History of 84 Squadron from 3 January 1942 - 7 March 1942

History of 84 Squadron from 3 January 1942 - 7 March 1942

A detailed history of 84 Squadron over a two month period.
There is a second, different, history.

Eight and eleven printed sheets

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[underlined] HISTORY OF 84 SQUADRON FROM 3.1.42 – 7.3.42 [/underlined]

84 SQUADRON was withdrawn from the Western Desert on 3.1.42 in order to re-equip to transfer to the Far East, Aircraft were flown to Heliopolis and personnel were posted to the Almaza Transit Camp. This camp was found to be unsatisfactory and the airman [sic] were accommodated in squadron tentage on the edge of Heliopolis aerodrome.

The squadron was re-equiped [sic] with 24 I.E. aircraft which meant raising the establishment to 484 ground staff and 33 complete air crews. As no person approaching the end of his overseas tour was to proceed to the Far East a considerable number of the original personnel were posted away.

[inserted] W/C [/inserted] C.D. BOYCE handed over command of the squadron to W/C J.R. JEUDWIN [sic] on 5.1.42.

Representatives of 206 (Maintenance) Group inspected the squadron’s aircraft on 5.1.42 and passed ten fit for further service. These were completely overhauled by B.A.R.U. at Heliopolis and were ready by 11.1.42. The fourteen aircraft required to bring the squadron up to strength were collected from 103 and 108 M.U.’s on 12/1, 13/1, 14/1. All aircraft were fitted with a 55 gallon overload petrol tank, carried in the bomb bay, whose contents had to be pumped into the main tanks by a Zwicky pump fitted on the starboard side of the pilot’s cockpit. These tanks were fitted for operation “CRUSADER” which was to locate the aircraft H.M.S. INDOMITABLE off the coast of Java and excort [sic] Hurricanes to a shore base.

The air party left in four sections on 14/1. 15/1, 16/1. and 17/1. Each aircraft carried two passengers besides the crew, together with kits, spares, and tool kits, the all up weight of each aircraft being 14,800 lbs. The route followed was Heliopolis – Habbaniya – Bahrein – Sharja – Karachi – Calcutta – (via Bombay – Hyderabad – or Allahabad) – Tounghoo [sic] – Rangoon – (Mingaladoon or Zayet Kwein) – Lho’nga (Sumatra) – Medan – Palembang (K.L.M. aerodrome). The C.O. left on 16/1, and by making the first two stages Heliopolis – Shaibah (via Habbaniya) and Shaibah – Karachi (via Sharja) caught No.2 formation at Karachi, and managed to catch No. 1 formation at Calcutta.

Aerodromes and servicing facilities were as follows:-

Habbaniya Very good. Bombay Good.
Shaibah Very good. Hyderabad Good.
Bahrein Good. Allahabad Good.
Sharja Good. Calcutta Bad.
Karachi Excellent. Tounghoo Bad.
Rangoon Bad. Medan Adequate.
Lho’nga Poor. Palembang Poor.

Crews were briefed at Cairo (A.H.Q. Egypt), Habbaniya, Karachi, Calcutta, and Rangoon. The stage Rangoon – Lho’nga was via the Andamans and Nicobars, and BURGROUP had no information to impart. Also the position of Lho’nga was incorrectly plotted, and although a correction was sent by signal from Sumatra no notice was taken of it and this faulty briefing caused the loss of one 84 Squadron’s aircraft and one of 211 Squadron’s.

On the arrival of the first formation at Lho’nga, where briefing was expected for the final stage to Singapore, orders were received that the squadron was to proceed to Palembang. No maps [deleted word] were held of this area, which was south of the equator, and none were available. Eventually one small motoring map of Sumatra was procured and this had to suffice.

Owing to the size of Lho’nga aerodrome aircraft only took on enough fuel to reach Medan, also a small aerodrome, where sufficient petrol was taken for the flight to Palembang.

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At Medan S/Ldr. PASSMORE ran into a badly filled in bomb crater and did slight damage to his aircraft. Because of the delay in sending spares from Singapore, there being none in Sumatra, he was there 17 days before the aircraft was made serviceable.

The most noticeable thing at the aerodrome in Sumatra was the general nervousness, approaching panic. Steel helmets were worn continuously, and the arrival of aircraft was viewed with apprehension in case an air raid should follow. When the first formation landed in Medan the refuelling party could not work fast enough to get the aircraft ready for departure, and the officer in charge was beside himself with anxiety when S/Ldr. PASSMORE’s aircraft got stuck in the middle of the aerodrome.

The first five aircraft arri[missing letter]ed at Palembang (P.1) on 23/1. P/O MACDONALD became separated from the formation and forced landed about 100 miles be-yond Palembang in a river, where he and his crew and passengers were picked up by natives and returned to civilisation. Owing to the build of the members of the party and to the fact that they had some Indian 2-anna pieces with them, the first report of their safsty [sic] was that some ‘tall men with big feet and square money’ had been picked up.

The organisation of the R.A.F. in Sumatra was then in its infancy. Group Captain BISHOP was in command, later superseded by Air Commodore HUNTER, and except for on S/Ldr. in the operations room, the rest of the staff were A. and S.D. Officers, most of whom had lived in Malaya for a considerable time and who had no experience of the R.A.F. This lack of trained officers and the inability of the various heads of departments to make a decision consequent upon their ignorance of Service matters, was largely responsible for the muddles and delays which occurred. There were no spares, insufficient refuelling facilities, insufficient armament stocks, and an almost complete lack of transport. During the whole of the squadron’s stay in Sumatra the only transport which could be obtained was one decrepit 16-seater bus on loan from the Dutch, which was not obtained until early February.

The plan for 84 Squadron was that it should be based at P.1. with the air crews and maintenance personnel, with the exception of a small maintenance party, quartered in the town which was some 8 miles away from the aerodrome. Accommodation was to be in schools, and the one in which the squadron air crews lived had been designed for a maximum of forty boarders including staff. In this were crammed the air crews of three squadrons and the ground staff of one squadron. Conditions were appalling. Cooking arrangements were inadequate and the only means of getting a meal was to go to an hotel where the prices were exorbitant. Crews slept on mattresses on the ground, and it was not possible to rig mosquito nets. Luckily the area was non-malarial but the mosquitos were very troublesome. If anyone was away for the night on operations, he would find on his return that his mattress had been taken by someone else, and quarrels over sleeping space were frequent. The sanitary arrangements, also inadequate, soon broke down, and it was only by good fortune that there was no epidemic. There was however, considerable sickness from gastric complaints.

The small maintenance party was to be stationed at P.2. a satellite aerodrome 42 miles by road from the town and across a river [inserted] / [/inserted] where there was a ferry service but no bridge. Conditions here were extremely bad, there being very little accommodation and at times no food at all. The men’s billets were 1 1/2 – 2 miles away from the squadron dispersal area and as no transport was available until early February, much time was wasted in walking between billets and the aircraft.

