This item was sent to the IBCC Digital Archive already in digital form. No better quality copies are available.]]> John 'Jack' Crawford]]> IBCC Digital Archive]]> Pending text-based transcription]]> eng]]> Text]]> Text. Diary]]> Royal Air Force]]> Royal Air Force. Bomber Command]]> Royal Canadian Air Force]]> Royal New Zealand Air Force]]> Atlantic Ocean--North Sea]]> Belgium]]> Belgium--Houffalize]]> Canada]]> Alberta]]> Alberta--Calgary]]> Alberta--Edmonton]]> British Columbia]]> British Columbia--Vancouver]]> Manitoba]]> Manitoba--Winnipeg]]> Nova Scotia]]> Nova Scotia--Halifax]]> Ontario]]> Ontario--Ottawa]]> Québec]]> Québec--Montréal]]> Saskatchewan]]> Czech Republic]]> Czech Republic--Most]]> France]]> France--Boulogne-sur-Mer]]> France--Le Havre]]> Germany]]> Germany--Ruhr (Region)]]> Germany--Bremen]]> Germany--Braunschweig]]> Germany--Darmstadt]]> Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal]]> Germany--Hamburg]]> Germany--Heilbronn]]> Germany--Hörstel]]> Germany--Kaiserslautern]]> Germany--Karlsruhe]]> Germany--Munich]]> Germany--Nuremberg]]> Germany--Siegen]]> Germany--Stuttgart]]> Germany--Wilhelmshaven]]> Great Britain]]> England--Gloucestershire]]> England--Lincolnshire]]> England--Oxfordshire]]> England--Staffordshire]]> Netherlands]]> Netherlands--Vlissingen]]> Norway]]> Norway--Trondheim]]> Panama]]> Panama--Panama Canal]]> Russia (Federation)]]> Russia (Federation)--Kaliningrad (Kaliningradskai︠a︡ oblastʹ)]]> United States]]> Illinois]]> Illinois--Chicago]]> New York (State)]]> New York (State)--New York]]> Czech Republic--Most (Okres)]]> 1942-06-11]]> 1942-06-20]]> 1942-06-22]]> 1942-07-14]]> 1942-07-21]]> 1943-03-06]]> 1943-04-02]]> 1943-05-03]]> 1943-12-16]]> 1944-08-30]]> 1944-08-31]]> 1944-09-10]]> 1944-09-11]]> 1944-09-12]]> 1944-09-13]]> 1944-09-17]]> 1944-09-27]]> 1944-09-28]]> 1944-10-05]]> 1944-10-06]]> 1944-10-07]]> 1944-10-11]]> 1944-10-17]]> 1944-10-18]]> 1944-10-19]]> 1944-10-20]]> 1944-10-23]]> 1944-11-11]]> 1944-11-12]]> 1944-11-22]]> 1944-11-23]]> 1944-11-26]]> 1944-11-27]]> 1944-12-04]]> 1944-12-05]]> 1944-12-10]]> 1944-12-11]]> 1944-12-31]]> 1945-01-03]]> 1945-01-04]]> 1945-01-05]]> 1945-01-07]]> 1945-01-08]]> 1945-01-16]]> 1945-01-17]]> 1945-02-17]]> 1945-03-01]]> 1945-03-02]]>
This item was provided, in digital form, by a third-party organisation which used technical specifications and operational protocols that may differ from those used by the IBCC Digital Archive.]]> Geoff Burton]]> IBCC Digital Archive]]> Anne-Marie Watson]]> Carolyn Emery]]> eng]]> Sound]]> Royal Air Force]]> Great Britain]]> Middle East--Palestine]]> Poland]]> Russia (Federation)]]> England--Lincolnshire]]> England--Liverpool]]> Russia (Federation)--Katynʹ]]> Russia (Federation)--Yagodnik]]> Russia (Federation)--Arkhangelʹskai︠a︡ oblastʹ]]> 1939-09-17]]> 1940-02-10]]> 1942-04-01]]> 1943]]> 1945]]> Steve Cooke]]> IBCC Digital Archive]]> Peter Schulze]]> Maureen Clarke]]> Pending review]]> Pending revision of OH transcription]]> eng]]> Sound]]> Civilian]]> Germany]]> Lithuania]]> Russia (Federation)]]> 1942]]> 1945]]> 1947]]> Chris Brockbank]]> IBCC Digital Archive]]> Sally Coulter]]> Vivienne Tincombe]]> Maureen Clarke]]> eng]]> Sound]]> Royal Air Force]]> Second generation]]> Great Britain]]> England--Devon]]> England--Lincolnshire]]> England--Yorkshire]]> England--Norfolk]]> England--Wiltshire]]> England--Cheshire]]> England--Cornwall (County)]]> England--Cambridgeshire]]> Germany]]> Russia (Federation)]]> Cyprus]]> Germany--Berlin]]> David Kavanagh]]> IBCC Digital Archive]]> Nick Cornwell-Smith]]> Julie Williams]]> Maureen Clarke]]> Carolyn Emery]]> eng]]> Sound]]> Royal Air Force]]> Royal Air Force. Bomber Command]]> Great Britain]]> England--Lincolnshire]]> England--Boston]]> England--Lincoln]]> Russia (Federation)]]> Russia (Federation)--Kaliningrad (Kaliningradskai︠a︡ oblastʹ)]]> England--The Wash]]> Germany]]> Germany--Berlin]]> Germany--Frankfurt am Main]]> Germany--Leipzig]]> Netherlands]]> Atlantic Ocean--North Sea]]> 1943]]> 1944-02]]> 1945]]>
This item was provided, in digital form, by a third-party organisation which used technical specifications and operational protocols that may differ from those used by the IBCC Digital Archive.]]> Geoff Burton]]> IBCC Digital Archive]]> Anne-Marie Watson]]> Maureen Clarke]]> Pending review]]> Pending revision of OH transcription]]> eng]]> Sound]]> Royal Air Force]]> Polskie Siły Powietrzne]]> Great Britain]]> Poland]]> Middle East]]> England--Lincolnshire]]> England--Blackpool]]> Russia (Federation)]]> Russia (Federation)--Omsk]]> Russia (Federation)--Siberia]]> 1940]]>

[This item was provided, in digital form, by a third-party organisation which used technical specifications and operational protocols that may differ from those used by the IBCC Digital Archive.]
]]> Geoff Burton]]> IBCC Digital Archive]]> Anne-Marie Watson]]> Chris Cann]]> Maureen Clarke]]> eng]]> Sound]]> Royal Air Force]]> Polskie Siły Powietrzne]]> Royal Air Force. Bomber Command]]> Argentina]]> France]]> Germany]]> Great Britain]]> Russia (Federation)]]> Poland]]> England--Lincolnshire]]> England--Shropshire]]> England--Yorkshire]]> England--Blackpool]]> England--London]]> Germany--Gelsenkirchen]]> 1939]]> 1941]]> 1943]]>
[In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.]
]]> Peter Schulze]]> IBCC Digital Archive]]> Peter Schulze]]> Maureen Clarke]]> deu]]> Sound]]> Wehrmacht. Luftwaffe]]> Germany--Jever]]> Germany--Hamburg]]> France]]> Belgium]]> Germany]]> Russia (Federation)]]> Germany--Wilhelmshaven]]> 1940-06-06]]> 1940-06-07]]> Gunther Rall was raised in Stuttgart and, as a youngster, enjoyed outdoor and sporting activities. He was also a Boy Scout. He became a cadet in the army and joined the 13th Infantry Regiment. He met a friend in the air force and decided it was the service for him. He joined the Luftwaffe in 1938 and he decided he wanted to be fighter pilot. He scored his first aerial victory in 1940 during the Battle of France, shooting down a Curtiss P36 Hawk. During the combat he also sustained damage to his aeroplane, which made him realise how dangerous air combat can be. He also took part in the Battle of Britain flying against convoys and supporting Ju 87 Stukas as well as facing Spitfire and Hurricane fighters of the RAF. He was posted to Romania flying the Bf 109F and took part in support of the German invasion of Crete, and the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, the attack against Russia, shooting down Russian bombers. He became an ace, flying as a squadron commander with Jagdgeswader 52, in support of Stuka dive bombers. In one combat with the Russian air force, he cut off the right wing of his opponent with his propeller, damaging his own aircraft, but made it back to friendly territory. During the attack against the Russians he experienced harsh weather conditions and relied on re-supply by the few Ju 52 transport aircraft available. In 1943 he received the award of Oak Leaves and Swords to add to his Knights Cross and Iron Cross from Adolf Hitler but left his meeting feeling depressed with a feeling that the war was lost. In 1944 he became commander of Jagdgeswader 11 flying in defence of the Reich, mainly in daylight against the American 8TH Air Force. During his career he was able to fly captured aircraft such as the P 51 Mustang, and Spitfire, he also flew the Me 262 jet fighter. After the war he became a prisoner and was flown to England where he met some of his former enemy fighter pilots and particularly remembers Wing Commander Robert S Tuck. In the 1950s he joined the post war Luftwaffe and became Project Officer in the procurement of the F104 Starfighter aircraft. In later life he was invited to meet some Russian fighter pilots and veterans at their base in Kubinka, where he was treated to the finest foods and drank many toasts.

[This item is available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.]

]]> Ken Cothliff]]> David Tappin]]> IBCC Digital Archive]]> Julie Williams]]> Maureen Clarke]]> GR: Yeah.
KC: So, it’s a sort of —
DT: I think we ended up in the right place.
KC: Yeah.
DT: Are we ready to go?
KC: Are you happy David?
Other: Yes. I’m happy. Ok chaps, and if you can keep looking this way all the time just try to ignore the cameras here.
GR: I can guarantee.
Other: Ok. Off you go, chaps.
DT: Generalleutnant Gunther Rall, on behalf of everyone at the Yorkshire Air Museum may we welcome you to Yorkshire?
GR: Thank you.
DT: We are delighted to see you, sir.
GR: Thank you. It’s my pleasure to be here.
DT: If we may ask you a few questions about your family background.
GR: Yeah.
DT: Before we go on to the aviation.
GR: Ok.
DT: What exactly is your family background?
GR: I was born in the Black Forest but I was raised in Stuttgart and I actually, Stuttgart, consider to be my home town. I went to school and all the time as a young boy I had in Stuttgart and my father was a merchant. My mother was an excellent housewife in those days and I have a sister. The dominating activities during my youth was the, I was a member of the Boy Scouts, the Christian Boy Scouts and this really dominated all the activities. I was an outdoor boy which in those days we didn’t have these luxury camps, you know. We, we built our own tents and we were out. This was the one activity and the next one besides the school [laughs] I was, I was at school very well and there was, no problems. Sometimes better, sometimes less but anyhow, it wasn’t a problem. And the second activity was sport. I was an enthusiastic sportsman at athletics. A hundred metres up to four hundred metres. The, how do you call it? Long jumping and javelin throwing and this type and I was very successful as a youth and made some small championships in small circles. But anyhow, this was a dominating factor in my youth and after the elementary school I went to the Gymnasium. What we call Gymnasium, Humanistic Gymnasium, and I learned Latin and Greek. The old type of science. Latin. Greek. History. This was the predominant, the faculties at school.
DT: Do you have any brothers or sisters?
GR: I have a sister. I have a sister. She’s still alive. She lives in Stuttgart. She’s a widow but she has grandchildren and there’s a very harmonised family.
DT: So, is your, is your wife still alive?
GR: No, unfortunately not. My wife, she was a doctor. She was a Viennese and I get acquainted with her when I was in a full body cast when I was injured in Russia, we maybe we touch this later, and finally ended up in Vienna in the hospital for special treatment. There was a very famous professor and I was partially paralysed on the right side by breaking my back in three places, and my station doctor became my wife.
DT: When did you —
Other: Stop there a second. I’ll just close this door. There are people coming down the stairs.
[pause]
KC: General Rall would you perhaps just, if you are finished would you just move your finger.
GR: Yeah.
DT: Ok. Just something like that.
GR: So, that you can then start your —
DT: Yeah. Ok. Ok Darren?
Other: Yes.
DT: When did you first become interested in aviation?
GR: It was quite late. My wish was to become an officer, and first of all I wanted to get into the Navy but it was so difficult in those days. It was a tremendous selection so I thought do what you hope you get and I made my application to become an officer cadet in the Army which happened, and I became a cadet in the Infantry Regiment 13 near Stuttgart, a very famous old regiment and I made my career in the Army Officer School. And after the promotion to lieutenant then I changed to the Air Force because when I was in the Officer’s School in Dresden, I had a friend. He was in the Officer’s School in the, in the Air Force which was also in Dresden, and every Saturday we met and he told me where he was. He was in Hamburg, he was in Munich, flying. I said what the hell. I was laying on the ground and grubbing around in the, on a, on a training camp. A training field. I was challenged by this and think that’s a wonderful life and I wanted to become a flyer. This made my decision.
DT: When did you join the Luftwaffe?
GR: I joined the Luftwaffe in 1938.
DT: Was it your wish at that time to be a fighter pilot?
GR: Yes. Right from the beginning. I think according to my temperament I wanted to be a fighter pilot. I loved all the acrobatics. I was single crew flying and I, I wouldn’t have pleasure in just sitting in a big cockpit with a crew and dropping bombs. I wanted to be a fighter pilot.
DT: I knew an old gentleman who flew in the First World War with a Sopwith Camel who said that the, all the fighter pilots were the madmen and all the bomber pilots were the intelligent sane men.
GR: Ok. Let them think that way [laughs] I was happy to be a fighter pilot whether intelligent or not. I didn’t care.
DT: Did you have any boyhood heroes? Aviation heroes.
GR: I mean in those days certainly, Richthofen, Boelke. These were heroes but they were far away, unreachable, you know. They were, it was a challenge to be like he. He was too far out of my imagination.
DT: Would you describe to us your first aerial victory?
GR: The first air victory was over France. Way, you know, there was when the war against France was declared there was about six months, we had nothing. The French called it drole de guerre and when the invasion, the German invasion started, attacks started we had to escort a reconnaissance plane back from France from a mission and the rendezvous point was near the North Sea. Metz, in this area at six thousand metres and we took off from Trier which was an airfield right to the front, to the frontier and we saw the, the reconnaissance plane coming back but I also spotted ten or twelve dots behind. Far away, but pretty soon I saw these were fighters chasing that Heinkel 111. We approached them very rapidly and luckily the Heinkel was on the level, was not anymore of interest to the, to the fighters on both sides so we were in the, we were in a, in a very hectic dogfight. It was the first time I ran into the enemy and I saw the [cook house], and everybody was very, very excited. I led the second element in the squadron. I jumped down. I’d just, French P-36s. They flew the P36. Curtiss P36 just was ahead of me and was a tremendous curving and turns, rapid turns. It was the first time that I recognised if I gain a very rough turn just by gravity the leading air slots come out on the outer wing which causes a snap and they give me a, one warning of the characteristic of this aeroplane so I released the stick a little bit and everything was ok, and I give a burst and the poor guy got on flames but luckily could bale out. This was my first victory. At the same time, I heard a hell of a noise in my aeroplane and I got shot at and had a lot of holes. So, it gave me a tremendous self-confidence. I was a victor. But also, a warning because I was hit several times.
DT: How did the air fighting during the Battle of Britain compare to the Battle of France?
GR: You know, in France the, the Air Force was, the effect of the Air Force was very poor. The French in, in their planning they put priority on the Army and the Air Force was inferior in numbers and in quality. Quality as far as equipment is concerned. I mean they had very courageous pilots no doubt but it didn’t play that role as the German Air Force played in the battle against France, you know. The Air Force was a tactical Air Force with tremendous power, Ju87 dive bombers with a very effective support for the German Army. Against the British it was a different situation. The difference was that the British came with their Spitfires, with their Hurricanes. Very good equipment. In some areas superior to the 109. They were fighting over their own territory and this makes a hell of a difference. If they had to bail out, the next day they could fly another mission with another aeroplane. We were, we had the wrong tactics I must say. I just speak for my own group. We were a young group, inexperienced and the group was established three or four months before that so there was not an experienced fighter group, and we had to fly against convoys in the British Channel escorting Ju87 and the order was direct escort. Close escort. So, we gave up our, our superiority in speed. We had to reduce the speed to the Ju87 which was a deadly tactic because the Spitfires and Hurricanes just waited upstairs and came down, shot off and we had a lot of losses in a very short time.
DT: Was there a great deal of aerial fighting in the battles for Crete and the Balkans?
GR: You know the, when we came to Greece the battle was gone already and was decided and we went down to the Peloponnese for the attack to, to Crete Island and over Crete Island there was not very much air activities. It was more air to ground and, you know there were a lot mistakes from the German side. They dropped the troops at too high altitude so that means they were hanging from their parachutes for too long time and they were shot at by the New Zealanders on the ground. And then the gliders who came over there they crashed in the, in the olive, in these olive trees, and the terrain was very rough and was, there were hills. So, there were a lot of losses just by, at the landing when the, when they started. And we had to support the Army by ground attacks but it was very difficult because they dropped the, the weapons in containers, and they were, they were in a flag of swastika, with swastika and they dropped it and they just landed by the New Zealanders and they laid out the flag so we couldn’t know who is who. This was our problem.
DT: What were your thoughts when you realised that Operation Barbarossa was about to commence, with the situation on the western front still unresolved?
GR: You know, there was, we were a little bit shocked because it was against every logic. A two front war was a very deadly operation. The operation hadn’t been finished in the west and we started in the east with a tremendous enemy and with a tremendous land space to cover and we all remember the Napoleon. His fate. And we couldn’t believe it at the beginning until two weeks before we started and then it was a fact.
DT: Can you recall the first week of Operation Barbarossa?
GR: Yes. I was down in Romania, just shortly before we came back from Crete Island and we got new aeroplanes. The F 109. F was a brilliant aeroplane and we loved it. The first one with the round wing tips, and with the DB 603, and in the evening, I got the order to go with my squadron. Fly with my squadron, to Mamaia because the Russian had attacked the, the harbour of Constanta on the Black Sea and the harbour had a tremendous importance because it was an oil harbour to ship the oil and there were refineries also. So, I flew with my squadron down to Mamaia, to the beach of the Black Sea but there was nothing on that airfield. Just an empty hangar. That was it. No radar. No telephone. No. No nothing. So, I, I, the very night Ju52 came with barrels of fuel so with a hand pump we filled our aircraft and right from dawn in the morning I sent out a patrol. Two ship patrol over the ocean because if the Russians attacked, they had to come to Constanta. It was the only target. They flew patrol in six thousand metres about twenty kilometres out to the Black Sea and the whole Romanian squadron was on cockpit alert. And when they gave the signal they come, we scrambled and we were very successful. We also, we always could catch them before they reached the coast and we shot down quite a number of DB3 two engine bombers. They came without any fighter escort and this was for them a very deadly operation. And after one week with heavy losses they stopped and they never came back.
DT: What was your rank at the time of Operation Barbarossa when it began? And were you still with the same Jagdgeshwader that you were with in the west?
GR: Yes. I had the same squadron, you know. I became squadron leader in the British Channel. Due to the losses of our senior officers and the commanders were, were shot down so I became a squadron commander and I was a squadron commander for three and a half years of the 8 Squadron in the Wing 52, and at that time I was first lieutenant and squadron commander.
DT: Did you think that victory was possible in the east in 1941 or did you think it was a foolhardy episode?
GR: You know, if you start, if you go to war you always think you’ll win. Otherwise, you forget it. But pretty soon you have doubts, and we had doubts when we saw these masses. But at the beginning I must give in, there were, the Russians had tremendous losses, particularly the Air Force and the, our opponents on the other side on the run in they were not qualified. They had obsolete equipment, they had not a very good training, and they had very bad tactics so they had tremendous losses. This gave us some feeling of security.
DT: How did the Russian tactics then compare directly with the Luftwaffe’s tactics? What was the difference in the way they operated?
GR: You know, the Russian Air Force was under the command of the Army so it was a supporting Air Force. They say they also had a strategic fleet but they never showed up. Not at least in our area and I flew for quite a time. I never saw a strategic bomber from the Russians. The main bulk of the Air Force was the ground supporters. It was too heavily armed to, to the ground, and always escorted by fighters. This was the main operation. They supported their Army activities and actions continuously, and we flew the front line in the areas of priority and you always run into a bulk of EL2 escorted by fighters.
DT: How did you cope with that first dreadful winter?
GR: You know nobody was prepared for such an extreme winter situation. Particularly with the, with the temperature. We went down to minus forty centigrade, unprepared. Not technically prepared for our aircraft. You know, it was very, very difficult to start the engine in the morning which caused that we sometimes we had open fires underneath the aircraft just to heat it up. On the other hand, also our mechanics and our pilots were not prepared for this. We didn’t have the suit for that. You know, the overalls. It took time to get them over there. Can you imagine what it means for a mechanic to work on an engine without gloves at a temperature of minus forty degrees? This is a problem
DT: Yes. Which victory in Russia do you recall most vividly?
GR: You know, the most dramatic one was my mid-air collision. It was a victory but I didn’t know that it was going to be a victory. It was the day of the Pocket Battle of Kursk. In the late afternoon in the east was a tremendous cumulus cloud. In the west was the sun and the cumulus cloud was lit, you know, bright and I flew from west to east and spotted two dots ahead of me far away and I approached them with my adjutant. We flew, we had a two-ship formation and when I came closer, I saw two aircraft with a big radial engine. I knew that at that time for these tremendous operations in the, in the Kursk battle a German F-190 unit was transferred to this area. A friend of mine was the leader of that. I never have seen a 190 in the air before. I saw it in a, on a picture but not, there was no, so when I approached, I was not sure if this now was 190 or was a La 5, because against this white cumulus you only could see the silhouette, not the colours. So, I approached with high speed. I pulled up to the side and looked down and saw green, red star so I couldn’t turn away otherwise I would have been chased. So, I turned again back to the sky, down. I gave him a full burst which hit him. Pulled up my aeroplane and got in a high- speed stall and just crashed and slipped over him, and I never forget this big bang and I cut off his right wing with my propeller, slipped away and he cut off my body of the aeroplane with his propeller. But he couldn’t recover because he got in a spin. Without, without one wing you cannot recover. I had a tremendous vibration in my aeroplane and it was over Russian territory. I want to get to the German lines and it was about four thousand metres altitude and the aircraft was in a tremendous vibration. I was always looking for the right RPM setting to reduce this but it didn’t happen. But I made it back to the German lines. I lowered the gear. I was very, very cautious in making a turn because I thought maybe the, the tail comes off and breaks off by any G load on that. I landed and I saw that I had a split underneath for about one metre. He cut off that. I was very lucky. It was a victory [laughs] and it was a dramatic one.
Other: Can we just —
KC: We’re getting a bit of vibration from the —
DT: We’re picking up a bit of noise from your shoes against the legs of the table General.
GR: I see.
KC: Just. Yeah. Ok. Yes. Yeah.
Other: Ok chaps.
KC: Ok?
Other: Yeah.
DT: Which of the battles in the Soviet do you consider to be the most significant?
GR: You know, there are three battles, and I refer to the Russians themselves and they are, they are two. The first, the German didn’t reach the objective in the first year. The plan was to reach a line Astrakhan [Hungaris]. We couldn’t make it because we were late. The winter came and we couldn’t even make Moscow. The winter stopped us and the Russians stopped us in front of Moscow. That was number one. Number two was Stalingrad. Stalingrad was a turning point and we lost the Sixth Army which was a tremendous loss by wrong planning and by wrong orders directed from Hitler, you know. He never allowed a retreat of the Sixth Army. Stay where you are. And it happened. And the third battle was 1943. June. July. The Battle of Kursk where the Russians really knocked out the German tank force, and the German tank force what they say would have been a very serious part during the invasion, but it didn’t exist in that numbers any more. From the Russian side of this this made the invasion possible.
DT: Can you tell us something about Hans Rudel and Erich Hartmann? Rudel the Stuka pilot, and Hartmann the fighter pilot both as air fighter, and as people.
GR: I flew many, many escorts for Rudel and Rudel was a unique Stuka pilot. Very fanatic. He flew three or four missions a day and he also invented the tactics to kill the tanks, you know. He had these tremendous guns in his undercarriage and over the time he knocked out five hundred tanks. That’s a tank army by one man. Later on, I was, after the war I was together with Rudel in Tangmere as a prisoner of war and we were in the same room so we became very close. We had different opinions. It doesn’t mean that he was a Stuka pilot, I was a fighter pilot but I respected this man tremendously for his dedication. For his courage. Bubi Hartmann came to me 1941 or ’42, to the Caucasus as a very young lieutenant and fighter pilot. It, it took some time to adjust him to the unit and all of a sudden, he became successful, developed his own tactics and had a, developed also a certain charisma in his squadron. But his, his ability was more or less to be a single fighter pilot. His own success Certainly he raised the success of his own squadron. Bubi had a very bad fate and I have to tell this which characterises the man. Being the number one pilot very well known to the Russians. When the Armistice came Bubi Hartmann was on the Eastern Front and he got the order from higher headquarters to fly to the west. Not to come to, become a Russian prisoner. Bubi refused. Bubi said, ‘No. I share the fate of my Wing.’ And he stayed with them and he became a prisoner of war, and had a very, very hard time for ten years in Russia which almost broke his personality. But he was a very brave man. No doubt.
DT: Was he popular as a man in the squadron?
GR: Oh yeah. Oh Yeah. Yeah. Oh yeah.
DT: And was Rudel. Rudel was a loner, was he? Did he sort of work hard?
GR: I can’t tell how he was in the squadron, you know. I only know him as a person and what he did was extraordinary.
DT: Who do you consider to be the best German fighter ace of all? Who do you consider?
