the equipment released from our aircraft is to be put to good use elsewhere. The Group Countermeasure Party is to remain in existence to assist with the maintenance of Carpet II in the Pathfinder Squadrons and, later on, will play a part in the installation and servicing of Boozer.
[Underlined] RADAR [/underlined]
Very extensive operations were carried out during July with the pace being stepped up considerably. Generally speaking Radar serviceability remained on the same footing as for June, although a few ups and downs were experienced on the various types of equipment.
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
The way was again shown by Gee with a percentage serviceability of 97.24 for a total of 2643 completed sorties. This was a slight decrease from the previous months [sic] record figure of 97.77. Although we had expected to see the serviceability increase instead of decrease, a period of approximately ten days in which we were unable to obtain replacements put a considerable strain on servicing. It is hoped that we shall not have to go through this again.
[Underlined] MONICA [/underlined]
By completing 478 out of a total of 501 sorties without any difficulty whatever, Monica V took over second position on the serviceability chart for July. This figure gives a percentage serviceability of 95.41, which is an increase of 1.52 per cent on June. The Squadrons who are using this equipment are to be congratulated for their progress in the standard of their servicing, and now let us look forward to August for a corresponding increase over July’s figures.
Monica IIIA fell to third position but we feel certain that despite the great difficulty in obtaining replacements, which are now almost non-existent, the 93.79 per cent serviceability obtained for 805 completed sorties, will be brought up during August and return this Tail Warning Device to its proper place.
By putting in a great number of late hours, and hard work, an excellent replacement has been developed during the past four weeks for Monica IIIA and Monica V. The two equipments which are in good supply, namely Monica I. Transmitters and Receivers and Fishpond indicators, have been combined to give us a further type of Visual Monica. The service trials and operational use of the first set have proved most satisfactory, and now by local production it is hoped to create a source of replacements for the present devices of which we are so sorely in need.
[Underlined] REPEATER INDICATOR [/underlined]
This secondary warning indicator, which we told you about in last months [sic] News has now reached the production stage and by the end of August we should see a large number of them in operational use. Production has had to be handled locally by the Base Workshops who are now turning out the boxes; when produced these will be delivered to No. 53 Base for final completion and testing.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
This past month brought back several high level bombing operations, and with it a slight decrease in the percentage serviceability of H2S Mk. II. Of the 1298 sorties completed, 90.16 per cent were free of all difficulties. This is a drop of 1.6 per cent below June. Replacement of the high voltage condensers is now taking place on the production line but so far none have been received in the Group for retrospective fitting to units already held by Squadrons. Judging from the considerable number of cases of flashing, this remains one of the greatest sources of break-down. It is strongly emphasised that all causes of breakdown must be conscientiously reported in accordance with A.M.O. A. 869/43, as this is the only method by which these difficulties can be brought to light and dealt with effectively.
H 2 S Mk. III shows a slight improvement during July. A total of 6 difficulties was experienced out of 95 completed sorties, which gives a percentage serviceability of 93.69. Servicing conditions on 83 and 97 Squadrons are made rather more difficult because of the two types of H 2 S equipment and this calls for a high degree of organisation on the part of the Radar Branch. When the complete changeover to Mk. III has taken place conditions should ease quite considerably.
[Underlined] FISHPOND [/underlined]
The number of completed sorties with Fishpond carried out during the past month was 1260 of which 90.24 per cent gave very satisfactory results. The difficulties experienced were largely due, as was to be expected, to the unserviceability of H 2 S. With the higher degree of training now being carried out the benefit derived from this equipment has been increased to very large extent.
The intensity of operations will be still greater during the coming month, and this in turn will call for every effort on the part of Radar Sections. We have seen a very gratifying increase in the efficiency of all types of equipment during the past six months, and now we look forward to August to bring the efficiency even closer to the degree we all know possible.
(Continued on Page 4 Column 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24.. JULY, 1944. PAGE 3.
[Page break]
SIGNALS (CONTD:)
[Underlined] WIRELESS OPERATORS (AIR) [/underlined]
July brought no outstanding performance in aircrew signals but Operators did quite well in their reception of Controllers and Wind Broadcast messages, sometimes under difficult conditions due to static interference. This augers well for future operations, and with constant practice at the morse buzzer a higher standard can yet be reached.
A scheme will soon be in operation for the further classification of Wireless Operators in this Group, and tests will be set each operator to assess his eligibility for classification in the Grades laid down. The scheme will be an amplification of the tests laid down in 5 Group Signals Instruction No. 13.
[Underlined] CONTROLLERS WIRELESS OPERATORS [/underlined]
The standard of W/T operating by all Controller Wireless Operators during the past month was very good and 83 and 97 Squadrons are to be congratulated on their practice efforts which effected this improvement. Now the writer would like to see other Squadrons following their example and have their Wireless Operators carry out the tests laid down in 5 Group Signals Instruction No. 13. I know they can do it, so come along and have their names inscribed in the register of “Wireless Operator Controller”.
[Underlined] V.H.F. MANIPULATION [/underlined]
All aircraft in the Group are now fitted with TR.1143. How many Wireless Operators (Air) have been along to their W/T Maintenance Sections to find out how it works? What are the crystal frequencies? How many times is this frequency multiplied, and how? What are the power supplies? Where are the fuses? It is your duty to know all these answers and advise your Captain on its proper functioning.
[Underlined] W/T EXERCISE [/underlined]
The Group W/T Exercise has, like the Curate’s Egg, been good and bad in parts. Some very good exercises have taken place, particularly one exercise when sixty-two messages were transmitted and received correctly in one and a quarter hours operating, There is still the tendency of some Operators, however, to revert to the old idea of the “Survival of the Slickest”. Now this is definitely not good operating, and this tendency, once it is developed in an Operator, may lead to dire trouble both for himself and some other unfortunate Operator who happens to be in the air at the same time.
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]
The majority of attacks were again reported over the target while the Wireless Operator was on W/T watch. The new instruction whereby the Wireless Operator does not log the Controllers instructions provided his Captain is satisfied with the serviceability of his V.H.F., should enable him to concentrate more on his E.W.D. in this vulnerable area.
[Underlined] CALLSIGNS [/underlined]
July saw the abolition of Squadron Callsigns within Bomber Command. This step, whatever prompted it, is desirable in that it is a simplification. Now the one R/T S.A.C.S. can be used at Base or elsewhere, on V.H.F. or H.F. on Darky or ‘L.F.C.’. the whole thing becomes a ‘Piece of Cake’. But one precaution must still be observed. On pre-operational flights to advanced bases, or during Squadron moves, an S.A.C.S. must be obtained from the station of destination. Should the terminus station not have an S.A.C.S. available then this Headquarters can supply, and this use of the appropriate callsign provides a simple little countermeasure designed to fox the enemy listening service.
WAR SAVINGS
(a) Pence saved per head of strength
(b) %age of personnel contributing
(c) Total amount saved
[Table of War Savings by Station]
TOTAL SAVED £21,504 0 10
ARMAMENT
The attention of Armament Officers has been fully occupied in dealing with operational bomb loads and changes of loads. The excellent way in which Armament staffs have worked has enabled the Group bombing effort to be maintained at a very high level. Considerable attention has been paid to the care in handling and loading bombs, thus avoiding damage to tail units, but some tails have been damaged due to various causes. Most of these tail units are repairable, but this takes time which could well be employed on other work. It is hoped that during August the number of tail units damaged will be reduced considerably.
BOMB DUMPS have been, to a considerable extent, reorganised and improved. It is well known that all bomb dumps are grossly overloaded and it is only by the careful planning and maintenance of tidy conditions that a reasonable degree of safety can be guaranteed; by far the biggest factor is careful planning and unloading stores in the right place, thus avoiding double handling and general loss of efficiency due to unnecessary work.
CO-OPERATION WITH BOMBING LEADERS has led to many excellent results. One particular case is quoted where the Station Armament Officer prepares a pro-forma whenever he suspects that an armament failure is due to manipulation. A Senior Air Bomber is appointed by the Bombing Leader to visit the Station Armoury daily and collect any forms relating to the past 24 hours work. The Air Bomber then interviews the crews concerned investigating all the details of the failure, reports this to the Bombing Leader, and if a difference of opinion exists, the Bombing Leader contacts the Armament Officer with all the facts available and the matter is settled amicably. This liaison is making a very considerable decrease in the number of failures due to manipulation recorded in the Squadron concerned. “No copyright is claimed – please copy”.
BOMB TROLLEYS. Care and maintenance of these items will always pay in the long run, and grossly overloaded trolleys, apart from being an unsafe practice, will lead to rapid wear or failure of the trolley itself.
(Continued in column 2)
Continued from column 3
Trolley maintenance must, therefore, be kept up, and more particularly so during the present period when trolleys are being used so frequently. A modification will shortly be introduced to render the type “D” trolleys more useful in dealing with the transport of 1000 lb and 500 lb bombs. Detailed information will be circulated immediately.
FAILURES TABLE
[Table of Armament Failures by Squadron]
A =AMANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING
D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 4.
[Page break]
NAVIGATION
This month has seen a return to medium range targets, and Navigators have had opportunity to put to the test their skill and efficiency. Broadcast W/V’s have been used on 3 occasions with varying degrees of accuracy.
Track keeping and timing was good, with one or two exceptions. On almost every operation there are 2 or 3 aircraft between 10 and 30 miles off track. In the majority of instances this is attributable to u/s Compasses or instruments but there are several examples of bad navigation. Track keeping and timing are vital to the success of any operation and everything must therefore be done to achieve concentration. There were no early returns through Navigational failures this month. This is as it should be. Every effort is to be made by Station and Squadron Navigation Officers to see that no early returns are caused through Navigational errors, such as incorrect fixing and computations, or through u/s Compasses. The vast majority of Navigational early returns are attributable to alleged D.R. Compass failures. If the D.R. Compass is suspected carry out the correct drill for synchronisation and checking. If the fault is still not remedied then press on immediately using the P4 compass. Check true course with the Astro Compass regularly, using the quick method of sighting on Polaris. But DON’T, on any account, turn back with a u/s D.R. Compass.
BROADCAST WIND VELOCITIES
The use of broadcast w/v’s on the three Stuttgart raids proved very useful practice. As stated above, they brought to light many mistakes and deficiencies, the most important of which are as follows:-
(a) Insufficient w/v’s found and transmitted. Difficulty is sometimes experienced by the W/Op when transmitting the winds to Base. This is being remedied by the Signals Section. Navigators MUST now do their share and find w/v’s regularly.
(b) Winds are often found over too large an area. The ideal windfinding period is 15 to 20 minutes. Winds applying for a period of 40 minutes or more are almost useless.
(c) Wind messages incorrectly coded.
Very few of the Navigators who were the “windfinders” of last winter are still operating, and therefore, it was expected that “teething troubles” would be experienced It is the responsibility of Base, Station and Squadron Navigation Officers to eliminate these various mistakes and errors. Do all windfinders appreciate the importance of their task? It must be made quite clear to them that non-H2S crews rely entirely on the broadcast w/v’s when out of Gee range. Serious consequences may be the result of poor or indifferent windfinding. The accuracy of bombing is also directly affected by the found winds since the broadcast bombing winds are forecast from those transmitted by aircraft.
The standard and accuracy of winds found by the detailed crews has, so far, been very good. If we eliminate points (a), (b) and (c) above, we shall achieve accuracy. So go to it, all of you, and let us see that you can do!
[Underlined] NAVIGATIONAL TECHNIQUE [/underlined]
It is difficult to arrive at a perfect navigational technique, e.g. how often to obtain a w/v check, E.T.A. check, etc. Many methods have been adopted and others experimented with, but the perfect technique has not yet been found. One school of thought argues that a Navigator should “work his fingers to the bone” and obtain maximum w/v and E.T.A. checks. Another school argues that this is a waste of time and unnecessary. The ideal is surely in between, i.e. regular, but not too regular fixes, w/v and E.T.A. checks, and a maximum amount of time available for checking of all computations. Skellingthorpe are working on these lines as an experiment. Their procedure is as follows:- Obtain a w/v and E.T.A. check every 20 minutes and a check fix every 10 minutes. All Navigators can easily cope with this amount of work and, what is more important, they have plenty of time in which to check and re-check all computations. The charts turned in by the Skellingthorpe Navigators using this system are good. The charts are not cluttered with a multitude of fixes and wind arrows and their work is very accurate. All Squadrons and Stations are urged to experiment with this or any similar method, and note whether greater accuracy is achieved. Whatever method if adopted, it must allow the Navigator time in which to plot the wind vector accurately. It must also allow him sufficient time in which to re-check all his computations and calculations.
[Underlined] ANALYSIS OF FOUND WINDS [/underlined]
The O. R. S. Section at H.Q. 5 Group have analysed the target winds found by all Navigators on the following three raids:-
KIEL 23/34 July, 1944.
POMMEREVAL 24/25 June, 1944.
REVIGNY 18/19 July, 1944.
The intention was to find the consistency of Navigator’s found winds and to compare the mean found wind with the forecast w/v. The analysis showed that the winds found by Navigators were very consistent and gave a probable vector error of 7 m.p.h; with the exception of Revigny where it was just under 10 m.p.h. This is good, but there were several “wide” wind velocities; some were almost reciprocals, obviously caused by incorrect resetting of the A.P.I. or by inaccurate plotting. On the Revigny attack the w/v was light and variable and consequently a large spread was experienced, 2/3rds of the wind velocities were in the Westerly section and 1/3rd in the Easterly section.
If the wind speed is only say 8 m.p.h. then 15 minutes wind is represented by a vector 2 miles in length. Any slight inaccuracy in either the Gee or H2S fix will make a very considerable change in wind velocity. The greatest possible care must therefore be taken when obtaining a gee or H2S fix for finding a wind velocity, and more particularly when the wind speed is very light.
From the three attacks analysed the mean found wind differed from the Met., forecast w/v by the following amount:-
(i) KIEL Vector difference of 17 mph.
(ii) POMMEREVAL Vector difference of 8 mph.
(iii) REVIGNY Vector difference of 8 mph.
Base and Station Navigation Officers can themselves very easily analyse all winds found over a certain area by plotting them on a large scale plotting rose. It does not take more than 10 to 15 minutes to plot all the winds for one Station. The mean average w/v can then be seen at a glance and from this it is possible to pick out the “wides”. This should be repeated for 2 or 3 areas of the same operation. The inaccurate windfinders will stand out. It is then possible to trace the causes of these “wide” w/v’s. Was the inaccurate w/v obtained immediately after resetting the A. P. I. or vectoring? If so, there is the answer. Was it caused by inaccurate transferring of Gee fixes? Did the Navigator measure the w/v vector correctly or otherwise? All S.N.O.’s are to report their findings to Group as soon as possible.
[Underlined] UNION NEWS [/underlined]
F/Lt Anderson, D.F.C. No. 1654 C.U. to be Nav. Leader.
S/Ldr Schofield SNO. Fiskerton posted to P.F.F.
F/Lt Kelly, D.F.C. No. 617 Sqdn. to be Station Nav. Officer, Fiskerton.
F/Lt Edwards, D.F.C. No.44 Sqdn to be Navigation Officer.
F/Lt Lascelles, D.F.C. No. 1654 C.U. to be Nav. Officer 50 Sqdn.
S/Ldr Stevens, D.F.C. Navigation Officer 97 Squadron missing on operations.
S/Ldr Galienne, D.F.C. Navigation Officer 83 Sqdn. posted to No. 8 Group – tour expired.
S/Ldr Blair, D.S.O., D.F.C. No.83 Squadron to be Sqdn. Nav. Officer.
F/Lt Martin, D.F.C. No.630 Squadron to be Sqdn. Nav. Officer.
F/Lt De Friend, D.F.M. H.Q. No.5 Group to be Squadron Nav. Officer No.57 Squadron.
[Underlined] A.P.I. WINDFINDING ATTACHMENT [/underlined]
This is a new instrument, designed to enable navigators to find a very accurate w/v over a short period of time. The instrument gives a reading to the nearest hundredth of a nautical mile and is very simple to use. The w/v is found by the closed ground circuit method, i.e. pass over a datum point, complete an orbit of 3 – 5 minutes duration and again pass over the datum point at the same height and on the same heading.
Numerous tests have been carried out by R.A.E. Farnborough and the average vector error of 63 winds found, checked by smoke puff w/v’s, was 3 m.p.h! Nos. 9 and 467
(Continued on page 6, col. 2)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 5.
[Page break]
RADAR/NAV
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]
Gee ranges during the month have been considerably better than of late, probably due to the introduction of the 27 units into Squadrons. However, it is still noted that some Squadrons are capable of obtaining Gee to far greater advantages than others. This is mainly due to the attention paid by these Squadrons to the importance of constant training in reading signals through jamming or grass. Squadrons not so successful may well keep this in mind.
Serious consideration is now being paid to the probability of bombing on Gee, particularly when weather conditions in Northern France prevent a visual attack. The success of such an attack depends upon each individual Navigator taking part. Every effort must be made by each Navigator to develop the technique required in this type of blind bombing and to familiarise himself with the setting up and manipulation of the Gee Indicator. No Navigator should be satisfied until at least 75% of the Gee practice bombing runs he makes are within a quarter of a mile of the Aiming Point. Don’t waste your opportunities, the Watch Office on your airfield is as good a target as any, and every return to base in daylight should be turned into a Gee practice bombing run. Station Navigation Officers are to watch this point.
This month has brought us news of yet another Gee chain – the Channel chain, intended to give more accurate facilities over the Pas de Calais and Paris areas. Locking tests are being carried out and its facilities will be available on the RF.27 Unit in a short time. Lattice Maps are now available, and Stations should see that they have sufficient quantity of stock before the chain is made available. These Lattice Maps are 500:000 topographical maps overprinted with lattice lines. It is appreciated that, although the maps are not ideal from a Bomber Command standpoint, the demands of A.E.F. and T.A.F. had to be met and a compromise reached. A word of warning – the C lattice lines on the Channel Chain Series Maps are coloured BLUE. This is due to the green colouring of the map which prevents Green lattice lines being overprinted.
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]
With the longer range targets now being attacked, H 2 S is once again coming to the forefront. Although Gee continues to give abnormal ranges, it still remains for the H 2 S Navigators to provide the majority of broadcast winds. Stress is therefore to be made in all stages of training on the navigational use of H2S, and its importance in windfinding.
