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                  <text>Stephenson, Stuart</text>
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                  <text>Stuart Stephenson MBE</text>
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                  <text>S Stephenson</text>
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                  <text>Stephenson, S</text>
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                  <text>84 items. An oral history interview with Stuart Stephenson MBE, Chairman of the Lincs-Lancaster Association, and issues of 5 Group News.&#13;
&#13;
The collection was catalogued by Barry Hunter.&#13;
&#13;
In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, some  items are available only at the International Bomber Command Centre / University of Lincoln.&#13;
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                  <text>This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.</text>
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              <text>Base Commander.&#13;
&#13;
Base Int: [Stamp]&#13;
&#13;
MARCH * 1944* CONFIDENTIAL * NO * 20 &#13;
&#13;
V GROUP NEWS V&#13;
&#13;
FOREWORD by A.O.C.&#13;
&#13;
March proved a record month for 5 Group, with a total of 1720 aircraft despatched, and a bomb load of 7200 tons. The month also showed a lower figure for early returns at 4.01%, and a missing rate well below the average for the past six months.&#13;
&#13;
Outstanding during the month were the series of attacks on small targets, by individual Bases. These were well undertaken and caused much damage to the French aircraft industry, which is engaged on sub-contracting and repair work for the G.A.F. – work which is of increasing importance as the major factories in Germany are obliterated by the U.S. .A.F.&#13;
&#13;
These attacks call for exact marking, accurate bombing and good signals communications. Much training is still necessary before every operation runs smoothly and can be undertaken with equal success on dark nights, by the aid of flares instead of the moon. That such attacks are possible is shown by the success achieved by No. 617 Squadron, who in this respect are acting as pioneers and gaining invaluable experience of a type of attack which is of growing importance.&#13;
&#13;
The success which this Squadron has achieved was rewarded by a special visit from General Carl Spaatz, Commanding the United States Strategic Air Forces, and General Doolittle, Commanding the 8th Bomber Force, who came to see for themselves the methods which are employed.&#13;
&#13;
Further evidence of the wide interest which is being taken in these attacks can be found in the Air Intelligence Summary of the United States Strategic Forces in Europe, for the week ending April 2nd. &#13;
&#13;
An article headed “R.A.F. Precision Attacks by Night”, after describing the results of many of the recent attacks, including those undertaken by all squadrons in this Group, continues as follows:-&#13;
&#13;
“Relatively small formations of Lancasters, manned by experienced and carefully trained crews, are responsible for the success of these missions, an outstanding feature of which has been the economy of force used to produce the desired result. Expert navigation followed by pin point marking of the target by a single aircraft at low level, has permitted visual bombing with a precision comparable to the best results obtained in daylight.”&#13;
&#13;
This praise, coming from the United States Air Force, is indeed welcome, for we recognise the magnificent results which they are achieving by day. If we think that precision bombing by night is not only possible, but in some respects easier than precision bombing by day, as well as being more economical, it is up to us to undertake the training and to give the thought necessary to prove that our conviction is right by the only valid method – that of results. I hope that during April we shall have an opportunity of gaining further experience and providing further proof of what can be done.&#13;
&#13;
With so much activity in front of the Group a heavier load than ever will be placed on the Training Base. It is going to be hard work for everyone, but it is only through their efforts that we have been able to carry out these damaging attacks. I congratulate all ranks in the Base on having achieved the full planned output of crews throughout the winter months, in spite of great difficulties of weather and an unexpected change in the type of aircraft used for conversion training. The requirements from now on are for the maximum number of crews who can be trained with the available resources.&#13;
&#13;
[Page break]&#13;
&#13;
PROGRESS OF NAVIGATION&#13;
&#13;
For the first two years of the war, the policy of operational navigation was controlled by individual Station and Squadron Commanders. Routeing, timing, heights to fly and recommendations of the best Navigational aids then available were decided locally.&#13;
&#13;
As the Command effort increased, and the enemy night defences grew stronger, it became necessary to route aircraft in concentration; thus, routeing was taken over by Bomber Command. The concentration achieved was still poor, however. There were several contributory factors:-&#13;
&#13;
(i) Lack of Navigational aids which would enable all aircraft to establish their positions when over enemy territory.&#13;
&#13;
(ii) Inaccurate flying of courses by Pilots due to weaving, evasive action, etc.&#13;
&#13;
(iii) Inaccuracies in calculations and computations by navigators.&#13;
&#13;
(iv) Due to the combination of (i), (ii), and (iii) above, the inability of the Navigator to determine the correct wind velocities.&#13;
&#13;
A concentrated drive was then made to remove these shortcomings. Gee, and later H.2.S. was introduced to enable Navigators to determine their position over enemy territory. The introduction of the A.P.I. which maintains an accurate air plot, gave the Navigator a method of recording inaccuracies of the aircraft and of the pilot which would normally pass unnoticed. Weaving was forbidden. More attention during the Navigator’s training, was given to computations and the elimination of careless mathematical errors.&#13;
&#13;
H 2 S and the A.P.I., however, were not available to the entire force, and the average Navigator was still unable to determine correct wind velocities. An analysis of many raids proved that a certain number of experienced Navigators, with the required aids, could find accurate winds, and it was decided to let the whole force benefit by the experience and capabilities of these crews. The scheme was pioneered by this Group on several occasions, and the results were very successful. It was then adopted by Bomber Command for general use. The procedure is as follows&#13;
&#13;
15/25 crews from each Group flying in aircraft equipped with H 2 S and A.P.I. are detailed as “wind finders”. The Navigators of these aircraft obtain wind velocity checks as often as possible, and transmit to Base all wind velocities found.&#13;
&#13;
Before the operation, the Senior Met. Officer at Group prepares a chart illustrating the route, the meridian code and the estimated position of aircraft at broadcast times. Attached to this chart is a list of the wind finding aircraft. As each wind is received, it is entered in the column allotted to the particular aircraft.&#13;
&#13;
The wind signals from aircraft are intercepted at Group Headquarters by the Signals Section, who keep a monitoring watch on all Base frequencies. From the time of breaking enemy R.D.F. cover, signals runners are constantly employed delivering wind messages to the Met. Office.&#13;
&#13;
There is a hook up between all Group Met. Sections within the Command, and winds received from the entire force are collated. The Met. Officer sits with one eye on his chart and one eye on the clock, and five minutes before the next broadcast is due, a forecast wind is issued, and, if necessary, a corrected past wind.&#13;
&#13;
As the raid progresses, and the chart fills up, so the look of satisfaction grows on the Senior Met. Officer’s face. Sometimes there are blanks when aircraft cannot obtain a wind velocity check, due to u/s equipment, or because aircraft have returned early. At other times a wind velocity obtained is not transmitted by the aircraft until long after it has left the area to which the wind velocity applies. In both instances, this gives the Met. Staff so much less information on which to base their corrections and forecasts. There have been instances when they have had no more than two or three wind velocities over a detailed area, and even then there have been large discrepancies. A good example is the Berlin raid of 24/25 March, 1944, when only 9 wind velocities were received, homeward bound, from the target to the enemy coast – 2 1/4 hours flying! In such circumstances it may be exceedingly difficult to give you accurate forecast winds. Crews now realise how important it is to obtain as many wind velocity checks as possible, and pass them to Base immediately. Even if the wind velocity obtained differs considerably from the forecast on the Form 2330, then providing you are confident of the fix used, send back the w/v you have found. If you have “boobed”, then the Met. Staff can, and will, see this, and no harm will be done. There will be no “strips” for the crew concerned. If, however, you obtain a w/v and [underlined] DO NOT [/underlined] send it back, then you are withholding vital information which may affect the safety of the whole Bomber Force, including your own.&#13;
&#13;
The Group Met. Staff have had considerable experience of this scheme, and they are getting to know the various windfinders. One often hears a remark in the Met. Office “Old Snooks is flying in “F”57 tonight, we shall get some reliable winds from him” – and they do!! They know that each wind “Old Snooks” sends back will be reliable, and his messages are greatly treasured.&#13;
&#13;
A Navigator is employed in the Met. Office whose duty it was in the past, to present to the Air Staff the effect of the corrected w/v’s on track and time keeping, and whether aircraft would arrive at the target early or late. All went well until the attack on Leipzig on the night of 19/20th February, when it was obvious from application of the broadcast winds that aircraft would arrive at the target 10 – 15 minutes early. We all know the result – 79 aircraft lost.&#13;
&#13;
The obvious way to tackle this problem was to adjust the zero hour, and since we were obtaining from aircraft reliable information of true winds over enemy territory, a scheme was devised whereby the zero hour could be amended if necessary. The Duty Navigator in the Command Met. Office ascertains from application of the corrected w/v’s, whether the aircraft will arrive at the target early on time, or late, and consequently whether the zero hour needs amending. All H 2 S wind finders in this Group transmit the times at which they pass two datum points on the route. It is obvious, however, that both calculations will be valueless unless all aircraft [underlined] do [/underlined] leave the concentration point [underlined] exactly [/underlined] on time, and fly at the speeds laid down at the Flight Planning Conference. It must also be obvious to the reader, that unless wind information and times at the datum points are sent back by aircraft immediately, then there will be neither sufficient information on which to base an amendment to the zero hour, nor time in which to take necessary action.&#13;
&#13;
Accurate time keeping, good concentration and correct timing of the attack, in short the success of the operation, depend on every wind finder knowing and doing his job. It’s up to you.&#13;
&#13;
WHERE TO LOOK&#13;
&#13;
A.O.C’s Foreword. Page 1&#13;
Aircrew Volunteers. 6&#13;
Air Bombing. 7&#13;
Air Sea Rescue. 8&#13;
Absence. 11&#13;
Accidents. 14&#13;
Armament. 15&#13;
Bombing, Air. 7&#13;
Decorations. 6&#13;
Engineering. 14&#13;
Equipment. 11&#13;
Flying Control. 5&#13;
Flight Engineers. 6&#13;
Gardening. 4&#13;
Gee. 5&#13;
Gunnery. 9&#13;
H 2 S. Page 5&#13;
Link Trainer Times. 10&#13;
Navigation, Progress of. 2&#13;
Navigation. 13&#13;
Organisation. 14&#13;
Operations. 16&#13;
Progress of Navigation. 2&#13;
Photography. 4&#13;
Public Relations. 10&#13;
Signals/Radar. 3&#13;
Second Thoughts for Pilots 10&#13;
Sports. 12&#13;
Tactics. 6&#13;
Training. 11&#13;
War Effort. 16&#13;
War Savings. 6&#13;
&#13;
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 2.&#13;
&#13;
[Page break]&#13;
&#13;
SIGNALS/RADAR&#13;
&#13;
March was not the best of months from the Aircrew Signals point of view, and it is to be hoped that Signals Leaders will make every endeavour to effect an improvement in the coming month.&#13;
&#13;
You may not have any connection with the following examples but is that because you know all the answers, or is it that you have not been caught out.&#13;
&#13;
There was once a Wireless Operator (Air) who after 14 operational sorties, used the spelling table of CD0250 for the following – REQUEST Q.F.E. – a total of 5 Groups where 1 Group would have covered the situation. Five minutes instruction per day would prevent any unnecessary waste of ether time.&#13;
&#13;
Once upon a time (in March) a Wireless Operator (Air) gave out the wrong Bomber Code, which all the simpletons in his section accepted without a murmur. It is said at this Headquarters that all the murmuring came from the Duty Signals Officer – I wouldn’t know. In days gone by (March again), a Wireless Operator (Air) did not know where to find the fuse of his Visual Monica equipment, and the aircraft had no Early Warning Device – a congratulatory message from the Luftwaffe is expected any day. Talking of Early Warning Devices, the writer knows of two Operators (no names, no Grade 1) who did not know how to cope with simple fault finding.&#13;
&#13;
Now we can do better than this, and it is suggested that every Signals Leader has a daily session with all the Wireless Operators, just ten minutes every morning will pay handsome dividends.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] EARLY WARNING DEVICES [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
The new system of reporting the performance of Early Warning Devices by pro-forma is working very well, thanks to the co-operation of all concerned. This is going to save a lot of time and unnecessary telephone calls, which ultimately will help the war effort. Since the last News, a new instruction on the use of I.F.F. when circling dinghies or crashed aircraft, has been brought into force, 5G/S.4403/50/Sigs, of 23rd March, refers.&#13;
&#13;
On Flight Planning for Thursday, 30th March, the Air Officer Commanding outlined the danger to the Bomber Force caused by selfish captains trying to but [sic] a little extra security for themselves at the expense of their fellow captains, when they order their Wireless Operators into the Astro-dome. It is hoped that this point has now gone right home, and that there will be nor further occurrence of this practice.&#13;
&#13;
Just one more item that requires the attention of all Airborne Signals types. The constant back tuning that goes on during every operation, and the passing back of wind messages during the normal transmission times. When you read the first part of these notes again, as it is hoped you will, add a reminder about back tuning and listening out, to your daily session.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] GOOD SHOWS [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
Two good points stand out for the month; they are both from No.57 Squadron.&#13;
&#13;
P/O. Bracker, on the night of 24/25th did some quick thinking to get his R1155 working and receive the broadcasts.&#13;
&#13;
On the same night, Sgt. Robinson saw on his Fishpond screen, two aircraft close together. He reported this, and gunners reports a combat taking place. The aircraft joined in the fight, drew the enemy aircraft’s fire and eventually shot it down.&#13;
&#13;
This is an excellent example of the intelligent use of Fishpond – a good show by the W/Op and his crew.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] STOP PRESS [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
Congratulations to F/Lt. Stevens, Signals Leader of No.57 Squadron, on obtaining an “A” category on No.5 Signals Leader’s Course.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] SIGNALS MAINTENANCE [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
The percentage of Signals failures for March is considerably lower than for February, being less than 50% of the February figures. No Signals failure was responsible for a cancelled sortie, but out of the total of 24 failures reported, four were the reason for, or a contributory cause of, early returns.&#13;
&#13;
The very small percentage contribution to early returns for March 0.235% against 1.30% for February is a welcome indication of a general drive to eliminate the possibility of Signals contribution in any way to a cancelled or abandoned sortie.&#13;
&#13;
This does not mean that failure reports generally show a decrease. On the contrary, the conscientious reporting of any type of failure whatsoever, irrespective of whether it affects the success of the sortie or not, or even appears on the raid report, is essential.&#13;
&#13;
A perusal of the details of failures for March, shows that one Squadron reported ten failures, none of which caused an early return; but they do provide the information required to enable action to be taken to institute modifications which will, in time, make failures almost impossible. The more attention which is paid to reporting failures the sooner will the improvements be incorporated.&#13;
&#13;
We do not wish to take part in any competition between Groups for the lowest number of reported failures, but we must show the lowest percentage contributing to cancellations and early returns.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] COUNTERMEASURE MANDREL [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
The fitting of Mandrel is proceeding satisfactorily. The great hold-up has been due to so many new aircraft arriving with the downward vision blister, thus denying us our original aerial position. However, Bomber Command have now authorised the removal of these blisters and, as a result, the aerial returns to its original position.&#13;
&#13;
We still manage to fly a high proportion of the Command Mandrel effort.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] SIGNALS SECURITY [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
During the month there occurred an outstanding example of loss of security on an operation through injudicious use of R/T. Take-off was 18.13, the route was northerly, and W/T silence was not to be broken until approximately 20.45. At 19.09 an early return called up his station, stating that his instruments were u/s, and requesting permission to land after jettisoning petrol. On being told to stand by, the E.R. stated that although he was aware that boomerang procedure was to jettison the cookie, he didn’t want to fly around much longer, and suggested jettisoning the petrol and landing with cookie. The ground station then requested details as to what was wrong with the aircraft instruments. After replying, the aircraft requested instructions again, and was told to jettison incendiaries safe, and pancake. This instruction was repeated, the aircraft carried out the instructions and returned, making a final reference to his cookie as a warning to ground crews. The entire conversation lasted 23 minutes, by which time any doubts the enemy might have had of the hostile intentions of the force plotted by his long range Radar must have been completely dispersed. “It is to be assumed” say Bomber Command, “that every time a word is spoken, it is heard by the enemy”. So, on this particular night, we gave him one hour’s prior notice of the attack and that is a luxury we can’t afford.&#13;
&#13;
After many representations, the British Joint Communications Board have now conceded that for INTER RAF WORKING ONLY, J – Johnny may be used in lieu of J-Jig. For combined and joint working, J-Jig must still be used. This latter point is important. The probability of joint and combined working is imminent, and strict observance of the alphabet and standard procedure will play an important part in ensuring the smooth working of our forces.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] GEE [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
The serviceability of Gee remains high, and shows a slight improvement over February. A total of 1201 Gee sorties were flown during the month, and in 96.7% of them the equipment was completely serviceable. It is hoped that a further increase can be shown next month.&#13;
&#13;
Three new Radar Workshops have been completed during the month. All squadrons now possess their own building, which should help considerably to increase serviceability. &#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] H 2 S [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
H 2 S serviceability improved slightly during last month, but it is still far from satisfactory; the percentage serviceable to the target and back was 76%.&#13;
&#13;
The new Filament Transformers, which have now flown up to 50 sorties, give every indication of being the solution to the main causes of unserviceability; unfortunately, production difficulties will cause considerable delay in a changeover programme. The arrival of a drier season should prevent a further source of unserviceability that has been caused by dampness. It is felt that a considerable percentage on non-reproduceable faults were due to such dampness.&#13;
&#13;
Manipulation failures due to lack of experience with the equipment, still assume too high a percentage, and every effort must be made to eliminate them. A new switch procedure has been drawn up and put into force which, if strictly adhered to, should result in greater serviceability.&#13;
&#13;
The repositioning of the Scanner Heater &#13;
&#13;
(Continued on page 4, col.3)&#13;
&#13;
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 3.&#13;
&#13;
[Page break]&#13;
&#13;
PHOTOGRAPHY&#13;
&#13;
Failures from all causes totalled 109, equalling 6.9%; this represents a decrease of 1.4% on the month of February. These technical failures remain persistently at 6-7% and there is no doubt that many of them can be avoided with more careful inspection and maintenance.&#13;
&#13;
Instructions have been issued by Eng/Elect Branch to modify all Lancaster aircraft camera circuits; this is a return to bomb door operation of the camera. Briefly this circuit is wired through the Mk. XIV bombsight panel, and incorporates a relay which safeguards the camera from premature operation through deliberate or accidental movement of the pilot’s bomb door selector arm, provided that the bombsight graticule is not switched on. Once the bombsight graticule has been switched on, the circuit from the selector arm is “live”. Therefore, when the bomb doors are selected open, the camera winds over one frame; when the Air Bomber releases the bombs, the normal camera cycle commences. During the period that the Type 35 Control motor is running, the pilot’s selector arm circuit to the camera is “dead”, and should the doors be closed before the camera cycle is completed, the frame sequence remains uninterrupted. &#13;
&#13;
An effort has been made to produce an ideal circuit, and the modification now being introduced is as near to the ideal as possible; for instance, switching on the graticule late i.e. after the bomb doors have been opened, would result in the loss of the first frame, and would bring the bombing frame into position at No.6 instead of No.7. This will be bad enough with ordinary H.S. night film, but with composite colour in use, the probable loss of ground detail on the bombing frame would be serious.&#13;
&#13;
The introduction of this circuit does not mean that technical failures in Type 35 Controls and camera gear boxes are overcome. Careful inspection, testing and thorough maintenance, are the only cures. It is evident from failure reports that insufficient care is being taken to ensure that camera equipment issued from the Equipment Section is entirely satisfactory before installing it into operational aircraft.&#13;
&#13;
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS BY SQUADRONS&#13;
&#13;
[Table of Photographic Analysis by Squadrons]&#13;
&#13;
GARDENING&#13;
&#13;
The Command planted 1,472 vegetables this month, 76% being distributed off the East Frisians, in Keil Bay and the Fehmarn Belt and off the French U-boat bases; the remainder in the Channel, off Holland and on the Spanish Iron Ore Routes. 3 Group planted over half the total 6 Group nearly 400 and 4 Group nearly 300.&#13;
&#13;
This is the third month of intensive high altitude gardening and reports of results now coming in are proof of its success. So far this year the casualty rate due to Bomber Command’s mining is 5 ships sunk or damaged per week, but latest reports show that this has now increased to a rate of [underlined] 1.4 ships per day. [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
The most encouraging report has come to hand from a source now in this country, who, up until recently, has been obliged to sail the German North Sea Convoy Routes, and who had to “swim for it” at least once. “Minephobia” is so acute that whenever minelaying is even suspected, all traffic is stopped for 24 hrs. The crews of mine sweepers after a six months “tour”, now get three months leave, most of which is spent in hospitals specialising in the cure of neurosis.&#13;
&#13;
Now that the various methods of high altitude mining have had fair operational trial, it is possible to lay down standard rules, and various orders lately issued will be consolidated. A point which stands out from the last three months work, is that the success of high altitude mining outside Gee range has been dependent on H 2 S aircraft being available either to mark for those not so fitted, or, in restricted gardens, to do the laying.&#13;
&#13;
Undoubtedly the ideal method is a D.R. run from a visual pinpoint using the Mark XIV bombsight and aided by H 2 S, but weather conditions which will permit visual pinpointing unaided by markers are the exception rather than the rule.&#13;
&#13;
Commander R. A. McDonald, Royal Navy, of H.M.S. Vernon, explained to aircrews of 49, 57, 630, 207, and 106 Squadrons some of the pleasant little surprises that our mines spring on the enemy’s shipping and mine sweepers (and the devices which prevent them from being sprung on our own Armament staffs). He was unfortunately prevented from visiting other Squadrons, by operations.&#13;
&#13;
SIGNALS (CONT.)&#13;
&#13;
(Continued from page 3, col. 3)&#13;
&#13;
has been practically completed, and during the last month no scanners have frozen where this modification has been incorporated. Bomber Command is also issuing a modification covering heating of Scanner Motors, and repositioning of the Scanner Heater Switch.&#13;
&#13;
[Boxed] FISHPOND [/boxed]&#13;
&#13;
This device also showed an improvement during the month, but here too a great deal of work remains to be done. The serviceability percentage for March was 78%.&#13;
&#13;
W/Ops and Navigators still lack the training and co-ordination required to derive the full benefit from this Warning Device. It is to their own advantage to become fully proficient in its operation. A shortened maximum range has been experimented with, and those Operators who have used it express complete satisfaction. Bomber Command have been requested to approve this modification for general installation.&#13;
&#13;
[Boxed] VISUAL MONICA [/boxed]&#13;
&#13;
Serviceability continues to improve, and last month reached 89.5%. It is felt, however, that this figure may still be improved.&#13;
&#13;
The amount of work spent on the Switch Motors has paid great dividends, and the old theory that the Motor was to blame has been refuted. In this connection, the changeover plugs for the aerial leads have proved very valuable on the few occasions when Switch Motors have stopped.&#13;
&#13;
The introduction of Mark IV A.I. as a Tail Warning Device has made available from 54 Base further supplies of Visual Monica, with which it has been possible to almost completely equip the Group with Visual Tail Warning Devices, and thus eliminate Aural Monica.&#13;
&#13;
[Boxed] A.I. [/boxed]&#13;
&#13;
The new addition to Bomber aircraft has now seen considerable operational work, and shows the qualities of a fine Tail Warning Device. Serviceability was 78% for the two weeks it has been in operation. This will, without doubt, be raised week by week as personnel become fully conversant with the equipment.&#13;
&#13;
Operators find the equipment easy to use, due to previous experience in Visual Monica, and are very enthusiastic. The elevation part has worked very satisfactorily in No. 617 Squadron, and a general installation programme is now in hand for the other A.I. squadrons.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] SPORTS (Contd. From page 12, col. 3) [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] FUTURE EVENTS [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
RUGBY – No. 1 Air Landing Brigade is of the opinion that its Brigade Rugger side can put paid to a 5 Group representative team. The challenge is being joyfully taken up; the result should be a first class game.&#13;
&#13;
CRICKET – It has, unfortunately, been impossible to obtain transport for a ‘straight’ Group Cricket League. The next best thing, a Group Cricket Knock-out, is being run. Full details will be forwarded to all stations. It [sic] the meantime, stations are advised to look up friendlies as usual.&#13;
