Interview with Reginald Walter Jordan. Three.

Interview with Reginald Walter Jordan. Three.

Liberator pilot Reg Jordan flew with 356 Squadron on the Burma Campaign. Returning from one operation his rear gunner recognised a Japanese fighter beside them performing acrobatics. This was part of a decoy operation as the other Japanese fighters attacked the squadron from the other direction. Returning from another operation the crew realised their bombs were still on the aircraft and so he turned the aircraft around and they completed the operation. Reg and his crew also took part in direct Army support in the region. As Reg and his crew were approaching the end of their tour the government extended the length of tours which had a serious effect on the mental health of many crews.

Taken from video.

2019-11-24

00:31:39 Audio Recording

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AJordanRW191124

TO: Would you be able to cover that section please?
RJ: Yeah [pause] So am I reading from here?
TO: Yes. From where it says, “Fighters,” please.
RJ: Ok. Side heading, “Fighters. Fighters.” On the 22nd of October we flew as a number two in a box of four aircraft to renew the attack on the port of Mawlamyine. The squadron put up between twelve and sixteen aircraft that day and our box was part of a much larger formation. To eliminate unnecessary fatigue we were briefed to follow the standard practice of flying in cloud but over enemy territory, I’ll have to read, I’ll have to re-read that piece I’m afraid. To eliminate unnecessary fatigue we were briefed to follow the standard practice of flying in loose formation whilst in friendly airspace except when penetrating cloud over enemy territory to tighten up for mutual protection. The weather was bright and clear and except for some well broken cumulonimbus cloud to that extent enroute to the target. I remember feeling quite exposed between [pause] I’ll re-read that piece again. I remember feeling quite exposed without the cloud cover which had masked our approach on earlier raids. As we neared the target we again saw American Liberator formations high above us also heading for Mawlamyine and I wondered what suitable bombsight they were using that they could be so confident of hitting the target from that altitude. We found it difficult enough from thousands of feet lower down. I also found myself envying their superb station keeping which I attributed rightly or wrongly to their special [fingertip] controls which I mentioned earlier.
TO: OK. Can you carry on from —
RJ: Over the target we encountered heavy anti-aircraft fire. Several of our machines including my own receiving superficial damage. Alright?
TO: Can you carry on? Yeah.
RJ: Yeah. Several [pause] I’ll have to re-read it. Over the target we encountered heavy anti-aircraft fire. Several of our machines including my own receiving superficial damage. Our station keeping however remained good and it was annoying to hear Joe [Carbury] report that the whole of our formation’s bomb pattern had overshot the target. As usual we had followed the practice of taking our point of bomb release as our line of attack from the overall leader. On subsequent practice, pardon me, I’ll just read that. On subsequent pattern bombing raids [pause – pages turning] As a result of this debacle each individual air bomber calculated his own point of release so that we never again risked compounding an error on the part of the leader whether it was due to the human miscalculation or on equipment malfunction. Some lessons were learned the hard way. Do you want me to carry on?
TO: Yes, please.
RJ: By the time the enemy fighters struck we were already well out over the Gulf of Martaban on our return journey and our formation had begun to loosen up. Suddenly there was an excited cry from Ted Holmes, my rear gunner of, ‘Fighters. Fighters.’ Nothing resembling numbers, position or range. ‘Where? How many?’ I snapped back. In the meantime with the adrenalin flowing I slammed over the throttles to get back into close formation. ‘One fighter nine o’clock level. Three hundred yards,’ came the reply. Glancing left there it was. A single radial engine machine, jungle green in colour not closing in to attack but performing aerobatics of all things. Just then with no more than a few wingspans separating, now separating our aircraft two Japanese fighters ripped through our gaggle from above spraying us with machine gun fire as they did so. The joker on our left had been a decoy. By now the adrenalin was really buzzing. Any moment surely another attack would come but could I get back into my position? No. Someone had grabbed it. Question should I slot in just anywhere or might this lead to a misunderstanding and a possible collision. I felt it might so I closed alongside my lodger inviting him to give way. He did but reluctantly and later we had words. No further attacks came but we had learned our lesson. For the remainder of our passage through enemy