GR: I mean, the most talented and the most, dare I say one unique judgment, this is Marseille. Marseille is a great fighter. He was a great fighter pilot. He was. You can dispute about him as a soldier. He was a, he was a unique character. Very intelligent, with some civilian attitude but once he became a leader responsible for a school, he was a tremendous good leader and he has the benefit to have a very father type in command which was [unclear]. He really held his hand over Marseille and Marseille developed his own tactics which were tailored for him. You never can, as a proven, as a norm because everybody who would fly like Marseille would be killed. He’d make acrobatics. He’d be running to the circle of the Spitfires and he was outstanding and he was lucky for a certain time until his bad fate.
DT: Can you give a direct comparison flying the Messerschmitt 109 and the Fokke Wulf 190 and really was the TA15 —
Other: Sorry, we should change the tapes now.
DT: Right. Ok.
[recording paused]
DT: Ok.
Other: Right. When, when everybody’s set, we’re ok. Ready.
DT: Ok. General, can you give us a direct comparison between flying the Messerschmitt 109 and the Fokke Wulf 190? And was the later mark of the Fokke Wulf 190 the Dora or the TA152 as it was sometimes called better than the Messerschmitt 109 G Gustav?
GR: That’s a very difficult question. I haven’t flown all these types. I flew the 109, all the marks and the Fokke Wulf and some, some flights with a long nosed but always, I always said the Fokke Wulf to me it’s a sabre and the 109, it’s a florette, and each aircraft had its advantages and disadvantages. The Fokke Wulf was a rugged aircraft. A good undercarriage, a good adjustment of weapons, that is four guns and it was like a shower. The 109 was more sensitive. This aircraft, you know. It had a very touchy undercarriage. It had slots and I only had three weapons. One through the, what do you call it? Through the propeller. And two guns. One cannon. Two guns. Now, this is the difference and I figured out that all these victories in one day, the serious was most cases started with the Fokke Wulf, not with a 104 err not with a 109. The long nosed I don’t have this experience. Certainly, the long nosed Fokke Wulf for [unclear] with the injection engine was supposed to be better but it came late and never came in operation in considerable numbers so I cannot give you exact comparison versus the 109.
KC: It was reputed that at the end —
GR: Yeah.
KC: The, the Fokke Wulf was.
GR: Sure.
KC: An improvement over the Gustav.
GR: Yeah. Yeah.
KC: General, what were, living conditions like on the Eastern Front?
GR: It was very different, you know. In the north there was a very static wall and they were in front of Leningrad for three years. We in the south, I mean south, let’s say from Kiev, well down to the Caucasus Mountains was a fast- moving wall. Forward and back, forward and backwards and it raised tremendous problems, logistic problems particularly in the, when we had the weather season when we had mud on the road or in winter when we got a lot of snow. For the pilot himself and for the crew itself it was a life like, like gypsies, you know. We were staying for maybe for one week on a lawn selected from the air. It was not a prepared airfield. Living in tents from April ‘til October. Then we dug into the ground to get some cover from the, from the from snow and, and from the temperatures. So, this was a very different situation in the south. There was not a solid front line also, you know. You were always in the open and one day my Group, I was in the back my Group were rolled over by tanks also. By Russian tanks. It could happen. So, this was a quite different situation to the situation to the air warfare in the north or in the west.
DT: Who do you consider to be the most aggressive air fighter on the eastern front?
GR: You mean the person?
DT: Yes. For —
GR: What type?
DT: Aggressive, straight in and attack type of fighter, in the east.
GR: From the, from the Russians?
No. From, from the Luftwaffe’s point of view.
GR: Oh, I can’t tell you this, I think. I think as far as I remember in my group, you know we had a lot of very aggressive fighters [unclear] Krupinski, Bubi Hartmann, these were all very aggressive fighters and I’m sure that in other Wings they had the same calibre.
DT: Can you recall the day when Bully Lang destroyed eighteen Russian aircraft in one day?
GR: Who was it?
DT: Lang.
GR: Ah, Lang. No. I didn’t have any contact with him. I knew Emil Lang before the war. He was a great athlete. Eight hundred metre runners. He was a very good runner and I knew him from there but I never was in the same theatre with Lang. Lang was in the invasion front and he got killed there. And at that time, I was over Germany or in the hospital.
DT: During 1944 Adolf Hitler personally awarded you the Oak Leaves and Swords to your Knight’s Cross.
GR: ’43.
DT: 1943.
GR: ’43.
DT: Shall I ask that again?
Other: Yes. Please.
DT: During 1943 Adolf Hitler personally awarded you the Oak Leaves and Swords to your Knight’s Cross and the Iron Cross. Can you recall these occasions and can you recall what he said to you?
GR: Yes. You know, I got the first what was it, the first report to Hitler was 1942 when we were in front of Stalingrad, in front of El Alamein, and there was a very euphoristic mood in the headquarter because everybody thought we might get it in the next two weeks. And at that time Hitler talked to us. We were four, Captain Steinhoff and [unclear] In fact, nine months later, this was ’43 I had to report again. And you know, it was not only me but from the oak leaves onwards was what handed over the medal by Hitler himself, and after the handing over ceremony we were sitting around the fireplace and he developed his ideas. In ‘43 this was quite a different Hitler. What happened in the meantime between the first and the second visit to the headquarter was that we lost Stalingrad, we lost the Sixth Army, and all his forecasts were [laughs] not realised, and we were on the retreat in North Africa and this was a Hitler who never spoke. In fact, he spoke in mystery. In deep valley, and dark and we have to get through and silver strip on the horizon, and this junk, you know. Not substantial. And it was very, I left the headquarter very depressed like this, and we are not going to win the war.
DT: Do you think that Hitler himself appreciated that victory was impossible at that time?
GR: That’s very hard to say, you know. There’s [laughs] I’m not [pause] Hitler was a psychopath and how, what his ideas were, you can hardly analyse. You know, how can you analyse a man who says in the very last days of war if the German nation is not worth to win the war then it’s worth to get disappeared. Out. I mean one man claims the right to, to give the fate to a whole nation.
[pause]
DT: We understand that Hitler had a form of Parkinson’s disease which affected his, did you think this affected, can I ask that again, Dave?
Other: Yes.
DT: Is it correct that Hitler had some form of Parkinson’s disease and if so, could this have, affected his judgement in crucial areas?
GR: You should ask a doctor. A medical doctor. I cannot tell. I cannot give you an answer. The only thing I can say, the third time I had to report to headquarter was the 10th of January 1944, and all the, the bearer of the Oak Leaf with Swords had to report there to get the certificate, the [unclear] certificates. There was Galland, [unclear] a lot of good outstanding fighter pilots who got killed later on were assembled there and we sat around at lunch and I saw what Hitler, his medicine. It was a battery of [unclear] with around his, his table setting, and I saw my God how much medicine he has to take, but I couldn’t certainly not realise that he had a Parkinson with it. So then, this was recognised after the 20th of July when, after the explosion in his headquarters. He said that Hitler had shivers in his hands. I couldn’t make them like this.
DT: During operation Barbarossa how were the [Wehrmacht] and the Luftwaffe supplied during the critical periods of the autumn and winter?
GR: How do you mean?
DT: Shall I just explain quickly Dave?
GR: Yeah.
DT: Logistically, how did you get the, how did you move equipment?
GR: Yeah. You know —
DT: Can I ask the question again, general?
GR: No, I know.
DT: Right.
GR: This was a very difficult problem, the logistic problems of supply because there was a very, very poor road system and from fall onwards it was mud. We couldn’t move very much our trucks, heavy trucks. And in winter this was snow and it was ice and it was frozen. So, we sent back all our heavy trucks back to the west. We couldn’t use them which means we strictly depend on air transport, Ju52. But the problem was there was a lack. We had only few Ju52 available because in the Battle of Crete there were tremendous losses in Ju52 which never recovered. So, we got our support and supply by air, by Ju52. We strictly depend on them.
DT: Was the large powered glider the Messerschmitt 323 Gigant, was this a successful aeroplane during the Soviet campaign?
GR: You know, I don’t know. It never showed up in the front line. It was too big and too manoeuvrable, and too vulnerable. I flew it back from, from, when I had to report in the, back home. I flew back with, with this aircraft but from an airport which was too the west. It didn’t show up in the front area.
DT: Is it correct that when you left the Eastern Front in 1944 you were at that time the world’s leading fighter ace?
GR: It could be. It could be. I think I was. Is there a number 2? You know we always, we were equal, always, even with Nowotny. Nowotny was in the middle section of Russia and I was in the south and one time I was ahead, and he was ahead. Exactly I can’t tell you the situation when I came to the, to the home defence.
DT: Were you conscious of a rivalry between yourselves to be the leading ace?
GR: Oh, this was a friendly rivalry, you know. It was not a, I respected Nowotny. He was a very very fine character and I met him several times, and I respected him and I liked him very much.
DT: A very similar situation to the First World War.
GR: Yeah.
DT: In 1918 with Udet and Loewenhardt.
GR: Yeah.
DT: They, they battled for the —
GR: Sure.
DT: To be the leading ace.
GR: Sure. Ok. You are always you know as a young pilot you were eager to be successful but not to, you are, I was also happy when he was successful.
DT: Yes.
GR: Yeah. There was no jealousy.
DT: So, when you left Bubi Hartman was the third ranked ace.
GR: Yeah.
DT: Behind you and Nowotny.
GR: Yeah. Yeah. Bubi Hartman came up much later, you know, I was the leading when I was shot down and lost my thumb. That time. And I think at that time Nowotny was, he flew the 262 then. And I don’t know whether he was already killed or still alive, but anyhow when I was shot down and lost my thumb I had to go into hospital. At that time, I was the number one and it took three months and when I was in hospital that Bubi Hartmann came up. Bubi Hartmann and Barkhorn.
DT: And at the end of the war that was the position. Hartmann. Barkhorn. Rall.
GR: Right. Right. That was it.
DT: Batz, number four.
GR: Yes. I don’t know. Yeah.
DT: Wilhelm Batz.
GR: Yeah.
DT: When you left the Eastern Front and transferred to the west you took over command of Jagdgeshwader 11.
GR: No. For a Group.
DT: Oh sorry.
GR: The 2nd Group.
DT: How did the conditions in air fighting compare in the west to conditions on the Eastern Front?
GR: There was a completely different situation. First of all, the, the air warfare over Germany was a, was a air warfare on its’ own right. Not in relation to the Army. In Russia that was always supporting the Army. Over Germany air warfare on its own right with highly capable experienced pilots and very good equipment in numbers. In numbers. In quantities. This was our problem when I took over the Group. The situation was that every mission we flew against the, we flew in daylight so in most cases against the Americans from the Eighth Air Force in, in south England. They came over escorted by long range fighters in numbers. And the average loss rate was fifty percent which every pilot knew. Every second pilot would not return.
DT: When you, when you first went into action in the west had the P51 been introduced? Had it replaced the P47?
GR: Both were there. The P47 and the P51 but P47 was in a process of be pulled out and replaced by P51, and I had the privilege before I took over to [pause] no after that. After that I had the privilege to fly the P51 and the P47, and I could see the difference to the 109 for instance you know, in the flight manoeuvrability and all this, speed it was absolutely adequate but the big advantage was the endurance. They flew for seven and a half hours and we flew for one and a half hours. That was a big difference.
DT: How, how was the P47 as a dogfighter?
GR: A dogfight it has its benefits. I feel, you know climbing in a dog fight we feel superior. In a dive he was much faster. The structural strength was much higher than in the 109, you know. They could stand up to fourteen hundred kilometres and the 109 was limited up to a thousand kilometres. So, the rule was don’t dive away from a P47 because it’s faster and it had a bit better structure than a 109. But you cannot always select what you want. You are forced to some even illogic manoeuvres.
DT: I understand that a Thunderbolt pilot removed part of your anatomy during 1944.
GR: Yeah [laughs] He became a friend of mine which was very unusual. It was the 12th of May ‘44 and I run into Thunderbolts, and there was a dogfight and there was lucky. I got two Thunderbolts. Big flames because they were full of fuel and as the leader pulled away and made escape manoeuvres, rolls and what the hell and dive from me his second element spotted me and they chased me to the dead end, you know. They shot off my thumb, shot off the engine, cooler. It was bang, bang, bang in the aircraft and I was in a dive which was certainly I knew that I cannot make it against four P47 flying line abreast and chasing me. What can I do? When I turned to the left, I turn in the guns, I turn to the right I turn in the guns. So, I went down to tree top level, pulled up. I wanted to get out of the aeroplane. They wanted to go back to England. So, I was in that situation had a better condition. Just dropped out of the aeroplane, and pulled my parachute and after freefall of about five, eight hundred metres and the parachute opened and then I came down. Much later, years later by studying all the documents they identified this was the P47 Group, was Hub Zemke’s Wolf Pack and we became friends.
DT: Is Zemke still alive?
GR: No. Unfortunately, he died two years ago. He lived in California.
DT: How would you compare the American bomber commanders Ira Eaker, and Jimmy Doolittle with their tactics?
GR: I can’t. I wouldn’t dare to give a judgement over this. I had the privilege to visit Jimmy Doolittle when he was retired in his home in Pebble Beach in California. He was a great, great man but in those days ninety years old, over ninety years old. He was beyond of daily problems you know, and he was a very graceful man, and we are sitting there and together with Galland, with Peter Townsend was a group of us and it was a great privilege to meet him before he passed away.
DT: Did you know that the American bomber crews called him something like Doolittle the murderer because he released the fighters on the free chase?
GR: Yeah.
DT: Rather than, than fly close escort to the bombers.
GR: No.
DT: At first.
GR: No. I don’t know that.
DT: They realised later.
GR: Yeah.
DT: That it worked.
GR: It worked. It was our problem, you know. The direct escort of give the fighter the freedom to sweep the airspace clean, and use his own tactics and apply his own superiorities where, in which area he ever could.
KC: Did you use the Messerschmitt 109 with the rocket attachments underneath?
GR: No.
KC: Not at all.
GR: No.
DT: Ok. Just distracted me a bit.
[pause]
DT: Were you greatly outnumbered in 1944 when you —
GR: Yeah.
DT: Attacked the Americans.
GR: Yes. Very much, and I’ll give you an example. On this particular mission 12th of May 1944, we had a unit with two Fokke Wulf Groups. Heavy fighters. They were supposed to attack the bombers and I had a Group with twenty five high altitude fighters, 109 polished and cleaned for that and all unnecessary equipment out of the aeroplane. We cruised at a level of eleven thousand metres without pressurisation. Without, without heating of the cockpit and it was a group of seventy five. The bombers were eight hundred and we had escort, fighter escort by radar. Recognised from the Hartz Mountains down to Stuttgart. All together about eleven hundred. There might have been another German Group which I don’t know but we were, we were at the spot, you know and with this outnumbering magnitude of bombers and fighters.
DT: So, the, so the total ratio of bombers and fighters to yourselves was about thirty to one.
GR: I don’t know. I must say this this was not in our area. I mean, a bomber stream of eight hundred bombers takes about a hundred kilometres.
DT: Yes.
GR: You know.
DT: It must have been a daunting prospect.
GR: But at one point we were there, you know and this is, it was, it was always we were always outnumbered. We were outnumbered in Russia.
DT: How did you feel when you, when you saw the huge size of the American offensive operation? The sky must have been full of aeroplanes.
GR: No.
DT: Did you feel —
GR: You don’t. You don’t, you know this is a wide space. The, the, in there and you see some, you see some here, you see some there and what do you think? You know, this is more, this is not only a thinking process. It’s also let’s say a hunting instinct also. Certainly, you know the rules. How to attack, when, from which direction. How to get your formation to the enemy, you know. But from there it’s his business, you know. We cannot direct every part in a dogfight. That’s his own business, but to get them in in a good position but this is a matter of a fraction of seconds very often. Not long -term planning. It’s a moving target. A high-speed moving target and the situation changes from every second.
KC: You said that you actually flew aircraft that were stripped and polished.
GR: Yeah.
KC: So that they gave an improved performance.
GR: Yeah.
KC: The Americans did this and they took the camouflage off their fighters and polished them.
GR: Ah yeah.
KC: Did you actually fly silver polished aircraft?
GR: No. No. No. No.
KC: They were still camouflaged.
GR: They were still, yeah camouflaged you know [laughs] It doesn’t, it doesn’t work very much if they identified us whether with colour or not.
KC: You said a few moments ago that you had the pleasure to fly the P47.
GR: Yeah.
KC: And the P51. Did you fly any other captured aircraft, and whereabouts was this that you flew these captured aeroplanes?
GR: A P38, a Spitfire. I flew them and I think that one of the outstanding aeroplanes is a Spitfire, but the Spitfire had the same problem with me. I only flew, all the European’s aircraft where a fighter aircraft, were designed for short range.
KC: I understand that you have a particular quote for the P38 that it was quite a good aircraft, but there was a particular role that it was more suited to than any other.
GR: Yeah. I would, I would, I would like to fly with a P38 on vacation you know. Fantastic. Luxury. Good space in the cockpit, two engines, not the status. A very comfortable thing, you know. Beautiful. But in a dogfight, I think it’s two big, you know with two engines it turned out. The concept, we had discerned on the German side also once this idea to have the long range destroyer [unclear] and it didn’t work out. They had tremendous losses. It wasn’t that the P38 was not as bad as the 110 but compared the 51, 47 I would prefer the 51.
Other: Stop it there, chaps. We’re about to run out of tape again.
[recording paused]
Other: Ok, chaps.
KC: Going back to the, the flying of captured allied aircraft was this with the special unit that you —
GR: Yes.
KC: You flew. Were you detached to this unit?
GR: Yeah. At that, time I was not able to fly in combat because I still had an open injury, yeah and I was ordered to be the commander of a German Fighter Leader School and I had to train young officers to become squadron commanders. And we got a visit. There was a German unit formed by captured aircraft. They flew captured aircraft painted with the German insignia and, just for evaluation and they came to me, and I certainly took the chance to fly all of them as target against my students. So, I get very well acquainted with all these planes.
KC: Did, did you, did you come across the P39? The Airacobra or the Kingcobra.
GR: No. We didn’t. In Russia yes. We had a lot of Airacobra in Russia and the Russians liked them. Particularly Pokryshkin, one of the outstanding fighter pilots, Russian fighter pilots. He flew the Airacobra. We also liked them because sometimes I thought it’s a, it’s a good target because the Airacobra has the engine behind the pilot at the back which means it has the centre of gravity is way back in this aeroplane and in a dogfight if you hit and this is what I recognised, when you hit an Airacobra in the wing you get instability, you know and then it gets in a spin and can’t recover because of this centre of gravity situation.
KC: Were you invited to join General Galland’s jet unit JV44 to fly the Messerschmitt 262?
GR: No. I flew the 262. At the time I was the commander of this Fighter Leader School, and I took the chance. It was very close to the training base in the south of Augsburg where my friend Heinz [Behr] was the commander said, ‘Come over.’ Gave me the chance to fly the 262. So, I got checked out to fly the 262 and flew about twenty, thirty hours. Not in operation. Just to get acquainted with the aeroplane and then I had to take over another Wing. The Wing 300. This it would be to come to the 44 Wing from Galland, and all these guys who were in Galland’s wing their units were dissolved. They didn’t exist anymore, but I had to take over a Wing. I mean these were the ruins of a Wing but it was Wing.
KC: And was, was among obviously the aircraft was dramatically different to fly but how did you feel as an experienced pilot?
GR: It was a new dimension, you know. First, if you taxied with a, with a 262 it was a wonderful feeling. You had a beautiful view because you have a nosewheel. You taxied like in a taxi. Yeah. You know, not the zigzag of a 109 where you had the engine in front of you and you reduced the visibility, forward visibility. So, this was number one. Number two you had a very good radio situation. No background noise because there was no interference from the engine. This was very clear. Without noise. Then take off. The, you had to accelerate the throttle very, very carefully and slowly. If, you do it rapidly you can over heat and risk of fire in the engine which happened quite often. So, advance the throttle very carefully and slowly. Once you release the brakes and you rolled down the runway catching up speed and getting into the air the 262 at the beginning is very heavy and unmanoeuverable, until she really catches up speed. Then we are superior. And the 262 was the only aeroplane designed to make dogfights, you know. The advantage was attack with high speed go and start again but don’t turn the old-fashioned dogfights. This is not for the 262. But the 262 flew at about the double speed. Double the speed of the normal conventional aircraft.
KC: After the war you got to know Steinhoff very well indeed. He served with you in NATO and I think he became a friend of yours.
GR: Yeah.
KC: He often said that he felt that his crash in the 262 was due to a bomb crater but when we met General Galland he seemed to think that there was a movement between, there is control for a flap.
GR: Yeah.
KC: And the throttle controls were very close together, and he seemed to think that possibly Steinhoff had used that as well as a contributory factor. Did you get to talk to Steinhoff about that particular incident?
GR: No. You know and you have to, this was such a dramatic accident. Even the memory of Steinhoff, you know was not, couldn’t be realistic, you know, because there are a lot of psychological influence in such a situation. What really happened I don’t know. Some say with the flaps. Lowering for flaps, or reducing flaps too early and he says the crater, a bomb crater. I don’t know and whether he could have the right memory I don’t, after such a dramatic, dramatic accident, you know. He lost his face and his consciousness. Everything. How can he commemorate exactly what happened?
KC: At the end of the war of course you came into the allied, the, became a prisoner of war.
GR: Yeah.
KC: In the west.
GR: Yeah.
KC: How were you treated and what was your story of your movement from operational status to —
GR: Yeah.
KC: Prisoner of war.
GR: Well, you know this was from one day to another one you know. We want to go home. The war is over. There is no, no fighting anymore and we dissolved our units and I said goodbye and thanked them and you go to north and we go south and soon you get the food. That was last and everybody tries to go home. And we marched with my staff until the late, [unclear] and what we didn’t know at that time there was a very strong, there was a very strong all these soldiers came this is the alpine fortress. Something like that. Very fanatic Nazis fighting to the dead end. It wasn’t true. We wanted to go home. Ok. They got us and then I had some camps. Lousy camps. I don’t blame the Americans you know, because there was such a number of prisoners from one day to the other. They hardly could feed them, you know. There was a logistical problem. There was, no camps. Where to put them? And so it would happen to us also, you know. From one day we had thousands and thousands and thousands of prisoners but no camps, no food. We were fed and suddenly we have an, we had an array of people, other people who couldn’t stand it. They passed away. There was tremendous malnutrition but it was due to the fact that it was unforeseen situation. Then I was picked up by the Secret Service or whoever we call it. CIA or what. They called to get all the Air Force officers, and they called out the name. Five. Rall bump, bump and then we were interrogated privately, individually and the question was, ‘You flew the —’ Asked me, ‘You flew the 262?’ I said, ‘Yes.’ And they said, ‘Would you, would you assist us by giving us your advice? By building up a jet force. We don’t have —’ The Americans didn’t have a jet at that time in operation. The war was over. Our sympathy was with the west and I said, ok. Then I said, ok, and we were taken out from this camp and you know after we didn’t have, we were really suffering from food and no food. Lackage of food. And when this oversized jeep took four of us out of the camp after one hour or after half an hour he stopped in a small trail beside the main road and opened his trunk and here came sausage and food and tomato juices and this was the first time we were very, very happy. Then we went to Heidelberg and from there to Wiesbaden, and finally we were taken over to England in to an interrogation camp, and every day we walked up and down and talked the war over again, you know. Primarily about the different types. 262 certainly. This was a main interest. And with one of these interrogators we still have, or Galland had a close friendship with Colonel Wigman. An American colonel. He lives in Vienna and he also attended the funeral of Galland. He was a good friend. So, the treatment was very [pause] comfortable. Not comfortable but acceptable. Put it that way. Acceptable. And then I was taken to, from England to when, you know we lost, they lost interest in our, in our personalities you know, the persons because the war is still running in in the Far East, and they dropped the atomic bomb and the whole thing was over. Then we, then they lost every interest in us. And I was in France and I was as a, as a, as an American prisoner, and they were asked to lend us to the British and then we came over to Tangmere together with Rudel, and in Tangmere we sat together in the evening with all the outstanding British fighter pilots, Bader, Stanford Tuck and [unclear] and they treated us as gentlemen up there.
KC: I believe —
GR: Grateful. Very grateful.
Other: Can we just hold that chaps. I’m about to lose the batteries.
[recording paused]
GR: He was a blockhead, you know.
DT: Yes.
GR: [unclear] I cannot say that here.
DT: Right.
GR: It becomes history. This man is damned, you know. I don’t like that. He was a great fighter, no doubt. But certainly, I wouldn’t call him a friend, you know.
KC: What was, what was he like as a, did it come across in conversation, his, his attitude.
GR: Me. I. ‘I was the greatest.’ ‘I had the highest decoration.’
DT: Mohammed Ali type.
KC: He couldn’t, that was it, the special medal he got. What was it called?
GR: He got the, he had the Knights Cross with Oak Leaf and Swords in diamonds in gold.
DT: That’s right. And only Goering had —
GR: Only. Only he. Only he has. Yeah.
KC: Ok.
GR: Actually, he has the highest decoration. Rudel.
KC: Could, could you just tell us of that flight from France and your first meeting with the British officers at Tangmere.
