After dinner speeches at the Air Gunners' Association - includes speeches by Lord Boothby, Sir Arthur Harris. Air Marshall I Broom, Group Captain Willie Tait, Major General James Stuart and Wing Commander J Skinner.

After dinner speeches at the Air Gunners' Association - includes speeches by Lord Boothby, Sir Arthur Harris. Air Marshall I Broom, Group Captain Willie Tait, Major General James Stuart and Wing Commander J Skinner.

At dinner held to commemorate 30th anniversary of VE Day on 10 May 1975 at RAF Club, London. Starts with greetings sent and toasts proposed by unidentified men. Present are Lord Boothby, Sir Athur Harris, and Air Marshall Broom. Starts with speech by Lord Boothby mentioning that he had been the adjutant of 9 Squadron and tells story of incident when he got into trouble for talking about new gadget to improve bombing accuracy. He goes on to describe another embarrassing moment concerning the 1000 bomber raid on Cologne. Continues with remarks about bomber command's achievements, then the battle of the Atlantic and finally attacks on German synthetic oil supplies. Mentions Dresden and treatment of Harris and the command after the war. Concludes with toast to the RAF. Follows a speech by Air Marshall Ivor Broom to reply to the toast. Talks of changes to the RAF over last 30 years since VE day. Tells story of Polish air gunner's visit to give talk at girls' school. Continues with talk about current Air Force and offers another anecdote. Follows a toast to guests by Wing Commander J A G Skinner, the president of the air gunners' association. Offers remarks about Sir Arthur Harris's history and then offers toast to him. Follows speech by Sir Arthur Harris. Starts with praise for work of air gunners followed by anecdote. Then offers critical remarks on the book 'The History of Strategic Bomber Offensive' and its dependence on the American bombing survey. Goes on to talk about history books written by senior officers of all services and their treatment of Bomber Command. Then goes on with his own views and remarks on bomber command's achievements as well as other historical events. Includes accounts by Albert Speer about events towards the end of the war. Continues with comments on Bomber Command targets including canals, mining, German naval ships as well as other comments on events and bombing of civilians and casualties. Follows a speech by Group Captain Willie Tait giving response to Sir Arthur's speech. Follows a toast by Major General James Stuart to absent friends. Submitted with caption 'Written on insert "Air Gunners' Dinner". After-dinner speeches at the Air Gunners Association dinner to commemorate the 30th anniversary of VE Day on May 10th 1975 at the Royal Air Force Club, Piccadilly, London Leonard Cheshire not on this tape. Includes speeches from Lord Boothby, Air Marshal Ivor Broom, Wing Commander J A G Skinner, Marshal of the RAF Sir Arthur Harris, Group Captain Willie Tait. Ends with a few words from American actor Jimmy Stewart'.

1975-05-10

Audio recording 01:29:55

This content is property of the Leonard Cheshire Archive which has kindly granted the International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive a royalty-free permission to publish it. Please note that it was digitised by a third-party which used technical specifications that may differ from those used by International Bomber Command Centre Digital Archive. It has been published here ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre.

SCheshireGL72021v20018-0001, SCheshireGL72021v20018-0001-Transcript

Leonard Cheshire Resonate Project

File Title: After dinner speeches at Air Gunners' Association dinner held to commemorate 30th anniversary of VE Day on 10 May 1975 at RAF Club, London

Duration: 1 hour 30 mins 03 secs
Transcription date: 30/01/21
Archive Number: AV-S_249

Start of Transcription

00:00: Man 1: This cassette is the property of Group Captain Leonard Cheshire, VC, DSO, DFC, and is a personal copy of the after-dinner speeches at the Air Gunners Association dinner to commemorate the 30th anniversary of VE Day on May 10th 1975 at the Royal Air Force Club, Piccadilly, London.

00:29: Man 2: I have received the Queen’s command to ask you [unclear 00:33 to 00:35] to all members of the Air Gunners Association [unclear 00:38] to gather tonight for a kind message of royal greetings sent on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of VE Day. [Unclear 00:49 to 00:50] very good wishes for her visit to Japan, signed by her private secretary.

[00:58 applause to 01:04]

[01:05 no speech to 01:08]

01:09: Man 3: [unclear 01:09] toast of the Royal Air Force. Pray silence for Lord Boothby, Knight Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, Officer of the Legion of Honour.

[01:39 applause to 01:46]

01:47: Lord Boothby: Mr President. Is it working?

01:50: Man 2: No, but we can hear you.

01:53: LB: You can hear me?

01:54: Man 2: We can hear you.

01:55: LB: I’ll bet you can. Take the bloody thing away [laughter]. Mr President, Sir Arthur Harris, Air Marshal Broom and gentlemen. With the possible exception of my election to the rectorship of St Andrews University, to be invited to propose this particular toast on this particular night is perhaps the greatest honour that has ever been accorded to me, and I am deeply grateful to you.

[02:22 applause to 02:26]

02:27: LB: Now that the moment has come I feel a little bit like a celebrated bridegroom in my constituency of Aberdeenshire, who, as his bride was being led up the aisle turned noticeably white and broke out into a cold sweat. And the best man seized him by the arm and said ‘What’s the matter Sandy? Have you lost the wedding ring?’. And he said ‘No, but I seem to have lost my [unclear 02:51] [laughter].

[02:54 applause to 02:57]

02:58: LB: [unclear 02:58] precisely the position of that bridegroom tonight. In 1941 and 1942 I had the honour to be adjutant of Number 9 Bomber Squadron [unclear 03:13].

[03:14 applause to 03:17]

03:18: LB: [Unclear 03:18] of the squadron was as my friend the President has just reminded me: there’s always bloody something [laughter] and there always was. The Commander in Chief will not remember it, but there was an incident when I dined with the wife of one of his Group commanders (not I hasten to say my own Group Commander) in company with her husband, who was in the Royal Air Force, and the Attorney General, who was in the government. And the Attorney General made a bitter attack – it was Sir William Jowett – upon Bomber Command. And rising to the defence of Bomber Command I said ‘We’re working on various gadgets at the moment which are going greatly to improve our navigation, which will hit the right targets more regularly in the future, and we are conducting the war almost single-handed at the present time. And his wife met her brother, the Group Commander, an Air Vice-Marshal the next day and said ‘Bob Boothby tells me that you’re working now on a gadget that is going to greatly improve the accuracy of the bombing and make the finding of the targets easier’. I’ve no idea what the gadget was. I have no knowledge of mechanics of any kind at all. And the Air Vice-Marshal said ‘This is a very grave indiscretion on the part of an officer. I shall be reporting this to the Commander in Chief. It may necessitate a court martial’. And the Under-Secretary of State for Air was perturbed by this news from the Group. And he went down to see the Commander in Chief who had a file of note papers on the case and he said ‘Bob Boothby knows nothing about gadgets or mechanics of any kind at all’, and after a short pause the Commander in Chief said to the Under Secretary of State (who told me this himself) ‘Are you trying to tell me that this is all balls?’ [laughter]. [Unclear 05:43] replied ‘Precisely that’ [laughter]. ‘All right’ said the Commander in Chief and dropped the file into the waste paper basket [laughter].