With the numerous short range targets that have been recently attacked, considerable slackening off in the use of H2S has been noted. This was particularly evident in the raid on STUTTGART on July 28/29th, when the average number of H2S fixes taken by each by each operator on two Squadrons in the Group amounted to four. It is apparent that H2S operators on these two Squadrons, quite content with going round on Gee on short range targets, thought the same method could be applied in the case of a long range target and just didn’t make use of H2S to the full extent. H2S is the best Navigational aid produced, and it is a sheer waste of man hours in servicing if operators are not using it to best advantage. In addition operators on H2S Squadrons must remember that the non H 2 S Squadrons are dependent on them for broadcast winds when out of Gee range. Drastic action may have to be taken against operators who continue to regard H2S as a mere plaything and don’t use it to advantage.
Whilst emphasis is to be placed on the Navigational use of H2S, blind bombing is not entirely to be disregarded. An H2S Blind Bombing Competition is being held monthly and all Squadrons have been asked to participate. By means of this competition, a keen spirit of rivalry should be developed amongst the Squadrons and Bases, and some idea of the Group average error in blind bombing obtained. 54 Base have been carrying out trials during the month on blind marking by Wanganui flares, the idea being to lay an initial line of Wanganui flares downwind across the target and assess it for line. If correct, the backers-up line up visually on the initial line and release blind for H2S for range only. These trials have proved that by this method the concentration of Wanganui flares across the target can be kept within a band 1/2 a mile wide. This is a great improvement on the methods used in the past.
467 Squadron are now being equipped with H 2 S and it will be interesting to note the capabilities of the Australian crews on this equipment. Although training progress is slow due to heavy operational commitments, the Squadron does not lack enthusiasm for the equipment, and it may be well for the other Squadrons to look to their laurels.
NAVIGATION TRAINING
The total hours flown on navigational exercises during July were probably higher than ever before. In one night’s flying 218 hours were clocked by 52 aircraft on cross countries (including bombing). Several Command Diversions have been carried out, which have proved excellent training, especially in the use of Gee as the routes have been near enough to the continent to encounter jamming. Unfortunately they do not provide good H 2 S or searchlight training.
Considerable difficulty has been experienced by some pupil Navigators when using the Swinderby 6 minute system. The system was designed to assist the pupil in achieving speed and accuracy of work. This has been achieved in the main, but unfortunately a few pupils have become thoroughly confused and have not used fixes, wind velocities obtained, etc., in an intelligent manner. The 6 minute system is now not being used by any Navigator until he reaches the final stage of his Conversion Unit training. This is an experiment and we are now waiting to see if an improvement in the general standard of Navigation results.
Almost all aircraft in the Base are now fitted with API’s. Very little trouble has been experienced with these instruments and navigators arriving at Squadrons should now be 100% conversant with the use of them. If they are not, let us know immediately and action will be taken.
The Base is now training 75% of the input on H2S. The air training has had to be reduced for each crew, but every H2S crew passing out should have sufficient training to enable them to fly with the equipment immediately they reach the Squadrons – so relieving the Squadron Radar-Navs. of the basic ground training.
The “drive” on accurate windfinding, particularly for practice bombing still continues. The average vector error attributed to wind finding is the same as last month’s figure, i.e. 8 miles per hour. Every effort is being made to reduce this figure and our target for next month is a mean vector error of 5 m.p.h.
[Underlined] NAVIGATION (Continued from page 5.) [/underlined]
Squadrons have also tested the accuracy and efficiency of the instrument. All the crews concerned obtained equally good results.
It is unfortunate that the instrument can only be used effectively by completing a ground circuit, it cannot therefore be used for obtaining normal Navigational winds. We shall, however, be able to find a very accurate bombing w/v in the target area. A quota of A.P.I. attachments have been demanded and will be fitted to as many aircraft as possible.
[Underlined] PRACTICE BOMBING WINDs [/underlined]
The average vector error obtained by all Squadrons and Conversion Units this month is as shown in the adjoining table.
Average Errors: Squadrons – 7.5
Con. Units – 8.0
The Con. Unit figure is the same as last month’s, but the Squadrons average error has increased by 1/2 m.p.h. There is a very noticeable improvement in No. 57 Squadron, who have reduced last month’s error by 3 1/2 m.p.h.
[Table of Average Vector Error by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 6
[Page break]
ENGINEERING
[Underlined] GENERAL [/underlined]
Again a large number of sorties has been carried out, and this has called for big efforts to maintain the normal high standard of serviceability. Enemy action damage forms quite the greatest cause of unserviceability, and C.T.O’s are to review carefully each aircraft which appears to be a CAT. AC. If it is at all possible the repair must be carried out by the unit, if normal maintenance commitments permit, as otherwise larger numbers of aircraft will be stacked up on the CAT. AC. repair list, the Contractors (C.R.O) will become overburdened and long delays will take place before the aircraft is back in service. The striking force will then be reduced accordingly, as replacements for the CAT. AC. awaiting repairs will not be available in sufficient numbers. Base Engineer Officers and Chief Technical Officers must watch this trend and take the action which will give the highest serviceability.
[Underlined] DEFECTS [/underlined]
Cancellations and Early Returns which were due to matters concerning the Engineering Branch reduced the Group effort by 1.29%. Whilst the majority of these were due to defects which will be covered by modification action in the course of time, at least five should not have occurred and could have been prevented by more efficient servicing. The responsibility for three rests with the electricians and two with the fitters. The total Group summary of defects will be passed to Stations separately. No.50 Squadron is the only Squadron which went right through the month without a single operational failure due to Engineering, and is given a “big hand”.
The failure of the pipe oil relief valve to dual drive should be entirely eliminated with the fitment of the rubber connections in accordance with Headquarters, Bomber Command modification Merlin/2.
[Underlined] MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT [/underlined]
Many improvements are being effected in the design of ground equipment and ideas which have emanated from stations in this Group have been accepted for general application. For instance, the Wheel Transporter designed by R.A.F. Station, Fiskerton, has been accepted and in the near future should be issued to all stations. This device enables one man to transport a wheel fairly easily over short distances, and the transporter being also the carriage whereby the wheel is offered up into position on the aircraft, this gives a large saving in man power.
A Power Plant Transporter will be available in limited supply within the next few weeks and will enable two power plants to be moved at a time, the loading and unloading being comparatively simple and not requiring a crane. Adaptors will also be issued in due course to enable wheels or propellors to be moved on this same chassis. This item of equipment covers a long felt need in transporting the items mentioned, and was devised originally by 51 Base, Swinderby.
It is pleasing to see Bases taking the initiative in the manufacture of such items as Sand Blasting Machines so that an up to date sparking plug bay can be organised at each Base. Sufficient of the modern torque load tests are now available at each Base sparking plug bay, and when each is fully equipped with the items required to clean sparking plugs in an up to date manner, a great saving in personnel will be possible as the cleaning, gapping and testing of 1,000 plugs a day is a reasonable proposition with this modern equipment.
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]
[Table of Stirling and Lancaster Aircraft Serviceability]
DECORATIONS
The following IMMEDIATE awards have been approved during the month:-
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/Sgt J.J. SHIPLEY D.F.M.
P/O W.R. HORNE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O C. LACEY D.F.C.
P/O W.R. GREEN D.F.C.
F/O G.P. LACE, D.F.M. D.F.C.
F/O R.L. BIENVENU D.F.C.
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]
F/L A.W. DOUBLEDAY, D.F.C. D.S.O.
P/O D.E. WHITE D.F.C.
[Underlined] 97 SQUADRON [/underlined]
A/W/C J. SIMPSON D.S.O.
W/O R.M. CLARK D.F.C.
A/F/L G.F. BAKER, D.F.C. Bar to D.F.C.
F/O A.H. JONES D.F.C.
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]
W/Cdr R. KINGSFORD-SMITH, D.F.C. D.S.O.
Sgt K. De H. HAMBLIN D.F.M.
[Underlined] 467 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O S. JOHNS D.F.C.
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined}
F/O N.R. ROSS, D.F.C. D.S.O.
F/O W.A. DUFFY D.F.C.
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]
P/O F.F. MOLINAS D.F.C.
Sgt T.F. FROGLEY D.F.M.
TRAINING
The intensity of operations in July was well-matched by the strenuous efforts of 51 Base to provide a maximum number of crews for Squadrons. The total of 150 crews trained and over 9,000 hours flown provided the highest figures in the history of the Base. [Underlined] The target for August is as many crews as Instructors, aircraft and weather can produce. [/underlined]
Gunnery was well to the fore. The training in Early Warning Devices was intensified and fighter affiliation was given a high priority. The Stirling Conversion Units returned a record figure of exactly 1,000 Gyro exercises during their affiliation. The categorisation of Gunners was introduced towards the end of the month and 51 Base in future will pass all gunners to Squadrons with a category which will be an invaluable guide to Base and Squadron Gunnery Leaders.
The categorisation of gunners follows closely on the bombing categorisation which has already proved its worth. Incidentally, 1660 Conversion Unit set a new record within the Base by returning an average error of less than 200 yards for all crews bombing in June. Proposals are in hand for the categorisation of the remaining members of the crew.
Instructors pressed on steadily with navigation and H2S training and 75% of all crews are now being trained to use H2S. The importance of accurate navigation is not being overlooked because crews commencing training now will be starting in Squadrons as the longer nights and the longer trips come along.
The standard of instructors is receiving special attention and the early formation of the Bomber Command Instructors School which 5 Group has campaigned for over a long period will give new Instructors a greater opportunity to get into their stride quickly and on the right lines. Until the school is in full operation, Flight Commanders can help new instructors tremendously by flying with them when they are giving dual, and passing on advice from their greater experience after the flight is over.
[Underlined] NEW CREWS IN SQUADRONS [/underlined]
The policy of giving new crews a short period of supervised training in Squadrons to “put on the final polish” before they operate has proved successful. During the month the Instructors attached to Bases completed the training of 134 new crews and carried out thirty-one 10 and 20 sortie checks.
The corkscrew received considerable attention in the Squadron training and 51 Base welcomed constructive criticism and suggestions to ensure uniformity on instruction. In the light of tests carried out by the instructors in the operational Bases, 51 Base is making a special point of checking the speed and angles of bank in the corkscrew and emphasising the importance of the bomber making good a mean track during fighter affiliation. One or two crews have been finishing up almost on a reciprocal after being engaged by a fighter.
[Underlined] NIGHT AFFILIATION WITH HURRICANES [/underlined]
To make night affiliation with Hurricanes easier the fighters of 1690 B.D.T. Flight which had been detached to Operational Bases were centralised as Scampton under S/Ldr. Munro, D.S.O., D.F.C., formerly of 617 Squadron. The fighter pilots put in some intensive night
(Continued on page 9, col. 2)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 7
[Page break]
A VISIT TO NORMANDY
There are few of us who can accept the speed of air travel as a commonplace thing. To be at one minute in Group Headquarters, studying the detailed maps of the aiming points in the late afternoon, and then to be having supper with the noise of the Normandy guns rumbling in the distance, gave one a feeling which, to say the least, was uncanny.
We picked up our Dakota at Northolt and crossed the French coast just East of the Cherbourg Peninsula. Flying along parallel to the coast it was evident that the task of unloading was still priority job No.1. Many landing strips were passed – I believe there are about 15 in all – looking very neat and tidy from the air. They are mostly single runway strips made from the rich brown earth which has been levelled and rolled, and provide a very good surface.
We landed on a strip North-West of Caen, and were transported to the Headquarters of the 2nd Army. The camp was quite small, being situated in a field, and relying on tents for its main accommodation. The Messes were semi-dugouts, but nevertheless quite comfortable. The dinner was excellent and was finished off by some very good Camembert cheese, made in Normandy.
The organisation of the staff of the Headquarters was very similar to a Bomber Group staff. The bulk of the planning was done by the Chief of Staff, who had to advise his various specialist officers, e.g. Plans, Intelligence, Artillery, Equipment, Engineering, C.S.O., etc. The nerve centre of Headquarters is the Operations Room, which consisted of four caravans in a square, the centre of which was covered over, thus forming a central room with four control rooms. Contact with forward troops and armour is maintained by R/T and W/T and all communications of progress or otherwise, terminate in this Operations Room, where a complete state of the advance is maintained.
We had a talk by the Intelligence and Operations Officers, who put us in the picture as to the disposition of our own and the enemy troops, and finally by the Chief of Staff, who detailed to us the plan of attack and what we were out to achieve. The main object of the bombardment, which was to take place early the next day, was to pulverise the positions South-East and East of Caen that our armour could move through with ease, and thus enable the bulk of our weight to cross the River Orne, and join the general advance Southwards. A great factor in the success of this operation was the absence of German Air Force activity. Through lack of space East of the Orne the bulk of our troops and armour had been drawn on the Western Banks with the vehicles right up to the actual Bridges, ready to move over as soon as the force on the Eastern side of the river had vacated their ground by moving South. Had the enemy reconnaissance spotted these columns, then no doubt the success of our attack would have been seriously impaired.
On the way to our tents we saw a lot of ant-aircraft activity in the form of tracer, star shells and heavy flak, and in addition there was a perpetual rumble of heavy guns operating on the front South-West of Caen.
We were called at 03.30 hours, and after breakfast set out in cars for a hill position to the North-West of the iron foundry at Colombelles, which was one of the 5 Group aiming points. The weather looked favourable, there were only very local patches of fog, and there was a clear sky. The journey was started in darkness, which was rather frightening as there was a vast amount of traffic on the roads, and only the very minimum of lighting was allowed. Dawn broke and the weather was still holding as we passed through village after village on route to our view point. The villages varied considerably, some having sustained only minor damage, whilst others had been virtually flattened. The stench in some of these ruins was appalling and was due to the dead animals and human beings buried in the ruins, and which we had not yet had time to extricate.
Eventually we drove into a wood, and parked the cars, and walked up through a village, past a ruined chateau, to our vantage point, where we could see the factory quite clearly. As we were arriving the artillery, which was some 1,000 yards behind us, started attending to the German anti-aircraft positions. To our unaccustomed ears the din was terrific, although an A.A. Officer, who was with us, said that was merely a softening up process and that the really heavy barrage would not start until H Hour, which was 07.45.
Our photographic Mosquito formed the vanguard of the mass of Heavies, which we could hear approaching. Then came a red T.I., from an invisible Mosquito, and shortly afterwards a yellow T.I., dropped by the P.F.F. Master Bomber, fell across the aiming point. The hum of Merlins had now developed into a roar, and the Lancasters came in an absolute horde. You could see the bombs leaving the aircraft and we saw the first four sticks fall straight across the factory. It was a grand sight to see the red flashes of light sweeping one after the other throughout the length of the aiming point, but unfortunately that was just about the last glimpse we had of any ground detail, for columns of smoke and dust arose and blocked out everything.
The newspapers have already described the bombardment and I cannot improve on their eloquence. The Heavies were in a continuous stream for some 20 minutes, and the noise, and particularly the feel of the blast, was out of all proportion to what one had anticipated. Then came the Mediums, Marauders and Bostons, dropping fragmentation and other non-cratering bombs over the central area, over which our troops and armour would advance, and then the American Heavies, in silver formations against a clear blue sky. Typhoon dive bombers were also in the fun; you could see them wheeling in the sunlight at about 8,000’ before they turned into their headlong dive and disappeared in the mushroom of smoke. So widespread was the dust and smoke that even where we were we all looked as if we had just come out of a flour mill.
At 07.45, which was the H Hour for the advance, the artillery opened up at full blast. We were directly between them and their objective, and there was a perpetual scream of shells going over our heads.
We watched the bombing for about three hours and then walked back to have a look at the chateau behind us. This had been a fine old residence, but had been severely damaged. It had been vacated at very short notice and contained some fine old furniture, in the way of old oak armchairs and long settles. However, all furniture, crockery, children’s toys, books and papers had been blasted about the rooms, which were sometimes two feet deep in debris. One odd thing which I saw just outside the chateau was a lock of human hair tied with a piece of pink ribbon. One wondered what story lay behind it.
We then walked back to the village and had a look at the gun positions. The guns were literally everywhere, and the crews were heaving shells in, pulling the string, and heaving in the next one, as fast as they could go. At close range you felt the blast hit you in the eyes and then heard a sharp report.
We then drove down the coast and on the way passed guns firing away incessantly. One would drive along a road and find a dozen or so lined up against the hedge and shooting over your heads, and yet it is odd how human beings, and even animals can accustom themselves to this din. What children there were didn’t seem to mind the noise, and in one field with approximately a dozen guns in it, there were four horses grazing quite unconcerned.
At the coast we looked around a German coastal concrete blockhouse, which was underground for the most part, and was very well equipped with central heating, air conditioning and periscope.
We then drove along to Arramanches, where we saw a conversion from a seaside resort to a busy port. Two concrete moles, each approximately a mile in length, had been towed across, piece by piece, and sunk into position to form an outer protection to the port. Inside these moles was the main dock consisting of a large concrete and iron structure, some 500 yards long and 50 yards wide. This had massive superstructures, cranes and derricks, and was handling cargoes from the large vessels which lay alongside. This quay was situated about 1/2 mile from the shore and parallel to it, and was connected to each end by large pontoon slipways, over which was a constant stream of heavy traffic to and from the ships. The whole installation had been towed over from this country, piece by piece, and assembled.
We had a quick snack at the dockside and then went down to Bayeaux [sic], a fine town which had received no damage at all, and which our forces had taken on the evening of D Day. Food was plentiful here, the shops being well stocked with bread, cheese and farm butter.
We returned from Bayeaux [sic] to the Headquarters of the 2nd Army, where we arrived about 5 o’clock. Roads everywhere were full of troops and amour on the move. The roads were dusty and tanks threw up vast clouds of dust which temporarily reduced visibility to nil. On arrival at the Headquarters we went straight to the Operations Room and learned that as far as could be ascertained, the
(Continued on page 9, col. 3)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1844. PAGE 8
[Page break]
ACCIDENTS
During July 37 aircraft were damaged to an extent which rendered them unserviceable for more than 48 hours. 11 were the result of accidents known to be avoidable. Some of the others are classified as obscure at the moment, as investigations are incomplete, but will be recategorized later in the month.
Of the avoidable accidents 4 occurred in Squadron aircraft and consisted of 3 CAT AC. and 1 CAT E. 6 were damaged in 51 Base – 2 CAT AC., 3 CAT E. and 1 CAT B., and 1 was a CAT AC. Hurricane of 1690 Flight.