GR: Yes. You know, we were American prisoners and one day in a camp in, in the Brittany [pause] or Normandy, Normandy and one day the American officer came, ‘Pack.’ Didn’t know what to do, and I had to be at the main gate in ten minutes, and there also was Rudel. Rudel was in the hospital camp and they also came over and the jeep came and we jumped in to the jeep, and here we went and Rudel was always saying, ‘Where are we going? Where are we going? I think the Russians have sent a ship and they turn us over to the Russians.’ The command we are not that important that the Russians come with a cruiser from Leningrad to, to Cherbourg to pick two guys up and bring them back. We ended up in Cherbourg in a little airfield and waited. And after a while a Beechcraft came with British cocarde blue, white, red. Ok. Here we go to England, and we jumped into the Beechcraft and flew over the Channel. I knew the Channel and right after we crossed the border the, the, the, the coastline the pilot reduced the throttle. We are going to land. We looked outside. I said, ‘Ah, here’s a base.’ I saw the base and we went down. Circled down, and came in and landed. And when we landed, we jumped out of the plane and the air police came and Rudel jumped out and he had his rucksack, and in his rucksack, he had his artificial leg. He was on stretchers, one leg marching. The other one was in the rucksack [laughs] It was not the brightest view of the German Air Force. Anyway, they took us very politely. Escorted us to the prison. I thought this could not be the only reason to come over here. To go in another prison. But they left the doors open. This is a good indication. Say to Rudel, ‘You must be optimistic. The doors are open.’ After a short while a very smart British wing commander came. Good looking and exquisite German, ‘Excuse me. You came earlier than expected,’ and offered us immediately a cigarette. Never happened in the last years. I mean offered a cigarette. Very nice. And then he asked us in German, ‘Did you have lunch?’ I said, ‘Sir, I didn’t have lunch in the last three months.’ And he escorted us to the officer’s mess, and we get the lunch. It was fantastic to us as prisoners, always treated by guards with a machine gun, ‘Macht schnell. Macht schnell,’ and now treated as gentlemen. And the man who treated us as gentlemen was Wing Commander Stanford Tuck and I’ll never forget. This man gave us a feeling as we were treated as gentlemen.
KC: Did you, did you know then of his reputation at that time?
GR: No.
KC: As a fighter pilot.
GR: No. I knew his reputation after. He came over and we became friends in Germany, and he attended our fighter pilot’s meeting. He was, became a good friend of Galland, as Bader did. So, but not at that time.
KC: Eventually you became a major contributor to the build Other: up of the, rebuild of the Luftwaffe after the war in the 1950s. Could you tell us a little about your role?
GR: Yes. When I got, you know Steinhoff, they joined the office in preparation to build up the force and he wrote me a letter, Steinhoff when, when the time has come and we are legally authorised for new Germany. ‘You have to come. How should we build up an Air Force without you?’ Without you, not meaning me but all the pilots, the old fighter pilots. I said I was really lucky to because you know the, the bad experiences and the, the trauma of this feeling that we fought maybe for the wrong objectives, and with all these new knowledges, what happened, and all these arguments I was not willing to jump in a new adventure at this time. So, I was reluctant but I was convinced certainly in our new democratic system an armed force was necessary for the defence, you know in those days. We still had tremendous confrontation between east and west. The hot war. The, the Cold War. The Cold War. And finally, I said, ‘Ok. I come.’ And then I joined on the 1st of January ‘56 the new German Air Force which at that time was just in an early build up situation.
KC: And where did you train for this?
GR: First, I was on the staff to do our staff work and to make all the conditions for building up the force. We had to build up the staff, the schools, the structure. And then I went to, I went to flying and I was working on a programme to get all these wartime pilots trained in the States. You know, we started our training with the Harvard Mark 4 as a trainer. Then to the T33, first jet, and then we went to the States to Luke Air Force Base in Phoenix, Arizona, and we were trained on the F84. Some others were trained in Canada on the F86. This was the nucleus of the units in the new German Air Force.
KC: And eventually you went on to fly the Starfighter, I understand.
GR: Later on. You know, in ’58 my general asked me, ‘Do you want to fly the 104?’ And I said, ‘Yes sir.’ It was a most spectacular aircraft. The first aircraft who went through the barrier of sound in a climb. There was a [unclear] sixteen thousand pound thrust rate, six thousand pound, sixteen thousand pound thrust. So, one to one. I said yes so, they took me over to Palmdale, to Los Angeles with a group of engineers and they have to try to figure out the German version of the 104. The T version. At that time, we made six flights from me to the Lockheed Company out in Palmdale and I flew the A the B, and A model, and this was for me a new dimension. Fantastic. And when I came back, I was declared to the project officer of the 104, and from there on I was every year three or four months with young pilots and we flew all the tests of first, full maximum load and night flying and with the bomb being, which changed. The problem was that due to political pressure the 104 had to replace these old timers early as possible which meant that the, the production sometimes was parallel to the, to the design, to the to the development of the aircraft. This was sometimes a critical situation.
KC: At this time the aircraft actually became surrounded in some controversy because it got the reputation as a widow maker.
GR: Yeah.
KC: As an aircraft that was unreliable.
GR: You know, the 104 you can argue about this for hours and hours. What was the reason of the unacceptable losses we had on a 104? If you ask a pilot, every pilot who flew the 104 said it’s a pilot’s aircraft it was the best aircraft we could get. The 104 was an aircraft which wants to fly. You have to. You have to force it through the air. It flies by itself. A very stable weapons platform. But you have to follow the conditions, you know. Don’t make a mistake. It’s an unforgivable aircraft also with the small wings. Due to the fact that production development was parallel and some others certainly there was a source of mistakes, of failures. But as an overall judgement the, the losses of the 104 was not due to the wrong construction of the aeroplane, mistakes in the aeroplane it was a genius development of design from Kelly Johnson in the States. But we always had, or ninety percent of the whole losses were human failure in some area. Not only the pilot. The maintenance, the [unclear] or whatever.
KC: It was designed of course as an interceptor. A pure interceptor.
GR: I know.
KC: But in Europe it was employed in a ground attack role.
GR: It was a multi-roler. We had a multi-role. We used the 104 as an interceptor, as a fighter bomber, and as a reconnaissance and we thought for financial reasons we cannot afford to have a logistic system for interceptor, for fighter bomber and for the reconnaissance. This was, surely it was wrong, because a multi-role aircraft means always not the extreme best solution for the particular role. It means a compromise. A compromise is always giving up some advantages, and this is true of the 104.
DT: Do you still maintain contact with your wartime comrades?
GR: Yes. Sure. We, in Germany we have a very fine Association. A Fighter Pilot’s Association with a tremendously good president and due to him you know we have a very good contact. And what he does you know this is biological problem that if you have in fifty years of Fighter Association there’s nobody there. They all passed away so how can you solve this? Keep this unit, this association alive. It means you have to get in new pilots. A new force. So, most of the wing commanders of the new German Air Force I mean, the unit is fifty years old already. Much older than the old one. They all became members of the Fighter Pilot’s Association so, they will, if the old characters pass away, they still arrive, the Association.
DT: I understand you were one of the first if not the very first German ace to be invited to Moscow to speak to the Russian fighter pilots.
GR: Yeah.
DT: Tell us of your experiences in Moscow.
GR: Yeah. This is, you know I was invited by the veterans. War veterans. And I was invited through the German Embassy and the German Air Attache delivered this invitation. And the, the man who had the invitation was General Oberst Andreyev, he was not a wartime veteran he was younger but he was the commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Air Forces for a time. And when I came over, I was received very politely at the airport. Four, four persons saluted me and took me to my hotel. It was a very friendly treatment, and the next day we went out to Kubinka. Kubinka is the third most important operation base of the present Russian Air Force and it is the home of the acrobatic team with the MIG29 and the SU27. Highly modern aircraft. And there an assembly of five, four hundred officers and all the maps from the war time and all with the figures. How many army soldiers we had at the beginning and they had to compare, and the old veterans they couldn’t always get upright because they had tons of medals on their pressing down. Like a, like an arming plate, you know. But this is a Russian habit. And now, we were on the front stage and we are on the table and they delivered their speech to the four hundred officers. This was the meaning. To give these officers inspiration because the Russian armed forces are in a very, very critical shape. This was a privileged cast in the past. Now, they are completely underprivileged. They don’t have money, you know, and many draughtees don’t show up. They don’t come and all the privileges are gone and from one day to the other, you know. This is only a very short time so they are in a situation and they want to motivate their officers. Therefore, they invited the old groups, all to talk about the war and all the medals. And then I was on the stage and I had the privilege to have a very good interpreter. A very nice lady. And I spoke one sentence, and she could translate and I would think of the next one so, because I was completely unprepared. I didn’t know. It was very nice and I recapulated all my experience in the east and certainly also spelling out my high respect for their great fighting morale. Their capability to switch from a very obsolete Air Force to a very modern, very very acceptable Air Force during the war. And after that we went out to a balcony, and we had the demonstration of the acrobatic team with the MIG29 and SU27. It was outstanding. Excellent. And after that finally, we went to lunch. It was about 4 o’clock in the afternoon, and there was a tremendous table set. Beautiful. We came in. There was a band playing Russian, very nice Russian songs, and a colonel, a lieutenant colonel. He was a singer. He sung, beautiful Russian voice and a major in a duet sometimes and what I spotted on the table set was every thirty centimetres one bottle of vodka.
Other: Can you just hold it there? I’m sorry.
[recording paused]
Other: If you want to go back over the, maybe the setting out the table.
GR: About the what? Sorry? Yeah. OK.
DT: Go back to you went, you went out on the balcony.
GR: Ok.
DT: And saw the aircraft.
GR: No. When we came back into, into the lunch room, you know.
DT: Yeah.
GR: With the little band playing and singing. The lieutenant colonel singing and the major singing. It was, it was wonderful. And then we are sitting at the table, and I was sitting next to General Andreyev, and he delivered a speech and then he gave me the wings of Russian Air Force. I was very touched by this. And then there was beautiful for food, Caviar and what you have. And then he asked all these veterans toast to so and so, and it was in Russian. I couldn’t follow that, trust me [laughs] And all these old timers, one after the other toasted to somebody, to something. I don’t know what but I know after every toast of [unclear] vodka, no swallowing, just pouring in. You can imagine after eight toasts, it was a very gay club there, and this is what I would really liked, you know, and a two star general, Army general stood up and gave a poem, you know. He, how do you —
DT: Recite.
KC: Recited.
GR: Yeah. A poem. And then it was sung. And next to him was the pilot of the MIG29, and when I had, I was offered to, to make some, give some words to them, and I said, well I’m deeply touched about the wide span of Russian mentality from a very sentimental, very amusable, very agreeable situation by the songs of Russian songs, about the poems about the very, very literal mood to the strong tactical side of the pilot of the MIG29 and SU27, this was a wide span recording the Russian soul. It was no doubt.
KC: Grateful that you came over here to Yorkshire to the Yorkshire Air Museum and helped us with our fund raising. I think everybody who came to the lecture that we had last night thoroughly enjoyed themselves and certainly David and I would be pleased to know whether you are actually grateful that eventually after many phone calls and letters you did give in to the persistent Yorkshireman as you call him, my colleague here.
GR: I am very glad to be here and I’m very, I’m convinced it was good to come over here to meet friends. I can say that and to make a contribute to the, to the very, very fine Yorkshire Air Museum. And I envy you I must say. When you are about here because of the great interest and enthusiasm of your people here in masses to be interested. Historical events, and events of today which I am slightly missing in Germany. Thank you.
KC: Sir, thank you very much indeed.
Other: What we need to do now is, if you just carry on chatting and I’ll just get some listening shots.
KC: Right.
Other: You know, but if you can try and keep him quiet. So, I’m just do, you know a few close ups of his face listening, and then we’ll do the same with you.
KC: What? Talking. Listening to me, talking, you mean.
Other: Yeah.
KC: Right.
Other: [unclear] I’ll just get —
DT: Right. So when, when does your plane go general, today?
GR: 14.40 I think.
KC: Yes. Yes.
GR: And I will go to Gatwick in one hour. Then I arrive Salzburg, I think 1910, which is here 1810.
KC: I think we have to say that David and I, certainly David was the inspiration behind these things, aviation lectures and when we first started them which was about what four years ago —
DT: Yeah.
KC: Four years ago, the first ones we had was a local speaker and I think there was six people turned up.
DT: Something like that.
KC: Six or seven people turned up to the first one. We had a —
DT: And a dog. And one dog.
KC: And a dog. We had some, we had a quiz which was again just a few local people.
GR: Yeah.
DT: And at that time one of our museum colleagues said we decided to put up the entrance fee from two pounds to three pounds and our friend said. ‘You’re being very risky. Keep it to local people and about two pounds.’ And four years later here we are with such distinguished speakers as yourself as yourself and Johnny Johnson, and Wilhelm Johnen.
GR: Yeah.
DT: And the various people we’ve had.
GR: Yeah.
DT: Colonel David from the Canadian Air Force.
GR: Yeah.
KC: From all over the world. I mean it is quite remarkable. I don’t think David and I in our wildest dreams would ever have thought that we’d have spent such time with people like yourself, and the British aces. I mean it’s absolutely incredible.
DT: I’ll tell you, if we are not on record, General Rall, I said to the museum chairman one year ago we may have an opportunity to speak to Gunther Rall, and he said, ‘Who is Gunther Rall?’ [laughs] I said, ‘Well, he is the — ’
GR: Was he a German? Sorry [laughs]
DT: ‘He is the world’s leading fighter ace still left alive.’ ‘Oh,’ He said, ‘Well,’ he said, ‘Nobody in England has heard of him apart from you.’ Apart from me.
GR: Yeah. Yeah.
DT: I said, ‘That is rubbish.’
GR: Yeah.
DT: ‘Many people have heard of Gunther Rall,’ I said.
GR: Yeah. Yeah.
DT: He said, ‘I think it is a big risk for the Yorkshire Air Museum — ’ So — [laughs]
GR: Yeah. Yeah.
DT: We’ve taken —]]> eng]]> Sound]]> Wehrmacht. Luftwaffe]]> France]]> Germany]]> Great Britain]]> Russia (Federation)]]> France--Marseille]]> Germany--Stuttgart]]> Black Sea]]> 1940]]> 1943]]> 1944]]>
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln. ]]> Alastair Montgomery]]> IBCC Digital Archive]]> Julie Williams]]> Maureen Clarke]]> Pending review]]> DM: Good morning.
AM: Tell me just a little bit about your family background and where you lived prior to joining the Royal Air Force.
DM: Oh yeah. I lived and was brought up in Clydebank and I was a police cadet and then became a policeman for a short time. Yeah.
AM: Right. And were any of your family in the services?
DM: Well, mainly all in the police actually.
AM: Right. So having been in the police which I think was a —
DM: Reserved Occupation.
AM: Exactly. Why did you choose to join the Royal Air Force?
DM: Because that was the only one I could go to actually. It was the only place I could go actually because it was a Reserved Occupation.
AM: Right. And just tell me a little bit about your training as a, as a pilot and some of the more memorable aspects of it.
DM: How do you mean? I’m not quite clear.
AM: Well, first of all when you actually joined up where did you go and how was the cycle of training?
DM: Oh yeah. I went to ACRC which was a aircrew recruiting place in Lords. In Lords in London. Yeah.
AM: And where, where did you commence your flying training?
DM: Ah yeah. Well, I did about nine hours in Fairoaks and then the rest was done in Florida.
AM: Right. And what aeroplane was that on?
DM: Pardon?
AM: Which aeroplane was that on?
DM: Harvard.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: So tell me a wee bit about the Harvard then.
DM: It was very nice to fly actually. Yeah. What was it? A single engine of course and had retractable gear.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: And from the Harvard where did you go?
DM: From a Harvard then I eventually went on to Blenheims.
AM: And where was that?
DM: At a place called Snetterton.
AM: Right. Right. You’d better tell us where Snetterton is.
DM: It’s in the Midlands.
AM: Right. Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: So that was your first experience of multi engine aircraft.
DM: Yeah. Yeah.
AM: Yeah. So tell me a little bit about flying that.
DM: How do you mean?
AM: What was it like to fly?
DM: Well, it was pretty good actually. Yeah. A little on the heavy side but otherwise ok.
AM: And what age were you at that point?
DM: Twenty one.
AM: Right. Gosh.
DM: Pardon?
AM: And was that where you, you met up with your crew or —
DM: Oh no. No. It was much later.
AM: Right. So tell me about the, a little bit about the crewing up process.
DM: Ah yeah. That’s right. I was left without anyone. I was a bit worried they were going to give me someone and then when I was having a, having breakfast I saw a chap came in with N here you see. And that was Nigel and I immediately, I didn’t tell him, I put him on my crew and he was very very good indeed actually.
AM: Right.
DM: First class.
AM: So he was the first person you knew you crewed up with.
DM: Yeah.
AM: The navigator.
DM: Yeah. Yeah.
AM: And did you stay with him throughout your wartime?
DM: Oh yeah. Yeah.
AM: Right. And what about the rest of the crew? It doesn’t matter about names but just how you came together.
DM: I’m not quite sure now.
Other: Phil Tetlow. That’s one dad.
DM: Oh yeah. Yeah.
Other: Radio officer.
DM: That’s right.
Other: Hold on dad. I’ll get you a photograph and that will give you a —
DM: I’m not quite sure.
Other: Here we are dad.
AM: We’ll just pause till we get them.
[recording paused]
AM: Just how you teamed up as a, as a crew and what that experience was like and —
DM: Oh yeah. I was a bit worried at first actually I’d be given sort of left overs but then I saw Nigel with this N here and without telling him I got him put in my crew and he was absolutely first class. Probably wouldn’t have got through without him actually. Yeah.
AM: Yeah. Well, that’s a great thing to say about somebody.
DM: Yeah. Yeah.
AM: And once you were crewed up.
DM: Yeah.
AM: Apart from odd occasions did you fly with the same crew?
DM: Oh yeah. Yeah.
AM: For the rest of the war.
DM: Yeah. That was a wartime, a wartime thing because you could do it in peacetime because you know there was going on holiday and all the rest of it.
AM: Sure.
DM: But because it was more, more efficient for you. For you and the rest of the crew you all flew together throughout the war. Yeah.
AM: Right. So you crewed up at the OTU. Is that correct?
DM: Yeah. Yeah.
AM: And then you went to 9 Squadron.
DM: Yeah.
AM: And where was that?
DM: At Bardney.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: Tell me a wee bit about what it was like arriving on your very first squadron as a young twenty year old.
DM: Yeah. I was a bit, I was a bit overwhelmed but they were very sort of reasonable to me and took me in very quickly and I felt very much at home and, yeah.
AM: And what rank were you then?
DM: Flying officer.
AM: Right.
DM: F4.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: So were all the crew officers or were you the only officer?
DM: To begin with I was the only officer but then later on Nigel got his commission and then I think Pete [Rammell] got his as well.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: So how many sorties did you fly on the squadron before you went operational? How many training sorties did you do?
DM: About three or four.
AM: Right. And what did they consist of?
DM: Usually flying, flying across Land’s End and then across to the, to the French coast and back again.
AM: Right. And was this daytime or at night?
DM: Daytime.
AM: Right. And how did you feel in these early sorties?
DM: I was very pleased actually. I’d got what I wanted to do.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: Right. And had the crew readily accepted you as their boss? They knew that from the beginning.
DM: Oh yeah. Yeah.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: Right. Tell me a bit about your very first operational mission if you can recall it.
DM: Let me think now. What [pause] Oh that was to Saint Cyr in France actually.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: And that was a bombing sortie? That was a bombing sortie?
DM: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. That was the German held, it had been a military academy and the Germans took it over there and it became the centre for, it became a centre there for, for the rest of Germany.
AM: Right. Right. So that was your first sortie.
DM: Yeah.
AM: I noticed from your book that you did quite a lot of daytime sorties as well.
DM: Yeah. Yeah.
AM: How did you find the difference in these sorties? Between day sorties and night sorties?
DM: Well, day sorties you had to watch out actually because there was a lot of German fighters around. You to watch out. Yeah.
AM: And obviously, I say obviously but on night sorties people comment on the, on the aspects of seeing flak.
DM: Yeah.
AM: What was it like the first time you went over Germany and saw flak?
DM: One of the things I did see was a Lancaster, all engines afire about two or three miles away. Going straight down like that.
AM: Oh my goodness.
DM: That made you, made me sharpen up a bit.
AM: And what did the rest of your crew say when you —
DM: They didn’t say anything.
AM: They didn’t say anything. Right. And, and did you see that regularly or —
DM: Oh yeah. Yeah.
AM: Right. Today a lot of people talk about losses being due to the upward firing —
DM: Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.
AM: The Schräge musik.
DM: Yeah. Yeah.
AM: Did you know about that then?
DM: Oh yeah. Yeah.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah. Yeah, that why I used to do a banking search and do that about every two minutes to make sure they hadn’t snuck underneath me.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: Right. So that was purely to prevent fighters coming underneath you or to make sure you could find them.
DM: Make sure they weren’t underneath us. Sneaking underneath you.
AM: Right. So, I know that the escape manoeuvre was called a corkscrew.
DM: Oh yeah.
AM: Did you ever have to do that in anger?
DM: All the time.
AM: Right. So tell me a little bit about it.
DM: Yeah. We were flying along there and the rear gunner said, ‘Corkscrew. Port.’ You see. And you’d go down like that. Pick up a lot of speed and down, a bit more speed and then you were up to about three or four hundred knots and came up like that. Then on again.
AM: Right.
Other: Very impressive looking, isn’t it?
AM: Well, in your case it clearly worked every time.
Other: Yeah.
DM: Yeah.
AM: But it must have been daunting for the rest of the crew.
DM: Well, I think they were quite happy we were doing it actually.
AM: Yeah. And what about the tail gunner for him probably had the best view of all of this?
DM: Yeah. Well, he just used to give us a lot of instructions.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: Right. So, after a night sortie over Germany —
DM: Yeah.
AM: When you came back to Bardney just tell me sort of what happened after you landed.
DM: Well, if you’d been across there you were entitled to one egg.
AM: Right.
DM: Which was a big deal in those days actually. Yeah. Now, let me think. Say again now.
AM: When you landed —
DM: Yeah.
AM: Presumably you got a debrief of some kind.
DM: Yeah. Yeah, there was a WAAF actually used to debrief us there and [pause] yeah.
AM: And what, can you remember what sort of things she would ask about the targets or —
DM: I’m not sure now. I’m not sure about that.
AM: That’s alright.
DM: Yeah.
AM: We can come back to it. When in the debrief were you aware, presumably you were aware of the losses to other crews. How did that affect you and your own crew when people, other crews on 9 Squadron didn’t come back?
DM: Well, it was just one feeling actually. We were bloody glad it was, it was them and not us.
AM: Right. Did you share accommodation with other crews?
DM: Well, officers, when I became an officer after a while they made all the pilots of four engine aircraft became, became officers.
AM: Right.
DM: And in fact, the rank I was a pilot officer then.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: Right. So did, did you share a hut as a crew or did you share with other crews?
DM: With other, eventually with other officers.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: Right. So what was the, the atmosphere like in the officer’s mess at Bardney?
DM: From what point of view?
AM: Well, social really.
DM: It was very very good indeed you know. Knocking back the pints.
AM: Yeah.
DM: Yeah.
AM: And did you leave the base a lot to go out to Lincoln or local pubs?
DM: When we could actually. There was always a question of transport.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: Right. So you didn’t have a car then?
DM: Not many people had a car. No.
AM: Yeah. Yeah.
DM: Yeah.
AM: So tell me something about the, the frequency of sorties. The sort of gap between one mission and then the next mission.
DM: Well, sometimes on one occasion they did four on a trot.
AM: Right. Four nights on the trot.
DM: Yeah.
AM: Right. And how did that feel?
DM: Got a bit tiring actually.
AM: I bet it was. Now, you’ve played a key part in the, in the raids on the Tirpitz.
DM: Yeah. Yeah.
AM: Tell me a little about each of them if you could including your trip to Russia.
DM: Oh yeah. Let me think now. That’s right. We flew towards, towards Archangel there and we were running short of fuel and I was just about to put it down and I saw, saw the other Lancaster around so very quickly ran and landed and got to the end and lined up with the rest of them.
AM: Right. And was that on a proper airfield?
DM: It was, no it was a grass island on [unclear]
AM: Right.
Other: Tell the story about the guy with the gun dad.
DM: The what?
Other: The story about the guy with the —
[recording paused]
DM: As soon as we landed opened the door and the, a chap in charge said, ‘Don’t move because they have orders to shoot you if you move.’ So —
AM: Good grief.
DM: They were a bit keen that way.
AM: So how long did that stand off last for?
DM: How do you mean?
AM: Well, how, how long were you faced up with this chap with the gun?
DM: Oh. Just a couple of minutes.
AM: Right. Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: So you flew a mission from Archangel.
DM: Yeah.
AM: Did that work or what happened?
DM: No. It didn’t actually. It was a bit of a disaster because the Germans got the smoke going.
AM: Right. This is smoke over the Tirpitz.
DM: Yeah.
AM: Right. So what did they aircraft actually do?
DM: Well, if you had any sense you dropped your bomb there because you’d be running short of fuel but some, some people brought them back and they were desperately short of fuel you know. Obviously.
AM: And did you go back to Archangel?
DM: Yeah.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: So and how did the Russians react to that?
DM: They thought we were a bunch of clots basically.
AM: Right. So, so did you fly a second mission from Archangel?
DM: Well, just think about that now.
AM: Just tell me that. So after you, you left Archangel —
DM: Yeah.
AM: And came back to the UK.
DM: Yeah. Yes. Yeah. I also carried a crash crew with me actually.
AM: Right. So what was that for?
DM: Sorry?
AM: So why did you carry that crash crew?
DM: Well, they had to get back. Back to the UK so —
AM: Oh, I see. So you were just a transport for them.
DM: Yeah.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: So that was the first sortie against the Tirpitz.
DM: Yeah.
AM: Tell me about the next one.
DM: You’ll have to prompt me on that now.
AM: Ok. Don, I think the second attack on the Tirpitz was, and the third were flown from Lossiemouth in Scotland. Can you tell me a little about, a little bit about both of these sorties?
DM: Yeah. Well, we obviously flew up from, from Bardney and we stopped in Lossiemouth. You’ll have to prompt me on that.
AM: That’s alright. So you went to Lossiemouth. And did you, were the bombs loaded at Lossiemouth for the trip to, to the fjords?
DM: Yeah. Yeah.
AM: Right. And was this a day raid or a night raid?
DM: It was a day raid.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: Roughly how many aeroplanes, aircraft were on this second raid?
DM: Thirty.
AM: Right. Gosh. Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: And was it successful or not?
Other: Was it successful, dad?
DM: Was it? Well yeah. Was it or not? I’m not sure.