[05:53 applause to 05:59]

06:00: LB: There was another slightly embarrassing moment for me when a wing commander of Group (my old group) rang me up and said ‘Tonight we are going to have the first [unclear 06:09] bomber raid on Cologne, and we want to put every aeroplane into the air without fail, and we understand from our files that you have 11 aircraft available. We shall want the lot. And I said ‘Well I’m afraid there’s one difficulty; we’re short of a navigator. And even for Cologne you must have a navigator’ [laughter]. [Unclear 06:48 to 06:49]. And an hour later the wing commander rang me up and said ‘I have good news for you’. So I said ‘What’s that?’. He said ‘A warrant officer who has got the DSM, who is one of the ablest navigators we’ve ever had in Bomber Command; he’s already completed a tour of duty and just returned from leave, and I’m sending him over in a special motor car. All you have to do is to introduce him to the captain and the crew and take him to the briefing, and you can put your whole 11 aircraft into the air. So I said ‘Right, that’s grand’. And an hour later a very smart warrant officer arrived and knocked on the door of my office at Acton and saluted very smartly and said ‘Sir’, and I said ‘I’m very glad to see you’. I said ‘It’s a big raid tonight on Cologne. I’m going to take you straight over to the captain of the aircraft now and then we’ll go to the briefing. And that is all that is necessary because of’ [unclear 07:40 to 07:41]. And he said ‘Yes sir, but I’m afraid there is a snag’. So I said ‘A snag?’. He said ‘Yes. I’ve done 1 tour of duty; I have survived it. I do not expect to survive another and I have reached a decision’. And I said ‘What decision is that?’. He said ‘I never intend to leave the Earth again’ [laughter]. And he said ‘No, not even in a Moth’ [laughter]. So I rang up the wing commander at Group Command and said ‘Thank you very much for sending me the warrant officer’, and he said ‘I knew you’d be pleased. He’s absolutely first class’ [laughter]. ‘Well I know he’s first class. I’ve no doubt he’s first class, but there’s a snag’. And he said ‘Snag, what do you mean snag?’. I said ‘Yes, he never intends to leave the Earth again, not even in a Moth’. And so we were only able to put 10 aircraft [unclear 08:36] [laughter]. That was why I think there was something to be said for the squadron’s motto There’s always bloody something [laughter].

[08:48 applause to 08:53]

08:54: LB: Between 1941 and 1942 I have no hesitation in saying that Bomber Command sustained the morale of the British people, who were under heavy bombardment, and it was their only form of retaliation. They weren’t fighting the Germans, and nobody else during those critical months was actually in action against them all the time. Lindeman’s estimate of the effects of area bombing proved in the end to have been grossly exaggerated in the early years. But as A J P Taylor, my late television sparring partner and historian of great brilliance wrote in the book he’s just published called The Second World War (there were of course [unclear 10:03] an attack I may say on Bomber Command) said ‘There were of course some compensations’. Over a million Germans were diverted from the factories into air raid precautions. The factories themselves switched from producing bombers to producing fighters, and this made retaliation by the Germans increasingly difficult. Even more important, the German fighters were kept at home for the defence of German cities and almost disappeared from the battle fronts. When the Allies landed in Normandy in 1944 they had complete command in the air. Similarly the heavy flak guns which were going to be [unclear 10:41 to 10:42] were kept in Germany. These were [unclear 10:45 to 10:46], although unforeseen [unclear 10:50] from the [unclear 10:52] offensive. Gentlemen, all I can say is that I endorse the word inestimable – inestimable gains. I reject the word unforeseen; that they were foreseen by Sir Arthur Harris himself.

[11:12 applause to 11:17]

11:18: LB: Then came the Battle of the Atlantic. We were a bit slow in providing the Navy with the long-distance strike bombers which were so central for tracking down the U-boats. But in the end we did it and we did it in time. And the Battle of the Atlantic, which in the words of Captain Stephen [unclear 11:55] the official historian of the naval war, who’s not prone to exaggeration, was very nearly lost in January 1943, had been won by April 1943. And [unclear 12:04] recalled his U-boats, and that was the end of that. And Bomber Command played a noble part. Gentlemen, the bomber offensive was resumed. The attacks on the synthetic oil supplies of Germany by us and by the American Air Force, by that time of the war were crippling. Similarly those on bridges and railways in France prior to the invasion. They simply couldn’t move their troops. And we have for evidence of this the evidence of Albert von Speer, who was responsible for German war construction and production. And his evidence cannot be refuted. Then came 1945, the year of victory and the year of the raid on Dresden, and upon this I must again quote Taylor, because I think he had something to say of interest. The civilian leaders from Churchill downwards hastily repudiated responsibility for the raid on Dresden, which they had in fact endorsed. Bomber Command was consigned to obscurity. Churchill did not mention it in his victory broadcast; no campaign medal was ever struck. Alone among the successful war leaders Sir Arthur Harris was not elevated to the House of Lords, and I’m not sure he’s not to be congratulated on that.

[13:34 applause to 13:43]

13:44: LB: I prefer to call it area bombing myself, had been for years the British achievement – most prized by both public opinion and the state. Now I happen to have evidence in my possession that there is a great deal of proof in that. The raid in Dresden was certainly no heavier than the raid on Hamburg and many other German cities. Admittedly there were a great many refugees there and some British prisoners of war, and the war ended much more quickly than was expected. Therefore public opinion turned against Dresden, and the truth is that both Bomber Command and its indomitable leader were badly treated by the politicians.

[14:35 applause to 14:40]

14:41: LB: And I believe it was the politicians who first advocated the bombing of Dresden as such and that it was Bomber Command who protested against it. Well never mind, they were badly treated. They were not alone. [Unclear 15:00] were always badly treated. [Unclear 15:04] was badly treated. He should have been made a marshal of the Royal Air Force after the Battle of Britain. He never was. [Unclear 15:12] was badly treated, and many others. The fact remains gentlemen, when all is said and done, when all the history books come to be written [unclear 15:25] it will emerge that while the Royal Navy won the Battle of the Atlantic and the Army marched to final victory from Alamein to Luneburg [unclear 15:38] where Montgomery signed the armistice with the Germans, the United Kingdom was saved from defeat and destruction during the critical and vital years between 1940 and 1944 by the Royal Air Force.