The maintenance party’s duties were to service and inspect the aircraft as necessary. All u/s aircraft were to be kept at P.2. In addition they were to handle the serviceable aircraft which were to be flown from P.1 to P.2. at

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dawn each day for dispersal, and back to P.1. at dusk. This left very little work for the party at P.1. which was to comprise the bulk of the squadron, but when this was pointed out, it was stated that owing to the limited accomodation [sic] at P.2 the arrangements would have to stand. As the only ground personnel available during the squadron‘s stay in Sumatra were the passengers in the aircraft there were none to spare for P.1, and only on two occasions were aircraft sent there from P.2 for the night. On the second occasion the Japanese made a dawn raid on P.1 and three of our aircraft were destroyed, after which this arrangement was not observed.

In spite of all the drawbacks the ground personnel under F/Sgts. SLEE and BARKER did a most excellent job of work and no praise can be high enough for them. No help could be obtained from the other squadrons, most of whom were R.A.A.F. and whose personnel were discourteous, dishonest, undisciplined, and completely lacking in morale. 84 Squadron’s morale was perfect, and this squadron and 211 Squadron, which was also sent out from the Middle East, were the only bomber squadrons which showed any intention of fighting.

It was found on arrival at Palembang that 34 Squadron from Singapore had been fitted and detailed for operation “CRUSADER”. Their state of serviceability, however, was such that two of 84 Squadron’s aircraft were required, and these were flown to Batavia by F/Lts WYLLIE and HOLLAND on 25/1, although all aircraft urgently needed 40 hour inspections after their flight from Egypt. Our two aircraft were the third pair off on the operation and the first pair to find the carrier, the proceeding pairs having failed to find the ship in spite of perfect weather.

On the afternoon of 25/1 five crews from 84 Squadron were sent in reputedly serviceable Mk. I Blenheims belonging to another squadron to attack a Japanese landing at Endau. 84 Squadron’s aircraft had been put on 40 hour inspection and could not be made serviceable in time. Owing to delays in bombing up, the aircraft could only get as far as Singapore when darkness fell and all landed safely at Sembawang. This turned out to be very fortunate as the oil consumption of two of the aircraft was so heavy that they would have force landed on their way back from the target. The three others carried out a night raid on Kuantan on 26/1 and the party returned to P.2 on 28/1. In the absence of the C.O on this operation, two of 84 Squadrons aircraft had been handed to two Hudson pilots who had flown Mk.I Blenheims some time ago but not Mk. IV, to carry out a recconnaissance [sic], and one had been crashed on landing at Tengah (Singapore) and written off.

While at Sembawang some very illuminating glimpses were abtained [sic] of the conditions in Singapore island. The aerodrowm [sic] had been bombed, but no very serious damage appeared to have been done. There were a number of craters on the aerodrome, but one strip had not been hit. [deleted] There were a number of craters on the aerodrome, but no [/deleted] There was no effort being made to fill in these craters or clear up any debris, in fact the most remarkable thing about the station was the absence of personnel during daylight hours. The explanation was as follows: the Japanese were sending three raids a day against the island, the first raid coming over about 10.00 hours. At about 09.30 hours, the yellow warning would be broadcast round the camp, whereupon the great majority of the personnel, officers included, left the camp and hid in the rubber, most of them remaining there all day. There was no system of spotters and insufficient slit trenches round the camp. Native labour of course was almost unobtainable, but no effort was being made to get the airmen to repair damage or dig trenches.

All operation records were unfortunately lost in the series of evacuations which took place from Sumatra ad Java, but operations from P.2 were against Ipoh, Singora, Penang, the Anambas, and against Japanese troop transports off Sumatra. Of the 24 aircraft which left Egypt, 16 arrived at Palembang, 3 arrived in Sumatra but never reached Palembang, 2 crashed on the way out, one with fatal results, and the remaining three were held up by defects and never got beyond

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Burma before the route was closed. Of the 16 which arrived, two were crashed on arrival, one was crashed by a Hudson pilot, and three were destroyed in an air raid the day after they had completed their 40 hour inspection. Thus the greatest number available for operations was never more than 10.

The raids against land targets mentioned above were all carried out by night and all except those against the Anambas were made via Medan, which meant using only experienced night pilots as the aerodrome was so small. The raids from Medan were very tiring. Air crews had to travel the 42 miles to P.2 where they would usually get no lunch, and have to be off the ground by 13.00 hours so as to arrive at Medan before dusk. After about two hours on the ground aircraft would take off for the raid which would take 2 – 4 hours, returning to Medan where a scratch meal and a bed would be provided. Crews would be called in time to have a quick meal and be off the ground at first light and would arrive at P.2 where again there would be no lunch, and at such a time that it was impossible to get any in the town. The day after their return from medan, the operation would be repeated, so every other day crews would fly 10-12 hours to drop 4 x 250 lb bombs on targets about which there was little or no information, have one good meal in 48 hours (for which they would have to pay), and get very little sleep. No one complained. The authorities were asked to [inserted] ALLOW [/inserted] one flight to be detached to Medan, where there were excellent dispersal, and concealment available. This was not approved as (a) there were no bombs at Medan and there was insufficient transport to send any up there, and (b) neither the R.A.F. nor the Dutch wanted aircraft based there in case they shoud [sic] call.

The second raid on the Anambas took place on the night of 11/12/2. [sic] These raid [deleted letter] s involved 6 hours flying and were timed so that the aircraft got back at first light. It was on this raid that our first casualty occurred. The station commander (Group Captain McCauley R.A.A.F.) insisted [inserted] / [/inserted] on the flare path being controlled from the watch office, which had the only telephone on the aerodrome, so that any notification of an impending air raid could be sent by runner to the officer i/c flare-path. In addition, his scheme was for each aircraft in turn to taxi to the takeoff position and switch off. The officer i/c flare-path would then listen for any possible Japanese recconnaissance [sic] aircraft and if none were heard, give the pilot a ‘green! The latter would then start his engines. which was the sign for the flare-path (hurricane lamps) to be lit, and the aircraft would take off. Apart from the impracticability of stopping and restarting the engines of Blenheim aircraft, ordered to take off at two minute intervals, with the flare-path starting from the watch tower the last two flares were hidden by a hump in the aerodrome, and the airman in charge of the lamps could not see when to light them. Consequently aircraft were liable to come over the brow of the hill and have no guide for the rest of their run. Any slight deviation to either side pointed the aircraft at a belt of trees. The station commander had insisted on this arrangement as he had been convinced by experience at his last station (Sembawang) that this was the only way to avoid accidents. On the night in question two aircraft of 211 Squadron ran into the trees before becoming air-borne, one aircraft exploding and killing the entire crew, while Sgt. HYATT is thought to have hit a tree with his wing jast [sic] after take-off and in trying to regain the aerodrome stalled and crashed. The gunner was seriously injured and lived, but the pilot and onserver [sic] were both killed.