airspace hardly a wingspan separated us. Fortunately none of our crews were injured by the attack and damage to those aircraft hit was minimal. The Americans had been less fortunate however. Shortly after the attack we saw two pillars of dense black smoke rising from the waters of the Gulf. For their check, bravado and, for their cheek I should say, for their cheek, bravado and professionalism it was impossible not to admire our attackers for the way they had the deployed, the decoy had positioned himself [pause] I’ll read that again. Sorry about that. For the check, bravado, for their cheek I beg your pardon, bravado and professionalism it was impossible not to admire our attackers for the way the way the decoy had positioned himself down the side of us out of range of our guns and drawn our attention to him with his aerobatics whilst the remaining, while the rest of his, while the rest of his formation manoeuvred in to attack us from above and out of the sun. And the attack itself in which they had not pussy footed around on the edge of our formation or concentrated their attack on a straggler but bore straight through the middle of our loose gaggle. Had they been equipped with cannon they could have hardly have failed to nail one or two of us or maybe they were equipped with cannon and had used up that part of their ammunition on those unfortunate Americans. The ones we had seen burning below in the bay. Being attacked by the fighters twenty minutes or so after delivering our bombs was hardly something we expected but the underlying lesson for loosening up our formation too soon was the general absence of enemy fighters over Burma at that time and the lack of vigilance which had begun to breed in us. Or the lack of vigilance which this had begun to breed in us. To preserve their aircraft from Allied attack the Japanese normally kept [unclear] daylight raids action bringing them forward on an ad hoc basis. The fact that they attacked well out from the target on our way home classically the role of the fighter is to destroy the bomber formation before it reaches its target. It was almost certainly they were operating from a rearward base. This aerial encounter reflected little credit on us revealing as it did a weakness in our tactics and procedures and we could certainly count ourselves fortunate in receiving a salutary lesson at virtually no cost. Our deficiencies went beyond bad defensive formation keeping for which I accept my full share of blame. Speaking for my crew at least there was Ted’s lapse of composure when reporting the presence of fighters so that for a few precious seconds the rest of us had no idea of numbers and position etcetera etcetera. Finally there was confusion and the delay caused by someone grabbing my position and insisting for some time in holding on to it.
TO: Thank you.
[recording paused]
TO: Just this part here please. If you could start there.
[pause]
RJ: We made good landfall west of [unclear] and having crossed the Gulf of Martaban we made another one on the Tenasserim coastline. Our original brief was to pinpoint our position on the Gulf of Siam coastline and to run into the target from there. But as I saw it if our colleagues ahead of us had done their job properly we should be able to make a direct approach on to the fires started by their incendiaries. So it proved. We first saw the fires from thirty to forty miles away. Clearly the target had already received a fair pasting. Later we learned that fifteen aircraft of 159 Squadron had joined in the attack. Nearing the target I disposed the crews to their stations for the bombing run reminding Joe [Carbury] of the need to identify the target as such and not to merely aim at the fires. We were still some five minutes from the bomb release point when a number of bluish searchlights stabbed the darkness which judging from the immediate accuracy appeared to be radar guided. Almost immediately we were subjected to a lively barrage of anti-aircraft fire which persisted with some intensity until we had released our bombs and with some minutes out bound from the target. Do you want me to carry on?
TO: Yes, please.
RJ: On the bombing run itself the noise of the ack ack shells had sounded like a giant whip lashing the fuselage. There was also a good deal of turbulence and at the same time I also [pause] I’ll read that again. There was also a good deal of turbulence and at this time I also attributed this to the gunfire. On cooler reflection it was almost certainly due to the heat from the fires below. Nevertheless it was all rather distracting. This also no doubt because the defences had only one target to deal with. Clear of the Bangkok defences I asked Ted Holmes and Red Rigby if our bombs had hit the target. Ted because the view from the rear turret was like, was the equivalent of a seat in the Grand Circle and Red perhaps at midships he had a splendid view of either beam. From either beam hatch. At first both seemed vague about our results