

NO. 5 GROUP OPERATION ORDER NO. B.976

APPENDIX 'A' - ROUTES AND TIMINGS

APPENDIX 'B' - SIGNALS PROCEDURE FOR
TARGET DIVERSIONS, ETC

APPENDIX 'C' - LIGHT AND MOON TABLES

INFORMATION.

General.

1. The inhabitants and industry of the Ruhr rely to a very large extent on the enormously costly water barrage dams in the Ruhr District. Destruction of TARGET X alone would bring about a serious shortage of water for drinking purposes and industrial supplies. This shortage might not be immediately apparent but would certainly take effect in the course of a few months. The additional destruction of one or more of the five major dams in the Ruhr Area would greatly increase the effect and hasten the resulting shortage. TARGET 2 is next in importance.
2. A substantial amount of damage would be done, and considerable local flooding would be caused immediately consequent on the breach of TARGET X. In fact it might well cause havoc in the Ruhr valley. There would be a large loss of cooling water for the large thermal plants.
3. In the Weser District the destruction of the TARGET Y would seriously hamper transport in the Mittelland Canal and in the Weser, and would probably lead to an almost complete cessation of the great volume of traffic now using these waterways.
4. The reservoirs usually reach their maximum capacity in May or June, after which the level slowly falls.

Enemy Defences.

5. (a) TARGET X.

There are three subjects on the crest of this dam which may each be a light A.A. gun. A light 3-gun A.A. position is situated below and to the N. of the dam with a possible searchlight position nearby. A double line boom with timber spreaders is floating on the main reservoir at 400 to 300 feet from the dam. No other A.A. position or defence installation is known.

(b) TARGETS Y and Z.

Information about the defences of these two dams will be given when P.R.U. sorties have covered these areas. (Information has now been issued).

(c) The last resort targets are unlikely to be defended.

INTENTION

6. To breach the following dams in order of priority as listed:

- (a) TARGET 'X' (GO 939)
- (b) TARGET 'Y' (GO 934)
- (c) TARGET 'Z' (GO 960)
- (d) Last Resort Targets:-
 - (i) TARGET 'D' (GO 938)
 - (ii) TARGET 'E' (GO 935)
 - (iii) TARGET 'F' (GO 933)

/EXECUTION

Code Name.

7. This operation will be known by a code name which will be issued separately.

Date of Attack.

8. The operation is to take place on the first suitable date after 15th May, 1943.

Effort.

9. Twenty Special Lancasters from 617 Squadron.

Outline Plan.

10. The twenty special Lancasters of 617 Squadron are to fly from base to target area and return in moonlight at low level by the routes given in APPENDIX 'A'. The Squadron is to be divided into three main waves, viz:-

(a) 1st Wave. Is to consist of three sections, spaced at ten minute intervals, each section consisting of three aircraft. They are to take the Southern route to the target area and attack Target X. The attack is to be continued until the Dam has been clearly breached. It is estimated that this might require three effective attacks. When this has been achieved the leader is to divert the remainder of this wave to Target Y, where similar tactics are to be followed. Should both X and Y be breached any remaining aircraft of this wave are to attack Z.

(b) 2nd Wave. Is to consist of five aircraft manned by the specially trained crews who are to take the Northern route to the target, but are to cross the enemy coast at the same time as the leading section of the 1st wave. This 2nd wave are to attack Target Z.

(c) 3rd Wave. Is to consist of the remaining aircraft and is to form an airborne reserve under the control of Group H.Q. They are to take the Southern route to the target but their time of take-off is to be such that they may be recalled before crossing the enemy coast if the 1st and 2nd waves have breached all the targets.

Recall will probably not be possible unless the first section of the 1st Wave are at POSITION 51°51' N., 03°00'E. by Civil Twilight (EVENING) + 30 minutes and the 3rd Wave must be at this position 2 hours 30 minutes later. Orders will be passed to aircraft on the Special Group frequency if possible before they reach the enemy coast instructing them which target they are to attack. Failing receipt of this message aircraft are to proceed to X, Y and finally last resort targets in that order, attacking any which are not breached. Officer Commanding, R.A.P. Station, Scampton, is to arrange for individual aircraft to be detailed to specific last resort targets.