On Friday 13/2 the squadron was scheduled to move to Lahat, some 120 miles South-West of P.2. There was not much advantage operationally in the move as there were no fuel or bomb stocks there and aircraft would have to fly to P.2 daily for orders, but at least air crews, ground crews, and aircraft would all be based at the same place and accommodation was more satisfactory. The move never took place as it was reported that Japanese transports were approaching Sumatra and orders were given for preparation for immediate EVACUTATION [sic]. Later the authorities decided to send a strike force and the evacuation was cancelled or postponed.

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In the evening A.V.M. MALTBY paid a visit and gave a lecture about the pernicious habit of looking over ones shoulder, and the necessity for all officers to shave and look smart. He vowed that there would be no evacuation and that everyone from pilots to cooks would fight to the last, This was to be an effort to retrieve the good name of the Air Force, which had been lost in Singapore, A talk of this nature was an excellent thing as the morale of the personnel who had come from Malaya or Singapore was extremely low, but it must be confessed that a lot of the effect was lost as the A.V.M. had only just arrived from Singapore, and had no conception of the conditions under which we were operating, which precluded shaving every day and keeping our buttons polished.

On 14/2 attacks were made on Japanese transports approaching Moesi river and these were continues [sic] on the 15/2. The bombers had to go unescorted on all raids although Hurricanes were available and opposition was expected. Bad weather was the excuse made by one of the fighter squadron commanders, but the bombers came and went just the same. Luckily no opposition was encountered, and later the Hurricanes joined in the straffing [sic] on invasion barges up the Moesi river. The weight of these attacks and the frequency was seriously hampered by the lack of armament personnel and of transport. Fitters, riggers, and air crews made up the personnel deficiency, but the lack of transport was insurmountable, All this time there was ample transport in Singapore, lying idle, but apparently full use was not made of shipping space available.

Late in the afternoon of 15/2 the order to evacuate to Java was given and the Hudsons and Hurricanes left in a flash. Both 84 and 211 Squadrons had aircraft out on raids making it impossible to reach Batavia before dark, so they decided to remain the night and leave early the next morning. This they did bringing all squadron ground personnel and also aircraft belonging to 27 and 34 squadrons. On the way to Java Sgt. GEAPIN had engine failure and crashed, killing himself, his crew, and all the passengers except one. The remaining aircraft arrived safely at Batavia. Spare aircrews and the Adjutant, F/Lt. ASHMOLE had left by road for Oostaven p.m. 15/2. The Adjutant earned praise for his efforts in leading a force comprised of the spare air crews against a Japanese parachute attack on P.1.

The operations carried out by 84 Squadron on 15/2 were highly successful. Caiques were bombed and sunk and landing parties in barges were machine-gunned causing numerous casualties. The observers made very good shooting with their blister guns. F/Lts. WYLLIE and HOLLAND ‘borrowed two Mk. I Fighter Blenheims from 27 Squadron and strafed invasion barges with great success. All aircraft were damaged by intense small arms fire from the ground but only one gunner was slightly wounded and one aircraft had to crash-land through having its hydraulics shot away. The story published in the Australian press about the C.O. and a flight commander of the R.A.A.F. Squadron taking the last four bombs from P.2 in the last aircraft to leave the aerodrome, bombing and sinking a Japanese cruiser and then going on th [sic] Java, is utter fabrication. If truth be told some of the R.A.A.F. had already gome [sic] to Java before the order to evacuate came through and the remainder stayed not upon the order of their going when it did come.

At Batavia instructions were received for the Squadron to go to Kalidjati, an aerodrome about 80 miles east if [sic] Batavia and about 40 miles from the coast. Here ground personnel were quartered in the Dutch barracks while the air crews lived in Soebang, 10 miles from the aerodrome, in houses belonging to planters of the ‘P & T’ Company. Again there was no transport to start with.

On 18/2 R.A.F. Headquarters at Bandoeng decided that all Blenheim Squadrons in Java should be amalgamated and that 84 Squadron should take over all the aircraft. These totalled 21 Mk. IV and 5Mk. I’s. It was also decided that a total of 200 ground personnel, including cooks and butchers and a few A.C.H. G.D. would be sufficient to maintain the aircraft, with 20 complete air-crews to operate them. It was rumoured that 84 Squadron’s sea party had arrived at Batavia so demands were made on WESGROUP for the necessary number of tradesmen

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to be sent to Kalidjati. These demands were made daily without results until 24.2 when the C.O. went to Batavia to try and get hold of men. WESGROUP denied all knowledge of the demands and of the whereabouts of the men, but a search of the town resulted in finding some of the officers. These stated that they had been reporting to WESTGROUP daily asking for instructions, but they had been told that the whereabouts of the Squadron was unknown and that they were not to come and worry people.

The sea party had embarked in S.S. ‘YOMA’ on 18/1 at Suez, with F/Lt. BONGARD (i/c), the equipment officer, F/O. BRENTNALL, engineering officer, F/O JEBB, intelligence officer, F/Lt. TIERNEY, medical officer, and P/O’s MACNALLY and BISHOP, cypher officers. This party brought all the squadron equipment and kits, including the air party’s kits. A three-month pack-up of spares was sent by A.H.Q. Iraq, but this never arrived in Sumatra. The sea party arrived at Oosthavan [sic] on 13/2, just when the first scare arose over the evacuation of Sumatra. Only armed personnel were allowed ashore and some 250 men, mostly tradesmen, and all the above mentioned officers were sent up country about 30 miles to act as a rearguard. After two nights and a day sitting in a swamp and without seeing a single Japanese (they were just starting to land in the Moesi river) the squadron was ordered to return to Oosthaven and embark for Batavia. On arrival at the port, which by then had been almost entirely destroyed by the Dutch, they found that the ‘Yoma’ had been moved out. They were trerefore [sic] embarked in another ship and sent across to Batavia where they were disembarked and quartered in some barracks.

The ‘Yoma’ carrying the remainder of the squadron and all kits and equipment, and on which the Adjutant and the spare aircrews from Palembang with the exception of S/Ldr, TAYLER and P/) [sic] MACDONALD, had been embarked, also arrived at Batavia but no one was allowed off the ship and she evevtually [sic] sailed for Colombo, the policy being to evacuate all the surplus personnel.

A selection was made from the personnel ashore to fill the revised establishment, and these airmen and all the officers proceeded to Kalidjati on 26/2. Accommodation for the ground staff had been arranged in a village of native houses off the edge of the aerodrome, and squadron and flight officers were also situated there, As there were no telephones a D.R. service was maintained with S.H.Q. F/O JEBB was appointed Adjutant vice F/Lt ASHMOLE who had been forcibly evacuated.

From 19/2 operations from Kalidjati were mainly cloud cover raids on shipping in the Banka Straights, attacks on enemy aircraft on P.1. and, after 25/2 on P.2, and recconnaissances [sic] of the Palembang – Oosthaven road. No activity was ever seen on this road.