AM: Don, on the third raid against the Tirpitz what sort of weapon was the Lancaster carrying?
DM: Carrying a six tonne, a six tonne Tallboy. Yeah.
AM: Right. So one Tallboy.
DM: Oh yeah. One.
AM: Right.
DM: Six tonnes.
AM: Right.
DM: That’s enough.
AM: A huge weapon.
DM: Yeah.
AM: Were all the aircraft equipped with Tallboy?
DM: In the end yes. So —
AM: Right. Right. And how did you release? Singly or as a group?
DM: Singly.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: And where were you in the stream attacking the Tirpitz?
DM: I was at the end there because I was wind finding. That’s right. I remember that now.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: So, tell me the purpose of wind finding.
DM: Yeah. The purpose of wind finding was to have an accurate wind for, for dropping your bomb because if you hadn’t got it right actually it would be off target.
AM: Right. So how did how did you go about that?
DM: Ok. I used to fly into wind and then go down for about, it was a racetrack. Down for about two minutes then back, drift and back over again. And the distance between we had flown and that was that was a wind then.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: So you passed that wind to the other crews.
DM: Yeah. And whoever was in charge assessed it. I mean he might not think yours was the best so he’d decide which was the correct one or the best one.
AM: Right. So, so this left you then at the back of the stream.
DM: Yeah. Yeah.
AM: Right. So, when you released your Tallboy what happened then?
DM: Oh, you came up about seven hundred feet.
AM: Right. Right. And did you know then what the result of the attack? Could you see anything?
DM: Not really.
AM: No.
DM: No.
AM: So when did you find out the raid had been a, a success?
On the way home actually. On the BBC news.
AM: Right.
DM: Still flying home.
AM: Right. That must have been amazing.
DM: It was.
AM: Yeah.
DM: It was quite something.
AM: Yeah. I’ll just switch if off.
[recording paused]
AM: Don, what sort of time of day was the release over the target at the fjord against the Tirpitz?
DM: About 1 o’clock.
AM: Right. And what about enemy fighters? Were there any there?
DM: There should have been but as I said we had an anti-Nazi sympathiser who sent them to the wrong place.
AM: Gosh.
DM: Yeah. A bit of luck for us actually.
AM: Yeah. I mean what do you think? Can you remember what kind of fighters that were based there?
DM: Yeah. Focke Wulf 190.
AM: Which are fairly powerful machines.
DM: Indeed. Yeah.
AM: Yeah. And what sort of, what sort of effect would that have had against a daytime Lancaster?
DM: We probably would lost half of them. Fifty percent losses.
AM: Right. Right. So when you heard the news on the BBC that the Tirpitz was no more.
DM: Yeah.
AM: What, what did you feel like?
DM: I felt very glad we wouldn’t have to go back again.
AM: I’ll bet you were.
DM: Yeah.
AM: I’ll switch that off.
[recording paused]
AM: Don, while you were at Bardney did you get any opportunity to go back to Scotland to visit your family?
DM: I think I did on one occasion. Then later on actually and we landed at Lossiemouth.
AM: Oh right. You flew up.
DM: Yeah.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: And then did you get a train or —
DM: I think there was transport laid on there.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: And what was it like to be back home now as, you know an experienced pilot? You probably won’t like me saying this but something of a hero in the community. What was it like to be home?
DM: Well, I wasn’t regarded as a hero because everybody else was doing their own thing as well you know.
AM: Right. Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: And after you visited your folks you went back by the same way to Bardney.
DM: Yeah. Yeah.
AM: Right. Now, towards the end of the campaign I believe you flew a sortie to Berchtesgaden.
DM: Yeah. Yeah.
AM: Can you tell me just a wee bit about that?
DM: Let me think about that now.
AM: I’ll switch this off.
[recording paused]
AM: Don, I believe that after the end of the war you took some of the ground crew on flights.
DM: Yes. That’s right. I said that.
AM: Over Germany.
DM: Yeah. Yeah.
AM: What was, what was that like for you? But more importantly what was it like for them?
DM: I think they were a bit, a bit aghast at the damage that had been done you know.
AM: Right. And what sort of places did you take them to? Which cities?
DM: Cologne, because that was nearer there and then Stuttgart. Yeah.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: Right. And because you flew past Stuttgart when you went to Berchtesgaden by the Alps.
DM: Yeah. Yeah.
AM: Now that was a long long sortie.
DM: Yeah. Yeah.
AM: Yeah. Was that the last operational sortie you flew or —
DM: I’m not sure.
AM: No.
DM: No.
AM: No, so when the, when the war actually finished what was the feeling like at Bardney?
DM: Let me just think now. Well, I think over you know.
AM: Yeah.
DM: Yeah. And we could go, could go on some jollies there and —
AM: Yeah.
DM: Yeah.
AM: And had you made up your own mind what you wanted to do with your life at that point?
DM: Yeah. I wanted to go into civil flying.
AM: Right.
DM: The whole point of it actually. I was very keen.
AM: Right.
DM: To go flying solely.
AM: Right. And how did you go about that? Could you do training with the RAF or did you have to leave the RAF at that point?
DM: Let me think now. Yeah.
AM: Right.
DM: They failed me. So —
AM: What did they fail you on? I find that hard to believe.
DM: Well, the old CO took a scunner to me actually.
AM: Really. And what aeroplane was that on?
DM: That was on a York.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: Which was a bit like a Lancaster.
DM: Yeah. Yeah.
AM: Right. Right so after this chap had the cheek to fail you what happened then?
DM: Oh yes. Yes. I remember now. I was walking along [unclear] Street which was in the middle of London and I saw an advert said, four engine, “Four engine pilots wanted.” So I went straight in, said, ‘I’m a four engine pilot.’ The next thing I was flying down to Rio.
AM: Brilliant. Brilliant. That was the start of your civil flying career.
DM: Yeah. Yeah.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah.
AM: And how long did you fly for from that point on? How many years do you think you flew?
DM: Thirty five.
AM: Right. And what was the last aeroplane you flew?
DM: A 747.
AM: So the Lancaster to the 747.
DM: Yeah. Yeah.
AM: Quite remarkable.
DM: Yeah.
AM: Now, coming back to the war.
DM: Yeah.
AM: You, a lot of the sorties might merge together. What was your, you’re looking back now you know are there any things that really stand out either about sorties or about people that will remain with you?
DM: Let me just think. Flying, flying to Berchtesgaden. Yeah. We weren’t sure what was going to happen now. You know there was a lot of but but there wasn’t, there was anybody there waiting for us because I told you they had this anti-Nazi chap.
AM: Right.
DM: Yeah. Are you alright there?
Other: [unclear] the other stories.
AM: It doesn’t matter at all. No. Is there anything else that you would like to add in that I haven’t asked you that you’d like to say about your experience?
DM: No. Not really. I think I’ve covered it all. Yes.
AM: I’ve really enjoyed it. It’s fantastic. Amazing. Can I have a look at your picture?
DM: Yes. Sure.
Other: I went down to Phil Tetlow’s funeral I think it was, wasn’t it?
DM: Yeah.
Other: About two years ago and I presented his then wife with a photo, a framed photo of this and see which one he is.
AM: I think that’s him there. Is that right?
Other: Yes. Yes. Yes. He was in the RAF much longer than dad actually. I think, I think he —
DM: He went into Control. Yeah.
Other: Right. So he made it his, it was his —
DM: What dear?
Other: It was his career.
DM: Yeah.
AM: He went into air traffic control did he?
DM: Yeah. Yeah.
AM: Right.
DM: This fell out of your —
AM: Oh right. Bookmark.
DM: Yeah.
AM: Right.
Other: It’s hard to believe that these are all twenty something.
AM: I think that’s what’s —
DM: I mean that’s that alone I find incredible because I look at a twenty, twenty one year old today and I’m thinking very frightening. Put them in the same situation I don’t know but you know I’m very proud of them all.
AM: Yes. I mean that is the question. You just don’t know how today’s youngsters would react.
DM: Oh, I think they’d do very well.
AM: Yeah. I suspect so too.
DM: Yeah.
AM: If push came to the shove.
Other: Yeah. Exactly.
AM: I mean because the difference when I joined the Air Force which was in the late 60s it had become a peace time Air Force, you know.
DM: Right.
AM: There was still quite a lot of wartime people around. Not many pilots interestingly. Quite a lot of engineers and navigators.
DM: Navigators. Right.
AM: And the only people you saw with medals of course were wartime —
DM: Yeah.
AM: Aircrew.
DM: Yeah.
AM: And I mean it used to be a joke that the average number of medals was zero in my peer group until much later.
Other: Until the Falklands really.
AM: Until the Falklands.
Other: Yeah.
AM: And then of course since I mean some of the stories coming out of —
Other: Iraq and —
AM: Iraq and Afghanistan.
DM: Afghanistan.
AM: Is amazing.
DM: Yeah. Unbelievable. Yeah.
AM: Right. Now, can I, do you mind if I take a photograph of you there?
DM: Ok.
AM: To go with the record.
DM: I’ll probably crack the lens but never mind.
AM: [laughs] Right.
DM: Ok.
[pause]
AM: And get one of you together as well. Right.
[pause]
AM: Very good.
AM: Ok.
That’s better. One more. I’ll get one of Alison in a minute.
AM: I’ve got a form that I need to sign.
Other: Alright. No worries. It’s ok.
AM: Right. You must be immensely proud of your father.
Other: Oh I am.
AM: Yeah.
Other: Absolutely.
AM: Yeah.
Other: Absolutely. I mean like I’ve seen where he’s been and dad won’t mind me saying this but where he’s been interviewed in years gone by where the memories are fresher.
AM: Right.
Other: And I think you know as time goes on.
AM: Remarkable.
Other: Yeah. I think. Yes.
AM: Yeah. Right.
Other: I don’t think I could remember anything at ninety five.
AM: Actually, I actually found a transcript, Don.
DM: Yeah.
AM: Of an interview you did more than ten years ago.
Other: Oh really.
DM: Oh yeah.
AM: With a bloke from a magazine.
DM: Oh yeah. Yeah.
AM: About your book.
DM: Oh.
Other: Oh.
AM: Quite interesting.
DM: Yeah.
AM: I found it online.
Other: Oh, did you really?
AM: I just typed in Don MacIntosh DFC and up it came.
Other: Really.
DM: Good Lord.
Other: Interesting.
AM: Amazing, isn’t it?
Other: Yeah. Oh a lot of times —
AM: So I read through it. The same guy —
Other: Because I think you also did something for BBC. I remember when we came for your eightieth.
AM: Right.
Other: Actually dad had a interview I think with BBC. I don’t know if you remember actually so.
[background chat about photos]
Other: So, how do you think you did dad?
DM: What?
Other: How did you think you did?
DM: You tell me.
Other: No. Do you feel you did alright? I mean I know there were a few pauses but I think like he said you know seventy years on.
DM: Yeah.
Other: I’m glad that you did your book when you did it. I don’t think you could have written your book now.
DM: Oh no. Absolutely not.
Other: No, I’m just saying you would have been too tired eh.
DM: I wouldn’t have the energy anyway.
Other: Energy. So, I think when you started it it’s been out fifteen years so that would have been ‘80 when it was published and then you worked on it for fifteen years so so it was you were at the end of your sixties early seventies. Right dear?
DM: Yeah. Yeah.
]]> eng]]> Sound]]> Royal Air Force]]> Royal Air Force. Bomber Command]]> Great Britain]]> Norway]]> Russia (Federation)]]> England--Lincolnshire]]> Russia (Federation)--Yagodnik]]> Andrew Panton]]> IBCC Digital Archive]]> Julie Williams]]> Maureen Clarke]]> Pending review]]> eng]]> Sound]]> Royal Air Force]]> Royal Air Force. Bomber Command]]> Germany]]> Great Britain]]> Norway]]> Germany--Berchtesgaden]]> Norway--Bergen]]> Norway--Tromsø]]> Scotland--Lossiemouth]]> Russia (Federation)]]> Russia (Federation)--Yagodnik]]> 1944]]> 1945]]>
This item is available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.]]> Ken Cothliff]]> David Tappin]]> IBCC Digital Archive]]> Peter Schulze]]> Pending review]]> AG: Ok. It is my pleasure.
I: I may start with the first question. Is there a military tradition in your family?
AG: Not at all. My, we came, my family came from France, we were Huguenots. And one of this Frenchmen who came over, one Galland was, was a French captain, the chivalry, it was the only [unclear] we have as military.
I: Right. When did you first fly in an airplane?
AG: Oh, I did fly my first time when I was sixteen. I flew in gliders, not very far from my home there were some, an area in which gliding course was done. And I started there in ’20, ’28, I was sixteen years old.
I: I understand you set a record in your gilder.
AG: Ja, that’s right, that’s right. A record in endurance. This area did not have very high mountains, there were only hills and I did for more than two hours, two hours twenty minutes, something like this. This was an area record.
I: Ok.
AG: With my own plane. I got a plane when I finished, [unclear]Schule, I finished
UI2: Like University.
AG: Ja.
I: When did you decide to become a professional pilot and how did you achieve this?
AG: I did it all during my schooltime. Before I left school, I decided to be a commercial pilot and I told this one Sunday, walking with my father outside and he asked me: ‘What do you want to be later on?’. And I said: ‘I want to be a commercial pilot in an airline’. ‘Ah’, he said, ‘don’t you want to study?’. I said, ‘No, I want to make my exam as a professional pilot’. And he said. ‘You can do this, but I have not learned that this is a profession. You can teach me, do you expect a regular fee or do you fly for tips?’
[UI laughs]
AG: You can see how the times have changed. Now the airlines, they don’t like this joke. But they are making a lot of money also. And it is a fine profession. Also today, I think so.
I: So you then go from the airline directly into the Luftwaffe?
AG: No. The first year, at the end of the first year we were told that this was a commercial pilot school. The students were offered to become military pilots. We were told, commercial pilot doesn’t have good aspects for the future, but we will soon have military pilots and you can decide to switch over to the military career. I didn’t like this very much but there was no other questions. This was a strong invitation.
I: [laughs] There must have been many applications to become a professional pilot in those days.
AG: For the commercial side or the military?
I: For the military.
AG: For the military. No, we didn’t have any military organisation at that time at all, everything was, inexistent, was private, commercially or private or it was camouflaged, military.
I: The black Luftwaffe.
AG: The black Luftwaffe did start already in these days.
I: Yes.
AG: But most of the pilots were trained in Russia as you know, Lipezk, a Russian base, we had an agreement with Russia and we trained our people there.
I: Were you there?
AG: No, I have not been there. When Göring came in power, he cancelled this agreement with Russia and he started with Italy an agreement on a similar base. So, I was in the first group which was sent to Italy to be trained there, militarywise. We did not learn too much there in Italy. This agreement was not based on a good understanding between Göring and Balbo, maybe they had language problems, so the Italians did believe we were beginners and we knew already to fly. I remember one day, a French acrobatic pilot that had set up a record [unclear] inverted, invertedly and for two hours or so and we at this time did make acrobatics also there. So I decided when I was, when it was my turn to fly, I went up and go this way, I moved around the airfield all the time invertedly. To make a joke then they sent another airplane up, dropped down [laughs].
I: [laughs] Did you break the record?
AG: No [laughs]. I didn’t have fuel for this. I flew for ten minutes or so, but I showed.
UI2: What type of aircraft were you flying at that time, sir?
AG: Italian aircraft.
UI2: Italian aircraft. Macchi and [unclear].
I: When the Luftwaffe was formed officially in 1935, what was your first unit and what aircraft did you fly?
AG: When I had finished the training, I was ordered to go to the first fighter group which was built close to Berlin, in Döbritz. This was the first group of the fighter wing Richthofen, of the new fighter wing Richthofen. So, I came to this wing as, I was lieutenant, but I was released as Leutenant and we were installed again as Kettenführer.
I: Flight Commander.
AG: Ja, something like this. But, very soon later die Tarnung, the camouflage was taken away and we were made Lieutenants again.
I: I see. You would fly the Heinkel 51?
AG: No, at this time we had the Arado 65. And then we had the Arado 68 and then came the 51.
I: Heinkel 51.
AG: The second group later was set up in Jüterbog, south of Berlin, as the second group that have the 51s already.
I: Did you have any flying accidents in the early days?
AG: [laughs] I had many accidents and many damages. Sometimes they called me the millionaire of the new Luftwaffe, it was for the value of the airplanes I had damaged or destroyed.
[All laugh]
AG: But this was overdoned a little bit. I had one terrible accident, with a Stieglitz, with a biplane by doing acrobatics. I was very good in acrobatics and I had to train for flight demonstrations, which were set up in different towns and I had to show there acrobatics in the Stieglitz. And in this case I had modified the horizontal stabilizer in order to get better flight conditions in inverted flights, but this resulted that the aircraft did have a complete [unclear] conditions in spin. And I couldn’t recover, I could not recover the plane from spin earlier enough so I hit the ground in this position about 45°, this was a terrible accident.
I: I understand that after that [unclear] you are very good at passing eyetests.
AG: [laughs], ja, it is true. In this case I had, the plane had an open cockpit and I had glasses and I destroyed one eye with a splinter from [unclear] glasses and I had a damage on the eye and this resulted in a shorter sight of this eye. And I knew I had to pass a new physical and so to be sure I learnt the numbers and the, was ist Buchstaben?
I: Letters.
AG: The letters. I learned the letters from the table and I knew them by memorising them and I passed my exam very fine. [laughs]
I: The doctors they were bewildered.
AG: Yes [laughs]
I: [laughs]. Yes Can you tell us something about the airfighting in Spain with the Condor legion and just how much influence did Mölders have on evolving tactics for the Luftwaffe?
AG: [clears throat] Mölders became my successor as squadron leader and he, my squadron was equipped with 51s and we did ground attacks. And we were very successful in, we were helping the army, the Spanish army in their advances. Mölders arranged to change the missions to real fighter missions and so his, my other squadron was equipped then with 109s and Mölders started then to find a new tactic. He really invented the open flying formation, finger-four formation and he also had set up a, set up the methods to train the pilots in this way. So we flew in a very open formation, two planes at the same altitude, about onehundred, onehundredfifty meters apart
I: Apart.
AG: From the other and we moved all the time this way in the air in a very open formation. And this had the advantage that the number two could see also, could observe the airspace. In a close formation, number two and number three are seeing nothing, nothing but the guide only. So the next two they are flying from here to there also in this open formation. And this was really invented and explored by Mölders, this is his merit, is no question. By the way, was later on also a very good formation leader. We have pilots, and another example is Hartmann, Hartmann was not a leader at all, he could only fly by his own, and many pilots, Udet was also such a pilot, couldn’t lead a formation, I was told. Mölders once told me: ‘I will tell you one thing, you can become a Richthofen, you can become a new Richthofen, I wanted to be a Boelcke’, this means he wanted to fly with his head, so he was convinced that he was taktisch. And he was [unclear].
I: Did you ever fly the Heinkel 112?
AG: No, I was there when these people were doing [screams] this, the Olympic heroes there but I could not, I could not be pleased by looking at the athletics. So I decided to sell my ticket, sold it. I went up to Warnemünde or in the North, on the East Sea and I did chase Swedish girls, was more pleasant.
I: We have heard of your reputation. [laughs] Is another Galland legend. Did you ever fly the Heinkel 112?
AG: No.
I: Would it have been a better fighter than the Messerschmitt 109?
AG: Ja, ja, it’s no question, would have been a much better fighter than the other plane but the plane was more expensive to be built. The wing profile was changing all the time. The wing of the 109 was much more, much easier to build and for much less money to build. And this was one of the reasons why it has been decided in favour of the 109. Especially the undercarriage of the 109 was very narrow and the plane did have a terrible tendency to loop, to break out in taking off and landing, specially with crosswind. The aircraft lost an unbelievable number of planes by, of 109s by accidents during the war.
I: Would the extra range of the Heinkell had been an advantage to you in the battle of Britain?
AG: Of course, it would have been, would have been an advantage, but it wouldn’t have been decisive. The outcome of the battle would have been more or less the same because the Luftwaffe was not build and was not equipped for a battle like battle of Britain, was not build for strategic airwar. The Luftwaffe was for defense, for air defense and also for helping the army.
I: Tactical support.
AG: Ja, tactical support.
I: After Dunkirk, and the fall of France, did you think that the Luftwaffe could win the battle of Britain?
AG: No, we did not believe this, we did hope it but we learned very soon that this was not possible. Lord Dowding was a very, very cleaver man in guiding his fighters the right way and he did not use the fighters so much as Göring did. He was a much better tactician than Göring. There’s no question.
I: And yet he was sacked, he was discharged shortly after the battle of Britain by the High Command.
AG: Yes. Dowding?
I: Downing.
AG: But he came back.
I: Yes. Well, he was never honoured as he should have been for his part in the battle of Britain. Because mainly of Leigh-Mallory.
AG: Ah ja. This are [unclear] conditions and we learned during the battle that Dowding was a very, very cleaver man and Göring had the intention, first to bring the English Fighter Command down and then to bomb England and bomb London by using this medium bombers we had, the Heinkel 111 mostly [unclear] we had the Junkers 88. But the [clears throat] the Stukas had to withdrawn from the battle very soon because they detect high losses, they could not be escorted [unclear]. So the next decision in favour of the Stukas was a mistake. Another mistake was the set up of the 110 formations, what we called Zerstörer, destroyer. It was supposed to be an escort fighter, but a twin-engine fighter aircraft cannot be compared with a single engine fighter. Is always less maneuvrable and has not the acceleration, he has better armament but in fact the 110 as an escort fighter had to be escorted by single engine fighters and we had to withdraw first the Stukas, Junkers 87, and then the 110 from the battle they could not stand the too high losses.
I: Did this come as a major shock to the crews of the 110s?
AG: Ja, it was a shock, but we knew that it would come. We knew this from exercises. Before the war. We could learn in this maneuvers that the Stuka and the 110 would not, would not be used for long time to [unclear] because the performance were not. Performance were compared to single engine fighters were too low.
I: Your famous comment about the, to Göring about the Spitfires, giving you a squadron of Spitfires, you feel that perhaps would not have made the difference either?
AG: Göring came during the battle of Britain with this special train in the Pas-de-Calais and he ordered Mölders and myself to come. And he blamed us for half an hour for not performing the escort. Our bombers wanted to have the fighters sitting on their wing, on their wing tips but by doing this with the 109 we could not stay, we could not fight, we needed speed and this, our speed was not higher than the bomber formation speed, with outside bomb, so the bombs were hanging there. We had to cross over the and below the formation, but was a higher speed and the bombers did not like it. And Göring blamed us, we should sit on their wing tip, we should not leave this position, we should defend the bombers, and I told him we can only defend the bombers by being aggressive, by being offensive, we have to attack the enemy fighters. And this we can only do when we have a higher speed. And Göring said: ‘Don’t talk such a bla bla, you have the best fighter of the world, the Messerschmitt 109 and everybody knows it, this world war I fighter aircraft’. And finally after half an hour he finished this blaming and he asked Mölders: ‘What can I do to improve the fighting capacity of your wing commanders at this time?’. And Mölders said he wanted to have the Messerschmitt 109 with the more powerfull Daimler-Benz 605 M engines, that was an engine with a higher capation [unclear] and this octane 100 fuel. And Göring said to his aide: ‘Take a note, Mölders will get the first engines’. And then he said: ‘What can I do for your wing?’. And I said: ‘Please Reichsmarschall equip my wings with Spitfires’. [laughs] I do not know, what gave me the courage. [all laugh] Göring was standing there, he was unable to say anything. He looked at me, he turned around and [unclear], trying to restrain.
I: That is legend, sir, it is legend now.
AG: But, I never did get the Spitfire. Mölders did get the engines, but I never got. But I was not punished, [unclear], I was not punished, I expected.
I: You were respected for us. In your opinion, if Leigh-Mallory had controlled 11 Group with his big wing tactics and Keith Park had controlled 12 Group in the battle of Britain, the two group commanders, do you think the outcome would have been the same?
AG: Ja, this is, as I said, true English question. I know this and I believe it would have been good to have a bigger formation than only one wing, only one squadron. But not the only group in one wing. So wings with forty, more or less, forty aircraft or twenty to forty, that would be the best in my opinion.
I: Why were Messerschitt 109s not fitted with dropable fuel tanks during the battle of Britain?
AG: That was a real mistake, absolutely was forgotten or they were not available, we have used in Spain already as I told you, but for the 109 we did not, we did not [unclear]
I: And yet it would have helped your range.
AG: It would have helped but we would have, had to drop the tanks already when we came over England.
I: Yes.
AG: Because the dogfight, fighter against fighter, with drop tanks ist not very [unclear]. So later on when we got them, Göring extended an order not to drop the tanks, only when we were attacked.
I: One of the major factors was that the Luftwaffe didn’t concentrate its attack on the communications network and particularly the radar stations. Why was that so?
AG: A mistake.
I: Again a mistake.
AG: Absolutely a big mistake.
I: You knew about them.
AG: Ja, we knew of them, we had photos and it was a mistake. It was a mistake to finish the attack against Fighter Command was a mistake also, we should have continued. Ensure the british fighters did not come up when we came only by fighter. We had to use some bombers to go with us, to drop some bombs, to force the british fighters to come up. But to switch over from the battle against Fighter Command to the attacks on London was a terrible mistake.
I: How would you compare the Messerschmitt 109e with the Mark I Spitfire and Hurricane? I believe yours actually had Mickey Mouse on its, why did you have Mickey Mouse as your logo?
AG: When I was in Spain, Mickey Mouse had just come up everywhere and one of the pilots already in operations had the Mickey Mouse. And I did like this, I said, I will take the Mickey Mouse also, modified it a little bit and then I was told I should not use the Mickey Mouse because it was an American.
I: Yes, quite.
AG: Toy and this did make me decide to have it at all, to keep it and I kept it all the time.
I: Yes, indeed.
AG: I still today in my car [laughs].
I: And how do you think the 109 compared to the Spitfire then? The 109e?