Detailed Plan.

11. The 1st Wave is to take off in three sections each of three aircraft and fly to the target at low level by the route given in Appendix 'A'. Sections are to be spaced at intervals of ten minutes and are to fly in open formation. Height is not to exceed 1,500 feet over England. On leaving the English Coast aircraft are to descend to low level and set their altimeters to 60 feet using the Spotlight Altimeter for calibration. The QFP at various stages of the route is to be carefully noted. Aircraft are to remain at low level for the Flight to the target and on the return journey at least until crossing a point 03°00'E.

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as low as possible both going in and coming out even if it is necessary to climb a little later for map reading.

13. On arriving at a point 10 miles from the target the leader of each section is to climb to about 1,000 feet. On seeing this all other aircraft are to listen out on V.H.F. Each aircraft is to call the leader of the Wave on V.H.F. on arriving at the target. Spinning of the special store is to be started ten minutes before each aircraft attacks. The leader is to attack first and is then to control the attacks on TARGETS X and Y by all the other aircraft of the 1st Wave using the Signals procedure given in APPENDIX 'B'.

14. Number 2 of the leading section of the 1st Wave is to act as deputy leader for the whole of the 1st Wave during the attack on TARGET X. Should the leader fall out No. 2 of the leading section is to take over leadership, and No. 3 deputy leadership, for the attack of TARGET X. For the attack of TARGET Y Number 4 is to take over deputy leadership, or if No. 1 is absent he is to take over leadership, in which event No. 7 is to be the deputy leader. All other aircraft are to return by Route 1, the second three by Route 2 and the last three aircraft of this wave by Route 3.

15. The direction of attack of TARGET X is to be at right angles to the length of the target. The general direction of attack is, therefore, to be S.E. to N.W. Aircraft are not to be diverted to TARGET Y until TARGET X has been breached. If TARGET X is breached, up to two additional aircraft may be used, at the discretion of the leader, to widen the breach in TARGET X providing at least three aircraft are diverted to attack TARGET Y.

16. When TARGET X is seen to be breached beyond all possible doubt the leader is to divert the remainder of the first Wave to TARGET Y by W/T and V.H.F. where similar tactics are to be used for the attack of this target. The general direction of attack of TARGET Y is to be from N.W. to S.E. If target Y is seen to be breached beyond all possible doubt all remaining aircraft of the 1st Wave are to be diverted by the leader to attack TARGET Z independently using the same tactics as the 2nd wave.

18. For the attacks of both Targets X and Y the special range finder is to be used, the height of attack is to be 60 feet and the ground speed 220 m.p.h.

19. The 2nd Wave is to take off and fly to Target Z at low level by the Northern Route given in Appendix 'A'. Aircraft are to cross the enemy coast in close concentration, but not in formation, at the same time, although at a different point, as the leading section of the 1st Wave. Aircraft on this Wave will be controlled on the alternative V.H.F. channel. The special stores are not to be spun for the attack of Target Z. Aircraft are to attack this target from N.W. to S.E. parallel to the length of the dam and are to aim to hit the water just short of the centre point of the dam about 15 to 20 feet out from the edge of the water. Attacks are to be made from the lowest practicable height at a speed of 180 m.p.h. I.A.S. Aircraft are to return to base independently. First two aircraft by Route 1; second two aircraft by Route 2 and the last by Route 3.