but Red finally said he was sure the fires had been stoked up by our attack. From the bomb aimer’s station Joe confirmed that his release indicator had registered the proper release of our bombs. I was a bit disappointed not to hear more conclusive evidence of our success but decided to wait until Bangkok was well behind us before pursuing a more explicit report. The accuracy of the searchlights and the gunfire had surprised me and I thought it more than possible that some sophistication might be accompanied by the presence of night fighters. I impressed this view on the gun positions and Jack and I, and Jack and I put the cockpit lighting right down so as to blackout the aircraft as far as possible. This in spite of the fact that our aircraft was viewed. This in spite of the fact that viewed from above and behind a white hot engine turbine disc would have made a wonderful homing beacon. Well out from the target, almost an hour on our homeward journey I felt I could indulge in a more detailed chat about our bombing results. At this stage Ted was still in his turret and Red was caressing his five-inch, point five-inch machine gun in the rear position. By now I had begun to entertain the nagging thought that we might have dropped our bombs without triggering their fuses. Otherwise surely Ted or Red or both would have seen the target erupt more positively. Ted maintained his reticence and on this occasion even Red could not find the words to reassure me. I could wait no longer to dispel my doubts and instructed Terry [unclear], my wireless operator to enter the bomb bay and physically to check that the fusing links had been retained by our bombs when our bombs were released. It was, if this was the case then our bombs had indeed been properly armed and my doubts would be removed. The intercom burst into life. It was Terry giving me the message that even I had not foreseen. Our bombs were still on board. Pushing aside protests about lighting up the aircraft over enemy territory I had Terry switch on the bomb bay lights and turning in my seat I looked aft through the trap door into the bomb bay. Row upon row of undelivered ordinands stared back at me and I sprung into action. First I asked Red if we had enough fuel to return to the target and still reach Chittagong the nearest friendly base. He thought we had. Next whilst Red was coming forward to fine tune that reply I turned the aircraft about to head roughly towards Bangkok and asked Jock to work out a proper heading. Before this turnabout we had almost reached [unclear] on the Tenasserim Coast so Jock could pinpoint from which to correct on my heading. At this point Joe came up with the idea of bombing a target on the way home. I’m afraid my reply was more than a bit rough. Provided we had the fuel I was in no mood to compromise. Red had to join me on the flight back and checking his arithmetic I agreed with his assessment that we could make Chittagong with a safe margin enemy action permitting. Fifty minutes later the enemy defences gave us the mixture as before. Just as active but mercifully still lacking that final degree of accuracy. By contrast our own methods represented an orderly, an order of improvement as we [pause] I can’t read that. I agreed with his assessment that we could make Chittagong with a safe margin enemy action permitting. Fifty minutes later the defences gave us the same mixture as before. Just as active but mercifully still lacking the final degree of accuracy. By contrast our own methods represented an order of improvement virtually contrived to remove every possible [pause] every possibility of another aborted attack. Terry was now in the bomb bay squatting on the catwalk and plugged into the intercom. Immediately following the bomb release the bombs jettisoned and was operated. Terry physically watched the bombs leave the aircraft and finally the fact on the intercom and for good measure on receiving Terry’s call I flew the aircraft into a turn and personally observed the results. On this occasion our results were good. Were really good although Jack’s log earlier had born a similar remark in an entry recorded almost two hours earlier. Ok?
TO: Yeah.
[recording paused]
TO: Thank you.
[pause]
RJ: Yes, that gives a nice sort of setting for it doesn’t it? Direct support for the Army. Do you want me to record that?
TO: Yes, please. Yes.
RJ: So am I doing it now?
TO: Yes please. Yes.