[16:01 applause to 16:07]

16:08: LB: You sustained our morale; you beat the enemy out of the skies and you enabled the armies ultimately to achieve the victory they did. It therefore gives me very great pleasure indeed tonight to raise my glass to the toast of the Royal Air Force of [unclear 16:54 to 16:55]

16:56: Man 3: [Unclear 16:56]. The Royal Air Force.
16:58: Audience: The Royal Air Force

[17:00 no speech to 17:07]

[17:08 applause to 17:15]

[17:16 no speech to 17:20]

Man 3: [Unclear 17:21] My lords, distinguished guests of the evening, other distinguished guests, gentlemen. Pray silence for Air Marshal Ivor Broom, Companion of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, Companion of the Distinguished Service Order, holder of the Distinguished Flying Cross and Bearer of the Air Force Cross.

[17:38 applause to 17:45]

17:46: Ivor Broom: Now Mr President, my lord, distinguished guests and gentlemen, it gave me much pleasure when your president approached me and asked me if I would answer for the toast of the Royal Air Force tonight, but I was quickly filled with dismay when I heard that I should have to follow such a distinguished after-dinner speaker as Lord Boothby. My fears I must say my lord have been proved to be only too ample after the delightful way in which you have proposed that toast. I must say that I feel like this at this moment, rather like the negress who was standing under the shower watching the water splash down on her ebony body and she looked down at her left breast and she said, shaking her head ‘It’s neither right nor fair’ [laughter]. And that my lord is how I feel on following you tonight. The RAF has seen many changes in the 30 years that have passed since we celebrated that great day in Europe 30 years ago. In fact it would be very strange if there had not been changes. And I for one am not one who moans about the past and say things aren’t quite what they used to be, or else we wouldn’t have a few, and unfortunately it is only a few, of the very fine high-performance aircraft we have today. We’d still be looking back at some of those aircraft we loved so affectionately but wouldn’t be much good with us today. When you think of the modern fighter for instance which [unclear 19:55] passing through 30,000 feet in a minute and a half, it’s a little bit different from the good old days with the Sterling the Lanc and the Wimpy [laughter]. Things have changed. Of course, much to your regret no doubt we have to admit we have no air gunners in the Air Force serving as air gunners today. We [unclear 20:16] a few of course in other jobs, but we have no one service, and we have to rely on electronic aids, fortunately I hope a little bit more efficient than this [laughter] as our means of defence. In fact I am reminded of that Polish air gunner who was shot down over Germany, who evaded capture, got back to this country and despite the fact that his English was very poor, some bright spark decided they would send him on a lecture tour around the schools. And you no doubt have heard of this particular air gunner. But he went to a girls’ school and he started to describe how he was shot down. He was talking to the sixth form and he described how this couple of Fockes came out of the sun at him, and the girls tittered, and the headmistress thought she ought to intervene and she said ‘I can explain girls. The Focke is the name of a German fighter and our guest is talking about the Focke-Wulf 190, and this Polish air gunner said ‘No no no no, I’m not talking about a 190. The Fockes were 109 [laughter]. But to get back to today’s air force, things have changed. It takes 3 years roughly to train a fighter pilot, a man from the day he joins us to the day he becomes fully competent as a member of an operational squadron. And so you can see that if ever we are involved in another war we will not have time to recruit and train people to come into the front line as we did in days of old. And I think it right and proper that you should know, and you should know, and I’m sure Lord Boothby and everybody else knows who reads their parliamentary debates that we have in this country today only approximately 100 supersonic front-line fighters. And I think that is a sobering thought. Their capability is quite fantastic compared with what we have known in the past, but you can’t have a chap in 2 places at the same time. When there is no obvious threat to a country then of course you find that people don’t care about defence. But the fact that a threat is not obvious does not mean that it is not real. And I wonder therefore for instance how many members of parliament or prospective members in the last election mentioned defence in their manifesto. And I wonder how many people of the electorate asked them questions about defence. And I say this because we’ve jolly well got to wake this country up. And it is good folk like yourselves who love this country so dearly who are the people who must be asking these questions. And I would leave that particular thought with you. Because we’ve only seen in the last few weeks how force is still unfortunately the final arbiter when interests conflict. Well we are small, terribly small, but don’t get despondent please about the chaps in it. If you get worried about the youth of the day come [unclear 24:07] to the air force and see the young men in it. They are better than they’ve ever been.

[24:13 applause to 24:18]

24:19: IB: They’re all volunteers. They’re all there because they want to be there. And if you’re feeling a bit downhearted and fed up with things you see in the country, try and arrange a visit to an operational squadron and your heart will be uplifted and you’ll go home greatly cheered. The chaps are good and I am very proud to be associated with them. Don’t get despondent. Well I’ve been talking a little about the past, a little bit about the present, and I could perhaps end by saying that the language used in the [unclear 25:06] language (perhaps that’s the wrong word), some of the expressions used in the Air Force today are very different from the expressions of days of old, and words which you used in the wartime days are quite out of fashion today. I believe later on this evening we’re going to be privileged to have James Stewart join us, and I must say that occasionally the odd Americanism has crept into our language. I must tell you a true story. It’s absolutely true; it affected me. In my last appointment I commanded 11 Group, the [unclear 25:40] and I was going to visit one of my stations in Scotland and I was asked if I minded if a number of spares were put on the aeroplane and that I would be dropped at Leuchars, and this was going on to Kinloss with a lot of spares. So I stopped at Leuchars and the aircraft disappeared and went on its way, and I thought it would be coming back for me later. And as I was wandering round the station with the station commander and wing commander and my ADC, someone – an airman – came in and joined on to the entourage and whispered conversations, and suddenly the wing commander beckoned to my ADC and they left us. And I never thought any more about it. At the end of the day the commanding officer said to me ‘Did you know what was going on when the wing commander and your ADC left us this afternoon?’. I said ‘No, it didn’t bother me. What happened?’. He said ‘Oh it’s rather interesting. That airman who came in and spoke to the wing commander said that Mrs Broom was about to land’. And so out they went and they rang up the CO’s wife, and the CO’s wife said ‘I don’t believe it. I was talking to the AOC a short time ago, and I’m sure that if Mrs Broom had been coming in by air then the AOC would have told me’. So she said ‘Well get out and meet the aeroplane. If Mrs Broom’s on it please telephone me and I’ll come down and meet her’. Well out they went to the aeroplane, it taxied in, stopped, an empty aeroplane – no Mrs Broom in it. So the wing commander thought he would track down this message and he got hold of the airman and he said ‘Now where did you get the message from that Mrs Broom was about to land?’. And he said ‘Oh I got it from Air Traffic Control. I think that’s a bit of a laugh when I’m now Controller of the National Air Traffic Services, but I got it from Air Traffic Control’. And he said to the airman ‘Well what did Air Traffic Control say to you?’. And it was only then we found out how Americanisms are getting into our language because the airman said to the wing commander ‘Oh Air Traffic Control said “The AOC’s bird is in the circuit” ‘ [laughter]. Today things are a little different. I thank you all very much for inviting me to represent the Royal Air Force here tonight. I thank you my lord for your kind remarks and bless you all.