&#13;
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 4.&#13;
&#13;
[Page break]&#13;
&#13;
GEE&#13;
&#13;
Ranges obtained on Gee this month were average on all major operations. Many Navigators however, obtained quite remarkable fixes on special operations, and in a number of cases over the targets. Single position lines from strong signals were intelligently used, and in a few cases Gee was used by Navigators as a means of homing to the special targets.&#13;
&#13;
The mere fact that signals begin to fade into the jamming appears to act as a deterrent to many navigators who forget that jamming can occur in certain local areas on the continent. Once through a local jamming area fixes may again be obtained and under no circumstances should a Navigator neglect to check the Gee Indicator to see if this is so. If a local jamming area is encountered report it at interrogation for the benefit of others.&#13;
&#13;
“Coding” does not appear to have caused any serious trouble and is reported to be phased and timed accurately. However, now that further instructions have been issued, navigators and wireless operators are warned to take greater care in reading the indicator to prevent serious mistakes being made. If you are uncertain of the present day instructions check up at your section now.&#13;
&#13;
Don’t forget that the Southern and South-Eastern Chains are now on a new frequency. This recent changeover should solve the problem of break through pulses which have been reported recently.&#13;
&#13;
The new North Eastern Chain is now operating daily for test purposes and reports on transmissions are requested. Navigators and Wireless Operators, this chain has been provided for your benefit, let us have these reports; in doing so you are helping the technicians to provide a better facility for yourselves. It is hoped that charts to cover this chain will be issued this month.&#13;
&#13;
One word about descent through cloud and the correct homing procedure to Base. Air Staff Instructions lay down the procedure to be adopted for descent through cloud and homing to Base on Gee and these instructions must be followed. Navigators should ensure that the captain follows the correct procedure. Descent through cloud must be made between the correct lattice lines and along the correct homing lattice line applicable to base. Remember – individual lattice lines have been chosen for each airfield to prevent the risk of collision, and these are to be used like railway tracks. Follow the Green Indicator to safety.&#13;
&#13;
H 2 S&#13;
&#13;
H 2 S training on Squadrons this month was confined mainly to the Bombing Competition, and although a considerable number of aircraft were detailed, few obtained photographs owing to unsatisfactory target conditions. Of the results received to date, the majority are within one mile of the aiming point, reflecting great credit on the crews taking part. It is hoped to publish a summary of results in the next issue of the “News”.&#13;
&#13;
Training at Conversion Units is improving and many crews are now completing 10 – 15 hours air training, which should prove of considerable benefit to the squadrons.&#13;
&#13;
Full use is being made of the ground trainers both as navigational and bombing aids. Emphasis must be placed on the use of H 2 S as a navigational aid, particularly in the early stages of training, and trainer cross countries should be carried out with this point in mind. Navigators and Air Bombers must aim at a high standard of efficiency in both the taking and plotting of fixes, particularly as the whole of the Bomber Force depends on this aid for accurate broadcast winds.&#13;
&#13;
An investigation has been carried out this month into all manipulation failures since the beginning of the year, and it is noted that they occur during the first 20 hours of air training and are mainly due to incorrect tuning. To overcome this, Aircraft Drill No.14 was issued setting out the correct H 2 S switching, tuning and re-tuning sequences and operators are to follow this procedure at all times. It is of no practical use to switch the set on, tune and leave it whilst Gee is in range, then commence trying to identify responses when out of Gee coverage, without re-tuning. Tuning varies with the height and time the set is on, so recheck frequently.&#13;
&#13;
Bomber Command intend issuing in the near future a list of faults which can be remedied in the air. However, it is pointed out at this stage, operators are still failing to check fuses when the equipment goes unserviceable. This fault is the easiest which can be remedied in the air and failure to do this is inexcusable.&#13;
&#13;
As always, practice makes perfect, and to overcome manipulation failures, operators should endeavour to spend considerable time tuning and re-tuning the bench set, following the procedure laid down in the drill. This applies to trained and untrained crews alike.&#13;
&#13;
H 2 S and Fishpond are inter-dependent; consequently a manipulation failure on H 2 S leaves a crew without an essential warning device. This point alone easily outweighs all other arguments which may be brought up regarding manipulation failures. H 2 S operators and Wireless Operators must therefore realise that by spending a little time in training to keep efficient on both H 2 S and Fishpond, they are contributing to the safety of their aircraft and crew.&#13;
&#13;
FLYING CONTROL&#13;
&#13;
33 AIRCRAFT LANDED IN 45 MINS:&#13;
&#13;
March has seen a further improvement in landing times, the average for the Group for the month being 2.13 minutes per aircraft. There is still, however, room for improvement in Single-squadron Stations, and Skellingthorpe has shown that the Landing Scheme can produce a high landing rate with small numbers of aircraft; on the night 18/19th March they landed fifteen aircraft in 25 minutes; the fact that a station only has one squadron to land is no excuse for poor landing times. If all single squadron stations follow Skellingthorpe’s example, then we can look forward to an overall Group average of well below the two minute mark.&#13;
&#13;
Some excellent performances have been put up by Stations in this Group during the past month. Below are some figures which are the result of good flying discipline and good airmanship. They are not “peak period” figures, but are taken over the total period.&#13;
&#13;
[Table of selected Aircraft recovery times by Station]&#13;
&#13;
A conference was held at this Headquarters early in the month to review the landing scheme, and improve where necessary. One point raised was the difficulty in persuading pilots to adhere to the airspeeds laid down for return from the last concentration point. If you are one of the unfortunate ones, and are allotted one of the lower airspeeds, make up your mind to stick to it, for it does eliminate that tedious and highly dangerous orbiting of the airfield on return. There are many aircraft using a small piece of sky, and although we are not often troubled with intruders yet, one Hun fighter operating around 5 Group could do a deal of damage. If you rush back, you will certainly have to waste time before landing, so why not waste it peacefully over the sea, rather than be told to go for a short cross country in a congested area.&#13;
&#13;
On reviewing diversions over the past six month it is obvious that standard R/T and control drills are lacking. As the result of a conference held at Headquarters Bomber Command, a standard method of control and R/T procedure has been agreed and will be issued shortly. It is to be used when aircraft are diverted away from Base and the 5 Group Quick Landing Scheme consequently not in operation. It is important that pilots have this procedure at their fingertips. Diversions are never a pleasant end to an operational sortie, but if you can get down at your diversion airfield with the minimum trouble, it makes the task an easier one for all concerned.&#13;
&#13;
FOG DISPERSAL&#13;
&#13;
The fog dispersal apparatus at Fiskerton was responsible for the landing of 14 aircraft during the month. The total number of aircraft landed to date, using this installation is 48. On the 17th March, when five aircraft landed, visibility before lighting up was only 200 yards, with fog estimated to be 800 feet thick. In sixteen minutes visibility on the runway had improved from 15 – 2,000 yards. Again on the 24th, 5 Group aircraft were able to use Fiskerton, and visibility was increased from 100 yards to 1500 yards in 12 minutes. Fog Dispersal is there for your use and your safety. Landing Notes have been issued to all Units and pilots must ensure that they are fully conversant with the use of the Fog Dispersal Installation. We will shortly have another installation serviceable at Metheringham, and perhaps the day &#13;
&#13;
(Continued on page 8, col. 3)&#13;
&#13;
MARCH LANDING TIMES&#13;
&#13;
[Table of March Landing Times by Station]&#13;
&#13;
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 5.&#13;
&#13;
[Page break]&#13;
&#13;
DECORATIONS&#13;
&#13;
The following immediate awards were approved during the month.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] 9 SQUADRON [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
A/F/L/ W.D. ERVINE D.F.C.&#13;
A/W/Cdr E.L. PORTER, D.F.C. Bar TO D.F.C.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] 44 SQUADRON [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
F/Lt F.H. PHILLIPS. D.F.C.&#13;
P/O H.N. DAVIES D.F.C.&#13;
A/F/L I. RADEMEYER D.F.C.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] 49 SQUADRON [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
F/O W.B. HEALEY D.F.C.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] 50 SQUADRON [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
A/S/L/ L.A.J. McLEOD D.F.C.&#13;
R/O T.H. BLACKHAM D.F.C.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] 57 SQUADRON [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
SGT J. BRADFORD D.F.M.&#13;
F/SGT D. LIGHTFOOT D.F.M.&#13;
A/F/L C.J. SPRIGGS D.F.C.&#13;
A/F/L W.M. WALTON D.F.C.&#13;
P/O S.F. ATCHESON D.F.C.&#13;
A/S/L M.I. BOYLE D.F.C.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] 61 SQUADRON [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
A/S/L E.H. MOSS D.F.C.&#13;
F/Lt B.C. FITCH D.F.C.&#13;
F/O T.D. HALLIWELL D.F.C.&#13;
SGT A.E. HARRIS D.F.M.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] 463 SQUADRON [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
F/O V.H. TRIMBLEE D.F.C.&#13;
SGT G.R. PRICE D.F.M.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] 617 SQUADRON [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
A/F/L/ I. WHITTAKER, DFC. Bar to D.F.C.&#13;
A/S/L H.B. MARTIN, DSO, DFC &amp; Bar. Bar to D.S.O.&#13;
F/O L.W. CURTISS, D.F.C. Bar TO D.F.C.&#13;
F/O T.D. SIMPSON D.F.C.&#13;
F/O B.T. FOXLEE D.F.C.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] 619 SQUADRON [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
P/O K. ROBERTS D.F.C.&#13;
F/SGT G.C. KING D.F.M.&#13;
F/SGT D. SCHOFIELD D.F.M.&#13;
F/SGT G.E. HEXTER D.F.M.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] 630 SQUADRON [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
A/F/L J.C.W. WELLER D.F.C.&#13;
SGT R. PARLE D.F.M.&#13;
&#13;
WAR SAVINGS&#13;
&#13;
(a) Pence saved per head of strength.&#13;
(b) %age of personnel contributing.&#13;
(c) Total amount saved.&#13;
&#13;
[Table of War Savings by Station]&#13;
&#13;
TOTAL SAVED £7299.2.0.&#13;
&#13;
TACTICS&#13;
&#13;
The ill effects of weaving in the bomber stream have been recorded by an experienced Flak Liaison Officer, and his opinions are set out in 5G/1/41/Air, sent to Stations on the 27th March, 1944. All crews should read this letter.&#13;
&#13;
Since the introduction of early warning devices, more attention than ever must be paid to flying straight and level unless attacked. In this connection there is a point about weaving which is perhaps not fully appreciated. A weaving aircraft is continually closing range on other aircraft in the stream and is likely to confuse Monica and Fishpond operators, who may interpret the resultant blip as an enemy fighter closing in to attack. The consequencies [sic] may then be serious, particularly on a dark night, when gunners have been known to mistake four engines for two. In these days when all crews are conscious of some collision risk, the sighting of an aircraft crossing their line of flight is, to say the least, upsetting, and in any event, is unfair to gunners who can ill afford to waste time in identifying friendly bombers which behave in a suspicious manner.&#13;
&#13;
Further, the straight and level policy is enforced to enable crews more easily to keep to the track laid down. The dangers of straying from track and the concentration are known to all. All the old hands at the game have realised that weaving is out of date and leads to trouble, and are now following the straight and narrow. Why not you?&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] COMBATS [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
Two points of interest have been sorted out from an investigation into combats for March. They are:-&#13;
&#13;
(i) Enemy fighters rarely fire more than one burst during each attack.&#13;
&#13;
(ii) Period between opening fire and breaking away is a matter of seconds.&#13;
&#13;
It is clear that many enemy fighters are opening fire at about the same time as they are identified by gunners or before a defensive manoeuvre is started. Night fighters as a rule depend on surprise and accuracy of their first burst, and if this fails, there is no doubt that the advantage passes to the gunners. The main problems are therefore:-&#13;
&#13;
(i) To see the fighter and recognise it before it opens fire, and &#13;
&#13;
(ii) to convey the information to the pilot immediately.&#13;
&#13;
Problem (i) can only be met by energetic use of early warning devices, constant recognition practice and efficient night vision by gunners.&#13;
&#13;
Problem (ii) can be solved if gunners report sightings immediately to the pilot, using the standard reporting code. A second’s delay in identifying the attacker before reporting it may mean the difference between eventually shooting it down, or your sustaining damage before you have that opportunity. Remember that a defensive manoeuvre, although designed to give gunners a known deflection, is also intended to evade the fighter’s fire; therefore, in view of the apparent short duration of combats, if an aircraft is flying suspiciously, gunners should not wait to identify it before ordering a corkscrew, particularly if the suspected aircraft is within firing range.&#13;
&#13;
Flight Engineers&#13;
&#13;
The most important job of the Flight Engineer is to help in getting his aircraft to the target and back, in the most efficient manner possible. But there us another side of his job that must not be forgotten; it is of the greatest importance. He must assist in keeping his machine up to the best standard of serviceability.&#13;
&#13;
He can only do this id he is a keen, conscientious worker. He must pay every attention to the smallest detail in his aircraft, both when he is flying and on the ground; he should be with the ground crew whenever he can while they carry out their daily inspection.&#13;
&#13;
He is the “Flying Spanner”, but firstly he should be the engineer on the ground, and know that the aircraft is tuned up to the last ounce. How can he know this if he only visits his dispersal about one hour before he goes on “Ops”?&#13;
&#13;
Delay has occurred many times in the rectification of defects through an aircraft landing away from the parent station; this must be altered. It must be impressed upon Flight Engineers that it is their responsibility to report to the C.T.O. of that Station any defects or trouble which have developed during flight, and which may prevent them returning to their Base at the earliest moment. It is no good to be interrogated, have a meal and go to bed forgetting to report to the C.T.O. until the next day. The report must be given in person to the Engineering Officer on duty that night; he should also be told if petrol and oil is required, and the approximate time the aircraft will take off.&#13;
&#13;
In the past, aircraft have been delayed through wrong information being passed on, and so it is essential that the Flight Engineer reports all known defects to the C.T.O. Confusion and incorrect information is caused by too many inexperienced people handling the message. &#13;
&#13;
Aircrew Volunteers&#13;
&#13;
(a) New Volunteers.&#13;
(b) Accepted by A.C.S.B.&#13;
(c) Posted for training.&#13;
(d) Awaiting interview by A.C.S.B.&#13;
&#13;
[Table of Aircrew Volunteers by Station]&#13;
&#13;
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 6.&#13;
&#13;
[Page break]&#13;
&#13;
AIR BOMBING &#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] THE MONTH’S BOMBING [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
March was a varied month for the Bomb Aimers in the Group, the highlight from the bombing point of view being the precision attacks by Bases on special targets deep into France.&#13;
&#13;
On the whole bombing was accurate, severe damage being done by Nos. 52, 53 and 54 Bases. It is apparent therefore, that our continuous practice has not been wasted. However, no one who studies the stick craters on the P.R.U. photographs can possibly feel complacent. Many crews missed!!!&#13;
&#13;
The question immediately raised by these misses is whether or not the bombsight was serviceable. It is an intricate bombsight, but anyone who doubts its capabilities should study the long list of bombing errors less than 150 yards at 20,000 feet, given on this page. It must be serviceable, though, and it can only be proven serviceable though use. Therefore you must, at every opportunity, carry out practice bombing with your sight. Whenever you fly, carry out the established N.F.T. checks – report any failings you discover in the bombsight to the Instrument Section, and when you get crew errors of 100 yds or less, thank the instrument section who have helped to make it possible.&#13;
&#13;
Finally, treat all practice bombing as precision bombing – the Air Bombers in 106 Squadron have reason to be proud. In teamwork with their pilots, they won the Squadron Bombing Competition against all-comers in the Group for 3 successive months, and were runners up in March. There is a great gap between the top and bottom errors in the Competition – there should not be! It should be a neck-and-neck struggle with only a few yards separating the Squadrons in the Group.&#13;
&#13;
Are [underlined] YOU [/underlined] bombing your best for your Squadron?&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] GEN FROM THE SQUADRONS [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] 9 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt Bell, D.F.C.) reports the construction and issue to all Air Bombers of a hook as per diagram.&#13;
&#13;
[Diagram]&#13;
&#13;
This device is used for manual release of any H.E. hang-ups, and is of a length that ensures the linkage can be raised. Further, it can be used on No. 13 Station to make certain the “Cookie” has actually left the aircraft, a visual check from the nose being impeded by the incendiary containers.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] 44 Squadron [/underlined] (F/Lt Lowry) has had the illumination bulbs in the Mark XIV Bombsight Computor [sic] painted red to counteract the glare. This ensures minimum effect on Night Vision.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] 1654 Con. Unit [/underlined] (F/Lt Morgan) has completed the installation of the complete Mark XIV Bombsight in the A.M.B.T.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] 1660 Con. Unit [/underlined] (F/Lt Brewer, D.F.C.) have nearly completed installation of A.M.B.T. Mk. XIV, several clever modifications being introduced. Excellent co-operation has been provided by the Armament and Electrical Officer and their staffs.&#13;
&#13;
HIGH LEVEL BOMBING TRAINING (ALL ERRORS IN YARDS, CONVERTED TO 20,000 FEET)&#13;
&#13;
[Table of Bombing Training and Errors by Squadron and Conversion Units, with averages]&#13;
&#13;
THE BEST CREW EXERCISES DURING MARCH&#13;
&#13;
Squadron or Con. Unit Pilot Air Bomber Navigator Error at 20,000 feet.&#13;
&#13;
44 P/O Levy Sgt Peck F/O Fox 82 &amp; 130 yds&#13;
P/O Hobbs F/S Scott F/S Fenwick 144 yds&#13;
F/L Dorehill F/S Deacon F/S Wright 116 yds&#13;
W/O Barton F/S Barnes F/O Sparrow 125 yds&#13;
F/L Wiggin F/O Marshall F/O Maury 112 yds&#13;
&#13;
50 P/O Lundy F/O Bignell F/S Jordan 125 &amp; 145 yds&#13;
Sgt MacFarlin Sgt Ball Sgt Elliott 108 yds&#13;
57 F/L Munday F/O Evans P/O West 120 yds&#13;
106 P/O Rossel Sgt Goss F/S White 140 yds&#13;
F/O Clement F/O Gautschi F/O Wilkinson 82 &amp; 120 yds&#13;
463 F/S Page F/O Braithwaite W/O Fair 84 yds&#13;
619 W/Cdr Jeudwine Sgt Booth Sgt Gosling 79 yds&#13;
S/L Whamond F/O Kennedy F/O Marshall 135 yds&#13;
F/L McGilvray F/O Baker F/O Drake 140 yds&#13;
F/L Moore F/O Butler F/O Wood 123 yds&#13;
F/S Schofield F/S Hexter F/S Withinshaw 147 yds&#13;
630 F/L Roberts Sgt Davies Sgt Jeffreys 140 yds&#13;
W/Cdr Deas F/O Barker Sgt Wright 120 (twice) and 143 yds&#13;
S/L Calvert F/S Hogg F/S Beaudoin 148 yds&#13;
P/O Hill Sgt Allen F/S Stancer 120 yds&#13;
1654 S/L Bloom-Jones F/O Foulkes F/L Martin 148 yds&#13;
F/O Murray F/O Towers F/S Keeble 144 yds&#13;
F/S Ayres Sgt Charteris Sgt Airey 114 yds&#13;
P/O Spencer Sgt. Gordge Agt Hugh-Games 122 yds&#13;
1661 S/L Jones F/O Seibal F/O West 140 yds&#13;
5 LFS F/S Horne Sgt Johnson F/S Shipley 88 yds&#13;
Sgt Patterson Sgt Hall Sgt Rice 121 yds&#13;
&#13;
Special mention is made of W/Cdr Deas and crew, 630 Squadron, who achieved Crew Errors less than 150 yards on [underlined] three [/underlined] exercises this month.&#13;
&#13;
617 Squadron obtained a total of 26 exercises in the “Less than 150 yards” category the best three being:- &#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] PILOT AIR BOMBER ERROR [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
F/O Kell F/O Morieson 47 yards&#13;
F/L Cooper F/O Harden 68 yards&#13;
F/O Willsher F/S Everitt 75 yards&#13;
&#13;
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 7.&#13;
&#13;
[Page break]&#13;
&#13;
AIR BOMBING (CONT.)&#13;
&#13;
SQUADRON BOMBING COMPETITION&#13;
&#13;
In a month where 9 Squadrons qualified in the Competition it fell to 44 Squadron to wrest the leadership from 106 Squadron who headed the table for the three months December, January and February. 44 Squadron have set a very high standard and are to be congratulated on rising from the 6th position to the top of the table.&#13;
&#13;
57 Squadron have shown notable improvement in rising to 5th place, which they share with 207 Squadron.&#13;
&#13;
It is expected that April will bring maximum qualification by all Squadrons in the Group and a really close struggle for the top position.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] PILOTS AND AIR BOMBERS NAVIGATORS [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] ALL ERRORS CONVERTED TO 20,000 FEET [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
1st 44 Squadron – 85 yards 1st 630 Squadron – 120 yards&#13;
2nd 106 Squadron – 98 yards 57 Squadron – 120 yards&#13;
3rd 619 Squadron – 108 yards 3rd 619 Squadron – 134 yards&#13;
4th 630 Squadron – 119 yards 4th 44 Squadron – 138 yards&#13;
5th 207 Squadron – 141 yards 5th 207 Squadron – 154 yards&#13;
57 Squadron - 141 yards 6th 467 Squadron – 181 yards&#13;
7th 463 Squadron – 169 yards 7th 463 Squadron – 197 yards&#13;
9 Squadron – 169 yards 8th 9 Squadron – 223 yards&#13;
9th 467 Squadron – 196 yards 9th 106 Squadron – 253 yards&#13;
&#13;
The following Squadrons failed to enter the necessary 8 qualifying exercises:-&#13;
&#13;
10th 61 Squadron – 132 yards (5 exercises) 10th 61 Squadron – 143 yards&#13;
11th 50 Squadron – 90 yards (4 exercises) 11th 50 Squadron – 123 yards&#13;
12th 49 Squadron – 89 yards (1 exercise) 12th 49 Squadron – 92 yards&#13;
&#13;
ADDITION BOMBING TRAINER&#13;
&#13;
[Table of Trainer Activity by Squadron]&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] BIGCHIEF COMPETITION [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
Two entries were received this month:&#13;
&#13;
W/Cdr Porter 112 yards (Errors include bombsight error)&#13;
G/Cpt Pleasance 289 yards (Error of 98 yards)&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] LEADER COMPETITION [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
F/Lt Walmsley – 122 yards&#13;
&#13;
How about some competition, Bombing Leaders?&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] AIR BOMBERS’ QUIZ [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
1. What is the theory of Wanganui technique and what are the correct bombsight settings?&#13;
&#13;
2. If the Bomb Doors were open, but the Bomb Release Test could not be extracted from the positive Fusing Device, what check would you make before manually releasing?&#13;
&#13;
3. Where is the type “H” Jettison Button and when do you need to use it?&#13;
&#13;
4. Why do you set [underlined] indicated [/underlined] Wind Speed on the Mk. XIV Computor. [sic]&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] BOMBING LEADERS’ CORNER [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
F/Lt Allan has left Scampton and is passing through the Conversion Units in order to return to operations for his 2nd tour. Good Luck!&#13;
&#13;
F/Lt Gibson has become tour-expired and moved to Scampton to superintend the Bombing Section of the Aircrew School.&#13;
&#13;
F/O Abbott has moved from 106 Squadron to 49 Squadron. We now expect to see [underlined] 49 [/underlined] Squadron top of the Bombing Competition!!&#13;
&#13;
F/O Toogood (106 Squadron), tour-expired has moved to 92 Group for Bombing Leader’s duties.&#13;
&#13;
P/O Duck who obtained 14th position with “B” pass on 77 Bombing Leaders’ Course has moved from 619 to 617 Squadron.&#13;
&#13;
F/O Falgate (463 Squadron) and P/O Hulland D.F.M., (1654 Con. Unit) were 8th and 12th respectively on No.78 Bombing Leaders’ Course, with “B” passes.&#13;
&#13;
AIR SEA RESCUE&#13;
&#13;
For two months now there has been no ditching in this Group, which shows a deal of consideration for the Air Sea Rescue Officers in the Group, but at the same time it is wondered whether crews generally have increased their knowledge to an equivalent extent – have you got all your A.S.R. gen and equipment buttoned up?&#13;
&#13;
In addition to giving swimming instruction P.F.O’s are now lending a hand with dinghy instruction in the South Park Girls’ School Swimming Baths. Now that summer is almost here, this should be a real attraction, and every effort must be made for regular attendance. As a further attraction some stations have periods during the early evening so that, with the co-operation of the M.T. Sections, an evening out in Lincoln should be enjoyed by all – after the instruction is over.&#13;
&#13;
[Cartoon] EMP.&#13;
&#13;
It is hoped that “Q” type dinghies (which will replace the “J” type fairly soon) will shortly be available on the scale of one per Squadron for instructional purposes. This dinghy is quite a complicated bit of work, and crews should take every opportunity of getting in sailing practice on local stretches of water (remembering that the depth of water must be at least 4 feet, owing to the depth of keel). Some good fun should be had these long summer evenings – when you can afford time off from obliterating the Hun.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] HINT TO USERS [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
The floating torch has a nasty habit of lighting at awkward moments – why not pad the torch pocket in Mae Wests and Buoyancy suits with some light-damping material, so that the light will not shine through? Whatever happens, don’t go flying over the sea without your floating torch.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] FLYING CONTROL (Contd. From page 5, col. 3) [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
is not far off when an operation will be planned and will depend solely on Fog Dispersal Installations for landing of aircraft.&#13;
&#13;
There will be, therefore, three Fog Dispersal airfields situated in a comparatively small area, LUDFORD MAGNA in 1 Group, FISKERTON and METHERINGHAM. The identification of these airfields as night presents a problem, for you if you mistake another airfield for your own and are listening on your local airfield frequency, there is no means of contacting you by R/T. It is essential therefore, that darky frequency is used for all R/T control at Fog Dispersal airfields.&#13;
&#13;
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 8.&#13;
&#13;
[Page break]&#13;
&#13;
GUNNERY&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] STANDARD FREE GUNNERY TRAINER [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