Classifications are as follows:-
Taxying – 3
Overshoots landing – 2
Swings landing – 2
Swings taking off – 1
Other taking off errors – 1
Miscellaneous – 2
Excluding those accidents at present unclassified, there were two fewer “avoidables” in July than in June, and, what is more, the past two months have produced a far smaller of this type of accident than the average for March to May. Keep it up and we will reach the top of the Bomber Command ladder and remain there.
Here is a selection of the month’s avoidables:-
[Underlined] TAXYING. [/underlined] A Lancaster was taxying down a runway where another was stationary (compass swinging) in broad daylight. The pilot made the old mistake of assuming he could get past. He didn’t – until his wing smashed the nose of the other aircraft.
A Stirling was returning to dispersal. The pilot reports he was unable to throttle back his port outer engine. He ran off the track and hit an oil bowser.
[Underlined] OVERSHOOTING. [/underlined] At night a Mosquito overshot a 1400 yards runway in good visibility. It entered the overshoot area and as then taxied back through a wire fence. No taxying light was used. This speaks for itself.
A Stirling pupil on his first solo was caught out in bad weather and after trying various airfields finally found one where he attempted to land. He overshot mainly because of poor visibility.
A Stirling on 3 engines was deliberately swung when the pilot saw he was going to overshoot. Deliberate swinging is now forbidden, and all pilots are to take note. The aircraft must be kept straight. There is far less risk of serious damage when the overshoot area is used. A swing almost invariably results in broken undercarriage legs.
[Underlined] SWINGS. [/underlined] A Lancaster rudder pedal slipped when the pilot was levelling off for a landing. The result was a violent swing which broke the undercarriage. All Lancasters are now being modified to prevent rudder pedals slipping out of the ratchet at critical moments.
In bad visibility a Stirling on 3 engines made an approach to the wrong runway. At 200’ he realised his mistake and went round again with difficulty. The aircraft was diverted to another airfield where it approached at an angle to the runway. A heavy landing was made and the aircraft swung and crashed. Cloud base was down to 600’ – visibility 3 miles – accident still under investigation.
[Underlined] OTHERS. [/underlined] A Stirling had just taken off when violent juddering was experienced. The pilot throttled back and landed in the overshoot area – CAT E. – nothing has been found wrong technically. Instructors should warn pupils before going solo of the common causes of juddering on take off. This is the second accident of this nature in 6 weeks.
A Verey pistol was accidentally fired off in an aircraft. It did quite a bit of damage. The full facts are not yet known but it is evident someone was careless.
A Lancaster pilot jettisoned his bombs too low and sustained damage to his aircraft. He landed safely at base.
[Underlined] SILVER LANCASTER COMPETITION [/underlined]
July begins the second leg of the Silver Lancaster Competition. So far, the Units stand as follows (it must, however, be remembered that this list is subject to revision when the full facts of all accidents for July are known): 49, 50, 57, 106, 61, 619, 207, 467, 463, 97, 83 – all [underlined] NIL; [/underlined] 9, 44, 617, 627 – 1 avoidable accident each; 1660 – 5; 1661 – Nil; 1654 – 3; L.F.S. – Nil; 1690 Flt. – 1.
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF DAMAGE – FORMS 765(C) [/underlined]
The first of July saw the new aircraft damage category – A (R) - come into force. Many units have completely ignored the order which was an amendment to A.M.O. A. 1348/43. All Units are reminded that aircraft under this category are not counted against them in the Bomber Command accident ladder, so it is definitely to their advantage, and to the Group as a whole, that the Forms 765 (c) should be correctly made out. Aircraft affected are those which have had a replacement of a major component (e.g. engine, propellor, rudder), as a result of an accident, [underlined] in 48 hours. [/underlined]
[Underlined] TRAINING (Contd. From page 7, col.3) [/underlined]
training and logged over 30 hours night flying in a week, so that they are now ready to tackle any crew the Squadrons like to put up. Full details of the organisation and procedure have been issued and Squadrons are urged to take advantage of this first class facility. From now on the policy must be NIGHT AFFILIATION IS ON EVERY NIGHT.
Operational crews had little opportunity for further Squadron PRACTICES because of operations. Some useful work was done, however, in between sorties. Incidentally Flight Commanders should note that the term PRACTICE is to be used instead of TRAINING for non-operational exercises done by Operational crews. This Command ruling makes the distinction between operational crews who are fully trained and who are “practising” to improve their standards, and new crews under training who have still got something to learn.
EQUIPMENT
[Underlined] RETURN OF EQUIPMENT BY UNITS TO M.Us & R.E.Ds. [/underlined]
Complaints have been received from No. 40 Group that Units are not carrying out instructions in returning serviceable and repairable equipment to M.Us and R.E.Ds.
The attention of Equipment Officers is again drawn to A.M.O. A. 736/43 as amended by A.M.Os. A.1132/43 and A.210/44, also to Bomber Command Equipment Staff Instruction No. 35. These A.M.Os and Instructions give full details on the returning of serviceable and repairable equipment, and must be complied with.
The following points are specially important and every Equipment Officer must make certain that these are carried out:-
(a) Except for Quartz Crystals, [underlined] all [/underlined] Cat.C. equipment in Section 10 must be returned to No. 3 R.E.D.
(b) Items for which there are special transit cases, must be packed in these cases.
(c) Items in 1A and E should be returned to G.E.Ds.
(d) Cat. A. items are to be packed and vouched separately from other unit returns.
(e) Separate vouchers for each Vocab. Section.
(f) [Underlined] ALL [/underlined] equipment must be labelled.
(g) Cases addressed to particular sites should only contain equipment for those sites.
Every Equipment Officer should make certain that his staff knows and carried out all the instructions on the return of equipment, since equipment turning up at the wrong M.U. causes great delay to that M.U’s work.
[Underlined] PLATFORMS, AIRCRAFT INSPECTION [/underlined]
Attention is drawn to A.M.O. N. 714/44 dealing with the introduction of a new type of Inspection platform for Lancaster aircraft.
[Underlined] A VISIT TO NORMANDY [/underlined]
(Continued from page 8, column 3)
battle was going well. Our advances were better than originally hoped for, and the Army were extremely pleased with the bombing. Little resistance had been met in the area North-East and East of Caen, but considering the attention given by our aircraft and artillery this fact is not surprising.
Unfortunately we were not allowed to go and see results of the bombing even though our forces had moved through the positions, so we returned again to our landing strip, after making our farewells and thanks to the officers who had extended their hospitality to us, and looked after us so well. The Dakota awaited us and we took off again for Northolt, leaving behind us the battle area, which was still shrouded in dust and smoke.
The main thing which struck me throughout the visit was the atmosphere of efficiency which dominated everywhere. The running of the camp, traffic control, organisation of salvage and supply dumps, gave one the impression that everyone had a job to do, knew what that job was, and was wasting no time in getting on with it.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 9
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AIR SEA RESCUE
During July three aircraft of the Group are known to have come down in the sea. “H” of 630 Squadron hit the sea when returning from operations at a low altitude, there were two survivors. A Mosquito of 627 Squadron ditched off Cherbourg – the full story of this is not yet available as the crew is still in Normandy. “C” of 207 Squadron crashed into the sea whilst jettisoning bombs.
There were several unusual aspects of the ditching of “H” of 630 Squadron which are the subject of a formal investigation. At the time of the impact the aircraft was flying at 200 – 210 m.p.h. and the crew were not at their usual stations because of an intercomm failure. The Navigator and Air Bomber were sitting up at the Navigator’s table and the Wireless Operator was forward without Mae West or parachute trying to rectify the intercomm failure.
Fortunately the sea was calm and the Pilot, Air Bomber, Wireless Operator and Navigator got out. The fuselage broke in half and the Rear Gunner, whose turret was on the beam, succeeded in leaving after he had gone under a few feet. The Rear Gunner did not contact the other survivors until an hour after impact.
On leaving the fuselage, the Navigator made the Wireless Operator get into the dinghy first; when the Navigator followed the dinghy sank below the surface. As the Wireless Operator had no Mae West the Navigator left him to get what support he could from the dinghy and rejoined the others holding on to the aircraft.
After approximately 30 minutes the fuselage sank, and the Navigator calling to the others to follow him, swam across to the dinghy which had drifted some distance away. The Pilot and Air Bomber never reached the dinghy and the Navigator set out to look for them but was forced to give up when overtaken by cramp. These two were not seen again.
By chance the Navigator found the “Makers” Pack and knowing it contained the signal pistol and cartridges he tried to open it. The Rear Gunner appeared making his way to support the Wireless Operator, who was in a bad way. After a two hour struggle, the Navigator succeeded in extracting the pistol and cartridges and 40 minutes after firing the first signal a Naval trawler picked up the Rear Gunner and Navigator, who had been 3 1/2 hours in the water. The Wireless Operator, in spite of the Rear Gunner’s efforts, had succumbed.
[Underlined] SAFETY DRILL COMPETITION RESULTS [/underlined]
[Table of Safety Drill Competition Results by Base and Squadron]
[Underlined] Note: [/underlined]
In June a total of 390 aircrew were rescued from the sea against 240 (47.2%) in May. Unfortunately the precise number of unsuccessful incidents is not known and so the percentage of aircrew saved cannot be expressed. In addition 243 non-flying personnel were saved – 218 in the Channel area. Air Sea Rescue aircraft flew 1,176 sorties in the Channel Area alone!
RECENT GOOD SHOWS
Whilst on a daylight operation, an aircraft of 106 Squadron flown by F/Sgt. Netherwood was severely damaged by flak. He was forced to feather both port engines. The port wing and tyre were damaged and hydraulics rendered unserviceable, but in spite of this, F/Sgt. Netherwood carried out his bombing run successfully, completed his attack and, showing great skill, flew his damaged aircraft back to Base where he made an emergency landing without further damage to his aircraft or injury to his crew.
F/O McCracken of 49 Squadron was returning from a night operation when his aircraft was attacked by an enemy fighter. The trimming tabs. A.S.I., intercomm., R/T, hydraulics and D.R. Compass were rendered unserviceable. Fires were started in the two inner engines and in the bomb-bay and the Navigator and two Gunners were wounded. The fires were extinguished, and in spite of the damage to his aircraft, F/O. McCracken flew back to this country and carried out a successful landing at an emergency airfield.
An aircraft of 61 Squadron, piloted by F/O Aukland, collided with another Lancaster over the target. Both port engines and the port main plane were severely damaged. Showing fine airmanship P/O Aukland flew the aircraft back to this country where he made a successful emergency landing.
Another pilot in 61 Squadron P/O Hallett, carried out a successful landing in difficult conditions. He aircraft had been heavily engaged by enemy defences and the Rear Gunner was wounded, the port tyre punctures and hydraulics rendered unserviceable. In spite of this damage, P/O Hallett carried out a good landing without flaps or brake pressure.
AIRCREW VOLUNTEERS
(a) New Volunteers.
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.
(c) Posted for training.
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Station]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 10
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING
[Underlined] “A MISS IS AS GOOD AS A MILE” [/underlined]
There has been an increase in the number of attacks carried out against Flying Bomb sites, stores and rocket sites. To bombing crews, these targets present a difficult problem. They are extremely well camouflaged, small and heavily fortified and further, suffer negligibly from blast damage. In consequence, a stick of bombs that fails to make a direct hit is of no value. The “misses” on marshalling yard bottlenecks may do damage to railway tracks, wagon sheds and rolling stock. Misses on aerodrome hangars may crater runways, damage dispersed aircraft and spread chaos in the ‘communal site’. Misses against Flying Bomb installations, however, merely make holes which can be filled in.
It is, therefore, essential that all crews make the most accurate attacks within their power, and realise that a miss will have no value at all – there can be no ‘fluke’ damage.
Owing to repeated operations and poor weather, there is but limited opportunity for bombing practice at the bombing ranges, so every advantage must be taken of the exercises completed.
A detailed analysis must follow each practice to eliminate all faults both human and mechanical.
Air Bombers must examine their bombsights in accordance with 5 Group Aircraft Drills, (Drill No. 9, Appendix “C”) at every opportunity and further ensure that the operational procedure as detailed in Drill No.3 is carried out conscientiously.
If all this is done, it will naturally follow that the sticks of bombs aimed at these enemy installations will be more accurate.
They are not impregnable but they are impervious to near misses.
Direct hits are being obtained only by A+ or A crews. There are far too few of this category at the Group’s disposal. A determined effort must be made by every crew to strive for this category from the initial exercise attempted in 51 Base. Every crew that fails to obtain an “A” exercise at any practice must, in conjunction with the Bombing Leader, discover the reason why.
Remember! ONLY DIRECT HITS WILL CAUSE DAMAGE!!!
[Underlined] CREW CATEGORISATION [/UNDERLINED]
A+ Crews – 85 yds or less
A Crews – 140 yds or less
B Crews – 210 yds or less
C Crews – 280 yds or less
D Crews – Over 280 yds.
[Underlined] RESULTS [/underlined]
[Table of Crew Categories by Base]
Congratulations to F/Lt. MATHESON and crew 49 Squadron, on obtaining the first A+ category with the Mark XIV Bombsight!
[Underlined] HIGH LEVEL BOMBING PRACTICE [/underlined]
[Table of High Level Bombing Practice Results by Squadron and Conversion Unit]
[Underlined] JULY’S OUTSTANDING CREW ERRORS [/underlined]
Apologies are due to 1661 Conversion Units, R.A.F. Station, WINTHORPE. In last month’s NEWS 2 excellent crew errors of 1661 Conversion Unit were credited to 1654 Conversion Unit. This was indeed unfortunate as the error of 53 yards obtained by F/Sgt McKechnie and crew was a Unit Record. Once again only Crew Errors below 80 yards can be recorded.
Squadron or Con. Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Error at 20,000 feet (in yards)
44 F/O Cartwright F/O Beaton F/O Olson 69
F/O Freestone F/O Woollam Sgt Gage 68
49 F/O Russell Sgt Reid Sgt Millar 79
F/L Matheson F/O Mathews Sgt Launder 60, 59 & 75
106 F/L Taylor P/O Power F/S Watson 39
83 F/O Meggeson P/O Franklin F/O Wicker 47, 72 & 57
97 F/O Edwards F/O Barker F/L Burt 57 & 66
83 F/O Kelly Sgt Burleigh F/O Irwin 79
463 P/O Garden F/S Murrell W/O Turner 79
1654 F/S Wilson Sgt Stuart F/O Howarth 74 & 76
F/O Hughes Sgt Buxton Sgt Dunckerly 72
Sgt McGregor Sgt Bache Sgt Chadwick 62
1660 F/S Herbert F/O Cleary Sgt Maxwell 78
Sgt Hart Sgt Bell Sgt Green 53
F/O Joplin F/S Hibberd Sgt Fish 45
F/S Harper F/S Williams Sgt Cooper 71
1661 F/S Hayler Sgt Hearn P/O Winterburn 69
F/O Judge F/S Gore P/O Cook 71
Congratulations are extended to F/O MEGGESON and crew (83 Squadron) and F/Lt. MATHESON and crew (49 Squadron) for each obtaining 3 outstanding crew errors using the S.A.B.S. and Mark XIV Bombsight respectively.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 11
[Page break]
AIR BOMBING (CONT.)
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]
Congratulations to 1660 C.U. Swinderby, the [underlined] FIRST [/underlined] Conversion Unit to achieve the average crew error for a month of less than 200 yards.
[Underlined] 627 Squadron [/underlined] report an outstanding dive-bombing exercise by F/Lt BARTLEY – releasing at 500 ft.- his average error was 5 1/2 yards.
[Underlined] 54 Base. [/underlined] W/Cdr. JEUDWINE, carrying out an initial exercise in a Lightning aircraft, dive bombing, averaged 9 1/2 yds. for 6 bombs.
[Underlined] 44 & 619 Squadrons (R.A.F. Stn. DUNHOLME) [/underlined] Station Armament Officer has sectioned one of each type of fuse in use and these are displayed in the Bombing Offices.
[Underlined] 1661 C.U. (F/LT PRICE). [/underlined] P/O HARROP and crew obtained direct hits on Flashlight Bullseye target at Bristol on night of 29/30th July.
[Underlined] “GEN” FROM THE BOMBING RANGES [/underlined]
[Underlined] WAINFLEET BOMBING RANGE. [/underlined] 4407 bombs aimed by 923 aircraft.
[Underlined] EPPERSTONE BOMBING RANGE. [/underlined] 1666 bombs aimed by 285 aircraft.
[Underlined] OWTHORPE BOMBING RANGE. [/underlined] 1535 bombs aimed by 287 aircraft.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS CORNER [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/O CAMPBELL, D.F.C. [/underlined] (Aircrew School – R.A.F. Station Scampton) has moved to No. 9 Squadron as Bombing Leader, for his 2nd tour.
[Underlined] F/L NUGENT [/underlined] becomes Bombing Leader to 61 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/LT McDONALD, [/underlined] tour expired, has moved to H.Q. No. 6 Group.
[Underlined] F/LT BILLINGTON [/underlined] (207 Squadron) has moved to 54 Base.
[Underlined] P/O LINNETT [/underlined] becomes Bombing Leader to 207 Squadron.
[Underlined] F/LT ASTBURY [/underlined] (617 Squadron) is tour expired and has moved to H.Q.54 Base to supervise S.A.B.S. training.
F/O FOULKES (630 Squadron) has succeeded F/Lt Farara as Bombing Leader.
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ COURSES [/underlined]
[Underlined] F/O NUGENT [/underlined] was 5th on No. 85 Course with “B” Category.
[Underlined] F/O NAWELL [/underlined] (463 Sqdn.) and [underlined] F/O FOULKES [/underlined] (630 Squadron) were 2nd and 11th respectively on No. 86 Course with “B” Categories.
[Underlined] F/O McMASTER [/underlined] (1654 C.U.) was 12th with “B” Category on No. 87 Course.
[Underlined] THE BOMBING COMPETITION [/underlined]
Maximum entries were obtained in the Competition this month; the results are below. 52 Base are to be congratulated on obtaining the first 3 places in the Squadron Competition.
[Underlined] SQUADRON COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st 49 Squadron 61 yards
2nd 44 Squadron 65 yards
3rd 619 Squadron 66 yards
4th 9 Squadron 71 yards
5th 207 Squadron 72 yards
6th 97 Squadron 88 yards
7th 83 Squadron 90 yards
8th 630 Squadron 94 yards
9th 50 Squadron 99 yards
10th 463 Squadron 101 yards
11th 106 Squadron 103 yards
12th 57 Squadron 109 yards
13th 61 Squadron 119 yards
14th 467 Squadron 128 yards
[Underlined] CONVERSION UNIT COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st 1661 Con. Unit 56 yards
2nd 1660 Con. Unit 67 yards
3rd 1654 Con. Unit 76 yards
4th 5 L.F.S. 151 yards
Congratulations 1661 Con. Unit!!!!