[28:41 applause]

28:42: Man 3: Distinguished guests, gentlemen. We come now to the toast, the toast for your chief guest of honour. Pray silence for the President of the Air Gunners Association, Wing Commander J A G Skinner, holder of the Distinguished Flying Cross’.

[28:59 applause to 29:05].

29:07: J Skinner: My lords, very distinguished guests, other distinguished guests and members of our association. As you know we are here today to celebrate the 30th anniversary of a wonderful victory, the victory over the Nazi Reich in Europe. I personally think that that victory ranks with the victory of the Battle of Britain as two of the greatest victories in our time. And we are very fortunate in having as our very distinguished guest one of the chief architects of that victory, none other than Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Sir Arthur Harris.

[30:02 applause to 30:!0].

30:!2: JS: I would like to say that in my humble opinion, that if Sir Arthur could have had his way, we would have been here 2 years ago celebrating this victory, but we had to wait just a little bit longer. Now I’d like to fill you in a little bit on the history of our distinguished guest. (I won’t tell you his age – that was in the paper a month ago). At the age of 16 I am told (I know I’m going to get into trouble if I’m wrong), that he had a slight difference of opinion with his parents, who wanted him to follow a career in the Army, and he flatly refused thank God, and he accepted a passage to South Africa and a [unclear 31:26]. Times have changed haven’t they? And he went over to Africa, South Africa, pottered around, did 1 or 2 jobs – farming, driving, mining and the ‘14-‘18 war broke out. He tried his hardest to join, I think it was the First Rhodesian Regiment, and they only had 2 vacancies in that regiment. One was for a machine gunner and the other was for a bugler. He applied for the first and the examiner found he knew nothing at all about machine guns, so having blown a bugle at the ATC he took the job as a bugler. He served in that regiment, and at the end of the German campaign in Africa he came back to the United Kingdom. He joined the Royal Flying Corps, and upwards and onwards served. He was one of the first airmen to fly at night. And he finished up as AOC of the Royal Air Force in Palestine and Trans Jordan 1938 and ’39 at the outbreak of the Second World War. He became Deputy Chief of the Air Staff in 1940 and eventually (there must have been some far-sighted people in those days) he became Commander in Chief of Bomber Command. Now there must be quite a number of people in this room who know a lot better than I of his achievements in Bomber Command.

[33:23 applause to 33:29]

33:30: JS: I can remember 1 article in a newspaper – I’ll tell you which one it was – it was the Daily Express, when he was referred to as the human dynamo of aerial strategy, and I think that was the correct name for him in those days – the human dynamo of aerial strategy – because he set about his task in Bomber Command with resolution, planning and moulded that command into what we knew it in our serving days. He had a wonderful ability of picking out the best of men and getting the best out of his pickings. He had some wonderful men serving under him and he had that knack of getting their loyalty and getting them working. You can remember the OTU’s where the lads went back from the first tour and became instructors. They all worked with a feeling that they were doing something to help, and especially to help our Commander in Chief. He had a great human affection for the air crew – his boys he called them – and I would like to quote a statement of his which says ‘There are no words with which I can do justice to the air crew who fought under my command’. And we thank you for those words Sir Arthur. The civilian world and those that didn’t know coined a name for him. They called him “Bomber”, “Bomber Harris”. But I think the name we affectionately knew him by in those days was Butch. We loved him as Butch. And seeing him now I think time has mellowed us a little bit. I think I’d like to refer to him as Uncle Butch [laughter]. I don’t want to go on boring you. You want to hear what Sir Arthur has to say, so I will ask you to rise and drink heartily to the toast.

[36:53 no speech to 36:55]

36:57: Man 3: [Unclear 36:57] of the toast, your chief guest of honour: Sir Arthur Travers Harris.

[37:02 applause to 37:04]

37:05: Man 4: For he’s a jolly good fella.

[37:06 no speech to 37:11]

[37:12 applause to 37:21]

[37:22 no speech to 37:28]

37:29: Man 3: President, my lords, distinguished guests, gentlemen. Pray silence for Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Arthur Travers Harris, Knight [unclear 37:32] of the Most Honourable [unclear 37:34] of the Bath, Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire, Holder of the Air Force Cross and a doctor of law.

[37:44 applause to 38:03]