On 23/2 three aircraft were sent to bomb four Japanese submarines reported off the coast about 50 miles from the aerodrome, Although there were more bombs at Kalidjati than there had been in the whole of Sumatra, the supply of fuses was very limited and the submarines had to be attacked with 0.12 second D.A. fuses which were not very effective, though one submarine was claimed to have been damaged.

P/O FIHELLY was missing from a cloud cover raid on P.1 on 25/2. He was last seen diving under control while being attacked by three ‘Army 96’ fighterers. [sic]

On the evening of 28/2 instructions were received to attack a large Japanese convoy approaching the coast to the North West of Kalidjati, the attack to continue all night with all available aircraft, but aircraft to land by dawn. All night flying pilots made two sorties and some made three, the total number of sorties being approximately 25. Sgt. SAYER was chesed [sic] by night fighters and driven off the West where he fonce [sic] – landed through lack of petrol. He and his crew all arrived safely at Bandoeng.

F/Lt. WYLLIE distinguished himself during these attacks, destroying one ship and damaging two others. He was subsequently recommended for a D.F.C.

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which was awarded.

Considerable time was lost in the early stages of the attack, in trying to locate the target. There was a lot of low cloud and the moon did not rise until after midnight. Also the reconnaissance report was inaccurate as regards the initial position of the convoy and the Japanese employed warships as decoys. The main force of 15 transports was eventually discovered at Indramaya at approximately 0200 hours on 1/3 when they had already begun their landing. This information was passed to A.H.Q. Bandoeng ao [sic] 0300 hours.

At 0600 hours on 1/3 that station commander at Kalidjati, Group Captina WISTONDALE, informed the C.O. that the Dutch were evacuating all their serviceable aircraft to Bandoeng and destroying the petrol dump, but R.A.F. Headquarters at Bandoeng had ordered maximum dispersal and concealment of 84 Squadron’s aircraft ad usual. This meant taking the bombs off the operationally serviceable aircraft, of which there were only three left, and putting these and the other five serviceable aircraft in such a position that at least five minutes taxying was required to get them on to the only serviceable strip available. The aerodrome had been bomber several times and the ground crews had been working at night keeping one strip fit for use. Of the eight fit to fly one was a Mk. I.

After confirming these orders with A.H.Q. the C.O. drove to Soebang to warn the spare aircrews there to be ready to evacuate. On hearing from an officer in the Dutch Volunteer Force that they had been ordered to evacuate Soebang and to withdraw to the hills, the spare aircrews were ordered to proceed to Bandoeng and report to A.H.Q.

The C.O., returned to Kalidjati and reported the situation at Soebang to the station commander, who decided to go to Soebang himself. He was never seen again. Arrangements were made for the squadron to be ready to move at short notice; crews stood by serviceable aircraft, a demolition party was detailed and posted on the aerodrome, and the remainder of the ground staff were split up into partiesm [sic] each party being allotted to a lorry, and dispersed along the West side of the aerodrome.

In the meanwhile P/O MACNALLY had driven to Soebang to collect some kit and had returned saying that the village was deserted. A truck was then sent with P/O’s KEWISH and BOTT, F/Sgt.McBRIDE, and four other airmen to collect the kits of the aircrews who had been on the aerodrome all night. This party never returned.

It should be noted that Kalidjati was [underlined] 15 miles in front of the first [/underlined] line of defence; there were no coastal defences between Batavia and Cheribon; and that the small Dutch aerodrome defence party had withdrawn at dawn on 1/3 without informing the R.A.F.

When the preparations for the evacuation of the squadron had been completed the C.O. drove over to S.H.Q. to report. There was considerable confusion here as the station commander had not returned from Soebang and sporadic rifle and gun fire could be heard in the distance. A signal from A.H.Q. confirming the instructions had been received re dispersing and concealing aircraft, but added that if communications were interrupted or the situation became serious the station commander might evacuate serviceable aircraft at his discretion. At that moment an officer of the R.A. drove up to say that the Japanese were three miles up the road, so the C.O. immediately gave orders for the aircraft to be flown to Bandoeng. Before a move could be made the Headquarters building came under rifle fire and mortar fire. A dash was made for the aerodrome, but by the time the cars were half way across the Japanese had reached the entrance, and by deploying along the North and East sides soon had the whole area covered. This was followed by three tanks and two armoured cars driving onto the aerodrome and their fire made it impossible to approach any aircraft, let alone attempt to start them up or destroy them, so the order was given for all personnel to evacuate. A number of people in one of the dispersal areas

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could not be reached, but some of them manager [sic] to escape into the rubber and made their way on foot to Bandoeng. Among these were S/Ldr. TAYLER, P/O MILSON and Sgt. COSGROVE. Altogether 19 people were lost including P/O KEWISH’s party and two Sgts, who had not left with the rest of the spare aircrews from Soabang [sic]. The reason for this is not known.

Among those lost was F/Sgt, SLEE, who is known to have been wounded and who could not be moved. It is to be hoped that he recovered. With only a hansful [sic] of men to do the work, with insufficient tools and spares, without any outside assistance, and handicapped by lack of transport, he was responsible for the maintenance of the squadron’s aircraft from 23/1 to 1/3, and the results deserve the highest praise. It is a matter for the deepest regret that he should have been incapacitated at the moment when the squadron had just succeeded in becoming a unit again and that the squadron should so soon have been rendered ineffective. The armament Warrant Officer, W/O JONES, also earned praise for way in which he overcame difficulties caused by lack of personnel and equipment, and especially for the very hard work he put in getting bombs and rearming aircraft on the night of 28/2 – 1/3.

It was subsequently established that the force which attacked Kalidjati aerodrome consisted of the tanks and armoured cars mentioned above, and 100 – 150 troops, most of whom were armed with Tommy guns. Reinforcements soon arrived and consolidated the position, which was never recaptured.

The squadron arrived at Bandoeng on the afternoon of 1/3 and was accommodated in some barracks about 10 miles from the town. The first job that was given to them was the task of filling in bomb craters on Andir aerodrome. It was assumed that the squadron would be required to take to the jungle and wage guerilla warfare and arms were procured so that every man was equipped with either a rifle or a Tommy gun. As soon as a start had been made and [sic] order was received from A.H.Q. to the effect that the men were to be [underlined] trained in arms drill. [/underlined].

On the afternoon of 3/3 A.V.M. MALTBY who was the A.O.C. told the C.O. that there was a chance that more ships would be available for the evacuation of surplus personnel and that as 84 Squadron was a complete unit, it would be evacuated as such if the opportunity arose. On the morning of 4/3 however an order was issued to all units to the effect that all flying personnel were to proceed to Tjilatjap forthwith. This was confirmed with the C.O. by the Deputy A.O.C. Air Commodore STATON. All aircrews set off by road, arriving at Tjilatjap at about 0100 hours on 5/3, leaving the ground personnel at Bandoeng with the Adjutant, Equipment, Engineer, Medical, and Cypher Officers.