[Underlined] BOMBING LADDER [/underlined]
617 and 627 Squadrons maintain a bombing “ladder”; top positions this month are as follows:-
[Underlined] 617 Squadron 627 Squadron [/underlined]
1st F/LT KEARNS & CREW F/LT BARTLEY
2nd F/O DUFFY & CREW F/LT DEVIGNE
3rd F/O KELL & CREW F/LT GRAY
[Underlined] BIGCHIEF COMPETITION [/underlined]
1st A/CDR. POPE (H.Q. No.52 Base) 114 yards
2nd G/CAPT. WEIR (R.A.F. Stn. Fiskerton) 116 yards
[Underlined] ?? BOMBING QUIZ ?? [/underlined]
1. What check must you make if bomb firing switch cannot be removed from stowage, with bomb doors open?
2. What is the difference between “George” pressure and Pescopump suction as applied to the Mk. XIV Bombsight?
3. What bombing errors would you expect is the suction was low at the Mark XIV Sighting Head?
4. What Mk. XIV settings are necessary for a “Wanganui” attack?
THE LORD CAMROSE
[Crest]
BOMBING TROPHY
A silver model of a 12,000 lb. bomb has been presented to the Group by Lord Camrose. The A.O.C. has decided to award this trophy to the Squadron with the most accurate High Level bombing results, calculated on the results obtained with the Mk. XIV Bombsight between the 1st January and 30th June, 1944.
No. 50 Squadron, R.A.F. Station, Skellingthorpe, have achieved the best average error over this period and the A.O.C. will present them with the trophy as soon as possible.
The bombing trophy will be held for a period of 3 months and the next award will be announced on the results obtained between 1st July and 30th September, 1944.
The final figures for the first 6 months of the year are as follows:-
[Table of Average Crew Error by Squadron]
That line [drawing]
will cost you
a donation
to the
PARCELS FUND
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 12.
[Page break]
PHOTOGRAPHY
Though failures for the month of July show no overall increase on the month of June, actually photographic failures increased almost 100%. On the whole this was caused by the tape join on composite colour film failing to pass round the guide roller on the ‘receive side’ of the magazine, and condensation of moisture which deposits itself inside the lens front component, on the rear lens surface, or under the glass register plate during certain conditions of temperature and humidity.
The former of these two failures should be relatively easy to overcome. A thorough testing of all film magazines under power using a composite film should reveal those which will cause film stoppage. A film magazine has been sectioned and it was found that the metal of the outside casing increases in thickness towards the closed end leaving insufficient clearance for the thickness of two films and the tape. The cure for this is to request the C.T.O. to arrange for the clearance to be increased by ‘routing’ out some of the metal.
Moisture condensation has been one of the most persistent causes of photographic failures during both night and day operations, unfortunately a cure has not yet been found for cameras installed in Lancaster aircraft. Trials are being carried out, however, and much can be done by efficient maintenance. Particular care must be taken to avoid the dampness in camera muffs when these are in use.
It is evident that many defective camera units are being exchanged without N.C.O.’s reporting the defect. There is no hope of any remedial action unless failures are reported in the proper manner. Form 1022 action may appear to be a useless waste of paper, but if used intelligently and completed with all the essential information, Air Ministry will take all appropriate action to rectify manufacturing and design defects. This is particularly important because the F.24 camera is now being replaced by the American version, the K.24.
It is again necessary to remind all photographers of the importance of producing photographic results with the utmost speed, without sacrificing photographic efficiency. Photographic N.C.O.’s are to re-examine their internal organisation with the object of producing better results in less time. Where section personnel are overstaffed, this must be regarded as a temporary state, personnel surpluses are bound to be absorbed at short notice, and no replacements will be available. The volume of photographic work being produced in photographic sections has increased enormously and no operational section should complain of lack of work or variety, but the peak has not yet been reached. Increased efforts on the part of all photographic personnel will be necessary as the photographic equipment used during operations increases.
ANALYSIS OF NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHY
[Table showing Photography Statistics - Night and Day, showing Attempts and Failures by Squadron]
LINK TRAINER
[Table of Link Trainer Sessions by Squadron]
For the second month is succession there was an increase in Link Trainer Times throughout the Group, but there is still room for improvement. Special attention is again drawn to the 5 Group Link Trainer Syllabus with emphasis on those exercises with the artificial horizon and directional Gyro blanked off. Pilots should also take advantage of the Corkscrew Exercise to polish up their corkscrew procedure for the present drive on gunnery.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 13
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GUNNERY
[Underlined] CATEGORISATION OF AIR GUNNERS [/underlined]
Instructions have now been issued to Squadrons and Units to categorise all Air Gunners immediately. Gunners arriving from O. T. U. ‘s are to be categorised at Aircrew Training School and will be re-categorised at Conversion Units before proceeding to a Squadron. Squadron Gunnery Leaders will, in the future, know the capabilities of new arrivals from their categories and will be able to concentrate immediately on training the backward gunners to a higher standard and improved category. Gunners holding the higher categories will be tested and reassessed after 10 and 20 sorties, but those with the lower categories will be required to have a test every two weeks until they have graduated to a higher category. Base Gunnery Leaders are responsible for the categorisation of Gunners in Squadrons within their respective Bases, and a big improvement in the standard of Gunnery throughout the Group is anticipated.
[Underlined] OPERATIONS – COMBATS [/underlined]
As was to be expected, the Hun reacted to our continuous raids in France and the Low Countries by bringing down his night fighter Squadrons from Germany. This has resulted in increased numbers of combats on those operations where he has been successful in intercepting the stream. The large number of 57 combats tool place on the night 28/29th July, when Stuttgart was attacked. Visibility was good above 10/10ths cloud and the Group claimed 13 destroyed and 1 damaged. Other good nights were 4/5th with 36 combats, 6 enemy aircraft being claimed destroyed and 3 damaged, and 18/19th when 4 enemy aircraft were claimed destroyed. A total of 27 enemy aircraft were claimed as destroyed during the month, which is over 10% of the combats. This is a big improvement on previous months and to keep it up, at the expense of Hun Night Fighter’s morale gunners must be 100% efficient in all departments and use their sights correctly during combats.
Successes have been achieved by those gunners who have used their equipment to the full and who are also alert and efficient in their search procedure. Particular mention should be made of F/O McIntosh and P/O Sutherland of 207 Squadron, who have followed up their achievement of last month of 3 enemy aircraft destroyed in one night, with a further 2 enemy aircraft claimed destroyed during July. With the Mark IIIN sight now installed in turrets, gunners must get used to watching tracer and target through the sight, and this can only be achieved by practice. Hose piping with tracer has very rarely, if ever, been successful and will never be effective. Casualties among the enemy night fighter personnel must affect their efficiency and morale, and if we can be sure that each combat will result in a destroyed or damaged Hun, this end will be attained. “The few” do it regularly each month, so it is up to the remainder to follow their excellent example.
[Underlined] GUNNERY LEADERS’ MOVEMENTS [/underlined]
61 Squadron – F/Lt Glover
50 Squadron – F/Lt Mills
5 L. F. S. – F/Lt Crawford
THIS MONTH’S BAG [Cartoon]
[Underlined] DESTROYED [/underlined]
Sqdn A/C letter Date Type of E/A.
97 “L” 4/5 July ME.41o [sic] (c)
61 “Y” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
617 “A” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “F” 4/5 July ME.109 (c)
9 “L” 4/5 July ME.210 (c)
630 “T” 4/5 July DO.217 (c)
57 “E” 6/7 July ME.210 (c)
83 “D” 7/8 July S/E (c)
207 “M” 12/13 July ME.109 (c)
61 “N” 18/19 July U/I (c)
57 “B” 18/19 July ME.109 (c)
630 “N” 19 July U/I (c)
106 “Z” 20/21 July T/E
44 “Q” 24/25 July S/E
83 “L” 24/25 July JU. 88
50 “R” 25 July ME.109 (c)
207 “L” 26/27 July ME.410
9 “W” 28/29 July ME.110 (c)
49 “P” 28 July FW.190 (c)
49 “U” 28 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “M” 28/29 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “K” 28/29 July JU. 88 JU. 88 ME.109
619 “X” 28/29 July JU. 88
463 “H” 28/29 July ME.410
463 “D” 28/29 July ME.109
207 “U” 28/29 July JU. 88 1 Flying Bomb
[Underlined] PROBABLY DESTROYED [/underlined]
9 “N” 4/5 July ME.110 (c)
57 “R” 12/13 July JU. 88 (c)
44 “F” 14/15 July ME.109 (c)
57 “O” 18/19 July JU. 88 (c)
61 “N” 18/19 July JU. 88 (c)
[Underlined] DAMAGED [/underlined]
630 “V” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
630 “Y” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
630 “Q” 4/5 July JU. 88 (c)
9 “Z” 7/8 July JU. 88
467 “C” 7 July ME.210 (c)
463 “A” 25 July ME.109
207 “Z” 25/26 July ME.410 (c)
49 “F” 28 July JU. 88 (c)
106 “C” 28/29 July JU. 88 (c)
207 “X” 28/29 July JU. 88 (c)
Claims annotated (c) have been confirmed by Headquarters, Bomber Command.
[Underlined] SUMMARY OF COMBATS [/underlined]
No. of Combats 207
E/A Destroyed 28
E/A Probably Destroyed 5
E/A Damaged 10
AIR TRAINING CARRIED OUT IN CONVERSION UNITS AND SQUADRONS DURING JULY.
[Table of Fighter Affiliation Exercises by Squadron]
FIGHTER AFFILIATION GRAND TOTAL = 1774
[Underlined] ODD JOTTINGS [/underlined]
Flash trainers are now installed at each Station and training is going ahead. Emphasis should be laid on the training for quickening of mental reaction rather than a further means of teaching aircraft recognition. Instructions for the use of the Flash Trainer have been issued by Bomber Command and these must be adhered to.
Skeet ranges have been erected now on the majority of Stations and training should commence immediately in liaison with the P.F.O.
A ‘back-type’ parachute is now on trial in the Group. Reports as to it’s [sic] suitability are awaited and will be made known in due course.
F/Lt. Jones, Sighting Adviser to Bomber Command, visited Swinderby and lectured on the “Pictorial Strip” Method of Assessing Cine-Gyro films. Instructions will be issued in the near future.
Squadron Gunnery Leaders should refer to A.M.O. N.978/43 and demand necessary number of Spectacles Mk.VIII Anti-glare for their Squadron gunners. These spectacles should be worn at times when glare conditions exist. The stores section and reference numbers are:-
22C/961 Medium A.
22C/962 Large A.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 14
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OPERATIONS
[Underlined] ST. LEU D’ESSERENT 4/5TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Cheshire [/underlined]
The first operation of the month was an attack on the flying bomb storage depot at St. Leu D’Esserent, North East of Paris, on the West bank of the river Oise. 229 aircraft from the Group were detailed.
MARKING The target was identified by the Marker Force, but the markers fell mainly in a direction North East to South East of the aiming point.
RESULTS An accurate concentration of bombs fell round the markers, but photographic cover from P.R.U. showed that the M.P.I. of this concentration was some 400 yards slightly north east of the aiming point, and on the eastern side of the river. Heavy damage was done to the railway yards adjoining. No. 617 Squadron took part in the operation and were allocated a separate aiming point.
CONTROL Several “snags” occurred in the control of this operation:-
(i) The Master Bomber experienced trouble with his VHF set, and he was unable to pass instructions either to No. 617 Squadron or to the main force, W/T links or flare force.
(ii) the Deputy Controller, hearing no instructions from the Master Bomber, issued orders for the 617 Squadron attack, but failed to establish contact with the W/T link aircraft of the main force.
(iii) W/T link No. 1 was damaged by a fighter and had to return to Base. He passed the message “Returning to base” to W/T link II; this was sent in plain language and resulted in a few aircraft of the main force returning to base. The message he should have sent should merely have been “take over”; this could not have caused any mis-understanding. W/T Link II then took over control of the attack, and no further difficulties were experienced.
[Underlined] ST. LEU D’ESSERENT 7/8th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined]
225 Aircraft from the Group were detailed to make a second attack on this target which was to be marked by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and by No. 54 Base.
MARKING The marking was opened by Oboe, the second marker falling on the marking point. The flare force then came in, dropping their flares accurately over the target area. In the light of these, the marking point was identified by a 54 Base marker, who dropped 2 red spot fires which were assessed by the marker leader as 100 yards South of the Aiming Point. Night photographs show them to have been 247° - 185 yards. The Marker Leader then called upon the remaining Mosquitos to back up and drop their markers 100 yards North of the red spot fires. The Master Bomber then called in the main force to bomb, and an accurate concentration of bombs was reported to have developed round the markers, which were further backed up by Red T.I.’s.
RESULTS P.R.U. photographs show that the Northern Central, and Southern tunnel entrances were severely hit, and that considerable damage was done to the railway supplying the site, and also to the main railway lines. At least one aircrew bombed before the time ordered for the main force to attack, and before the Master Bomber gave the order to attack. This endangered the Mosquito Aircraft and prevented full backing up being carried out. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the success of a controlled attack upon small targets depends on rigid adherence by all crews to the Standing Instructions laid down, and to compliance with instructions issued by the Master Bomber or his deputy.
CONTROL W/T was very good. VHF R/T suffered interference, through a fault in the intercommunications system in the Master Bomber’s aircraft.
[Underlined] CULMONT/CHALINDREY 13/14TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined]
157 aircraft were detailed to attack the railway junction and repair depot. The attack took place in conditions of no cloud and good visibility. There were two aiming point, Eastern and Western, and the attack on each was scheduled to open simultaneously. One marking point was chosen, bombing to be carried out by the vector method.
MARKING Flare illumination was punctual and accurate. Owing to a fault in the Master Bomber’s No.1 V.H.F. set, the deputy controller temporarily took over the direction of the attack. The latter gave orders for the attack on the Western aiming point to commence, and this went ahead according to plan. Some six minutes later, the Master Bomber had changed to his alternative V.H.F. set, and took charge of the attack on the Eastern aiming point. This was then completed without further breakdown of the communications.
RESULTS Windfinding was good on this operation, and the correct vector was passed for both the East and West aiming point. P.R.U. photographs reveal a very heavy concentration of craters all over the area od the locomotive sheds, and many locomotives were damaged. The lines are obliterated by craters in this area. The rail junctions east of the sheds is severed in many places. The construction of lines at the South end of the target and all other lines leading to the South West have been cut in many places.
CONTROL W/T control was excellent on both aiming points. VHF R/T very good, after the Master Bomber had changed to his stand-by set.
[Underlined] VILLENEUVE ST. GEORGES (RAILWAY YARDS) 14/15TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Jeudwine [/underlined]
118 aircraft from all Bases were detailed to attack the Railway marshalling Yards South of Paris, the marking to be carried out by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. and by 54 Base.
The weather was clear at first, but thin cloud drifted over during the attack, giving 5/10ths cover at about 7,000 feet at the time of the attack.
MARKING The Oboe markers were placed in the marshalling yards, one to the N.W. of the aiming point and two to the East. The first flares lit up the aiming point and Mosquitos dropped two red spot fires. Some bombs were dropped on the red spot fires but the Master Bomber considered that more marking was required, and ordered bombing to cease. More flares were called for, and by their aid Mosquito backers-up dropped two more red spot fires and a green T. I. The Master Bomber added one 1,000 lb red and one green T. I., and having assessed the marking as accurate gave the order to bomb the concentration of red and green markers. Towards the end of the attack, there was a slight spread towards the northern end of the marshalling yards.
CONTROL W/T communication on this raid was entirely satisfactory. A small percentage of aircraft complained of interference on V.H.F.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows that the main weight of the attack fell on the extreme Eastern edge of the sorting sidings, spreading across the fields to the East, but heavy damage was caused to tracks and rolling stock in these sidings, and the Eastern through lines Paris – Dijon were cut.
[Underlined] NEVERS (RAILWAY JUNCTION AND LOCOMOTIVE DEPOT) 15/16TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Porter [/underlined]
109 aircraft from all Bases were ordered to attack the railway junction and locomotive depot at Nevers. The flare and marker forces were provided by No. 54 Base.
MARKING Flares were dropped over the target area on time, and a 1,000 lb green T.I. was dropped in the correct position as a datum point. A hold up in the marking occurred in the early stages, as the marker leader inadvertently released his two red spot fires in the early part of his dive and they fell some 500 yards short, and North of the aiming point. These were subsequently cancelled by a yellow T.I. The aiming point was re-marked with two more red spot fires, which were assessed as having fallen along the axis of the railway lines. The main forces were ordered by the Master Bomber to bomb the red spot fires. Bombing developed, and the concentration, in the estimation of the Master Bomber, was some 150 yards West of the target. He therefore sent out a vector to bring the remaining bombs back to the aiming point.
CONTROL Control on both W/T and VHF R/T was satisfactory. Wind-finding was good, and the vector issued by the Master Bomber correct.
RESULTS P. R. U. photographs show a very heavy concentration of craters from the junction right through the marshalling yards to their southern extremity by the main station. This concentration is so intense at a centre about 450 yards south of the junction, that all lines and rolling stock have been obliterated. The road bridge over the yard has been damaged but
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944 PAGE 15
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OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
not severed and the workshops to the East side of the yard have been severely damaged. On this occasion, the Group carried a load of 100% delayed action bombs. 25% of the bombs were fused L.D. 6 – 144 hours, and the remainder 1/2 hour or 1 hour delay. To enable the Master Bomber, and the crews themselves, to have some indication where the sticks were dropping, all aircraft carried one tail trace attachment in their load.
[Underlined] CAEN – DAY 18TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: P.F.F. and 54 Base (W/Cdr. Jeudwine) [/underlined]
203 aircraft from the Group were detailed to attack special targets in the Caen area, in direct support of our troops in Normandy. The attack was designed to eliminate certain enemy strong points and concentrations of armour, to enable tour troops to occupy the Suburbs of Caen and the East bank of the Orne and to make a break through into the open country South east of the town. Aircraft from other Bomber Command Groups also took part in this operation, and some 5,000 tons of bombs were dropped. Two areas were allotted to No. 5 Group.