AG: The e was not the best, the g was later better, g4. The Messerschmitt was, besides bad conditions in taking off and landing, based on this narrow undercarriage. The Me 109 had only one advantage, that was the fuel injection of the engine. We could easily use, manoeuvre was negative g, [unclear]
I: Yes.
AG: And the engine would drive perfectly, would not stop. We knew it was the carburator immediately when you get negative g and it stops. So, we could, when we were fired, we dropped only the nose down, and always more down and we could escape. This was a advantage. In other flying conditions both types, the Spitfire and the 109 were more or less equal. Acceleration. Manouvreability was better in the Spitfire, the Spitfire had a lower wingload, had a lower wingload and was better in manoeuvre, but acceleration were more or less the same.
I: Yes. I understand, Sir, that you had three brothers who were also fighter pilots with the Luftwaffe. Did they see service throughout the war with you?
AG: Ja, Ja. First came my younger brother to my wing. He started as a anti-aircraft and he was unhappy there, I took him out and he got a special training and then he came to my wing. And he became very soon a very capable, very good fighter pilot, very good. He had in his time 57 victories between b7, four-engine B-17s, was a high number. And he got the Ritterkreuz, this decoration we had. And my younger brother, the youngest brother, he had some difficulties, he came also from the anti-aircraft and had also a special training. I took him in my wing and in the beginning he had very high difficulties and he asked me to help him. So, I went with him to his 109 and he was sitting in the aircraft, immediately I saw he was sitting in the wrong way in the cockpit. When you had not the right position, then, the, what is when you are shooting?
I: Gunsight.
AG: Gunsight. Gunsight. He was sitting wrong behind the gunsight and this resulted in a mistake of his balance, of his shooting.
I: Yes.
AG: So, I corrected this [unclear] he got in the aircraft and from one day to the other he shot up.
I: Really?
AG: He was so happy. I also. He was a very young fellow, he died with twentythree years, he had 17 victories. And the elder one, he was, was a bad fighter. He was really a bad fighter, he wasn’t able to do anything, he was hopeless, so I managed to get him to the air reconnaissance 109. He flew there but he was not successful [unclear].
I: Did the two other brothers today survive the war with you?
AG: Only the elder, only the elder one but in the mean time he died also. Ten years ago.
I: Alright. I understand that at one time your crew chief was actually given a rocket for saving your life. What’s the story behind that?
AG: He one time did install an additional
I: Armour plate
AG: Plate,
I: Armour?
AG: Armour, armour plate behind me. And this armour blade went over my head and he didn’t tell me when I crossed the cockpit and were taking off, I shut the roof and I hit my head terribly and I blamed him: ‘You did not tell me you installed this’. ‘Wait, when I’m back I will tell you something’. And during this mission, I was shot down and I got an impact on this plate, exactly on this plate. [everybody laughs] So I didn’t blame him, I gave him zweihundert Marks and a special leave.
I: Yes. There is one well-known photograph of your Messerschmitt with a modification of a gunsight. It’s a well-known photograph.
AG: Was a mistake.
I: Was it?
AG: Was absolute a mistake. I thought I could use it for shooting on a longer distance but I learned immediately it is good for nothing, it wasn’t even good to identify the planes. When you have a plane in front, sometimes it is difficult to decide is it 109, or is it Spitfire. So, I thought when I looked through this, I can make it out [unclear] you cannot get it concentrated in anything so I decided to get [unclear]. But this aircraft, many times it has been photographed and many times on many photos it appears with the gunsight. We had not, we had a simple gunsight I have to [unclear] this was a fixed gunsight but what we had needed was a gunsight which was directed by
I: Gyro,
AG: BY gyro,
I: By gyroscope.
AG: By gyro. This we have needed terribly. We got it finally late in ’44 but it didn’t work properly. So this was an advantage on the british you had this gyroscopic gunsight, which made shooting in terms much easier.
I: Without Operation Barbarossa, the attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, would the American 8th Air Force and Bomber Command, in your opinion, have been able to sustain the bomber offensive?
AG: No, no. We were already so much beaten at this time, we would have more fighters available for the air defense and the losses would have been higher on the other side but we could, would not have been able to stop the air offensive. The western allies, the English, the British, they did a very clever thing, to split up the air offensive in day and night offensive and the british concentrated completely on the night. This was very clever, very clever. So, we had to build up a nightfighter airforce, nightfighter force, which did not exist at the beginning of the war. Göring said: ‘Nightfighters? We don’t need them. It will never be a night bombing’. So, when he made the decision, it was a decision, it was [unclear] this. He did not accept anything what was critical or negative of the airforce, everything was first class what he did.
I: Were you ever in charge of the night fighters?
AG: Ja, I was in charge and this after the catastrophe of Hamburg. In this case, Kammhuber, general Kammhuber was responsible for the night fighters and he was a very stupid man, he didn’t fly himself and he gave orders which the night fighters didn’t accept anymore. He was using one night fighter against the incoming bombers and he could only guide one fighter. And at this time, when the Bomber Command switched over to the bomber stream, all the night fighters wanted to follow the stream, they could see it by night, depending from the visibility but with lighting from the ground and with the fire over the towns, our night fighters could see the bomber stream and by the bombers they shoot their fire, they could follow this stream but Kammhuber did not allow our night fighters to go with the stream, to follow. So, they came, the night fighters came to me and they said: ‘You must help us. Our commander, Kammhuber, he bind us on one radar, in the range of one radar, in a circle of 120 km, he bind us and we want to follow’. We used Window the first time in Hamburg and this did lead to a complete catastrophe of Kammhuber’s tactic. So I had to tell this Göring and Kammhuber was released of the [unclear] and he went over to fleet commander, airfleet commander North, 5th airfleet.
I: In Norway.
AG: Norway. And he blamed this on me, Kammhuber, they said. He didn’t say to me but he was convinced I had originated this trouble. And I had, so we had not a very good relationship [unclear]. And after the war Blank was the first man who did set up the beginning of the air force and Blank wanted to have me as the first commander of the air force. And he invited me to come and talk to me and he said: ‘I did not want to have high ranking officers of World War I in the new air force, they are too old. So, everybody has voted for you, you should be the first commander of the air force, when you accept it’. And I said: ‘I am coming from Argentina, I have no idea what is going on here, I must be, first get a complete information what is done, what is planned and so on’. And then finally this was done and I decided to go up to do it, that [unclear] did say this to Blank. Then came a stop on the rebuilding of our new air force because the French blocked, they blocked this, was the European Defense Committee, Community and [unclear] came up this time. And the French did stop the European Defense Committee. So, and this was one time delayed and then this time Kammhuber came as the first commander of the air force because Blank did change against Strauss, Strauss being Bavarian he brought Kammhuber with him, who was also Bavarian and he was [unclear] over. Kammhuber did build up the air force. Was a nice story. When Kammhuber was in charge of the night fighters, I had to see him in order to use his night organisation also during daytime. Kammhuber did denie this completely, he said: ‘No, I have set up for the night fighters and you are day fighter, and they will set up your organisation, radar and everything’. And I said: ‘No, that is not true, we are not so rich that we can do this. This is a hotel with a hotel organisation, we have a night porter and a day porter, you are the night porter, I am the day porter’. We blamed for hours, we could not convince, and then he said: ‘ [unclear] I will show a complete new radar installation I have just set up’. And we went in his car, a big Mercedes, open Mercedes, his big flag as commanding general on front and there was a soldier of the infantry [unclear] He blocked us and said: ‘Your passport’. Kammhuber said: ‘Don’t you know me?’ ‘No. Passport’. [unclear] said: ‘Do you know this flag? I am your commanding officer’. He said: ‘This can be said by everybody. Passport.’ Kammhuber made a head like this and finally he said: ‘Do you know him?’. He looked at me and said: ‘Ah, I believe I have seen him on a [unclear], on a newspaper, in front of a newspaper, a big photo. I think that this is Major Mölders, then you can go’. [unclear] He was [unclear] also, Major Mölders.
I: I’ve been asked by some of the veterans who flew from the Yorkshire fields, where we are from, from 5 Group and 6 Group veterans, what were your feelings towards the night bomber crews, when you were general of night fighters?
AG: I didn’t understand too much about night fighting, I must say this, I’m a complete day fighter, and [coughs] we had a saying as dayfighters: the night is not good for fighter pilots, the night is good for bitches, but not for fighters. But really this was a good organisation and also the guiding systems we had in the night fighters they were very fine, very very fine. And the night fighters did have a better fighter, leading fighter, guiding organisation than any fighters had but they did not need it.
I: This was Wild Boar and Tame Boar.
AG: Ja.
I: After the raid on Schweinfurt-Regensburg, did you think the 8th Air Force could be stopped by the Luftwaffe?
AG: No, I did not believe this, there were too many mistakes done and too many things were not performed. When Hamburg occurred, everybody, Göring did call a big meeting and all important men were present at this meeting. There was a unique opinion, we have now to change the priority and we have to give the air defense first priority. And we have to stop everything else but we have to concentrate all our power on air defense. Göring was convinced and he decided to bring this up to Hitler immediately. This meeting was in Hitler’s headquarters, Wolfsschanze in East Prussia. So Göring went to Hitler. He came back after one hour, he was completely destroyed, he broke down in his quarter and finally he ordered [unclear] and myself to come and he said: ‘Hitler has not accepted our plan. Hitler has decided to build up a new attack air force, a new bomber air force to bomb England. Bombing can only be stopped by bombing, not by air defense’. And he had explained this to me and Hitler has right. He fall down completely, he is right as he is always right. The way through air defense is too far away and we were stopped, we were blocked from continue bombing aim. So Peltz, general Peltz, a young fellow was made the attack guidance, the attack commander in England. This was immediately after Hamburg.
I: 1943.
AG: Ja. Unbelievable, unbelievable.
I: Was this the beginning of what they call the Bedeker Raids?
AG: Ja.
I: Where they used the Bedeker Atlas to bomb.
AG: Ja.
I: May I ask you general?
AG: Göring was not stupid, he was a clever man. He knew this was wrong, but he has never resisted Hitler. When Hitler gave an order, he immediately was of the same opinion, because Göring was not a man for combat, was not a man for fight, was not a man for war. Göring wanted to continue his life as the most richest man in Europe, he wanted to be brilliant and he didn’t like the war at all.
I: Without a western front to defend, could Operation Barbarossa have succeded?
AG: Could?
I: If Germany had not been fighting on two fronts, could you have succeeded with the attack on the Soviet Union?
AG: With the attack on the Soviet Union. It is difficult to decide but we were close to win the battle, but we have been blocked again by beginning the offensive against Russia by the Italians. When you have the Italians as your allies, you have 50% of the war already lost, you we can be sure. [UI and UI2 laugh] Really. The Italians have started the war in Africa, so this did force us to go to Africa. Then, Germany wanted to take over Malta. Mussolini said: ‘No, Malta, we will take over. You can take Greece’. And we took Greece with much losses and it was not good for nothing, I know. And the Russian campaign has been delayed by the Italians again, this time by the war in the Balcans, by attacking Albania. And we had to go to the Balcans. This [unclear] a delay of half a year. Again our allies deterred us. So I still am going to say, if we could have won the war, I think we could have broken the power of Russia, we could have. We were close to Moskow and if we would have started half a year earlier, everything would have been much more in favour.
I: A huge country of course.
AG: Ja.
I: You were a pallbearer at the funeral of Ernst
AG: I knew the war was lost, was probably or was not to be won, there is a difference, already in 19, in the second war Russian campaign, this was
I: 1942. 1942.
AG: 1942. In this year I remember conversations I had with the chief of staff of the Air force, Jeschonnek, who told me: ‘You can believe me the war cannot be won anymore’. I said: ‘I agree competely’. But we were not allowed to talk about this, to tell this anybody. And we, ourselves, we fighters, young people, we knew the war could not be won anymore but we hoped, did heartly hope, that the war could be brought to an better end. This means, the unconditional surrender condition, this was something we are fighting against up to the last man.
I: You were a pallbearer at the funeral of Ernst Udet. When did you realise that he had committed suicide and what are your memories of Udet?
AG: When we at the funeral of Udet, we were told by Göring, Göring could difficultly close his mouth if he wanted to talk. So, he did tell us what has happened and some weeks, three weeks before, I was with Udet one night in the special train of Göring in East Prussia. And Udet was completely broken, completely broken, he was blamed to be responsible for the armament which were not going up and [unclear] and this was true. Udet was responsible for the development, for test, and for armament, for building, for the industry, and this he could not do, he was not able to do this at all, he could not organise the industry and he did not have the help to do this correctly. And therefore, he missed completely, lost completely this order to build up the industry. But this was not the responsibility of Udet, this was the responsibility of Göring to make him responsible for this. There were other people, Milch is an example, was absolutely more capable to do this and the production went up when Milch took over the post of Udet. So, is this the answer?
I: What are your memories of him as a person?
AG: Oh, he was a wonderful man. He was a wonderful, charming man, he was an artist. He was joking, he was very much liked by everybody. He was a great flier, pilot and you could have a lot of joke with him. And we did have.
UI. Yes.
AG: He did like the whiskeys.
I: And the ladies?
AG: Also.
I: [laughs] I understand that Douglas Bader was a guest of Geschwader 26 for a while.
AG: Ja. I have the date here when he was shot up, that was in 1943. There was an incoming English Royal Air Force attack, Blenheims with escort of Spitfires, and we had a big fight over the Pas de Calais. This was my wing and the wing Richthofen, but in this case only my wing 26 was involved, we did shot down I think 6 Spitfires and 2 or 3 Blenheims, I shot a Blenheim down. And I shot, I combat also with Spitfires but I think [unclear] off 3 Blenheims and 6 Spitfires downed. And in the afternoon one of my group commanders phoned me and said: ‘We have shot down one incredible man, an English wing commander, by the name Bader, he said, Bader said wanted only to be called Bader. He has two wooden legs and you must invite him to come immediately, bring him my invitation. And Bader had to bail out and he left one of his wooden legs in the Spit and the Spit landed with out him and my mechanics could repair this wooden leg a little bit. So, I was called some days later, Bader can come now and visit you. And I did send him my biggest car and a good looking, first Lieutenant. Bader came on. I had informed myself a little bit about him and it was absolutely a great impression, from the first moment, this stepped on his two wooden legs. And Bader said to me: ‘Can you send a message to our side that I am safe in your hands and I wanted to have a second set of my legs, which I have in my [unclear] and a good pipe and tobacco’. I said:’ Yes, I will try it’. So, then I phoned Göring in the evening and said: ‘We have Wing Commander Bader here, a man with two wooden legs, unbelievable man, sympathic and [unclear] the rules [unclear] immediately’. And I said: ‘We wanted, or he, he wanted that we communicate to the other side, to the English side, he is in our hands and he wants to have a spare legs’. And Göring said: ‘You can do this, we have done this in world war one, many times, you can do this, I like this, I like this’, the meaning was [unclear]. So, we put it on the way of the international sea rescue. It was confirmed from the other side, I communicate this to Göring and he said: ‘How do you want to do this?’ I said: ‘We are waiting now that the English [unclear] and then we make a proposal, we make an open space with an airfield and we guarantee a safe landing and coming to our side and of course we will make some photos’. [laughs]
I: Doctor Goebbels [laughs]
AG: This, our message was confirmed through the other side and nothing happened two, three days and then came in the same way, in the same way, the same frequency, a message: in this present attack we are doing, we drop not only bombs, we drop also a case with the spare legs from Bader. They dropped our airfield [unclear], no, not [unclear], Saint-Omer, dropped a case with a parachute, I have photos of this, there were the spare legs, that was not very nice, we were disappointed. So Bader many time has visited me, for tea and then I showed him the aircraft from my wing and showed especially mine, my 109 and he wanted to step out, he mounted the cockpit immediately with his wooden legs, this is unbelievable. And as he was sitting in the aircraft, Heidi, you must being the photos, and he said, I showed him everything, explained [unclear] please can you start the engine [all laugh] all around the place, only around the place. I said, no wing commander, let’s stop this nonsense because I have two 109s for my own personal use and if you take off I would have to follow you. And I would have to shot at you again and I do not want to do this. He was laughing. Of course he has never expected that we would start it. Then he was brought back to the hospital and he made an escape from the hospital, on the sheets from the prisoners, he did borrow the sheets and came down from the second floor to the ground and the last sheet did broke and he did fall down and he hurt one leg again and he had to go the hospital. So, he was immediately captured again. When I heard this, that he had escaped again, I was [unclear] because I had shown him to much [unclear]. I would have had [unclear] perhaps but he came back and he did make another escape. This man was unbelievable.
I: On that engagement when Bader was shot down by your Geschwader, there was another pilot and our research indicates that you shot him down and he lives in Sheffield, which is quite near to the Yorkshire museum. He is still alive today and he sends his best wishes to you.
AG: Oh, thank you. That was on this occasion?
I: Yes. Buck Kassen was his name and he was shot down and made prisoner of war the same time as Douglas Bader. And we interview him as part of this tape.
AG: What is the name of this Spitfire pilot shot down in?
I: [unclear]
AG: My victory 56. He calls himself your victory 56.
I: [unclear]
FS: I’ll take some.
I: May I ask you why did most of the Luftwaffe’s very high scoring aces, such as Hartmann, Barckhorn, Rall, why did they fly the Messerschmitt 109 rather than the Focke Wulff 190?
AG: In the beginning, the 190 was not available, the 190 was only available for wings from April ‘43, so up to this date they could only use the 109. The 190 came later, it was not, was not ready for being used by the operational units.
I: But even later, even later many of the aces still preferred the 109.
AG: Maybe. I personally flew the 190 the last months of the war and my latest was the 262 of course.
I: Yes.
AG: But the 190 was much better for attacks on bombers. The 109 was absolutely better for fighting fights against fighters. Danke. The 190 had a lot of protection against the bomber fighter, the Spit [unclear] engine gave you a feeling of safety.
I: Why did the death of one man, general Wever, bring about the scrapping of the german strategic bomber program and what were Göring’s and Jeschonnek’s views after the battle of Britain?
AG: Wever was an army general but as an army general he had a great understanding for air war and Wever was also a follower of Douhet, this Italian general, the inventor of the strategic air war. And Wever did promote the four-engine big bomber, he did promote this. Unfortunately, he killed himself in a flying accident. He started a Heinkel 70 with the rollers blocked in Dresden, came down immediately. If he would have lived perhaps we would have had a four bomber air force also. I believe this. But then Udet went to the States and he was convinced by the American navy air force, which were, they were using these dive bombers, and Udet was convinced by them that was the way for people which have not big reserves on raw material, like Germany, to get the same result by picking up pinpoint targets. And really Udet did influence the air force, the top air force men, including Göring, that this was the way for Germany to have the Stukas instead of the four-engine bomber. [unclear] we can get the same result if we had the power station of a big plant or we destroyed your plant. This is the same result. So, at this time, an order was given that all the German aircraft, even the twin-engine Junkers 88, could have been used, should have been used in dive attacks. Also the Heinkel 177, which was the German four-engine bomber, in which two engines were blocked, bound together, they should also go in dive-bombing, which was a mistake, of course.
I: When you were promoted to general in charge of fighters, sir, how old were you? You were a very young man, I believe. And how do you feel about succeeding Mölders?
AG: 29, 29 years and I was practically the immediate successor of Mölders.
I: How did you feel about that, sir?
AG: I was not happy, I was absolutely unhappy in these days because I wanted to continue as wing commander. I was very unhappy in this position. I wanted to fight, only to fly. I already upset with, myself with Göring when I was made wing commander, because I did believe I so much paperwork to do that I could not fly anymore. My intention was to fight.
I: Hitler awarded you the Germany’s highest award for bravery, the diamonds to your knight’s cross following your 94th victory. But I understand there was more to it than just the diamonds. You had quite a collection of diamonds in the end.
AG: Ja. The first diamond I got was the Spanish cross with diamonds. That was a german award very nice with diamonds in the middle. This was awarded, I think, nine times.
I: [unclear]
AG: And next I got the diamonds to the oak leaves to the knight’s cross. And when I got this, Göring did had not seen it before and I was sitting in Göring’s train [unclear] and Göring looked at me and said: ‘Are these the diamonds the Führer gave you as highest german award?’. I said ja. ‘It cannot be’, he said, ‘take it off’. I took it off and gave them to him [unclear]. ‘Terrible, terrible, The Führer knows everything, knows every carrier of the [unclear], of the german army, the german, he knows the complete trajectory, every gun, but diamonds, he has no idea, not enough. I tell you, these are splinters. Little splinters, these are not diamonds. Give it to me, I will, I have a jewelier in Berlin, who will make you another set. You will see what diamonds are looking like’. So I took it off and gave it to him. Some weeks later, I was ordered to come to his house in Carinhall. ‘Galland, look at here, this are the splinters of Hitler, these are the diamonds of Göring, who knows about diamonds?’. So, he gave me both sets back, I had now twice. Then, he must have told this to Hitler because some weeks later I was asked to see Hitler and Hitler said: ‘My dear Galland, finally I’m in a position to award you with the final edition of [unclear] decoration. Look at this’. He gave me this case. ‘Take a look, [unclear]’. I did not know for what is this order to come, I had the diamonds from Göring, the big ones. And he said: ‘Can you see the difference? These are splinters’. ‘This is obsolete’. ‘No, you can wear this every day. They are expensive, the big ones here. When you are flying daily, take the other ones. The splinters’. I was about to explode. He gave me both sets back, I did three times now. And then came a time, I was so upset with Göring, I had so big fights with him. And he had in one big meeting in Munich Schleissheim, there were about forty officers in this meeting and he blamed the fighters in a terrible way. He said we were not anymore brave, we were scapegoats and good for nothing, we were decorated highly at the beginning of the war and we did not pay for it. And most of the pilots had with lies made their high decorations over England. When he said this, I took my decoration off, I was sitting opposite to him and hit it on the table. Göring finished this meeting and he tried to calm me down, but I said: ‘No, you should refuse this [unclear]’. I said: ‘Göring, I cannot do it, I cannot do it, [unclear] I cannot take my decoration on anymore’. And I did hang this number three [unclear] in my office in Berlin and this Olympic game installation and hang it on the neck of the wooden [unclear]and It was hanging there, I didn’t take my decoration for, I think, five months. And then Hitler one day saw a photo of mine on a newspaper, Berliner Illustrierte, and said:’Why is Galland not showing his decoration?’. And Hitler was told the Royal Air Force was bombing Berlin. And Hitler said: ‘You should [unclear] immediately and get a new [unclear]. I had to see Hitler without. And Hitler said finally: ‘Bad luck, but you have a new set’. But this is was number four. [laughs] And by the end of this war I was wearing this number four and I took this as prisoner of war with me, until we were asked to take it away. But I could keep this with me and [unclear] till today. That is the only set. The other sets, one was burned, two sets, [unclear] was liberated at the end of the war by the americans,
I: They might be somewhere in America still, probably.
AG: I talked to one man who has one set.
I: Really? Amazing story. You were responsible for the fighter screen when the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst and Prinz Eugen made the famous Channel dash. How was this success achieved under the eyes of the RAF?
AG: I was made responsible for this fighter escort, is true and I was in a meeting with Hitler and Hitler at the end of the meeting he took me away and said: ‘Do you believe this operation can be performed?’ And I told him: ‘It is possible, but the first condition, first and most important condition is complete, this operation is completely secret. And the English should not know about the operation, should not know when is going on and so on, completely secret and Hitler said: ‘Yes, I agree 100%’. ‘But’, I said, ‘there is a lot of risk in war’. Hitler said: ‘In all my operations, the last years, the biggest risk was the [unclear], it was true, he always was playing with this risk, in an incredible [unclear]. Hitler agreed and when the operation were prepared very much in detail and seriously, very seriously. And I invented the callname, the codename for this operation.
I: Really?
AG: I invented Donnerkeil. This was not accepted by the navy. The navy called it, what was it?
I: Cerberus.
AG: Cerberus, Cerberus, they called it Cerberus. And this was good and in so far as the British secret service knew about this was [unclear], not in detail but they knew, we were preparing it. They did believe this were two different operations, they did not bring the two operations together, so this was an advantage. And then our highest chief of the communication, Martini, he did use for the first time a big system of disturbing the English radar and this disturbation gave the English the impression we were coming in with big [unclear], with big offensive formations and this did help a lot. And the weather did help a lot, it was a miserable weather and on the English side, not in France, nothing, this did help us also. So, we had finally the success based on a lot of luck, lot of luck and our fighters were brave, fighting very very brave. I remember I had my two brothers in this operation and they told me.
I: And a very british Victoria cross was ordered in that operation too. What are your memories of the ace Hans-Joachim Marseille? And how did you regard him as a fighter ace, in comparison to Hartmann?
AG: In my book, the virtuoso, [unclear] but he was a single fighter, also was not a [unclear], nobody could follow him, he did fly like Richthofen, more than Richthofen
I: As a loner, as we would say.
AG: He was not able to guide four fighters there. And he got so impacts I think in his last [unclear] and he did make a mistake by escaping from the aircraft. He didn’t make a [unclear] but he did in the beginning. And was pulling out and he hit the tail. Later, I personally did escape twice by our new method took the nose up, engine down, nose up and then we pushed the bottom very strongly unclear], the aircraft did make this motion and in this situation the pilot was ejected really, the pilot was flying up ten meters, thirty feet and this was this [unclear] method risky.
AG: Ja, we’re finished now.