20. The 3rd Wave is to consist of the remaining aircraft and is to form an airborne reserve under the control of Group Headquarters. They are to fly to Target X in close concentration, but not in formation, at low level by the Southern route given in Appendix 'A'. These aircraft are to be at Position 51°52' N., 01°00'E. 2 hours 30 minutes after the leading section of the 1st Wave have crossed this point on their outward route to the target. Orders for the 3rd Wave will be passed to all aircraft on the special Group frequency, if possible before they reach the enemy coast, instructing them which target they are to attack. Failing receipt of this message aircraft are to proceed to X, Y and, finally, last resort targets in that order attacking any which are not breached. The 3rd Wave are to use tactics of attack

/similar to those ...

similar to those used by the 1st Wave when attacking Targets X and Y except that attacks on last resort targets are to be made independently. After attacking, aircraft are to return to base independently at low level by any of the three return routes given in Appendix 'A'. Aircraft attacking early should take Route 1; the next aircraft Route 2 and the last Route 3.

Method of Attack.

21. Aircraft are to use the method of attack already practiced. The pilot being responsible for line, the Navigator for height, the Air Bomber for range and the Flight Engineer for speed.

22. The interval between attacking aircraft is to be not less than three minutes all targets.

23. On all targets except Target Z each aircraft is to fire a red very cartridge immediately over the den during the attack. Aircraft attacking Target Z are each to fire a red very cartridge as they release their special store.

24. All aircraft are to fly left hand circuits in each target area keeping as low as possible when waiting their turn to attack.

Time of Attack.

25. The time of attack of each target by each wave is not important to within a few minutes. The time of crossing the enemy coast is, however, all important. ZERO HOUR, which will be given in the executive order, is, therefore to be the time at which the first section of the 1st wave are to be at POSITION 51°52'N., 03°00'E. on the outward route to the target. This time will probably be Civil Twilight (EVENING) + 30 minutes. At this time aircraft of the 2nd Wave should be about Position 53°19'N., 04°00'E.

Routes.

26. As in Appendix 'A'.

Diversions.

27. The whole essence of this operation is surprise, and to avoid bringing enemy defences to an unnecessary degree of alertness, diversionary attacks must be carefully timed. H.Q. B.C. will be asked to arrange the maximum possible diversionary attacks 20 minutes after the leading section of the 1st wave crosses the enemy coast. No diversionary attacks should be despatched which would cross the enemy coast for a period of one hour preceding the 3rd Wave. 15 minutes after the 3rd Wave cross the enemy coast further diversionary attacks should be made at maximum strength and should continue, if possible until the 3rd wave are clear of enemy territory on the return journey. Diversionary attacks below 2,000 ft. should not be made in the area bounded by the points (51°00'N., 03°20'E.), (51°20'N., 06°30'E.), (51°00'N., 10°00'E.), 52°00'N., 09°00'E.), (53°20'N., 06°00'E.). H.Q. B.C. will also be asked to arrange suitable weather reconnaissance to report in particular on the visibility in the target area at least in sufficient time to recall the Lancasters before they cross the enemy coast if the weather is unsuitable.

Armament.

28. (a) Bomb Load. - Each Lancaster is to carry one special modified store (UPKEEP).
(b) Ammunition. - All guns to be loaded with 100 night tracer (G VI).

Fuel.

29. The Lancasters may take off at a maximum all up weight of 63,000 lbs. at +14 boost. As the modified store now weighs about 9,000 lbs. 1750 gallons of petrol can be carried.

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Navigation.

30. H.Q. B.C. are requested to arrange for the Eastern Chain, Stud 5 to be switched on at Z - 20 minutes and to remain on for the whole of the operation. This should assist in making an accurate landfall on the enemy coast at the correct time.

31. The route is to be carefully studied before flight and the outstanding features, obstructions and pinpoints noted, particularly water pinpoints. E.T.A.'s at each are to be carefully calculated and if any pinpoint is not found on E.T.A. a search is to be made before proceeding to the next pinpoint. Aircraft may climb to 500 feet shortly before reaching each pinpoint if necessary to help map reading.

32. The maximum use is to be made of the Air Position Indicators.

Synchronisation of Watches.

33. All watches are to be synchronised with B.B.C. time before take off on the day of the operation.

Secrecy.