MARKING Marking was carried out by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and the attack was controlled by a Master Bomber also supplied by the P.F.F. The markers were accurately placed, and the attack on both areas was carried out according to plan.
CONTROL The directions of the Master Bomber were clearly heard by all crews.
RESULTS Eye witnesses on the ground testify to the accuracy of the bombing, and no reports have been received of any bombs having been dropped in the sectors occupied by our own troops. All crews will know of General Montgomery’s acknowledgement of the success of this attack, which enabled the Allied Forces to attain their immediate objectives.
[Underlined] REVIGNY (MARSHALLING YARDS) 18/19TH JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr. Jeudwine [/underlined]
116 aircraft from the Group were detailed to attack the Marshalling Yards at Revigny, the marking to be carried out by No.54 Base.
MARKING One 1,000 lb Red T.I. was dropped by the marker leader, which was assessed as 50 yards 050° from the aiming point. Night photographs show this assessment to have been correct. The Master Bomber then gave the order for the Main Force to bomb the Red T.I. In the early stages of bombing a very large explosion occurred some 300 yards from the aiming point, followed by fires and smoke which obscured the Red T.I. The Master Bomber gave the order for the fires to be attacked, but during an orbit he once again saw the Red T.I. burning on the ground, countermanded his second order and issued further instructions to continue bombing the T.I. No further instructions were issued until the “Cease bombing” signal was given.
An examination of the bomb craters shown in P.R.U. photographs, gives the approximate mean point of impact of the bombs as 350 yards 100° from the aiming point. The wind velocity broadcast for the use of the main force was 120° 17 m.p.h., whereas an analysis of all winds found shows the average to have been 240° 05 m.p.h. Two facts are clear:-
(a) The marker stated to be on the railway attracted practically no bombs.
(b) The wind was very light and variable, but was not strong enough to displace the M.P.I. by some 350 yards.
A study of all the raid reports indicates that the majority of crews bombed on a red marker; in many cases this was reported to be faint. A few crews also mention the presence of a green T.I. none of which were in fact dropped, and some reported having bombed fires, on the Master Bomber’s instructions. The experienced crews of No. 627 Squadron reported a terrific explosion which was corroborated by most of the main force crews. In addition there are reports of aircraft seen burning in the vicinity of the red marker.
RESULTS P.R.U. photographs show a building about 200 yards South East of the aiming point, which not only received a hit or hits, but also appears to have blown up and to have been damaged by fire. It is highly probable that this attracted the attention, and was probably the aiming point of some bomb aimers. It seems fairly clear from the plot examined that the majority of crews did in fact bomb something which was about 200 yards South East of the aiming point and this would account for some of the vector error. Only a few sticks of bombs have actually straddled the railway lines themselves.
CONTROL W/T Control was excellent; VHF R/T satisfactory.
[Underlined] THIVERNY (FLYING BOMB STORAGE) EVENING 19TH JULY [/underlined]
[Master Bomber: S/Ldr Owen [/underlined]
The chalk cliffs and caves at Thiverny, North of Paris, known to be a site for the storage of flying bombs, were the target for 106 aircraft of the Group in the evening of July 19th. The main marking was to be carried out by Oboe aircraft of the P.F.F. backed up if necessary by markers of 54 Base.
MARKING The initial Oboe marking was late and a 54 Base marker dropped 4 red T.I’s. These, however, fell some 500 yards short and the Master Bomber gave orders for these to be attacked, with a 500 yards overshoot. Some Yellow Oboe T.I’s were then dropped and fell on the aiming point, and the Master Bomber immediately gave orders for these to be attacked. The bombing was somewhat scattered, and did not approach the standard achieved during our night attacks on tactical targets.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover, nevertheless, shows the target area liberally plastered with bomb craters, and considerable damage was also caused to the railway yards adjoining, and supplying the storage site. There is, however, no subsidence of earth into the caves, and the entrances are not blocked, though the main road to Creil is blocked by craters.
This was the second large-scale daylight attack within two days, but it involved a much deeper penetration into enemy occupied territory than the daylight attack on the Caen area.
The necessity for maintaining as compact a formation as possible was stressed at briefing, and this was in fact achieved on the route to the target. However, late marking caused aircraft to orbit, and thus split up the formation on the return route.
A general directive on tactics to be employed by a night bomber force when employed on daylight operations has been received from H.Q.B.C. and passed to Bases, but these may have to be modified in the light of experience.
Bases have been asked to submit comments, proposals and suggestions on daylight tactics to this Headquarters and any points which may call for immediate action will be dealt with during the Flight Planning for any particular operation.
CONTROL W/T control satisfactory. Master Bomber’s VHF was technically serviceable, but suffered from much interference. He gave instructions to change to the alternative channel but only part of the main force received the order.
[Underlined] COURTRAI (MARSHALLING YARDS) 20/21st JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber: W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
The marshalling yards at Courtrai were the target for 198 aircraft of the Group on the night of July 20/21st., and the attack took place in good weather, no cloud, slight haze but visibility generally good.
MARKING The marking was to be carried out by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and by markers of No. 54 Base.
The first Oboe was dropped accurately. Flares followed; these were close to the town of Courtrai, but nevertheless the target was identified and the aiming point marked with a green T.I. assessed at 100 yards 230° by the Marker Leader, and confirmed by the Master Bomber. Actual positions could not be plotted from night photographs. Mosquitos were ordered to back up, and further Green T.I’s. were dropped, and these covered the length of the Marshalling Yards. The Master Bomber then ordered bombing on the Green T.I.’s. A large explosion occurred shortly afterwards and smoke resulting from this tended to obscure the markers. The Master Bomber at this stage ordered bombing to cease, to enable backers-up to drop further markers; more Green T.I’s were accurately placed, and bombing was resumed, until the Master Bomber gave the “Cease bombing” signal.
CONTROL W/T control excellent. V.H.F. generally satisfactory, but about 15% of main force complained of excessively loud VHF signals which interfered with their intercommunication. Action has been taken to eliminate trouble from this source.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover shows that very severe damage was done to the marshalling yards on this attack. Locomotive and repair shops were partially destroyed, also much rolling stock and over at least half of the target areas, the configuration of the tracks has been obliterated.
[Underlined] KIEL – 23/24th JULY [/underlined]
Kiel was the target for 100 Lancasters of the Group while six aircraft were detailed to
(Continued on page 17, col. 1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 16
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FLYING CONTROL
[Underlined] QUARTERLY COMPETITION. [/underlined]
Congratulations to Skellingthorpe who have been selected as being the most efficient station in the Group from the Flying Control aspect. During the quarter’s survey of flying control for this competition features of interest have been noted at several station. Below are examples of initiative shown.
[Underlined] Syerston. [/underlined]
An indicator panel which is electrically operated from the control panel has been installed. The insertion of the aircraft pin causes a light to show on the indicator panel in the aircraft’s position.
[Underlined] East Kirkby and Coningsby. [/underlined]
An illuminated indicator panel showing wind direction, runway in use, perimeter track and dispersals, has been installed in the Control Room.
[Underlined] Bardney. [/underlined]
A very thorough job has been made of the daylight letters at this station by building them in shallow concrete.
[Underlined] Spilsby. [/underlined]
Experiments are being carried out at this station with the Stud ‘B’ control transferred to the roof of the Watch Office. From this vantage point the control officer commands a view of the entire circuit and by marrying R/T and visual information of the position of aircraft on the circuit the control officer can assist in aircraft spacing.
General initiative has been shown on all stations and the effort put in by flying control staffs in internal decoration is to be commended. Inter-station visits can help considerably. So get to know your neighbour’s gadgets and if they are any use to you adapt them to your purpose.
[Underlined] QUICK LANDING. [/underlined]
The Group average is well under the 2 minute mark, though there is a slight increase on the average landing time for June. There are still some stations who are unable to maintain a constant high landing rate and who feel that because they are single squadron stations they cannot expect to attain the figures compatible with those of two squadron stations. Yet all these single squadron stations during the month do put up good figures on one or two nights. With good discipline the landing drill will give low landing times always, and the reason for these discrepancies can only be bad drill either in the air or on the ground.
Some station in the Group find a stop watch very helpful in obtaining even spacing in the circuit. A position (for example “flaps”) is selected and the intervals between aircraft are timed by means of the stop watch. The intervals should be approximately 1 minute, and should this spacing not be maintained then the flying control officer should instruct the aircraft either to delay or close up for the appropriate number of seconds.
One final word about the role of the flying control officer on Stud ‘B’ whose duty it is to assist the aircraft in their spacing around the circuit. Overshoots waste time, are unnecessary and must be reduced to the absolute minimum, and an active “Stud ‘B’ Officer” can do much to achieve this.
[Underlined] JULY LANDING TIMES [/underlined]
[Table of Landing times by Station]
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[Blank page]
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OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
lay mines in Kiel Bay. This was a return to a long range strategic target which took the enemy by surprise. 10/10th strato. cu. cloud covered the target and rendered the searchlights ineffective.
MARKING Crews bombed either Wanganui sky Markers or Red and Green T.I’s which could be seen through the cloud. Marking was carried out by the P.F.F.
RESULTS Results of bombing were not observed but crews reported the glow of fires seen through the cloud, in the target area. Night photographs taken with the bombing show no ground detail, and complete P.R.U. cover has not been obtained hence no assessment of the success of the raid can yet be made.
[Underlined] STUTTGART AND DONGES (24/25th JULY) [/underlined]
[Underlined] Donges Master Bomber: W/Cdr Woodroffe. [/underlined]
Two strategic targets were allocated to this Group for the night of 24/25th July, first the town of Stuttgart, a centre of precision engineering, and second, oil installations and storage tanks at Donges, near St. Nazaire.
100 aircraft took part in the Stuttgart attack. The weather over the target was 9 – 10/10ths cloud, and crews bombed either on Wanganui sky markers or the glow of fires seen through the clouds, as ordered by the Master Bomber who was controlling the attack. Weather conditions made observations of bombing results impossible, and night photographs show no ground detail.
104 aircraft from all Bases were detailed for the attack on Donges, which took place in favourable weather conditions of no cloud but slight haze.
MARKING The target was marked by Oboe aircraft of P.F.F. and by marker aircraft of No. 54 Base. The Oboe markers went down on time, and were assessed as 200 yards from the Aiming Points. A 54 Base Mosquito dropped his Green T.I. in a position which was assessed as 200 yards 120° from the aiming point. Actual position from night photographs 150 yards 152°. The Master Bomber then ordered the remaining Mosquitos to back up the Green T.I. overshooting by 200 yards.
RESULTS Crews reported that a good concentration of bombs fell round the markers, and P.R.U. photographs show that a great deal of damage was done to installations and many oil tanks were totally destroyed. The oil jetty received two direct hits on the railway lines supplying the site.
CONTROL W/T Control was excellent, and VHF R/T best results so far obtained.
[Underlined] ST. CYR (EVENING 25th July) [/underlined]
The military depot and port at St. Cyr was the target for 97 Lancasters of No. 53 Base plus 106 Squadron, in daylight on July 25th. The attack took place below 10/10ths cloud at 12,000 feet in good visibility.
MARKING The target was accurately marked throughout the attack by Oboe markers of the P.F.F., although the majority of bomb aimers were able to identify their individual aiming points and bombed visually.
Full fighter cover was provided throughout the attack. Very few enemy fighters were seen but accurate heavy flak was met with in the target area and as many as 49 aircraft were hit, which represents 52.1% of the total force. One aircraft only is missing from this operation.
RESULTS Crews’ reports were most enthusiastic about the results of this raid, and P.R.U. photographs show that very considerable damage was done, and a heavy concentration of bomb craters covers the whole target area.
CONTROL W/T and VHF R/T both good.
[Underlined] STUTTGART – 25/26th JULY [/underlined]
Stuttgart was raided for the second night in succession, and on this occasion 84 Lancs of 52 and 55 Bases took part. The target was to be marked by the P.F.F., with whom 13 aircraft of No. 97 Squadron operated. Weather conditions over the target were reported as hazy and several layers of thin cloud between 16/22,000 feet.
MARKING The marking was a combination of sky markers and T.I’s, though the majority of crews bombed the ground markers which were seen through the cloud. The marking was reported as somewhat scattered, though in the later stages of the attack crews reported a large fire area, which could still be seen from 30 miles away on the homeward route.
RESULTS Insufficient ground detail appears on the night photographs to enable markers to be plotted, or the accuracy of the attack to be assessed, but crews generally are of the opinion that the attack was more successful than the previous one.
[Underlined] GIVORS – 26/27th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bombers: Northern A/P – W/Cdr Porter
Southern A/P – W/C Woodroffe [/underlined]
The marshalling yards at Givors, a few miles South of Lyons, were the target for 178 aircraft from the Group on this night.
There were two aiming points, the North and South, and the attack on each was under a separate Master Bomber. Marking to be carried out by No. 54 Base. Weather conditions both en route and over the target were most unfavourable, and much cumulus and cu.nimb. cloud, with rain and thunderstorms was encountered. The Mosquito markers experienced serious icing and difficulty with their equipment, and had to return to base.
MARKING The Master Bombers received the winds transmitted by selected windfinding crews according to plan. The Master Bomber (Northern aiming point) was unable to identify his target in the light of the flares dropped by the flare force, and dropped a Wanganui marker on a time and distance run from Lyons; he followed this up by dropping his own reserve flares, but was still unable to locate the target.
The Southern aiming point Master Bomber had succeeded in locating his target, and dropped two Green T.I’s which he assessed as accurately placed, so he ordered the main force to attack them. Actual positions of markers plotted from night photographs from the Southern Aiming Point :- (i) 1,350 yards 007°. (ii) 1,360 yards - 024°. (iii) 2000 yards - 034°. They were soon obscured, so the Master Bomber stopped the bombing while he dropped four more Green T.I’s and having assessed them ordered the main force to start bombing again on a heading of 345°, undershooting by 5 seconds. At this point the Northern Aiming Point Master Bomber, still unable to identify his target, ordered his force to bomb the Green T.I’s with similar instructions.
RESULTS P. R. U. photographs show that in spite of the most unfavourable weather conditions some damage was caused in both targets. Both round houses in the Marshalling Yards have been damaged, and there are about seventeen hits affecting the tracks between the yards and the railway junction.
CONTROL VHF R/T and W/T control were both very good, in spite of unusually heavy static interference.
[Underlined] STUTTGART – 28/29th JULY [/underlined]
Stuttgart was attacked for the third time within a week on the night of July 28/29th. 176 aircraft from the Group took part in this attack. Well broken cloud was met over the channel en route, and this increased to 9/10 strato cumulus, with tops about 8,000 feet over the target; visibility was good.
MARKING P.F.F. marking consisted of Green T.I’s and sky markers. The majority of crews bombed the Green T.I’s which could be clearly seen through the thin layer of cloud. Owing to cloud cover the accuracy of the markers and the success of the attack could not be assessed. Defences were reported to have been much stronger than on the two previous raids, but once again no trouble was experienced from searchlights. Many fires, the glow of which could be seen through the cloud, were left burning, and these could be seen 50 miles away on the return journey.
RESULTS P.R.U. cover now shows that about 300 acres in the centre of the city have been devastated in these three raids, and very considerable damage has also been caused in the Eastern part of the city.
[Underlined] CAHAGNES (NORMANDY) DAY 30th JULY [/underlined]
106 aircraft from the Group were assigned a special task in support of military operations in Normandy, the attack to take place at 08.00 hours.
Weather en route was 8 – 10/10th strato. cu. tops 4/5,000 feet, which broke to little or none over the channel, but re-formed a few miles North of the French Coast. At the target there was 9 – 10/10ths cloud, tops 5,000 feet and base 2,000 feet. These conditions rendered precision bombing impossible, and orders were given for the force to return to base.
[Underlined] JOIGNY LAROCHE, RILLY LA MONTAGNE DAY 31st JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
The Marshalling Yards at Joigny Laroche and the railway tunnel at Rilly La Montagne near Rheims, were the target for two striking
(Continued on page 18, col.1)
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 17
[Page break]
forces provided by the Group in daylight on 31st July.
Each force was sub-divided into two. One half of the Rilly force to attack the Northern entrance to the tunnel and the railway lines, and the other half the Southern entrance and lines. In the same way the Southern force were split up, half to attack the marshalling yards and half to attack the engine roundhouses.
RESULTS The weather at both targets was clear, with slight haze. At Rilly all crews identified both aiming points visually although a P.F.F. marker was dropped half way between the two tunnel entrances as a marking point. Attacks on both aiming points were reported to be accurate and P.R.U. photographs show damage at both ends of the tunnel, and hits on the railway lines.
At Joigny all crews identified the canal, river, and triangular bridge and railway junction and were able to pick out their respective aiming points. Here again, good bombing concentrations were reported, and substantial damage was caused. This is confirmed by P.R.U. photographs.
CONTROL W/T control on both targets was satisfactory, but VHF control on the Rilly attack was seriously interfered with at one stage by a main force aircraft whose V.H.F. set remained on “transmit”, owing to a technical defect; a great deal of unnecessary chatter was heard by all other main force aircraft, but fortunately the offender changed frequency before the target was reached. VHF control on Joigny Laroche was satisfactory. In order to prevent the control of an attack being jeopardised in future, by aircraft VHF sets being left on “transmit” either through carelessness or through some technical defect, orders have been given for the “transmit” crystals in all main force aircraft to be removed pending the introduction of a modification whereby the transmit crystal can be isolated.
[Underlined] SPECIAL ATTACKS MADE BY 617 SQUADRON MARQUISE MIMOYECQUES – DAY 6th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
This target, an installation believed to be connected with the enemy’s long range rocket projectile, was attacked in daylight by 17 aircraft of No. 617 Squadron in good weather conditions.
MARKING The Master Bomber marked the target with 2 Red Spot Fires, one of which was a direct hit on the aiming point, the second dropping immediately to the West. Fourteen aircraft attacked: two crews brought their bombs back, because they were unable to identify the aiming point, and one crew did not drop their bomb as the bombsight became unserviceable.
RESULTS P.R.U. photographs taken after the arrack, later in the day, show 11 craters within 250 yards of the aiming point, including one direct hit and two near misses.
CONTROL Control of this attack by VHF, and W/T was satisfactory.
(Continued on page 19, col. 3)
It is proposed in future to give some details in the V Group News about 5 Group precision bombing patterns. After each attack the P.R.U. cover is examined by O.R.S., 5 Group, who construct a crater plot, which in conjunction with the marker plot prepared from night photographs shows the success of the attack.