RJ: Direct support for the 14th Army. In the second week of January 1945 the priorities for the Strategic Air Force, the SAF were influenced by a new factor. The 14th Army was approaching the River Irrawaddy along the front of over two hundred miles and for their part the Japanese gave every indication of offering stubborn resistance along this defensive feature. With both sides aware that from early May the Irrawaddy would increase substantially in width and speed the stage was set for an opposed crossing at an early date. From this point until the end of September, I beg your pardon, I must read that again. From this point until the end of February SAF, that’s the Strategic Air Force switched a good deal of effort from the long-range interdiction of strategic supply routes to operations in direct support of our Army in the field. For my crew this phase of direct support for the Army opened on the 13th of January with an attack on Japanese barracks in Mandalay. Not close support as such but a softening up of troops which might be called on to oppose our crossing of the Irrawaddy. A number of Strategic Air Force close support sorties were flown during January. Our troops being only eight hundred yards from the target area for instance. General Slim, the 14th Army commander personally witnessed some of SAF’s pattern bombing attacks from close support targets such as artillery positions defending the [pause] I’ll read part of it again. General Slim the 14th Army commander personally witnessed some of SAF’s pattern bombing attacks on close support targets such as artillery positions describing the results as magnificent in his signals at the time. Later in his personal account of the Burma Campaign in his book, “Defeat into Victory,” he again made generous reference to these SAF operations and since I was never near the receiving end of these attacks and he was I think his description of them as earthquake bombings can be taken as something of a fair description.
TO: Can you read a little bit more about the, I think there is attacks on bridges in there.
[pause]
TO: Or maybe it’s the railway.
[pause]
RJ: Right. Aside from these direct support operations January was something of a mixed bag for 231 Group. Among the gains the standard of bombing accuracy was greatly improved following December’s training phase. SAF squadrons including 355 and 356 Squadrons gave support to the invasion of Ramree Island off the Arakan coast as airfields were successfully attacked. On this occasion with P-47s Thunderbolt fighters as escort. On the debit side 358 Liberator squadron which had formed a [unclear] heavy bomber unit only two months before and had completed only one bombing attack was removed from the Group Air Order of Battle on becoming a special duty squadron. The Burma Siam Railway was also attacked during January. Nevertheless the Group Operations Record Book for that month expresses concern over the shortage of precise intelligence on the whereabouts of the POW camps which provided the labour force for the railway maintenance and there was a clear wish on our, on the part of the air staff to establish a proper balance between the importance of severing the supply link and to avoid as far as possibly hazarding the prisoners. Does that make sense?
TO: Yeah.
RJ: The apparent lack of firm direction, directive [pause] the apparent lack of a firm directive from higher command relating to the attacks on the Burma Siam Railway added to the air staff’s concern at this stage. For its own, for its own part headquarters 351 Group did its best to ameliorate the position by issuing wings and headquarters sent the 7th Bombardment Group USAF with a map giving them all the details of known POW camps. Does that make sense?
[pause]
RJ: Speaking as an aircraft chap I can say that when attacking the Burma Siam Railway we took great pains to bomb with accuracy and invariably we arranged our directional attack to minimise damage outside the target itself. At the same time as I’ve already indicated our equipment and techniques fell short of being able to guarantee anything like complete accuracy. January also caused the group air staff some anxiety over the supply of Liberator aircrews. Up to that point an operational tour of duty had consisted of three hundred operational flying hours. But the crews from Canada had failed to reach the timescale promised by the UK Air Ministry and our [unclear] chaired by the AOC met to find a solution. The outcome was a decision to fill the gap by increasing the tour of existing crew members to four hundred hours or one year depending whichever came first and that is stipulation being that crews should not operate through more than one southwest monsoon period without a rest. The impact of this decision to extend our personal operational tours did not reach 356 Squadron, that’s my squadron until March by which time a number of us including my crew members, including my own crew were on the brink of tour expiry. That’s the operational tour you fly. For most this was hard to stomach and air crew morale generally took quite a knock. For my own part I was able to accept the extension philosophically but I recall more than one high calibre person coming close to cracking up at the thought of his tour being extended. A flood of tears from a grown man can be very embarrassing. It was as though some people had subsequently paced themselves to last for a set number of hours on operations and an eleventh hour of change in the rules was the last straw. Ok. I’ve done enough I think.