34. Secrecy is VITAL. Knowledge of this operation is to be confined to the Station Commander, O.C. 617 Squadron and his two Flight Commanders until receipt of the EXECUTIVE signal. After crews are briefed they are to be impressed with the need for the utmost secrecy because of the possibility that the operation may be postponed should weather reconnaissance prove the weather to be unsuitable.

Reports.

35. Each aircraft as soon as possible after it has attacked is to report by W/T on the normal Group operational frequency in accordance with APPENDIX 'B'.

Special Devices.

36. MANDREL and TYNSEL are not fitted.

37. IFF is NOT to be used on the outward journey but normal procedure is to be followed on the homeward flight. Any aircraft returning early is NOT to use IFF except after Z + 30 minutes for the 1st and 2nd Waves and after Z + 3 hours for the 3rd Wave.

Nickels.

38. Nickels are not to be dropped.

INTERCOMMUNICATION.

Wireless Silence.

39. Strict W/T and R/T silence is to be maintained until after Z + 30 minutes for the 1st and 2nd Waves and after Z + 3 hours for the 3rd Wave. Any aircraft returning early is NOT to break W/T or R/T silence and is NOT to identify on MF/DF except after Z + 30 minutes for the 1st and 2nd Waves and after Z + 3 hours for the 3rd Wave. Aircraft returning before that time are to cross the English Coast at 1,500 feet at the point of exit and proceed direct to base or the nearest suitable airfield. Otherwise normal operational signals procedure is to be used except as modified by Appendix 'B'.

MF/DF Section.

40. Section D is to be used if required in accordance with Paragraph 39.

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Executive Order.

41. The executive order for the operation will be given by EXECUTIVE followed by the code word allotted, the date on which the operation is to take place and the time of Zero Hour in British Double Summer Time.

42. ACKNOWLEDGE BY TELEPRINTER.

(Sgd.) H.V. SATTERLY C/C
Senior Air Staff Officer,
No. 5 Group,
Royal Air Force.

Ref:- 50/101/54/Air.
Date:- 16th May, 1943.

DISTRIBUTION

External.

Group Captain J. N. H. Whitworth, DSO., DFC.
Headquarters, Bomber Command.
(Deputy C.-in-C. personally, or in his absence,
Group Captain N.W.D. Marwood-Elton, D.P.C.).

Cowp No.

1 and 2.
3, 4 and 5.

Internal.


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C.S.O.

File.

Spares.


6 } Not to be
7 } issued until
8 } after
9, 10, 11, } despatch
and 12. } of
Executive
Signal.



LEGEND

- Outward routes
- - - - - Homeward routes
- △ Aircraft "S" missing at this point; arrow denotes direction of flight.
- ⊙ Aircraft "M" missing at target. △ Other aircraft seen to crash.
- (w) Aircraft "W" targeted back at this point, abortive

Operation Chastise : planned routes



RED I

CRS Y II

MARE II

OPTIMUM DEPTH FOR
EXPLOSION OF 5000 LB. CHARGE

No. 607 MOUNTAIN. MOUNTAIN MOUNTAIN 16.7.41.

No.	No.	Grade.	Weight.	Designation.	Notes.	Number.	Point Gunner.	2nd Gunner.	
J.P.P.	1.	G. WIDE. GUNNER.	200. PULVER.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	0.416
	2.	G. WIDE. GUNNER.	200. PULVER.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	0.419
	3.	G. WIDE. GUNNER.	200. PULVER.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	0.421
	4.	G. WIDE. GUNNER.	200. PULVER.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	0.424
S	5.	G. WIDE. GUNNER.	200. PULVER.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	0.426
	6.	G. WIDE. GUNNER.	200. PULVER.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	0.428
	7.	G. WIDE. GUNNER.	200. PULVER.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	0.430
	8.	G. WIDE. GUNNER.	200. PULVER.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	0.432
S	9.	G. WIDE. GUNNER.	200. PULVER.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	0.434
	10.	G. WIDE. GUNNER.	200. PULVER.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	0.436
	11.	G. WIDE. GUNNER.	200. PULVER.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	0.438
	12.	G. WIDE. GUNNER.	200. PULVER.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	0.440
J.P.P.	13.	G. WIDE. GUNNER.	200. PULVER.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	0.442
	14.	G. WIDE. GUNNER.	200. PULVER.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	0.444
	15.	G. WIDE. GUNNER.	200. PULVER.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	0.446
	16.	G. WIDE. GUNNER.	200. PULVER.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	0.448
S	17.	G. WIDE. GUNNER.	200. PULVER.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	0.450
	18.	G. WIDE. GUNNER.	200. PULVER.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	0.452
	19.	G. WIDE. GUNNER.	200. PULVER.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	0.454
	20.	G. WIDE. GUNNER.	200. PULVER.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	W/O. WIDE.	0.456