The trainer at Fiskerton is now equipped for training with the Mark IIC Gyro Gunsight, and training of the squadron gunners is going ahead under the supervision of F/O Johnson-Biggs, ex 619 Squadron, P/O Collingwood, ex 50 Squadron, and Sgt Kennedy of 49 Squadron. The trainer is housed in a spacious blister type building equipped with a large screen on which the target aircraft is projected, together with the fixed and moving graticules which are a feature of the new sight. An F.N. 16 turret is used for manipulation, and this is fitted with all the controls of the gunsight. Very realistic conditions can be reproduced, although until a trainer is produced which will introduce conditions like the Link Trainer with its “Bumps” attachment, the gunner is still operating from a rock steady platform which does not give a true indication of his ability to hold a target in the sight. A demonstration stand is housed in the same building which has a complete Gyro Gunsight with all controls and fittings. This is used for introducing gunners to the sight during initial instruction, and enables one gunner to operate the sight on the stand whilst another gunner is operating the turret on the trainer. A new type of film is available for use with the trainer; this gives a light coloured aircraft on the screen with a dark background, differing from the film in general use for aircraft recognition training on the Jurby trainer, which project a dark aircraft on a light background.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] FUTURE INSTALLATIONS [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] Swinderby [/underlined] is the next station to have the trainer installed. This will be housed in the standard spotlight trainer building, which at present is being modified by removing the steelwork situated on the front of the screen. All the equipment is available and installation should commence within the next two weeks.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] Winthorpe [/underlined] have received part of the equipment and the construction of the building has been commenced.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] G.2. GUNNERY NOTES [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
On the 6th January, 1944, a letter (BC/S.24636/Trg.) was issued from H.Q.B.C. stating that the G.2 Notes were available in large quantities, and intimating that they could be demanded on the following scale.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] Instructors’ Notes. [/underlined] 1 copy per instructor or Gunnery Leader not already holding one.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] Students’ Notes. [/underlined] 1 copy per Air Gunner not already holding one. This would appear to be a straightforward matter, but certain Units within the Group are still without these very important notes for a variety of reasons; units who demanded the notes as instructed received their demands promptly, but any unit who has not received these notes may obtain single copies by contacting the G.G.O. As these notes form the basis for all instructions on sighting in the Command, it is of paramount importance that all Gunnery Leaders instructors and gunners be familiar with their contents. It has been discovered that gunners attending the Specialist Sighting Course and Air Gunner Instructors’ Course at Manby have been handicapped by a lack of preliminary knowledge of sighting due to the failure of Units to obtain the notes when the instruction was first issued.&#13;
&#13;
(Continued on page 10, col. 3)&#13;
&#13;
[Cartoon] WFW&#13;
&#13;
THIS MONTH’S BAG&#13;
&#13;
DESTROYED&#13;
&#13;
49 Sqdn “D” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c&#13;
619 Sqdn “J” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c&#13;
617 Sqdn “H” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c&#13;
617 Sqdn “H” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c&#13;
630 Sqdn “L” 18/19 March, 1944. ME109 c&#13;
61 Sqdn “K” 22/23 March, 1944. S/E c&#13;
57 Sqdn “R” 24/25 March, 1944. ME109&#13;
106 Sqdn “N” 30/31 March, 1944. ME109&#13;
&#13;
PROBABLY DESTROYED&#13;
&#13;
619 Sqdn “T” 24/25 March, 1944. JU88 c&#13;
630 Sqdn “S” 24/25/ March, 1944. ME109 c&#13;
463 Sqdn “Q” 30/31 March, 1944. JU88 c&#13;
&#13;
DAMAGED&#13;
&#13;
207 Sqdn “G” 1/2 March, 1944. T/E c&#13;
467 Sqdn “F” 1/2 March, 1944. FW190 c&#13;
61 Sqdn “W” 15/16 March, 1944. FW190 c&#13;
619 Sqdn “P” 15/16 March, 1944. JU88 c&#13;
207 Sqdn “J” 15/16 March, 1944. ME109 c&#13;
50 Sqdn “M” 18/19 March. 1944. ME109 c&#13;
467 Sqdn “J” 18/19 March, 1944. ME110 c&#13;
207 Sqdn “O” 18/19 March, 1944. JU88 c&#13;
630 Sqdn “D” 22/23 March, 1944. JU88 c&#13;
467 Sqdn “Q” 22/23 March, 1944. ME109&#13;
50 Sqdn “U” 24/25 March, 1944. JU88 c&#13;
49 Sqdn “K” 24/25 March, 1944. JU88 c&#13;
44 Sqdn “J” 24/25 March, 1944. S/E c&#13;
57 Sqdn “H” 24/25 March, 1944. ME109 c&#13;
57 Sqdn “M” 26/27 March, 1944. JU88&#13;
463 Sqdn “G” 26/27 March, 1944. JU88&#13;
44 Sqdn “U” 30/31 March, 1944. JU88&#13;
57 Sqdn “B” 30/31 March, 1944. JU88&#13;
50 Sqdn “Z” 30/31 March, 1944. ME109 c&#13;
&#13;
Claims annotated “c” have been confirmed by Command. Other claims have not been confirmed owing to late rendition of combat reports.&#13;
&#13;
It is intended to publish in the “News” a table showing the amount of air training carried out by Units each month. This will chiefly consist of Fighter Affiliation exercises and air firing, and provision is made for tabulating the Fighter Affiliation under three headings, i.e. “Camera &amp; Gyro”, “Camera only” and “Without Camera”. This table is standard throughout the Command.&#13;
&#13;
To ensure that a standard method is used throughout, a fighter combat exercise is to be considered as a “Combat” between a fighter and one air gunner in a bomber aircraft. Thus, if both Mid-Upper and Tail turrets are in use two exercises would be carried out. In future monthly training returns are to state the number of exercises as defined above. It is hoped that future tables published will include attacks by fighters on “Bullseye” exercises.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] C.G.S. COURSES [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] Course No. 75 [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
F/O Spilsbury – 5 LFS – 82% - Cat. “A”&#13;
&#13;
Sgt Boardman – 49 Sqdn – 77.2% - Cat. “C”&#13;
&#13;
Gunnery Leaders are reminded that they are invited to attend the Assessment Committee held at the conclusion of each course, and Gunnery Leaders who have gunners taking the course should make an effort to attend this board and obtain first hand information of their pupil’s efforts.&#13;
&#13;
Gunnery Leaders desirous of visiting the C.G.S. for this purpose are to contact the G.G.O. who will make the necessary arrangements.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] AIR TRAINING – MARCH [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
[Table of Gunnery Exercises by Squadron]&#13;
&#13;
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 9.&#13;
&#13;
[Page break]&#13;
&#13;
SECOND THOUGHT FOR PILOTS&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] VETERANS [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
Stick rigidly to your lattice lines when homing to your airfield. There was a regrettable accident during the month when a pilot in the Group arrived at the airfield on the wrong side of the circuit and crashed when he was forced to dive to avoid an aircraft on the circuit. The lattice lines are your “right of way“ in the sky.&#13;
&#13;
Don’t get careless about your flaps, and remember the Lancaster flaps provide maximum lift from 25° to the fully up position. From the 25° stage to the fully down position, lift is decreasing and drag is increasing. So, remember, take your flap off in two stages and exercise great care in taking off the last 25°. Trim as you do it.&#13;
&#13;
If you make a “sighting” and you are orbiting a ditched aircraft or a dinghy, switch your I.F.F. on to “distress”. Do not change height while orbiting otherwise your plot will fade and you may give the impression that you have ditched. This new Signals Instruction is to enable R.D.F. to plot you, and thus double check your position, and the position of the sighting.&#13;
&#13;
Don’t get off hand about reporting defects after flight. Record any defect on Form 700. Let the ground crew or Flight Commander and the N.C.O. know. Keep them all in the picture, the Security Officer won’t jump on you for that.&#13;
&#13;
By the way, when did you and your crew last go through the bombing up procedure with the Armament types? There might be a day when you have to do your own bombing up.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] FRESHMEN [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
If you are unlucky and get fire in the air, do not dive your aircraft in the hope of putting the flames out. It will make them spread more, making it difficult to abandon aircraft, and will produce structural strain, causing a more rapid break up as the fire develops. The “gen” for fire in the air is in the 5 Group Aircraft Drills.&#13;
&#13;
You can now land from West to East as well as from East to West at Woodbridge. The landing is from East to West at all times except when you see smoke generators burning at each end of the main runway. So watch for the smoke, and then land towards the sea.&#13;
&#13;
Inspect S.D. 158 periodically. It is a secret document, and therefore you won’t find it lying around the Flight office; Ops/Flying Control will oblige. Note the instruction to burn resin lights above 8,000 feet at night.&#13;
&#13;
Pay the closest attention to the latest “gen” about the moveable T.O.T. and remember the importance of sticking to the air speed laid down. 5 m.p.h. either side of the specified air speed it not good enough.&#13;
&#13;
Have you dropped any practice bombs yet? It is the duty of every pilot to try his hand at bombing. Team up with another pilot in your flight, and see who gets the best result.&#13;
&#13;
Public Relations&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] SIX STATIONS ON THE AIR [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
No.5 Group entered the radio world in earnest during March, no fewer than six stations being visited by B.B.C. recording units. &#13;
&#13;
Though the resulting broadcasts did not hit the high lights in home programmes, they were given many times, and in many languages, all over the world. They reminded our overseas troops that the R.A.F. is still doing big business!!&#13;
&#13;
First, a five day visit was paid to Skellingthorpe by F/Lt W Caverhill, of the broadcasting branch at Air Ministry, accompanied by B.B.C. engineers. They prepared scripts and made records of 18 R.A.F. and W.A.A.F. personnel, who gave short talks to be included in the B.B.C’s overseas programme “Radio News Reel”.&#13;
&#13;
Bardney was visited on the night of March 18/19th by a B.B.C. recording unit, and more than a doz en [sic] records were made of the station’s contribution towards the night’s attack on Frankfurt. This picture of R.A.F. life was broadcast in both short and long versions on the General Forces programme, as well as overseas.&#13;
&#13;
The success of the Bardney broadcasts prompted the B.B.C. to make a return visit to record the operation against Berlin, on the night of March 24/25th. This time, the famous commentators, Mr. Robert Dunnett and Mr. Stewart MacPherson, brought a recording unit to Coningsby. On the way, the unit stopped at Metheringham as the aircraft were taking off and filled one disc with an interesting description of the scene.&#13;
&#13;
At Coningsby a number of members of ground crews and station personnel came to the microphone and described their work. Further recordings were made in the Operations Room.&#13;
&#13;
Owing to weather changes, the party beat a hasty retreat from Coningsby and went to &#13;
&#13;
(Continued on page 11col.1)&#13;
&#13;
Negotium Perambulans In Tenebris&#13;
&#13;
The Meteorological Gremlin has spectacles and grey hair,&#13;
And his mysterious lair &#13;
Is very jealously guarded;&#13;
And must be regarded&#13;
With suitable awe, by all except&#13;
The few adept.&#13;
It is chiefly a nocturnal beast, and is often found&#13;
Prowling and prowling&#13;
(Like a host of Midian)&#13;
Searching for a datum or perhaps a meridian.&#13;
In this it is frequently assisted by a tiny female mammal whose chemical formula is PA2AOC,&#13;
Whose small scurrying figure you will often see&#13;
Bearing winds to the Gremlin. It is easy to please&#13;
With an airy zephyr, or a balmy breeze&#13;
Which it consumes with avidity, and that is why&#13;
It is able to prophesy!!&#13;
&#13;
ANON (Circa, 1944)&#13;
&#13;
Link Trainer&#13;
&#13;
[Table of Link Trainer Sessions by Squadron]&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] GUNNERY (Continued from page 9 col 1) [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] SPECIALIST SIGHTING COURSE AT MANBY [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
The object of this course, which lasts for 10 days, is the training of sighting instructors and instructors capable of assessing cine gyro films. Originally only Conversion Unit or Gunnery Flight personnel could attend but this restriction has recently been removed, and all Units may now nominate gunners for this course; they must show an aptitude for sighting and must have passed well in this subject on a Gunnery Leaders’ Course or Air Gunner Instructors’ course. One vacancy only is allotted to the Group per month.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] THOSE SQUADRON GYROS [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
The Gyro Assessors held by squadrons have in some instances been leading a very quiet life tucked away nicely in the Armoury or on a shelf in a cupboard. Numerous reasons are put forward for not using the Gyro during Fighter Affiliation exercises; for instance, aircraft not modified, not enough notice given to Gunnery sections, Photo. Section unable to process film, etc., etc. None of these reasons is really serious , and all can be easily overcome by a little more co-operation from the sections concerned. Modification on the aircraft is simple, consisting of enlarging the port inner gun port in the rear turret, and can be done in half-an-hour. It is not, repeat not, necessary to blank off the servo motor, and the gyro assembly can be installed in half an hour at the most. All the electrical gear is mounted on the gyro rig and after the rig has been fitted to the gun cradle only three things remain to be done:-&#13;
&#13;
(i) Connect electrical cable to supply in turret.&#13;
&#13;
(ii) Connect rear sear release pipe to gyro rig.&#13;
&#13;
(iii) Harmonize gun sight to camera.&#13;
&#13;
All Photo. Sections CAN process the film, and there is no shortage of magazines in the Group. At 51 Base, a Corporal Armourer is available to give assistance on gyro assessors. This N.C.O. has constructed all the Gyro Assessors in use in the Group, and the present compact and efficient rig is his product. Units requiring his services should contact 51 Base Armament Officer. The Gyro Assessors are not to be left in aircraft which are engaged on night flying as two assessors have already been lost through aircraft with gyros fitted, crashing on night flying.&#13;
&#13;
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 10.&#13;
&#13;
[Page break]&#13;
&#13;
EQUIPMENT&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] M.T. SPARES [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
Concern Is being caused by the unserviceability of M.T. vehicles in general, and every effort should be made by Equipment Officers to review establishments and ensure that demands are raised regularly to keep stocks of the generally used items up to maximum. It is impracticable and uneconomical to hold stocks of the many parts which not only vary with the make of vehicles but also with the diverse models of each make of vehicle, which again vary according to the year of manufacture. Therefore all M.T. Officers must anticipate requirements for inspection overhauls and other contingencies where certain parts are known to be badly worn and will need replacement in the near future. [Underlined] At least two weeks’ [/underlined] notice of these requirements should be given to the Equipment Officer, and Forms 674 should not only state for what purpose the spares are required, but the approximate date the replacement is required; the chassis and engine number of the vehicle MUST in all cases be quoted. Demands will then be raised in accordance with A.M.O. A.481/43.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] A.E.C. TANKER FUEL HOSES [/underlined] (Stores Ref 4K/2009) have for some considerable time been in very short supply, and the chief cause for this is the difficulty in the manufacture of sufficient protective coverings. Bomber Command have now agreed to accept these hoses without this covering and as a result it is anticipated that the supply position will improve considerably within the next two months. In the meantime, arrangements should be made, wherever possible, for the repair of these hoses by the manufacturer, under Station local purchase powers.&#13;
&#13;
It is understood that Messrs. Zwicky of Slough (telephone: Slough 23776) are prepared to sell these hoses to the Service, but stations are only to resort to local purchase in extreme cases, where operational efficiency is directly affected and supplies cannot be obtained through Service channels.&#13;
&#13;
A meeting of Base and Station Equipment Officers was held at this Headquarters during the month, when points of mutual interest were discussed, with a view to giving even better service than in the past, to all and sundry.&#13;
&#13;
Before closing the meeting, the A.O.C. spoke highly of the service given by the Equipment Branch. This, naturally, was most gratifying, for sometimes we feel that quite a lot of people look upon us as mere “dogsbodies”, and give no thought to the time, patience and methods (sometimes very unorthodox) adopted in an endeavour to produce the goods.&#13;
&#13;
(Continued from page10, col. 2)&#13;
&#13;
Fiskerton, where the return of aircraft was described, and aircrew were interviewed.&#13;
&#13;
Dunholme received a short visit of the Hon. Herman Hodge, of the Colonial Office, and a B.B.C. recording unit, on 21st March.&#13;
&#13;
Press visitors during the month included representatives of “The Star”, Sheffield, to the Sheffield Squadron at Fiskkerton, on March 15th, and Mrs K. Wilson of the “Sydney Morning Herald”, to Waddington on 31st March.&#13;
&#13;
TRAINING&#13;
&#13;
The Stirling is becoming slowly but surely a nicely house-trained creature. It can be taken out for long or short trips with few difficulties that delay training and rend the tempers of Lancaster loving instructors. The lurid language of February, which produced a glow like unto many batteries of sodiums, is scarcely remembered. Perhaps ‘tis Spring and everything is set for an ideal world.&#13;
&#13;
The L.F.S. at Syerston achieved great success with 93 crews passed out to Squadrons and the H.C.U’s were in no way overshadowed, for they passed on 98 crews for Lancaster training. The outlook for April is therefore fairly good, and squadrons may look forward with confidence to a reasonably early increase in crews, weather permitting.&#13;
&#13;
It is a matter of real regret that accidents have marred an otherwise good month, and may have dragged 5 Group to the bottom of the ladder. A promise has however, been extracted from all and sundry, that 5 Group shall move to the top in April and there will be no avoidable accidents in 51 Base. The heavy snow fall, and the resultant snow banks were chiefly responsible- or perhaps it was the determination to get on with flying and crew output, despite the snow banks.&#13;
&#13;
The April programme is optimistic indeed. There is a measure of quiet confidence about, and if results come up to expectation a new high standard will have been set for Conversion Bases. The results will be seen in better trained and more experienced crews, and we hope the squadrons will not be reluctant to pay the Units a visit and express their appreciation.&#13;
&#13;
Fighter Affiliation Training is now being carried out in Units with detachments of 1690 Flight (1485 regenerated) and an improvement in Gunnery standards is expected.&#13;
&#13;
Synthetic Fishpond training has been introduced, and is likely to be adopted generally.&#13;
&#13;
Recent changes include Group Captain Vintras to command Wigsley; Wing Commander Baxter (106) to Chief Instructor, Swinderby; Wing Commander Jennings (207) to Wing Commander Training, 51 Base; Wing Commander MacFarlane (51 Base) to Chief Instructor Wigsley, and Wing Commander Hallows (5 Group) to Chief Instructor, Winthorpe.&#13;
&#13;
Squadron Leader Osborne (1660) is training Lancaster instructors at Syerston, and also Wing Commanders “Ops” from operational Bases. Squadron Leader Shields and Flight Lieutenant Wyness (1654) are training Stirling instructors at Swinderby. Both “Academies [sic] are doing well.&#13;
&#13;
ABSENCE&#13;
&#13;
ENEMY AGENTS – ABSENTEES&#13;
&#13;
During the coming months, the Allied Forces are likely to be called upon for a maximum effort on land, sea and air, to defeat the enemy.&#13;
&#13;
No. 5 Group will certainly be expected to take its full part in this effort, and there can be no doubt that at heart every man and woman serving in the Group would agree that he or she was going to do it. In spite of all these good intentions there are still far too many absentees, aircrew and ground staff alike. Not long absences, just a few hours or a few days, but absences just the same, at a time when the manpower position simply cannot afford absentees. There isn’t a Tom there now to do Dick’s work while he slips off to see the Dog-races, and there isn’t a Joan there to drive that van while Mary goes off to her sister’s wedding.&#13;
&#13;
[Cartoon] WFW&#13;
&#13;
ABSENT WITHOUT LEAVE &#13;
&#13;
Of course those two extra days at home in the garden with the wife were well worth two days pay, and even a bit of C.C. as well, and that special party was well worth a day’s pay and a rep., but that isn’t the point. It’s to have days at home in the garden and special parties that we are fighting this war. There might very well not be a garden or wife at all if the Germans laid down the orders for us, and we should certainly not be the ones to enjoy any parties that were arranged.&#13;
&#13;
There is this special point for aircrews to remember too. You work together as a team and your captain has to have complete confidence in each one of his crew or he cannot give his best to his job. If you have let him down by going absent once or twice during training is he going to have that confidence and is he going to feel quite certain that you’re not absent(minded) in that rear turret? It might make all the difference!&#13;
&#13;
If you’re absent on the ground, you’re quite likely to be absent in the air; it’s all a matter of self-discipline, and that’s the same in each case.&#13;
&#13;
In this war, no-one in the services can be a neutral; if you don’t do a day’s work for the Allies, you are doing a day’s work for the Axis, and at the end of the war your Form 121 will show just how many days you put in fighting [underlined] for [/underlined] Hitler. If you put it that way, that day’s absence doesn’t look so good, so cut it out and [underlined] don’t be an enemy agent. [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 11.&#13;
&#13;
[Page break]&#13;
&#13;
[Cartoon] SPORTS [Cartoon]&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] THE MATZ CUP [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
The semi final between Coningsby and Scampton was a tremendous affair. From the kick off, Scampton’s attack went all out, and Coningsby’s defence is to be congratulated on the way they held them. Coningsby’s attack improved, and the game swung from goal to goal. Ten minutes before half time, Coningsby centre headed a goal from a corner kick. After the break, Scampton forced the pace and equalised after ten minutes with a shot that gave the Coningsby goalie no chance. Both sides were all out in an endeavour to snatch the lead. Coningsby left wing repeatedly broke away and centred, but nobody could connect. By three quarters time both teams were slackening as a result of the terrific pace; both defences, and especially the goalies, were coping brilliantly. A draw seemed inevitable. Then came the turning point; Coningsby attacked, their left half was well up the field, and instead of the usual pass to the wing he made ground, then shot hard and true for the top corner. The last 15 minutes of the game saw repeated Coningsby attacks, and five minutes from time they got a third goal. It was a magnificent game, and Coningsby are to be congratulated on entering the final via such a tremendous obstacle in the powerful Scampton team.&#13;
&#13;
Round two produced a hard fought duel between Winthorpe and Metheringham. Two draws were played, 1-1 and 3-3 after extra time in each game. In the third game Winthorpe won 4 – 1, and are now due to play Skellingthorpe at Swinderby in the semi final.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] THE LANCASTER SEVEN-A-SIDE RUGGER COMPETITION [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
This competition has been a failure as a Group competition, but has been an immense success in 53 Base where 86 teams in all have taken part. Very few casualties have resulted in the large number of games played, the most serious being a broken collar bone, which is undoubtedly more than could be claimed for a Soccer competition boasting a equivalent number of entrants. The event must now be considered a 53 Base monopoly, since in spite of many appeals from this Headquarters, no other squadrons have got cracking. The inter unit play off will be at Waddington within the next few days (to be signalled to all stations) and it is hoped that Stations will provide transport for as many of their aircrew personnel as possible to witness the play off.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] THE WINES RUGGER TROPHY [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
Round two of the competition saw Winthorpe beat Scampton 14 – 11 in a hard fought game. Dunholme beat Swinderby 8 – 0, so these two teams pass to the semi final. Round two games still undecided are – Waddington v Metheringham/Woodhall and East Kirkby v Fiskerton. It is hoped those Stations will complete the events within the next few days.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] 5 GROUP MIXED HOCKEY TROPHY [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
Swinderby are now in the semi final, and the outstanding matches are – Waddington v Metheringham. Syerston v Scampton and East Kirkby v 5 Group. These three games should be decided within the next week.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] FOOTBALL [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
SCAMPTON played six station matches with the very fine result of 4 wins. Their only loss was with Coningsby in the Matz semi-final. They beat A.V. Roe 5 – 4 in the 3rd round of the Lincoln Amateur Cup, and drew 0 - 0 with R.A.F. Wickenby in the semi-final of the Amateur Cup.&#13;
&#13;
DUNHOLME had a busy but rather unsuccessful month. They lost their 3rd round Matz Cup game 2 – 3 to Coningsby, and their 3rd round in the Amateur Cup by the same score to R.A.F. Wickenby.&#13;
&#13;
CONINGSBY – The highlight of the Coningsby month, indeed to quote 54 Base excellent “GEN” – of the season, was their MATZ Cup victory over Scampton. Intersection league games were fewer than usual owing to the bad weather. 619 v 617 and 106 v 61 are also games due this month in the Base Commander’s “All Sports” Trophy.&#13;
&#13;
METHERINGHAM – The duel with Winthorpe in the 2nd round of the Matz Cup was most notable. Weather caused cancellations of no fewer than 10 games, but five inter-section games were completed.&#13;
&#13;
BARDNEY played 4 station matches, playing the 1st Border Regt. twice (1 win 3 – 2, 1 draw 1 – 1), beating Metheringham 3 – 2 and losing to Coningsby by the same margin. 5 inter-section games were completed.&#13;
&#13;
EAST KIRKBY Station XI played 4 games, and won all four, beating Kirkby and Spilsby R.A.F.R. teams and two Field-Craft Airborne Units. In the seven inter-section events, 630 – B Flight were most successful.&#13;
&#13;
SPILSBY had seven games during the month. Their R.A.F.R. Squadron beat East Kirkby R.A.F.R. Squadron 7 – 2, and the local Suffolks 9 – 3, losing 4 – 2 to Kirkby and 3 – 2 to R.A.F. Skegness.&#13;
&#13;
H.Q. 5 GROUP – The Group side are still only able to play away fixtures. In March they had three games, losing to a Scampton team 2 – 3, to Skellingthorpe 0 – 4, and holding their old opponents 93 M.U. to a 2 – 2 draw.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] RUGBY [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
SCAMPTON had only the two games completed due to cancellations by opponents. They lost to Hemswell 0 – 3 and to Winthorpe 11 – 14 in round two of the Wines Cup.&#13;
&#13;
DUNHOLME have a really strong side led by F/L Waterhouse. They overwhelmed Bardney 33 – 0 in round 1 of the Wines Cup, and have since beaten Swinderby 8 – 0 in round two.&#13;
&#13;
METHERINGHAM list 0 – 27 to Waddington, and were unlucky to have six games postponed, their opponents including Digby, Bardney and Coningsby.&#13;
&#13;
BARDNEY had only one station game, in which they were unlucky to meet Dunholme on top of their form in the Wines Cup, and suffer a 33 – 0 defeat.&#13;
&#13;
EAST KIRKBY had three games, a 630 Squadron A and B practice game, and a 57 Squadron A and B practice, followed by a station A and B trial. In spite of this preparation they were unlucky enough to forego their Wines Cup round one as Wigsley could not raise a side. They are now waiting to play Fiskerton in the second round.&#13;
&#13;
HOCKEY&#13;
&#13;
SCAMPTON had four games of mixed hockey, beating Spilsby 6 – 1 in round one of the Group competition, and Foldingsworth 5 – 0. They lost 2 – 3 to 368 Searchlight Battery and 1 – 5 to Rose Bros. In the second round of the cup they have now to play Syerston.&#13;
&#13;
DUNHOLME had only one mixed hockey game, v Scampton in the Group competition, which they lost 1 – 4.&#13;
&#13;