No ships arrived at Tjilatjap, and the squadron was given the option of making its own escape. This was attempted by boat but had to be given up owing to lack of preparation. Eventually the C.O. and eleven other members of the squadron sailed to Australia in a ship’s life boat to get help for the remainder of the aircrews. By the time help arrived, these crew had left the rendezvous.

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[inserted] F/LT ASHMOLE [/inserted] [underlined] SECRET [/underlined]

[underlined] 84 SQUADRON HISTORY [/underlined]

[underlined] JANUARY 14th – MARCH 17th 1942 [/underlined]

84 Squadron under the command of Wing Commander J.R. Jeudwine, left Heliopolis by Air and Sea parties (as detailed in the Squadron Movement Order) between January 14th and 18th 1942. The first flight of the Air Party was inspected by Air Marshall Sir Arthur Tedder, A.C.C. in C. Middle East, on the afternoon of the 13th January. Of this flight all except P/O Goldfinch (who burst a main tyre and started on the 15th) left Heliopolis on January 14th. The itineraries of this and subsequent flights are given in detail in the appendix (A).

The main route was by way of Habbaniya, Bahrein Island, Sharjah, Karachi, Allahabad (alternatively Hyderabad), Calcutta (Dum-Dum), Toungoo, Rangoon (Mingaladon or the satellite Zyatquin), Lhoknga, Medan, (or Pakan Baros) to Palembang.

The sea party left Heliopolis at 21.00 hours on January 16th, reached Port Tewfik at about 04.00 hours on the 17th, embarked on H.T. “Yoma” during the forenoon and left about 14.00 hours same day. They sailed via Aden and Colombo to Oosthaven, Sumatra, where they arrived on the 14th February (the day that the Japanese parachute troops invaded Palembang (P.1.) aerodrome.

The following notes on the arrangements for accommodation, servicing and briefing at various places on the way to the far East may be of interest, and the falst [sic] briefing at Rangoon and Toungoo would certainly seem to call for investigation.

Arrangements at [underlined] Habbaniya [/underlined] were excellent, especially the way in which the aircraft were directed to their dispersal points and taken in hand for repairs without delay. The briefing too was thorough and helpful. [underlined] Sharjah [/underlined] being a British Overseas Airways Corporation station, offered excellent accommodation, and other arrangements were also good.

At [underlined] Karachi [/underlined] Airport both accommodation and servicing were admirable, and the briefing could hardly have been bettered.

At [underlined] Dum-Dum [/underlined] no proper arrangements had been made for accommodating more than a fraction of the crews that arrived (even these had no mosquito nets) and transport was chaotic.

No money was available for N.C.O. air-crews and airmen so that accommodation and food for them had to be paid for privately by the officers. Briefing was sketchy and no indication could be given of the lay out of Toungoo aerodrome, the next stop for the aircraft.

At Toungoo arrangements of all kinds were tolerably good, but there was one disastrous flaw in the briefing. This presumably was due to 221 Group at Rangoon, since the same error was included in the briefing there. So serious was this that it may be doubted whether it was not due to enemy activity. It was

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as follows, and apparently every aircraft of the Squadron received it:- Aircraft were instructed, after leaving Mingladon, to make for North Sumatra and to land at an aerodrome (some crews were told its name was Lhobingawan) of which the map reference was given as 05 degrees 30 minutes North, 95 degrees 13 minutes East. Some crews were also told not to land at Kotaradja unless this other aerodrome could not be found. The map reference proved to be a rugged spot up in the hills thirty miles south of Lhoknga with no aerodrome, and old inhabitants of Sumatra assured us that there was no such place as Lhobingawan.

This false briefing led directly to the destruction of two aircraft and to the endangering of many others, since owing to the distance covered, all were found to be short of fuel by the time they reached Sumatra. Thus they could not fly around searching for the place or turn back to Lhoknga or Sabang when they failed to find it.

What happened to a flight of three aircraft led by F/Lt. Clutterbuck of 211 Squadron (one of the three was Sgt. Hough of 84 Squadron) is typical. Several others escaped similar disasters by luck or by deciding for various reasons to come down at Lhoknga as soon as they found it. Clutterbuck reached the place indicated on the map reference, and seeing no trace of an aerodrome flew a good many miles down the North West coast of Sumatra. Still discovering no trace he turned back and reached Lhoknga with a few gallons of fuel to spare. The two aircraft of the flight followed him the whole distance south but when he turned back they were so short of fuel that they could not make Lhoknga and were forced to land in rice fields, both being total losses. Bad briefing was also responsible for the loss of P/O Macdonald’s aircraft (for which see Appendix “B”)

[underlined] Jan. 23rd [/underlined]

The first five aircraft of the Squadron arrived at [inserted] Ines W.S. [/inserted] Palembang (P1) in the afternoon to find that the aerodrome had been bombed and ground-strafed at 9.00 hours that morning. The Liberator in which AC2 Partington, the Squadron Intelligence clerk, had just arrived from the Middle East was involved: Partington was struck by bomb-splinters as he was leaving the aircraft, and died that evening in hospital. The air-crews were given instructions to leave P1 at 07.45 next morning for P2, 45 miles South West of Palembang. This was the Squadron’s base for the remainder of the time it was in Sumatra. All the ground-staff remained at P2, but the C.O. and all aircrews were billeted in Maria School, an evacuated girls’ school in Palembang itself, on the road leading to P1 (S.H.Q. P1. was later moved to quarters half a mile further up the same road.) All R.A.F. officers were made honorary members of the local Dutch club, Society Palembang.

[underlined] Jan. 25th [/underlined]

All five aircraft – the C.O., Whyllie [sic], Gill, Milson and Fihelly stood by to do a raid. The aircraft were however all

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overdue for inspection and eventually stood down.

[underlined] Jan. 26th [/underlined]

Japanese warships and troopships were sighted making for Endau, 62 miles North of Singapore on the East Coast, by a reconnaissance aircraft early this morning, but owing to a delay in sending the signal from Singapore it was not until an hour and a half before dusk that the C.O., Wyllie, Milson and Gill were ordered to take off from P2 in Mk I Blenheims belonging to 27 Squadron, (our own being on inspection) to bomb these transports. Long before they reached Singapore it was dark, and they were obliged to abandon the raid and return to Sembawang. Fihelly left just before the others with orders to go straight to Sembawang and land there, since he had done little night flying.

[underlined] Jan. 27th [/underlined]

The five crews waited all day as a “striking force” and were not allowed to return to Sumatra, but no use was made of them until night time, when at 00.30 hours (28th) the C.O., Milson, Gill and Fihelly took off and bombed Kuantan aerodrome; there was thick cloud almost from ground level up to 5000 ft. making the target very difficult to find. All, however, found it, either through gaps or underneath the cloud, and returned safely to Sembawang, resting there for the remainder of the day, a projected raid having been cancelled.