Bombs dropped can be divided into two classes:-
(a) those which are aimed at the markers or aiming point.
(b) those which are loose, i.e. ought never to have been dropped.
The purpose of the O.R.S. analysis is to determine:-
(i) The proportion of loose bombs.
(ii) The spread of the aimed bombs around the M. P. I., that is to discover the size of the 5 Group bombing pattern.
(iii) The distance of the Marker chosen as the point of aim from the target to be destroyed, and the distance of the mean point of impact of the bomb pattern from the marker.
The results of these three calculations determine the success of the attack, and permit the Air Staff to calculate the number of bombs which must in future be despatched to destroy a given target.
For the purpose of the V Group Monthly News the results of these three calculations for each attack will be shown as follows:-
(i) Percentage of loose bombs.
(ii) Estimate of the radius of the circle containing half the bombs.
(iii) The distance of the M.P.I. of the aimed bombs from the aiming point. That is made up of two components, the error with which the point of aim us indicated, and the systematic error of aiming by the bomb aimers.
It is not always possible to provide such a complete picture for each attack; because sometimes clouds spoil the P.R.U. cover or make the plotting of markers impossible. On some occasions it is not practicable even to separate with accuracy the 5 Group bomb craters on the P.R.U. cover, from those produced by previous attacks of other Groups or Commands. It is, therefore, proposed to issue each month a table giving the results of those attacks which have so far been analysed. The table appended gives some of the results for April, May, June and July respectively. It has been impossible to include all the results for each month in the present table; but as additional calculations are made fresh results will be issued in subsequent monthly summaries.
[Table of Bombing Pattern Results by Date]
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 18
[Page break]
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoon]
[Underlined] CRICKET [/underlined]
[Underlined] Group Cricket Trophy. [/underlined] July saw the last of the trophy. Syerston and Woodhall, the two section winners, met at Coningsby on a gloriously sunny afternoon. Woodhall batted first and had the best of the wicket, which began to crumble a little later in the game. Warburton opened the Syerston attack and was turning the ball amazingly on so dry a wicket. He bowled throughout the Woodhall innings, and returned the splendid analysis of 7 for 26. Woodhall produced some lively batting, but lost one or two cheap wickets in the opening stages. Stanford hit a brisk 34, which gave them a much needed fillip, and the tail wagged with great vigour, Vaughan hitting a very timely 27 not out. The Woodhall innings produced the respectable total of 123. Warburton opened the Syerston innings, and with only a few runs on the board, Woodhall missed a golden opportunity of running him out. His partner pushed a ball to mid-off and called a single, not counting on the snappy pick-up and throw-in that Stanford produced. Warburton ran his hardest, but had the wicket keeper held the return he would have been yards out. After his escape Warburton batted right through the Syerston innings making 45 not out, a splendid contribution to his side’s total of 87. Tuxford got 4 Syerston wickets for 25 in the dour Woodhall attack. In the absence of the Base Commander, G/Capt. Philpott had the pleasure of presenting Woodhall, his own team, with the Trophy, a very handsome silver bowl. F/O Denning, Coningsby P.F.O., is to be congratulated on his arrangements for the game which had to be completed in rather less than an hour; he has just cause to be proud in seeing another Group Trophy brought home to roost alongside the Matz Cup.
[Underlined] H.Q. 5 GROUP. [/underlined] The Group side managed four games during the month. On the 2nd against 93 M.U. they suffered a 158 – 25 reverse, being well and truly dampened by a rain storm that persisted throughout their innings. For the M.U. Kinder scored 44 and took 7 wickets. On the 18th, Group avenged their defeat by a 83 – 68 win over the M.U. Wigsley defeated the Group side at Morton Hall, scoring 110 for 6 against 31 for 10. F/L Pearcey, for Wigsley, scored 40 and took 5 Group wickets. The last of the month’s games was with Newark Town at Newark. Group fielded their strongest side and won by 152 – 75. Sprawson hit 41 and Todd 37, but the outstanding performance was by S/L Unwin who took 9 wickets for 36, eight of them clean bowled, a welcome return to his old form.
[Underlined] DUNHOLME LODGE [/underlined] played 6 games returning the following outstanding results:-
v Welton Home Guard at Dunholme Welton 27 – 10 Dunholme 99 – 10
v De Aston School at Dunholme De Aston 35 – 10 Dunholme 88 – 10
v No. 7 I.T.C. at Lincoln I.T.C. 135 – 10 Dunholme 163 – 6
v Wickenby at Dunholme Wickenby 32 – 10 Dunholme 108 – 9
v Hemswell at Hemswell Hemswell 165 – 5 Dunholme 85 – 9
v Waddington at Waddington Waddington 72 – 10 Dunholme 81 – 10
The best individual performance was by F/S. Wallin, who hit 85 not out, against Lincoln I.T.C.
The Station Cricket Knock-Out is in full swing, S. H. Q. Sgts. having reached the 2nd round, while 44 Squadron Air Crew Officers beat 44 Squadron Aircrew Sgts. by 2 runs to qualify for the 2nd round.
[Underlined] METHERINGHAM [/underlined] put up a strong fight against Woodhall in the semi-final of the Group Trophy, scoring 67 – 10 against Woodhall’s 73 – 6. At one period, Metheringham had high hopes of winning as Stanford (Woodhall’s Aussie Star) was run out for five, but the Woodhall batting proved too good in the long run.
Two inter-station games were played, Bardney being beaten by 98 – 3 to 44 – 10. The side failed at East Kirkby, scoring 39 against Kirkby’s 90 for 9.
Inter-Squadron and inter-section games produced six matches, in all a busy cricket month.
[Underlined] GENERAL [/underlined]
Any Squadron that ‘fancies its chance’ at Soft Ball is invited to ring Dunholme Lodge and make a date.
The approach of the Winter Sports season is already felt and, taking the ‘pessimistic’ view that even after Berlin some of us will still be in the Mob, negotiations are in progress to obtain official blessing for sufficient transport to run a Soccer League. As soon as a firm basis is reached, a meeting of all P.F.O.’s will be called and arrangements and fixture dates agreed. But irrespective of the establishment of a League, the Matz Soccer Cup, Wines Rugger Cup and 5 Group Hockey Trophy will be fought for, and the dates and arrangements for these Tourneys can best be served by a Group representative gathering.
OPERATIONS (CONTINUED)
[Underlined] WIZERNES – DAY – 17th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Tait. [/underlined]
17 Lancasters of No.617 Squadron, of which 16 took off, were detailed to attack the constructional works, believed to be connected with the enemy’s long range rocket projectiles. 1 Mustang and 1 Mosquito were to mark the aiming point.
MARKING The Red T.I’s of both the Mustang and Mosquito fell in the same place, approximately 100 yards N.E. of the concrete dome. The 12,000 lb bombs were dropped from heights varying between 16,600 and 18,600 feet.
RESULTS There were no direct hits on the dome, but P.R.U. photographs show two large craters in the quarry some 30 – 50 yards from the entrance which caused a minor landslide. Three bombs were seen to fall within 70 yards North West of the Aiming Point, and a further four within 50 yards to the South East. Later crews were unable to identify the Aiming Point visually, owing to haze and smoke from the earlier bombs, and aimed their bombs on its estimated position.
CONTROL W/T control on this operation was good, but considerable interference was experienced on VHF believed to be due to enemy jamming.
[Underlined] WIZERNES 20/21st JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Porter [/underlined]
15 Lancasters and 3 Mosquitos were detailed to attack the rocket site at Wizernes. The target was covered with 8 – 10/10ths low stratus, and the operation was abandoned.
[Underlined] WATTEN – DAY – 25th JULY [/underlined]
[Underlined] Master Bomber:- W/Cdr Woodroffe [/underlined]
Constructional works at Watten, believed to be connected with the enemy’s intended use of long range rocket projectiles, were the target for 16 Lancasters of No. 617 Squadron in daylight on July 25th. The target was to be marked by 1 Mosquito and 1 Mustang.
MARKING Weather in the target area was clear with excellent visibility, and in these conditions the Master Bomber considered that marking was unnecessary and the majority of aircraft bombed on the first run up.
RESULTS A detailed interpretation of the photographic cover of this raid has not yet been received, but three probable hits are shown within the complex. One has removed a portion of the concrete from the roof of the large building on the North side. The others are just North East of the main building and just North of the North East corner. The access facilities on the Eastern side appear to be completely destroyed.
CONTROL No communications difficulties were experienced, either on VHF R/T or W/T.
There are points arising from these attacks which merit special attention. These may be enumerated as follows:-
(a) Minor troubles with V.H.F. sets. These are inherent when aircraft are equipped with new apparatus, and crews are unfamiliar with its operation. Snags
(Continued in col. 2)
are being eliminated one by one, and it is hoped that during August they will be entirely eliminated. Several crews have been guilty of leaving their sets on transmit. Not only has this seriously interfered with the control of the operation, but it has also revealed much unnecessary crew chatter. The remedy for this has been to remove the “transmit” crystals from all main force aircraft.
(ii) [sic] Some crews have been guilty of bombing before H Hour, or before orders to commence have been received from the Master Bomber. Not only does this disobedience of orders display bad crew discipline, but, what is more serious, it endangers the marker aircraft flying at a lower level, and on occasion has prevented successful backing up by the marker force.
(iii) T.I. markers must be released from a height which will allow them to cascade; if they are dropped too low, they will break up when they hit the ground or ricochet for some considerable distance. The minimum should be 700 – 800 feet.
(iv) Bombing by the vector method. This has proved to be very successful, and our attacks carried out by this method at night have proved to be rather more accurate than the direct method.
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944. PAGE 19
[Page break]
TACTICS
[Underlined] NEW FIELDS [/underlined]
Four phases of our bomber offensive have been applied this month, as follows:-
(i) Heavy night attacks on Germany (three Command attacks on Stuttgart and one on Kiel).
(ii) Heavy short range day attacks (combined attack on Caen, 18th July).
(iii) Daylight precision attacks by the Group force.
(iv) Night precision attacks by the Group force.
Opportunities have therefore been provided for studying:-
(i) Enemy night fighter reaction to the resumption of heavy night raids on German cities.
(ii) Enemy day fighter reaction to large and small forces operating over and beyond the battle zone.
(iii) The virtues of day bombing (visually and on markers) compared with normal night precision attacks.
(iv) The best disposition of aircraft (opposed to strict formation flying) for heavy bomber attacks by day.
The night attacks on Germany brought into use a new and extensive countermeasure scheme, designed to outwit the skilful deployment of enemy night fighter defences in Germany. Details of this scheme must remain secret for the time being, but the careful routeing of Bullseyes has been one of the foremost elements of the plan and has frequently delayed the interception of our bombers. On the Kiel attack, the fighters were kept almost completely at bay, which resulted in an exceptionally low loss rate.
Stuttgart, after three heavy attacks, has suffered extensive damage, mainly from fire. It is interesting to note that the last attack (the most successful) depended largely on blind (Wanganui) marking. As a result of new Pathfinder equipment, we hope crews will not have to face tough German fighter opposition in the coming months without the reward of good marking and more successful blind attacks.
It is particularly important that all crews should revise their knowledge of enemy defences and concentrate on achieving perfectly executed combat manoeuvres. Crews who have completed their first sorties on lightly defended occupied targets, must learn the art of getting out of searchlight cones, and, most important, must be on the top line with gunnery, night vision and the technique of interpreting and applying the correct tactics to Monica and Fishpond. With a firm knowledge of what defences to expect and what to do if you are a victim of fighters, flak or searchlights, you can achieve bombing accurately on defended targets equal to that on some of the recent attacks in France.
The heavy attack at dawn on Caen gave us the first opportunity of studying the appearance of a close concentration of 1,000 aircraft. From observations on the trip, it was estimated that the collision and bomb damage risks were exceptionally high, but analysis shows that there were no collisions and only one aircraft in this Group was damaged by falling bombs, and yet all aircraft made a good bombing run and there were no loose sticks outside the target area. One fact was clearly confirmed, however – that any aircraft at night or in the daytime which manoeuvres unnecessarily in the stream is endangering not only its own crew but the rest of the force.
More daylight operations towards the end of the month and at the beginning of August have introduced new problems – the best disposition of aircraft to prevent too much congestion at the target and to provide an effective defence against fighters and flak. It must not be forgotten that a formidable fighter force is still available to the Hun, and although it has not been seen so far in daylight, our forces must be so disposed to be ready to meet heavy fighter opposition.
Daylight concentration requires even more accurate flying than at night. Leaders of each element must keep their speeds and heights accurately. They must appreciate that following aircraft cannot execute tight turns and sudden increases or decreases in speed. Similarly, all aircraft must keep behind the Leaders as briefed, to ensure that the correct distribution of aircraft is achieved at the target.
On the whole, these operations have shown that our heavy bomber force can now be adapted for night and day strategic and tactical bombing with a good measure of success. Even the weather has been beaten by the skilful efforts of the Master Bomber and determination of the crews. The attack at DONGES (Night 24/25th July) was accompanied by thick Cu.Nb. cloud en route which forced some of the Mosquito markers to turn back. In spite of low cloud, lightning, rain and poor visibility at the target, a successful attack was delivered and a large oil storage depot destroyed.
[Underlined] BRIEFING ORDERS [/underlined]
Many instances have been recorded recently of crews failing to follow the Flight Plan. One example is the report of a number of experienced crews who kept low on the return from Wesseling (21/22nd June) as ordered, who observed aircraft being attacked at heights up to 12,000 ft. A great many considerations go into planning these days, and this incident shows that people with their own ideas on how to get to the target and back come up against the very thing that the plan is designed to avoid.
A gross breach of flight discipline was recently reported, when the Group was ordered to keep below 5000 feet for the first leg out to sea. British Radar plotted some of our aircraft at 8-10,000 feet. This, of course, is just inviting the Hun fighters to come out to meet you, and even a few aircraft doing this sort of thing will nullify the effect of the whole countermeasure and spoofing plan.
[Underlined] COMBATS [/underlined]
An examination of this month’s combat reports shows again that you can be attacked and get away with it if you do the right thing. A crew of 9 Squadron was attacked and followed continuously for an hour by an A. I. fighter. The first indication was on Boozer, and the development of the attacks was recorded on Monica. The aircraft was corkscrewing practically the whole time. By keeping to the correct drill this crew outwitted a very persistent and probably experienced night fighter pilot.
A large number of combats are still first made known by the appearance of tracer. A good search and a constant vigil on Monica and Fishpond is the only answer to this at the moment. One of the main faults has been misuse of early warning devices. Several crews have obtained contacts at 2,000 yards and yet have taken no action until the fighter has been seen by gunners at ranges from 500 to 250 yards. The fighter has thus been able to close in with a steady aim and damage the aircraft by opening fire before a corkscrew was commenced, or at the moment of starting it. Early warning devices have been fitted to ensure early action (i.e. corkscrew at 750 yards and do not wait for a visual). People who do the right thing may still be fired at, but the fighter is put off and the tracer passes over the fuselage instead of through it.
At least two captains have reported that after persistent attacks from enemy fighters they dived their aircraft away from the fighter in a manner to indicate that their aircraft was out of control. The foundation for these ideas is completely discounted by the experience of fighter pilots. The enemy is rarely deceived, and nothing is more dangerous than to manoeuvre in this way. The fighter is only too pleased to find an opportunity of diving after the bomber, completing his work and claiming a confirmed victory. Flames coming from an engine prompted one of the pilots to dive away. Diving to put out a fire is fatal, as more heat is generated in the engine and the added draught will assist the flames to spread. In addition, an already weakened structure will possibly be strained to breaking point in the dive. Decisions are difficult to make in a tight corner, but tactical manoeuvres have been thought out purposely for the best defence, and continued practice in corkscrew and the correct patter will prevent panic in these awkward moments.
[Underlined] BLACK MAGIC [/underlined]
We know the Hun is clever but, believe it or not, the following extracts are from combat reports of experienced crews:-
“We were attacked by an enemy aircraft which had been shot down.”
“The enemy aircraft was seen to go into a [underlined] swallow [/underlined] dive.”
“The rear gunner continued firing after the rear turret had been feathered.”
5 GROUP NEWS. NO.24. JULY, 1944.
Dublin Core
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Title
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V Group News, July 1944
5 Group News, July 1944
Description
An account of the resource
Five Group Newsletter, number 24, July 1944. Includes a foreword by the Air Officer Commanding, and features about second thoughts for pilots, gardening, war effort, signals, armament, war savings, navigation, radar navigation, navigation training, engineering, training, decorations, a visit to Normandy, accidents, equipment, air sea rescue, recent good shows, aircrew volunteers, air bombing, the Lord Camrose bombing trophy, photography, link trainer, gunnery, operations, flying control, sports, and tactics,
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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1944-07
Contributor
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Anne-Marie Watson
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
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22 printed sheets
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eng
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Text
Identifier
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MStephensonS1833673-160205-28
Coverage
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Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
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Belgium
France
Germany
Great Britain
Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea
Atlantic Ocean--English Channel
Belgium--Kortrijk
England--Lincolnshire
France--Caen
France--Chalindrey
France--Creil
France--Donges
France--Givors
France--Marne
France--Marquise
France--Migennes
France--Mimoyecques
France--Nevers
France--Paris
France--Saint-Cyr-sur-Mer
France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)
France--Tours
France--Watten
Germany--Kiel
Germany--Stuttgart
Temporal Coverage
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1944-07
1944-07-04
1944-07-05
1944-07-06
1944-07-18
1944-07-30
5 Group
air gunner
air sea rescue
aircrew
bomb aimer
bombing
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
bombing of the Mimoyecques V-3 site (6 July 1944)
Cheshire, Geoffrey Leonard (1917-1992)
Distinguished Flying Cross
Distinguished Flying Medal
Distinguished Service Order
ditching
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Lancaster
mine laying
navigator
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Oboe
pilot
radar
rivalry
searchlight
sport
tactical support for Normandy troops
training
V-2
V-3
V-weapon
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1412/26737/MTindallAJ173966-150815-01.1.pdf
a1be5ac8a0b08b29a93ddf0e2b323d17
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Tindall, Arthur John
A J Tindall
Publisher
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IBCC Digital Archive
Date
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2015-04-03
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This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
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Tindall, AJ
Description
An account of the resource
Nine items. The collection concerns Flight Lieutenant Arthur John Tindall DFC (1388739 Royal Air Force) and contains his log book, documents and photographs. He flew operations as a wireless operator with 97 Squadron.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by June Tindall and catalogued by Barry Hunter.