METHERINGHAM played a 2 – 2 draw with Waddington on their new aerodrome pitch. They are now due to play Waddington again in the Group contest.&#13;
&#13;
BARDNEY neat Dunholme 4 – 1 in the Group contest, and later registered a 4 – 1 win against Waddington. They were finally knocked out of the trophy by Swinderby (5 – 1).&#13;
&#13;
EADT KIRKBY had four games, three inter-station and one (a 1- 1 draw) with Spilsby G.S. They are now waiting to meet 5 Group at home in the contest.&#13;
&#13;
SPILSBY played Scampton in the Group trophy, but were defeated 6 – 1.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] ICE HOCKEY [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
54 Base boast a Canadian Cougars’ team that is certainly 100% full blooded, judging from the “GEN” account of their 5 – 4 victory over Digby Dynamites.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] SOFT BALL [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
F/Lt. Rodgers (Gunnery Leader 617) now has a Woodhall Soft Ball team that challenges all comers. Roll up, roll up, and have your money ready!!&#13;
&#13;
(Continued on page 4, col. 3)&#13;
&#13;
[Cartoon] WFW&#13;
&#13;
Dot and Dash, the immaculate WAAFs.&#13;
&#13;
“…OPERATIONS? I’VE ‘AD ‘EM!”&#13;
&#13;
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1044. Page 12.&#13;
&#13;
[Page break]&#13;
&#13;
NAVIGATION&#13;
&#13;
Navigation generally has been of a high order this month. There is still room for considerable improvement however. A good many of the Navigators’ Charts still look very bare. Although all aircraft are equipped with Air Position Indicators, a few Navigators still do not “keep an air plot”, in that they do not plot their Air Position regularly and obtain a D.R. position. This is most important and must be done. A standard Navigational procedure to be adopted when using broadcast w/v’s, has been laid down (see Air Staff Instruction Nav/14). We are constantly striving for concentration, and for obvious reasons the concentration should be on the planned track, it is therefore imperative that you constantly obtain your D.R. position by intelligent use of the broadcast w/v’s. If the D.R. position obtained places the aircraft off track, then alter course immediately and regain track.&#13;
&#13;
The A.P.I. has been modified, and the error in this instrument is now very small. If the windfinders obtain accurate fixes on their H 2 S, the resultant w/v should be almost perfect. Navigators should, therefore, have every confidence in the broadcast w/v’s and make the fullest possible use of them.&#13;
&#13;
Whilst track keeping is very important, it must be remembered that timing is equally important. This does not seem to be fully appreciated, and a few Navigators still persist om leaving the concentration point with “a few minutes in hand”. Other aircraft inadvertently leave the concentration point a few minutes late (possibly due to late take-off, etc.) with the result that the stream of aircraft is very much longer than it should be, and the chance of success by the German night fighter is increased. If it is calculated that the aircraft will arrive at the concentration point early, then dog-legs [underlined] must [/underlined] be carried out before reaching this position. All Navigation Officers are to check the time at the concentration point of each aircraft, and they must insist that no aircraft leaves this position with any time in hand.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] AIR POSITION INDICATORS [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
All aircraft of the Group are now equipped with the A.P.I. fully modified. Several tests have been carried out to ascertain the accuracy of this instrument now it has been modified, and the results have shown that the error is now very small, and of the order of 3 or 4 m.p.h. We must, therefore, make every use of this valuable instrument. It is considered by a few Navigators that errors arise when resetting the A.P.I. Mechanically this is not so, and any errors are due to incorrect setting by the Navigator. If the A.P.I. is reset every 30 minutes, as it should be, then the amount to be subtracted or added to the counters should not be great, and would not generally be more that 30-35 minutes of latitude or longitude. For ease and simplicity, the A.P.I. should not be reset until the latitude or longitude counters are showing an even number of minutes, e.g. 10, 20, 30, etc. It should then be a simple matter to add or subtract say 25 minutes of latitude or longitude.&#13;
&#13;
It is advocated by a small section of the “Union” that the A.P.I. should be reset as little as possible, e.g. at the last Gee fix, the target, and first Gee fix, etc., but this method has several disadvantages. It will become cumbersome after a long period of D.R. e.g. the Berlin raid 24/25 March, 1944, when the wind vector from target to Enemy Coast was approx. 230 miles long. There is as great a risk of error in plotting this vector as in resetting the A.P.I. Another disadvantage is that the Air Position may run off the chart in use. This would necessitate carrying several charts.&#13;
&#13;
The Air Position Indicator is a valuable instrument if correctly used. Navigators are urged to experiment with the A.P.I. in the various methods of use, and discuss with their Station Navigation Officers.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] BROADCAST W/V’S [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
March was a mixed month for broadcast w/v’s. The wind finding and resultant track keeping was good, with the exception of Berlin and Nuremburg. The last two mentioned raids have been investigated, and the results are worthy of special comment.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] Berlin. [/underlined] Average forecast w/v from Base to Target at 20,000 feet was 350/60. Average w/v transmitted was 350/90. Average true w/v was approximately 350/105. It will be noted that the winds transmitted by Aircraft were, on average, 15 m.p.h. under strength. A large percentage of windfinders obtained the accurate w/v, but only a few transmitted it. The remainder either did not send it, or, not believing there could be such a large error in the forecast w/v’s, “watered it down” and sent that. This procedure is very dangerous. Navigators must send back all w/v’s they obtain, providing they are confident the fixes used are accurate.&#13;
&#13;
Another feature of the Berlin raid was the delay in aircraft sending back w/v’s. All the difficulties experienced by aircrew are fully appreciated, but every effort must be made to get the w/v’s back to Base as soon as possible.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] Nuremburg. [/underlined] The investigation into this raid has not yet been completed, but the one outstanding feature is that the wind direction at and above 20,000 feet backed by 15° - 20° and this was a contributory factor to the Northerly trend on the return journey.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] LIAISON VISITS [/underlined&#13;
&#13;
Only a few liaison visits have been completed during the month. It is very difficult for operational Station and Squadron Navigational Officers to visit the Con. Units or Scampton Aircrew School, but every effort should be made. Make a note of all the deficiencies of Navigators, your suggestions, criticisms etc., then go and discuss them with the Con. Unit or Scampton. More good can be done by paying one liaison visit than by writing a hundred letters. Con. Unit, L.F.S. and Scampton Instructors must also pay regular visits to Squadrons.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] LOG AND CHART KEEPING [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
During the month, one Navigator from each Squadron was detailed to experiment with Log and Chart work. Each was asked to work almost entirely on the Chart, making only a very few log entries. This method has proved very popular. Full reports are not yet to hand, but an analysis of all reports will be sent to Stations and Squadrons in due course.&#13;
&#13;
1. If the D.R. Compass topples, and the repeater rotates, what action would you take to maintain the line of flight marker on the H 2 S correctly orientated?&#13;
&#13;
2. What action would you take to tune in the ground returns and set up the height marker on the H 2 S equipment if the trace on the height tube were missing?&#13;
&#13;
3. You are using broadcast wind velocities, and the Bomb Aimer gives you a pinpoint which is “off track”. What two actions would you take?&#13;
&#13;
4. You have received an amendment to the zero hour, but, having applied the correction, observe that you still have several minutes in hand. How and where would you lose this time?&#13;
&#13;
5. In which countries are the following towns: Strasbourg, Aix-le Chappelle, Flensburg, Ghent, Pilsen, Charlattenburg?&#13;
&#13;
6. Which is the shorter distance – Stuttgart to ROME or Stuttgart to LONDON?&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] ANSWERS TO LAST MONTH’S QUIZ [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
1. (a) Passes to W/Optr. On paper (1) Course, (2) Height, (3) I.A.S., (4) present position, (5) estimated time of ditching, (6) reason for ditching. ( )&#13;
(b) Obtain a Gee fix and pass to W/Op., on paper, the Gee co-ordinates and time of fix.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] NOTE: [/underlined] Few crews carry out correct procedure, which is – the emergency procedure when ditching is considered unavoidable, S.O.S. procedure when ditching is imminent within 15 minutes.&#13;
&#13;
2. 30°&#13;
&#13;
3. If B strobe is missing. Line up signals in usual manner, and take “C” reading. Then reverse signals so that B signal is on the C trace, strobe the signal and take the reading remembering to subtract 30. If “C” strobe is missing, reverse above procedure and add 30 to the “C” pulse reading.&#13;
&#13;
4. (a) It means that you are heading for high ground.&#13;
(b) Turn on reciprocal course and obtain a check on your position. If no reliable aids are available in the aircraft, the Navigator should request W/Op. to obtain an M/F D/F fix.&#13;
&#13;
Lines to those who went on leave on April 4th.&#13;
&#13;
For you the birds tra-la do sing!&#13;
For me the heavens do glower and rain!&#13;
For you buds burst like anything!&#13;
My buds ‘gainst blight do strive in vain!&#13;
The reason’s simple why I grieve,’&#13;
And why my downtrod soul doth pine;&#13;
For you continue with your leave,&#13;
But I’ve just heard that I’ve had mine!!&#13;
&#13;
ANON (Circa 1944)&#13;
&#13;
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 13.&#13;
&#13;
[Page break]&#13;
&#13;
ACCIDENTS&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] ANOTHER BAD MONTH [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
The [underlined] Avoidable [/underlined] Accident Summary for March again makes bad reading – Squadrons had 9 and Training Base had 33. These figures speak for themselves, and they use pretty strong language. As a result of these accidents, 4 aircraft were CAT “E”, 6 were CAT “B”, 20 were CAT AC” and 12 were CAT “A”. Bear in mind these were only avoidable accidents. Technical failures are not included in this list. Details are as follows:-&#13;
&#13;
Ground collisions (including taxying) – 15; overshoot landing – 3; crashes on 3-engined overshoots – 3; swings on take off – 5; swings landing – 4; errors of judgement landing – 5; heavy landings – 3; maintenance – 2; taking off – 1; other errors of judgement – 1: Total [underlined] 42 [/underlined].&#13;
&#13;
The snow period at the beginning of the month was directly responsible for 14 of these accidents, all within 51 Base. Had there been no hard snow banks, no damage would have been done to these aircraft. The hazard had to be accepted, and no action was on these “snow” accidents. Under this heading there were 5 taxying, 7 swinging and 2 landing. This however, still leaves 19 avoidable accidents in 51 Base, in the usual categories, and 9 in squadrons – total 28, as under:-&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] Squadrons [/underlined] – Ground collisions – 3; overshoot landing – 2; maintenance errors – 2; other errors of judgement – 2.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] 51 Base [/underlined] Ground collisions – 7; swings – 2; overshoot landing 1; heavy landings – 2; other landing errors – 4; crashes on 3 engined overshoots – 3.&#13;
&#13;
Collisions on the ground (10) still account for more damaged aircraft than any other category. There were two more M.T. collisions this month, both due to careless driving by ground personnel, in spite of the recent drive to eliminate these costly entirely inexcusable accidents. One aircraft was damaged during compass swinging at a squadron, and two more were damaged on dispersal. In the others, only a very slight degree of carelessness was shown by aircrew. They were more unfortunate than anything else. Apart from the M.T. collisions, there has not been an instance this month of down right careless taxying, which is a step in the right direction.&#13;
&#13;
The swings were by inexperienced pilots, both of whom took the correct action after the swing developed. This action avoided serious damage. One of the heavy landings was made in difficult wind conditions, the other only accentuated damage which had been started as a result of previous heavy landings; both pilots were under training.&#13;
&#13;
Three aircraft crashed on 3 engined overshoots – two Stirlings and one Lancaster. It is hoped that the revised technique of dealing with three engined landings at Conversion Units will minimise these three engined accidents. The overshoot landing at Training Base was also made on three engines. The pilot hesitated between landing and going round again, decided on one, then changed his mind; he finished up in the overshoot area. Overshoots on the squadrons were made under extremely difficult circumstances. One was made on two engines, and in the other, visibility was practically nil.&#13;
&#13;
(Continued on page 15, col. 3)&#13;
&#13;
ORGANISATION&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] (MAY BE READ BY AIRCREW TYPES) [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
When the so-called “brained types” of the Royal Air Force are binding round the fireplace in the mess, they sometimes utter the most amazing theories on how the war can be won on a date earlier than that already forecast by Lindoe. But no one tries to make a note of what is said by these Fuehrers, except, maybe, to insert a few rude remarks in the local “Line Book”.&#13;
&#13;
When, however, an observation is made that is clever and helpful, quotations are extracted and issued to the world at large. Such an extract is made in Section 1 of A.P.837 – “Principles of Administration”.&#13;
&#13;
An extract from the Manual says “A good organisation requires competent management to produce satisfactory results”. In the Royal Air Force, this management of the [underlined] ORGANISATION [/underlined] is called Administration; it is the system whereby, in principle and in executive detail, the Service carries out its function ….TO OPERATE EFFICIENTLY….!!!... and to work efficiently, co-operation is essential. (Co-operation, by the way, is something to which every member of a Service contributes).&#13;
&#13;
Another famous quotation by Socrates, was to the effect that “A disorderly mob is no more an army than a “pranged” aircraft a fighting machine”. The bits and pieces must be [underlined] organised. [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
So, therefore, let’s have a look at organisation in action-theory is not sufficient, it must be applied.&#13;
&#13;
With apologies to Tee Emm. here are a few “Do’s and Don’t s”.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] DO [/underlined] see that Orders issued are brief, complete and unambiguous. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] lay yourself open to being misunderstood. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] forget that in your planning, you must always ask yourself who has to be consulted before you reach a decision, and who has to be informed of your decision.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] DO [/underlined] grasp the scope of the task, and foresee what it demands, with thoroughness and imagination. [Underlined] DO [/underlined] see with what other tasks run by other Sections, you must interlock. [Underlined] DO [/underlined] co-ordinate with your equals and underlings. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] plan until you are absolutely clear what is to be done. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] jump at the first solution. [Underlined] DO [/underlined] consider all the advantages and disadvantages of each solution. [Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] go off at half-cock.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] DO [/underlined] remember that in war, speed is nearly everything.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] forget that ceaseless driving force and ceaseless supervision are essential.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] DO [/underlined] check and check again.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] DON’T [/underlined] forget, whatever your job, your ability to organise is every bit as important to the Service as a whole, whether you are throwing an aircraft about the sky, or writing Railway Warrants.&#13;
&#13;
ENGINEERING&#13;
&#13;
Early returns for the month of March were about average, and cancellations were much reduced. Cancellations for March were 0.98%, a considerable improvement on the 3.47% recorded for February. Early Returns for March were 4.01% for all causes, again, an improvement on February’s figures which were 6.5%. &#13;
&#13;
Serviceability was generally good, the main causes of unserviceability being:-&#13;
&#13;
1. Aircraft on acceptance checks.&#13;
2. Aircraft on minor inspection.&#13;
3. Aircraft landing away from base due to diversion.&#13;
&#13;
The number of sorties flown by this Group is again a record, but still greater numbers will be expected during the coming months.&#13;
&#13;
The maintenance statistics staff are still at Waddington and very soon experiments will proceed with a 75 hour maintenance cycle, using the revised maintenance schedule.&#13;
&#13;
Much unnecessary engine running is taking place on the ground, and the method of some of the running is harsh and detrimental to the engine. C.T.O’s must ensure that all N.C.O’s and men who “run up” engines are qualified to do so, and that they have passed the necessary test.&#13;
&#13;
Many cases have been noticed where on a ground run a mag drop has been experienced, and the fitter at the controls has run the engine up three or four times “hoping! It may clear. This is a waste of time, imposes heavy loads on the engine, and proves the man in the cockpit does not know his job.&#13;
&#13;
Another point about ground running is that much damage is done on a ground test by inspection panels and turret covers not being secure, and being damaged by the slipstream. C.T.O’s must have a drive on this, and when they see it happening, check the man at the controls and the N.C.O. i/c aircraft.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] RENDITION OF FORMS 765C [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
The remarks on Form 765C by the specialist officers are in many cases too brief and are of no assistance to this Headquarters in attempting to establish a cause, or make recommendations to prevent a recurrence of the trouble which led to the forced landing or failure. This is liable to indicate, in the case of engine trouble, that the cause is not investigated thoroughly at the Station. As it is known that the cause is always investigated it is small trouble to insert more details in the paragraph provided in the 765C for Specialist’s remarks, and it will save a large amount of correspondence and telephone calls between Group and Stations. If a full technical report is to follow after rendition of the 765C then of course this should be stated in the appropriate paragraph.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] TRAINING UNIT SERVICEABILITY [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
[Tables of Serviceability of Stirling and Lancaster aircraft by Unit]&#13;
&#13;
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 14.&#13;
&#13;
[Page break]&#13;
&#13;
ARMAMENT&#13;
&#13;
This has been a month of records, and on one occasion a period of sweat, toil, and almost tears.&#13;
&#13;
To create a record with the existing power available, whether it be sprinting, car racing or bombing up, it is necessary to exclude wasted energy. As man power cannot be increased and new armament records must be realised, it is essential that this strive for maximum efficiency be closely investigated.&#13;
&#13;
Wasted energy in the bombing up phase of operations is too often attributed to shortage of equipment, bomb trollies, small bomb containers, Whitlocks, Hampden twins, liners; even spanners. It is admitted that there is a shortage of some of these items; all the more reason why the few available should be kept serviceable; further, if failures and faults occur, an expedient system of repair must be instituted. A flat tyre on a bomb trolley, a few popped rivets on a small bomb container, small faults, easily remedied, but if allowed to accumulate they may easily cause a bottleneck in the repair section and eventually a complete breakdown.&#13;
&#13;
A large percentage of the necessary repairs are caused by mishandling. Bombing up parties must not be allowed to model on the popular conception of a dockyard stevedore.&#13;
&#13;
A release slip that fails is a bomb returned, and a stupendous effort is wasted, especially as it is necessary to cart the weapon back to the bomb dump. Do not therefore allow speed to interfere with the quality of workmanship.&#13;
&#13;
Short cuts and new devices of local manufacture, such as tools and loading platforms save time, and time saved is man hours of effort that can be directed to raising the standard of workmanship, and thus increasing the tonnage dropped on the enemy.&#13;
&#13;
New records will be set, so prepare now for every eventuality.&#13;
&#13;
Load the [underlined] GOODS [/underlined] so that our colleagues the aircrew may deliver them.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] WARNING TO WANTONS [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
A rumour is rife that by trial, a certain Group discovered that if the centre station release mechanism is plugged to the rear turret electric heating system, and the gunner turns on his heated clothing, the following incidents occur:-&#13;
&#13;
(a) A large bomb goes through the bomb doors.&#13;
&#13;
(b) The rear gunner is practically electrocuted.&#13;
&#13;
(c) Pandemonium reigns in the aircraft.&#13;
&#13;
(The Group and Unit concerned prefer to remain anonymous.)&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] FIREWORKS [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
To alleviate the somewhat chaotic state brought about by the increase in the use of target markers and indicators, and the need for an improved system of supply, it has been decided to form a pyrotechnical park at Woodhall. It is intended that this park should hold a quantity sufficient to supply any Station at short notice, and that any technical information regarding these new and unheralded devices will be available from that source.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] TRANSPORT [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
A word of appreciation is directed to the transport sections, who undertook many nocturnal journeys to ensure prompt deliveries of bombs in readiness for operations.&#13;
&#13;
[Underlined] FAILURES [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
This month a total of 2 cancellations and 7 Early Returns were attributed to Armament. Although this represents a decided improvement on last month’s figures, it is still too high. The total of 9 abortive sorties were due to:-&#13;
&#13;
(i) 3 Gunners’ “boobs”.&#13;
(ii) 1 aircraft returned early as a result of a sticky Palmer Firing Valve, the result of a tight gland nut on the valve spindle.&#13;
(iii) 1 aircraft was not bombed up in time for take-off and consequently cancelled.&#13;
(iv) 4 aircraft returned with unserviceable tail turrets due to defects in technical equipment, i.e.&#13;
&#13;
(a) A broken ball bearing resulted in a seized vane oil motor.&#13;
(b) Spline shaft of the E.D.P. sheared.&#13;
(c) Pressure pipe union at the Engine Driven Pump fractured during flight – exit the last old type flex pipe in the Group. &#13;
(d) Collapsed gun ram washer.&#13;
&#13;
From this analysis it can be seen that at least 5 out of 9 abortive sorties could, and should, have been avoided. After deducting the three gunners’ “boobs” and 4 failures due to defective equipment, Armament can say with satisfaction, that they were responsible for only two abortive sorties out of a total of 1720 sorties flown. (.116%) – Good show!! A record number of sorties flown, a record tonnage dropped on the Hun and an all-time low of abortive sorties.&#13;
&#13;
There is, however, grave cause for alarm regarding small bomb container compartment hang-ups. Although a greater tonnage than ever before was dropped, so also was a greater tonnage returned to the bomb store, and unfortunately over 50% of the failures were caused by carelessness. Of 102 S.B.C. hang-ups there were 60 maintenance failures directly attributed to severed and trapped leads.&#13;
&#13;
These maintenance failures cannot be accepted, and it is obvious that the present system of supervision during bombing up needs overhaul.&#13;
&#13;
FAILURES TABLE&#13;
&#13;
[Table of failures by Squadron]&#13;
&#13;
A = MANIPULATION B = MAINTENANCE C = ICING D = TECHNICAL E = ELECTRICAL F = OBSCURE + = H 2 S Squadron&#13;
&#13;
ACCIDENTS&#13;
&#13;
(Continued from page 14, col.1)&#13;
&#13;
The other landing accidents occurred in 51 Base. They consisted of collapsing of Stirling under-carriages after touch-down. These have not yet been fully investigated.&#13;
&#13;
The remaining “error of judgement” occurred in a squadron. The aircraft crashed in the circuit at dusk. The reason for this crash is still obscure, and has only been included because investigation at this stage does not suggest technical failure of any kind.&#13;
&#13;
A fatal accident took place this month in the Waddington circuit. A Lancaster collided in mid-air with a 1 Group aircraft on its way home to base. Responsibility for the accident has not yet been allocated, but it brings home once again the necessity for keeping a thorough look-out at all times. The pilot of an aircraft is naturally preoccupied in the circuit with his cockpit drill etc., and it is up to the crew, especially the gunners to keep up a search all round. The natural tendency to look inside the circuit at the flarepath must be resisted.&#13;
&#13;
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944. Page 15.&#13;
&#13;
[Page break]&#13;
&#13;
OPERATIONS&#13;
&#13;
The opening months of the year have each [missing word] noteworthy contributions to the Bomber Offensive, and this month has proved no exception. Not only have we established a new sortie peak of 1720, but our achievements also include the distinction of being the first Group in the field to drop over 1000 tons in one night on a single target. The high percentage of successes (89.7%) was maintained despite the set-back of two abortive operations, and losses remained a constant 3.37%.&#13;
&#13;
The principal role of the Group, outside the main force “blitz” targets, has been the continuation of the offensive, commenced last month, against Germany’s aircraft production – an essential prelude to the establishment of a Second Front. This offensive has been rewarded by no mean success.&#13;
&#13;
The attack on 2/3rd March against ALBERT resulted in the total destruction of the aero-engine factory of Cle Mecanique d’Albert, with the aircraft factory of S.N.C.A. du Nord more than half destroyed – an impressive result.&#13;
&#13;
MARIGNANE, singled out for attack on the 9/10th, also sustained extremely severe damage, particularly to the assembly shop, heat treatment shop, offices, flight hangar, components’ store, garages, workshops and other buildings in the factory area.&#13;
&#13;
The following night (namely the 10/11th), an ambitious programme was conducted against aircraft factories at CHATEAUROUX, CLERMOND FERRAND and OSSUN, and the Needle Bearing Factory at LA RICAMARIE. Interpretation of P.R.U. photographs provides evidence of the high measure of success which attended these missions. Thirteen buildings comprising the larger part of the workshops of S.N.C.A. du Sud-Ouest Chateauroux, have been destroyed or severely damaged, including the main assembly store, transformer house and other key buildings. The aircraft repair factory at CLERMOND FERRAND has received major damage throughout, including two large multi-bay buildings, compounding plant and power station – the latter now being observed to be inactive – OSSUN Factory airfield bears its scars in the form of severe damage to the two larger factory buildings and other ancillary buildings. The devastation at LA RICAMARIE is particularly acute. The eastern two thirds of the plant has suffered heavily, and every building, with one exception, has been either damaged or destroyed.&#13;
&#13;
Three persistent attacks against the Sigma Aero Engine Works, LYONS, on 23/24th, 25/26th and again on 29/30th, terminated in sixteen out of the 22 buildings comprising the Factory receiving varying degrees of damage, in addition to which a neighbouring hutted encampment has been virtually destroyed.&#13;