38:04: Arthur Harris: Mr President and gentlemen. If there are any of you at the far end of the room who can’t hear what I’m trying to say, you can do one of two things – either wave a hand and I’ll try and make it a bit louder, or you can just sit there and say thank God [laughter]. It’s a great honour for me to be invited to come here and dine with you fellas who really did the dirty work in the war and faced up to conditions that few people in any of the services have ever been called upon to face up to before or since. And I’m sorry to have to say, but using that terrible word – the media – you have damn little applause for what you achieved, which was vastly more than most people realise. There are several sorts of history. Henry Ford described them mostly as bunk, and just lately another American with typical American facility for words has described history as the way things get around. Well [unclear 40:09] got around about Bomber Command are almost too extraordinary at times for people who are in the know to believe. If you want to leave or have to leave for any purpose whatsoever I won’t be insulted, I will just keep on [laughter]. [Unclear 40:32 to 40:33] making a speech, sit down. F E Smith, who became Lord Birkenhead had one way when a speaker went on and on and on [unclear 40:45 to 40:46] missing his last train unless something happened, said to F E ‘Can’t you make that damn fella sit down?’, and F E said ‘Certainly’, picked up his menu, wrote something on the back [unclear 40:56] and said ‘Hold that in front of the speaker’. The speaker was delighted. He thought it was something else to add to his interminable talk. However, he read it and sat down after muttering a few disjointed words, sat down with a bang. The fella with a train to catch said ‘What did you put on that message?’. [Unclear 41:29] ‘your fly buttons are undone’ [laughter]. Don’t try that on me because I’ve got a zipper [laughter]. Somebody a few years later [unclear 41:49] who was getting a little bit prolix and he didn’t really pause for more than a second or two in his speech, he wrote a reply on the message about his buttons and went on with his talk. And when the fellow who’d sent the message looked to see what Winston had written, it read ‘A dead bird never fell out of its nest’ [laughter]. Now referring again to the matter of history, what Bomber Command has suffered from ever since the war is those deplorable volumes known as The History of the Strategic Bomber Offensive which [unclear 42:42] credit for most of what you’ve done with faint praise, which is the worst form of adulation, and finished up by saying you won the war, but it was too late for them to say that. Well you can’t blame the author, a junior officer who was put in to write that history, having previously expressed his views, because he had nothing to go on except the American bomber survey. When the Americans went into Germany they took with them a vast organisation – thousands – of every conceivable sort of expert – administrators, investigators [unclear 43:36], civil administrators – everything imaginable. And their task was to find out what made Germany tick to start with and what stopped her ticking. Well of course the answer to what stopped her ticking was obvious when you send in an outfit like that. You know when first prehistoric man saw the first flash of lightning and heard the first roar of thunder, naturally enough he dived back into the cave to his [unclear 44:02] and said ‘By God [unclear 44:03 to 44:04] and see what I’ve just done’ [laughter]. If I may say so the American, quite understandable attitude to what they [unclear 44:16] but you know [unclear 44:18] share in it one way and another [laughter]. When I enquired as to where our bombers’ survey was, I was told there wasn’t one, which to me was absolutely fantastic. I even appealed to Winston, and I’m sorry to have to say, but I was rather understandably and impatiently brushed aside, because he was busy then maturing plans to kick the Japanese out of the war, little appreciating the fact that a grateful electorate, after all he’d done, was about to kick him out of the war. And the result was the media had nothing to go on but those volumes of the so-called History of the Strategic Bomber Offensive. Well you know I always try to divide the history into 2 departments – the stuff that comes straight from the horse’s mouth and the stuff that comes straight through the jawbone of the largest braying ass in the environment. And we have plenty of damn fine horses praising what you fellas did. You don’t see it repeated too often. A J Taylor, as Lord Wilby has just said, has made some very nice remarks, deservedly, about your efforts. But some of these horses are really worth listening to. Take for instance Alanbrooke, Lord Alanbrooke, no particular friend of the Air Force, always making the most inordinate demands on what we ought to do for the Army and finishing up in his book about his diary in which he said that Bomber Command … he referred to their brilliant skills [unclear 46:30 to 46:33] your brilliant skills and the wonderful support which you gave to the Army. Well that’s good enough coming from that particular source. Then you get Monty. Monty was beyond doubt, I think you will agree, the greatest general this country has produced since Wellington and Marlborough. He had a habit of saying what he was going to do and then getting up and doing precisely that, exactly when he said he was going to do it. There have been many traducers of Monty, but that just [unclear 47:13 to 47:14] the braying jackasses [unclear 47:16]. Now you go to Eisenhower. Eisenhower, as you know, was a great man in many ways and a great coordinator of the work of a very mixed body of different nationalities. General Marshall, Secretary of State for War wrote to Eisenhower in some correspondence which was only lately released – very top secret, not intended to butter up an ally in any way, meant only for his eyes and Eisenhower’s for the next 20 or 30 years. In that letter Marshall referred to the fact that it had been proposed by the Chiefs of Staff … by the joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington to take the direct command of British Bomber Command and the American strategic bombers away from Eisenhower because the invasion was progressing so well, and return those commands to the heads of their own services, Arnold and [unclear 48:37] who had [unclear 48:39 to 48:41] compete with apart from Europe. In Marshall’s letter he said to Eisenhower I hope this doesn’t mean that you won’t get the support you’ve been getting from Bomber Command. Eisenhower in his reply said he had no such misapprehension. He had come to [unclear 49:05] Bomber Command [unclear 49:07 to 49:08] as one of the most [unclear 49:11 to 49:12] parts of his entire organisation, and he finished up by saying that when the great battle (these are his words), when the great battle [unclear 49:23] into Germany [unclear 49:24] you will find that Bomber Command will be on the job. Well we were on the job. Monty [unclear 49:31 to 49:34] on 2 occasions I have heard him say; he said it many times [unclear 49:37 to 49:40] by the government and in another similar show in London here say that the bombers did more towards winning the war than anyone or anything else. [Unclear 50:01 to 50:04] [laughter]. When the great [unclear 50:12] to break into Germany occurred [unclear 50:16 to 50:17] the prophets of doom and gloom were saying ‘Oh this is going to be like the first day of the battle of the Somme in 1916’. Well in the first 12 hours of the battle of the Somme in 1916 the British army had 70,000 casualties, and as I said the prophets of doom and gloom were saying ‘This is going to happen again’. Monty was faced with the awe-inspiring job of getting across a broad and deep river in the face of long-prepared defences manned by men who were told ‘Do or die’, and knowing full well that Corporal Hitler was [unclear 51:05 to 51:06] they didn’t do or die on the spot [unclear 51:09 to 51:10]. Well Monty appealed to me. He said [unclear 51:14 to 51:24]. Well we took out the defences [unclear 51:28 to 51:35] and the defences around it. And the army went across in this great battle to break into Germany, which Eisenhower and everybody else said was going to be such a tremendous struggle and for which they expected these colossal [unclear 51:40 to 51:41]. In the morning I got a telegram from Monty saying thank you for your magnificent cooperation in the Battle of the Rhine. The bombing of [unclear 52:07] was a masterpiece (these were his words), a masterpiece, and enabled us to take all our objectives before midnight. Well in the grim dawn that followed, when they’d finished rounding up the few [unclear 52:24 to 52:26] that had survived and were still staggering round, our army had time to add up its own casualties in this tremendous battle that everybody was … previously prophesied. They totalled 36 – entirely due to the bombing. Well, did you ever hear that put out by the media?