Transcribed document
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Transcription
Text transcribed from audio recording or document
EE179 OF-T Transferred to 44 Sqn. Shot down 3/12/43. Attacking Berlin = no survivors.
JB470 OF-T Transferred to 635 Sqn. Shot down (Nightfighter) 12/4/44. No survivors.
ND355 OF-T Transferred to 635 Sqn. Crashed at Bokel 27/8/44. 5 survivors – all POW.
ME625 OF-T Collided with ND981 OF-H on 23/6/44. Both crashed = one survivor.
ND 589 OF-D Returned to Avro. Converted to Air Sea Rescue Mk.III. Finally scrapped Oct. 46.
PB181 OF-D Transferred to 83 Sqn. Collided with 97 Sqn aircraft on 8/2/45. Both aircraft crashed. No survivors.
[underlined] The Targets [/underlined]
7/10/43. Stuttgart. Fairly successful raid, but Boblingen (16K north) was attacked by second wave
8/10/41 Hanover Very accurate bombing. Hanovers worst raid of the war.
18/10/43 Hanover Raid scattered. Most bombs falling in open country north and north west of city.
20/10/43 Leipzig Very scattered bombing due to “appalling” weather.
22/10/43 Kassel Main raid “exceptionally accurate and concentrated.. There was a firestorm.
3/11/43 Colonge Bombs hit centre of city “with extreme accuracy”
18/11/43 Berlin Marking and bombing carried out blind – very scattered result
22/11/43 Berlin The most effective raid on Berlin of the war. Vast area of destruction.
23/11/43 Berlin Although cloud covered, most aircraft on target. Much damage.
26/11/43 Frankfurt Less than half of Force reached target. Very scattered bombs.
26/11/43 Stuttgart Bombing very scattered. Little damage.
2/12/43 Berlin Incorrect wind forecast – widely scattered bombing, Siemens factories hit.
3/12/43 Leipzig Accurate bombing. Leipzigs worst raid of the war.
16/12/43 Berlin “Reasonably accurate” Housing and railways badly hit.
20/12/43 Frankfurt German decoy fire site and dummy TIs caused scattered bombing.
24/12/43 Berlin Suburbs hit. Pathfinder radar problems and thick cloud.
14/1/44 Brunswick Unsuccessful – 10 houses destroyed, 4 people killed. Nearby villages bombed.
27/1/44 Berlin Again thick cloud. South and eastern areas of city bombed.
30/1/44 Berlin Heavy damage in city centre – but much bombing in surrounding countryside.
21/2/44 Stuttgart Considerable damage in city centre. Bosch factory heavily damaged.
25/2/44 Augsburg. Controversial result – beautiful town completely destroyed.
1/3/44 Stuttgart Housing, Daimler Benz factory and main railway station badly damaged.
15/3/44 Stuttgart Poor PFF marking- most bombing fell in open country SW of city.
18/3/44 Frankfurt Extensive damage in central, eastern and western areas of city.
22/3/44 Frankfurt Damage even more severe, especially in western district.
11/4/44 Laon Only a corner of the railway yards was hit.
22/4/44 Brunwick First 5 Grp low level marking- not very successful.
23/4/44 Munich Much devastation particularly to railway installations.
26/4/44 Schweinfurt Failure – most bombs fell outside Schweinfurt.
28/4/44 Kjeller Airframe factory. Very successful accurate bombing.
31/5/44 Maisy Gun Battery. Thick cloud. Only 6 aircraft bombed.
6/6/44 St Pierre du Mont Railway installation – No report due to invasion confusion.
6/6/44 Argentan Much damage to railway installation.
9/6/44 Etampes Railway and road systems badly damaged
12/6/44 Poitiers This attack was the most accurate of many attacks this night. Railway yards.
21/6/44 Gelsenkirchen Oil Plant – all production ceased for several weeks.
24/6/44 Prouville Flying Bomb site, so many craters, difficult to assess results.
4/7/44 St Leu D’ Esserent. Underground F/bombs store. Very accurate bombing.
20/7/44 Coutrai Railway yards and junctions. Devastated.
24/7/44 Donges Oil Depot. Devastated.
25/7/44 Stutgart No German report available on this raid.
31/7/44 Joigny-laroche Railway yards. Very accurate attack in excellent weather.
6/8/44 Bois du Casson Flying bomb site. Very scattered bombing.
11/8/44 Givors “Exceptionally accurate “ attack on Railway yards.
14/8/44 Brest Clemenceau & Gueydon both left sinking.
[Page Break]
[underlined] Fl/Lt. A.J. Tindall DFC [/underlined]
[underlined] Operations with 97 Squadron [/underlined]
[underlined]7/8 October 1943 [/underlined]
Lancaster Mk.III EE179 OF-T Target: : STUTTGART
Crew: Sgts A.A. Johnson. J.A. Pearson. K. Swale. P/O J. Peden. Sgt [inserted] A.J [/inserted] [deleted] J.A [/deleted] Tindall Sgt J.H. McGregor. F/Sgt E.H. Hansen.
Bomb Load: 1 x4,000lb. 10 x 500lb.
Time up: 21:06 Down 03:24
Primary target Stuttgart attacked. 18,000ft. 8/10ths cloud. Bombed point between yellow and red TIs in bombsight. Own results not seen. Two glows from fires seen.
8/9 October 1943
Lancaster Mk.III JB190 OF-Y Target: Hanover
Crew: Normal.
Bomb Load: 1 x 4,000lb. 6 x 1,000lb.
Time up: 22:57. Down: 03.40.
Primary target bombed. 19,000 ft. Clear sky. Vis. good. Bombed on one yellow TI marker in bombsight. Had no time to verify results visually as Flight Engineer was ill. One particularly big fire was noticed.
18 October 1943
Lancaster Mk.III EE179 OF-T Target: HANOVER
Crew: Normal.
Bomb Load: 6 x 2,000lb.
Time up: 17:23 Down 22:11
Primary target Hanover bombed. 20,000ft. 10/10ths cloud. No moon. Bombed centre between two red and one green TIs. Big red glow illuminated cloud followed by a similar one three minutes later. Nothing else seen.
20/21 October 1943
Lancaster Mk.III EE179 OF-T Target: LEIPZIG
Crew: Normal.
Bomb Load: 1 x 4,000lb. 7 x 500 lb.
Time up: 17:47. Down 00:07
Target Leipzig attacked. 21,000ft. 9/10th cloud. Bombed on one red cascading TI marker in bombsight. No other TIs seen. Nothing else observed except scattered incendiaries.
22 October 1943
Lancaster Mk.III EE179 OF-T Target: KASSEL
Crew: Normal, plus F/Lt E.F. Cawdery, 2nd Pilot.
Bomb Load: 1 x 4,000lb. 6 x 1,000lb.
Time up: 18:30. Down 23:28
Kassel attacked, 20,000ft. No moon, no cloud, vis. good. Bombed centre point between two red TI markers. TIs well concentrated over aiming point. Too early on target for results.
[Page Break]
3 November 1943
Lancaster Mk.III EE179 OF-T Target: COLOGNE
Crew: Normal, plus F/L Cawdery.
Bomb Load: 1 x 4000lb. 6 x1,000 lb. 4 x 500lb.
Time up: 17:26. Down: 21:36.
Target Cologne. Moonlight clear sky, hazy below. 20,000ft. Bombed on cluster of red and green TIs- red actually in bombsight. Many bomb burst seen to slightly overshoot reds. Long line of fires seen as aircraft left target.
18/19 November 1943
Lancaster Mk.III JB470 OF-T Target: BERLIN
Crew: F/L Cawdery now pilot. F/Sgt Johnson with another crew shot down and killed on this raid.
Bomb Load: 4 x 2,000lb.
Time up: 17:30 Down: 00:05.
Berlin attacked from 20,000 ft. 10/10th cloud. Vis. poor. TIs at first appeared spread but improved later. Starboard inner engine and bomb doors holed by heavy flak.
22 November 1943
Lancaster Mk.III JB470 OF-T Target: BERLIN
Crew: F/L Cawdery, normal crew.
Bomb Load: 7 xTI. 1 x 4, 000lb. 3 x 1,000 lb.
Time up: 17:25. Down: 23:10.
9/10ths – 10/10ths cloud, tops at 6,000ft. Vis. good. Bombs released on cluster of three TIs red and one green.
23 November 1943
Lancaster Mk.III JB470 OF-T Target: BERLIN
Crew: Normal
Bomb Load: 4 x TI, 1 x 4,000lb.
Time up: 17:30 Down: 23:50
Berlin bombed from 19,000ft. Aiming point identified by cluster of TI reds and few greens. Large patch of fires seen on arrival in target area.
26 November 1943
Lancaster Mk.III JB470 OF-T Target: FRANKFURT
Crew: Normal
Bomb Load: 6 x TI. 1 x4, 000lb. 6 x 1,000 lb.
Time up: 00.35. Down: 06:00.
Frankfurt attacked from 20,000ft. Target identified by red TIs. Sudden glow observed below clouds at 02:50 hrs. No markers seen.
26/27 November 1943
Lancaster Mk.III JB470 OF-T Target: STUTTGART
Crew: Normal
Bomb Load: 6 x TI. 1 x4,000lb. 5 x 1,000 lb.
No times entered in ORB. Average for other aircraft Up 17:30 Down. 00:10.
Stuttgart bombed from 21,000ft. Only one TI red seen over target but fires were reflected on clouds, and ref glow was seen for 60 miles on track home.
[Page Break]
2 December 1943
Lancaster Mk.III JB470 OF-T Target: BERLIN
Crew: Normal.
Bomb Load: 5 x 2,000lb.
Time up: 17:20. Down: 23.50
Target located by aid of “Y” and bombed from 19,000t. On target too early to observe results. Glow from fires seen on return. Red TIs appeared to be accurate.
3 December 1943
Lancaster Mk.III JB470 OF-T Target: LEIPZIG
Crew: P/O E.E. Osler replaces F/O Peden.
Bomb Load: 1 x 4,000lb. 4 x 2,000 lb. 1 x 500lb.
Time up: 17:20. Down: 23:30
Leipzig bombed from 17,000ft. “Y” equipment used for locating target. Vis. good. Aircraft was early on target but on leaving glow from fires could be seen.
16/17 December 1943
Lancaster Mk.III JB470 OF-T Target: BERLIN
Crew: It is now [underlined]S/L [/underlined] Cawdery. F/O Peden is back. Plus F/Lt. E. Clarke as 2nd Pilot.
Bomb Load: 5 x2, 000lb.
Time up: 16:50. Down: 00:35
Berlin bombed from 19,500ft. Vis. good. 10/10ths cloud tops at 3,000ft. TIs and Wanganuis fairly well concentrated. No results seem owing to cloud.
20 December 1943
Lancaster Mk.III JB470 OF-T Target: FRANKFURT
Crew: Normal.
Bomb Load: 6 x 2,000lb.
Time up: 17:25. Down: 21:59
Frankfurt bombed from 19,000ft. 6-7/10ths cloud. Vis. very good. Target located on “Y”. One Wanganui flare observed falling at 19:27hrs. Many yellow TIs fells after 19:30hrs. Little immediate results but huge red explosion seen from distance at 19:48hrs. Fires were visible from 70 miles.
24 December 1943
Lancaster Mk.III JB470 OF-T Target: BERLIN
Crew: Normal.
Bomb Load: 5 x2,000lb.
Time up: 00:21. Down: 07:15
Target attacked from 20,500ft. TIs and Wanganuis well concentrated. Cloud prevented observation of results. Rear gunner observed glow from some distance on track home.
14 January 1944
Lancaster Mk.III ND355 OF-T Target: BRUNSWICK
Crew: Normal, plus S/L J. Simpson, 2nd Pilot.
Bomb Load: 16 x flares. 3 xTI. 1 x 4,000lb. 4 x 1,000 lb.
Time up: 16:51. Down: 22:01
Primary target attacked in fairly good visibility. Bombs released in centre of concentration of Wanganui flares. Majority of Wanganui flares scattered.
[Page Break]
27/28 January 1944
Lancaster Mk.III ND355 OF-T Target: BERLIN
Crew: PROMOTIONS!! S/L Cawdery. F/Sgt Pearson, F/Sgt Swale. F/L Peden. F/Sgt Tindall F/Sgt McGregor. F/Sgt Hansen.
Bomb Load: 4 xTI. 1 x4,000lb. 4 x 1,000 lb.
Time up: 17:20. Down 00:25
Primary target bombed on H2S. Wanganui concentration good and compact. No results observed owing to 10/10ths cloud.
30 January 1944
Lancaster Mk.III ND415 OF-Z Target: BERLIN
Crew: Normal.
Bomb Load: 5 x Flares. 4 x TI. 1 x 4,000lb. 4 x 1,000 lb.
Time up: 17:30. Down: 23:45
Berlin successfully bombed. Bombs dropped in centre of concentration of Wanganuis. No fires or bomb burst seen, but slight reflection on clouts form red and green TIs.
21 February 1944
Lancaster Mk.III ND355 OF-T Target: STUTTGART
Crew: It is now [underlined] P/O [/underlined] Pearson
Bomb Load: 4 x Flares. 4 x TI. 1 x 4,000lb. 5 x1,000lb.
Time up: 00:25. Down: 07:00
Bombed target at 19,000ft with H2S. Weather 4/10ths cloud tops 5,000ft. Vis. good. Large explosion seen.
25/26 February 1944
Lancaster Mk.III ND355 OF-T Target: AUGSBURG
Crew: Normal.
Bomb Load: 21 Flares. 1 xRSF. 3 x TI. 1 x 4,000lb. 3 x 1,000lb.
No times entered in ORB. Average for other aircraft up 19:00 Down 02:10
Augsberg bombed from 18,000ft. Vis. good with a clear sky. H2S used for bombing. Green TIs were clear and formed circle round target. A red/green salvo appeared to overshoot.
1/2 March 1944
Lancaster Mk.III ND355 OF-T Target: STUTTGART
Crew: Normal
Bomb Load: 4 x Flares. 2 xTIs. 1 x 4,000lb. 5 x 1,000 lb.
Time up: 23:40. Down 06:45
Stuttgart bombed from 20,000ft. 10/10ths cloud, vis. good. Good concentration of Wanganui flares. Good explosion observed of orange coloured flames.
15/16 March 1944
Lancaster Mk.III JND355 OF-T Target: STUTTGART
Crew: Normal. It is now [underlined] P/O Swale [/underlined]
Bomb Load: 20 x flares. 4 x 4 TI. 1 x 4000lb. 2 x1,000 lb.
Time up: 19:25 . Down: 02:20
9/10ths cloud over Stuttgart. Vis. good, bombed on H2S. The first Wanganui went down at 23:11hrs Three minutes later a good concentration of Wanganuis at about 5 miles to the east – one only which was being bombed by Main Force. No results could be observed.
[Page Break]
18/19 March 1944
Lancaster Mk.III ND355 OF-T Target: FRANKFURT
Crew: Normal
Bomb Load: 20 x Flares. 4 xTI. 1 x4,000lb. 1 x 1,000 lb. 2x 500lb
Time up: 19:25. Down 00:15
Frankfurt bombed from 18,000ft on H2S. Nothing was seen in target area except flash from own bomb. After bombing 4 or 5 large flashes seen.
22 March 1944
Lancaster Mk.III ME625 OF-T Target: FRANKFURT
Crew: Normal.
Bomb Load: 20 x Flares. 4 xTI. 1 x 4,00lb. 1 x1,000lb. 2 x 500 lb. 1 x red/yellow Flare..[sic]
Time up: 18:45. Down:23:50
2/10th cloud over target, vis. good. Bombed from 18,500ft on H2S. Two green TIs descended and one red/yellow stars fell at the same time as aircraft bombed target at the same spot. One 4,000lb HC observed to explode over built up area.
11 April 1944
Lancaster Mk.III ME625 OF-T Target: LAON
Crew: Normal.
Bomb Load: 6 x 1000lb GP. 6 x 1,000lb MC.
Time up: 01:25. Down: 05:10
Vis. good over Laon. No cloud. Bombed from 15,700ft in centre of green TIs. Red and greens were tight together and marking was constant. Bursts of own bombs seen. Target could not be identified visually but was seen from light of photo flash.
[underlined] RAF CONINGSBY [/underlined]
22/23 April 1944
Lancaster Mk.III ME625 OF-T Target: BRUNSWICK
Crew: It is now [underlined] P/O [/underlined] Tindall. F/Sgt Hansen replaced by F/Sgt R..M.Clarke
Bomb Load: 12 x 4 7” flares. 1 x 4.5” flare. 1 x green TI.
No times entered in ORB. Average from other aircraft Up: 23:05 Down 04:50
Weather over target 6-8/10ths cloud. Hazy, visibility bad. Flares scattered. One RSF seen to south-east, outside area of flares.
24/25 April 1945
Lancaster Mk.III ME625 OF-T Target: MUNICH
Crew: W/O Clarke as rear gunner
Bomb Load: 12 x cluster flares. 1 x green TI No.4
Time up: 20:53. Down 06:27.
Bombing by visual on markers at datum point, H2S over target. Had good run from yellow TI. Our flares went straight across town which was clearly seen. Concentration of fires seen after leaving target. Glow seen for 100 miles.
26/27 April 1944
Lancaster Mk.III ME625 OF-T Target: SCHWEINFURT
Crew: W/O Clarke as rear gunner.
Bomb Load: 12 x 7” flares. 2 x green TI No.4.
Time up: 21:33. Down 05:44
No cloud, slight haze, visibility good. Bombed on H2S. Several lots of flares were down and one green TI which Master Bomber was instructing aircraft to bomb. All flares dropped on one run as original 6 not gone before orders were received to back up.
[Page Break]
28/29 April 1944
Lancaster Mk.III ME625 OF-T Target: KJELLER (OSLO)
Crew: W/O Clarke as read [sic] gunner.
Bomb Load: 6 x clusters 7” flares. 1 x yellow TI no.4. 5 x1000lb MC.
Time up: 21:08. Down 04:12
Good visibility permitted visual identification of runway on airfield. Flares dropped across runways between aiming point “A” and “B”. RSF on roof of one building (Aiming point “A”). Bombs dropped running due west across target. As we were early to bomb, results not seen but rear gunner saw stick of bomb bursts on building as we were leaving the area.
31 May/1 June 1944
Lancaster Mk.III ND981 OF-H Target: MAISY
Crew: S/L J.A. Ingham. P/O J.A. Pearson. P/O K. Swale. F/L J. Peden. P/O A.J. Tindall.