&#13;
A further two nights out of the month were devoted with great profit to the firing of Hun powder magazines. The results were impressive indeed, and upheld the high hopes of the crews. BERGERAC on 18/19th took the count in the first round. The east end of the plant is almost completely demolished, while the nitration houses and acid recovery plant are severely damaged, with evidence of severe blast throughout the Factory. ANGOULEME, attacked on 20/21st, was still burning the day following the raid, and severe damage throughout the target area, particularly to the nitro-cellulose plant, can be seen.&#13;
&#13;
We, as a Group, also played a small, but nevertheless noteworthy part in the attack against the enemy’s communications supplying his Channel Ports. AULNOYE was selected as our target, and the ensuing attack on 25/26th resulted in the central portion of one of the carriage and wagon repair shop being damaged. Rather more than twenty direct hits have been secured on the tracks – and the locomotive shed to the south is half destroyed.&#13;
&#13;
An outstandingly successful attack was made on 16/17th against the CLERMOND FERRAND MICHELIN PLANT – not a building of which escaped. Severe damage is displayed throughout the entire area.&#13;
&#13;
Seven major attacks were undertaken during the month. STUTTGART was our first objective on 1/2nd and again on 15/16th. The heaviest concentration of damage from these attacks is seen to the North West and North East of the town centre, where many factories of high priority are situated. Throughout the town, scattered incidents to business and residential property are apparent.&#13;
&#13;
FRANKFURT on 18/19th and 22/23rd, was spectacular, not only by reason of the success of the attack, but because the Group seized the unique opportunity of unloading bombs exceeding 1000 tons of H.E. and incendiaries on the target. Some 12 hours after the second attack, columns of smoke were rising to 15,000 feet, and drifting southwards for at least 200 miles – a grave spectacle for dwellers in the South of the Reich. The principal damage is concentrated in the city centre, stretching a scarred arm northwards between the railway station and east harbour.&#13;
&#13;
No month would be complete without an attack on the “Big City”. Limited cover only was available the day following the raid on 24/25th, but from the provisional report (which omits reference to the centre and the east), the potential results can be contemplated with some optimism. At the time of photography, fires were still burning.&#13;
&#13;
For some months, rebuilding in ESSEN has been stealthily proceeding, and the night of 26/27th was selected as a favourable opportunity to disrupt this activity. PR.U. photographs are of poor quality, but fresh damage can be identified in many parts of the town, and in the workshops of Krupps. A full report is awaited.&#13;
&#13;
The final bout of the month witnessed a bitter struggle with the enemy’s fighter defences throughout the deep penetration to NURNBERG on 30/31st, involving our heaviest loss so far recorded. Our aircraft, however, put up a spirited defence, shooting down a number of the enemy. The losses were not a small price to pay, even for a successful attack on this extremely important war production centre, but the casualties can perhaps be placed in their proper perspective, and to some extent minimised, when viewing the Battle of Germany as a whole. It is difficult to place any assessment on the raid owing to cloud conditions, and P.R.U. cover has not yet been obtained.&#13;
&#13;
To speculate on the value of our contribution towards the opening of the Second Front is obviously vain, but there can be no doubt that the month’s activity has left its mark clearly impressed on the Reich.&#13;
&#13;
WAR EFFORT&#13;
&#13;
[Table of statistics on aircraft, sorties, bombing and training by Squadron]&#13;
&#13;
ORDER OF MERIT in this table is now based on the number of SUCCESSFUL sorties completed, per average aircraft on charge, i.e. Total number of sorties minus Early Returns and Missing, divided by Average A/C on charge. No 617 Squadron, in view of their special task, are shown separately.&#13;
&#13;
5 Group News. No. 20. March, 1944.</text>
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In accordance with the conditions stipulated by the donor, this item is available only at the University of Lincoln.</text>
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              <text>[picture]&#13;
REAR VIEW&#13;
Ralph Briars&#13;
&#13;
[page break]&#13;
&#13;
[photograph]&#13;
&#13;
TO MARK AND AMANDA, IN THE FERVENT HOPE THAT THEY AND THEIRS NEVER BECOME INVOLVED IN WORLD UPHEAVALS SUCH AS HAPPENED BETWEEN 1939 AND 1945&#13;
&#13;
DEDICATED FIRSTLY TO MY TRAVELLING COMPANIONS IN THOSE UNFRIENDLY SKIES, PARTICULARLY TO JOHN SANDERS WHO FLEW US THERE AND BACK, AND JAMES BARRON WHO GUIDED US. THE OTHERS AL AND ARTHUR, ROY AND TOMMY, ALL STRANGERS THROWN TOGETHER IN THE COMMON CAUSE.&#13;
SECONDLY TO BILL HUDSON WHO CAME WITH ME FROM GUNNERY SCHOOL TO FISKERTON, A WARMLY REMEMBER [sic] PERSON WHOSE FAVOURITE TIPPLE WAS GUINESS AND GIN-MIXED. SADLY HIS AIRCRAFT DID NOT RETURN FROM A RAID IN MARCH 1944, SHORTLY BEFORE WE WERE POSTED TO 617 SQUADRON.&#13;
&#13;
[page break]&#13;
&#13;
[underlined] FORE-WORD [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
TO EMPLOY A WELL WORN BUT NONE THE LESS ACCURATE CLICHÉ, LIFE IS FULL OF SURPRISES. THUS I PONDERD [sic] RUEFULLY, IN JANUARY 1944, ON FINDING MYSELF SITTING AT THE REAR OF A LANCASTER BOMBER EN ROUTE TO STETTING, WHICH IS THE WRONG SIDE OF DENMARK. NOT THAT I AM UNPATRIOTIC REALLY, BUT DURING THE TIME THAT HAD PASSED SINCE JOINING THR [sic] ROYAL AIR FORCE I DID THINK THAT SOMEONE OUGHT TO GET A MOVE ON AND WIN THE WAR BEFORE I BECAME INVOLVED.&#13;
THE R.A.F. INVITED ME TO JOIN IN 1941 ON THE ROSY PROSPECT THAT TRAINING AS A WIRELESS OPERATOR/AIR GUNNER – KNOWN IN THE TRADE AS A WOP/AG – WOULD FOLLOW INITIAL INSTRUCTION ON GETTING THE LEFT FOOT AND RIGHT ARM IN SYNCHRONISATION ON MOVING OFF. SO AWAY TO SAMPLE THE DELIGHTS OF THE BLACKPOOL LANDLADIES, BLESS-EM. SOME WERE LIKE MUVVERS, OTHERS LET YOU WASH IN THE YARD AND NO WARM SHAVING WATER. ONE LEARNED, USUALLY TOO LATE, NEVER TO EXPOUND THE VIRTUES OF THEIR COOKING – OR ANY OTHER ACTIVITY – FOR THE PERMANENT STAFF SOON HAD YOU OUT AND THEMSELVES IN, TO USE THE VERNACULAR, WITH THEIR FEET AND TRULY UNDER THE TABLE.&#13;
NOW I WOULD NOT SAY THE MORSE CODE IS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT TO LEARN GIVEN MORE TIME MY INSTRUCTORS WERE PREPARED TO OFFER, AND AS THE WAR WAS NOT GOING ALL THAT WELL I HAD TO DEPART FROM THIS POSH PART OF LANCASHIRE. ALTHOUGH I WAS A BIT MIFFED AT THE TIME, THE DECISION WAS EVENTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS, AS I WILL EXPAND LATER,..&#13;
SO THERE I WAS, WITH A FEW OTHER FAILURES, ON THE ISLE OF SHEPPEY, BEING INSTRUCTED ON A DIFFERENT SUBJECT, PARACHUTE AND CABLES. BEAR WITH ME, IF YOU WILL, YOU’LL NOT BELIEVE THE REST. SOME BRIGHT SPARK IN THE MIN. OF DEFFENCE [sic] INVENTED A FORM OF DEFENCE AGAINST LOW FLYING AIRCRAFT CONSISTING OF A ROW OF TUBES SET VERTICALLY AND CONTAINING ROCKETS TO WHICH WERE ATTACHED. [sic]&#13;
&#13;
[page break]&#13;
&#13;
2&#13;
&#13;
LONG LENGTHS OF STEEL CABLE, WITH INCREDIBLE ACCURACY YOU FIRED THESE OFF JUST AS AN AIRCRAFT – PREFERABLE [sic] BELONGING TO THE OTHER SIDE – WAS ABOUT TO CROSS THE LINE, WHERE-UPON UP THEY WENT TO AROUND 800 FEET, EJECTING A PARACHUTE FIXED TO THE CABLE WHICH THEN SLOWLY DROPPED TO THE GROUND. IF THEN YOUR TARGET WAS NOT ENTANGLED IN THE STEEL CURTAIN, OR A SECOND ONE CAME ALONG, YOU NEEDED AT LEAST 30 MINUTES TO REFILL THE SYSTEM, PRESUMABLY THIS VISIONARY TYPE OF DEFENCE AROSE DURING THE PROBLEMS OF SUPPLYING CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AT THAT STAGE OF THE WAR, AND WAS USED TO DEFEND MERCHANT SHIPPING AS WELL AS AIR FIELDS.&#13;
ANYWAY, I WAS PACKED OFF TO SAVE THE R.A.F. BASE AT LINTON-ON-OUSE, NEAR YORK, AND IN THE PERIOD FROM CHRISTMAS 1941 TO AROUND FEBRUARY 1943 WE FIRED NOT ONE SHOT. NO DOUBT THE LUFTWAFFE HAD HEARD ABOUT IT ALL. DURING THIS EXCITING PERIOD I MADE REGULAR APPLICATIONS TO TRAIN AS AN AIR GUNNER, FOR NOT ONLY WAS THIS DEFENCE WORK FARCICAL – FOR EXAMPLE ONE COULD NOT OPERATE AFTER DARK AS THERE WAS NO REFERNCE [sic] TO JUDGE DISTANCE – OUT DEFENCE DUTIES WERE BEING SLOWLY TAKEN OVER BY THE NEWLY FORMED R.A.F. REGIMENT, WITH ALL THE ASSOCIATED ARMY STYLE TRAINING WHICH I COULD PLAINLY SEE WAS NOT GOING TO BE MY CUP OF TEA AT ALL.&#13;
EVENTUALLY I FOUND MYSELF IN ST. JOHNS WOOD, IN LONDON, ONCE AGAIN ON ASSESSMENTS AND INITIAL TRAINING LEADING TO A GUNNERY COURSE. THENCE TO BRIDLINGTON FOR THE REAL THING, WHERE AMONGST DIVERS ACTIVITIES WE SPENT HOURS IN A LOCAL GARAGE WHIRLING AROUND ON DIFFERENT TYPES OF GUN TURRETS MOUNTED UPON METAL FRAMES CONTAINING SMALL PETROL ENGINES WHICH SUPPLIED ELECTRIC AND HYDRAULIC POWER. NEARBY FLAMBOROUGH HEAD WAS USED FOR LIVE FIRING MUCH TO THE DISCOMFORT OF THR [sic]  RESIDENT GULLS, FOR THE CONTINUAL USE OF OLD GUNS SEEMINGLY SO WIDENED THE BORE THAT TRACER BULLETS RARELY FOLLOWED EACH OTHER BUT WANDERED ABOUT LIKE GUNSHOT.&#13;
&#13;
[page break]&#13;
&#13;
3&#13;
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THE NEXT STOP WAS DALCROSS, THE FLYING SCHOOL NEAR INVERNESS WHICH IS NOW THAT TOWN’S AIRPORT. WHERE WE SPENT SEVERAL WEEKS IN LOVELY WEATHER FLYING OVER THE MORAY FIRTH IN OLD DEFIANTS AND ANSONS FIRING AT TOWED TARGET DROGUES OR SEA MARKERS. MANY OF THE PILOTS WERE POLISH, TEMPORARILY WITHDRAWN FROM ACTIVE DUTY, AND THEY UNDERSTANDABLY WANTED TO RETURN TO BASHING THE HUN RATHER THAN FERRYING AROUND THREE TYRO GUNNERS AND THEIR INSTRUCTOR. ONE OCCURRENCE THAT WOULD INVITE A FLOW OF FURIOUS POLISH – THE PURPORT OF WHICH WAS CLEAR EVEN THOUGH THE LANGUAGE WAS NOT – WAS WHEN AFTER PAINFULLY CLIMING [sic] TO HEIGHT AND AWAITING THE ARRIVAL OF THE TARGET TOWING AIRCRAFT THE FIRST GUNNER IN THE TURRET SHOT OFF THE DROGUE. AMONGST US GUNNERS THIS WAS SEEN AS EVIDENCE OF GREAT PROWESS, BUT THE RESULT WAS RATHER A LONG HOPEFULL [sic] WAIT FOR A NEW DROGUE TO BE STREAMED BY THE TOWING AIRCRAFT, OR, AS MORE OFTEN HAPPENED, A RETURN TO THE AIRFIELD. EACH GUNNER FIRED 200 ROUNDS. THE TIPS OF WHICH HAD BEEN DIPPED IN A STICKY SORT OF PRINTERS INK, RED PURPLE OR GREEN, SO THAT THE HITS COULD BE COUNTED. THE PROCEDURE WAS FOR US TO LAND FIRST AND AWAIT THE DROPPING OF THE DROGUE TARGET, WHICH WE HAD TO LUG INTO THE SCOOL [sic] FOR ASSESSMENT. OH! THE EXCITEMENT! HOW MANY WOULD YOU HAVE? HAD YOU, IN FACT ANY? 10 WAS EXCELLENT 15 INCREDIBLE, MORE OFTEN IT WAS SINGLE NUMBERS. AIR TO AIR FIRING WAS WILDLY WASTEFUL, NONE OF YOUR HEAT-SEEKING MISSILES THEN!&#13;
WE DID A LOT OF GUN TURRET TRAINING, AND COULD EVENTUALLY WRITE OUR NAMES BY MEANS OF A PENCIL WEDGED INSIDE THE GUN BARREL WHICH ENABLED ONE TO TRACE THE LETTERS ONTO A BOARD HELD IN FRONT OF THE TURRET. HOURS WERE SPENT INSIDE LARGE WHITE WASHED DOMES WHERE MOVING FILMS OF VARIOUS ATTACKING AIRCRAFT WERE PROJECTED, AND WITH A TORCH STRAPPED TO THE GUN BARREL ONE HAD TO SHOW CONVINCING ABILITY TO TRACK AND LEAD THE TARGET. ALERTNESS WAS EVERYTHING, FOR SOMETIMES A BRITISH AIRCRAFT WOULD BE SHOWN, AND IF NOT&#13;
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IDENTIFIED HEAVY SARCASM WOULD BE OBSERVED BY THE INSTRUCTOR, HAD NOT THE SERVICE ENOUGH TROUBLES ALREADY?&#13;
THE END OF THE COURSE CAME AND WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE UNFORTUNATE SOUL WE ALL PASSSED [sic]. THERE WE WERE AGAIN, BACK ON THE OLD L.M.S., TRAIN, DESTINED FOR VARIOUS COMMANDS AND GROUPS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. PASSING ALONG THE GRAND SCOTTISH SCENE THROUGH AVIEMORE, PERTH AND CARSTAIRS, AND THEN BY WAYS DEVIOUS I ENDED THE JOURNEY, WITH ONE ACQUAINTANCE FROM DALCROSS, AT 14 C.T.U. [sic] 9 (OPERATIONAL TRAINING UNIT) AT COTTESMORE IN WHAT AT THE TIME WAS THE PLEASANT COUNTY OF RUTLAND.&#13;
HERE FOR THE FIRST TIME WE MET OTHER FLYING TRADESMEN, PILOTS, NAVIGATORS, WIRELESS OPERATORS AND BOMB AIMERS. FIVE TO A CREW FOR THE TIME BEING, AS WE TRAINED ON WELLINGTON TWIN ENGINE AIRCRAFT. IN A SURPRISING BUT SOMEHOW VERY BRITISH WAY, A NOVEL WAY OF FORMING CREWS WAS ADOPTED.&#13;
NOT FOR US A LIST OF WHO WOULD FLY WITH WHOM, WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED, BUT INSTEAD A PERIOD – FROM LONG MEMORY AROUND TWO DAYS – IN WHICH WE MADE OUR OWN SELECTION. ANYONE NOT CREWED UP IN THE TIME ALLOTTED WAS MADE UP WITH OTHERS SIMILARLY PLACED. SO IT WAS DOWN TO THE (GEORGE) AT OAKHAM, AND BY THE TIME WE WERE CHUCKED OUT MOST CREWS WERE ARRANGED. HOW, YOU MIGHT SAY, DID ONE CAREFULLY SELECT SUITABLE SKILLED, ALERT, ETC. COMPATRIOTS WITH WHOM TO GO SWANNING AROUND GERMAN SKIES? DID ONE EARNESTLY ASK A PILOT HOW MANY HAD HE WRITTEN OFF ALREADY, OR SEEK A NAVIGATORS OPINION ON THE TRIANGLE OF VELOCITIES? YOU MUST BE JOKING! AFTER A FEW DRINKS WE WERE ALL EXCELLENT FELLOWS! THIS NAVIGATOR STEADIED HIMSELF ON ME AND SAID HE HAD A PILOT, WAS I FIXED UP? SEEMINGLY REASONABLY RESPECTABLE I WANT ALONG WITH HIM TO SEE THE PILOT, WHO HAD TWO WINGS UP SO WAS CLEARLY RELIABLE, AND HE TOOK ME ON, WE THEN ALL FOUND A WIRELESS MAN APPARENTLY KNEW ALL THE PUBS IN NOTTINGHAM, AND ON---&#13;
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ON THE WAY BACK ASSISTED THIS CANADIAN BOMB AIMER WHO WAS NOT SURE WHICH WAY EAST OR WEST, AND SO SANDERS SAINTS WERE FORMED.&#13;
TOGETHER WE TRAINED AS A TEAM UNTILL [sic] THE END OF SEPTEMBER, FLYING OUT OF SATELLITE AIR FIELDS AT MARKET HARBOROUGH AND HUSBANDS BOSWORTH, TOTALLING AROUND 80 HOURS FLYING TIME. INITIALY [sic] THE PILOT WAS MOST INVOLVED IN FAMILIARISING HIMSELF, UNDER INSTRUCTION, WITH THE LARGER AND HEAVIER AIRCRAFT. ONE HAS SOME FEELING FOR HIM IN THIS, FOR HIS SKILL AND PROGRESS WERE WITHIN SIGHT AND SOUND OF THE REST OF US PASSENGERS DURING SEVERAL HOURS TAKINF [sic] OFF AND LANDING, COLLOQUIALLY KNOWN AS CIRCUITS AND BUMPS. HOWEVER JOHN SANDERS WAS QUITE UP TO ALL THIS, AND BEFORE LONG WE ALL HAD TO JUSTIFY OUR TRAINING DURING CROSS-COUNTRY EXERCISES, PRACTICE BOMBING AND GUNNERY. IN THESE THE PILOT AND NAVIGATOR WERE OF COURSE CONTINUALLY EXTENDING THEIR EXPERIENCE AND EXPERTISE, AS WAS THE WIRELESS OPERATOR, TUCKED UP IN HIS LITTLE NICHE, AND HERE I WOULD INTERPOSE MY FEELINGS TOUCHED UPON EARLIER CONCERNING MY SUMMARY EXIT FROM THE WIRELESS SCHOOL.&#13;
THE VITAL WIRELESS OPERATOR, - RECEIVING INFORMATION ABOUT WIND SPEED AND DIRECTION CHANGES, ALTERATIONS TO BOMBING TECHNIQUES, CHECKING THE INTERCOM, TUNING IN TO ENEMY AIRCRAFT AND THEIR CONTROLLERS WAVELENGTHS SO THEY COULD BE JAMMED VIA A MICROPHONE IN AN ENGINE COMPARTMENT, TRACKING POSSIBLE NIGHT FIGHTERS ON A SMALL VDU, - SAW LITTLE OF ACTUAL WAR. SOME MAY THINK IMAGINATION WOULD HAVE WORKED OVERTIME WONDERING WHAT WAS HAPPENING OUTSIDE, LISTENING AND FEELING BUT NOT KNOWING. THE SIGHTS I SAW FROM MY VANTAGE POINT AT THR [sic] REAR WERE NOT ALWAYS ENTIRELY REASSURING, BUT THAT’S REALITY, AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO NOT KNOWING AT ALL, WAS PREFERABLE.&#13;
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SHORTLY BEFORE LEAVING COTTESMORE AT THE END OF OCTOBER 1943 TWO MORE CREW MEMBERS ARRIVED, THE ENGINEER AND THE MID-UPPER TURRET GUNNER. WHILST THE FORMER COULD BE ACCOMMODATED IN THE DUAL COCKPIT OF THE WELLINGTON, THE NEW GUNNER WAS LESS FORTUNATE AND SPENT A FEW DRAUGHTY COLD SPELLS IN THE FUSELARGE [sic]. ROY MACHIN WAS A LITTLE LESS THAN DELIGHTED WITH LIFE, BUT IT WAS NOT LONG BEFORE WE MOVED AND HE HAD HIS OWN NEST.&#13;
SO IT WAS OFF TO THE LAST STAGE OF TRAINING AT WINTHORPE, NEAR NEWARK. THIS PERIOD OF SIX WEEKS WAS SIMILAR TO THAT AT COTTESMORE, EXCEPT THAT THIS UNIT, 1661 CONVERSION UNIT, FAMILIARISED US WITH THE SAME TYPE OF AIRCRAFT USED IN OPERATIONS, THE HALIFAX AND THE LANCASTER. I BELIEVE OUR 5 GROUP WAS PHASING OUT THE HALIFAX AT THE TIME, ANDWE [sic] ONLY FLEW ABOUT FIVE HOURS IN THEM. FROM THE GUNNERS POINT OF VIEW THE MAIN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO TYPES WAS THE BOULTON AND PAUL (BP) TURRET IN THE HALIFAX AND THAT MADE BY FRAZER-NASH IN THE LANCASTER. BOTH HAD FOUR GUNS FED BY AMMUNITION CONVEYED ON TRACKS FROM BINS NEAR THE CENTRE OF THE FUSELAGE TO AVOID UNWANTED WEIGHT AT THE REAR OF THE AIRCRAFT. THE BP TURRET WAS ELECTRICALLY OPERATED AND CONTROLLED BY A SINGLE JOYSTICK, WHEREAS THAT IN THE LANCASTER WAS HYDRAULICALLY DRIVEN WITH BICYCLE TYPE HANDLEBAR CONTROLS. I PREFERRED THE LATTER, PROBABLY DUE TO FAMILIARITY THOUGH BOTH HAD A SMOOTH AND PRECISE ACTION, EACH ‘303 BROWNING GUN FIRED ABOUT 1200 ROUNDS A MINUTE, AND WERE (HARMONISED) THAT IS FOCUSED FOR MAXIMUM CUMULATIVE EFFECT ON TARGET AT 400 YARDS. HAVING SEEN THE DEVASTATING RESULT OF SIX GUNS ON AN ENEMY AIRCRAFT DURING OUR FIRST OPERATION TO STETTIN WE HAD MUCH CONFIDENCE IN THEM.&#13;
THE PROBLEM WITH NIGHT OPERATIONS WAS, SIMPLY, SEEING THE ATTACKER. THE REAR GUNNER SEARCHED BEHIND AND BELOW, THE OTHER GUNNER BEHIND AND ABOVE, BOTH CONSTANTLY SCANNING THE SIDE AREAS AS WELL. THE MAIN DANGER CAME FROM TWIN ENGIND [sic] ME110’S AND JUNKERS 88’S NEITHER OF WHICH WAS ------&#13;
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PARTICULARY [sic] FAST BUT EASILY SURPASS A LADEN LANCASTER’S CRUISING SPEED OF 170 M.P.H. FURTHERMORE, SOME FIGHTERS WERE FITTED WITH UPWARD FIRING 20 M.M. CANNON, AND WOULD CREEP ALONG BELOW BOMBERS WHICH TENDEDTO [sic] SILHOUETTE AGAINST THE LIGHTER UPPER SKY. THEY WERE VERY DIFFICULT TO SEE, UNLESS THE GROUND WAS SNOW COVERED AND ALL WE COULD DO WAS TO CARRY OUT A BANKING SEARCH – THE PILOT DOING THE HARD WORK TILTING THE AIRCRAFT ENABLING THE AREA BELOW TO BE INSPECTED. THIS WAS, OF COURSE, DIFFICULT WITH A LOADED BOMBER, AND DOUBTLESS MANY GOOD CREWS WERE LOST DUE TO THE SHEER SLOG OF CONTINUAL SEARCHING AND A CONSEQUENT FALLING OFF OF EFFICIENT LOOKOUT.&#13;
THERE IS THOUGHT, HOWEVER THAT AS THE CANNON WERE, I BELIEVE, INCLINED AT 60 DEGREES ABOVE THE HORIZONTAL, IN ANY LIKELY FIRING ATTITUDE THE FIGHTER HAD TO BE BELOW, AND BEHIND, THUS WITHIN THE REAR GUNNERS FIELD OF SEARCH. PROVIDED NATURALLY IT WAS NOT TOO DARK TO SEE ANYTHING AT ALL!&#13;
MANY OF THE RADIAL ENGINED LANCASTER II WERE FITTED WITH AN EXTERNAL GUN POSITION OPERATED REMOTELY FROM WITHIN THE REAR FUSELARGE [sic], PROBABLY WITH A PERISCOPIC SIGHT VISIBILITY AT NIGHT WITH THE NAKED EYE IS OBVIOUSLY LIMITED AND MOST REAR TURRETS EVENTUALLY HAD THE PERSPEX PANEL FRONT OF THE GUNSIGHT REMOVED ENTIRELY. ANY FORM OR [sic] PERISCOPE WAS NO DOUBT FOUND TO HAVE SUCH A POOR FIELD OF VISION TO NOT JUSTIFY THE ADDITIONAL CREW MEMBER AND THE WEIGHT PENALTY INSTALLATION.&#13;
I HAVE INTERJECTED ONE OR TWO MATTERS FOR THE RECORD, AS THIS FORWARD TO THE DIARY FINISHES WITH COMPLETION OF THE COURSE AT WINTHORPE AND OUR POSTING TO 49 SQUADRON AT FISKERTON, A FEW MILES EAST OF LINCOLN, IN DECEMBER 1943.&#13;
A WORD ABOUT THE DEPTH OF TRAINING THE R.A.F. GAVE US. DESPITE THE WAR LOSSES OF PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL – MANY AND MUCH OR [sic] WHICH CAME BY HAZARDOUS SEA PASSAGES – THERE WAS NEVER ANY FEELING OF HASTE IN INSTRUCTING TRAINEES SO THEY COULD BE PASSED ON QUICKLY TO OPERATIONAL DUTIES.&#13;
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THE INSTRUCTING AND TRAINING SOMETIMES WAS UNIMAGINATIVE AND REPETITIVE, BUT IN THE OUTCOME IT WAS OF SUFFICIENT DEPTH FOR ONE TO ACHIEVE SOME SKILLS AND QUICK REACTION TO EVENTS. THIS IS PROBABLY TRUE OF THE OTHER SERVICES, AND SOMETHING FOR WHICH ALL TRAINEES SHOULD BE THANKFULL [sic]. HOWEVER, IT IS AN INEVITABLE FACT THAT IN WARTIME THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF TRAINING IS SUBJECT IN MANY RESPECTS TO LUCK, OR FATE, OR WHAT YOU WILL. THAT IS, BEING IN THE RIGHT PLACE AT THE RIGHT TIME OR BEING IN THE WRONG PLACE AT ANY TIME.&#13;
CONSIDER AIR COLLISIONS, A MATTER MUCH DISCUSSED IN THESE ‘80’S OBVIOUSLY IT CAN NEVER NOW BE KNOWN WHAT PROPORTION OF WARTIME LOSSES WERE DUE TO THIS CAUSE, BUT VISULISE [sic] THE FACTS. IN 1944 UP TO 800 OR SO BOMBERS TAKING OFF IN THE DARKNESS FROM DOZENS OF AIRFIELDS IN THE MIDLANDS AND EASTERN ENGLAND, NAVIGATION LIGHTS EXTINGUISHED BEFORE CROSSING THE COAST, ALL CLIMBING TOWARDS THE FIRST TURNING POINT. AS TIME TO BE OVER THE TARGET IS STAGGERD [sic] THROUGHOUT THE FORCE OVER A PERIOD OF SAY 20 MINUTES, AND THE NAVIGATOR FINDS SOME TIME MUST BE LOST, (DOG-LEGGING) IS RESORTED TO. SIMPLY THIS MEANS THE AIRCRAFT DIVERGES FROM THE COURSE BEING FOLLOWED AND RETURNS WHEN SUFFICIENT TIME HAS BEEN DROPPED.&#13;
THE IMPLICATION OF DELIBERATELY TURNING ACROSS THE PATHS OF MANY UNSEEN OTHERS AND RETURNING A LITTLE LATER STILL CHILLS ME. WHILST STILL OVER THE NORTH SEA IT WAS NOT UNUSUAL TO SEE AN EXPLOSION IN THE SKY, FOLLOWED BY BURNING DEBRIS, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY PREVIOUS AIR TO AIR FIRING IT WAS REASONABLE TO ASSUME A COLLISION HAD OCCURRED. SOMEWHAT WORSE WAS WHEN THE TARGET WAS REACHED AND GROUND MARKERS HAD NOT BEEN DROPPED, OR WERE IN THE WRONG POSITION OR HAD BURNT OUT, AND IT WAS NECESSARY TO CIRCLE WHILST AWAITING FRESH MARKERS. CLEARLY, NOT ALL AIRCRAFT WOULD BE CIRCLING CONCENTRICALLY!&#13;
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THEN UPON RETURN TO ENGLAND THERE WOULD BE A CONVERGING OF THE THRONG, WHICH FOR VARIOUS REASONS WOULD BE FROM MANY DIRECTIONS. ONCE AGAIN WITHOUT NAVIGATION LIGHTS UNTILL CLOSE TO BASE (OR NOT AT ALL IF THE LUFTWAFFE WAS INFILTRATING THE STREAM HOPING TO FIND SOMEONE ASLEEP) WHERE WE CIRCLED HOPEFULLY WELL AWAY FROM ONE ANOTHER BEFORE BEING CALLED TO LAND. THIS WAS IRKSOME AT WOODHALL SPA BECAUSE BEING CLOSE TO CONINGSBY THE RING OF MARKER LIGHTS GUIDING AIRCRAFT AROUND EACH FIELD ACTUALLY INTERSECTED AND TO AVOID COLLISIONS AT THIS POINT WE ALL HAD TO FLY THE DOUBLE CIRCLE THUS CONSIDERABLY EXTENDING THE TIME TAKEN TO LAND. THIS PROCEDURE WAS OF COURSE PARTICULARLY TIRING TO THE PILOT WHO HAD BEEN AT THE CONTROLS CONTINUALLY FOR MANY HOURS.&#13;
THE POINT OF ALL THIS IS TO REITERATE THAT THE HIGHEST DEGREE OF TRAINING CANNOT NECESSARILY OVERCOME CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE ODDS ARE ADVERSELY STACKED. THE MIRACLE IS THAT SO MANY SURVIVED THESE ODDS; THE SADNESS THAT SO MANY CAPABLE CREWS WERE LOST, OFTEN THROUGH CAUSES OTHER THAN ENEMY ACTION. AN EXAMPLE OF THIS IS MENTIONED IN THE NOTES CONCERNING A RAID ON A TARGET NEAR RHEIMS ON THE 31ST OF JULY.&#13;
AS TO THE DIARY, WELL, THIS WAS WRITTEN UP SHORTLY AFTER EACH TRIP, USUALLY IN BED FOLLOWING THE TRADITIONAL SUPPER OR BREAKFAST OF EGG AND BACON. I HAVE NO RECOLLECTION WHY I WROTE IT, IT’S JUST THE SORT OF THING I USED TO DO. THE DIARY WAS MISSING FOR YEARS, BUT I HAD A FEELING IT WOULD RE-APPEAR, AND WHEN IT DID I DECIDED TO PROPERLY LAY IT OUT BEFORE IT WENT AGAIN. DESPITE WINCING AT THE STYLE AND PROSE OF THOSE TIMES I FELT IT RIGHT TO REPRODUCE IT VERBATIN [sic], WARTS AND ALL.&#13;
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[underlined] 6 – 1 – 44 STETTIN [/underlined]&#13;
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FELT MORE INTEREST THAN NERVOUSNESS ON THIS TRIP – QUEER,. NOT TOO COLD AT 22,000 FEET, TARGET WELL ALIGHT. ENGAGED 109 WHICH WAS FINALLY SEEN WITH BROWN SMOKE POURING HEAVILY FROM THE ENGINE, OUR DAMAGE WASA [sic] FEW BULLETS FROM M.U. THROUGH THE FUSELAGE AND ONE THROUGH THE TURRET, SHAKY DO! SIX HOURS BACK – TERRIBLE, SAW SUN RISE OVER THE SEA, TEA NEVER SO WELCOME. SHORT OF FUEL, S.O.S. PREPARED, READY TO DITCH, FINALLY MADE IT AND LANDED AT THE FIRST DROME, LUDFORD MAGNA. PRETTY TIRED, 9 HOURS 50 MINUTES IN THE AIR. DICKENDS [sic] OF A JOB TO KEEP AWAKE, LUCKILY BAGS OF CLOUD, NEVER DID LAND LOOK MORE WELCOME AS THE COAST OF LINCOLNSHIRE.&#13;
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[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] 109 WAS A SINGLE ENGINE MESSERSCHMITT AIRCRAFT, NORMALLY A DAY FIGHTER, BUT OCCASIONALLY SEEN AT NIGHT. WHEN THE ATTACK TOOK PLACE WE HAD JUST ENTERED AN AREA ILLUMINATED BY FLARES DROPPED BY HIGH FLYING GERMAN AIRCRAFT; THE FIGHTER APPROACHED FROM NEARLY DEAD ASTERN, FIRING – BUT MISSING – ALL THE WAY IN. AS I STARTED FIRING I SAW TRACER PASSING OVERHEAD FROM ROY MACHIN IN THE – UPPER TURRET (M.U.) AND ALTHOUGH INTERUPTER [sic] GEAR SHOULD HAVE PREVENTED HIS FIRE FROM DAMAGING OUR AIRCRAFT IN THIS INSTANCE IT DID NOT, FORTUNATELY WITOUT [sic] DISASTROUS RESULTS.&#13;
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[underlined] 14 – 1 – 44 BRUNSWICK [/underlined]&#13;
FAIRLY COLD, -32 CALL LIGHT REPEATEDLEY [sic] FLASHED FOR NO GOOD REASON, HAD TO SMASH BULB HAVING NO WISH TO ADVERTISE OUR POSITION. CLEAR MOST OF THE WAY, 7/10 OVER TARGET, FIRES WERE NOT SO GOOD AS BEFORE, SAW 110 BUT DID NOT ENGAGE, LITTLE FLAK, BAGS OF SEARCHLIGHTS, NO OTHER FIGHTERS SEEN. SCARECROW FLARES SEEN, TWO LOADS JETTISONED NEAR TEXEL,. ENGINEER SHORT OF OXYGEN, DROPPED MY KNIFE WITH LEAFLETS. BACK AT 10-30 BEST LANDING JACK MADE. EGG, SAUSAGE, AND BACON FOR SUPPER, LOVELY;&#13;
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[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] CALL LIGHT WAS A SIGNALLING LIGHT AT ALL CREW STATIONS FOR USE IN CASE OF FAILURE OF THE NORMAL INTERCOM, IN THE GUNNERS POSITION IT COULD BE SEEN FROM OUTSIDE THE AIRCRAFT. 110 WAS A TWIN ENGINE MESSERSCHMITT, MUCH USED AGAINST THE R.A.F. AT NIGHT. SCARECROW FLARES GAVE THE EFFECT OF AN AIRCRAFT EXPLODING PRESUMABLY EMPLOYED AGAINST MORALE. WHEN BOMBS HAD TO BE JETTISONED THE RESULTING LINE OF EXPLOSIONS GAVE AN INDICATION OF ROUTE TO ANY NIGHT FIGHTERS IN THE AREA. BETTER THE BOMBS WERE DROPPED (SAFE) BUT THIS WAS UNDESIRABLE OVER ENEMY OR OCCUPIED TERRITORY AS THEY COULD BE RECOVERD [sic] AND EXAMINED. FUSES WERE OFTEN RE-DESIGNED TO FRUSTRATE, UNEXPLODED BOMBS BEING MADE SAFE BY THE ENEMY. TO BE HONEST, HOWEVER, IN AN EMERGENCY NECESSITATING JETTISONING A HEAVY LOAD IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE (SAFE) OR (LIVE) ASPECT WOULD OFTEN BE CONSIDERED! 7/10 INDICATED PROPORTION CLOUD/SKY.&#13;
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[underlined] 20 – 1 – 44 BERLIN (MY BIRTHDAY) [/underlined]&#13;
NICE TRIP, FELT QUITE GOOD ALL WAY, EXCEPT USUAL SINKING FEELING OVER TARGET; THIS WAS WELL LIT UP, ANOTHER BROCKS BENEFIT, SCARECROWS AND ROCKETS ABOUT, FLAK NOT TROUBLESOME, NO FIGHTERS SEEN. DICKENS OF A JOB TO KEEP EYES OPEN LAST TWO OR THREE HOURS, EVEN STICKING HEAD INTO THE WIND DOESN’T HELP MUCH. MIKE WAS U/S FOR A PERIOD, HEARD SKIPPER SAY WAS I ASLEEP, CHEEK! FIRED TEST BURST OVER TARGET, GUNS O.K. WASN’T VERY COLD. CAME HOME A BIT QUICKER THAN USUAL, HOPE ALL TRIPS ARE AS PEACEFUL.&#13;
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[underlined] Notes [/underlined] (MIKE) WAS MICROPHONE BUILT INTO OXYGEN MASK AND OFTEN FROZE DUE TO BREATH EXHALATION FREEZING. EVENTUALLY SMALL HEATERS WERE FITTED INTO THE MASK, AND THESE CURED THE PROBLEM.&#13;
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[underlined] 21 – 1 – 44 MAGDEBURG [/underlined]&#13;
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HAD LITTLE TROUBLE OURSELVES, NO ENGAGEMENTS, A FEW FIGHTERS SEEN, BAGS OF FIGHTER FLARES AND SOME SCARECROWS. MIKE FROZE AS WE CAME ON TO THE TARGET, LUCKILY THERE WAS NO TROUBLE, IT BECAME U/S 1 HOUR FROM BASE. SPOOF ON BERLIN ABSOLUTELY USELESS, THERE BEING NO FLAK, FLARES OR ANYTHING, RAN INTO COASTAL FLAK ON RETURN, NO DAMAGE. TARGET WELL ALIGHT, LIKE STETTIN, 3/10 CLOUD. DON’T KNOW HOW I KEPT AWAKE AFTER LAST EFFORT, DARNED TIRED NOW.&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] (SPOOF) WAS A DIVERSIONARY RAID, OFTEN CARRIED OUT BY MOSQUITO AIRCRAFT TO SOW DOUBT INTO THE GERMAN DEFENCES AS TO THE REAL TARGET. LIKE MANY THINGS IN WARTIME, SOME WORKED, OTHERS DID NOT.&#13;
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[underlined] 27 – 1 – 44 BERLIN [/underlined]&#13;
VERY QUITE TRIP ON THE WHOLE, WARM TOO, TEMP. ABOUT – MINUS 20, DIFFICULT TO CLIMB – OVER TARGET AT .17,500 FEET. 10/10 CLOUD OVER CITY, NO FIGHTERS SEEN, THO’ OBVIOUSLY ACTIVE, QUITE A NUMBER OF FIGHTER FLARES, SAW ONE LANC. ONLY, NOT MUCH DOING OVER THE TARGET, QUEER. LONG ROUTE BACK, TERRIBLE BIND, ARRIVED AT ENGLISH COAST BANG-ON, DON’T KNOW HOW JOCK DOES IT. JACK WHEELED KITE IN, PERFECT LANDING NO TROUBLE WITH MIKE THESE DAYS.&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] (JOCK) WAS THE NAVIGATOR JAMES BARRON, A CHEERFUL, SCOT WHO GUIDED US THERE AND BACK WITH LITTLE FUSS BUT WITH MUCH EXPERTISE. LIKE MOST BRITISH AIRCRAFT OF THE TIME, THE LANCASTER NORMALLY LANDED ON TWO MAIN WHEELS AND THE TAIL WHEEL, (THREE POINT) LANDING. OCCASIONALLY THE PILOT WOULD TOUCH DOWN ON ONLY THE TWO MAIN WHEELS, HOLDING THE TAIL WHEEL OFF THE RUNWAY UNTILL SPEED REDUCED. THIS WAS MUCH MORE COMFORTABLE FOR THE REAR GUNNER.&#13;
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[underlined] 29 – 1 – 44 BERLIN [/underlined]&#13;
THE BOYS WERE CERTAINLY WAITING FOR US TONIGHT, SAW COMBATS ALL THE WAY IN FROM THE COAST, BAGS OF FIGHTER FLARES, ROUTE LIKE PICCADILLY IN PEACE TIME. FIRED AT ORIGIN OF GREEN TRACER, SAW SOMETHING FALLING. TARGET HORRIBLY WELL LIT UP, HOW WE GET AWAY WITH IT BEATS ME, MARVELLOUS PRANG, FAR BETTER THAN PREVIOUS, SAW GLARE WHILE NEAR ROSTOCK ON THE WAY BACK. BAGS OF CLOUD MOST OF RETURN, - VERY USEFUL. CLOUD AT BASE DOWN TO 800 FEET, DON’T CARE FOR HEDGE HOPPING IN EARLY MORNING. VERY TIRED, BUT WE GO ON LEAVE TOMORROW!&#13;
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[underlined] 15 – 2 – 44 BERLIN [/underlined]&#13;