[underlined] Jan. 29th [/underlined]

All returned to P2 extremely tired, being still unused to the heat and high humidity: they carried away a poor impression of the morale of people with whom they had come into contact.

By this time Holland, Thomson, Longmore, Young and Sayers and crews had arrived at P2; four out of five Blenheims IVF’s of the Squadron left behind on inspection had been flown by members of 62 Squadron and one of them crashed on landing at Seletar, Singapore. Macdonald, who left Medan on the 2 (Maurice, his observer, having been given the wrong distance in briefing at Medan) passed Palembang, and being unable to find an aerodrome, belly-landed in the dusk in the swamps at the mouth of the Lompoor river. Crew and passengers were unhurt, but passed an extremely uncomfortable night (Friday 23rd) in a thunderstorm, on their aircraft, which fortunately did not sink, wet through, covered with slime and tormented by mosquitos. They were rescued at dawn the following day by natives from a neighbouring village, and after a public bath put into three native boats and set off that afternoon up the river. They journeyed for three nights and three days, and were then met by the Dutch Ambassador resident in Toeloeng Selapan. Thence they were taken by car and were put up by him and his wife for the night at his own house in Kajoeagoeng, being driven to Palembang next morning.

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[underlined] Jan. 30th. [/underlined]

About six aircraft took off about 14.00 hours for Medan, (Gill turning back owing to faulty petrol feed), they refuelled there, left again after dark and bombed shipping and the submarine base in Penang harbour; returning to Medan that night and to P2 the next morning (31st). In the meantime four aircraft were standing by at P2 as a striking force against convoys, nut [sic] no raid was ordered.

[underlined] Feb. 1st. [/underlined]

Aircraft stood by all day again, and the same procedure, which involved driving forty-five miles each way to and from Palembang morning and evening, was followed.

[underlined] Feb. 2nd. [/underlined]

The C.C. [sic], Wyllie, Gill, Milson and Fihelly drove out to P2 again and left at 13.00 hours for Medan accompanied by F/Lt. Jackson of 34 Squadron. There they refuelled and fed, and rested until 21.00 hours, at 22.00 hours they took off and flew to Songkhla in Thailand, where they bombed buildings and stores on a spit of land north of the aerodrome: slight opposition from warships at sea was encountered. They arrived back at Medan about four and a half hours later (3rd Feb.) and returned to Palembang again, after an early breakfast, arriving about midday; having covered about eighteen hundred miles in thirteen hours flying in order to drop four 250 lb. bombs each. In the meantime other air crews stood by at P2 all day.

[underlined] Feb. 4th. [/underlined]

Five crews stood by all day in case a convoy on its way from Singapore should be attacked, but they were not called upon to take off. That evening about 17.00 hours there was a notification from Group that Japanese parachutists were likely to land at Palembang that night. Accordingly pickets were posted, machine gun posts manned, all available officers and airmen on the Station (some hundreds in all) were armed with rifles or tommy-guns etc., and no crews were allowed to return to Palembang. In the early hours of the morning the siren was sounded and an attack was believed imminent. Action stations were taken, several Blenheims had their port engines started in order that the turrets might be operated, but nothing further happened – a false alarm.

[underlined] Feb. 5th. [/underlined]

Eight aircraft took off after lunch and flew to Medan in order to do a night operation against Songkhla, but very bad weather set in at 22.00 hours just as the aircraft were starting, so the raid was cancelled.

[underlined] Feb. 6th. [/underlined]

A request by the C.O., next morning to stay at Medan and do the same operation that night was refused by Group, so the aircraft were de-bombed and returned to P2. Sgt. Thomson,

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when about to land at P1. at the end of the flight from Medan, was attacked by Navy “OS” which Sgt. Gardner P. . his gunner believed to be Hurricanes, having seen some flying by just before. By the time Gardner recognised them for what they were he could not fire owing to the selector lever being in the “down” position in order to lower the undercarriage. His turret was struck and he himself hit in the thigh. Thomson, however, made a good landing with damaged elevators.

[underlined] Feb. 7th. [/underlined]

P1. was again twice ground-strafed. In this raid the Squadron lost three aircraft that had just arrived and were awaiting repairs – Thomson’s, Passmore’s “Queen of Shaibah” (which Longmore had collided with a Hurricane) and Longmore’s own aircraft which he had crashed a few days earlier.

[underlined] Feb. 8th and 9th. [/underlined]

No raids – stood by at P2 all day.

[underlined] Feb. 10th. [/underlined]

Six crews:- C.O., Gill, Milson, Wyllie, Holland and one other, stood by all day for a day raid, and, from 14.00 hours, to do a night raid on Malaya, but at 16.00 hours it was cancelled. Preparations were made for a move to Lahat aerodrome. A talk for Officers and N.C.O.’s by the Air Officer Commanding, Air Vice Marshall Maltby was first given at P2 at 17.00 hours and at Palembang in the evening. He said that we were here to fight, and that there was no intention of evacuating Sumatra, and that if we had wished to save our skins now would have been the time to do it.

[underlined] Feb. 11th. [/underlined]

Five or six crews, including the C.O., Passmore, Hyatt, Wyllie and Milson, took off just after midnight for an operation against shipping. The flare path was very badly laid out and the ground was very boggy. Some of the heavily-loaded Blenheims were past the last flare before coming air-borne; two Blenheims of 211 Squadron struck trees and crashed, the crews being killed or badly injured. Hyatt also struck trees, turned to come in to land again but hit the orderly room building. He and his observer, Sgt. Hutton, were killed; Sgt. Irvine his air gunner was badly injured.

The others carried out the raid except Milson. Milson took off and immediately found that his airspeed indicator, gyro-horizon, gyro-compass altimeter and rate of climb indicator were entirely unserviceable. This was due either to the heavy rains or to humidity; and indeed during the whole of the stay in Sumatra, trouble was experienced with instruments, and with the electro-magnetic releases and fusing switches of the armament equipment. It was a pitch black night and only by the aid of light from flashes of lightning was he able to keep control at all. At one moment he would be climbing steep and at the next moment diving, at another with the wings at right angles

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to the horizon. Fortunately, after completing half a circuit he spotted the flare path and with great skill landed at high speed without damage. On the way back Passmore was lost and arrived with only a few minutes’ petrol left.

[underlined] Feb. 12th. [/underlined]

These crews returned to Palembang by midday. Meanwhile Gill brought out five crews who stood by all day and later stood by for a night operation on enemy shipping off Bangka Island, but no raid was ordered.

[underlined] Feb. 13th. [/underlined]

C.O. went out to P2 and flew to Lahat to inspect the aerodrome, returning again to P2. The surplus air crews were ordered to leave Palembang for Lahat a.m. 14th. This was later postponed for 24 hours. Air crews stood by all day, afterwards returning to Palembang, though not before the middle of the night, owing to a tremendous storm.