I: We could move to the end of the war. So, Germany’s experience with jet fighters where of course the Messerschmitt 262 was the first operational combat jet fighter in the world. Do you feel that that aircraft, if it had been available in sufficient numbers in 1943, could have altered the bombing offensive? And what was it like to fly? What was it as an aeroplane?1
AG: I’ve known this airplane I think in June ‘43 the first time and I have made a report on this, I have a copy of this. On Saturday the 22 of May ’43. I’ve flown this aircraft in Ausgburg, taking off in Ausgburg, is a Messerschmitt plant and this a report about this first flight addressed to Feldmarschal Milch. He was responsible man for armament and for development. And I am saying, this aircraft [unclear] us complete new tactical possibilities, this is a revolution and I recommend therefore to stop the messerschnitt 262 development completely and to take this out of the plan. Concentrate only on the Focke Wulff 190 D development and all capacity and concentrate from now on to the 262. This will give us greatest chances supposed that the allies, the Americans and the English [unclear] continuing their operation on piston, only on piston driven fighter base and bombers. WE knew that they were also developing the Meteor and did not know when they were ready. But the 262 would have given us the biggest chance if we would have the time. The development of this project was stopped and delayed, later delayed by order of Hitler, because he was of the opinion that the war was shortly before to be won and developments would take more than one year to be finished, would come too late [unclear]. That was his argument. And without this [unclear] development, which was done by Messerschmitt and by Henkel, was done without being known by Hitler, was done in secret [unclear] of Hitler. Only in the last months of the war, when the aircraft was there, when the RAF made this first light tests, and this report, then he decided to use it only, only as [unclear] against the invasion. This is the aircraft, with which I will fight the forthcoming invasion, he said in my presence, this is the aircraft. I order this aircraft to not be used in any other form and should not be imagined in another operation as [unclear].
I: What was your opinion, sir, of the two other jet fighters that did see operational service or limited, the 162, the Heinkel 162 and of course the incredible Messerschmitt 163 Komet, the jet, rocket jet fighter?
AG: The 163, the rocket fighter was already under development and I knew about this and this would have been a compliment for the anti-aircraft, only for the defense of certain objects, like the derrick oil plants. I was of the opinion that this plane could be used for this object protection with a certain success. It would have been that a lower flight plane target with flight time, with power was only 6 or 8 minutes but the aircraft was then so high up that it could make one or two attacks and then go down. This was only an additional aircraft for the air defense but the 162, this was a political development. It was supposed to set the Hitler
I: Hitler Youth.
AG: Hitler Youth on these planes then only with the training of gliders, which was completely wrong, completely wrong, I was against this development because I said youngsters cannot fly this plane with success, this is absolutely impossible. Secondly, the engine BMW 003 is not so practical, [unclear] that it can be used only one engine on one aircraft, we need two engines. And certainly the 163 with this engine behind the pilots and without the exit seat, this would result, every pilot who tried to bail out would land in the engine. So, I have fought against this plane because the concept was only based on a political wrong thinking, absolutely wrong thinking. And this should have been performed and executed by a, the youngsters and responsible for this was the fieldmarshal or the general, colonel general Keller.
I: From the first world war.
AG: Ja, from the first world war. And I took Keller with me to Nowotny on the day in which there was a , was shot down, hit the ground. In order, my intention was to show him what a jet operation does mean, more complicated than this and at the end of the war, when I was leading my JW 44 in Munich Ried, two or three handful of this 162 came to me and said we want to fly with you. They didn’t have any success at all. So this was, the 162 was a complete wrong concept from the beginning. A political development.
UI. We’re getting near the end, sir, but can you very briefly tell us about JV 44? Is it correct that all the pilots have the night’s cross?
AG: No, no, this is not correct. We had several pilots with the knights cross and most their officers and at the end of the war, pilots who were in hospitals or were in, wie heisst das [unclear]? the recovery stations, they came to me and said:’We want to be, we want to fly under you’, they all said: ‘we want to fight the end of the days with you’. And I have accepted this. So, in the last week or two last weeks, I only accepted such pilots who wanted to continue to fly. Pilots who said, [unclear] for family reasons or something like this and I do not want to fly anymore, he could do this, he would not be punished at all. This were only Freiwillige, free will pilots, [unclear]
I: Volunteers.
AG: Volunteers, volunteers. And Steinhoff had this terrible accident, he was the man who was responsible for operations in my group 44, strong and he believes he had hit a [unclear]. I believe he pushed the wrong button, Steinhoff was used to take off with flaps in and only when he reached, came close to the take off speed, then he dropped the flaps, this [unclear] a little bit [unclear] the take off. But in the Messerschmitt are two buttons, one is for undercarriage, one is for flaps and they are close together, you can see on old cockpits. I think, yes, he pushed the undercarriage. Then he tried to take off, he made a jump, restored its speed, came down with too early engines about 2000 feet after he came lifted from the ground, came down, he hit the ground and burned out.
I: Did you see the crash?
AG: Ja. I was number one, he was number four in my wing. This was the last, my last mission. Finnegan believes he should, this American guy, he came, I shot down two more others in this mission and I didn’t know if the second one was already finished so I made a turn, looked at this [unclear] and [unclear] gave me some shots [unclear].
[All laugh]
I: Five more questions.
AG: Finnegan or when the Americans say, you were shot down by Finnegan, that is not true, I could manage to get home, one engine was hit, ja, that is correct but I could manage to come down and manage a perfect landing with one engine on my base on which I had taken off, is not a victory.
I: Not at all, an American-type victory.
UI2: Unconfirmed probably.
[All laugh]
I: Five more questions, if I may. You are now 82 years of age?
AG: Ja, unfortunately.
I: How do you feel about the events of 55 years ago, during the battle of Britain, when you were fighting for your life, all this time, all this long distance from battle, how do you feel?
AG: At this time when this had happened, we did never believe we would survive. Even in the last days of the war, when I flew the 262, I didn’t believe I would survive the war. I was real ready with my life, had a good life and [unclear] success, [unclear] success in my life and I always wanted to be better than others and I got the feeling to be better than others [unclear]. So, I am thankful for my life and I think it was an extraordinary class of life which I performed. And I thank God for being with you now and have survived all situations. And I have the experience of what I say. I have had so much responsibility during my military life and when I saw the terrible destructions of the allied airwar in Germany and I saw the people who did suffer in such terrible form, I had only the wish and the intention to fight up to the last minute in order to compensate, not to win the war.
I: General Adolf Galland, this has been a real pleasure, sir, we greatly appreciate it. Thank you. Marvellous sir.
I: Thank you sir. You are part of aviation history.
AG: [unclear]
I: Yes, yes, we do, we have some presentations for you.
I: On the way here, sir, I had to pinch myself to make sure that it is real, that I am meeting Adolf Galland. A small gift, sir, on behalf of the Yorshire air Museum.
AG: Thank you.
I: Our air museum plan.
AG: I’ve got quite a collection already.
Unknown interviewer: General Galland, on behalf of everyone at the Yorkshire Air Museum, may I thank you for granting us this interview. It is greatly appreciated.
AG: Ok. It is my pleasure.
I: I may start with the first question. Is there a military tradition in your family?
AG: Not at all. My, we came, my family came from France, we were Huguenots. And one of this Frenchmen who came over, one Galland was, was a French captain, the chivalry, it was the only [unclear] we have as military.
I: Right. When did you first fly in an airplane?
AG: Oh, I did fly my first time when I was sixteen. I flew in gliders, not very far from my home there were some, an area in which gliding course was done. And I started there in ’20, ’28, I was sixteen years old.
I: I understand you set a record in your gilder.
AG: Ja, that’s right, that’s right. A record in endurance. This area did not have very high mountains, there were only hills and I did for more than two hours, two hours twenty minutes, something like this. This was an area record.
I: Ok.
AG: With my own plane. I got a plane when I finished, [unclear]Schule, I finished
UI2: Like University.
AG: Ja.
I: When did you decide to become a professional pilot and how did you achieve this?
AG: I did it all during my schooltime. Before I left school, I decided to be a commercial pilot and I told this one Sunday, walking with my father outside and he asked me: ‘What do you want to be later on?’. And I said: ‘I want to be a commercial pilot in an airline’. ‘Ah’, he said, ‘don’t you want to study?’. I said, ‘No, I want to make my exam as a professional pilot’. And he said. ‘You can do this, but I have not learned that this is a profession. You can teach me, do you expect a regular fee or do you fly for tips?’
[UI laughs]
AG: You can see how the times have changed. Now the airlines, they don’t like this joke. But they are making a lot of money also. And it is a fine profession. Also today, I think so.
I: So you then go from the airline directly into the Luftwaffe?
AG: No. The first year, at the end of the first year we were told that this was a commercial pilot school. The students were offered to become military pilots. We were told, commercial pilot doesn’t have good aspects for the future, but we will soon have military pilots and you can decide to switch over to the military career. I didn’t like this very much but there was no other questions. This was a strong invitation.
I: [laughs] There must have been many applications to become a professional pilot in those days.
AG: For the commercial side or the military?
I: For the military.
AG: For the military. No, we didn’t have any military organisation at that time at all, everything was, inexistent, was private, commercially or private or it was camouflaged, military.
I: The black Luftwaffe.
AG: The black Luftwaffe did start already in these days.
I: Yes.
AG: But most of the pilots were trained in Russia as you know, Lipezk, a Russian base, we had an agreement with Russia and we trained our people there.
I: Were you there?
AG: No, I have not been there. When Göring came in power, he cancelled this agreement with Russia and he started with Italy an agreement on a similar base. So, I was in the first group which was sent to Italy to be trained there, militarywise. We did not learn too much there in Italy. This agreement was not based on a good understanding between Göring and Balbo, maybe they had language problems, so the Italians did believe we were beginners and we knew already to fly. I remember one day, a French acrobatic pilot that had set up a record [unclear] inverted, invertedly and for two hours or so and we at this time did make acrobatics also there. So I decided when I was, when it was my turn to fly, I went up and go this way, I moved around the airfield all the time invertedly. To make a joke then they sent another airplane up, dropped down [laughs].
I: [laughs] Did you break the record?
AG: No [laughs]. I didn’t have fuel for this. I flew for ten minutes or so, but I showed.
UI2: What type of aircraft were you flying at that time, sir?
AG: Italian aircraft.
UI2: Italian aircraft. Macchi and [unclear].
I: When the Luftwaffe was formed officially in 1935, what was your first unit and what aircraft did you fly?
AG: When I had finished the training, I was ordered to go to the first fighter group which was built close to Berlin, in Döbritz. This was the first group of the fighter wing Richthofen, of the new fighter wing Richthofen. So, I came to this wing as, I was lieutenant, but I was released as Leutenant and we were installed again as Kettenführer.
I: Flight Commander.
AG: Ja, something like this. But, very soon later die Tarnung, the camouflage was taken away and we were made Lieutenants again.
I: I see. You would fly the Heinkel 51?
AG: No, at this time we had the Arado 65. And then we had the Arado 68 and then came the 51.
I: Heinkel 51.
AG: The second group later was set up in Jüterbog, south of Berlin, as the second group that have the 51s already.
I: Did you have any flying accidents in the early days?
AG: [laughs] I had many accidents and many damages. Sometimes they called me the millionaire of the new Luftwaffe, it was for the value of the airplanes I had damaged or destroyed.
[All laugh]
AG: But this was overdoned a little bit. I had one terrible accident, with a Stieglitz, with a biplane by doing acrobatics. I was very good in acrobatics and I had to train for flight demonstrations, which were set up in different towns and I had to show there acrobatics in the Stieglitz. And in this case I had modified the horizontal stabilizer in order to get better flight conditions in inverted flights, but this resulted that the aircraft did have a complete [unclear] conditions in spin. And I couldn’t recover, I could not recover the plane from spin earlier enough so I hit the ground in this position about 45°, this was a terrible accident.
I: I understand that after that [unclear] you are very good at passing eyetests.
AG: [laughs], ja, it is true. In this case I had, the plane had an open cockpit and I had glasses and I destroyed one eye with a splinter from [unclear] glasses and I had a damage on the eye and this resulted in a shorter sight of this eye. And I knew I had to pass a new physical and so to be sure I learnt the numbers and the, was ist Buchstaben?
I: Letters.
AG: The letters. I learned the letters from the table and I knew them by memorising them and I passed my exam very fine. [laughs]
I: The doctors they were bewildered.
AG: Yes [laughs]
I: [laughs]. Yes Can you tell us something about the airfighting in Spain with the Condor legion and just how much influence did Mölders have on evolving tactics for the Luftwaffe?
AG: [clears throat] Mölders became my successor as squadron leader and he, my squadron was equipped with 51s and we did ground attacks. And we were very successful in, we were helping the army, the Spanish army in their advances. Mölders arranged to change the missions to real fighter missions and so his, my other squadron was equipped then with 109s and Mölders started then to find a new tactic. He really invented the open flying formation, finger-four formation and he also had set up a, set up the methods to train the pilots in this way. So we flew in a very open formation, two planes at the same altitude, about onehundred, onehundredfifty meters apart
I: Apart.
AG: From the other and we moved all the time this way in the air in a very open formation. And this had the advantage that the number two could see also, could observe the airspace. In a close formation, number two and number three are seeing nothing, nothing but the guide only. So the next two they are flying from here to there also in this open formation. And this was really invented and explored by Mölders, this is his merit, is no question. By the way, was later on also a very good formation leader. We have pilots, and another example is Hartmann, Hartmann was not a leader at all, he could only fly by his own, and many pilots, Udet was also such a pilot, couldn’t lead a formation, I was told. Mölders once told me: ‘I will tell you one thing, you can become a Richthofen, you can become a new Richthofen, I wanted to be a Boelcke’, this means he wanted to fly with his head, so he was convinced that he was taktisch. And he was [unclear].
I: Did you ever fly the Heinkel 112?
AG: No, I was there when these people were doing [screams] this, the Olympic heroes there but I could not, I could not be pleased by looking at the athletics. So I decided to sell my ticket, sold it. I went up to Warnemünde or in the North, on the East Sea and I did chase Swedish girls, was more pleasant.
I: We have heard of your reputation. [laughs] Is another Galland legend. Did you ever fly the Heinkel 112?
AG: No.
I: Would it have been a better fighter than the Messerschmitt 109?
AG: Ja, ja, it’s no question, would have been a much better fighter than the other plane but the plane was more expensive to be built. The wing profile was changing all the time. The wing of the 109 was much more, much easier to build and for much less money to build. And this was one of the reasons why it has been decided in favour of the 109. Especially the undercarriage of the 109 was very narrow and the plane did have a terrible tendency to loop, to break out in taking off and landing, specially with crosswind. The aircraft lost an unbelievable number of planes by, of 109s by accidents during the war.
I: Would the extra range of the Heinkell had been an advantage to you in the battle of Britain?
AG: Of course, it would have been, would have been an advantage, but it wouldn’t have been decisive. The outcome of the battle would have been more or less the same because the Luftwaffe was not build and was not equipped for a battle like battle of Britain, was not build for strategic airwar. The Luftwaffe was for defense, for air defense and also for helping the army.
I: Tactical support.
AG: Ja, tactical support.
I: After Dunkirk, and the fall of France, did you think that the Luftwaffe could win the battle of Britain?
AG: No, we did not believe this, we did hope it but we learned very soon that this was not possible. Lord Dowding was a very, very cleaver man in guiding his fighters the right way and he did not use the fighters so much as Göring did. He was a much better tactician than Göring. There’s no question.
I: And yet he was sacked, he was discharged shortly after the battle of Britain by the High Command.
AG: Yes. Dowding?
I: Downing.
AG: But he came back.
I: Yes. Well, he was never honoured as he should have been for his part in the battle of Britain. Because mainly of Leigh-Mallory.
AG: Ah ja. This are [unclear] conditions and we learned during the battle that Dowding was a very, very cleaver man and Göring had the intention, first to bring the English Fighter Command down and then to bomb England and bomb London by using this medium bombers we had, the Heinkel 111 mostly [unclear] we had the Junkers 88. But the [clears throat] the Stukas had to withdrawn from the battle very soon because they detect high losses, they could not be escorted [unclear]. So the next decision in favour of the Stukas was a mistake. Another mistake was the set up of the 110 formations, what we called Zerstörer, destroyer. It was supposed to be an escort fighter, but a twin-engine fighter aircraft cannot be compared with a single engine fighter. Is always less maneuvrable and has not the acceleration, he has better armament but in fact the 110 as an escort fighter had to be escorted by single engine fighters and we had to withdraw first the Stukas, Junkers 87, and then the 110 from the battle they could not stand the too high losses.
I: Did this come as a major shock to the crews of the 110s?
AG: Ja, it was a shock, but we knew that it would come. We knew this from exercises. Before the war. We could learn in this maneuvers that the Stuka and the 110 would not, would not be used for long time to [unclear] because the performance were not. Performance were compared to single engine fighters were too low.
I: Your famous comment about the, to Göring about the Spitfires, giving you a squadron of Spitfires, you feel that perhaps would not have made the difference either?
AG: Göring came during the battle of Britain with this special train in the Pas-de-Calais and he ordered Mölders and myself to come. And he blamed us for half an hour for not performing the escort. Our bombers wanted to have the fighters sitting on their wing, on their wing tips but by doing this with the 109 we could not stay, we could not fight, we needed speed and this, our speed was not higher than the bomber formation speed, with outside bomb, so the bombs were hanging there. We had to cross over the and below the formation, but was a higher speed and the bombers did not like it. And Göring blamed us, we should sit on their wing tip, we should not leave this position, we should defend the bombers, and I told him we can only defend the bombers by being aggressive, by being offensive, we have to attack the enemy fighters. And this we can only do when we have a higher speed. And Göring said: ‘Don’t talk such a bla bla, you have the best fighter of the world, the Messerschmitt 109 and everybody knows it, this world war I fighter aircraft’. And finally after half an hour he finished this blaming and he asked Mölders: ‘What can I do to improve the fighting capacity of your wing commanders at this time?’. And Mölders said he wanted to have the Messerschmitt 109 with the more powerfull Daimler-Benz 605 M engines, that was an engine with a higher capation [unclear] and this octane 100 fuel. And Göring said to his aide: ‘Take a note, Mölders will get the first engines’. And then he said: ‘What can I do for your wing?’. And I said: ‘Please Reichsmarschall equip my wings with Spitfires’. [laughs] I do not know, what gave me the courage. [all laugh] Göring was standing there, he was unable to say anything. He looked at me, he turned around and [unclear], trying to restrain.
I: That is legend, sir, it is legend now.
AG: But, I never did get the Spitfire. Mölders did get the engines, but I never got. But I was not punished, [unclear], I was not punished, I expected.
I: You were respected for us. In your opinion, if Leigh-Mallory had controlled 11 Group with his big wing tactics and Keith Park had controlled 12 Group in the battle of Britain, the two group commanders, do you think the outcome would have been the same?
AG: Ja, this is, as I said, true English question. I know this and I believe it would have been good to have a bigger formation than only one wing, only one squadron. But not the only group in one wing. So wings with forty, more or less, forty aircraft or twenty to forty, that would be the best in my opinion.
I: Why were Messerschitt 109s not fitted with dropable fuel tanks during the battle of Britain?
AG: That was a real mistake, absolutely was forgotten or they were not available, we have used in Spain already as I told you, but for the 109 we did not, we did not [unclear]
I: And yet it would have helped your range.
AG: It would have helped but we would have, had to drop the tanks already when we came over England.
I: Yes.
AG: Because the dogfight, fighter against fighter, with drop tanks ist not very [unclear]. So later on when we got them, Göring extended an order not to drop the tanks, only when we were attacked.
I: One of the major factors was that the Luftwaffe didn’t concentrate its attack on the communications network and particularly the radar stations. Why was that so?
AG: A mistake.
I: Again a mistake.
AG: Absolutely a big mistake.
I: You knew about them.
AG: Ja, we knew of them, we had photos and it was a mistake. It was a mistake to finish the attack against Fighter Command was a mistake also, we should have continued. Ensure the british fighters did not come up when we came only by fighter. We had to use some bombers to go with us, to drop some bombs, to force the british fighters to come up. But to switch over from the battle against Fighter Command to the attacks on London was a terrible mistake.
I: How would you compare the Messerschmitt 109e with the Mark I Spitfire and Hurricane? I believe yours actually had Mickey Mouse on its, why did you have Mickey Mouse as your logo?
AG: When I was in Spain, Mickey Mouse had just come up everywhere and one of the pilots already in operations had the Mickey Mouse. And I did like this, I said, I will take the Mickey Mouse also, modified it a little bit and then I was told I should not use the Mickey Mouse because it was an American.
I: Yes, quite.
AG: Toy and this did make me decide to have it at all, to keep it and I kept it all the time.
I: Yes, indeed.
AG: I still today in my car [laughs].
I: And how do you think the 109 compared to the Spitfire then? The 109e?
AG: The e was not the best, the g was later better, g4. The Messerschmitt was, besides bad conditions in taking off and landing, based on this narrow undercarriage. The Me 109 had only one advantage, that was the fuel injection of the engine. We could easily use, manoeuvre was negative g, [unclear]
I: Yes.
AG: And the engine would drive perfectly, would not stop. We knew it was the carburator immediately when you get negative g and it stops. So, we could, when we were fired, we dropped only the nose down, and always more down and we could escape. This was a advantage. In other flying conditions both types, the Spitfire and the 109 were more or less equal. Acceleration. Manouvreability was better in the Spitfire, the Spitfire had a lower wingload, had a lower wingload and was better in manoeuvre, but acceleration were more or less the same.
I: Yes. I understand, Sir, that you had three brothers who were also fighter pilots with the Luftwaffe. Did they see service throughout the war with you?
AG: Ja, Ja. First came my younger brother to my wing. He started as a anti-aircraft and he was unhappy there, I took him out and he got a special training and then he came to my wing. And he became very soon a very capable, very good fighter pilot, very good. He had in his time 57 victories between b7, four-engine B-17s, was a high number. And he got the Ritterkreuz, this decoration we had. And my younger brother, the youngest brother, he had some difficulties, he came also from the anti-aircraft and had also a special training. I took him in my wing and in the beginning he had very high difficulties and he asked me to help him. So, I went with him to his 109 and he was sitting in the aircraft, immediately I saw he was sitting in the wrong way in the cockpit. When you had not the right position, then, the, what is when you are shooting?
I: Gunsight.
AG: Gunsight. Gunsight. He was sitting wrong behind the gunsight and this resulted in a mistake of his balance, of his shooting.
I: Yes.
AG: So, I corrected this [unclear] he got in the aircraft and from one day to the other he shot up.
I: Really?
AG: He was so happy. I also. He was a very young fellow, he died with twentythree years, he had 17 victories. And the elder one, he was, was a bad fighter. He was really a bad fighter, he wasn’t able to do anything, he was hopeless, so I managed to get him to the air reconnaissance 109. He flew there but he was not successful [unclear].
I: Did the two other brothers today survive the war with you?
AG: Only the elder, only the elder one but in the mean time he died also. Ten years ago.
I: Alright. I understand that at one time your crew chief was actually given a rocket for saving your life. What’s the story behind that?
AG: He one time did install an additional
I: Armour plate
AG: Plate,
I: Armour?
AG: Armour, armour plate behind me. And this armour blade went over my head and he didn’t tell me when I crossed the cockpit and were taking off, I shut the roof and I hit my head terribly and I blamed him: ‘You did not tell me you installed this’. ‘Wait, when I’m back I will tell you something’. And during this mission, I was shot down and I got an impact on this plate, exactly on this plate. [everybody laughs] So I didn’t blame him, I gave him zweihundert Marks and a special leave.
I: Yes. There is one well-known photograph of your Messerschmitt with a modification of a gunsight. It’s a well-known photograph.
AG: Was a mistake.
I: Was it?
AG: Was absolute a mistake. I thought I could use it for shooting on a longer distance but I learned immediately it is good for nothing, it wasn’t even good to identify the planes. When you have a plane in front, sometimes it is difficult to decide is it 109, or is it Spitfire. So, I thought when I looked through this, I can make it out [unclear] you cannot get it concentrated in anything so I decided to get [unclear]. But this aircraft, many times it has been photographed and many times on many photos it appears with the gunsight. We had not, we had a simple gunsight I have to [unclear] this was a fixed gunsight but what we had needed was a gunsight which was directed by
I: Gyro,
AG: BY gyro,
I: By gyroscope.
AG: By gyro. This we have needed terribly. We got it finally late in ’44 but it didn’t work properly. So this was an advantage on the british you had this gyroscopic gunsight, which made shooting in terms much easier.
I: Without Operation Barbarossa, the attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, would the American 8th Air Force and Bomber Command, in your opinion, have been able to sustain the bomber offensive?
AG: No, no. We were already so much beaten at this time, we would have more fighters available for the air defense and the losses would have been higher on the other side but we could, would not have been able to stop the air offensive. The western allies, the English, the British, they did a very clever thing, to split up the air offensive in day and night offensive and the british concentrated completely on the night. This was very clever, very clever. So, we had to build up a nightfighter airforce, nightfighter force, which did not exist at the beginning of the war. Göring said: ‘Nightfighters? We don’t need them. It will never be a night bombing’. So, when he made the decision, it was a decision, it was [unclear] this. He did not accept anything what was critical or negative of the airforce, everything was first class what he did.
I: Were you ever in charge of the night fighters?
AG: Ja, I was in charge and this after the catastrophe of Hamburg. In this case, Kammhuber, general Kammhuber was responsible for the night fighters and he was a very stupid man, he didn’t fly himself and he gave orders which the night fighters didn’t accept anymore. He was using one night fighter against the incoming bombers and he could only guide one fighter. And at this time, when the Bomber Command switched over to the bomber stream, all the night fighters wanted to follow the stream, they could see it by night, depending from the visibility but with lighting from the ground and with the fire over the towns, our night fighters could see the bomber stream and by the bombers they shoot their fire, they could follow this stream but Kammhuber did not allow our night fighters to go with the stream, to follow. So, they came, the night fighters came to me and they said: ‘You must help us. Our commander, Kammhuber, he bind us on one radar, in the range of one radar, in a circle of 120 km, he bind us and we want to follow’. We used Window the first time in Hamburg and this did lead to a complete catastrophe of Kammhuber’s tactic. So I had to tell this Göring and Kammhuber was released of the [unclear] and he went over to fleet commander, airfleet commander North, 5th airfleet.
I: In Norway.