Collection H.B.I.

(SEE OVER)


No. 617 SQUADRON, NIGHT FLYING PROGRAMME 16.5.43.

No.	A/C	Captain	F/Engr	Navigator	W/Optr	A/Bomber	Front Gunner	Rear Gunner
1.	G.	W/Cdr. GIBSON.	SGT. PULFORD.	P/O. TAYLOR.	F/Lt. HUTCHINSON.	P/O. SPAFFORD.	F/SGT. DEERING.	F/Lt. TREVOR-ROPER.
2.	M.	F/Lt. HOPGOOD.	SGT. BREWSTER.	F/O. EARNshaw.	SGT. MINCHIN.	P/O. FRASER.*	P/O. GREGORY.	F/O. BURCHER.*
3.	P.	F/Lt. MARTIN.*	P/O. WHITTAKER.	F/Lt. LEGGO.*	F/O. CHAMBERS.*	F/Lt. HAY.	P/O. FOXLEE.*	F/SGT. SIMPSON.*
4.	A.	S/Ldr. YOUNG.	SGT. HORSFALL.	SGT. ROBERTS.	SGT. NICHOLS.	F/O. MACCAHL.*	SGT. YEO.	SGT. IBBOTSON.
5.	J.	F/Lt. MALBY.	SGT. HAYTON.	SGT. NICHOLSON.	SGT. STONE.	P/O. FORT.	F/SGT. HILL.	SGT. SIMMONDS.
6.	L.	F/Lt. SHANNON.*	SGT. HENDERSON.*	F/O. WALKER.*	F/O. GOODALE.*	F/SGT. SUMPTON.	SGT. JAGGER.	P/O. HUCKLEY.*
7.	Z.	S/Ldr. MARSLEY.	SGT. MARRIOTT.	F/O. UQUHART.	SGT. COITAM.	P/O. FULLER.	F/O. TYNBERL'GH.	SGT. HURROWS.
8.	B.	F/Lt. ATELL.	SGT. KIDNEAR.	P/O. WILE.	SGT. GARSHOVITZ.	F/O. HOPKINSON.	SGT. GARRAS.	SGT. BOLITHO.
9.	N.	F/Lt. KNIGHT.	SGT. GRAYSTON.*	F/O. HODDAY.*	SGT. KELLOW.*	F/O. JOHNSON.*	SGT. SUTHERLAND.*	SGT. O'DRIEN.*
10.	W.	F/Lt. MUNRO.*	SGT. APPELEY.*	F/O. RUMBLE.*	SGT. PIGEON.*	SGT. CLAY.*	SGT. HOWARTH.*	F/SGT. WEEKS.*
11.	Q.	F/Lt. MCCARTHY.*	SGT. RADCLIFFE.*	F/SGT. McLEAN.*	SGT. EATON.*	SGT. JOHNSON.*	SGT. BAISON.*	F/O. RODGER.*
12.	H.	P/O. RICE.*	SGT. SMITH.	F/O. MACFARLANE.	SGT. GOSNIE.	F/SGT. THORNTON.	SGT. MAYNARD.	SGT. BURNS.
13.	K.	SGT. BYERS.	SGT. TAYLOR.	F/O. WARDER.	SGT. WILKINSON.	SGT. WHITAKER.	SGT. JARVIE.	SGT. McDOWELL.
14.	E.	F/Lt. BARLOW.	SGT. NEILLIS.	F/O. BURGESS.	F/O. WILLIAMS.	SGT. GILLESPIE.	F/O. GLINE.	SGT. LIDDELL.
15.	C.	P/O. OTTLEY.	SGT. MARSDEN.	F/O. BARRETT.	SGT. GUTTMAN.	F/SGT. JOHNSTON.	SGT. TEES.*	SGT. STRANGE.
16.	S.	P/O. BURPEE.	SGT. FREIER.	SGT. JAYE.	P/O. WELER.	SGT. ARTHUR.	SGT. LONG.	F/SGT. BRADY.
17.	O.	F/SGT. TOWNSEND.*	SGT. POWELL.	P/O. HOWARD.*	F/SGT. CHALMERS.*	SGT. FRANKLIN.*	SGT. WEBB.*	SGT. WILKINSON.*
18.	F.	F/SGT. BROWN.*	SGT. FENERON.*	SGT. HEAL.*	SGT. HENSTONE.*	SGT. GANCIA.*	SGT. ALLATSON.	F/SGT. MacDonald.*
19.	Y.	F/SGT. ANDERSON.	SGT. PATTERSON.	SGT. NUGENT.	SGT. NICKLE.	SGT. GREEN.	SGT. EVAN.	SGT. BUCK.