[underlined] Feb. 14th. [/underlined]

A little after 09.00 hours Japanese parachutists were dropped from Hudsons and other aircraft around P1. Numbers have been variously estimated but between 50 and 150 seems the right figures; (an officer at Karachi in April was heard telling local inhabitabts [sic] of the R.A.F. Station there that 800 were dropped the first day and 1600 the second). A number were also dropped on oil-storage tanks several miles down the river from Palembang, and these tanks having been set on fire (believed by the Dutch defenders) blazed fiercely all day and night.

At this time the C.O., and most of the air crews were on standby at P.2. S/Ldr. Tayler, F/Lt. Gill, F/Lt. Ashmole (who had arrived by Hudson on the 11th), P/O Maurice and P/O Macdonald were at Maria School, Palembang. Maurice had actually gone down to Group about 09.00 hours to arrange about the move to Lahat, and at about 09.30 hours, armed with a rifle, took a lorry of armed men up the road towards P1. but was turned back by the Dutch. Tayler, Gill and Macdonald and four officers of other units with eighty men were sent down (on the strength of a message received from the Dutch Home Guard) to form a bridgehead at the ferry. On arrival there they were informed by Air Commodore Hunter that Palembang was to be evacuated, its unarmed occupants to move to P2 and Lahat; those with arms were to remain for the time being and guard the ferry. Owing to lack of control, there was much confusion and congestion at the ferry: at one time Hurricane spares, secret documents and parachutes were seen being dumped in the river. As soon as the unarmed men had crossed the ferry, Maurice, who had by this time returned, also crossed the ferry with a small body of armed men supplied with Mills bombs, to guard the South side against possible attack from the river. Meanwhile, immediately after the dropping of the parachutists, Ashmole went a mile or two up the road from Maria School towards P1, (collecting two

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airmen on the way) as far as a Dutch road block. After consultation with the officer in charge he went out on a side track towards the East and reconnoitred the country for an hour or so without finding any trace of parachutists, and returned at lunch-time to Maria School to find it empty. Gill came back from the ferry just after that, in a lorry, and together (thinking the order to desert Palembang was premature) they started to load up a lorry with food and water and to gather as many as they could find to try and find out what was happening on the road to P1. While this was in progress two naval officers arrived. They had had instructions to report to Group but on arrival there, had found it deserted. One had arrived from Singapore in a small ship towing five R.A.F. launches. The crankshaft had broken and they had come up the river in one of the launches [underlined] rescuing on the way the pilot and navigator of a Blenheim aircraft which had landed in the river, (the gunner being killed) [/underlined]. The party in the lorry consisted of thirteen in all, Sgt. Hough driving, set off up the road towards P1. They passed several Dutch pickets and eventually about six or seven miles up, came to the last, which consisted of two Vickers guns mounted on an open truck. A Dutch officer informed them that a Japanese road block had been formed at an overturned R.A.F. petrol bowser two hundred yards up the road round a bend. The lorry was parked, and about ten of the party, under Ashmole and Gill including some newcomers with arms, went forward, those unarmed remaining with the lorry. Two R.A.F. officers were also there and from them it was learned that a convoy of wounded in motor lorries was trying to get through from P1. It was decided to try to set fire to the bowser with incendiary bullets and thus drive out the Japanese defenders, but it was later learned that a dying airman was pinned under the bowser. About a hundred and fifty yards up, the party took to the swampy jungle at the side of the road, because of the Japanese trench-mortaring and machine-gun firing. Dutch native troops under Dutch officers (some wounded) together with one or two R.A.F. airmen, were falling back. Soon after, the party was able to advance along the road, past two dead Japanese parachutists, to the overturned petrol bowser. This bowser had been trying to rush through from P1. to Palembang loaded with 232 Squadron and had been ambushed by the Japanese parachutists. A not very clear account of this had reached us at Maria School, Palembang, about midday, and S/Ldr. Tayler had set out with a party to raise the bowser and release the airman, but had been turned back by the Dutch. There were other Japanese dead among the trees and also British dead (including F/O Wright Engineering Officer 232 Squadron) and wounded. These were attended to, and a car was sent for to take them away. This arrived about a quarter of an hour later, and they were taken into Palembang. From here Ashmole and two airmen advanced along the road having made contact with a R.A. officer who was trying to clear a Japanese machine-gun post in order to get the convoy of wounded through from P1. After consultation with him, Ashmole took his men off to the right into lightly wooded country in order to try and work round it. Gill, just behind, went into the heavy jungle where the original

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Japanese ambush had been, to see if more parachutists were there. Eventually the convoy, consisting of three or four lorries full of wounded, got through, and the road being clear, the party returned to Palembang at dusk.

Although drivers of the lorries with the wounded reported no enemy action as they came through, it appears that so soon as night fell the parachutists were able to re-establish a road-block in spite of the Dutch. The hot food and ammunition, which was sent from Maria School on a lorry, was fired at, and its load had to be transferred to a Dutch armoured car which rushed through and reached P1 safely. In this connection it should be mentioned that the plating of the Dutch armoured cars was not thought capable of standing up to trench-mortar and machine-gun fire (it was reported that one had actually been damaged so) and the Dutch were loth [sic] to use them in forcing a way through. But it is certain that if a strong lead had been given by Group the way to P1. would have been kept open for another twelve hours at least, and the nineteen tons of high explosive under the runways (designed to make craters thirty feet wide and nine feet deep) could have been exploded with far-reaching consequences that can hardly be overestimated. Of these arrangements for demolition we only heard from the Dutch Authorities midday on 16th., when it was too late to take any action. The shipping in Batavia harbour was sunk during the attack on or about the 23rd by Japanese aircraft operating from P1.

[underlined] Feb. 15th. [/underlined]

It was agreed by the officers of 84 Squadron who were in Palembang to carry out the instructions (issued on the 11th) of moving surplus aircrews to Lahat, but to go by way of P2. in case these orders should have been modified. As soon as it was light the lorry used the day before, an open Ford 3 tonner, was taken out by Gill for refuelling, and this proved to be a very lengthy job owing to lack of fuel at the various pumps, most of which were either closed or empty. When he finally got back about 08.00 hours Macdonald had collected a small civilian van, and the two vehicles set off together with air-crews, all available ammunition and kit.