AG: Norway. And he blamed this on me, Kammhuber, they said. He didn’t say to me but he was convinced I had originated this trouble. And I had, so we had not a very good relationship [unclear]. And after the war Blank was the first man who did set up the beginning of the air force and Blank wanted to have me as the first commander of the air force. And he invited me to come and talk to me and he said: ‘I did not want to have high ranking officers of World War I in the new air force, they are too old. So, everybody has voted for you, you should be the first commander of the air force, when you accept it’. And I said: ‘I am coming from Argentina, I have no idea what is going on here, I must be, first get a complete information what is done, what is planned and so on’. And then finally this was done and I decided to go up to do it, that [unclear] did say this to Blank. Then came a stop on the rebuilding of our new air force because the French blocked, they blocked this, was the European Defense Committee, Community and [unclear] came up this time. And the French did stop the European Defense Committee. So, and this was one time delayed and then this time Kammhuber came as the first commander of the air force because Blank did change against Strauss, Strauss being Bavarian he brought Kammhuber with him, who was also Bavarian and he was [unclear] over. Kammhuber did build up the air force. Was a nice story. When Kammhuber was in charge of the night fighters, I had to see him in order to use his night organisation also during daytime. Kammhuber did denie this completely, he said: ‘No, I have set up for the night fighters and you are day fighter, and they will set up your organisation, radar and everything’. And I said: ‘No, that is not true, we are not so rich that we can do this. This is a hotel with a hotel organisation, we have a night porter and a day porter, you are the night porter, I am the day porter’. We blamed for hours, we could not convince, and then he said: ‘ [unclear] I will show a complete new radar installation I have just set up’. And we went in his car, a big Mercedes, open Mercedes, his big flag as commanding general on front and there was a soldier of the infantry [unclear] He blocked us and said: ‘Your passport’. Kammhuber said: ‘Don’t you know me?’ ‘No. Passport’. [unclear] said: ‘Do you know this flag? I am your commanding officer’. He said: ‘This can be said by everybody. Passport.’ Kammhuber made a head like this and finally he said: ‘Do you know him?’. He looked at me and said: ‘Ah, I believe I have seen him on a [unclear], on a newspaper, in front of a newspaper, a big photo. I think that this is Major Mölders, then you can go’. [unclear] He was [unclear] also, Major Mölders.
I: I’ve been asked by some of the veterans who flew from the Yorkshire fields, where we are from, from 5 Group and 6 Group veterans, what were your feelings towards the night bomber crews, when you were general of night fighters?
AG: I didn’t understand too much about night fighting, I must say this, I’m a complete day fighter, and [coughs] we had a saying as dayfighters: the night is not good for fighter pilots, the night is good for bitches, but not for fighters. But really this was a good organisation and also the guiding systems we had in the night fighters they were very fine, very very fine. And the night fighters did have a better fighter, leading fighter, guiding organisation than any fighters had but they did not need it.
I: This was Wild Boar and Tame Boar.
AG: Ja.
I: After the raid on Schweinfurt-Regensburg, did you think the 8th Air Force could be stopped by the Luftwaffe?
AG: No, I did not believe this, there were too many mistakes done and too many things were not performed. When Hamburg occurred, everybody, Göring did call a big meeting and all important men were present at this meeting. There was a unique opinion, we have now to change the priority and we have to give the air defense first priority. And we have to stop everything else but we have to concentrate all our power on air defense. Göring was convinced and he decided to bring this up to Hitler immediately. This meeting was in Hitler’s headquarters, Wolfsschanze in East Prussia. So Göring went to Hitler. He came back after one hour, he was completely destroyed, he broke down in his quarter and finally he ordered [unclear] and myself to come and he said: ‘Hitler has not accepted our plan. Hitler has decided to build up a new attack air force, a new bomber air force to bomb England. Bombing can only be stopped by bombing, not by air defense’. And he had explained this to me and Hitler has right. He fall down completely, he is right as he is always right. The way through air defense is too far away and we were stopped, we were blocked from continue bombing aim. So Peltz, general Peltz, a young fellow was made the attack guidance, the attack commander in England. This was immediately after Hamburg.
I: 1943.
AG: Ja. Unbelievable, unbelievable.
I: Was this the beginning of what they call the Bedeker Raids?
AG: Ja.
I: Where they used the Bedeker Atlas to bomb.
AG: Ja.
I: May I ask you general?
AG: Göring was not stupid, he was a clever man. He knew this was wrong, but he has never resisted Hitler. When Hitler gave an order, he immediately was of the same opinion, because Göring was not a man for combat, was not a man for fight, was not a man for war. Göring wanted to continue his life as the most richest man in Europe, he wanted to be brilliant and he didn’t like the war at all.
I: Without a western front to defend, could Operation Barbarossa have succeded?
AG: Could?
I: If Germany had not been fighting on two fronts, could you have succeeded with the attack on the Soviet Union?
AG: With the attack on the Soviet Union. It is difficult to decide but we were close to win the battle, but we have been blocked again by beginning the offensive against Russia by the Italians. When you have the Italians as your allies, you have 50% of the war already lost, you we can be sure. [UI and UI2 laugh] Really. The Italians have started the war in Africa, so this did force us to go to Africa. Then, Germany wanted to take over Malta. Mussolini said: ‘No, Malta, we will take over. You can take Greece’. And we took Greece with much losses and it was not good for nothing, I know. And the Russian campaign has been delayed by the Italians again, this time by the war in the Balcans, by attacking Albania. And we had to go to the Balcans. This [unclear] a delay of half a year. Again our allies deterred us. So I still am going to say, if we could have won the war, I think we could have broken the power of Russia, we could have. We were close to Moskow and if we would have started half a year earlier, everything would have been much more in favour.
I: A huge country of course.
AG: Ja.
I: You were a pallbearer at the funeral of Ernst
AG: I knew the war was lost, was probably or was not to be won, there is a difference, already in 19, in the second war Russian campaign, this was
I: 1942. 1942.
AG: 1942. In this year I remember conversations I had with the chief of staff of the Air force, Jeschonnek, who told me: ‘You can believe me the war cannot be won anymore’. I said: ‘I agree competely’. But we were not allowed to talk about this, to tell this anybody. And we, ourselves, we fighters, young people, we knew the war could not be won anymore but we hoped, did heartly hope, that the war could be brought to an better end. This means, the unconditional surrender condition, this was something we are fighting against up to the last man.
I: You were a pallbearer at the funeral of Ernst Udet. When did you realise that he had committed suicide and what are your memories of Udet?
AG: When we at the funeral of Udet, we were told by Göring, Göring could difficultly close his mouth if he wanted to talk. So, he did tell us what has happened and some weeks, three weeks before, I was with Udet one night in the special train of Göring in East Prussia. And Udet was completely broken, completely broken, he was blamed to be responsible for the armament which were not going up and [unclear] and this was true. Udet was responsible for the development, for test, and for armament, for building, for the industry, and this he could not do, he was not able to do this at all, he could not organise the industry and he did not have the help to do this correctly. And therefore, he missed completely, lost completely this order to build up the industry. But this was not the responsibility of Udet, this was the responsibility of Göring to make him responsible for this. There were other people, Milch is an example, was absolutely more capable to do this and the production went up when Milch took over the post of Udet. So, is this the answer?
I: What are your memories of him as a person?
AG: Oh, he was a wonderful man. He was a wonderful, charming man, he was an artist. He was joking, he was very much liked by everybody. He was a great flier, pilot and you could have a lot of joke with him. And we did have.
UI. Yes.
AG: He did like the whiskeys.
I: And the ladies?
AG: Also.
I: [laughs] I understand that Douglas Bader was a guest of Geschwader 26 for a while.
AG: Ja. I have the date here when he was shot up, that was in 1943. There was an incoming English Royal Air Force attack, Blenheims with escort of Spitfires, and we had a big fight over the Pas de Calais. This was my wing and the wing Richthofen, but in this case only my wing 26 was involved, we did shot down I think 6 Spitfires and 2 or 3 Blenheims, I shot a Blenheim down. And I shot, I combat also with Spitfires but I think [unclear] off 3 Blenheims and 6 Spitfires downed. And in the afternoon one of my group commanders phoned me and said: ‘We have shot down one incredible man, an English wing commander, by the name Bader, he said, Bader said wanted only to be called Bader. He has two wooden legs and you must invite him to come immediately, bring him my invitation. And Bader had to bail out and he left one of his wooden legs in the Spit and the Spit landed with out him and my mechanics could repair this wooden leg a little bit. So, I was called some days later, Bader can come now and visit you. And I did send him my biggest car and a good looking, first Lieutenant. Bader came on. I had informed myself a little bit about him and it was absolutely a great impression, from the first moment, this stepped on his two wooden legs. And Bader said to me: ‘Can you send a message to our side that I am safe in your hands and I wanted to have a second set of my legs, which I have in my [unclear] and a good pipe and tobacco’. I said:’ Yes, I will try it’. So, then I phoned Göring in the evening and said: ‘We have Wing Commander Bader here, a man with two wooden legs, unbelievable man, sympathic and [unclear] the rules [unclear] immediately’. And I said: ‘We wanted, or he, he wanted that we communicate to the other side, to the English side, he is in our hands and he wants to have a spare legs’. And Göring said: ‘You can do this, we have done this in world war one, many times, you can do this, I like this, I like this’, the meaning was [unclear]. So, we put it on the way of the international sea rescue. It was confirmed from the other side, I communicate this to Göring and he said: ‘How do you want to do this?’ I said: ‘We are waiting now that the English [unclear] and then we make a proposal, we make an open space with an airfield and we guarantee a safe landing and coming to our side and of course we will make some photos’. [laughs]
I: Doctor Goebbels [laughs]
AG: This, our message was confirmed through the other side and nothing happened two, three days and then came in the same way, in the same way, the same frequency, a message: in this present attack we are doing, we drop not only bombs, we drop also a case with the spare legs from Bader. They dropped our airfield [unclear], no, not [unclear], Saint-Omer, dropped a case with a parachute, I have photos of this, there were the spare legs, that was not very nice, we were disappointed. So Bader many time has visited me, for tea and then I showed him the aircraft from my wing and showed especially mine, my 109 and he wanted to step out, he mounted the cockpit immediately with his wooden legs, this is unbelievable. And as he was sitting in the aircraft, Heidi, you must being the photos, and he said, I showed him everything, explained [unclear] please can you start the engine [all laugh] all around the place, only around the place. I said, no wing commander, let’s stop this nonsense because I have two 109s for my own personal use and if you take off I would have to follow you. And I would have to shot at you again and I do not want to do this. He was laughing. Of course he has never expected that we would start it. Then he was brought back to the hospital and he made an escape from the hospital, on the sheets from the prisoners, he did borrow the sheets and came down from the second floor to the ground and the last sheet did broke and he did fall down and he hurt one leg again and he had to go the hospital. So, he was immediately captured again. When I heard this, that he had escaped again, I was [unclear] because I had shown him to much [unclear]. I would have had [unclear] perhaps but he came back and he did make another escape. This man was unbelievable.
I: On that engagement when Bader was shot down by your Geschwader, there was another pilot and our research indicates that you shot him down and he lives in Sheffield, which is quite near to the Yorkshire museum. He is still alive today and he sends his best wishes to you.
AG: Oh, thank you. That was on this occasion?
I: Yes. Buck Kassen was his name and he was shot down and made prisoner of war the same time as Douglas Bader. And we interview him as part of this tape.
AG: What is the name of this Spitfire pilot shot down in?
I: [unclear]
AG: My victory 56. He calls himself your victory 56.
I: [unclear]
FS: I’ll take some.
I: May I ask you why did most of the Luftwaffe’s very high scoring aces, such as Hartmann, Barckhorn, Rall, why did they fly the Messerschmitt 109 rather than the Focke Wulff 190?
AG: In the beginning, the 190 was not available, the 190 was only available for wings from April ‘43, so up to this date they could only use the 109. The 190 came later, it was not, was not ready for being used by the operational units.
I: But even later, even later many of the aces still preferred the 109.
AG: Maybe. I personally flew the 190 the last months of the war and my latest was the 262 of course.
I: Yes.
AG: But the 190 was much better for attacks on bombers. The 109 was absolutely better for fighting fights against fighters. Danke. The 190 had a lot of protection against the bomber fighter, the Spit [unclear] engine gave you a feeling of safety.
I: Why did the death of one man, general Wever, bring about the scrapping of the german strategic bomber program and what were Göring’s and Jeschonnek’s views after the battle of Britain?
AG: Wever was an army general but as an army general he had a great understanding for air war and Wever was also a follower of Douhet, this Italian general, the inventor of the strategic air war. And Wever did promote the four-engine big bomber, he did promote this. Unfortunately, he killed himself in a flying accident. He started a Heinkel 70 with the rollers blocked in Dresden, came down immediately. If he would have lived perhaps we would have had a four bomber air force also. I believe this. But then Udet went to the States and he was convinced by the American navy air force, which were, they were using these dive bombers, and Udet was convinced by them that was the way for people which have not big reserves on raw material, like Germany, to get the same result by picking up pinpoint targets. And really Udet did influence the air force, the top air force men, including Göring, that this was the way for Germany to have the Stukas instead of the four-engine bomber. [unclear] we can get the same result if we had the power station of a big plant or we destroyed your plant. This is the same result. So, at this time, an order was given that all the German aircraft, even the twin-engine Junkers 88, could have been used, should have been used in dive attacks. Also the Heinkel 177, which was the German four-engine bomber, in which two engines were blocked, bound together, they should also go in dive-bombing, which was a mistake, of course.
I: When you were promoted to general in charge of fighters, sir, how old were you? You were a very young man, I believe. And how do you feel about succeeding Mölders?
AG: 29, 29 years and I was practically the immediate successor of Mölders.
I: How did you feel about that, sir?
AG: I was not happy, I was absolutely unhappy in these days because I wanted to continue as wing commander. I was very unhappy in this position. I wanted to fight, only to fly. I already upset with, myself with Göring when I was made wing commander, because I did believe I so much paperwork to do that I could not fly anymore. My intention was to fight.
I: Hitler awarded you the Germany’s highest award for bravery, the diamonds to your knight’s cross following your 94th victory. But I understand there was more to it than just the diamonds. You had quite a collection of diamonds in the end.
AG: Ja. The first diamond I got was the Spanish cross with diamonds. That was a german award very nice with diamonds in the middle. This was awarded, I think, nine times.
I: [unclear]
AG: And next I got the diamonds to the oak leaves to the knight’s cross. And when I got this, Göring did had not seen it before and I was sitting in Göring’s train [unclear] and Göring looked at me and said: ‘Are these the diamonds the Führer gave you as highest german award?’. I said ja. ‘It cannot be’, he said, ‘take it off’. I took it off and gave them to him [unclear]. ‘Terrible, terrible, The Führer knows everything, knows every carrier of the [unclear], of the german army, the german, he knows the complete trajectory, every gun, but diamonds, he has no idea, not enough. I tell you, these are splinters. Little splinters, these are not diamonds. Give it to me, I will, I have a jewelier in Berlin, who will make you another set. You will see what diamonds are looking like’. So I took it off and gave it to him. Some weeks later, I was ordered to come to his house in Carinhall. ‘Galland, look at here, this are the splinters of Hitler, these are the diamonds of Göring, who knows about diamonds?’. So, he gave me both sets back, I had now twice. Then, he must have told this to Hitler because some weeks later I was asked to see Hitler and Hitler said: ‘My dear Galland, finally I’m in a position to award you with the final edition of [unclear] decoration. Look at this’. He gave me this case. ‘Take a look, [unclear]’. I did not know for what is this order to come, I had the diamonds from Göring, the big ones. And he said: ‘Can you see the difference? These are splinters’. ‘This is obsolete’. ‘No, you can wear this every day. They are expensive, the big ones here. When you are flying daily, take the other ones. The splinters’. I was about to explode. He gave me both sets back, I did three times now. And then came a time, I was so upset with Göring, I had so big fights with him. And he had in one big meeting in Munich Schleissheim, there were about forty officers in this meeting and he blamed the fighters in a terrible way. He said we were not anymore brave, we were scapegoats and good for nothing, we were decorated highly at the beginning of the war and we did not pay for it. And most of the pilots had with lies made their high decorations over England. When he said this, I took my decoration off, I was sitting opposite to him and hit it on the table. Göring finished this meeting and he tried to calm me down, but I said: ‘No, you should refuse this [unclear]’. I said: ‘Göring, I cannot do it, I cannot do it, [unclear] I cannot take my decoration on anymore’. And I did hang this number three [unclear] in my office in Berlin and this Olympic game installation and hang it on the neck of the wooden [unclear]and It was hanging there, I didn’t take my decoration for, I think, five months. And then Hitler one day saw a photo of mine on a newspaper, Berliner Illustrierte, and said:’Why is Galland not showing his decoration?’. And Hitler was told the Royal Air Force was bombing Berlin. And Hitler said: ‘You should [unclear] immediately and get a new [unclear]. I had to see Hitler without. And Hitler said finally: ‘Bad luck, but you have a new set’. But this is was number four. [laughs] And by the end of this war I was wearing this number four and I took this as prisoner of war with me, until we were asked to take it away. But I could keep this with me and [unclear] till today. That is the only set. The other sets, one was burned, two sets, [unclear] was liberated at the end of the war by the americans,
I: They might be somewhere in America still, probably.
AG: I talked to one man who has one set.
I: Really? Amazing story. You were responsible for the fighter screen when the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst and Prinz Eugen made the famous Channel dash. How was this success achieved under the eyes of the RAF?
AG: I was made responsible for this fighter escort, is true and I was in a meeting with Hitler and Hitler at the end of the meeting he took me away and said: ‘Do you believe this operation can be performed?’ And I told him: ‘It is possible, but the first condition, first and most important condition is complete, this operation is completely secret. And the English should not know about the operation, should not know when is going on and so on, completely secret and Hitler said: ‘Yes, I agree 100%’. ‘But’, I said, ‘there is a lot of risk in war’. Hitler said: ‘In all my operations, the last years, the biggest risk was the [unclear], it was true, he always was playing with this risk, in an incredible [unclear]. Hitler agreed and when the operation were prepared very much in detail and seriously, very seriously. And I invented the callname, the codename for this operation.
I: Really?
AG: I invented Donnerkeil. This was not accepted by the navy. The navy called it, what was it?
I: Cerberus.
AG: Cerberus, Cerberus, they called it Cerberus. And this was good and in so far as the British secret service knew about this was [unclear], not in detail but they knew, we were preparing it. They did believe this were two different operations, they did not bring the two operations together, so this was an advantage. And then our highest chief of the communication, Martini, he did use for the first time a big system of disturbing the English radar and this disturbation gave the English the impression we were coming in with big [unclear], with big offensive formations and this did help a lot. And the weather did help a lot, it was a miserable weather and on the English side, not in France, nothing, this did help us also. So, we had finally the success based on a lot of luck, lot of luck and our fighters were brave, fighting very very brave. I remember I had my two brothers in this operation and they told me.
I: And a very british Victoria cross was ordered in that operation too. What are your memories of the ace Hans-Joachim Marseille? And how did you regard him as a fighter ace, in comparison to Hartmann?
AG: In my book, the virtuoso, [unclear] but he was a single fighter, also was not a [unclear], nobody could follow him, he did fly like Richthofen, more than Richthofen
I: As a loner, as we would say.
AG: He was not able to guide four fighters there. And he got so impacts I think in his last [unclear] and he did make a mistake by escaping from the aircraft. He didn’t make a [unclear] but he did in the beginning. And was pulling out and he hit the tail. Later, I personally did escape twice by our new method took the nose up, engine down, nose up and then we pushed the bottom very strongly unclear], the aircraft did make this motion and in this situation the pilot was ejected really, the pilot was flying up ten meters, thirty feet and this was this [unclear] method risky.
AG: Ja, we’re finished now.
I: We could move to the end of the war. So, Germany’s experience with jet fighters where of course the Messerschmitt 262 was the first operational combat jet fighter in the world. Do you feel that that aircraft, if it had been available in sufficient numbers in 1943, could have altered the bombing offensive? And what was it like to fly? What was it as an aeroplane?1
AG: I’ve known this airplane I think in June ‘43 the first time and I have made a report on this, I have a copy of this. On Saturday the 22 of May ’43. I’ve flown this aircraft in Ausgburg, taking off in Ausgburg, is a Messerschmitt plant and this a report about this first flight addressed to Feldmarschal Milch. He was responsible man for armament and for development. And I am saying, this aircraft [unclear] us complete new tactical possibilities, this is a revolution and I recommend therefore to stop the messerschnitt 262 development completely and to take this out of the plan. Concentrate only on the Focke Wulff 190 D development and all capacity and concentrate from now on to the 262. This will give us greatest chances supposed that the allies, the Americans and the English [unclear] continuing their operation on piston, only on piston driven fighter base and bombers. WE knew that they were also developing the Meteor and did not know when they were ready. But the 262 would have given us the biggest chance if we would have the time. The development of this project was stopped and delayed, later delayed by order of Hitler, because he was of the opinion that the war was shortly before to be won and developments would take more than one year to be finished, would come too late [unclear]. That was his argument. And without this [unclear] development, which was done by Messerschmitt and by Henkel, was done without being known by Hitler, was done in secret [unclear] of Hitler. Only in the last months of the war, when the aircraft was there, when the RAF made this first light tests, and this report, then he decided to use it only, only as [unclear] against the invasion. This is the aircraft, with which I will fight the forthcoming invasion, he said in my presence, this is the aircraft. I order this aircraft to not be used in any other form and should not be imagined in another operation as [unclear].
I: What was your opinion, sir, of the two other jet fighters that did see operational service or limited, the 162, the Heinkel 162 and of course the incredible Messerschmitt 163 Komet, the jet, rocket jet fighter?
AG: The 163, the rocket fighter was already under development and I knew about this and this would have been a compliment for the anti-aircraft, only for the defense of certain objects, like the derrick oil plants. I was of the opinion that this plane could be used for this object protection with a certain success. It would have been that a lower flight plane target with flight time, with power was only 6 or 8 minutes but the aircraft was then so high up that it could make one or two attacks and then go down. This was only an additional aircraft for the air defense but the 162, this was a political development. It was supposed to set the Hitler
I: Hitler Youth.
AG: Hitler Youth on these planes then only with the training of gliders, which was completely wrong, completely wrong, I was against this development because I said youngsters cannot fly this plane with success, this is absolutely impossible. Secondly, the engine BMW 003 is not so practical, [unclear] that it can be used only one engine on one aircraft, we need two engines. And certainly the 163 with this engine behind the pilots and without the exit seat, this would result, every pilot who tried to bail out would land in the engine. So, I have fought against this plane because the concept was only based on a political wrong thinking, absolutely wrong thinking. And this should have been performed and executed by a, the youngsters and responsible for this was the fieldmarshal or the general, colonel general Keller.
I: From the first world war.
AG: Ja, from the first world war. And I took Keller with me to Nowotny on the day in which there was a , was shot down, hit the ground. In order, my intention was to show him what a jet operation does mean, more complicated than this and at the end of the war, when I was leading my JW 44 in Munich Ried, two or three handful of this 162 came to me and said we want to fly with you. They didn’t have any success at all. So this was, the 162 was a complete wrong concept from the beginning. A political development.
UI. We’re getting near the end, sir, but can you very briefly tell us about JV 44? Is it correct that all the pilots have the night’s cross?
AG: No, no, this is not correct. We had several pilots with the knights cross and most their officers and at the end of the war, pilots who were in hospitals or were in, wie heisst das [unclear]? the recovery stations, they came to me and said:’We want to be, we want to fly under you’, they all said: ‘we want to fight the end of the days with you’. And I have accepted this. So, in the last week or two last weeks, I only accepted such pilots who wanted to continue to fly. Pilots who said, [unclear] for family reasons or something like this and I do not want to fly anymore, he could do this, he would not be punished at all. This were only Freiwillige, free will pilots, [unclear]
I: Volunteers.
AG: Volunteers, volunteers. And Steinhoff had this terrible accident, he was the man who was responsible for operations in my group 44, strong and he believes he had hit a [unclear]. I believe he pushed the wrong button, Steinhoff was used to take off with flaps in and only when he reached, came close to the take off speed, then he dropped the flaps, this [unclear] a little bit [unclear] the take off. But in the Messerschmitt are two buttons, one is for undercarriage, one is for flaps and they are close together, you can see on old cockpits. I think, yes, he pushed the undercarriage. Then he tried to take off, he made a jump, restored its speed, came down with too early engines about 2000 feet after he came lifted from the ground, came down, he hit the ground and burned out.
I: Did you see the crash?
AG: Ja. I was number one, he was number four in my wing. This was the last, my last mission. Finnegan believes he should, this American guy, he came, I shot down two more others in this mission and I didn’t know if the second one was already finished so I made a turn, looked at this [unclear] and [unclear] gave me some shots [unclear].
[All laugh]
I: Five more questions.
AG: Finnegan or when the Americans say, you were shot down by Finnegan, that is not true, I could manage to get home, one engine was hit, ja, that is correct but I could manage to come down and manage a perfect landing with one engine on my base on which I had taken off, is not a victory.
I: Not at all, an American-type victory.
UI2: Unconfirmed probably.
[All laugh]
I: Five more questions, if I may. You are now 82 years of age?
AG: Ja, unfortunately.
I: How do you feel about the events of 55 years ago, during the battle of Britain, when you were fighting for your life, all this time, all this long distance from battle, how do you feel?
AG: At this time when this had happened, we did never believe we would survive. Even in the last days of the war, when I flew the 262, I didn’t believe I would survive the war. I was real ready with my life, had a good life and [unclear] success, [unclear] success in my life and I always wanted to be better than others and I got the feeling to be better than others [unclear]. So, I am thankful for my life and I think it was an extraordinary class of life which I performed. And I thank God for being with you now and have survived all situations. And I have the experience of what I say. I have had so much responsibility during my military life and when I saw the terrible destructions of the allied airwar in Germany and I saw the people who did suffer in such terrible form, I had only the wish and the intention to fight up to the last minute in order to compensate, not to win the war.