[52:55 no speech to 52:57]. Now go back to another big battle when the Germans nearly broke through in the Battle of the Bulge, through the Ardennes. You all know what happened. Here were these fit German troops, presumably equipped with everything that Hitler could give them, on the verge of breaking through between the British and the American armies. And they suddenly fetched up [unclear 53:40]. The one thing the Germans couldn’t face up to was an American general when he was told to surrender and he said ‘Balls’ [laughter]. That absolutely finished them off [laughter]. One began to develop a suspicion that there may have been something else happening [laughter], and if you want to go back to the horse’s mouth again and get the true facts you will get them from von Speer – Albert Speer. Hitler, when he’d finished screaming at his generals, who’d stopped, finding they couldn’t go, weren’t going on, told Speer to get up to the front line and tell them to go on at all costs. In his account Speer said … he remarked on his despair at seeing the marshalling yards and the German railways crammed with stuff that should have been in the hands of the first-line troops in this offensive long before - stuck there because the railways had been busted up by the bombers. He gets to [unclear 55:09 to 55:12] from the east to that very difficult Ardennes country – so difficult that the French had said on 3 occasions it was impossible for any armies to break through there, in spite of the fact that this was the third time the Germans had done it [laughter]. They were still saying it when the Germans got through on this last occasion. Well Speer goes on to say he arrived at Trier (or Treves); nothing going forward. He then gives an account of his progress along … there are only 2 very poor channels of communication through the Ardennes through [unclear 55:53 to 55:55] respectively. He gives an account of his enormous difficulties in trying to get through, sometimes only making a mile in an hour. Well you can bet that as Hitler’s representative he would have been given absolute priority and he would have been lifted, car and all over the obstructions if necessary. Eventually he arrived at the headquarters of Sepp Dietrich who commanded the 5th Panzer SS [unclear 56:29 to 56:30], the spearhead of the whole attack, which had been stopped dead by that rude American general with his dirty work [laughter]. And he said to Sepp Dietrich … and Sepp Dietrich was the 1 man who dared answer Hitler back, because as Hitler’s chauffeur originally he had unfortunately saved Hitler from being assassinated. He said to Sepp Dietrich ‘The Fuhrer says you must go on at once; you must press on regardless’. And Sepp Dietrich said [unclear 56:55 to 56:57] said ‘Go on – how can we go on? We have no ammunition; all our supply lines have been completely cut by [unclear 57:08 to 57:09]. Well I think you’ll agree that’s a more potent reason for not going on rather than merely have an American or any other sort of general saying ‘Balls to you’ [laughter].

[57:24 applause to 57:28]

57:29: AH: If you can bear with me a little bit longer, Speer goes on to give an account of what he calls his nocturnal discussion with Sepp Dietrich. Sepp Dietrich says ‘You know people don’t understand the effect of this mass bombing on even the best troops (meaning his own troops).

[58:08 no speech to 58:11]

58:12: AH: He said ‘After an experience of it, they’re useless. They lose all their fighting spirit. You can’t do anything with them’. What he meant to say – it’s a well-known medical symptom – they were just literally punch-drunk – it’s a physical symptom from the explosions. He goes on to describe how they sat there in their nocturnal discussion listening to the continual roar overhead of the heavy four engine bombers, the crash of the explosives and the glow in the fog and the dark of the fires and explosions. And his final remark [unclear 58:42 to 58 :43] of his report is: what a scene of German military impotence; no defence anywhere; we’ve lost the war. Well now I’m going to let you into a secret. You may know it. Who did that [unclear 59:02]? You fellas did. And you alone did it over those critical days and nights. And the reason you alone did it is that all our bases on the continent, all the Allied air bases were nearly continuously shut down by fog. Most of the American bases in East Anglia were shut down by fog and their normal method of operation of course was in daylight and in formation. And under those circumstances they couldn’t really compete. Most of our bases were shut down by fog. But as all you fellas have experienced our fellas would take off in practically anything provided [unclear 59:43 to 59:46]. And we were lucky enough to have our bases here and there opening up so that they could get down again after their efforts. Well I’ll tell you [unclear 59:59 to 1:00:04] Eisenhower sent me a message of thanks [unclear 1:00:10 to 1:00:13]. I replied, thanking him for his message which I said had been sent on to the crews concerned, and just in order to choke the wireless a bit more I added to my signal: ‘You know by now you can depend on my boys for anything short of the impossible’. [Unclear 1:00:49] relates in his book that that signal of mine was circulating round Eisenhower’s headquarters, and scrawled right across my signal in Eisenhower’s handwriting were the words ‘Goddamnit’ (you know in American that’s all 1 word). ‘Goddamnit they’ve already achieved the impossible’. Well I don’t know whether you fellas want any higher accolade than that from the Commander in Chief of all the forces in northern Europe. So that really was the history of the Ardennes battle. It was not won I’m sorry to have to claim, it was not won by that rude American general [laughter].

[1:01:33 applause to 1:01:42].

1:01:43: AH: If you could possibly bear with me a bit more I would like to go into Germany with that good horse of ours, Albert Speer. As you know, during the war our sailor friends, bless ‘em, had a most tremendous job to do and were doing their damnedest as usual, but when they do that sort of thing and are faced with that sort of thing they always won everything, and they wanted every bomber we’d got to go looking for needles in a haystack in the Atlantic. We argued that the place for getting needles is in the factory and not where they’re spread around all over the countryside. It was a tremendous argument. You will be told in various smearing stories etc that we nearly lost the war by insisting on going on bombing Germany instead of giving the sailors all the bombs. Well, let’s go to Albert Speer again. Two simple lines in his report: ‘We would have kept to our promises of submarines for Admiral Donitz if the bombers had not destroyed a third of them in the port’.

[1:03:13 applause to 1:03:17]