F/O F.P.L. Broome (Permanent). W/O E.H. Hansen
Bomb Load: 6 x 7 4.5” clusters. 8 x1, 000lb MC. 3 x 4.5” reco flares.
Time up: 23:03. Down 02:23
Target located by yellow T1 and H2S. Yellow (Oboe) at 00:45 hrs followed by two others at 00:47hrs in target area. Slightly visible above cloud. Instructed at 00:50hrs approx. on VHF, confirmed by W/T to return to base by ordered route. Landed Chipping Norton.
6 June 1944
Lancaster Mk.III ND589 OF-D Target: ST. PIERRE DU MONT
Crew: S/L J.A. Ingham. (Deputy Controller) Normal crew.
Bomb Load: 11 x1000lb MC. 4 x 1,000 lb GP.
Time up:02:52. Down:06:56
Weather over St. Pierre du Mont 10/10th cloud base 8,500 – 9,000ft. Broken low cloud below. Target identified visually and by Oboe markers red TIs. Layer of cloud made it impossible to bomb from any greater height than 9,000ft. Controller gave orders to decrease height but 2,000ft. Oboe markers not down on time; first one seen in sea just off shore. PFF very good and green TIs were rather scattered at first. Bombing Oboe seemed to be fairly good. Sticks seen bursting or target. Visibility was impeded by ice on the bomb aimer’s Perspex and pilots’s windscreen. VHF rather noisy on channel B and changed to channel C on Controllers order. Still a lot of interference probably due to people transmitting at the same time.
6/7 June 1944
Lancaster Mk.III ND589 OF-D Target: ARGENTAN
Crew: Normal plus F/L W.G. Cooper (Vis. B/Aimer)
Bomb Load: 2 x red/green star Flares. 3 x green TI no.23. 15 x 500lb MC.
No times entered in ORB. Average for other aircraft Up 23: 30 Down 03:20
Good vis. 10/10ths Stratus cumulus 6-7,000ft. Target located visually. Green TI lighting actual buildings. Backing up was on the target too. Marking went through very well indeed in spite of the fact that most of the illuminating flares overshot by about 2 miles. Oboe marker was not seen but it may have burst on the ground. On reaching the target 00:53hrs, appeared to be large buildings in the town itself well on fire. Attack appeared successful. Marking appeared 60 yards west of aiming point and bombing generally was w [sic]
[Page Break]
9/10 June 1944
Lancaster Mk.III ND589 OF-D Target: ETAMPES
Crew: Normal.
Bomb Load: 2 x TI green. 2 xTI red. 2 x TI yellow. 2 x Flares green/red stars 10 x 500lb MC.
3 x 4.5” rec. flares.
Time up: 21:56. Down: 02:10
Weather 10/10ths cloud, base 7,500ft. Vis. moderate, slight haze. Target traced by Oboe marker. First flares were 2-3 minutes late. Oboe marker also one minute late. Initial marking was not quite as ordered and a long time elapsed before permission given to bomb at H+14, meantime some aircraft had bombed. Released green TI on RSF on Controller’s orders 00:05hrs approx. (after one dummy run), then attacked by fighter for two minutes. Patter between gunners and pilot was seriously impeded by VHF. In spite of this, the gunners succeeded in shooting the fighter down on Controllers instructions. As an anti-climax, our bombs released safe as during attack by enemy aircraft the switch was put in Safe in case we had to jettison, and this was forgotten when bombs were dropped. Controllers instructions on VHF passed on by W/T Spoof yellow TI seen to cascade after attack but quiet useless as a decoy.
12/13 June 1944
Lancaster Mk.III ND589 OF-D Target: POITIERS
Crew: S/L Ingham (Deputy Controller 1) Normal crew..
Bomb Load:2 x flares green/red. 2 x 1 000lb MC. 2 x TI green. 1 x TI yellow. 9 x 7” clusters.
Time up: 22:27. Down: 04:47
Good vis. broken stratus layer at 6,500 ft. Location by H2S. Bombing started by overshooting as markers were a bit scattered and tended to be to port. After large red TI was dropped, bombing improved but some sticks were still scattered far and wide. Oil or petrol explosion at 01:52hrs 300 yards south of large red.
21/22 June 1944
Lancaster Mk.III ND589 OF-D Target: GELSENKIRCHEN
Crew: S/L Ingham (Deputy Controller 1) Normal crew.
Bomb Load: 4 x TI red. 1 x TI yellow No.16. 9 x7” cluster. 2 x flares green/red stars.
Time up: 23:08. Down: 03:29.
10/10th cloud, tops estimated 3,000ft. Target identified by yellow Oboe marker. First Oboe went down at 01:30.5hrs. This was ahead. At 01:32hrs another Oboe went down starboard quarter approx.. 1 ½ miles north of first Oboe, cascading from about 5,000ft, which was confusing as we were not expecting more than one (at H-hour only). Saw one red TI go down some miles north of main cluster. We took over from Controller at 01:20hrs as he was having engine trouble. Ordered Flare Force not to drop flares and sent Marking Force home. . [sic] Ordered Main Force to bomb southerly TI at 01:38.5hrs.
24/25 June 1944
Lancaster Mk.III ND589 OF-D Target: PROUVILLE
Crew: S/L Ingham (Deputy Controller 1) Normal Crew.
Bomb Load: 4 x TI red No.16. 1 x TI yellow No.16. 2 x flares red/green stars. 9 x7 x 4.5”clusters.
1x 4.5” rec. flare.
Time up: 22:49. Down: 02:10
No cloud, ground haze, vis. moderate. Target located by yellow Oboe marker. This fell 2 minutes early at 00:10 and a second at 00:11hrs almost together. No Mosquito marking seen except one RSF which appeared momentarily. Controller asked for Mosquitos to mark but nothing happened. Further flares were requested and dropped. No Wanganuis dropped to indicate so second flares were dropped on H2S. At Controller’s request own aircraft dropped two red TI on H2S and backed up with two more on 4th run. Controller ordered bombings on red TI dropped by D/97 – at 00:35hrs approx. Final Cease Bombing signal and order to go home not heard. Over target for 30 minutes.
[Page Break]
4/5 July 1944
Lancaster Mk.III ND589 OF-D Target: ST. LEU D’ESSERENT
Crew: Now [underlined] W/C [/underlined] Ingham (Deputy Controller 1) Normal Crew.
Bomb Load: 6 x T1 green. 2 x TI yellow. 5 x 1,000lb MC. 1 x 1,000lb MC (LD)
Time up: 23:30. Down: 03:35
Searchlight belt extended 15 miles approx. further SW, no indication of radar control, attacked by two fighters at 01:10hrs – 49.47N 0135E at 14,00oft and sustained damage to mort mainplane. Handed over to Deputy 2 by W/T – acknowledged 01:16 hrs approx.. Target not attacked.
20/21 July 1944
Lancaster Mk.III PB181 OF-D Target: COURTRAI
Crew: W/C Ingham (Deputy Controller 1) Normal Crew.
Bomb Load: 9 X 7” clusters. 3 X yellow TI No. 16. 2 x Wanganui flares green/red star.
Time up: 23:08. Down: 02:16
Nil cloud, moderate base. First Oboe went down slightly early. Marking very rapid and successful. Bombing at first was a little wide north and south and west. After first few sticks bombing was good. Clouds of smoke tended to obscure markers. Controller called in VBU at 01:00hrs (attack had been ordered 00:57hrs). Some fighter activity.
24/25 July 1944
Lancaster Mk.III PB181 OF-D Target: DONGES
Crew: W/C Ingham (Deputy Controller 1) Normal Crew.
Bomb Load: 6 x7” clusters. 2 x yellow TI No.16. 5 x 1000lb MC (LD 6 hours) 2 x Flares green/red stars.
Time up: 22:42. Down: 03:47
Nil cloud below 16,000ft. Slight haze. Target identified on H2S. Raid opened up with Oboe marker one minute early. Flare illuminated target, marked by Mosquitos, assessed as being 200 yards east of aiming point. This green TI was backed up and produced a concentration of markers round the aiming point. Bombing order given at 01:14hrs. Bombing seemed to be quite concentrated around the green TIs.
25/26 July 1944
Lancaster Mk.III PB181 OF-D Target: STUTTGART
Crew: W/C Ingham Normal Crew.
Bomb Load: 6 x 4 flares white. 2 x TI red LB. 1 x 4,000lb. 4 x 500 lb. 1 x flare green/red.
Time up: 22:00. Down 05:20
8/10ths thick cloud, tops 18,000ft. Vis. moderate. Target located on GPI run. General concentration of TIs was good, mainly red, some greens seen.
31 July 1944
Lancaster Mk.III PB181 OF-D Target: JOIGNY-LAROCHE
Crew: Normal Crew, plus F/Sgt M.H. McBride, Front Gunner.
Bomb Load: 4 x 500lb MC ( ½ hr). 11 x 1,000 LB (1hr).
Time up: 17:20 Down: 23:20
Weather good, no cloud, slight haze. Located target by visual on canal and yards and by TIs. Lax attention to height caused trouble when the two forces divided. A gap of at least 500ft should be left between the two forces. Navigation could be better controlled if the Path Finder Force were not divided. Flying speed after the target was increased above that laid down by 10mph at least. It would be better policy to reduce rather than increase speed after leave the target, to allow formation to close up the straggle due to bombing, and also to allow any aircraft damaged to have a chance to keep up. Landed at Swinderby.
[Page Break]
6 August 1944
Lancaster Mk.III PB133 OF-C Target: BOIS DU CASSON
Crew: Normal
Time up: 09:12. Down 13:59.
There are no individual crew reports for 6/8.44. No Bombs Loads are listed But there is a resume of the operation carried out that day.
[underlined] Weather [/underlined]
Clear, break over target, cumulus tops 15,000ft to 20,000ft in target area.
[underlined] Results [[/underlined]
Crossing English coast Controllers Gee and intercom failed. As planned to home to target on Gee, handed over to G/38 (F/L Drinkall-missing)). [sic] Controller and Deputy changed position, Controller having fixed up poor intercom on 1196 (after 7 minutes) stood by in advisory capacity. About 40 miles inland a big cumulus cloud was lying across track. Deputy descended to 16,000ft and broadcast that he was going to take Force below the cloud. Controller warned him not to go below 15,000ft, and next advised him to turn to starboard. Deputy ordered Force to diverge and dive through cloud. Formation broke up in cloud. On emerging, Main Force were scattered over many miles of sky. There were some attempts to gather into a bunch (or bunches) but impossible to regain proper formation. As a result some aircraft appeared to bomb the primary. The number bombing was not large enough to impede daylight bombing runs and the other bombing of the target that did occur was believed accurate. Other aircraft bombed as best they could with some mistaking pin-points owing to icing troubles and the rush. Attack scattered over a large area.
Aborted : S/97 aborted mission, unable to identify target
Missing J/97 ND 840 (F/O Bucknell)
Opposition encountered: Moderate heavy flak seen. Fighters in target area attacked aircraft which were most dispersed on breaking cloud.
11/12 August 1944
Lancaster Mk.III PB181 OF-D Target: GIVORS
Crew: W/C Ingham (Deputy Controller 1) Normal Crew.
Bomb Load: 6 x red TI No. 16. 2 x yellow TI No . 16. 1 x yelow [sic] TI B22.
2 x Flares green/red. 4 x 1,000lb. 1 x 1 ,000lb (LD)
Time up: 20:39. Down: 05:17
Weather clear. Target located by illuminating flares. Unable to contact Controller so took over controlling. First flares fell two miles east, not illuminating target properly. Flares very scattered, heard green Force Controller ask for reserve flares. Marker Leader requested Wanganui but it did not function as a skymarker and went sraight [sic] down. We postponed H-hour for 5 minutes at 01:00hrs reserve flares then forthcoming, which gave good illumination. First red TI (at 01:012 hrs) assessed as 600 yards south, then second red TI more accurate on aiming point. This was backed up by third red which fell at least 500 yards to west. B/U asked to back up centre TI at 01:07hrs, which promptly went out. This left two inaccurate ones so instructed B/U to drop red directly between two and did so myself at 01:11 hrs. These TIs were subsequently thought to be in marshalling yard itself and were assessed by Marker Leader as 300 yards east of aiming point, so Main Force were ordered to bomb these with zero wind and ignore most westerly red TI, which was not cancelled as main concentration was obvious. Bombing subsequently well concentrated on these, though some ticks overshot to north and south. One or two fires seen. Yellow datum point TI not dropped by us as top pre-occupied as Controller. Landed at Witchford.
14 August 1944
Lancaster Mk.III PB 181 OF-D Target: BREST (Shipping)
Crew: Normal.
Bomb Load: 8 x1,000lb. ANM 65
Time up: 17:44. Down: 22:26
Weather clear, good visibility. Target identified visually. Two of our stick of bombs observed bursting on the cruiser. Tanker was seen burning after the attack. Winds received B3 100/7, B1 200/9, B4 126/5, B5 148/9. Winds sent 150/6 at 20:12hrs. Bombing heading received at 20:16 hrs as 010T.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Arthur Tindall's service and operations
Description
An account of the resource
A list of aircraft, operations and details of each operation undertaken by Arthur Tindall.
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
Ten typed sheets
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Memoir
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Germany--Berlin
Germany--Rendsburg
Germany--Stuttgart
Germany--Leipzig
Germany--Kassel
Germany--Cologne
Germany--Frankfurt am Main
Germany--Augsburg
France--Laon
Germany--Munich
Germany--Schweinfurt
Norway--Kjeller
France--Normandy
France--Argentan
France--Poitiers
Germany--Gelsenkirchen
France--Abbeville
France--Oise
France--Donges
France--Joigny
France--Paris
France--Givors
France--Brest
Great Britain
England--Cambridgeshire
England--Lincolnshire
Belgium--Kortrijk
Germany--Hannover
Germany--Braunschweig
France--Étampes (Essonne)
France--Saint-Pierre-du-Mont (Landes)
France
Germany
Belgium
Norway
Germany--Ruhr (Region)
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
MTindallAJ173966-150815-01
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1943
1944
1944-06
1944-07
1944-08
1944-06-05
1944-06-06
1944-06-24
1944-06-25
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
Claire Monk
44 Squadron
635 Squadron
83 Squadron
97 Squadron
aircrew
anti-aircraft fire
bombing
bombing of Kassel (22/23 October 1943)
bombing of the Creil/St Leu d’Esserent V-1 storage areas (4/5 July 1944)
bombing of the Normandy coastal batteries (5/6 June 1944)
bombing of the Pas de Calais V-1 sites (24/25 June 1944)
Distinguished Flying Cross
flight engineer
Gee
H2S
Lancaster
Mosquito
Normandy campaign (6 June – 21 August 1944)
Oboe
Pathfinders
RAF Coningsby
RAF Swinderby
RAF Witchford
target indicator
V-weapon
wireless operator
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1792/32522/PWilsonH1504.1.jpg
8b51075ead362e6cb024cc041922d8fb
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Wilson, Harold
H Wilson
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-01-09
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Wilson, H
Description
An account of the resource
24 items. The collection concerns Flight Sergeant Harold Wilson DFM (Royal Air Force) who flew two tours completing 45 operations as a bomb aimer on 9 and 97 squadrons. Collection contains an identity document, a letter, his flying log book, a memoir and photographs (including some while he was a member of a missing research and enquiry unit in Germany after the war).
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Barbara Armstrong and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Courtrai
Description
An account of the resource
Target photograph showing bomb bursts in built up area and the silhouette of a Lancaster below. Caption '2775 CON 20/21-7-44//NT 8" 15000, 225, COURTRAI. BB, 5X1000, 23SECS. F/O LASH[...]'.
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
1944-07-20
1944-07-21
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One b/w photograph
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Photograph
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PWilsonH1504
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Belgium
Belgium--Kortrijk
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-07-20
1944-07-21
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Geolocated
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
aerial photograph
bombing
Lancaster
target photograph
-
https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/files/original/1903/36302/PSparkesW17010012.1.jpg
c6b89519ea1f30fc7927853660986247
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Sparkes, Ned
William Sparkes
W Sparkes
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Date
A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource
2017-07-16
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
Sparkes, W
Description
An account of the resource
56 items. The collection concerns Flight Sergeant William "Ned" Sparkes (1601722 Royal Air Force) and contains his log book and an album with photographs, newspaper cuttings and documents including descriptions of his operations. He flew operations as a flight engineer with 431 Squadron.
The collection has been donated to the IBCC Digital Archive by Clive Sparkes and catalogued by Nigel Huckins.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Operations, the railway plan
Description
An account of the resource
Top - a note explaining the railway plan in preparation for Operation Overlord, attacks on French railway system.
Top left - extract from Ned Sparkes's logbook from 1 March 1944 to 29 March 1944 with operations to Trappes, Le Mans (twice), Brest, Amiens (twice), Contrai and Vaires (Paris).
Top right - short document entitled The Overlord debate about Harris being directed to carry out attacks on 6 marshalling yards in France instead of pointblank directive targets
Bottom - eight short documents giving details of eight operations including numbers and types of aircraft used, results, civilian casualties, other comments, bomber losses if any and minor operations.
Temporal Coverage
Temporal characteristics of the resource.
1944-03-01
1944-03-04
1944-03-06
1944-03-07
1944-03-09
1944-03-11
1944-03-13
1944-03-15
1944-03-16
1944-03-26
1944-03-29
Spatial Coverage
Spatial characteristics of the resource.
Great Britain
England--Durham
France
France--Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines
France--Le Mans
France--Brest
France--Amiens
Belgium
Belgium--Kortrijk
France--Paris
France--Vaires-sur-Marne
England--Durham (County)
Coverage
The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant
Royal Air Force
Royal Air Force. Bomber Command
Royal Canadian Air Force
Language
A language of the resource
eng
Type
The nature or genre of the resource
Text
Text. Log book and record book
Format
The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource
One typed document, one extract from log book and nine printed documents mounted on an album page
Conforms To
An established standard to which the described resource conforms.
Pending review
Identifier
An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context
PSparkesW17010012
Rights
Information about rights held in and over the resource
This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
IBCC Digital Archive
Is Part Of
A related resource in which the described resource is physically or logically included.
Sparkes, Ned. Album
3 Group
4 Group
431 Squadron
5 Group
6 Group
8 Group
aircrew
bombing
flight engineer
Halifax
Lancaster
mine laying
Mosquito
RAF Croft
Stirling