10/10 CLOUD OVER MOST OF GERMANY, LITTLE TROUBLE EXCEPT AT TARGET, - LOADS OF FIGHTER FLARES AND FAIR AMOUNT OF FLAK BELOW, NO FIGHTERS SEEN. GENERATOR WENT U/S AFTER TARGET, GYRO COMPAS [sic] U/S, HAD TO USE P4. JACK MANAGED WELL. 23,000 FEET ON THE WAY BACK, SUITS NOT VERY USEFUL OWING TO LOW VOLTAGE. R/T U/S AT BASE, HAD TO USE VERY’S TO COME IN. TARGET NOT MUCH TO LOOK AT GENERALLY&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] I DON’T REMEMBER HOW MANY GENERATORS THERE WERE, BUT CLEARLY MORE THAN ONE! THE P4 WAS A STANDBY MAGNETIC COMPASS, QUITE RELIABLE BUT NOT SO EASY FOR THE PILOT TO FOLLOW AS WAS THE GYRO COMPASS REPEATER. (SUITS) REFERS TO ELECTRICALLY WARMED SUITS WORN BY BOTH GUNNERS. THERE WAS NO HEATING IN THE FUSELAGE AFTER THE MAIN SPAR AT THE WIRELESS OPERATORS POSITION, -- AND NOT A LOT FORWARD EITHER. VERY’S ARE SIGNALLING PISTOLS, USED HERE TO SEEK LANDING PERMISSION BY FIRING APPROPRIATETCOLOUR [sic] TO RUNWAY CONTROLLER IN THE CARAVAN, WHO SIMILARLY RESPONDED.&#13;
I NOTE FROM MY LOG BOOK THAT DURING THESE FIRST SEVEN OPERATIONS 261 AIRCRAFT WERE LOST. TOWARDS THE END OF FEBRUARY THIS INFORMATION WAS OMITTED, PRESUMABLY FOR BEING TOO GLOOMY TO INCLUDE.&#13;
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[underlined] 19 – 2 – 44 LEIPZIG [/underlined]&#13;
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ON THE WAY OUT COULD GET NO GUN DEPRESSION, AGREED TO GO ON, FLACK AND SEARCHLIGHTS OVER COAST, SAW A NUMBER OF COMBATS, AND AIR WAS FAIRLY LIVELY ALL THE WAY TO THE TARGET; ARRIVED EARLY AND HAD TO STOOGE AROUND UNTILL THE MARKERS WENT DOWN. NOT A LOT OF OPPOSITION OVER TARGET, WHICH BLAZED UP QUITE WELL. SOON AFTER LEAVING THE TARGET OXYGEN TUBE DISCONNECTED FROM MASK, AND HAD TO COME HOME SUCKING TUBE – NOT VERY COMFORTABLE CLOUD MOST OF THE TRIP, COLD TOO – MINUS 30.&#13;
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[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] ONE OF THOSE TRIPS; DESPITE PRE-FLIGHT AIR TEST, FAULT OCCURRED IN TURRET HYDRAULICS THAT PREVENTED GUNS BEING DEPRESSED BELOW HORIZONTAL. FORTUNATELY WE WERE NOT ATTACKED, - AND 79 AIRCRAFT WERE LOST.&#13;
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[underlined] 20 – 2 – 44 STUTTGART [/underlined]&#13;
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COLD TRIP, ABOUT 20,000 FEET MOST OF THE WAY, WENT OVER READING, FELT QUITE HOMESICK. VERY QUIET TRIP, COUPLE OF FLAK BURSTS OVER FRENCH COAST SHOOK ME A BIT. MIKE FROZE UP SOME TIME BEFORE TARGET, GETTING A REGULAR HABIT. 5/10 OVER TARGET, SAW BITS OF GROUND, GOOD PRANG, NOT MUCH FLAK, FIGHTER FLARES DID NOT ARRIVE UNTIL ABOUT 15 MINUTES AFTER LEAVING. HAD TO LAND AT DUNHOLME OWING TO TAKE-OFF CRASH AT BASE. PRETTY TIRED, BED LOOKED GOOD TO ME&#13;
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[underlined] 24 – 2 – 44 SCHWEINFURT [/underlined]&#13;
ARRIVED AT THE SOUTH COAST IN TIME TO GET MIXED UP IN HUN RAID; CONED BY OWN SEARCHLIGHTS, LUCKILY COLOURS OF THE DAY DOUSED THEM BUT IT WAS PRETTY WARM. OVER THE OTHER SIDE IT WAS VERY QUIET, DIDN’T SEE ONE FIGHTER FLARE OR COMBAT. GOOD VISION, NO CLOUD, BOMBS WELL CONCENTRATED ON TARGET, BAGS OF SMOKE -----&#13;
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--- AND FIRES AS WE LEFT, AIRCRAFT CLIMBED WELL 23,000 FEET WAY BACK; FOR ONCE MIKE DIDN’T FREEZE, BUT ICE FORMED ON MASK OVER FRANCE.&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] COLOURS OF THE DAY WERE FIRED FROM A VERY PISTOL FOR IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES, RED/WHITE GREEN/RED ETC. COLOURS WERE CHANGED AT REGULAR INTERVALS, SOMETIMES EVERY 12 HOURS, LEST THE ENEMY USED THEM TO PROTECT THEMSELVES AGAINST OUR DEFENCES.&#13;
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[underlined] 25 – 2 – 44 AUGSBURG [/underlined]&#13;
7 HOURS SLEEP, AND NO SQUARE MEAL BEFORE TAKE-OFF, BAD SHOW ARRIVED FRENCH COAST IN SOME LIGHT, PROMPTLY GOT SHOT-UP BY FIGHTER, FEW HITS ON PORT WING AND COCKPIT. LOTS OF ACTIVITY OVER FRANCE, SAW SEVERAL KITES GO DOWN. 30 MILES FROM TARGET LANCASTER BELOW SQUIRTED AT US, DAMAGED AIRCRAFT BEHIND DOOR SEVERELY, ON FIRE, ROY AND I PUT IT OUT, REAR TURRET U/S, NO OXYGEN, HAD TO GO FORWARD. BOMBS JETTISONED, STARBOARD ELEVATOR FABRIC STRIPPED, BALANCE TAB PRACTICALLY SHOT OFF, INTERCOM U/S, KITE DIFFICULT TO HANDLE, SKIPPER DID WIZARD JOB GETTING US HOME AND LANDING – SHAKY NIGHT.&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] (SQUIRTED) – FIRED AT US FROM REAR TURRET. U/S – UNSERVICEABLE. THE FOLLOWING WAS ADDED TO MY DIARY ENTRY, UPON SUBSEQUENT EXAMINATION IT WAS FOUND THAT THE AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN HIT BY CANNON SHELLS SO IT SEEMS WE WERE HIT BY STRAY SHELLS AT THE IDENTICAL MOMENT THE LANCASTER FIRED. ALTERNATIVELY THE LUFTWAFFE WAS USING A CAPTURED LANCASTER WITH CANNON IN THE TURRET. THE 5 GROUP INVESTIGATOR THOUGHT IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY. WONDER IF WE’LL EVER KNOW? I STILL HAVE NO DOUBT AS TO WHAT I SAW THAT NIGHT. THE LANCASTER BELOW US WAS QUITE VISIBLE AT INTERVALS WHEN WE PASSED OVER PARTLY SNOW COVERD [sic] LAND, I HAD NOTICED IT EACH TIME THE TURRET WAS ROTATED IN THAT DIRECTION, AND NO ONE WAS MORE SURPRISED THAN I WHEN THE STREAM OF TRACER CAME TOWARDS US – AND WE WERE ON FIRE. THE DIRECTION OF THE SUSTAINED DAMAGE AND THE EXPLOSIVE EVIDENCE SUGGEST&#13;
S THAT POSSIBLY -------&#13;
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------- AND AT THE SAME TIME WE WERE STRUCK BY CANNON SHELLS FROM A NIGHT FIGHTER BELOW AND TO THE OTHER SIDE. IT SOUNDS A BIT THIN, BUT THE CASE WILL HAVE TO REST.&#13;
PILOT JOHN SANDERS WAS AWARDED A IMEADIATE [sic] D.F.C. THE WIRELESS OPERATOR ARTHUR WARD AND THE TWO GUNNERS ROY MACHIN AND RALPH BRIARS WERE AWARDED IMEADIATE D.F.M.&#13;
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[underlined] 10 – 3 – 44 OSSUN [/underlined]&#13;
FIRST TRIP IN BRIGHT MOONLIGHT, FELT VERY OBVIOUS IN THE SKY, VISION ABOUT 3 MILES. EXPECTED BAGS OF FIGHTERS, BUT NONE SEEN, DIDN’T GET IT; OVER FRANCE AT 15,000 FEET TEMPERATURE MINUS 14, LOVELY, TARGET AT 8,000 FEET. CLEAR OVER OSSUN, HAD TO IDENTIFY TARGET FOR A CHANGE, WERE STOOGING AROUND FOR ABOUT 20 MINUTES BUT DIDN’T FEEL UNDULY WORRIED, - IT WAS TOO PEACEFUL. AL FINALLY SAW THE TARGET AND WE BOMBED, WE HAD D A’S SO DID NOT SEE RESULT, BUT SAW AND HEARD OTHER BOMBS GO OFF. SAW PYRENEES, LOKED [sic] GRAND BUT RATHER FORBIDDING. RATHER TIRED ON RETURN.&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] AL WAS OUR CANADIAN BOMB-AIMER, D A’S WERE DELAYED ACTION BOMBS, JUST TO CONFUSE OUR FRENCH ALLIES, WHO NO DOUB-T [sic] HAQD TO DEFUSE THEM.&#13;
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[underlined] 15 – 3 – 44 STUTTGART [/underlined]&#13;
BAGS OF OPPOSITION ON THE WAY IN, SAW SEVERAL COMBATS – AND SEVERAL GO DOWN, NOT SO GOOD, MAKES ONE WONDER WHO’S NEXT. FLAK HEAVY OVER TARGET, NO FIGHTER FLARES, SAW ONE COLLISION. BIT IF [sic] A MIX UP, PFF LATE, FEW T I’S UNTILL WE LEFT, APEARED [sic] TO BE QUITE A GOOD BLAZE ON TARGET LATER. VERY QUIET RETURN, SAW NOTHING; CLOUDS UP TO 20,000 FEET IN PLACES, CON TRAILS APPEARD [sic] NEAR FRENCH COAST, MOON BRIGHT, EXPECTED TROUBLE, NONE CAME.&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] PFF WAS PATH FINDER FORCE WHO IDENTIFIED THE TARGET AND DROPPED TARGET IDENTIFIERS – COLOURED GROUND MARKERS WHICH THE MAIN FORCE FOLLOWING BEHIND SIGHTED UPON -----&#13;
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----- AND THESE WERE BACKED UP AS NECESSARY AS THR [sic] RAID PROGRESSED SO POOR OLD PFF HAD TO CIRCLE AROUND UNTIL EVERYONE HAD DONE THEIR BIT, NOT AN ENVIABLE JOB; CON. TRAILS THEN, AS NOW, OCCUR WHEN AIR CONDITIONS ARE SUCH THAT WATER VAPOUR IN EACH ENGINE’S EXHAUST BREEZES [sic] AND TRAILS ALONG WHITE PLUME, JUST RIGHT FOR A NIGHT FIGHTER TO FOLLOW. CHANGING HEIGHT DOWNWARDS WAS THE CURE AND THE PILOT PROMPTLY DID SO ON HEARING THE WAILS FROM THE GUNNERS.&#13;
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[underlined] 30 – 3 – 44 NUREMBURG [/underlined]&#13;
VERY COLD TRIP, OPPOSITION HEAVY SOUTH OF RHUR, FULL MOON NO CLOUD TO KEEP FIGHTERS DOWN. USUAL TROUBLE, ROUTE TOO LONG, JERRY MARKING TRACK ON BOTH SIDES WITH COLOURED FLARES, 96 AIRCRAFT LOST A.M. WILL HAVE TO REVISE ROUTING METHODS. SAW AT LEAST A DOZEN KITES SHOT DOWN, BAD FOR MORALE IF NOTHING ELSE, SEVERAL ROCKETS OBSERVED. TARGET LOOKED POOR, THICK FLAK AT 17,000 TO 19,000 FEET. WAY BACK AGONY TO SIT TWO HOURS AND KEEP AWAKE. PERHAPS DAYLIGHTER WOULDN’T BE SUCH A STRAIN. TIRED AS HELL, BED;&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] THE LOSSES ON THIS RAID WERE THE WORST SUSTAINED DURING ONE OPERATION. AIR CHIEF MARSHALL HARRIS LATER SAID THAT AGAINST AN EXPERIENCED, WILY ENEMY, WHO WAS FAMILIAR WITH MOST OF OUR AIR WAR STRATAGEMS BY 1944, THINGS WERE INEVITABLE OCCASIONALLY DISASTROUS. SEEMINGLY THE LONG STRAIGHT ROUTE LEGS WERE, HOPEFULLY, A RUSE TO SUGGEST TO THE LUFTWAFFE THAT WE WERE GOING TO NUREMBURG, WHERE UPON THEY WOULD, BY EXPERIENCE, SUSPECT WE WOULD SUDDENLY DIVERT ELSEWHERE AND DISPOSE THEIR FORCES ACCORDINGLY, THIS TIME THEY WERE NOT DECEIVED. TRULY ONE CANNOT WIN’EM ALL, PARTICULARLY IN WARTIME. REFERENCE TO (DAYLIGHTS) REFERRED TO DAY OPERATIONS, OF WHICH AT THAT TIME, WE HAD NO EXPERIENCE. WHEN, LATER, WE FLEW MANY SUCH RAIDS, I ADDED A FOOTNOTE TO THIS DIARY ENTRY – AFTER 22 DAYLIGHT TRIPS I FOUND THIS TRUE – WELL, THERE’S NO ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES.&#13;
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FOLLOWING THR NUREMBURG TRIP WE WERE POSTED, QUITE SUDDENLY AND FOR WHATEVER REASON, TO 617 SQUADRON AT WOODHALL SPA, NORTH OF BOSTON LINCOLNSHIRE. THE MUCH PUBLICISED RAIDS ON THE GERMAN DAMS AT MOHNE, SORPE AND EDER WERE CARRIED OUT BY THIS SPECIALLY FORMED SQUADRON, WHICH WAS SUBSEQUENTLY, THOUGH NOT ENTIRELY RETAINED FOR SPECIALISED OPERATIONS. LEONARD CHESHIRE WAS THE WING COMMANDER WHEN WE ARRIVED AND HE WAS REPLACED BY WILLY TAIT IN JULY, I THINK BOTH WERE OF SIMILAR MOULD AND MUCH RESPECTED.&#13;
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[underlined] 18 – 4 – 44 JUVISY RAILWAY YARDS – PARIS [/underlined]&#13;
DARK NIGHT, 10,000 FEET ALL THE WAY, TEMPERATURE MINUS 5,. DROPPED FLARES TO HELP MOSQUITOES IDENTIFY MARSHALLING YARD, THEN CIRCLED AND BOMBED THEIR MARKER, SAW ONE MOSQUITO CIRCLING AT 2-3000 FEET APPARENTLY UNCONCERNED AT WHAT LITTLE FLAK THERE WAS, IMAGINED BOMBS SHOOK IT RATHER. NO FIGHTERS, FLAK SHIP IN THE CHANNEL FIRED AT US, WISH WE HAD BEEN LOW ENOUGH TO DO THE SAME. CIRCLED BASE FOR 50-55 MINUTES BEFORE COMING IN, - SHADES OF FISKERTON.&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] MOSQUITOES WERE TWIN ENGINE AIRCRAFT, LARGELY BUILT OF PLYWOOD AND GLUED TOGETHER. FAST AND HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL IN VARIOUS ROLES – NIGHT FIGHTERS, BOMBERS THAT COULD DROP 4000 POUNDS ON BERLIN, RECONNAISSANCE AND CLANDESTINE MISSIONS INCLUDING CONVEYING DIPLOMATS AND OTHERS IN THE (VERY COLD) BOMB BAY BETWEEN BRITAIN AND SWEDEN. BOTH CHESHIRE AND TAIT USED THESE FOR TARGET MARKING, LATER CHANGING TO ANOTHER EXCELLENT DESIGN, THE ROLLS-ROYCE ENGINE MUSTANG FIGHTER. PHOTOGRAPHS SHOWED AN UNUSUALLY CONCENTRATED BOMBING PATTERN, AT THE TIME WE DID NOT FULLY APPRECIATE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS RAIL DISRUPTION SIX WEEKS OR SO BEFORE THE JUNE INVASION OF FRANCE. REFERENCE TO FISKERTON IS DUE TO THE GOOD OLD HABIT OF BELIEVING THE LAST WAS BETTER THAN THE NEW; ------&#13;
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------ INITIALLY I THINK WE FELT PROCEDURE AT WOODHALL WAS NOT TO THE STANDARD OF FISKERTON, IN OTHER WORDS WE WERE KEPT WAITING FOR OUR SUPPER; THIS SOMETIMES WAS DUE TO HAVING TO FLY AROUND TWO OUTER MARKER CIRCLES OF LIGHTS WHEN NEARBY CONNINGSBY WAS ALSO RECEIVING AIRCRAFT, AS MENTIOND [sic] IN THE FORWARD. TO BE FAIR, THOSE IN THE CONTROL TOWER WERE NO DOUBT JUST AS ANXIOUS TO GET US DOWN QUICKLY AS WE WERE; ONE’S FIRST DUTY WAS TO THE KING, THE SECOND TO GRUMBLE ABOUT THE METHOD OF SO DOING ..&#13;
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[underlined] 20 – 4 – 44 PARIS – LA CHAPPELLE [/underlined]&#13;
INTRUDERS OVER AS WE TOOK OFF, STARTS STRAIN AT ONCE, STILL THERE WAS NO APPARENT TROUBLE. QUIET ALL IN AND OUT, BOMBED AT 11,500 FEET, TARGET, BEING NEARER THE CENTRE OF THE CITY, HAD QUITE A BIT OF MEDIUM AND LIGHT FLAK. LONG STRINGS OF RED AND GREEN CAME ALL ROUND, BURSTING ABOUT 1000 FEET BELOW, WITH BRIGHT SPARKLING FLASHES – PRETTY; AL WELL AND TRULY HIT THE YARDS WITH OUR BOMBS, CARRIED 12 X 1000 LBS BOMBS, NICE LOAD. SAW MOSQUITO RUN INTO AREA – AND SHOOT HELL OUT OF THEM. TEMPERATURE MINUS 5.&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] (INTRUDERS) WERE NIGHT FIGHTERS PROWLING AROUND FOR SOMEONE LEAVING THEIR NAVIGATION LIGHTS ON TOO LONG AFTER TAKE-OFF MIND YOU, A TRICKY DECISION. LEAVE THEM ON FOR FRIENDS TO SEE – AND THE LUFTWAFFE, TURN THEM OFF AND RISK A COLLISION.&#13;
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[underlined] 22 – 4 – 44 BRUNSWICK [/underlined]&#13;
LITTLE FIGHTER OPPOSITION IN OR OUT, CONDITIONS HAZY OVER TARGET ABOVE 18,000 FEET, SO WE DIVED THROUGH TO ABOUT 16,000 FEET TO BOMB, PFF A FEW MINUTES LATE SO IT WAS A NIGHT-MARE OF KITES COMING IN ALL DIRECTIONS. HEARD FLAK BURSTING FOR THE FIRST TIME, TARGET WAS WELL ON FIRE. LONG TRIP BACK, TO AVOID ANOTHER LANCASTER JACK DIVED SO SUDDENLY AND STEEPLY MY NEW THERMOS WAS BROKEN, MY KNEE BRUISED AND ALL THE AMMUNITION WAS THROWN OUT OF THE TANKS. -----&#13;
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----- INTRUDERS ALL THE WAY HOME, DARNED NUISANCE BUT WE HAD NO TROUBLE, TEMPERATURE MINUS 15 TO MINUS 20&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] AS MENTIONED IN THE FOREWARD, CIRCLING THE TARGET WHILST AWAITING MARKERS TO BE DROPPED BY THE PATHFINDERS WAS NOT THE MOST DESIRABLE OCCUPATION. LOOK AT THE MOANS AND GROANS, TOO, DON’T YOU KNOW THERE’S A WAR ON.&#13;
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[underlined] 24 – 4 – 44 MILAN (ABORTED) [/underlined]&#13;
OUR FIRST BOOMERANG; (EARLY RETURN TO BASE) SHORTLY AFTER TAKE-OFF AN OIL PIPE IN THE TURRET BURST AND IN A FEW MINUTES THERE WAS NO OIL IN THE SYSTEM, - MOST OF IT WAS ON ME. AFTER A BIT OF NATTERY WE DECIDED TO RETURN, REMEMBERING THE LEIPZIG TRIP, AND IN VIEW OF A LONG JOURNEY – MILAN. PITY, BUT IT WAS THE BEST THING, BESIDES, WE GO ON LEAVE TOMORROW.&#13;
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[underlined] 6 – 6 – 44 2ND FRONT (D-DAY) [/underlined]&#13;
AFTER NEARLY SIX WEEKS OF VERY BORING TRAINING AND INACTION WE DID OUR STUFF – SLINGING OUT WINDOW TO SIMULATE A CONVOY AND TO CONFUSE POOR JERRY; BY THE LACK OF OPPOSITION DURING TROOP LANDINGS IT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A USEFUL TRIP. TOOK TWO CREWS IN ONE KITE, ROY AND I TOOK TURNS AS FRONT GUNNER, QUITE A CHANGE. SAW SOME OF THE SHIPPING IN THE CHANNEL – GRAND SIGHT – ALSO THE LUFTWAFFE APPARENTLY ATTACKING A CONVOY, ONE SHIP CAUGHT FIRE AND BLEW UP. LOTS OF TUGS AND GLIDERS SEEN GOING OVER. QUIET TRIP.&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] (WINDOW) WAS METALLIC COATED STRIP DROPPED TO CONFUSE ENEMY RADAR. WE FLEW OVAL COURSES, EACH CIRCUIT BEING PROGRESSIVELY NEARER FRANCE. THE INTERVALS OF DROPPING THE FOIL MATCHED THE SPEED OF AN IMAGINARY CONVOY IN THE CHANNEL APPROACHING THE COAST MILES TO THE EAST OF THE ACTUAL LANDING AREA IN NORMANDY -------&#13;
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------ I AM NOT NOW SURE, BUT POSSIBLY ANOTHER SQUADRON WAS WITH US. TWO CREWS BECAUSE OF THE QUANTITY OF WINDOW TO BE DROPPED. AGAIN, MANY AIRCRAFT ORBITING UNSEEN TO EACH OTHER OVER A FOUR HOUR PERIOD IN QUITE A NARROW SPACE. I DOUBT THE BLOOMIN’ INFANTRY BELOW CONCIDERED [sic] THERE WAS A LACK OF OPPOSITION! WE CAN ONLY HOPE OUR EFFORTS SOMWHAT [sic] REDUCED THE PRESSURE.&#13;
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[underlined] 8 – 6 – 44 SAUMER (FRANCE) [/underlined]&#13;
FLEW THROUGH CLOUD MOST OF THE WAY THERE AND BACK, WEATHER CLEAR OVER TARGET. USUAL SCHEME, H2S KITES DROPPED FLARES AND MOSQUITOES MARKED WITH RED SPOT FIRES. SQUADRON CARRIED 12,000 POUNDER BOMBS, - LOOK LIKE TORPEDOES – AND WE TOOK 1,000 POUNDERS TO ATTACK NEARBY BRIDGE, WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE FAIRLY UNSUCESSFUL [sic]. BIG BOMBS MADE COLOSSAL FLASH AND WE SAW EARTH FLUNG TO HELL OF A HEIGHT, THIS WAS SUCESSFUL! FLAK FROM ONE GUN BURST AT OUR HEIGHT BUT ONLY IN ONE AREA, SO WE CIRCLED ROUND IT – NO FIGHTERS ARRIVED, - NO TROUBLE, DIVERTED TO METHERINGHAM AIRFIELD TO LAND BECAUSE OF LOW CLOUD.&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] SAUMER WAS ON THE MAIN RAIL LINK TO NORTHERN FRANCE AND THE OPERATION WAS TO PREVENT PANZER DIVISIONS ARRIVING AT THE DEVELOPING BRIDGEHEAD AT NORMANDY. THERE ARE PICTURES SHOWING HOW COMPLETELY THE TUNNEL WAS BLOCKED. H2S WAS AN EARY [sic] FORM OF RADAR THAT GAVE THE NAVIGATOR A RATHER POOR PICTURE ON HIS VDU OF THE GROUND BELOW. RIVERS AND ESTUARIES SHOWED UP QUITE WELL, OTHER FEATURES WERE NOT EASILY DISTINGUISHABLE. THE EXTERNAL SCANNER WAS CONTAINED IN A PROMINENT HALF-EGG SHAPE HOUSING BELOW THE AIRCRAFT. THIS TRIP WAS THE FIRST TIME WE HAD COME ACROSS THE 12,000 LB. BOMB, CODE NAME (TALLBOY) AND WE SUBSEQUENTLY DROPPED MANY ON SPECIALIST TARGETS. THEIR TAIL FINS WERE OFFSET, AND WHEN DROPPED FROM NEARBY AIRCRAFT ONE COULD OBSERVE THEM STARTING TO SPIN AS THEY RAPIDLY FELL OUT OF SIGHT. MY LOG BOOK REVEALS THAT WITH CAPTAIN SANDERS I WENT TO METHERINGHAM BY ROAD TO FLY OUR LANCASTER BACK TO WOODHALL. AS FLIGHT ENGNEER [sic] (TEMPORARY UNPAID) I THINK I WAS PERMITTED TO RAISE THE UNDER-CARRIAGE (MY FINEST HOUR.)&#13;
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[underlined] 14 – 6 – 44 LE HAVRE [/underlined]&#13;
FIRST DAYLIGHT RAID – OVER THE TARGET ABOUT 10-30 P.M. FLEW IN FORMATION GOING, SOME SIGHT, WENT AS FRONT GUNNER AS WE STILL HAVE NO KITE OF OUR OWN. SECOND TO BOMB – WITH TALLBOY – TARGET QUIET UNTILL A FEW MINUTES BEFORE DROPPING THE BOMB, THEN THEY LET LOOSE BAGS OF LIGHT AND MEDIUM FLAK, PREDICTED, TOO AS BOMB LEFT FLAK HIT STARBOARD INNER ENGINE AND TOP TURRET, GUNNER OK, ENGINE HAD TO BE FEATHERED. E BOAT PENS, 25 FEET THICK, WERE HIT, GOOD BOMBING. SAW PART OF SPITFIRE ESCORT, NO ENEMY FIGHTERS SEEN, INTERESTING TRIP.&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] THE LANCASTER WE FLEW FROM FISKERTON WHEN POSTED TO 617 SQUADRON IN APRIL 1944 REMAINED A 49 SQUADRON AIRCRAFT, ALTHOUGH WE USED IT ON SEVERAL OPERATIONS PENDING IT’S RETURN TO THAT SQUADRON. EVENTUALLY WE WERE ALLOCATED A 617 AIRCRAFT THAT HAD BEEN REPAIRED AFTER A SPOT OF BOTHER LATE IN 1943. OMINOUSLY NUMBERED ME562, IT NEVERTHELESS SERVED US WELL OVER NINE MONTHS FOR NINETEEN OR SO OPERATIONS, SURVIVED THE WAR AND WAS SOLD OUT OF SERVICE IN JANUARY 1947. BY CONTRAST, OF THE TWELVE OTHER OPERATIONAL LANCASTERS WE HAD FLOWN IN – EITHER ON RAIDS OR PRACTICE BOMBING OR OTHER EXERCISES – ONLY TWO SURVIVED, ONE BEING THE FIRST WE HAD FLOWN IN ON A CROSS-COUNTRY EXERCISE ON ARRIVAL AT FISKERTON.&#13;
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[underlined] 15 – 6 – 44 BOULOGNE [/underlined]&#13;
FOUND PORT OUTER ENGINE MOUNTING HAD ALSO BEEN HIT AFTER LAST NIGHT, SO IT HAD TO BE CHANGED, THIS MADE US FORTY MINUTES LATE TAKING OFF BUT WE GOT OVER THE TARGET SHORTLY BEFORE REST OF KITES LEFT, VISIBILITY WAS VERY BAD WITH LOW CLOUD AND WE WERE TOLD TO RETURN TO BASE. BOB KNIGHTS, BEING A KEEN TYPE AND IN VIEW OF THE WORK THE GROUND CREW HAD DONE DECIDED TO BOMB. BAGS OF LIGHT AND MEDIUM FLAK, HOT FOR A FEW MINUTES, REAR TURRET AND OIL TANK HIT, NO ONE INJURED. TARGET LOOKED QUITE A MESS WHEN WE LEFT, SAW LITTLE FIGHTER COVER. TARGET HEIGHT 7,500 FEET. ------&#13;
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------ [underlined] NOTES [/underlined] HERE AGAIN, I FLEW WITH THE SAME PILOT AS THE DAY BEFORE. WHAT NOW PUZZLES ME IS WHY I FLEW FIVE SUCCESSIVE TRIPS WITH BOB KNIGHTS, AS FRONT GUNNER. WHAT WAS THE THEN P.O. SANDERS DOING ALL THIS TIME? I HAVE A FEELING HE WAS AWAY HAVING A BABY, FOR I HAVE A FAINT RECOLLECTION OF A CONSTANT AIR OF CRISIS CONCERNING THE EVENT. THERE WERE EVEN STRONG RUMOURS THAT A LANCASTER HAD BEEN BORROWED TO FURTHER THE ABOUT-TO-BE-FARTHER’S [sic] CAUSE.&#13;
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[underlined] 19 – 6 – 44 WATTEN (PAS DE CALAIS) [/underlined]&#13;
TOOK OFF ABOUT 6 PM IN TRUE FIGHTER STYLE, ONE EACH SIDE OF THE RUNWAY, FLEW OVER IN FORMATION OF FIVE, WEATHER PERFECT. FIGHTER COVER OF SPITFIRES., MET US AT ORFORDNESS. TARGET 10-12 MILES INLAND, SAW RESULTS OF THE MARAUDERS WORK IN LOTS OF PLACES, A LITTLE FLAK OUTSIDE TARGET AREA DIDN’T TROUBLE US. CIRCLING FOR ABOUT 20 MINUTES BEFORE WING COMMANDER GAVE THE OK TO BOMB, TARGET DIFFICULT IT WAS IN A CLEARING ON THE EDGE OF A WOOD. BOMBING FAIR, BOMBAIMER’S [sic] A BIT DISAPPOINTED WITH RESULTS, WATCHED THE REST OF THE AIRCRAFT COMING IN TO BOMB AND THEN CAME HOME. BELIEVE BANDITS TURNED UP AS MOSQUITOES LEFT – GOOD SHOW, FLEW AT 17,000 FEET.&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] THE OPERATION WAS AGAINST FLYING BOMB SITES AS WERE MANY OTHERS THIS MONTH AND AGAIN IN JULY. (MARAUDERS) WERE TWIN ENGINE AMERICAN BOMBERS MUCH USED BY THE TACTICAL AIR FORCES.&#13;
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[underlined] 4 – 7 – 44 ST-LEU-D’ – ESSERENT (PARIS) [/underlined]&#13;
FULL MOON – EXPECTED – AND HAD A RECEPTION AS AT NUREMBURG, SEARCHLIGHT BELT JUST INSIDE COAST ANNOYING BUT NO FLAK. COMBATS SEEN ALL THE WAY IN AND OUT, AT TARGET WE TURNED AND HAD THE MOON BEHIND, HARDLY HELPFUL; FIGHTERS CAME IN FROM ALL DIRECTIONS, NEVER SEEN SO MUCH TRACER, GOT VERY MAD AND SCARED; ------&#13;
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------ JU88 AT LAST CAME NEAR ENOUGH TO GIVE IT TWO LONG SQUIRTS OF GUN FIRE AND IT APPEARED TO GO INTO ONE BIG BALL OF FIRE, LOST SIGHT OF IT BUT SKIPPER RECKONS IT BROKE IN HALF AND HIT THE DECK. UNABLE TO BOMB BECAUSE MARKERS INDEFINITE, PITY. FIGHTERS FOLLOWED ALL THE WAY TO OUR COAST, COULDN’T HAVE ANY COFFEE TILL WE GOT TO READING.&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] TARGET HERE WAS A V.1 STORAGE DEPOT ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF PARIS. V1’S WERE PILOTLESS FLYING BOMBS V2’S WERE THE LATER GUIDED ROCKETS. THE LAUNCH SITES OF BOTH WERE THE FOCUS OF MUCH BOMBING EFFORT, AND WERE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO LOCATE.&#13;
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[underlined] 17 – 7 – 44 WIZERNES (FRANCE) [/underlined]&#13;
TOOK OFF 11 A.M FLEW IN LOOSE BUNCH TILL REACHING TARGET, CLOSED UP A LITTLE THERE. WEATHER GRAND, ABOUT 1/10 CLOUD COVER OVER FRANCE, TARGET VISABLE [sic]. TARGET AREA HEAVILY BOMBED. SPITFIRE ESCORT, SAW NO HUN FIGHTERS, NO FLAK AT ALL, GENERALLY ALL WAS REMARKABLY QUIET. BOMBING SEEMED GOOD – ALTOGETHER VERY NICE AND QUIET TRIP. HAD TWO EGGS FOR DINNER, WONDER WHAT THE CATCH IS.&#13;
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[underlined] 25 – 7 – 44 WATTEN [/underlined]&#13;
TOOK OFF ABOUT 07-00 FAIRLY CLEAR, COOL. SKY CLEARED NICELY OVER THE CHANNEL, TARGET EASILY SEEN. WATCHED KITES BEHIND AS WE RAN IN, SO INTERESTED THAT I FORGOT ABOUT DEFENCES, AND THEY LET GO SOME VERY ACCURATE FLAK JUST BEFORE BOMB WENT DOWN. DESPITE ALL THIS BOMBS WERE WELL DROPPED, GRAND SHOW ON BOMBAIMERS [sic] PART. WEAVED LIKE HELL FOR A FEW MINUTES TILL CLEAR OF AREA, NEVER FELT OR HEARD FLAK SO NEAR – SLUNG OUT SOME WINDOW MYSELF, STARBOARD TAILPLANE SLIGHTLY DAMAGED. SAW ONE KITE HIT IN ENGINE, SMOKE POURED OUT, ENGINE WAS FEATHERD [sic] AND THEY GOT BACK HOME.&#13;
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[underlined] 31 – 7 – 44 RILLY-LA-MONTAGE (NEAR RHEIMS) [/underlined]&#13;
WENT WITH ABOUT 200 MAIN FORCE KITES, - MADE A SIGHT WORTH SEEING. TARGET 120-150 MILES INLAND, JUST SOUTH OF RHEIMS, ANTICIPATED SOME JERRY ACTIVITY BUT NONE APART FROM HEAVY FLAK IN TARGET AREA. TARGET IN WOOD, DEPOT FOR FLYING BOMBS, RESULTS APPEARED GOOD, DIFFICULT TO ASSESS DUE TO SMOKE. JUST MANAGED TO WEAVE OUT OF THE WAY OF A STICK OF BOMBS FROM KITE ABOVE. BILL REID V.C. WAS HIT THE SAME WAY AND WAS LOST – SEE NOTES. WEATHER QUITE CLEAR. SPITFIRE ESCORT. ONE PIECE OF FLAK IN AIRCRAFT NOSE, AL (BOMB AIMER) DIDN’T KNOW TILL WE LANDED.&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] BILL REID’S AIRCRAFT WAS TO ONE SIDE AND BELOW US AND WAS HIT BEHIND THE TOP TURRET BY A BOMB THAT DID NOT EXPLODE BUT SO DAMAGED THE FUSELAGE THAT IT MOMENTARILY SAGGED, THEN BROKE IN TWO AND SPUN AWAY. MIRACULOUSLY, BILL AND ONE OF HIS CREW SURVIVED. DURING THE LUNCH FOLLOWING THE SQUADRON MEMORIAL DEDICATION IN 1987, BILL TOLD US OF HIS FEELINGS AS HE FELL FROM THE STRICKEN LANCASTER, KNOWING HE HAD WON A FEW POUNDS GAMBLING, (THERE GOES THAT B----- REID) THEY WOULD BE SAYING (TAKING OUR MONEY WITH HIM) A LOVELY CHAP.&#13;
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[underlined] 5 – 8 – 44 BREST [/underlined]&#13;
TOOK OFF 09-45, CLIMBED ON TRACK FOR A CHANGE. WEATHER PERFECT, COUNTRYSIDE LOOKED GRAND, ESPECIALLY IN THE SOUTH WEST. SPITFIRE’S MET US OFF SIDMOUTH. TARGET U-BOAT PENS, DIDN’T FEEL SO HAPPY KNOWING BREST’S REPUTATION FOR FLAK, OVER 80 HEAVY GUNS TO BE SHARED AMONGST SIXTEEN KITES. AS WE RAN IN FLAK BANGED VERY CLOSE, BUT CLEARED FOR BOMBING RUN. GOOD RESULTS, FIVE PENS HIT, REST VERY CLOSE. SAW ONE PARACHUTE FROM KITE THAT WAS LOST, QUEER THING, IT APPEARED TO BE UNDER CONTROL BUT MADE NO EFFORT TO COME HOME. WE HAD FLAK THROUGH THE NOSE AND ONE ENGINE COVER.&#13;
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[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] THE AIRCRAFT LOST AT BREST WAS PROBABLY F/LT CHENEY’S, AND BRINCKHILL’S BOOK (THE DAM BUSTERS) HAS A VIVID DESCRIPTION OF WHAT HAPPENED TO IT AFTER RECEIVING DIRECT FLAK SHELLS. THE PILOT AND TWO OTHERS WERE PICKED UP BY A FRENCH FISHING BOAT AND LATER RETURNED TO THE SQUADRON, THE REST WERE NEVER FOUND.&#13;
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[underlined] 6 – 8 – 44 LORIENT [/underlined]&#13;
TOOK OFF ABOUT 18-00, WEATHER AND FLIGHT PLAN AS BEFORE, PROBABLY; SAW AN AIRFIELD BEING SHELLED NEAR TARGET. FLAK STARTED EARLY BUT AT 16,000 FEET WE SEEMED TO BE IN A FREE BELT, AS ABOVE AND BELOW IT WAS VERY THICK. BOMBING RUN GOOD, ALTOGETHER IT DIDN’T APPEAR TO BE SUCH A GOOD EFFORT AS YESTERDAYS, BUT DIFFICULT TO TELL REALLY. HEAVY FLAK FOR A FEW MINUTES OUT OF THE AREA, HIT IN TAILPLANE AND SPINNER, NO KITES LOST. HOPE THERE ARE NO MORE PENS TO HIT, JERRY GETS ANNOYED SOMEWHAT.&#13;
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[underlined] 9 – 8 – 44 LA PALLICE [/underlined]&#13;
TOOK OFF 10-00, WEATHER GOOD. BEING A BIT LATE WE CUT ACROSS COUNTRY, PASSED QUITE CLOSE TO ALDERNEY AND GUERNSEY, EVENTUALLY CAUGHT UP WITH THE REST NEAR FRENCH COAST. WENT NEAR TO LORIENT AND FOLLOWED COAST TO THE TARGET. RAN IN FROM THE SEA, NO FLAK UNTILL BOMB WENT, RESULTS GOOD EXCEPT FOR ONE BOMB THAT WENT A LONG WAY WIDE AND HIT THE HARBOUR WORKS INSTEAD OF THE PENS. FLAK MODERATE, HIT ON ONE SPINNER. QUITEA [sic] LONG TRIP, SAW NO ENEMY FIGHTERS, ESCORT OF MUSTANGS AND SPITFIRES, MOST OF THEM MET US ON THE WAY BACK – HELPFUL; SKIPPER AND ROY’S THIRTIETH TRIP.&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] ALTHOUGH AIRCREWS NORMALLY FLEW TOGETHER UNDER ONE PILOT, THERE WERE OCCASIONS WHEN INDIVIDUALS WOULD JOIN OTHER CREWS, AS I DID FOR SEVERAL TRIPS WITH BOB KNIGHTS. THE REASONS WERE MANY, SICKNESS OF ONE MEMBER MIGHT RESULT IN A REPLACEMENT FROM ANOTHER CREW, OR THE VARIOUS TRADES MIGHT BE FARMED OUT TO OTHER CREWS NEEDING TEMPORARY STAFF. ------&#13;
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------- THUS DIFFERENT MEMBERS OF THE SAME CREW OFTEN HAD VARYING NUMBERS OF OPERATIONAL SORTIES TO THEIR CREDIT, I SEEM TO REMEMBER THAT ON ARRIVING AT 49 SQUADRON OUR PILOT, JOHN SANDERS, FLEW HIS FIRST FLIGHT OVER GERMANY AS SECOND PILOT, SO HE WAS ONE UP ON THE REST OF US ALREADY; I SUPPOSE THE IDEA WAS TO SEE IF HE LIKED THE EXPERIENCE. . . . THE FIRST TOUR WAS THIRTY OPERATIONS, THE SECOND FIFTEEN.&#13;
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[underlined] 11 – 8 – 44 LA PALLICE [/underlined]&#13;
TOOK OFF ABOUT 11.30, LOAD 6 X 2.000 LD. [sic] ARMOUR PIERCING, DON’T KNOW WHAT USE THESE ARE AGAINST PENS, - OURS NOT TO REASON WHY. ROUTE AS YESTERDAY, AS WAS THE ESCORT. MUCH MORE FLAK ON RUN IN, SAW ONE KITE HIT AND CONTINUE ON THREE ENGINES, HEARD LOTS OF BURSTS, BOMBS WENT DOWN BANG ON TARGET, WE WERE HIT IN THE AIRCRAFT NOSE AND ONE ENGINE, NOTHING SERIOUS. LANDED AT GROVE, SHORT OF PETROL. HOPE THIS TARGET IS FINISHED, FLAK FAR TOO ACCURATE FOR COMFORT,&#13;
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[underlined] 12 – 8 – 44 BREST [/underlined]&#13;
TOOK OFF 07-00 – 12 HOURS AFTER LANDING. WEATHER PRETTY FOUL, TRIED TO CLIMB THROUGH CLOUD, BECAME ICED UP, HAD TO REDUCE TO 11,000 FEET AND CLIMB OVER CHANNEL. ONLY EIGHT KITES ON THE RAID, EXPECTED TO BE SHOT TO HELL, BUT LUCKILY FLAK WAS LIGHTER AND LESS ACCURATE THAN BEFORE, - ONE FLAK SHIP IN THE HARBOUR. PENS APPEARED TO RECEIVE SEVERAL DIRECT HITS, SMOKE POURED FROM GAP IN THE ROOF, SMALL DENT IN SPINNER, NOT BAD TRIP, INTERCOM BETTER THAN YESTERDAY, SO CREW WAS MORE SOCIABLE; SAW NO ESCORT, EXCEPT USUAL MOSQUITO.&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] IT SEEMS WE HAD MORE DENTED SPINNERS THAN ANYTHING ELSE, WHICH IS PROBABLY VERY FORTUNATE, CURIOUS REFERENCE TOA [sic] MOSQUITO AS ESCORT, WHEREAS I KNOW VERY WELL IT WAS THE MARKING AIRCRAFT. PERHAPS THE CRACKS WERE BEGINNING TO SHOW.&#13;
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[underlined] 13 – 8 – 44 BREST [/underlined]&#13;