I: General Adolf Galland, this has been a real pleasure, sir, we greatly appreciate it. Thank you. Marvellous sir.
I: Thank you sir. You are part of aviation history.
AG: [unclear]
I: Yes, yes, we do, we have some presentations for you.
I: On the way here, sir, I had to pinch myself to make sure that it is real, that I am meeting Adolf Galland. A small gift, sir, on behalf of the Yorshire air Museum.
AG: Thank you.
I: Our air museum plan.
AG: I’ve got quite a collection already.
I: I’m quite sure you must have.
AG: Thank you.
I: The history of our county town of York. You to have a look at.
AG: Oh ja.
I: We have to sign it.
AG: You know there is a collection of signatures there.
I: Yes. We are going to sign these as well.
I: These are other people at the museum.
AG: Oh ja.
I: Would you be so kind as to sign some bits for ourselves, sir?
AG: Ja.
I: [unclear]I’m quite sure you must have.
AG: Thank you.
I: The history of our county town of York. You to have a look at.
AG: Oh ja.
I: We have to sign it.
AG: You know there is a collection of signatures there.
I: Yes. We are going to sign these as well.
I: These are other people at the museum.
AG: Oh ja.
I: Would you be so kind as to sign some bits for ourselves, sir?
AG: Ja.
I: [unclear]]]> eng]]> Sound]]> Royal Air Force]]> Royal Air Force. Bomber Command]]> Royal Air Force. Fighter Command]]> Wehrmacht. Luftwaffe]]> Great Britain]]> Germany]]> France]]> Spain]]> Norway]]> Malta]]> Russia (Federation)]]> Germany--Hamburg]]> IBCC Digital Archive]]> Sue Smith]]> Maureen Clarke]]> eng]]> Text]]> Text. Memoir]]> Royal Air Force]]> Royal Air Force. Bomber Command]]> Civilian]]> Netherlands]]> Netherlands--Holten]]> Great Britain]]> England--Lincoln]]> France]]> Netherlands--Tilburg Metropolitan Area]]> Norway]]> Russia (Federation)]]> Germany]]> Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal]]> Netherlands--Arnhem]]> Scotland--Glasgow]]> Russia (Federation)--Yagodnik]]> Netherlands--Nijverdal]]> 1944-09-23]]> 1944-09-24]]> IBCC Digital Archive]]> Sally Coulter]]> Pending text-based transcription. Other languages than English]]> fra]]> Text]]> Russia (Federation)]]> Germany]]> Peter Lovatt]]> IBCC Digital Archive]]> Maureen Clarke]]> Peter Bradbury]]> eng]]> Text]]> Text. 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Kriegsmarine]]> United States]]> Rhode Island--Quonset Point Naval Air Station]]> Bahamas--Nassau]]> New York (State)--New York]]> Bahamas--New Providence Island]]> Great Britain]]> England--Harrogate]]> Scotland--Perth]]> Scotland--Glasgow]]> England--Warrington]]> England--Blackpool]]> Luxembourg]]> France]]> Belgium]]> Netherlands]]> France--Dunkerque]]> England--Dover]]> England--Grantham]]> England--Torquay]]> Wales--Aberystwyth]]> Iceland]]> Greenland]]> Sierra Leone]]> Russia (Federation)--Murmansk]]> Singapore]]> France--Saint-Malo]]> Denmark]]> Sweden]]> Germany--Lübeck]]> Netherlands--Ameland Island]]> England--Grimsby]]> Germany--Helgoland]]> Netherlands--Rotterdam]]> Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay]]> England--Lundy Island]]> Germany--Cologne]]> North Carolina]]> North Carolina--Cape Hatteras]]> Aruba]]> Curaçao]]> Iceland--Reykjavík]]> Greenland--Narsarssuak]]> Canada]]> Québec--Montréal]]> Rhode Island]]> New York (State)--Buffalo]]> Gulf of Mexico]]> Caribbean Sea]]> Virginia]]> Florida--Miami]]> Cuba--Guantánamo Bay Naval Base]]> Puerto Rico--San Juan]]> Cuba]]> Florida--West Palm Beach]]> Cuba--Caimanera]]> India]]> Sierra Leone--Freetown]]> Jamaica]]> Jamaica--Kingston]]> Jamaica--Montego Bay]]> Virginia--Norfolk]]> Washington (D.C.)]]> Newfoundland and Labrador]]> Northern Ireland--Limavady]]> England--Chatham (Kent)]]> Newfoundland and Labrador--Gander]]> Gibraltar]]> England--Leicester]]> Massachusetts--Boston]]> Egypt--Alamayn]]> Algeria--Algiers]]> Algeria--Oran]]> Algeria--Bejaïa]]> Algeria--Annaba]]> Italy--Sicily]]> England--Milton Keynes]]> Germany--Essen]]> England--Dunwich]]> Europe--Scheldt River]]> England--Sizewell]]> Germany--Hamburg]]> England--Kent]]> Germany--Stuttgart]]> England--Crowborough]]> Netherlands--Hague]]> England--Peterborough]]> England--Bristol]]> Germany--Homburg (Saarland)]]> Belgium--Brussels]]> Germany--Bochum]]> Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal]]> Germany--Wanne-Eickel]]> Belgium--Liège]]> Germany--Frankfurt am Main]]> Germany--Hannover]]> Germany--Aschaffenburg]]> Germany--Castrop-Rauxel]]> Germany--Mittelland Canal]]> Germany--Aachen]]> Germany--Karlsruhe]]> Germany--Neuss]]> Germany--Nuremberg]]> Germany--Duisburg]]> Germany--Hagen (Arnsberg)]]> Germany--Leuna]]> Germany--Osnabrück]]> Germany--Ludwigshafen am Rhein]]> Germany--Ulm]]> Germany--Munich]]> Poland--Szczecin]]> Germany--Bonn]]> Belgium--Houffalize]]> Germany--Mannheim]]> Germany--Grevenbroich]]> Germany--Dülmen]]> France--Metz]]> Germany--Magdeburg]]> Germany--Zeitz]]> Germany--Gelsenkirchen]]> England--Dungeness]]> Germany--Mainz (Rhineland-Palatinate)]]> Germany--Wiesbaden]]> Germany--Dresden]]> Germany--Leipzig]]> Germany--Koblenz]]> Germany--Chemnitz]]> Germany--Dortmund]]> Germany--Düsseldorf]]> Germany--Münster in Westfalen]]> Germany--Worms]]> Germany--Pforzheim]]> Germany--Darmstadt]]> Europe--Lake Constance]]> Germany--Bergkamen]]> Germany--Dessau (Dessau)]]> Germany--Wesel (North Rhine-Westphalia)]]> France--Aube]]> Germany--Augsburg]]> England--Feltwell]]> England--Croydon]]> Norway--Oslo]]> Sweden--Stockholm]]> Czech Republic--Prague]]> Italy--Florence]]> Portugal--Lisbon]]> Monaco--Monte-Carlo]]> France--Boulogne-sur-Mer]]> Netherlands--Venlo]]> Netherlands--Amsterdam]]> France--Paris]]> France--Lyon]]> France--Digne]]> France--Nevers]]> France--Lille]]> Norway--Ålesund]]> France--Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais)]]> France--Bailleul (Nord)]]> Belgium--Ieper]]> Belgium--Mesen]]> France--Cambrai]]> France--Somme]]> France--Arras]]> France--Lens]]> France--Calais]]> Germany--Emden (Lower Saxony)]]> Netherlands--Vlissingen]]> France--Brest]]> France--Lorient]]> France--La Pallice]]> Egypt--Suez]]> Germany--Berlin]]> Yemen (Republic)--Aden]]> Cyprus]]> Turkey--Gallipoli]]> Black Sea--Dardanelles Strait]]> Turkey--İmroz Island]]> Turkey--İzmir]]> Greece--Lesbos (Municipality)]]> Greece--Thasos Island]]> Greece--Chios (Municipality)]]> Bulgaria]]> Turkey--Istanbul]]> Europe--Macedonia]]> Greece--Kavala]]> Kenya--Nairobi]]> Tanzania]]> Sudan]]> Eritrea]]> Ethiopia]]> Sudan--Kassalā]]> Eritrea--Asmara]]> Yemen (Republic)--Perim Island]]> Ethiopia--Addis Ababa]]> Sudan--Khartoum]]> Ghana--Takoradi]]> Libya--Cyrenaica]]> Libya--Tobruk]]> Egypt--Cairo]]> Iraq]]> Greece--Crete]]> Tunisia--Mareth Line]]> Libya--Tripoli]]> Tunisia--Qaṣrayn]]> Tunisia--Medenine]]> Italy--Pantelleria Island]]> Malta]]> Italy--Licata]]> Italy--Brindisi]]> Italy--Foggia]]> Italy--Cassino]]> Italy--Sangro River]]> Italy--Termoli]]> Yugoslavia]]> Croatia--Split]]> Croatia--Vis Island]]> Italy--Loreto]]> Italy--Pescara]]> Trinidad and Tobago--Trinidad]]> North America--Saint Lawrence River]]> Newfoundland and Labrador--Happy Valley-Goose Bay]]> Bahamas]]> Florida]]> Italy]]> Poland]]> Massachusetts]]> New York (State)]]> Algeria]]> Tunisia]]> Libya]]> Egypt]]> North Africa]]> Ontario]]> Québec]]> Germany]]> Croatia]]> Czech Republic]]> Ghana]]> Greece]]> Kenya]]> Norway]]> Russia (Federation)]]> Turkey]]> Yemen (Republic)]]> Portugal]]> Trinidad and Tobago]]> North America--Niagara Falls]]> France--Reims]]> Europe--Frisian Islands]]> Germany--Monheim (North Rhine-Westphalia)]]> Germany--Ruhr (Region)]]> England--Norfolk]]> England--Suffolk]]> England--Gloucestershire]]> England--Lancashire]]> England--Leicestershire]]> England--Lincolnshire]]> Germany--Oberhausen (Düsseldorf)]]> Greece--Thessalonikē]]> Germany--Herne (Arnsberg)]]> Atlantic Ocean--Kattegat (Baltic Sea)]]> Libya--Banghāzī]]> Great Britain Miscellaneous Island Dependencies--Jersey]]> Virginia--Hampton Roads (Region)]]> Russia (Federation)--Yagodnik]]> West Indies]]> West Indies]]> West Indies]]> West Indies]]> France--Pas-de-Calais]]> Atlantic Ocean--English Channel]]> Puerto Rico]]> Europe--Ardennes]]> Peter Lovatt]]> IBCC Digital Archive]]> eng]]> Text]]> Text. Personal research]]> Royal Air Force]]> Royal Air Force. Coastal Command]]> Royal Air Force. Bomber Command]]> Wehrmacht. Kriegsmarine]]> United States]]> Rhode Island--Quonset Point Naval Air Station]]> Bahamas--Nassau]]> New York (State)--New York]]> Bahamas--New Providence Island]]> England--Harrogate]]> Scotland--Perth]]> Scotland--Glasgow]]> England--Warrington]]> England--Blackpool]]> Luxembourg]]> France]]> Belgium]]> Netherlands]]> France--Dunkerque]]> England--Dover]]> England--Grantham]]> England--Torquay]]> Wales--Aberystwyth]]> Iceland]]> Greenland]]> Sierra Leone]]> Russia (Federation)--Murmansk]]> Singapore]]> France--Saint-Malo]]> Denmark]]> Sweden]]> Germany--Lübeck]]> Netherlands--Ameland Island]]> England--Grimsby]]> Germany--Helgoland]]> Netherlands--Rotterdam]]> Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay]]> England--Lundy Island]]> Germany--Cologne]]> North Carolina]]> North Carolina--Cape Hatteras]]> Aruba]]> Curaçao]]> Iceland--Reykjavík]]> Greenland--Narsarssuak]]> Canada]]> Québec--Montréal]]> Rhode Island]]> New York (State)--Buffalo]]> Gulf of Mexico]]> Caribbean Sea]]> Virginia]]> Florida--Miami]]> Cuba--Guantánamo Bay Naval Base]]> Puerto Rico--San Juan]]> Cuba]]> Florida--West Palm Beach]]> Cuba--Caimanera]]> India]]> Sierra Leone--Freetown]]> Jamaica]]> Jamaica--Kingston]]> Jamaica--Montego Bay]]> Virginia--Norfolk]]> Washington (D.C.)]]> Newfoundland and Labrador]]> Trinidad and Tobago--Trinidad]]> North America--Saint Lawrence River]]> Newfoundland and Labrador--Happy Valley-Goose Bay]]> Bahamas]]> Florida]]> New York (State)]]> Great Britain]]> Ontario]]> Québec]]> Germany]]> Russia (Federation)]]> Trinidad and Tobago]]> North America--Niagara Falls]]> Europe--Frisian Islands]]> Germany--Ruhr (Region)]]> England--Devon]]> England--Kent]]> England--Lancashire]]> England--Lincolnshire]]> Atlantic Ocean--Kattegat (Baltic Sea)]]> Virginia--Hampton Roads (Region)]]> Russia (Federation)--Yagodnik]]> West Indies]]> West Indies]]> West Indies]]> West Indies]]> Puerto Rico]]> Great Britain. Royal Air Force]]> IBCC Digital Archive]]> Review Oct 2024]]> eng]]> Text]]> Text. Log book and record book]]> Royal Air Force]]> Royal Air Force. Bomber Command]]> Belgium]]> France]]> Germany]]> Norway]]> Great Britain]]> England--Buckinghamshire]]> England--Cambridgeshire]]> England--Devon]]> England--Greater Manchester]]> England--Lancashire]]> England--Lincolnshire]]> England--Nottinghamshire]]> England--Yorkshire]]> Wales--Vale of Glamorgan]]> Atlantic Ocean--English Channel]]> Atlantic Ocean--Bay of Biscay]]> Atlantic Ocean--North Sea]]> Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea]]> Belgium--Kortrijk]]> France--Boulogne-sur-Mer]]> France--Brest]]> France--Caen]]> France--Calais]]> France--Culmont-Chalindrey]]> France--Châtellerault]]> France--Doullens]]> France--Joigny]]> France--Le Havre]]> France--Limoges]]> France--L'Isle-Adam]]> France--Villeneuve-Saint-Georges]]> France--Saint-Nazaire]]> Germany--Bremerhaven]]> Germany--Darmstadt]]> Germany--Dresden]]> Germany--Heilbronn]]> Germany--Hörstel]]> Germany--Karlsruhe]]> Germany--Kiel]]> Germany--Merseburg]]> Germany--Munich]]> Germany--Rheydt]]> Germany--Rüsselsheim]]> Germany--Stuttgart]]> Germany--Wettin]]> Norway--Horten]]> Russia (Federation)--Kaliningrad (Kaliningradskai︠a︡ oblastʹ)]]> Germany--Böhlen]]> France--Lyon]]> Russia (Federation)]]> France--Bordeaux (Nouvelle-Aquitaine)]]> France--Secqueville-en-Bessin]]> France--Saint-Leu-d'Esserent]]> France--Châtellerault]]> Germany--Altenburg (Thuringia)]]> Czech Republic--Most (Okres)]]> France--Revigny-sur-Ornain]]> Germany--Borna (Leipzig)]]> Germany--Ladbergen]]> Germany--Leipzig]]> France--Pas-de-Calais]]> France--Saint-Cyr-l'Ecole]]> France--Prouville]]> France--Pas-de-Calais]]> 1944]]> 1945]]> 1944-06-19]]> 1944-06-20]]> 1944-06-23]]> 1944-06-24]]> 1944-06-25]]> 1944-06-27]]> 1944-06-28]]> 1944-06-29]]> 1944-07-12]]> 1944-07-13]]> 1944-07-14]]> 1944-07-15]]> 1944-07-18]]> 1944-07-19]]> 1944-07-20]]> 1944-07-21]]> 1944-07-23]]> 1944-07-24]]> 1944-07-25]]> 1944-07-26]]> 1944-07-27]]> 1944-07-28]]> 1944-07-29]]> 1944-07-30]]> 1944-07-31]]> 1944-08-01]]> 1944-08-02]]> 1944-08-05]]> 1944-08-07]]> 1944-08-08]]> 1944-08-09]]> 1944-08-10]]> 1944-08-11]]> 1944-08-12]]> 1944-08-13]]> 1944-08-14]]> 1944-08-26]]> 1944-08-27]]> 1944-08-31]]> 1944-09-05]]> 1944-09-10]]> 1944-09-11]]> 1944-09-12]]> 1944-09-13]]> 1944-09-14]]> 1944-09-18]]> 1944-09-19]]> 1944-09-20]]> 1944-11-26]]> 1944-11-27]]> 1944-12-04]]> 1944-12-06]]> 1944-12-10]]> 1944-12-21]]> 1944-12-22]]> 1945-01-13]]> 1945-01-14]]> 1945-01-15]]> 1945-01-16]]> 1945-01-17]]> 1945-02-02]]> 1945-02-03]]> 1945-02-06]]> 1945-02-07]]> 1945-02-08]]> 1945-02-13]]> 1945-02-14]]> 1945-02-15]]> 1945-02-20]]> 1945-02-21]]> 1945-02-23]]> 1945-02-24]]> 1945-03-20]]> 1945-03-21]]> 1945-04-07]]> 1945-02-08]]> 1945-02-09]]> Great Britain. Royal Air Force]]> IBCC Digital Archive]]> Mike Connock]]> Review Oct 2024]]> eng]]> Text]]> Text. Log book and record book]]> Royal Air Force]]> Royal Air Force. Bomber Command]]> Belgium]]> Czech Republic]]> France]]> Germany]]> Great Britain]]> Norway]]> Poland]]> Russia (Federation)]]> Belgium--Kortrijk]]> Atlantic Ocean--Baltic Sea]]> Czech Republic--Chomutov]]> Czech Republic--Plzeň]]> England--Lincolnshire]]> England--Nottinghamshire]]> France--Caen]]> France--Givors]]> France--Hesdin]]> France--La Pallice]]> France--Lens]]> France--L'Isle-Adam]]> France--Villers-Bocage (Calvados)]]> Germany--Braunschweig]]> Germany--Darmstadt]]> Germany--Dortmund-Ems Canal]]> Germany--Dresden]]> Germany--Giessen (Hesse)]]> Germany--Hamburg]]> Germany--Heilbronn]]> Germany--Kiel]]> Germany--Mittelland Canal]]> Germany--Mönchengladbach]]> Germany--Munich]]> Germany--Sassnitz]]> Germany--Stuttgart]]> Norway--Bergen]]> Norway--Tønsberg]]> Norway--Trondheim]]> Poland--Gdynia]]> Poland--Police (Województwo Zachodniopomorskie)]]> Russia (Federation)--Kaliningrad (Kaliningradskai︠a︡ oblastʹ)]]> Germany--Münster in Westfalen]]> Germany--Ruhr (Region)]]> France--Trossy St. Maximin]]> France--Trossy St. Maximin]]> Germany--Ladbergen]]> France--Siracourt]]> Germany--Hörstel]]> France--Pas-de-Calais]]> Germany--Böhlen]]> France--Culmont-Chalindrey]]> 1944]]> 1944-07]]> 1944-08]]> 1945]]> 1944-07-12]]> 1944-07-13]]> 1944-07-17]]> 1944-07-20]]> 1944-07-21]]> 1944-07-22]]> 1944-07-23]]> 1944-07-24]]> 1944-07-25]]> 1944-07-26]]> 1944-07-27]]> 1944-07-28]]> 1944-07-29]]> 1944-07-30]]> 1944-08-01]]> 1944-08-02]]> 1944-08-03]]> 1944-08-19]]> 1944-08-24]]> 1944-08-25]]> 1944-08-26]]> 1944-08-27]]> 1944-08-29]]> 1944-08-30]]> 1944-08-31]]> 1944-09-18]]> 1944-09-19]]> 1944-09-23]]> 1944-09-24]]> 1944-10-14]]> 1944-10-15]]> 1944-10-28]]> 1944-10-29]]> 1944-11-06]]> 1944-11-07]]> 1944-11-21]]> 1944-11-22]]> 1944-11-23]]> 1944-11-26]]> 1944-11-27]]> 1944-12-04]]> 1944-12-05]]> 1944-12-06]]> 1944-12-07]]> 1944-12-09]]> 1944-12-17]]> 1944-12-18]]> 1944-12-19]]> 1945-01-07]]> 1945-01-08]]> 1945-01-13]]> 1945-01-14]]> 1945-02-07]]> 1945-02-08]]> 1945-02-09]]> 1945-02-13]]> 1945-02-14]]> 1945-02-20]]> 1945-02-21]]> 1945-02-22]]> 1945-03-03]]> 1945-03-04]]> 1945-03-05]]> 1945-03-06]]> 1945-03-07]]> 1945-03-20]]> 1945-03-21]]> 1945-03-22]]> 1945-04-08]]> 1945-04-09]]> 1945-04-16]]> 1945-04-17]]> 1945-04-18]]> 1945-04-19]]> 1945-04-25]]> 1945-04-26]]> IBCC Digital Archive]]> Pending text-based transcription. Other languages than English]]> deu]]> Text]]> Photograph]]> Wehrmacht]]> Russia (Federation)]]> Russia (Federation)--Volgograd]]> 1942]]> 1943]]> IBCC Digital Archive]]> Sally Coulter]]> Pending text-based transcription. Other languages than English]]> deu]]> Text]]> Germany]]> Russia (Federation)]]> 1943-04-21]]>
The three countries would continue their close co-operation and joint warfare planning into the period after hostilities had ceased to maintain peace and encourage prosperity.

The Chinese Ambassador signed the declaration during the conference. The declaration outlined the principles for a comprehensive system of international co-operation and security, including all peace-loving nations. It was decided to establish a European Advisory Commission in London to consider European questions. There was to be a further Advisory Committee on Italy, including representatives from Greece, Yugoslavia and France. The Allied governments wanted democracy to be restored in Italy and fascism to be eradicated. They wanted the Italian people to determine their own form of government. The ministers also desired Austria’s independence but would take account of how much Austria had contributed to its liberation, particularly in view of its arms production for Germany. They furthermore declared that German war criminals would be returned and face justice in the countries in which they committed their crimes.

The Four Great Powers are said to be united in their quest to create future peace and security with a worldwide organisation, the United Nations. They will continue hostilities against the Axis powers until their unconditional surrender. It is said to thwart Hitler’s hopes for disunity. The German people are becoming aware that Germany has no prospect of winning the war.

A statement on Italy, and declarations on international security and Austria are included, as well as a declaration on war crimes. With evidence of mass murders and executions in several countries, including by retreating armies, the three Allies, on behalf of the 32 United Nations, declare that Germans involved in war crimes will be returned and tried in the country where their crime was committed. Those committing crimes in more than one country will be judged jointly by the Allied governments.

This is a warning shot to those who have not committed any war crimes, so that they do not become complicit in the Nazis’ attempt to prolong the war and postpone their day of reckoning.
]]> IBCC Digital Archive]]> Sally Coulter]]> Pending text-based transcription. Other languages than English]]> deu]]> Text]]> Royal Air Force]]> Royal Air Force. Bomber Command]]> Germany]]> Austria]]> France]]> Russia (Federation)]]> Russia (Federation)--Moscow]]> 1943-11]]> 1943-10]]> 1943-11-01]]> IBCC Digital Archive]]> Box, Douglas Charles. Banknotes]]> rus]]> Physical object]]> Civilian]]> Russia (Federation)]]> IBCC Digital Archive]]> eng]]> Photograph]]> Royal Air Force]]> Royal Air Force. Bomber Command]]> Russia (Federation)]]> Russia (Federation)--Yagodnik]]> 1944-09]]> E R James]]> IBCC Digital Archive]]> Jan Waller]]> eng]]> Text]]> Text. Diary]]> Royal Air Force]]> Royal Air Force. Bomber Command]]> Germany--Kiel]]> Germany--Stuttgart]]> France--Le Havre]]> France--Paris]]> France--Blaye]]> France--Caen]]> Poland--Szczecin]]> Russia (Federation)--Kaliningrad (Kaliningradskai︠a︡ oblastʹ)]]> Germany--Castrop-Rauxel]]> Germany--Saarbrücken]]> Germany--Wanne-Eickel]]> Germany--Duisburg]]> Germany--Wilhelmshaven]]> Netherlands--Walcheren]]> Germany--Cologne]]> Germany--Jülich]]> Germany--Neuss]]> Germany--Leipzig]]> Germany--Essen]]> France--Bordeaux (Nouvelle-Aquitaine)]]> Germany--Osnabrück]]> Germany--Ludwigshafen am Rhein]]> Germany--Münster in Westfalen]]> France]]> Germany]]> Poland]]> Netherlands]]> Russia (Federation)]]> Germany--Ruhr (Region)]]> Germany--Scholven]]> 1944-07-23]]> 1944-07-24]]> 1944-07-28]]> 1944-07-31]]> 1944-08-03]]> 1944-08-04]]> 1944-08-05]]> 1944-08-07]]> 1944-08-29]]> 1944-09-11]]> 1944-09-13]]> 1944-09-15]]> 1944-10-05]]> 1944-10-06]]> 1944-10-12]]> 1944-10-14]]> 1944-10-17]]> 1944-10-15]]> 1944-10-16]]> 1944-10-25]]> 1944-10-28]]> 1944-10-30]]> 1944-10-31]]> 1944-11-16]]> 1944-11-18]]> 1944-11-21]]> 1944-11-30]]> 1944-12-03]]> 1944-12-06]]> 1944-12-13]]> 1944-12-15]]> 1944-12-18]]> IBCC Digital Archive]]> eng]]> Photograph]]> Royal Air Force]]> Royal Air Force. Bomber Command]]> Russia (Federation)]]> Russia (Federation)--Yagodnik]]> 1944-09-17]]>