* SURVIVED THE WAR.

THE LONDON GAZETTE

POINT OF RELEASE - ABOUT 400-450 YDS. UPSTREAM.



VENTILATIONS RECORD BOOK

DETAIL OF WORK CARRIED OUT

By _____ No. 612 Squadron.

SECRET

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J. Polym. Sci. Part A: Polym. Chem. 42: 1184–1194 (2004)

For THE Month of May 1943

[illegible]

Date	Description
15.5.63	R/O. M. BURTON RD A/C reported to Squadron on appointment to commission. [REDACTED] R/O. R.E. WILLIAMS B.A.Sc. CND(A) reported to the Squadron on appointment to commission. Flt/Lt Training prior to operations completed today.
16.5.63	A special operation for which this Squadron had been training so hard was carried out. The target was the three great German Dams, the Alder, the Wiersse and the Sauer. 10 aircraft took off to attack the targets, and of these, 8 failed to return. The attack was an outstanding success in spite of these losses, and the Alder and the Wiersse Dams were definitely breached, and the Sauer damaged.
22.5.63	To-day, the Air Officer Commanding No. 5 Group addressed all personnel of this Squadron. After his address, all officers proceeded on 7 days leave, and ground crew, with the exception of a few personnel remaining as a skeleton staff, were given 7 days. W/O. FREIGHT D.S. J.1946 reported to Squadron on appointment to commission. W/O. G.S. DERRIN J.LTAS reported to squadron on appointment to commission.
29.5.63	F/M. I.R. HANCOCK(SMUS) ■■■■ R.O.C. ID granted acting rank of Squadron Leader ■■■■ 168100 SGT. WILLIAM E. A/C, ceased attachment to A.C.R.I. Brighton.
20.6.63	151400 SGT. WILLIAM E. A/C, ceased attachment to A.C.R.I. Brighton.
21.6.63	P/L. ALLSPOOK AND SHERIDAN posted to Squadron. His Majesty the King approved the following immediate awards for the Squadron operation on the German Dam, i.e. VICTORIAN CROSS. THE COMMANDER P.P. HENRY D.F.C. ■■■■ D.P.M. ■■■■ G.D.S. F/Sgt. C.B. SPENCER F/Sgt. T.G. TOMLINSON ■■■■ D.F.C. ■■■■ D.J. HENDERSON D.F.C., F/Vlt. J.G. HENDYMAN RFO. R/O. L.S. HUNTER. S/Ldr D.L. KELLY RFO, P/Vlt. L.B. MARTIN RFO. SAJ TO R.O.C. ■■■■ R/O. D.L. THOMSON RFO. P/L. A.P. NICHOLSON RFO R/O. J.P. ASHBY RFO. ■■■■ R/O. C.W. ROY RFO. ■■■■ R/O. A.C. KIRKHAM R/O. C.H. HOWARD R/O. G.A. DENNING. R/O. J.R. CASSELL. R/O. F.H. SHUTTER. ■■■■ P/Lie. THOMAS-JONES RFO. R/O. A.PART. ■■■■ R/O. H.E. HENWAY. R/O. R.G. JOXLEY