TOOK OFF 08-30, WEATHER GOOD. TARGET FOR US WAS A SHIP IN THE HARBOUR THAT MIGHT BE USED AS A BLOCKSHIP, OTHERS BOMBED PENS, AND 9 SQUADRON SUPPORTING HAD ANOTHER VESSEL. FLAK; COR! IT WAS HOT, JUST LIKE FIRST TIME TO BREST HIT IN UNDERCARRIAGE AND HYDRAULICS, BEFORE OUR BOMB LOAD (12 X 1.000 POUNDERS) WENT DOWN, BAGS OF HOT OIL AND VAPOUR IN THE NOSE, PANIC FOR A FEW MINUTES; TOMMY’S HARNESS WAS HIT AND THERE WERE OTHER HOLES. SAW ONE KITE GO DOWN, STRAIGHT DOWN AND BURST ON THE SHORE, NASTY, ONE BURST OF FLAK WAS PINK, - GREMLINS GOT ME AT LAST; ALTOGETHER FAR TOO LIVELY FOR MY LIKING.&#13;
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[underlined] 14 – 8 – 44 BREST [/underlined]&#13;
TOOK OFF 08-30, USUAL TIME, WEATHER GOOD. AFTER YESTERDAYS EFFORT FELT LOUSY ON THE WAY ANTICIPATING EVERY SORT OF TROUBLE, THE OLD TUMMY GETS A BIT SORE THINKING OF FLAK THESE DAY’S. TARGET – SHIP IN THE HARBOUR AGAIN, 9 SQUADRON SUPPORTING RAN INTO TARGET IN MORE N.W. DIRECTION – OVER – BAY HEIGHT 16,200 FEET, FLAK BOUNCED US ABOUT A BIT BUT IT WASN’T QUITE SO BAD. PIECES OF FLAK THROUGH JACK’S SCREEN, MID UPPER TURRET AND ONE ENGINE, NOTHING SERIOUS. SAW SEVEN STICKS OF BOMBS GO DOWN, EACH JUST MISSED THE SHIP, HOPE SOMEONE HIT IT OR BACK WE GO ANOTHER DAY. BOMB LOAD 6 X 2,000 POUNDERS, ARMOUR – PIERCING.&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] (STICKS) WERE THE ENTIRE BOMB LOAD DROPPED BY EACH AIRCRAFT. IT WAS INFURIATING TO WATCH THE FOUNTAINS OF SPRAY APPEAR AS EACH BOMB HIT THE WATER ON EITHER SIDE OF THE VESSEL. I WONDER IF IT EVER SANK, WE DIDN’T GO TO BREST AGAIN, THANK GOODNESS, (THE SHIP WAS THE GERMAN CRUISER GUEYDON) WE THEN WENT ON TO MORE INTERESTING THINGS. -----&#13;
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[underlined] 11 – 9 – 44 KAA FIORD NORWAY (VIA RUSSIA) [/underlined]&#13;
THE BIG ONE AGAINST THE GERMAN POCKET BATTLESHIP [underlined] TIRPITZ [/underlined], WHICH HAD SO FAR LED A CHARMED LIFE DESPITE A VARIETY OF ATTACKS BY EVERY – BODY EXCEPT THE ARMY, - AND SURVIVED THE LOT AS THE VESSEL WAS OUT OF RANGE FROM BRITAIN THE PLAN WAS TO FLY TO YAGODNIK, AN ISLAND AIRFIELD UPSTREAM FROM ARCHANGEL, REFUEL, CARRY OUT THE RAID, REFUEL AGAIN IN RUSSIA AND RETURN TO LINCOLNSHIRE. AS ADDITIONAL PETROL HAD TO BE CARRIED THE TOP TURRET WAS REMOVED, TOGETHER WITH MUCH OF THE AMMUNITION FOR THE REAR TURRET, SOME OF THE RADAR AND THE EXHAUST COWS [sic] FROM EACH ENGINE, - WHICH SEEMED RATHER EXTREME AND MAY HAVE BEEN DONE UNDER THE OLD DICTUM THAT EVERY LITTLE HELPS. A 250 GALLON FUEL WAS INSTALLED IN THE FUSELAGE, AND THE LENGTH OF THE TANK NECESSITATED THE DEPARTURE OF THE TOP TURRET. WE CARRIED TWELVE 450 POUND BOMBS – WHICH I HAVE A FEELING WERE A SORT OF SEA MINE – AND OTHERS HAD THE 12,000 POUND “TALLBOY”. THERE WERE TWENTY LANCASTERS FROM 617 AND EIGHTEEN FROM 9 SQUADRON. THE DIARY ENTRY:&#13;
TOOK OFF 19-00, HEADED FOR NORWAY AT 2,000 FEET, CLIMBED TO 6,000 FEET AT THE COAST TO CLEAR THE MOUNTAINS, BIT CLOUDY, SAW GLIMPSES OF THE PEAKS AT TIMES. SWEDEN WAS WELL LIGHTED, EVEN SAW NEON SIGNS OCCASIONALLY, SOME FLAK IN ONE AREA, ONE KITE DAMAGED. AS IT BECAME LIGHTER WE DROPPED TO AVOID CLOUD AT 500-1,000 FEET, CROSSED WHITE SEA VERY LOW, LOOKED SOMEWHAT INHOSPITABLE AND COLD. EVENTUALLY FOUND ARCHANGEL IN THE MOUTH OF THE RIVER, AND AFTER SOME SEARCHING CAME ACROSS THE AIRFIELD ON A [sic] ISLAND DOWN STREAM. LANDED ON GRASS WITH BOMBS ON BOARD. QUARTERS IN A OLD RIVER STEAMER, HAD TO CLEAN OUT, WASHING AND SANITARY CONDITIONS LOUSY. MEALS GOOD GENERALLY, PLENTY OF EGGS, BUTTER AND SUGAR. TEA WITHOUT MILK – IN GLASSES – SLIGHTLY SOUR BREAD AND SPAM WILL BE REMEMBERD [sic]; --------;&#13;
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----- SWAPPED CIGARETTES FOR CAP BADGES, COINS, PAPER MONEY AND BUTTONS. ENTERTAINED EVERY NIGHT WITH CONCERTS, FILMS AND DANCES. BAND COULD EVEN PLAY (LAMBETH WALK) SAND AND GRASS FIELD, WEATHER SLIGHTLY COLDER THAN AT HOME.&#13;
TOOK OFF 09-30 ON SEPTEMBER 15TH LOOSE GAGGLE, 1,000 FEET, ROUTE OVER FINLAND, SWEDEN AND NORWAY, A GOD-FORSAKEN COUNTRYSIDE OF HILLS, RIVERS, TIMBER AND MARSHES. WE LED J.W. FORCE AND CAME IN FROM A DIFFERENT DIRECTION. TO THE MAIN FORCE. SAW SMOKE GENERATORS START UP A FEW MINUTES BEFORE BOMBING, NUISANCE. SAW J.W’S SWINGING DOWN ON PARACHUTES, WEIRD SIGHT, FLAK SCATTERD [sic] AND INACCURATE, SUPRISING [sic] AS WE BOMBED AT 11,000 FEET, NO FIGHTERS. ONE KITE ONLY DAMAGED.&#13;
TOOK OFF 19-15 ON THE 16TH TO RETURN HOME. WEATHER DULL, POOR VISIBILITY, 1,500 FEET OVER FINLAND, CLIMED [sic] TO 7,000 OVER SEA AND SWEDEN. DARK NIGHT, SAW SOME AIRFIELDS LIGHTED, OCCASIONAL LIGHT FLAK. BAD WEATHER JUST AFTER LEAVING SWEDEN, HAD TO DROP TO 4,000 FEET TO CLEAR CLOUD AND HEAVY RAIN, OFF TRACK, RAN OVER NORTH DENMARK, SEARCHLIGHTS EVADED BY USING CLOUD COVER, FLAK SHIPS A DARN NUISANCE OFF COAST. CARRIED THREE OF ROSS’S CREW BACK. BET THEY WERE COLD IN THE FUSEELARGE [sic]. GLAD TO SEE ENGLISH SEARCHLIGHTS AND AIRFIELDS AGAIN – AND REAL EGG, BACON AND CHIPS ON RETURN.&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] RE READING THE DIARY REMINDS ME OF THE PROFICIENCY OF OUR NAVIGATOR, JAMES BARON, WHO SO SKILLFULLY [sic] GUIDED OUR WAY TO RUSSIA AND BACK, BASICALLY WITH ONLY HIS EXPERTISE, MAP, AND SIX PAIRS OF ANXIOUS EYES TO ASSIST. NO NAVIGATIONAL AIDS IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD, SEVERAL AIRCRAFT FORCE-LANDED IN THE AREA WHEN FUEL RAN OUT IN THEIR VAIN SERCH [sic] FOR THE LANDING FIELD; SO FAR AS I RECALL, NO ONE WAS LOST, THE RUSSIANS BROUGHT THEM ALONG IN VARIOUS ANCIENT LIGHT PLANES AT INTERVALS. THERE IS A PHOTO OF A DOWNED LANCASTER, IT’S 12,000 POUND TALLBOY BOMB HURLED FREE ON LANDING INPACT [sic] AND LAYING FORLORNLY IN THE MUD. A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE FROM THE AIRCRAFT.&#13;
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THE CREWS INVOVLED [sic] WITH THESE CRASHED LANCASTERS CAME HOME IN OTHER AIRCRAFT AND THEIR AIRCRAFT LEFT IN RUSSIA.&#13;
THE RUSSIAN FILMS WERE TERRIBLE, LONG AFFAIRS OF CONTINUAL WAR SCENES, AND I SEEM TO RECALL THAT THE ROYAL NAVY CONTINGENT AT ARCHANGEL SENT SOME CARTOONS WHICH CHEERED US UP AND LEFT OUR HOSTS BAFFLED. LIVING AROUND THE AIRFIELD IN VARIOUS PRIMITIVE HUTS WERE SOME OF THE RUSSIAN STAFF, INCLUDING, NO DOUBT, THE LADIES WHO FELL ABOUT IN LAUGHTER WHEN ASKED FOR HOT WATER TO SHAVE WITH – SUCH WESTEN [sic] DECADENCE. THE MEN SPENT MUCH TIME PLAYING CARDS ON THE RIVER BANK. THEIR WIVES ONLY APPEARED WHEN CALLED TO HAVE LARGE TREE TRUNKS, THAT HAD FLOATED DOWN FROM THE URALS, HOISTED ON TO THEIR STURDY SHOULDERS BY THEIR CARING PARTNERS; IT WAS A PEACEFUL SCENE, ONLY DISTURBED BY THE SOUND OF CHOPPING AND SAWING WHILST THE INTERRUPTED CARD GAME CONTINUED. LENIN WOULD SURELY HAVE APPROVED. I JEST A LITTLE, WITHIN THE LIMITATION OF THE TIMES, THE RUSSIANS WE MET WERE GENERALLY KINDLY, GENEROUS HOSTS. THEY BEAT US HANDSOMELY AT FOOTBALL TOO.&#13;
THE WAIT FOR SUITABLE WEATHER ACCOUNTED MAINLY FOR THE FEW DAYS THAT PASSED BEFORE ATTACKING THE (TIRPITZ) AND THE TIME WAS PROBABLY USEFUL TO ENABLE SOME AIRCRAFT SERVICING TO BE DONE. I THINK OUR J.W. BOMBS WERE KNOWN FOR SOME REASON AS JOHNNY WALKERS, AND AS DESCRIBED, THEY FLOATED GENTLY DOWN ON PARACHUTES. IF THEY HIT SOMETHING SOLID THEY EXPLODED ON CONTACT, IF THEY FELL INTO THE WATER THEY WOULD SINK ARMED THEM SELVES AND RISE TO THE SURFACE HOPEFULLY DETONATING UNDER A SHIP IF NO TARGET WAS FOUND THEY WOULD SINK AGAIN AND MOVE 30 FEET AND REPEAT.&#13;
AT THE TIME OWING TO THE SMOKE SCREEN THE RAID WAS NOT THOUGHT TO HAVE BEEN THAT SUCCESSFUL, BUT LATER IT WAS FOUND THAT TALLBOY NEAR MISSES HAD DAMAGED THE SHIP AND PREVENTED IT FROM RETURNING TO THE SEA.&#13;
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THE TAKE-OFF TO RETURN HOME TO ENGLAND WAS AN INTERESTING SIGHT FOR ONLOOKERS, AS REFUELLING HAD TO BE DONE WITH THE ONLY AVAILABLE LOWER OCTANE RATED PETROL SO THERE WAS SOME ENGINE COUGHING AND BANGING AS EACH LANCASTER SPED ALONG THE SO CALLED RUNWAY AND FINALLY STAGGERD [sic] INTO THE AIR.&#13;
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[underlined] 23 – 9 – 44 DORTMUND-EMS CANAL [/underlined]&#13;
NIGHT TRIP AGAIN – DARNED IF I LIKE ‘EM TARGET – AQUEDUCT CARRYING CANAL ACROSS A RIVER, LOAD TALLBOY. HAD FIRST SHAKING WHEN TWO KITES COLLIDED OFF THE COAST; THEN ANTI-RADAR LIGHTS WERE LEFT UNCOVEREDAND [sic] FLASHES ALL ROUND THE TRIP. QUEER THINGS, RED GREEN AND YELLOW FLARES, ENORMOUS FLAK BURSTS, KITES GOING DOWN WITHOUT COMBAT, - NO TRACER USED BY FIGHTERS, I GUESS. SPOT FIRE JUST UNDER CLOUD, HAD SEVERAL TRIES TO BOMB, BUT IT BECAME COVERED JUST BEFORE RELEASE SO WE BROUGHT THE BOMB BACK FELT VERY TIRED AND SHAKEN ON RETURN, CURSE THE DARKNESS.&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] I DON’T REALY [sic] RECOLLECT BEING UNDULY DISTURBED ABOUT OPERATIONS, BUT IT SEEMS THERE IS JUST A HINT OF BOTHER WITH MY DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENTS. USUALLY UNSYMPATHETICALLY REFERRED TO AS THE TWITCH, IT WAS QUITE OFTEN EVIDENT IN THE DEMEANOUR OF THOSE IN THEIR THIRD OR FOURTH TOUR.&#13;
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[underlined] 29 – 10 – 44 KEMS BARRAGE (ON THE RHINE) [/underlined]&#13;
TOOK OFF 13-10 PLAN SEVEN KITES TO BOMB AT 7-6,000 FEET, SIX AT [underlined] 600 [/underlined] FEET, WE WERE ONE OF THE SIX, OF COURSE AFTER THE DRAW, MUSTANGS AS ESCORT AND ANTI-FLAK. WE BOMBED FIVE MINUTES AFTER HIGH FORCE, RAN IN TWO ABREAST DROPPING TALLBOY WITH DELAYED ACTION. NOT A LOT OF FLAK, BUT MACHINE GUNS VERY ACCURATE WHICH HIT TWO KITES AFTER BOMBING, THEY HIT THE DECK – HARD, SO ONLY FOUR OUT OF THE SIX MADE IT. MY PERSPEX WAS SHATTERED TWO SPLINTERS IN MY SHOULDER, (NOTHING MUCH) BLAZED AWAY AT FLAK POSTS, VERY HAPPY; AL’S BOMB ZIPPED OVER BARRAGE TOP, GATES FINALLY GAVE AWAY, GOOD JOB.&#13;
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[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] THIS WAS A PRE-EMPT EFFORT TO FORESTALL THE GERMANS FROM RELEASING THE PENT UP WATERS OF THE RHINE WHEN ALLIED GROUND FORCES WERE ABOUT TO CROSS. THE EFFECT OF A CONSIDERABLE HEAD OF WATER UPON TEMPORARY BRIDGES MAY BE IMAGINED. DURING A SWISS HOLIDAY IN THE MIDDLE 80’S WE TOOK A VERY FRAGILE BOAT TRIP TO A ROCKY ISLAND IN THE MIDDLE OF THE RHINE FALLS AT SCHAFFHAUSES, WHERE THE VIBRATION GRAPHICALLY DEMONSTRATED THE WEIGHT OF THE WATER FLOWING BY. THE TWO AIRCRAFT THAT WAS SHOT DOWN PILOTED BY (S/L WYNESS AND F/O HOWARD) IT HAS BEEN SAID THAT WYNESS AND HIS CREW MANAGED TO GETOUT [sic] OF THEIR AIRCRAFT AND INTO THE DINGHY TO SAIL DOWN THE RHINE TO GAIN THE SANCTUARY OF THE SWISS BANK BUT WERE SHOT BY THE GERMANS. PILOT JOHN SANDERS WAS AWARDED BAR TO HIS D.F.C.&#13;
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[underlined] 29 – 10 – 44 TIRPITZ – TROMSO [/underlined]&#13;
TOOK OFF FROM LOSSIE MOUTH AT 2 A.M. AND LANDED BACK AT 2-55P.M. – DID I FEEL DONE. CROSSED NORWEGIAN COAST AT DAWN AND FLEW NORTH OVER SWEDEN, LOOKED VERY BLEAK AND COLD HAD TO ORBIT AT RENDEZVOUS, BOTH SQUADRONS WENT ON TO THE TARGET, BECAME VERY HAZY EVEN AT 15,000 FEET WITH 7-6/10’S CLOUD BELOW, SHIP HARD TO FIND, AL FINALLY BOMBED ON FOURTH RUN. BAGS OF FLAK, BUT VERY INACCURATE, ONE KITE HIT BADLY, LANDED IN SWEDEN. TERRIBLE STOOGE HOME, SAW NO LAND FOR FOUR HOURS, - HAD 16 HOURS SLEEP AT LOSSIE.&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] THE VESSEL WAS MOVED SOUTHWARDS TO TROMSO AFTER THE SEPTEMBER ATTACK, POSSIBLY BECAUSE OF THE DAMAGED [sic] RECEIVED THIS PUT IT IN THE RANGE FROM LOSSIEMOUTH, AGAIN WITH LONG-RANGE FUEL TANKS. THE CLOUD PREVENTED ACCURATE BOMB-AIMING AND THE ‘TIRPITZ’ SURVIVED ONCE MORE, - BUT NEMESIS DREW NIGH; A SOME WHAT COMIC ASPECT OF THE LONG SEA CROSSING BACK WAS THE REASSURANCE GIVEN AT BRIEFING THAT ROYAL NAVY DESROYERS [sic] WOULD BE ON OUR RETURN ROUTE SHOULD ANY NEED TO PUT DOWN IN THE WATER ARISE. ------&#13;
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------ BY 1944 THE R.N. HAD QUITE PROPERLY DEVELOPED ITCHY GUN FINGERS WHERE AIRCRAFT WERE CONCERNED, PARTICULARLY IF THEY GAVE NO REGOGNITION [sic] SIGNALS. THUS WE WERE RATHER ALARMED TO FIND OURSELVES BEARING DOWN ON THIS MENACING LOOMING SHIP WITH AL IN THE NOSE FRANTICALLY DIGGING AROUND FOR THE COLOURS-OF-THE-DAY CARTRIDGES TO PUT IN HIS VERY PISTOL. I’M NOT SURE IF WE WERE ACTUALLY FIRED UPON, BUT CERTAINLY THE COLOURS WENT UP A TRIFLE LATE. ONE CAN IMAGINE THE IRATE OFFICER-OF-THE-WATCH DOWN THERE FUMING ‘THAT SHOWER’ UP THERE.&#13;
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[underlined] NOVEMBER 1944 [/underlined]&#13;
MY LOG BOOK FOR THIS MONTH SHOWS ONLY A TRIP TO LOSSIEMOUTH FOR ANOTHER GO AT THE ‘TIRPITZ’, BUT THE WEATHER FORECAST WAS SUCH THAT WE RETURNED TO WOODHALL THE NEXT DAY.&#13;
MORE IMPORTANTLY, AN UN-DATED NOTE IS ADDED THAT MUST HAVE BEEN WRITTEN IN JANUARY 1945:- “BROKE MY FINGER WHILST TRYING TO FIX AN ESCAPE HATCH DURING NIGHT PRACTICE BOMBING – CLOT!! WENT U/S UNTILL AFTER CHRISTMAS. ROY AND AL MEANWHILE FINISHED THEIR SECOND TOUR, DIDN’T SEE AL AGAIN. LUCKILY MANAGED TO GET BACK WITH SANDY AND REMAINDER OF THE CREW.&#13;
NIGHT BOMBING PRACTICE AT WAINFLEET WAS NOT A FAVOURITE PASTIME, SO I DOUBT ANYONE REGRETTED THE EARLY RETURN ARISING FROM MY MISHAP. I CHERISH THE MEMORY OF OUR CAPTAIN SPEEDILY CALLING FOR AN AMBULANCE TO MEET US ON LANDING, AND HIS INSISTENCE ON HALF CARRYING ME DOWN THE AIRCRAFT LADDER TO THE GROUND. BEING A VERY FORTUNATE CREW, THIS WAS ABOUT THE WORST THING THAT HAPPENED TO US IN ALL THE TIME WE FLEW TOGETHER ON OPERATIONS.&#13;
THUS I DID NOT JOIN THE FINAL ATTACK ON THE “TIRPITZ” ON 29TH OF NOVEMBER, WHEN THE VESSEL CAPSIZED FOLLOWING DIRECT HITS WITH TALLBOY 12,000 POUND BOMBS; INSTEAD ROY MACHIN HAD A VIEW OF THE AFFAIR FROM THE TAIL RATHER THAN HIS ACCUSTOMED POSITION IN THE TOP TURRET. ONE OF THE MINOR MYSTERIES IS WHY NO ENEMY FIGHTERS APPEARED DURING THE LAST TWO RAIDS, WHEN IN NORWAY.&#13;
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[underlined] 3 – 2 – 45 PORTESHAVEN (HOLLAND) [/underlined]&#13;
TOOK OFF 14-00, TARGET MIDGET U-BOAT PENS. WEATHER CLEAR, HEIGHT 14,000 FEET. OVERCOAST [sic] SAW WALCHEREN ISLAND, NEARLY ALL FLOODED, TERRIBLE DEVASTATION. LONG RUN UP TO TARGET AND JUST BEFORE BOMB WENT FLAK WAS VERY ACCURATE THO’ NOT PARTICULARLY HEAVY. WE BOMBED SECOND AND I SAW THE REST OF THE EFFORT, WHICH EXCEPT FOR THREE WIDE THE REST WAS DEAD ON. P.R.L. COVER DETERMINED THAT THE WHOLE STRUCTURE HAD COLLAPSED. IT HAD FIFTEEN HOLES.&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] P.R.L. WAS THE PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE UNIT, OFTEN FLYING MOSQUITOES, SOMETIMES SPITFIRES, USUALLY ALONE – DODGY IN DAYLIGHT.&#13;
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[underlined] 6 – 2 – 45 BIELEFELD VIADUCT (GERMANY) [/underlined]&#13;
ON THIS THE LONGEST TRIP INTO THE REICH, WE DEFINITELY EXPECTED BANDITS, SO GAGGLE WAS TIGHTENED AND ALTOGETHER WE HAD TEN SQUADRONS OF SPITFIRES AND MUSTANGS AS COVER, - VERY NICE FOR SEVENTEEN KITES; SOME HEAVY FLAK AT AACHEN AND COOLENZ, OTHERWISE NONE. 10/10 CLOUD COVER MOST OF THE ROUTE, SAW NO BOMBING. VERY SURPRISED AT NO LUFTWAFFE – AND RELIEVED. SKY WAS FULL OF OUR COVER, AND YANKS WERE VERY ACTIVE WITH HEAVY STUFF.&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] BY 1944 THE AMERICAN AIRFORCE (U.S.A.A.F.) WERE WELL USED TO FORMATION FLYING NECESSITATED BY THEIR BOMBING TECHNIQUES, AND THE MUTUAL COVER AGAINST THE LUFTWAFFE. APART FROM INITIAL DISASTROUS DAYLIGHT SORTIES IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE WAR, BOMBER COMMAND IN EUROPE LARGELY RESORTED TO NIGHT RAIDS UNTILL D-DAY IN 1944. THEN THE (GAGGLE) WAS THOUGHT UP AS A LOOSE FORMATION TO GIVE SOME PROTECTION AGAINST FIGHTERS WHILST STILL RETAINING EACH BOMB-AIMERS DESCRIPTION AS TO THE MOMENT OF RELEASE. HOWEVER, I FEEL THE WORTHY INTENTION WAS DIMINISHED BY THE RESULT IN THE AIR, AS AFTER YEARS OF INDIVIDUAL FLYING IN THE DARK THE DISCIPLINE-AND WILL-NEEDED TO KEEP IN CLOSE FORMATION WAS JUST NOT THERE AND WE TENDED TO JUST TRUNDLE ALONG FAIRLY NEAR TO ONE ANOTHER; ------&#13;
&#13;
[page break]&#13;
&#13;
36&#13;
------ AS IT HAPPENED IT DID NOT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE ON THE DAYLIGHT TRIPS I FLEW ON. THERE IS NOT MUCH DOUBT IN MY MIND, HOWEVER, THAT AN ATTACK ON US BY THE LUFTWAFFE WOULD HAVE HAD SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES BEFORE OUR ESCORT COULD HAVE GOT AMONGST THEM. BOTH GERMANS AND AMERICANS FOUND THAT EFFECTIVE DEFENCE OF BOMBERS BY FIGHTERS IS MOST DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE AGAINST DETERMINED ATTACKS, SOME WILL ALWAYS SUCCEED.&#13;
&#13;
[underlined] 6 – 2 – 45 IJMUIDEN (HOLLAND) [/underlined]&#13;
TOOK OFF 06-00 UNDER DULL HIGH CLOUD THAT PERSISTED WAY TO THE TARGET, SAW BAGS OF LIBERATORS FORMING UP ON THE WAY OUT. SPITFIRE ESCORT MET US OFF THE COAST. BOMBING RUN SEEMED PLAIN STUPID; INSTEAD OF RUNNING IN FROM THE SEA WE CIRCLED IN LAND, NEAR AMSTERDAM, AND HAD A LONG RUN UP TO TARGET IN HEAVY FLAK AREA. JACK LED GAGGLE AND DID THEY PASTE US, FOR JUST OVER TWO MINUTES WERE CONTINUALLY PREDICTED, - NEVER FELT AND HEARD SO MUCH. U-BOAT PENS WERE HIT,&#13;
[underlined] NOTES [/underlined] NOW WE ARE CRITICISING ROUTEING[sic] – EVERYONE IS AN EXPERT AFTER TWO TOURS, THIS WAS THE LAST OPERATIONAL TRIP FOR ME. DURING RAIDS INVOLVING MANY AIRCRAFT FLAK WAS GENERALLY INDISCRIMINATE, BUT WHEN ONLY TWENTY OR THIRTY WERE OVERHEAD IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR THE DEFENCES TO FOCUS ON ONE BY RADAR AND (PREDICT) ITS COURSE AND FIRE ACCORDINGLY. FLAK BATTERIES WERE OFTEN IN FOURS, AND OCCASIONALLY ONE COULD SEE SUCCESSIVE BURSTS FOLLOWING BEHIND, EVEN WHEN TURNING. I NOTICED THIS PARTICULARLY DURING THE OCTOBER (TIRPITZ) RAID AS WELL AS THIS ONE. NOT A LOT COULD USEFULLY BE DONE – EXCEPT HOPE – IF ON THE BOMB RUN; EVENTUALLY, OF COURSE, WE FLEW OUT OF RANGE, OR THEY SELECTED ANOTHER LUCKY LOT FOR ATTENTION.&#13;
&#13;
[page break]&#13;
&#13;
37&#13;
[underlined] POSTSCRIPT [/underlined]&#13;
&#13;
TO FORESTALL ANY BRIGHT SPARK WHO MAY HAVE COUNTED ONLY FORTY OPERATIONS IN THE DIARY, THERE WERE FIVE OTHER TRIPS MENTIONED BUT NOT DESCRIBED AS EACH TIME THE TARGET WAS NOT BOMBED DUE, TO CLOUD AT THE CRUCIAL POINT, FOUR WERE ‘V’ BOMB SITES IN NORTHERN FRANCE, THE OTHER LA PALLICE AGAINST U-BOAT PENS TO MY SURPRISE, AND NO DOUBT PLEASURE, THESE WERE INCLUDED IN THE TOTAL FOR TWO TOURS OF OPERATIONS, THAT IS FORTY FIVE TRIPS. THE ‘V’ WEAPONS WERE FIRSTLY SELF PROPELLED FLYING BOMBS DIRECTED AT LONDON, AND SECONDLY ROCKET PROPELLED MISSILES LAUNCHED FROM HOLLAND THAT FELL UPON THE CITY WITHOUT WARNING. FORTUNATELY THIS ALL STARTED AROUND THE SUMMER OF 1944, SO THE LAUNCH SITES WERE PROGRESSIVELY OVER RUN AS THE ALLIED LAND ARMIES MOVED EASTWARDS FROM NORMANDY LATER IN THE YEAR.&#13;
ONE MUST OBSERVE THAT AS A CREW WE WERE QUITE FORTUNATE, FOR I CANNOT RECALL ANYONE BEING HURT, NEITHER WERE THERE MANY DISAGREEMENTS. THE ONLY ONE OF THE LATTER THAT COMES TO MIND WAS AN ALTERCATION THAT AROSE WHILST WAITING AROUND OUTSIDE THE AIRCRAFT AS TO THE MERITS OF THE FLIGHT SANDWICHES ISSUED FROM THE OFFICERS PALACE AT THE PETWOOD HOTEL (OFFICERS MESS) COMPARED TO THOSE FROM THE SERGEANTS MESS; IMPORTANT MATTERS SUCH AS THIS COULD HAVE AFFECTED THE WHOLE COURSE OF THE WAR.&#13;
TO COMMENT ON LUCK, THERE IS A STORY OF THE BOMB-AIMER’S PARACHUTE HARNESS. WE WERE SETTLING DOWN AT DISPERSAL AWAITING TAXI CLEARANCE WHEN AN AGONISED CRY CAME FROM AL IN THE NOSE – I’VE FORGOT MY PARACHUTE HARNESS, JACK; MUCH HEAVY BREATHING FROM OUR ESTEEMED PILOT BRFORE [sic] HE GROUND OUT “YOU’D BETTER HURRY AND GET IT THEN” OR WORDS TO THAT EFFECT. WITH INTEREST I WATCHED AL LEAP OUT, GRAB ONE OF THE GROUND CREW’S BIKES AND VANISH IN THE DIRECTION OF THE LOCKER ROOM, HEAD DOWN, PEDALLING FURIOUSLY. ------&#13;
&#13;
[page break]&#13;
&#13;
38&#13;
------ MEANWHILE, IN THE COCKPIT THE CAPTAIN AND ENGINEER WERE DECIDING TO SWITCH OFF THE ENGINES AS THEY WOULD OVERHEAT QUITE QUICKLY WHILST IDLING DUE TO THE LACK OF AIR PASSING THROUGH THE RADIATORS FROM THE PROPELLERS. WHEN AL REAPPEARED FULLY KITTED AND BREATHLESS, THE ENGINES WERE RE-STARTED. ONE, HOWEVER, STUTTERD [sic] BANGED AND BELCHED BLUE SMOKE, RAN VERY ROUGHLY FOR A FEW SECONDS AND FINALLY STOPPED WITH A SHUDDER THAT SHOOK THE WHOLE AIRCRAFT. SO WE ALL CLAMBERED OUT AND JOINED THE GROUND CREW CLUSTED [sic] UNDER THE OFFENDING ENGINE, ONE STILL HOPEFULLY CLUTCHING A FIRE EXTINGUISHER, SOME STAGING WAS PUSHED INTO PLACE AND A FITTER REMOVED THE COWLING AND LOOKED INTO THE WORKS. “T’ARIN’T ARF A MESS” HE INFORMED THE THRONG, “RECKIN IT’S THE CYLINDER HEAD, THERE’S BITS AND PIECES EVERYWHERE”. THUS, IT SEEMS, OUR LUCK HELD AGAIN WHO KNOWS, BUT FOR THE DELAY, WHETHER THAT ENGINE MIGHT HAVE FAILED ON TAKR-OFF [sic], AND WE HAD A 12,000 LB BOMB ON ABOARD.&#13;
SO THERE IT IS. ON COMPLETION OF THE TOURS I WAS SOON POSTED AWAY TO BECOME THE SHIFT NCO I/C THE PARACHUTE STORE AT WOOLFOX LODGE, AND WHERE THAT WAS I NOW HAVE NO IDEA. HOWEVER, WHILST THERE I HAD MY LAST FLIGHT IN A LANCASTER ON THE 20TH OF JUNE 1945, STANDING BEHIND THE PILOT ON A SIGHT SEEING TRIP OVER GERMANY IN DAYLIGHT. NO FIGHTERS, NO FLAX [sic] JUST GHASTLY DEVASTATION IN THE RHUR DOWN AS FAR AS COLOGNE AND EASTWARDS TO DORTMUND. WHICH REMINDS THAT ONLY A FEW WEEKS AGO WE WERE IN THE STATION AREA OF DORTMUND, WHERE EVEN THE TAXIS ARE MERCEDES BENZ REFLECTING THE GENERAL WEALTH. BARMY, AIN’T IT.&#13;
IN DECEMBER 1945 I MANAGED TO GET ON AN AIRFIELD CONTROL COURSE AT WATCHFIELD, NEAR SHRIVENHAM. HERE WE OCCASIONALLY FLEW IN ANSON AIRCRAFT, THE SAME AS AT GUNNERY SCHOOL SEEMINGLY SO MANY YEARS AGO. NOTHING HAD CHANGED, THE UNDERCARRIAGE STILL HAD TO BE WOUND UP AND DOWN BY HAND. HAVING SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED THE COURSE IN THE NEW YEAR, I WAS POSTED TO WELFORD, NEAR NEWBURY.&#13;
&#13;
[page break]&#13;
&#13;
39&#13;
WE WERE MARRIED AT THIS TIME SO I WAS ABLE TO COMMUTE FOR A WHILE VIA THE LAMBOURN VALLY [sic] RAILWAY AND PUSHBIKE. THE JOB AT WELFORD WAS LARGELY IN THE RUNWAY CARAVAN WHERE ONE IMPORTANTLY FLASHED LIGHJTS [sic] AND FIRED FLARES WHILST HOPEFULLY CONTROLLING AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS. ACCORDING TO THE SHIFT ONE WAS ON RATIONS WERE SENT OUT TO BE COOKED ON AN OLD PRIMUS STOVE, AND WHEN THE WEATHER WAS KIND IT WAS ALL SORT OF IDYLLIC, MUNCHING ON A BACON SANDWICH WITH A POT OF STRONG TEA HANDY, OBSERVING THE WILD LIFE ALL AROUND BEFORE THE FIRST AIRCRAFT TO LAND OR TAKE OFF DISTURBED THEM. INEVITABLY THIS COULD NOT LAST, AS WELFORD WAS BEING LESS AND LESS USED, AND SO I WAS SENT AWAY AGAIN, FIRST TO DISHFORTH IN YORKSHIRE AND FINALLY TO TERN HILL IN SHROPSHIRE. HERE I RECALL ENDLESS HOURS IN THE CONTROL TOWER LOGGING TRAINING HARVARD AIRCRAFT MOVEMENTS. ONE HAD TO BE SURE THE NUMBERS THAT WENT OUT BALANCED THOSE THAT LANDED, OTHERWISE A GREAT FLAP AROSE, FOR WENLOCK EDGE AND THE WREKIN SEEMED TO ATTRACT THE UNWISE ATTENTION OF THE TYRO PILOTS.&#13;
EVENTUALLY THE R.A.F. AND I PARTED IN AUGUST 1946, WITH ME SENT TO OLYMPIA TO FIND A CIVVY SUIT. MY PARENTS HAD A FLAT AT POLPERRO AT THIS TIME, SO SYLVIA AND I WERE ABLE TO SOAK UP THE SUN IN THIS UNSPOILED VILLAGE BEFORE RETURNING TO NEWBURY AND WORK.&#13;
[underlined] WAS IT ALL WORTH IT; --- [/underlined] WELL, IT HAD TO BE, DIDN’T IT, AS I COME OUT UNSCATHED. AN ADVENTURE TO BE SURE, WITH GRAND AQUAINTANCES [sic] MET ON THE WAY. WITH OUR COMBINED GRATUITY WE BOUGHT SOME LAND ON WHICH OUR FIRST HOME WAS BUILT – BUT THAT’S ANOTHER STORY ----&#13;
&#13;
RALPH BRIARS&#13;
BOURNMOUTH&#13;
1989</text>
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                <text>Rear view - Ralph Briars memoir</text>
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          <element elementId="41">
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              <elementText elementTextId="366198">
                <text>Starts with tribute to crew and has colour photograph of a 617 Squadron Lancaster over Lincoln. Writes of his joining the RAF, selection as an air gunner and his basic training. Goes on with description of gunnery training, before going to OTU at RAF Cottesmore where he crewed  up while training on Wellington. He describes member of the crew. He describes heavy conversion unit flying Halifax and Lancaster.  Provides a long description of a  night sorties and discusses the level of training in the RAF for aircrew as well as problem of collisions. He is finally posted to become operational on 49 Squadron at RAF Fiskerton. He gives a very detailed diary of the 14 operations he carried out on 49 Squadron,, followed by the 25 he carried out after the crew were posted to 617 Squadron. These sorties included the Saumur tunnel, V1 and V2 sites, the Tirpitz, Dortmund Ems canal and the Bielefeld viaduct. He concludes with some more anecdotes and life after he finished operational flying, including getting married.</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366199">
                <text>R Briars</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366200">
                <text>1989</text>
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                <text>Thirty-nine page printed document</text>
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          <element elementId="44">
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            <description>A language of the resource</description>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366202">
                <text>eng</text>
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                <text>Photograph</text>
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            <description>The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant</description>
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                <text>Royal Air Force</text>
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                <text>England--Leicestershire</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366218">
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                <text>Germany--Leipzig</text>
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                <text>Germany--Stuttgart</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366229">
                <text>Germany--Augsburg</text>
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                <text>Germany--Nuremberg</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366231">
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                <text>France--Paris</text>
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                <text>Italy</text>
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                <text>Italy--Milan</text>
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                <text>France--Normandy</text>
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                <text>France--Saumur</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366237">
                <text>France--Le Havre</text>
              </elementText>
              <elementText elementTextId="366238">
                <text>France--Boulogne-sur-Mer</text>
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              </elementText>
              <elementText elementTextId="366241">
                <text>France--Brest</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366242">
                <text>France--Lorient</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366243">
                <text>France--Creil</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366244">
                <text>France--La Rochelle</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366245">
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              <elementText elementTextId="366248">
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              <elementText elementTextId="366249">
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                <text>Germany--Bielefeld</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="797936">
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                <text>Russia (Federation)--Yagodnik</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366254">
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              <elementText elementTextId="366255">
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              <elementText elementTextId="366256">
                <text>1944-01-21</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366257">
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              <elementText elementTextId="366258">
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              <elementText elementTextId="366259">
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              <elementText elementTextId="366260">
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              <elementText elementTextId="366261">
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              <elementText elementTextId="366262">
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              <elementText elementTextId="366263">
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              <elementText elementTextId="366264">
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              <elementText elementTextId="366265">
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              <elementText elementTextId="366268">
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              <elementText elementTextId="366269">
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              <elementText elementTextId="366270">
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              <elementText elementTextId="366271">