1:03:18: AH: That was only the beginning. [Unclear 1:03:20 to 1:03:22] in Bomber Command over 90% [unclear 1:03:24 to 1:03:27]. The Boche had a usual bright idea with a snag tied on to it. He realised it was hopeless trying to go on producing submarines in quantity in the port. If you’re going to produce them, mass-produced inland, pre-fabricated, send them up to the port to be buttoned together in a week [unclear 1:03:49 to 1:03:52]. Well of course he made the usual silly big mistake that the dear Boche always make. Those sections were so big that they couldn’t go by road or rail; they could only go by canal. Well people ask often of Bomber Command ‘Why did you keep bombing those damn canals?’. Well that was the answer [laughter]. That was the answer, and if you go to Speer again you will find that the output of prefabricated parts for inland ports started at 120 [unclear 1:04:22] and finished up from 6 to 0. [Unclear 1:04:27 to 1:04:30]. Now in addition to that we have a [Unclear 1:04:33] from the German air force in command running the training of the U-boat crew in which he said ‘Without [unclear 1:04:44] crew you cannot have a U-boat offensive, and I can’t train crews if you can’t keep these damned [unclear 1:04:53 to 1:04:54] out of my training area’. 30,000 tons of mines [unclear 1:05:13 to 1:05:14] on behalf of the Admiralty. You wouldn’t think so [unclear 1:05:20 to 1:05:22] [laughter]. All in areas where no other … nearly all in areas where no other form of mine-laying could take place. And with what result? Well all we know is that a considerable number of German submarines were what the Germans used to call [unclear 1:05:56 to 1:05:57] sunk without trace. The mines certainly took a good share of that [unclear 1:06:04]. In addition they also totally annihilated the German merchant marine on which they depended for the import of essential [unclear 1:05:16] from Scandinavia. The losses were so complete that once the pistol was removed from the back of the Swedish neck the Swedes themselves took away their own ships or what remained of them from that [unclear 1:06:36] leaving Germany whithout those essential [unclear 1:06:41]. Then again you get down to the German [unclear 1:06:45] fleet. You know if you read the history of the war you might imagine that the Germans never had a [unclear 1:06:42] fleet. Well they had, but they didn’t have it for long. The Navy sank 3 [unclear 1:06:52 to 1:06:53] Montevideo [laughter]. The Norwegians sank one; the American bombers destroyed one; you fellas destroyed 6. You kept 2 out of action by repeated damage almost throughout the war. You would have destroyed the last 2 – the Eugen and the Nuremberg – where they lay in bright sunlight, with no defence except their own guns in shallow water opposite Copenhagen, and just as our fellas were drawing a [unclear 1:07:43 to 1:07:47] the Admiralty cancelled the strike. Well I was out of my office for 10 minutes – sometimes I had to be out of my office [laughter], and by the time I’d done up my buttons and got back [laughter] my naval liaison officer, rightly thinking that an order from the Admiralty only took barely second place to a direct command by the Almighty had issued the report and it was too late to turn ‘em round again – and with what results. The Eugen and the Nuremberg bombarded Copenhagen with the rest of their ammunition, killed a lot of our Danish friends and did a lot of damage. I have never been able to get any explanation as to why that strike was called off. I can only assume; I hope I’m wrong but I don’t think I am, that our sailor friends didn’t want yet another demonstration of the uselessness of pitting [unclear 1:08:42] ships against bombers. After all it’s been demonstrated by them all over the world. Well that was the story of [unclear 1:08:53 to 1:08:54] fleet. Now there’s just another couple of things that I would like to mention. You were the blighters, as you well know from the media who let those [unclear 1:09:05] boats escape from Brest to Germany. Well what’s the truth of that from the horse’s mouth? Not our job to stop battle boats [unclear 1:09:28] around the ocean. That’s what we pay the Navy for. There was a submarine on guard waiting for [unclear 1:09:38] coming out. Didn’t report them because they were all stationed teeing up their batteries or doing something [unclear 1:09:47 to 1:09:48] that fellas have to do. They weren’t there at the critical moment. Coastal Command sailed because they had 2 reconnaissance machines on the job and radar air to surface vessels, radar [unclear 1:10:02 to 1:10:04]. Fighter Command saw them, but that particular patrol stuck to its orders [unclear 1:10:11 to 1:10:14], didn’t say anything until it got home, and by then it was pretty late. The Navy made as you know a swordfish attack and got a well-deserved VC for making it, but it achieved nothing. They made a destroyer attack, which achieved nothing. Bomber Command were forced to make bombing attacks under hopeless conditions. No ceiling … no bombs were any good from that height against that type of ship, but they were forced to do it, lost a lot of machines, got no thanks for it. Then they got down to what had been laid on, although I said they shouldn’t. I think I started it [unclear 1:10:47 to 1:10:48]. They got down to mine laying and they bagged both the ships, but do you ever hear that – no. They damaged [unclear 1:10:57] so badly it took the Germans nearly a year to repair her. Then the Navy sank her off the north Cape. [Unclear 11:06 to 11:07] was so badly damaged she crawled into [unclear 1:11:09 to 1:11:15]. She went back to Kiel. Within 3 weeks you’d knocked her out again. She was by then so rickety that they dragged her back to what they called [unclear 1:11:16] because she was too rickety to go [unclear 1:11:18 to 1:11:19]. They dragged her off to [unclear 11:22 to 11:26]. So it was Bomber Command who [unclear 1:11:29] stopped those ships ever repeating their original raids into the Atlantic by the repeated damage inflicted on them by the bombers, and bagged both of them on the way home. That is history from the horse’s mouth and not from the jaws of any of these braying jackasses. Well, just one other thing, which Lord Boothby here has already told you about – how true it was that the maximum number of German anti-tank guns – over 20,000 [unclear 1:12:20 to 1:12:21] only produced a little over 20,000 had to be retained in Germany as anti-aircraft guns, with 150 million rounds of anti-aircraft ammunition [unclear 1:12:38 to 1:12:46]. Now amongst those guns the 8.8 [unclear 1:12:50 to 1:12:52] has a very sophisticated sighting. [Unclear 1:12:54 to 1:12:57] the toughest tank in the war. That was the 1 essential thing that the Germans lacked on the front. There they were all doing anti-aircraft duty in Germany together with 27,000 heavy automatics which you knew to your cost as light flak. Well I ask you, what would have been the difference in the war I wonder if the Germans had had another million men, and instead of having 3172 anti-tank guns [unclear 1:13:26 to 1:13:28] they would have had over 20,000 of them, it would have made quite a difference. Now I’ve nearly got to the end, but there’s 1 thing I must say. We are a little weary of being accused of hitting nothing but churches, hospitals and baby creches. The implication is always that bombers and the bombers alone carry war against the civilian population [unclear 1:14:15 to 1:14:16]. Well, can anybody in this room tell me what other strategy the Navy has ever had than carrying out war against the nation as a whole? Blockade and counter-blockade to starve the enemy nation of everything it needs to carry on the war, including the food in their belly.

[1:14:47 no speech to 1:14:51]