28 MAY 43.

01-10 1967 2d Airborne Div, Fort Benning JMWG, 2nd, 3rd, Reserve at Ft Benning Airfield, Co 8th Squadron.

This officer served as a night bomber pilot at the beginning of the war and mainly specialized in operations as a night bomber pilot. In addition to training and flying the latest bombers in all combat operations he was also involved in the defense of the country. He was a highly skilled and experienced pilot and was awarded several decorations for his service. He was a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and was also a member of the Royal Air Force. He was a highly skilled and experienced pilot and was awarded several decorations for his service. He was a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and was also a member of the Royal Air Force.

When his tour of operational duty was completed, he asked for a further operational posting and that he be assigned to a night-duty unit instead of being posted for international duties. In the course of his second year, he continued to learn the enemy weapons and the tactics and the training and development of his night fighter formations.

[illegible]

in conclusion of his third operational tour, the Commander stated: "I would like to be allowed to remain in command and be re-assigned to command a squadron than leaving for another tour. Under the current budget, this squadron has not executed one of the most devastating attacks of the war - the destruction of the enemy's air base."

[illegible]

After the meeting, BARKER then led the remainder of his forces to the town of HALL, with complete success and for his own safety he requested his location, and once more BARKER was informed that they were being followed by the police and the FBI.

[illegible]

(SEE OVER)

THE LONDON GAZETTE. 28th.MAY 1943.

Acting Wing Commander Guy Penrose GIBSON, DSO, DFC, Reserve of Air Force Officers, No.617 Squadron.

This officer served as a night bomber pilot at the beginning of the war and quickly established a reputation as an outstanding operational pilot. In addition to taking the fullest possible share in all normal operations he made single handed attacks during his "Rest" nights on such highly defended objectives as the German Battleship TIRPITZ then completing in WILHELMSHAVEN.

When his tour of operational duty was concluded, he asked for a further operational posting and went to a night-fighter unit instead of being posted for instructional duties. In the course of his second Tour, he destroyed at least three enemy bombers and contributed much to the raising and development of new night fighter formations.

After a short period in a training unit he again volunteered for operational duties and returned to night bombers. Both as an operational pilot and as a leader of his squadron, he achieved outstandingly successful results and his personal courage knew no bounds. BERLIN, COLOGNE, DARSIG, GYDNIA, GEMOA, Le CREUSOT, MILAN, NUREMBURG and STUTTGART were among the targets he attacked by day and night.

On conclusion of his third operational tour, Wing Commander GIBSON pressed strongly to be allowed to remain on operations and he was selected to command a Squadron then forming for special tasks. Under his inspiring leadership, this squadron has now executed one of the most devastating attacks of the war, the breaching of the MOHNE and EDER dams

The task was fraught with danger and difficulty. Wing Commander GIBSON personally made the initial attack on the MOHNE dam. Descending to within a few feet of the water and taking the full brunt of the anti-aircraft defences, he delivered his attack with great accuracy. Afterwards he circle low for thirty minutes drawing the enemy fire on himself in order to leave as free a run as possible for the following aircraft which were attacking the dam in turn.

Wing Commander GIBSON then led the remainder of his force to the EDER dam where, with complete disregard for his own safety, he repeated his tactics and once more drew on himself the enemy so that the attack would be successfully developed.

Wing Commander GIBSON has completed 170 sorties involving more than 600 hours operational flying, throughout his operational career, prolonged exceptionally at his own request, he has show leadership, determination and valour of the highest order.