                <text>1944-06-06</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366272">
                <text>1944-06-08</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366273">
                <text>1944-06-14</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366274">
                <text>1944-06-15</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366275">
                <text>1944-06-19</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366276">
                <text>1944-07-04</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366277">
                <text>1944-07-17</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366278">
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              <elementText elementTextId="366279">
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              <elementText elementTextId="366280">
                <text>1944-08-05</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366281">
                <text>1944-08-06</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366282">
                <text>1944-08-09</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366283">
                <text>1944-08-11</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366284">
                <text>1944-08-12</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366285">
                <text>1944-08-13</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366286">
                <text>1944-08-14</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366287">
                <text>1944-09-11</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366288">
                <text>1944-09-23</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366289">
                <text>1944-10-29</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366290">
                <text>1945-02-03</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366291">
                <text>1945-03-02</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="366292">
                <text>1945-02-06</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="529266">
                <text>1944-03-31</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="529267">
                <text>1944-06-16</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="529268">
                <text>1944-07-05</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="529269">
                <text>1944-04-19</text>
              </elementText>
              <elementText elementTextId="529270">
                <text>1944-06-09</text>
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              <elementText elementTextId="530915">
                <text>1944-06-05</text>
              </elementText>
            </elementTextContainer>
          </element>
          <element elementId="47">
            <name>Rights</name>
            <description>Information about rights held in and over the resource</description>
            <elementTextContainer>
              <elementText elementTextId="374398">
                <text>This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.</text>
              </elementText>
            </elementTextContainer>
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            <description>An entity responsible for making the resource available</description>
            <elementTextContainer>
              <elementText elementTextId="377734">
                <text>IBCC Digital Archive</text>
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                  <text>Pittwood, John</text>
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                  <text>Ten items. The collection concerns Flight Sergeant John Pittwood (b. 1923, 1291454 Royal Air Force) and contains his diary, documents and correspondence.  He flew operations as a navigator with 207 Squadron. He was shot down during the operation to Mailly-le-Camp on 3/4 May 1944 and managed to evade and return to the UK.&#13;
&#13;
The collection has been loaned to the IBCC Digital Archive for digitisation by John Pittwood and catalogued by Barry Hunter.</text>
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                  <text>2022-08-27</text>
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                  <text>This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal. </text>
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                  <text>Pittwood, J</text>
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              <text>[underlined] THE DIARY OF AN AIRMAN [/underlined].&#13;
&#13;
This is the diary of an airman who was reported missing after a raid on Mailly-le-camp, France on May 3 &amp; 4th. 1944.&#13;
&#13;
His name is Flight Sgt. John Pittwood who was the Navigator of a Lancaster Bomber.&#13;
&#13;
The pilot Leslie Lizetts (Liz) who was a New Zealander and the rear gunner, Ron Ellis were still in the aircraft when it crashed and both were killed.&#13;
&#13;
The mid gunner Ron Emeny (Curly) was burned very badly about the face attempting to rescue the rear gunner who was trapped in his gun turret.&#13;
&#13;
He dropped in the same field as Jack and he arrived back in England a few weeks after him.&#13;
&#13;
The wirless [sic] operator and the Engineer got back to England after the liberation of France but unfortunately the Engineer has since died.&#13;
&#13;
It has since been learned that the bomb aimer was taken P.O.W. but he is now back in England. (8th May 1945).&#13;
&#13;
[inserted] Warrant Officer J. Pittwood [/inserted]&#13;
&#13;
[page break]&#13;
&#13;
[missing word] 3rd 1944.&#13;
Left base at 10-30pm. For attack on Camp Mailly, crossed English coast at Beechy Head at 11-05pm. expecting to cross back home two hours later. Crossed enemy coast at 11-15pm. arrived over base at exactly midnight. An aircraft goes up in front of us on bombing range, flack starts to come close just as Wes closes the bomb doors and Liz puts aircraft into weave. At 12-10am. the port outer engine is set on fire by flack, the order to feather is given but at first the fire refused to douse so Liz gave orders to put on chutes. Later Nick managed to put out fire and we set off for home. Just as we turned onto course fighters came in on us so we abandoned plane at 12-40am.&#13;
&#13;
May 4th.&#13;
I landed lightly in a ploughed field surrounded on three sides by woods and by a road on the fourth. I had not seen any other chutes on the way down and was surprized to see Curly come over to me, he asked me what his face looked like and what I intended to do. I told him to get rid of his chute harness and may west as we were going to make a run for it. We made for the woods and someone called to us, wether [sic] he was French or German we dont know and we didnt stop to ask. Gerry must have known that we were arround [sic] as serchlights [sic] were being played across the ground. Once in the woods we decided to move south and get as far away from the aircraft as possible, so guided by the stars we started our first trek towards freedom. The woods were thick and we got covered with scratches but they gave us a first class cover and they lasted for several miles. We eventually came to a clearing and found ourselves along side a railway, it was as light as day and I kept praying that clouds would cover the moon but no such luck. A train was in sight heading north so we lay low at the edge of the forest, our hearts beating like thunder, and every snap of a twig sounded like an explosion. As soon as the train had passed we crossed the rails, we&#13;
&#13;
[page break]&#13;
&#13;
[missing words] Cont.&#13;
were on a swamp plain and our only way for the next few miles was along the main road so we disguised our uniform as much as possible, burying Curlys outer suit in a well and once again started walking. It was now three o’clock and we were begining [sic] to feel a little more settled and away from the first hue and cry and jerry wouldnt start a proper serch [sic] until morning, so we decided to get as far as possible before five and then find a hiding place for the day. We walked on through a small village, every dog was barking and scaring us to death. Then we approached a town and from the notices on the toll we found out that it was Ferriers. We skirted the town, later to find out that it was a German garrison town, so it was lucky for us that we did not go through. Five o’clock us by a river on the S.E. of the town, so we purified some water and ate a little chocolate and some horlicks tablets, we then lay under the edge to sleep remaining there all day. We were going to carry on walking the following evening but as Curly was in pain we didnt get very far.&#13;
&#13;
May 5th.&#13;
I decided to try a farm to get help for Curly, at first the farmer did not like the idea but after a short while he decided to let us stay in the barn as long as we didnt stay more than one day. He gave us some wine and some bread and what was most welcome something to bath Curlys face. we stayed in the barn that night and the following day but I got little sleep as one of us had to be on watch and Curly was to [sic] ill and was best asleep.&#13;
&#13;
May 6th.&#13;
We decided to move just after midnight as it was obvius [sic] that Curlys face wanted treating by a doctor. We went back to the main road towards Ferriers and called at a big house on the outskirts of the town. They gave us more wine and bread and jam, by this time we were begining [sic] to feel hungry as our last&#13;
&#13;
[page break]&#13;
&#13;
[missing words] Cont.&#13;
meal had been supper on the on the [sic] 3rd. exept [sic] for a few odds and ends. The old lady informed us that Ferriers was a garrison town and that the doctor would probably hand us over, but 17 Kilometers [sic] down the road was La Selle de Bain where the doctor would help us, so off we set for La Selle. We had to travel along the road and it was begining to get light and were still in uniform, we passed several French men going to work but no one stopped us. On approaching La Selle we met a wood man who gave us a drink of cognac and told us to go on a little further and call at another house. After being passed through several houses at each of which we had either wine or cognac. We were eventually taken into the village and by this time all the inhabitants knew we were here and we became the object of a crowd of sightseers. The doctor told us to wait in the cemetry [sic] where a school teacher, the first English speaking person we had met asked us a few questions and then took us to a barn. The doctor dressed Curlys face and after our identity discs told us that we should be taken to the Marquis that evening. The villagers brought us plenty of food and drink and we really ended our hunger. At about 10pm. that night the school teacher and another French man returned and gave us a revolver and a cloak and then took us to the school house where we had our first French coffee (our first warm drink). They explained to us that we had about 12 Kilometers [sic] to go and were taken to a farm. They took us into a back room where there was already a French boy who was on the run from the Gestapo, we were given a good meal and for the first time in four days we were able to get proper sleep.&#13;
&#13;
May 7th.&#13;
After a French breakfast of coffee and rolls we were given civilian clothes and our uniforms etc. were buried and another farmer who was presumably the local boss came to see us and&#13;
&#13;
[page break]&#13;
&#13;
[missing words] cont.&#13;
Dr. Salmon came to see Curly.&#13;
&#13;
[missing number]th. &amp; 9th.&#13;
The doctor decided that his daily visits to see Curly would arouse suspicion so they decided to take him to the doctors house. Sebastion who later became my guide and Georges two students both able to speak English came to interrogate me and told me I should be leaving in two days time for Paris and that I should have to be ready to leave on the Friday.&#13;
&#13;
May 10th.&#13;
Uneventful.&#13;
&#13;
May 11th. Thurs.&#13;
Georges came for me on a motor bike and told me that we were not going direct to Paris as the train was controlled, i.e. passengers checked, but were going by bus to Sens from Montargy and going to Paris the following day. We went by motor bike to a house in Montargy where I was given an identity card and ration cards. After dinner we went to the bus station and it was here that I came into contact with German troops for the first time and I can not say that I felt happy because they were waiting for the same bus as we were. You can imagine how relieved I was to get off that bus at Sens, of all my experiences I think that ride was the worst. As we walked through Sens I seemed to think that every German soldier must recognize me and it was not for quite a few days that I began to cease being afraid. We stayed the night in Sens at a school teachers house.&#13;
&#13;
May 12th. (Ritas Birthday)&#13;
We went by train to Paris Garde L’Est by tube to Garre de Lion, the tube is always full of German soldiers and here I made my first boob, I knocked down a German rifle and picking it up I said “Sorry” but luckily he didnt catch on. We then went by train to Lagny, where I was to stay untill [sic] May 26th. Sebastion took me to a house where I met the local resistance chief another school teacher and was then taken&#13;
&#13;
[page break]&#13;
&#13;
[missing word] 12th. cont.&#13;
to the next village where I met Sgt. John Pearce a rear gunner also shot down at Mailly. It was grand to talk to an Englishman. Later I was taken to 13 Rue de la Paix, Lagny, Seine et Marne, where I met Marguerite and Bert Cane, Mdme [sic] Rheti and the two girls M and Mdme Boutte were also there. We had a good talk with Bert doing all the translating. I was given some new clothes and was able to have a bath, I was shown my bedroom which was next to the nursery and had a big French window looking onto the woods and my instructions were that in any emergency I was to go into the woods.&#13;
&#13;
May 13th.&#13;
Had my first visit to Paris where I met Georges, saw Notre Dame, Les Invalides and saw for the first time German horse drawn traffic which reminded me of the films of the Civil War. The Americans bombed Orly. Sebastion told me that Curlys face was healing quickly and he was returning to the farm at La Choppilles.&#13;
&#13;
May 14th.&#13;
Went to Bamper to see Sgt. Pearce spent the morning on the Marne and chopping wood for the bakery, this exercise was very welcome. We went for a drink with John and the Captain, the bar was full of Luftwaffe personel [sic] but captain didnt seem to worry.&#13;
&#13;
May 15th.&#13;
Went to the Cinema with Marguerite and Mdme Rheti.&#13;
&#13;
May 16th.&#13;
S/Ldr. Sparks controller at Mailly came to Dampar. We went for a drink together. Hank shot down from Thunderbolt, stays in Lagny. Cafe Yoche is becoming quite allied. John, Sparks and Mdme Boutte came to No. 13. Later a French man who had been in prison with came to stop with us. Chief came to see me and he introduced me to the Gardener who was a member of the&#13;
&#13;
[page break]&#13;
&#13;
[missing words]th cont.&#13;
underground, this was the first time that he knew we were in the house, neither did he know what Cane was.&#13;
&#13;
May 17th.&#13;
Attended a conference of the local F.F.I. at the school house. I was informed that at a minutes notice an army of 10,000 men all armed could be raised in the Paris, Leine et Marne area. This little party was a credit to any country The Chief, his wife, Bert, Sebastion, two more boy students and two girl students discussed supply, dropping what arms and ammo were needed, distribution of weapons and technical points of new weapons. The girls spoke like experienced armourers. These were the first indications that final preparations were being made for the invasion.&#13;
&#13;
May 18th-22nd.&#13;
Remained at No. 13, and saw John each night.&#13;
&#13;
May 23rd.&#13;
Rosie came to see us and gave us the Gen about the second front. She also told us that they were trying to arrange for an A/C or boat to pick us up.&#13;
&#13;
May 24th.&#13;
Agent disappears after landing by air from London so plans are altered and we are to go into Spain.&#13;
&#13;
May 25th.&#13;
John Sparks and I go to Paris and wait for Rosie in the park near to Garre de L’Est. We were then taken to Georges where we did another sight seeing tour, we were introduced to an officer of the Paris Gendarmerie, the men who led the barricades battles.&#13;
&#13;
May 26th.&#13;
We met at Petaine school where 7 Yanks and 6 English men were given new identity cards and Railway travel permits. We were to catch the 9-30 train from Paris to Toulouse and from there by local train to Pau where we are to wait on some open ground near the station untill [sic] we are picked up. (this was to be the worst journey I have ever had) We split up into twos&#13;
&#13;
[page break]&#13;
&#13;
[missing words]th. cont.&#13;
and made our way to the station. Luckily by this time we had begun to disregard the Germans. When we arrived at the station we found that our train was in and it was fairly crowded and once again we began to feel uncomfortable. We were expecting to be on the train anything from twenty four to fourty [sic] eight hours and on the train were thirteen people who couldnt talk French so we would just have to hope that no one would try to make conversation with us. We stayed in the corridors and although we kept in twos and threes I felt that it must be obvious that we were a party and the way we whispered to one another must have seemed suspicious. There were many German Soldiers, Sailors and Luftwaffe on the platform. The rear of our train was a troop train and the train opposite was going to the west coast and was mainly loaded with troops. They would walk up and down the platform yelling at porters and pushing aside any Frenchman who happened to be in the way and the Frenchmen after looking around would spit at them after they had passed. Eventually at about 8p.m. we left Paris and about an hour later we reached Juvessy which a month ago had been attacked by the R.A.F. and boy you would have to see it to believe it, I had seen Villeneuve St. George, La Chappelle, where twenty out of twenty three bridges had been knocked down and also Neusy La Lec which had been badly knocked about, but Juvessy beat the lot, it wasn’t crators or broken tracks and smashed trains, it was one great tumult just like a garden after it had been dug over. It was four hours later before we left Juvessy. We were moved part way by electric train part way by steam and in the middle they borrowed the engine to shunt some goods waggons across. The French people seemed used to this they just got out of the train and strolled around untill the controller told them that we were moving. We took the opportunity of eating something. Evenually [sic] we started to move again so John and I lay in the corridor to get some sleep. It was just after we woke up that I had one of my greatest&#13;
&#13;
[page break]&#13;
&#13;
[missing words]hcon.&#13;
heartbeats, a Gendarme came over to me and asked me something in French all I caught was the end bit “La on La” and luckily I knew this meant there or there so I just pointed and said La and luckily I was right. We arrived at Toulouse at 7pm. on Saturday night and we had to change trains to reach our final destination which was Pau. On Toulouse station we had what I think was our last greatest real scare, we followed our Guide on to the electric trains and just as it was about to go out he found that it was the wrong train so we all got out and tore up the platform and for about a quater [sic] of an hour we ran about trying to find our train. When we did get on the right train we found out that it was only going as far as Yarbes and at Yarbes a porter asked us for our tickets and started talking to us but luckily he was a friendly and he locked us in a room untill our right train did come in. In the morning from Yarbes we could see the Pyrennies [ sic] clearly and they looked rather high to climb. We arrived at Pau and waited for our contacts as instructed and for the first time the whole thirteen, lucky thirteen for us, were together. We must have looked a sight we had eaten a boiled egg and two sandwiches in the last fourty [sic] eight hours, we were unshaven and hadnt had a wash, we were in old clothes and we were all very tired. After waiting for over two hours no contact had turned up so the Guides went out to see what had happened and it was another three hours before they came back so we all split up and I went into a nearby hotel with a fellow called Rosie.&#13;
&#13;
May 27th.&#13;
We all met again and went to a farm about four miles out of town and stayed in a disused house. It was here that we got to know about each other, Sparks Johny Ginger and myself were all from the Mailly raid, Rhodesia a Typhoon pilot who had crash landed only a few days ago, Junior, Canack and Bill had bailed out about the same time as I had, this was all the R.A.F. boys. Hank Dillingger had been in France about 15 months and twice&#13;
&#13;
[page break]&#13;
&#13;
[missing words] cont.&#13;
ran out by the Gestapo, he was called Dillinger because of his hunted look, Rebel a southener [sic] who was knocked down in his first flight from a Mustang, Lucky and Harry were from Fortresses and Slim was from a Liberator. Although it had been planned that there should be no waiting in Pau I think that these few days together did us a lot of good, it gave us some much needed rest and enabled us to get to know each other. We were here four days and spent the time telling experiences playing cards and preparing as well as possible for our climb, we washed our clothes and several changed shoes to get the best fit. Our food was brought up from the farm and although it was very rough we ate well. We cleared the house out and lay on straw and apart from complaints of mice running around we all slept very well. There were plenty of cherries to be picked and we also drank our first mountain water. Rosie and a Frenchman came to see us and brought us some Lucky Strike cigarettes, Cognac and some cube sugar.&#13;
&#13;
May 31st. &#13;
We left the Farm in small parties for Pau where we were to catch a bus to Lasserex where taxis would take us to the point where we were to start our climb, when they said taxis we thought they had gone mad even in Paris a taxis was a museum piece, but somehow they had one waiting for us. We boarded the bus at Pau, I have never seen a bus so crowded, in this country conductors complain when there are five or six people standing, but this was a thirty two seater single decker bus inside there were about fourty five people and there were in between twenty and thirty people on top and behind there was a pig cart which some passengers had hitched on, there were even people riding on that. The bus was driven by coke and every time it hit a bump we left red hot coke lying on the road. The conductor knew who we were and he was to open the rear door when we arrived at a given place, by the time we were to leave I think everyone knew who we were&#13;
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[missing words]. Cont.&#13;
and they were saying “bonne Chane” and “bonne Voyage” as we left the bus. Six of us got into the taxis and we went about fifteen miles to the foot of the Pyrenees and then it went back for the others. We had food for two days two boiled eggs each about a pound of bread each and a pound of chocolate between us, we also had a little meat and cheese. We ate a boiled egg between two and a little bread and we all had a drink of Cognac. It was now ten o’clock and we were to move as soon as it got dark at about midnight and the first night should take us past the German first frontier posts and our danger would then be patrols of dogs and men. Our party consisted of one guide one Frenchman, Charles who had been told to go over with us as his time was up in Paris, seven English men and six Yanks. We left at midnight and for about six miles followed the road and then we took to the the [sic] fields, we had to cover twenty miles the first night but it wasnt bad going and we reached our shelter at about five o’clock in the morning, it was an old cowshed. We were just past the frontier posts but the shed was in full view of them and we were not allowed outside at all. If everything had gone well we should have had ten hours the followin [sic] night and then there would be four hours the evening after, but the mountains which had for weeks been clear became cloud covered and it started to pour with rain. When darkness came we all cut ourselves sticks and started again, and to make things worse we had our first range before us, the tracks had become marl and instead of doing five or six miles an hour we were doing from 200 to 400 yards. We were soon covered in mud and we were drenched to the skin. The top of the ridge brought us no respite as the desent [sic] was even worse, we slipped time and time again but by keeping together we prevented anyone one [sic] from slipping down the hill. At three o’clock we came to a hut and as we had no chance of reaching the next shelter we decided to pack in and and [sic] stay there form the day. I doubt if we could have gone much&#13;
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farther anyhow and I was glad of the rest, and Dille who in his fifteen monthe [sic] of captivity had had very little exercize [sic] was in a very weak state. We had very little food and the guide went to see if he could get any. He was unsuccessful at first but later he managed to get a can of soup which was warm and was very welcome, we ate a little bread with it and this left us with two eggs and some sugar and cognac and luckily we decided to keep this as long as we could. We were very uncomfortable here so as soon as it began to get dusk we started to move on again. Charles who had done a lot of mountaineering helped Dille along, the rain had stopped but we were still in the misty wet bottam [sic] of the clouds and the climbing got stiffer but we knew that once we were over this lot we should not be long before getting back to Blighty. We came to an almost vertical bank of clay which seemed impossible to climb but the guide got up and tied a rope to a tree and we were soon moving ahead again. We found a few cherries and there was plenty of water to drink. We rested the next day at a goatsmans hut and the following night we reached what should have been our shelter the second night. Several times we heard dogs barking but never saw anything of a patrol. The fifth night was fairly level going but owing to the mist we were very slow and we moved in crocodile fashion. We stumbled quite a few times and each time I managed to put my hand on nettles, we also crossed several streams but now we were so wet that we just waded through them, then we came to a river with two or three farm houses alongside and from the bushes the guide swung a kind of bridge across it was rather flimsy but it got us across. Later we reached a hut and stayed there, we now had one more ridge to cross. We chopped up the last egg and had this to eat with some meat paste.&#13;
&#13;
6th June.&#13;
We started out just after midnight but the going wasnt rough it was grass, fairly steep and slippery and perhaps because it&#13;
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[missing words]. cont.&#13;
was the last lap it seemed to go on for ever. We crossed the first boundry [sic] at 4-15am. we were now in no mans land and at 6-10am. we crossed into Spain. We were now decending [sic] but the mist was freezing on our clothes and although it was June snow was falling. We found a little hut, lit a fire and dried our clothes a little and then pushed off towards the nearest village. Hank Junior Lucky and I went on ahead and were going fine even the sun was begining [sic] to shine. From behind the hedges there came two soldiers with guns we thought they were jerries but they turned out to be Spaniards, they lit us a fire and we waited for the rest. We were then taken to ISABA where we were taken to jail and they promised us a meal and about two hours later they came in with a great bowl of potatoes and a spoon each, but it was very welcome.&#13;
&#13;
June 7th.&#13;
We were taken by bus to Pamplona where we were handed over to the consul and then to the Spanish Air Force. Afterwards we were sent to the British Embassy in Madrid, I shall never forget that journey on account of the beggars asking for food or money. I have never seen so many poor people, that is fascism for you, everything for the few. We were given some money and we stayed at an hotel. The food was awful everything was floating in olive oil, we showed the cheff [sic] how to make cherry pie. Later we went to a Bull fight and nearly caused a riot because we would not give the Fascist salute. The Spaniards were not very friendly to us. After a time we were sent to Gibralter [sic] and eventually we got a plane home.</text>
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                <text>Jack's diary of events after his aircraft was shot down over France.</text>
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                <text>This content is available under a CC BY-NC 4.0 International license (Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0). It has been published ‘as is’ and may contain inaccuracies or culturally inappropriate references that do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the University of Lincoln or the International Bomber Command Centre. For more information, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ and https://ibccdigitalarchive.lincoln.ac.uk/omeka/legal.</text>
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