Tayler, Ashmole, Gill, Maurice, Macdonald, Sgts. Craddock, Ellis, Hough, W. Miller, Longmore, Nourse, 671 Thompson, Thomson, 842 Gardner, Young, Duigan, 674 Morris and A.C.1. Latham a Fitter II attached to P1. who asked to join the Squadron, arrived at the ferry. Here there was great congestion, the Dutch rightly claimed priority for a number of vehicles loaded with troops destined to deal with Japanese who were now known to be coming up the river in boats. The ferry could only take five vehicles at a time and the journey across and back occupied some fifteen minutes. The Squadron’s lorry and van were between thirtieth and fortieth in the queue. Gill here took charge of the regulation of the traffic in co-operation with a Dutch officer, and thanks to them there was no panic. When it seemed

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possibly that our vehicles might not get over at all before the Japanese started either bombing the ferry or arriving in force by river or road, it was agreed to send over our people with their small kit, and, in the event of failure to get our own vehicles across, attempt to obtain others on the far side. Tayler, Maurice and others were sent across with the kit, Ashmole followed, Gill and Macdonald remained with the vehicles. All our people helped with the loading and unloading of the wounded on both sides of the river, and a third motor van was commandeered and also put at the disposal of wounded, with Sgt. Hough as driver. Hough later drove wounded between the railway station at P2. and was last seen by us so engaged at Sick Quarters at P2. in the later afternoon.

(During the morning and afternoon of February 14th, 84 Squadron’s aircraft together with aircraft of 211, 62 and 232 Squadrons carried out sorties continuously from P2, bombing and ground strafing the Japanese barges which were coming up the river. Details of these sorties are not yet available).
Meanwhile the Japanese Air Force appeared in numbers over P1, parachutists were again dropped and it seemed that aircraft were landing. During this wait at the ferry, the whole scene was enveloped in drifts of dense black smoke from the oil storage tanks (these had been blazing all night) and other stores were set on fire by the Dutch. There were also periodical explosions as the wharves were blown up. An official at one of the banks started giving away bottles of brandy, wines and liqueurs of which he had an enormous supply, but this was checked, and he was made to shatter each bottle with an axe, until the gutters were running with it.

Odd civilians came to the ferry with young children (many in arms) and the most varied belongings, and were helped across it, but for the most part they stayed in their homes. The Dutch native crew worked their ferry nobly and without panic until, just after midday, the Captain announced the last trip: by this time Japanese fighters were flying low over the river, but surprisingly (perhaps thinking their own river-borne troops had reached the ferry) did not open fire. On the last ferry but one came Macdonald with the Ford lorry. On the last boat came Gill, and F/Lt. Jackson (34 Squadron) who was driving the commandeered civilian van. We loaded some food on the lorry and also took on board a number of officers from 226 (Fighter) Group, (S/Ldr Richards and F/Lt. Domvile among them); on the road to P2 we picked up one or two others, including a Fleet Air Arm officer on a stretcher who was supported on the hands and knees of Maurice and others for thirty miles or so. The journey to P2 was otherwise uneventful except that we had to refuse room (owing to extreme over-crowding) to various people on foot and also unfortunately to a Chinese member of the crew of a British ship, who had been wounded in the foot. None of these, however, should have had difficulty in getting a lift eventually, for there were a number of vehicles running from the railhead to P2. Macdonald, meanwhile, with F/lt. Jackson and Sgt. Miller, had taken the civilian van direct to Lahat. The remainder arrived at P2 about 15.00 hours and immediately made contact with C.O. He rang up Group, whose instructions were that we should proceed

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to Transit Camp, Oosthaven, and not to Lahat as previously ordered – our first intimidation that complete evacuation of the islands was intended. Those air crews of the Squadron who had aircraft, and the ground crews of P2, were to fly to Bandoeng that evening, but they did not however leave till next morning 16th. We therefore added Ellis, Lister, Sharrott and Pile, who had no aircraft, to our passengers, together with two or three airmen belonging to 226 Group, and having refuelled set off as soon as possible about 16.00 hours. It was agreed to drive continuously through the night, partly because of the need for speed, partly because we had no protection from the wild beasts or from the rain which falls every 24 hours at this time of the year.

The lorry, though heavily loaded, ran excellently; Gill and Tayler taking turns at driving it with the AC driver through the night. About midnight torrential rain started. There was no cover and few groundsheets and everyone got pretty wet, some soaked through. However, it was warm, and the wetting seemed to do no harm to any one: but it was a difficult matter to hold up the heavy lorry from skidding on the sodden road-surface of many of the hills, and the average speed was low but the progress useful. We stopped at Batoeradja to refuel and at Partapoera for a snack. Just before dawn Kotaboemi was reached, and here a fire was kindled and tea made. Thence the run to Oosthaven was made at good speed.

A few miles south from Kotaboemi Cpl. Burrluck, M.T.M. of 84 Sqaudron was encountered. He had been driving a local bus full of small arms ammunition from Oosthaven for P2, (a distance of over 300 miles). The bus had broken down several times already, and was obviously unfit to go much further. Seeing that P2 had already been evacuated he was ordered to return to Oosthaven.

He was the first of the Sea Party of 84 Squadron, which had left Port Tewfik on board H.T. YOMA, just a month before, to be met by any of the Air Party. Group’s intention on February 10th had been to send the Sea Party, immediately on their arrival to Lahat, in order to staff the station there as well as to perform their normal Squadron duties. But when they did arrive the situation was such that it was not possible to do more than send those of them who were armed – some two hundred – as infantry, to hold Natar, a junction of road, rail and stream about twenty miles north of Oosthaven. As the survivors from Palembang passed through they were greeted by numbers of this detachment. At Oosthaven, S/Ldr. Tayler reported to a Group Captain at the docks and was (as senior G.D. officer) ordered to join the ground party of the Squadron ashore: the remainder of the lorry party were ordered to embark at once, which they did, and found that the ship was actually the “YOMA” and that the unarmed members of 84 Squadron, including the Assistant Adjutant, Walker, were still aboard her. Walker and others without arms had actually spent a night at Natar but were recalled the following day. The “YOMA”

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sailed at midday for Java.

The ground party later re-embarked on a small fast ammunition ship which reached Batavia before the party on the YOMA.

The YOMA lay off Batavia from 10.30 hours 17.2.42. until 14.00 hours 18.2.42. and when she docked members of this ground party, including S/Ldr. Tayler, F/Lt. Tierney, F/O Keble-While, F/O Jebb, P/O Macdonald, P/O McNally, were on the quay and some came aboard the next day. It was fully expected that we should disembark and re-equip in Java but we were not allowed off the ship, although the remainder of 211 Squadron were disembarked.

Preparations were then made for another seven hundred R.A.F. to embark and these we expected would be the remainder of our own Squadron. But instead on [sic] hundred and seventy civilians, mostly wives and children of officers and civilians from Singapore, came aboard: and with them we sailed, but not until midday 20.2.42, forming up into convoy during the afternoon and finally leaving Java at dusk for Ceylon and India. Our escort for a day and a half was H.M.S Exeter, which then turned back to Java, and was sunk by the Japanese. We arrived at Colombo on 1.3.42. and left on 2.3.42, arriving at Bombay on 6.3.42. leaving again on 13.3.42 and eventually, disembarking at Karachi on 16th and 17th March, 1942.