1:14:52: AH: That is their strategy. They can’t have any other. So why accuse us of being the only people who affect civilians in war time? Now here is an extraordinary thing. All this poppycock about the bombing of Dresden, which in fact, as Lord Boothby has said was ordered by the American headquarters, by our politicians, by our big boys and Stalin and co at Yalta, by Marshall in Washington, all to cut the Germans in half and make the join up with the Russians quicker and stop the war quicker – a really obvious and necessary operation. But it was a way ahead of the Army. Therefore it was [unclear 1:15:33 to 1:15:35] on their own. Entirely untrue of course, entirely untrue. But here is an extraordinary thing: do you ever hear any criticism of the bombing of St Nazaire [unclear 1:15:48 to 1:15:49], towns belonging to our unfortunate French allies who were under the heel of the Nazi invader, those towns razed to the ground until the German madman in charge said not a cat remained alive to prowl amongst the midnight ruins, It was quite OK. You know [unclear 1:16:06 to 1:16:07]. It wasn’t ordered by the bloody bombing airmen, it was ordered by the sailors [unclear 1:16:13 to 1:16:15]. At the same time I was told to eradicate Bordeaux for the same reason – the second largest city in France. And I refused to do it without a direct order signed by the Prime Minister, which was not forthcoming. Do you ever hear anything about the dozens of smaller towns all the way through France and Belgium that were wrecked or half-wrecked by the bombers because the armies wanted it done? No, that’s quite all right. That was in the range of the armies’ guns, the range of their intended movements, therefore it was absolutely all right. It didn’t matter a bit about the civilians [unclear 1:17:08 to 1:17:09] and that’s that. That is this extraordinary outlook that people have about the bombers being the only people that ever killed civilians. We published a white paper at the end if the First War saying that the naval blockage of Germany killed 800,000 Germans [unclear 1:17:32] beyond the wildest dreams of the most ruthless exponent of [unclear 1:17:36]. Those 800,000 of course were mainly civilians – died as a result of what they euphemistically called malnutrition, which you and I would say means bloody well starved. And that is what happened. It didn’t work in the last war; it was tried. It didn’t work simply because Germany occupied vast areas of other people’s countries. They lived on the fat of other people’s land and let the other people do the starvation in the occupied territories, which believe you me they did. I was talking to some Dutch friends of mine only the other day and they said towards the end of the war their daily ration was 1 slice of combustible rather than edible bread, and if they were very lucky [unclear 1:18:31] stew of their own tulip bulbs, thanks to the naval blockade. So there you are. You know I was once a Rhodesian. I won’t say anything about Rhodesia today, but I would like to say quite a lot. I was once a South African and I would find it very difficult to explain to my Afrikaner friends that armies don’t make war against civilians to the same extent that all wars of any sort always in the end land up on the heads of the civilians. After all in the Boer War 14,000 Boers perished in the field of battle [unclear 1:19:32].

[1:19:33 no speech to 1:19:35]

1:19:36: AH: The British army with its [unclear 1:19:40 to 1:19:42] of devastating the land, burning the farms, burning the crops, slaughtering the cattle, making life impossible for the [unclear 1:19:51 to 1:19:53] affected the civilian population, with what results? Well, 14,000 Boers died in the field of battle; 39,000 civilians – mainly women and children; also very old men and they had to be very old and crippled died in the [unclear 1:20:16] concentration camps. Don’t tell me that armies and navies, like the bombers [unclear 1:20:32] against civilians. It’s like all major wars. They’re waged against 1 [unclear 1:20:39], against 1 object, and that is the defeat of the enemy nation as a whole, And that’s what we were doing, and you fellas took the major share in it. And if you want to know who said so, I’ve told you. People like Montgomery, Alanbrooke, Eisenhower, von Speer [unclear 1:20:54 to 1:20:57]. Thank you.

[1:20:58 applause to 1:21:01]

1:21:03: Man 3: Distinguished guests, gentlemen. Pray silence for Group Captain Willie Tait, Companion of the Distinguished Service Order and the holder of the Distinguished Flying Cross.

[1:21:27 applause to 1:21:34]

1:21:35: Group Captain: Mr President, my lords, Sir Arthur and gentlemen. It’s a happy occasion for me on behalf of your [unclear 1:21:44] tonight to give a response to [unclear 1:21:49] for his kind words. As a pilot amongst you all can I say is that the relationship between a pilot and his air gunner is a peculiar one, since I was told that you are a dead race [unclear 1:22:16 to 1:22:21]. They sit or sat at opposite ends of the aircraft, as far away as they could get from each other, and they sat back to back [laughter], but the relationship was not quite so hostile as that might appear. There was a pact between them that the pilot looked after his end and the air gunner looked after his, and [unclear 1:23:09 to 1:23:!2] that florid poet talks about [unclear 1:23:17 to 1:23:19]. I think that the air gunner’s idea was that he was blue with cold. However he thought [unclear 1:23:35] of the pilot at his end in the warm cockpit, but he at his end was certainly in the hot seat.

[1:23:44 no speech to 1:23:48]

1:23:49: GC: We’ve had a most memorable evening, and on behalf of your guests I thank you for the most excellent dinner and the warmth of your hospitality. There was an apocryphal tale of the actor manager who, on the occasion of the first night of his new play [unclear 1:24:07 to 1:24:08] to a famous politician 2 tickets with a note: Hope you’ll come to my first night and bring a friend if you have a friend, which the politician returning the tickets with a note said: Sorry that I’m engaged for your first night, but I’d be glad to come to the second night if there is a second night [laughter]. If there’s a second night we would like to come again and I think that [unclear 1:25:03 to 1:25:04] can muster more than 1 friend, thank you. [Unclear 1:25:09 to 1:25:12] for your gift tonight, and I wish the Association continuing … and who knows, in spite of what I’ve said you’re not dead, and there may be a future yet.

[1:25:33 applause to 1:25:45]

[1:25:46 no speech to 1:25:57]

1:25:58: Man 3: My lords, distinguished guests, gentlemen. We had with us this evening until just a few moments ago 2 members of the Royal Flying Corps. One of those gentlemen has left us, but it is your President’s wish that you stand and drink wine to the remaining member of the Royal Flying Corps and also of course our very distinguished top guest who is also a member of that distinguished corps. Gentlemen. Upstanding. Toast. Wine. With our members of the Royal Flying Corps. [Toast].

[1:26:25 no speech to 1:26:38]

1:26:39: Man 3: My lords, gentlemen. You have been told already that we are going to be graced by the presence of none other than Major General James Stewart. Well I don’t know whether [unclear 1:26:50 to 1:26:53].

[1:26:54 applause to 1:27:03]

1:27:04: Man 5: Goddamnit [laughter]

[1:27:11 background chatter to 1:27:33]

1:27:34: James Stewart: Gentlemen. I’m very honoured to be asked to this function. I’m sorry I’m late, but I’m working and they make you work at night [laughter].

[1:27:51 background chatter to 1:28:44]

1:28:45: Man 3: Mr President, my lords, distinguished guests of the evening, other distinguished guests, gentlemen. The toast is the toast to absent friends. Pray silence for the chairman of the Air Gunners Association, Mr Norman [unclear 1:29:00].

[1:29:01 applause to 1:29:08]

[1:29:09 background chatter to 1:29:11]

1:29:12: Chairman: Mr President, my lords, distinguished guests, fellow members of the Air Gunners Association, before I propose this toast I would like to mention the ceremony, the ceremony of remembrance to the officers and men of the air forces of the Commonwealth that will be held at Runnymede memorial tomorrow at 11.00 hours. In past years at Runnymede the wreath of the Air Gunners Association has been laid by Flight Lieutenant John Mason, and it is with great sorrow that I have to announce the passing last year of John, one of our most loyal and respected members. This year the wreath of the Association will be laid by Flight Lieutenant Bill Lawrence. And now gentlemen I would ask you to be upstanding for the toast of absent friends.

1:30:01: Man 3: The toast of absent friends.

1:30:03: Speech ends
1:30:03: End of recording

End of transcription